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diff --git a/33727-h/33727-h.htm b/33727-h/33727-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ad1e27 --- /dev/null +++ b/33727-h/33727-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,15772 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> +<head> +<meta name="generator" content="HTML Tidy, see www.w3.org" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content= +"text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Creative Intelligence, by Various.</title> +<style type="text/css"> + + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em;} + p.tb { margin-top: 1.25em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em;} + + h1 { text-align: center; margin-top: .7em; margin-bottom:0.75em; clear: both; } + + h2,h3,h2,h4,h5 { text-align: center; margin-top: 1.5em; margin-bottom:0.75em; clear: both; } + + center { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: center; + margin-bottom: .75em;} + + + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 1.5em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + td.t80 { padding-left: 4em; font-size: .85em; margin-left: 2em; text-indent: -2em; padding-bottom: 1em; text-align: left; width: 85%;} + + td.t85 { padding-left: 3em; font-size: .85em; margin-left: 2em; text-indent: -2em; padding-bottom: 0em; text-align: left; width: 85%;} + td.t15 {font-size: .85em; padding-bottom: 0em; text-align: right; width: 15%; vertical-align: bottom;} + td.t15a {font-size: .85em; padding-bottom: 1em; text-align: right; width: 15%; vertical-align: bottom;} + + body {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; } + + .pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + right: 3%; font-style: normal; + font-size: .8em; + text-align: right; + } /* page numbers */ + + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + + .figcenter {margin: auto; text-align: center; margin-top: 0em; } + + img {text-decoration: none; border: none; margin-bottom: -1em; margin-top: 0em;} + + img.floatInsert2 {height: 1.6em; border : none; margin-bottom: -.6em; margin-top: 0em;} + img.floatInsert3 {height: 2em; border : none; margin-bottom: -.6em; margin-top: 0em;} + + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + .u {text-decoration: underline;} + + img.center {height: 3.5em; vertical-align: middle;} + .footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} + .footnote {margin-left: 5%; margin-right: auto; font-size: 0.8em;} + .footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 88%; text-align: right; font-size: .8em;} + .fnanchor {vertical-align: super; font-size: .7em; line-height: 0.5em; text-decoration: none;} + +</style> +</head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Creative Intelligence, by +John Dewey, Addison W. Moore, Harold Chapman Brown, George H. Mead, Boyd H. Bode, Henry Waldgrave, Stuart James, Hayden Tufts, Horace M. Kallen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Creative Intelligence + Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude + +Author: John Dewey, Addison W. Moore, Harold Chapman Brown, George H. Mead, Boyd H. Bode, Henry Waldgrave, Stuart James, Hayden Tufts, Horace M. Kallen + +Release Date: September 14, 2010 [EBook #33727] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE *** + + + + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Turgut Dincer and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<h1>CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE</h1> + +<h3>ESSAYS IN THE PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE</h3> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h3>JOHN DEWEY<br /> +ADDISON W. MOORE<br /> +HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN<br /> +GEORGE H. MEAD<br /> +BOYD H. BODE<br /> +HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART<br /> +JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS<br /> +HORACE M. KALLEN<br /><br /></h3> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 100px;"><a name="pm" id="pm"></a><img src="images/pm.png" width="100" height="118" alt="Printers's mark" title="" /></div> + +<h5><br />NEW YORK</h5> +<h4>HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY</h4> + +<hr /> +<h5> +<span class="smcap">Copyright</span>, 1917,<br /> +<br /> +BY<br /> +<br /> +HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY<br /> +<br /> +Published January, 1917<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS<br /> +<br /> +RAHWAY, N. J.<br /> +</h5> +<hr /> +<h3>PREFATORY NOTE</h3> + +<p>The Essays which follow represent an attempt at +intellectual coöperation. No effort has been made, +however, to attain unanimity of belief nor to proffer a +platform of "planks" on which there is agreement. The +consensus represented lies primarily in outlook, in conviction +of what is most likely to be fruitful in method +of approach. As the title page suggests, the volume +presents a unity in attitude rather than a uniformity +in results. Consequently each writer is definitively +responsible only for his own essay. The reader will +note that the Essays endeavor to embody the common +attitude in application to specific fields of inquiry +which have been historically associated with philosophy +rather than as a thing by itself. Beginning with philosophy +itself, subsequent contributions discuss its application +to logic, to mathematics, to physical science, to +psychology, to ethics, to economics, and then again to +philosophy itself in conjunction with esthetics and religion. +The reader will probably find that the significant +points of agreement have to do with the ideas of the +genuineness of the future, of intelligence as the organ +for determining the quality of that future so far as it +can come within human control, and of a courageously +inventive individual as the bearer of a creatively employed +mind. While all the essays are new in the form +in which they are now published, various contributors +make their acknowledgments to the editors of the +<i>Philosophical Review</i>, the <i>Psychological Review</i>, and +the <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific +Methods</i> for use of material which first made its appearance +in the pages of these journals.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h3>CONTENTS</h3> + +<table width="100%" summary="TOC"> +<tr> +<td class="t85"> </td> +<td class="t15">PAGE</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t85"><span class="smcap">The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy</span></td> +<td class="t15"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t80">John Dewey, Columbia University.</td> +<td class="t15a"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t85"><span class="smcap">Reformation of Logic</span></td> +<td class="t15"><a href="#Page_70">70</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t80">Addison W. Moore, University of Chicago.</td> +<td class="t15a"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t85"><span class="smcap">Intelligence and Mathematics</span></td> +<td class="t15"><a href="#Page_118">118</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t80">Harold Chapman Brown, Leland Stanford,</td> +<td class="t15a"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t85"><span class="smcap">Scientific Method and Individual Thinker</span></td> +<td class="t15"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t80">George H. Mead, University of Chicago.</td> +<td class="t15a"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t85"><span class="smcap">Consciousness and Psychology</span></td> +<td class="t15"><a href="#Page_228">228</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t80">Boyd H. Bode, University of Illinois.</td> +<td class="t15a"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t85"><span class="smcap">The Phases of the Economic Interest</span></td> +<td class="t15"><a href="#Page_282">282</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t80">Henry Waldgrave Stuart, Leland Stanford, Jr., University.</td> +<td class="t15a"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t85"><span class="smcap">The Moral Life and the Construction Of Values and Standards</span></td> +<td class="t15"><a href="#Page_354">354</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t80">James Hayden Tufts, University of Chicago.</td> +<td class="t15a"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t85"><span class="smcap">Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art, And Religion</span></td> +<td class="t15"><a href="#Page_409">409</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="t80">Horace M. Kallen, University of Wisconsin.</td> +<td class="t15a"> </td> +</tr> +</table> + +<hr /> + +<h2>CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE</h2> + +<hr /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span></p> + +<h2>THE NEED FOR A RECOVERY OF PHILOSOPHY</h2> + +<h4>JOHN DEWEY</h4> + +<p>Intellectual advance occurs in two ways. At +times increase of knowledge is organized about old +conceptions, while these are expanded, elaborated +and refined, but not seriously revised, much less abandoned. +At other times, the increase of knowledge demands +qualitative rather than quantitative change; +alteration, not addition. Men's minds grow cold to +their former intellectual concerns; ideas that were +burning fade; interests that were urgent seem remote. +Men face in another direction; their older perplexities +are unreal; considerations passed over as negligible +loom up. Former problems may not have been solved, +but they no longer press for solutions.</p> + +<p>Philosophy is no exception to the rule. But it is +unusually conservative—not, necessarily, in proffering +solutions, but in clinging to problems. It has been so +allied with theology and theological morals as representatives +of men's chief interests, that radical alteration +has been shocking. Men's activities took a decidedly +new turn, for example, in the seventeenth century, +and it seems as if philosophy, under the lead of +thinkers like Bacon and Descartes, was to execute an +about-face. But, in spite of the ferment, it turned out<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span> +that many of the older problems were but translated +from Latin into the vernacular or into the new terminology +furnished by science.</p> + +<p>The association of philosophy with academic teaching +has reinforced this intrinsic conservatism. Scholastic +philosophy persisted in universities after men's +thoughts outside of the walls of colleges had moved +in other directions. In the last hundred years intellectual +advances of science and politics have in like +fashion been crystallized into material of instruction +and now resist further change. I would not say that +the spirit of teaching is hostile to that of liberal inquiry, +but a philosophy which exists largely as something +to be taught rather than wholly as something +to be reflected upon is conducive to discussion of views +held by others rather than to immediate response. Philosophy +when taught inevitably magnifies the history +of past thought, and leads professional philosophers to +approach their subject-matter through its formulation +in received systems. It tends, also, to emphasize points +upon which men have divided into schools, for these +lend themselves to retrospective definition and elaboration. +Consequently, philosophical discussion is likely +to be a dressing out of antithetical traditions, where +criticism of one view is thought to afford proof of the +truth of its opposite (as if formulation of views guaranteed +logical exclusives). Direct preoccupation with +contemporary difficulties is left to literature and politics.</p> + +<p>If changing conduct and expanding knowledge ever +required a willingness to surrender not merely old solutions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span> +but old problems it is now. I do not mean that +we can turn abruptly away from all traditional issues. +This is impossible; it would be the undoing of the one +who attempted it. Irrespective of the professionalizing +of philosophy, the ideas philosophers discuss are still +those in which Western civilization has been bred. They +are in the backs of the heads of educated people. But +what serious-minded men not engaged in the professional +business of philosophy most want to know is +what modifications and abandonments of intellectual inheritance +are required by the newer industrial, political, +and scientific movements. They want to know +what these newer movements mean when translated into +general ideas. Unless professional philosophy can +mobilize itself sufficiently to assist in this clarification +and redirection of men's thoughts, it is likely to get +more and more sidetracked from the main currents of +contemporary life.</p> + +<p>This essay may, then, be looked upon as an attempt +to forward the emancipation of philosophy from too +intimate and exclusive attachment to traditional problems. +It is not in intent a criticism of various solutions +that have been offered, but raises a question <i>as to +the genuineness, under the present conditions of science +and social life, of the problems</i>.</p> + +<p>The limited object of my discussion will, doubtless, +give an exaggerated impression of my conviction as +to the artificiality of much recent philosophizing. Not +that I have wilfully exaggerated in what I have said, +but that the limitations of my purpose have led me not +to say many things pertinent to a broader purpose. A<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span> +discussion less restricted would strive to enforce the +genuineness, in their own context, of questions now discussed +mainly because they have been discussed rather +than because contemporary conditions of life suggest +them. It would also be a grateful task to dwell upon +the precious contributions made by philosophic systems +which as a whole are impossible. In the course of the +development of unreal premises and the discussion of +artificial problems, points of view have emerged which +are indispensable possessions of culture. The horizon +has been widened; ideas of great fecundity struck out; +imagination quickened; a sense of the meaning of things +created. It may even be asked whether these accompaniments +of classic systems have not often been treated as +a kind of guarantee of the systems themselves. But +while it is a sign of an illiberal mind to throw away the +fertile and ample ideas of a Spinoza, a Kant, or a +Hegel, because their setting is not logically adequate, +is surely a sign of an undisciplined one to treat their +contributions to culture as confirmations of premises +with which they have no necessary connection.</p> + +<h5>I</h5> + +<p>A criticism of current philosophizing from the standpoint +of the traditional quality of its problems must +begin somewhere, and the choice of a beginning is arbitrary. +It has appeared to me that the notion of experience +implied in the questions most actively discussed +gives a natural point of departure. For, if I mistake +not, it is just the inherited view of experience common +to the empirical school and its opponents which keeps<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span> +alive many discussions even of matters that on their +face are quite remote from it, while it is also this view +which is most untenable in the light of existing science +and social practice. Accordingly I set out with a brief +statement of some of the chief contrasts between the +orthodox description of experience and that congenial +to present conditions.</p> + +<p>(i) In the orthodox view, experience is regarded +primarily as a knowledge-affair. But to eyes not looking +through ancient spectacles, it assuredly appears +as an affair of the intercourse of a living being with +its physical and social environment. (ii) According +to tradition experience is (at least primarily) a psychical +thing, infected throughout by "subjectivity." +What experience suggests about itself is a genuinely +objective world which enters into the actions and sufferings +of men and undergoes modifications through +their responses. (iii) So far as anything beyond a +bare present is recognized by the established doctrine, +the past exclusively counts. Registration of what has +taken place, reference to precedent, is believed to be +the essence of experience. Empiricism is conceived of +as tied up to what has been, or is, "given." But experience +in its vital form is experimental, an effort to +change the given; it is characterized by projection, by +reaching forward into the unknown; connexion with +a future is its salient trait. (iv) The empirical tradition +is committed to particularism. Connexions and +continuities are supposed to be foreign to experience, +to be by-products of dubious validity. An experience +that is an undergoing of an environment and a striving<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span> +for its control in new directions is pregnant with +connexions. (v) In the traditional notion experience +and thought are antithetical terms. Inference, so far +as it is other than a revival of what has been given in +the past, goes beyond experience; hence it is either invalid, +or else a measure of desperation by which, using +experience as a springboard, we jump out to a world +of stable things and other selves. But experience, taken +free of the restrictions imposed by the older concept, +is full of inference. There is, apparently, no conscious +experience without inference; reflection is native and +constant.</p> + +<p>These contrasts, with a consideration of the effect +of substituting the account of experience relevant to +modern life for the inherited account, afford the subject-matter +of the following discussion.</p> + +<p>Suppose we take seriously the contribution made to +our idea of experience by biology,—not that recent +biological science discovered the facts, but that it has +so emphasized them that there is no longer an excuse +for ignoring them or treating them as negligible. Any +account of experience must now fit into the consideration +that experiencing means living; and that living +goes on in and because of an environing medium, not +in a vacuum. Where there is experience, there is a +living being. Where there is life, there is a double connexion +maintained with the environment. In part, environmental +energies constitute organic functions; they +enter into them. Life is not possible without such +direct support by the environment. But while all +organic changes depend upon the natural energies of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</a></span> +the environment for their origination and occurrence, +the natural energies sometimes carry the organic functions +prosperously forward, and sometimes act counter +to their continuance. Growth and decay, health and +disease, are alike continuous with activities of the natural +surroundings. The difference lies in the bearing +of what happens upon future life-activity. From the +standpoint of this future reference environmental incidents +fall into groups: those favorable to life-activities, +and those hostile.</p> + +<p>The successful activities of the organism, those +within which environmental assistance is incorporated, +react upon the environment to bring about modifications +favorable to their own future. The human being has +upon his hands the problem of responding to what is +going on around him so that these changes will take one +turn rather than another, namely, that required by its +own further functioning. While backed in part by the +environment, its life is anything but a peaceful exhalation +of environment. It is obliged to struggle—that +is to say, to employ the direct support given by +the environment in order indirectly to effect changes +that would not otherwise occur. In this sense, life goes +on by means of controlling the environment. Its activities +must change the changes going on around it; they +must neutralize hostile occurrences; they must transform +neutral events into coöperative factors or into an +efflorescence of new features.</p> + +<p>Dialectic developments of the notion of self-preservation, +of the <i>conatus essendi</i>, often ignore all the important +facts of the actual process. They argue as if<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span> +self-control, self-development, went on directly as a +sort of unrolling push from within. But life endures +only in virtue of the support of the environment. And +since the environment is only incompletely enlisted in +our behalf, self-preservation—or self-realization or +whatever—is always indirect—always an affair of the +way in which our present activities affect the direction +taken by independent changes in the surroundings. +Hindrances must be turned into means.</p> + +<p>We are also given to playing loose with the conception +of adjustment, as if that meant something fixed—a +kind of accommodation once for all (ideally at least) +of the organism <i>to</i> an environment. But as life requires +the fitness of the environment to the organic +functions, adjustment to the environment means not +passive acceptance of the latter, but acting so that +the environing changes take a certain turn. The +"higher" the type of life, the more adjustment takes +the form of an adjusting of the factors of the environment +to one another in the interest of life; the less the +significance of living, the more it becomes an adjustment +to a given environment till at the lower end of +the scale the differences between living and the non-living +disappear.</p> + +<p>These statements are of an external kind. They +are about the conditions of experience, rather than +about experiencing itself. But assuredly experience as +it concretely takes place bears out the statements. +Experience is primarily a process of undergoing: a +process of standing something; of suffering and passion, +of affection, in the literal sense of these words.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span> +The organism has to endure, to undergo, the consequences +of its own actions. Experience is no slipping +along in a path fixed by inner consciousness. Private +consciousness is an incidental outcome of experience of +a vital objective sort; it is not its source. Undergoing, +however, is never mere passivity. The most patient +patient is more than a receptor. He is also an agent—a +reactor, one trying experiments, one concerned with +undergoing in a way which may influence what is still +to happen. Sheer endurance, side-stepping evasions, +are, after all, ways of treating the environment with a +view to what such treatment will accomplish. Even if +we shut ourselves up in the most clam-like fashion, we +are doing something; our passivity is an active attitude, +not an extinction of response. Just as there is +no assertive action, no aggressive attack upon things as +they are, which is all action, so there is no undergoing +which is not on our part also a going on and a going +through.</p> + +<p>Experience, in other words, is a matter of <i>simultaneous</i> +doings and sufferings. Our undergoings are experiments +in varying the course of events; our active tryings +are trials and tests of ourselves. This duplicity +of experience shows itself in our happiness and misery, +our successes and failures. Triumphs are dangerous +when dwelt upon or lived off from; successes use themselves +up. Any achieved equilibrium of adjustment +with the environment is precarious because we cannot +evenly keep pace with changes in the environment. +These are so opposed in direction that we must choose. +We must take the risk of casting in our lot with one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span> +movement or the other. Nothing can eliminate all risk, +all adventure; the one thing doomed to failure is to +try to keep even with the whole environment at once—that +is to say, to maintain the happy moment when +all things go our way.</p> + +<p>The obstacles which confront us are stimuli to variation, +to novel response, and hence are occasions of +progress. If a favor done us by the environment conceals +a threat, so its disfavor is a potential means of +hitherto unexperienced modes of success. To treat +misery as anything but misery, as for example a blessing +in disguise or a necessary factor in good, is disingenuous +apologetics. But to say that the progress of +the race has been stimulated by ills undergone, and that +men have been moved by what they suffer to search +out new and better courses of action is to speak +veraciously.</p> + +<p>The preoccupation of experience with things which +are coming (are now coming, not just to come) is obvious +to any one whose interest in experience is empirical. +Since we live forward; since we live in a world +where changes are going on whose issue means our +weal or woe; since every act of ours modifies these +changes and hence is fraught with promise, or charged +with hostile energies—what should experience be but +a future implicated in a present! Adjustment is no +timeless state; it is a continuing process. To say that +a change takes time may be to say something about the +event which is external and uninstructive. But adjustment +of organism to environment takes time in the +pregnant sense; every step in the process is conditioned.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span> +by reference to further changes which it effects. What +is going on in the environment is the concern of the +organism; not what is already "there" in accomplished +and finished form. In so far as the issue of what is +going on may be affected by intervention of the organism, +the moving event is a challenge which stretches +the agent-patient to meet what is coming. Experiencing +exhibits things in their unterminated aspect +moving toward determinate conclusions. The finished +and done with is of import as affecting the future, not +on its own account: in short, because it is not, really, +done with.</p> + +<p>Anticipation is therefore more primary than recollection; +projection than summoning of the past; the +prospective than the retrospective. Given a world like +that in which we live, a world in which environing +changes are partly favorable and partly callously +indifferent, and experience is bound to be prospective +in import; for any control attainable by the living +creature depends upon what is done to alter the state +of things. Success and failure are the primary "categories" +of life; achieving of good and averting of ill +are its supreme interests; hope and anxiety (which are +not self-enclosed states of feeling, but active attitudes +of welcome and wariness) are dominant qualities of +experience. Imaginative forecast of the future is this +forerunning quality of behavior rendered available for +guidance in the present. Day-dreaming and castle-building +and esthetic realization of what is not practically +achieved are offshoots of this practical trait, or +else practical intelligence is a chastened fantasy. It<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span> +makes little difference. Imaginative recovery of the +bygone is indispensable to successful invasion of the +future, but its status is that of an instrument. To +ignore its import is the sign of an undisciplined agent; +but to isolate the past, dwelling upon it for its own +sake and giving it the eulogistic name of knowledge, is +to substitute the reminiscence of old-age for effective +intelligence. The movement of the agent-patient to +meet the future is partial and passionate; yet detached +and impartial study of the past is the only alternative +to luck in assuring success to passion.</p> + +<h5>II</h5> + +<p>This description of experience would be but a rhapsodic +celebration of the commonplace were it not in +marked contrast to orthodox philosophical accounts. +The contrast indicates that traditional accounts have +not been empirical, but have been deductions, from +unnamed premises, of what experience <i>must</i> be. Historic +empiricism has been empirical in a technical and +controversial sense. It has said, Lord, Lord, Experience, +Experience; but in practice it has served ideas +<i>forced into</i> experience, not <i>gathered from</i> it.</p> + +<p>The confusion and artificiality thereby introduced +into philosophical thought is nowhere more evident than +in the empirical treatment of relations or dynamic continuities. +The experience of a living being struggling +to hold its own and make its way in an environment, +physical and social, partly facilitating and partly obstructing +its actions, is of necessity a matter of ties +and connexions, of bearings and uses. The very point<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span> +of experience, so to say, is that it doesn't occur in a +vacuum; its agent-patient instead of being insulated +and disconnected is bound up with the movement of +things by most intimate and pervasive bonds. Only +because the organism is in and of the world, and its +activities correlated with those of other things in multiple +ways, is it susceptible to undergoing things and +capable of trying to reduce objects to means of securing +its good fortune. That these connexions are of +diverse kinds is irresistibly proved by the fluctuations +which occur in its career. Help and hindrance, stimulation +and inhibition, success and failure mean specifically +different modes of correlation. Although the +actions of things in the world are taking place in one +continuous stretch of existence, there are all kinds of +specific affinities, repulsions, and relative indifferencies.</p> + +<p>Dynamic connexions are qualitatively diverse, just +as are the centers of action. <i>In this sense</i>, pluralism, +not monism, is an established empirical fact. The attempt +to establish monism from consideration of the +very nature of a relation is a mere piece of dialectics. +Equally dialectical is the effort to establish by a consideration +of the nature of relations an ontological +Pluralism of Ultimates: <i>simple and independent beings.</i> +To attempt to get results from a consideration of the +"external" nature of relations is of a piece with the +attempt to deduce results from their "internal" character. +Some things are relatively insulated from the +influence of other things; some things are easily invaded +by others; some things are fiercely attracted to +conjoin their activities with those of others. Experience<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span> +exhibits every kind of connexion<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> from the most +intimate to mere external juxtaposition.</p> + +<p>Empirically, then, active bonds or continuities of all +kinds, together with static discontinuities, characterize +existence. To deny this qualitative heterogeneity is to +reduce the struggles and difficulties of life, its comedies +and tragedies to illusion: to the non-being of the Greeks +or to its modern counterpart, the "subjective." Experience +is an affair of facilitations and checks, of being +sustained and disrupted, being let alone, being helped +and troubled, of good fortune and defeat in all the +countless qualitative modes which these words pallidly +suggest. The existence of genuine connexions of all +manner of heterogeneity cannot be doubted. Such +words as conjoining, disjoining, resisting, modifying, +saltatory, and ambulatory (to use James' picturesque +term) only hint at their actual heterogeneity.</p> + +<p>Among the revisions and surrenders of historic problems +demanded by this feature of empirical situations, +those centering in the rationalistic-empirical controversy +may be selected for attention. The implications +of this controversy are twofold: First, that connexions +are as homogeneous in fact as in name; and, secondly, +if genuine, are all due to thought, or, if empirical, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span> +are arbitrary by-products of past particulars. +The stubborn particularism of orthodox empiricism is +its outstanding trait; consequently the opposed rationalism +found no justification of bearings, continuities, +and ties save to refer them in gross to the work of a +hyper-empirical Reason.</p> + +<p>Of course, not all empiricism prior to Hume and +Kant was sensationalistic, pulverizing "experience" +into isolated sensory qualities or simple ideas. It did +not all follow Locke's lead in regarding the entire content +of generalization as the "workmanship of the understanding." +On the Continent, prior to Kant, philosophers +were content to draw a line between empirical +generalizations regarding matters of fact and necessary +universals applying to truths of reason. But +logical atomism was implicit even in this theory. Statements +referring to empirical fact were mere quantitative +summaries of particular instances. In the sensationalism +which sprang from Hume (and which was left +unquestioned by Kant as far as any strictly empirical +element was concerned) the implicit particularism was +made explicit. But the doctrine that sensations and +ideas are so many separate existences was not derived +from observation nor from experiment. It was a logical +deduction from a prior unexamined concept of the +nature of experience. From the same concept it followed +that the appearance of stable objects and of +general principles of connexion was but an appearance.<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span>Kantianism, +then, naturally invoked universal bonds +to restore objectivity. But, in so doing, it accepted +the particularism of experience and proceeded to supplement +it from non-empirical sources. A sensory +manifold being all which is really empirical in experience, +a reason which transcends experience must provide +synthesis. The net outcome might have suggested a +correct account of experience. For we have only to +forget the apparatus by which the net outcome is arrived +at, to have before us the experience of the plain +man—a diversity of ceaseless changes connected in all +kinds of ways, static and dynamic. This conclusion +would deal a deathblow to both empiricism and rationalism. +For, making clear the non-empirical character +of the alleged manifold of unconnected particulars, it +would render unnecessary the appeal to functions of +the understanding in order to connect them. With the +downfall of the traditional notion of experience, the +appeal to reason to supplement its defects becomes +superfluous.</p> + +<p>The tradition was, however, too strongly entrenched; +especially as it furnished the subject-matter of an alleged +science of states of mind which were directly +known in their very presence. The historic outcome +was a new crop of artificial puzzles about relations; +it fastened upon philosophy for a long time the quarrel +about the <i>a priori</i> and the <i>a posteriori</i> as its chief +issue. The controversy is to-day quiescent. Yet it is +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></span>not at all uncommon to find thinkers modern in tone +and intent who regard any philosophy of experience as +necessarily committed to denial of the existence of +genuinely general propositions, and who take empiricism +to be inherently averse to the recognition of the +importance of an organizing and constructive intelligence.</p> + +<p>The quiescence alluded to is in part due, I think, to +sheer weariness. But it is also due to a change of +standpoint introduced by biological conceptions; and +particularly the discovery of biological continuity from +the lower organisms to man. For a short period, Spencerians +might connect the doctrine of evolution with +the old problem, and use the long temporal accumulation +of "experiences" to generate something which, +for human experience, is <i>a priori</i>. But the tendency +of the biological way of thinking is neither to confirm +or negate the Spencerian doctrine, but to shift the +issue. In the orthodox position <i>a posteriori</i> and <i>a +priori</i> were affairs of knowledge. But it soon becomes +obvious that while there is assuredly something <i>a priori</i>—that +is to say, native, unlearned, original—in human +experience, that something is <i>not</i> knowledge, but is +activities made possible by means of established connexions +of neurones. This empirical fact does not solve +the orthodox problem; it dissolves it. It shows that +the problem was misconceived, and solution sought by +both parties in the wrong direction.</p> + +<p>Organic instincts and organic retention, or habit-forming, +are undeniable factors in actual experience. +They are factors which effect organization and secure<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span> +continuity. They are among the specific facts which +a description of experience cognizant of the correlation +of organic action with the action of other natural +objects will include. But while fortunately the contribution +of biological science to a truly empirical description +of experiencing has outlawed the discussion +of the <i>a priori</i> and <i>a posteriori</i>, the transforming effect +of the same contributions upon other issues has gone +unnoticed, save as pragmatism has made an effort to +bring them to recognition.</p> + +<h5>III</h5> + +<p>The point seriously at issue in the notion of experience +common to both sides in the older controversy +thus turns out to be the place of thought or intelligence +in experience. Does reason have a distinctive +office? Is there a characteristic order of relations contributed +by it?</p> + +<p>Experience, to return to our positive conception, is +primarily what is undergone in connexion with activities +whose import lies in their objective consequences—their +bearing upon future experiences. Organic functions +deal with things as things in course, in operation, +in a state of affairs not yet given or completed. What +is done with, what is just "there," is of concern only +in the potentialities which it may indicate. As ended, +as wholly given, it is of no account. But as a sign +of what may come, it becomes an indispensable factor +in behavior dealing with changes, the outcome of which +is not yet determined.</p> + +<p>The only power the organism possesses to control its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span> +own future depends upon the way its present responses +modify changes which are taking place in its medium. +A living being may be comparatively impotent, or comparatively +free. It is all a matter of the way in which +its present reactions to things influence the future reactions +of things upon it. Without regard to its wish +or intent every act it performs makes some difference +in the environment. The change may be trivial as respects +its own career and fortune. But it may also +be of incalculable importance; it may import harm, +destruction, or it may procure well-being.</p> + +<p>Is it possible for a living being to increase its control +of welfare and success? Can it manage, in any +degree, to assure its future? Or does the amount of +security depend wholly upon the accidents of the situation? +Can it learn? Can it gain ability to assure +its future in the present? These questions center attention +upon the significance of reflective intelligence +in the process of experience. The extent of an agent's +capacity for inference, its power to use a given fact +as a sign of something not yet given, measures the extent +of its ability systematically to enlarge its control +of the future.</p> + +<p>A being which can use given and finished facts as +signs of things to come; which can take given things +as evidences of absent things, can, in that degree, forecast +the future; it can form reasonable expectations. +It is capable of achieving ideas; it is possessed of intelligence. +For use of the given or finished to anticipate +the consequence of processes going on is precisely +what is meant by "ideas," by "intelligence."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span>As +we have already noted, the environment is rarely +all of a kind in its bearing upon organic welfare; its +most whole-hearted support of life-activities is precarious +and temporary. Some environmental changes are +auspicious; others are menacing. The secret of success—that +is, of the greatest attainable success—is for +the organic response to cast in its lot with present auspicious +changes to strengthen them and thus to avert +the consequences flowing from occurrences of ill-omen. +Any reaction is a venture; it involves risk. We always +build better or worse than we can foretell. But the +organism's fateful intervention in the course of events +is blind, its choice is random, except as it can employ +what happens to it as a basis of inferring what is +likely to happen later. In the degree in which it can +read future results in present on-goings, its responsive +choice, its partiality to this condition or that, become +intelligent. Its bias grows reasonable. It can deliberately, +intentionally, participate in the direction of +the course of affairs. Its foresight of different futures +which result according as this or that present factor +predominates in the shaping of affairs permits it to +partake intelligently instead of blindly and fatally in +the consequences its reactions give rise to. Participate +it must, and to its own weal or woe. Inference, the +use of what happens, to anticipate what will—or at +least may—happen, makes the difference between +directed and undirected participation. And this +capacity for inferring is precisely the same as +that use of natural occurrences for the discovery +and determination of consequences—the formation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span> +of new dynamic connexions—which constitutes knowledge.</p> + +<p>The fact that thought is an intrinsic feature of experience +is fatal to the traditional empiricism which makes +it an artificial by-product. But for that same reason +it is fatal to the historic rationalisms whose justification +was the secondary and retrospective position assigned +to thought by empirical philosophy. According to the +particularism of the latter, thought was inevitably only +a bunching together of hard-and-fast separate items; +thinking was but the gathering together and tying of +items already completely given, or else an equally artificial +untying—a mechanical adding and subtracting of +the given. It was but a cumulative registration, a +consolidated merger; generality was a matter of bulk, +not of quality. Thinking was therefore treated as lacking +constructive power; even its organizing capacity +was but simulated, being in truth but arbitrary pigeon-holing. +Genuine projection of the novel, deliberate +variation and invention, are idle fictions in such a version +of experience. If there ever was creation, it all +took place at a remote period. Since then the world +has only recited lessons.</p> + +<p>The value of inventive construction is too precious +to be disposed of in this cavalier way. Its unceremonious +denial afforded an opportunity to assert that +in addition to experience the subject has a ready-made +faculty of thought or reason which transcends experience. +Rationalism thus accepted the account of experience +given by traditional empiricism, and introduced +reason as extra-empirical. There are still thinkers who<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span> +regard any empiricism as necessarily committed to a +belief in a cut-and-dried reliance upon disconnected +precedents, and who hold that all systematic organization +of past experiences for new and constructive purposes +is alien to strict empiricism.</p> + +<p>Rationalism never explained, however, how a reason +extraneous to experience could enter into helpful relation +with concrete experiences. By definition, reason +and experience were antithetical, so that the concern of +reason was not the fruitful expansion and guidance of +the course of experience, but a realm of considerations +too sublime to touch, or be touched by, experience. +Discreet rationalists confined themselves to theology +and allied branches of abtruse science, and to mathematics. +Rationalism would have been a doctrine reserved +for academic specialists and abstract formalists +had it not assumed the task of providing an apologetics +for traditional morals and theology, thereby getting +into touch with actual human beliefs and concerns. +It is notorious that historic empiricism was strong in +criticism and in demolition of outworn beliefs, but weak +for purposes of constructive social direction. But we +frequently overlook the fact that whenever rationalism +cut free from conservative apologetics, it was also simply +an instrumentality for pointing out inconsistencies +and absurdities in existing beliefs—a sphere in which +it was immensely useful, as the Enlightenment shows. +Leibniz and Voltaire were contemporary rationalists +in more senses than one.<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>The +recognition that reflection is a genuine factor +within experience and an indispensable factor in that +control of the world which secures a prosperous and +significant expansion of experience undermines historic +rationalism as assuredly as it abolishes the foundations +of historic empiricism. The bearing of a correct idea +of the place and office of reflection upon modern idealisms +is less obvious, but no less certain.</p> + +<p>One of the curiosities of orthodox empiricism is that +its outstanding speculative problem is the existence +of an "external world." For in accordance with the +notion that experience is attached to a private subject +as its exclusive possession, a world like the one in which +we appear to live must be "external" to experience +instead of being its subject-matter. I call it a curiosity, +for if anything seems adequately grounded empirically +it is the existence of a world which resists the characteristic +functions of the subject of experience; which +goes its way, in some respects, independently of these +functions, and which frustrates our hopes and intentions. +Ignorance which is fatal; disappointment; +the need of adjusting means and ends to the course +of nature, would seem to be facts sufficiently characterizing +empirical situations as to render the existence +of an external world indubitable.</p> + +<p>That the description of experience was arrived at +by forcing actual empirical facts into conformity with +dialectic developments from a concept of a knower out<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span>side +of the real world of nature is testified to by the historic +alliance of empiricism and idealism.<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> According +to the most logically consistent editions of orthodox +empiricism, all that can be experienced is the fleeting, +the momentary, mental state. That alone is absolutely +and indubitably present; therefore, it alone is +cognitively certain. It alone is <i>knowledge</i>. The existence +of the past (and of the future), of a decently +stable world and of other selves—indeed, of one's own +self—falls outside this datum of experience. These can +be arrived at only by inference which is "ejective"—a +name given to an alleged type of inference that jumps +from experience, as from a springboard, to something +beyond experience.</p> + +<p>I should not anticipate difficulty in showing that this +doctrine is, dialectically, a mass of inconsistencies. +Avowedly it is a doctrine of desperation, and as such +it is cited here to show the desperate straits to which +ignoring empirical facts has reduced a doctrine of experience. +More positively instructive are the objective +idealisms which have been the offspring of the marriage +between the "reason" of historic rationalism and the +alleged immediate psychical stuff of historic empiricism. +These idealisms have recognized the genuineness of connexions +and the impotency of "feeling." They have +then identified connexions with logical or rational +connexions, and thus treated "the real World" as a +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span> +synthesis of sentient consciousness by means of a rational +self-consciousness introducing objectivity: stability +and universality of reference.</p> + +<p>Here again, for present purposes, criticism is unnecessary. +It suffices to point out that the value of this +theory is bound up with the genuineness of the problem +of which it purports to be a solution. If the basic concept +is a fiction, there is no call for the solution. The +more important point is to perceive how far the +"thought" which figures in objective idealism comes +from meeting the empirical demands made upon actual +thought. Idealism is much less formal than historic +rationalism. It treats thought, or reason, as constitutive +of experience by means of uniting and constructive +functions, not as just concerned with a realm of eternal +truths apart from experience. On such a view thought +certainly loses its abstractness and remoteness. But, +unfortunately, in thus gaining the whole world it loses +its own self. A world already, in its intrinsic structure, +dominated by thought is not a world in which, save by +contradiction of premises, thinking has anything to do.</p> + +<p>That the doctrine logically results in making change +unreal and error unaccountable are consequences of importance +in the technique of professional philosophy; +in the denial of empirical fact which they imply they +seem to many a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> of the premises +from which they proceed. But, after all, such consequences +are of only professional import. What is serious, +even sinister, is the implied sophistication regarding +the place and office of reflection in the scheme of +things. A doctrine which exalts thought in name while<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span> +ignoring its efficacy in fact (that is, its use in bettering +life) is a doctrine which cannot be entertained and +taught without serious peril. Those who are not concerned +with professional philosophy but who are solicitous +for intelligence as a factor in the amelioration of +actual conditions can but look askance at any doctrine +which holds that the entire scheme of things is already, +if we but acquire the knack of looking at it aright, fixedly +and completely rational. It is a striking manifestation +of the extent in which philosophies have been +compensatory in quality.<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> But the matter cannot be +passed over as if it were simply a question of not grudging +a certain amount of consolation to one amid the +irretrievable evils of life. For as to these evils no +one knows how many are retrievable; and a philosophy +which proclaims the ability of a dialectic theory of +knowledge to reveal the world as already and eternally +a self-luminous rational whole, contaminates the scope +and use of thought at its very spring. To substitute +the otiose insight gained by manipulation of a formula +for the slow coöperative work of a humanity guided by +reflective intelligence is more than a technical blunder +of speculative philosophers.</p> + +<p>A practical crisis may throw the relationship of ideas +to life into an exaggerated Brocken-like spectral relief, +where exaggeration renders perceptible features not +ordinarily noted. The use of force to secure narrow +because exclusive aims is no novelty in human affairs. +The deploying of all the intelligence at command in +order to increase the effectiveness of the force used is +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span> +not so common, yet presents nothing intrinsically remarkable. +The identification of force—military, economic, +and administrative—with moral necessity and +moral culture is, however, a phenomenon not likely to +exhibit itself on a wide scale except where intelligence +has already been suborned by an idealism which identifies +"the actual with the rational," and thus finds +the measure of reason in the brute event determined by +superior force. If we are to have a philosophy which +will intervene between attachment to rule of thumb +muddling and devotion to a systematized subordination +of intelligence to preëxistent ends, it can be found only +in a philosophy which finds the ultimate measure of +intelligence in consideration of a desirable future and +in search for the means of bringing it progressively +into existence. When professed idealism turns out to +be a narrow pragmatism—narrow because taking for +granted the finality of ends determined by historic +conditions—the time has arrived for a pragmatism +which shall be empirically idealistic, proclaiming +the essential connexion of intelligence with the unachieved +future—with possibilities involving a transfiguration.</p> + +<h5>IV</h5> + +<p>Why has the description of experience been so remote +from the facts of empirical situations? To answer +this question throws light upon the submergence +of recent philosophizing in epistemology—that is, in +discussions of the nature, possibility, and limits of +knowledge in general, and in the attempt to reach conclusions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span> +regarding the ultimate nature of reality from +the answers given to such questions.</p> + +<p>The reply to the query regarding the currency of a +non-empirical doctrine of experience (even among professed +empiricists) is that the traditional account is +derived from a conception once universally entertained +regarding the subject or bearer or center of experience. +The description of experience has been forced +into conformity with this prior conception; it has been +primarily a deduction from it, actual empirical facts +being poured into the moulds of the deductions. The +characteristic feature of this prior notion is the assumption +that experience centers in, or gathers about, +or proceeds from a center or subject which is outside +the course of natural existence, and set over against +it:—it being of no importance, for present purposes, +whether this antithetical subject is termed soul, or +spirit, or mind, or ego, or consciousness, or just knower +or knowing subject.</p> + +<p>There are plausible grounds for thinking that the +currency of the idea in question lies in the form which +men's religious preoccupations took for many centuries. +These were deliberately and systematically other-worldly. +They centered about a Fall which was not an +event in nature, but an aboriginal catastrophe that +corrupted Nature; about a redemption made possible +by supernatural means; about a life in another world—essentially, +not merely spatially, Other. The supreme +drama of destiny took place in a soul or spirit which, +under the circumstances, could not be conceived other +than as non-natural—extra-natural, if not, strictly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span> +speaking, supernatural. When Descartes and others +broke away from medieval interests, they retained as +commonplaces its intellectual apparatus: Such as, +knowledge is exercised by a power that is extra-natural +and set over against the world to be known. Even if +they had wished to make a complete break, they had +nothing to put as knower in the place of the soul. It +may be doubted whether there was any available empirical +substitute until science worked out the fact that +physical changes are functional correlations of energies, +and that man is continuous with other forms of +life, and until social life had developed an intellectually +free and responsible individual as its agent.</p> + +<p>But my main point is not dependent upon any particular +theory as to the historic origin of the notion about +the bearer of experience. The point is there on its +own account. The essential thing is that the bearer +was conceived as outside of the world; so that experience +consisted in the bearer's being affected through a +type of operations not found anywhere in the world, +while knowledge consists in surveying the world, looking +at it, getting the view of a spectator.</p> + +<p>The theological problem of attaining knowledge of +God as ultimate reality was transformed in effect into +the philosophical problem of the possibility of attaining +knowledge of reality. For how is one to get beyond +the limits of the subject and subjective occurrences? +Familiarity breeds credulity oftener than contempt. +How can a problem be artificial when men have been +busy discussing it almost for three hundred years? +But if the assumption that experience is something set<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span> +over against the world is contrary to fact, then the +problem of how self or mind or subjective experience +or consciousness can reach knowledge of an external +world is assuredly a meaningless problem. Whatever +questions there may be about knowledge, they will not +be the kind of problems which have formed epistemology.</p> + +<p>The problem of knowledge as conceived in the industry +of epistemology is the problem of knowledge <i>in +general</i>—of the possibility, extent, and validity of +knowledge in general. What does this "in general" +mean? In ordinary life there are problems a-plenty of +knowledge in particular; every conclusion we try to +reach, theoretical or practical, affords such a problem. +But there is no problem of knowledge in general. I do +not mean, of course, that general statements cannot +be made about knowledge, or that the problem of attaining +these general statements is not a genuine one. +On the contrary, specific instances of success and failure +in inquiry exist, and are of such a character that +one can discover the conditions conducing to success +and failure. Statement of these conditions constitutes +logic, and is capable of being an important aid in +proper guidance of further attempts at knowing. But +this logical problem of knowledge is at the opposite +pole from the epistemological. Specific problems are +about right conclusions to be reached—which means, +in effect, right ways of going about the business +of inquiry. They imply a difference between knowledge +and error consequent upon right and wrong +methods of inquiry and testing; not a difference between<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span> +experience and the world. The problem of knowledge +<i>überhaupt</i> exists because it is assumed that there is a +knower in general, who is outside of the world to be +known, and who is defined in terms antithetical to +the traits of the world. With analogous assumptions, +we could invent and discuss a problem of digestion in +general. All that would be required would be to conceive +the stomach and food-material as inhabiting different +worlds. Such an assumption would leave on our +hands the question of the possibility, extent, nature, +and genuineness of any transaction between stomach +and food.</p> + +<p>But because the stomach and food inhabit a continuous +stretch of existence, because digestion is but +a correlation of diverse activities in one world, the +problems of digestion are specific and plural: What +are the particular correlations which constitute it? +How does it proceed in different situations? What is +favorable and what unfavorable to its best performance?—and +so on. Can one deny that if we were to +take our clue from the present empirical situation, including +the scientific notion of evolution (biological +continuity) and the existing arts of control of nature, +subject and object would be treated as occupying the +same natural world as unhesitatingly as we assume the +natural conjunction of an animal and its food? Would +it not follow that knowledge is one way in which natural +energies coöperate? Would there be any problem +save discovery of the peculiar structure of this coöperation, +the conditions under which it occurs to best effect, +and the consequences which issue from its occurrence?</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span>It +is a commonplace that the chief divisions of modern +philosophy, idealism in its different kinds, realisms +of various brands, so-called common-sense dualism, agnosticism, +relativism, phenomenalism, have grown up +around the epistemological problem of the general relation +of subject and object. Problems not openly +epistemological, such as whether the relation of changes +in consciousness to physical changes is one of interaction, +parallelism, or automatism have the same origin. +What becomes of philosophy, consisting largely as +it does of different answers to these questions, in case +the assumptions which generate the questions have no +empirical standing? Is it not time that philosophers +turned from the attempt to determine the comparative +merits of various replies to the questions to a consideration +of the claims of the questions?</p> + +<p>When dominating religious ideas were built up about +the idea that the self is a stranger and pilgrim in this +world; when morals, falling in line, found true good +only in inner states of a self inaccessible to anything +but its own private introspection; when political theory +assumed the finality of disconnected and mutually exclusive +personalities, the notion that the bearer of experience +is antithetical to the world instead of being +in and of it was congenial. It at least had the warrant +of other beliefs and aspirations. But the doctrine of +biological continuity or organic evolution has destroyed +the scientific basis of the conception. Morally, +men are now concerned with the amelioration of the +conditions of the common lot in this world. Social +sciences recognize that associated life is not a matter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span> +of physical juxtaposition, but of genuine intercourse—of +community of experience in a non-metaphorical sense +of community. Why should we longer try to patch +up and refine and stretch the old solutions till they +seem to cover the change of thought and practice? +Why not recognize that the trouble is with the problem?</p> + +<p>A belief in organic evolution which does not extend +unreservedly to the way in which the subject of experience +is thought of, and which does not strive to bring +the entire theory of experience and knowing into line +with biological and social facts, is hardly more than +Pickwickian. There are many, for example, who hold +that dreams, hallucinations, and errors cannot be accounted +for at all except on the theory that a self (or +"consciousness") exercises a modifying influence upon +the "real object." The logical assumption is that +consciousness is outside of the real object; that it is +something different in kind, and therefore has the power +of changing "reality" into appearance, of introducing +"relativities" into things as they are in themselves—in +short, of infecting real things with subjectivity. +Such writers seem unaware of the fact that this assumption +makes consciousness supernatural in the literal +sense of the word; and that, to say the least, +the conception can be accepted by one who accepts +the doctrine of biological continuity only after every +other way of dealing with the facts has been exhausted.</p> + +<p>Realists, of course (at least some of the Neo-realists), +deny any such miraculous intervention of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span> +consciousness. But they<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> admit the reality of the +problem; denying only this particular solution, they +try to find some other way out, which will still preserve +intact the notion of knowledge as a relationship +of a general sort between subject and object.</p> + +<p>Now dreams and hallucinations, errors, pleasures, +and pains, possibly "secondary" qualities, do not occur +save where there are organic centers of experience. +They cluster about a subject. But to treat them as +things which inhere exclusively in the subject; or as +posing the problem of a distortion of <i>the</i> real object +by a knower set over against the world, or as presenting +facts to be explained primarily as cases of contemplative +knowledge, is to testify that one has still to learn +the lesson of evolution in its application to the affairs +in hand.</p> + +<p>If biological development be accepted, the subject +of experience is at least an animal, continuous with +other organic forms in a process of more complex +organization. An animal in turn is at least continuous +with chemico-physical processes which, in living +things, are so organized as really to constitute the +activities of life with all their defining traits. And +experience is not identical with brain action; it is +the entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction +with the environment, natural and social. The +brain is primarily an organ of a certain kind of behavior, +not of knowing the world. And to repeat +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span> +what has already been said, experiencing is just +certain modes of interaction, of correlation, of natural +objects among which the organism happens, so to say, +to be one. It follows with equal force that experience +means primarily not knowledge, but ways of doing and +suffering. Knowing must be described by discovering +what particular mode—qualitatively unique—of doing +and suffering it is. As it is, we find experience assimilated +to a non-empirical concept of knowledge, derived +from an antecedent notion of a spectator outside of +the world.*<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> + +<p>In short, the epistemological fashion of conceiving +dreams, errors, "relativities," etc., depends upon the +isolation of mind from intimate participation with other +changes in the same continuous nexus. Thus it is like +contending that when a bottle bursts, the bottle is, in +some self-contained miraculous way, exclusively responsible. +Since it is the nature of a bottle to be +whole so as to retain fluids, bursting is an abnormal +event—comparable to an hallucination. Hence it cannot +belong to the "real" bottle; the "subjectivity" +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span> +of glass is the cause. It is obvious that since the breaking +of glass is a case of specific correlation of natural +energies, its accidental and abnormal character has +to do with <i>consequences</i>, not with causation. Accident +is interference with the consequences for which the bottle +is intended. The bursting considered apart from +its bearing on these consequences is on a plane with any +other occurrence in the wide world. But from the +standpoint of a desired future, bursting is an anomaly, +an interruption of the course of events.</p> + +<p>The analogy with the occurrence of dreams, hallucinations, +etc., seems to me exact. Dreams are not +something outside of the regular course of events; they +are in and of it. They are not cognitive distortions +of real things; they are <i>more</i> real things. There is +nothing abnormal in their existence, any more than +there is in the bursting of a bottle.<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> But they may +be abnormal, from the standpoint of their influence, of +their operation as stimuli in calling out responses to +modify the future. Dreams have often been taken as +prognostics of what is to happen; they have modified +conduct. A hallucination may lead a man to consult +a doctor; such a consequence is right and proper. But +the consultation indicates that the subject regarded +it as an indication of consequences which he feared: +as a symptom of a disturbed life. Or the hallucination +may lead him to anticipate consequences which in fact +flow only from the possession of great wealth. Then +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span> +the hallucination is a disturbance of the normal course +of events; the occurrence is wrongly <i>used</i> with reference +to eventualities.</p> + +<p>To regard reference to use and to desired and +intended consequences as involving a "subjective" +factor is to miss the point, for this has regard to +the future. The uses to which a bottle are put are +not mental; they do not consist of physical states; +they are further correlations of natural existences. +Consequences in use are genuine natural events; +but they do not occur without the intervention of +behavior involving anticipation of a future. The +case is not otherwise with an hallucination. The differences +it makes are in any case differences in the +course of the one continuous world. The important +point is whether they are good or bad differences. +To use the hallucination as a sign of organic lesions +that menace health means the beneficial result of seeing +a physician; to respond to it as a sign of consequences +such as actually follow only from being +persecuted is to fall into error—to be abnormal. The +persecutors are "unreal"; that is, there are no things +which act as persecutors act; but the hallucination +exists. Given its conditions it is as natural as any +other event, and poses only the same kind of problem +as is put by the occurrence of, say, a thunderstorm. +The "unreality" of persecution is not, however, a +subjective matter; it means that conditions do not exist +for producing the <i>future</i> consequences which are now +anticipated and reacted to. Ability to anticipate future +consequences and to respond to them as stimuli to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span> +present behavior may well <i>define</i> what is meant by a +mind or by "consciousness."<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> But this is only a way +of saying just what kind of a real or natural existence +the subject is; it is not to fall back on a preconception +about an unnatural subject in order to characterize +the occurrence of error.</p> + +<p>Although the discussion may be already labored, let +us take another example—the occurrence of disease. +By definition it is pathological, abnormal. At one time +in human history this abnormality was taken to be +something dwelling in the intrinsic nature of the event—in +its existence irrespective of future consequences. +Disease was literally extra-natural and to be referred +to demons, or to magic. No one to-day questions its +naturalness—its place in the order of natural events. +Yet it is abnormal—for it operates to effect results +different from those which follow from health. The +difference is a genuine empirical difference, not a mere +mental distinction. From the standpoint of bearing +on a subsequent course of events disease is unnatural, +in spite of the naturalness of its occurrence and origin.</p> + +<p>The habit of ignoring reference to the future is +responsible for the assumption that to admit human participation +in any form is to admit the "subjective" in +a sense which alters the objective into the phenomenal. +There have been those who, like Spinoza, regarded +health and disease, good and ill, as equally real and +equally unreal. However, only a few consistent materialists +have included truth along with error as merely +phenomenal and subjective. But if one does not regard +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span> +movement toward possible consequences as genuine, +wholesale denial of existential validity to all these +distinctions is the only logical course. To select truth +as objective and error as "subjective" is, on this +basis, an unjustifiably partial procedure. Take everything +as fixedly given, and both truth and error are +arbitrary insertions into fact. Admit the genuineness +of changes going on, and capacity for its direction +through organic action based on foresight, and both +truth and falsity are alike existential. It is human to +regard the course of events which is in line with our +own efforts as the <i>regular</i> course of events, and interruptions +as abnormal, but this partiality of human +desire is itself a part of what actually takes place.</p> + +<p>It is now proposed to take a particular case of the +alleged epistemological predicament for discussion, since +the entire ground cannot be covered. I think, however, +the instance chosen is typical, so that the conclusion +reached may be generalized.</p> + +<p>The instance is that of so-called relativity in perception. +There are almost endless instances; the stick +bent in water; the whistle changing pitch with change +of distance from the ear; objects doubled when the +eye is pushed; the destroyed star still visible, etc., etc. +For our consideration we may take the case of a +spherical object that presents itself to one observer as +a flat circle, to another as a somewhat distorted elliptical +surface. This situation gives empirical proof, so +it is argued, of the difference between a real object and +mere appearance. Since there is but one object, the +existence of two <i>subjects</i> is the sole differentiating factor.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span> +Hence the two appearances of the one real object +is proof of the intervening distorting action of the +subject. And many of the Neo-realists who deny the +difference in question, admit the case to be one of +knowledge and accordingly to constitute an epistemological +problem. They have in consequence developed +wonderfully elaborate schemes of sundry kinds to maintain +"epistemological monism" intact.</p> + +<p>Let us try to keep close to empirical facts. In the +first place the two unlike appearances of the one sphere +are physically necessary because of the laws of reaction +of light. If the one sphere did <i>not</i> assume these +two appearances under given conditions, we should be +confronted with a hopelessly irreconcilable discrepancy +in the behavior of natural energy. That the result is +natural is evidenced by the fact that two cameras—or +other arrangements of apparatus for reflecting light—yield +precisely the same results. Photographs are as +genuinely physical existences as the original sphere; +and they exhibit the two geometrical forms.</p> + +<p>The statement of these facts makes no impression +upon the confirmed epistemologist; he merely retorts +that as long as it is admitted that the organism is the +cause of a sphere being seen, from different points, as +a circular and as an elliptical surface, the essence of +his contention—the modification of the real object by +the subject—is admitted. To the question why the +same logic does not apply to photographic records he +makes, as far as I know, no reply at all.</p> + +<p>The source of the difficulty is not hard to see. The +objection assumes that the alleged modifications of <i>the</i> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span> +real object are cases of <i>knowing</i> and hence attributable +to the influence of a <i>knower</i>. Statements which set +forth the doctrine will always be found to refer to the +organic factor, to the eye, as an observer or a percipient. +Even when reference is made to a lens or a +mirror, language is sometimes used which suggests that +the writer's naïveté is sufficiently gross to treat these +physical factors as if they were engaged in perceiving +the sphere. But as it is evident that the lens operates +as a physical factor in correlation with other physical +factors—notably light—so it ought to be evident that +the intervention of the optical apparatus of the eye +is a purely non-cognitive matter. The relation in question +is not one between a sphere and a would-be knower +of it, unfortunately condemned by the nature of the +knowing apparatus to alter the thing he would know; +it is an affair of the dynamic interaction of two physical +agents in producing a third thing, an effect;—an +affair of precisely the same kind as in any physical +conjoint action, say the operation of hydrogen and +oxygen in producing water. To regard the eye as primarily +a knower, an observer, of things, is as crass +as to assign that function to a camera. But unless the +eye (or optical apparatus, or brain, or organism) be +so regarded, there is absolutely no problem of observation +or of knowledge in the case of the occurrence of +elliptical and circular surfaces. Knowledge does not +enter into the affair at all till <i>after</i> these forms of +refracted light have been produced. About them there +is nothing unreal. Light is really, physically, existentially, +refracted into these forms. If the same spherical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span> +form upon refracting light to physical objects in +two quite different positions produced the same geometric +forms, there would, indeed, be something to marvel +at—as there would be if wax produced the same +results in contact simultaneously with a cold body and +with a warm one. Why talk about <i>the real</i> object in +relation to <i>a knower</i> when what is given is one real thing +in dynamic connection with another real thing?</p> + +<p>The way of dealing with the case will probably meet +with a retort; at least, it has done so before. It has +been said that the account given above and the account +of traditional subjectivism differ only verbally. +The essential thing in both, so it is said, is the admission +that an activity of a self or subject or organism +makes a difference in the real object. Whether the subject +makes this difference in the very process of knowing +or makes it prior to the act of knowing is a minor +matter; what is important is that the known thing has, +by the time it is known, been "subjectified."</p> + +<p>The objection gives a convenient occasion for summarizing +the main points of the argument. On the +one hand, the retort of the objector depends upon talking +about <i>the</i> real object. Employ the term "<i>a</i> real +object," and the change produced by the activity characteristic +of the optical apparatus is of just the same +kind as that of the camera lens or that of any other +physical agency. Every event in the world marks a +difference made to one existence in active conjunction +with some other existence. And, as for the alleged +subjectivity, if subjective is used merely as an adjective +to designate the specific activity of a particular<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span> +existence, comparable, say, to the term feral, applied +to tiger, or metallic, applied to iron, then of course +reference to subjective is legitimate. But it is also tautological. +It is like saying that flesh eaters are carnivorous. +But the term "subjective" is so consecrated +to other uses, usually implying invidious contrast with +objectivity (while subjective in the sense just suggested +means specific mode <i>of</i> objectivity), that it is +difficult to maintain this innocent sense. Its use in any +disparaging way in the situation before us—any sense +implicating contrast with a real object—assumes that +the organism <i>ought</i> not to make any difference when +it operates in conjunction with other things. Thus +we run to earth that assumption that the subject is +heterogeneous from every other natural existence; it +is to be the one otiose, inoperative thing in a moving +world—our old assumption of the self as outside of +things.<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> + +<p>What and where is knowledge in the case we have +been considering? Not, as we have already seen, in the +production of forms of light having a circular and elliptical +surface. These forms are natural happenings. +They may enter into knowledge or they may not, according +to circumstances. Countless such refractive +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span> +changes take place without being noted.<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> When they +become subject-matter for knowledge, the inquiry they +set on foot may take on an indefinite variety of forms. +One may be interested in ascertaining more about the +structural peculiarities of the forms themselves; one +may be interested in the mechanism of their production; +one may find problems in projective geometry, +or in drawing and painting—all depending upon the +specific matter-of-fact context. The forms may be +<i>objectives</i> of knowledge—of reflective examination—or +they may be means of knowing something else. It may +happen—under some circumstances it does happen—that +the objective of inquiry is the nature of the geometric +form which, when refracting light, gives rise to +these other forms. In this case the sphere is the thing +known, and in this case, the forms of light are signs +or evidence of the conclusion to be drawn. There is no +more reason for supposing that they <i>are</i> (mis)knowledges +of the sphere—that the sphere is necessarily +and from the start what one is trying to know—than +for supposing that the position of the mercury in the +thermometer tube is a cognitive distortion of atmospheric +pressure. In each case (that of the mercury +and that of, say, a circular surface) the primary datum +is a physical happening. In each case it may be used, +upon occasion, as a sign or evidence of the nature of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span> +the causes which brought it about. Given the position +in question, the circular form would be an intrinsically +<i>unreliable</i> evidence of the nature and position of the +spherical body only in case it, as the direct datum of +perception, were <i>not</i> what it is—a circular form.</p> + +<p>I confess that all this seems so obvious that the +reader is entitled to inquire into the motive for reciting +such plain facts. Were it not for the persistence of +the epistemological problem it would be an affront to +the reader's intelligence to dwell upon them. But as +long as such facts as we have been discussing furnish +the subject-matter with which philosophizing is peculiarly +concerned, these commonplaces must be urged and +reiterated. They bear out two contentions which are +important at the juncture, although they will lose special +significance as soon as these are habitually recognized: +Negatively, a prior and non-empirical notion +of the self is the source of the prevailing belief that experience +as such is primarily cognitional—a knowledge +affair; positively, <i>knowledge is always a matter of the +use that is made of experienced natural events</i>, a use +in which given things are treated as indications +of what will be experienced under different conditions.</p> + +<p>Let us make one effort more to clear up these points. +Suppose it is a question of knowledge of water. The +thing to be known does not present itself primarily as +a matter of knowledge-and-ignorance at all. It occurs +as a stimulus to action and as the source of certain +undergoings. It is something to react to:—to drink, +to wash with, to put out fire with, and also something<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></span> +that reacts unexpectedly to our reactions, that makes +us undergo disease, suffocation, drowning. In this twofold +way, water or anything else enters into experience. +Such presence in experience has of itself nothing to do +with knowledge or consciousness; nothing that is in the +sense of depending upon them, though it has everything +to do with knowledge and consciousness in the sense +that the latter depends upon prior experience of this +non-cognitive sort. Man's experience is what it is because +his response to things (even successful response) +and the reactions of things to his life, are so radically +different from knowledge. The difficulties and tragedies +of life, the stimuli to acquiring knowledge, lie +in the radical disparity of presence-in-experience and +presence-in-knowing. Yet the immense importance of +knowledge experience, the fact that turning presence-in-experience +over into presence-in-a-knowledge-experience +is the sole mode of control of nature, has systematically +hypnotized European philosophy since the +time of Socrates into thinking that all experiencing is +a mode of knowing, if not good knowledge, then a low-grade +or confused or implicit knowledge.</p> + +<p>When water is an adequate stimulus to action or +when its reactions oppress and overwhelm us, it remains +outside the scope of knowledge. When, however, +the bare presence of the thing (say, as optical stimulus) +ceases to operate directly as stimulus to response and +begins to operate in connection with a forecast of the +consequences it will effect when responded to, it begins +to acquire meaning—to be known, to be an object. It +is noted as something which is wet, fluid, satisfies thirst,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span> +allays uneasiness, etc. The conception that we begin +with a known visual quality which is thereafter enlarged +by adding on qualities apprehended by the other +senses does not rest upon experience; it rests upon +making experience conform to the notion that every +experience <i>must</i> be a cognitive noting. As long as the +visual stimulus operates as a stimulus on its own account, +there is no apprehension, no noting, of color or +light at all. To much the greater portion of sensory +stimuli we react in precisely this wholly non-cognitive +way. In the attitude of suspended response in which +consequences are anticipated, the direct stimulus becomes +a sign or index of something else—and thus matter +of noting or apprehension or acquaintance, or +whatever term may be employed. This difference (together, +of course, with the consequences which go with +it) is the difference which the natural event of +knowing makes to the natural event of direct organic +stimulation. It is no change of a reality into an +unreality, of an object into something subjective; it +is no secret, illicit, or epistemological transformation; +it is a genuine acquisition of new and distinctive features +through entering into relations with things with +which it was not formerly connected—namely, possible +and future things.</p> + +<p>But, replies some one so obsessed with the epistemological +point of view that he assumes that the prior +account is a rival epistemology in disguise, all this involves +no change in Reality, no difference made to +Reality. Water was all the time all the things it is +ever found out to be. Its real nature has not been altered<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span> +by knowing it; any such alteration means a mis-knowing.</p> + +<p>In reply let it be said,—once more and finally,—there +is no assertion or implication about <i>the</i> real +object or <i>the</i> real world or <i>the</i> reality. Such an assumption +goes with that epistemological universe of +discourse which has to be abandoned in an empirical +universe of discourse. The change is of <i>a</i> real object. +An incident of the world operating as a physiologically +direct stimulus is assuredly a reality. Responded to, +it produces specific consequences in virtue of the response. +Water is not drunk unless somebody drinks it; +it does not quench thirst unless a thirsty person drinks +it—and so on. Consequences occur whether one is +aware of them or not; they are integral facts in experience. +But let one of these consequences be anticipated +and let it, as anticipated, become an indispensable +element in the stimulus, and then there is a known +object. It is not that knowing <i>produces</i> a change, +but that it <i>is</i> a change of the specific kind described. +A serial process, the successive portions of which are +as such incapable of simultaneous occurrence, is telescoped +and condensed into an object, a unified inter-reference +of contemporaneous properties, most of +which express potentialities rather than completed +data.</p> + +<p>Because of this change, an <i>object</i> possesses truth or +error (which the physical occurrence as such never +has); it is classifiable as fact or fantasy; it is of a sort +or kind, expresses an essence or nature, possesses implications, +etc., etc. That is to say, it is marked by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span> +specifiable <i>logical</i> traits not found in physical occurrences +as such. Because objective idealisms have seized +upon these traits as constituting the very essence of +Reality is no reason for proclaiming that they are +ready-made features of physical happenings, and +hence for maintaining that knowing is nothing but an +appearance of things on a stage for which "consciousness" +supplies the footlights. For only the epistemological +predicament leads to "presentations" being +regarded as cognitions of things which were +previously unpresented. In any empirical situation of +everyday life or of science, knowledge signifies something +stated or inferred of another thing. Visible water +is not a more less erroneous presentation of H<sub>2</sub>O, but +H<sub>2</sub>O is a knowledge about the thing we see, drink, wash +with, sail on, and use for power.</p> + +<p>A further point and the present phase of discussion +terminates. Treating knowledge as a presentative relation +between the knower and object makes it necessary +to regard the mechanism of <i>presentation</i> as constituting +the act of knowing. Since things may be presented +in sense-perception, in recollection, in imagination +and in conception, and since the mechanism in every +one of these four styles of presentation is sensory-cerebral +the problem of knowing becomes a mind-body +problem.<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> The psychological, or physiological, mechanism +of presentation involved in seeing a chair, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span> +remembering what I ate yesterday for luncheon, imagining +the moon the size of a cart wheel, conceiving a +mathematical continuum is identified with the operation +of knowing. The evil consequences are twofold. The +problem of the relation of mind and body has become +a part of the problem of the possibility of knowledge +in general, to the further complication of a matter +already hopelessly constrained. Meantime the actual +process of knowing, namely, operations of controlled +observation, inference, reasoning, and testing, the only +process with <i>intellectual</i> import, is dismissed as irrelevant +to the theory of knowing. The methods of +knowing practised in daily life and science are excluded +from consideration in the philosophical theory +of knowing. Hence the constructions of the latter +become more and more elaborately artificial because +there is no definite check upon them. It would be +easy to quote from epistemological writers statements +to the effect that these processes (which supply the +only empirically verifiable facts of knowing) are +<i>merely</i> inductive in character, or even that they +are of purely psychological significance. It would +be difficult to find a more complete inversion of the +facts than in the latter statement, since presentation +constitutes in fact the psychological affair. A +confusion of logic with physiological physiology has +bred hybrid epistemology, with the amazing result that +the technique of effective inquiry is rendered irrelevant +to the theory of knowing, and those physical events involved +in the occurrence of data for knowing are +treated as if they constituted the act of knowing.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></span></p> + +<h5>V</h5> + +<p>What are the bearings of our discussion upon the +conception of the present scope and office of philosophy? +What do our conclusions indicate and demand +with reference to philosophy itself? For the philosophy +which reaches such conclusions regarding knowledge and +mind must apply them, sincerely and whole-heartedly, +to its idea of its own nature. For philosophy +claims to be one form or mode of knowing. If, then, the +conclusion is reached that knowing is a way of employing +empirical occurrences with respect to increasing +power to direct the consequences which flow from +things, the application of the conclusion must be made +to philosophy itself. It, too, becomes not a contemplative +survey of existence nor an analysis of what is past +and done with, but an outlook upon future possibilities +with reference to attaining the better and averting the +worse. Philosophy must take, with good grace, its own +medicine.</p> + +<p>It is easier to state the negative results of the changed +idea of philosophy than the positive ones. The point +that occurs to mind most readily is that philosophy +will have to surrender all pretension to be peculiarly +concerned with ultimate reality, or with reality as a +complete (i.e., completed) whole: with <i>the</i> real object. +The surrender is not easy of achievement. The philosophic +tradition that comes to us from classic Greek +thought and that was reinforced by Christian philosophy +in the Middle Ages discriminates philosophical +knowing from other modes of knowing by means of an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></span> +alleged peculiarly intimate concern with supreme, ultimate, +true reality. To deny this trait to philosophy +seems to many to be the suicide of philosophy; to be a +systematic adoption of skepticism or agnostic positivism.</p> + +<p>The pervasiveness of the tradition is shown in the +fact that so vitally a contemporary thinker as Bergson, +who finds a philosophic revolution involved in +abandonment of the traditional identification of the +truly real with the fixed (an identification inherited +from Greek thought), does not find it in his heart to +abandon the counterpart identification of philosophy +with search for the truly Real; and hence finds it necessary +to substitute an ultimate and absolute flux for +an ultimate and absolute permanence. Thus his great +empirical services in calling attention to the fundamental +importance of considerations of time for +problems of life and mind get compromised with a +mystic, non-empirical "Intuition"; and we find him preoccupied +with solving, by means of his new idea of +ultimate reality, the traditional problems of realities-in-themselves +and phenomena, matter and mind, free-will +and determinism, God and the world. Is not that another +evidence of the influence of the classic idea about +philosophy?</p> + +<p>Even the new realists are not content to take their +realism as a plea for approaching subject-matter directly +instead of through the intervention of epistemological +apparatus; they find it necessary first to +determine the status of <i>the</i> real object. Thus they +too become entangled in the problem of the possibility<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></span> +of error, dreams, hallucinations, etc., in short, the problem +of evil. For I take it that an uncorrupted realism +would accept such things as real events, and find in +them no other problems than those attending the consideration +of any real occurrence—namely, problems +of structure, origin, and operation.</p> + +<p>It is often said that pragmatism, unless it is content +to be a contribution to mere methodology, must +develop a theory of Reality. But the chief characteristic +trait of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely +that no theory of Reality in general, <i>überhaupt</i>, +is possible or needed. It occupies the position of an +emancipated empiricism or a thoroughgoing naïve +realism. It finds that "reality" is a <i>denotative</i> term, +a word used to designate indifferently everything that +happens. Lies, dreams, insanities, deceptions, myths, +theories are all of them just the events which they specifically +are. Pragmatism is content to take its stand +with science; for science finds all such events to be +subject-matter of description and inquiry—just like +stars and fossils, mosquitoes and malaria, circulation +and vision. It also takes its stand with daily life, which +finds that such things really have to be reckoned with +as they occur interwoven in the texture of events.</p> + +<p>The only way in which the term reality can ever +become more than a blanket denotative term is through +recourse to specific events in all their diversity and +thatness. Speaking summarily, I find that the retention +by philosophy of the notion of a Reality feudally +superior to the events of everyday occurrence is the +chief source of the increasing isolation of philosophy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></span> +from common sense and science. For the latter do +not operate in any such region. As with them of old, +philosophy in dealing with real difficulties finds itself +still hampered by reference to realities more real, more +ultimate, than those which directly happen.</p> + +<p>I have said that identifying the cause of philosophy +with the notion of superior reality is the cause of an +<i>increasing</i> isolation from science and practical life. The +phrase reminds us that there was a time when the enterprise +of science and the moral interests of men both +moved in a universe invidiously distinguished from that +of ordinary occurrence. While all that happens is +equally real—since it really happens—happenings are +not of equal worth. Their respective consequences, +their import, varies tremendously. Counterfeit money, +although real (or rather <i>because</i> real), is really different +from valid circulatory medium, just as disease is +really different from health; different in specific structure +and so different in consequences. In occidental +thought, the Greeks were the first to draw the distinction +between the genuine and the spurious in a generalized +fashion and to formulate and enforce its tremendous +significance for the conduct of life. But since they +had at command no technique of experimental analysis +and no adequate technique of mathematical analysis, +they were compelled to treat the difference of the true +and the false, the dependable and the deceptive, as +signifying two kinds of existence, the truly real and +the apparently real.</p> + +<p>Two points can hardly be asserted with too much +emphasis. The Greeks were wholly right in the feeling<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></span> +that questions of good and ill, as far as they fall within +human control, are bound up with discrimination of +the genuine from the spurious, of "being" from what +only pretends to be. But because they lacked adequate +instrumentalities for coping with this difference in specific +situations, they were forced to treat the difference +as a wholesale and rigid one. Science was concerned +with vision of ultimate and true reality; opinion was +concerned with getting along with apparent realities. +Each had its appropriate region permanently marked +off. Matters of opinion could never become matters +of science; their intrinsic nature forbade. When the +practice of science went on under such conditions, +science and philosophy were one and the same thing. +Both had to do with ultimate reality in its rigid and +insuperable difference from ordinary occurrences.</p> + +<p>We have only to refer to the way in which medieval +life wrought the philosophy of an ultimate and supreme +reality into the context of practical life to realize that +for centuries political and moral interests were bound +up with the distinction between the absolutely real and +the relatively real. The difference was no matter of a +remote technical philosophy, but one which controlled +life from the cradle to the grave, from the grave to the +endless life after death. By means of a vast institution, +which in effect was state as well as church, the +claims of ultimate reality were enforced; means of access +to it were provided. Acknowledgment of The +Reality brought security in this world and salvation +in the next. It is not necessary to report the story +of the change which has since taken place. It is enough<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></span> +for our purposes to note that none of the modern +philosophies of a superior reality, or <i>the</i> real object, +idealistic or realistic, holds that its insight makes a +difference like that between sin and holiness, eternal +condemnation and eternal bliss. While in its own context +the philosophy of ultimate reality entered into the +vital concerns of men, it now tends to be an ingenious +dialectic exercised in professorial corners by a few who +have retained ancient premises while rejecting their +application to the conduct of life.</p> + +<p>The increased isolation from science of any philosophy +identified with the problem of <i>the</i> real is equally +marked. For the growth of science has consisted precisely +in the invention of an equipment, a technique of +appliances and procedures, which, accepting all occurrences +as homogeneously real, proceeds to distinguish +the authenticated from the spurious, the true from the +false, by specific modes of treatment in specific situations. +The procedures of the trained engineer, of the +competent physician, of the laboratory expert, have +turned out to be the only ways of discriminating the +counterfeit from the valid. And they have revealed +that the difference is not one of antecedent fixity of +existence, but one of mode of treatment and of the +consequences thereon attendant. After mankind has +learned to put its trust in specific procedures in order +to make its discriminations between the false and the +true, philosophy arrogates to itself the enforcement +of the distinction at its own cost.</p> + +<p>More than once, this essay has intimated that the +counterpart of the idea of invidiously real reality is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></span> +the spectator notion of knowledge. If the knower, however +defined, is set over against the world to be known, +knowing consists in possessing a transcript, more or less +accurate but otiose, of real things. Whether this transcript +is presentative in character (as realists say) or +whether it is by means of states of consciousness which +represent things (as subjectivists say), is a matter of +great importance in its own context. But, in another +regard, this difference is negligible in comparison with +the point in which both agree. Knowing is viewing +from outside. But if it be true that the self or subject +of experience is part and parcel of the course of events, +it follows that the self <i>becomes</i> a knower. It becomes +a mind in virtue of a distinctive way of partaking in +the course of events. The significant distinction is no +longer between the knower <i>and</i> the world; it is between +different ways of being in and of the movement of +things; between a brute physical way and a purposive, +intelligent way.</p> + +<p>There is no call to repeat in detail the statements +which have been advanced. Their net purport is that +the directive presence of future possibilities in dealing +with existent conditions is what is meant by knowing; +that the self becomes a knower or mind when anticipation +of future consequences operates as its stimulus. +What we are now concerned with is the effect of this +conception upon the nature of philosophic knowing.</p> + +<p>As far as I can judge, popular response to pragmatic +philosophy was moved by two quite different considerations. +By some it was thought to provide a new species +of sanctions, a new mode of apologetics, for certain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">60</a></span> +religious ideas whose standing had been threatened. +By others, it was welcomed because it was taken as a +sign that philosophy was about to surrender its otiose +and speculative remoteness; that philosophers were beginning +to recognize that philosophy is of account only +if, like everyday knowing and like science, it affords +guidance to action and thereby makes a difference in +the event. It was welcomed as a sign that philosophers +were willing to have the worth of their philosophizing +measured by responsible tests.</p> + +<p>I have not seen this point of view emphasized, or +hardly recognized, by professional critics. The difference +of attitude can probably be easily explained. The +epistemological universe of discourse is so highly technical +that only those who have been trained in the history +of thought think in terms of it. It did not occur, +accordingly, to non-technical readers to interpret the +doctrine that the meaning and validity of thought are +fixed by differences made in consequences and in satisfactoriness, +to mean consequences in personal feelings. +Those who were professionally trained, however, took +the statement to mean that consciousness or mind in +the mere act of looking at things modifies them. It understood +the doctrine of test of validity by consequences +to mean that apprehensions and conceptions are true +if the modifications affected by them were of an emotionally +desirable tone.</p> + +<p>Prior discussion should have made it reasonably clear +that the source of this misunderstanding lies in the +neglect of temporal considerations. The change made +in things by the self in knowing is not immediate and,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">61</a></span> +so to say, cross-sectional. It is longitudinal—in the +redirection given to changes already going on. Its analogue +is found in the changes which take place in the +development of, say, iron ore into a watch-spring, not +in those of the miracle of transubstantiation. For the +static, cross-sectional, non-temporal relation of subject +and object, the pragmatic hypothesis substitutes +apprehension of a thing in terms of the results in other +things which it is tending to effect. For the unique +epistemological relation, it substitutes a practical relation +of a familiar type:—responsive behavior which +changes in time the subject-matter to which it applies. +The unique thing about the responsive behavior which +constitutes knowing is the specific difference which +marks it off from other modes of response, namely, the +part played in it by anticipation and prediction. Knowing +is the act, stimulated by this foresight, of securing +and averting consequences. The success of the achievement +measures the standing of the foresight by which response +is directed. The popular impression that pragmatic +philosophy means that philosophy shall develop +ideas relevant to the actual crises of life, ideas influential +in dealing with them and tested by the assistance +they afford, is correct.</p> + +<p>Reference to practical response suggests, however, +another misapprehension. Many critics have jumped +at the obvious association of the word pragmatic with +practical. They have assumed that the intent is to +limit all knowledge, philosophic included, to promoting +"action," understanding by action either just any +bodily movement, or those bodily movements which conduce<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">62</a></span> +to the preservation and grosser well-being of the +body. James' statement, that general conceptions +must "cash in" has been taken (especially by European +critics) to mean that the end and measure of intelligence +lies in the narrow and coarse utilities which +it produces. Even an acute American thinker, after +first criticizing pragmatism as a kind of idealistic epistemology, +goes on to treat it as a doctrine which regards +intelligence as a lubricating oil facilitating the workings +of the body.</p> + +<p>One source of the misunderstanding is suggested by +the fact that "cashing in" to James meant that a +general idea must always be capable of verification in +specific existential cases. The notion of "cashing in" +says nothing about the breadth or depth of the specific +consequences. As an empirical doctrine, it could not +say anything about them in general; the specific cases +must speak for themselves. If one conception is verified +in terms of eating beefsteak, and another +in terms of a favorable credit balance in the +bank, that is not because of anything in the +theory, but because of the specific nature of the +conceptions in question, and because there exist particular +events like hunger and trade. If there are +also existences in which the most liberal esthetic +ideas and the most generous moral conceptions can be +verified by specific embodiment, assuredly so much the +better. The fact that a strictly empirical philosophy +was taken by so many critics to imply an <i>a priori</i> dogma +about the kind of consequences capable of existence is +evidence, I think, of the inability of many philosophers<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">63</a></span> +to think in concretely empirical terms. Since the critics +were themselves accustomed to get results by manipulating +the concepts of "consequences" and of "practice," +they assumed that even a would-be empiricist +must be doing the same sort of thing. It will, I suppose, +remain for a long time incredible to some that a +philosopher should really intend to go to specific experiences +to determine of what scope and depth practice +admits, and what sort of consequences the world permits +to come into being. Concepts are so clear; it takes so +little time to develop their implications; experiences +are so confused, and it requires so much time and energy +to lay hold of them. And yet these same critics charge +pragmatism with adopting subjective and emotional +standards!</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, the pragmatic theory of intelligence +means that the function of mind is to project new +and more complex ends—to free experience from routine +and from caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish +purposes already given either in the mechanism +of the body or in that of the existent state of +society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and +liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson. Action restricted +to given and fixed ends may attain great +technical efficiency; but efficiency is the only quality to +which it can lay claim. Such action is mechanical (or +becomes so), no matter what the scope of the preformed +end, be it the Will of God or <i>Kultur</i>. But the +doctrine that intelligence develops within the sphere of +action for the sake of possibilities not yet given is the +opposite of a doctrine of mechanical efficiency. Intelligence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">64</a></span> +<i>as</i> intelligence is inherently forward-looking; +only by ignoring its primary function does it become a +mere means for an end already given. The latter <i>is</i> +servile, even when the end is labeled moral, religious, or +esthetic. But action directed to ends to which the agent +has not previously been attached inevitably carries with +it a quickened and enlarged spirit. A pragmatic intelligence +is a creative intelligence, not a routine mechanic.</p> + +<p>All this may read like a defense of pragmatism by +one concerned to make out for it the best case possible. +Such is not, however, the intention. The purpose is +to indicate the extent to which intelligence frees action +from a mechanically instrumental character. Intelligence +is, indeed, instrumental <i>through</i> action to the determination +of the qualities of future experience. But +the very fact that the concern of intelligence is with +the future, with the as-yet-unrealized (and with the +given and the established only as conditions of the +realization of possibilities), makes the action in which +it takes effect generous and liberal; free of spirit. Just +that action which extends and approves intelligence +has an intrinsic value of its own in being instrumental:—the +intrinsic value of being informed with intelligence +in behalf of the enrichment of life. By the same stroke, +intelligence becomes truly liberal: knowing is a human +undertaking, not an esthetic appreciation carried on +by a refined class or a capitalistic possession of a few +learned specialists, whether men of science or of philosophy.</p> + +<p>More emphasis has been put upon what philosophy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">65</a></span> +is not than upon what it may become. But it is not +necessary, it is not even desirable, to set forth philosophy +as a scheduled program. There are human difficulties +of an urgent, deep-seated kind which may be +clarified by trained reflection, and whose solution may +be forwarded by the careful development of hypotheses. +When it is understood that philosophic thinking is +caught up in the actual course of events, having the +office of guiding them towards a prosperous issue, problems +will abundantly present themselves. Philosophy +will not solve these problems; philosophy is vision, imagination, +reflection—and these functions, apart from +action, modify nothing and hence resolve nothing. But +in a complicated and perverse world, action which is +not informed with vision, imagination, and reflection, +is more likely to increase confusion and conflict than to +straighten things out. It is not easy for generous and +sustained reflection to become a guiding and illuminating +method in action. Until it frees itself from identification +with problems which are supposed to depend +upon Reality as such, or its distinction from a world +of Appearance, or its relation to a Knower as such, +the hands of philosophy are tied. Having no chance to +link its fortunes with a responsible career by suggesting +things to be tried, it cannot identify itself with questions +which actually arise in the vicissitudes of life. +Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device +for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes +a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing +with the problems of men.</p> + +<p>Emphasis must vary with the stress and special impact<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">66</a></span> +of the troubles which perplex men. Each age +knows its own ills, and seeks its own remedies. One does +not have to forecast a particular program to note that +the central need of any program at the present day +is an adequate conception of the nature of intelligence +and its place in action. Philosophy cannot disavow +responsibility for many misconceptions of the nature +of intelligence which now hamper its efficacious operation. +It has at least a negative task imposed upon it. +It must take away the burdens which it has laid upon +the intelligence of the common man in struggling with +his difficulties. It must deny and eject that intelligence +which is naught but a distant eye, registering in +a remote and alien medium the spectacle of nature and +life. To enforce the fact that the emergence of imagination +and thought is relative to the connexion of the +sufferings of men with their doings is of itself to illuminate +those sufferings and to instruct those doings. +To catch mind in its connexion with the entrance of the +novel into the course of the world is to be on the road +to see that intelligence is itself the most promising of +all novelties, the revelation of the meaning of that transformation +of past into future which is the reality of +every present. To reveal intelligence as the organ for +the guidance of this transformation, the sole director of +its quality, is to make a declaration of present untold +significance for action. To elaborate these convictions +of the connexion of intelligence with what men undergo +because of their doings and with the emergence and +direction of the creative, the novel, in the world is of +itself a program which will keep philosophers busy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">67</a></span> +until something more worth while is forced upon them. +For the elaboration has to be made through application +to all the disciplines which have an intimate connexion +with human conduct:—to logic, ethics, esthetics, economics, +and the procedure of the sciences formal and +natural.</p> + +<p>I also believe that there is a genuine sense in which +the enforcement of the pivotal position of intelligence +in the world and thereby in control of human fortunes +(so far as they are manageable) is the peculiar problem +in the problems of life which come home most closely +to ourselves—to ourselves living not merely in the +early twentieth century but in the United States. It +is easy to be foolish about the connexion of thought +with national life. But I do not see how any one can +question the distinctively national color of English, or +French, or German philosophies. And if of late the +history of thought has come under the domination of +the German dogma of an inner evolution of ideas, it +requires but a little inquiry to convince oneself that +that dogma itself testifies to a particularly nationalistic +need and origin. I believe that philosophy in America +will be lost between chewing a historic cud long since reduced +to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes +(lost to natural science), or a scholastic, schematic +formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness +America's own needs and its own implicit principle +of successful action.</p> + +<p>This need and principle, I am convinced, is the necessity +of a deliberate control of policies by the method +of intelligence, an intelligence which is not the faculty<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">68</a></span> +of intellect honored in text-books and neglected elsewhere, +but which is the sum-total of impulses, habits, +emotions, records, and discoveries which forecast what +is desirable and undesirable in future possibilities, and +which contrive ingeniously in behalf of imagined good. +Our life has no background of sanctified categories +upon which we may fall back; we rely upon precedent +as authority only to our own undoing—for with us +there is such a continuously novel situation that final +reliance upon precedent entails some class interest +guiding us by the nose whither it will. British empiricism, +with its appeal to what has been in the past, is, +after all, only a kind of <i>a priorism</i>. For it lays down +a fixed rule for future intelligence to follow; and only +the immersion of philosophy in technical learning prevents +our seeing that this is the essence of <i>a priorism</i>.</p> + +<p>We pride ourselves upon being realistic, desiring a +hardheaded cognizance of facts, and devoted to mastering +the means of life. We pride ourselves upon a +practical idealism, a lively and easily moved faith in +possibilities as yet unrealized, in willingness to make +sacrifice for their realization. Idealism easily becomes +a sanction of waste and carefulness, and realism a +sanction of legal formalism in behalf of things as they +are—the rights of the possessor. We thus tend to +combine a loose and ineffective optimism with assent +to the doctrine of take who take can: a deification of +power. All peoples at all times have been narrowly +realistic in practice and have then employed idealization +to cover up in sentiment and theory their brutalities. +But never, perhaps, has the tendency been so<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">69</a></span> +dangerous and so tempting as with ourselves. Faith +in the power of intelligence to imagine a future which +is the projection of the desirable in the present, and to +invent the instrumentalities of its realization, is our +salvation. And it is a faith which must be nurtured +and made articulate: surely a sufficiently large task +for our philosophy.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">70</a></span></p> + +<h2>REFORMATION OF LOGIC</h2> + +<h4>ADDISON W. MOORE</h4> + +<h5>I</h5> + +<p>In a general survey of the development of logical +theory one is struck by the similarity, not to say identity, +of the indictments which reformers, since the days +of Aristotle, have brought against it. The most fundamental +of these charges are: first, that the theory of +logic has left it formal and with little significance for +the advancement of science and the conduct of society; +second, that it has great difficulty in avoiding the +predicament of logical operations that are merely labored +reproductions of non-logical activities and therefore +tautologous and trifling, or of logical operations +that are so far removed from immediate, non-logical experience +that they are irrelevant; third, that logical +theory has had trouble in finding room in its own +household for both truth and error; each crowds out +the other.</p> + +<p>The identity of these indictments regardless of the +general philosophical faith, empiricism, or rationalism, +realism, or idealism to which the reformer or the +logic to be reformed has belonged, suggests that +whatever the differences in the doctrines of these various +philosophic traditions, they possess a common +ground from which these common difficulties spring.</p> + +<p>It is the conviction of a number who are at present<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">71</a></span> +attempting to rid logic of these ancient disabilities +that their common source is to be found in a lack of +continuity between the acts of intelligence (or to avoid +the dangers of hypostasis, intelligent acts) and other +acts; between logical conduct and other conduct. So +wide, indeed, is this breach, that often little remains of +the act of knowing but the name. It may still be +called an act, but it has no describable instruments nor +technique of operation. It is an indefinable and often +mystical performance of which only the results can be +stated. In recent logical discussion this techniqueless +act of knowing has been properly enough transformed +into an indefinable "external relation" in which an +entity called a knower stands to another entity called +the known.</p> + +<p>For many centuries this breach between the operations +of intelligence and other operations has been +closed by various metaphysical devices with the result +that logic has been a hybrid science,—half logic, half +metaphysics and epistemology. So great has been +the momentum of the metaphysical tradition that long +after we have begun to discover the connection between +logical and non-logical operations its methods remain +to plague us. Efforts to heal the breach without a +direct appeal to metaphysical agencies have been made +by attempting a complete logicizing of all operations. +But besides requiring additional metaphysics to effect +it, the procedure is as fatal to continuity as is an impassable +disjunction. Continuity demands distinction +as well as connection. It requires the development, the +<i>growth</i> of old material and functions into new forms.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">72</a></span>Driven by the difficulties of this complete logicization, +which are as serious as those of isolation, logical +theory was obliged to reinstate some sort of distinction. +This it did by resorting to the categories of +"explicit" and "implicit." All so-called non-logical +operations were regarded as "implicitly" logical. +And, paradoxically, logical operations had for their +task the transformation of the implicit into the explicit.</p> + +<p>An adequate account of the origin and continuance +of this isolation of the conduct of intelligence +from other conduct is too long a story to be +told here. Suffice it to recall that in the society in +which the distinction between immediate and reflective +experience, between opinion and science, between percepts +and universals was first made, intelligence was +largely the possession of a special and privileged class +removed in great measure from hand-to-hand contact +with nature and with much of society. Because it did +not fully participate in the operations of nature and +society intelligence could not become fully domesticated, +i.e., fully naturalized and socialized in its world. It +was a charmed spectator of the cosmic and social drama. +Doubtless when Greek intelligence discovered the distinction +between immediate and reflective experience—possibly +the most momentous discovery in history—"the +world," as Kant says of the speculations of +Thales, "must suddenly have appeared in a new light." +But not recognizing the full significance of this discovery, +ideas, universals, became but a wondrous spectacle +for the eye of reason. They brought, to be sure, +blessed relief from the bewildering and baffling flux of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">73</a></span> +perception. But it was the relief of sanctuary, not of +victory.</p> + +<p>That the brilliant speculations of Greek intelligence +were barren because there was no technique for testing +and applying them in detail is an old story. But it +is merely a restatement, not a solution, of the pertinent +question. This is: why did not Greek intelligence +develop such a technique? The answer lies in +the fact that the technique of intelligence is to be found +precisely in the details of the operations of nature and of +human conduct from which an aristocratic intelligence +is always in large measure shut off. Intelligence cannot +operate fruitfully in a vacuum. It must be incarnate. +It must, as Hegel said, have "hands and feet." +When we turn to the history of modern science the one +thing that stands out is that it was not until the point +was reached where intelligence was ready (continuing +the Hegelian figure) to thrust its hands into the vitals +of nature and society that it began to acquire a real +control over its operations.</p> + +<p>In default of such controlling technique there was +nothing to be done with this newly found instrument of +intelligence—the universal—but to retain it as an object +of contemplation and of worshipful adoration. +This involved, of course, its hypostasis as the metaphysical +reality of supreme importance. With this, the +only difference between "opinion" and "science" became +one of the kind of objects known. That universals +were known by reason and particulars by sense +was of little more logical significance than that sounds +are known by the ear and smells by the nose. Particulars<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">74</a></span> +and universals were equally given. If the latter required +some abstraction this was regarded as merely +auxiliary to the immediate vision, as sniffing is to the +perception of odor. That universals should or could +be conceived as experimental, as hypotheses, was, when +translated into later theology, the sin against the Holy +Ghost.</p> + +<p>However, the fact that the particulars in the world +of opinion were the stimuli to the "recollection" of +universals and that the latter in turn were the patterns, +the forms, for the particulars, opened the way in actual +practice for the exercise of a great deal of the controlling +function of the universals. But the failure to +recognize this control value of the universal as fundamental, +made it necessary for the universal to exercise +its function surreptitiously, in the disguise of a pattern +and in the clumsy garb of imitation and participation.</p> + +<p>With perceptions, desires, and impulses relegated to +the world of opinion and shadows, and with the newly +discovered instrument of knowledge turned into an object, +the knower was stripped of all his knowing apparatus +and was left an empty, scuttled entity definable +and describable only as "a knower." The knower +must know, even if he had nothing to know with. +Hence the mystical almost indefinable character of the +knowing act or relation. I say "almost indefinable"; +for as an act it had, of course, to have some sort of +conceptualized form. And this form vision naturally +furnished. "Naturally," because intelligence was so +largely contemplative, and vision so largely immediate, +unanalyzed, and diaphanous. There was, to be sure, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">75</a></span> +concept of effluxes. But this was a statement of the +fact of vision in terms of its results, not of the process +itself. Thus it was that the whole terminology of +knowing which we still use was moulded and fixed upon +a very crude conception of one of the constituents of +its process. There can be no doubt that this terminology +has added much to the inertia against which +the advance of logical theory has worked. It would +be interesting to see what would be the effect upon +logical theory of the substitution of an auditory or +olfactory terminology for visual; or of a visual terminology +revised to agree with modern scientific analysis +of the <i>act</i> of vision as determined by its connections +with other functions.</p> + +<p>With the act of knowing stripped of its technique +and left a bare, unique, indescribable act or relation, the +foundations for epistemological and metaphysical logic +were laid. That Greek logic escaped the ravages of +epistemology was due to the saving materialism in its +metaphysical conception of mind and to the steadfastness +of the aristocratic régime. But when medieval +theology and Cartesian metaphysics had destroyed the +last remnant of metaphysical connection between the +knowing mind and nature, and when revolutions had +torn the individual from his social moorings, the stage +for epistemological logic was fully set. I do not mean +to identify the epistemological situation with the Cartesian +disjunction. That disjunction was but the metaphysical +expression of the one which constitutes the +real foundation of epistemology—the disjunction, +namely, between the act of knowing and other acts.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">76</a></span>From +this point logic has followed one of two +general courses. It has sought continuity by attempting +to reduce non-logical things and operations to terms +of logical operations, i.e., to sensations or universals +or both; or it has attempted to exclude entirely the act +of knowing from logic and to transfer logical distinctions +and operations, and even the attributes of truth +and error to objects which, significantly enough, are +still composed of these same hypostatized logical processes. +The first course results in an epistemological +logic of some form of the idealistic tradition, rationalism, +sensationalism, or transcendentalism, depending +upon whether universals, or sensations, or a combination +of both, is made fundamental in the constitution of +the object. The second course yields an epistemological +logic of the realistic type,—again, sensational or rationalistic +(mathematical), or a combination of the +two—a sort of realistic transcendentalism. Each type +has essentially the same difficulties with the processes +of inference, with the problem of change, with truth +and error, and, on the ethical side, with good and evil.</p> + +<p>With the processes of knowing converted into objects, +and with the act of knowing reduced to a unique +and external relation between the despoiled knower and +the objects made from its own hypostatized processes, +all knowing becomes in the end immediate. All attempts +at an inference that is anything more than an elaborated +and often confused restatement of non-logical +operations break down. The associational inference +of empiricism, the subsumptive inference of rationalism, +the transcendental inference of objective idealism, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">77</a></span> +analytical inference of neo-realism—all alike face +the dilemma of an inference that is trifling or +miraculous, tautologous or false. Where the knower +and its object are so constituted that the only relation +in which the latter can stand to the former is that of +presence or absence, and if to be present is to be known, +how, as Plato asked, can there be any false knowing?</p> + +<p>For those who accept the foregoing general diagnosis +the prescription is obvious. The present task of logical +theory is the restoration of the continuity of the act +and agent of knowing with other acts and agents. But +this is not to be done by merely furnishing the act of +knowing with a body and a nervous system. If the +nervous system be regarded as only an onlooking, beholding +nervous system, if no connection be made between +the logical operations of a nervous system and +its other operations a nervous system has no logical +advantage over a purely psychical mind.</p> + +<p>It was to be expected that this movement toward +restoration of continuity made in the name of "instrumental" +or "experimental" logic would be regarded, +alike, by the logics of rationalism and empiricism, of +idealism and of realism, as an attempt to rob intelligence +of its own unique and proper character; to reduce +it to a merely "psychological" and "existential" affair; +to leave no place for genuine intellectual interest +and activity; and to make science a series of more or +less respectable adventures. The counter thesis is, that +this restoration is truly a restoration—not a despoliation +of the character and rights of intelligence; that +only such a restoration can preserve the unique function<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">78</a></span> +of intelligence, can prevent it from becoming merely +"existential," and can provide a distinct place for intellectual +and scientific interest and activity. It does +not, however, promise to remove the stigma of "adventure" +from science. Every experiment is an adventure; +and it is precisely the experimental character +of scientific logic that distinguishes it from scholasticism, +medieval or modern.</p> + +<h5>II</h5> + +<p>First it is clear that a reform of logic based upon the +restoration of knowing to its connections with other +acts will begin with a chapter containing an account +of these other operations and the general character of +this connection.<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Logical theory has been truncated. +It has tried to begin and end in the middle, with the +result that it has ended in the air. Logic presents the +curious anachronism of a science which attempts to +deal with its subject-matter apart from what it comes +from and what comes from it.</p> + +<p>The objection that such a chapter on the conditions +and genesis of the operations of knowing belongs to +psychology, only shows how firmly fixed is the discontinuity +we are trying to escape. As we have seen, the +original motive for leaving this account of genesis to +psychology was that the act of knowing was supposed +to originate in a purely psychical mind. Such an origin +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">79</a></span> +was of course embarrassing to logic, which aimed to be +scientific. The old opposition between origin and +validity was due to the kind of origin assumed and the +kind of validity necessitated by the origin. One may +well be excused for evading the question of how ideas, +originated in a purely psychical mind, can, in Kant's +phrase, "have objective validity," by throwing out the +question of origin altogether. Whatever difficulties remain +for validity after this expulsion could not be +greater than those of the task of combining the objective +validity of ideas with their subjective origin.</p> + +<p>The whole of this chapter on the connection between +logical and non-logical operations cannot be written +here. But its central point would be that these other +acts with which the act of knowing must have continuity +are just the operations of our unreflective conduct. +Note that it is "unreflective," not "unconscious," nor +yet merely "instinctive" conduct. It is our perceptive, +remembering, imagining, desiring, loving, hating +conduct. Note also that we do not say "psychical" or +"physical," nor "psycho-physical" conduct. These +terms stand for certain distinctions in logical conduct,<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> +and we are here concerned with the character of non-logical +conduct which is to be distinguished from, and +yet kept in closest continuity with, logical conduct.</p> + +<p>If, here, the metaphysical logician should ask: "Are +you not in this assumption of a world of reflective and +unreflective conduct and affection, and of a world of +beings in interaction, begging a whole system of metaphysics?" +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">80</a></span> +the reply is that if it is a metaphysics bad +for logic, it will keep turning up in the course of logical +theory as a constant source of trouble. On the +other hand, if logic encounters grave difficulties +when it attempts to get on without it, its assumption, +for the purposes of logic, has all the justification possible.</p> + +<p>Again it will be urged that this alleged non-logical +conduct, in so far as it involves perception, memory, +and anticipation, is already cognitive and logical; or if +the act of knowing is to be entirely excluded from logic, +then, in so far as what is left involves objective "terms +and relations," it, also, is already logical. And it may +be thought strange that a logic based upon the restoration +of continuity between the act of knowing and other +acts should here be insisting on distinction and separation. +The point is fundamental; and must be disposed +of before we go on. First, we must observe that the +unity secured by making all conscious conduct logical +turns out, on examination, to be more nominal than +real. As we have already seen, this attempt at a complete +logicizing of all conduct is forced at once to introduce +the distinction of "explicit" and "implicit," of +"conscious and unconscious" or "subconscious" logic. +Some cynics have found that this suggests dividing +triangles into explicit and implicit triangles, or into +triangles and sub-triangles.</p> + +<p>Doubtless the attempt to make all perceptions, memories, +and anticipations, and even instincts and habits, +into implicit or subconscious inference is an awkward +effort to restore the continuity of logical and non-logical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">81</a></span> +conduct. Its awkwardness consists in attempting +to secure this continuity by the method of subsumptive +identity, instead of finding it in a transitive continuity +of function;—instead of seeing that perception, memory, +and anticipation <i>become</i> logical processes when +they are employed in a process of inquiry, whose purpose +is to relieve the difficulties into which these operations +in their function as direct stimuli have fallen. +Logical conduct is constituted by the coöperation of +these processes for the improvement of their further +operation. To regard perception, memory, and imagination +as implicit forms or as sub-species of logical +operation is much like conceiving the movements of our +fingers and arms as implicit or imperfect species of +painting, or swimming.</p> + +<p>Moreover, this doctrine of universal logicism teaches +that when that which is perfect is come, imperfection +shall be done away. This should mean that when painting +becomes completely "explicit" and perfect, fingers +and hands shall disappear. Perfect painting will be +the pure essence of painting. And this interpretation +is not strained; for this logic expressly teaches that in +the perfected real system all temporal elements are +unessential to logical operations. They are, of course, +<i>psychologically</i> necessary for finite beings, who can +never have perfectly logical experiences. But, from +the standpoint of a completely logicized experience, all +finite, temporal processes are accidents, not essentials, +of logical operations.</p> + +<p>The fact that the processes of perception, +memory, and anticipation are transformed in their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">82</a></span> +logical operation into sensations and universals, terms, +and relations, and, as such, become the subject-matter +of logical theory, does not mean that they have +lost their mediating character, and have become merely +objects of logical contemplation at large. Sensations +or sense-data, and ideas, terms and relations, are +the subject-matter of logical theory for the reason that +they sometimes succeed and sometimes fail in their +logical operations. And it is the business of logical +theory to diagnose the conditions of this success and +failure. If, in writing, my pen becomes defective and +is made an object of inquiry, it does not therefore lose +all its character as a pen and become merely an object +at large. It is <i>as</i> an instrument of writing that it is +investigated. So, sense-data, universals, terms, and +relations as subject-matter of logic are investigated in +their character <i>as</i> mediators of the ambiguities and +conflicts, of non-logical experience.</p> + +<p>If the operations of habit, instinct, perceptions, +memory, and anticipation <i>become</i> logical, when, instead +of operating as direct stimuli, they are employed in a +process of inquiry, we must next ask: (1) under +what conditions do they pass over into this process of +inquiry? (2) what modifications of operation do they +undergo, what new forms do they take, and what new +results do they produce in their logical operations?</p> + +<p>If the act of inquiry be not superimposed, it must +arise out of some specific condition in the course of non-logical +conduct. Once more, if the alarm be sounded +at this proposal to find the origin of logical in non-logical +operations it must be summarily answered by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">83</a></span> +asking if the one who raises the cry finds it impossible +to imagine that one who is not hungry, or angry, or +patriotic, or wise may become so. Non-logical conduct +is not the abstract formal contradictory of logical conduct +any more than present satiety or foolishness is +the contradictory of later hunger or wisdom, or than +anger at one person contradicts cordiality to another, +or to the same person, later. The old bogie of the +logical irrelevance of origin was due to the inability to +conceive continuity except in the form of identity in +which there was no place for the notion of <i>growth</i>.</p> + +<p>The conditions under which non-logical conduct <i>becomes</i> +logical are familiar to those who have followed +the doctrines of experimental logic as expounded in the +discussions of the past few years. The transformation +begins at the point where non-logical processes instead +of operating as direct unambiguous stimuli and response +become ambiguous with consequent inhibition of conduct. +But again this does not mean that at this juncture +the non-logical processes quit the field and give +place to a totally new faculty and process called reason. +They stay on the job. But there is a change in +the job, which now is to get rid of this ambiguity. +This modification of the task requires, of course, corresponding +modification and adaptation of these +operations. They take on the form of sensations and +universals, terms and relations, data and hypotheses. +This modification of function and form constitutes +"reason" or, better, reasoning.</p> + +<p>Here some one will ask, "Whence comes this ambiguity? +How can a mere perception or memory as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">84</a></span> +such be ambiguous? Must it not be ambiguous to, or +for, something, or some one?" The point is well taken. +But it should not be taken to imply that the ambiguity +is for a merely onlooking, beholding psychical mind—especially +when the perception is itself regarded as an +act of beholding. Nor are we any better off if we suppose +the beholding mind to be equipped with a faculty +of reason in the form of the principle of "contradiction." +For this throws no light on the origin and +meaning of ambiguity. And if we seek to make all perceptions +as such ambiguous and contradictory, in order +to make room for, and justify, the operations of reason, +other difficulties at once beset us. When we attempt +to remove this specific ambiguity of perceptive conduct +we shall be forced, before we are through, to appeal +back to perception, which we have condemned as inherently +contradictory, both for data and for verification.</p> + +<p>However, the insistence that perception must be ambiguous +to, or for, something beyond itself is well +grounded. And this was recognized in the statement +that it is equivocal as a stimulus in conduct. There +need be no mystery as to how such equivocation arises. +That there is such a thing as a conduct at all means +that there are certain beings who have acquired definite +ways of responding to one another. It is important +to observe that these forms of interaction—instinct +and habit, perception, memory, etc.—are not to be +located in either of the interacting beings but are functions +of both. The conception of these operations as +the private functions of an organism is the forerunner<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">85</a></span> +of the epistemological predicament. It results in a +conception of knowing as wholly the act of a knower +apart from the known. This is the beginning of epistemology.</p> + +<p>But to whatever extent interacting beings have acquired +definite and specific ways of behavior toward one +another it is equally plain—the theory of external relations +notwithstanding—that in this process of interaction +these ways of behavior, of stimulus and response, +undergo modification. If the world consisted of +two interacting beings, it is conceivable that +the modifications of behavior might occur in +such close continuity of relation to each of +the interacting beings that the adjustment would +be very continuous, and there might be little or no +ambiguity and conflict. But in a world where any two +interacting beings have innumerable interactions with +innumerable other beings and in all these interactions +modifications are effected, it is to be expected that +changes in the behavior of each or both will occur, so +marked that they are bound to result in breaks in the +continuity of stimulus and response—even to the point +of tragedy. However, the tragedy is seldom so great +that the ambiguity extends to the whole field of conduct. +Except in extreme pathological cases (and in +epistemology), complete skepticism and aboulia do not +occur. Ambiguity always falls within a field or direction +of conduct, and though it may extend much further, +and must extend some further than the point at which +equivocation occurs, yet it is never ubiquitous. An +ambiguity concerning the action of gravitation is no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">86</a></span> +less specific than one regarding color or sound; indeed, +the one may be found to involve the other.</p> + +<p>Logical conduct is, then, conduct which aims to +remove ambiguity and inhibition in unreflective +conduct. The instruments of its operation are forged +from the processes of unreflective conduct by such +modification and adaptation as is required to enable +them to accomplish this end. Since these logical operations +sometimes fail and sometimes succeed they become +the subject-matter of logical theory. But the +technique of this second involution of reflection is not +supplied by some new and unique entity. It also is +derived from modifications of previous operations of +both reflective and non-reflective conduct.</p> + +<p>While emphasizing the continuity between non-logical +and logical operations, we must keep in mind that +their distinction is of equal importance. Confusion at +this point is fatal. A case in point is the confusion +between non-logical and logical observation. The results +of non-logical observation, e.g., looking and listening, +are direct stimuli to further conduct. But the +purpose and result of <i>logical</i> observation are to secure +data, not as direct stimuli to immediate conduct but as +stimuli to the construction or verification of hypotheses +which are the responses of the <i>logical</i> operation of imagination +to the data. Hypotheses are anticipatory. +But they differ from non-logical anticipation in that +they are tentatively, experimentally, i.e., logically anticipatory. +The non-logical operations of memory and +anticipation lack just this tentative, experimental character. +When we confuse the logical and non-logical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">87</a></span> +operations of these processes the result is either that +logical processes will merely repeat non-logical operations +in which case we have inference that is tautologous +and trifling; or the non-logical will attempt to +perform logical operations, and our inference is +miraculous. If we seek to escape by an appeal to habit, +as in empiricism, or to an objective universal, as in +idealism and neo-realism, we are merely disguising, not +removing the miracle.</p> + +<p>It may be thought that this confusion would be most +likely to occur in a theory which teaches that non-logical +processes are carried over into logical operations. But +this overlooks the fact that the theory recognizes at +the same time that these non-logical operations undergo +modification and adaptation to the demands of the logical +enterprise. On the other hand, those who make all +perceptions, memory, and anticipation, not to speak of +habit and instinct, logical, have no basis for the distinction +between logical and non-logical results; while those +who refuse to give the operations of perception, memory, +etc., any place in logic can make no connections +between logical and non-logical conduct. Nor are they +able to distinguish in a specific case truth from error.</p> + +<p>In all logics that fail to make this connection and +distinction between logical and non-logical operations +there is no criterion for data. If ultimate simplicity +is demanded of the data, there is no standard +for simplicity except the <i>minimum sensibile</i> or the +<i>minimum intelligibile</i> which have recently been +resurrected. On the other hand, where simplicity is +waived, as in the logic of objective idealism, there is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">88</a></span> +still no criterion of logical adequacy. But if we understand +by <i>logical</i> data not anything that happens to be +given, but something <i>sought</i> as material for an hypothesis, +i.e., a proposed solution (proposition) of an +ambiguous object of conduct and affection, then whatever +results of observation meet this requirement are +logical data. And whenever data are found from which +an hypothesis is constructed that succeeds in abolishing +the ambiguity, they are simple, adequate, and true +data.</p> + +<p>No scientist, not even the mathematician, in the +specific investigations of his field, seeks for ultimate +and irreducible data at large. And if he found them he +could not use them. It is only in his metaphysical personality +that he longs for such data. The data which +the scientist in any specific inquiry seeks are the data +which suggest a solution of the question in which the +investigation starts. When these data are found they +are the "irreducibles" of that problem. But they are +relative to the question and answer of the investigation. +Their simplicity consists in the fact that they are the +data from which a conclusion can be made. The term +"simple data" is tautologous. That one is in need +of data more "simple" means that one is in need of +new data from which an hypothesis can be formed.</p> + +<p>It is true that the actual working elements with which +the scientist operates are always complex in the sense +that they are always something more than elements in +any specific investigation. They have other connections +and alliances. And this complexity is at once the +despair and the hope of the scientist; his despair, be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">89</a></span>cause +he cannot be sure when these other connections +will interfere with the allegiance of his elements to his +particular undertaking; his hope, because when these +alliances are revealed they often make the elements more +efficient or exhibit capacities which will make them +elements in some other undertaking for which elements +have not been found. A general resolves his army into +so many marching, eating, shooting units; but these +elements are something more than marching, shooting +units. They are husbands and fathers, brothers and +lovers, protestants and catholics, artists and artisans, +etc. And the militarist can never be sure at what point +these other activities—I do not say merely external +relationships—may upset his calculations. If he could +find units whose whole and sole nature is to march and +shoot, his problem would be, in some respects, simpler, +though in others more complex. As it is, he is constantly +required to ask how far these other functions +will support and at what point they will rebel at the +marching and shooting.</p> + +<p>Such, in principle, is the situation in every scientific +inquiry. When the failure of the old elements occurs +it is common to say that "simpler" elements are +needed. And doubtless in his perplexity the scientist +may long for elements which have no entangling alliances, +whose sole nature and character is to be +elements. But what in fact he actually seeks in every +specific investigation are elements whose nature and +functions <i>will not interfere</i> with their serving as units +in the enterprise in hand. But from some other standpoint +these new elements may be vastly more complex<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">90</a></span> +than the old, as is the case with the modern as compared +with the ancient atom. When the elements are +secured which operate successfully, the non-interfering +connections can be ignored and the elements can be +treated as if they did not have them,—as if they were +metaphysically simple. But there is no criterion for +metaphysical simplicity except operative simplicity. +To be simple is to serve as an element, and to serve +as an element is to be simple.</p> + +<p>It is scarcely necessary in view of the foregoing to +add that the data of science are not "sense-data," if +by sense-data be meant data which are the result of the +operations of sense organs alone. Data are as much +or more the result of operations, first, of the motor +system of the scientist's own organism, and second, of +all of the machinery of his laboratory which he calls +to his aid. Whether named after the way they are obtained, +or after the way they are used, data are quite +as much "motor" as "sense." Nor, on the other hand, +are there any purely intellectual data—not even for the +mathematician. Some mathematicians may insist that +their symbols and diagrams are merely stimuli to the +platonic operation of pure and given universals. But +until mathematics can get on without these symbols or +any substitutes the intuitionist in mathematics will +continue to have his say.</p> + +<p>Wherever the discontinuity between logical operations +and their acts persists, all the difficulties with data have +their correlative difficulties with hypotheses. In Mill's +logic the account of the origin of hypotheses oscillates +between the view that they are happy guesses of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">91</a></span> +a mind composed of states of consciousness, and +the view that they are "found in the facts" or +are "impressed on the mind by the facts." The +miracle of relevancy required in the first position +drives the theory to the second. And the tautologous, +useless nature of the hypothesis in the second +forces the theory back to the first view. In this +predicament, little wonder Mill finds that the easiest +way out is to make hypotheses "auxiliary" and not indigenous +to inference. But this exclusion of hypotheses +as essential leaves his account of inference to oscillate +between the association of particulars of nominalism +and scholastic formalism, from both of which Mill, with +the dignified zeal of a prophet, set out to rescue +logic.</p> + +<p>Mill's rejection of hypotheses formed by a mind +whose operations have no discoverable continuity with +the operations of things, or by things whose actions +are independent of the operations of ideas, is forever +sound. But his acceptance of the discontinuity between +the acts of knowing and the operation of things, +and the conclusion that these two conceptions of the +origin and nature of hypotheses are the only alternatives, +were the source of most of his difficulties.</p> + +<h5>III</h5> + +<p>The efforts of classic empiricism at the reform of +logic have long been an easy mark for idealistic reformers. +But it is interesting to observe that the idealistic +logic from the beginning finds itself in precisely the +same predicament regarding hypotheses;—they are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">92</a></span> +trifling or false. And in the end they are made, as +in Mill, "accidents" of inference.</p> + +<p>The part played by Kant's sense-material and the +categories is almost the reverse of those of data and +hypothesis in science. Sense material and the categories +are the given elements from which objects are +somehow made; in scientific procedure data and hypothesis +are derived through logical observation and imagination +from the content and operations of immediate +experience. In Kant's account of the process by which +objects are constructed we are nowhere in sight of any +experimental procedure. Indeed, the real act of knowing, +the selection and application of the category to +the sense matter, is, as Kant in the end had to confess, +"hidden away in the depths of the soul." Made in +the presence of the elaborate machinery of knowing +which Kant had constructed, this confession is almost +tragic; and the tragic aspect grows when we find that +the result of the "hidden" operation is merely a phenomenal +object. That this should be the case, however, +is not strange. A phenomenal object is the inevitable +correlate of the "hidden" act of knowing whether in +a "transcendental" or in an "empirical" logic. In +vain do we call the act of knowing "constructive" +and "synthetic" if its method of synthesis is hidden. +A transcendental unity whose method is indefinable has +no advantage over empirical association.</p> + +<p>It was the dream of Kant as of Mill to replace the +logics of sensationalism and rationalism with a "logic +of things" and of "truth." But as Mill's things turned +to states of consciousness, so Kant's are phenomenal.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">93</a></span> +Their common fate proclaims their common failure—the +failure to reëstablish continuity between the conduct +of intelligence and other conduct.</p> + +<p>One of the chief counts in Hegel's indictment of +Kant's logic is that "it had no influence on the methods +of science."<a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> Hegel's explanation is that Kant's categories +have no genesis; they are not constructed in +and as part of logical operations. As given, ready-made, +their relevance is a miracle. But if categories +be "generated" in the process of knowing, says Hegel, +they are indigenous, and their fitness is inevitable. +In such statements Hegel raises expectations that we +are at last to have a logic which squares with the procedure +of science. But when we discover that instead +of being "generated" out of all the material involved +in the scientific problem Hegel's categories are derived +from each other, misgivings arise. And when we further +learn that this "genesis" is timeless, which means that, +after all, the categories stand related to each other in +a closed, eternal system of implication, we abandon +hope of a scientific—i.e., experimental—logic.</p> + +<p>Hegel also says it is the business of philosophy "to +substitute categories or in more precise language adequate +notions for the several modes of feeling, perception, +desire, and will." The word "substitute" reveals +the point at issue. If "to substitute" means that +philosophy is a complete exchange of the modes of +feeling, perception, desire, and will for a world of categories +or notions, then, saying nothing of the range of +values in such a world, the problem of the meaning +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">94</a></span> +of "adequate" is on our hands. What is the +notion to be adequate to? But if "to substitute" +means that the modes of feeling, perception, desire, and +will, when in a specific situation of ambiguity and inhibition, +go over into, take on, the modes of data and +hypothesis in the effort to get rid of inhibiting conflict +that is quite another matter. Here the "notion," +as the scientific hypothesis, has a criterion for its adequacy. +But if the notion usurps the place of feeling, +perception, desire, and will, as many find, in the end, +it does in Hegel's logic, it thereby loses all tests +for the adequacy of its function and character as a +notion.</p> + +<p>In the development of the logical doctrines of Kant +and Hegel by Lotze, Green, Sigwart, Bradley, Bosanquet, +Royce, and others, there are indeed differences. +But these differences only throw their common ground +into bolder relief. This common ground is that, procedure +by hypotheses, by induction, is, in the language +of Professor Bosanquet, "a transient and external +characteristic of inference."<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> And the ground of this +verdict is essentially the same as Mill's, when he rejects +hypotheses "made by the mind," namely, that such +hypotheses are too subjective in their origin and nature +to have objective validity. "Objective" idealism is +trying, like Mill, to escape the subjectivism of the +purely individual and "psychical" knower. But, being +unable to reconstruct the finite knower, and being +too sophisticated to make what it regards as Mill's +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">95</a></span> +naïve appeal to "hypotheses found in things," it transfers +the real process of inference to the "objective +universal," and the process of all thought, including +inference, is now defined as "<i>the reproduction, by a +universal presented in a content, of contents distinguished +from the presented content which also are +differences of the same universal</i>."<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a></p> + +<p>It need scarcely be said that in inference thus defined +there is scant room for hypotheses. There is +nothing "hypothetical," "experimental," or "tentative" +in this process of reproduction by the objective +universal as such. As little is there any possibility of +error. If there is anything hypothetical, or any possibility +of error, in inference, it is due to the temporal, +finite human being in which, paradoxically enough, this +process of "reproduction" goes on and to whom, at +times, is given an "infinitesimal" part in the operation, +while at other times he is said merely to "witness" +it. But the real inference does not "proceed by hypotheses"; +it is only the finite mind in witnessing the +real logical spectacle or in its "infinitesimal" contribution +to it that lamely proceeds in this manner.</p> + +<p>Here, again, we have the same break in continuity between +the finite, human act of knowing and the operations +that constitute the real world. When the logic of the +objective universal rejects imputations of harboring a +despoiled psychical knower it has in mind, of course, the +objective universal as knower, not the finite, human act. +But, if the participations of the latter are all accidents +of inference, as they are said to be, its advantage +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">96</a></span> +over a purely psychical knower, or "states +of consciousness," is difficult to see. The rejection +of metaphysical dualism is of no consequence if the +logical operations of the finite, human being are only +"accidents" of the real logical process. As already +remarked, the metaphysical disjunction is merely a +schematism of the more fundamental, logical disjunction.</p> + +<p>As for tautology and miracle, the follower of Mill +might well ask: how an association of particulars, +whether mental states or things, could be more tautologous +than a universal reproducing its own differences? +And if the transition from particular to particular is +a miracle in which the grace of God is disguised as +"habit," why is not habit as good a disguise for Providence +as universals? Moreover, by what miracle +does the one all-inclusive universal become <i>a</i> universal? +And since perception always presents a number of universals, +what determines which one shall perform the +reproduction? Finally, since there are infinite differences +of the universal that might be reproduced, what +determines just which differences shall be reproduced? +In this wise the controversy has gone on ever since the +challenge of the old rationalistic logic by the nominalists +launched the issue of empiricism and rationalism. All +the charges which each makes against the other are +easily retorted upon itself. Each side is resistless in +attack, but helpless in defense.</p> + +<p>In a conception of inference in which both data and +hypothesis are regarded as the tentative, experimental +results of the processes of perception, memory, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">97</a></span> +constructive imagination engaged in the special task +of removing conflict, ambiguity, and inhibition, and in +which these processes are not conceived as the functions +of a private mind nor of an equally private brain +and nervous system, but as functions of interacting +beings,—in such a conception there is no ground for +anxiety concerning the simplicity of data, nor the objectivity +of hypotheses. Simplicity and objectivity +do not have to be secured through elaborate and +labored metaphysical construction. The data are +simple and the hypothesis objective in so far as they +accomplish the work where unto they are called—the +removal of conflict, ambiguity, and inhibition in conduct +and affection.</p> + +<p>In the experimental conception of inference it is clear +that the principles of formal logic must play their rôle +wholly inside the course of logical operations. They +do not apply to relations <i>between</i> these operations and +"reality"; nor to "reality" itself. Formal identity +and non-contradiction signify, in experimental logic, +the complete correlativity of data and hypothesis. They +mean that <i>in</i> the logical procedure data must not be +shifted without a corresponding change in the hypothesis +and conversely. The doctrine that "theoretically" +there may be any number of hypotheses for +"the same facts" is, when these multiple hypotheses +are anything more than different names or symbols, +nothing less than the very essence of formal contradiction. +It doubtless makes little difference whether a +disease be attributed to big or little, black or red, demons +or whether the cause be represented by a, b, or c,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">98</a></span> +etc. But where data and hypotheses are such as are +capable of verification, i.e., of mutually checking up +each other, a change in one without a corresponding +modification of the other is the principle of all formal +fallacies.<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> + +<p>With this conception of the origin, nature, and functions +of logical operations little remains to be said of +their truth and falsity. If the whole enterprise of logical +operation, of the construction and verification of +hypothesis, is in the interest of the removal of ambiguity, +and inhibition in conduct, the only relevant +truth or falsity they can possess must be determined +by their success or failure in that undertaking. The +acceptance of this view of truth and error, be it said +again, depends on holding steadfastly to the conception +of the operations of knowing as <i>real acts</i>, which, though +having a distinct character and function, are yet in +closest continuity with other acts of which indeed they +are but modifications and adaptations in order to meet +the logical demand.</p> + +<p>Here, perhaps, is the place for a word on truth and +satisfaction. The satisfaction which marks the truth +of logical operations—"intellectual satisfaction"—is +the satisfaction which attends the accomplishment of +their task, viz., the removal of ambiguity in conduct, +i.e., in our interaction with other beings. It does not +mean that this satisfaction is bound to be followed by +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">99</a></span> +wholly blissful consequences. All our troubles are not +over when the distress of ambiguity is removed. It +may be indeed that the verdict of the logical operation +is that we must face certain death. Very well, we must +have felt it to be "good to know the worst," or no +inquiry would have been started. We should have +deemed ignorance bliss and sat with closed eyes waiting +for fate to overtake us instead of going forward to +meet it and in some measure determine it. Death anticipated +and accepted is <i>realiter</i> very different from +death that falls upon us unawares, however we may +estimate that difference. If this distinction in the <i>foci</i> +of satisfaction is kept clear it must do away with a +large amount of the hedonistic interpretations of satisfaction +in which many critics have indulged.</p> + +<p>But hereupon some one may exclaim, as did a colleague +recently: "Welcome to the ranks of the intellectualists!" +If so, the experimentalist is bound to +reply that he is as willing, and as unwilling, to be welcomed +to the ranks of intellectualism as to those of +anti-intellectualism. He wonders, however, how long +the welcome would last in either. Among the intellectualists +the welcome would begin to cool as soon as it +should be discovered that the ambiguity to which logical +operations are the response is not regarded by the experimentalist +as a purely intellectual affair. It is an +ambiguity in conduct with all the attendant affectional +values that may be at stake.<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> It is, to be sure, the +fact of ambiguity, and the effort to resolve it, that adds +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">100</a></span> +the intellectual, logical character to conduct and to +affectional values. But if the logical interest attempts +entirely to detach itself it will soon be without either +subject-matter or criterion. And if it sets itself up as +supreme, we shall be forced to say that our quandaries +of affection, our problems of life and death are merely +to furnish occasions and material for logical operations.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the welcome of the anti-intellectualists +is equally sure to wane when the experimentalist +asserts that the doctrine that logical operations +mutilate the wholeness of immediate experience overlooks +the palpable fact that it is precisely these immediate +experiences—the experiences of intuition and instinct—that +get into conflict and inhibit and mutilate +one another, and as a consequence are obliged to go +into logical session to patch up the mutilation and +provide new and better methods of coöperation.</p> + +<p>At this point the weakness in Bergson's view of logical +operations appears. Bergson, too, is impressed by +the break in continuity between logical operations and +the rest of experience. But with Mr. Bradley he believes +this breach to be essentially incurable, because +the mutilations and disjunctions are due to and introduced +by logical operations. Just why the latter are +introduced remains in the end a mystery. Both, to be +sure, believe that logical operations are valuable for +"practical" purposes,—for action. But, aside from +the question of <i>how</i> operations essentially mutilative can +be valuable for action, immediate intuitional experience +being already in unity with Reality, why should there +be any practical need for logical operations—least<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">101</a></span> +of all such as introduce disjunction and mutilation?</p> + +<p>The admission of a demand for logical operations, +whether charged to matter, the devil, or any other +metaphysical adversary, is, of course, a confession that +conflict and ambiguity are as fundamental in experience +as unity and immediacy and that logical operations +are therefore no less indigenous. The failure to see +this implication is responsible for the paradox that in +the logic of Creative Evolution the operations of intelligence +are neither creative nor evolutional. They +not only have no constructive part but are positively +destructive and devolutional.</p> + +<p>Since, moreover, these logical operations, like those +of the objective universal, and like Mill's association +of particulars, can only reproduce in fragmentary +form what has already been done, it is difficult to see +how they can meet the demands of action. For here +no more than in Mill, or in the logic of idealism, is +there any place for constructive hypotheses or any +technique by which they can become effective. Whatever +"Creative Evolution" may be, there is no place +in its logic for "Creative Intelligence."</p> + +<h5>IV</h5> + +<p>The prominence in current discussion of the logical +reforms proposed by the "analytic logic" of the neo-realistic +movement and the enthusiastic optimism of its +representatives over the prospective results of these +reforms for logic, science, and practical life are the warrant +for devoting a special section to their discussion.</p> + +<p>There are indeed some marked differences of opinion<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">102</a></span> +among the expounders of the "new logic" concerning +the results which it is expected to achieve. Some find +that it clears away incredible accumulations of metaphysical +lumber; others rejoice that it is to restore +metaphysics, "once the queen of the sciences, to her +ancient throne."</p> + +<p>But whatever the difference among the representatives +of analytical logic all seem agreed at the outset +on two fundamental reforms which the "new logic" +makes. These are: first, that analytic logic gets rid +entirely of the <i>act</i> of knowing, the retention of which +has been the bane of all other logics; second, in its discovery +of "terms and relations," "sense-data and +universals" as the simple elements not only of logic +but of the world, it furnishes science at last with +the simple neutral elements at large which it is supposed +science so long has sought, and "mourned because it +found them not."</p> + +<p>Taking these in order, we are told that "realism frees +logic as a study of objective fact from all accounts of +the states and operations of mind." ... "Logic and +mathematics are sciences which can be pursued quite +independently of the study of knowing."<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> "The new +logic believes that it deals with no such entities as +thoughts, ideas, or minds, but with entities that merely +are."<a href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> + +<p>The motive for the banishment of the act of knowing +from logic is that as an <i>act</i> knowing is "mental," +"psychological," and "subjective."<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> All other logics +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">103</a></span>have indeed realized this subjective character of the <i>act</i> +of knowing, but have neither dared completely to discard +it nor been able sufficiently to counteract its effects +even with such agencies as the objective universal +to prevent it from infecting logic with its subjectivity. +Because logic has tolerated and attempted to compromise +with this subjective act of knowing, say these +reformers, it has been forced constantly into epistemology +and has become a hybrid science. Had logic +possessed the courage long ago to throw overboard this +subjective Jonah it would have been spared the storms +of epistemology and the reefs of metaphysics.</p> + +<p>Analytic logic is the first attempt in the history of +modern logical theory at a deliberate, sophisticated exclusion +of the act of knowing from logic. Other logics, +to be sure, have tried to neutralize the effects of its +presence, but none has had the temerity to cast it bodily +overboard. The experiment, therefore, is highly interesting.</p> + +<p>We should note at the outset that in regarding the +act of knowing as incurably "psychical" and "subjective" +analytic logic accepts a fundamental premise +of the logics of rationalism, empiricism, and idealism +which it seeks to reform. It is true that it is the +bold proposal of analytic logic to keep logic out +of the pit of epistemology by excluding the +act of knowing from logic. Nevertheless analytic +logic still accepts the subjective character of this +act; and if it excludes it from its logic it welcomes it +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">104</a></span>in its psychology. This is a dangerous situation. Can +the analytic logician prevent all osmosis between his +logic and his psychology?<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> If not, and if the psychological +act is subjective, woe then to his logic. +Had the new logic begun with a bold challenge of the +psychical character of the act of knowing, the prospect +of a logic free from epistemology would have been +much brighter.</p> + +<p>With the desire to rid logic of the epistemological +taint the "experimental logic" of the pragmatic movement +has the strongest sympathy. But the proposal to +effect this by the excision of the act of knowing appears +to experimental logic to be a case of heroic but fatal +surgery. <i>Prima facie</i> a logic with no act of knowing +presents an uncanny appearance. What sort of logical +operations are possible in such a logic and of what +kind of truth and falsity are they capable?</p> + +<p>Before taking up these questions in detail it is worth +while to note the character of the entities that "merely +are" with which analytic logic proposes exclusively to +deal. In their general form they are "terms" and +"propositions," "sense-data" and universals. We are +struck at once by the fact that these entities bear the +names of logical operations. They are, to be sure, disguised +as entities and have been baptised in a highly +dilute solution of objectivity called "subsistence." +But this does not conceal their origin, nor does it obscure +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">105</a></span> +the fact that if it is possible for any entities +that "merely are" to have logical character those +made from hypostatized processes of logical operations +should be the most promising. They might +be expected to retain some vestiges of logical character +even after they have been torn from the process +of inquiry and converted into "entities that merely +are." Also it is not surprising that having stripped +the act of knowing of its constituent operations +analytic logic should feel that it can well dispense +with the empty shell called "mind" and, as Professor +Dewey says, "wish it on psychology." But if the +analytic logician be also a philosopher and perchance +a lover of his fellow-man, it is hard to see how he can +have a good conscience over this disposition of the +case.</p> + +<p>Turning now to the character of inference and of +truth and falsity which are possible in a logic which +excludes the operation of knowing and deals only with +"entities that are," all the expounders seem to agree +that in such a logic inference must be purely deductive. +All alleged induction is either disguised deduction or +a lucky guess. This raises apprehension at the +start concerning the value of analytic logic for other +sciences. But let us observe what deduction in analytic +logic is.</p> + +<p>We begin at once with a distinction which involves +the whole issue.<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> We are asked to carefully distinguish +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">106</a></span> +"logical" deduction from "psychological" deduction. +The latter is the vulgar meaning of the term, +and is "the thinker's name for his own act of conforming +his thought" to the objective and independent processes +that constitute the real logical process. This act +of conforming the mind is a purely "psychological" +affair. It has no logical function whatever. In what +the "conforming" consists is not clear. It seems to be +merely the act of turning the "psychological" eye on +the objective logical process. "One beholds it (the +logical process) as one beholds a star, a river, a character +in a play.... The novelist and the dramatist, +like the mathematician and logician, are onlookers at +the logical spectacle."<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> On the other hand, the term +"conforming" suggests a task, with the possibilities +of success and failure. Have we, then, two wholly independent +possibilities of error—one merely "psychological," +the other "logical"? The same point may be +made even more obviously with reference to the term +"beholding." The term is used as if beholding were a perfectly +simple act, having no problems and no possibilities +of mistakes—as if there could be no mis-beholding.<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> + +<p>But fixing our psychological eye on the "logical +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">107</a></span>spectacle," what does it behold? A universal generating +an infinite series of identical instances of itself—i.e., +instances which differ only in "logical position." If in +a world of entities that "merely are" the term "generation" +causes perplexity, the tension is soon relieved; +for this turns out to be a merely subsistential non-temporal +generation which, like Hegel's generation of +the categories, in no way compromises a world of entities +that "merely are."</p> + +<p>Steering clear of the thicket of metaphysical problems +that we here encounter, let us keep to the logical +trail. First it is clear that logical operations +are of the same reproductive repetitive type that we +have found in the associational logic of empiricism, and +in the logic of the objective universal. Indeed, after +objective idealism has conceded that the finite mind +merely "witnesses" or at most contributes only in an +"infinitesimal" degree to the logical activity of the +objective universal, what remains of the supposed gulf +between absolute idealism and analytic realism?</p> + +<p>It follows, of course, that there can be no place in +analytic logic for "procedure by hypotheses." However, +it is to the credit of some analytic logicians that +they see this and frankly accept the situation instead +of attempting to retain hypotheses by making them "accidents" +or mere "auxiliaries" of inference. On the +other hand, others find that the chief glory of analytic +logic is precisely that it "gives thought wings"<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> for +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">108</a></span> +the free construction of hypotheses. In his lectures on +"Scientific Methods in Philosophy" Mr. Russell calls +some of the most elemental and sacred entities of analytic +logic "convenient fictions." This retention of hypotheses +at the cost of cogency is of course in order to avoid +a break with science. Those who see that there is no +place in analytic logic for hypotheses are equally anxious +to preserve their connections with science. Hence +they boldly challenge the "superstition" that science +has anything to do with hypotheses. Newton's "<i>Hypotheses +non fingo</i>" should be the motto of every conscientious +scientist who dares "trust his own perceptions +and disregard the ukase of idealism." "The +theory of mental construction is the child of idealism, +now put out to service for the support of its parents." +"Theory is no longer regarded in science as an hypothesis +added to the observed facts," but a law which +is "found in the facts."<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> The identity of this with +Mill's doctrine of hypotheses as "found in things" +is obvious.</p> + +<p>As against the conception of hypotheses as "free," +"winged," constructions of a psychical, beholding, gossiping +mind we may well take our stand with those who +would exclude such hypotheses from science. And this +doubtless was the sort of mind and sort of hypotheses +Newton meant when he said "<i>Hypotheses non fingo</i>."<a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> +But had Newton's mind really been of the character +which he, as a physicist, had learned from philosophers +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">109</a></span>to suppose it to be, and had he really waited to find his +hypotheses ready-made in the facts, there never would +have been any dispute about who discovered the calculus, +and we should never have been interested in what +Newton said about hypotheses or anything else. What +Newton did is a much better source of information on +the part hypotheses play in scientific method than +what he said about them. The former speaks for itself; +the latter is the pious repetition of a metaphysical creed +made necessary by the very separation of mind from +things expressed in the statement quoted.</p> + +<p>Logically there is little to choose between hypotheses +found ready-made in the facts and those which are +the "winged" constructions of a purely psychical mind. +Both are equally useless in logic and in science. One +makes logic and science "trifling," the other makes +them "miraculous." But if hypotheses be conceived +not as the output of a cloistered psychical entity but as +the joint product of all the beings and operations +involved in the specific situation in which logical +inquiry originates, and more particularly in all those +involved in the operations of the inquiry itself (including +all the experimental material and apparatus which +the inquiry may require), we shall have sufficient continuity +between hypotheses and things to do away with +miracle, and sufficient reconstruction to avoid inference +that is trifling.</p> + +<p>It is, however, the second contribution of analytic +logic that is the basis of the enthusiasm over its prospective +value for other sciences. This is the discovery +that terms and propositions, sense-data, and universals,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">110</a></span> +are not only elements of logical operation but are +the simple, neutral elements at large which science is +supposed to have been seeking. "As the botanist analyzes +the structures of the vegetable organism and +finds chemical compounds of which they are built so +the ordinary chemist analyzes these compounds into +their elements, but does not analyze these. The physical +chemist analyzes these elemental atoms, as now appears, +into minuter components <i>which he in turn must +leave to the mathematicians and logicians further to +analyze</i>."<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> + +<p>Again it is worth noting that this mutation of +logical into ontological elements seems to differ +only "in position" from the universal logicism of +absolute idealism.</p> + +<p>What are these simple elements into which the +mathematician and logician are to analyze the crude +elements of the laboratory? And how are these elements +to be put into operation in the laboratory? Let +us picture an analytic logician meeting a physical +scientist at a moment when the latter is distressed over +the unmanageable complexity of his elements. Will +the logician say to the scientist: "Your difficulty is +that you are trusting too much to your mundane apparatus. +The kingdom of truth cometh not with such +things. Forsake your microscopes, test tubes, refractors +and resonators, and follow me, and you shall behold +the truly simple elements of which you have dreamed."? +And when the moment of revelation arrives and the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">111</a></span> +expectant scientist is solemnly told that the "simple +elements" which he has sought so long are "terms and +propositions," sense-data and universals, is it surprising +that he does not seem impressed? Will he not ask: +"What am I to do with these in the specific difficulties +of my laboratory? Shall I say to the crude and complex +elements of my laboratory operations: 'Be ye resolved +into terms and propositions, sense-data and +universals'; and will they forthwith obey this incantation +and fall apart so that I may locate and remove +the hidden source of my difficulty? Are you not mocking +me and deceiving yourself with the old ontological +argument? Your 'simple' elements—are they anything +but the hypostatized process by which elements may +be found?"<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a></p> + +<p>The expounders as well as the critics of analytic +logic have agreed that it reaches its most critical junction +when it faces the problem of truth and error. +There is no doubt that the logic of objective idealism, in +other respects so similar to analytic logic, has at this +point an advantage; for it retains just enough of the +finite operation of knowing—an "infinitesimal" part +will answer—to furnish the culture germs of error. +But analytic logic having completely sterilized itself +against this source of infection is in serious difficulty.</p> + +<p>Here again it is Professor Holt who has the courage +to follow—or shall we say "behold"?—his theory +as it "generates" the doctrine that error is a given +objective opposition of forces entirely independent of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">112</a></span> +any such thing as a process of inquiry and all that such +a process presupposes. "All collisions between bodies, +all inference between energies, all process of warming +and cooling, of starting and stopping, of combining +and separating, all counterbalancings, as in cantilevers +and gothic vaultings, are contradictory forces +which can be stated only in propositions that manifestly +contradict each other."<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> But the argument +proves too much. For in the world of forces +to which we have here appealed there is no +force which is not opposed by others and no +particle which is not the center of opposing forces. +Hence error is ubiquitous. In making error objective +we have made all objectivity erroneous. We find ourselves +obliged to say that the choir of Westminster +Abbey, the Brooklyn bridge, the heads on our shoulders +are all supported by logical errors!</p> + +<p>Following these illustrations of ontological contradictions +there is indeed this interesting statement: +"Nature is so full of these mutually negative processes +that we are moved to admiration when a few forces coöperate +long enough to form what we call an organism."<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> +The implication is, apparently, that as an +"opposition" of forces is error, "coöperation" of +forces is truth. But what is to distinguish "opposition" +from "coöperation"? In the illustration it is +clear that opposing forces—error—do not interfere +with coöperative forces—truth. Where should we find +more counterbalancing, more starting and stopping, +warming and cooling, combining and separating +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">113</a></span>than in an organism? And if these processes +can be stated only in propositions that are +"manifestly contradictory," are we to understand +that truth has errors for its constituent +elements? Such paradoxes have always delighted the +soul of absolute idealism. But, as we have seen, only +the veil of an infinitesimal finitude intervenes between the +logic of the objective universal of absolute idealism +and the objective logic of analytic realism.</p> + +<p>It is, of course, this predicament regarding +objective truth and error that has driven most +analytic logicians to recall the exiled psychological, +"mental" act of knowing. It had to be +recalled to provide some basis of distinction +between truth and error, but, this act having already +been conceived as incurably "subjective," the result +is only an exchange of dilemmas. For the reinstatement +of this act <i>ipso facto</i> reinstates the epistemological +predicament to get rid of which it was first banished +from logic.</p> + +<p>Earnest efforts to escape this outcome have been +made by attaching the act of knowing to the nervous +system, and this is a move in the right direction. But +so far the effort has been fruitless because no connection +has been made between the knowing function of +the nervous system and its other functions. The result +is that the cognitive operation of the nervous system, +as of the "psychical" mind, is that of a mere spectator; +and the epistemological problem abides. An +onlooking nervous system has no advantage over an +"onlooking" mind. Onlooking, beholding may indeed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">114</a></span> +be a part of a genuine act of knowing. But in that +act it is always a stimulus or response to other acts. +It is one of them;—never a mere spectator of them. +It is when the act of knowing is cut off from its connection +with other acts and finds itself adrift that it +seeks metaphysical lodgings. And this it may find +either in an empty psychical mind or in an equally +empty body.<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> + +<p>If, in reinstating the act of knowing as a function +of the nervous system, neo-realism had recognized the +logical significance of the fact that the nervous system +of which knowing is a function is the same nervous +system of which loving and hating, desiring and striving +are functions and that the transition from these +to the operations of inquiry and knowing is not a +capricious jump but a transition motived by the loving +and hating, desiring and striving—if this had been +recognized the logic of neo-realism would have been +spared its embarrassments over the distinction of truth +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">115</a></span> +and error. It would have seen that the passage +from loving and hating, desiring and striving to inquiry +and knowing is made in order to renew and reform +specific desires and strivings which, through +conflict and consequent equivocation, have become +fruitless and vain; and it must have seen that the results +of the inquiry are true or false as they succeed +or fail in this reformation and renewal.</p> + +<p>But once more, it must steadily be kept in view that +while the loving and hating, desiring and striving, +which the logical operations are reforming and renewing, +are functions of the nervous system, they are not +functions of the nervous system alone, else the door +of subjectivism again closes upon us. Loving and +hating, desiring and striving have their "objects." +Hence any reformation of these functions involves no +less a reformation of their objects. When therefore +we say that truth and error are relevant to desires +and strivings, this means relevant to them as including +their objects, not as entitized processes (such are +the pitfalls of language) inclosed in a nervous system +or mind. With this before us the relevance of truth +and error to desires and strivings can never be made +the basis for the charge of subjectivism. The conception +of desires as peculiarly individual and subjective +is a survival of the very isolation which is the source +of the difficulty with truth and error. Hence the appeal +to this isolation, made alike by idealism and realism, +in charging instrumental logic with subjectivism +is an elementary <i>petitio</i>.</p> + +<p>Doubtless it will be urged again that the act of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">116</a></span> +knowing is motived by an independent desire and striving +of its own. This is of course consonant with the +neo-realistic atomism, however inconsonant it may be +with the conception of implication which it employs. +If we take a small enough, isolated segment of experience +we can find meaning for this notion, as we +may for the idea that the earth is flat and that the +sun moves around the earth. But as consequences accrue +we find as great difficulties with the one as with +the other. If the course of events did not bring us to +book, if we could get off with a mere definition of truth +and error we might go on piling up subsistential definitional +logics world without end. But sublime adventurers, +logically unregenerate and uninitiated, will +go on sailing westward to the confusion and confounding +of all definitional systems that leave them out of +account.</p> + +<p>The conclusion is plain. If logic is to have room +in its household for both truth and error, if it is to +avoid the old predicament of knowledge that is trifling +or miraculous, tautologous or false, if it is to have no +fear of the challenge of other sciences or of practical +life, it must be content to take for its subject-matter +the operations of intelligence conceived as real acts +on the same metaphysical plane and in strictest continuity +with other acts. Such a logic will not fear +the challenge of science, for it is precisely this continuity +that makes possible experimentation, which is +the fundamental characteristic of scientific procedure. +Science without experiment is indeed a strange apparition. +It is a λόγος with no λέγειν, a science<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">117</a></span> +with no <i>scire</i>; and this spells dogmatism. How necessary +such continuity is to experimentation is apparent +when we recall that there is no limit to the range of +operations of every sort which scientific experiment +calls into play; and that unless there be thoroughgoing +continuity between the logical demand of the experiment +and all the materials and devices employed in the +process of the experiment, the operations of the latter +in the experiment will be either miraculous or ruinous.</p> + +<p>Finally, if this continuity of the operations of intelligence +with other operations be essential to science, +its relation to "practical" life is <i>ipso facto</i> established. +For science is "practical" life aware of its problems +and aware of the part that experimental—i.e., +creative—intelligence plays in the solution of those +problems.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">118</a></span></p> + +<h2>INTELLIGENCE AND MATHEMATICS</h2> + +<h4>HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN</h4> + +<p>Herbart is said to have given the deathblow to +faculty psychology. Man no longer appears endowed +with volition, passion, desire, and reason; and logic, +deprived of its hereditary right to elucidate the operations +of inherent intelligence, has the new problem of +investigating forms of intelligence in the making. This +is no inconsequential task. "If man originally possesses +only capacities which after a given amount of +education will produce ideas and judgments" (Thorndike, +<i>Educational Psychology</i>, Vol. I, p. 198), and if +these ideas and judgments are to be substituted for +a mythical intelligence it follows that tracing their development +and observing their functioning renders +clearer our conception of their nature and value and +brings us nearer that exact knowledge of what we +are talking about in which the philosopher at least +aspires to equal the scientist, however much he may fall +below his ideal.</p> + +<p>For contemporary thought concerning the mathematical +sciences this altered point of view generates +peculiarly pressing problems. Mathematicians have +weighed the old logic and found it wanting. They have +builded themselves a new logic more adequate to their +ends. But they have not whole-heartedly recognized +the change that has come about in psychology; hence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">119</a></span> +they have retained the faculty of intelligence knit into +certain indefinables such as implication, relation, class, +term, and the like, and have transported the faculty +from the human soul to a mysterious realm of subsistence +whence it radiates its ghostly light upon the realm +of existence below. But while they reproach the old +logic, often bitterly, their new logic merely furnishes +a more adequate show-case in which already attained +knowledge may be arranged to set off its charms for +the observer in the same way that specimens in a +museum are displayed before an admiring world. This +statement is not a sweeping condemnation, however, for +such a setting forth is not useless. It resembles the +classificatory stage of science which, although not itself +in the highest sense creative, often leads to higher +stages by bringing under observation relations and +facts that might otherwise have escaped notice. And +in the realm of pure mathematics, the new logic has +undoubtedly contributed in this manner to such discoveries. +Danger appears when the logician attains +Cartesian intoxication with the beauty of logico-mathematical +form and tries to infer from the form +itself the real nature of the formed material. The +realm of subsistence too often has armed Indefinables +with metaphysical myths whose attack is valiant when +the doors of reflection are opened. It may be possible, +however, to arrive at an understanding of mathematics +without entering the kingdom of these warriors.</p> + +<p>It is the essence of science to make prediction possible. +The value of prediction lies in the fact that +through this function man can control his environment,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">120</a></span> +or, at worst, fortify himself to meet its vagaries. To +attain such predictions, however, the world need not +be grasped in its full concreteness. Hence arise processes +of abstraction. While all other symptoms remain +unnoticed, the temperature and pulse may mark a +disease, or a barometer-reading the weather. The +physicist may work only in terms of quantity in a +world which is equally truly qualitative. All that is +necessary is to select the elements which are most +effective for prediction and control. Such selection +gives the principle that dominates all abstractions. +Progress is movement from the less abstract to the +more abstract, but it is progress only because the +more abstract is as genuinely an aspect of the concrete +starting-point as anything is. Moreover, the +outcome of progress of this sort cannot be definitely +foreseen at the beginnings. The simple activities of +primitive men have to be spontaneously performed before +their value becomes evident. Only afterwards can +they be cultivated for the sake of their value, and then +only can the self-conscious cultivation of a science begin. +The process remains full not only of perplexities, +but of surprises; men's activities lead to goals far other +than those which appear at the start. These goals, +however, never deny the method by which the start is +made. Developed intelligence is nothing but skill in +using a set of concepts generated in this manner. In +this sense the histories of all human endeavors run +parallel.</p> + +<p>Where the empirical bases of a science are continually +in the foreground, as in physics or chemistry, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">121</a></span> +foregoing formulation of procedure is intelligible and +acceptable to most men. Mathematics seem, however, +to stand peculiarly apart. Many, with Descartes, have +delighted in them "on account of the certitude and +evidence of their reasonings" and recognized their +contribution to the advancement of mechanical arts. +But since the days of Kant even this value has become +a problem, and many a young philosophic student has +the question laid before him as to why it is that mathematics, +"a purely conceptual science," can tell us +anything about the character of a world which is, apparently +at least, free from the idiosyncrasies of individual +mind. It may be that mathematics began in +empirical practice, such philosophers admit, but they +add that, somehow, in its later career, it has escaped +its lowly origin. Now it moves in the higher circles of +postulated relations and arbitrarily defined entities +to which its humble progenitors and relatives are denied +the entrée. Parvenus, however, usually bear with them +the mark of history, and in the case of this one, at +least, we may hope that the history will be sufficient to +drag it from the affectations of its newly acquired set +and reinstate it in its proper place in the workaday +world. For the sake of this hope, we shall take the +risk of being tedious by citing certain striking moments +of mathematical progress; and then we shall +try to interpret its genuine status in the world of +working truths.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">122</a></span></p> + +<h5>I</h5> + +<h4><span class="smcap">Beginnings of Arithmetic and Geometry</span></h4> + +<p>The most primitive mathematical activity of man is +counting, but here his first efforts are lost in the obscurity +of the past. The lower races, however, yield +us evidence that is not without value. Although +the savage mind is not identical with the mind of primitive +man, there is much in the activities of undeveloped +races that can throw light upon the behavior of peoples +more advanced. We must be careful in our inferences, +however. Among the Australians and South +Americans there are peoples whose numerical systems +go little, or not at all, beyond the first two or three +numbers. "It has been inferred from this," writes +Professor Boas (<i>Mind of Primitive Man</i>, pp. 152-53), +"that the people speaking these languages are not +capable of forming the concept of higher numbers.... +People like the South American Indians, +... or like the Esquimo ... are presumably +not in need of higher numerical expressions, because +there are not many objects that they have to count. +On the other hand, just as soon as these same people +find themselves in contact with civilization, and when +they acquire standards of value that have to be +counted, they adopt with perfect ease higher numerals +from other languages, and develop a more or less perfect +system of counting.... It must be borne in +mind that counting does not become necessary until +objects are considered in such generalized form that +their individualities are entirely lost sight of. For this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">123</a></span> +reason it is possible that even a person who owns a +herd of domesticated animals may know them by name +and by their characteristics, without even desiring to +count them."</p> + +<p>And there is one other false interpretation to be +avoided. Man does not feel the need of counting and +then develop a system of numerals to meet the need. +Such an assumption is as ridiculous as to assume prehistoric +man thinking to himself: "I must speak," +and then inventing voice culture and grammar to make +speaking pleasant and possible. Rather, when powers +of communication are once attained, presumably in +their beginnings also without forethought, man being +still more animal than man, there were gradually +dissociated communications of a kind approaching +what numbers mean to us. But the number is not yet +a symbol apart from that of the things numbered. +Picture writing, re-representing the things meant, preceded +developmentally any kind of symbolization representing +the number by mere one-one correspondence +with non-particularized symbols. It is plausible, although +I have no anthropological authority for the +statement, that the prevalence of finger words as number +symbols (cf. infra) is originally a consequence of +the fact that our organization makes the hand the +natural instrument of pointing.</p> + +<p>The difficulty of passing from concrete representations +to abstract symbols has been keenly stated by +Conant (<i>The Number Concept</i>, pp. 72-73), although +his terminology is that of an old psychology and the +limitations implied for the primitive mind are limita<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">124</a></span>tions +of practice rather than of capacity as Mr. Conant +seems to believe. "An abstract conception is +something quite foreign to the essentially primitive +mind, as missionaries and explorers have found to their +chagrin. The savage can form no mental concept of +what civilized man means by such a word as <i>soul</i>; nor +would his idea of the abstract number 5 be much clearer. +When he says <i>five</i>, he uses, in many cases at least, the +same word that serves him when he wishes to say <i>hand</i>; +and his mental concept when he says <i>five</i> is a hand. +The concrete idea of a closed fist, of an open hand with +outstretched fingers, is what is uppermost in his mind. +He knows no more and cares no more about the pure +number 5 than he does about the law of conservation +of energy. He sees in his mental picture only the real, +material image, and his only comprehension of the +number is, "these objects are as many as the fingers +on my hand." Then, in the lapse of the long interval +of centuries which intervene between lowest barbarism +and highest civilization, the abstract and concrete become +slowly dissociated, the one from the other. First +the actual hand picture fades away, and the number +is recognized without the original assistance furnished +by the derivation of the word. But the number is still +for a long time a certain number <i>of objects</i>, and not an +independent concept."</p> + +<p>An excellent fur trader's story, reported to me by +Mr. Dewey, suggests a further impulse to count besides +that given by the need of keeping a tally, namely, the +need of making one thing correspond to another in a +business transaction. The Indian laid down one skin<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">125</a></span> +and the trader two dollars; if he proposed to count +several skins at once and pay for all together, the +former replied "too much cheatem." The result, +however, demanded a tally either by the fingers, +a pebble, or a mark made in the sand, and as the magnitude +of such transactions grows the need of a specific +number symbol becomes ever more acute.</p> + +<p>The first obstacle, then, to overcome—and it has already +been successfully passed by many primitive peoples—is +the need of fortuitous attainment of a numerical +symbol, which is not the mere repeated symbol of +the things numbered. Significantly, this symbol is +usually derived from the hand, suggesting gestures of +tallying, and not from the words of already developed +language. Consequently, number words relate themselves +for the most part to the hand, and written number +symbols, which are among the earliest writings of +most peoples, tend to depict it as soon as they have +passed beyond the stage mentioned above of merely repeating +the symbol of the things numbered. W. C. +Eells, in writing of the Number Systems of the North +American Indians (<i>Am. Math. Mo.</i>, Nov., 1913; pp. +263-72), finds clear linguistic evidence for a digital +origin in about 40% of the languages examined. Of +the non-digital instances, 1 was sometimes connected +with the first personal pronoun, 2 with roots meaning +separation, 3, rarely, meaning more, or plural as distinguished +from the dual, just as the Greek uses a +plural as well as a dual in nouns and verbs, 4 is often +the perfect, complete right. It is often a sacred number +and the base of a quarternary system. Conant<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">126</a></span> +(<i>loc. cit.</i> p. 98) also gives a classification of the meanings +of simple number words for more advanced languages; +and even in them the hand is constantly in +evidence, as in 5, the hand; 10, two hands, half a man, +when fingers and toes are both considered, or a man, +when the hands alone are considered; 20, one man, two +feet. The other meanings hang upon the ideas of existence, +piece, group, beginning, for 1; and repetition, +division, and collection for higher numerals.</p> + +<p>A peculiar difficulty lies in the fact that when once +numbering has become a self-conscious effort, the collection +of things to be numbered frequently tends to +exceed the number of names that have become available. +Sometimes the difficulty is met by using a second +man when the fingers and toes of the first are used up, +sometimes by a method of repetition with the record +of the number of the repetition itself added to the +numerical significance of the whole process. Hence +arise the various systems of bases that occur in developed +mathematics. But the inertia to be overcome +in the recognition of the base idea is nowhere more +obvious than in the retention by the comparatively developed +Babylonian system of a second base of 60 to +supplement the decimal one for smaller numbers. +Among the American Indians (Eells, <i>loc. cit.</i>) the system +of bases used varies from the cumbersome binary +scale, that exercised such a fascination over Leibniz +(<i>Opera</i>, <i>III</i>, p. 346), through the rare ternary, and +the more common quarternary to the "natural" quinary, +decimal, and vigesimal systems derived from the +use of the fingers and toes in counting.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">127</a></span> +The achievement of a number base and number words, +however, does not always open the way to further mathematical +development. Only too often a complexity of +expression is involved that almost immediately cuts off +further progress. Thus the Youcos of the Amazon +cannot get beyond the number three, for the simplest +expression for the idea in their language is +"pzettarrarorincoaroac" (Conant, <i>loc. cit.</i>, pp. 145, +83, 53). Such names as "99, tongo solo manani nun +solo manani" (i.e., 10, understood, 5 plus 4 times, and +5 plus 4) of the Soussous of Sierra Leone; "399, +caxtolli onnauh poalli ipan caxtolli onnaui" (15 plus +4 times 20 plus 15 plus 4) of the Aztec; "29, wick a +chimen ne nompah sam pah nep e chu wink a" +(Sioux), make it easy to understand the proverb of +the Yorubas of Abeokuta, "You may be very clever, +but you can't tell 9 times 9."</p> + +<p>Almost contemporaneously with the beginnings of +counting various auxiliary devices were introduced to +help out the difficult task. In place of many men, +notched sticks, knotted strings, pebbles, or finger pantomime +were used. In the best form, these devices resulted +in the abacus; indeed, it was not until after the +introduction of arabic numerals and well into the +Renaissance period that instrumental arithmetic gave +way to graphical in Europe (D. E. Smith, <i>Rara Arithmetica</i>, +under "Counters"). "In eastern Europe," +say Smith and Mikami (<i>Japanese Mathematics</i>, pp. +18-19), "it"—the abacus—"has never been replaced, +for the tschotü is used everywhere in Russia to-day, and +when one passes over into Persia the same type of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">128</a></span> +abacus is common in all the bazaars. In China the +swan-pan is universally used for the purposes of computation, +and in Japan the soroban is as strongly entrenched +as it was before the invasion of western +ideas."</p> + +<p>Given, then, the idea of counting, and a mechanical +device to aid computation, it still remains necessary to +obtain some notation in which to record results. At +the early dawn of history the Egyptians seem to have +been already possessed of number signs (cf. Cantor, +<i>Gesch. de. Math.</i>, p. 44) and the Phœnicians either +wrote out their number words or used a few simple +signs, vertical, horizontal, and oblique lines, a process +which the Arabians perpetuated up to the beginning +of the eleventh century (Fink, p. 15); the Greeks, as +early as 600 B. C., used the initial letters of words for +numbers. But speaking generally, historical beginnings +of European number signs are too obscure to +furnish us good material.</p> + +<p>Our Indians have few number symbols other than +words, but when they occur (cf. Eells, <i>loc. cit.</i>) they +usually take the form of pictorial presentation of some +counting device such as strokes, lines dotted to suggest +a knotted cord, etc. Indeed, the smaller Roman numerals +were probably but a pictorial representation of +finger symbols. However, a beautiful concrete instance +is furnished us in the Japanese mathematics (cf. Smith +and Mikami, Ch. III). The earliest instrument of +reckoning in Japan seems to have been the rod, Ch'eou, +adapted from the Chinese under the name of Chikusaku +(bamboo rods) about 600 A. D. At first relatively<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">129</a></span> +large (measuring rods?), they became reduced to about +12 cm., but from their tendency to roll were quickly +replaced by the sangi (square prisms, about 7 mm. +thick and 5 cm. long) and the number symbols were +evidently derived from the use of these rods:</p> + +<div class="figcenter"><img class="floatInsert2" src="images/f129.png" alt="Math." /></div> + +<p>For the sake of clearness, tens, hundreds, etc., were +expressed in the even place by horizontal instead of +vertical lines and vice versa; thus 1267 would be +formed<img class="floatInsert2" src="images/f129b.png" alt="Math." /> The rods were arranged on a sort of +chessboard called the swan-pan. Much later the lines +were transferred to paper, and a circle used to denote +the vacant square. The use of squares, however, rendered +it unnecessary to arrange the even places differently +from the odd, so numbers like 38057 came to +be written <img class="floatInsert3" src="images/f129c.png" alt="Math." /> instead of <img class="floatInsert3" src="images/f129d.png" alt="Math." /> +as in the earlier notation.</p> + +<p>Somewhere in the course of these early mathematical +activities the process has changed from the more or +less spontaneous operating that led primitive man to +the first enunciation of arithmetical ideas, and has +become a self-conscious striving for the solution of +problems. This change had already taken place before +the historical origins of arithmetic are met. Thus, +the treatise of Ahmes (2000 B. C.) contains the curious +problem: 7 persons each have 7 cats; each cat eats +7 mice; each mouse eats 7 ears of barley; from each ear +7 measures of corn may grow; how much grain has +been saved? Such problems are, however, half play, +as appears in a Leonardo of Pisa version some 3000 +years later: 7 old women go to Rome; each woman<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">130</a></span> +has 7 mules; each mule, 7 sacks; each sack contains 7 +loaves; with each loaf are 7 knives; each knife is in 7 +sheaths. Similarly in Diophantus' epitaph (330 +A. D.): "Diophantus passed 1/6 of his life in childhood, +1/12 in youth, and 1/7 more as a bachelor; 5 +years after his marriage, was born a son who died 4 +years before his father at 1/2 his age." Often among +peoples such puzzles were a favorite social amusement. +Thus Braymagupta (628 A. D.) reads, "These problems +are proposed simply for pleasure; the wise man +can invent a thousand others, or he can solve the problems +of others by the rules given here. As the sun +eclipses the stars by its brilliancy, so the man of knowledge +will eclipse the fame of others in assemblies of +the people if he proposes algebraic problems, and +still more if he solves them" (Cajori, <i>Hist. of Math.</i>, +p. 92).</p> + +<p>The limitation of these early methods is that the +notation merely records and does not aid computation. +And this is true even of such a highly developed system +as was in use among the Romans. If the reader +is unconvinced, let him attempt some such problem +as the multiplication of CCCXVI by CCCCLXVIII, +expressing it and carrying it through in Roman numerals, +and he will long for the abacus to assist his +labors. It was the positional arithmetic of the Arabians, +of which the origins are obscure, that made possible +the development of modern technique. Of this discovery, +or rediscovery from the Hindoos, together with +the zero symbol, Cajori (<i>Hist. of Math.</i>, p. 11) has said +"of all mathematical discoveries, no one has contributed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">131</a></span> +more to the general progress of intelligence +than this." The notation no longer merely records results, +but now assists in performing operations.</p> + +<p>The origins of geometry are even more obscure than +those of arithmetic. Not only is geometry as highly +developed as arithmetic when it first appears in occidental +civilization, but, in addition, the problems of +primitive peoples seem to have been such that they +have developed no geometrical formulæ striking enough +to be recorded by investigators, so far as I have been +able to discover. But just as the commercial life of the +Phœnicians early forced them self-consciously to develop +arithmetical calculation, so environmental conditions +seem to have forced upon the Egyptians a need +for geometrical considerations.</p> + +<p>It is almost platitudinous to quote Herodotus' remark +that the invention of geometry was necessary because +of the floods of the Nile, which washed away the +boundaries and changed the contours of the fields. And +as Proclus Diadochus adds (<i>Procli Diadochi, in primum +Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii</i>—quoted Cantor, +I, p. 125): "It is not surprising that the discovery +of this as well as other sciences has sprung from need, +because everything in the process of beginning proceeds +from the incomplete to the complete. There takes +place a suitable transition from sensible perception to +thoughtful consideration and rational knowledge. Just +as with the Phœnicians, for the sake of business and +commerce, an exact knowledge of numbers had its beginning, +so with the Egyptians, for the above-mentioned +reasons, was geometry contrived."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">132</a></span>The earliest Egyptian mathematical writing that we +know is that of Ahmes (2000 B. C.), but long before +this the mural decorations of the temple wall involved +many figures, the construction of which involved a certain +amount of working knowledge of such operations +as may be performed with the aid of a ruler and compass. +The fact that these operations did not earlier +lead to geometry, as ruler and compass work seems to +have done in Japan in the nineteenth century (Smith +and Mikami, index, "Geometry"), is probably due to +the stage at which the development of Egyptian intelligence +had arrived, feebly advanced on the road to +higher abstract thinking. It is everywhere characteristic +of Egyptian genius that little purely intellectual +curiosity is shown. Even astronomical knowledge was +limited to those determinations which had religious or +magically practical significance, and its arithmetic and +geometry never escaped these bounds as with the more +imaginative Pythagoreans, where mystical interpretation +seems to have been a consequence of rather +than a stimulus to investigation. An old Egyptian +treatise reads (Cantor, p. 63): "I hold the wooden pin +(Nebi) and the handle of the mallet (semes), I hold +the line in concurrence with the Goddess Sạfech. My +glance follows the course of the stars. When my eye +comes to the constellation of the great bear and the +time of the number of the hour determined by me is +fulfilled, I place the corner of the temple." This incantation +method could hardly advance intelligence; but +the methods of practical measuring were more effective. +Here the rather happy device of using knotted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">133</a></span> +cords, carried about by the Harpedonapts, or cord +stretchers, was of some moment. Especially, the fact +that the lengths 3, 4, and 5, brought into triangular +form, served for an interesting connection between +arithmetic and the right triangle, was not a little gain, +later making possible the discovery of the Pythagorean +theorem, although in Egypt the theoretical properties +of the triangle were never developed. The triangle obviously +must have been practically considered by the +decorators of the temple and its builders, but the cord +stretchers rendered clear its arithmetical significance. +However, Ahmes' "Rules for attaining the knowledge +of all dark things ... all secrets that are contained +in objects" (Cantor, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 22) contains merely +a mixture of all sorts of mathematical information of +a practical nature,—"rules for making a round fruit +house," "rules for measuring fields," "rules for making +an ornament," etc., but hardly a word of arithmetical +and geometrical processes in themselves, unless it be +certain devices for writing fractions and the like.</p> + +<h5>II</h5> + +<h4><span class="smcap">The Progress of Self-conscious Theory</span></h4> + +<p>A characteristic of Greek social life is responsible +both for the next phase of the development of mathematical +thought and for the misapprehension of its +nature by so many moderns. "When Archytas and +Menaechmus employed mechanical instruments for solving +certain geometrical problems, 'Plato,' says Plutarch, +'inveighed against them with great indignation +and persistence as destroying and perverting all the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">134</a></span> +good that there is in geometry; for the method absconds +from incorporeal and intellectual or sensible +things, and besides employs again such bodies as require +much vulgar handicraft: in this way mechanics +was dissimilated and expelled from geometry, and being +for a long time looked down upon by philosophy, became +one of the arts of war.' In fact, manual labor +was looked down upon by the Greeks, and a sharp distinction +was drawn between the slaves who performed +bodily work and really observed nature, and the leisured +upper classes who speculated, and often only knew +nature by hearsay. This explains much of the naïve +dreamy and hazy character of ancient natural science. +Only seldom did the impulse to make experiments for +oneself break through; but when it did, a great progress +resulted, as was the case of Archytas and Archimedes. +Archimedes, like Plato, held that it was undesirable for +a philosopher to seek to apply the results of science to +any practical use; but, whatever might have been his +view of what ought to be in the case, he did actually +introduce a large number of new inventions" (Jourdain, +<i>The Nature of Mathematics</i>, pp. 18-19). +Following the Greek lead, certain empirically minded +modern thinkers construe geometry wholly from an +intellectual point of view. History is read by them +as establishing indubitably the proposition that +mathematics is a matter of purely intellectual operations. +But by so construing it, they have, in geometry, +remembered solely the measuring and forgotten +the land, and, in arithmetic, remembered the counting +and forgotten the things counted.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">135</a></span>Arithmetic experienced little immediate gain from +its new association with geometry, which was destined +to be of momentous import in its latter history, beyond +the discovery of irrationals (which, however, +were for centuries not accepted as numbers), and the +establishment of the problem of root-taking by its association +with the square, and interest in negative +numbers.</p> + +<p>The Greeks had only subtracted smaller numbers +from larger, but the Arabs began to generalize the +process and had some acquaintance with negative results, +but it was difficult for them to see that these +results might really have significance. N. Chuquet, in +the fifteenth century, seems to have been the first to +interpret the negative numbers, but he remained a long +time without imitators. Michael Stifel, in the sixteenth +century, still calls them "Numeri absurdi" as over +against the "Numeri veri." However, their geometrical +interpretation was not difficult, and they soon won +their way into good standing. But the case of the +imaginary is more striking. The need for it was first +felt when it was seen that negative numbers have no +square roots. Chuquet had dealt with second-degree +equations involving the roots of negative numbers in +1484, but says these numbers are "impossible," and +Descartes (<i>Geom.</i>, 1637) first uses the word "imaginary" +to denote them. Their introduction is due to +the Italian algebrists of the sixteenth century. They +knew that the real roots of certain algebraic equations +of the third degree are represented as results of operations +effected upon "impossible" numbers of the form<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">136</a></span> +<i>a</i> + <i>b</i>√-1 (where <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> are real numbers) without +it being possible in general to find an algebraic +expression for the roots containing only real numbers. +Cardan calculated with these "impossibles," using them +to get real results [(5 + √-15) (5 - √-15) = 25 - (-15) = 40], +but adds that it is a "quantitas +quae vere est sophistica" and that the calculus itself +"adeo est subtilis ut est inutilis." In 1629, Girard +announced the theorem that every complete algebraic +equation admits of as many roots, real or imaginary, +as there are units in its degree, but Gauss first proved +this in 1799, and finally, in his <i>Theory of Complex +Quantity</i>, in 1831.</p> + +<p>Geometry, however, among the Greeks passed into +a stage of abstraction in which lines, planes, etc., in +the sense in which they are understood in our elementary +texts, took the place of actually measured surfaces, +and also took on the deductive form of presentation +that has served as a model for all mathematical +presentation since Euclid. Mensuration smacked too +much of the exchange, and before the time of Archimedes +is practically wholly absent. Even such theorems +as "that the area of a triangle equals half the product +of its base and its altitude" is foreign to Euclid (cf. +Cajori, p. 39). Lines were merely directions, and +points limitations from which one worked. But there +was still dependence upon the things that one measures. +Euclid's elements, "when examined in the light +of strict mathematical logic, ... has been pronounced +by C. S. Peirce to be 'Riddled with fallacies'" +(Cajori, p. 37). Not logic, but observation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">137</a></span> +of the figures drawn, that is, concrete symbolization +of the processes indicated, saves Euclid from +error.</p> + +<p>Roman practical geometry seems to have come from +the Etruscans, but the Roman here is as little inventive +as in his arithmetical ventures, although the latter +were stimulated somewhat by problems of inheritance +and interest reckoning. Indeed, before the entrance of +Arabic learning into Europe and the translation of +Euclid from the Arabic in 1120, there is little or no +advance over the Egyptian geometry of 600 B. C. Even +the universities neglected mathematics. At Paris "in +1336 a rule was introduced that no student should +take a degree without attending lectures on mathematics, +and from a commentary on the first six books +of Euclid, dated 1536, it appears that candidates for +the degree of A. M. had to give an oath that they had +attended lectures on these books. Examinations, when +held at all, probably did not extend beyond the first +book, as is shown by the nickname 'magister matheseos' +applied to the <i>Theorem of Pythagoras</i>, the last +in the first book.... At Oxford, in the middle of +the fifteenth century, the first two books of Euclid were +read" (Cajori, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 136). But later geometry +dropped out and not till 1619 was a professorship of +geometry instituted at Oxford. Roger Bacon speaks +of Euclid's fifth proposition as "elefuga," and it also +gets the name of "pons asinorum" from its point of +transition to higher learning. As late as the fourteenth +century an English manuscript begins "Nowe sues +here a Tretis of Geometri whereby you may knowe the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">138</a></span> +hegte, depnes, and the brede of most what erthely +thynges."</p> + +<p>The first significant turning-point lies in the geometry +of Descartes. Viete (1540-1603) and others had +already applied algebra to geometry, but Descartes, +by means of coördinate representation, established the +idea of motion in geometry in a fashion destined to +react most fruitfully on algebra, and through this, on +arithmetic, as well as enormously to increase the scope +of geometry. These discoveries are not, however, of +first moment for our problem, for the ideas of mathematical +entities remain throughout them the generalized +processes that had appeared in Greece. It is worth +noting, however, that in England mechanics has always +been taught as an experimental science, while on the +Continent it has been expanded deductively, as a development +of <i>a priori</i> principles.</p> + +<h5>III</h5> + +<h4><span class="smcap">Contemporary Thought in Arithmetic and +Geometry</span></h4> + +<p>To develop the complete history of arithmetic and +geometry would be a task quite beyond the limits of this +paper, and of the writer's knowledge. In arithmetic +we were able to observe a stage in which spontaneous +behavior led to the invention of number names and +methods of counting. Then, by certain speculative and +"play" impulses, there arose elementary arithmetical +problems which began to be of interest in themselves. +Geometry here also comes into consideration, and, in +connection with positional number symbols, begin those<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">139</a></span> +interactions between arithmetic and geometry that +result in the forms of our contemporary mathematics. +The complex quantities represented by number symbols +are no longer merely the necessary results of +analyzing commercial relations or practical measurements, +and geometry is no longer directly based upon +the intuitively given line, point, and plane. If number +relations are to be expressed in terms of empirical spatial +positions, it is necessary to construct many imaginary +surfaces, as is done by Riemann in his theory of functions, +a construction representing the type of imagination +which Poincaré has called the intuitional in +contradistinction to the logical (<i>Value of Science</i>, +Ch. I). And geometry has not only been led to +the construction of many non-Euclidian spaces, but +has even, with Peano and his school, been freed from +the bonds of any necessary spatial interpretation +whatsoever.</p> + +<p>To trace in concrete detail the attainment of modern +refinements of number theory would likewise exhibit +nothing new in the building up of mathematical intelligence. +We should find, here, a process carried out +without thought of the consequences, there, an analogy +suggesting an operation that might lead us beyond a +difficulty that had blocked progress; here, a play interest +leading to a combination of symbols out of which a +new idea has sprung; there, a painstaking and methodical +effort to overcome a difficulty recognized from the +start. It is rather for us now to ask what it is that +has been attained by these means, to inquire finally +what are those things called "number" and "line"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">140</a></span> +in the broad sense in which the terms are now used.</p> + +<p>In so far as the cardinal number at least is concerned, +the answer generally accepted by Dedekind, +Peano, Russell, and such writers is this: the number +is a "class of similar classes" (Whitehead and Russell, +<i>Prin. Math.</i>, Vol. II, p. 4). To the interpretation of +this answer, Mr. Russell, the most self-consciously +philosophical of these mathematicians, has devoted his +full dialectic skill. The definition has at least the +merit of being free from certain arbitrary psychologizing +that has vitiated many earlier attempts at the problem. +Mr. Russell claims for it "(1) that the formal +properties which we expect cardinal numbers to have +result from it; (2) that unless we adopt this definition +or some more complicated and practically equivalent +definition, it is necessary to regard the cardinal number +of a class as indefinable" (<i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 4). That +the definition's terms, however, are not without obscurity +appears in Mr. Russell's struggles with the zigzag +theory, the no-class theory, etc., and finally in his taking +refuge in the theory of "logical types" (<i>loc. cit.</i>, +Vol. III, Part V. E.), whereby the contradiction that +subverted Frege and drove Mr. Russell from the standpoint +of the <i>Principles of Mathematics</i> is finally overcome.</p> + +<p>The second of Mr. Russell's claims for his definition +adds nothing to the first, for it merely asserts that +unless we adopt some definition of the cardinal number +from which its formal properties result, number is +undefined. Any such definition would be, <i>ipso facto</i>, a +practical equivalent of the first. We need only consider<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">141</a></span> +whether or not the formal properties of numbers +clearly follow from this definition.</p> + +<p>Mr. Russell's own experience makes us hesitate. +When he first adopted this definition from Frege, he +was led to make the inference that the class of all possible +classes might furnish a type for a greatest cardinal +number. But this led to nothing but paradox and +contradiction. The obvious conclusion was that something +was wrong with the concept of class, and the +obvious way out was to deny the possibility of any such +all-inclusive class. Just why there should be such +limitation, except that it enables one to escape the +contradiction, is not clear from Mr. Russell's analysis +(cf. Brown, "The Logic of Mr. Russell," <i>Journ. of +Phil., Psych., and Sci. Meth.</i>, Vol. VIII, No. 4, pp. +85-89). Furthermore, to pass to the theory of types +on this ground is to give up the value of the first claim +for the definition (quoted above), since the formal +properties of numbers now merely follow from the definition +because the terms of the definition are reinterpreted +from the properties of number, so that these +properties will follow from it. The definition has become +circular.</p> + +<p>The real difficulty lies in the concept of the class. +Dogmatic realism is prone to find here an entity for +which, as it is obviously not a physical thing, a home +must be provided in some region of "being." Hence +arises the realm of subsistence, as for Plato the world +of facts duplicated itself in a world of ideas. But +the subsistent realm of the mathematician is even more +astounding than the ideal realm of Plato, for the latter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">142</a></span> +world is a prototype of the world of things, while the +world of the mathematician is peopled by all sorts of +entities that never were on land or sea. The transfinite +numbers of Cantor have, without doubt, a definite +mathematical meaning, but they have no known representatives +in the world of things, nor in the imagination +of man, and in spite of the efforts of philosophers it +may even be doubted whether an entity correlative to +the mathematical infinite has ever been or can ever +be specified.</p> + +<p>Mr. Russell now teaches that "classes are merely +symbolic" (<i>Sci. Meth. in Phil.</i>, p. 208), but this expression +still needs elucidation. It does, to be sure, +avoid the earlier difficulty of admitting "new and mysterious +metaphysical entities" (<i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 204), but +the "feeling of oddity" that accompanies it seems not +without significance. What can be meant by a merely +symbolic class of similar classes themselves merely symbolical? +I do not know, unless it is that we are to +throw overboard the effort aimed at arbitrary and +creative definition and proceed in simple inductive and +interpretative fashion. With classes as entities abandoned, +we are left, until we have passed to a new point +of view as to arithmetical entities, in the position of +the intelligent ignoramus who defined a stock market +operation as buying what you can't get with money +you never had, and selling what you never owned for +more than it was ever worth.</p> + +<p>The situation seems to be that we are now face to +face with new generalizations. Just as number symbols +arose to denote operations gone through in counting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">143</a></span> +things when attention is diverted from the particular +characteristics of the things counted, and remained +a symbol for those operations with things, so now we +are becoming self-conscious of the character of the +operations we have been performing and are developing +new symbols to express possible operations with +operations. The infinity of the number series expresses +the fact that it is possible to continue the enumerating +process indefinitely, and when we are asked by certain +mathematicians to practise ourselves in such thoughts +as that for infinite series a proper part can be the equal +of the whole, where equality is defined through the +establishment of one-one correspondence, we are really +merely informed that among the group of symbols used +to denote the concrete steps of an ever open counting +process are groups of symbols that can be used to +indicate operations that are of the same type as the +given one in so far as the characteristic of being an +open series is concerned. If there were anywhere an +infinity of things to count, an unintelligible supposition, +it would by no means be true that any selection of +things from that series would be the equivalent of all +things in the series, except in so far as equivalence +meant that they could be arranged in the same type +of series as that from which they were drawn.</p> + +<p>Similarly the mathematical conception of the continuum +is nothing but a formulation of the manner in +which the cuts of a line or the numbers of a continuous +series must be chosen so that there shall remain no +possible cut or number of which the choice is not indicated. +Correspondence is reached between elements<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">144</a></span> +of such series when the corresponding elements can be +reached by an identical process. It seems to me, however, +a mistake to <i>identify</i> the number continuum with +the linear continuum, for the latter must include the +irrational numbers, whereas the irrational number can +never represent a spatial position in a series. For +example, the √2 is by nature a decimal involving an +infinite, i.e., an ever increasing, number of digits to +express it and, by virtue of the infinity of these digits, +they can never be looked upon as all given. It is then +truly a number, for it expresses a genuine numerical +operation, but it is not a position, for it cannot be a +determinate magnitude but merely a quantity approaching +a determinate magnitude as closely as one +may please. That is, without its complete expression, +which would be analogous to the self-contradictory task +of finding a greatest cardinal number, there can be no +cut in the line which is symbolized by it. But the operations +of translating algebraic expressions into geometrical +ones and vice versa (operations which are so important +in physical investigations) are facilitated by +the notion of a one to one correspondence between number +and space.</p> + +<p>When we pass to the transfinite numbers, we have +nothing in the Alephs but the symbols of certain groupings +of operations expressible in ordinary number +series. And the many forms of numbers are all simply +the result of recognizing value in naming definite +groups of operations of a lower level, which may itself +be a complication of processes indicated by the simple +numerical signs. To create such symbols is by no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">145</a></span> +means illegitimate and no paradox results in any forms +as long as we remember that our numbers are not +things but are signs of operations that may be performed +directly upon things or upon other operations.</p> + +<p>For example, let us consider such a symbol as √-5. +-5 signifies the totality of a counting process carried +on in an opposite sense from that denoted by +5. +To take the square root is to symbolize a number, the +totality of an operation, such that when the operation +denoted by multiplying it by itself is performed the +result is 5. Consequently the √-5 is merely the symbol +of these processes combined in such a way that the +whole operation is to be considered as opposite in some +sense to that denoted by √5. Hence, an easy method +for the representation of such imaginaries is based on +the principle of analytic geometry and a system of co-ordinates.</p> + +<p>The nature of this last generalization of mathematics +is well shown by Mr. Whitehead in his monumental +<i>Universal Algebra</i>. The work begins with the +definition of a calculus as "The art of manipulating +substitutive signs according to fixed rules, and the deduction +therefrom of true propositions" (<i>loc. cit.</i>, +p. 4). The deduction itself is really a manipulation +according to rules, and the truth consists essentially +in the results being actually derived from the premises +according to rule. Following Stout, substitutive signs +are characterized thus: "a word is an instrument for +thinking about the meaning which it expresses; a substitutive +sign is a means of not thinking about the +meaning which it symbolizes." Mathematical symbols<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">146</a></span> +have, then, become substitutive signs. But this is only +possible because they were at an early stage of their +history expressive signs, and the laws which connected +them were derived from the relations of the things +for which they stood. First it became possible to +forget the things in their concreteness, and now they +have become mere terms for the relations that had been +generalized between them. Consequently, the things +forgotten and the terms treated as mere elements of a +relational complex, it is possible to state such relational +complexes with the utmost freedom. But this does not +mean that mathematics can be created in a purely +arbitrary fashion. The mark of its origin is upon it in +the need of exhibiting some existing situation through +which the non-contradictory character of its postulates +can be verified. The real advantage of the generalization +is that of all generalizations in science, namely, +that by looking away from practical applications (as +appears in a historical survey) results are frequently +obtained that would never have been attained if our +labor had been consciously limited merely to those +problems where the advantages of a solution were obvious. +So the most fantastic forms of mathematics, +which themselves seem to bear no relation to actual +phenomena, just because the relations involved in them +are the relations that have been derived from dealing +with an actual world, may contribute to the solutions of +problems in other forms of calculus, or even to the creation +of new forms of mathematics. And these new forms +may stand in a more intimate connection with aspects +of the real world than the original mathematics.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">147</a></span>In 1836-39 there appeared in the <i>Gelehrte Schriften +der Universität Kasan</i>, Lobatchewsky's epoch-making +"New Elements of Geometry, with a Complete Theory +of Parallels." After proving that "if a straight line +falling on two other straight lines make the alternate +angles equal to one another, the two straight lines +shall be parallel to one another," Euclid, finding himself +unable to prove that in every other case they +were not parallel, assumed it in an axiom. But it +had never seemed obvious. Lobatchewsky's system +amounted merely to developing a geometry on the basis +of the contradictory axiom, that through a point outside +a line an indefinite number of lines can be drawn, +no one of which shall cut a given line in that plane. +In 1832-33, similar results were attained by Johann +Bolyai in an appendix to his father's "<i>Tentamen +juventutem studiosam in elementa matheseosos +puræ ... introducendi</i>" entitled "The Science of +Absolute Space." In 1824 the dissertation of Riemann, +under Gauss, introduced the idea of an <i>n</i>-ply extended +magnitude, or a study of <i>n</i>-dimensional manifolds and +a new road was opened for mathematical intelligence.</p> + +<p>At first this new knowledge suggested all sorts of +metaphysical hypotheses. If it is possible to build +geometries of <i>n</i>-dimensions or geometries in which the +axiom of parallels is no longer true, why may it not +be that the space in which we make our measurements +and on which we base our mechanics is some one of +these "non-Euclidian" spaces? And indeed many experiments +were conducted in search of some clue that +this might be the case. Such experiments in relation to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">148</a></span> +"curved spaces" seemed particularly alluring, but all +have turned out to be fruitless in results. Failure leads +to investigation of the causes of failure. If our space +had been some one of these spaces how would it have +been possible for us to know this fact? The traditional +definition of a straight line has never been satisfactory +from a physical point of view. To define it as the shortest +distance between two points is to introduce the idea +of distance, and the idea of distance itself has no +meaning without the idea of straight line, and so the +definition moves in a vicious circle. On the metaphysical +side, Lotze (<i>Metaphysik</i>, p. 249) and others (Merz, +<i>History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century</i>, +Vol. II, p. 716) criticized these attempts, on the +whole justly, but the best interpretation of the situation +has been given by Poincaré.</p> + +<p>Two lines of thought now lead to a recasting of our +conceptions of the fundamental notions of geometry. +On the one hand, that very investigation of postulates +that had led to the discovery of the apparently strange +non-Euclidian geometries was easily continued to an +investigation of the simplest basis on which a geometry +could be founded. Then by reaction it was continued +with similar methods in dealing with algebra, and other +forms of analysis, with the result that conceptions of +mathematical entities have gradually emerged that represent +a new stage of abstraction in the evolution of +mathematics, soon to be discussed as the dominating +conceptions in contemporary thought. On the other +hand, there also developed the problem of the relations +of these geometrical worlds to one another, which has<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">149</a></span> +been primarily significant in helping to clear up the +relations of mathematics in its "pure" and "applied" +forms.</p> + +<p>Geometry passed through a stage of abstraction like +that examined in connection with arithmetic. Beginning +with the discovery of non-Euclidian geometry, it +has been becoming more and more evident that a line +need not be a name for an aspect of a physical object +such as the ridge-pole line of a house and the like, nor +even for the more abstract mechanical characteristic +of direction of movement;—although the persistency +with which intuitionally minded geometers have sought +to adapt such illustrations to their needs has somewhat +obscured this fact. However, even a cursory examination +of a modern treatise on geometry makes clear +what has taken place. For example, Professor Hilbert +begins his <i>Grundlagen der Geometrie</i>, not with definition +of points, lines, and planes, but with the assumption +of three different systems of things (Dinge) of +which the first, called points, are denoted A, B, C, etc., +second, called straight lines (Gerade), are denoted +a, b, c, etc., and the third, called planes, are denoted +by α, β, γ, etc. The relations between these things +then receive "genaue und vollständige Beschreibung" +through the axioms of the geometry. And the fact +that these "things" are called points, lines, and planes +is not to give to them any of the connotations ordinarily +associated with these words further than are +determined by the axiom groups that follow. Indeed, +other geometers are even more explicit on this point. +Thus for Peano (<i>I Principii di Geometria</i>, 1889) the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">150</a></span> +line is a mere class of entities, the relations amongst +which are no longer concrete relations but types of relations. +The plane is a class of classes of entities, etc. +And an almost unlimited number of examples, about +which the theorems of the geometry will express truths, +can be exhibited, not one of which has any close resemblance +to spatial facts in the ordinary sense.</p> + +<p>Philosophers, it seems to me, have been slow to recognize +the significance of the step involved in this last +phase of mathematical thought. We have been so +schooled in an arbitrary distinction between relations +and concepts, that while long familiar with general +ideas of concepts, we are not familiar with generalized +ideas of relations. Yet this is exactly what +mathematics is everywhere presenting. A transition +has been made from relations to types of relations, +so that instead of speaking in terms +of quantitative, spatial and temporal relations, +mathematicians can now talk in terms of symmetrical, +asymmetrical, transitive, intransitive relational +types and the like. These present, however, +nothing but the empirical character that is common to +such relations as that of father and son; debtor and +creditor; master and servant; a is to the left of b, +b of c; c of d; a is older than b, b than c, c than d, +etc. Hence this is not abandonment of experience +but a generalization of it, which results in a calculus +potentially applicable not only to it but also to other +subject-matter of thought. Indeed, if it were not for +the possibility of this generalization, the almost unlimited +applicability of diagrams, so useful in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">151</a></span> +classroom, to illustrate everything from the nature +of reality to the categorical imperative, as well as to +the more technical usages of the psychological and +social sciences, would not be understandable.</p> + +<p>It would be a paradox, however, if starting out from +processes of counting and measuring, generalizations +had been attained that no longer had significance for +counting or measuring, and the non-Euclidian hyper-dimensional +geometries seem at first to present this +paradox. But, as the outcome of our second line of +thought proves, this is not the case. The investigation +of the relations of different geometrical systems to +each other has shown (cf. Brown, "The Work of H. +Poincaré," <i>Journ. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth.</i>, Vol. +XI, No. 9, p. 229) that these different systems have a +correspondence with one another so that for any +theorem stated in one of them there is a corresponding +theorem that can be stated in another. In other +words, given any factual situation that can be stated +in Euclidian geometry, the aspect treated as a straight +line in the Euclidian exposition will be treated as a +curve in the non-Euclidian, and a situation treated as +three-dimensional by Euclid's methods can be treated +as of any number of dimensions when the proper fundamental +element is chosen, and vice versa, although of +course the element will not be the line or plane in our +empirical usage of the term. This is what Poincaré +means by saying that our geometry is a free choice, +but not arbitrary (<i>The Value of Science</i>, Pt. III, +Ch. X, Sec. 3), for there are many limitations imposed +by fact upon the choice, and usually there is some<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">152</a></span> +clear indication of convenience as to the system chosen, +based on the fundamental ideal of simplicity.</p> + +<p>It is evident, then, that geometry and arithmetic +have been drawing closer together, and that to-day the +distinction between them is somewhat hard to maintain. +The older arithmetic had limited itself largely +to the study of the relations involved in serial orders +as suggested by counting, whereas geometry had concerned +itself primarily with the relations of groups of +such series to each other when the series, or groups +of series, are represented as lines or planes. But partly +by interaction in analytic geometry, and partly in the +generalization of their own methods, both have come to +recognize the fundamental character of the relations +involved in their thought, and arithmetic, through the +complex number and the algebraic unknown quantities, +has come to consider more complex serial types, while +geometry has approached the analysis of its series +through interaction with number theory. For both, +the content of their entities and the relations involved +have been brought to a minimum. And this is true even +of such apparently essentially intuitional fields as projective +geometry, where entities can be substituted for +directional lines and the axioms be turned into relational +postulates governing their configurations.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, geometry like arithmetic, has remained +true to the need that gave it initial impulse. As in +the beginning it was only a method of dealing with a +concrete situation, so in the end it is nothing but such +a method, although, as in the case of arithmetic, from +ever closer contact with the situation in question, it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">153</a></span> +has been led, by refinements that thoughtful and continual +contact bring, to dissect that situation and give +heed to aspects of it which were undreamed of at the +initial moment. In a sense, then, there are no such +things as mathematical entities, as scholastic realism +would conceive them. And yet, mathematics is not +dealing with unrealities, for it is everywhere concerned +with real rational types and systems where such types +may be exemplified. Or we can say in a purely practical +way that mathematical entities are constituted +by their relations, but this phrase cannot here be +interpreted in the Hegelian ontological sense in which +it has played so great and so pernicious a part in contemporary +philosophy. Such metaphysical interpretation +and its consequences are the basis of paradoxical +absolutisms, such as that arrived at by Professor +Royce (<i>World and the Individual</i>, Vol. II, Supplementary +Essay). The peculiar character of abstract +or pure mathematics seems to be that its own operations +on a lower level constitute material which serves +for the subject-matter with which its later investigations +deal. But mathematics is, after all, not fundamentally +different from the other sciences. The +concepts of all sciences alike constitute a special +language peculiarly adapted for dealing with certain +experience adjustments, and the differences in the +development of the different sciences merely express +different degrees of success with which such languages +have been formulated with respect to making it possible +to predict concerning not yet realized situations. +Some sciences are still seeking their terms and fundamental<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">154</a></span> +concepts, others are formulating their first +"grammar," and mathematics, still inadequate, yearly +gains both in vocabulary and flexibility.</p> + +<p>But if we are to conceive mathematical entities as +mere terminal points in a relational system, it is necessary +that we should become clear as to just what is +meant by relation, and what is the connection between +relations and quantities. Modern thought has shown +a strong tendency to insist, somewhat arbitrarily, on +the "internal" or "external" character of relations. +The former emphasis has been primarily associated +with idealistic ontology, and has often brought with it +complex dialectic questions as to the identity of an +individual thing in passing from one relational situation +to another. The latter insistence has meant primarily +that things do not change with changing relations +to other things. It has, however, often implied +the independent existence, in some curiously metaphysical +state, of relations that are not relating anything, +and is hardly less paradoxical than the older view. +In the field of physical phenomena, it seems to triumph, +while the facts of social life, on the other hand, lend +some countenance to the view of the "internalists." +Like many such discussions, the best way around them +is to forget their arguments, and turn to a fresh and +independent investigation of the facts in question.</p> + +<h5>IV</h5> + +<h4><span class="smcap">Things, Relations, and Quantities</span></h4> + +<p>As I write, the way is paved for me by Professor +Cohen (<i>Journ. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth.</i>, Vol. XI,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">155</a></span> +No. 23, Nov. 5, 1914, pp. 623-24), who outlines a +theory of relations closely allied to that which I have +in mind. Professor Cohen writes: "Like the distinction +between primary and secondary qualities, the distinction +between qualities and relations seems to me a +shifting one because the 'nature' of a thing changes +as the thing shifts from one context to another.... +To Professors Montague and Lovejoy the 'thing' is +like an old-fashioned landowner and the qualities are +its immemorial private possessions. A thing may enter +into commercial relations with others, but these relations +are extrinsic. It never parts with its patrimony. +To me, the 'nature' of a thing seems not to be so +private or fixed. It may consist entirely of bonds, +stocks, franchises, and other ways in which public +credit or the right to certain transactions is represented.... +At any rate, relations or transactions +may be regarded as wider or more primary than qualities +or possessions. The latter may be defined as internal +relations, that is, relations <i>within</i> the system +that constitutes the 'thing.' The nature of a thing +contains an essence, i.e., a group of characteristics +which, in any given system or context, remain invariant, +so that if these are changed the things drop out +of our system ... but the same thing may present +different essences in different contexts. As a thing +shifts from one context to another, it acquires new +relations and drops old ones, and in all transformations +there is a change or readjustment of the line +between the internal relations which constitute the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">156</a></span> +essence and the external relations which are outside the +inner circle...."</p> + +<p>Before continuing, however, I wish to make certain +interpretations of these statements for which, of course, +Professor Cohen is not responsible, and with which he +would not be wholly in agreement. My general attitude +will be shown by the first comment. Concepts +are only means of denoting fragments of experience +directly or indirectly given. If we then try to speak +of a "nature of a thing" two interpretations of this +expression are possible. The "thing" as such is only +a bit of reality which some motive, that without undue +extension of the term can be called practical, has led +us to treat as more or less isolable from the rest of +reality. Its nature, then, may consist of either its +relations to other practically isolated realities or +things, its actual effective value in its environment +(and hence shift with the environment as Professor +Cohen points out), or may consist of its essence, the +"relations within the system," considered from the +point of view of the potentialities implied by these for +various environments. In the first sense the nature +may easily change with change in environment, but if +it changes in the second sense, as Professor Cohen +remarks, it "drops out of our system." This I should +interpret as meaning that we no longer have that thing, +but some other thing selected from reality by a different +purpose and point of view. I should not say with +Professor Cohen that "the same thing may present +different essences in different contexts." Every reality +is more than one thing—man is an aggregate of atoms,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">157</a></span> +a living being, an animal, and a thinker, and all of +these are different things in essence, although having +certain common characteristics. All attribution of +"thingship" is abstraction, and all particular things +may be said to participate in higher, i.e., more abstract, +levels of thingship. Hence the effort to retain a thingship +through a changing of essence seems to me but +the echo of the motive that has so long deduced +ontological monism from the logical fact that to +conceive any two things is at least to throw them +into a common universe of discourse. Consequently +I should part company from Professor Cohen on this +one point (which is perhaps largely a matter of definition, +though here not unimportant) and distinguish +merely the nature of a thing as <i>actual</i> and as <i>potential</i>. +Of these the former alone changes with the environment, +while the latter changes only as the thing ceases +to be by passing into some other thing. In other +words, if the example does not do violence to Professor +Cohen's thought, I can quite understand this paper +as a stimulator of criticism, or as a means of kindling +a fire. Professor Cohen would, I suspect, take this +to mean that the same thing—this paper—must be +looked upon as having two different essences in two +different contexts, for "the same thing may possess +two different essences in different contexts," whereas +I should prefer to interpret the situation as meaning +that there are before me three (and as many more +as may be) different things having three different +essences: first, the paper as a physical object having +a considerable number of definite properties; second,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">158</a></span> +written words, which are undoubtedly in one sense mere +structural modifications of the physical object paper +(i.e., coloring on it by ink, etc.), but whose reality +for my purpose lies in the power of evoking ideas +acquired by things as symbols (things, indeed, but +things whose essence lies in the effects they produce +upon a reader rather than in their physical character); +and third, the chemical and combustion producing +properties of the paper. Now it is simpler for me to +consider the situation as one in which three things +have a common point in thingship, i.e., an abstract +element in common, than to think of "<i>a</i> thing" shifting +contexts and thereby changing its essence.</p> + +<p>But now my divergence from Professor Cohen becomes +more marked. He continues with the following +example (p. 622): "Our neighbor M. is tall, modest, +cheerful, and we understand a banker. His tallness, +modesty, cheerfulness, and the fact that he is a banker +we usually regard as his qualities; the fact that he is +our neighbor is a relation which he seems to bear to us. +He may move his residence, cease to be our neighbor, +and yet remain the same person with the same qualities. +If, however, I become his tailor, his tallness +becomes translated into certain relations of measurement; +if I become his social companion, his modesty +means that he will stand in certain social relations +with me, etc." In other words, we are illustrating the +doctrine that "qualities are reducible to relations" +(cf. p. 623). This doctrine I cannot quite accept +without modification, for I cannot tell what it means. +Without any presuppositions as to subjectivity or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">159</a></span> +consciousness (cf. p. 623, (a).) there are in the world +as I know it certain colored objects—let the expression +be taken naïvely to avoid idealistico-realistic discussion +which is here irrelevant. Now it is as unintelligible +to me that the red flowers and green leaves of the +geraniums before my windows should be reducible to +mere relations in any existential sense, as it would be +to ask for the square root of their odor, though of +course it is quite intelligible that the physical theory +and predictions concerning green and red surfaces +(or odors) should be stated in terms of atomic distances +and ether vibrations of specific lengths. The +scientific conception is, after all, nothing more than +an indication of how to take hold of things and manipulate +them to get foreseen results, and its entities +are real things only in the sense that they are the +practically effective keynotes of the complex reality. +Accordingly, instead of reducing qualities to relations, +it seems to me a much more intelligible view to consider +relations as abstract ways of taking qualities in +general, as qualities thought of in their function of +bridging a gap or making a transition between two +bits of reality that have previously been taken as +separate things. Indeed, it is just because things are +not ontologically independent beings (but rather selections +from genuinely concatenated existence) that +relations become important as indications of the practical +significance of qualitative continuities which have +been neglected in the prior isolation of the thing. +Thus, instead of an existential world that is "a network +of relations whose intersections are called terms"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">160</a></span> +(p. 622), I find more intelligible a qualitatively heterogeneous +reality that can be variously partitioned into +things, and that can he abstractly replaced by systems +of terms and relations that are adequate to symbolize +their effective nature in particular respects. There is +a tendency for certain attributes to maintain their +concreteness (qualitativeness) in things, and for others +to suggest the connection of things with other things, +and so to emphasize a more abstract aspect of experience. +Thus then arises a temporary and practical +distinction that tends to be taken as opposition between +qualities and relations. As spatial and temporal +characteristics possess their chief practical value in +the connection of things, so they, like Professor Cohen's +neighbor-character, are ordinarily assumed abstractly +as mere relations, while shapes, colors, etc., and Professor +Cohen's "modesty, tallness, cheerfulness," may +be thought of more easily without emphasis on other +things and so tend to be accepted in their concreteness +as qualities, but how slender is the dividing-line Professor +Cohen's easy translation of these things into +relations makes clear.</p> + +<p>Taken purely intellectualistically, there would be +first a fiction of separation in what is really already +continuous and then another fiction to bridge the gap +thus made. This would, of course, be the falsification +against which Bergson inveighs. But this interpretation +is to misunderstand the nature of abstraction. +Abstraction does not substitute an unreal for a real, +but selects from reality a genuine characteristic of it +which is adequate for a particular purpose. Thus to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">161</a></span> +conceive time as a succession of moments is not to +falsify time, but to select from processes going on in +time a characteristic of them through which predictions +can be made, which may be verified and turned +into an instrument for the control of life or environment. +A similar misunderstanding of abstraction, +coupled with a fuller appreciation than Bergson +evinces of the value of its results, has led to the neo-realistic +insistence on turning abstractions into existent +entities of which the real world is taken to be an +organized composite aggregate.</p> + +<p>The practice of turning qualities into merely conscious +entities has done much to obscure the status +of scientific knowing, for it has left mere quantity as +the only real character of the actual world. But once +take a realistic standpoint, and quantity is no more +real than quality. For primitive man, the qualitative +aspect of reality is probably the first to which he gives +heed, and it is only through efforts to get along with +the world in its qualitative character that its quantitative +side is forced upon the attention. Then so-called +"exact" science is born, but it does not follow that +qualities henceforth become insignificant. They are +still the basis of all relations, even of those that are +most directly construed as quantitative. Quality and +quantity are only different aspects of the world which +the status of our practical life leads us to take separately +or abstractly. "Thing" is no less an abstraction, +in which we disregard certain continuities with +the rest of the world because we are so constituted that +the demands of living make it expedient to do so.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">162</a></span> +Things once given, further abstractions become possible, +among which are those leading to mathematical +thinking, in which higher abstractions are made, +guided always by the "generating problem" (cf. Karl +Schmidt, <i>Jour. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth.</i>, Vol. X, +No. 3, 1913, pp. 64-75).</p> + +<h5>V</h5> + +<h4><span class="smcap">The Function of Theory in Science</span></h4> + +<p>The controlling factors for the progress of scientific +thought are inventions that lead the scientist into +closer contact with his data, and direct attention to +complexities which would otherwise have escaped observation. +This end is best fulfilled by conceiving +entities that under some point of view are practically +isolable from the context in which they occur. Only +too often philosophic thought has confused this practical +segregation with ontological separation, and so +been obliged to introduce metaphysical and external +relations to bring these entities together again in a +real world, when in reality they have never been separated +from one another and hence not from the real +world. Furthermore, the conceptual model, built on +the lines of a calculus of mathematics, is often considered +the truth <i>par excellence</i> after the analogy of +a camera's portrait. Progress in science, however, +shows that these models have to be continually rebuilt. +Each seems to lead to further knowledge that necessitates +its reconstruction, so that truth takes on an ideal +value as an ultimate but unattained, if not unattainable, +goal, while existing science becomes reduced to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">163</a></span> +working hypotheses. From a positivistic point of view, +however, the goal is not only practically unattainable, +but it is irrational, for there seems to be every +evidence that it expresses something contrary to the +nature of the real. Yet scientific theory is not wholly +arbitrary. We cannot construe nature as constituted +of any sorts of entities that may suit our whim. And +this is because science itself recognizes that its entities +are not really isolated, but are endowed with all sorts +of properties that serve to connect them with other +entities. They are only symbols of critical points of +reality which, conceived in a certain way, make the +behavior of the whole intelligible. Indeed, the only +significant sense in which they are true for the scientist +is that they indicate real connections that might otherwise +have been overlooked, and this is only possible +from the fact that reality has the characteristics that +they present and that, with their relations, they give +an approximate presentation of what is actually presented +just as a successful portrait painter considers +the individuality of the eyes, nose, mouth, etc., although +he does not imply that a face is compounded +of these separate features as a house is built of +boards.</p> + +<p>The atomic theory, for example, has undoubtedly +been of the greatest service to chemistry, and atoms +undoubtedly denote a significant resting-place in the +analysis of the physical world. Yet in the light of +electron theories, it is becoming more and more evident +that atoms are not ultimate particles, and are not even +all alike (Becker, "Isostasy and Radioactivity," <i>Sci.</i>,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">164</a></span> +Jan. 29, 1915) when they represent a single substance. +Again, while there is as yet no evidence to suggest +that the electron must itself be considered as +divisible (unless it be the distinction between the positive +and negative electron), there are suggestions that +electrons may themselves arise and pass away (cf. +Moore, <i>Origin, and Nature of Life</i>, p. 39). "A wisely +positivistic mind," writes Enriques (<i>Problems of +Science</i>, p. 34), "can see in the atomic hypothesis only +a subjective representation,"<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> and, we might add, "in +any other hypothesis." He continues (pp. 34-36): +"robbing the atom of the concrete attributes inherent +in its image, we find ourselves regarding it as a mere +symbol. The logical value of the atomic theory depends, +then, upon the establishment of a proper correspondence +between the symbols which it contains and +the reality which we are trying to represent.</p> + +<p>"Now, if we go back to the time when the atomic +theory was accepted by modern chemistry, we see that +the plain atomic formulæ contain only the representation +of the invariable relations in the combination of +simple bodies, in weight and volume; these last being +taken in relation to a well-defined gaseous state.</p> + +<p>"But, once introduced into science, the atomic +phraseology suggested the extension of the meaning +of the symbols, and the search in reality for facts in +correspondence with its more extended conception.</p> + +<p>"The theory advances, urged on, as it were, by its +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">165</a></span> +metaphysical nature, or, if you wish, by the association +of ideas which the concrete image of the atom +carries with it.</p> + +<p>"Thus for the plain formulæ we have substituted, +in the chemistry of carbon compounds, structural formulæ, +which come to represent, thanks to the disposition +or grouping of atoms in a molecule, structural +relations of the second degree, that is to say, relations +inherent in certain chemical transformations with respect +to which some groups of elements have in some +way an invariant character. And here, because the +image of a simple molecule upon a plane does not +suffice to explain, for example, the facts of isomerism, +we must resort to the stereo-chemical representation of +Van't Hoff.</p> + +<p>"Must we further recall the kinetic theory of gases, +the facts explained by the breaking up of molecules +into ions, the hypothesis suggested, for example, by +Van der Waals by the view that an atom has an actual +bulk? Must we point to a physical phenomenon of +quite a different class, for example, to the coloring of +the thin film forming the soap-bubbles which W. +Thomson has taken as the measure of the size of a +molecule?</p> + +<p>"Such a résumé of results shows plainly that we +cannot help the progress of science by blocking the +path of theory and looking only at its positive aspects, +that is to say, at the collection of facts that it explains. +The value of a theory lies rather in the hypothesis +which it can suggest, by means of the psychological +representation of the symbols.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">166</a></span>"We shall not draw from all this the conclusion that +the atomic hypothesis ought to correspond to the extremely +subtle sensations of a being resembling a perfected +man. We shall not even reason about the possibility +of those imaginary sensations, in so far as they +are conceived simply as an extension of our own. But +we shall repeat, in regard to the atomic theory, what +an illustrious master is said to have remarked as to +the unity of matter: if on first examination a fact +seems possible which contradicts the atomic view of +things, there is a strong probability that such a fact +will be disproved by experience.</p> + +<p>"Does not such a capacity for adaptation to facts, +thus furnishing a model for them, perhaps denote the +<i>positive</i> reality of a theory?"</p> + +<p>And the above principles are as true of mathematical +concepts as of chemical. Everywhere it is "capacity +of adaptation to facts" that is the criterion of a +branch of mathematics, except, of course, that in +mathematics the facts are not always physical facts. +Mathematics has successfully accomplished a generalization +whereby its own methods furnish the material for +higher generalizations. The imaginary number and the +hyper-dimensional or non-Euclidian geometries may be +absurd if measured by the standard of physical reality, +but they nevertheless have something real about them +in relation to certain mathematical processes on a +lower level. There is no philosophic paradox about +modern arithmetic or geometry, once it is recognized +that they are merely abstractions of genuine features +of simpler and more obviously practical manipulations<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">167</a></span> +that are clearly derived from the dealing of a human +being with genuine realities.</p> + +<p>In the light of these considerations, I cannot help +feeling that the frequent attempts of mathematicians +with a philosophical turn of mind, and philosophers +who are dipping into mathematics, to derive geometrical +entities from psychological considerations are +quite mistaken, and are but another example of those +traditional presuppositions of psychology which, Professor +Dewey has pointed out (<i>Jour. of Phil., Psy., +and Sci. Meth.</i>, XI, No. 19, p. 508), were "bequeathed +by seventeenth-century philosophy to psychology, instead +of originating within psychology" ... that +"were wished upon it by philosophy when it was as +yet too immature to defend itself."</p> + +<p>Henri Poincaré (<i>Science and Hypothesis</i>, Ch. IV, +<i>The Value of Science</i>, Ch. IV) and Enriques (<i>Problems +of Science</i>, Ch. IV, esp. B—<i>The Psychological +Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts</i>) furnish two of +the most familiar examples of this sort of philosophizing. +Each isolates special senses, sight, touch, or +motion, and tries to show how a being merely equipped +with one or the other of these senses might arrive at +geometrical conceptions which differ, of course, from +space as represented by our familiar Euclidian geometry. +Then comes the question of fusing these different +sorts of experience into a single experience of which +geometry may be an intelligible transcription. Enriques +finds a parallel between the historical development +and the psycho-genetic development of the postulates +of geometry (<i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 214 <i>seq.</i>). "The three<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">168</a></span> +groups of ideas that are connected with the concepts +that serve as the basis for the theory of continuum +(<i>Analysis situs</i>), of metrical, and of projective geometry, +may be connected, as to their psychological origin, +with three groups of sensations: with the general tactile-muscular +sensations, with those of special touch, +and of sight, respectively." Poincaré even evokes ancestral +experience to make good his case (<i>Sci. and +Hyp.</i>, Ch. V, end). "It has often been said that if +individual experience could not create geometry, the +same is not true of ancestral experience. But what +does that mean? Is it meant that we could not experimentally +demonstrate Euclid's postulate, but that our +ancestors have been able to do it? Not in the least. +It is meant that by natural selection our mind has +<i>adapted</i> itself to the conditions of the external world, +that it has adopted the geometry <i>most advantageous</i> +to the species: or in other words, the <i>most convenient</i>."</p> + +<p>Now undoubtedly there may be a certain modicum +of truth in these statements. As implied by the last +quotation from Poincaré, the modern scientist can +hardly doubt that the fact of the adaptation of our +thinking to the world we live in is due to the fact that +it is in that world that we evolved. As is implied by +both writers, if one could limit human contact with the +world to a particular form of sense response, thought +about that world would take place in different terms +from what it now does and would presumably be less +efficient. But these admissions do not imply that any +light is thrown upon the nature of mathematical entities +by such abstractions. Russell (<i>Scientific Method in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">169</a></span> +Philosophy</i>) is in the curious position of raising arithmetic +to a purely logical status, but playing with +geometry and sensation after the manner of Poincaré, +to whom he gives somewhat grudging praise on this +account.</p> + +<p>The psychological methods upon which all such investigations +are based are open to all sorts of criticisms. +Chiefly, the conceptions on which they are based, even +if correct, are only abstractions. There is not the +least evidence for the existence of organisms with a +single differentiated sense organ, nor the least evidence +that there ever was such an organism. Indeed, according +to modern accounts of the evolution of the +nervous system (cf. G. H. Parker, <i>Pop. Sci. Month.</i>, +Feb., 1914) different senses have arisen through a +gradual differentiation of a more general form of stimulus +receptor, and consequently, the possibility of the +detachment of special senses is the latter end of the +series and not the first. But, however this may be, +the mathematical concepts that we are studying have +only been grasped by a highly developed organism, +man, but they had already begun to be grasped by him +in an early stage of his career before he had analyzed +his experience and connected it with specific sense +organs. It may of course be a pleasant exercise, if +one likes that sort of thing, to assume with most +psychologists certain elementary sensations, and then +examine the amount of information each can give in +the light of possible mathematical interpretations, but +to do so is not to show that a being so scantily endowed +would ever have acquired a geometry of the type in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">170</a></span> +question, or any geometry at all. Inferences of the +sort are in the same category with those from hypothetical +children, that used to justify all theories of +the pedagogue and psychologist, or from the economic +man, that still, I fear, play too great a part in the +world of social science.</p> + +<h5>VI</h5> + +<h4><span class="smcap">Mathematical Intelligence</span></h4> + +<p>The real nature of intelligence as it appears in the +development of mathematics is something quite other +than that of sensory analysis. Intelligence is fundamentally +skill, and although skill may be acquired in +connection with some sort of sensory contact of an +organism and environment, it is only determined by +that contact in the sense that if the sensory conditions +were different the needs of the organism might be +different, and the kind and degree of skill it could attain +would be other than under the conditions at first +assumed. Whenever the beginnings of mathematics +appear with primitive people, we find a stage of development +that calls for the exercise of skill in dealing +with certain practical situations. Hence we found early +in our investigations that it was impossible to affirm a +weak intelligence from limited achievements in counting, +just as it would be absurd to assume the feeble +intelligence of a philosopher from his inability to manipulate +a boomerang. The instance merely suggests +a kind of skill that he has never been led to +acquire.</p> + +<p>Yet it is possible to distinguish intellectual skill, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">171</a></span> +better skills, from physical or athletic prowess. Primarily, +it is directed at the formation and use of concepts, +and the concept is only a symbol that can be +substituted for experiences. A well-built concept is a +part of a system of concepts where relations have taken +the place of real connections in such a fashion that, +forgetting the actuality, it is possible to present situations +that have never occurred or at least are not +immediately given at the time and place of the presentation, +and to substitute them for actual situations +in such a fashion that these may be expediently met, +if or when such situations present themselves. An isolated +concept, that is, one not a part of any system, is as +mythical an entity as any savage ever dreamed. Indeed, +it would add much to the clearness of our thinking +if we could limit the use of "intelligence" to skill +in constructing and using different systems of concepts, +and speak concretely of mathematical intelligence, +philosophical intelligence, economic intelligence, historic +intelligence, and the like. The problem of +creative intelligence is, after all, the problem of the +acquisition of certain forms of skill, and while the +general lines are the same for all knowledge (because +the instruments are everywhere symbolic presentations, +or concepts), in each field the situation studied makes +different types of difficulties to be overcome and suggest +different methods of attaining the object.</p> + +<p>In mathematics, the formal impulse to reduce the +content of fundamental concepts to a minimum, and +to stress merely relations has been most successful. +We saw its results in such geometries as Hilbert's and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">172</a></span> +Peano's, where the empty name "entity" supplants +the more concrete "point," and the "1" of arithmetic +has the same character. In the social sciences, however, +such examples as the "political" and the "economic" +man are signal failures, while, perhaps, the +"atom" and the "electron" approach the ideal in +physics and chemistry. In mathematics, all further +concepts can be defined by collections of these fundamental +entities constituted in certain specified ways. +And it is worth noting that both factually and logically +a collection of entities so defined is not a mere aggregate, +but possesses a differentiated character of its +own which, although the resultant of its constitution, +is not a property of any of its elements. A whole +number is thus a collection of 1s, but the properties of +the whole number are something quite different from +that of the elements through which it is constituted, +just as an atom may be composed of electrons and yet, +in valency, possess a property that is not the direct analogue +of any property possessed by electrons not so +organized.</p> + +<p>Natural science, however, considers such building +up of its fundamental entities into new entities as a +process taking place in time rather than as consequent +upon change of form of the whole rendering new +analytic forms expedient. Hence it points to the occurrence +of genuine novelties in the realm of objective +reality. Mathematics, on the other hand, has generalized +its concepts beyond the facts implied in spatial +and temporal observations, so that while significant +in both fields by virtue of the nature of its abstractions,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">173</a></span> +its novelties are the novelties of new conceptual formations, +a distinguishing of previously unnoted generalizations +of relations existent in the realm of facts. +But the fact that time has thus passed beyond its +empirical meaning in the mathematical realm is no +ground for giving mathematics an elevated position as +a science of eternal realities, of subsistent beings, or +the like. The generalization of concepts to cover both +spatial and temporal facts does not create new entities +for which a home must be provided in the partition of +realities. Metaphysicians should not be the "needy +knife grinders" of M. Anatole France (cf. <i>Garden of +Epicurus</i>, Ch. "The Language of the Metaphysicians"). +Nevertheless, the success of abstraction for +mathematical intelligence has been immense.</p> + +<p>No significant thinking is wholly the work of an +individual man. Ideas are a product of social coöperation +in which some have wrested crude concepts from +nature, others have refined them through usage, and +still others have built them into an effective system. +The first steps were undoubtedly taken in an effort to +communicate, and progress has been in part the progress +of language. The original nature of man may +have as a part those reactions which we call curiosity, +but, as Auguste Comte long ago pointed out (Lévy-Bruhl, +<i>A. Comte</i>, p. 67), these reactions are among the +feeblest of our nature and without the pressure of practical +affairs could hardly have advanced the race beyond +barbarism. Science was the plaything of the +Greek, the consolation of the Middle Ages, and only +for the modern has it become an instrument in such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">174</a></span> +fashion as to mark an epoch in the still dawning discovery +of mind.</p> + +<p>Man is, after all, rational only because through his +nervous system he can hold his immediate responses +in check and finally react as a being that has had +experiences and profited by them. Concepts are the +medium through which these experiences are in effect +preserved; they express not merely a fact recorded but +also the significance of a fact, not merely a contact +with the world but also an attitude toward the future. +It may be that the mere judgment of fact, a citation +of resemblances and differences, is the basis of scientific +knowledge, but before knowledge is worthy of the +name, these facts have undergone an ideal transformation +controlled by the needs of successful prediction +and motivated by that self-conscious realization of the +value of control which has raised man above the beasts +of the field.</p> + +<p>The realm of mathematics, which we have been examining, +is but one aspect of the growth of intelligence. +But in theory, at least, it is among the most +interesting, since in it are reached the highest +abstractions of science, while its empirical beginnings +are not lost. But its processes and +their significance are in no way different in +essence from those of the other sciences. It marks +one road of specialization in the discovery of mind. +And in these terms we may read all history. To +quote Professor Woodbridge (<i>Columbia University +Quarterly</i>, Dec., 1912, p. 10): "We may see man +rising from the ground, startled by the first dim intimation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">175</a></span> +that the things and forces about him are +convertible and controllable. Curiosity excites him, +but he is subdued by an untrained imagination. The +things that frighten him, he tries to frighten in return. +The things that bless him, he blesses. He would scare +the earth's shadow from the moon and sacrifice his +dearest to a propitious sky. It avails not. But the +little things teach him and discipline his imagination. +He has kicked the stone that bruised him only to be +bruised again. So he converts the stone into a weapon +and begins the subjugation of the world, singing a song +of triumph by the way. Such is his history in epitome—a +blunder, a conversion, a conquest, and a song. +That sequence he will repeat in greater things. He +will repeat it yet and rejoice where he now despairs, +converting the chaos of his social, political, industrial, +and emotional life into wholesome force. He will sing +again. But the discovery of mind comes first, and then, +the song."</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">176</a></span></p> + +<h2>SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND INDIVIDUAL +THINKER</h2> + +<h4>GEORGE H. MEAD</h4> + +<p>The scientist in the ancient world found his test of +reality in the evidence of the presence of the essence +of the object. This evidence came by way of observation, +even to the Platonist. Plato could treat this +evidence as the awaking of memories of the ideal essence +of the object seen in a world beyond the heavens during +a former stage of the existence of the soul. In the +language of Theatetus it was the agreement of fluctuating +sensual content with the thought-content imprinted +in or viewed by the soul. In Aristotle it is again +the agreement of the organized sensuous experience +with the vision which the mind gets of the essence of +the object through the perceptual experience of a number +of instances. That which gives the stamp of reality +is the coincidence of the percept with a rational content +which must in some sense be in the mind to insure +knowledge, as it must be in the cosmos to insure existence, +of the object. The relation of this test of reality +to an analytical method is evident. Our perceptual +world is always more crowded and confused than the +ideal contents by which the reality of its meaning is +to be tested. The aim of the analysis varies with the +character of the science. In the case of Aristotle's +theoretical sciences, such as mathematics and metaphysics,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">177</a></span> +where one proceeds by demonstration from the +given existences, analysis isolates such elements as +numbers, points, lines, surfaces, and solids, essences +and essential accidents. Aristotle approaches nature, +however, as he approaches the works of human art. +Indeed, he speaks of nature as the artificer par excellence. +In the study of nature, then, as in the study +of the practical and productive arts, it is of the first +importance that the observer should have the idea—the +final cause—as the means of deciphering the nature of +living forms. Here analysis proceeds to isolate characters +which are already present in forms whose functions +are assumed to be known. By analogy such identities +as that of fish fins with limbs of other vertebrates are +assumed, and some very striking anticipations of modern +biological conceptions and discoveries are reached. +Aristotle recognizes that the theory of the nature of +the form or essence must be supported by observation +of the actual individual. What is lacking is any body +of observation which has value apart from some theory. +He tests his theory by the observed individual which +is already an embodied theory, rather than by what +we are wont to call the facts. He refers to other observers +to disagree with them. He does not present +their observations apart from their theories as material +which has existential value, independent for the +time being of any hypothesis. And it is consistent +with this attitude that he never presents the observations +of others in support of his own doctrine. His +analysis within this field of biological observation does +not bring him back to what, in modern science, are the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">178</a></span> +data, but to general characters which make up the +definition of the form. His induction involves a gathering +of individuals rather than of data. Thus analysis +in the theoretical, the natural, the practical, +and the productive sciences, leads back to universals. +This is quite consistent with Aristotle's metaphysical +position that since the matter of natural objects has +reality through its realization in the form, whatever +appears without such meaning can be accounted for +only as the expression of the resistance which matter +offers to this realization. This is the field of a blind +necessity, not that of a constructive science.</p> + +<p>Continuous advance in science has been possible +only when analysis of the object of knowledge has supplied +not elements of meanings as the objects have +been conceived but elements abstracted from those +meanings. That is, scientific advance implies a willingness +to remain on terms of tolerant acceptance of +the reality of what cannot be stated in the accepted +doctrine of the time, but what must be stated in the +form of contradiction with these accepted doctrines. +The domain of what is usually connoted by the term +facts or data belongs to the field lying between the old +doctrine and the new. This field is not inhabited by +the Aristotelian individual, for the individual is but +the realization of the form or universal essence. When +the new theory has displaced the old, the new individual +appears in the place of its predecessor, but +during the period within which the old theory is being +dislodged and the new is arising, a consciously growing +science finds itself occupied with what is on the one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">179</a></span> +hand the débris of the old and on the other the building +material of the new. Obviously, this must find its immediate +<i>raison d'être</i> in something other than the +meaning that is gone or the meaning that is not yet +here. It is true that the barest facts do not lack +meaning, though a meaning which has been theirs in +the past is lost. The meaning, however, that is still +theirs is confessedly inadequate, otherwise there would +be no scientific problem to be solved. Thus, when +older theories of the spread of infectious diseases lost +their validity because of instances where these explanations +could not be applied, the diagnoses and accounts +which could still be given of the cases of the +sickness themselves were no explanation of the spread +of the infection. The facts of the spread of the infection +could be brought neither under a doctrine of +contagion which was shattered by actual events nor +under a doctrine of the germ theory of disease, which +was as yet unborn. The logical import of the dependence +of these facts upon observation, and hence +upon the individual experience of the scientist, I shall +have occasion to discuss later; what I am referring to +here is that the conscious growth of science is accompanied +by the appearance of this sort of material.</p> + +<p>There were two fields of ancient science, those of +mathematics and of astronomy, within which very considerable +advance was achieved, a fact which would +seem therefore to offer exception to the statement just +made. The theory of the growth of mathematics is a +disputed territory, but whether mathematical discovery +and invention take place by steps which can be identified<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">180</a></span> +with those which mark the advance in the experimental +sciences or not, the individual processes in which +the discoveries and inventions have arisen are almost +uniformly lost to view in the demonstration which presents +the results. It would be improper to state that +no new data have arisen in the development of mathematics, +in the face of such innovations as the minus +quantity, the irrational, the imaginary, the infinitesimal, +or the transfinite number, and yet the innovations +appear as the recasting of the mathematical theories +rather than as new facts. It is of course true that +these advances have depended upon problems such as +those which in the researches of Kepler and Galileo +led to the early concepts of the infinitesimal procedure, +and upon such undertakings as bringing the combined +theories of geometry and algebra to bear upon the +experiences of continuous change. For a century after +the formulation of the infinitesimal method men were +occupied in carrying the new tool of analysis into +every field where its use promised advance. The +conceptions of the method were uncritical. Its applications +were the center of attention. The next +century undertook to bring order into the concepts, +consistency into the doctrine, and rigor into the +reasoning. The dominating trend of this movement +was logical rather than methodological. The development +was in the interest of the foundations of +mathematics rather than in the use of mathematics +as a method for solving scientific problems. Of course +this has in no way interfered with the freedom of +application of mathematical technique to the problems<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">181</a></span> +of physical science. On the contrary, it was on account +of the richness and variety of the contents which the +use of mathematical methods in the physical sciences +imported into the doctrine that this logical housecleaning +became necessary in mathematics. The movement +has been not only logical as distinguished from methodological +but logical as distinguished from metaphysical +as well. It has abandoned a Euclidean space with its +axioms as a metaphysical presupposition, and it has +abandoned an Aristotelian subsumptive logic for which +definition is a necessary presupposition. It recognizes +that everything cannot be proved, but it does not undertake +to state what the axiomata shall be; and it also +recognizes that not everything can be defined, and does +not undertake to determine what shall be defined implicitly +and what explicitly. Its constants are logical +constants, as the proposition, the class and the relation. +With these and their like and with relatively +few primitive ideas, which are represented by symbols, +and used according to certain given postulates, it becomes +possible to bring the whole body of mathematics +within a single treatment. The development of this +pure mathematics, which comes to be a logic of the +mathematical sciences, has been made possible by such +a generalization of number theory and theories of the +elements of space and time that the rigor of mathematical +reasoning is secured, while the physical +scientist is left the widest freedom in the choice +and construction of concepts and imagery for his +hypotheses. The only compulsion is a logical compulsion. +The metaphysical compulsion has disappeared<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">182</a></span> +from mathematics and the sciences whose techniques it +provides.</p> + +<p>It was just this compulsion which confined ancient +science. Euclidian geometry defined the limits of +mathematics. Even mechanics was cultivated largely +as a geometrical field. The metaphysical doctrine +according to which physical objects had their own places +and their own motions determined the limits within +which astronomical speculations could be carried on. +Within these limits Greek mathematical genius achieved +marvelous results. The achievements of any period +will be limited by two variables: the type of problem +against which science formulates its methods, and the +materials which analysis puts at the scientist's disposal +in attacking the problems. The technical problems +of the trisection of an angle and the duplication +of a cube are illustrations of the problems which +characterize a geometrical doctrine that was finding +its technique. There appears also the method of analysis +of the problem into simpler problems, the +assumption of the truth of the conclusion to be proved +and the process of arguing from this to a known truth. +The more fundamental problem which appears first +as the squaring of the circle, which becomes that of +the determination of the relation of the circle to its +diameter and development of the method of exhaustion, +leads up to the sphere, the regular polyhedra, to conic +sections and the beginnings of trigonometry. Number +was not freed from the relations of geometrical magnitudes, +though Archimedes could conceive of a number +greater or smaller than any assignable magnitude.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">183</a></span> +With the method of exhaustion, with the conceptions +of number found in writings of Archimedes and others, +with the beginnings of spherical geometry and trigonometry, +and with the slow growth of algebra finding +its highest expression in that last flaring up of Greek +mathematical creation, the work of Diophantes; there +were present all the conceptions which were necessary +for attack upon the problems of velocities and changing +velocities, and the development of the method of +analysis which has been the revolutionary tool of Europe +since the Renaissance. But the problems of a +relation between the time and space of a motion that +should change just as a motion, without reference to +the essence of the object in motion, were problems +which did not, perhaps could not, arise to confront +the Greek mind. In any case its mathematics was firmly +embedded in a Euclidian space. Though there are +indications of some distrust, even in Greek times, of +the parallel axiom, the suggestion that mathematical +reasoning could be made rigorous and comprehensive +independently of the specific content of axiom and +definition was an impossible one for the Greek, because +such a suggestion could be made only on the +presupposition of a number theory and an algebra +capable of stating a continuum in terms which are +independent of the sensuous intuition of space and time +and of the motion that takes place within space and +time. In the same fashion mechanics came back to +fundamental generalizations of experience with reference +to motions which served as axioms of mechanics, +both celestial and terrestrial: the assumptions of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">184</a></span> +natural motion of earthly substances to their own +places in straight lines, and of celestial bodies in circles +and uniform velocities, of an equilibrium where equal +weights operate at equal distances from the fulcrum.</p> + +<p>The incommensurable of Pythagoras and the paradoxes +of Zeno present the "no thoroughfares" of ancient +mathematical thought. Neither the continuum +of space nor of motion could be broken up into ultimate +units, when incommensurable ratios existed which +could not be expressed, and when motion refused to be +divided into positions of space or time since these are +functions of motion. It was not until an algebraic +theory of number led mathematicians to the use of +expressions for the irrational, the minus, and the imaginary +numbers through the logical development of +generalized expressions, that problems could be formulated +in which these irrational ratios and quantities +were involved, though it is also true that the effort +to deal with problems of this character was in no small +degree responsible for the development of the algebra. +Fixed metaphysical assumptions in regard to number, +space, time, motion, and the nature of physical objects +determined the limits within which scientific investigation +could take place. Thus though the hypothesis +of Copernicus and in all probability of Tycho Brahe +were formulated by Greek astronomers, their physical +doctrine was unable to use them because they were in +flagrant contradiction with the definitions the ancient +world gave to earthly and celestial bodies and their +natural motions. The atomic doctrine with Democritus' +thoroughgoing undertaking to substitute a quantitative<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">185</a></span> +for a qualitative conception of matter with the +location of the qualitative aspects of the world in the +experience of the soul appealed only to the Epicurean +who used the theory as an exorcism to drive out of the +universe the spirits which disturbed the calm of the +philosopher.</p> + +<p>There was only one field in which ancient science +seemed to break away from the fixed assumptions +of its metaphysics and from the definitions of natural +objects which were the bases for their scientific inferences, +this was the field of astronomy in the period +after Eudoxus. Up to and including the theories of +Eudoxus, physical and mathematical astronomy went +hand in hand. Eudoxus' nests of spheres within spheres +hung on different axes revolving in different uniform +periods was the last attempt of the mathematician +philosopher to state the anomalies of the heavens, and +to account for the stations, the retrogressions, and +varying velocities of planetary bodies by a theory resolving +all phenomena of these bodies into motions of +uniform velocities in perfect circles, and also placing +these phenomena within a physical theory consistent +with the prevailing conceptions of the science and philosophy +of the time. As a physicist Aristotle felt the +necessity of introducing further spheres between the +nests of spheres assigned by Eudoxus to the planetary +bodies, spheres whose peculiar motions should correct +the tendency of the different groups of spheres to pass +their motions on to each other. Since the form of the +orbits of heavenly bodies and their velocities could not +be considered to be the results of their masses and of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">186</a></span> +their relative positions with reference to one another; +since it was not possible to calculate the velocities and +orbits from the physical characters of the bodies, since +in a word these physical characters did not enter into +the problem of calculating the positions of the bodies +nor offer explanations for the anomalies which the +mathematical astronomer had to explain, it was not +strange that he disinterested himself from the metaphysical +celestial mechanics of his time and concentrated +his attention upon the geometrical hypotheses +by means of which he could hope to resolve into uniform +revolutions in circular orbits the anomalous motions +of the planetary bodies. The introduction of the +epicycle with the deferent and the eccentric as working +hypotheses to solve the anomalies of the heavens is +to be comprehended largely in view of the isolation of +the mathematical as distinguished from the physical +problem of astronomy. In no sense were these conceptions +working hypotheses of a celestial mechanics. +They were the only means of an age whose mathematics +was almost entirely geometrical for accomplishing +what a later generation could accomplish by an algebraic +theory of functions. As has been pointed out, +the undertaking of the ancient mathematical astronomer +to resolve the motions of planetary bodies into +circular, uniform, continuous, symmetrical movements +is comparable to the theorem of Fourier which allows +the mathematician to replace any one periodic function +by a sum of circular functions. In other words, +the astronomy of the Alexandrian period is a somewhat +cumbrous development of the mathematical technique<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">187</a></span> +of the time to enable the astronomer to bring the anomalies +of the planetary bodies, as they increased under +observation, within the axioms of a metaphysical +physics. The genius exhibited in the development of +the mathematical technique places the names of Apollonius +of Perga, Hipparchus of Nicaea, and Ptolemy +among the great mathematicians of the world, but they +never felt themselves free to attack by their hypotheses +the fundamental assumptions of the ancient metaphysical +doctrine of the universe. Thus it was said of +Hipparchus by Adrastus, a philosopher of the first +century A. D., in explaining his preference for the +epicycle to the eccentric as a means of analyzing the +motions of the planetary bodies: "He preferred and +adopted the principle of the epicycle as more probable +to his mind, because it ordered the system of the +heavens with more symmetry and with a more intimate +dependence with reference to the center of the universe. +Although he guarded himself from assuming the rôle +of the physicist in devoting himself to the investigations +of the real movements of the stars, and in undertaking +to distinguish between the motions which nature has +adopted from those which the appearances present to +our eyes, he assumed that every planet revolved along +an epicycle, the center of which describes a circumference +concentric with the earth." Even mathematical +astronomy does not offer an exception to the scientific +method of the ancient world, that of bringing to +consciousness the concepts involved in their world +of experience, organizing these concepts with reference +to each, analyzing and restating them within<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">188</a></span> +the limits of their essential accidents, and assimilating +the concrete objects of experience to these typical +forms as more or less complete realizations.</p> + +<p>At the beginning of the process of Greek self-conscious +reflection and analysis, the mind ran riot among +the concepts and their characters until the contradictions +which arose from these unsystematized speculations +brought the Greek mind up to the problems of +criticism and scientific method. Criticism led to the +separation of the many from the one, the imperfect copy +from the perfect type, the sensuous and passionate from +the rational and the intrinsically good, the impermanent +particular from the incorruptible universal. The line +of demarcation ran between the lasting reality that +answered to critical objective thought and the realm +of perishing imperfect instances, of partially realized +forms full of unmeaning differences due to distortion +and imperfection, the realm answering to a sensuous +passionate unreflective experience. It would be a quite +inexcusable mistake to put all that falls on the wrong +side of the line into a subjective experience, for these +characters belonged not alone to the experience, but also +to the passing show, to the world of imperfectly developed +matter which belonged to the perceptual passionate +experience. While it may not then be classed +as subjective, the Greeks of the Sophistic period felt +that this phase of existence was an experience which +belongs to the man in his individual life, that life in +which he revolts from the conventions of society, in +which he questions accepted doctrine, in which he differentiates +himself from his fellows. Protagoras seems<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">189</a></span> +even to have undertaken to make this experience of the +individual, the stuff of the known world. It is difficult +adequately to assess Protagoras' undertaking. He +seems to be insisting both that the man's experience as +his own must be the measure of reality as known and +on the other hand that these experiences present norms +which offer a choice in conduct. If this is true Protagoras +conceived of the individual's experience in its +atypical and revolutionary form as not only real but +the possible source of fuller realities than the world +of convention. The undertaking failed both in philosophic +doctrine and in practical politics. It failed +in both fields because the subjectivist, both in theory +and practice, did not succeed in finding a place +for the universal character of the object, its meaning, +in the mind of the individual and thus in finding +in this experience the hypothesis for the reconstruction +of the real world. In the ancient world the +atypical individual, the revolutionist, the non-conformist +was a self-seeking adventurer or an anarchist, not +an innovator or reformer, and subjectivism in ancient +philosophy remained a skeptical attitude which could +destroy but could not build up.</p> + +<p>Hippocrates and his school came nearer consciously +using the experience of the individual as the actual +material of the object of knowledge. In the skeptical +period in which they flourished they rejected on the +one hand the magic of traditional medicine and on the +other the empty theorizing that had been called out +among the physicians by the philosophers. Their practical +tasks held them to immediate experience. Their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">190</a></span> +functions in the gymnasia gave their medicine an interest +in health as well as in disease, and directed their +attention largely toward diet, exercise, and climate +in the treatment even of disease. In its study they have +left the most admirable sets of observations, including +even accounts of acknowledged errors and the results +of different treatments of cases, which ancient science +can present. It was the misfortune of their science +that it dealt with a complicated subject-matter dependent +for its successful treatment upon the whole +body of physical, chemical, and biological disciplines +as well as the discovery and invention of complicated +techniques. They were forced after all to adopt a +hopelessly inadequate physiological theory—that of +the four humors—with the corresponding doctrine of +health and disease as the proper and improper mixture +of these fluids. Their marvelously fine observation +of symptoms led only to the definition of types and a +medical practice which was capable of no consistent +progress outside of certain fields of surgery. Thus +even Greek medicine was unable to develop a different +type of scientific method except in so far as it kept alive +an empiricism which played a not unimportant part +in post-Aristotelian philosophy. Within the field of +astronomy in explaining the anomalies of the heavens +involved in their metaphysical assumptions, they built +up a marvelously perfect Euclidian geometry, for here +refined and exhaustive definition of all the elements was +possible. The problems involved in propositions to be +proved appeared in the individual experience of the +geometrician, but this experience in space was uniform<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">191</a></span> +with that of every one else and took on a universal not +an individual form. The test of the solution was given +in a demonstration which holds for every one living +in the same Euclidian space. When the mathematician +found himself carried by his mathematical technique +beyond the assumptions of a metaphysical physics he +abandoned the field of physical astronomy and confined +himself to the development of his mathematical expressions.</p> + +<p>In other fields Greek science analyzed with varying +success and critical skill only the conceptions found in +the experience of their time and world. Nor did Greek +thought succeed in formulating any adequate method +by which the ultimate concepts in any field of science +were to be determined. It is in Aristotle's statement of +induction and the process of definition that we appreciate +most clearly the inadequacy of their method. This +inadequacy lies fundamentally in Aristotle's conception +of observation which, as I have already noted, implies +the recognition of an individual, that is, an object +which is an embodied form or idea. The function of +knowledge is to bring out this essence. The mind sees +through the individuals the universal nature. The +value of the observation lies, then, not in the controlled +perception of certain data as observed facts, +but in the insight with which he recognizes the nature +of the object. When this nature has been seen it is +to be analyzed into essential characters and thus +formulated into the definition. In Aristotle's methodology +there is no procedure by which the mind can +deliberately question the experience of the community<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">192</a></span> +and by a controlled method reconstruct its received +world. Thus the natural sciences were as really fixed +by the conceptions of the community as were the exact +sciences by the conceptions of a Euclidian geometry +and the mathematics which the Greeks formulated +within it. The individual within whose peculiar experience +arises a contradiction to the prevailing conceptions +of the community and in whose creative +intelligence appears the new hypothesis which makes +possible a new heaven and a new earth could utilize +his individual experience only in destructive skepticism. +Subjectivism served in ancient thought to invalidate +knowledge not to enlarge it.</p> + +<p>Zeller has sketched a parallelism between the ideal +state of Plato and the social structure of the medieval +world. The philosopher-king is represented by the Pope, +below him answering to the warrior class in the Platonic +state stands the warrior class of the Holy Roman +Empire, who in theory enforce the dictates of the +Roman curia, while at the bottom in both communities +stand the mass of the people bound to obedience to the +powers above. There is, however, one profound difference +between the two, and that is to be found in the +relative positions of the ideal worlds that dominate +each. Plato's ideal world beyond the heavens gives +what reality it has to this through the participation +by the world of becoming in the ideas. Opinion dimly +sensed the ideas in the evanescent objects about it, and +though Plato's memory theory of knowledge assumed +that the ideas had been seen in former existence and +men could thus recognize the copies here, the ideal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">193</a></span> +world was not within the mind but without. In a real +sense the Kingdom of Heaven was within men in the +medieval world, as was the Holy Roman Empire. They +were ideal communities that ought to exist on earth, +and it was due to the depravity of men that they did +not exist. From time to time men undertook in various +upheavals to realize in some part these spiritual and +political ideals which they carried within them. And +men not only carried within them the ideas of a New +Jerusalem in which the interest of one was the interest +of all and of an earthly state ordered by a divine +decree to fulfil this Christian ideal, but the determining +causes of the present condition and the future +realization depended also upon the inner attitudes and +experiences of the individuals themselves.</p> + +<p>Without carrying the analogy here too far, this +relation between the experience of the individual and +the world which may arise through the realization of +his ideas is the basis of the most profound distinction +between the ancient world and the modern. Before +the logic of this attitude could appear in science a long +period of intellectual and social growth was necessary. +The most essential part of this growth was the slow +but steady development of psychological doctrine which +placed the objective world in the experience of the +individual. It is not of interest here to bring out the +modern epistemological problem that grew out of this, +or to present this in the world of Leibnitzian monads +that had no windows or in the Berkeleyan subjective +idealism. What is of interest is to point out that this +attitude established a functional relationship between<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">194</a></span> +even the subjective experience of the individual and the +object of knowledge. A skepticism based upon subjectivism +might thereafter question the justification of +the reference of experience beyond itself; it could not +question knowledge and its immediate object.</p> + +<p>Kant formalizes the relation of what was subjective +and what was objective by identifying the former with +the sensuous content of experience and the latter with +the application of the forms of sensibility and understanding +to this content. The relationship was formal +and dead. Kant recognized no functional relationship +between the nature of the <i>Mannigfaltigkeit</i> of sensuous +experience and the forms into which it was poured. The +forms remained external to the content, but the relationship +was one which existed within experience, not +without it, and within this experience could be found +the necessity and universality which had been located +in the world independent of experience. The melting +of these fixed Kantian categories came with the spring +floods of the romantic idealism that followed Kant.</p> + +<p>The starting-point of this idealism was Kantian. +Within experience lay the object of knowledge. The +Idealist's principal undertaking was to overcome the +skepticism that attached to the object of knowledge +because of its reference to what lies outside itself. If, +as Kant had undertaken to prove, the reality which +knowledge implies must reach beyond experience, then, +on the Kantian doctrine that knowledge lies within +experience, knowledge itself is infected with skepticism. +Kant's practical bridge from the world of experience +to the world of things-in-themselves, which he walked<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">195</a></span> +by faith and not by sight, was found in the postulates +of the conduct of the self as a moral being, as a personality. +The romantic idealists advance by the same +road, though as romanticists not critical philosophers, +they fashioned the world of reality, that transcends +experience, out of experience itself, by centering the +self in the absolute self and conceiving the whole infinite +universe as the experience of the absolute self. +The interesting phase of this development is that the +form which experience takes in becoming objective is +found in the nature and thought of the individual, and +that this process of epistemological experience becomes +thus a process of nature, if the objective is the natural. +In Kant's terms our minds give laws to nature. But +this nature constantly exhibits its dependence upon +underlying noumena that must therefore transcend the +laws given by the understanding. The Romanticist insists +that this other reality must be the same stuff as +that of experience, that in experience arise forms which +transcend those which bound the experience in its earlier +phase. If in experience the forms of the objective +world are themselves involved, the process of knowledge +sets no limits to itself, which it may not, does not, by +implication transcend. As further indication of the +shift by which thought had passed into possession of +the world of things in themselves stands the antinomy +which in Kantian experience marks the limit of our +knowledge while in post-Kantian idealism it becomes +the antithesis that leads to the synthesis upon the +higher plane. Contradiction marks the phase at which +the spirit becomes creative, not simply giving an empty<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">196</a></span> +formal law to nature, but creating the concrete universe +in which content and form merge in true actuality. +The relation of the sensuous content to the +conceptual form is not dead, as in Kant's doctrine. It +is fused as perception into concept and carries its +immediacy and concreteness of detail into the concrete +universal as the complete organization of stimulation +and response pass into the flexible habit. And yet +in the Hegelian logic, the movement is always away +from the perceptual experience toward the higher realm +of the <i>Idee</i>. Thought is creative in the movement, but +in its ultimate reality it transcends spatial and temporal +experience, the experience with which the natural +and mathematical sciences deal. Thought is not a +means of solving the problems of this world as they +arise, but a great process of realization in which this +world is forever transcended. Its abstract particularities +of sensuous detail belong only to the finite experience +of the partial self. This world is, therefore, +always incomplete in its reality and, in so far, always +untrue. Truth and full reality belong not to the field +of scientific investigation.</p> + +<p>In its metaphysics Romantic Idealism, though it +finds a place for scientific discovery and reconstruction, +leaves these disdainfully behind, as incomplete phases +of the ultimate process of reality, as infected with untruth +and deceptive unwarranted claims. The world is +still too much with us. We recognize here three striking +results of the development of reflective consciousness +in the modern world:—first, it is assumed that the +objective world of knowledge can be placed within<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">197</a></span> +the experience of the individual without losing thereby +its nature as an object, that all characters of that +object can be presented as belonging to that experience, +whether adequately or not is another question; +and second, it is assumed that the contradictions in +its nature which are associated with its inclusion in +individual experience, its references beyond itself when +so included, may themselves be the starting-point of +a reconstruction which at least carries that object +beyond the experience within which these contradictions +arose; and third, it is assumed that this growth +takes place in a world of reality within which the +incomplete experience of the individual is an essential +part of the process, in which it is not a mere fiction, +destroying reality by its representation, but is a growing-point +in that reality itself.</p> + +<p>These characters of philosophic interpretation, the +inclusion of the object of knowledge in the individual +experience and the turning of the conflicts in that experience +into the occasion for the creation of new +objects transcending these contradictions, are the +characters in the conscious method, of modern science, +which most profoundly distinguish it from the method +of ancient science. This, of course, is tantamount to +saying that they are those which mark the experimental +method in science.</p> + +<p>That phase of the method upon which I have touched +already has been its occupation with the so-called data +or facts as distinguished from Aristotelian individuals.</p> + +<p>Whenever we reduce the objects of scientific investigation +to facts and undertake to record them as such,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">198</a></span> +they become events, happenings, whose hard factual +character lies in the circumstance that they have taken +place, and this quite independently of any explanation +of their taking place. When they are explained they +have ceased to be facts and have become instances of +a law, that is, Aristotelian individuals, embodied +theories, and their actuality as events is lost in the +necessity of their occurrence as expressions of the law; +with this change their particularity as events or happenings +disappears. They are but the specific values +of the equation when constants are substituted for +variables. Before the equation is known or the law +discovered they have no such ground of existence. Up +to this point they find their ground for existence in +their mere occurrence, to which the law which is to +explain them must accommodate itself.</p> + +<p>There are here suggested two points of view from +which these facts may be regarded. Considered with +reference to a uniformity or law by which they will +be ordered and explained they are the phenomena with +which the positivist deals; as existencies to be identified +and localized before they are placed within such a uniformity +they fall within the domain of the psychological +philosopher who can at least place them in their relation +to the other events in the experience of the individual +who observes them. Considered as having +a residual meaning apart from the law to which they +have become exceptions, they can become the subject-matter +of the rationalist. It is important that we +recognize that neither the positivist nor the rationalist +is able to identify the nature of the fact or datum<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">199</a></span> +to which they refer. I refer to such stubborn facts as +those of the sporadic appearance of infectious diseases +before the germ theory of the disease was discovered. +Here was a fact which contradicted the doctrine of the +spread of the infection by contact. It appeared not as +an instance of a law, but as an exception to a law. +As such, its nature is found in its having happened +at a given place and time. If the case had appeared +in the midst of an epidemic, its nature as a case of the +infectious disease would have been cared for in the +accepted doctrine, and for its acceptance as an object +of knowledge its location in space and time as an event +would not have been required. Its geographical and +historical traits would have followed from the theory +of the infection, as we identify by our calculations the +happy fulfilment of Thales' prophecy. The happening +of an instance of a law is accounted for by the law. +Its happening may and in most instances does escape +observation, while as an exception to an accepted law +it captures attention. Its nature as an event is, then, +found in its appearance in the experience of some individual, +whose observation is controlled and recorded +as his experience. Without its reference to this individual's +experience it could not appear as a fact +for further scientific consideration.</p> + +<p>Now the attitude of the positivist toward this fact +is that induced by its relation to the law which is <i>subsequently</i> +discovered. It has then fallen into place in +a series, and his doctrine is that all laws are but uniformities +of such events. He treats the fact when it +is an exception to law as an instance of the new law<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">200</a></span> +and assumes that the exception to the old law and +the instance of the new are identical. And this +is a great mistake,—the mistake made also by the neo-realist +when he assumes that the object of knowledge +is the same within and without the mind, that nothing +happens to what is to be known when it by chance +strays into the realm of conscious cognition. Any as +yet unexplained exception to an old theory can happen +only in the experience of an individual, and that which +has its existence as an event in some one's biography +is a different thing from the future instance which is +not beholden to any one for its existence. Yet there +are, as I indicated earlier, meanings in this exceptional +event which, at least for the time, are unaffected by +the exceptional character of the occurrence. For example, +certain clinical symptoms by which an infectious +disease is identified have remained unchanged in diagnosis +since the days of Hippocrates. These characters +remain as characters of the instance of the law of germ-origin +when this law has been discovered. This may +lead us to say that the exception which appears for +the time being as a unique incident in a biography +is identical with the instance of a germ-induced disease. +Indeed, we are likely to go further and, in the assurance +of the new doctrine, state that former exceptions can +(or with adequate acquaintance with the facts could) +be proved to be necessarily an instance of a disease +carried by a germ. The positivist is therefore confident +that the field of scientific knowledge is made up +of events which are instances of uniform series, although +under conditions of inadequate information<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">201</a></span> +some of them appear as exceptions to the statements +of uniformities, in truth the latter being no uniformities +at all.</p> + +<p>That this is not a true statement of the nature of +the exception and of the instance, it is not difficult to +show if we are willing to accept the accounts which +the scientists themselves give of their own observation, +the changing forms which the hypothesis assumes during +the effort to reach a solution and the ultimate +reconstruction which attends the final tested solution. +Wherever we are fortunate enough, as in the biographies +of men such as Darwin and Pasteur, to follow +a number of the steps by which they recognized problems +and worked out tenable hypotheses for their +solution, we find that the direction which is given to +attention in the early stage of scientific investigation +is toward conflicts between current theories and observed +phenomena, and that since the form which these +observations take is determined by the opposition, it is +determined by a statement which itself is later abandoned. +We find that the scope and character of the +observations change at once when the investigator sets +about gathering as much of the material as he can +secure, and changes constantly as he formulates tentative +hypotheses for the solution of the problem, which, +moreover, generally changes its form during the investigation. +I am aware that this change in the form +of the data will be brushed aside by many as belonging +only to the attitude of mind of the investigator, while +it is assumed that the "facts" themselves, however +selected and organized in his observation and thought,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">202</a></span> +remain identical in their nature throughout. Indeed, +the scientist himself carries with him in the whole procedure +the confidence that the fact-structure of reality +is unchanged, however varied are the forms of the observations +which refer to the same entities.<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> + +<p>The analysis of the fact-structure of reality shows +in the first place that the scientist undertakes to form +such an hypothesis that all the data of observation +will find their place in the objective world, and in the +second place to bring them into such a structure that +future experience will lead to anticipated results. He +does not undertake to preserve facts in the form in +which they existed in experience before the problem +arose nor to construct a world independent of experience +or that will not be subject itself to future reconstructions +in experience. He merely insists that future +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">203</a></span> +reconstructions will take into account the old in re-adjusting +it to the new. In such a process it is evident +that the change of the form in the data is not due to +a subjective attitude of the investigator which can be +abstracted from the facts. When Darwin, for instance, +found that the marl dressings which farmers +spread over their soil did not sink through the soil +by the force of gravity as was supposed, but that the +earthworm castings were thrown up above these dressings +at nearly the same rate at which they disappeared, +he did not correct a subjective attitude of mind. He +created in experience a humus which took the place +of a former soil, and justified itself by fitting it into +the whole process of disintegration of the earth's surface. +It would be impossible to separate in the earlier +experiences certain facts and certain attitudes of mind +entertained by men with reference to these facts. Certain +objects have replaced other objects. It is only after +the process of analysis, which arose out of the conflicting +observations, has broken up the old object that what +was a part of the object, heavier-things-pushing-their +way-through-soil-of-lighter-texture, can become a mere +idea. Earlier it was an object. Until it could be +tested the earthworm as the cause of the disappearance +of the dressings was also Darwin's idea. It became fact. +For science at least it is quite impossible to distinguish +between what in an object must be fact and what may +be idea. The distinction when it is made is dependent +upon the form of the problem and is functional to its +solution, not metaphysical. So little can a consistent +line of cleavage between facts and ideas be indicated,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">204</a></span> +that we can never tell where in our world of observation +the problem of science will arise, or what will be regarded +as structure of reality or what erroneous +idea.</p> + +<p>There is a strong temptation to lodge these supposititious +fact-structures in a world of conceptual objects, +molecules, atoms, electrons, and the like. For these at +least lie beyond the range of perception by their very +definition. They seem to be in a realm of things-in-themselves. +Yet they also are found now in the field +of fact and now in that of ideas. Furthermore, a study +of their structure as they exist in the world of constructive +science shows that their infra-sensible character +is due simply to the nature of our sense-processes, +not to a different metaphysical nature. They occupy +space, have measurable dimensions, mass, and are subject +to the same laws of motion as are sensible objects. +We even bring them indirectly into the field of vision +and photograph their paths of motion.</p> + +<p>The ultimate elements referred to above provide a +consistent symbolism for the finding and formulating of +applied mathematical sciences, within which lies the whole +field of physics, including Euclidian geometry as well. +However, they have succeeded in providing nothing +more than a language and logic pruned of the obstinate +contradictions, inaccuracies, and unanalyzed sensuous +stuff of earlier mathematical science. Such a rationalistic +doctrine can never present in an unchanged form +the objects with which natural science deals in any of +the stages of its investigation. It can deal only with +ultimate elements and forms of propositions. It is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">205</a></span> +compelled to fall back on a theory of analysis +which reaches ultimate elements and an assumption of +inference as an indefinable. Such an analysis is actually +impossible either in the field of the conceptual objects +into which physical science reduces physical objects, or +in the field of sensuous experience. Atoms can be reduced +into positive and negative electrical elements and +these may, perhaps do, imply a structure of ether that +again invites further analysis and so on ad infinitum. +None of the hypothetical constructs carry with themselves +the character of being ultimate elements unless +they are purely metaphysical. If they are fashioned +to meet the actual problems of scientific research they +will admit of possible further analysis, because they +must be located and defined in the continuity of space +and time. They cannot <i>be</i> the points and instants of +modern mathematical theory. Nor can we reach ultimate +elements in sensuous experience, for this lies +also within a continuum. Furthermore, our scientific +analyses are dependent upon the form that our objects +assume. There is no general analysis which research +in science has ever used. The assumption that psychology +provides us with an analysis of experience +which can be carried to ultimate elements or facts, and +which thereby provides the elements out of which the +objects of our physical world must be constructed, +denies to psychology its rights as a natural science of +which it is so jealous, turning it into a Berkeleyan +metaphysics.</p> + +<p>This most modern form of rationalism being unable +to find ultimate elements in the field of actual science<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">206</a></span> +is compelled to take what it can find there. Now the +results of the analysis of the classical English psychological +school give the impression of being what Mr. +Russell calls "hard facts," i.e., facts which cannot be +broken up into others. They seem to be the data of +experience. Moreover, the term hard is not so uncompromising +as is the term element. A fact can be more +or less hard, while an ultimate element cannot be more +or less ultimate. Furthermore, the entirely formal +character of the logic enables it to deal with equal +facility with any content. One can operate with the +more or less hard sense-data, putting them in to satisfy +the seeming variables of the propositions, and reach +conclusions which are formally correct. There is no +necessity for scrutinizing the data under these circumstances, +if one can only assume that the data are those +which science is actually using. The difficulty is that +no scientist ever analyzed his objects into such sense-data. +They exist only in philosophical text-books. +Even the psychologists recognize that these sensations +are abstractions which are not the elements out of which +objects of sense are constructed. They are abstractions +made from those objects whose ground for isolation +is found in the peculiar problems of experimental +psychology, such as those of color or tone perception. +It would be impossible to make anything in terms of +Berkeleyan sense-data and of symbolic logic out of any +scientific discovery. Research defines its problem by +isolating certain facts which appear for the time being +not as the sense-data of a solipsistic mind, but as experiences +of an individual in a highly organized society,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">207</a></span> +facts which, because they are in conflict with accepted +doctrines, must be described so that they can be +experienced by others under like conditions. The +ground for the analysis which leads to such facts is +found in the conflict between the accepted theory and +the experience of the individual scientist. The analysis +is strictly <i>ad hoc</i>. As far as possible the exception is +stated in terms of accepted meanings. Only where the +meaning is in contradiction with the experience does +the fact appear as the happening to an individual and +become a paragraph out of his biography. But as such +an event, whose existence for science depends upon the +acceptance of the description of him to whom it has +happened, it must have all the setting of circumstantial +evidence. Part of this circumstantial evidence is found +in so-called scientific control, that is, the evidence that +conditions were such that similar experiences could +happen to others and could be described as they are +described in the account given. Other parts of this +evidence which we call corroborative are found in the +statements of others which bear out details of this +peculiar event, though it is important to note that +these details have to be wrenched from their settings +to give this corroborative value. To be most conclusive +they must have no intentional connection with +the experience of the scientist. In other words, +those individuals who corroborate the facts are made, +in spite of themselves, experiencers of the same facts. +The perfection of this evidence is attained when the +fact can happen to others and the observer simply +details the conditions under which he made the observation,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">208</a></span> +which can be then so perfectly reproduced that +others may repeat the exceptional experience.</p> + +<p>This process is not an analysis of a known world +into ultimate elements and their relations. Such an +analysis never isolates this particular exception which +constitutes the scientific problems as an individual experience. +The extent to which the analysis is carried +depends upon the exigencies of the problem. It is the +indefinite variety of the problems which accounts for +the indefinite variety of the facts. What constitutes +them facts in the sense in which we are using the +term is their <i>exceptional</i> nature; formally they appear +as particular judgments, being denials of universal +judgments, whether positive or negative. This exceptional +nature robs the events of a reality which would +have belonged to them as instances of a universal law. +It leaves them, however, with the rest of their meaning. +But the value which they have lost is just that which +was essential to give them their place in the world as +it has existed for thought. Banished from that universally +valid structure, their ground for existence is +found in the experience of the puzzled observer. Such +an observation was that of the moons of Jupiter made +possible by the primitive telescope of Galileo. For +those who lived in a Ptolemaic cosmos, these could have +existence only as observations of individuals. As moons +they had distinct meaning, circling Jupiter as our +moon circles the earth, but being in contradiction with +the Ptolemaic order they could depend for their existence +only on the evidence of the senses, until a Copernican +order could give them a local habitation and a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">209</a></span> +name. Then they were observed not as the experiences +of individuals but as instances of planetary order in +a heliocentric system. It would be palpably absurd to +refer to them as mere sense-data, mere sensations. They +are for the time being inexplicable experiences of certain +individuals. They are inexplicable because they +have a meaning which is at variance with the structure +of the whole world to which they belong. They are the +phenomena termed accidental by Aristotle and rejected +as full realities by him, but which have become, in the +habitat of individual experience, the headstone of the +structure of modern research of science.</p> + +<p>A rationalism which relegates implication to the +indefinables cannot present the process of modern +science. Implication is exactly that process by which +these events pass from their individual existence into +that of universal reality, and the scientist is at pains +to define it as the experimental method. It is true that +a proposition implies implication. But the proposition +is the statement of the result of the process by which +an object has arisen for knowledge and merely indicates +the structure of the object. In discovery, invention, +and research the escape from the exceptional, from the +data of early stages of observation, is by way of an +hypothesis; and every hypothesis so far as it is tenable +and workable in its form is universal. No one would +waste his time with a hypothesis which confessedly was +not applicable to all instances of the problem. An +hypothesis may be again and again abandoned, it may +prove to be faulty and contradictory, but in so far as +it is an instrument of research it is assumed to be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">210</a></span> +universal and to perfect a system which has broken +down at the point indicated by the problem. Implication +and more elaborated instances flow from the +structure of this hypothesis. The classical illustration +which stands at the door of modern experimental +science is the hypothesis which Galileo formed of the +rate of the velocity of a falling body. He conceived +that this was in proportion to the time elapsed during +the fall and then elaborated the consequences of this +hypothesis by working it into the accepted mathematical +doctrines of the physical world, until it led to an +anticipated result which would be actually secured and +which would be so characteristic an instance of a falling +body that it would answer to every other instance +as he had defined them. In this fashion he defined his +inference as the anticipation of a result because this +result was a part of the world as he presented it +amended by his hypothesis. It is true that back of the +specific implication of this result lay a mass of other +implications, many not even presented specifically in +thought and many others presented by symbols which +generalized innumerable instances. These implications +are for the scientist more or less implicit meanings, but +they are meanings each of which may be brought into +question and tested in the same fashion if it should become +an actual problem. Many of them which would +not have occurred to Galileo as possible problems have +been questioned since his day. What has remained after +this period of determined questioning of the foundations +of mathematics and the structure of the world +of physical science is a method of agreement with one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">211</a></span>self +and others, in (a) the identification of the object +of thought, in (b) the accepted values of assent and +denial called truth and falsehood, and in (c) referring +to meaning, in its relation to what is meant. In any +case the achievement of symbolic logic, with its indefinables +and axioms has been to reduce this logic to +a statement of the most generalized form of possible +consistent thought intercourse, with entire abstraction +from the content of the object to which it refers. +If, however, we abstract from its value in giving +a consistent theory of number, continuity, and infinity, +this complete abstraction from the content has +carried the conditions of thinking in agreement with +self and others so far away from the actual problem +of science that symbolic logic has never been used as +a research method. It has indeed emphasized the fact +that thinking deals with problems which have reference +to uses to which it can be put, not to a metaphysical +world lying beyond experience. Symbolic logic has to +do with the world of discourse, not with the world of +things.</p> + +<p>What Russell pushes to one side as a happy guess +is the actual process of implication by which, for example, +the minute form in the diseased human system is +identified with unicellular life and the history of the +disease with the life history of this form. This identification +implies reclassification of these forms and a +treatment of the disease that answers to their life history. +Having made this identification we anticipate the +result of this treatment, calling it an inference.</p> + +<p>Implication belongs to the reconstruction of the object.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">212</a></span> +As long as no question has arisen, the object +is what it means or means what it is. It does not +imply any feature of itself. When through conflict +with the experience of the individual some feature of +the object is divorced from some meaning the relationship +between these becomes a false implication. When +a hypothetically reconstructed object finds us anticipating +a result which accords with the nature of such +objects we assert an implication of this meaning. To +carry this relation of implication back into objects +which are subject to no criticism or question would of +course resolve the world into elements connected by +external relations, with the added consequence that +these elements can have no content, since every content +in the face of such an analysis must be subject +to further analysis. We reach inevitably symbols such +as X, Y, and Z, which can symbolize nothing. Theoretically +we can assume an implication between any +elements of an object, but in this abstract assumption +the symbolic logician overlooks the fact that he is also +assuming some content which is not analyzed and which +is the ground of the implication. In other words this +logician confuses the scientific attitude of being ready +to question anything with an attitude of being willing +to question everything at once. It is only in an unquestioned +objective world that the exceptional instance +appears and it is only in such a world that an +experimental science tests the implications of the hypothetically +reconstructed object.</p> + +<p>The guess is happy because it carries with it the consequences +which follow from its fitting into the world,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">213</a></span> +and the guess, in other words the hypothesis, takes on +this happy form solely because of the material reconstruction +which by its nature removes the unhappy +contradiction and promises the successful carrying out +of the conflicting attitudes in the new objective world. +There is no such thing as formal implication.</p> + +<p>Where no reconstruction of the world is involved in +our identification of objects that belong to it and +where, therefore, no readjustment of conduct is demanded, +such a logic symbolizes what takes place in +our direct recognition of objects and our response +to them. Then "X is a man implies X is mortal for +all values of X" exactly symbolizes the attitude toward +a man subject to a disease supposedly mortal. But +it fails to symbolize the biological research which starting +with inexplicable sporadic cases of an infectious +disease carries over from the study of the life history +of infusoria a hypothetical reconstruction of the history +of disease and then acts upon the result of this +assumption. Research-science presents a world whose +form is always universal, but this universal form is +neither a metaphysical assumption nor a fixed form of +the understanding. While the scientist may as a metaphysician +assume the existence of realities which lie +beyond a possible experience, or be a Kantian or Neo-Kantian, +neither of these attitudes is necessary for his +research. He may be a positivist—a disciple of Hume +or of John Stuart Mill. He may be a pluralist who +conceives, with William James, that the order which +we detect in parts of the universe is possibly one that +is rising out of the chaos and which may never be as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">214</a></span> +universal as our hypothesis demands. None of these +attitudes has any bearing upon his scientific method. +This simplifies his thinking, enables him to identify the +object in which he is interested wherever he finds it, and +to abstract in the world as he conceives it those features +which carry with them the occurrence he is endeavoring +to place. Especially it enables him to make his thought +a part of the socially accepted and socially organized +science to which his thought belongs. He is far too +modest to demand that the world be as his inference +demands.</p> + +<p>He asks that his view of the world be cogent and +convincing to all those whose thinking has made his +own possible, and be an acceptable premise for the +conduct of that society to which he belongs. The +hypothesis has no universal and necessary characters +except those that belong to the thought which preserves +the same meanings to the same objects, the same relations +between the same relata, the same attributes of +assent and dissent under the same conditions, the same +results of the same combinations of the same things. +For scientific research the meanings, the relations with +the relata, the assent and dissent, the combinations +and the things combined are all in the world of experience. +Thinking in its abstractions and identifications +and reconstructions undertakes to preserve the values +that it finds, and the necessity of its thinking lies in its +ability to so identify, preserve, and combine what it +has isolated that the thought structure will have an +identical import under like conditions for the thinker +with all other thinkers to whom these instruments of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">215</a></span> +research conduct are addressed. Whatever conclusions +the scientist draws as necessary and universal results +from his hypothesis for a world independent of his +thought are due, not to the cogency of his logic, but +to other considerations. For he knows if he reflects +that another problem may arise which will in its solution +change the face of the world built upon the present +hypothesis. He will defend the inexorableness of his +reasoning, but the premises may change. Even the +contents of tridimensional space and sensuous time are +not essential to the cogency of that reasoning nor can +the unbroken web of the argument assure the content +of the world as invariable. His universals, when applied +to nature, are all hypothetical universals; hence +the import of experiment as the test of an hypothesis. +Experience does not rule out the possible cropping up of +a new problem which may shift the values attained. +Experience simply reveals that the new hypothesis fits +into the meanings of the world which are not shaken; +it shows that, with the reconstruction which the hypothesis +offers, it is possible for scientific conduct to +proceed.</p> + +<p>But if the universal character of the hypothesis and +the tested theory belong to the instrumental character +of thought in so reconstructing a world that has proved +to be imperfect, and inadequate to conduct, the stuff +of the world and of the new hypothesis are the same. +At least this is true for the scientist who has no interest +in an epistemological problem that does not +affect his scientific undertakings in one way nor another. +I have already pointed out that from the standpoint<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">216</a></span> +of logical and psychological analysis the things +with which science deals can be neither ultimate elements +nor sense-data; but that they must be phases and +characters and parts of things in some whole, parts +which can only be isolated because of the conflict between +an accepted meaning and some experience. I have +pointed out that an analysis is guided by the practical +demands of a solution of this conflict; that even that +which is individual in its most unique sense in the conflict +and in attempts at its solution does not enter into +the field of psychology—which has its own problems +peculiar to its science. Certain psychological problems +belong to the problems of other sciences, as, for example, +that of the personal equation belongs to astronomy +or that of color vision to the theory of light. But they +bulk small in these sciences. It cannot be successfully +maintained that a scientific observation of the most +unique sort, one which is accepted for the time being +simply as a happening in this or that scientist's experience, +is as such a psychological datum, for the data in +psychological text-books have reference to <i>psychological</i> +problems. Psychology deals with the consciousness +of the individual in its dependence upon the physiological +organism and upon those contents which detach +themselves from the objects outside the individual and +which are identified with his inner experience. It deals +with the laws and processes and structures of this consciousness +in all its experiences, not with <i>exceptional</i> +experiences. It is necessary to emphasize again that +for science these particular experiences arise within a +world which is in its logical structure organized and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">217</a></span> +universal. They arise only through the conflict of the +individual's experience with such an accepted structure. +For science individual experience <i>presupposes</i> the organized +structure; hence it cannot provide the material +out of which the structure is built up. This is the error +of both the positivist and of the psychological philosopher, +if scientific procedure gives us in any sense a +picture of the situation.</p> + +<p>A sharp contrast appears between the accepted hypothesis +with its universal form and the experiences +which invalidate the earlier theory. The reality of +these experiences lies in their happening. They were +unpredictable. They are not instances of a law. The +later theory, the one which explains these occurrences, +changes their character and status, making them necessary +results of the world as that is conceived under +this new doctrine. This new standpoint carries with it +a backward view, which explains the erroneous doctrine, +and accounts for the observations which invalidated it. +Every new theory must take up into itself earlier +doctrines and rationalize the earlier exceptions. +A generalization of this attitude places the scientist +in the position of anticipating later reconstructions. +He then must conceive of his world as subject to +continuous reconstructions. A familiar interpretation +of his attitude is that the hypothesis is thus +approaching nearer and nearer toward a reality which +would never change if it could be attained, or, from the +standpoint of the Hegelian toward a goal at infinity. +The Hegelian also undertakes to make this continuous +process of reconstruction an organic phase in reality<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">218</a></span> +and to identify with nature the process of finding exceptions +and of correcting them. The fundamental +difference between this position and that of the scientist +who looks before and after is that the Hegelian undertakes +to make the exception in its exceptional character +a part of the reality which transcends it, while the +scientist usually relegates the exception to the experience +of individuals who were simply caught in an error +which later investigation removes.</p> + +<p>The error remains as an historical incident explicable +perhaps as a result of the conditions under which it +occurred, but in so far as it was an error, not a part +of reality. It is customary to speak of it as subjective, +though this implies that we are putting the man who +was unwittingly in error into the position of the one +who has corrected it. To entertain that error in the +face of its correction would be subjective. A result +of this interpretation is that the theories are abstracted +from the world and regarded as something outside it. +It is assumed that the theories are mental or subjective +and change while the facts remain unchanged. Even +when it is assumed that theories and facts agree, men +speak of a correspondence or parallelism between idea +and the reality to which it refers. While this attitude +seems to be that of science toward the disproved theories +which lie behind it, it is not its attitude to the +theories which it accepts. These are not regarded as +merely parallel to realities, as abstracted from the +structure of things. These meanings go into the makeup +of the world. It is true that the scientist who looks +before and after realizes that any specific meaning<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">219</a></span> +which is now accepted may be questioned and discarded. +If he carries his refection far enough he sees that a complete +elimination of all the meanings which might conceivably +be so discredited would leave nothing but logical +constants, a world with no facts in any sense. In this +position he may of course take an agnostic attitude +and be satisfied with the attitude of Hume or Mill or +Russell. But if he does so, he will pass into the camp +of the psychological philosophers and will have left +the position of the scientist. The scientist always deals +with an <i>actual</i> problem, and even when he looks before +and after he does so in so far as he is facing in inquiry +some actual problem. No actual problem could +conceivably take on the form of a conflict involving +the whole world of meaning. The conflict always arises +between an individual experience and certain laws, certain +meanings while others are unaffected. These others +form the necessary field without which no conflict can +arise. They give the man of research his (που στω) +upon which he can formulate his problem and undertake +its solution. The possible calling in question of +any content, whatever it may be, means always that +there is left a field of unquestioned reality. The attitude +of the scientist never contemplates or could contemplate +the possibility of a world in which there +would be no reality by which to test his hypothetical +solution of the problem that arises. Nor does this +attitude when applied to past discarded theories necessarily +carry with it the implication that these older +theories were subjective ideas in men's minds, while +the reality lay beside and beyond them unmingled with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">220</a></span> +ideas. It always finds a standpoint from which these +ideas in the earlier situation are still recognized as +reliable, for there are no scientific data without meanings. +There could be no history of science on any other +basis. No history of science goes back to ultimate elements +or sense-data, or to any combination of bare data +on one hand and logical elements on the other. The +world of the scientist is always there as one in which +reconstruction is taking place with continual shifting +of problems, but as a real world within which the problems +arise. The errors of the past and present appear +as untenable hypotheses which could not bear the test +of experiment if the experience were sufficiently enlarged +and interpreted. But they are not mere errors +to be thrown into the scrap heap. They become a part +of a different phase of reality which a fuller history +of the past records or a fuller account of the present +interprets, giving them thereby their proper place in +a real world.<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> + +<p>The completion of this program, however, awaits the +solution of the scientific problem of the relation of the +psychical and the physical with the attendant problem +of the meaning of the so-called origin of consciousness +in the history of the world. My own feeling is that +these problems must be attacked from the standpoint +of the social nature of so-called consciousness. The +clear indications of this I find in the reference of our +logical constants to the structure of thought as a +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">221</a></span> +means of communication, in the explanation of errors +in the history of science by their social determination, +and in the interpretation of the inner field of experience +as the importation of social intercourse into the +conscious conduct of the individual. But whatever +may be the solution of these problems, it must +carry with it such a treatment of the experience of the +individual that the latter will never be regarded merely +as a subjective state, however inadequate it may have +proved itself as a scientific hypothesis. This seems +to me to be involved in the conception of psychology +as a natural science and in any legitimate carrying +out of the Hegelian program of giving reality and +creative import to individual experience. The experience +of the individual in its exceptional character is +the growing-point of science, first of all in the recognition +of data upon which the older theories break, and +second in the hypothesis which arises in the individual +and is tested by the experiment which reconstructs the +world. A scientific history and a scientific psychology +from which epistemology has been banished must place +these observations and hypotheses together with erroneous +conceptions and mistaken observations <i>within</i> the +real world in such a fashion that their reference to the +experience of the individual and to the world to which +he belongs will be comprehensible. As I have indicated, +the scientific theory of the physical and conscious individual +in the world implied in this problem has still +to be adequately developed. But there is implied in +the conception of such a theory such a location of the +process of thought in the process of reality as will<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">222</a></span> +give it an import both in the meaning of things and +in the individual's thinking. We have the beginning of +such a doctrine in the conception of a functional value +of consciousness in the conduct of living forms, and the +development of reflective thought out of such a consciousness +which puts it within the act and gives it the +function of preparation where adjustment is necessary. +Such a process creates the situation with reference to +which the form acts. In all adjustment or adaptation +the result is that the form which is adjusted finds that +by its adjustment it has created an environment. The +ancients by their formulation of the Ptolemaic theory +committed themselves to the world in which the fixed +values of the heavenly over against the earthly obtained. +Such a world was the interpretation of the experience +involved in their physical and social attitudes. They +could not accept the hypothesis of Aristarchus because +it conflicted with the world which they had created, with +the values which were determining values for them. The +same was true of the hypothesis of Democritus. They +could not, as they conceived the physical world, accept +its purely quantitative character. The conception of a +disinterested truth which we have cherished since the +Middle Ages is itself a value that has a social basis as +really as had the dogma of the church. The earliest +statement of it was perhaps that of Francis Bacon. +Freeing investigation from the church dogma and its +attendant logic meant to him the freedom to find in +nature what men needed and could use for the amelioration +of their social and physical condition. The full +implication of the doctrine has been recognized as that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">223</a></span> +of freedom, freedom to effect not only values already +recognized, but freedom to attain as well such complete +acquaintance with nature that new and unrecognized +uses would be at our disposal; that is, that progress +should be one toward any possible use to which increased +knowledge might lead. The cult of increasing +knowledge, of continually reconstructing the world, took +the place both of the ancient conception of adequately +organizing the world as presented in thought, +and of the medieval conception of a systematic formulation +on the basis of the statement in church dogma of social +values. This modern conception proceeds from the +standpoint not of formulating values, but giving society +at the moment the largest possible number of alternatives +of conduct, i.e., undertaking to fix from moment +to moment the widest possible field of conduct. The purposes +of conduct are to be determined in the presence +of a field of alternative possibilities of action. The ends +of conduct are not to be determined in advance, but in +view of the interests that fuller knowledge of conditions +awaken. So there appears a conception of determining +the field that shall be quite independent of given +values. A real world which consists not of an unchanged +universe, but of a universe which may be continually +readjusted according to the problems arising +in the consciousness of the individuals within society. +The seemingly fixed character of such a world is found +in the generally fixed conditions which underlie the +type of problems which we find. We determine the +important conditions incident to the working out of +the great problems which face us. Our conception of a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">224</a></span> +given universe is formed in the effort to mobilize all +the material about us in relation to these problems—the +structure of the self, the structure of matter, the +physical process of life, the laws of change and the +interrelation of changes. With reference to these +problems certain conditions appear fixed and become +the statement of the world by which we must determine +by experimental test the viability of our hypotheses. +There arises then the conception of a world +which is unquestioned over against any particular +problem. While our science continually changes that +world, at least it must be always realized as there. +On the other hand, these conceptions are after all +relative to the ends of social conduct which may +be formulated in the presence of any freedom of +action.</p> + +<p>We postulate freedom of action as the condition of +formulating the ends toward which our conduct shall +be directed. Ancient thought assured itself of its ends +of conduct and allowed these to determine the world +which tested its hypothesis. We insist such ends may +not be formulated until we know the field of possible +action. The formulation of the ends is essentially a +social undertaking and seems to follow the statement +of the field of possible conduct, while in fact the statement +of the possible field of conduct is actually dependent +on the push toward action. A moving end +which is continually reconstructing itself follows upon +the continually enlarging field of opportunities of +conduct.</p> + +<p>The conception of a world of existence, then, is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">225</a></span> +result of the determination at the moment of the conditions +of the solution of the given problems. These +problems constitute the conditions of conduct, and the +ends of conduct can only be determined as we realize +the possibilities which changing conditions carry with +them. Our world of reality thus becomes independent +of any special ends or purposes and we reach an entirely +disinterested knowledge. And yet the value and +import of this knowledge is found in our conduct and +in our continually changing conditions. Knowledge +for its own sake is the slogan of freedom, for it alone +makes possible the continual reconstruction and enlargement +of the ends of conduct.</p> + +<p>The individual in his experiences is continually creating +a world which becomes real through his discovery. +In so far as new conduct arises under the +conditions made possible by his experience and his hypothesis +the world, which may be made the test of +reality, has been modified and enlarged.</p> + +<p>I have endeavored to present the world which is an +implication of the scientific method of discovery with +entire abstraction from any epistemological or metaphysical +presuppositions or complications. Scientific +method is indifferent to a world of things-in-themselves, +or to the previous condition of philosophic servitude of +those to whom its teachings are addressed. It is a +method not of knowing the unchangeable but of determining +the form of the world within which we live as +it changes from moment to moment. It undertakes to +tell us what we may expect to happen when we act in +such or such a fashion. It has become a matter of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">226</a></span> +serious consideration for a philosophy which is interested +in a world of things-in-themselves, and the epistemological +problem. For the cherished structures of +the metaphysical world, having ceased to house the +values of mankind, provide good working materials in +the hypothetical structures of science, on condition of +surrendering their metaphysical reality; and the epistemological +problem, having seemingly died of inanition, +has been found to be at bottom a problem of method +or logic. My attempt has been to present what seems +to me to be two capital instances of these transformations. +Science always has a world of reality by which +to test its hypotheses, but this world is not a world +independent of scientific experience, but the immediate +world surrounding us within which we must act. Our +next action may find these conditions seriously changed, +and then science will formulate this world so that in +view of this problem we may logically construct our +next plan of action. The plan of action should be +made self-consistent and universal in its form, not that +we may thus approach nearer to a self-consistent and +universal reality which is independent of our conduct, +but because our plan of action needs to be intelligent +and generally applicable. Again science advances by +the experiences of individuals, experiences which are +different from the world in which they have arisen +and which refer to a world which is not yet in existence, +so far as scientific experience is concerned. But this +relation to the old and new is not that of a subjective +world to an objective universe, but is a process of +logical reconstruction by which out of exceptions the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">227</a></span> +new law arises to replace a structure that has become +inadequate.</p> + +<p>In both of these processes, that of determining the +structure of experience which will test by experiment +the legitimacy of the new hypothesis, and that of formulating +the problem and the hypothesis for its solution, +the individual functions in his full particularity, +and yet in organic relationship with the society that +is responsible for him. It is the import for scientific +method of this relationship that promises most for the +interpretation of the philosophic problems involved.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">228</a></span></p> + +<h2>CONSCIOUSNESS AND PSYCHOLOGY</h2> + +<h4>BOYD H. BODE</h4> + +<p>If it is true that misery loves company, those persons +who feel despondent over the present situation in +philosophy may console themselves with the reflection +that things are not so bad as they might be. Our +friends, the psychologists, are afflicted even as we are. +The disagreements of experts as to both the subject-matter +and the method of psychology are as fundamental +as anything that philosophy can show. A spirit +of revolt is abroad in the land, and psychology is once +more on trial. The compact which provided that +psychology should be admitted to the rank of a natural +science, on condition that it surrender its pretension +to be the science of the soul and confine itself to the +study of consciousness, is no longer considered binding. +The suspicion is growing that consciousness is nothing +more nor less than an attenuated form of the soul that +it pretends to displace. Consequently the psychology +without a soul to which we have just become accustomed +is now attacked on behalf of a psychology without +a consciousness, on the ground that this latter +standpoint alone can give assurance against entangling +alliances between psychology and metaphysics.</p> + +<p>From the side of philosophy this situation is interesting, +not only to such as may crave the comfort that +springs from the spectacle of distress, but also to those<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">229</a></span> +who take a more hopeful view of present-day tendencies. +The question that is at issue is fundamentally +the question of the nature of consciousness, which is +quite as important to philosophy as to psychology. +On the one hand it is maintained that psychology has +to do with consciousness and that its distinctive method +is the method of introspection. On the other hand it +is urged that psychology is nothing more nor less than +a study of behavior, that it is not a science at all, unless +the existence of consciousness is denied or at least +ignored, and that the method of introspection is a +delusion and a snare. The two standpoints are not +always clearly formulated, nor can we say that every +system of psychology is true to type. It is, in fact, +the lack of clearness in the fundamental concepts that +makes the status of psychology a matter of so much +uncertainty.</p> + +<p>The situation presents an apparent anomaly. Both +parties profess to deal with facts of observation, yet +the claim of the introspectionist that he observes facts +of consciousness is met by the assertion of his rival that +there is no consciousness to be observed. How can this +be, unless we assume that introspection presupposes +an esoteric principle, like the principle of grace in +religion? It seems evident that we have to do here +with some deep-seated misconception regarding the +facts that are supposed to constitute the subject-matter +for observation and description.</p> + +<p>A common procedure on the part of introspectionism +is to assert the existence of consciousness as something +which is indeed indefinable, but which admits of observation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">230</a></span> +and description. But this procedure is no longer +justified. In the first place, the assertion that consciousness +exists is not the statement of a fact but the +designation of a problem. What is the nature of the +fact that we call consciousness? If the common-sense +individual, who assents so readily to the proposition +that we all know consciousness, be asked to differentiate +between consciousness and the objects of consciousness, +he is dazed and helpless. And, secondly, the assertion +of indefinability involves us in a difficulty. The indefinability +of consciousness has sometimes been likened +to that of space, but in this latter case we find no such +confusion between space and the objects in space. It +is clear, however, that if consciousness is not something +distinguishable from objects, there is no need to +discuss consciousness, and if it is distinguishable, it +must be distinguished before we are entitled to proceed +with observation and description. Definition is indispensable, +at least to the extent of circumscribing the +facts that are to be investigated. Moreover, if consciousness +cannot be defined, neither can it be described. +What is definition, after all, but a form of description? +To assert, in effect, that consciousness is indefinable +because it is indescribable, and that for this reason we +must be content with description, is both a flagrant disregard +of consistency and an unwarranted abuse of our +good nature.</p> + +<p>This difficulty leads on to another, for doubts, like +lies, have a singular propensity to breed more of their +kind. If consciousness is something that everybody +knows, why should it be necessary to look to the psychologist<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">231</a></span> +for a description of it? if the study of consciousness +brings to light any new fact, that fact by +definition is not a conscious fact at all, and consequently +is not the kind of thing that we set out to describe. +Consciousness, in short, cannot be analyzed; it cannot +be resolved into elements or constituents. It is +precisely what it is and not some product of +our after-thought that we are pleased to substitute +for it.</p> + +<p>These familiar considerations do not, indeed, decide +the issue between the rival theories of psychology, but +they serve to suggest that our introspective psychology +has been too easily satisfied in the conception of its +specific problem or subject-matter. As a matter of +fact, the work that has been done in the name of psychology +has been peculiarly barren of results, so far +as a consciousness <i>an sich</i> is concerned, although it has +led to a wealth of material pertaining to adaptive behavior. +Its solid achievements lie in the domain, not +of consciousness, but of instinctive, habitual, and intelligent +adaptation. It teaches us little that has to +do unequivocally with consciousness as distinct from +things, but it teaches us much concerning stimulus and +response, attention and habit, conflict and adjustment. +The doctrine that psychology is a science of behavior +is justified at least to the extent that it emphasizes a +factor, the importance of which introspectionism has +consistently refused to recognize. Whatever conclusion +we may ultimately reach regarding the nature of +consciousness, the whole drift of psychological and +biological investigation seems to indicate that an adequate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">232</a></span> +conception of consciousness and of the distinctive +problem of psychology can be attained only on the +basis of a painstaking reflection on the facts of behavior.</p> + +<h5>I</h5> + +<p>It is evident that the attempt to ascertain the nature +of consciousness and of psychology from the standpoint +of behavior is committed to the assumption that +the behavior in question is of a distinctive kind. The +justification of this assumption will enable us to formulate +the definitions which we seek. Discussions of +conscious behavior ordinarily emphasize the similarity +between conscious and reflex behavior rather than the +difference. An attitude of expectancy, for example, +is usually conceived as a sort of temporary reflex. +Certain nervous connections are organized for the occasion, +so that, when a given stimulus arrives, it will +induce its appropriate response. This situation is +best exemplified, perhaps, in simple reaction-experiments, +in which the subject makes a certain predetermined +response upon presentation of the stimulus. The +process is supposed to be of the reflex type throughout, +the only difference being that ordinary reflexes are +relatively permanent and unvarying, whereas a prearranged +response to a stimulus has to do with a reflex +that is made to order so as to meet the exigencies +of the moment.</p> + +<p>For certain purposes such a description of conscious +behavior is no doubt sufficiently accurate. Our present +concern, however, is with the differences between these<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">233</a></span> +temporary organizations and ordinary reflexes. In +order to bring out these differences, let us introduce +a slight complication into our reaction-experiment and +suppose that the subject is to make one of two alternative +responses, according to the nature of the stimulus. +His state of expectancy is accompanied by a certain +bodily "set" or preparedness for the coming event, +although the precise nature of the event is a matter of +uncertainty. His nervous system is in readiness to +respond this way or that, or rather, it has already +started to act in both of the alternative ways. If the +subject is to respond with the right hand to one stimulus +and with the left hand to the other, both hands +are in a state of activity before the stimulus appears. +The organization of the temporary reflex through the +agency of the cerebral cortex could not be achieved +were it not for the fact that all the movements entering +into the organization are nascently aroused before the +spring is touched which permits the act to unroll itself +in orderly sequence.</p> + +<p>The various successive movements, then, which make +up our temporary reflex achieve their relationship to +one another from the fact that they are started simultaneously, +and this peculiarity constitutes a distinctive +feature. Apparently this feature is absent from true +reflexes. An act of swallowing, performed unconsciously, +may start the complicated processes of digestion, +but it is merely the first act of a series. There +is no evidence that the movements of the stomach and +of the other organs concerned in digestion must be presupposed +before the act of swallowing can take place.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">234</a></span> +The swallowing may start the other processes, but we +cannot say that these other processes react back upon +the first act and make it one of swallowing rather than +something else. Yet this "back stroke" is precisely +what is necessary in our reaction-experiment, for it is +by virtue of this fact that the organization of the temporary +reflex becomes a possibility. The first response +cannot take place until the last is provided for. Thus +the immediate act of looking has embodied in it the +activity that is to follow later. The looking is not +simply with the eye, but with the hands that are to +complete the response. The optical response is a response +which, in the language of Bergson, prefigures +or sketches out the act of a later moment. The nervous +system is enabled to act as a unit, because the movements +that are to occur at a later time are represented +in the first stage of the complete act. The first stage, +accordingly, does not occur independently, but <i>as</i> a +preliminary to the second. With an imperfect organization +of the entire response, it may happen that the +subsequent movements are not suppressed until their +proper moment arrives, but appear in advance of their +scheduled time. In writing, for example, we frequently +omit words or add to a word the final letter of some +word that belongs to a subsequent part of the sentence. +An error of this sort could hardly occur so readily in +the course of an act that belongs to the type of the +true reflex.</p> + +<p>Lest the reader suspect that this is <i>a priori</i> physiology, +I may quote the following from a prominent +neurologist: "No simple sensory impulse can, under<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">235</a></span> +ordinary circumstances, reach the cerebral cortex without +first being influenced by subcortical association +centers, within which complex reflex combinations may +be effected and various automatisms set off in accordance +with their preformed structure. These subcortical +systems are to some extent modifiable by racial +and individual experience, but their reactions are chiefly +of the determinate or stereotyped character, with a +relatively limited range of possible reaction types for +any given stimulus complex.</p> + +<p>"It is shown by the lower vertebrates, which lack +the cerebral cortex, that these subcortical mechanisms +are adequate for all of the ordinary simple processes +of life, including some degree of associative memory. +But here, when emergencies arise which involve situations +too complex to be resolved by these mechanisms, +the animal will pay the inevitable penalty of failure—perhaps +the loss of his dinner, or even of his +life.</p> + +<p>"In the higher mammals with well-developed cortex +the automatisms and simple associations are likewise +performed mainly by the subcortical apparatus, but +the inadequacy of this apparatus in any particular situation +presents not the certainty of failure, but rather +a dilemma. The rapid preformed automatisms fail to +give relief, or perhaps the situation presents so many +complex sensory excitations as to cause mutual interference +and inhibition of all reaction. There is a stasis +in the subcortical centers. Meanwhile the higher neural +resistance of the cortical pathways has been overcome +by summation of stimuli and the cortex is excited to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">236</a></span> +function. Here is a mechanism adapted, not for a +limited number of predetermined and immediate responses, +but for a much greater range of combination +of the afferent impressions with each other and with +memory vestiges of previous reactions and a much +larger range of possible modes of response to any given +set of afferent impressions. By a process of trial and +error, perhaps, the elements necessary to effect the +adaptive response may be assembled and the problem +solved.</p> + +<p>"It is evident here that the physiological factors +in the dilemma or problem as this is presented to the +cortex are by no means simple sensory impressions, +but definitely organized systems of neural discharge, +each of which is a physiological resultant of the reflexes, +automatisms, impulses, and inhibitions characteristic +of its appropriate subcortical centers. The +precise form which these subcortical combinations will +assume in response to any particular excitation is in +large measure determined by the structural connections +<i>inter se</i>....</p> + +<p>"From the standpoint of the cerebral cortex considered +as an essential part of the mechanism of higher +conscious acts, every afferent stimulus, as we have seen, +is to some extent affected by its passage through various +subcortical association centers (i.e., it carries a +quale of central origin). But this same afferent impulse +in its passage through the spinal cord and brain +stem may, before reaching the cortex, discharge collateral +impulses into the lower centers of reflex coördination, +from which incipient (or even actually consummated)<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">237</a></span> +motor responses are discharged previous to the +cortical reaction. These motor discharges may, +through the 'back stroke' action, in turn exert an +influence upon the slower cortical reaction. Thus the +lower reflex response may in a literal physiological +sense act <i>into</i> the cortical stimulus complex and become +an integral part of it."<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></p> + +<p>It seems clear, then, that conscious behavior involves +a certain <i>process</i> of organization which constitutes a +differential. The units entering into this process are +"definitely organized systems of neural discharge," +the antecedent organization of these several systems +being due either to the inherited or to the acquired +structure of the nervous system. Given a certain +amount of plasticity, the nervous system builds up +specific forms of response for certain objects or situations, +and these forms of response subsequently become +the material from which new organizations or new +modes of response are constructed. The achievements +of the past, accordingly, become stepping-stones to +new achievement. The new organization, moreover, is +not determined by a mechanism antecedently provided, +but has a peculiar flexibility, so as to meet the demands +of a new situation. That is, a new mode of procedure +is adopted. Instead of being a purely mechanical +reaction, the response that results from the situation +is tentative or experimental in character, and "by a +process of trial and error, perhaps, the elements necessary +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">238</a></span> +to effect the adaptive response may be assembled +and the problem solved."</p> + +<p>We may add at once that the reorganization which is +required to constitute conscious behavior varies a great +deal in extent. In an act that is more or less habitual, +a comparatively slight modification of the corresponding +organized system of neural discharge will suffice +to harmonize the conflicting elements, whereas on other +occasions a more extensive modification is required. +But in any case it appears that there is a certain +impropriety in describing conscious behavior in terms +of a temporary reflex, since the study of this behavior +is concerned with the organization of the discordant +elements, not as a result, but primarily as a process. +In a reflex act we may suppose that the stimulus which +evokes the first stage in the response is like the first +in a row of upstanding bricks, which in falling knocks +down another. That is, the reflex arc is built up by +agencies that are quite independent of the subsequent +act. The arc is all set up and ready for use by the +time the reflex act appears upon the scene. In the case +of conscious activity, on the other hand, we find a very +different state of affairs. The arc is not first constructed +and then used, but is constructed as the act +proceeds; and this progressive organization is, in the +end, what is meant by conscious behavior. If the +course of a reflex act may be compared with traveling +in a railroad train, the progress of a conscious act is +more like that of a band of explorers, who hew their +path and build their bridges as they go along. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">239</a></span> +direction of the act is not determined from without but +from within; the end is internal to the process.</p> + +<p>This process of organization and purposive direction +is exemplified in every act of attention. Is that noise, +for example, a horse in the street, or is it the rain on +the roof? What we find in such a situation is not a +paralysis of activity, but a redirection. The incompatibility +of responses is purely relative. There is +indeed a mutual inhibition of the responses for hoof-beats +and rain respectively, in the sense that neither +has undisputed possession of the field; but this very +inhibition sets free the process of attention, in which +the various responses participate and coöperate. +There is no static balancing of forces, but rather a +process in which the conflict is simply a condition for +an activity of a different kind. If I am near a window +facing the street, my eye turns thither for a clue; if +the appeal to vision be eliminated, the eye becomes +unseeing and coöperates with the ear by excluding all +that is irrelevant to the matter in hand. In this process +the nervous system functions as a unit, with reference +to the task of determining the source and character +of the sound. This task or problem dominates +the situation. A voice in an adjoining room may break +in, but only as something to be ignored and shut out; +whereas a voice in the street may become all-absorbing +as possibly indicating the driver of the hypothetical +horse. That is, the reason why the conflict of responses +does not end in a deadlock, but in a redirection, +is that a certain selectiveness of response comes into +play. Out of the mass of more or less inchoate activities<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">240</a></span> +a certain response is selected as a rallying-point +for the rest, and this selection is of a purposive character. +The selection is determined by reference to the +task in hand, which is to restore a certain harmony +of response. Accordingly, that response is selected +which gives promise of forwarding the business of the +moment. By virtue of this selective character, one of the +constituents of the total activity becomes exalted among +its fellows and is entrusted with the function of determining +further behavior.</p> + +<p>The purpose of the discussion, up to this point, is +to put forward this selective or teleological character +as the fundamental and differentiating trait of conscious +behavior; and our task, accordingly, is to give an account +of the nature and <i>modus operandi</i> of this purposive +control. This control, it is evident, consists in giving +direction to behavior with reference to results that +are still in the future. The basis for this anticipation +of the future is furnished by the nascent responses +which foreshadow further activity, even while they are +still under the thraldom of the inhibitions which hold +them back. These suppressed activities furnish a sort +of diagram or sketch of further possible behavior, and +the problem of consciousness is the problem of making +the result or outcome of these incipient responses effective +in the control of behavior. Future results or +consequences must be converted into present stimuli; +and the accomplishment of this conversion is the miracle +of consciousness. To be conscious is to have a future +possible result of present behavior embodied as a present +existence functioning as a stimulus to further behavior.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">241</a></span> +Thus the qualities of a perceptual experience may be +interpreted, without exception, as anticipations of the +results of activities which are as yet in an embryonic +stage. The results of the activity that is as yet partly +suppressed are already expressed or anticipated in the +perception. The present experience may, as James says, +"shoot its perspective far before it, irradiating in advance +the regions in which lie the thoughts as yet unborn."<a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> +A baseball player, for example, who is all +"set" to field a ball as a preliminary to a further play, +sees the ball, not simply as an approaching object, +but as ball-to-be-caught-and-then-thrown-to-first-base. +Moreover, the ball, while still on the way, is a ball-that-may-bound-to-the-right-or-to-the-left. +The corresponding +movements of the player to the right or left, and +the act of throwing, although present only as inhibited +or incipient acts, are nevertheless embodied in the visual +experience. Similarly my couch looks soft and inviting, +because the optical stimulation suggests or prompts, not +only the act of lying down, but also the kind of relaxation +that is made possible by a comfortable bed. So +likewise the tiger's jaws and claws look cruel and horrible, +because in that perception are reflected the incipient +movements of defense and recoil which are going on +in the body of the observer. Perception, like our air-castles, +or like dreams in the Freudian theory, presents +what is at best but a suggestion or program in the guise +of accomplished fact.</p> + +<p>This projection, however, of our submerged activities +into our perceptions requires a more precise statement. +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">242</a></span> +According to the foregoing contention, the appearance, +for example, of a razor's edge as sharp is the +sensory correlate of an incipient response which, if it +were to attain full-blown perfection, would be the +reaction to a cut. By hypothesis, however, the response +is inhibited, and it is this inhibition which calls forth +the perception of the object. If the response encountered +no obstruction, adaptation would be complete and +perception would not occur. Since there is a blocking +of the response, nature resorts to a special device in +order to overcome the difficulty, and this device consists +in furnishing the organism with a new type of +stimulus. The razor as perceived does not actually +cut just now, but it bodies forth the quality 'will cut,' +i.e., the perceived attribute derives its character from +what the object will, or may, do at a future time. That +is, a perceived object is a stimulus which controls or +directs the organism by results which have not yet occurred, +but which will, or may, occur in the future. +The uniqueness of such a stimulus lies in the fact that +a contingent result somehow becomes operative as a +present fact; the future is transferred into the present +so as to become effective in the guidance of behavior.</p> + +<p>This control by a future that is made present is what +constitutes consciousness. A living body may respond +to an actual cut by a knife on purely mechanical or +reflex principles; but to respond to a cut by anticipation, +i.e., to behave with reference to a merely possible +or future injury, is manifestly an exhibition of intelligence. +Not that there need be any conscious reference +to the future as future in the act. Merely to see the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">243</a></span> +object as "sharp" is sufficient to give direction to +conduct. But "sharp" is equivalent to "will cut"; +the quality of sharpness is a translation of future possibility +into terms of present fact, and as thus +translated the future possibility becomes a factor +in the control of behavior. Perception, therefore, +is a point where present and future coincide. +What the object <i>will</i> do is, in itself, just a contingency, +an abstract possibility, but in perception this possibility +clothes itself in the garments of present, concrete +fact and thus provides the organism with a different +environment. The environment provides a new +stimulus by undergoing a certain kind of change, i.e., +by exercising a peculiar function of control. This control +is seeing, and the whole mystery of consciousness is +just this rendering of future stimulations or results into +terms of present existence. Consciousness, accordingly, +is a name for a certain change that takes place in the +stimulus; or, more specifically, it is a name for the +control of conduct by future results or consequences.</p> + +<p>To acquire such a stimulus and to become conscious +are one and the same thing. As was indicated previously, +the conscious stimulus is correlated with the various +inherited and acquired motor tendencies which have +been set off and which are struggling for expression, +and the uniqueness of the stimulus lies in the fact that +the adaptive value of these nascent motor tendencies becomes +operative as the determining principle in the +organization of the response. The response, for example, +to "sharp" or "will cut" is reminiscent of an +earlier reaction in which the organism engaged in certain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">244</a></span> +defensive movements as the result of an actual injury. +That is, the response to "sharp" is a nascent +or incipient form of a response which at the time of its +first occurrence was the expression of a maladaptation. +The response that is induced when an object is seen as +sharp would be biologically bad, if it were completed, +and the fact that the object is seen as sharp +means that this result is foreshadowed and operates +as a stimulus to prevent such maladaptation. +Similarly the couch which meets my weary eye becomes +a stimulus to repose because the nascent activity which +is aroused would be biologically good if completed. In +any case the character of the stimulus is determined by +the adaptive value which the incipient activity would +have if it were carried out. Consciousness, accordingly, +is just a future adaptation that has been set to +work so as to bring about its own realization. The +future thus becomes operative in the present, in much +the same way as the prospects for next year's crop may +be converted by the farmer into ready money with +which to secure the tools for its production.</p> + +<p>To justify this conclusion by a detailed and extensive +application of this interpretation to every form of +quality and relation would carry us beyond the limits of +the present undertaking. It is a view, however, which +offers possibilities that have not as yet been properly +recognized. Certain considerations, besides those already +discussed, may be mentioned as giving it an antecedent +plausibility. As regards simple sense-qualities, +there is abundant reason for believing that Locke's doctrine +of "simple ideas" is a violent perversion of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">245</a></span> +facts. To assume that the last results of analysis are the +first things in experience is to give a fatal twist to psychology +and to commit us to the fruitless agonies of +epistemology. The original "blooming, buzzing confusion" +with which experience starts becomes differentiated +into specific qualities only to the extent that +certain typical and organized forms of response are +built up within the body. Sense-qualities, in other +words, are functionally not simple but extremely complex; +they owe their distinctiveness or individuality to +the fact that each of them embodies a specific set of +cues or anticipations, with reference to further experiences. +The difference between a quality like "sharpness" +and a quality like "red" lies in the fact that +the former is a translation of a relatively simple possibility, +viz., "will cut," whereas the latter embodies a +greater variety of anticipations. The perception of +red, being the outcome of many comparisons and associations, +presupposes a complex physical response +which contains multitudinous tendencies to reinstate +former responses; and the combined effect of these suppressed +tendencies is the perception of a color which +offers possibilities of control over behavior in such directions +as reminiscences, idle associations, or perhaps +scrutiny and investigation. A similar explanation evidently +applies to abstract ideas, which neither admit +of reduction to "revived sensations" nor compel the +adoption of a peculiarly "spiritual" or "psychic" +existence in the form of unanalyzable meanings. Here +again a complex mode of response must be assumed, +having as its correlate an experience describable only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">246</a></span> +in terms of its functioning, which is such as to +enable the organism to act intelligently, i.e., with reference +to future results, which are sufficiently embodied +in the experience to secure appropriate behavior. +Again, this point of view offers a satisfactory solution +for the time-worn puzzle of relativity. If perception is +just the translation of future possible stimulations into +present fact, there is assuredly no justification for +the notion that perception distorts the facts or that +discrepancies among different perceptions prove their +"subjectivity." There remains but one test by which +the correctness or validity of perception may be +judged, viz., whether the perceived object proves to be +the kind of stimulus which is reported or anticipated in +the present experience.</p> + +<p>So far our discussion has emphasized the anticipatory +character of the conscious stimulus. Future consequences +come into the present as <i>conditions</i> for further +behavior. These anticipations are based, indeed, +upon previous happenings, but they enter into the +present situation as conditions that must be taken into +account. But to take them into account means that +the conscious situation is essentially incomplete and in +process of transformation or reconstruction. This +peculiar incompleteness or contingency stands out +prominently when the situation rises to the level of +uncertainty and perplexity. To borrow the classical +illustration of the child and the candle, the child +is in a state of uncertainty because the neural +activity of the moment comprises two incompatible +systems of discharge, the one being a grasping and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">247</a></span> +holding, the other a withdrawal and such further +movements as may be induced by contact with fire. +Hence the candle has the seductiveness of a prize, +but at the same time carries the suggestion of burning +the fingers. That is, the perceived object has +a unique character of uncertainty, which inheres in it +as a present positive quality. We are here confronted +with genuine contingency, such as is encountered nowhere +else. Other modes of behavior may be uncertain +in the sense that the incoming stimulation finds no fixed +line of discharge laid down for itself within the organism. +In seeking to convert itself into response it may +either sweep away the obstructions in its path or work +itself out along lines of less resistance, in ways that no +man can foretell. There may be moments of equilibrium, +moments when it remains to be seen where the +dam will break and the current rush through. Such +uncertainty, however, is the uncertainty of the bystander +who attempts to forecast what will happen +next. It is not the uncertainty that figures as an +integral part of conscious behavior.</p> + +<p>This inherent uncertainty means that conscious +behavior, as contrasted with the mechanical character +of the reflexes, is essentially experimental. The uncertainty +exists precisely because an effort is under way +to clear up the uncertainty. The resort to eye or ear +or to reflective thinking is suggested by the corresponding +nascent responses and is an endeavor to secure +something which is still to seek, but which, when +found, will meet the requirements of the situation. +Translating this process into terms of stimulus and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">248</a></span> +response, we may say that the conscious stimulus +of the moment induces the investigation or scrutiny +which presently results in the arrival of a stimulus that +is adequate to the situation. The stimulus, in other +words, provides for its own successor; or we may say +that the process as a whole is a self-directing, self-determining +activity. Stimulus and response are not +successive stages or moments, but rather simultaneous +functions or phases of the total process. Within this +process the given situation is the stimulus because +it is that aspect or function which guides the subsequent +course of the activity, while the bodily movements +are the response because they already embody the activity +that is to follow. The significant circumstance +here is that stimulus and response resist the temporal +separation that we find in a purely reflex act; stimulus +and response are bound together as correlated functions +in a unitary, self-directing process, so that these +twain are one flesh.</p> + +<p>Situations of uncertainty and expectancy, as exemplified +by the familiar child-candle incident, are of interest, +because they emphasize both the anticipatory +character of experience and the peculiar reconstruction +of the stimulus. These situations, however, differ +merely in degree, not in kind, from other experiences; +their merit is that in them the distinctive character of +conscious life is writ large. To say that they are conscious +situations is to say that they are so constituted +that the possibilities of a subsequent moment are embodied +in them as a positive quality. In them the +present moment embodies a future that is contingent.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">249</a></span> +And similarly the response has neither the predetermined +organization of the reflex nor the aimless character +of a response that issues in a set of random movements. +It is, so to speak, of a generalized character, +like the paleontological specimens that foreshadow in +their structure the advent of both fish and reptile. This +form of organization, however, while exemplified most +strikingly in situations of uncertainty, pertains to all +conscious behavior. In uttering a sentence, for example, +we know in advance what we are going to say, yet +the sentence shapes itself into definite form only as we +proceed; or perhaps we get "stuck," and by hemming +and hawing bear witness that a struggle for a certain +kind of organization is going on. The same word in +different contexts is a different word in each instance, +by virtue of the coloring that it takes on from what +is to follow after. And this is equally true of our +most casual experiences. The auditory or visual object +that we happen to notice and immediately afterwards +ignore is apprehended with reference to the possibility +of warranting further attention, or else it presents +itself as an intruder that is to be excluded in order that +we may go on with the concern of the moment. All experience +is a kind of intelligence, a control of present +behavior with reference to future adjustment. To be +in experience at all is to have the future operate in the +present.</p> + +<p>This reference to the future may be in the nature of +an end or goal that controls a series of activities or it +may be of a momentary and casual kind. In any case +the character of the stimulus changes with the progress<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">250</a></span> +of the act. The book on the table must become successively +book-to-be-reached-for, book-to-be-picked-up, and +book-to-be-opened, unless the process is to drop back to +the type of reflex. This development of the stimulus +gives genuine continuity, since every moment in the +process comes as a fulfilment of its predecessor and as +a transition-point to its successor. In a purely mechanical +act response follows stimulus like the successive +strokes of a clock. It is a touch-and-go affair; +the stimulus presses the button and then subsides, +while the neural organization does the rest. In +conscious behavior, on the other hand, stimulus and +response keep step with each other. A mere succession +of stimuli would reduce conscious behavior +to a series of explosive jerks, on the principle +of the gasoline engine. To be conscious at all is to +duplicate in principle the agility of the tight-rope performer, +who continuously establishes new co-ordinations +according to the exigencies of the moment and +with constant reference to the controlling consideration +of keeping right side up. The sensory stimulus +provides continuously for its own rehabilitation or appropriate +transformation, and in a similar way the +neural organization is never a finished thing, but is in +constant process of readjustment to meet the demands +of an adaptation that still lies in the future.</p> + +<p>It is this relationship of present response to the response +of the next moment that constitutes the distinctive +trait of conscious behavior. The relatively unorganized +responses of the present moment, in becoming +reflected in the experienced object, reveal their outcome<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">251</a></span> +or meaning before they have become overt, and thus +provide the conditions of intelligent action. In other +words, future consequences become transformed into a +stimulus for further behavior. We are confronted here +with a distinctive mode of operation, which must be +properly recognized, if we are to give a consistent and +intelligent account of conscious behavior. On the other +hand, if we refuse to recognize the advent here of a +new category, intelligence becomes an anomaly and +mystery deepens into contradiction. Since intelligence +or consciousness must be provided for somehow, we are +forced back upon either interactionism or else epiphenomenalism, +more or less disguised under a euphonious +name, such as psycho-physical parallelism or the double-aspect +theory. That is, the relation of stimulus and +response is either reduced to plain cause and effect or +else is rejected altogether and supplanted by a bare concomitance +of the physical and mental series. In either +case conscious behavior is reduced to the type of reflex +action, the only issue between the two doctrines being +the question whether or not it is necessary or permissible +to interpolate mental links in the causal chain.</p> + +<p>According to the doctrine of parallelism, conscious +behavior is nothing more than a complicated form of +reflex, which goes on without any interference on the +part of mind or intelligence. Intelligence adds nothing +to the situation except itself; it carries no implications +or new significance with regard to conduct. The +psychic correlate is permitted to tag along, but the +explanations of response remain the same in kind as +they were before they reached the level of consciousness.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">252</a></span> +"Mere complexity should not becloud the issue. Every +brain process, like every reflex activity, is presumably +the result of physico-chemical processes. The assumption +of a mysterious intuition or 'psychic force' adds +nothing to the mechanistic explanation, even when the +latter is most fragmentary. The interactionists go out +of their way unnecessarily in assuming a special activity +of consciousness to account for the dislocation of +reactions from sensations. The nervous organization +suffices to explain it. Distant-stimuli and central +stimuli co-operate to bring about anticipatory reactions; +foresight is but the conscious side of this process. +The phenomenon is <i>both</i> physical and mental."<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> + +<p>The passage just quoted is fairly typical. Since the +mental is an aspect or concomitant of the physical it +is clearly entitled to an occasional honorable mention, +but the fact remains that the explanation of behavior +is to be given wholly in terms of neural organization. +The mental is quite literally an "also ran." To say +that a physico-chemical process is also mental is of no +particular significance as long as it is implied that the +end or goal of the process plays no part in shaping the +course of events. The mental simply gives dignity to +the occasion, like the sedan chair with no bottom, in +which the Irishman's admirers, according to James's +story, ran him along to the place of banquet and which +prompted the hero to remark: "Faith, if it wasn't for +the honor of the thing, I might as well have come on +foot."</p> + +<p>It is this empty show of respect which the interactionists +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">253</a></span> +seek to avoid when they make the mental a distinct +link in the causal sequence. The physical first +causes the mental, and the mental in turn brings about +a change in the physical. In this way a certain importance +is indeed secured to mental facts, but it appears +that, so far as purposive action is concerned, we +are no better off than we were before. The mental is +simply another kind of cause; it has as little option +regarding its physical effect as the physical cause has +with regard to its mental effect. Non-mechanical behavior +is again ruled out, or else a vain attempt is made +to secure a place for it through the introduction of an +independent psychic agency.</p> + +<p>It is true, indeed, that we are under no antecedent +obligation to maintain the existence of an activity that +is not entirely reducible to the type of everyday cause +and effect. But neither does scientific zeal and incorruptibility +require us to do violence to the facts in order +to secure this uniformity of type. Not to speak at all +of the difficulties inherent in this dualism, it seems undeniable +that some facts persistently refuse to conform +to the type of mechanism, unless they are previously +clubbed into submission. Foresight and the sense of +obligation, for example, must learn to regard themselves +as nothing more than an interesting indication +of the way in which the neural machinery is operating +before they will fit into the scheme. And similarly the +progress of an argument is no way controlled or directed +by the end in view, or by considerations of logical +coherence, but by the impact of causation. Ideas lose +their power to guide conduct by prevision of the future,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">254</a></span> +and truth and error consequently lose their significance, +save perhaps as manifestations of cerebral +operations. Since reasoning involves association, it +must be reducible to bare association; the sequence of +the process is just sequence and nothing more. A +description of this kind is on a par with the celebrated +opinion that violin music is just a case of scraping +horse-hair on catgut. Everything that is distinctive in +the facts is left out of account, and we are forced to +the conclusion that no conclusion has any logical significance +or value.</p> + +<p>In the end these difficulties, and in fact most of our +philosophic ills, may be traced back to the prejudice +that experience or knowing is a process in which the +objects concerned do not participate and have no share. +This assumption commits us at once to various corollaries +and thus breeds a set of abstractions that pass +themselves off as entities and add themselves to the world +of our experience as demonstrable facts. In philosophy, +as in the financial world, there is a constant temptation +to do business on a basis of fictitious capitalization. +Our abstract physico-chemical processes, with their +correlates, such as passive, independent objects, souls, +minds, or absolutes, do not represent actual working +capital, but watered stock, and their inevitable tendency +is to convert the legitimate business of philosophy +into a campaign of exploitation, which is none the less +exploitation because it is frequently done in the interests +of what are supposed to be the spiritual values of +man. A careful inventory of our assets brings to light +no such entities as those which have been placed to our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">255</a></span> +credit. We do not find body and object <i>and</i> consciousness, +but only body and object. We do not find objects +that remain indifferent to the experiential process, +but rather objects that exhibit a flexibility and +mobility which defy all description. We do not find a +self-sufficient environment or absolute <i>to</i> which intelligence +must needs adjust itself, but an environment that +is at odds with itself and struggling in the throes of a +reconstruction. The process of intelligence is something +that goes on, not in our minds, but in things; it +is not photographic, but creative. From the simplest +perception to the most ideal aspiration or the wildest +hallucination, our human experience is reality engaged +in the guidance or control of behavior. Things undergo +a change in becoming experienced, but the change consists +in a doing, in the assumption of a certain task or +duty. The experiential object hence varies with the +response; the situation and the motor activity fit together +like the sections of a broken bowl.</p> + +<p>The bearing of this standpoint on the interpretation +of psychology is readily apparent. If it be granted +that consciousness is just a name for behavior that is +guided by the results of acts not yet performed but reflected +beforehand in the objects of experience, it +follows that this behavior is the peculiar subject-matter +of psychology. It is only by reference to +behavior that a distinctive field can be marked off +for psychological enterprise. When we say that +the flame is hot, the stone hard, and the ice cold and +slippery, we are describing objects and nothing more. +These qualities are, indeed, anticipations of future possibilities,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">256</a></span> +but this means simply that the objects are +described in terms of their properties or capacities as +stimuli of the organism. Such an account leaves out +of consideration certain changes which things undergo +when they exercise the function of controlling or +directing changes in the adjustment of the body. A +quality, such as "sharp" or "hot," is not mental or +constituted by consciousness, but the function of the +quality in giving direction to behavior through certain +changes which it undergoes is consciousness. The +changes that take place in things as a result of association, +attention, or memory, are changes that have +no significance, save with regard to their function as +stimuli to new adjustments. Psychology, therefore, +is properly a study of the conditions which determine +the change or development of stimuli; more specifically +it is a study of the conditions which govern such processes +as those by which problems are solved, lessons are +memorized, habits and attitudes are built up, and decisions +are reached. To call such study "applied" +psychology is to misunderstand the proper scope and +purpose of the subject. Psychology frequently has +occasion to draw extensively upon physics and physiology, +but it has its own problem and its own method +of procedure.</p> + +<p>That this view of conscious behavior should involve +an extensive reinterpretation of familiar facts is altogether +natural and inevitable. If consciousness is a +form of control, the question, for example, what is +"in" consciousness and what is not must be interpreted +with reference to this function of control. In a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">257</a></span> +sense we perceive many things to which we are not paying +attention, such as the light in the room or the +familiar chairs and bookcases. These are perceived +"marginally," as we say, in the sense that the presence +of these objects affects the total adjustment of the +moment in such a way that the experience <i>would</i> become +a clue to these objects if they were withdrawn. +And similarly we may speak of marginal sensations of +strain or movement, to indicate possible clues to certain +bodily activities which are factors in the process. These +marginal perceptions or images are not actual existences, +but are symbols and nothing more. The significance +of these symbols is that they point to certain +conditions by which the experiences in question are +determined. Thus the question whether a given experience +involves certain "sensations" is just a question +whether certain bodily or extra-bodily conditions +are involved in the experience. If this reference +to conditions is ignored and experience is explained +in terms of sensory material that blends and +fuses and otherwise disposes itself, the explanation +is no longer science but sleight-of-hand. Psychology +has no proper concern with such mythical constituents +of consciousness; its business is with things as +related to conduct, which is to say that psychology +is a science of behavior.</p> + +<h5>II</h5> + +<p>According to the standpoint set forth in the preceding +discussion, the key to a consistent and fruitful +interpretation of consciousness and psychology lies in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">258</a></span> +behavior. If we turn now to the psychology of introspection, +which has been dominant so many years, we +find a standpoint and mode of procedure which, on the +surface at least, is of a radically different kind. It +behooves us, therefore, to consider this standpoint in +some detail in order to justify the attempt to reinterpret +and "evaluate" it in the light of our own doctrine.</p> + +<p>The point of departure for introspective psychology +is to be found, so it seems, not in the facts of behavior, +but in the distinction between focal and marginal experience. +It is on this distinction that the introspective +psychologist bases the attempt to give a psychological +analysis and description of the contents of +experience. To analyze and describe the facts of consciousness +is to bring the marginal constituents of +experience into the white light of attention. Analysis +and description are possible just because experience +is so largely a welter of elements that disguise their +identity and character. In some way these unrecognized +and unidentified elements are constituents of the +total experience. To borrow the language of a writer +quoted by James, "However deeply we may suppose +the attention to be engaged by any thought, any considerable +alteration of the surrounding phenomena +would still be perceived; the most abstruse demonstration +in this room would not prevent a listener, however +absorbed, from noticing the sudden extinction of +the lights."<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> Or, as James remarks: "It is just like +the overtones in music. Different instruments give the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">259</a></span> +'same note,' namely, various upper harmonics of it +which differ from one instrument to another. They are +not separately heard by the ear; they blend with the +fundamental note and suffuse it, and alter it."<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> Let +the attention be directed to these overtones, however, +and they at once detach themselves from their surroundings +and step forth into the light of day. Even so the +ticking of the clock may pass unnoticed in the sense +that it is an undiscriminated element in the background +of our consciousness; but if the ticking comes to a sudden +stop, the feeling of a void in our consciousness proclaims +the fact that something has gone out from it.</p> + +<p>The observation and description of the facts of consciousness, +then, is based directly on the fact that experience, +as the psychologist deals with it, possesses a +focus and margin. Nature as conceived by the physical +sciences presents no such distinction. The facts are +what they are, and their character as focal or marginal, +as clear or obscure, depends altogether upon their relation +to an intelligence. Or we may say that if the +facts of experience were always focal and never marginal, +it would never occur to us to speak of consciousness +as we do at present. As long as we confine +ourselves to a given color, shape or temperature, as +experienced focally, we are not dealing with consciousness, +but with objects. An analysis of such facts that +does not bring in the marginal is not an analysis of +consciousness, but an analysis of physical reality. Even +if we consider non-physical objects, such as mathematical +or economic concepts, we find that our analysis +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">260</a></span> +is not psychological as long as the marginal is left out. +The consideration of the margin, however, brings us +into the presence of facts which are of a distinctive +kind and which warrant a new science. Let the margin +be eliminated and psychology disappears at the same +time.</p> + +<p>The psychological doctrine of focus and margin, +then, is a matter of fundamental importance. On the +interpretation of this doctrine depend our systems of +psychology and of philosophy. What, then, is meant +by focus and margin? If we turn to our psychologies, +we seem to be confronted once more with something +that everybody knows and nobody can define. But +since we have to do with a distinction, the obligation to +differentiate cannot be wholly ignored. Consciousness +is sometimes likened to a visual field and sometimes to +the waves of the sea. Like the visual field it has a foreground +and a background, a near and a remote, a +center and a margin or periphery. The contents of +consciousness are vivid or clear in the center of this +field and fade away into vagueness or obscureness in +proportion to their approach to the periphery. Or, to +take the other comparison, the focus may be represented +by the crest of a wave and the margin by what we +may call its base. This illustration has the advantage +that it indicates the difference between higher and lower +degrees of concentration. As concentration increases, +the crest of the wave rises higher and its width +decreases, while the reverse is true where the concentration +of attention is less intense. All consciousness possesses +the distinction of focus and margin in some<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">261</a></span> +degree; however much we may be absorbed in an object +or topic, there is always an indirect mental vision +that informs us of other facts, which for the time being +are in the background of our consciousness.</p> + +<p>For purposes of description a metaphor is at best a +clumsy device. It has a tendency to substitute itself +for the thing to be described and thus to conceal its +limitations and inaccuracies. The present case is no +exception. I am forced to think that the visual field in +particular is a thoroughly vicious metaphor when employed +to body forth the distinction of focus and +margin. Whatever this distinction may in the end turn +out to be, it is not such as this comparison would lead +one to suppose. Objects seen in indirect vision appear +obscure and blurred precisely because they are in the +focus of consciousness. We get pretty much the same +sort of obscureness or blur on a printed page when we +look at it in indirect vision as we do when we look at +it from a distance that is just too great to make out +the words or characters. What the illustration shows +is that things look different according as the circumstances +under which we see them are different, but what +bearing this has on marginal consciousness is not at all +obvious to an unsophisticated intelligence.</p> + +<p>When we speak of a focus and margin in consciousness, +we are presumably dealing with conscious fact. +Now this illustration of the visual field does not represent +conscious fact. Ordinary perception carries with +it no sense of obscureness at all, and when it does we +have exactly the same kind of situation as when an +object is too distant or in some other way inaccessible<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">262</a></span> +to satisfactory perception. That is, the object perceived +is in the 'focus' and not in the margin. The +obscureness of objects when seen with the margin of the +retina has no more to do with the margin of consciousness +than the obscureness caused by an attack of dizziness +or by a morning fog.</p> + +<p>It will be said, perhaps, that consciousness may be +unclear even though there be no sense of unclearness, +that there is such a thing as intrinsic clearness, quite +apart from obstacles and problems. In other words, +the same sensation is capable of realizing various degrees +of clearness. It is not at all obvious, however, +why the different experiences that are concerned in such +a comparison should be called the same sensation. As +long as we abstract from objective reference, each sensation +is just what it is and there is no opportunity to +make comparisons on the basis of clearness. A sensation +as such—if we are bound to speak of sensations—can +by no possibility be an obscure sensation, for the +trait that we call obscureness or vagueness constitutes +the intrinsic being of that sensation. If we permit ourselves +to speak of clearness at all, we should rather say +that it possesses a maximum of clearness, since it has +managed to express or present its whole nature with +not one trait or feature lacking. What more could be +demanded, in the way of clearness, of any conscious +fact than that it should body forth every detail that it +possesses?</p> + +<p>If sensations or states of consciousness possess degrees +of clearness, it seems to follow that we may +scrutinize them for the purpose of discovering characteristics<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">263</a></span> +that were present though scarcely perceived, +in much the same way that the polishing of old furniture +brings out the grain in the wood. But such a +parallel, I submit, is plain nonsense. The supposition +that consciousness is something that in due time and +with good fortune may attain consciousness is too absurd +for discussion, even though it is a supposition that +plays a considerable rôle in present-day psychology.</p> + +<p>The purpose of the discussion, up to this point, has +not been to deny the validity of the distinction between +focus and margin, but to insist upon the necessity of +reconsidering the meaning of this distinction, if we are +to attain to a workable definition of consciousness and +a fruitful or even intelligible conception of the problem +of psychology. I have endeavored to show, in the +first place, that the doctrine of focus and margin involves +the <i>raison d'être</i> of psychology. Apart from +this doctrine we have no task or problem that psychology +can claim as its distinctive possession. The +analysis of what is in the focus of consciousness is adequately +provided for in the other sciences; it is only +with the introduction of what is called the margin that +an enterprise of a different kind becomes necessary. +But, secondly, this distinction of focus and margin cannot +be drawn on the basis of the experienced contrast +between clearness and obscureness. The very fact that +anything is experienced as obscure means that it is an +object of attention, or, in other words, that it is in the +focus of consciousness and not in the margin. The +comparison of focus and margin with direct and indirect +vision is misleading, because it suggests that experiences<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">264</a></span> +are marginal in proportion as they are felt +as obscure. And, thirdly, if we undertake to distinguish +between focus and margin on the basis of a difference +in clearness or vividness of which no note is +taken at the time, we encounter the difficulty that experience +or consciousness, taken abstractly, does not +admit of such variations in degree, and so this criterion +likewise goes by the board.</p> + +<p>The situation is indeed peculiar. That there is a +realm of psychological fact is universally conceded. As +a consequence of this conviction a great body of fact +and of doctrine has been built up. It would be folly +to deny either the distinctiveness or the significance of +this achievement. And yet James's description of psychology +as "a string of raw facts; a little gossip and +wrangle about opinions; a little classification and generalization +on the mere descriptive level; a strong prejudice +that we <i>have</i> states of mind and that our brain conditions +them,"<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> is not wholly untrue even today. It is +even possible for a present-day critic to outdo James +and maintain that the legitimacy of psychology as a +separate inquiry is a matter of faith rather than of +sight. The 'raw facts' of which James speaks resolve +themselves into physical and physiological material on +the one hand and metaphysical dogmas on the other; +the gossip and wrangle are largely over fictitious problems; +the classifications and generalizations as a rule +involve trespassing on other fields; the prejudice that +we have states of mind has less standing-ground today +than it had twenty years ago. In other words, there +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">265</a></span> +is still plausible ground for James's pessimistic comment: +"This is no science, it is only the hope of a +science." A situation such as this carries with it the +insistent suggestion that the trouble lies, not primarily +in the nature of the subject-matter, but in our conception +of the problem. "The matter of a science," +as James says, "is with us." And if the distinction +of focus and margin constitutes the starting-point and +justification for a science of psychology, a better understanding +of this distinction will mean a more adequate +appreciation of the problem with which psychology +has to deal.</p> + +<p>As a starting-point for a reconsideration of focus +and margin, we may take those experiences in which the +distinction of clearness and obscureness is presented as +an experienced fact. Let us then turn once more to the +familiar illustration of the visual field. "When we look +at a printed page, there is always some one portion +of it, perhaps a word, which we see more clearly than +we do the rest; and out beyond the margin of the page +we are still conscious of objects which we see only in +a very imperfect way."<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> That is, we appreciate the +distinction between what lies in the center of our visual +field and what is more remote, just because in this experiment +we are trying to see what lies beyond the +center without turning our eyes in that direction. We +set ourselves the task of seeing what is on the page, +and at the same time we interpose an artificial obstacle. +Hence the sense of effort, and the contrast between +what is clear and what is obscure. The present experience +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">266</a></span> +is obscure, not inherently, but only with reference +to a certain problem or question. It is inadequate as +an anticipation of further experience. The contrast +between clear and obscure is created by our attempt to +overcome the difficulty, and is therefore absent from +ordinary, unobstructed visual perception.</p> + +<p>The situation described in the following familiar +quotation from James is an illustration of the same +thing: "Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. +The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is +a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is +intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in +it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at +moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and +then letting us sink back without the longed-for term."<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a></p> + +<p>'I met this man on the train, and later at the reception; +but what is his name?' The struggle rends our +consciousness in twain. The occasions of our meeting, +his appearance, his conversation, are solid fact, yet all +suffused with the pervasive, evanscent "wraith" that +tantalizes us with glimpses which half reveal and half +conceal the name we seek to grasp.</p> + +<p>To account for such experiences simply in terms of +half-submerged "sensations" and "images" is to do +violence to all the requirements for clear thinking. If +we rule out explanations of this kind, we are evidently +forced to the conclusion that these experiences are obscure, +not in themselves or in the abstract, but with +reference to the function of putting us in possession +of the name to which they are inadequate clues. It is +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">267</a></span> +the subsequent, satisfactory experience of the name +which furnishes our standard for clearness; in other +words, the implications of obscureness are of a functional, +and not of a static or structural, kind. The +marginal character of an experience is simply a reference +to its function as a clue or cue to some further experience, +i.e., a reference to its character as a changing +stimulus. Or we may say that the distinction between +focus and margin is just another aspect of the distinction +between the conditions for further activity and the +incompleteness which leads to further adjustment. +The transfer of the future into the present gives us a +fact, here and now, and in this respect the experience is +entirely focal in character, and as such it is subject-matter +for the various sciences. Whatever the nature +of the experience, it is just what it is, and not something +else. With respect to the further experience, +however, which it conditions or for which it prepares +the way, the present experience is entirely marginal, +i.e., in its character as a changing stimulus it is subject-matter +for psychology. The distinction of focus +and margin, then, is based ultimately upon the function +of experience in the control of behavior. The +given situation is a present fact and is in functional +change; or, in terms of our present discussion, it +has both a focus and a margin. As present fact it +is a reality which requires recognition in the form of +adjustment; as in functional change it provides opportunity +for bringing the adjustment to fruition. That is, +the experience both sets a task or makes a demand and +it points the way. The distinction is a distinction of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">268</a></span> +function, not of static existence, and it is this distinction +which is represented by the contrast of focus and +margin.</p> + +<p>If we compare this interpretation of focus and margin +with that of traditional psychology, we find that +the latter construes the relation of the present to the +future experience wholly in static terms, the functional +relation being left out of account. The later experience +is read back into its predecessor in the form of dim or +marginal images, which need but show themselves more +completely to make the two identical. If these sensations +were intended only as symbols of a functional +relationship, it would perhaps be scarcely worth while +to enter a protest against them. But when the functional +relationship is quite overlooked, the explanation +that is given becomes exceedingly dubious. The ticking +of the clock, for example, that is present, though unnoticed, +the overtones of the note that suffuse the whole +without diverting attention to their individual qualities,—in +what precise way are facts of this kind concerned +in the description of the experience which they +modify? A study of the clock or of the overtones +can hardly pass as an analysis of consciousness; it is +too obviously an affair of physics. Such a study becomes +merely an excuse for repeating the analyses of +physics and reading them off in terms of sensations +and images. Moreover, the transfer of all this material +to consciousness looks suspiciously like a transaction +in mental chemistry. Where, then, is psychology +to gain a foothold? What is the meaning of these uncanny +sensations and images, which nobody experiences,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">269</a></span> +unless it be their character as symbols of +adjustment? They have no legitimate status, and psychology, +by consequence, has no legitimate problem, +except in so far as they represent those possible acts +of adaptation which are the sole and proper concern +of psychology.</p> + +<p>It remains to point out briefly the bearing of these +results on what is called "the method of introspection." +We are sometimes assured that introspection has discarded +the belief in a separate mental stuff or subject-matter, +but there is ground for the suspicion that such +protestations are made in the same spirit that we affirm +our belief in the Ten Commandments or the Golden +Rule, with no thought of being taken seriously. At all +events, without a literal "looking within" it seems to +become exceedingly difficult to differentiate introspection +from ordinary observation as practised in the +other sciences. The reason for this difficulty is that +there is nothing left in introspection by which it can +be differentiated. The term introspection properly +designates, not a method but a problem; the problem, +namely, of interpreting given facts with reference to +their function in the control of behavior. If psychology +is to justify its claim to the status of a science, +it is in duty bound to secure for itself both an objective +criterion for the adjudication of disputes which otherwise +are of necessity interminable, and a subject-matter +that is not simply a heritage of metaphysical prejudice, +but a realm of fact that is attested by everyday observation +and experience.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">270</a></span></p> + +<h5>III</h5> + +<p>Within recent years the doctrine that psychology +is a science of behavior has acquired a certain prominence. +It is presupposed, of course, that the behavior +with which psychology is concerned is of a distinctive +sort; but the differentia is unfortunately the very thing +that the "behaviorist" has hitherto left out of account. +In his revolt against introspectionism, which has +been accustomed to give to its subject-matter a subjectivistic +and "psychic" interpretation, he goes to +the other extreme and relies on behavior pure and simple. +Being without a serviceable differentia, he is +unable to mark off the field of psychology from contiguous +territory. The selection of certain problems +within the general range of behavior, with no recognition +of any distinctive trait to guide and justify the +selection, is hardly enough to warrant a new science. +Even an arbitrary principle of selection is better than +none, and it would, therefore, be quite as reasonable +to subdivide the field of botany in the interests of a +new science, and group together for separate botanical +study those flowers which have enabled poets to give +symbolic expression to the beauty of women.</p> + +<p>That the principle of selection is, in the end, the +ability to modify behavior through the anticipation of +possible consequences, appears from the fact that the +category of stimulus and response is otherwise found +to be unworkable. It is true that in the simpler forms +of behavior stimulus and response may be correlated +without practical difficulty. But when we deal with +what has been called "delayed overt response," the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">271</a></span> +matter becomes more complicated and the theoretical +difficulty becomes more prominent. The behaviorist +would not seriously undertake to record everything +that happens between stimulus and response. He proceeds +selectively, taking the relation of stimulus and +response as his clue. He is properly interested in the +movements which result from the application of the +stimulus only in so far as they constitute response. +Otherwise his study is not a study of behavior, but a +study of movements. But when does a movement constitute +a response? Do we label as stimulus the spoken +word which results in overt action a week later, or the +visual perception which sets a complicated and long-drawn-out +problem, for no other reason than that it +appears somewhere as an antecedent in the causal chain +of events? If so, there is no obvious reason why the +event which occurred just before or immediately after +the <i>soi-disant</i> stimulus should not be regarded as the +true stimulus. Unless a satisfactory reason is forthcoming, +it would seem better to substitute cause and +effect for stimulus and response and to drop the term +behavior from our vocabulary. Psychology then becomes +a study of certain causal relationships, but is +still without a principle for the selection of those causal +events which are supposed to constitute its peculiar +subject-matter.</p> + +<p>Even if we manage to become reconciled to this situation, +however, our troubles are not yet at an end. +There still remains the difficulty in certain cases of +showing that the event which is selected as stimulus +or cause bears any significant relationship to the event<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">272</a></span> +which figures in our scheme as the response. The +stimulus is supposed to have a causal connection with +the response, but how are we to know that this is the +fact? How are we to know that the engineer who +solves a problem for me at my request might not have +done so anyway? No behaviorist can possibly show that +the air waves set in motion by my vocalization were an +indispensable stimulus. We doubtless believe that the +spoken word was in fact the spark which lit the fuse +and finally exploded the mine, but this belief involves +a complication of causes which it is wholly beyond +our power to control or to verify.</p> + +<p>It is true, of course, that we are able, as a matter +of fact, to correlate stimulus and response. I know +that it was the spoken word which caused the commission +to be executed, for the expert reminds me of the +fact and presents a bill. But neither of us makes any +pretense that his belief is derived from a scrutiny of +the causal sequence. Memory furnishes us with a shortcut +to the result. While our present acts are doubtless +connected with the past through causation, we do +not regard them as simply the effects of antecedent +causes. They are rather responses to present stimuli. +The expert presents his bill, being moved thereto by +a stimulus which may be indicated by saying that it +is the spoken-word-constituting-a-commission-now-completed-and-entitling-me-to-compensation. +That is, the +stimulus cannot be pushed back and anchored at a +fixed point in the past, but is a present factor at the +moment of response and is operative by virtue of its +anticipation of future events.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">273</a></span>If, then, psychology is to be regarded as a study +of behavior, it is plainly necessary to reinterpret the +category of behavior. For example, a purely mechanical +response to a light-stimulus may properly be +viewed as response to the ether-vibration or wave-length +upon which it follows in temporal sequence. But if +this stimulation results in what is commonly called consciousness, +a different kind of response ensues. The +light-stimulus becomes a cause or occasion for the act +of looking. But why look, unless it be to secure a +new stimulus for further response? We stop to look, +precisely because the first stimulus does not run +smoothly off the reel. The response will not go forward, +but is halted and expends itself in the effort to +secure a further stimulus. This is the moment of attention, +in which the stimulus undergoes a process of +transformation, concomitantly with the process of reorganization +in the motor responses, and in the direction +of ends or results that are foreshadowed in it. This +change in the stimulus takes place under certain specifiable +conditions, and the study of these conditions is +a study of such processes as perceiving, attending, remembering, +and deliberating, which are distinctively +psychological in their nature. Processes of this kind, +if taken as changes in stimuli, find an objective criterion +in the adaptive behavior for the sake of which +they occur, and they provide psychology with a distinctive +task and subject-matter.</p> + +<p>As against the introspectionist, then, the behaviorist +is justified in his contention that psychological procedure +must be objective and experimental in character.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">274</a></span> +The danger to which he has exposed himself is the +failure to differentiate his problem from that of physiology +and physics. It is only by a proper recognition +of both the objective and the distinctive character of +conscious behavior that psychology can free itself of +the reproach which is heaped upon it by members of its +own household and take the place that rightfully belongs +to it in the community of the sciences.</p> + +<h5>IV</h5> + +<p>According to the preceding exposition, the current +psychological doctrine of focus and margin is an attempt +to reduce the changes in the stimulus to terms +of static entities denominated sensations and images. +By abstracting from change we convert the new +stimulus that is already on the way into inert sensory +material, which lends itself to purely analytic treatment. +In this way the suggested hardness of the rock +becomes a "centrally aroused sensation" of a stubbed +toe, the heat of the candle becomes an image of a +burn, etc. As was said before, the sensations are not +existences, but representatives or symbols of our +nascent activities; they are the static equivalents of +this foreshadowing or reference to the future. The explanation +of experience that we find in James and +Bergson approximates this view so closely in one respect +and departs from it so widely in another as to +warrant a brief discussion.</p> + +<p>A prominent characteristic of the doctrine advocated +by James and Bergson is the emphasis given to +the foreshadowings or anticipations of the future. Experiences<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">275</a></span> +of conflict, such as the struggle to recall a +name, take on their peculiar coloring, so these writers +contend, from their relationship to a beyond, to something +which is yet to be. If we are to understand +experience as it really is, we must guard against the +besetting temptation to translate everything into +spatial equivalents. This forward reference is usually +read off as a distinction and contrast between simultaneously +existing components. Some constituent is +first set apart as the nucleus or focus and is then enveloped +with an elusive, intangible wraith of meaning, +which is called the margin. We have been taught to +think of the focus as made up of sensory material of +some sort and silhouetted against a background lit up +by the fitful, inconsequential heat-lightning of meaning. +But this is a perversion of the facts. When we are +engaged in a problem it is precisely these unformed +meanings that are of interest and importance. They +are in the focus of consciousness, in so far as we can +speak of a focus at all. They absorb our attention +and direct our energies. They inform us of a margin, +not by refusing to compete for our attention with more +important or more interesting facts, but by bodying +forth the <i>unfinished</i> character of the situation. Hence +this beckoning, this tingling with the sense of closeness, +this sinking back when our efforts meet with defeat. +Focus and margin, in short, have to do with +movement, with transition, and not with a static field. +These situations are felt as inherently unstable and in +process of reconstruction. There is a peculiar sense +of activity, of "something doing," of a future knocking<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">276</a></span> +on the door of the present. What is thus on its +way to the present we can designate only in terms of +the object as it is after it has arrived. To call it +marginal is to immerse the object in this temporal +flux, which embodies perfectly the characteristics of +Bergsonian duration.</p> + +<p>But this is only a first step. If we turn now to +those experiences from which this inner diremption +of fact and meaning is absent, we find a process that +is essentially the same in kind. They likewise constitute +a temporal flow, even though there be no sense of +duration or of change as such. The different moments +of these experiences are not mechanically juxtaposed, +but blend together in much the same way as when the +process is experienced as a process. In principle we +have the same transition, the same becoming, the same +growth from less to more, the same activity of continuous +reconstruction. Conscious life, we find, is a continuous +adjustment; each of its moments is a "transitive +state." The more evenly flowing experiences +are likewise endowed with a focus and margin, not in +the form of static elements, but as a dynamic relationship +of what is with what is to be.</p> + +<p>Such an interpretation of experience, moreover, +opens the way for a proper valuation of the psychologist's +procedure. The concept of sensation is methodology +pure and simple. Granted that focus and +margin are such as was indicated a moment ago, how +are they to be described, unless we resort to some +<i>Hilfsbegriff</i> such as sensations? James's description of +the effort to recall a forgotten name is not description<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">277</a></span> +at all in a scientific sense, since the "wraith of +the name" that we are trying to recover is of too unearthly +a fabric to be weighed and measured by accepted +scientific standards. It makes us "tingle," it +lets us "sink back," but such portrayal is literature +rather than science. Our first step must be to resolve +our material into components. These components we +identify with genuine elements if we can, with pious +fictions if we must; but until this is done there can +be no exact description. There can be no precision in +our statement of the facts and no formulation of the +laws that govern their changes.</p> + +<p>This view undeniably has a certain plausibility. As +long as the results are attained which the psychologist +sets out to reach, we need not be hypersensitive on the +score of methods. In the field of natural science, at +all events, this Jesuitical principle is not incompatible +with respectability. If it be true, however, that sensation +is but a tool or artifact, a means to an end, what +is the end that is to be attained by this device? It +is at this point that we come to the parting of the ways. +According to the view previously elaborated, the anticipations +of the future have to do with the results +of our possible acts, and sensations are simply symbols +for the various elements in our complex motor responses. +In the case of Bergson and James, however, +the clue that is furnished by response is discarded. +The reference to the future, being dissociated from +behavior, is taken as evidence of an abstract or metaphysical +duration, so that experience is somehow other +than it seems; and sensation is regarded as the translation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">278</a></span> +of duration into the language of space. Associationism +is justified in its belief that reality is different +from its appearance in our experience, but is +criticized for attempting to interpret the real in terms +of space rather than time. In both cases the lead of +the subject-matter is abandoned in favor of an explanation +that is derived from a fourth-dimensional plane +of existence.</p> + +<p>The suspicion that these two positions have a deep-seated +affinity is strengthened if we call to mind that +the concept of sensation was originated, not in the +interests of methodology, but as the expression of a +historic preconception that mistook fiction for fact. +The fundamental error back of it was the preposterous +notion that consciousness consists of subconscious or +unconscious constituents, which by their mechanical or +chemical combinations make our experience what it is. +The question which it raises and which has afflicted us +even to the present day is not primarily the question +of fact, but the question of intelligibility, as the controversy +over mindstuff abundantly attests. Whether +we regard experience as made up of sensory material, +however, or as constituted in a Bergsonian fashion, is +a matter of detail; the primary question is whether +a distinction between consciousness as it appears and +as it "really" is has any meaning. In so far as this +distinction is maintained, we are beating the thin air +of mythology, despite our reinterpretations and justifications. +True conversion does not consist in a renaming +of old gods, but demands a humble and a contrite +heart. To call sensation an artifact, a methodological<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">279</a></span> +device, without a surrender of the metaphysical assumption +that lies back of Associationism is not to correct +the evil, but is more likely to be treated as an indulgence +for sins that are yet to be committed.</p> + +<p>This fundamental identity is presumably the reason +for certain other similarities, which would perhaps not +be readily anticipated. Both doctrines undertake to +tell us what is going on behind the scenes, what consciousness +or experience "really" is. The descriptions +present an astonishing difference of vocabulary, but +if we take care not to be misled by superficial differences, +we find an equally astonishing agreement as to +content. From the one side consciousness is explained +as a juxtaposition of elements; from the other as an +interpenetration of elements so complete that the parts +can be neither isolated nor distinguished from the whole. +On the one hand we find a multiplicity without unity, +on the other a unity without multiplicity. In the one +account the temporal unit is a sensation devoid of +internal temporal diversity; in the other duration as +such is a unity in which past, present, and future blend +into an undifferentiated whole. The one position gathers +its facts by a mystifying process called introspection; +the other obtains its results from a mystical +faculty of intuition. The difference in language remains, +but both accounts lead us away into a twilight +region where words substitute themselves for facts.</p> + +<p>As was suggested a moment ago, the contrast between +ordinary experience and something else of which it is +the appearance is the result of the failure to give +proper recognition to the facts of behavior. If we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">280</a></span> +connect the forward reference of experience with the +operations of our nascent activities, we have no need +of a pure duration or of bridging the gulf between +reality and its appearances. In the same way, if we +construe sensations as just symbols of our responses, +we rid ourselves of problems that are insoluble because +they are unintelligible. Such problems constitute metaphysics +in the bad sense of the word, whether they show +themselves in the domain of science or of philosophy. +To describe experience by reference to such a real is +to explain what we know in terms of what we do not +know. The question what is real is absolutely sterile. +Our descriptions and explanations must remain on the +same plane as the experiences with which they deal, +and not seek after a real of a different order. If we +are to have an explanation of consciousness at all, the +explanation must not take us back to hypothetical sensations +that are almost but not quite experienced, nor +to a duration in which all distinctions are swallowed +up, but must be rendered in terms of other facts that +dwell in the light of common day.</p> + +<p>By way of conclusion I venture to urge once more +that a proper consideration of the facts of behavior +will furnish us with a key that will unlock many a door. +The conception of stimulus and response gives us a +differentia for experience and also enables us to distinguish +within experience between consciousness and +object. If, however, we disregard behavior, we are +bound to lose our way. The distinction between the +experienced and the unexperienced is either wiped out<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">281</a></span> +or else is permitted to convert itself into a distinction +between appearance and reality that leads nowhere and +explains nothing. The significance of truth as the +successful guidance of behavior, in accordance with +the program laid down in the organization of stimulus +and response, is lost to sight and recourse is had to +a fourth-dimensional truth or reality for the miracle +of breathing life into the dead bones of our philosophic +abstractions. The study of behavior constitutes a +mode of approach that holds out the hope of deliverance +from questions that should never have been asked. +We are on a different and, let us hope, a higher level +when we cease to ask how consciousness can lay hold +of passive objects, or how knowledge <i>überhaupt</i> is possible, +and concern ourselves rather with the wondrous +activity whereby this plastic dance of circumstance +that we call the universe transcends the domain of +mechanism and embodies itself in the values of conscious +life.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">282</a></span></p> + +<h2>THE PHASES OF THE ECONOMIC INTEREST</h2> + +<h4>HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART</h4> + +<p>§ 1. In the logic of Instrumentalism, truth has been +identified with usefulness and the good with the satisfactory. +Classifying critics have seen in this the damaging +mark of Utilitarianism, certain of them deeming +"Amerikanismus" an even shrewder and more specific +diagnosis. The association of these terms together +and the aptness of either to express what the critics +have in mind are matters of small interest. It is of +more importance to discover, behind the reproach implied, +the assumptions which may have made the reproach +seem pertinent. One cannot, of course, suppose +it to express a sheer general aversion to the useful or +an ascetic abhorrence of all satisfaction on principle. +Puritanism, æstheticism, and pedantry should be last +resorts in any search for an interpretative clue.</p> + +<p>The distrust of Utilitarianism need be ascribed to +none of these. It comes instead from a conception of +the true Utilitarian as a dull and dogmatic being with +no interests beyond the range of his own uninquiring +vision, no aspiration beyond the complacent survey +of his own perfections and no standards beyond the +inventory of his own <i>bourgeois</i> tastes and prejudices. +The type is indeed not yet extinct in our day: but is +it plausible to charge a "new" philosophy with conspiring +to perpetuate it? Is Instrumentalism only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">283</a></span> +philistinism called by a more descriptive name? It professes +at least to be a logic of hypothesis and experiment, +whereas for the perfect philistine there are no +ultimate problems and hence no logic but the logic of +self-evidence. When Instrumentalism speaks of needs +and interests in its analysis of truth and goodness does +it then mean the needs and interests that define the individual +in what is sometimes invidiously termed a +"biological" sense—interests that control him before +his conduct becomes in any way a problem for himself? +Quite as a matter of course, just this has been the assumption. +The satisfactoriness of prompt and cogent +classification has had a hand in the vindication of truth's +supremacy over satisfaction. In the view of instrumentalism +this ready interpretation of its meaning +is nothing less than the thinking of the unthinkable +and the bodying-forth of what is not. The +man who has solved a problem simply <i>is</i> not the man +he was before—if his problem was a genuine one and +it was he who solved it. He cannot measure and judge +the outcome by his earlier demands for the very good +reason that the outcome of real deliberation empties +these earlier demands of their interest and authority +for him.</p> + +<p>Can the conception thus suggested of personal +growth through exercise of creative or constructive intelligence +be in any measure verified by a general survey +of the economic side of life? Has it any important +bearings upon any parts of economic theory? These +are the questions to which this essay is addressed.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">284</a></span></p> + +<h5>I</h5> + +<p>§ 2. How have the real or fancied needs of the average +person of today come to be what they are? For +all sorts and conditions of men, the ways and means of +living have, during the past century or two—even during +the past decade or two—undergone revolutionary +changes. It is true that many of these changes have been +relatively superficial, touching only certain externalities +and entering in no important way into life's underlying +and dominant motives. Others, no doubt, may fairly +be held to confuse and disperse the energies of men, +instead of making for wholeness, sanity and development +of human interest and power. And critics of industrial +and social progress who have felt the need +for reservations of this sort fall easily into a certain +mood of historic homesickness for the supposed "simplicity" +of an earlier age. But our interest, in this +discussion, is in the genesis, the actual process of becoming, +of our present "standards of living," not their +value as rated by any critical (or uncritical) standard. +And accordingly we shall take it for a fact that on +the whole the average person of today is reasonably, +perhaps unreasonably, well satisfied with his telephone, +his typewriter, and his motor-car; with his swift and +easy journeyings over land and sea; with his increasingly +scientific medical attendance and public sanitation; +with his virtually free supplies of literature and +information, new and old, and with his electric light +or his midnight oil (triple distilled) to aid in the +perusal. More than this, he is so well satisfied with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">285</a></span> +all these modern inventions that, historical or æsthetical +or other "holidays" apart, he would never for a +moment dispense with any one of them as a matter of +free choice. Grossly material and humbly instrumental +though they are, these things and their like constitute +the framework sustaining the whole system of spiritual +functions that make up the life we live today, as a +society and as individuals. And our present problem +simply is the way in which they were first received by +those who were to use them, and passed into their present +common acceptance. To put the matter in general +terms, how is it that novel means of action or enjoyment, +despite their novelty, are able to command fair +scrutiny and hearing and can contrive to make their +way, often very speedily, into a position of importance +for industry and life?</p> + +<p>There is an easy and not unnatural way of thinking +of this process as we see it going on about us that may +keep us long unmindful of even the possibility of such +a question. In every field of action, we habitually +look back upon accomplished changes from some present +well-secured vantage-point, and as we trace the steps +by which they have come to pass it is almost inevitable +that we should first see the sequence as an approach, +direct or devious but always sure, to the stage on +which we happen to have taken our stand. It seems +clear to us that what we have attained is better than +aught that has gone before—if it were not distinctly +satisfactory on its own merits we should not +now be taking it as the standpoint for a survey. +But once it is so taken, our recognition of its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">286</a></span> +appreciable and satisfying superiority passes over insensibly +into metaphysics. What we now find good we +find ourselves perceiving to have been all the while predestined +in the eternal scheme of things! We pause in +retrospect like the wayfarer who has reached the turning +of a mountain road or the man of middle age who +for the first time feels that his professional position +is assured. This, we say, justifies the effort it has cost, +<i>this</i> at last is really living! And the next step in retrospective +reconstruction follows easily; this was my +true goal from the first, the dim and inexpressible hope +of which would not let me pause and kept me until now +dissatisfied. The end was present in the beginning, +provoking the first groping efforts and affording progressively +the test and measure by which their results +were found ever wanting.</p> + +<p>This retrospective logic may explain the presence +and perennial charm of those panoramic pages in our +encyclopædias purporting to show forth the gradual +perfecting of great instrumentalities upon which our +modern life depends. We survey the "evolution" of +printing, for example, from the wooden blocks of the +Chinese or of Laurens Coster down to the Hoe press, +the stereotype plate, and the linotype machine. Or we +see the forms of written record from pictured papyrus, +cuneiform brick, and manuscript scroll down to the +printed book and the typewritten page; the means of +carriage by land from the ox-cart of the patriarchs to +the stage-coach, the Cannonball Limited, the motor-truck, +and the twelve-cylinder touring-car. And as one +contemplates these cheerfully colored exhibits there is in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">287</a></span> +each case an almost irresistible suggestion of a constant +and compelling need of "universal man" seeking in +more and more marvellously ingenious ways an adequate +expression and satisfaction. This need seems +never to have lapsed or changed its nature. All along +both driving power and direction, it has been the +one fixed factor in a long process in which all else has +been fluctuating, contingent, and imperfect—all else except +the nature of the materials and the principles of +mechanics, which, too, are seen in the end to have been +mutely conspiring toward the result. Essential human +nature, it seems clear, does not and happily cannot +change. Spiritual progress, in this ultimate optimism, +means simply clearer vision, completer knowledge, and +a less petulant and self-assertive habit of insistence +upon the details of particular purposes as individual +"impulse" and "idiosyncrasy" define them. We fortunate +beings of today have available, in the various departments +of our life, certain instrumentalities, and to +these our interests attach. These interests of ours in +their proportional strength (so the argument runs) express +our native and generic constitution in so far as this +constitution has been able as yet to achieve outward +expression and embodiment. And accordingly, in interpreting +the long history of technological evolution, +we take what we conceive ourselves now to be as normative +and essential. We project back into the lives of +primitive man, of our own racial ancestors, or of our +grandfathers, the habits and requirements which we acknowledge +in ourselves today and we conceive the men +of the past to have been driven forward on the ways<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">288</a></span> +of progress by the identical discontent that would presumably +beset ourselves if we were to be suddenly carried +back to their scale and manner of existence.</p> + +<p>§ 3. Whatever else may be thought of it, there is +at least this to be said for the cult of historic homesickness +to which reference has just been made: it happens +to be at one with modern ethnology and history in +suggesting that earlier cultures were on the whole not +less content and self-satisfied in their condition than our +own. It is primitive man, not the modern, who is slow +to move and is satisfied, as a matter of course, with the +manner of life in which he fancies his people to have +lived from time immemorial. Change in early social +groups is tragic when it is not insensible. It comes +through conquest and enslavement by outsiders or +through stress of the dread of these, or by gradual +adaptation of custom to failing environmental resources +or to increasing wealth. Assent to change is in general +grudging or tacit at best and is commonly veiled by some +more or less transparent fiction.</p> + +<p>And our suspicion of fallacy lurking somewhere in +the type of retrospective Idealism we have been considering +is strengthened when we come to look a little +closely to details. To take a commonplace example—can +it be held that the difference between using a typewriter +and "writing by hand" is purely and simply +a matter of degree—that the machine serves the same +purpose and accomplishes the same <i>kind</i> of result as +the pen, but simply does the work more easily, rapidly, +and neatly? Undoubtedly some such impression may +easily be gathered from an external survey of the ways<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">289</a></span> +that men have used at different times for putting +their ideas on record. But it ignores important +aspects of the case. For one thing, the modern invention +effects a saving of the writer's time which can be +used in further investigation or in more careful revision +or in some way wholly unrelated to literary work, +and if the machine makes any part of the writer's +task less irksome, or the task as a whole less engrossing, +the whole matter of literary effort becomes less +forbidding and its place and influence as a social or +a personal function may for better or for worse be +altered. The difference brought to pass transcends +mere technical facility—it ramifies into a manifold of +differences affecting the entire qualitative character +and meaning of the literary function. And only by +an arbitrary sophistication of the facts can this complexity +of new outcome be thought of as implicit and +dynamic in the earlier stage.</p> + +<p>In the same way precisely, the motor-car, as every +one knows, has "vanquished distance" and has "revolutionized +suburban life." In England it is said to +have made acute the issue of plural voting. In America +it is hailed by the optimistic as the solution of the +vexed problem of urban concentration and the decline +of agriculture. Even as a means of recreation it is +said by the initiated to transform the whole meaning +of one's physical environment, exploiting new values +in sky and air and the green earth, which pass the +utmost possibilities of family "carry-all" or coach +and four. Or consider the ocean steamship and its +influence: today we travel freely over the world, for all<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">290</a></span> +manner of reasons, sufficient or otherwise. A hundred +years ago distant journeyings by sea or land were +arduous and full of peril, undertaken only by the most +adventurous or the most curious or for urgent need. +Now commodities of every sort can be transported to +virtually every quarter of the globe—rails and locomotives, +cement and structural steel, machinery of all +kinds from the motor and the dynamo to the printing +press and the cinematograph, in a word whatever is +necessary to recreate the waste places of the earth and +to make life in these regions humanly liveable. The +sheer scale and magnitude of such operations lifts them +above the level of the international trade of five hundred +or even a hundred years ago. And their far-reaching +results of every sort in the lives of nations and of individuals +the world over can in no intelligible sense be understood +as mere homogeneous multiples of what trade +meant before our age of steam, iron, and electricity. +Finally, we may think of modern developments in printing +as compared, for example, with the state of the +craft in the days when the New England Primer served +to induct juvenile America into the pleasant paths of +"art and literature." And it is clear that the mechanical +art that makes books and reading both widely +inviting and easily possible of enjoyment today is not +merely a more perfect substitute for the quill and ink-horn +of the mediæval scribe or even for the printing +press of Caxton or of Benjamin Franklin. The enormously +and variously heightened "efficiency" of the +mechanical instrumentalities nowadays available has for +good and for evil carried forward the whole function<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">291</a></span> +of printing and publication into relations and effects +which are qualitatively new and beyond the possible +conception of the earlier inventors and readers.</p> + +<p>§ 4. The real evolution in such cases of the coming +of a new commodity or a new instrument into +common and established use is an evolution of a +more radical, more distinctly epigenetic type than +the pictured stories of the encyclopædia-maker serve +to suggest. At each forward step the novelty makes +possible not merely satisfactions more adequate as +measured by existing requirements or more economical +in terms of cost, but new satisfactions also for which +no demand or desire before existed or could possibly +exist—satisfactions which, once become habitual, +make the contentment of former times in the lack of +them hard to understand or credit. And indeed the +story is perhaps never quite one-sided; the gain we +reckon is perhaps never absolutely unmixed. There +may be, perhaps must in principle be, not only gain +but loss. The books we read have lost something of +the charm of the illuminated manuscript; our compositors +and linotypers, it may be, have forgotten something +of the piety and devotion of the mediæval scribe +and copyist. So everywhere in industry the machine +depreciates and pushes out the skilled artisan and +craftsman, summoning into his place the hired operative +whose business is to feed and serve instead of to conceive +and execute. For cheapness and abundance, for +convenience of repair and replacement we everywhere +sacrifice something of artistic quality in the instrumentalities +of life and action and something of freedom<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">292</a></span> +and self-expression in the processes of manufacture. +Thus again, to change the venue, there are those who +miss in democratic government or in an ethical type +of religion the poignant and exalting spiritual quality +of devotion to a personal sovereign or a personal God. +Whatever one's judgment may be in particular cases, +there can be no reason for disputing that in epigenetic +or creative evolution there is, in a sense, loss as well as +gain. There is no more reason for supposing that all +that was wholesome or ennobling or beautiful in an +earlier function <i>must</i> somehow have its specific compensation +in kind infallibly present in the new than for +supposing that all that is desirable in the new must +surely have been present discernibly or indiscernibly in +the old.</p> + +<p>If we are on the whole satisfied with the new on its +intrinsic merits as a present complex fact, we have +therein sufficient ground for saying that it marks +a stage in progress. This, in fact, is what such a +proposition means. And the old then appears more +or less widely discontinuous with the new—not merely +that it shows, in units of measure, less of the acceptable +quality or qualities which the <i>new</i> fact or +situation is found to possess, but that it belongs for us +to a qualitatively different level and order of existence. +How, we wonder, could our ancestors have found life +tolerable in their undrained and imperfectly heated +dwellings, without the telephone, the morning's news of +the world by cable, and the phonograph? How, again, +could feudal homage and fealty have ever been the +foundation of social order in countries where today<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">293</a></span> +every elector is wont to think and to act in his +public relations no longer as a subject but as a citizen. +And how, in still a different sphere, could the father +or the mother of a happy family of children ever have +found the freedom and irresponsibility of bachelorhood +endurable? Shall we say that in changes like +these we have to do simply with the quantitative increase +of some quality, present in small measure in +the earlier stages and in larger measure in the +later? Or shall we evade the issue with the general +admission that <i>of course</i>, as every schoolboy knows, +there are in this world many differences of degree that +somehow "amount to differences of kind"? As a matter +of fact what has happened in every case like these +is an actual change of standard, a new construction in +the growing system of one's norms of value and behavior. +Provisionally, though hopefully, a step has +been taken—a real event in personal and in social history +has been given place and date. From some source +beyond the scope and nature of the earlier function a +suggestion or an impulsion has come by which the +agent has endeavored to move forward. The change +wrought is a transcendence of the earlier level of +experience and valuation, not a widening and clarification +of vision on that level. And the standards +which govern on the new level serve not so much to +condemn the old as to seal its consignment to disuse +and oblivion. Least of all can a judgment or appraisal +of the old from the standpoint of the new be taken +for a transcript of the motives which led to the +transition.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">294</a></span>We must confine ourselves more closely, however, +to the sphere of material goods and their uses. And +in this sphere objection to the view proposed will run +in some such terms as the following: Take our ancestors, +for example, and their household arrangements +to which invidious reference has been made: why should +we suppose that their seeming contentment was anything +more (or less) than a dignified composure in which +we might well imitate them—an attitude in no way +precluding a definite sense of specific discomforts and +embarrassments and a distinct determination to be rid +of them as soon as might be? And, in fact, if they were +satisfied with what they had why did they receive the +new when it was offered? If, on the other hand, they +were not satisfied, how is the fact intelligible except +upon the assumption that they had distinct and definite +wants not yet supplied, and were wishing (but patiently) +for conveniences and comforts of a sort not +yet existent. And this latter hypothesis, it will be +urged, is precisely what the foregoing argument has +sought to discredit as an account of the moving +springs in the evolution of consumption.</p> + +<p>§ 5. Any adequate discussion of the central issue +thus presented would fall into two parts. In the first +place, before a consumption good can come into general +acceptance and currency it must have been in some way +discovered, suggested or invented, and the psychology +of invention is undoubtedly a matter of very great +complexity and difficulty. But for the purposes of the +present inquiry all this may be passed over. The other +branch of a full discussion of our problem has to do<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">295</a></span> +with the reception of the newly invented commodity +or process into wider and wider use—and this again is +a social phenomenon not less complex than the other. +It is this phenomenon of increasing extension and vogue, +of widening propagation from person to person, that +is directly of present concern for us—and in particular +the individual person's attitude toward the new thing +and the nature of the interest he takes in it.</p> + +<p>It has recently been argued by a learned and acute +investigator of economic origins that "invention is the +mother of necessity," and not the child.<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> Such a complete +reversal of all our ordinary thought about the +matter seems at first sheer paradox. What, one may +ask, can ever suggest an invention and what can give +it welcome and currency but an existing need—which, +if it happens to be for the time being latent and unconscious, +needs only the presentation of its appropriate +means of satisfaction to "arouse" and "awaken" it +fully into action? But this paradox as to invention +is at all events not more paradoxical than the view as +to the reception of new commodities and the rise of +new desires that has been above suggested. What it +appears to imply is in principle identical with what +has seemed, from our consideration of the other aspect +of the general situation, to be the simple empirical fact; +neither the existence of the new commodity nor our +interest in it when it is presented admits of explanation +as an effect on each particular occasion of a preëxisting +unsatisfied desire for it. What both sides of the +problem bring to view is a certain original bent or +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">296</a></span> +constitutive character of human nature—a predisposition, +an <i>élan vital</i> perhaps, which we must recognize +as nothing less than perfectly general and comprehensive—finding +expression in inventive effort and likewise +in the readiness with which the individual meets a new +commodity halfway and gives it opportunity to become +for him, if it can, a new necessity and the source of +a new type of satisfaction.</p> + +<p>From the point of view of "logic," as William +James might have said, such a version of psychological +fact may seem essentially self-contradictory. Unless, +it may be argued, a novelty when presented excites +some manner of desire for itself in the beholder, the +beholder will make no effort towards it and thus +take no step away from his existing system of life +to a new system in which a new desire and a new +commodity shall have a place. So much would seem +clear enough but the question immediately follows: +How can a thing that is new arouse desire? In so +far as it is new it must <i>ex vi termini</i> be unknown +and wanting definition in terms of remembered past +experiences; and how can a thing unknown make that +connection with the present character of the individual +which must be deemed necessary to the arousal of desire +in him? A new thing would seem, then, from this +point of view, to be able to arouse desire only in so +far as it is able to conceal or subordinate its aspects +of novelty and appear as known and well-accredited—either +this or there must be in the individual some +definite instinctive mechanism ready to be set in action +by the thing's presentment. And on neither of these<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">297</a></span> +suppositions can having to do with the new thing effect +any fundamental or radical difference in the individual—it +can serve at most only to "bring out" what was +already "there" in him in a "latent" or "implicit" +status. Whatever new developments of power or desire +may be attained and organized into the individual's +character through his commerce with the novelty must +be new in only a superficial sense—they will be new only +as occurrences, only as the striking of the hour by +the clock and the resulting abrasion of the bell and +hammer are new events. But the clock was made to +strike; it is the nature of metal to wear away and +likewise these changes in the individual are in deeper +truth not new at all but only a disclosure of the agent's +character, a further fulfilment along preëstablished +and unalterable lines which all along was making headway +in the agent's earlier quests and efforts and +attainments.</p> + +<p>There is a sense, no doubt, in which some such version +of the facts as this is unanswerable, but controversial +advantage is paid for, here as elsewhere in the +logic of absolute idealism, at the cost of tangible meaning +and practical importance. Just what does the contention +come to? Let us say, for example, that one +has learned to use a typewriter. What has happened +is like an illiterate person's learning to read and write. +Correspondence with one's friends begins to take on +new meaning and to acquire new value; one begins to +find a new pleasure and stimulation taking the place +of the ineffectual drivings of an uneasy conscience. All +this, let us say, has come from the moderate outlay for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">298</a></span> +a superior mechanical instrument. And now let it be +granted that it would not have come if the fortunate +individual had not been "what he was." If it has come +it is because the individual and the rest of the world +were "of such a sort" that the revival and new growth +of interest <i>could</i> take its rise with the provision of the +new instrumentality. But what, precisely, does such a +statement mean? What sort of verification does it admit +of? What fruitful insight into the concrete facts +of the case does it convey? Of <i>what</i> sort, prior to the +event, does it show the individual to have been?</p> + +<p>The truth is, of course, that he was of <i>no</i> sort, then +and there and with reference to the purchase—he was +of no sort decisively. He was neither purchaser nor +rejector. He was neither a convinced "typist" nor +piously confirmed in his predilection for writing "by +hand." He was neither wholly weary of his correspondence +nor fully cognizant of the importance of +intercourse with his friends for his soul's good. He +may have been dissatisfied and rebellious or he may +have been comfortably persuaded that letter-writing, +though an irksome labor, was even at that sufficiently +worth while. The most that can be said is simply that +he must have been willing and desirous to try the experiment +for the sake of any good, imaginable or beyond +present imagination, that might come of it. But being +of "such a sort" as this could not prejudge the issue—although, +undoubtedly, in willingness to raise an issue +there lies always the possibility of change. All the +plausibility of the dogma we are here considering comes +from its hasty inclusion of this general attitude of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">299</a></span> +constructively experimental inquiry and effort, this +essential character of creative intelligence, as <i>one among</i> +the concrete interests which constitute and define our +particular problems in their inception. To say <i>ex post +facto</i> that the individual must have been "of such a +sort" as to do what he has in fact done is a purely +verbal comment which, whatever may be its uses, can +assuredly be of no use whatever in suggesting either +solution or method for the next situation to arise. It +may be comfortably reassuring afterwards, but it is an +empty oracle beforehand.</p> + +<p>§ 6. If then "logic" is unable to express the nature +of our forward looking interest in the unexperienced +and unpredictable, perhaps the empirical fact will speak +for itself. We call things new; we recognize their +novelty and their novelty excites our interest. But just +as we are sometimes told that we can only <i>know</i> the +new in terms of its resemblances to what we have known +before, so it may be held that in the end we can <i>desire</i> +it only on the like condition. Are we, then, to conclude +that the seeming novelty of things new is an +illusion, or shall we hold, on the contrary, that novelty +need not be explained away and that a spontaneous +constructive interest stands more or less constantly +ready in us to go out to meet it and possess it?</p> + +<p>Unquestionably, let us say the latter. Any new +commodity will, of course, resemble in part or in a +general way some old one. It is said that bath-tubs +are sometimes used in "model tenements" as coal-bins. +Old uses persist unchanged in the presence of new possibilities. +But in general new possibilities invite interest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">300</a></span> +and effort because our experimental and constructive +bent contrives on the whole to make head against habituation +and routine. We recognize the new as new. +And if it be contended that novelty in its own right +cannot be a ground of interest, that novelty must first +get restatement as the old with certain "accidents" +externally adhering, the answer is that the "accidents" +interest us nevertheless. They may prove their right +to stand as the very essence of some new "kind" that +one may wish to let take form and character for him. +Instead of the chips and shavings, they are in fact the +raw material of the logical process. For if we can +know the new <i>as new</i>, if we can know the "accident" +<i>as accidental</i> in a commodity before us, the fact betrays +an incipient interest in the quality or aspect that its +novelty or contingency at least does not thwart. And +is this quite all? Will it be disputed that a <i>relation</i> +of a quality or feature to ourselves which we can know, +name, and recognize—like "novelty"—must be known, +as anything else is known, through an interest of which +it is the appropriate terminus?<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">301</a></span>And +there is no difficulty in pointing to instances +in which the character of novelty seems fundamental. +Consider, for example, the interest one feels in spending +a day with a friend or in making a new acquaintance +or, say, in entering on the cares of parenthood. +Or again, take the impulse toward research, artistic +creation, or artistic study and appreciation. Or again, +take the interest in topography and exploration. That +there is in such phenomena as these a certain essentially +and irreducibly forward look, a certain residual freedom +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">302</a></span> +of our interest and effort from dependence on the +detail of prior experience down to date, probably few +persons without ulterior philosophical prepossessions +will dispute. If we call these phenomena instinctive +we are using the term in a far more loose and general +sense than it seems to have in the best usage of animal +psychology. If we call them attitudes or dispositions, +such a term has at least the negative merit of setting +them apart from the class of instinctive acts, but it may +carry with it a connotation of fixity and unconsciousness +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">303</a></span> +that after all surrenders the essential distinction. +It will suffice to look at a single one of these instances.</p> + +<p>In friendship, for example, there is undoubtedly +strongly operative a desire for the mere recurrence, in +our further friendly intercourse, of certain values that +have become habitual and familiar. We may have long +known and become attached to a friend's tones of voice, +peculiarities of manner and external appearance, turns +of speech and thought and the like, which we miss in +absence and which give us pleasure when we meet the +friend again. But if the friendship is not one of "pleasure" +or "utility" simply, but of "virtue"<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> as well, +there is also present on both sides a constructive or progressive +or creative interest. And this interest, stated +on its self-regarding and introspective side, is more +than a desire for the mere grateful recurrence of the old +looks and words "recoined at the old mint." It is an +interest looking into the "undone vast," an interest +in an indefinite prolongation, an infinite series, of joint +experiences the end of which cannot and need not be +foreseen and the nature of which neither can nor need +be forecasted. And there is the same characteristic +in all the other instances mentioned in this connection. +It is not a desire for recurrent satisfactions of a determinate +type, but an interest in the active development +of unexperienced and indeterminate possibilities. +If finally the question be pressed, how there can be an +interest of this seemingly self-contradictory type in +human nature, the answer can only be that we must take +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">304</a></span> +the facts as we find them. Is such a conception +inherently more difficult than the view that all ramifications +and developments of human interest are concretely +predetermined and implicit <i>a priori</i>? To ignore +or deny palpable fact because it eludes the reach +of a current type of conceptual analysis is to part +company with both science and philosophy. We are +in fact here dealing with the essential mark and trait +of what is called self-conscious process. If there are +ultimates and indefinables in this world of ours, self-consciousness +may as fairly claim the dignity or avow +the discredit as any other of the list.</p> + +<p>§ 7. Does our interest in economic goods on occasion +exhibit the trait of which we are here speaking? +Precisely this is our present contention. And yet it +seems not too much to say that virtually all economic +theory, whether the classical or the present dominant +type that has drawn its terminology and working concepts +from the ostensible psychology of the Austrian +School, is founded upon the contradictory assumption. +The economic interest, our desire and esteem for solid +and matter-of-fact things like market commodities and +standardized market services, has been conceived as +nothing visionary and speculative, as no peering into +the infinite or outreaching of an inexpressible discontent, +but an intelligent, clear-eyed grasping and holding +of known satisfactions for measured and acknowledged +desires. Art and religion, friendship and love, sport +and adventure, morality and legislation, these all may +be fields for the free play and constructive experimentation +of human faculty, but in our economic efforts<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">305</a></span> +and relations we are supposed to tread the solid +ground of fact. Business is business. Waste not, +want not. First a living, then (perhaps) a "good +life."<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> And we are assured one need not recoil from +the hard logic of such maxims, for they do not dispute +the existence of spacious (and well-shaded) suburban +regions fringing the busy areas of industry and commerce.</p> + +<p>Such is the assumption. We have said that it precludes +the admission of speculation as an economic +factor. Speculation for economic theory is a purely +commercial phenomenon, a hazarding of capital on the +supposition that desires will be found ready and waiting +for the commodity produced—with a sufficient offering +of purchasing power to afford a profit. And the +"creation of demand," where this is part of the program +of speculative enterprise, means the arousal +of a "dormant" or implicit desire, in the sense above +discussed—there is nothing, at all events, in other parts +of current theory to indicate a different conception. +The economist will probably contend that what the +process of the creation of demand may <i>be</i> is not his +but the psychologist's affair; that his professional concern +is only whether or not the economic demand, as an +objective market fact, be actually forthcoming. But +what we here contend for as a fact of economic experience +is a speculation that is in the nature of personal +adventure and not simply an "adventuring of stock."</p> + +<p>§ 8. For what is the nature of the economic "experience" +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">306</a></span> +or situation, considered as a certain type of +juncture in the life of an individual? It may be shortly +described as the process of determining how much of +one's time, strength, or external resources of any sort +shall be expended for whatever one is thinking of doing +or acquiring. Two general motives enter here to govern +the estimate and each may show the routine or the +innovative phase. In any work there is possible, first, +more or less of the workman's interest—an interest not +merely in a conventional standard of excellence in the +finished result but also in betterment of the standard +and in a corresponding heightened excellence of +technique and spirit in the execution.<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> These interests, +without reference to the useful result and "for +their own sake" (i.e., for the workman's sake, in ways +not specifiable in advance), may command a share of +one's available time, strength, and resources. In the +second place, any work or effort or offer to give +in exchange has a nameable result of some kind in +view—a crop of wheat, a coat, a musical rendition, +or the education of a child. Why are such things +"produced" or sought for? Verbally and platitudinously +one may answer: For the sake of the "satisfactions" +they are expected to afford. But such an +answer ignores the contrast of attitudes that both workmanship +and productive or acquisitive effort in the ordinary +sense display. As the workman may conform +to his standard or may be ambitious to surpass it, so +the intending consumer may be counting on known +satisfactions or hoping for satisfactions of a kind that +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">307</a></span> +he has never known before. Both sorts of effort +may be of either the routine or the innovative type. +In neither workmanship nor acquisition can one fix upon +routine as the "normal" type, hoping to derive or to +explain away the inevitable residue of "outstanding +cases." For as a matter of fact the outstanding cases +prove to be our only clue to a knowledge of how +routine is made.<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a></p> + +<p>The above formula will apply, with the appropriate +changes of emphasis, to buyers and sellers in an organized +market, as well as to the parties to a simple transaction +of barter. Two main empirical characteristics +of the economic situation are suggested in putting +the statement in just these terms. In the first place, +the primary problem in such a situation is that of +"exchange valuation," the fixation of a "subjective" +(or better, a "personal") price ratio between what +the agent wishes to acquire and whatever it is that +he offers in exchange. The agent thus is engaged +in determining what shall be the relative importance +for himself of <i>two</i> commodities or exchangeable goods. +And in the second place these goods get their values +determined together and in relation to each other, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">308</a></span> +never singly and with a view to <i>subsequent</i> comparison. +These values when they have been determined +will be measured in terms of marginal utility in accordance +with familiar principles, but the marginal utilities +that are to express the attained and accepted ratio at +which exchange eventually takes place are not known +quantities at all in the inception of the process of comparison. +If these dogmatic statements seem to issue in +hopeless paradox or worse, then let us not fear to face +the paradox and fix its lines with all possible distinctness. +Can a man decide to offer so much of one commodity +for so much of another unless he <i>first</i> has settled +what each is worth to him in some intelligible terms +or other? And is not this latter in point of fact the real +decision—at all events clearly more than half the battle? +Does not the exchange ratio to which one can agree +"leap to the eyes," in fact, as soon as the absolute +values in the case have been once isolated and given +numerical expression?</p> + +<p>In a single word we here join issue. For the comparison +in such a case is <i>constructive comparison</i>, not +a mechanical measuring of fixed magnitudes, as the above +objection tacitly assumes. And constructive comparison +is essentially a transitive or inductive operation +whereby the agent moves from one level to another, +altering his standard of living in some more or less +important way, embarking upon a new interest, entering +upon the formation of a new habit or upon a new accession +of power or effectiveness—making or seeking to +make, in short, some transformation in his environment +and in himself that shall give his life as an entire system<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">309</a></span> +a changed tenor and perspective. The term "constructive +comparison" is thus intended, among other +things, to suggest that the process is in the nature of +adventure, not calculation, and, on the other hand, +that though adventurous it is not sheer hazard +uncontrolled. And the motive dominant throughout +the process—the economic motive in its constructive +phase—is neither more nor less than a supposition, +on the agent's part, that there may be +forthcoming for him in the given case in hand just +such an "epigenetic" development of new significance +and value as we have found actual history to disclose +as a normal result of economic innovation. It is the +gist of hedonism, in economic theory as in its other +expressions, that inevitably the agent's interests and +motives are restricted in every case to the precise range +and scope of his existing tendencies and desires; he +can be provoked to act only by the hope of just those +particular future pleasures or means of pleasure which +the present constitution of his nature enables him to +enjoy. Idealism assumes that the emergent new interest +of the present was wrapped up or "implied," in some +sense, in the interests of the remote and immediate past—interests +of which the agent at the time could of +course be but "imperfectly" aware. Such differences +as one can discern between the two interpretations seem +small indeed—like many others to which idealism has +been wont to point in disparagement of the hedonistic +world view. For in both philosophies the agent is without +initiative and effect; he is in principle but the convergence +of impersonal motive powers which it is, in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">310</a></span> +the one view, absurdly futile, in the other misguidedly +presumptuous, to try to alter or control.</p> + +<p>§ 9. A commodity sought or encountered may then +be of interest to us for reasons of the following three +general sorts. In the first place it may simply be the normal +and appropriate object of some established desire +of ours. We may be seeking the commodity because +this desire has first become active, or encountering +the commodity in the market may have suddenly +awakened the desire. Illustration seems superfluous; +tobacco for the habitual smoker, clothing of most +sorts for the ordinary person, regular supplies of the +household staples—these will suffice. This is the province +within which a hedonistic account of the economic +motive holds good with a cogency that anti-hedonistic +criticism has not been able to dissolve. Our outlays for +such things as these may as a rule be held in their due +and proper relation to each other—at all events in their +established or "normal" relation—simply by recalling +at critical times our relative marginal likes and dislikes +for them. That these likes and dislikes are not self-explanatory, +that they are concrete expectations and +not abstract affective elements, does not seem greatly +to matter where the issue lies between maintaining or +renouncing an existing schedule of consumption. And +in this same classification belong also industrial and +commercial expenditures of a similarly routine sort. +Even where the scale of operations is being enlarged, +expenditures for machines, fuel, raw materials, and +labor may have been so carefully planned in advance +with reference to the desired increase of output or pecuniary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">311</a></span> +profit that no special problem of motivation attaches +directly to them. And these outlays are so important +in industry and commerce that the impression +comes easily to prevail that all business undertaking, +and then all consumption of finished goods, fall under +the simple hedonistic type.</p> + +<p>But if we keep to the plane of final consumption, +there appears a second sort of situation. Our interest +in the commodity before us may be due to a suggestion +of some sort that prompts us to take a step beyond +the limits that our present formed desires mark out. +The suggestion may be given by adroit advertising, +by fashion, by the habits of another class to which one +may aspire or by a person to whom one may look as +guide, philosopher, and friend. An authority of one +sort or another invites or constrains us to take the +merits of the article on trust. Actual trial and use +may show, not so much that it can minister to a latent +desire as that we have been able through its use to form +a habit that constitutes a settled need.</p> + +<p>And, finally, in the third place, there is a more spontaneous +and intrinsically personal type of interest which +is very largely independent of suggestion or authority. +A thing of beauty, a new author, a new acquaintance, +a new sport or game, a new convenience or mechanical +device may challenge one's curiosity and powers of +appreciation, may seem to offer a new facility in action +or some unimagined release from labor or restriction. +The adventure of marriage and parenthood, the intimate +attraction of great music, the mystery of an unknown +language or a forbidden country, the disdainful<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">312</a></span> +aloofness of a mountain peak dominating a landscape +are conspicuous instances inviting a more spontaneous +type of constructive interest that finds abundant expression +also in the more commonplace situations and +emergencies of everyday life. It is sheer play upon +words to speak in such cases of a pleasure of adventurousness, +a pleasure of discovery, a pleasure of conquest +and mastery, assigning this as the motive in order to +bring these interests to the type that fits addiction to +one's particular old coat or easy-chair. The specific +"pleasure" alleged could not exist were the tendency +not active beforehand. While the same is true in a +sense for habitual concrete pleasures in relation to their +corresponding habits, the irreducible difference in constructive +interest as a type lies in the <i>transition</i> which +this type of interest purposes and effects from one +level of concrete or substantive desire and pleasure to +another. Here one consciously looks to a result that +he cannot foresee or foretell; in the other type his interest +as interest goes straight to its mark, sustained +by a confident forecast.<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">313</a></span>§ 10. +But constructive interests, whether provoked +by suggestion or of the more freely imaginative type, +may, as has been said, be held to lie outside the scope of +economic theory. How a desire for a certain thing has +come to get expression may seem quite immaterial—economically +speaking. Economics has no concern with human +folly as such or human imitativeness, or human +aspiration high or low or any other of the multitude of +motives that have to do with secular changes in the +"standard of living" and in the ideals of life at large. +It has no concern with anything that lies behind the fact +that I am in the market with my mind made up to buy or +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">314</a></span>sell a thing at a certain price. And the answer to this +contention must be that it first reverses and then distorts +the true perspective of our economic experience. +Let it be admitted freely—indeed, let it be insisted on—that +the definition of a science must be determined by +the pragmatic test. If an economist elects to concern +himself with the problems of what has been called the +"loose mechanics of trade" there can be no question +of his right to do so or of the importance of the services +he may render thereby, both to theory and to practice. +But on the other hand economic theory cannot be therefore, +once and for all, made a matter of accounting—to +the effacement of all problems and aspects of problems +of which the accountant has no professional +cognizance. Just this, apparently, is what it means to +level down all types of interest to the hedonistic, leaving +aside as "extra-economic" those that too palpably +resist the operation. It is acknowledged that freshly +suggested modes of consumption and ends of effort require +expenditure and sacrifice no less than the habitual, +that the exploration of Tibet or of the Polar Seas +affects the market for supplies not less certainly than +the scheduled voyages of oceanic liners. Moreover, +behind these scheduled voyages there are all the varied +motives that induce people to travel and the desires +that lead to the shipment of goods. Shall it be said +that all of these motives and desires must be traceable +back to settled habits of behavior and consumption? +And if this cannot be maintained is it not hazardous to +assume that such general problems of economic theory +as the determination of market values or of the shares<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">315</a></span> +in distribution require no recognition of the other empirical +types of interest? These types, if they are +genuine, are surely important; they may well prove +to be, in many ways, fundamentally important. For a +commodity that has become habitual must once have +been new and untried.</p> + +<p>§ 11. The economic demands which make up the +budget of a particular person at a particular time are +clearly interdependent. A man's income or the greater +part of it is usually distributed among various channels +of expenditure in a certain fairly constant way. +In proportion to the definiteness of this distribution +and the resoluteness with which it is maintained does +the impression gain strength that the man is carrying +out a consistent plan of some sort. Such a regular +plan of expenditure may be drawn out into a schedule, +setting forth the amounts required at a certain price +for the unit of each kind. And such a schedule is an +expression in detail, in terms of ways and means, of +the type of life one has elected to lead. For virtually +any income above the level of bare physical subsistence, +there will be an indefinite number of alternative budgets +possible. A little less may be spent for household +conveniences and adornments and a little more for food. +Some recreations may be sacrificed for an occasional +book or magazine. One may build a house or purchase +a motor-car instead of going abroad. And whichever +choice is made, related expenditures must be made in +consequence for which, on the assumption of a definite +amount of income, compensation must be made by curtailment +of outlay at other points. What seems clear<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">316</a></span> +in general is that one's total budget is relative to +the general plan and manner of life one deems for +him the best possible and that this plan, more or less +definitely formulated, more or less steadily operative, +is what really determines how far expenditure shall go +in this direction and in that. The budget as a whole +will define for the individual an equilibrium among his +various recognized wants; if the work of calculating it +has been carefully done there will be for the time being +no tendency to change in any item.</p> + +<p>If, then, we choose to say in such a case that the individual +carries his expenditure along each line to the +precise point at which the last or marginal utility enjoyed +is precisely equal to the marginal utility on every +other line, it seems not difficult to grasp what such a +statement means. Quite harmlessly, all that it can mean +is that the individual has planned precisely what he has +planned and is not sorry for it, and for the time being +does not think he can improve upon it. As there is one +earth drawing toward its center each billiard ball of the +dozen in equilibrium in a bowl, so there is behind the +budget of the individual one complex personal conception +of a way of life that fixes more or less certainly +and clearly the kinds and intensities of his wants +and assigns to each its share of purchasing power. +That the units or elements in equilibrium hold their +positions with reference to each other for reasons capable +of separate statement for each unit seems a supposition +no less impossible in the one case than in the other. To +think of each kind of want in the individual's nature +as holding separately in fee simple and clamoring for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">317</a></span> +full and separate "satisfaction" in its separate kind, +is the characteristic illusion of a purely formal type +of analysis. The permanence of a budget and its carrying +out no doubt require the due and precise realization +of each plotted marginal utility—to go further than +this along any one line would inevitably mean getting +not so far along certain others, and thus a distorted +and disappointing total attainment in the end. But +to say that one actually plans and controls his expenditures +along various lines by the ultimate aim of attaining +equivalent terminal utilities on each is quite another +story. It is much like saying that the square inches of +canvas assigned in a picture to sky and sea and crannied +wall are arranged upon the principle of identical and +equal effects for artist or beholder from the last inches +painted of each kind. The formula of the equality of +marginal effects is no constructive principle; it is only a +concise if indeed somewhat grotesque way of phrasing +the essential fact that no change of the qualitative whole +is going to be made, because no imperfection in it as a +whole is felt.<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">318</a></span>§ 12. +We come, then, to the problem of the individual's +encounter with a new commodity. In general, a +purchase in such a case must amount to more or less of +a departure from the scheme of life in force and a +transition over to a different one. And a new commodity +(in the sense in which the term has been used +above) is apt to be initially more tempting than an +addition along some line of expenditure already represented +in the budget. The latter, supposing there +has been no change of price and no increase of income, +is usually a mere irregularity, an insurgent departure +from some one specification of a total plan without preliminary +compensating adjustment or appropriate +change at other points. The erratic outlay, if considerable,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">319</a></span> +will result in sheer disorder and extravagance—indefensible +and self-condemned on the principles of +the individual's own economy. But with a new commodity +the case stands differently. It is more interesting +to consider a really new proposal than to reopen +a case once closed when no evidence distinctly new is +offered. A sheer "temptation" or an isolated impulse +toward new outlay along a line already measured in +one's scheme has the force of habit and a presumption of +un-wisdom to overcome. If the case is one not of temptation +but of "being urged" one is apt to answer, "No, +I can make no use of any more of <i>that</i>." But a new commodity +has the charm of its novelty, a charm consisting +in the promise, in positive fashion, of new qualitative +values about which a new entire schedule will have to be +organized. Partly its strength of appeal lies in its +radicalism; it gains ready attention not only by its +promise but by its boldness. "Preparedness" gains a +more ready acclaim than better schools or the extirpation +of disease. The automobile and the "moving picture" +probably have a vogue today far surpassing any +use of earlier "equivalents" that a mere general augmentation +of incomes could have brought about. Indeed, +the economic danger of the middle classes in +present-day society lies not in mere occasional excess at +certain points but in heedless commitment to a showy +and thinned-out scheme of life in which the elements +are ill-chosen and ill-proportioned and from which, as a +whole, abiding satisfaction cannot be drawn. It is where +real and thoroughgoing change in the manner of life is +hopeless that irregular intemperance of various sorts<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">320</a></span> +appears to bulk relatively largest as an economic +evil.</p> + +<p>Shall we not say, however, that the superior attraction +of the new in competition with established lines +of expenditure only indicates the greater "satiation" +of the wants the latter represent and the comparative +freshness of the wants the novelty will satisfy? On the +contrary the latter wants are in the full sense not yet +existent, the new satisfactions are untried and unmeasured; +the older wants have the advantage of position, +and if satiated today, will reassert themselves +with a predictable strength tomorrow. The new wants, +it is true, if they are acquired, will be part of a new +system, but the present fact remains that their full +meaning cannot be known in advance of trial and the +further outlines of the new scheme of uses and values +cannot be drawn up until this meaning has been learned. +If, then, the new commodity is taken, it is not because +the promised satisfaction and the sum of known utilities +to be sacrificed are found equal, nor again because the +new commodity will fit neatly into a place in the existing +schedule that can be vacated for it. This latter is the +case of substitution. Such an interpretation of the +facts is retrospective only; it is a formal declaration that +the exchange has been deemed on the whole worth while, +but the reasons for this outcome such a formula is powerless +to suggest.</p> + +<p>In general the new commodity and the habits it +engenders could not remain without effect upon a system +into which they might be mechanically introduced. +Certain items in the schedule, associated in use with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">321</a></span> +those dispensed with for the new, must be rendered obsolete +by the change. The new interests called into +play will draw to themselves and to their further development +attention which may be in large measure +diverted from the interests of older standing. And in +the new system all interests remaining over from the +old will accordingly stand in a new light and their +objects will be valued, will be held important, for reasons +that will need fresh statement.<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a></p> + +<p>In similar fashion it might be argued that the commodities +or uses which one sacrifices for the sake of a +new venture are inevitably more than a simple deduction +that curtails one's schedule in a certain kind and amount. +Such a deduction or excision must leave the remaining +lines of the original complex hanging at loose ends. The +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">322</a></span> +catching-up of these and their coördination with the +new interest must in any event amount, as has been contended, +to a thoroughgoing reorganization. What must +really happen then, in the event of action, is in principle +nothing less than the disappearance of the whole from +which the sacrificed uses are dissevered. These latter, +therefore, stand in the process of decision as a symbol +for the existing personal economy as a whole. The old +order and the new confront each other as an accepted +view of fact and a plausible hypothesis everywhere confront +each other and the issue for the individual is the +practical issue of making the transition to a new working +level. To declare that the salient elements of the +confronting complexes are quantitatively equivalent is +only to announce in symbolic terms that the transition +has been effected, the die cast.<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">323</a></span>§ 13. +The statement thus given has been purposely +made, for many transactions of the sort referred to, +something of an over-statement. If I contemplate purchasing +a typewriter or a book on an unfamiliar but +inviting subject it may well seem somewhat extravagant +to describe the situation as an opposition between two +schemes of life. Is the issue so momentous; is the act +so revolutionary? But the purpose of our over-statement +was simply to make clear the type of situation +without regard to the magnitudes involved. No novelty +that carries one in any respect beyond the range of +existing habits can be wholly without its collateral +effects nor can its proximate and proper significance +be measured in advance. This is in principle as true +of a relatively slight innovation as of a considerable +one. And our present conscious exaggeration departs +less widely from the truth than the alternative usual +preoccupation of economic theory with the logic of +routine desire and demand. For the phenomena of routine +and habit are thereby made a standard by which +all others, if indeed recognized as real at all, must be +judged "exceptional." And, as we shall see, to do this +introduces difficulty into certain parts of substantive +economic theory.</p> + +<p>Again, objection may attach to the view that equivalence +of the "salient members" of the opposing systems +is only another name for the comprehensive fact +of the novelty's acceptance. For if we hesitate in such +a case, is this not because we judge the price too high? +What can this signify but that the service or satisfaction +we expect from the novelty falls short of sufficing +to convince us? And unless we are dealing with measured +quantities, how can we come to this conclusion? +Moreover, if the novel commodity is divided into units +we may take a smaller quantity when the price demanded +is "high" than if the price were lower. And +does this not suggest predetermined value-magnitudes +as data? But if one takes thus a smaller amount, as +the argument contends, it is because there is a presumption +of being able to make some important total +use of it and there is no general reason apparent for +supposing that this will be merely a fractional part +of a larger but like significance that might be hoped +for from a larger quantity. And on the other hand, +the prospect simply may not tempt at all; the smaller +quantity may be deemed an improbable support for a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">325</a></span> +really promising total program and the present program +will hold its ground, not seriously shaken. The +total demand of a market for a given commodity is +no doubt in some sort a mathematical function of the +price. The lower the price the greater in some ratio +will be the number of persons who will buy and in +general the greater the number of units taken by those +who are already buyers. But that such a proposition +admits of statistical proof from the observation of a +series of price changes in a market affords no presumption +concerning the nature of the reasons that move +any individual person to his action. The theoretical +temptation is strong, here as elsewhere, in passing from +the study of markets to the personal economy of the +individual forthwith to find this also a trafficking in unit-quantities +and marginal satisfactions to which the concepts +and notation of market analysis will readily apply.</p> + +<p>It remains to consider certain implications of this +view of economic desire and demand.</p> + +<h5>II</h5> + +<p>§ 14. It is evident that the issue finally at stake in +any economic problem of constructive comparison, is an +ethical issue. Two immediate alternatives are before +one—to expend a sum of money in some new and interesting +way, or to keep it devoted to the uses of one's +established plan. Upon the choice, one recognizes, +hinge consequences of larger and more comprehensive +importance than the mere present enjoyment or non-enjoyment +of the new commodity.<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> And these "more +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">326</a></span> +important" consequences <i>are</i> important because there +appears to lie in them the possibility of a type of personal +character divergent from the present type and +from any present point of view incommensurable with +it.<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> The ethical urgency of such a problem will impress +one in the measure in which one can see that such an +issue really does depend upon his present action and +irretrievably depends. And we are able now to see +what that economic quality is that attaches to ethical +problems at a certain stage of their development and +calls for a supplementary type of treatment.</p> + +<p>Let us first consider certain types of juncture in +conduct that will be recognized at once as ethical and +in which any economic aspect is relatively inconspicuous. +Temperance or intemperance, truth or falsehood, +idleness or industry, honesty or fraud, social justice or +class-interest—these will serve. What makes such +problems as these ethical is their demand for creative +intelligence. In each, alternative types of character +or manners of life stand initially opposed. If the concrete +issue is really problematical, if there is no rule +that one can follow in the case with full assurance, constructive +comparison, whether covertly or openly, must +come into play. How long, then, will a problem of temperance +or intemperance, idleness or industry, preserve +its obviously ethical character without admixture? +Just so long, apparently, as the modes of conduct that +come into view as possible solutions are considered and +valued with regard to their <i>directly physiological and +psychological</i> consequences alone. Any given sort of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">327</a></span> +conduct, that is to say, makes inevitably for the formation +of certain habits of mind or muscle, weakening, or +precluding the formation of, certain others. Attention +is engrossed that is thereby not available elsewhere, +time and strength are expended, discriminations are +dulled and sharpened, sympathies and sensitivities are +narrowed and broadened, every trait and bent of character +is directly or indirectly affected in some way by +every resolve concluded and every action embarked upon. +If one moves a certain way along a certain line he can +never return to the starting-point and set out unchanged +along any other. If one does one thing one +cannot do another. And when the sufficient reasons +for this mutual exclusion lie in the structure and +organization of the human mind and body our deliberation +as between the two alternatives, our constructive +comparison of them remains upon the ethical +plane.</p> + +<p>If one does one thing one cannot do another. If we +substitute the well-worn saying "one cannot eat his +cake and have it" we indicate the economic plane of +constructive comparison with all needful clearness.</p> + +<p>This is in fact the situation that has been already +under discussion at such length above and the economic +quality of which we are just now in quest arises from +neither more nor less than the fact of our dependence +in the working out of our personal problems upon +limited external resources. The eventual solution sought +under these circumstances remains ethical as before. +But to reach it, it is necessary to bring into consideration +not only such other interests and ends as the psycho-physical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">328</a></span> +structure of human nature and the laws of +character-development show to be involved, but a still +wider range of interests less intimately or "internally" +related to the focal interest of the occasion but +imperatively requiring to be heard. If my acquisition +of a phonograph turns upon the direct psychological +bearing of the new interest upon my other +interests, its probable effects whether good or bad +upon my musical tastes and the diplomatic complications +with my neighbors in which the possession +of the instrument may involve me, the problem of +its purchase remains clearly in the ethical phase. But +when I count the cost in terms of sacrifices which the +purchase price makes necessary, from literature down to +food and fuel, and must draw this whole range of fact +also into the adjustment if I can, the economic phase +is reached. In principle two entire and very concrete +schemes of life now stand opposed. Just <i>what</i> concrete +sacrifices I shall make I do not know—this, in fact, is one +way of stating my problem. Nor, conversely, do I know +just what I shall be able to make the phonograph worth +to me. It is my task to come to a conclusion in the case +that shall be explicit and clear enough to enable me to +judge in <i>the event</i> whether my expectation has been realized +and I have acted wisely or unwisely. Thus a problem +is economic when the fact of the limitation of my +external resources must be eventually and frankly faced. +The characteristic quality of a problem grown economic +is a certain vexatiousness and seeming irrationality in +the ill-assorted array of nevertheless indisputable interests, +prosaic and ideal, that have to be reduced to order.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">329</a></span>It is perhaps this characteristic emotional quality +of economic problems that has insensibly inclined economists +to favor a simpler and more clear-cut analysis. +As for ethical problems—they have been left to "conscience" +or to the jurisdiction of a "greatest happiness" +principle in which the ordinary individual or legislator +has somehow come to take an interest. That +they arise and become urgent in us of course does human +nature unimpeachable credit and economics must by +all means wait respectfully upon their settlement. So +much is conceded. But economics is economics, when all +is said and done. What we mean by the economic interest +is an interest in the direct and several satisfactions +that a man can get from the several things he +shrewdly finds it worth his while to pay for. And +shrewdness means nicety of calculation, accuracy of +measurement in the determination of tangible loss and +gain. Here, then, is no field for ethics but a field of fact. +Thus ethics on her side must also wait until the case is +fully ready for her praise or blame. Such is the <i>modus +vivendi</i>. But its simplicity is oversimple and unreal. +It pictures the "economic man" as bound in the chains +of a perfunctory deference that he would throw off if he +could. For the theory of constructive comparison or +creative intelligence, on the other hand, instead of a +seeker and recipient of "psychic income" and a calculator +of gain and loss, he is a personal agent maintaining +continuity of action in a life of discontinuously +changing levels of interest and experience. His measure +of attainment lies not in an accelerating rate +of "psychic income," but in an increasing sense of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">330</a></span> +personal effectiveness and an increasing readiness and +confidence before new junctures.</p> + +<p>The possession and use of commodities are, then, not +in themselves and directly economic facts at all. As +material things commodities serve certain purposes and +effect certain results. They are means to ends and +their serving so is a matter of technology. But do I +seriously want their services? This is a matter of +my ethical point of view. Do I want them at the +price demanded or at what price and how many? This +is the economic question and it obviously is a question +wholly ethical in import—more broadly and inclusively +ethical, in fact, than the ethical question in its earlier +and more humanly inviting form. And what we have +now to see is the fact that no consideration that has +a bearing upon the problem in its ethical phase can +lose its importance and relevance in the subsequent +phase.</p> + +<p>There can be no restriction of the economic interest, +for example, to egoism. If on general principles I would +really rather use goods produced in safe and cleanly +factories or produced by "union labor," there is no +possible reason why this should not incline me to pay +the higher prices that such goods may cost and make +the needful readjustment in my budget. Is there reason +why my valuation of these goods should <i>not</i> thus +be the decisive act that takes me out of one relation to +industrial workers and sets me in another—can anything +else, indeed, quite so distinctly do this? For economic +valuation is only the fixation of a purchase price, +or an exchange relation in terms of price and quantity,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">331</a></span> +upon which two schemes of life, two differing perspectives +of social contact and relationship converge—the +scheme of life from which I am departing and the one +upon which I have resolved to make my hazard. It is this +election, this transition, that the purchase price expresses—drawing +all the strands of interest and action +into a knot so that a single grasp may seize them. The +only essential egoism in the case lies in the "subjectivism" +of the fact that inevitably the emergency +and the act are mine and not another's. This is the +"egocentric predicament" in its ethical aspect. And +the egocentric predicament proves Hobbes and La +Rochefoucauld as little as it proves Berkeley or Karl +Pearson. No social interest, no objective interest of +any sort, is shown ungenuine by my remembering in +season that if I cannot fill my coal-bin I shall freeze.<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">332</a></span>§ 15. +This logical and psychological continuity of the +ethical and economic problems suggests certain general +considerations of some practical interest. In the first +place as to "egoism." I am, let us say, an employer. +If I am interested in procuring just "labor," in the +sense of foot-pounds of energy, then undoubtedly labor +performed under safe and healthful conditions is worth +no more to me than other labor (provided it does not +prove more efficient). But is this attitude of interest +in just foot-pounds of energy the attitude <i>par excellence</i> +or solely entitled to be called economic? And just this +may be asserted for the reason that an exclusive interest +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">333</a></span>in just <i>labor</i> is the only interest in the case that men +of business, or at least many of them, can entertain +without going speedily to the wall. If, then, I do <i>in +fact</i> pay more than I must in wages or if I expend more +than a bare minimum for conveniences and safety-guards +this is not because of the valuation I put upon +<i>labor</i>, but only because I take pleasure in the contentment +and well-being of others. And this is not +"business" but "uplift"—or else a subtle form of +emotional self-indulgence. Suppose, however, that by +legislation similar working conditions have been made +mandatory for the entire industry and suppose that +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">334</a></span>the community approves the law, even to the extent +of cheerfully paying so much of the additional cost +thereby imposed as may be shifted upon them.</p> + +<p>Shall we say that this is an ethical intrusion into the +sphere of economics or shall we say that the former +economic demand for labor "as such" has given place +to an economic demand for labor better circumstanced +or better paid? The community at all events is paying +the increase of price or a part of the increase. It +seems arbitrary to insist that the old price is still the +<i>economic</i> price of the commodity and the increase only +the price of a quiet conscience. The notion of a strictly +economic demand for labor pure and simple seems in +fact a concept of accounting. To meet the community's +demand for the commodity a number of producers were +required. The least capable of these could make both +ends meet at the prevailing price only by ignoring all +but the severely impersonal aspects of the process. +Taking these costs as a base, other more capable or +more fortunate producers may have been able to make +additional expenditures of the sort in question, charging +these perhaps to "welfare" account. The law then +intervenes, making labor in effect more expensive for +all by requiring the superior conveniences or by compelling +employers' insurance against accidents to workmen +or by enforcing outright a higher minimum wage. +The old basic labor cost becomes thus obsolete. And +without prejudging as to the expediency of such legislation +in particular industrial or business situations +may we not protest against <i>a priori</i> and wholesale condemnation +of such legislation as merely irresponsibly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">335</a></span> +"ethical" and "unscientific"? Is it not, rather, economically +experimental and constructive, amounting in +substance to a simple insistence that henceforth the +hiring and paying of labor shall express a wider range +of social interests—shall signalize a more clearly self-validating +level of comprehension, on the part of employers +and consumers, of the social significance of +industry than the old? And may we not protest also, +as a matter of sheer logic, against carrying over a <i>producer's</i> +distinction of accounting between "labor" cost +and "welfare" cost into the <i>consumer's</i> valuation of the +article? How and to what end shall a distinction be +drawn between <i>his</i> "esteem" for the trimmed and +isolated article and <i>his</i> esteem for the men who made it—which, +taken together, dispose him to pay a certain +undivided price for it?</p> + +<p>For the egoism of men is no fixed and unalterable +fact. Taking it as a postulate, a mathematical theory +of market phenomena may be erected upon it, but such +a postulate is purely formal, taking no note of the +reasons which at any given time lie behind the individuals' +"demand" or "supply schedules." It amounts +simply to an assumption that these schedules will not +change during the lapse of time contemplated in the +problem in hand. And it therefore cannot serve as the +basis for a social science. As an actual social phenomenon +egoism is merely a disclosure of a certain present +narrowness and inertness in the nature of the individual +which may or may not be definitive for him. It is precisely +on a par with anemia, dyspepsia or fatigue, or +any other like unhappy fact of personal biography.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">336</a></span>§ 16. +There is another suggestion of ethical and +economic continuity that may be briefly indicated. If +our view of this relation is correct, a problem, by becoming +economic, may lose something in dramatic interest +and grandiosity but gains in precision and complexity. +In the economic phase an issue becomes +sensibly crucial. It is in this phase that are chiefly +developed those qualities of clear-headedness, temperateness +of thought and action, and well-founded self-reliance +that are the foundation of all genuine personal +morality and social effectiveness. And one may question +therefore the ethical consequences of such measures +as old age, sickness, and industrial accident insurance +or insurance against unemployment. In proportion as +these measures are effective they amount to a constant +virtual addition to the individual's income from year +to year without corresponding effort and forethought on +his part. They may accordingly be condemned as systematic +pauperization—the "endowment of the unfit." +There is evidently a fundamental problem here at issue, +apart from all administrative difficulties. Clearly this +type of criticism assumes a permanent incapacity in +"human nature" or in most actual beings therewith +endowed, to recognize as seriously important other interests +than those upon which hinge physical life and +death. The ordinary man, it is believed, is held back +from moral Quixotism as from material extravagance by +the fear of starvation alone; and it is assumed that +there are no other interests in the "normal" man that +can or ever will be so wholesomely effective to these +ends. And two remarks in answer appear not without<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">337</a></span> +a measure of pertinence. First, if what is alleged be +true (and there is evidence in Malthus' <i>Essay</i> and elsewhere +to support it) it seems less a proof of original sin +and "inperfectibility" than a reproach to a social order +whose collective tenor and institutions leave the mass +untouched and unawakened above the level of animal reproduction +and whose inequalities of opportunity prevent +awakened life from growing strong. And second, +the democratic society of the future, if it exempts the +individual in part or wholly from the dread of premature +physical extinction must leave him on higher levels of +interest similarly dependent for success or failure upon +his ultimate personal discretion. And is it inconceivable +that on higher levels there should ever genuinely be such +a persisting type of issue for the multitude of men?<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a></p> + +<p>§ 17. We have held constructive comparison in its +economic phase to be a reciprocal evaluating of the +"salient members" of two budgets. The respective +budgets in such a case express in the outcome (1) the +plane of life to which one is to move and (2) the plane +one is forsaking. It was the salient member of the +former that presented the problem at the outset. In the +course of the process its associates were <i>gathered about</i> +it in their due proportions and perspective. The salient +member of the latter (i.e., whatever the purchase is to +oblige one to do without), it was the business of constructive +comparison to <i>single out</i> from among its associates +and designate for sacrifice. In any case at all +departing from the type of substitution pure and simple, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">338</a></span> +the commodities sacrificed will come to have a +certain "value in exchange" that clearly is a new +fact, a new judgment, in experience. This value in exchange, +this "subjective" or "personal" exchange +value, may fittingly be termed a "value for transition." +The transition once made, the exchange once concluded, +I shall deem the motor-car, for example, that I have <i>not</i> +bought to replace one used-up, to be worth less than the +piano I <i>have</i> bought instead. This indeed (in no disparaging +sense) is a tautology. But does this lesser relative +value equal or exceed or fall short of the value the car +would have had if no question of a piano had been raised +at all and I had bought it in replacement of the old one +as a matter of course? How can one say? The question +seems unmeaning, for the levels of value referred to are +different and discontinuous and the magnitudes belong +to different orders. In a word, because a "value for +transition" marks a resolve and succinctly describes an +act, it cannot be broken in two and expressed as an +equating of two magnitudes independently definable +apart from the relation. The motor-car <i>had</i> its value +as a member of the old system—the piano <i>has</i> its value +as a member of the new. "The piano is worth more than +the car"; "the car is worth less than the piano"—these +are the prospective and retrospective views across +a gulf that separates two "specious presents," not +judgments of static inequality in terms of a common +measure.</p> + +<p>Is value, then, absolute or relative? Is value or +price the prior notion? Was the classical English +economics superficial in its predilection for the relative<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">339</a></span> +conception of value? Or is the reigning Austrian economics +profound in its reliance upon marginal utility? +By way of answer let us ask—What in our world can +be more absolute a fact than a man's transition from +one level of experience and action to another? Can the +flight of time be stayed or turned backward? And if +not can the acts by whose intrinsic uniqueness and successiveness +time becomes filled for me and by which I +feel time's sensible passage as swift or slow, lose their +individuality? But it is not by a mere empiric temporalism +alone that the sufficient absoluteness of the +present act is attested. My transition from phase to +phase of "finitude" is a thing so absolute that Idealism +itself has deemed an Absolute indispensable to assure +its safe and sane achievement. And with all Idealism's +distrust of immediate experience for every evidential +use, the Idealist does not scruple to cite the "higher +obviousness" of personal effort, attainment, and fruition +as the best of evidence for his most momentous +truth of all.<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> And accordingly (in sharp descent) we +need not hesitate to regard value in exchange as a +primary fact in its own right, standing in no need of +resolution into marginal pseudo-absolutes. A price +agreed to and paid marks a real transition to another +level. There are both marginal valuation and <i>Werthaltung</i> +on this level, but they are subordinate incidents +to this level's mapping and the conservation of its resources. +On this level every marginal utility is relative, +as we have seen, to every other through their common +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">340</a></span> +relation to the complex plan of organization as a +whole.<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a></p> + +<p>§ 18. In conclusion one more question closely related +to the foregoing may be briefly touched upon. We have +held that the individual's attitude toward a commodity +is in the first instance one of putting a price-estimate +upon it and only secondarily that of holding it in a +provisionally settled marginal esteem. If this principle +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">341</a></span> +of the priority of price-estimation or exchange value is +true, it seems evident that there can be no line of demarcation +drawn (except for doubtfully expedient pedagogical +purposes) between (1) "Subjective valuations" +with which individuals are conceived to come to a +market and (2) a mechanical equilibration of demand +and supply which it is the distinctive and sole function +of market concourse to effect. In such a view the +market process in strict logic must be timeless as it is +spaceless; a superposition of the two curves is effected +and they are seen to cross in a common point which +their shapes geometrically predetermine. Discussion, +in any proper sense, can be no inherent part of a +market process thus conceived. Once in the market, +buyers and sellers can only declare their "subjective +exchange valuations" of the commodity and await the +outcome with a dispassionate certainty that whoever +may gain by exchanging at the price to be determined, +those who cannot exchange will at all events not lose. +But considered as a typical likeness of men who have +seen a thing they want and are seeking to possess it, +this picture of mingled hope and resignation is not +convincing. Most actual offering of goods for sale +that one observes suggests less the dispassionate manner +of the physiologist or psychologist taking the +measure of his subject's reactions, sensibilities, and +preferences than the more masterful procedure of the +physician or the hypnotist who seeks to uproot or +modify or reconstruct them. This is the process known +in economic writing since Adam Smith as "the higgling +and bargaining of the market."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">342</a></span>In +fact, the individual's ante-market valuation, when +there temporarily is one, is an exchange valuation of +the constructive or experimental and therefore (in any +significant sense of the word) perfectly objective type, +and the market process into which this enters is only +a perfectly homogeneous temporal continuation of it +that carries the individual forward to decisive action. +There is no more reason for a separation here than for +sundering the ante-experimental sketching out of an +hypothesis in any branch of research from the work of +putting the hypothesis to experimental test. The results +of experiment may serve in a marked way in both +sorts of process to elucidate or reconstruct the hypothesis.</p> + +<p>The "higgling and bargaining of the market" has +been accorded but scant attention by economists. It +has apparently been regarded as a kind of irrelevance—a +comedy part, at best, in the serious drama of industry +and trade, never for a moment hindering the significant +movement and outcome of the major action. +As if to excuse the incompetence of this treatment (or +as another phase of it) theory has tended to lay stress +upon, and mildly to deplore, certain of the less amiable +and engaging aspects of the process. The very term +indeed as used by Adam Smith, imported a certain +æsthetic disesteem, albeit tempered with indulgent approbation +on other grounds. In Böhm-Bawerk's more +modern account this approbation has given place to a +neutral tolerance. A certain buyer, he says (in his discussion +of simple "isolated" exchange), will give as +much as thirty pounds for a horse; the horse's owner will<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">343</a></span> +take as little as ten pounds—these are predetermined +and fixed valuations brought to the exchange negotiations +and nothing that happens in the game of wits is +conceived to modify them. The price will then be fixed +somewhere between these limits. But how? "Here +..." we read, "is room for any amount of 'higgling.' +According as in the conduct of the transaction the buyer +or the seller shows the greater dexterity, cunning, obstinacy, +power-of-persuasion, or such like, will the price +be forced either to its lower or to its upper limit."<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> But +the higgling cannot touch the underlying attitudes. +Even "power of persuasion" is only one part of "skill +in bargaining," with all the rest and like all the rest; +if it were more than this there would be for Böhm-Bawerk +no theoretically grounded price limits to define +the range of accidental settlement and the whole explanation, +as a theory of price, would reduce to nullity.<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">344</a></span>With this, then, appears to fall away all ground for +a one-sided, or even a sharply two-sided, conception of +the process of fixation of market-values. A "marginal +utility" theory and a "cost of production" theory +of market price alike assume that the factor chosen +as the ultimate determinant is a fixed fact defined by +conditions which the actual spatial and temporal meeting-together +of buyers and sellers in the market cannot +affect. In this logical sense, the chosen determinant +is in each case an ante-market or extra-market fact and +the same is true of the blades of Marshall's famous pair +of scissors.</p> + +<p>The price of a certain article let us say is $5. According +to the current type of analysis this is the price +because, intending buyers' and sellers' valuations of the +article being just what they are, it is at this figure +that the largest number of exchanges can occur. Were +the price higher there would be more persons willing +to sell than to buy; were it lower there would be more +persons willing to buy than to sell. At $5 no buyer +or seller who means what he says about his valuation +when he enters the market goes away disappointed or +dissatisfied. With this price established all sellers +whose costs of production prevent their conforming to +it must drop out of the market; so must all buyers +whose desire for the article does not warrant their paying +so much. More fundamentally then, Why is $5 the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">345</a></span>price? Is it because intending buyers and the marginal +buyer in particular do not desire the article more +strongly? Or is it because conditions of production, +all things considered, do not permit a lower marginal +unit cost? The argument might seem hopeless. But +the advantage is claimed for the principle of demand. +Without demand arising out of desires expressive of +wants there would simply <i>be</i> no value, no production, +and no price. Demand evokes production and sanctions +cost. But cost expended can give no value to a product +that no one wants.</p> + +<p>Does it follow, however, that the cost of a commodity +in which on its general merits I have come to take a +hypothetical interest can in no wise affect my actual +price-offer for it? Can it contribute nothing to the +preciser definition of my interest which is eventually to +be expressed in a price offer? If the answer is "No, +for how can this external fact affect the strength of +your desire for the object?"—then the reason given +begs the question at issue. <i>Is</i> my interest in the object +an interest in the object alone? And <i>is</i> the cost of the +object a fact for me external and indifferent? It is, +at all events, not uncommon to be assured that an article +"cannot be produced for less," that one or another +of its elements of cost is higher than would be natural +to suppose. Not always scientifically accurate, such +assurances express an evident confidence that they will +not be without effect upon a hesitant but fair-minded +purchaser. And in other ways as well, the position +of sellers in the market is not so defenseless as a strict +utility theory of price conceives—apart from the standpoint<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">346</a></span> +of an abstract "normality" that can never contrive +to get itself realized in empirical fact.<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> It is true +that, in general, one tends to purchase an article of a +given familiar kind where its price, all things considered, +is lowest. In consequence the less "capable" producers +or sellers must go to the wall. But the fact +seems mainly "regulative" and of subordinate importance. +Is it equally certain that as between branches +of expenditure, such as clothing, food, and shelter, +children, books, and "social" intercourse, the shares +of income we expend upon them or the marginal prices +we are content to pay express the original strength of +separate and unmodified extra-market interests? On +the contrary we have paid in the past what we have +had to pay, what we have deemed just and reasonable, +what we have been willing experimentally to hazard +upon the possibility of the outlay's proving to have +been worth while. In these twilight-zones of indetermination, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">347</a></span> +cost as well as other factors of supply have +had their opportunity. Shall we nevertheless insist that +our "demands" are <i>ideally</i> fixed, even though in fallible +human fact they are more or less indistinct, yielding +and modifiable? On the contrary they are "in principle +and for the most part" indeterminate and expectant +of suggested experimental shaping from the supply side +of the market. It is less in theory than in fact that +they have a salutary tendency (none too dependable) +toward rigidity.</p> + +<h4>CONCLUSION</h4> + +<p>§ 19. The argument may now be summarily reviewed.</p> + +<p>I. How are we to understand the acquisition, by an +individual, of what are called new economic needs and +interests? Except by a fairly obvious fallacy of retrospection +we cannot regard this phenomenon as a +mere arousal of so-called latent or implicit desires. +New products and new means of production afford +"satisfactions" and bring about objective results +which are unimaginable and therefore unpredictable, in +any descriptive fashion, in advance. In a realistic or +empirical view of the matter, these constitute genuinely +new developments of personality and of social function, +not mere unfoldings of a preformed logical or vital +system. "Human nature" is modifiable and economic +choice and action are factors in this indivisible process +(§§ 2-4). Now "logically" it would seem clear that +unless a new commodity is an object of desire it will +not be made or paid for. On the other hand, with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">348</a></span> +equal "logic," a <i>new</i> commodity, it would seem, <i>cannot</i> +be an object of desire because all desire must be +for what we already know. We seem confronted with +a complete <i>impasse</i> (§ 5). But the <i>impasse</i> is conceptual +only. We have simply to acknowledge the patent +fact of our recognition of the new as novel and our +interest in the new in its outstanding character of +novelty. We need only express and interpret this fact, +instead of fancying ourselves bound to explain it away. +It is an interest not less genuine and significant in +economic experience than elsewhere (§§ 6, 7). Its +importance lies in the fact that it obliges us to regard +what is called economic choice not as a balancing of +utilities, marginal or otherwise, but as a process of +"constructive comparison." The new commodity and +its purchase price are in reality symbols for alternatively +possible systems of life and action. Can the old +be relinquished for the new? Before this question is +answered each system may be criticized and interpreted +from the standpoint of the other, each may be supplemented +by suggestion, by dictate of tradition and by +impulsive prompting, by inference, and by conjecture. +Finally in experimental fashion an election must be +made. The system as accepted may or may not be, in +terms, identical with one of the initial alternatives; it +can never be identical in full meaning and perspective +with either one. And in the end we have not chosen the +new because its value, as seen beforehand, measured more +than the value of the old, but we now declare the old, +seen in retrospect, to have been worth less (§§ 8-12). +There are apparently no valid objections to this view to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">349</a></span> +be drawn from the current logical type of marginal-utility +analysis (§ 13).</p> + +<p>II. Because so-called economic "choice" is in reality +"constructive comparison" it must be regarded as essentially +ethical in import. Ethics and economic theory, +instead of dealing with separate problems of conduct, +deal with distinguishable but inseparable stages belonging +to the complete analysis of most, if not all, problems +(§ 14). This view suggests, (<i>a</i>) that no reasons in experience +or in logic exist for identifying the economic +interest with an attitude of exclusive or particularistic +egoism (§ 15), and (<i>b</i>) that social reformers are justified +in their assumption of a certain "perfectibility" in +human nature—a constructive responsiveness instead of +an insensate and stubborn inertia (§ 16). Again, in +the process of constructive comparison in its economic +phase, Price or Exchange Value is, in apparent accord +with the English classical tradition, the fundamental +working conception. Value as "absolute" is essentially +a subordinate and "conservative" conception, belonging +to a status of system and routine, and is "absolute" in +a purely functional sense (§ 17). And finally constructive +comparison, with price or exchange value as +its dominant conception, is clearly nothing if not a market +process. In the nature of the case, then, there can +be no such ante-market definiteness and rigidity of demand +schedules as a strictly marginal-utility theory of +market prices logically must require (§ 18).</p> + +<p>§ 20. In at least two respects the argument falls +short of what might be desired. No account is given of +the actual procedure of constructive comparison and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">350</a></span> +nothing like a complete survey of the leading ideas and +problems of economic theory is undertaken by way of +verification. But to have supplied the former in any +satisfactory way would have required an unduly extended +discussion of the more general, or ethical, +phases of constructive comparison. The other deficiency +is less regrettable, since the task in question +is one that could only be hopefully undertaken +and convincingly carried through by a professional +economist.</p> + +<p>For the present purpose, it is perhaps enough to +have found in our economic experience and behavior the +same interest in novelty that is so manifest in other departments +of life, and the same attainment of new self-validating +levels of power and interest, through the acquisition +and exploitation of the novel. In our economic +experience, no more than elsewhere, is satisfaction an +ultimate and self-explanatory term. Satisfaction carries +with it always a reference to the level of power and +interest that makes it possible and on which it must be +measured. To seek satisfaction for its own sake or to +hinge one's interest in science or art upon their ability +to serve the palpable needs of the present moment—these, +together, make up the meaning of what is called +Utilitarianism. And Utilitarianism in this sense (which +is far less what Mill meant by the term than a tradition +he could never, with all his striving, quite get free of), +this type of Utilitarianism spells routine. It is the +surrender of initiative and control, in the quest for +ends in life, for a philistine pleased acceptance of the +ends that Nature, assisted by the advertisement-writers,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">351</a></span> +sets before us. But this type of Utilitarianism is less +frequent in actual occurrence than its vogue in popular +literature and elsewhere may appear to indicate. As +a matter of fact, we more often look to satisfaction, +not as an end of effort or a condition to be preserved, but +as the evidence that an experimental venture has been +justified in its event. And this is a widely different +matter, for in this there is no inherent implication of +a habit-bound or egoistic narrowness of interest in the +conceiving or the launching of the venture.</p> + +<p>The economic interest, as a function of intelligence, +finds its proper expression in a valuation set upon one +thing in terms of another—a valuation that is either +a step in a settled plan of spending and consumption +or marks the passing of an old plan and our embarkation +on a new. From such a view it must follow that +the economic betterment of an individual or a society +can consist neither in the accumulation of material +wealth alone nor in a more diversified technical knowledge +and skill. For the individual or for a collectivist +state there must be added to these things alertness and +imagination in the personal quest and discovery of +values and a broad and critical intelligence in making +the actual trial of them. Without a commensurate +gain in these qualities it will avail little to make technical +training and industrial opportunity more free or +even to make the rewards of effort more equitable and +secure. But it has been one of the purposes of this +discussion to suggest that just this growth in outlook +and intelligence may in the long run be counted on—not +indeed as a direct and simple consequence of in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">352</a></span>creasing +material abundance but as an expression of +an inherent creativeness in man that responds to +discipline and education and will not fail to recognize +the opportunity it seeks.</p> + +<p>Real economic progress is ethical in aim and outcome. +We cannot think of the economic interest as restricted +in its exercise to a certain sphere or level of +effort—such as "the ordinary business of life" or the +gaining of a "livelihood" or the satisfaction of our +so-called "material" wants, or the pursuit of an +enlightened, or an unenlightened, self-regard. Economics +has no special relation to "material" or even +to commonplace ends. Its materialism lies not in its +aim and tendency but in its problem and method. It +has no bias toward a lower order of mundane values. +It only takes note of the ways and degrees of dependence +upon mundane resources and conditions that +values of every order must acknowledge. It reminds us +that morality and culture, if they are genuine, must +know not only what they intend but what they cost. +They must understand not only the direct but the indirect +and accidental bearing of their purposes upon +all of our interests, private and social, that they are +likely to affect. The detachment of the economic interest +from any particular level or class of values is +only the obverse aspect of the special kind of concern +it has with values of every sort. The very generality +of the economic interest, and the abstractness of the +ideas by which it maintains routine or safeguards +change in our experience, are what make it unmistakably +ethical. Without specific ends of its own, it affords<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">353</a></span> +no ground for dogmatism or apologetics. And +this indicates as the appropriate task of economic +theory not the arrest and thwarting but the steadying +and shaping of social change.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">354</a></span></p> + +<h2>THE MORAL LIFE AND THE CONSTRUCTION +OF VALUES AND STANDARDS<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a></h2> + +<h4>JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS</h4> + +<p>Writing about ethics has tended to take one of two +directions. On the one hand we have description of +conduct in terms of psychology, or anthropology. On +the other a study of the concepts right and wrong, +good and bad, duty and freedom. If we follow the +first line we may attempt to explain conduct psychologically +by showing the simple ideas or feelings +and the causal connections or laws of habit and association +out of which actions arise. Or anthropologically +we may show the successive stages of custom +and taboo, or the family, religious, political, legal, and +social institutions from which morality has emerged. +But we meet at once a difficulty if we ask what is the +bearing of this description and analysis. Will it aid +me in the practical judgment "What shall I do?" In +physics there is no corresponding difficulty. To analyze +gravity enables us to compute an orbit, or aim a +gun; to analyze electric action is to have the basis for +lighting streets and carrying messages. It assumes +the uniformity of nature and takes no responsibility as +to whether we shall aim guns or whether our messages +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">355</a></span> +shall be of war or of peace. Whereas in ethics it is +claimed that the elements are so changed by their +combination—that the <i>process</i> is so essential a factor—that +no prediction is certain. And it is also claimed +that the ends themselves are perhaps to be changed as +well as the means. Stated otherwise, suppose that mankind +has passed through various stages, can mere observation +of these tell me what next? Perhaps I don't care +to repeat the past; how can I plan for a better future? +Or grant that I may discover instinct and emotion, habit +and association in my thinking and willing, how will +this guide me to direct my thinking and willing to right +ends?</p> + +<p>The second method has tended to examine concepts. +Good is an eternal, changeless pattern; it is to be discovered +by a vision; or right and good are but other +terms for nature's or reason's universal laws which are +timeless and wholly unaffected by human desires or passions; +moral nature is soul, and soul is created not +built up of elements,—such were some of the older absolutisms. +Right and good are unique concepts not to +be resolved or explained in terms of anything else,—this +is a more modern thesis which on the face of it +may appear to discourage analysis. The ethical world +is a world of "eternal values." Philosophy "by taking +part in empirical questions sinks both itself and +them." These doctrines bring high claims, but are they +more valuable for human guidance than the empirical +method?<a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">356</a></span>"The +knowledge that is superhuman only is ridiculous +in man." No man can ever find his way home +with the pure circle unless he has also the art of the +impure. It is the conviction of this paper that +in ethics, as in knowledge, thoughts without contents +are empty; percepts without concepts are blind. Description +of what has been—empiricism—is futile in +itself to project and criticize. Intuitions and deductions +a priori are empty. The "thoughts" of ethics +are of course the terms right, good, ought, worth, and +their kin. The "percepts" are the instincts and emotions, +the desires and aspirations, the conditions of +time and place, of nature, and institutions.</p> + +<p>Yet it is misleading to say that in studying the history +of morals we are merely empiricists, and can hope +to find no criterion. This would be the case if we were +studying non-moral beings. But moral beings have to +some degree guided life by judgments and not merely +followed impulse or habit. Early judgments as to +taboos, customs, and conduct may be crude and in need +of correction; they are none the less judgments. Over +and over we find them reshaped to meet change from +hunting to agriculture, from want to plenty, from war +to peace, from small to large groupings. Much more +clearly when we consider civilized peoples, the interaction +between reflection and impulse becomes patent. To +study this interaction can be regarded as futile for the +future only if we discredit all past moral achievement.</p> + +<p>Those writers who have based their ethics upon concepts +have frequently expressed the conviction that the +security of morality depends upon the question whether<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">357</a></span> +good and right are absolute and eternal essences independent +of human opinion or volition. A different +source of standards which to some offers more promise +for the future is the fact of the moral life <i>as</i> a constant +process of forming and reshaping ideals and of +bringing these to bear upon conditions of existence. +To construct a right and good is at least a process +tending to responsibility, if this construction is to be +for the real world in which we must live and not merely +for a world of fancy or caprice. It is not the aim of +this paper to give a comprehensive outline of ethical +method. Four factors in the moral life will be pointed +out and this analysis will be used to emphasize especially +certain social and constructive aspects of our +concepts of right and good.</p> + +<h5>I</h5> + +<p>The four factors which it is proposed to emphasize +are these:</p> + +<p>(1) Life as a biological process involving relation +to nature, with all that this signifies in the equipment +of instincts, emotions, and selective activity by which +life maintains itself.</p> + +<p>(2) Interrelation with other human beings, including +on the one hand associating, grouping, mating, +communicating, coöperating, commanding, obeying, +worshiping, adjudicating, and on the psychological +side the various instincts, emotions, susceptibilities to +personal stimulation and appropriate responses in language +and behavior which underlie or are evoked by the +life in common.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">358</a></span>(3) Intelligence +and reason, through which experience +is interrelated, viewed as a whole, enlarged in +imagination.</p> + +<p>(4) The process of judgment and choice, in which +different elements are brought together, considered in +one conscious universe, evaluated or measured, thereby +giving rise reciprocally to a self on the one hand and +to approved or chosen objects on the other.</p> + +<p class="tb">(1) Life. Life is at least the raw material of all +values, even if it is not in itself entitled to be called +good without qualification. For in the process of +nourishing and protecting itself, the plant or animal +selects and in the case of higher animals, manipulates; +it adapts itself to nature and adapts nature to itself; +it shows reciprocal relation of means to end, of whole to +part. It foreshadows the conscious processes in so +many ways that men have always been trying to read +back some degree of consciousness. And life in the +animal, at least, is regarded as having experiences of +pleasure and pain, and emotions of fear, anger, shame, +and sex, which are an inseparable aspect of values. If +it is not the supreme or only good, if men freely sacrifice +it for other ends, it is none the less an inevitable +factor. Pessimistic theories indeed have contended +that life is evil and have sought to place good in a will-less +Nirvana. Yet such theories make limited appeal. +Their protest is ultimately not against life as life but +against life as painful. And their refutation is rather +to be intrusted to the constructive possibilities of +freer life than to an analysis of concepts.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">359</a></span>Another +class of theories which omit life from the +good is that which holds to abstractly ontological concepts +of good as an eternal essence or form. It must +be remembered, however, that the idea of good was not +merely a fixed essence. It was also for Plato the self-moving +and the cause of all motion. And further, +Plato evidently believed that life, the very nature of +the soul, was itself in the class of supreme values along +with God and the good. The prize of immortality was +καλόν and the hope great. And with Aristotle and his +followers the good of contemplation no less truly than +the good of action had elements of value derived from +the vital process. Such a mystic as Spinoza, who finds +good in the understanding values this because in it man +is "active," and would unite himself with the All because +in God is Power and Freedom. The Hebrew +prophet found a word capable of evoking great ethical +values when he urged his countrymen to "choose life," +and Christian teaching found in the conception of "eternal +life" an ideal of profound appeal. It is not surprising +that with his biological interests Spencer should +have set up life of greatest length and breadth as a goal.</p> + +<p>The struggle of the present war emphasizes tremendously +two aspects of this factor of life. National +life is an ideal which gets its emotional backing largely +from the imagery of our physical life. For any one of +the small nations involved to give up its national life—whatever +the possibilities of better organized industry +or more comfortable material conditions—seems +to it a desperate alternative. Self-defense is regarded +by the various powers at war as a complete<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">360</a></span> +justification not merely for armed resistance or attack +but for ruthless acts. And if we are tempted to say +that the war involves a prodigal waste of individual +life on a scale never known before, we are at the same +time compelled to recognize that never before has the +bare destruction of life aroused such horror.</p> + +<p>For never before has peace set its forces so determinedly +to protect life. The span of human life has +been lengthened: the wastefulness of accident and disease +has been magnified. The dumb acquiescence with +which former generations accepted the death of infants +and children and those in the prime of life has given +way to active and increasingly successful efforts to +preserve. The enormous increase in scientific study of +biology, including eugenics, reflects not only an advance +of science but a trend in morality. It is scarcely +conceivable that it should grow less in absolute importance, +whatever crises may temporarily cause its depreciation +relatively to other values.</p> + +<p>One exception to the growing appreciation calls for +notice—the interest in immortality appears to be less +rather than greater. The strong belief in life beyond +the grave which since the days of ancient Egypt has +prevailed in the main stream of Western culture seems +not only to be affected by the scientific temper of the +day, but also to be subject to a shift in interest. This +may be in part a reaction from other-worldliness. In +part it may be due to loss of fervor for a theological +picture of a future heaven of a rather monotonous sort +and may signify not so much loss of interest in life +as desire for a more vital kind of continuance. It is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">361</a></span> +not true that all that a man hath will he give for his +life, yet it is true that no valuing process is intelligible +that leaves out life with its impulses, emotions, and +desires as the first factor to be reckoned with.</p> + +<p>(2) The second factor is the life in common, with +its system of relations, and its corresponding instincts, +emotions, and desires.</p> + +<p>So much has been written in recent years on the social +nature of man that it seems unnecessary to +elaborate the obvious. Protest has even been raised +against the exaggeration of the social. But I believe +that in certain points at least we have not yet penetrated +to the heart of the social factor, and its significance +for morals.</p> + +<p>So far as the moral aspect is concerned I know +nothing more significant than the attitude of the Common +Law as set forth by Professor Pound.<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> This has +sought to base its system of duties on relations. The +relation which was prominent in the Middle Ages was +that of landlord and tenant; other relations are those +of principal and agent, of trustee, etc. An older relation +was that of kinship. The kin was held for the +wergeld; the goël must avenge his next of kin; the +father must provide for prospective parents-in-law; +the child must serve the parents. Duty was the legal +term for the relation. In all this there is no romanticism, +no exaggeration of the social; there is a fair +statement of the facts which men have recognized and +acted upon the world over and in all times. Individualistic +times or peoples have modified certain phases. +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">362</a></span> +The Roman law sought to ground many of its duties +in the contract, the will of the parties. But covenants +by no means exhaust duties. And according to Professor +Pound the whole course of English and American +law today is belying the generalization of Sir +Henry Maine, that the evolution of law is a progress +from status to contract. We are shaping law of insurance, +of public service companies, not by contract +but by the relation of insurer and insured, of public +utility and patron.</p> + +<p>Psychologically, the correlate of the system of relations +is the set of instincts and emotions, of capacity +for stimulation and response, which presuppose society +for their exercise and in turn make society possible. +There can be no question as to the reality and strength +of these in both animals and men. The bear will fight +for her young more savagely than for her life. The +human mother's thoughts center far more intensely +upon her offspring than upon her own person. The +man who is cut dead by all his acquaintance suffers +more than he would from hunger or physical fear. The +passion of sex frequently overmasters every instinct of +individual prudence. The majority of men face poverty +and live in want; relatively few prefer physical +comfort to family ties. Aristotle's φιλία is the oftenest +quoted recognition of the emotional basis of common +life, but a statement of Kant's earlier years is particularly +happy. "The point to which the lines of direction +of our impulses converge is thus not only in ourselves, +but there are besides powers moving us in the +will of others outside of ourselves. Hence arise the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">363</a></span> +moral impulses which often carry us away to the discomfiture +of selfishness, the strong law of duty, and the +weaker of benevolence. Both of these wring from us +many a sacrifice, and although selfish inclinations now +and then preponderate over both, these still never fail +to assert their reality in human nature. Thus we recognize +that in our most secret motives, we are dependent +upon the rule of the general will."<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a></p> + +<p>The "law of duty," and I believe we may add, the +conception of right, do arise objectively in the social +relations as the common law assumes and subjectively +in the social instincts, emotions, and the more intimate +social consciousness which had not been worked out in +the time of Kant as it has been by recent authors. +This point will receive further treatment later, but I +desire to point out in anticipation that if right and +duty have their origin in this social factor there is at +least a presumption against their being subordinate +ethically to the conception of good as we find them in +certain writers. If they have independent origin and +are the outgrowth of a special aspect of life it is at +least probable that they are not to be subordinated to +the good unless the very notion of good is itself reciprocally +modified by right in a way that is not usually +recognized in teleological systems.</p> + +<p>(3) Intelligence and reason imply (<i>a</i>) considering +the proposed act or the actually performed act as a +whole and in its relations. Especially they mean considering +consequences. In order to foresee consequences +there is required not only empirical observation +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">364</a></span> +of past experience, not only deduction from already +formulated concepts—as when we say that injustice +will cause hard feelings and revolt—but that +rarer quality which in the presence of a situation discerns +a meaning not obvious, suggests an idea, "injustice," +to interpret the situation. Situations are +neither already labeled "unjust," nor are they obviously +unjust to the ordinary mind. Analysis into +elements and rearrangement of the elements into a new +synthesis are required. This is eminently a synthetic +or "creative" activity. Further it is evident that the +activity of intelligence in considering consequences implies +not only what we call reasoning in the narrower +sense but imagination and feeling. For the consequences +of an act which are of importance ethically are +consequences which are not merely to be described but +are to be imagined so vividly as to be felt, whether they +are consequences that affect ourselves or affect others.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) But it would be a very narrow intelligence that +should attempt to consider only consequences of a single +proposed act without considering also other possible +acts and their consequences. The second important +characteristic of intelligence is that it considers either +other means of reaching a given end, or other ends, and +by working out the consequences of these also has the +basis for deliberation and choice. The method of +"multiple working hypotheses," urged as highly important +in scientific investigation, is no less essential +in the moral field. To bring several ends into the field +of consideration is the characteristic of the intelligent, +or as we often say, the open-minded man. Such consideration<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">365</a></span> +as this widens the capacity of the agent and +marks him off from the creature of habit, of prejudice, +or of instinct.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) Intelligence implies considering in two senses +all persons involved, that is, it means taking into account +not only how an act will affect others but also +how others look at it. It is scarcely necessary to say +that this activity of intelligence cannot be cut off from +its roots in social intercourse. It is by the processes +of give and take, of stimulus and response, in a social +medium that this possibility of looking at things from a +different angle is secured. And once more this different +angle is not gained by what in the strict sense could +be called a purely intellectual operation, although +it has come to be so well recognized as the necessary +equipment for dealing successfully with conditions that +we commonly characterize the person as stupid who does +not take account of what others think and feel and how +they will react to a projected line of conduct. This social +element in intelligence is to a considerable degree implied +in the term "reasonable," which signifies not merely that +a man is logical in his processes but also that he is ready +to listen to what others say and to look at things from +their point of view whether he finally accepts it or not.</p> + +<p>The broad grounds on which it is better to use the +word intelligence than the word reason in the analysis +with which we are concerned are two. (1) It is not a +question-begging term which tends to commit us at the +outset to a specific doctrine as to the source of our +judgments. (2) The activity of intelligence which is +now most significant for ethical progress is not suggested<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">366</a></span> +by the term reason, for unless we arbitrarily +smuggle in under the term practical reason the whole +activity of the moral consciousness without inquiry as +to the propriety of the name we shall be likely to omit +the constructive and creative efforts to promote morality +by positive supplying of enlarged education, new +sources of interest, and more open fields for development, +by replacing haunting fears of misery with positive +hopes, and by suggesting new imagery, new ambitions +in the place of sodden indifference or sensuality. +The term reason as used by the Stoics and by Kant +meant control of the passions by some "law"—some authority +cosmic or logical. It prepared for the inevitable; +it forbade the private point of view. But as thus +presenting a negative aspect the law was long ago characterized +by a profound moral genius as "weak." It +has its value as a schoolmaster, but it is not in itself +capable of supplying the new life which dissolves the +old sentiment, breaks up the settled evil habit, and supplies +both larger ends and effective motives.</p> + +<p>If we state human progress in objective fashion we +may say that although men today are still as in earlier +times engaged in getting a living, in mating, in rearing +of offspring, in fighting and adventure, in play, and +in art, they are also engaged in science and invention, +interested in the news of other human activities all +over the world; they are adjusting differences by judicial +processes, coöperating to promote general welfare, +enjoying refined and more permanent friendships and +affections, and viewing life in its tragedy and comedy +with enhanced emotion and broader sympathy. Leaving<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">367</a></span> +out of consideration the work of the religious or +artistic genius as not in question here, the great objective +agencies in bringing about these changes have +been on the one hand the growth of invention, scientific +method, and education, and on the other the increase +in human intercourse and communication. Reason +plays its part in both of these in freeing the mind from +wasteful superstitious methods and in analyzing situations +and testing hypotheses, but the term is inadequate +to do justice to that creative element in the formation +of hypotheses which finds the new, and it tends to leave +out of account the social point of view involved in the +widening of the area of human intercourse. More will +be said upon this point in connection with the discussion +of rationalism.</p> + +<p>(4) The process of judgment and choice. The elements +are not the sum. The moral consciousness is not +just the urge of life, plus the social relations, plus intelligence. +The <i>process</i> of moral deliberation, evaluation, +judgment, and choice is itself essential. In this process +are born the concepts and standards good and right, +and likewise the moral self which utters the judgment. +It is in this twofold respect synthetic, creative. It is +as an interpretation of this process that the concept of +freedom arises. Four aspects of the process may be +noted.</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The process involves holding possibilities of action, +or objects for valuation, or ends for choice, in +consciousness and measuring them one against another +in a simultaneous field—or in a field of alternating objects, +any of which can be continually recalled. One<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">368</a></span> +possibility after another may be tried out in anticipation +and its relations successively considered, but the +comparison is essential to the complete moral consciousness.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) The process yields a universe of valued <i>objects</i> +as distinguished from a subjective consciousness of desires +and feelings. We say, "This is right," "That is +good." Every "is" in such judgments may be denied +by an "is not" and we hold one alternative to be true, +the other false. As the market or the stock exchange +or board of trade fixes values by a meeting of buyers +and sellers and settles the price of wheat accurately +enough to enable farmers to decide how much land to +seed for the next season, so the world of men and +women who must live together and coöperate, or fight +and perish, forces upon consciousness the necessity of +adjustment. The preliminary approaches are usually +hesitant and subjective—like the offers or bids in the +market—e.g., "I should like to go to college; I believe +that is a good thing"; "My parents need my help; it +does not seem right to leave them." The judgments +finally emerge. "A college education is good;" "It +is wrong to leave my parents"—both seemingly objective +yet conflicting, and unless I can secure both I must +seemingly forego actual objective good, or commit actual +wrong.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) The process may be described also as one of +"universalizing" the judging consciousness. For it is +a counterpart of the objective implication of a judgment +that it is not an affirmation as to any individual's +opinion. This negative characterization of the judgment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">369</a></span> +is commonly converted into the positive doctrine +that any one who is unprejudiced and equally well informed +would make the same judgment. Strictly +speaking the judgment itself represents in its completed +form the elimination of the private attitude rather +than the express inclusion of other judges. But in the +making of the judgment it is probable that this elimination +of the private is reached by a mental reference to +other persons and their attitudes, if not by an actual +conversation with another. It is dubious whether an +individual that had never communicated with another +would get the distinction between a private subjective +attitude and the "general" or objective.</p> + +<p>Moreover, one form of the moral judgment: "This +is right," speaks the language of law—of the collective +judgment, or of the judge who hears both sides +but is neither. This generalizing or universalizing is +frequently supposed to be the characteristic activity of +"reason." I believe that a comparison with the kindred +value judgments in economics supports the doctrine +that in judgments as to the good as well as in those +as to right, there is no product of any simple faculty, +but rather a synthetic process in which the social factor +is prominent. A compelling motive toward an objective +and universal judgment is found in the practical +conditions of moral judgments. Unless men +agree on such fundamental things as killing, stealing, +and sex relations they cannot get on together. Not +that when I say, "Killing is wrong," I mean to affirm +"I agree with you in objecting to it"; but that the +necessity (a) of acting as if I either do or do not approve<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">370</a></span> +it, and (b) of either making my attitude agree +with yours, or yours agree with mine, or of fighting +it out with you or with the whole force of organized +society, compels me to put my attitude into objective +terms, to meet you and society on a common platform. +This is a <i>synthesis</i>, an achievement. To attribute the +synthesis to any faculty of "practical reason," adds +nothing to our information, but tends rather to obscure +the facts.</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) The process is thus a reciprocal process of +valuing objects and of constructing and reconstructing +a self. The object as first imaged or anticipated +undergoes enlargement and change as it is put into relations +to other objects and as the consequences of +adoption or rejection are tried in anticipation. The +self by reflecting and by enlarging its scope is similarly +enlarged. It is the <i>resulting</i> self which is the final +valuer. The values of most objects are at first fixed +for us by instinct or they are suggested by the ethos +and mores of our groups—family, society, national religions, +and "reign under the appearance of habitual +self-suggested tendencies." The self is constituted accordingly. +Collisions with other selves, conflicts between +group valuations and standards and individual +impulses or desires, failure of old standards as applied +to new situations, bring about a more conscious definition +of purposes. The agent identifies himself with +these purposes, and values objects with reference to +them. In this process of revaluing and defining, of +comparing and anticipation, freedom is found if anywhere. +For if the process is a real one the elements<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">371</a></span> +do not remain unaffected by their relation to each +other and to the whole. The act is not determined by +any single antecedent or by the sum of antecedents. +It is determined by the process. The self is not made +wholly by heredity, or environment. <i>It is itself creating +for each of its elements a new environment</i>, viz., the +process of reflection and choice. And if man can +change the heredity of pigeons and race horses by +suitable selection, if every scientific experiment is a +varying of conditions, it is at least plausible that man +can guide his own acts by intelligence, and revise his +values by criticism.</p> + +<p>The self is itself creating for each of its elements a +new environment—this is a fact which if kept in mind +will enable us to see the abstractness and fallacies not +merely of libertarianism and determinism, but of subjectivism +and objectivism. Subjective or "inward" +theories have sought standards in the self; but in regarding +the self as an entity independent of such a +process as we have described they have exposed themselves +to the criticism of providing only private, variable, +accidental, unauthoritative sources of standards—instincts, +or emotions, or intuitions. The self of the +full moral consciousness, however,—the only one which +can claim acceptance or authority—is born only in the +process of considering real conditions, of weighing and +choosing between alternatives of action in a real world +of nature and persons. Its judgments are more than +subjective. Objectivism in its absolutist and abstract +forms assumes a standard—nature, essence, law—independent +of process. Such a standard is easily shown<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">372</a></span> +to be free from anything individual, private, or changing. +It is universal, consistent, and eternal, in fact it +has many good mathematical characteristics, but unfortunately +it is not moral. As mathematical, logical, +biological, or what not, it offers no standard that appeals +to the moral nature as authoritative or that can +help us to find our way home.</p> + +<h5>II</h5> + +<p>If we are dissatisfied with custom and habit and seek +to take philosophy for the guide of life we have two possibilities: +(1) we may look for the good, and treat +right and duty as subordinate concepts which indicate +the way to the good, that is, consider them as good as +a means, or (2) we may seek first to do right irrespective +of consequences, in the belief that in willing to do +right we are already in possession of the highest good. +In either case we may consider our standards and +values either as in some sense fixed or as in the making.<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> +We may suppose that good is objective and absolute, +that right is discovered by a rational faculty, or +we may consider that in regarding good as objective +we have not made it independent of the valuing process +and that in treating right as a standard we have not +thereby made it a fixed concept to be discovered by the +pure intellect. The position of this paper will be (1) +that good while objective is yet objective as a value and +not as an essence or physical fact; (2) that a social +factor in value throws light upon the relation between +moral and other values; (3) that right is not merely a +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">373</a></span> +means to the good but has an independent place in the +moral consciousness; (4) that right while signifying +order does not necessarily involve a timeless, eternal +order since it refers to an order of personal relations; +(5) that the conception of right instead of being a +matter for pure reason or even the "cognitive faculty" +shows an intimate blending of the emotional and intellectual +and that this appears particularly in the conception +of the reasonable.</p> + +<p class="tb">(1) We begin with the question of the synthetic and +objective character of the good. With G. E. Moore +as with the utilitarians the good is the ultimate concept. +Right and duty are means to the good. Moore +and Rashdall also follow Sidgwick in regarding good +as unique, that is, as "synthetic." Sidgwick emphasized +in this especially the point that moral value cannot +be decided by physical existence or the course of +evolution, nor can the good be regarded as meaning the +pleasant. Moore and Russell reinforce this. However +true it may be that pleasure is one among other good +things or that life is one among other good things, +good does not mean either pleasure or survival. Good +means just "good."</p> + +<p>A similar thought underlies Croce's division of the +Practical into the two spheres of the Economic and +the Ethical. "The economic activity is that which +wills and effects only what corresponds to the conditions +of fact in which a man finds himself; the ethical +activity is that which, although it correspond to these +conditions, also refers to something that transcends<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">374</a></span> +them. To the first correspond what are called individual +ends, to the second universal ends; the one gives +rise to the judgment concerning the greater or less coherence +of the action taken in itself, the other to that +concerning its greater or less coherence in respect to +the universal end, which transcends the individual.<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> +Utilitarianism is according to Croce an attempt to reduce +the Ethical to the Economic form, although the +utilitarians as men attempt in various ways to make +a place for that distinction which as philosophers they +would suppress. "Man is not a consumer of pleasures. +He is a creator of life." With this claim of the distinctive, +synthetic, character of the moral consciousness +and of the impossibility of testing the worth of ideals +by cosmic laws, or by gratification of particular wants +as measured by pleasure, I have no issue. The +analysis of the moral judgment made above points out +just how it is that good is synthetic. It is synthetic +in that it represents a measuring and valuing of ends—instinctive +and imagined, individual and social—against +each other and as part of a whole to which a +growing self corresponds. It is synthetic in that it +represents not merely a process of evaluating ends +which match actually defined desires, but also a process +in which the growing self, dissatisfied with any ends already +in view, gropes for some new definition of ends +that shall better respond to its living, creative capacity, +its active synthetic character. Good is the concept +for just this valuing process as carried on by a +conscious being that is not content to take its desire +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">375</a></span> +as ready made by its present construction, but is +reaching out for ends that shall respond to a growing, +expanding, inclusive, social, self. It expresses value <i>as</i> +value.</p> + +<p>Value <i>as value</i>! not as being; nor as independent +essence; nor as anything static and fixed. For a synthetic +self, a living personality, could find no supreme +value in the complete absence of valuing, in the cessation +of life, in the negation of that very activity of projection, +adventure, construction, and synthesis in which +it has struck out the concept good. A theory of ethics +which upholds the synthetic character of the good may +be criticized as being not synthetic enough if it fails +to see that on the basis of the mutual determination +of percepts and concepts, of self and objects, the synthetic +character of the process must be reflected in the +ultimate meaning of the category which symbolizes and +incorporates the process.</p> + +<p>(2) We may find some light upon the question how +moral value gets its distinctive and unique character, +and how it comes to be more "objective" than economic +value if we consider some of the social factors +in the moral judgment. For although the concept +good is rooted in the life process with its selective activity +and attending emotions it involves a subtle social +element, as well as the more commonly recognized factors +of intelligence.</p> + +<p>Within the fundamental selective process two types +of behavior tend to differentiate in response to two general +sorts of stimulation. One sort is simpler, more +monotonous, more easily analyzable. Response to such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">376</a></span> +stimulation, or treatment of objects which may be described +under these terms of simple, analyzable, etc., is +easily organized into a habit. It calls for no great +shifts in attention, no sudden readjustments. There is +nothing mysterious about it. As satisfying various +wants it has a certain kind of value. It, however, +evokes no consciousness of self. Toward the more variable, +complex sort of stimuli, greater attention, constant +adjustment and readjustment, are necessary.</p> + +<p>Objects of the first sort are treated as things, in the +sense that they do not call out any respect from us +or have any intrinsic value. We understand them +through and through, manipulate them, consume them, +throw them away. We regard them as valuable only +with reference to our wants. On the other hand, objects +of the second sort take their place in a bi-focal +situation. Our attention shifts alternately to their behavior +and to our response, or, conversely, from our +act to their response. This back and forth movement +of attention in the case of certain of these objects is +reinforced by the fact that certain stimuli from them +or from the organism, find peculiar responses already +prepared in social instincts; gesture and language play +their part. Such a bi-focal situation as this, when +completely developed, involves persons. In its earlier +stages it is the quasi-personal attitude which is found +in certain savage religious attitudes, in certain æsthetic +attitudes, and in the emotional attitudes which we all +have toward many of the objects of daily life.</p> + +<p>Economic values arise in connection with attitudes +toward things. We buy things, we sell them. They<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">377</a></span> +have value just in that they gratify our wants, but +they do not compel any revision or change in wants or +in the self which wants. They represent a partial interest—or +if they become the total interest we regard +them as now in the moral sphere. Values of personal +affection arise as we find a constant rapport in thought, +feeling, purpose, between the two members of our social +consciousness. The attitude is that of going along +with another and thereby extending and enriching our +experiences. We enter into his ideas, range with his +imagination, kindle at his enthusiasms, sympathize with +his joys or sorrows. We may disagree with our +friend's opinions, but we do not maintain a critical attitude +toward <i>him</i>, that is, toward his fundamental +convictions and attitudes. If "home is the place +where, when you have to go there, they have to take +you in," as Frost puts it, a friend is one who, when +you go to him, has to accept you.</p> + +<p>Moral values also arise in a social or personal relation—not +in relation to things. This is on the surface +in the form of judgment; "He is a good man," "That +is a good act." If it is less obvious in the practical +judgment, "This is the better course of action," i.e., +the course which leads to the greater good, or to the +good, this is because we fail to discern that the good +in these cases is a something with which I can identify +myself, not a something which I merely possess and +keep separate from my personality. It is something +I shall be rather than have. Or if I speak of a share +or participation it is a sharing in the sense of entering +into a kindred life. It is an ideal, and an ideal for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">378</a></span> +a conscious personal being can hardly be other than +conscious. It may be objected that however personal +the ideal it is not on this account necessarily social. +It embodies what I would be, but does not necessarily +imply response to any other personality. This, however, +would be to overlook the analyses which recent +psychology has made of the personal. The ideal does +not develop in a vacuum. It implies for one thing individuality +which is conceivable only as other individuals +are distinguished. It implies the definition of +purposes, and such definition is scarcely if ever attempted +except as a possible world of purposes is +envisaged.</p> + +<p>Æsthetic valuation is in certain respects intermediate +between the valuation of things on the one hand +and the moral evaluation of acts of persons or conscious +states on the other. Æsthetic objects are in +many cases seemingly things and yet even as things +they are quasi-personal; they are viewed with a certain +sympathy quite different from that which we feel +for a purely economic object. If it is a work of art +the artist has embodied his thought and feeling and +the observer finds it there. The experience is that of +<i>Einfühlung</i>. Yet we do not expect the kind of response +which we look for in friendship, nor do we take the object +as merely a factor for the guidance or control of +our own action as in the practical judgment of +morality. The æsthetic becomes the object of contemplation, +not of response; of embodied meaning, not +of individuality. It is so far personal that no one of +æsthetic sensibility likes to see a thing of beauty destroyed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">379</a></span> +or mistreated. The situation in which we recognize +in an object meaning and embodied feeling, or +at least find sources of stimulation which appeal to our +emotions, develops an æsthetic enhancement of conscious +experience. The æsthetic value predicate is the +outcome of this peculiar enhancement.</p> + +<p>It seems that the social nature of the judgment plays +a part also in the varying objectivity of values. It is +undoubtedly true that some values are treated as belonging +to objects. If we cannot explain this fully we +may get some light upon the situation by noticing the +degree to which this is true in the cases of the kinds +of values already described.</p> + +<p>Economic values are dubiously objective. We use +both forms of expression. We say on the one hand, +"I want wheat," "There is a demand for wheat," or, +on the other, "Wheat is worth one dollar a bushel." +Conversely, "There is no demand for the old-fashioned +high-framed bicycle" or "It is worthless." The Middle +Ages regarded economic value as completely objective. +A thing had a <i>real value</i>. The retailer could not +add to it. The mediæval economist believed in the externality +of relations; he prosecuted for the offenses of +forestalling and regrating the man who would make a +profit by merely changing things in place. He condemned +usury. We have definitely abandoned this +theory. We recognize that it is the want which makes +the value. To make exchange possible and socialize +to some degree the scale of prices we depend upon a +public market or a stock exchange.</p> + +<p>In values of personal affection we may begin with a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">380</a></span> +purely individual attitude, "I love or esteem my +friend." If I put it more objectively I may say, "He +is an honored and valued friend." Perhaps still more +objectively, we—especially if we are feminine—may +say "Is not X dear?" We may then go on to seek a social +standard. We perhaps look for reinforcement in +a small group of like-minded. We are a little perplexed +and, it may be, aggrieved if other members of +the circle do not love the one whom we love. In such +a group judgment of a common friend there is doubtless +greater objectivity than in the economic judgment. +The value of a friend does not depend upon his adjustment +to our wants. As Aristotle pointed out, true +friendship is for its own sake. Its value is "disinterested." +If a man does not care for an economic good +it does not reflect upon him. He may be careless of +futures, neglectful of corn, indifferent to steel. It lessens +the demand, lowers the values of these goods, an +infinitesimal, but does not write him down an inferior +person. To fail to prize a possible friend is a reflection +upon us. However the fact that in the very nature +of the case one can scarcely be a personal friend +to a large, not to say a universal group, operates to +limit the objectivity.</p> + +<p>In the æsthetic and moral attitudes we incorporate +value in the object decisively. We do not like to think +that beauty can be changed with shifting fashions or to +affirm that the firmament was ever anything but sublime. +It seems to belong to the very essence of right +that it is something to which the self can commit itself +in absolute loyalty and finality. And, as for good, we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">381</a></span> +may say with Moore in judgments of intrinsic value, +at least, "we judge concerning a particular state of +things that it would be worth while—would be a good +thing—that that state of things should exist, even if +nothing else were to exist besides."</p> + +<p>With regard to this problem of objectivity it is significant +in the first place that the kind of situation out +of which this object value is affirmed in æsthetic and +moral judgments is a social situation. It contrasts in +this respect with the economic situation. The economic +is indeed social in so far as it sets exchange values, but +the object valued is not a social object. The æsthetic +and moral object is such an object. Not only is there +no contradiction in giving to the symbolic form or the +moral act intrinsic value: there is entire plausibility in +doing so. For in so far as the situation is really personal, +<i>either member is fundamentally equal to the +other and may be treated as embodying all the value +of the situation</i>. The value which rises to consciousness +in the situation is made more complete by eliminating +from consideration the originating factors, the +plural agents of admiration or approval, and incorporating +the whole product abstractly in the object. +In thus calling attention to the social or personal character +of the æsthetic or moral object it is not intended +to minimize that factor in the judgment which we +properly speak of as the universalizing activity of +thought, much less to overlook the importance of the +judgmental process itself. The intention is to point +out some of the reasons why in one case the thinking +process does universalize while in the other it does not,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">382</a></span> +why in one case the judgment is completely objective +while in the other it is not. In both æsthetic and moral +judgments social art, social action, social judgments, +through collective decisions prepare the way for the +general non-personal, objective form. It is probable +that man would not say, "This is right," using the +word as an adjective, if he had not first said, as member +of a judicially acting group, "This is right," using +the word as a noun. And finally whatever we may +claim as to the "cognitive" nature of the æsthetic and +moral judgment, the only test for the beauty of an object +is that persons of taste discover it. The only test +for the rightness of an act is that persons of good +character approve it. The only test for goodness is +that good persons on reflection approve and choose it—just +as the test for good persons is that they choose +and do the good.</p> + +<p>(3) Right is not merely a means to good but has +a place of its own in the moral consciousness. Many +of our moral choices or judgments do not take the +form of choice between right and wrong, or between +duty and its opposite; they appear to be choices between +goods. That is, we do not always consider our +value as crystallized into a present standard or feel a +tension between a resisting and an authoritative self. +But when they do emerge they signify a distinct factor. +What Moore says of good may be said also of +right. Right means just "right," nothing else. +That is, we mean that acts so characterized correspond +exactly to a self in a peculiar attitude, viz., one of adequate +standardizing and adjustment, of equilibrium, in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">383</a></span> +view of all relations. The concept signifies that in finding +our way into a moral world into which we are born +in the process of valuing and judging, we take along +the imagery of social judgment in which through language +and behavior the individual is constantly adjusting +himself, not only to the social institutions, and +group organization but far more subtly and unconsciously +to the social consciousness and attitudes.</p> + +<p>This conception of an order to which the act must +refer has usually been regarded as peculiarly a "rational" +factor. It is, however, rather an order of +social elements, of a nature of persons, than of a +"nature of things." In savage life the position of +father, wife, child, guest, or other members of the household, +is one of the most prominent facts of the situation. +The relationship of various totem groups and inter-marrying +groups is the very focus of moral consciousness. +Even in the case of such a cosmic conception of +order as Dike and Themis, Rita and Tao, the "Way" +is not impersonal cosmos. It is at least quasi-personal. +And if we say such primitive myth has no bearing on +what the "nature" of right or the "true" meaning +of right is, it is pertinent to repeat that concepts without +percepts are empty; that the term means nothing +except the conceptual interpretation of a unique synthetic +process in which an act placed in relation to a +standard is thereby given new meaning. So long as +custom or law forms the only or the dominant factor +in the process, we have little development of the ideal +concept right as distinct from a factual standard. +But when reason and intelligence enter, particularly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">384</a></span> +when that creative activity of intelligence enters which +attempts a new construction of ends, a new ordering +of possible experience, then the standardizing process +is set free; a new self with new possibilities of relation +seeks expression. The concept "right" reflects the +standardizing, valuing process of a synthetic order and +a synthetic self. Duty born similarly in the world of +social relations and reflecting especially the tension between +the individual and the larger whole is likewise +given full moral significance when it becomes a tension +within the synthetic self. And as thus reflecting the +immediate attitudes of the self to an ideal social order +both right and duty are not to be treated merely as +means to any value which does not include as integrant +factors just what these signify.</p> + +<p>This view is contrary to that of Moore, for whom +"right does and can mean nothing but 'cause of a +good result,' and is thus identical with useful."<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> +The right act is that which has the best consequences.<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> +Similarly duty is that action which will cause more +good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative. +It is evident that this makes it impossible for +any finite mind to assert confidently that any act is +right or a duty. "Accordingly it follows that we never +have any reason to suppose that an action is our duty: +we can never be sure that any action will produce the +greatest value possible.<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a></p> + +<p>Whatever the convenience of such a definition of right +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">385</a></span> +and duty for a simplified ethics it can hardly be claimed +to accord with the moral consciousness, for men have +notoriously supposed certain acts to be duty. To say +that a parent has no reason to suppose that it is his +duty to care for his child is more than paradox. And +a still greater contradiction to the morality of common +sense inheres in the doctrine that the right act is that +which has the best consequences. Considering all the +good to literature and free inquiry which has resulted +from the condemnation of Socrates it is highly probable—or +at least it is arguable—that the condemnation had +better results than an acquittal would have yielded. But +it would be contrary to our ordinary use of language +to maintain that this made the act right. Or to take +a more recent case: the present war may conceivably +lead to a more permanent peace. The "severities," +practised by one party, may stir the other to greater +indignation and lead ultimately to triumph of the latter. +Will the acts in question be termed right by the second +party if they actually have this effect? On this hypothesis +the more outrageous an act and the greater +the reaction against it, the better the consequences are +likely to be and hence the more reason to call the act +right and a duty. The paradox results from omitting +from right the elements of the immediate situation and +considering only consequences. The very meaning of +the concept right, implies focussing attention upon the +present rather than upon the future. It suggests a +cross-section of life in its relations. If the time process +were to be arrested immediately after our act I think +we might still speak of it as right or wrong. In trying<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">386</a></span> +to judge a proposed act we doubtless try to discover +what it will mean, that is, we look at consequences. But +these consequences are looked upon as giving us the +meaning of the present act and we do not on this account +subordinate the present act to these consequences. +Especially we do not mean to eliminate the significance +of this very process of judgment. It is significant that +in considering what are the intrinsic goods Moore +enumerates personal affection and the appreciation of +beauty, and with less positiveness, true belief, but does +not include any mention of the valuing or choosing or +creative consciousness.</p> + +<p>(4) If we regard right as the concept which reflects +the judgment of standardizing our acts by some ideal +order, questions arise as to the objectivity of this order +and the fixed or moving character of the implied standard. +Rashdall lays great stress upon the importance +of objectivity: "Assuredly there is no scientific problem +upon which so much depends as upon the answer +we give to the question whether the distinction which +we are accustomed to draw between right and wrong +belongs to the region of objective truth like the laws +of mathematics and of physical science, or whether it +is based upon an actual emotional constitution of individual +human beings."<a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> The appraisement of the +various desires and impulses by myself and other men +is "a piece of insight into the true nature of things."<a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> +While these statements are primarily intended to oppose +the moral sense view of the judgment, they also bear +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">387</a></span> +upon the question whether right is something fixed. +The phrase "insight into the true nature of things" +suggests at once the view that the nature of things +is quite independent of any attitude of human beings +toward it. It is something which the seeker for moral +truth may discover but nothing which he can in +any way modify. It is urged that if we are to have any +science of ethics at all what was once right must be +conceived as always right in the same circumstances.<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a></p> + +<p>I hold no brief for the position—if any one holds the +position—that in saying "this is right" I am making +an assertion about my own feelings or those of any one +else. As already stated the function of the judging +process is to determine objects, with reference to which +we say "is" or "is not." The emotional theory of +the moral consciousness does not give adequate recognition +to this. But just as little as the process of the +moral consciousness is satisfied by an emotional theory +of the judgment does it sanction any conception of +objectivity which requires that values are here or there +once for all; that they are fixed entities or "a nature +of things" upon which the moral consciousness may +look for its information but upon which it exercises no +influence. The process of attempting to give—or discover—moral +values is a process of mutual determination +of object and agent. We have to do in morals not +with a nature of things but with natures of persons. +The very characteristic of a person as we have understood +it is that he is synthetic, is actually creating +something new by organizing experiences and purposes, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">388</a></span> +by judging and choosing. Objectivity does not necessarily +imply changelessness.</p> + +<p>Whether right is a term of fixed and changeless character +depends upon whether the agents are fixed units, +either in fact or in ideal. If, as we maintain, right is +the correlate of a self confronting a world of other +persons conceived as all related in an order, the vital +question is whether this order is a fixed or a moving +order. "Straight" is a term of fixed content just because +we conceive space in timeless terms; it is by its very +meaning a cross-section of a static order. But a world +of living intelligent agents in social relations is in its +very presuppositions a world of activity, of mutual +understanding and adjustment. Rationalistic theory, +led astray by geometrical conceptions, conceived that +a universal criterion must be like a straight line, a fixed +and timeless—or eternal—entity. But in such an order +of fixed units there could be no selection, no adjustment +to other changing agents, no adventure upon the new +untested possibility which marks the advance of every +great moral idea, in a word, no morality of the positive +and constructive sort. And if it be objected that the +predicate of a judgment must be timeless whatever +the subject, that the word "is" as Plato insists cannot +be used if all flows, we reply that if right=the correlate +of a moving order, of living social intelligent beings, +it is quite possible to affirm "This is according to +that law." If our logic provides no form of judgment +for the analysis of such a situation it is inadequate for +the facts which it would interpret. But in truth mankind's +moral judgments have never committed themselves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">389</a></span> +to any such implication. We recognize the futility of +attempting to answer simply any such questions as +whether the Israelites did right to conquer Canaan or +Hamlet to avenge his father.</p> + +<p>(5) The category of right has usually been closely +connected, if not identified, with reason or "cognitive" +activity as contrasted with emotion. Professor Dewey +on the contrary has pointed out clearly<a name="FNanchor_76" id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">76</a> the impossibility +of separating emotion and thought. "To put ourselves +in the place of another ... is the surest way to +attain universality and objectivity of moral knowledge." +"The only truly general, the reasonable as distinct +from the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the +<i>generous</i> thought." But in the case of certain judgments +such as those approving fairness and the general +good Sidgwick finds a rational intuition. "The principle +of impartiality is obtained by considering the +similarity of the individuals that make up a Logical +Whole or Genus."<a name="FNanchor_77" id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">77</a> Rashdall challenges any but a +rationalistic ethics to explain fairness as contrasted with +partiality of affection.</p> + +<p>There is without question a properly rational or intellectual +element in the judgment of impartiality, +namely, analysis of the situation and comparison of the +units. But what we shall set up as our units—whether +we shall treat the gentile or the barbarian or negro as +a person, as end and not merely means, or not, depends +on something quite other than reason. And this other +factor is not covered by the term "practical reason." +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">390</a></span> +In fact no ethical principle shows better the subtle +blending of the emotional and social factors with the +rational. For the student of the history of justice is +aware that only an extraordinarily ingenious exegesis +could regard justice as having ever been governed by +a mathematical logic. The logic of justice has been +the logic of a we-group gradually expanding its area. +Or it has been the logic of a Magna Charta—a document +of special privileges wrested from a superior by a strong +group, and gradually widening its benefits with the +admission of others into the favored class. Or it has +been the logic of class, in which those of the same level +are treated alike but those of different levels of birth +or wealth are treated proportionately. Yet it would +seem far-fetched to maintain that the countrymen of +Euclid and Aristotle were deficient in the ability to +perform so simple a reasoning process as the judgment +one equals one, or that men who developed the Roman +Law, or built the cathedrals of the Middle Ages, were +similarly lacking in elementary analysis. Inequality +rather than equality has been the rule in the world's +justice. It has not only been the practice but the approved +principle. It still is in regard to great areas +of life. In the United States there is no general disapproval +of the great inequalities in opportunity for +children, to say nothing of inequalities in distribution +of wealth. In England higher education is for the +classes rather than for the masses. In Prussia the inequality +in voting strength of different groups and the +practical immunity of the military class from the constraints +of civil law seem to an American unfair. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">391</a></span> +western states of the Union think it unfair to restrict +the suffrage to males and give women no voice in the +determination of matters of such vital interest to them +as the law of divorce, the guardianship of children, the +regulation of women's labor, the sale of alcoholic liquors, +the protection of milk and food supply. Are all these +differences of practice and conviction due to the fact +that some people use reason while others do not? Of +course in every case excellent reasons can be given for +the inequality. The gentile should not be treated as a +Jew because he is not a Jew. The slave should not +be treated as a free citizen because he is not a free +citizen. The churl should not have the same wergeld +as the thane because he is lowborn. The more able +should possess more goods. The woman should not vote +because she is not a man. The reasoning is clear and +unimpeachable if you accept the premises, but what +gives the premises? In every case cited the premise +is determined largely if not exclusively by social or +emotional factors. If reason can then prescribe equally +well that the slave should be given rights because he is +a man of similar traits or denied rights because he has +different traits from his master, if the Jew may either +be given his place of equality because he hath eyes, +hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions, +or denied equality because he differs in descent, if a +woman is equal as regards taxpaying but unequal as +regards voting, it is at least evident that reason is no +unambiguous source of morality. The devil can quote +Scripture and it is a very poor reasoner who cannot +find a reason for anything that he wishes to do. A<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">392</a></span> +partiality that is more or less consistently partial to +certain sets or classes is perhaps as near impartiality +as man has yet come, whether by a rational faculty or +any other.</p> + +<p>Is it, then, the intent of this argument merely to +reiterate that reason is and ought to be the slave of +the passions? On the contrary, the intent is to substitute +for such blanket words as reason and passions +a more adequate analysis. And what difference will +this make? As regards the particular point in controversy +it will make this difference: the rationalist +having smuggled in under the cover of reason the whole +moral consciousness then proceeds to assume that because +two and two are always four, or the relations of +a straight line are timeless, therefore ethics is similarly +a matter of fixed standards and timeless goods. +A legal friend told me that he once spent a year trying +to decide whether a corporation was or was not a person +and then concluded that the question was immaterial. +But when the supreme court decided that a +corporation was a person in the meaning of the Fourteenth +Amendment it thereby made the corporation +heir to the rights established primarily for the negro. +Can the moral consciousness by taking the name +"reason" become heir to all the privileges of the +absolute idea and to the timelessness of space and +number?</p> + +<p>Suppose I am to divide an apple between my two +children—two children, two pieces—this is an analysis +of the situation which is obvious and may well be called +the analytic activity of reason. But shall I give to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">393</a></span> +each an equal share on the ground that both are equally +my children or shall I reason that as John is older or +larger or hungrier or mentally keener or more generous +or is a male, he shall have a larger piece than Jane? +To settle this it may be said that we ought to see +whether there is any connection between the size of the +piece and the particular quality of John which is considered, +or that by a somewhat different use of reason +we should look at the whole situation and see how we +shall best promote family harmony and mutual affection. +To settle the first of these problems, that of +the connection between the size of the piece and the +size of the hunger or the sex of the child, is seemingly +again a question of analysis, of finding identical units, +but a moment's thought shows that the case is not so +simple; that the larger child should have the larger +piece is by no means self-evident. This is in principle +doubtless the logic, to him that hath shall be given. +It is the logic of the survival of the strong, but over +against that the moral consciousness has always set another +logic which says that the smaller child should +have the larger piece if thereby intelligent sympathy can +contribute toward evening up the lot of the smaller. +Now it is precisely this attitude of the moral consciousness +which is not suggested by the term reason, for it +is quite different from the analytic and identifying activity. +This analytical and identifying activity may +very well rule out of court the hypothesis that I should +give John the larger piece because he has already eaten +too much or because he has just found a penny or because +he has red hair; it has undoubtedly helped in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">394</a></span> +abolishing such practices as that of testing innocence +by the ordeal. But before the crucial question of justice +which divides modern society, namely, whether we shall +lay emphasis upon adjustment of rewards to previous +abilities, habits, possessions, character, or shall lay +stress upon needs, and the possibility of bringing about +a greater measure of equality, the doctrine which would +find its standard in an <i>a priori</i> reason is helpless.</p> + +<p>If we look at the second test suggested, namely, that +of considering the situation as a whole with a view to +the harmony of the children and the mutual affection +within the family, there can be even less question that +this is no mere logical problem of the individuals in a +logical genus. It is the social problem of individuals +who have feelings and emotions as well as thought and +will. The problem of distributing the apple fairly is +then a complex in which at least the following processes +enter. (1) Analysis of the situation to show all the +relevant factors with the full bearing of each; (2) putting +yourself in the place of each one to be considered +and experiencing to the full the claims, the difficulties +and the purposes of each person involved; (3) considering +all of these <i>as</i> members of the situation so +that no individual is given rights or allowed claims +except in so far as he represents a point of view which +is comprehensive and sympathetic. This I take it is +the force of President Wilson's utterance which has +commanded such wide acceptance: "America asks nothing +for herself except what she has a right to ask in +the name of humanity." Kant aimed to express a high +and democratic ideal of justice in his doctrine that we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">395</a></span> +should treat every rational being as end. The defect +in his statement is that the rational process as such has +never treated and so far as can be foreseen never will +treat <i>human</i> beings as ends. To treat a human being +as an end it is necessary to put oneself into his place +in his whole nature and not simply in his universalizing, +and legislative aspects: Kant's principle is profound +and noble, but his label for it is misleading and leaves +a door open for appalling disregard of other people's +feelings, sympathies, and moral sentiments, as Professor +Dewey has indicated in his recent lectures on "German +Philosophy and Politics."</p> + +<p>The term "reasonable," which is frequently used in +law and common life as a criterion of right, seems to +imply that reason is a standard. As already stated, +common life understands by the reasonable man one who +not only uses his own thinking powers but is willing to +listen to reason as presented by some one else. He +makes allowance for frailties in human nature. To be +reasonable means, very nearly, taking into account all +factors of the case not only as I see them but as men +of varying capacities and interests regard them. The +type of the "unreasonable" employer is the man who +refuses to talk over things with the laborers; to put +himself in their place; or to look at matters from the +point of view of society as a whole.</p> + +<p>Just as little does the term reasonable as used in +law permit a purely intellectualistic view of the process +or an <i>a priori</i> standard. The question as to what is +reasonable care or a reasonable price is often declared +to be a matter not for the court but for the jury to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">396</a></span> +decide, i.e., it is not to be deduced from any settled +principle but is a question of what the average thoughtful +man, who considers other people as well as himself, +would do under the circumstances. A glance at some +of the judicial definitions of such phrases as "reasonable +care," "reasonable doubt," "reasonable law," as +brought together in <i>Words and Phrases Judicially Defined</i>, +illustrates this view. We get a picture not of +any definite standard but of such a process as we have +described in our analysis, namely, a process into which +the existing social tradition, the mutual adjustments +of a changing society and the intelligent consideration +of all facts, enter. The courts have variously defined +the reasonable (1) as the customary, or ordinary, or +legal, or (2) as according with the existing state of +knowledge in some special field, or (3) as proceeding +on due consideration of all the facts, or (4) as offering +sufficient basis for action. For example, (1) reasonable +care means "according to the usages, habits, and +ordinary risks of the business," (2) "surgeons should +keep up with the latest advances in medical science," +(3) a reasonable price "is such a price as the jury +would under all the circumstances decide to be reasonable." +"If, after an impartial comparison and consideration +the jury can say candidly they are not satisfied +with the defendant's guilt they have a reasonable +doubt." Under (4) falls one of various definitions of +"beyond reasonable doubt." "The evidence must be +such as to produce in the minds of prudent men such +certainty that they would act without hesitation in +their own most important affairs." There is evidently<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">397</a></span> +ground for the statement of one judge that "reasonable" +(he was speaking the phrase "reasonable care," +but his words would seem to apply to other cases) "cannot +be measured by any fixed or inflexible standard." +Professor Freund characterizes "reasonable" as "the +negation of precision." In the development of judicial +interpretation as applied to the Sherman Law the tendency +is to hold that the "rule of reason" will regard as +forbidden by the statute (<i>a</i>) such combinations as have +historically been prohibited and (<i>b</i>) such as seem to +work some definite injury.</p> + +<h5>III</h5> + +<p>The above view of the function of intelligence, and of +the synthetic character of the conscious process may be +further defined in certain aspects by comparison with +the view of Professor Fite, who likewise develops the significance +of consciousness and particularly of intelligence +for our ethical concepts and social program.</p> + +<p>Professor Fite insists that in contrast with the "functional +psychology" which would make consciousness +merely a means to the preservation of the organic individual +in mechanical working order, the whole value +of life from the standpoint of the conscious agent consists +in its being conscious. Creative moments in which +there is complete conscious control of materials and +technique represent high and unique individuality. Extension +of range of consciousness makes the agent "a +larger and more inclusive being," for he is living in the +future and past as well as in the present. Consciousness +means that a new and original force is inserted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">398</a></span> +into the economy of the social and the physical world."<a name="FNanchor_78" id="FNanchor_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">78</a> +On the basis of the importance of consciousness Professor +Fite would ground his justification of rights, his +conception of justice, and his social program. The +individual derives his rights simply from the fact that +he knows what he is doing, hence as individuals differ +in intelligence they differ in rights. The problem of +justice is that of according to each a degree of recognition +proportioned to his intelligence, that is, treat +others as ends so far as they are intelligent; so far +as they are ignorant treat them as means.<a name="FNanchor_79" id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">79</a> "The +conscious individual when dealing with other conscious +individuals will take account of their aims, as of other +factors in his situation. This will involve 'adjustment,' +but not abandonment of ends, i.e., self-sacrifice. +Obligation to consider these ends of others is based +on 'the same logic that binds me to get out of the way +of an approaching train.'"<a name="FNanchor_80" id="FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">80</a></p> + +<p>The point in which the conception of rights and +justice and the implied social program advocated in +this paper differs as I view it from that of Professor +Fite is briefly this. I regard both the individual and +his rights as essentially synthetic and in constant process +of reconstruction. Therefore what is due to any +individual at a moment is not measured by his present +stage of consciousness. It is measured rather by his +possibilities than his actualities. This does not mean +that the actual is to be ignored, but it does mean that +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">399</a></span> +if we take our stand upon the actual we are committed +to a program with little place for imagination, with an +emphasis all on the side of giving people what they +deserve rather than of making them capable of deserving +more. Professor Fite's position I regard as conceiving +consciousness itself too largely in the category +of the identical and the static rather than in the more +"conscious" categories of constant reconstruction. +When by virtue of consciousness you conceive new ends +in addition to your former particular ideas of present +good the problem is, he says, "to secure perfect fulfilment +of each of them." The "usefulness" or "advantage" +or "profitableness" of entering into social +relations is the central category for measuring their +value and their obligation.</p> + +<p>Now the conception of securing perfect fulfilment +of all one's aims by means of society rather than of +putting one's own aims into the process for reciprocal +modification and adjustment with the aims of others +and of the new social whole involves a view of these ends +as fixed, an essentially mechanical view. The same is +the implication in considering society from the point +of view of use and profit. As previously suggested +these economic terms apply appropriately to things +rather than to intrinsic values. To consider the uses +of a fellow-being is to measure him in terms of some +other end than his own intrinsic personal worth. To +consider family life or society as profitable implies in +ordinary language that such life is a means for securing +ends already established rather than that it <i>proves</i> a +good to the man who invests in it and thereby becomes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">400</a></span> +himself a new individual with a new standard of values. +Any object to be chosen must of course have value to +the chooser. But it is one thing to be valued because +it appeals to the actual chooser as already constituted; +it is another thing to be valued because it appeals to a +moving self which adventures upon this new unproved +objective. This second is the distinction of taking +an interest instead of being interested.</p> + +<p>The second point of divergence is that Professor Fite +lays greater stress upon the intellectual side of intelligence, +whereas I should deny that the intellectual activity +in itself is adequate to give either a basis for +obligation or a method of dealing with the social problem. +The primary fact, as Professor Fite well states +it, is "that men are conscious beings and therefore +know themselves and one another." It involves "a +mutual recognition of personal ends." "That very +knowledge which shows the individual himself shows him +also that he is living in a world with other persons and +other things whose mode of behavior and whose interests +determine for him the conditions through which his own +interests are to be realized."</p> + +<p>What kind of "knowledge" is it "which shows the +individual himself"? Professor Fite has two quite different +ways of referring to this. He uses one set of +terms when he would contrast his view with the sentimental, +or the "Oriental," or justify exploitation by +those who know better what they are about than the +exploited. He uses another set of terms to characterize +it when he wishes to commend his view as human, and +fraternal, and as affording the only firm basis for social<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">401</a></span> +reform. In the first case he speaks of "mere knowing"; +of intelligence as "clear," and "far-sighted," of higher +degrees of consciousness as simply "more in one." +"Our test of intelligence would be breadth of vision +(in a coherent view), fineness and keenness of insight."<a name="FNanchor_81" id="FNanchor_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">81</a></p> + +<p>In the second case it is "generous," it will show an +"intelligent sympathy"; it seeks "fellowship," and +would not "elect to live in a social environment in +which the distinction of 'inferiors' were an essential +part of the idea."<a name="FNanchor_82" id="FNanchor_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">82</a> The type of intelligence is found +not in the man seeking wealth or power, nor in the legal +acumen which forecasts all discoverable consequences +and devises means to carry out purposes, but in literature +and art.<a name="FNanchor_83" id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">83</a></p> + +<p>The terms which cover both these meanings are the +words "consider" and "considerate." "Breadth of +consideration" gives the basis for rights. The selfish +man is the "inconsiderate."<a name="FNanchor_84" id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> This term plays the +part of the <i>amor intellectualis</i> in the system of Spinoza, +which enables him at once to discard all emotion and yet +to keep it. For "consideration" is used in common +life, and defined in the dictionaries, as meaning both +"examination," "careful thought," and "appreciative +or sympathetic regard." The ambiguity in the term +may well have served to disguise from the author himself +the double rôle which intelligence is made to play. +The broader use is the only one that does justice to the +moral consciousness, but we cannot include sympathy +and still maintain that "mere knowing" covers the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">402</a></span> +whole. The insistence at times upon the "mere knowing" +is a mechanical element which needs to be removed +before the ethical implications can be accepted.</p> + +<p>Once more, how does one know himself and others? +Is it the same process precisely as knowing a mechanical +object? Thoughts without percepts are empty, and +what are the "percepts" in the two cases? In the first +case, that of knowing things, the percepts are colors, +sounds, resistances; in the case of persons the percepts +are impulses, feelings, desires, passions, as well as +images, purposes, and the reflective process itself. In +the former case we construct objects dehumanized; +in the latter we keep them more or less concrete. But +now, just as primitive man did not so thoroughly de-personalize +nature, but left in it an element of personal +aim, so science may view human beings as objects whose +purposes and even feelings may be predicted, and hence +may, as Professor Fite well puts it, view them mechanically. +What he fails to note is that just this mechanical +point of view is the view of "mere knowing"—if +"mere" has any significance at all, it is meant to shut +out "sentiment." And this mechanical view is entirely +equal to the adjectives of "clear," "far-sighted," and +even "broad" so far as this means "more in one." +For it is not essential to a mechanical point of view +that we consider men in masses or study them by statistics. +I may calculate the purposes and actions, yes, +and the emotions and values of one, or of a thousand, +and be increasingly clear, and far-sighted, and broad, +but if it is "mere" knowing—scientific information—it +is still "mechanical," i.e., external. On the other<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">403</a></span> +hand, if it is to be a knowledge that has the qualities +of humaneness, or "intelligent sympathy," it must +have some of the stuff of feeling, even as in the realm +of things an artist's forest will differ from that of the +most "far-sighted," "clear," and "broad" statistician, +by being rich with color and moving line.</p> + +<p>And this leads to a statement of the way in which my +fellow-beings will find place in "my" self. I grant that +if they are there I shall take some account of them. +But they may be there in all sorts of ways. They +may be there as "population" if I am a statistician, +or as "consumers," or as rivals, or as enemies, or +as fellows, or as friends. They will have a "value" +in each case, but it will sometimes be a positive value, +and sometimes a negative value. Which it will be, and +how great it will be, depends not on the mere fact of +these objects being "in consciousness" but on the +capacity in which they are there. And this capacity +depends on the dominant interest and not on mere +knowing. The trouble with the selfish man, says Professor +Fite, is that he "fails to consider," "he fails +to take account of me."<a name="FNanchor_85" id="FNanchor_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">85</a> Well, then, <i>why</i> does he +fail? <i>Why</i> does he not take account of me? He probably +does "consider" me in several of the ways that +are possible and in the ways that it suits him to consider +me. I call him selfish because he does not consider +me in the one particular way in which I wish to be +considered. And what will get me into his consideration +from this point of view? In some cases it may be +that I can speak: "Sir, you are standing on my toe," +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">404</a></span> +and as the message encounters no obstacle in any fixed +purpose or temperamental bent the idea has no difficulty +in penetrating his mind. In other cases it may +interfere with his desire to raise himself as high as +possible, but I may convince him by the same logic +as that of an "approaching railway train"—that he +must regard me. In still other cases—and it is these +that always test Individualism—I am not myself aware +of the injury, or I am too faint to protest. How shall +those who have no voice to speak get "consideration"? +Only by "intelligent sympathy," and by just those +emotions rooted in instinctive social tendencies which +an intellectualistic Individualism excludes or distrusts.</p> + +<h5>IV</h5> + +<p>What practical conclusion, if any, follows from this +interpretation of the moral consciousness and its categories? +Moral progress involves both the formation of +better ideals and the adoption of such ideals as actual +standards and guides of life. If our view is correct +we can construct better ideals neither by logical deduction +nor solely by insight into the nature of things—if +by this we mean things as they are. We must rather +take as our starting-point the conviction that moral +life is a process involving physical life, social intercourse, +measuring and constructive intelligence. We +shall endeavor to further each of these factors with the +conviction that thus we are most likely to reconstruct +our standards and find a fuller good.<a name="FNanchor_86" id="FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">86</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">405</a></span>Physical life, +which has often been depreciated from +the moral point of view, is not indeed by itself supreme, +but it is certain that much evil charged to a bad will +is due to morbid or defective conditions of the physical +organism. One would be ashamed to write such a truism +were it not that our juvenile courts and our prison +investigations show how far we are from having sensed +it in the past. And our present labor conditions show +how far our organization of industry is from any decent +provision for a healthy, sound, vigorous life of all the +people. This war is shocking in its destruction, but +it is doubtful if it can do the harm to Great Britain +that her factory system has done. And if life is in +one respect less than ideals, in another respect it is +greater; for it provides the possibility not only of +carrying out existing ideals but of the birth of new +and higher ideals.</p> + +<p>Social interaction likewise has been much discussed +but is still very inadequately realized. The great possibilities +of coöperation have long been utilized in war. +With the factory and commercial organization of the +past century we have hints of their economic power. +Our schools, books, newspapers, are removing some of +the barriers. But how far different social classes are +from any knowledge, not to say appreciation, of each +other! How far different races are apart! How easy +to inculcate national hatred and distrust! The fourth +great problem which baffles Wells's hero in the <i>Research</i> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">406</a></span> +<i>Magnificent</i> is yet far from solution. The great danger +to morality in America lies not in any theory as to the +subjectivity of the moral judgment, but in the conflict +of classes and races.</p> + +<p>Intelligence and reason are in certain respects advancing. +The social sciences are finding tools and +methods. We are learning to think of much of our +moral inertia, our waste of life, our narrowness, our +muddling and blundering in social arrangements, as +stupid—we do not like to be called stupid even if we +scorn the imputation of claiming to be "good." But +we do not organize peace as effectively as war. We +shrink before the thought of expending for scientific +investigation sums comparable with those used for military +purposes. And is scholarship entitled to shift the +blame entirely upon other interests? Perhaps if it +conceived its tasks in greater terms and addressed itself +to them more energetically it would find greater support.</p> + +<p>And finally the process of judgment and appraisal, +of examination and revaluation. To judge for the +sake of judging, to analyze and evaluate for the sake +of the process hardly seems worth while. But if we +supply the process with the new factors of increased +life, physical, social, intelligent, we shall be compelled +to new valuations. Such has been the course of moral +development; we may expect this to be repeated. The +great war and the changes that emerge ought to set +new tasks for ethical students. As medievalism, the +century of enlightenment, and the century of industrial +revolution, each had its ethics, so the century<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">407</a></span> +that follows ought to have its ethics, roused by the +problem of dealing fundamentally with economic, social, +racial, and national relations, and using the resources +of better scientific method than belonged to the ethical +systems which served well their time.</p> + +<p>Only wilful misinterpretation will suppose that the +method here set forth is that of taking every want +or desire as itself a final justification, or of making +morality a matter of arbitrary caprice. But some may +in all sincerity raise the question: "Is morality then +after all simply the shifting mores of groups stumbling +forward—or backward, or sidewise—with no fixed +standards of right and good? If this is so how can we +have any confidence in our present judgments, to say +nothing of calling others to an account or of reasoning +with them?" What we have aimed to present as a +moral method is essentially this: to take into our reckoning +all the factors in the situation, to take into +account the other persons involved, to put ourselves +into their places by sympathy as well as conceptually, +to face collisions and difficulties not merely in terms +of fixed concepts of what is good or fair, and what +the right of each party concerned may be, but with +the conviction that we need new definitions of the ideal +life, and of the social order, and thus reciprocally of +personality. Thus harmonized, free, and responsible, +life may well find new meaning also in the older intrinsic +goods of friendship, æsthetic appreciation and true +belief. And it is not likely to omit the satisfaction in +actively constructing new ideals and working for their +fulfilment.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">408</a></span>Frankly, +if we do not accept this method what remains? +Can any one by pure reason discover a single +forward step in the treatment of the social situation +or a single new value in the moral ideal? Can any +analysis of the pure concept of right and good teach +us anything? In the last analysis the moral judgment +is not analytic but synthetic. The moral life is not +natural but spiritual. And spirit is creative.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">409</a></span></p> + +<h2>VALUE AND EXISTENCE IN PHILOSOPHY, +ART, AND RELIGION</h2> + +<h4>HORACE M. KALLEN</h4> + +<p>He who assiduously compares the profound and the +commonplace will find their difference to turn merely +on the manner of their expression; a profundity is a +commonplace formulated in strange or otherwise obscure +and unintelligible terms. This must be my excuse +for beginning with the trite remark that the world +we live in is not one which was made for us, but one +in which we happened and grew. I am much aware +that there exists a large and influential class of persons +who do not think so; and I offer this remark with +all deference to devotees of idealism, and to other such +pietists who persist in arguing that the trouble which +we do encounter in this vale of tears springs from the +inwardness of our own natures and not from that of +the world. I wish, indeed, that I could agree with them, +but unhappily their very arguments prevent me, since, +if the world were actually as they think it, they could +not think it as they do. In fact, they could not think. +Thinking—worse luck!—came into being as response +to discomfort, to pain, to uncertainty, to problems, +such as could not exist in a world truly made for us; +while from time immemorial <i>pure</i> as distinct from human +consciousness has been identified with absolute certainty, +with self-absorption and self-sufficiency; as a god, a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">410</a></span> +goal to attain, not a fact to rest in. It is notable +that those who believe the world actually to have been +made for us devote most of their thinking to explaining +away the experiences which have made all men feel that +the world was actually not made for us. Their chief +business, after proving the world to be all good, is +solving "the problem of evil." Yet, had there really +been no evil, this evil consequence could not have ensued: +existence would have emerged as beatitude and +not as adjustment; thinking might in truth have +been self-absorbed contemplation, blissful intuition, +not painful learning by the method of trial and +error.</p> + +<p>Alas that what "might have been" cannot come into +being by force of discursive demonstration! If it could, +goodness alone would have existed and been real, and +evil would have been non-existence, unreality, and appearance—all +by the force of the Word. As it is, the +appearance of evil is in so far forth no less an evil +than its reality; in truth, it is reality and its best witnesses +are the historic attempts to explain it away. For +even as "appearance" it has a definite and inexpugnable +character of its own which cannot be destroyed by subsumption +under the "standpoint of the whole," "the +absolute good," the "over-individual values." Nor, since +only sticks and stones break bones and names never +hurt, can it be abolished by the epithet "appearance." +To deny reality to evil is to multiply the evil. It is +to make two "problems" grow where only one grew +before, to add to the "problem of evil" the "problem +of appearance" without serving any end toward the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">411</a></span> +solution of the real problem how evil can be effectively +abolished.</p> + +<p>I may then, in view of these reflections, hold myself +safe in assuming that the world we live in was not made +for us; that, humanly speaking, it is open to improvement +in a great many directions. It will be comparatively +innocuous to assume also, as a corollary, that +in so far as the world was made for mind, it has been +made so by man, that civilization is the adaptation of +nature to human nature. And as a second corollary +it may be safely assumed that the world does not stay +made; civilization has brought its own problems and +peculiar evils.</p> + +<p>I realize that, in the light of my title, much of what +I have written above must seem irrelevant, since the +"problem of evil" has not, within the philosophic tradition, +been considered part of a "problem of values" +as such. If I dwell on it, I do so to indicate that the +"problem of evil" can perhaps be best understood in +the light of another problem: the problem, namely, of +why men have created the "problem of evil." For +obviously, evil can be problematic only in an absolutely +good world, and the idea that the world is absolutely +good is not a generalization <i>upon</i> experience, but a +contradiction <i>of</i> experience. If there exists a metaphysical +"problem of evil," hence, it arises out of this +generalization; it is secondary, not primary; and the +primary problem requires solution before the secondary +one can be understood. And what else, under the circumstances, +can the primary one be than this: "Why +do men contradict their own experience?"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">412</a></span></p> + +<h5>II</h5> + +<p>So put, the problem suggests its own solution. It +indicates, first of all, that nature and human nature +are not completely compatible, that consequently, conclusions +are being forced by nature on human nature +which human nature resents and rejects, and that traits +are being assigned to nature by human nature which +nature does not possess, but which, if possessed, would +make her congenial to human needs. All this is so +platitudinous that I feel ashamed to write it; but then, +how can one avoid platitudes without avoiding truth? +And truth here is the obvious fact that since human +nature is the point of existence to which good and evil +refer, what is called value has its seat necessarily in +human nature, and what is called existence has its seat +necessarily in the nature of which human nature is a +part and apart. Value, in so far forth, is a content of +nature, having its roots in her conditions and its life +in her force, while the converse is not true. All nature +and all existence is not spontaneously and intrinsically +a content of value. Only that portion of it which is +human is such. Humanly speaking, non-human existences +become valuable by their efficacious bearing +on humanity, by their propitious or their disastrous +relations to human consciousness. It is these relations +which delimit the substance of our goods and evils, and +these, at bottom, are indistinguishable from consciousness. +They do not, need not, and cannot connect all +existence with human life. They are inevitably implicated +only with those which make human life possible<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">413</a></span> +at all. Of the environment, they pertain only to that +portion which is fit by the implicated conditions of life +itself. It may therefore be said that natural existence +produces and sustains some values,—at least the minimal +value which is identical with the bare existence of +mankind—on its own account, but no more. The residual +environment remains—irrelevant and menacing, wider +than consciousness and independent of it. Value, hence, +is a specific kind of natural existence among other existences. +To say that it is non-existent in nature, is +to say that value is not coincident and coexistent with +other existences, just as when it is said that a thing +is not red, the meaning is that red is not copresent +with other qualities. Conversely, to say that value +exists in nature is to say that nature and human nature, +things and thoughts, are in some respect harmonious +or identical. Hence, what human nature tries to force +upon nature must be, by implication, non-existent in +nature but actual in mind, so that the nature of value +must be held inseparable from the nature of mind.<a name="FNanchor_87" id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">87</a></p> + +<p>It follows that value is, in origin and character, +completely irrational. At the foundations of our existence +it is relation of their conditions and objects to +our major instincts, our appetites, our feelings, our +desires, our ambitions—most clearly, to the self-regarding +instinct and the instincts of nutrition, reproduction, +and gregariousness. Concerning those, as William +James writes, "Science may come and consider their +ways and find that most of them are useful. But it is +not for the sake of their utility that they are followed, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">414</a></span> +but because at the moment of following them we feel +that it is the only appropriate and natural thing to +do. Not a man in a billion when taking his dinner, +ever thinks of utility. He eats because the food tastes +good and makes him want more. If you ask him why +he should want to eat more of what tastes like that, +instead of revering you as a philosopher, he will probably +laugh at you for a fool. The connection between +the savory sensation and the act it awakens is for him +absolute and <i>selbstverständlich</i>, an <i>a priori</i> synthesis of +the most perfect sort, needing no proof but its own +evidence.... To the metaphysician alone can such +questions occur as 'Why do we smile when pleased, and +not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as +we talk to a single friend? Why does a particular +maiden turn our wits upside down?' The common man +can only say '<i>of course</i> we smile, <i>of course</i> our heart +palpitates at the sight of a crowd, <i>of course</i> we love +the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect +form, so palpably and flagrantly made from all eternity +to be loved.' And so, probably, does each animal +feel about the particular things it tends to do in the +presence of particular objects.... To the broody +hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that +there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful +of eggs was not the utterly fascinating and precious +and never-to-be-too-much-set-upon object it is to her." +In sum, fundamental values are relations, responses, +attitudes, immediate, simple, subjectively obvious, and +irrational. But everything else becomes valuable or +rational only by reference to them.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">415</a></span>Study +them or others empirically,<a name="FNanchor_88" id="FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">88</a> and they appear +as types of specific behavior, simple or complicated, +consisting of a given motor "set" of the organism, +strong emotional tone, and aggregates of connected +ideas, more or less systematized. In the slang of the +new medical psychology which has done so much to +uncover their method and mechanism, they are called +"complexes"; ethics has called them interests, and +that designation will do well enough. They are the +primary and morally ultimate efficacious units of which +human nature is compounded, and it is in terms of the +world's bearing upon their destiny that we evaluate +nature and judge her significance and worth.</p> + +<p>Now in interest, the important delimiting quality is +emotional tone. Whatever else is sharable, that is not. +It is the very stuff of our attitudes, of our acceptances +and rejections of the world and its contents, the very +essence of the relations we bear to these. That these +relations shall be identical for any two human beings +requires that the two shall be identical: two persons +cannot hold the same relation to the same or different +objects any more than two objects can occupy absolutely +the same space at the same time. Hence, all our +differences and disagreements. However socially-minded +we may be, mere numerical diversity compels us to act +as separate centers, to value things with reference to +separate interests, to orient our worlds severally, and +with ourselves as centers. This orienting is the relating +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">416</a></span> +of the environment to our interests, the establishment +of our worlds of appreciation, the creation of our orders +of value. However much these cross and interpenetrate, +coincide they never can.</p> + +<p>Our interests, furthermore, are possibly as numerous +as our reflex arcs. Each may, and most do, constitute +distinct and independent valuations of their objects, to +which they respond, and each, with these objects, remains +an irreducible system. But reflex arcs and interests +do not act alone. They act like armies; they +compound and are integrated, and when so integrated +their valuations fuse and constitute the more complex +and massive feelings, pleasures and pains, the emotions +of anger, of fear, of love; the sentiments of respect, of +admiration, of sympathy. They remain, through all +degrees of complexity, appraisements of the environment, +reactions upon it, behavior toward it, as subject to +empirical examination by the psychologist as the environment +itself by the physicist.</p> + +<p>With a difference, however, a fundamental difference. +When you have an emotion you cannot yourself examine +it. Effectively as the mind may work in sections, +it cannot with sanity be divided against itself nor long +remain so. A feeling cannot be had and examined in +the same time. And though the investigator who +studies the nature of red does not become red, the investigator +who studies the actual emotion of anger does +tend to become angry. Emotion is infectious; anger +begets anger; fear, fear; love, love; hate, hate; actions, +relations, attitudes, when actual, integrate and fuse; +as feelings, they constitute the sense of behavior, vary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">417</a></span>ing +according to a changing and unstable equilibrium +of factors <i>within</i> the organism; they are actually underneath +the skin, and consequently, to know them alive is to +have them. On the other hand, to know <i>things</i> is simply +to have a relation to them. The same thing may +be both loved and hated, desired or spurned, by different +minds at the same time or by the same mind at +different times. One, for example, values whiskey positively, +approaches, absorbs it, aims to increase its quantity +and sale; another apprehends it negatively, turns +from it, strives to oust it from the world. Then, according +to these direct and immediate valuations of +whiskey, its place in the common world of the two minds +will be determined. To save or destroy it, they may +seek to destroy each other. Even similar positive valuations +of the object might imply this mutual repugnance +and destruction. Thus, rivals in love: they enhance +and glorify the same woman, but as she is not +otherwise sharable, they strive to eliminate each other. +Throughout the world of values the numerical distinctness +of the seats or centers of value, whatever their +identity otherwise, keeps them ultimately inimical. +They may terminate in the common object, but they +originate in different souls and they are related to the +object like two magnets of like polarity to the same +piece of iron that lies between them. Most of what is +orderly in society and in science is the outcome of the +adjustment of just such oppositions: our civilization +is an unstable equilibrium of objects, through the coöperation, +antipathy, and fusion of value-relations.</p> + +<p>Individuals are no better off; personality is constructed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">418</a></span> +in the same way. If, indeed, the world had +been made for us, we might have been spared this +warfare to man upon earth. Life might have been the +obvious irrational flow of bliss so vividly described by +William James; nature and human nature would have +been one; bridging the gulf between them would never +have been the task of the tender-minded among philosophers. +Unfortunately our mere numerical difference, +the mere numerical difference of the interests which +compose our egos, makes the trouble, so that we are +compelled to devote most of our lives to converting the +different into the same. The major part of our instincts +serve this function recognizably, e.g., nutrition, +and the "higher powers" do so no less, if not so +obviously. Generalization is nothing more, thinking +nothing else. It is the assimilation of many instances +into one form, law, or purpose; the preservation of +established contents of value, just as nutrition is the +preservation of life by means of the conversion of foreign +matter into the form and substance of the body. +By bowels and by brain, what is necessary, what will +feed the irrationally given interest, is preserved and +consumed: the rest is cast off as waste, as irrelevance, +as contradiction.</p> + +<p>The relation may, of course, also reverse itself. Face +to face with the immovable and inexorable, the mind +may accept it with due resignation, or it may challenge +its tyranny and exclude it from its world. It may +seek or create or discover a substitute that it is content +to accept, though this will in turn alter the course +and character of the interest which in such an instance<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">419</a></span> +defines the mind's action. Thus, a way out for one of +the lovers of the same girl might be to become a depressed +and yearning bachelor, realizing his potential +sexuality in the vicarious reproduction of reverie and +sentiment; another might be to divert the stream of +his affections to another girl, reorganizing his life about +a different center and acquiring a new system of practical +values determined by this center; a third might +be a complete redirection of his sexual energies upon +objects the interest in which we would call, abnormal +and anti-social in one case, and in another lofty and +spiritual. In the latter case sexuality would have been +depersonalized; it would have changed into poetic and +humanitarian passion; it would have become love as +Plato means us to take the word. But each of these +processes would have been a conversion, through the +need defined by an identical instinct, of the <i>same into +the different</i>; the human nature which existed at the +beginning of the change would be deeply other than +the human nature in which the change culminated. In +each case a condition thrust upon the spirit by its +environment would have occasioned the creation and +maintenance of an environment demanded by the spirit. +Yet in so far as it was not truly <i>the same</i> as that +envisaged in the primitive demand, it would still imply +the tragedy of the world not made for us and the "problem +of evil," in which the life of the spirit is persistently +a salvage of one of two always incompatible goods, a +saving by surrender.</p> + +<p>And this is all that a mind is—an affair of saving +and rejecting, of valuing with a system of objects of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">420</a></span> +which a living body and its desires and operations, its interests, +are focal and the objects marginal, for its +standard. Mind, thus, is neither simple, nor immutable, +nor stable; it is a thing to be "changed," "confused," +"cleared," "made-up," "trained." One body, I have +written elsewhere,<a name="FNanchor_89" id="FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">89</a> "in the course of its lifetime, has +many minds, only partially united. Men are all too +often "of two minds." The unity of a mind depends on +its consistent pursuit of <i>one</i> interest, although we then +call it narrow; or on the coöperation and harmony of +its many interests. Frequently, two or more minds +may struggle for the possession of the same body; that +is, the body may be divided by two elaborately systematized +tendencies to act. The beginning of such division +occurs wherever there is a difficulty in deciding between +alternative modes of behavior; the end is to be +observed in those cases of dual or multiple personality +in which the body has ordered a great collection of +objects and systematized so large a collection of interests +in such typically distinct ways as to have set up +for itself different and opposed "minds." On the other +hand, two or fifty or a million bodies may be "of the +same mind."</p> + +<p>Unhappily, difference of mind, diversity and conflict +of interests is quite as fundamental, if not more so, +as sameness of mind, coöperation and unity of interests. +This the philosophical tradition sufficiently attests. To +Plato man is at once a protean beast, a lion, and an +intellect; the last having for its proper task to rule +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">421</a></span> +the first and to regulate the second, which is always +rebellious and irruptive.<a name="FNanchor_90" id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">90</a> According to the Christian +tradition man is at once flesh and spirit, eternally in +conflict with one another, and the former is to be mortified +that the latter may have eternal life. Common +sense divides us into head and heart, never quite at +peace with one another. There is no need of piling +up citations. Add to the inward disharmonies of mind +its incompatibilities with the environment, and you perceive +at once how completely it is, from moment to +moment, a theater and its life a drama of which the +interests that compose it are at once protagonists and +directors. The catastrophe of this unceasing drama +is always that one or more of the players is driven from +the stage of conscious existence. It may be that the +environment—social conditions, commercial necessity, +intellectual urgency, allies of other interests—will drive +it off; it may be that its own intrinsic unpleasantness +will banish it, will put it out of mind; whatever the +cause, it is put out. Putting it out does not, however, +end the drama; putting it out serves to complicate the +drama. For the "new psychology"<a name="FNanchor_91" id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">91</a> shows that whenever +an interest or a desire or impulsion is put out of +the mind, it is really, if not extirpated, put into the +mind; it is driven from the conscious level of existence +to the unconscious. It retains its force and direction, +only its work now lies underground. Its life henceforward +consists partly in a direct oppugnance to the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">422</a></span>inhibitions that keep it down, partly in burrowing beneath +and around them and seeking out unwonted channels +of escape. Since life is long, repressions accumulate, +the mass of existence of feeling and desire tends to +become composed entirely of these repressions, layer +upon layer, with every interest in the aggregate striving +to attain place in the daylight of consciousness.</p> + +<p>Now, empirically and metaphysically, no one interest +is more excellent than any other. Repressed or patent, +each is, whether in a completely favorable environment +or in a completely indifferent universe, or before the +bar of an absolute justice, or under the domination of +an absolute and universal good, entitled to its free fulfilment +and perfect maintenance. Each is a form of +the good; the essential content of each is good. That +any are not fulfilled, but repressed, is a fact to be recorded, +not an appearance to be explained away. And +it may turn out that the existence of the fact may +explain the effort to explain it away. For where interests +are in conflict with each other or with reality, +and where the loser is not extirpated, its revenge may +be just this self-fulfilment in unreality, in idea, which +philosophies of absolute values offer it. Dreams, some +of the arts, religion, and philosophy may indeed be considered +as such fulfilments, worlds of luxuriant self-realization +of all that part of our nature which the +harsh conjunctions with the environment overthrow and +suppress. Sometimes abortive self-expressions of frustrated +desires, sometimes ideal compensations for the +shortcomings of existence, they are always equally ideal +reconstructions of the surrounding evil of the world<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">423</a></span> +into forms of the good. And because they are compensations +in idea, they are substituted for existence, +appraised as "true," and "good," and "beautiful," +and "real," while the experiences which have suppressed +the desires they realize are condemned as illusory and +unreal. In them humanity has its freest play and amplest +expression.</p> + +<h5>III</h5> + +<p>This has been, and still to a very great extent remains, +most specifically true of philosophy. The environment +with which philosophy concerns itself is nothing +less than the whole universe; its content is, within +the history of its dominant tradition, absolutely general +and abstract; it is, of all great human enterprises, even +religion, least constrained by the direction and march +of events or the mandate of circumstance. Like music, +it expresses most truly the immediate and intrinsic interests +of the mind, its native bias and its inward goal. +It has been constituted, for this reason, of the so-called +"normative" sciences, envisaging the non-existent as +real, forcing upon nature pure values, forms of the +spirit incident to the total life of this world, unmixed +with baser matter. To formulate ultimate standards, +to be completely and utterly lyrical has been the prerogative +of philosophy alone. Since these standards +reappear in all other reconstructions of the environment +and most clearly in art and in religion, it is pertinent +to enumerate them, and to indicate briefly their +bearing on existence.</p> + +<p>The foremost outstanding is perhaps "the unity of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">424</a></span> +the world." Confronted by the perplexing menace of +the variation of experience, the dichotomies and oppositions +of thoughts and things, the fusion and diversifications +of many things into one and one into many, +mankind has, from the moment it became reflective, felt +in the relation of the One and the Many the presence +of a riddle that engendered and sustained uneasiness, +a mystery that concealed a threat. The mind's own +preference, given the physiological processes that condition +its existence, constitution, and operation, could +hardly come to rest in a more fundamental normation +than Unity. A world which is <i>one</i> is easier to live in +and with; initial adjustment therein is final adjustment; +in its substance there exists nothing sudden and in +its character nothing uncontrollable. It guarantees +whatever vital equilibrium the organism has achieved +in it, ill or good. It secures life in attainment and +possession, insuring it repose, simplicity, and spaciousness. +A world which is many complicates existence: it +demands watchful consideration of irreducible discrete +individualities: it necessitates the integration and humanization +in a common system of adjustment of entities +which in the last analysis refuse all ordering and +reject all subordination, consequently keeping the mind +on an everlasting jump, compelling it to pay with eternal +vigilance the price of being. The preference for +unity, then, is almost inevitable, and the history of +philosophy, from the Vedas to the Brahma Somaj and +from Thales to Bergson, is significantly unanimous in +its attempts to prove that the world is, somehow, +through and through one. That the oneness requires<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">425</a></span> +<i>proof</i> is <i>prima facie</i> evidence that it is a value, a desiderate, +not an existence. And how valuable it is may +be seen merely in the fact that it derealizes the inner +conflict of interests, the incompatibilities between nature +and man, the uncertainties of knowledge, and the +certainties of evil, and substitutes therefore the ultimate +happy unison which "the identity of the different" +compels.</p> + +<p>Unity is the common desiderate of philosophic systems +of all metaphysical types—neutral, materialistic, +idealistic. But the dominant tradition has tended to +think this unity in terms of <i>interest</i>, of <i>spirit</i>, of +<i>mentality</i>. It has tended, in a word, to assimilate nature +to human nature, to identify things with the <i>values</i> +of things, to envisage the world in the image of man. +To it, the world is all spirit, ego, or idea; and if not +such through and through, then entirely subservient, +in its unhumanized parts, to the purposes and interests +of ego, idea, or spirit. Why, is obvious. A world of +which the One substance is such constitutes a totality +of interest and purpose which faces no conflict and has +no enemy. It is fulfilment even before it is need, and +need, indeed, is only illusion. Even when its number +is many, the world is a better world if the stuff of these +many is the <i>same</i> stuff as the spirit of man. For mind +is more at home with mind than with things; the pathetic +fallacy is the most inevitable and most general. Although +the totality of spirit is conceived as good, that +is, as actualizing all our desiderates and ideals, it would +still be felt that, even if the totality were evil, and not +God, but the Devil ruled the roost, the world so constituted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">426</a></span> +must be better than one utterly non-spiritual. +We can understand and be at home with malevolence: +it offers at least the benefits of similarity, of companionship, +of intimateness, of consubstantiality with <i>will</i>; +its behavior may be foreseen and its intentions influenced; +but no horror can be greater than that of utter +aliency. How much of religion turns with a persistent +tropism to the consideration of the devil and his works, +and how much it has fought his elimination from the +cosmic scheme! Yet never because it loved the devil. +The deep-lying reason is the fact that the humanization +of Evil into Devil mitigates Evil and improves the +world. Philosophy has been least free from this corrective +and spiritizing bias. Though it has cared less +for the devil, it has predominantly repudiated aliency, +has sought to prove spirit the cause and substance of +the world, and in that degree, to transmute the aliency +of nature into sameness with human nature.</p> + +<p>With unity and spirituality, <i>eternity</i> makes a third. +This norm is a fundamental attribute of the One God +himself, and interchangeable with his ineffable name: +the Lord is Eternal, and the Eternal, even more than the +One, receives the eulogium of exclusive realness. To +the philosophical tradition it is the most real. Once +more the reason should be obvious. The underlying +urge which pushes the mind to think the world as a +unity pushes it even more inexorably to think the world +as timeless. For unity is asserted only against the perplexities +of a manyness which may be static and +unchanging, and hence comparatively simple. But eternity +is asserted and set against mutability: it is the negation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">427</a></span> +of change, of time, of novelty, of the suddenness and +slaughter of the flux of life itself, which consumes what +it generates, undermines what it builds and sweeps to +destruction what it founds to endure. Change is the +arch-enemy of a life which struggles for self-<i>preservation</i>, +of an intellect which operates spontaneously by +the logic of identity, of a will which seeks to convert +others into sames. It substitutes a different self for +the old, it falsifies systems of thought and deteriorates +systems of life. It makes unity impossible and manyness +inevitable. It upsets every actual equilibrium that +life attains. It opens the doors and windows of every +closed and comfortable cosmos to all transcosmic winds +that blow, with whatever they carry of possible danger +and possible ill. It is the very soul of chaos in which +the pleasant, ordered world is such a little helpless +thing. Of this change eternity is by primary intention +the negation, as its philological form shows. It is <i>not-time</i>, +without positive intrinsic content, and in its secondary +significances, i.e., in those significances which +appear in metaphysical dialectic, without meaning; +since it is there a pure negation, intrinsically affirming +nothing, of the same character as "not-man" or "not-donkey," +standing for a nature altogether unspecific +and indeterminable in the residual universe. By a sort +of obverse implication it does, however, possess, in the +philosophic tradition, a positive content which accrues +to it by virtue of what it denies. This content makes +it a designation for the persistence and perdurability +of desiderated quality—from metaphysical unity and +spirituality to the happy hunting-grounds or a woman's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">428</a></span> +affection. At bottom it means the assurance that the +contents of value cannot and will not be altered or +destroyed, that their natures and their relations to +man do not undergo change. There is no recorded attempt +to prove that evil is eternal: eternity is <i>eternity +of the good alone</i>.</p> + +<p>Unity, spirituality, and eternity, then, are the forms +which contents of value receive under the shaping hands +of the philosophic tradition, to which they owe their +metaphysical designation and of which the business has +so largely and uniquely been to <i>prove</i> them the foundations +and ontological roots of universal nature. But +"the problem of evil" does not come to complete solution +with these. Even in a single, metaphysically spiritual +and unchanging world, man himself may still be +less than a metaphysical absolute and his proper individuality +doomed to absorption, his wishes to obstruction +and frustration. Of man, therefore, the +tradition posits <i>immortality</i> and <i>freedom</i>, and even the +materialistic systems have sought to keep somehow room +for some form of these goods.</p> + +<p>To turn first to immortality. Its source and matrix +is less the love of life than the fear of death—that fear +which Lucretius, dour poet of disillusion, so nobly deplored. +That he had ever himself been possessed of it +is not clear, but it is perfectly clear that his altogether +sound arguments against it have not abolished its operation, +nor its effect upon human character, society, and +imagination. Fear which made the gods, made also the +immortality of man, the denial of death. What the +fear's unmistakable traits may be has never been articulately<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">429</a></span> said, perhaps never can be said. Most of us +never may undergo the fear of death; we undergo comfort +and discomfort, joy and sorrow, intoxication and +reaction, love and disgust; we aim to preserve the one +and to abolish the other, but we do not knowingly undergo +the fear of death. Indeed, it is logically impossible +that we should, since to do so would be to acquire +an experience of death such that we should be conscious +of being unconscious, sensible of being insensible, aware +of being unaware. We should be required to be and +not to be at the same instant, in view of which Lucretius +both logically and wisely advises us to remember +that when death is, we are not; and when we are, death +is not.</p> + +<p>Experience and feeling are, however, neither logical +nor wise, and to these death is far from the mere non-being +which the poet would have us think it. To these +it has a positive reality which makes the fear of it a +genuine cause of conduct in individuals and in groups, +with a basis in knowledge such as is realized in the diminishing +of consciousness under anæsthetic, in dreams of +certain types, and most generally in the nascent imitation +of the <i>rigor mortis</i> which makes looking upon +the dead such a horror to most of us. Even then, however, +something is lacking toward the complete realization +of death, and children and primitive peoples never +realize it at all. Its full meaning comes out as <i>an unsatisfied +hunger in the living</i> rather than as a condition +of the dead, who, alive, would have satisfied this hunger. +And the realization of this meaning requires sophistication, +requires a lengthy corporate memory and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">430</a></span> +the disillusions which civilization engenders. Primitive +peoples ask for no proof of immortality because they +have no notion of mortality; civilized thinking has +largely concerned itself about the proof of immortality +because its assurance of life has been shaken by the +realization of death through the gnawing of desire which +only the dead could still. The <i>proof</i> which in the history +of thought is offered again and again, be it noted, +is not of the reality of life, but of the unreality and +inefficacy of death. Immortality is like eternity, a negative +term; it is <i>im</i>mortality. The experienced fact is +mortality; and the fear of it is only an inversion of the +desire which it frustrates, just as frustrated love becomes +hatred. The doctrine of immortality, hence, +springs from the fear of death, not from the love of life, +and immortality is a value-form, not an existence. Now, +although fear of death and love of life are in constant +play in character and conduct, neither constitutes the +original, innocent urge of life within us. "Will to +live," "will to power," "struggle for existence," and +other Germanic hypostases of experienced events which +the great civil war in Europe is just now giving such +an airing, hardly deserve, as natural data, the high +metaphysical status that Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and +company have given them. They follow in fact upon a +more primary type of living, acting form, a type to +which the "pathetic fallacy" or any other manner of +psychologizing may not apply. The most that can +be said about this type is that its earlier stages +are related to its later ones as potential is to kinetic +energy. If, since we are discussing a metaphysical issue,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">431</a></span> +we must mythologize, we might call it the "will to self-expression." +Had this "will" chanced to happen in +a world which was made for it, or had it itself been the +substance of the world, "struggle for existence," "will +to live," and "will to power," never could have supervened. +All three of these expressions designate data +which require an opposite, a counter-will, to give them +meaning. There can be a struggle for existence only when +there are obstacles thereto, a will to live only when +there are obstructions to life, a will to power only +when there is a resistance against which power may be +exercised. Expression alone is self-implying and self-sufficient, +and in an altogether favorable environment +we might have realized our instincts, impulses, interests, +appetites and desires, expressed and actualized our +potentialities, and when our day is done, have ceased, +as unconcerned about going on as about starting.</p> + +<p>Metchnikoff speaks somewhere of an instinct toward +death and the euphoria which accompanies its realization. +He cites, I think, no more than two or three cases. +To most of us the mere notion of the existence and +operation of such an instinct seems fanciful and uncanny. +Yet from the standpoint of biology nothing +should be more natural. Each living thing has its span, +which consists of a cycle from birth through maturation +and senescence to dissolution, and the latter half +of the process is as "fateful" and "inevitable" as the +former! Dying is itself the inexpugnable conclusion +of that setting free of organic potentialities which we +call life, and if dying seems horrid and unnatural, it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">432</a></span> +seems so because for most of us death is violent, because +its occasion is a shock from without, not the realization +of a tendency from within. In a completely favorable +environment we should not struggle to exist, we +should simply exist; we should not will to live, we +should simply live, i.e., we should actualize our potentialities +and die.</p> + +<p>But, once more alas, our environment is not completely +favorable, and there's the rub. That disorderly +constellation of instincts and appetites and interests +which constitutes the personality of the best of us does +not work itself out evenly. At the most favorable, our +self-realizations are lopsided and distorted. For every +capacity of ours in full play, there are a score at least +mutilated, sometimes extirpated, always repressed. They +never attain the free fullness of expression which is +consciousness, or when they do, they find themselves +confronted with an opponent which neutralizes their +maturation at every point. Hence, as I have already +indicated, they remain in, or revert to, the subterranean +regions of our lives, and govern the making of our +biographies from their seats below. What they fail +to attain in fact they succeed in generating in imagination +to compensate for the failure; they realize themselves +vicariously. The doctrine of immortality is the +generic form of such vicarious self-realization, as frequently +by means of dead friends and relatives to whose +absolute non-being the mind will not assent, as by +means of the everlasting heaven in which the mind may +forever disport itself amid those delights it had to +forego on earth. Much of the underlying motive of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">433</a></span> +the doctrine is a <i>sehnsucht</i> and nostalgia after the +absent dead; little a concern for the continuity of the +visible living. And often this passion is so intense +that system after system in the philosophic tradition +is constructed to satisfy it, and even the most disillusioned +of systems—for example, Spinoza's—will preserve +its form if not its substance.</p> + +<p>That the "freedom of the will" shall be a particularized +compensatory desiderate like the immortality +of the soul, the unity, the spirituality, and the eternity +of the world is a perversion worked upon this ideal +by the historic accident we call Christianity. The assumptions +of that theory concerning the nature of the +universe and the destiny of man, being through and +through compensatory, changed freedom from the possible +fact and actual hope of Hellenic systems into the +"problem" of the Christian ones. The consequent +controversy over "free-will," the casuistic entanglement +of this ideal with the notion of responsibility, its +theological development in the problem of the relation +of an omnipotent God to a recalcitrant creature, have +completely obscured its primal significance. For the +ancients, the free man and the "wise man" were identical, +and the wise man was one who all in all had so +mastered the secrets of the universe that there was no +desire of his that was not actually realized, no wish +the satisfaction of which was obstructed. His way in +the world was a way without let or hindrance. Now +freedom and wisdom in this sense is never a fact and +ever a value. Its attainment ensues upon created distinctions +between appearance and reality, upon the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">434</a></span> +postulation of the metaphysical existence of the value-forms +of the unity, spirituality, and the eternity of the +world, in the realization of which the wise man founded +his wisdom and gained his freedom. Freedom, then, +is an ideal that could have arisen only in the face of +<i>obstruction to action directed toward the fulfilling and +satisfying of interests</i>. It is the assurance of the smooth +and uninterrupted flow of behavior; the flow of desire +into fulfilment, of thought into deed, of act into fact. +It is perhaps the most pervasive and fundamental of +all desiderates, and in a definite way the others may be +said to derive from it and to realize it. For the soul's +immortality, the world's unity and spirituality and +eternity, are but conditions which facilitate and assure +the flow of life without obstruction. They define a +world in which danger, evil, and frustration are non-existent; +they so reconstitute our actual environment +that the obstructions it offers to the course of life are +abolished. They make the world "rational," and in +the great philosophic tradition the freedom of man is +held to be a function of the rationality of the world. +Thus, even deterministic solutions of the "problem of +freedom" are at bottom no more than the rationalization +of natural existence by the dialectical removal of +obstructions to human existence. Once more, Spinoza's +solution is typical, and its form is that of all idealisms +as well. It ensues by way of identification of the obstruction's +interest with those of the obstructee: the +world becomes ego or the ego the world, with nothing +outside to hinder or to interfere. In the absolute, existence +is declared to be value <i>de facto</i>; in fact, <i>de jure</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">435</a></span> +And by virtue of this compensating reciprocity the +course of life runs free.</p> + +<p>Is any proof necessary that these value-forms are +not the contents of the daily life? If there be, why this +unvarying succession of attempts to <i>prove</i> that they +are the contents of daily life that goes by the name +of history of philosophy? In fact, experience as it +comes from moment to moment is not one, harmonious +and orderly, but multifold, discordant, and chaotic. Its +stuff is not spirit, but stones and railway wrecks and +volcanoes and Mexico and submarines, and trenches, +and frightfulness, and Germany, and disease, and +waters, and trees, and stars, and mud. It is not eternal, +but changes from instant to instant and from season +to season. Actually, men do not live forever; death +is a fact, and immortality is literally as well as in +philosophic discourse not so much an aspiration for the +continuity of life as an aspiration for the elimination +of death, purely <i>im</i>mortality. Actually the will is not +free, each interest encounters obstruction, no interest +is completely satisfied, all are ultimately cut off by +death.</p> + +<p>Such are the general features of all human experience, +by age unwithered, and with infinite variety forever +unstaled. The traditional philosophic treatment +of them is to deny their reality, and to call them appearance, +and to satisfy the generic human interest +which they oppose and repress by means of the historical +reconstruction in imaginative dialectic of a world +constituted by these most generalized value-forms and +then to eulogize the reconstruction with the epithet<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">436</a></span> +"reality." When, in the course of human events, such +reconstruction becomes limited to the biography of +particular individuals, is an expression of their concrete +and unique interest, is lived and acted on, it is +called paranoia. The difference is not one of kind, but +of concreteness, application, and individuality. Such +a philosophy applied universally in the daily life is a +madness, like Christian Science: kept in its proper +sphere, it is a fine art, the finest and most human of +the arts, a reconstruction in discourse of the whole +universe, in the image of the free human spirit. Philosophy +has been reasonable because it is so unpersonal, +abstract, and general, like music; because, in spite of +its labels, its reconstructions remain pure desiderates +and value-forms, never to be confused with and substituted +for existence. But philosophers even to this +day often have the delusion that the substitutions are +actually made.<a name="FNanchor_92" id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">92</a></p> + +<h5>IV</h5> + +<p>It is the purity of the value-forms imagined in philosophy +that makes philosophy "normative." The +arts, which it judges, have an identical origin and an +indistinguishable intent, but they are properly its subordinates +because they have not its purity. They, too, +aim at remodeling discordant nature into harmony with +human nature. They, too, are dominated by value-forms +which shall satisfy as nearly as possible all interests, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">437</a></span> +shall liberate and fulfil all repressions, and +shall supply to our lives that unity, eternity, spirituality, +and freedom which are the exfoliations of our +central desire—the desire to live. But where philosophy +has merely negated the concrete stuff of experience and +defined its reality in terms of desire alone, the arts +acknowledge the reality of immediate experience, accept +it as it comes, eliminating, adding, molding, until the +values desiderated become existent in the concrete immediacies +of experience as such. Art does not substitute +values for existence by changing their rôles and +calling one appearance and the other reality: art converts +values into existences, it realizes values, injecting +them into nature as far as may be. It creates truth +and beauty and goodness. But it does not claim for +its results greater reality than nature's. It claims for +its results greater immediate harmony with human interests +than nature. The propitious reality of the philosopher +is the unseen: the harmonious reality of the +artist must be sensible. Philosophy says that apparent +actual evil is merely apparent: art compels potential +apparent good actually to appear. Philosophy realizes +fundamental values transcendentally beyond experience: +art realizes them within experience. Thus, men +cherish no illusions concerning the contents of a novel, +a picture, a play, a musical composition. They are +taken for what they are, and are enjoyed for what +they are. The shopgirl, organizing her life on the +basis of eight dollars a week, wears flimsy for broadcloth +and the tail feather of a rooster for an ostrich plume. +She is as capable of wearing and enjoying broadcloth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">438</a></span> +and ostrich plume as My Lady, whose income is eight +dollars a minute. But she has not them, and in all +likelihood, without a social revolution she never will +have them. In the novels of Mr. Robert Chambers, +however, or of Miss Jean Libbey, which she religiously +reads in the street-car on her way to the shop; in the +motion picture theater which she visits for ten cents +after her supper of corned beef, cabbage, and cream +puffs, she comes into possession of them forthwith, +vicariously, and of all My Lady's proper perquisites—the +Prince Charming, the motor-car, the Chinese pug, +the flowers, and the costly bonbons. For the time being +her life is liberated, new avenues of experience are actually +opened to her, all sorts of unsatisfied desires are +satisfied, all sorts of potentialities realized. All that she +might have been and is not, she becomes through art, +here and now, and <i>continuously with</i> the drab workaday +life which is her lot, and she becomes this without any +compensatory derealization of that life, without any +transcendentalism, without any loss of grip on the necessities +of her experience: strengthened, on the contrary, +and emboldened, to meet them as they are.</p> + +<p>I might multiply examples: for every object of fine +art has the same intention, and if adequate, accomplishes +the same end—from the sculptures of Phidias and the +dramas of Euripides, to the sky-scrapers of Sullivan +and the dances of Pavlowa. But there is need only to +consider the multitude of abstract descriptions of the +æsthetic encounter. The artist's business is to create +the other object in the encounter, and this object, in +Miss Puffer's words, which are completely representa<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">439</a></span>tive +and typical, is such that "the organism is in a +condition of repose and of the highest possible tone, +functional efficiency, enhanced life. The personality is +brought into a state of unity and self-completeness." +The object, when apprehended, awakens the active functioning +of the whole organism directly and harmoniously +with itself, cuts it off from the surrounding world, shuts +that world out for the time being, and forms a complete, +harmonious, and self-sufficient system, peculiar and +unique in the fact that there is no passing from this +deed into further adaptation with the object. Struggle +and aliency are at end, and whatever activity now goes +on feels self-conserving, spontaneous, free. The need +of readjustment has disappeared, and with it the feeling +of strain, obstruction, and resistance, which is its +sign. There is nothing but the object, and that is +possessed completely, satisfying, and as if forever. +Art, in a word, supplies an environment from which +strife, foreignness, obstruction, and death are eliminated. +It actualizes unity, spirituality, and eternity +in the environment; it frees and enhances the life of the +self. To the environment which art successfully creates, +the mind finds itself completely and harmoniously +adapted by the initial act of perception.</p> + +<p>In the world of art, value and existence are one.</p> + +<h5>V</h5> + +<p>If art may be said to create values, religion has been +said to conserve them. But the values conserved are +not those created: they are the values postulated by +philosophy as metaphysical reality. Whereas, how<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">440</a></span>ever, +philosophy substitutes these values for the world +of experience, religion makes them continuous with the +world of experience. For religion value and existence +are on the same level, but value is more potent and +environs existence, directing it for its own ends. The +unique content of religion, hence, is a specific imaginative +extension of the environment with value-forms: the +visible world is extended at either end by heaven and +hell; the world of minds, by God, Satan, angels, demons, +saints, and so on. But where philosophy imaginatively +abolishes existence in behalf of value, where art realizes +value in existence, religion tends to control and to escape +the environment which exists by means of the +environment which is postulated. The aim of religion +is salvation from sin. Salvation is the escape from +experience to heaven and the bosom of God; while hell +is the compensatory readjustment of inner quality to +outer condition for the alien and the enemy, without +the knowledge of whose existence life in heaven could +not be complete.</p> + +<p>In religion, hence, the conversion of the repressed +array of interests into ideal value-forms is less radical +and abstract than in philosophy, and less checked by +fusion with existence than in art. Religion is, therefore, +at one and the same time more carnal and less reasonable +than philosophy and art. Its history and protagonists +exhibit a closer kinship to what is called insanity<a name="FNanchor_93" id="FNanchor_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">93</a>—that +being, in essence, the substitution in +actual life of the creatures of the imagination which +satisfy repressed needs for those of reality which repress +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">441</a></span> +them. It is a somnambulism which intensifies +rather than abolishes the contrast between what is desired +and what must be accepted. It offers itself ultimately +rather as a refuge from reality than a control +of it, and its development as an institution has turned +on the creation and use of devices to make this escape +feasible. For religion, therefore, the perception that +the actual world, whatever its history, is now <i>not</i> +adapted to human nature, is the true point of departure. +Thus religion takes more account of experience +than compensatory philosophy; it does not de-realize +existent evil. The outer conflict between human +nature and nature, primitively articulated in consciousness +and conduct by the distress engendered through +the fact that the food supply depends upon the march +of the seasons,<a name="FNanchor_94" id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">94</a> becomes later assimilated to the inner +conflict between opposing interests, wishes, and desires. +Finally, the whole so constituted gets expressed in the +idea of sin. That idea makes outward prosperity dependent +upon inward purity, although it often transfers +the locus of the prosperity to another world. Through +its operation fortune becomes a function of conscience +and the one desire of religious thinking and religious +practice becomes to bring the two to a happy outcome, +to abolish the conflicts. This desiderated abolition +is salvation. It is expressed in the ideas of a fall, +or a separation from heaven and reunion therewith. +The machinery of this reunion of the divided, the reconversion +of the differentiated into the same, consists +of the furniture of religious symbols and +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">442</a></span> +ceremonials—myths, baptisms, sacraments, prayers, and +sacrifices: and all these are at the same time instruments +and expressions of desires. God is literally "the conservation +of values."<a name="FNanchor_95" id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">95</a> "God's life in eternity," writes +Aristotle, who here dominates the earlier tradition, "is +that which we enjoy in our best moments, but are unable +to possess permanently: its very being is delight. +And as actual being is delight, so the various functions +of waking, perceiving, thinking, are to us the pleasantest +parts of our life. Perfect and absolute thought is +just this absolute vision of perfection."<a name="FNanchor_96" id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">96</a></p> + +<p>Even the least somnambulistic of the transcendental +philosophies has repeated, not improved upon Aristotle. +"The highest conceptions that I get from experience +of what goodness and beauty are," Royce declares, "the +noblest life that I can imagine, the completest blessedness +that I can think, all these are but faint suggestions +of a truth that is infinitely realized in the Divine, +that knows all truth. Whatever perfection there is suggested +in these things, that he must fully know and +experience."</p> + +<p>But this æsthetic excellence, this maximum of ideality +is in and by itself inadequate. God, to be God, must +<i>work</i>. He is first of all the invisible socius, the ever-living +witness, in whose eyes the disharmonies and injustices +of this life are enregistered, and who in the +life everlasting redresses the balances and adjusts the +account. Even his grace is not unconditional; it requires +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">443</a></span> a return, in deed or faith; a payment by which +the fact of his salvation is made visible. But this payment +is made identical by the great religions of disillusion +with nothing other than the concrete condition +from which the faithful are to be saved. If the self +is not impoverished, unkempt, and hungry, in fact, it +is made so. Cleanliness may be next to godliness, but +self-defilement is godliness; sainthood, if we are to trust +the lives of saints, whether in Asia or in Europe, is coincident +with insanitation; saintly virtues are depressed +virtues,—humility, hope, meekness, pity; and such conditions +of life which define the holy ones are unwholesome—poverty, +asceticism, squalor, filth. Hence, by +an ironic inversion, religions of disillusion, being other-worldly, +identify escape from an actual unpropitious +environment with submergence in it; that being the +visible and indispensable sign of an operative grace. So +the beatitudes: the blessed are the poor, the mourners, +the meek. Beginning as a correction of the evils of +existence, religion ends by offering an infallible avenue +of escape from them through postulating a desiderated +type of existence which operates to gather the spirit to +itself. For this reason the value-forms of the spirituality +or spiritual control of the universe and of the +immortality of the soul have been very largely the practical +concern of religion alone, since these are the +instruments indispensable to the attainment of salvation. +In so far forth religion has been an art and its +institutional association with the arts has been made +one of its conspicuous justifications. So far, however, +as it has declared values to be operative without making<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">444</a></span> +them actually existent it has been only a black art, +a magic. It has ignored the actual causes in the nature +and history of things, and has substituted for them +non-existent desirable causes, ultimately reducible to a +single, eternal, beneficent spirit, omnipotent and free. +To convert these into existence, an operation which is +the obvious intent of much contemporary thinking in +religion,<a name="FNanchor_97" id="FNanchor_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> it must, however, give up the assumption that +they already exist <i>qua</i> spirit. But when religion gives +up this assumption, religion gives up the ghost.</p> + +<p>What it demands of the ghost, and of all hypostatized +or anthropomorphized ultimate value-forms, is that they +shall work, and its life as an institution depends +upon making them work. Christian Science becomes +a refuge from the failure of science, magic from mechanism, +and by means of them and their kind, blissful immortality, +complete self-fulfilment is to be attained—after +death. There is a "beautiful land of somewhere," +a happy life beyond, but it is beyond life. In fact, +although religion confuses value and existence, it localizes +the great value-forms outside of existence. Its +history has been an epic of the retreat and decimation +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">445</a></span> +of the gods from the world, a movement from animism +and pluralism to transcendentalism and monism; and +concomitantly, of an elaboration and extension of institutional +devices by which the saving value-forms are +to be made and kept operative in the world.</p> + +<h5>VI</h5> + +<p>Let us consider this history a little.</p> + +<p>Consciousness of feeling, psychologists are agreed, is +prior to consciousness of the objects of feeling. The +will's inward strain, intense throbs of sensation, pangs +and pulses of pleasure and pain make up the +bulk of the undifferentiated primal sum of sentience. +The soul is aware of herself before she +is aware of her world. A childish or primeval +mind, face to face with an environment actual, +dreamt, or remembered, does not distinguish from +its privacy the objective or the common. All is +shot through with the pathos and triumph which come +unaccountably as desired good or evaded evil; all has +the same tensions and effects ends in the same manner +as the laboring, straining, volitional life within. These +feelings, residuary qualities, the last floating, unattached +sediment of a world organized by association +and classified by activity, these subtlest of all its beings, +finally termed mind and self, at first suffuse and dominate +the whole. Even when objects are distinguished +and their places determined these are not absent; and +the so-called pre-animistic faiths are not the less suffused +with spirit because the spiritual has not yet received +a local habitation and name. They differ from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">446</a></span> +animism in this only, not in that their objects are characterized +by lack of animation and vital tonality. And +this is necessary. For religion must be anthropopathic +before it becomes anthropomorphic; since feeling, eloquent +of good and evil, is the first and deepest essence +of consciousness, and only by its wandering from home +are forms distinguished and man's nature separated +from that of things and beasts.</p> + +<p>When practice has coördinated activity, and reflection +distinguished places, animism proper arises. First +the environment is felt as the soul's kindred; then its +operations are fancied in terms dramatic and personal. +The world becomes almost instinctively defined as a +hegemony of spirits similar to man, with powers and +passions like his, and directed for his destruction or conservation, +but chiefly for their own glory and self-maintenance. +The vast "pathetic fallacy" makes religion +of the whole of life. It is at this point indistinguishable +from science or ethics. It is, in fact, the pregnant +matrix of all subsequent discourse about the universe. +Its character is such that it becomes the determinating +factor of human adaptations to the conditions +imposed by the environment, by envisaging the +enduring and efficacious elements among these conditions +as persons. The satisfaction of felt needs is rendered +thereby inevitably social; and in a like manner fear +of their frustration cannot be unsocial. Life is conceived +and acted out as a miraculous traffic with the +universe; and the universe as a band of spirits who +monopolize the good and make free gifts of evil, who +can be feared, threatened, worshiped, scolded, wheedled,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">447</a></span> +coaxed, bribed, deceived, enslaved, held in awe, and +above all, used for the prosecution of desiderated +ends and the fulfilment of instinctive desires. The first +recorded cognized order is a moral order in which fragmentary +feelings, instinctive impulsions, and spontaneous +imaginings are hypostatized, ideas are identified +with their causes, all the contents of the immature, sudden, +primitive, blundering consciousness receive a vital +figure and a proper name. So man makes himself more +at home in the world without,—that world which enslaves +the spirit so fearfully and with such strangeness, +and which just as miraculously yields such ecstasy, such +power, such unaccountable good! In this immediate sense +the soul controls the world by becoming symbolic of it; +it is the world's first language. It is, however, an inarticulate, +blundering, incoherent thing and the cues +which it furnishes to the nature of the environment are +as often as not dangerous and misleading. When bows +and arrows, crystals and caves, clouds and waters, dung +and dew, mountains and trees, beasts and visions, are +treated as chiefs and men must be treated, then the +moral regimen initiated, taking little account of the +barest real qualities manifested by these things, and +attributing the maximum importance to the characters +postulated and foreign, is successful neither in allaying +evil nor in extending good. Its benefits are adventitious +and its malfeasance constant. Food buried with the +dead was food lost; blood smeared upon the bow to +make it shoot better served only to make the hands +unskilful by impeding their activity. Initiation, ceremony, +sacrificial ritual, fasting, and isolation involved<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">448</a></span> +privations for which no adequate return was recovered, +even by the medicine-man whose absolute and ephemeral +power needed only the betrayal of circumstances for its +own destruction, taking him along with it, oftener than +not, to disgrace or death.</p> + +<p>As the cumulus of experience on experience grew +greater, chance violations of tradition, or custom, or +ritual, or formula achieving for the violator a mastery +or stability which performance and obedience failed to +achieve, the new heresy became the later orthodoxy, for +in religion, as in all other matters human, nothing succeeds +like success. An impotent god has no divinity; +a disused potency means a dying life among the immortals +as on the earth. And as the gods themselves +seemed often to give their worshipers the lie, the futility +of the personal and dramatic definitions of the +immediate environment became slowly recognized, the +recognition varying in extent, and clearer in practice +than in discourse.</p> + +<p>Accordingly the most primitive of the animisms underwent +a necessary modification. The plasticity of +objects under destructive treatment, the impotence of +<i>taboo</i> before elementary needs, the adequate satisfactions +which violations of the divine law brought,—these +killed many gods and drove others from their homes +in the hearts of things. The objects so purged became +matters of accurate knowledge. Where animation is +denied the <i>whole</i> environment, wisdom begins to distinguish +between spirit-haunted matter and the purely +material; knowledge of person and knowledge of things +differentiate, and science, the impersonal and more potent<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">449</a></span> +knowledge of the environment, properly begins. +Familiarity leads to control, control to contempt, and +for the unreflective mind, personality is not, as for +the sophisticated, an attribute of the contemptible. The +incalculable appearance of thunder, the magic greed of +fire, the malice, the spontaneity, the thresh and pulse +as of life which seems to characterize whatever is capricious +or impenetrable or uncontrollable are too much +like the felt throbs of consciousness to become dehumanized. +To the variable alone, therefore, is transcendent +animation attributed. Not the seasonal variation +of the sun's heat, but the joy and the sorrow of which +his heat is the occasion made him divine. When the +gods appear, to take the place of the immanent spirits +immediately present in things, they appear, therefore, +as already transcendent, with habitations just beyond +the well-known: on high mountains, in the skies, in dark +forests, in caves, in all regions feared or unexplored. +But chiefly the gods inhabit those spaces whence issue +the power of darkness and destruction, particularly the +heaven, a word whose meaning is now, as it was primitively, +identical with divinity. The savage becomes a +pagan by giving concrete personality to the dreadful +unknown. Thence it is that the ancient poet assigns +the gods a lineage of fear; and fear may truly be said +to have made the gods, in so far as the gods personify +the fear which made them.</p> + +<p>The moral level of these figments alters with the level +of their habitation; their power varies with their remoteness; +Zeus lives in the highest heaven and is arbiter +of the destiny of both gods and man. To him and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_450" id="Page_450">450</a></span> +to his like there cannot be the relation of equality which +is sustained between men and spirits of the lower order. +His very love is blasting; interchange of commodities, +good for good and evil for evil is not possible where +he is concerned. Gods of the higher order he exemplifies, +even all the gods of Olympus, of the Himalayas, of +Valhalla, are literally beings invoked and implored, as +well as dwellers in heaven. To them man pays a toll +on all excellence he gains or finds; libations and burnt-offerings, +the fat and the first fruits: he exists by +their sufferance and serves their caprice. He is +their toy, born for their pleasure, and living by their +need.</p> + +<p>But just because men conceive themselves to be play-things +of the gods, they define in the gods the ideals +of mankind. For the divine power is power to live +forever, and the sum of human desire is just the desire +to maintain its humanity in freedom and happiness +endlessly. And exactly those capacities and instruments +of self-maintenance,—all that is beauty, or truth, +or goodness, the very essence of value in any of its +forms,—the gods are conceived to possess and to control: +these they may grant, withhold, destroy. They are +as eternal as their habitations, the mountains; as ruthless +as their element, the sea; as omnipresent as the +heavens, their home. To become like the gods, therefore, +the masters and fathers of men, is to remain +eternally and absolutely human: so that who is most +like them on earth takes his place beside them in heaven. +Hercules and Elias and Krishna, Çaka-Muni and Ishvara, +Jesus and Baha Ullah. Nay, they are the very<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_451" id="Page_451">451</a></span> +gods themselves, manifest as men! The history of the +gods thus presents a double aspect: it is first a characterization +of the important objects and processes of +nature and their survival-values,—the sun, thunder, +rain, and earthquakes; dissolution, rebirth, and love; +and again it is the narration of activities native and +delightful to mankind. Zeus is a promiscuous lover as +well as a wielder of thunderbolts; Apollo not only drives +the chariot of the sun; he plays and dances, discourses +melody and herds sheep.</p> + +<p>But while the portrait of the heart's desire in fictitious +adventures of divinity endears the gods to the +spirit, the exploration of the elements in the environment +whose natures they dramatically express, destroys +their force, reduces their number, and drives them still +further into the unknown. Olympus is surrendered for +the planets and the fixed stars. With remoteness of +location comes transmutation of character. The forces +of the environment which were the divinity are now +conceived as instrumental to its uses. Its power is +more subtly described; its nature becomes a more purely +ideal expression of human aspiration. Physical remoteness +and metaphysical ultimacy are akin. God among +the stars is better than God on Olympus. If, as with the +Parsees, the unfavorable character of the environment +is expressed in another and equal being,—the devil, +then the god of good must, in the symbolic struggle, become +the ultimate victor and remain the more potent +director of man's destiny. In religion, therefore, when +the mind grows at all by experience, monism develops +spontaneously. For the character of the god becomes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_452" id="Page_452">452</a></span> +increasingly more relevant to hope than to the conditions +of hope's satisfaction. And what man first of all +and beyond all aspires to, is that single, undivided good,—the +free flow of his unitary life, stable, complete, +eternal. There is hence always to be found a chief and +father among the gods who, as mankind gain in wisdom +and in material power, consumes his mates and his children +like Kronos or Jahweh, inherits their attributes +and performs their functions. The chief divinity becomes +the only divinity; a god becomes God. But +divinity, in becoming one and unique, becomes also transcendent. +Monotheism pushes God altogether beyond +the sensible environment. Personality, instead of being +the nature of the world, has become its ground and +cause, and all that mankind loves is conserved, in order +that man, whom God loves, may have his desire and live +forever. Life is eternal and happiness necessary, beyond +nature,—in heaven. Finally, in transcendental +idealism, the poles meet; what has been put eternally +apart is eternally united; the immaterial, impalpable, +transcendent heaven is made one and continuous with +the gross and unhappy natural world. One <i>is</i> the other; +the other the one. God <i>is</i> the world and transcends it; <i>is</i> +the evil and the good which conquers and consumes that +evil. The environment becomes thus described as a +single, eternal, conscious unity, in which all the actual +but transitory values of the actual but transitory life +are conserved and eternalized. In a description of God +such as Royce's or Aristotle's the environment is the +eternity of all its constituents that are dearest to man. +Religion, which began as a definition of the environment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_453" id="Page_453">453</a></span> +as it moved and controlled mankind, ends by describing +it as mankind desires it to be. The environment +is now the aforementioned ideal socius or self which +satisfies perfectly all human requirements. Pluralistic +and quarrelsome animism has become monistic and harmonious +spiritism. Forces have turned to excellences +and needs to satisfactions. Necessity has been transmuted +to Providence, sin has been identified with salvation, +value with existence, and existence with impotence +and illusion before Providence, salvation, and value.</p> + +<h5>VII</h5> + +<p>With this is completed the reply to the question: +Why do men contradict their own experience? Experience +is, as Spinoza says, passion and action, both inextricably +mingled and coincident, with the good and +evil of them as interwoven as they. That piecemeal +conquest of the evil which we call civilization has not +even the promise of finality. It is a Penelope's web, +always needing to be woven anew. Now, in experience +desire anticipates and outleaps action and fact rebuffs +desire. Desire realizes itself, consequently, in ideas +objectified by the power of speech into independent and +autonomous subjects of discourse, whereby experience +is One, Eternal, a Spirit or Spiritually Controlled, +wherein man has Freedom and Immortality. These, the +constantly desiderated traits of a perfect universe, are +in fact the limits of what adequacy environmental satisfactions +can attain, ideas hypostatized, normative of +existence, but not constituting it. With them, in philosophy +and religion, the mind confronts the experiences<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_454" id="Page_454">454</a></span> +of death and obstruction, of manifoldness, change and +materiality, and denies them, as Peter denied Jesus. +The visible world, being not as we want it, we imagine +an unseen one that satisfies our want, declaring the +visible one an illusion by its side. So we work a radical +substitution of desiderates for actualities, of ideals for +facts, of values for existences. Art alone acknowledges +the actual relations between these contrasting pairs. +Art alone so operates as in fact to convert their oppugnance +into identity. Intrinsically, its whole purpose +and technique consists of transmutation of values into +existences, in the incarnation the realization of values. +The philosophy and religion of tradition, on the contrary, +consists intrinsically in the flat denial of reality, +or at least, co-reality, to existence, and the transfer of +that eulogium to value-forms as such.</p> + +<p>Metaphysics, theology, ethics, logic, æsthetics, dialectic +developments as they are of "norms" or "realities" +which themselves can have no meaning without +the "apparent," changing world they measure and belie, +assume consequently a detachment and self-sufficiency +they do not actually possess. Their historians have +treated them as if they had no context, as if the elaboration +of the ideal tendencies of the successive systems +explained their origin, character, and significance. But +in fact they are unendowed with this pure intrinsicality, +and their development is not to be accounted for as +exteriorization of innate motive or an unfoldment of inward +implications. They have a context; they are +crossed and interpenetrated by outer interests and extraneous +considerations. Their meaning, in so far as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_455" id="Page_455">455</a></span> +it is not merely æsthetic, is <i>nil</i> apart from these interests +and considerations of which they are sometimes expressions, +sometimes reconstructions, and from which they +are persistently refuges.</p> + +<p>Philosophy and religion are, in a word, no less than +art, social facts. They are responses to group situations +without which they cannot be understood. Although +analysis has shown them to be rooted in certain persistent +motives and conditions of human nature by +whose virtue they issue in definite contours and significances, +they acquire individuality and specific importance +only through interaction with the constantly varying +social situations in which they arise, on which they +operate, and by which they are in turn operated on. +Philosophy has perhaps suffered most of all from +nescience of those and from devoting itself, at a minimum, +to the satisfaction of that passion for oneness, +for "logical consistency" without which philosophic +"systems" would never arise, nor the metaphysical +distinction between "appearance" and "reality"; and +with which the same systems have made up a historic aggregate +of strikingly repugnant and quarrelsome units. +It is this pursuit of consistency as against correctness +which has resulted in the irrelevance of philosophy that +the philosopher, unconscious of his motives and roots, +or naïvely identifying, through the instrumentality of +an elaborate dialectic, his instinctive and responsive +valuations of existence with its categoric essences, confuses +with inward autonomy and the vision of the "real." +Consequently, the systems of tradition begin as attempts +to transvalue social situations whose existence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_456" id="Page_456">456</a></span> +is troublesome and end as utterances of which the specific +bearing, save to the system of an opponent, is undiscoverable. +The attempt to correct the environment +in fact concludes as an abolition of it in words. The +philosophic system becomes a solipsism, a pure lyric +expression of the appetites of human nature.</p> + +<p>For this perversity of the philosophic tradition Plato +is perhaps, more than any one else, answerable. He is +the first explicitly to have reduplicated the world, to +have set existences over against values, to have made +them dependent upon values, to have assigned absolute +reality to the compensatory ideals, and to have identified +philosophy with preoccupation with these ideals. Behind +his theory of life lay far from agreeable personal +experience of the attitude of political power toward +philosophic ideas. Its ripening was coincident with the +most distressing period of the history of his country. +The Peloponnesian War was the confrontation of two +social systems, radically opposed in form, method, and +outlook. Democracy, in Athens, had become synonymous +with demagoguery, corruption, inefficiency, injustice +and unscrupulousness in every aspect of public +affairs. The government had no consistent policy and +no centralized responsibility; divided counsel led to continual +disaster without, and party politics rotted the +strength within. Beside Athens, Sparta, a communistic +oligarchy, was a tower of strength and effectiveness. +The Spartans made mistakes; they were slow, inept, +rude, and tyrannical, but they were a unit on the war, +their policy was consistent, responsibilities were adequately +centered, good order and loyalty designated the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_457" id="Page_457">457</a></span> +aims and habits of life.<a name="FNanchor_98" id="FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">98</a> The Republic is the response +to the confrontation of Spartan and Athenian; the attempt +to find an adequate solution of the great social +problem this confrontation expressed. The successful +state becomes in it the model for the metaphysical one, +and the difference between fact and ideal is amended by +dialectically forcing the implications of existence in the +direction of desire. Neither Athens nor Sparta presented +a completely satisfactory social organization. +There must therefore exist a type of social organization +which is so satisfying. It must have existed from +eternity, and must be in essence identical with eternal +good, identical with that oneness and spirituality, lacking +which, nothing is important. This archetypal social +organization whose essence is excellence, it is the congenital +vocation of the philosopher to contemplate and +to realize. Philosophers are hence the paragons among +animals, lovers of truth, haters of falsehood and of +multiplicity, spectators of all time and all existence. +In them the power to govern should be vested. Their +nature is of the same stuff as the Highest Good with +which it concerns itself, but being such, it appears, +merely "appears" alas! irrelevant to the actual situations +of the daily life. The philosopher is hence opposed +and expelled by that arch-sophist, Public Opinion: the +man on the street, failing to understand him, dubs him +prater, star-gazer, good-for-nothing.<a name="FNanchor_99" id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">99</a> He becomes an +ineffectual stranger, an outlaw, in a world in which he +should be master.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_458" id="Page_458">458</a></span></p> +<p>Plato's description of the philosopher and philosophy +is, it will be seen, at once an apology and a program. But +it is a program which has been petrified into a +compensatory ideal. The confession of impotence, the +abandonment of the programmatic intent is due to identification +of the ideal with metaphysical fact, to the +hypostasis of the ideal. With Christianism, that being +a philosophy operating as a religion, world-weariness +made the apology unnecessary and converted the hypostasis +into the basis of that program of complete +surrender of the attempt to master the problems of existence +upon which ensued the arrest of science and civilization +for a thousand years. The Greeks were not +world-weary, and consequently, their joy in life and +existence contributed a minimum of relevance to their +other-worldly dreams. Need it be reasserted that the +whole Platonic system, at its richest and best in the +Republic, is both an expression of and a compensation +for a concrete social situation? Once it was formulated +it became a part of that situation, altered it, served +as another among the actual causes which determined +the subsequent history of philosophy. Its historic and +efficacious significance is defined by that situation, but +philosophers ignore the situation and accept the system +as painters accept a landscape—as the thing in +itself.</p> + +<p>Now, the æsthetic aspect of the philosophic system, +its autonomy, and consequent irrelevancy, are undeniable. +Once it comes to be, its intrinsic excellence may +constitute its infallible justification for existence, with +no more to be said; and if its defenders or proponents<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_459" id="Page_459">459</a></span> +claimed nothing more for it than this immediate satisfactoriness, +there would be no quarrel with them. There +is, however, present in their minds a sense of the other +bearings of their systems. They claim them, in any +event, to be <i>true</i>, that is, to be relevant to a situation +regarded as more important because more lastingly determinative +of conduct, more "real" than the situation +of which they are born. Their systems are offered, +hence, as maps of life, as guides to the everlasting. +That they intend to define some method for the conservation +of life eternally, is clear enough from their initial +motivation and formal issue: all the Socratics, with +their minds fixed on happiness or salvation according +to the prevalence of disillusionment among them; the +Christian systems, still Socratic, but as resolutely other-worldly +as disillusioned Buddhists; the systems of Spinoza, +of Kant, the whole subsequent horde of idealisms, +up to the contemporary Germanoid and German idealistic +soliloquies,—they all declare that the vanity and +multiplicity of life as it is leads them to seek for the +permanent and the meaningful, and they each find it +according to the idiosyncrasies of the particular impulses +and terms they start with. That their Snark +turns out in every case to be a Boojum is another +story.</p> + +<p>Yet this story is what gives philosophy, like religion, +its social significance. If its roots, as its actual biography +shows, did not reach deep in the soil of events, +if its issues had no fruitage in events made over by its +being, it would never have been so closely identified with +intelligence and its systematic hypostasis would never<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_460" id="Page_460">460</a></span> +have ensued. The fact is that philosophy, like all forms +of creative intelligence, is a tool before it is a perfection. +Its autonomy supervenes on its efficaciousness; it +does not precede its efficaciousness. Men philosophize in +order to live before they live in order to philosophize. +Aristotle's description of the self-sufficiency of theory +is possible only for a life wherein theory had already +earned this self-sufficiency as practice, in a life, that +is, which is itself an art, organized by the application +of value-forms to its existent psycho-physical processes +in such a way that its existence incarnates the values +it desiderates and the values perfect the existence that +embodies them.</p> + +<p>The biography of philosophy, hence, reveals it to have +the same possibilities and the same fate that all other +ideas have. Today ideas are the patent of our humanity, +the stuff and form of intelligence, the differentiæ between +us and the beasts. In so far forth, they express +the surplusage of vitality over need, the creative freedom +of life at play. This is the thing we see in the +imaginings and fantasies of childhood, whose environment +is by social intent formed to favor and sustain its +being. The capacity for spontaneity of idea appears +to decrease with maturity, and the few favored healthy +mortals with whom it remains are called men of genius. +William James was such a man, and there are a few +still among the philosophers. But in the mass and in +the long run, ideas are not a primary confirmation of +our humanity; in the mass and long they are warnings +of menace to it, a sign of its disintegration. Even +so radical an intellectualist as Mr. Santayana cherishes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_461" id="Page_461">461</a></span> +this observation to the degree of almost suggesting it as +the dogma that all ideas have their origin in inner or +outer maladjustment.<a name="FNanchor_100" id="FNanchor_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">100</a> However this may be, that +the dominant philosophic ideas arise out of radical disharmonies +between nature and human nature need not +be here reiterated, while the provocative character of +minor maladjustments is to be inferred from the fertility +of ideas in unstable minds, of whatever type, from +the neurasthenic to the mad. Ideas represent in these +cases the limits of vital elasticity, the attempt of the +organism to maintain its organic balance; it is as if a +balloon, compressed on one side, bulged on the other.</p> + +<p>Ideas, then, bear three types of relations to organic +life, relations socially incarnated in traditional art, +religion, and philosophy. First of all they may be an +expression of innate capacities, the very essence of the +freedom of life. In certain arts, such as music, they +are just this. In the opposite case they may be the +effect of the compression of innate capacities, an outcome +of obstruction to the free low of life. They are +then compensatory. Where expressive ideas are confluent +with existence, compensatory ideas diverge from +existence; they become pure value-forms whose paramount +realization is traditional philosophy. Their rise +and motivation in both these forms is unconscious. They +are ideas, but not yet intelligence. The third instance +falls between these original two. The idea is neither +merely a free expression of innate capacities, nor a +compensation for their obstruction or compression. +Arising as the effect of a disharmony, it develops as an +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_462" id="Page_462">462</a></span> +enchannelment of organic powers directed to the conversion +of the disharmony into an adjustment. It does +not <i>use up</i> vital energies like the expressive idea, it is +not an abortion of them, like the compensatory idea. +It uses them, and is aware that it uses them—that is, +it is a program of action upon the environment, of +conversion of values into existences. Such an idea +has the differentia of intelligence. It is creative; it +actually converts nature into forms appropriate to +human nature. It abolishes the Otherworld of the compensatory +tradition in philosophy by incarnating it +in this world; it abolishes the Otherworld of the religionist, +rendered important by belittling the actual +one, by restoring the working relationships between +thoughts and things. This restoration develops as +reconstruction of the world in fact. It consists specifically +of the art and science which compose the efficacious +enterprises of history and of which the actual +web of our civilization is spun.</p> + +<p>Manifest in its purity in art, it attends unconsciously +both religion and philosophy, for the strands of life +keep interweaving, and whatever is, in our collective +being, changes and is changed by whatever else may be, +that is in reach. The life of reason is initially unconscious +because it can learn only by living to seek a +reason for life. Once it discovers that it can become +self-maintaining alone through relevance to its ground +and conditions, the control which this relevance yields +makes it so infectious that it tends to permeate every +human institution, even religion and philosophy. Philosophy, +it is true, has lagged behind even religion in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_463" id="Page_463">463</a></span> +relevancy, but the lagging has been due not to the +intention of the philosopher but to the inherent character +of the task he assumed. Both art and religion, we +have seen, possess an immediacy and concreteness which +philosophy lacks. Art reconstructs correlative portions +of the environment for the eye, the ear, the hopes and +fears of the daily life. Religion extends this reconstruction +beyond the actual environment, but applies its saving +technique at the critical points in the career of the +group or the individual; to control the food-supply, to +protect in birth, pubescence, marriage, and death. All +its motives are grounded in specific instincts and needs, +all its reconstructions and compensations culminate +with reference to these. Philosophy, on the other hand, +deals with the <i>whole</i> nature of man and his <i>whole</i> environment. +It seeks primaries and ultimates. Its traditional +task is so to define the universe as to articulate +thereby a theory of life and eternal salvation. It +establishes contact with reality at no individual, specific +point: its reals are "real in general." It aims, in a +word, to be relevant to all nature, and to express the +whole soul of man. The consequence is inevitable: it +forfeits relevance to everything natural; touching nothing +actual, it reconstructs nothing actual. Its concretest +incarnation is a dialectic design woven of words. +The systems of tradition, hence, are works of art, to be +contemplated, enjoyed, and believed in, but not to be +acted on. For, since action is always concrete and +specific, always determined to time, place, and occasion, +we cannot in fact adapt ourselves to the aggregate +infinitude of the environment, or that to ourselves.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_464" id="Page_464">464</a></span> +Something always stands out, recalcitrant, invincible, +defiant. But it is just such an adaptation that philosophy +intends, and the futility of the intention is evinced +by the fact that the systems of tradition continue side +by side with the realities they deny, and live unmixed +in one and the same mind, as a picture of the ocean +on the wall of a dining room in an inland town. Our +operative relations to them tend always to be essentially +æsthetic. We may and do believe in them in spite of +life and experience, because belief in them, involving no +action, involves no practical risk. Where action is a +consequence of a philosophic system, the system seems +to dichotomize into art and religion. It becomes particularized +into a technique of living or the dogma of +a sect, and so particularized it becomes radically self-conscious +and an aspect of creative intelligence.</p> + +<p>So particularized, it is, however, no longer philosophy, +and philosophy has (I hope I may say this without +professional bias) an inalienable place in the life of +reason. This place is rationally defined for it by the +discovery of its ground and function in the making of +civilization; and by the perfection of its possibilities +through the definition of its natural relationships. +Thus, it is, in its essential historic character at least, +as fine an art as music, the most inward and human of +all arts. It may be, and human nature being what it +is, undoubtedly will continue to be, an added item to +the creations wherewith man makes his world a better +place to live in, precious in that it envisages and projects +the excellences and perfections his heart desires +and his imagination therefore defines. So taken, it is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_465" id="Page_465">465</a></span> +not a substitution for the world, but an addition to it, +a refraction of it through the medium of human nature, +as a landscape painting by Whistler or Turner is not +a substitution for the actual landscape, but an interpretation +and imaginative perfection of it, more suitable +to the eye of man. A system like Bergson's is such +a work, and its æsthetic adequacy, its beauty, may be +measured by the acknowledgment it receives and the +influence it exercises. Choosing one of the items of +experience as its medium, and this item the most precious +in the mind's eye which the history of philosophy reveals, +it proceeds to fabricate a dialectical image of +experience in which all the compensatory desiderates +are expressed and realized. It entices minds of all orders, +and they are happy to dwell in it, for the nonce +realizing in the perception of the system the values +it utters. By abandoning all pretense to be true, philosophic +systems of the traditional sort may attain the +simple but supreme excellence of beauty, and rest content +therewith.</p> + +<p>The philosophic ideal, however, is traditionally not +beauty but truth: the function of a philosophic system +is not presentative, but <i>re</i>presentative and causal, and +that the systems of tradition have had and still have +consequences as well as character, is obvious enough. +It is, however, to be noted that these consequences have +issued out of the fact that the systems have been specific +items of existence among other equally and even +more specific items, thought by particular men, at particular +times and in particular places. As such they +have been programs for meeting events and incarnating<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_466" id="Page_466">466</a></span> +values; operative ideals aiming to recreate the +world according to determined standards. They have +looked forward rather than backward, have tacitly +acknowledged the reality of change, the irreducible +pluralism of nature, and the genuineness of the activities, +oppugnant or harmonizing, between the items of +the Cosmic. Many they ostensibly negate. The truth, +in a word, has been experimental and prospective; the +desiderates they uttered operated actually as such and +not as already existing. Historians of philosophy, +treating it as if it had no context, have denied or ignored +this rôle of philosophy in human events, but historians +of the events themselves could not avoid observing +and enregistering it.</p> + +<p>Only within very recent years, as an effect of the +concept of evolution in the field of the sciences, have +philosophers as such envisaged this non-æsthetic aspect +of philosophy's ground and function in the making of +civilization and have made it the basis for a sober vision +which may or may not have beauty, but which cannot +have finality. Such a vision is again nothing more +than traditional philosophy become conscious of its +character and limitations and shorn of its pretense. +It is a program to execute rather than a metaphysic +to rest in. Its procedure is the procedure of all the arts +and sciences. It frankly acknowledges the realities of +immediate experience, the turbulence and complexity of +the flux, the interpenetrative confusion of orders, the +inward self-diversification of even the simplest thing, +which "change" means, and the continual emergence +of novel entities, unforeseen and unprevisible, from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_467" id="Page_467">467</a></span> +reciprocal action of the older aggregate. This perceptual +reality it aims to remould according to the +heart's desire. Accordingly it drops the pretense of +envisaging the universe and devotes itself to its more +modest task of applying its standards to a particular +item that needs to be remade. It is believed in, but no +longer without risk, for, without becoming a dogma, it +still subjects itself to the tests of action. So it acknowledges +that it must and will itself undergo constant +modification through the process of action, in which it +uses events, in their meanings rather than in their natures, +to map out the future and to make it amenable to +human nature. Philosophy so used is, as John Dewey +somewhere says, a mode and organ of experience among +many others. In a world the very core of which is +change, it is directed upon that which is not yet, to +previse and to form its character and to map out the +way of life within it. Its aim is the liberation and enlargement +of human capacities, the enfranchisement of +man by the actual realization of values. In its integrate +character therefore, it envisages the life of +reason and realizes it as the art of life. Where it is +successful, beauty and use are confluent and identical +in it. It converts sight into insight. It infuses existence +with value, making them one. It is the concrete +incarnation of Creative Intelligence.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1"><span class="label">1</span></a> The word relation suffers from ambiguity. I am speaking +here of <i>connexion</i>, dynamic and functional interaction. "Relation" +is a term used also to express logical reference. I suspect +that much of the controversy about internal and external relations +is due to this ambiguity. One passes at will from existential +connexions of things to logical relationship of terms. Such an +identification of existences with <i>terms</i> is congenial to idealism, but +is paradoxical in a professed realism.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2"><span class="label">2</span></a> There is some gain in substituting a doctrine of flux and +interpenetration of psychical states, <i>à la</i> Bergson, for that of +rigid discontinuity. But the substitution leaves untouched the +fundamental misstatement of experience, the conception of experience +as directly and primarily "inner" and psychical.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3"><span class="label">3</span></a> Mathematical science in its formal aspects, or as a branch of +formal logic, has been the empirical stronghold of rationalism. But +an empirical empiricism, in contrast with orthodox deductive +empiricism, has no difficulty in establishing its jurisdiction as to +deductive functions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4"><span class="label">4</span></a> It is a shame to devote the word idealism, with its latent +moral, practical connotations, to a doctrine whose tenets are the +denial of the existence of a physical world, and the psychical +character of all objects—at least as far as they are knowable. +But I am following usage, not attempting to make it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5"><span class="label">5</span></a> See Dr. Kallen's essay, below.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6"><span class="label">6</span></a> The "they" means the "some" of the prior sentence—those +whose realism is epistemological, instead of being a plea for +taking the facts of experience as we find them without refraction +through epistemological apparatus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7"><span class="label">7</span></a> It is interesting to note that some of the realists who have +assimilated the cognitive relation to other existential relations +in the world (instead of treating it as an unique or epistemological +relation) have been forced in support of their conception +of knowledge as a "presentative" or spectatorial affair to extend +the defining features of the latter to all relations among +things, and hence to make all the "real" things in the world +pure "simples," wholly independent of one another. So conceived +the doctrine of external relations appears to be rather the +doctrine of complete externality of <i>things</i>. Aside from this +point, the doctrine is interesting for its dialectical ingenuity and +for the elegant development of assumed premises, rather than +convincing on account of empirical evidence supporting it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8"><span class="label">8</span></a> In other words, there is a general "problem of error" only +because there is a general problem of evil, concerning which see +Dr. Kallen's essay, below.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9"><span class="label">9</span></a> Compare the paper by Professor Bode.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10"><span class="label">10</span></a> As the attempt to retain the epistemological problem and +yet to reject idealistic and relativistic solutions has forced some +Neo-realists into the doctrine of isolated and independent simples, +so it has also led to a doctrine of Eleatic pluralism. In order +to maintain the doctrine the subject makes no difference to anything +else, it is held that <i>no</i> ultimate real makes any difference +to anything else—all this rather than surrender once for all the +genuineness of the problem and to follow the lead of empirical +subject-matter.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11"><span class="label">11</span></a> There is almost no end to the various dialectic developments +of the epistemological situation. When it is held that all the +relations of the type in question are cognitive, and yet it is recognized +(as it must be) that many such "transformations" go +unremarked, the theory is supplemented by introducing "unconscious" +psychical modifications.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12"><span class="label">12</span></a> Conception-presentation has, of course, been made by many +in the history of speculation an exception to this statement; +"pure" memory is also made an exception by Bergson. To take +cognizance of this matter would, of course, accentuate, not relieve, +the difficulty remarked upon in the text.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13"><span class="label">13</span></a> Cf. <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, Chs. I and II, by Dewey; also +"Epistemology and Mental States," Tufts, <i>Phil. Rev.</i>, Vol. VI, +which deserves to rank as one of the early documents of the "experimental" +movement.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14"><span class="label">14</span></a> Cf. "The Definition of the Psychical," G. H. Mead, <i>Decennial +Publications of the University of Chicago</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15"><span class="label">15</span></a> Cf. <i>The Logic of Hegel-Wallace</i>, p. 117.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16"><span class="label">16</span></a> <i>Bosanquet's Logic</i>, 2nd Ed., p. 171. The identification of +induction and procedure by hypothesis occurs on p. 156.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17"><span class="label">17</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 14 (italics mine).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18"><span class="label">18</span></a> Perhaps the most complete exhibition of the breakdown of +formal logic considered as an account of the operation of thought +apart from its subject-matter is to be found in Schiller's <i>Formal +Logic</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19"><span class="label">19</span></a> Cf. Stuart on "Valuation as a Logical Process" in <i>Studies in +Logical Theory</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20"><span class="label">20</span></a> <i>The New Realism</i>, pp. 40-41.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21"><span class="label">21</span></a> Cf. Montague, pp. 256-57; also Russell, <i>The Problems of</i> +<i>Philosophy</i>, pp. 27-65-66, <i>et passim</i>; and Holt's <i>Concept of Consciousness</i>, +pp. 14ff., discussed below.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22"><span class="label">22</span></a> Cf. Angell, "Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," <i>Decennial +Publications of University of Chicago</i>, Vol. III; also +Castro, "The Respective Standpoints of Psychology and Logic," +<i>Philosophic Studies, University of Chicago</i>, No. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23"><span class="label">23</span></a> I am here following, in the main, Professor Holt because he +alone appears to have had the courage to develop the full consequences +of the premises of analytic logic.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24"><span class="label">24</span></a> <i>The Concept of Consciousness</i>, pp. 14-15.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25"><span class="label">25</span></a> It is interesting to compare this onlooking act with the account +of consciousness further on. As "psychological" this act +of onlooking must be an act of consciousness. But consciousness +is a cross-section or a projection of things made by their interaction +with a nervous system. Here consciousness is a function +of all the interacting factors. It is in the play. It <i>is</i> the play. +It is not in a spectator's box. How can consciousness be a function +of all the things put into the cross-section and yet be a +mere beholder of the process? Moreover, what is it that makes +any particular, spectacle, or cross-section "logical"? If it be +said all are "logical" what significance has the term?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26"><span class="label">26</span></a> Cf. Russell's <i>Scientific Methods in Philosophy</i>, p. 59.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27"><span class="label">27</span></a> Holt, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 128-30.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28"><span class="label">28</span></a> In fact, Newton, in all probability, had the Cartesian pure +notions in mind.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29"><span class="label">29</span></a> Holt, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 118 (italics mine). Cf. also Perry's <i>Present +Philosophical Tendencies</i>, pp. 108 and 311.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30"><span class="label">30</span></a> The character of elements and the nature of simplicity have +been discussed in the preceding section.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31"><span class="label">31</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 275.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32"><span class="label">32</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 275.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33"><span class="label">33</span></a> This lack of continuity between the cognitive function of +the nervous system and its other functions accounts for the +strange paradox in the logic of neo-realism of an act of knowing +which is "subjective" and yet is the act of so palpably an +objective affair as a nervous system. The explanation is that +the essence of all deprecated subjectivity is, as before pointed +out, functional isolation. That this sort of subjectivity should +be identified with the "psychical" is not strange, since a living +organism is very difficult to isolate, while the term "psychical," +in its metaphysical sense, seems to stand for little else than just +this complete isolation. Having once appealed to the nervous +system it seems incredible that the physiological continuity of its +functions with each other and with its environment should not +have suggested the logical corollary. Only the force of the +prepossession of mathematical atomism in analytic logic can +account for its failure to do so.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34"><span class="label">34</span></a> But it would be better to use the term "logically-practical" +instead of "subjective" with the psychical implications of that +term.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35"><span class="label">35</span></a> An analysis which has been many times carried out has made +it clear that scientific data never do more than approximate the +laws and entities upon which our science rests. It is equally +evident that the forms of these laws and entities themselves shift +in the reconstructions of incessant research, or where they seem +most secure could consistently be changed, or at least could be +fundamentally different were our psychological structure or even +our conventions of thought different. I need only refer to the +<i>Science et Hypothèse</i> of Poincaré and the <i>Problems of Science</i> +of Enriques. The positivist who undertakes to carry the structure +of the world back to the data of observation, and the +uniformities appearing in the accepted hypotheses of growing +sciences cannot maintain that we ever succeed in isolating data +which must remain the same in the kaleidoscope of our research +science; nor are we better served if we retreat to the ultimate +elements of points and instants which our pure mathematics +assumes and implicitly defines, and in connection with which it has +worked out the modern theory of the number and continuous +series, its statements of continuity and infinity.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36"><span class="label">36</span></a> In other words, science assumes that every error is <i>ex post +facto</i> explicable as a function of the real conditions under which +it really arose. Hence, "consciousness," set over against Reality, +was not its condition.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37"><span class="label">37</span></a> C. Judson Herrick, "Some Reflections on the Origin and Significance +of the Cerebral Cortex," <i>Journal of Animal Behavior</i>, +Vol. III, pp. 228-233.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38"><span class="label">38</span></a> <i>Psychology</i>, Vol. I, p. 256.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39"><span class="label">39</span></a> H. C. Warren, <i>Psychological Review</i>, Vol. XXI, Page 93.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40"><span class="label">40</span></a> <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, I, p. 241, note.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41"><span class="label">41</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 258.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42"><span class="label">42</span></a> <i>Psychology. Briefer Course.</i> P. 468.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43"><span class="label">43</span></a> Angell, <i>Psychology</i>, p. 65.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44"><span class="label">44</span></a> <i>Psychology</i>, Vol. I, p. 251.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45"><span class="label">45</span></a> Thorstein Veblen: <i>The Instinct of Workmanship</i>, p. 316.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46"><span class="label">46</span></a> It may still be argued that we must depend upon analogy in +our acceptance or rejection of a new commodity. For any element +of novelty must surely suggest something to us, must <i>mean</i> something +to us, if it is to attract or repel. Thus, the motor-car will +whirl us rapidly over the country, the motor-boat will dart over +the water without effort on our part. And in such measure as we +have had them hitherto, we have always enjoyed experiences of +rapid motion. These new instruments simply promise a perfectly +well-known <i>sort</i> of experience in fuller measure. So the +argument may run. And our mental process in such a case may +accordingly be held to be nothing more mysterious than a passing +by analogy from the <i>old</i> ways in which we got rapid motion in +the past to the <i>new</i> way which now promises more of the same. +And more of the same is what we want. +</p><p> +"More of the same" means here intensive magnitude and in this +connection at all events it begs the question. Bergson's polemic +seems perfectly valid against such a use of the notion. But kept +in logical terms the case seems clearer. It is said that we reason +in such a case by "analogy." We do, indeed; but what is analogy? +The term explains nothing until the real process behind +the term is clearly and realistically conceived. What I shall here +suggest holds true, I think, as an account of analogical inference +generally and not simply for the economic type of case we have +here to do with. Reasoning is too often thought of as proceeding +from given independent premises—as here (1) the fact that +hitherto the driving we have most enjoyed and the sailing we +have most enjoyed have been <i>fast</i> and (2) the fact that the +motor-car is <i>fast</i>. But do we accept the conclusion because +the premises suggest it in a way we cannot resist? On the contrary, +stated thus, the premises clearly do <i>not</i> warrant the conclusion +that the motor-car will be enjoyable. Such a statement of +the premises is wholly formal and <i>ex post facto</i>. What, then, is +our actual mental process in the case? The truth is, I think, that +we simply—yes, "psychologically"—wish to try <i>that promised +unheard-of rate of speed</i>! That comes first and foremost. But +we mean to be reasonably prudent on the whole, although we are +avowedly adventurous just now in this particular direction! We, +therefore, ransack our memory for <i>other fast things</i> we have +known, to see whether they have encouragement to give us. We +try to supply ourselves with a major premise because the new +proposal in its own right interests us—instead of having the +major premise already there to coerce us by a purely "logical" +compulsion as soon as we invade its sphere of influence. And confessedly, +in point of "logic," there is no such compulsion in the +second figure: there is only a timid and vexatious neutrality, a +mere "not proven." +</p><p> +Why, then, do we in fact take the much admired "inductive +leap," in seeming defiance of strict logic? Why do we close our +eyes to logic, turn our back upon logic, behave as if logic were +not and had never been? In point of fact, we do nothing of the +sort. The "inductive leap" is no leap away from logic, but the +impulsion of logic's mainspring seen only in its legitimate event. +Because we have not taken care to see the impulse coming, it +surprises us and we are frightened. And we look about for an +illusive assurance in some "law of thought," or some question-begging +"universal premise" of Nature's "uniformity." We do +not see that we were already conditionally committed to the +"leap" by our initial interest. Getting our premises together +is no hurried forging of a chain to save us from our own +madness in the nick of time. We are only hoping to rid ourselves +of an excess of conservative ballast. To reason by analogy +is not to repress or to dispense with the interest in the radically +novel, but to give methodical and intelligent expression to that +interest.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47"><span class="label">47</span></a> Aristotle's <i>Nicomachaean Ethics</i> (Welldon's transl.), Book +VIII.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48"><span class="label">48</span></a> Cf. Aristotle's <i>Politics</i> (Jowett's trans.) III. 9. §6 ff. and elsewhere; +<i>Nicom. Ethics</i>, I, Chap. III (end).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49"><span class="label">49</span></a> Cf. Veblen: <i>op. cit.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50"><span class="label">50</span></a> W. McDougall in his <i>Social Psychology</i> (Ed. 1912, pp. 358 ff.) +recognizes "incomplete anticipation of the end of action" as a +genuine type of preliminary situation in human behavior, but appears +to regard this as in so far a levelling-down of man to the +blindness of the "brutes." But "incompleteness" is a highly +ambiguous term and seems here to beg the question. "Incompleteness" +may be given an emphasis in which it imports conjecture and +hypothesis—almost anything, in fact, but blindness. Rather do +the brutes get levelled up to man by such facts as those McDougall +cites.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51"><span class="label">51</span></a> I take <i>routine</i> to be the essence and meaning of hedonism. +There are two fundamental types of conduct—routine and constructiveness. +Reference may be made here to Böhm-Bawerk's +pronouncement on hedonism in <i>Kapital und Kapitalzins</i>, 1912 +(II-2, pp. 310 ff.): "What people love and hate, strive towards +or fight off—whether only pleasure and pain or other 'lovable' +and 'hatable' things as well,—is a matter of entire indifference +to the economist. The only thing important is that they do love +and hate certain things.... The deductions of marginal +utility theory lose no whit of their cogency even if certain ends +(dependent for their realization upon a supply of goods inadequate +to the fulfillment of all ends without limit) are held to +have the character not of pleasure but of something else. The +marginal utility may be a least pleasure or a competing least +utility of some other sort...." (p. 317). This is a not +uncommon view. As W. C. Mitchell has suggested, it is too +obvious to be wholly convincing. (<i>Journ. Pol. Ec.</i>, Vol. XVIII. +"The Rationality of Economic Activity.") Veblen has made it +perfectly clear that particular matters of theory are affected by +the presupposition of hedonism. (<i>Journ. Pol. Ec.</i>, Vol. XVII, +<i>Quart. Journ. Econ.</i>, Vol. XXII, p. 147 ff.) The matter is too +complex for a footnote, but I think it of little consequence +whether "pleasure" be in any case regarded as substantively the +end of desire or not. This is largely a matter of words. What is +important is the practical question whether a thing is <i>so habitual +with me that when the issue arises I cannot or will not give it up +and take an interest in something new</i> the "utility" of which I +cannot as yet be cognizant of because it partly rests with me +to create it. If this is the fact it will surely look as if pleasure or +the avoidance of pain were my end in the case. Hedonism and +egoism are in the end convertible terms. There is conduct wearing +the outward aspect of altruism that is egotistic in fact—not +because it was from the first insincere or self-delusive, but +because it has become habitual and may in a crisis be held to +for the sake of the satisfaction it affords. Genuine altruism, +on the other hand, is a form of constructiveness.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52"><span class="label">52</span></a> Until after this essay was finished I had not seen John A. +Hobson's book entitled <i>Work and Wealth, A Human Valuation</i> +(London, 1914). My attention was first definitely called to this +work by a friend among the economists who read my finished +MS. late in 1915, and referred me in particular to the concluding +chapter on "Social Science and Social Art." On now tardily +reading this chapter I find that, as any reader will readily perceive, +it distinctly anticipates, almost <i>verbatim</i> in parts, what +I have tried, with far less success, to say in the foregoing two +paragraphs above. Hobson argues, with characteristic clearness +and effect, for the qualitative uniqueness and the integral character +of personal budgets, holding that the logic of marginality +is "an entirely illusory account of the psychical process by +which a man lays out his money, or his time, or his energy" +(p. 331). "So far as it is true that the last sovereign of my +expenditure in bread equals in utility the last sovereign of my +expenditure in books, that fact proceeds not from a comparison, +conscious, or unconscious, of these separate items at this margin, +but from the parts assigned respectively to bread and books in +the organic plan of my life. Quantitative analysis, inherently +incapable of comprehending qualitative unity or qualitative differences, +can only pretend to reduce the latter to quantitative +differences. What it actually does is to ignore alike the unity +of the whole and the qualitativeness of the parts" (p. 334). +Hobson not only uses the analogy of the artist and the picture +(p. 330) precisely as I have done, but offers still other illustrations +of the principle that seem to me even more apt and telling. +Though not indebted to him for what I have put into the above +paragraphs, I am glad to be able to cite the authority of so distinguished +an economist and sociologist for conclusions to which +I found my own way. Other parts as well <i>of Work and Wealth</i> +(e.g., Chapter IV, on "The Creative Factor in Production") +seem to have a close relation to the main theme of the present +discussion.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53"><span class="label">53</span></a> It may be worth while to glance here for the sake of illustration +at an ethical view of preference parallel with the economic +logic above contested. "The act which is right in that it +promotes one interest, is, by the same principle," writes R. B. +Perry, "wrong in that it injures another interest. There is no +contradiction in this fact ... simply because it is possible +for the same thing to possess several relations, the question of +their compatibility or incompatibility being in each case a question +of empirical fact. Now ... an act ... +may be doubly right in that it conduces to the fulfillment of two +interests. Hence arises the conception of comparative goodness. +If the fulfillment of one interest is good, the fulfillment of two +is better; and the fulfillment of all interests is best.... +Morality, then, is <i>such performance as under the circumstances, +and in view of all the interests affected, conduces to most goodness</i>. +In other words, that act is morally right which is most +right." (<i>Present Philosophical Tendencies</i>, p. 334. Cf. also <i>The +Moral Economy</i>). It is evident that constructive change in the +underlying system (or aggregate?) of the agent's interests gets +no recognition here as a matter of moral concern or as a fact +of the agent's moral experience. Thus Perry understands the +meaning of freedom to lie in the fact that "<i>interests operate</i>," +i.e., that interests exist as a certain class of operative factors +in the universe along with factors of <i>other</i> sorts. "I can and do, +within limits, <i>act as I will</i>. Action, in other words, is governed +by desires and intentions." (pp. 342 ff.). The cosmical heroics +of Bertrand Russell are thus not quite the last word in Ethics +(p. 346). Nevertheless, the "free man," in Perry's view, apparently +must get on with the interests that once for all initially +defined him as a "moral constant" (p. 343).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54"><span class="label">54</span></a> In a recent interesting discussion of "Self-interest" (T. N. +Carver, <i>Essays in Social Justice</i>, 1915, Chap. III) occurs the +following: "We may conclude ... that even after we +eliminate from our consideration all other beings than self, there +is yet a possible distinction between one's present and one's future +self. It is always, of course, the present self which esteems or +appreciates all interests whether they be present or future. And +the present self estimates or appreciates present interests somewhat +more highly than it does future interests. In this respect +the present self appreciates the interests of the future self according +to a law quite analogous to, if indeed it be not the same law +as that according to which it appreciates the interests of others" +(p. 71). This bit of "subjective analysis" (p. 60), a procedure +rather scornfully condemned as "subjective quibbling" on the +following page, must be counted a fortunate lapse. It could be +bettered, I think, in only one point. Must the future self "of +course" and "always" get license to live by meeting the standards +of the present self? Has the present self no modesty, no +curiosity, no "sense of humor"? If it is so stupidly hard and +fast, how can a self new and qualitatively different ever get +upon its feet in a man? In some men no such thing can happen—but +must it be in all men impossible and impossible "of course"? +And what of the other self? Carver has not applied the "methods +of subjective analysis" to <i>change</i> from self <i>to</i> self or from interest +in self <i>to</i> interest in others. The present tense of formal logic +governs fundamentally throughout the whole account.</p> + +<p>If this essay were a volume I should try to consider, from the +point of view of constructive intelligence, the explanation of +interest as due to the undervaluation of future goods.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55"><span class="label">55</span></a> Fite, <i>Introductory Study of Ethics</i>, pp. 3-8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56"><span class="label">56</span></a> Dewey and Tufts, <i>Ethics</i>, pp. 205-11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57"><span class="label">57</span></a> The term "egocentric predicament" (cf. R. B. Perry: <i>Present +Philosophical Tendencies</i>, p. 129 ff.) has had, for a philosophic +term, a remarkable literary success. But at best it conveys a +partial view of the situation it purports to describe. The "egocentricity" +of our experience, viewed in its relation to action, +seems, rightly considered, less a "predicament" than an opportunity, +a responsibility and an immunity. For in relation to <i>action</i>, +it means (1) that an objective complex situation has become, in +various of its aspects, a matter of my cognizance in terms significant +to me. That so many of its aspects have come into relations +of conflict or reënforcement significant <i>for me</i> is <i>my</i> opportunity +for reconstructive effort if I choose to avail myself of it. +Because, again, I am thus "on hand myself" (<i>op. cit.</i>, p. 129) +and am thus able to "report" upon the situation, I am (2) +responsible, in the measure of my advantages, for the adequacy +of my performance. And finally (3) I cannot be held to account +for failure to reckon with such aspects of the situation as I +cannot get hold of in the guise of "ideas, objects of knowledge +or experiences" (<i>Ibid.</i>). Our egocentricity is, then, a predicament +only so long as one stubbornly insists, to no obvious positive purpose, +on thinking of knowledge as a self-sufficing entitative complex, +like a vision suddenly appearing full-blown out of the blue, +and as inviting judgment in that isolated character on the representative +adequacy which it is supposed to claim (cf. A. W. +Moore, "Isolated Knowledge," <i>Journ. of Philos., etc.</i>, Vol. XI). +The way out of the predicament for Perry and his colleagues is +to attack the traditional subjective and representative aspects of +knowledge. But, this carried out, what remains of knowledge is +a "cross-section of neutral entities" which <i>still</i> retains all the +original unaccountability, genetically speaking, and the original +intrinsic and isolated self-sufficiency traditionally supposed to belong +to knowledge. The ostensible gain achieved for knowledge is +an alleged proof of its ultimate self-validation or the meaninglessness +of any suspicion of its validity (because there is no uncontrolled +and distorting intermediation of "consciousness" in the +case). But to wage strenuous war on subjectivism and representationism +and still to have on hand a problem calling for the invention +<i>ad hoc</i> of an entire new theory of mind and knowledge seems +a waste of good ammunition on rather unimportant outworks. +They might have been circumvented. +</p><p> +But what concerns us here is the ethical parallel. The egocentric +predicament in this aspect purports to compel the admission +by the "altruist" that since whatever he chooses to do must +be his act and is obviously done because he wishes, for good and +sufficient reasons of his own, to do it, therefore he is an egoist +after all—perhaps in spite of himself and then again perhaps not. +The ethical realism of G. E. Moore (<i>Principia Ethica</i>, 1903) +breaks out of the predicament by declaring Good independent +of all desire, wish or human interest and <i>indefinable</i>, and by +supplying a partial list of things thus independently good. What +I do, I do because it seems likely to put me in possession of +objective <i>Good</i>, not because it accords with some habit or whim +of mine (although my own pleasure is undoubtedly <i>one</i> of the +good things). It is noteworthy that Perry declines to follow +Moore in this (<i>op. cit.</i>, p. 331 ff.). Now such an ethical objectivism +can give no account of the motivation, or the process, of +the individual's efforts to attain, for guidance in any case, a +"more adequate" apprehension of what things are good than he +may already possess, just as the objectivist theory of consciousness +(=knowledge) can supply no clue as to how or whether a <i>more</i> +or a <i>less</i> comprehensive or a qualitatively <i>different</i> "cross-section +of entities" can or should be got into one's "mind" as warrant or +guidance ("stimulus") for a contemplated response that is to +meet a present emergency (cf. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc +Concept in Psychology," <i>Psychol. Rev.</i>, Vol. IV). Thus neither +sort of deliverance out of the alleged predicament of egocentricity +abates in the least the only serious inconvenience or danger +threatened by subjectivism.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58"><span class="label">58</span></a> Cf. W. Jethro Brown, <i>The Underlying Principles of Modern +Legislation</i> (3d ed., London, 1914), pp. 165-68.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59"><span class="label">59</span></a> Bosanquet: <i>Principle of Individuality and Value</i>, pp. 13, 15, +20, 24, 27, 30.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60"><span class="label">60</span></a> The case against the Austrian explanation of market-price +in terms of marginal utility has been well summed up and re-enforced +by B. M. Anderson in his monograph, <i>Social Value</i> +(Boston, 1911). Anderson finds the fatal flaw in the Austrian +account to consist in the psychological particularism of the marginal +utility theory. The only way, he holds, to provide an +adequate foundation for a non-circular theory of price is to understand +the marginal estimates people put upon goods as resultants +of the entire moral, legal, institutional, scientific, æsthetical, +and religious state of society at the time. This total and therefore +absolute state of affairs, if I understand the argument, is +to be regarded as focussed to a unique point in the estimate each +man puts upon a commodity. Thus, presumably, the values which +come together, summed up in the total demand and supply +schedules for a commodity in the market, are "social values" +and the resultant market-price is a "social price." This +cross-sectional social totality of conditions is strongly suggestive +of an idealistic Absolute. The individual is a mere focussing of +impersonal strains and stresses in the Absolute. But the real +society is a radically temporal process. The real centers of +initiation in it are creatively intelligent individuals whose economic +character as such expresses itself not in "absolute" marginal +registrations but in price estimates. +</p><p> +On the priority of price to value I venture to claim the support +of A. A. Young, "Some Limitations of the Value Concept," +<i>Quart. Journ. Econ.</i>, Vol. XXV, p. 409 (esp. pp. 417-19). +Incidentally, I suspect the attempt to reconstruct ethical +theory as a branch of what is called <i>Werttheorie</i> to be a mistake +and likely to result only in useless and misleading terminology.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61"><span class="label">61</span></a> <i>Positive Theory of Capital</i> (Eng. trans.). Bk. IV, Ch. II. +The passage is unchanged in the author's latest edition (1912).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62"><span class="label">62</span></a> It is pointed out (e.g., by Davenport in his <i>Economics of +Enterprise</i>, pp. 53-54) that, mathematically, in a market where +large numbers of buyers and sellers confront each other with their +respective maximum and minimum valuations on the commodity +this interval within which price must fall becomes indefinitely +small to the point of vanishing. This is doubtless in accord with +the law of probability, but it would be an obvious fallacy to see +in this any manner of proof or presumption that therefore the +assumptions as to the nature of the individual valuations upon +which such analysis proceeds <i>are true</i>. In a large market where +this interval is supposed to be a vanishing quantity is there more +or less higgling and bargaining than in a small market where +the interval is admittedly perceptible? And if there <i>is</i> higgling +and bargaining (<i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 96-97), what is it doing that is +of price-fixing importance unless there be supposed to be a critical +interval for it to work in? Such a use of probability-theory +is a good example of the way in which mathematics may be used +to cover the false assumptions which have to be made in order to +make a mathematical treatment of certain sorts of subject-matter +initially plausible as description of concrete fact.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63"><span class="label">63</span></a> As I have elsewhere argued ("Subjective and Exchange +Value," <i>Journ. Pol. Econ.</i>, Vol. IV, pp. 227-30). By the same +token, I confess skepticism of the classical English doctrine that +cost can affect price only through its effect upon quantity produced. +"If all the commodities used by man," wrote Senior +(quoted by Davenport, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 58), "were supplied by nature +without any interference whatever of human labor, but were supplied +in precisely the same amounts that they now are, there +is no reason to suppose either that they would cease to be valuable +or would exchange at any other than the present proportions." +But is this inductive evidence or illustrative rhetoric? One wonders, +indeed, whether private property would ever have developed +or how long modern society would tolerate it if all wealth were +the gift of nature instead of only some of it (that part, of course, +which requires no use of produced capital goods for its appropriation).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64"><span class="label">64</span></a> Certain points in this discussion have been raised in two +papers, entitled, "The Present Task of Ethical Theory," <i>Int. +Jour. of Ethics</i>, XX, and "Ethical Value," <i>Jour. of Phil., Psy., +and Scientific Methods</i>, V, p. 517.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class="label">65</span></a> Cf. also John Dewey, <i>Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy</i>, +and Dewey and Tufts, <i>Ethics</i>, Ch. XVI.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66"><span class="label">66</span></a> <i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, XXV, 1914, pp. 1-24.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67"><span class="label">67</span></a> <i>Dreams of a Spirit Seer.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68"><span class="label">68</span></a> Cf. A. W. Moore, <i>Pragmatism and Its Critics</i>, 257-78.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69"><span class="label">69</span></a> Croce, <i>Philosophy of the Practical</i>, pp. 312 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70"><span class="label">70</span></a> G. E. Moore, <i>Principia Ethica</i>, p. 147.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71"><span class="label">71</span></a> <i>Ethics</i>, ch. V.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72"><span class="label">72</span></a> G. E. Moore, <i>Principia Ethica</i>, p. 149.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73"><span class="label">73</span></a> Rashdall, <i>Is Conscience an Emotion?</i> pp. 199 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74"><span class="label">74</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 177.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75"><span class="label">75</span></a> G.E. Moore, <i>Ethics</i>, Ch. III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76" id="Footnote_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76"><span class="label">76</span></a> Dewey and Tufts, <i>Ethics</i>, pp. 334 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77" id="Footnote_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77"><span class="label">77</span></a> <i>Methods of Ethics</i>, p. 380.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78" id="Footnote_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78"><span class="label">78</span></a> <i>Individualism</i>, 55, 61, 62.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79" id="Footnote_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79"><span class="label">79</span></a> Lectures III and IV, especially 175, 176, 235-39.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80" id="Footnote_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80"><span class="label">80</span></a> Pp. 111 ff., 172-75, 329 ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81" id="Footnote_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81"><span class="label">81</span></a> Pp. 73, 186, 236, 261 f., 267, 269.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82" id="Footnote_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82"><span class="label">82</span></a> 124, 182, 301.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83" id="Footnote_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83"><span class="label">83</span></a> 263 ff., 123.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84" id="Footnote_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84"><span class="label">84</span></a> Pp. 180, 241.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85" id="Footnote_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85"><span class="label">85</span></a> P. 180.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86" id="Footnote_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86"><span class="label">86</span></a> Art and religion have doubtless their important parts in embodying +values, or in adding the consciousness of membership in +a larger union of spirits, or of relation to a cosmic order conceived +as ethical, but the limits of our discussion do not permit treatment +of these factors.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87" id="Footnote_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87"><span class="label">87</span></a> Cf. my paper, "Goodness, Cognition, and Beauty," <i>Journal of +Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i>, Vol. IX, p. 253.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88" id="Footnote_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88"><span class="label">88</span></a> Cf. Thorndike, <i>The Original Nature of Man</i>; S. Freud, +<i>Die Traumdeutung</i>, <i>Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben</i>, etc.; +McDougall, <i>Social Psychology</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89" id="Footnote_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89"><span class="label">89</span></a> <i>The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific +Methods</i>, Vol. IX, p. 256.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90" id="Footnote_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90"><span class="label">90</span></a> Cf. Plato, <i>Republic</i>, IX, 571, 572, for an explicit anticipation +of Freud.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91" id="Footnote_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91"><span class="label">91</span></a> This "new psychology" is not so very new.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92" id="Footnote_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92"><span class="label">92</span></a> Cf. Hocking, <i>The Meaning of God in Human Experience</i>, +for the most recent of these somnambulisms. But any idealistic +system will do, from Plato to Bradley.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93" id="Footnote_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93"><span class="label">93</span></a> Cf. James, <i>The Varieties of Religious Experience</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94" id="Footnote_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94"><span class="label">94</span></a> Cf. Jane Harrison, <i>Ancient Art and Ritual</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_95" id="Footnote_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95"><span class="label">95</span></a> Cf. my paper, "Is Belief Essential in Religion?", <i>International +Journal of Ethics</i>, October, 1910.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_96" id="Footnote_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96"><span class="label">96</span></a> "Metaphysics," <i>Book Lambda</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_97" id="Footnote_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97"><span class="label">97</span></a> This is accomplished usually by ignoring the differentia of +the term of religion, and using it simply as an adjective of eulogy, +as in the common practice the term "Christian" is made coextensive +with the denotation of "good," or "social." For example, +a "Christian gentleman" can differ in no discernible way +from a gentleman not so qualified save by believing in certain +theological propositions. But in usage, the adjective is simply +tautologous. Compare R. B. Perry, <i>The Moral Economy</i>; E. S. +Ames, <i>The Psychology of Religious Experience</i>; J. H. Leuba, +<i>A Psychological Study of Religion</i>; H. M. Kallen, <i>Is Belief +Essential in Religion?</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_98" id="Footnote_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98"><span class="label">98</span></a> The condition of England and Germany in the present civil +war in Europe echoes this situation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_99" id="Footnote_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99"><span class="label">99</span></a> Cf. <i>Republic</i>, Books V and VI.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_100" id="Footnote_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100"><span class="label">100</span></a> Cf. <i>Winds of Doctrine</i> and <i>Reason in Common Sense</i>.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr /> + +<p><b>TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:</b> Punctuation has been normalized. +As well as obvious misprints have been corrected.</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Creative Intelligence, by +John Dewey, Addison W. Moore, Harold Chapman Brown, George H. Mead, Boyd H. 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