diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445-8.txt | 4542 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445-8.zip | bin | 0 -> 91341 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445-h.zip | bin | 0 -> 211542 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445-h/33445-h.htm | 4611 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445-h/images/illus01.jpg | bin | 0 -> 3736 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445-h/images/illus02.jpg | bin | 0 -> 69109 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445-h/images/illus03.jpg | bin | 0 -> 41957 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445.txt | 4542 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 33445.zip | bin | 0 -> 91308 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 |
12 files changed, 13711 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/33445-8.txt b/33445-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e3b4b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/33445-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4542 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Naval Warfare, by James R. Thursfield + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Naval Warfare + +Author: James R. Thursfield + +Release Date: August 16, 2010 [EBook #33445] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAVAL WARFARE *** + + + + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Graeme Mackreth and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + +The Cambridge Manuals of Science and +Literature + + + + +NAVAL WARFARE + + + + +CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS + +London: FETTER LANE, E.C. + +C.F. CLAY, MANAGER + +[Illustration] + + Edinburgh: 100 PRINCES STREET + Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO. + Leipzig: F.A. BROCKHAUS + New York: G.P. PUTNAM'S SONS + Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD. + + +_All rights reserved_ + + + + + NAVAL + WARFARE + + BY + + JAMES R. THURSFIELD + + M.A. + Hon. Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford + + WITH AN INTRODUCTION + + by Rear-Admiral + SIR CHARLES L. OTTLEY + K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O. + + Sometime Director of Naval Intelligence + and Secretary to the Committee of + Imperial Defence + + Cambridge: + at the University Press + + New York: + G.P. Putnam's Sons + + 1913 + + + + +_With the exception of the coat of arms at the foot, the design on the +title page is a reproduction of one used by the earliest known Cambridge +printer, John Siberch, 1521_ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE +INTRODUCTION BY SIR CHARLES OTTLEY vii + +PREFACE xiii + + +CHAP. + +I. INTRODUCTORY 1 + +II. THE COMMAND OF THE SEA 11 + +III. DISPUTED COMMAND--BLOCKADE 20 + +IV. DISPUTED COMMAND--THE FLEET IN BEING 30 + +V. DISPUTED COMMAND IN GENERAL 49 + +VI. INVASION 68 + +VII. COMMERCE IN WAR 93 + +VIII. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE 111 + +IX. THE DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY OF NAVAL FORCE 129 + +INDEX 147 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +The title chosen by its author for this little volume would assuredly +commend it to the Naval Service, even if that author's name were not--as +it is--a household word with more than one generation of naval officers. +But to such of the general public as are not yet familiar with Mr +Thursfield's writings a brief word of introduction may perhaps be +useful. For the matters herein dealt with are by no means of interest +only to the naval profession. They have their bearing also on every +calling and trade. In these days when national policy is at the mercy of +the ballot-box, it is not too much to say that a right understanding of +the principles of maritime warfare is almost as desirable amongst +civilians as amongst professional sailors. + +Regrettable indeed would it be if the mere fact that this little book +bears a more or less technical title should tempt the careless to skip +its pages or pitch it to that dreary limbo which attends even the best +of text-books on subjects which we think do not concern us. The fruits +of naval victory, the calamities attendant on naval defeat are matters +which will come home--in Bacon's classic phrase--to the business and the +bosoms of all of us, landsmen and seamen alike. Most Englishmen are at +least dimly aware of this. They realise, more or less reluctantly +perhaps, that a decisive British defeat at sea under modern conditions +would involve unspeakable consequences, consequences not merely fatal to +the structure of the Empire but destructive also of the roots of our +national life and of the well-being of almost all individuals in these +islands. + +Elementary prudence insists on adequate safeguards against evils so +supreme, and amongst those safeguards the education of the people to-day +occupies a foremost place. Our Empire's destinies for good and evil are +now in the hands of the masses of the people. Sincerely as all lovers of +ordered freedom may rejoice in this devolution of political power to the +people, thoughtful men will be apt to reflect that an uninstructed crowd +is seldom right in its collective action. If Ministerial responsibility +has dwindled, _pro tanto_ that of each one of His Majesty's lieges has +enormously increased; and it is more incumbent on the nation's rank and +file to-day than ever in the past to equip themselves with the knowledge +necessary to enable them to record their votes aright. + +It is from this point of view that this Manual should be read. It +epitomises the principles upon which success in naval warfare depends. +It shows how the moral factor in all cases and at every epoch dominates +and controls the material; how the "_animus pugnandi_," as Mr Thursfield +calls it, the desire to get at the enemy in "anything that floats," +transcends every other weapon in a nation's armoury; how if that spirit +is present, all other difficulties can be surmounted, and how without it +the thickest armour, the biggest all-shattering guns shrivel in battle +to the measure of mere useless scrap iron. + +This is the message of the book for the seaman. But--and this is of the +essence of the whole matter--for the landsman it has also a lesson of a +very different kind. His responsibility is for the material factor in +naval war. Let him note the supreme value of the moral factor; let him +encourage it with all possible honour and homage, but let him not limit +his contribution to the nation's fighting capital to any mere empty +lip-service of this kind. The moral factor is primarily the sailor's +business. The landsman's duty is to see to it that when war comes our +sailors are sent to sea, not in "anything that floats" but in the most +modern and perfect types of warship that human ingenuity can design. + +How can this fundamental duty be brought home to the individual +Englishman? Certainly not by asking him to master the niceties of +modern naval technique, matters on which every nation must trust to its +experts. But, the broad principles of naval warfare are to-day precisely +as they were at Salamis or Lepanto; and to a people such as ours, whose +history from its dawn has been moulded by maritime conditions, and which +to-day more than ever depends upon free oversea communications for its +continued existence, these broad principles governing naval warfare have +so real a significance that they may wisely be studied by all classes of +the community. + +Tactics indeed have profoundly altered, and from age to age may be +expected to change indefinitely. But so long as the sea remains naval +warfare will turn upon the command of the sea; a "Fleet in Being" will +not cease to be as real a threat to its foe as it was in the days of +Torrington; invasion of oversea territory will always be limited by the +same inexorable factors which for centuries have told in favour of the +British race and have kept the fields of England inviolate from the +tread of a conqueror. + +There are indications that still more heavy sacrifices will be demanded +from the British taxpayer for the upkeep of the Fleet in the future than +has been the case even in the recent past. Nothing but iron necessity +can justify this unfruitful expenditure, this alienation of the +national resources in men and money to the purposes of destruction. +Even as it is, naval administrators are finding it increasingly +difficult to carry all sections of politicians and the whole of the +masses of this country with them in these ever-increasing demands. The +best way of ensuring that future generations of Englishmen will rise to +the necessary height of a patriotic sense of duty and will record their +votes in support of such reasonable demands is to prepare their minds by +an elementary knowledge of what naval warfare really means. + +No Englishman, so far as the writer is aware, is better fitted than Mr +Thursfield to undertake this task, and this little book is a very +excellent example of the way in which that task should be fulfilled. It +unites--very necessarily--a high degree of condensation with a +simplicity of language and a lucidity of exposition both alike +admirable. And Mr Thursfield's right to be heard on naval questions is +second to that of no civilian in these islands. His relations with the +British Navy have been for more than a quarter of a century of the +closest kind. His reputation in the particular field of literary +endeavour which he has made his own ranks high amongst writers as +celebrated as Admiral Mahan, Sir George Sydenham Clarke (Lord Sydenham), +the late Sir John Colomb, and his brother the late Admiral P.H. Colomb, +Sir J.K. Laughton, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Admiral Sir R.N. +Custance, Mr Julian Corbett, Mr David Hannay, Mr Archibald Hurd, and +others. In the domain of naval history, its philosophy and its +literature, he has done brilliant work. When it is added that Mr +Thursfield is known to have been, for many years, one of the chief naval +advisers of _The Times_, enough will probably have been said to ensure a +sympathetic attention for this the veteran author's latest publication. + +C.L. OTTLEY + +_24th July 1913_ + + + + +PREFACE + + +Intelligent readers of this little Manual will perceive at once that it +pretends to be nothing more than an introduction, quite elementary in +character, to the study of naval warfare, its history, and its +principles as displayed in its history. As such, I trust it may be found +useful by those of my countrymen who desire to approach the naval +problems which are constantly being brought to their notice and +consideration with sound judgment and an intelligent grasp of the +principles involved in their solution. It is the result of much study +and of a sustained intimacy with the sea service, both afloat and +ashore, such as few civilians have been privileged to enjoy in greater +measure. Even so, I should have thought it right, as a civilian, to +offer some apology for undertaking to deal with so highly technical and +professional a subject, were I not happily relieved of that obligation +by the kindness of my friend Rear-Admiral Sir Charles L. Ottley, who +has, at the instance of the Editors of this series, contributed to this +volume an Introduction in which my qualifications are set forth with an +appreciation which I cannot but regard as far too flattering. It would +ill become me to add a single word--unless it were of deprecation--to +credentials expounded on such high authority. + +I should hope that readers who have found this volume useful to them +will not confine their studies to it. Abundant materials for a deeper +and more comprehensive study of the subject will be found in the several +works incidentally mentioned or quoted in my text, and in the writings +of those other contemporary authors with whom Sir Charles Ottley has +done me the high honour to associate myself. In these several works +further guidance to a still more sustained study of the subject will be +found, and in this regard I would specially mention the admirable _Short +History of the Royal Navy_, by Mr David Hannay--two volumes which, in +addition to their other and more conspicuous merits, contain a +well-selected list of authorities to be consulted prefixed to each +chapter. These references, which in truth cover the whole subject, will, +I trust, better serve the purpose of the advanced or advancing student +than any such Bibliography as I could compile on a scale commensurate +with the form and purpose of the present Manual. + +Readers of my other writings on naval topics will, perhaps, observe that +in one or two cases, where the same topics had to be discussed, I have +not hesitated to reproduce, with or without modification, the language I +had previously employed. This has been done deliberately. The topics so +treated fell naturally and, indeed, necessarily within the scope of the +present volume. To exclude them because I had discussed them elsewhere +was impossible. Wherever I found I could improve the language previously +employed in the direction of greater lucidity and precision I have done +so to the best of my ability, so that the passages in question are close +paraphrases rather than mere transcripts of those which occur elsewhere. +But I have not attempted to disguise or weaken by paraphrase any +passages which still seemed to me to convey my meaning better than any +other words I could choose. + +Changes in the methods, though not in the principles, of naval warfare +are in these days so rapid and often so sudden that one or two topics +have emerged into public prominence even since the present volume was in +type. I desire therefore to take this opportunity of adding a few +supplementary remarks on them. The first, and possibly in the long run +the most far-reaching of these topics, is that of aviation, which I have +only mentioned incidentally in the text. That aviation is still in its +infancy is a truism. But to forecast the scope and direction of its +evolution is as yet impossible. For the moment it may perhaps be said +that its offensive capacity--its capacity, that is, to determine or even +materially to affect the larger issues of naval warfare--is +inconsiderable. I say nothing of the future, whether immediate or +remote. Any day may witness developments which will give entirely new +aspects to the whole problem. In the meanwhile the chief functions of +aircraft in war will probably be, for some time to come, those of +scouting, observation, and the collection and transmission of +intelligence not obtainable by any other means. Offensive functions of a +more direct and formidable character will doubtless be developed in +time, and may be developed soon; but as I am no prophet I cannot attempt +to forecast the direction of the evolution, to determine its limits, or +to indicate its probable effects on the methods of naval warfare as +expounded in the following pages. I will, however, advance two +propositions which will not, I believe, be gainsaid by competent +authorities. They are true for the moment, though how long they may +remain true I do not know. One is that no aircraft yet constructed can +take or keep the air in all conditions of weather. The number of days in +the year in which it can do so in safety can only be represented by the +formula 365-_x_, in which _x_ is as yet an unknown quantity, though it +is no doubt a quantity which will diminish as the art of aviation is +developed. The other is that there is as yet no known method of +navigating an aircraft with accuracy and precision out of sight of land. +The air-currents by which it is affected are imperceptible to those +embarked, variable and indeterminate in their force and direction, and +quite incapable of being charted beforehand. In these conditions an +airman who sought to steer by compass alone, say, from Bermuda to New +York, might perchance find himself either at Halifax, on the one hand, +or at Charleston on the other. + +In my chapter on "Invasion" no mention is made of those subsidiary forms +of military enterprise across the sea which are known as raids. I have +treated invasion as an enterprise having for its object the subjugation +of the country invaded, or at least the subjection of its people and +their rulers to the enemy's will. As such it requires a force +commensurate in numbers with the object to be attained, and it stands to +reason that this force must needs be so large that its chances of +evading the vigilance of an enemy who is in effective command of the sea +must always be infinitesimal. A raid, on the other hand, is an +enterprise of much lesser magnitude and much smaller moment. Its method +is to elude the enemy's naval guard at this or that point of his +territory; and, having done so, its purpose is to land troops at some +vulnerable point of the territory assailed, there to create alarm and +confusion and to do as much harm as they can--which may be considerable +before their sea communications are severed by the defending naval force +assumed to be still in effective command of the sea affected. If that +command is maintained, the troops engaged in the raid must inevitably be +reduced sooner or later to the condition of a forlorn hope which has +failed. If, on the other hand, that command is overthrown, then the +troops aforesaid may prove to be the advanced guard of an invasion to +follow. Thus, although a successful raid may sometimes be carried out in +the teeth of an adverse command of the sea, yet it cannot be converted +into an invasion until that adverse command has been assailed and +overthrown. It is thus essentially fugitive in character, possibly very +effective as a diversion, certain to be mortifying to the belligerent +assailed, and not at all unlikely to cause him much injury and even more +alarm, but quite incapable of deciding the larger issues of the conflict +so long as his command of the sea remains unchallenged. It is perhaps +expedient to say this much on the subject, because the programme of the +Naval Manoeuvres of this year is known to have included a series of +raids of this fugitive character. Whether, or to what extent, any of +these operations were adjudged to have been successful I do not know. I +am only concerned to point out that, whether successful or not, their +utmost success can throw little or no light on the problem of invasion +unless in the course of the same operations the defenders' command of +the sea was adjudged to have been overthrown. + +In my chapter on "The Differentiation of Naval Force" I endeavoured to +define the functions of the so-called "battle-cruiser" and to forecast +its special uses in war. At the same time I pointed out that "it is held +by some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a +hybrid and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can +be given." It would appear that the views of these high authorities have +now been adopted, in some measure at least, by the Admiralty. Since the +chapter in question was in type it has been officially announced that +the battle-cruiser has been placed in temporary, and perhaps permanent, +abeyance. Its place is to be taken by a special type of fast battleship, +vessels in every way fit to lie in a line and yet, at the same time, +endowed with qualities which, without unduly increasing their size and +displacement, will enable them to discharge the special functions which +I assigned to the battle-cruiser in the line of battle. This is done by +employing oil instead of coal as the source of the ship's motive power. +The change thus adumbrated would seem to be in the natural order of +evolution, and at the same time to be in large measure one rather of +nomenclature than of substance. The battle-cruiser, as its name implies, +is itself essentially a fast battleship in one aspect and an exceedingly +powerful cruiser in another. In the fast battleship which is to replace +it, the battle function will be still further developed at the expense +of the cruiser function. But its speed will still qualify it to be +employed as a cruiser whenever occasion serves or necessity requires, +just as the battle-cruiser was qualified to lie in a line and do its +special work in a fleet action. The main difference is that the fast +battleship is much less likely to be employed as a cruiser than the +battle-cruiser was; but I pointed out in the text that the employment +even of the battle-cruiser in cruiser functions proper was likely to be +only occasional and subsidiary. + +The decision to use oil as the exclusive source of the motive power of +fast battleships, and of certain types of small cruisers of exceptional +speed, is undoubtedly a very significant one. It may be taken to point +to a time when oil only will be employed in the propulsion of warships +and coal will be discarded altogether. But that consummation can only be +reached when the internal combustion engine has been much more highly +developed for purposes of marine propulsion than it is at present. At +present oil is only employed in large warships for the purpose of +producing steam by the external combustion of the oil. But it may be +anticipated that a process of evolution, now in its initial stages in +the Diesel and other internal combustion engines, will in course of time +result in the production of an internal combustion engine capable of +propelling the largest ships at any speed that is now attainable by +existing methods. When that stage is reached oil will, for economic +reasons alone, undoubtedly hold the field for all purposes of propulsion +in warships. It is held by some that this country will then be placed at +a great disadvantage, inasmuch as it possesses a monopoly of the best +steam coal, whereas it has no monopoly of oil at all, and probably no +sufficient domestic supply of it to meet the needs of the Fleet in time +of war. But oil can be stored as easily as coal and, unlike coal, it +does not deteriorate in storage. To bring it in sufficient supplies from +abroad in time of war should be no more difficult for a Power which +commands the sea than to bring in the supplies of food and raw material +on which this country depends at all times for its very existence. +Moreover, even if we continued to depend on coal alone, that coal, +together with other supplies in large quantities, must, as I have shown +in my last chapter, be carried across the seas in a continuous stream +to our fleets in distant waters, and one of the great advantages of oil +over coal is that it can be transferred with the greatest ease to the +warships requiring it at any rendezvous on the high seas, whether in +home waters or at the uttermost ends of the globe, which may be most +conveniently situated for the conduct of the operations in hand. For +these reasons I hold that no serious apprehension need be entertained +lest the supply of oil to our warships should fail so long as we hold +the command of the sea. If ever we lost the command of the sea we should +not be worrying about the supply of oil. Oil or no oil, we should be +starving, destitute and defenceless. + +It only remains for me to express my gratitude to my friend Sir Charles +Ottley, not merely for an Introduction in which I cannot but fear that +he has allowed his friendship to get the better of his judgment, but +also for his kindness in devoting so much of his scanty leisure to the +reading of my proofs and the making of many valuable suggestions +thereon. I have also to thank my friend Captain Herbert W. Richmond, +R.N., for his unselfish kindness in allowing me to make use of his notes +on the Dunkirk campaign which he has closely studied in the original +papers preserved at the Admiralty and the Record Office. To my son, +Lieutenant H.G. Thursfield, R.N., I am also indebted for many valuable +suggestions. Finally, my acknowledgments are due to the Editors of this +series and the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for their +uniform courtesy and consideration. + +J.R.T. + +_4th September 1913._ + + + + +NAVAL WARFARE + + + + +CHAPTER I + +INTRODUCTORY + + +War is the armed conflict of national wills, an appeal to force as +between nation and nation. Naval warfare is that part of the conflict +which takes place on the seas. The civilized world is divided into +separate, independent States or nations, each sovereign within its own +borders. Each State pursues its own ideas and aims and embodies them in +a national policy; and so far as this policy affects only its own +citizens, it is subject to no control except that of the national +conscience and the national sense of the public welfare. Within the +State itself civil war may arise when internal dissensions divide the +nation into two parties, of which either pursues a policy to which the +other refuses to submit. In this case, unless the two parties agree to +separate without conflict, as was done by Sweden and Norway a few years +ago, an armed conflict ensues and the nation is divided into two +belligerent States which may or may not become, according to the +fortune of war, separate, independent, and sovereign in the end. The +great example of this in our own time was the War of Secession in +America, which, happily for both parties, ended without disruption, in +the surrender of the weaker of the two, and after a time in a complete +reconciliation between them. + +Thus war may arise between two parties in a single State, and when it +does the two parties become, to all intents and purposes, separate, +independent, and sovereign States for the time being, and are, for the +most part, so regarded and treated by other independent States not +taking part in the conflict. For this reason, though the origin of a +civil war may differ widely in all its circumstances and conditions from +that of a war between two separate States, sovereign and independent _ab +initio_, yet as soon as a state of war is established, as distinct from +that of a puny revolt or a petty rebellion, there is, for a student of +war, no practical difference between a civil war and any other kind of +war. Both fall under the definition of war as the armed conflict of +national wills. + +Between two separate, sovereign, independent nations a state of war +arises in this wise. We have seen that the internal policy of an +independent State is subject to no direct external control. But States +do not exist in isolation. Their citizens trade with the citizens of +other States, seeking to exchange the products of their respective +industries to the advantage of both. As they grow in prosperity, wealth, +and population, their capital seeks employment in other lands, and their +surplus population seeks an outlet in such regions of the earth as are +open to their occupation. Thus arise external relations between one +State and another, and the interests affected by these relations are +often found--and perhaps still more often believed--by one State to be +at variance with those of another. In pursuit of these interests--which, +as they grow and expand, become embodied in great consolidated kingdoms, +great colonial empires, or great imperial dependencies, and tend to be +regarded in time as paramount to all other national interests--each +State formulates and pursues an external policy of its own which may or +may not be capable of amicable adjustment to the policy of other States +engaged in similar enterprises. It is the function of diplomacy to +effect adjustments such as these where it can. It succeeds much more +often than it fails. Conflicting policies are deflected by mutual +agreement and concession so as to avoid the risk of collision, and each +State, without abandoning its policy, modifies it and adjusts it to the +exigencies of the occasion. Sometimes, however, diplomacy fails, either +because the conflicting policies are really irreconcilable, or because +passion, prejudice, national ambition, or international misunderstanding +induces the citizens of both States and their rulers so to regard them. +In that case, if neither State is prepared so to deflect its policy as +to avert collision, war ensues. The policy remains unchanged, but the +means of further pursuing it, otherwise than by an appeal to force, are +exhausted. War is thus, according to the famous definition of +Clausewitz, the pursuit of national policy by other means than those +which mere diplomacy has at its command--in other words by the conflict +of armed force. Each State now seeks to bend its enemy's will to its own +and to impose its policy upon him. + +The means of pursuing this policy vary almost indefinitely. But inasmuch +as war is essentially the conflict of armed force, the primary object of +each belligerent must in all cases be to subdue, and, in the last +resort, to destroy the armed forces of the adversary. When that is done +all is done that war can do. How to do this most speedily and most +effectively is the fundamental problem of war. There is no cut-and-dried +solution of the problem, because although war may be considered, as it +has been considered above, in the abstract, it is the most concrete of +all human arts and, subject to the fundamental principle above +enunciated, its particular forms may, and indeed must, vary with the +circumstances and conditions of each particular war. Many commentators +on war distinguishing, with Clausewitz, between "limited" and +"unlimited" war, would further insist that the forms of war must vary +with its objects. I cannot follow this distinction, which seems to me to +be inconsistent with the fundamental proposition of Clausewitz, to the +effect that war is the pursuit of policy by means of the conflict of +armed force. If you desire your policy to prevail you must take the best +means that are open to you to make it prevail. It is worse than useless +to dissipate your energies in the pursuit of any purpose, however +important in itself, which does not directly conduce, and conduce better +than any other purpose you could pursue, to that paramount end. The only +limitation of your efforts that you can tolerate is that they should +involve the least expenditure of energy that may be necessary to make +your policy prevail. But that is a question of the economics of war; it +is not a question of "limited war" or of "war for a limited object." +Your sole object is to bend the enemy to your will. That object is +essentially an unlimited one, or one that is limited only by the extent +of the efforts which the enemy makes to withstand you. The only sure way +of attaining this object is to destroy his armed forces. If he submits +before this is done it is he that limits the war, not you. Bacon's +unimpeachable maxim in this regard is often misinterpreted. "This much +is certain," he says, "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and +may take as much or as little of the war as he will." That is +indisputable, but its postulate is that the belligerent has secured the +command of the sea; that is, as I shall show hereafter, that he has +subdued, if not destroyed, the armed forces of the enemy afloat. Having +done that he may, in a certain sense, take as much or as little of the +war as he chooses; but he must always take as much as will compel the +enemy to come to terms. + +Naval warfare is no essential part of the armed conflict between +contending States. In some cases it exercises a decisive influence on +the conduct and issue of the conflict, in others none at all or next to +none. But sea power, that is, the advantage which a nation at war +derives from its superiority at sea, may largely affect the issue of a +war, even though no naval engagements of any moment may take place. In +the Crimean War the unchallenged supremacy of England and France on the +seas alone made it possible for the Allies to invade the Crimea and +undertake the siege of Sebastopol; while the naval campaigns of the +Allies in the Baltic, although they resulted in no decisive naval +operation, yet largely contributed to the success of the Allied arms in +the Crimea by compelling Russia to keep in the north large bodies of +troops which might otherwise have turned the scale against the Allies in +the South. In the War of 1859, between France and Austria, with the +Sardinian kingdom allied to the former, the superiority of the Allies at +sea enabled considerable portions of the French army to be transported +from French to Piedmontese ports, and by threatening the flank of the +Austrian line of advance, it accelerated the concentration of the Allies +on the Ticino. It also enabled the Allies to maintain a close blockade +of the Austrian ports in the Adriatic, and might have led to an attack +from the sea on the Austrian rear in Venetia had not the military +reverses of Austria in Lombardy brought the war to an end. In the War of +Secession in America the issue was largely determined, or at least +accelerated, by the close but not impenetrable blockade established by +the North over the ports and coasts of the South, and by the +co-operation of Farragut on the Mississippi with the Federal land forces +in that region. On the other hand, in the War of 1866 there was no naval +conflict worth mentioning between Austria and Prussia, because Prussia +had no navy to speak of; but as Italy, a naval Power, was the ally of +Prussia, and as Austria had a small but very efficient naval force led +by a great naval commander, the conflict between these two Powers led +to the Battle of Lissa, in which the Italian fleet was decisively +defeated, though the triumph of Prussia over the armies of Austria saved +Italy from the worst consequences of defeat, and indeed obtained for +her, in spite of her military reverses on land, the coveted possession +of Venetia. In the War of 1870 again, although the supremacy of France +on the seas was never seriously challenged by Prussia, yet her collapse +on land was so sudden and complete that her superiority at sea availed +her little or nothing. The maritime trade of Prussia was annihilated for +the time, but it was then too insignificant a factor in the economic +fabric of Prussia for its destruction to count for much, and the fleets +of France rode triumphant in the North Sea and the Baltic; but finding +no ships to fight, having no troops to land, and giving a wide berth to +fortifications with which they were ill-equipped--as ships always are +and always must be--to contend without support from the military arm, +their presence was little more than an idle and futile demonstration. In +the Boer War the influence of England's unchallenged supremacy at sea, +albeit latent, was decisive. The Boers had no naval force of any kind; +but no nation not secure in its dominion of the seas could have +undertaken such a war as England then had to wage, and it was perhaps +only the paramount sea power of this country that prevented the +conflict taking a form and assuming dimensions that would have taxed +British endurance to the uttermost and must almost certainly have +entailed the loss of South Africa to the Empire. Certain naval features +of the Cuban War between Spain and the United States, and of the War in +the Far East between Russia and Japan, will be more conveniently +considered in subsequent chapters of this manual. + +The normal correlation and interdependence of naval and military forces +in the armed conflict of national wills is sufficiently illustrated by +the foregoing examples. In certain abnormal and exceptional cases each +can act and produce the desired effect without the other. In a few +extreme cases it is hard to see how either could act at all. If, for +instance, Spain and Switzerland were to fall out, how could either +attack the other? They have no common frontier, and though Spain has a +navy, Switzerland has no seaboard. Cases where naval conflict alone has +decided the issue are those of the early wars between England and +Holland. Neither could reach the other except across the sea, there was +no territorial issue directly involved, and the object of both +combatants was to secure a monopoly of maritime commerce. But as +territorial issues, and territorial issues involving the sea and +affected by it directly or indirectly, are nearly always at stake in +great wars, history affords few examples of great international +conflicts in which sea power does not enter as a factor, often of +supreme importance. + +It must of course enter as a factor of paramount importance in any war +between an insular State and a continental one--as in the war between +Russia and Japan--or between two continental States which--as in the war +between Spain and the United States--have no common frontier on land. +War being the armed conflict of national wills, it is manifest that the +opposing wills cannot in cases such as these be brought into armed +conflict unless one State or the other is in a position to operate on +the sea. The first move in such a conflict must of necessity be made, by +one belligerent or the other, on the sea. This involves the conception +of "the command of the sea," and as this is the fundamental conception +of naval warfare as such, our analysis of naval warfare must begin with +an exposition of what is meant by the command of the sea. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE COMMAND OF THE SEA + + +We have seen that when two States go to war the primary object of each +is to subdue and if possible to destroy the armed forces of the other. +Until that is done either completely, or to such an extent as to induce +the defeated belligerent to submit, the conflict of wills cannot be +determined, and the two States cannot return to those normal relations, +involving no violence or force, which constitute a state of peace. If +they have a common frontier this circumstance indicates what is, as a +general rule, the best and most efficient way of securing the object to +be attained. The armed forces of both belligerents lie at the outset +within their respective frontiers. If those of either can be constrained +by the superior strategy of the other to keep within their own +territory, the initial advantage lies with the belligerent who has so +constrained them, and the war has in common parlance been carried into +the enemy's country. In other words, the invasion of the enemy's +territory has begun, and pressure has been brought to bear on his will +which, if maintained without intermission and with an intensity duly +proportioned to its growing extent, must in the end subdue it. To this +there is no alternative. To invade the enemy's territory at all is to +inflict a reverse on his armed forces, which would assuredly have +prevented the invasion if they could. The territory in the rear of the +invading army is in greater or less degree brought under the control of +the invader and thereby temporarily lost to the invaded State. If this +process is continued the authority and the resources of the invaded +State are progressively diminished, until at last when the capital is +occupied and the remainder of the invaded country lies open to the +advance of the invader, the defeated State must sue for peace on such +terms as the invader may concede, because it has nothing left to fight +for, and no force wherewithal to fight. This is of course merely an +abstract and generalized description of the course of a war on land, but +I need not consider its concrete details nor analyse any of the +conditions which may, and in the concrete often do, impede or deflect +its course, because my sole purpose is to show how armed force operates +in the abstract to subdue the will of the belligerent who is worsted in +the conflict. It operates by the destruction of his armed forces, by the +occupation of his territory, and by the consequent extinction of his +authority and appropriation of his resources. He can only recover the +latter and liberate his territory by submitting to such terms as the +invader may dictate or concede. + +Naval warfare aims at the same primary object, namely, the destruction +of the enemy's armed forces afloat; but it cannot by itself produce the +same decisive effect, because there is no territory which naval force, +as such, can occupy and appropriate. The sea is not territory. It is not +nor can it be made subject to the authority of an enemy in the same +sense that the land can, nor does it possess any resources in itself +such as on the land can be appropriated to the disadvantage and ultimate +discomfiture of a belligerent whose territory has been invaded. The sea +is the common highway of all nations, and the exclusive possession of +none. Apart from its fisheries, which, outside the territorial waters of +any particular State, are open to all nations, it is of no use, except +as a highway, to any State. But its use as a highway is the root of all +sea power, the foundation of all naval warfare. It is only by this +highway that an island State can be invaded, only by this highway that +an island State, or a State having no common frontier with its +adversary, can encounter and subdue the armed forces of the enemy, +whether on sea or on land. + +Moreover, the sea as a highway differs in many important respects from +such highways or other lines of communication as serve for the transit +and transport of armed forces and their necessary supplies on land. In +one sense it is all highway, that is, it can be traversed in every +direction by ships, wherever there is water enough for them to float. +For military purposes land transit is confined to such highways as are +suitable to the march of an army accompanied by artillery and heavy +baggage and supply trains, or to such railways as can more expeditiously +serve the same purpose. Hence an army advancing in an enemy's country +cannot advance on a very broad front, nor can it outmarch its baggage +and other supplies except for a very limited time and for some +exceptional purpose. Sea transport is subject to no such limitations. +Ships carry their own supplies with them, and a fleet of ships, whether +of transports or of warships, can move on as broad a front as is +compatible with the exercise of due control over their combined +movements. Moreover, within certain limits and with certain exceptions, +where the waters to be traversed are narrow, ships and fleets can vary +their line of transit and advance to such an extent as to render the +discovery of their whereabouts a matter of some difficulty. The same +conditions affect the transit of such merchant vessels as, carrying the +flag of one belligerent, are liable to capture by the other. Hence the +primary aim of all naval warfare is and must be so to control the lines +of communication which traverse the seas affected, that the enemy +cannot move his warships from one point to another without encountering +a superior force of his adversary, and that his merchant ships cannot +prosecute their voyages without running extreme risk of capture by the +way. This is called, in time-honoured phraseology, securing the command +of the sea, and the true meaning of this phrase is nothing more nor less +than the effective control of all such maritime communications as are or +can be affected by the operations of either belligerent. This control +may extend, according to circumstances, to all the navigable seas of the +globe, or it may be confined, for all practical purposes, to the waters +adjacent to the respective territories of the two belligerents. In +theory, however, its effect is unlimited, and so it must be in practice, +where the territories of one belligerent or the other are widely +scattered over the globe. That is the sense in which "the sea is all +one." + +It is important to note that the phrase "command of the sea" has no +definite meaning except in war. In time of peace no State claims to +command the sea or to control it in any way. But in any war in which +naval force is engaged each belligerent seeks to secure the command of +the sea for himself and to deny it to his enemy, that is to close the +highway which the sea affords in time of peace to his warships and his +merchant vessels alike. As regards the enemy's warships, moreover, he +seeks to secure his own command by their destruction or capture. This is +not always possible, because if the naval forces of the two belligerents +are very unequally matched, it is always open to the weaker of the two +to decline the conflict by keeping his main fleets in ports unassailable +by naval force alone, and seeking to reduce the superiority of his +adversary by assailing him incessantly with torpedo craft. He may also +attempt the hazardous enterprise of sending out isolated cruisers to +prey upon his adversary's commerce afloat. But in the case supposed, +where the superiority of one side is so great as to compel the main +fleets of the other to seek the protection of their fortified ports, +such an enterprise is, as I shall show in a subsequent chapter, not only +extremely hazardous in itself, but quite incapable of inflicting such +loss on the superior adversary as would be likely to induce him to +abandon the conflict. + +Nevertheless the command of the sea is not established, or at best it is +only partially, and it may be only temporarily, established by driving +the main fleets of the enemy into ports which are inaccessible to naval +force alone. They must not only be driven there but compelled to remain +there. This has generally been done in the past, and according to many, +but not all, naval authorities, it will generally have to be done in the +future by the operation known as blockade, whereby the enemy is +prevented from coming out, or is compelled if he does come out to fight +a superior force lying in wait outside. As a matter of fact, inasmuch as +a blockade to be really deterrent must be conducted by a blockading +force superior to that which is blockaded--for otherwise the latter need +not shun an engagement in the open with the former--it can rarely be the +interest of the blockader to prevent the exit of his adversary, since by +the hypothesis if he could get him out he could beat him. But the +blockade must nevertheless be maintained, because, although the +blockaded fleet cannot by that means be destroyed, it can, at any rate, +be immobilized and wiped off the board so long as it remains where it +is. + +The situation in which a blockade is set up by one belligerent and +submitted to by the other is not identical with an effective command of +the sea, though in certain circumstances it may approximate very closely +to it. The blockaded forces may not be so thoroughly intimidated by the +superior forces of the blockaders that they could not or would not, if +they could, seek a favourable opportunity for breaking or evading the +blockade imposed upon them. They may merely be waiting in a position +unassailable by naval force alone until the blockading forces are so +weakened through incessant torpedo attack, through the wear and tear +inflicted on them by the nature of the service on which they are +engaged, through stress of weather, through the periodical necessity +which compels even the best found ships to withdraw temporarily from the +blockade for the purposes of repair, refit, and replenishment of their +stores, and through the fatigue imposed on their officers and crews by +the incessant vigilance which a blockade requires as to afford them a +favourable opportunity of challenging a decision in the open. Or, again, +if the forces of the blockaded belligerent are distributed between two +or more of his fortified ports, he may attempt an evasion of the +blockade at two or more of them for the purpose of combining the forces +thus liberated and attacking one or more of the blockading fleets in +superior force before they can re-establish their own superiority by +concentration. Broadly speaking, this was the plan of operations +adopted, or rather attempted, by Napoleon in the memorable campaign +which ended at Trafalgar. It was frustrated by the persistent energy of +Nelson, by the masterly dispositions of Barham at the Admiralty, by the +tenacity with which Cornwallis maintained the blockade at Brest, and by +the instinctive sagacity with which other commanders of the several +blockading and cruising squadrons nearly always did the right thing at +the right moment, divined Barham's purpose, and carried it out almost +automatically. Practically, Napoleon was beaten and his projected +invasion of England was abandoned many weeks before Trafalgar was won. +But the command of the sea was not thereby secured to England. It needed +Trafalgar and the destruction of the French and Spanish Fleets there +accomplished to effect that consummation. England thenceforth remained +in effective and almost undisputed command of the sea, and the +Peninsular campaigns of Wellington were for the first time rendered +possible. The contrasted phases of the conflict before and after +Trafalgar are perhaps the best illustration in history of the vast and +vital difference between a command of the sea in dispute and a command +of the sea established. Trafalgar was the turning-point in the long +conflict between England and Napoleon. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +DISPUTED COMMAND--BLOCKADE + + +I have so far treated blockade as the initial stage of a struggle for +the command of the sea. That appears to me to be the logical order of +treatment, because when two naval Powers go to war it is almost certain +that the stronger of the two will at the outset attempt to blockade the +naval forces of the other. The same thing is likely to happen even if +the two are approximately equal in naval force, but in that case the +blockade is not likely to be of long duration, because both sides will +be eager to obtain a decision in the open. The command of the sea is a +matter of such vital moment to both sides that each must needs seek to +obtain it as soon and as completely as possible, and the only certain +way to obtain it is by the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy. +The advantage of putting to sea first is in naval warfare the equivalent +or counterpart of the advantage in land warfare of first crossing the +enemy's frontier. If that advantage is pushed home and the enemy is +still unready it must lead to a blockade. It is, moreover, quite +possible that even if both belligerents are equally ready--I am here +assuming them to be approximately equal in force--one or other, if not +both, may think it better strategy to await developments before risking +everything in an attempt to secure an immediate decision. In point of +fact, the difference between this policy and the policy of a declared +blockade is, as I am about to show, almost imperceptible, especially in +modern conditions of naval warfare. It is therefore necessary to +consider the subject of blockade more in detail. Other subjects closely +associated with this will also have to be considered in some detail +before we can grasp the full purport and extent of what is meant by the +command of the sea. + +There are two kinds of blockade--military and commercial. The former +includes the latter, but the latter does not necessarily involve the +former, except in the sense that armed naval force is necessary to +maintain it. By a commercial blockade a belligerent seeks to intercept +the maritime commerce of the enemy, to prevent any vessels, whether +enemy or neutral, from reaching his ports, and at the same time to +prevent their egress to the same extent. This in certain circumstances +may be a very effective agency for bending or breaking the enemy's will +and compelling his submission, but I reserve its consideration for more +detailed treatment hereafter. It is with military blockade that I am +here more especially concerned. + +We have seen that the paramount purpose of all naval warfare, and, +indeed, of all warfare, is the destruction of the armed forces of the +enemy. His armed forces are in the last resort the sole instrument of +his will, and their destruction to such an extent as is necessary to +subdue his will is the sole agency by which peace can be restored. +Whatever the extent of the war, whether it is limited or unlimited, in +the sense assigned to those words by Clausewitz and his followers, the +conflict of national wills out of which the quarrel arose must in some +way be composed, either by concessions on both sides or by the complete +subjection of one side to the other, before it can come to an end. It +follows that the main object of a military blockade can rarely be to +keep the enemy's forces sealed up, masked, and to that extent +immobilized in the blockaded ports. Its real object is to secure that if +they do come out they shall be observed, shadowed, and followed until +such time as they can be encountered by a superior force, and if +possible destroyed. The classical text on this topic is a letter written +on August 1, 1804, by Nelson to the Lord Mayor of London, acknowledging +a vote of thanks passed by the Corporation, and addressed to Nelson as +commanding the fleet blockading Toulon. Nelson said in his reply: "I beg +to inform your Lordship that the port of Toulon has never been blockaded +by me: quite the reverse--every opportunity has been offered to the +enemy to put to sea, for it is there that we hope to realize the hopes +and expectations of our country, and I trust that they will not be +disappointed." What Nelson here meant was that the so-called blockade of +the port--it was a common, but, as he held, an erroneous expression--was +merely incidental to the operation he was conducting. His main objective +was the armed forces of the enemy lying unassailable within the +blockaded port. He could not make them put to sea but he gave them every +opportunity of doing so. So far from wishing to keep them in, his one +desire was to get them out into the open, "for it is there that we hope +to realize the hopes and expectations of our country"--that is to get a +decision in favour of the British arms. + +Now, this being the object of a military blockade, its methods will be +subordinated to that object. In the days of sailing ships the method +which commended itself to the best naval authorities of the time was to +have an inshore squadron, consisting mainly of frigates and smaller +craft, but strengthened if necessary by a few capital ships, generally +two-deckers, closely watching the entrance to the port, but keeping +outside the range of its land defences. This was supported at a greater +distance in the offing by the main blockading fleet of heavier ships of +the line, cruising within narrow limits and keeping close touch with the +inshore squadron. Such a method is no longer practicable owing to the +development of steam navigation, and to the introduction into naval +warfare of the locomotive torpedo, and of special vessels designed to +make the attack of this weapon extremely formidable and extremely +difficult to parry. The inshore squadron of the old days was liable to +no attack which it could not parry if in sufficient force, and if too +hardly pressed it could always fall back on the main blockading fleet, +which was unassailable except by a corresponding force of the enemy. The +advent of the torpedo and of its characteristic craft has changed all +this. No naval Power can now afford to place its battleships at a fixed +station, or even in close touch with a fixed rendezvous, which is within +reach of an enemy's torpedo craft. The torpedo vessel which operates +only on the surface is, it is true, formidable only at night; in the +daytime it is powerless in attack and extremely vulnerable. But the +submarine is equally formidable in the daytime, and its attack even in +the daytime is far more insidious and difficult to parry than that of +the surface torpedo vessel is at night. The effective range of the +surface torpedo vessel is thus, for practical purposes, half the +distance which it can traverse in any given direction from its base +between dusk and dawn--say from one hundred to two hundred miles, +according to its speed and the season of the year. The speed of the +submarine is much less, but it can keep the sea for many days together, +sinking beneath the surface whenever it is threatened with attack. It +can also approach a battleship or fleet of battleships in the same +submerged condition, and experience has already demonstrated that its +advance in that condition to within striking distance is extremely +difficult to detect. Moreover, even if its presence is detected in time, +the only certain defence against it is for the battleship to steam away +from it at a speed greater than any submarine has ever attained or is +likely to attain in the submerged condition. It should further be noted +that torpedo craft engaged in offensive operations of this character are +not confined to the blockaded port as a base. Any sheltered anchorage +will serve their purpose, provided it is sufficiently fortified to +resist such attacks from the sea as may be anticipated. + +Thus, in the conditions established by the advent of the torpedo and its +characteristic craft, there would seem to be only two alternatives open +to a fleet of battleships engaged in blockade operations. Either it must +be stationed in some sheltered anchorage outside the radius of action of +the enemy's surface torpedo craft, and if within that radius adequately +defended against torpedo attack--as Togo established a flying base for +the use of his fleet, first at the Elliot Islands and afterwards at +Dalny, for the purpose of blockading Port Arthur; or it must cruise in +the open outside the same limits, keeping in touch with its advanced +cruisers and flotillas by means of wireless telegraphy, and thereby +dispensing with anything like a fixed rendezvous. It is not, perhaps, +imperative that it should always cruise entirely outside the prescribed +radius, because experience in modern naval manoeuvres has frequently +shown that it is a very difficult thing for torpedo craft, moving at +random, to discover a fleet which is constantly shifting its position at +high speed, especially when they are at any moment liable to attack from +cruisers and torpedo craft of the other side. + +Thus a modern blockade will, so far as battle fleets are concerned, be +of necessity rather a watching blockade than a masking or sealing up +blockade. If the two belligerents are unequal in naval strength it will +probably take some such form as the following. The weaker belligerent +will at the outset keep his battle fleet in his fortified ports. The +stronger may do the same, but he will be under no such paramount +inducement to do so. Both sides will, however, send out their torpedo +craft and supporting cruisers with intent to do as much harm as they can +to the armed forces of the enemy. If one belligerent can get his +torpedo craft to sea before the enemy is ready, he will, if he is the +stronger of the two, forthwith attempt to establish as close and +sustained a watch of the ports sheltering the enemy's armed forces as +may be practicable; if he is the weaker, he will attempt sporadic +attacks on the ports of his adversary and on such of his warships as may +be found in the open. If the enemy is so incautious as to have placed +any of his capital ships or other important craft in a position open to +the assault of torpedo craft--as Russia did at Port Arthur at the +opening of the war with Japan--or if he has been so lacking in vigilance +and forethought as not to have taken timely and adequate measures for +meeting sporadic attacks of the kind indicated, such attacks may be very +effective and may even go so far to redress the balance of naval +strength as to encourage the originally weaker belligerent to seek a +decision in the open. But the forces of the stronger belligerent must be +very badly handled and disposed for anything of the kind to take place. +The advantage of superior force is a tremendous one. If it is associated +with energy, determination, initiative, and skill of disposition no more +than equal to those of the assailant, it is overwhelming. The +sea-keeping capacity, or what has been called the enduring mobility, of +torpedo craft, is comparatively small. Their coal-supply is limited, +especially when they are steaming at full speed, and they carry no very +large reserve of torpedoes. They must, therefore, very frequently return +to a base to replenish their supplies. The superior enemy is, it is +true, subject to the same disabilities, but being superior he has more +torpedo craft to spare and more cruisers to attack the torpedo craft of +the enemy and their own escort of cruisers. When the raiding torpedo +craft return to their base he will make it very difficult for them to +get in and just as difficult for them to get out again. He will suffer +losses, of course, for there is no superiority of force that will confer +immunity in that respect in war. But even between equal forces, equally +well led and handled, there is no reason to suppose that the losses of +one side will be more than equal to those of the other; whereas if one +side is appreciably superior to the other it is reasonable to suppose +that it will inflict greater losses on the enemy than it suffers itself, +while even if the losses are equal the residue of the stronger force +will still be greater than that of the weaker. It is true that the whole +art of war, whether on sea or on land, consists in so disposing your +armed forces, both strategically and tactically, that you may be +superior to the enemy at the critical point and moment, and that success +in this supreme art is no inherent prerogative of the belligerent whose +aggregate forces are superior to those of his adversary. But this is +only to say that success in war is not an affair of numbers alone. It is +an affair of numbers combined with hard fighting and skilful +disposition. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +DISPUTED COMMAND--THE FLEET IN BEING + + +We have seen that blockade is only a means to an end, that end being the +destruction or surrender of the armed forces of the enemy. We have seen +also that that end cannot be obtained by blockade alone. All that a +military blockade can do is by a judicious disposition of superior +force, either to prevent the enemy coming out at all, or to secure that +if he does come out he shall be brought to action. The former method is +only applicable where the blockader's superiority of force is so great +that his adversary cannot venture at the outset to encounter his main +fleets in the open, and in that case the establishment of a blockade of +this character is for many purposes practically tantamount to securing +the command of the sea to the blockader so long as the blockade can be +maintained. Such a situation, however, can very rarely arise. There are +very few instances of it in naval history, and there are likely to be +fewer in the future than there have been in the past. The closest +blockade ever established and maintained was that of Brest by Cornwallis +from 1803 to 1805, when Napoleon was projecting the invasion of +England. Yet it would be too much to say that during those strenuous +years Ganteaume never could have got out, had he been so minded, and it +is not to be forgotten that for some time during the crisis of the +campaign he was forbidden by Napoleon to make the attempt. Moreover, +such a situation, even when it does arise, amounts at best to a +stalemate, not to a checkmate. It leaves the enemy's fleet "a fleet in +being," immobilized and wiped off the board for the moment, but +nevertheless so operating as to immobilize the blockading fleet in so +far as the chief effort of the latter must be concentrated on +maintaining the blockade. + +It is necessary to dwell at some length on this conception of "a fleet +in being." Admiral Mahan, the great historian of sea power--whose high +authority all students of naval warfare will readily acknowledge and +rarely attempt to dispute--speaks of it in his _Life of Nelson_ as a +doctrine or opinion which "has received extreme expression ... and +apparently undergone extreme misconception." On the other hand, Admiral +Sir Cyprian Bridge tells us in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_ (_s.v._ +"Sea-Power") that "the principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the +bottom of all sound strategy." Of a principle which, according to one +high authority, lies at the bottom of all sound strategy, and according +to another has received extreme expression and undergone misconception +equally extreme, it is plainly essential that a true conception should +be obtained before it can be applied to the elucidation of any of the +problems of naval warfare. Now what is this much-debated principle? It +is best to go to the fountain-head for its elucidation. The phrase "a +fleet in being" was first used by Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, in +his defence before the Court Martial which tried and acquitted him for +his conduct of the naval campaign of 1690, and especially of the Battle +of Beachy Head, which was the leading event--none too glorious for +British arms--of that campaign. "Both as a strategist and as a +tactician," says Admiral Bridge, "Torrington was immeasurably ahead of +his contemporaries. The only English admirals who can be placed above +him are Hawke and Nelson." Yet he was regarded by many of his +contemporaries, and has been represented by many historians, merely as +the incapable seaman who failed to win the Battle of Beachy Head, and +thereby jeopardized the safety of the kingdom at a very critical time. + +The situation was as follows. The country was divided between the +partisans of James II. and the supporters of William III. James was in +Ireland, where his strength was greatest, and William had gone thither +to encounter him, his transit having been covered by a small squadron of +six men-of-war, under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovel. The army +was with William in Ireland, and Great Britain could only be defended on +land by a hastily levied militia. Its sole effective defence was the +fleet; and the fleet, although reinforced by a Dutch contingent, was, +for the moment, insufficient to defend it. The chief reliance of James +was upon the friendship and forces, naval and military, of Louis XIV. +Here was a case in which the security of England against insurrection at +home and invasion from abroad depended on the sufficiency and capacity +of her fleets to maintain the command of the sea--that is, either to +defeat the enemy's naval forces or to keep them at bay, and thereby to +deny freedom of transit to any military forces that Louis might attempt +to launch against British territory. The French king resolved to make a +determined attempt to wrest the command of the sea from his adversaries, +and by overpowering the allied fleets of England and Holland in the +Channel, to open the way for a successful invasion and a successful +insurrection to follow. A great fleet was collected at Brest, under the +supreme command of Tourville, and a squadron from Toulon under +Château-Renault was ordered to join him in the Channel, so as to enable +him to threaten London, to foment a Jacobite insurrection in the +capital, to land troops in Torbay, and to occupy the Irish Channel in +such force as to prevent the return of William and his army. + +Now, of course, none of these objects could be attained unless the +allied fleets in the Channel and adjacent waters could be either +decisively defeated in the open or else so intimidated by the superior +forces of the enemy as to decline a conflict and retire to some place of +safety. On the broad principle that the paramount object of all warfare +is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, Tourville, if he +felt himself strong enough, was bound to seek out the allied fleet and +challenge it to a decisive combat. On the same principle, Torrington, if +he felt himself strong enough, was bound to pursue the same aggressive +strategy, and by thoroughly beating the French to frustrate all their +objects at once. But Torrington was not strong enough and knew that he +was not strong enough. He had foreseen the crisis and warned his +superiors betimes, entreating them to take adequate measures for dealing +with it. They took no such measures. On the contrary, the dispositions +they made were calculated rather to aggravate the danger than to avert +it. Early in the year a fleet of sixteen sail of the line under +Killigrew had been sent in charge of a convoy to Cadiz with orders to +prevent, if possible, the exit of the Toulon fleet from the +Mediterranean and to follow it up should it make good its escape. This +strategy was unimpeachable if only Killigrew could make sure of +intercepting Château-Renault and defeating him, and if the naval forces +left in home waters when Killigrew was detached were sufficient to give +a good account of the fleet that Tourville was collecting at Brest. But +in its results it was disastrous, for Killigrew, delayed by weather and +by the many preoccupations, commercial and strategic, entailed by his +instructions was unable either to bar the passage of the Toulon fleet or +to overtake it during its progress towards the Channel. Hence +Château-Renault was able to effect his junction with Tourville +unmolested, while Killigrew did not reach Plymouth until after the +battle of Beachy Head had been fought, when, Tourville being victorious +in the Channel, he was obliged to carry his squadron into the Hamoaze so +as to be out of harm's way. Shovel, having escorted the king and his +troops to Ireland, was equally unable to carry out his orders to join +Torrington in the Channel, since Tourville stood in the way. Hence, +although fully alive to the strategic value, in certain contingencies, +of the forces under Killigrew and Shovel, Torrington was compelled to +rely mainly on the force under his immediate command, the insufficiency +of which he had many months before pointed out and vainly implored his +superiors to redress. + +The result of all this was that no adequate steps were, or could be, +taken, to prevent the advance of Tourville in greatly superior force +into the Channel. Torrington hoisted his flag in the Downs at the end of +May, and even then the Dutch contingent had not joined in the numbers +promised. Hence it was impossible to keep scouts out to the westward as +the Dutch had undertaken to do, and the first definite intelligence that +Torrington received of the advance of the French was the information +that on June 23 they were anchored in great force to the westward of the +Isle of Wight. Three days later, having in the meanwhile received a +Dutch reinforcement bringing his force up to fifty-five sail of the line +and twenty fire-ships, he offered them battle in that position, but it +was declined. His own comment on this hazardous adventure may here be +quoted: "I do acknowledge my first intention of attacking them, a +rashness that will admit of no better excuse than that, though I did +believe them stronger than we are, I did not believe it to so great a +degree.... Their great strength and caution have put soberer thoughts +into my head, and have made me very heartily give God thanks they +declined the battle yesterday; and indeed I shall not think myself very +unhappy if I can get rid of them without fighting, unless it may be upon +equaller terms than I can at present see any prospect of.... A council +of war I called this morning unanimously agreed we are by all manner of +means to shun fighting with them, especially if they have the wind of +us; and retire, if we cannot avoid it otherwise, even to the Gunfleet, +the only place we can with any manner of probability make our account +good with them in the condition we are in. We have now had a pretty good +view of their fleet, which consists of near, if not quite, eighty +men-of-war fit to lie in a line and thirty fire-ships; a strength that +puts me beside hopes of success, if we should fight, and really may not +only endanger the losing of the fleet, but at least the quiet of our +country too; for if we are beaten they, being absolute masters of the +sea, will be at great liberty of doing many things they dare not attempt +while we observe them and are in a possibility of joining Vice-Admiral +Killigrew and our ships to the westward. If I find a possibility, I will +get by them to the westward to join those ships; if not, I mean to +follow the result of the council of war." + +The strategy here indicated is plain, and, in my judgment, sound. It may +be profitably compared with that of Nelson as explained to his captains +during his return from the West Indies whither he had pursued +Villeneuve. Villeneuve was on his way back to European waters and Nelson +hoped to overtake him. He had eleven ships of the line in his fleet and +Villeneuve was known to have not less than eighteen. Yet, though Nelson +did not shrink from an engagement on his own terms, he was resolved not +to force one inopportunely. "Do not," he said to his captains, "imagine +I am one of those hot-brained people who fight at immense disadvantage +without an adequate object. My object is partly gained"--that is, +Villeneuve had been driven out of the West Indies. "If we meet them we +shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail of +the line, and therefore do not be surprised if I do not fall on them +immediately; we won't part without a battle. I think they will be glad +to leave me alone, if I will let them alone; which I will do, either +till we approach the shores of Europe, or they give an advantage too +tempting to be resisted." Torrington's attitude was the same as +Nelson's, except perhaps that he lacked the ardent faith to say with +Nelson, "We won't part without a battle." He would not think himself +very unhappy if he could get rid of Tourville without a battle. But the +situations of the two men were different. Nelson knew, as he said +himself, that "by the time that the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, +they will do us no harm this year." If, that is, by the sacrifice of +eleven ships of his own he could wipe out eighteen or twenty of the +enemy, destroying some and disabling as many as he could of the rest, he +would leave the balance of naval force still strongly in favour of his +country, more strongly in fact than if he fought no action at all. +Torrington, on the other hand, knew that "if we are beaten they, being +absolute masters of the sea, will be at great liberty of doing many +things they dare not attempt while we observe them and are in a +possibility of joining Vice-Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the +westward." Killigrew and Shovel had twenty-two sail of the line between +them, and Torrington, in the dispatch above quoted, had requested that +they should be ordered to advance to Portsmouth, whence, if the French +pursued him to the eastward, they might be able to join him "over the +flats" of the Thames. As he had fifty-five sail of the line himself, +with a possibility of reinforcements from Chatham, the concentration off +the Thames of the whole of the forces available would have enabled him +to encounter Tourville on something like equal terms; and from that, +assuredly, he would not have shrunk. Meanwhile he would wait, watch, +observe, and pursue a defensive strategy. If Tourville should withdraw +to the westward he would follow him and get past him if he could, and in +that case, having picked up Killigrew and Shovel, he would be in a +position to take the offensive on no very unequal terms and not to part +from Tourville without a battle. + +But the strategy of Torrington--admirable and unimpeachable as, +according to such high authorities as Admiral Bridge and the late +Admiral Colomb, it was--did not at all commend itself to Mary and her +Council, who, during William's absence in Ireland, were left in charge +of the kingdom. They wanted a battle, although Torrington had plainly +told them that it could not be a victory and might result in a +disastrous and even fatal defeat. "We apprehend," they said in a +dispatch purporting to come from Mary herself, "the consequences of your +retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal, that we choose rather you +should, upon any advantage of the wind, give battle to the enemy than +retreat further than is necessary to get an advantage upon the enemy." +Torrington, of course, never intended to retire to the Gunfleet--which +was an anchorage protected by sandbanks off the coast of Essex to the +north of the Thames--if he could avoid doing so. But unless he went +there, there was no advantage to be got upon the enemy by retreating to +the eastward, because there alone could he get reinforcements from +Chatham and possibly be joined by Killigrew and Shovel "over the flats"; +which is what he meant by saying that the Gunfleet was "the only place +we can with any manner of probability make our account with them in the +position we are in." On the other hand, if the French gave him an +opportunity he would, if he could, get past them to the westward and +there join Killigrew and Shovel in a position of much greater +advantage. But in his actual situation, not being one of "those +hot-brained people who fight at immense disadvantage without an adequate +object," he knew that a battle was the last thing which he ought to risk +and the first that the French must desire. However, as a loyal seaman, +who knew how to obey orders, he did as he was told. The French had +pressed him as far as Beachy Head and there he gave battle, taking care +so to fight as to risk as little as possible. He was beaten, as he +expected to be, and the Dutch, who had been the most hotly engaged, were +very severely handled by the French. But though his losses were +considerable, for he had to destroy some of his ships to prevent their +falling into the hands of the enemy, he saved his fleet from the +destruction which must have befallen it had he fought otherwise than he +did. As the day advanced and the battle raged, the wind dropped and the +tide began to ebb. Torrington, taking advantage of this, anchored his +fleet, while the French drifted away to the westward. When the tide +again began to flow he again took advantage of it and retreated to the +eastward. The French made some show of pursuit, but Torrington made good +his retreat into the Thames, where, the buoys having been taken up, the +French could not follow him. Finally, the French withdrew from the +Channel, having accomplished nothing beyond an insignificant raid on +Teignmouth. Torrington was tried by Court Martial and acquitted, though +he was never again employed afloat. But the fact remains that, as +Admiral Bridge says, "most seamen were at the time, have been since, and +still are in agreement with Torrington." As to his conduct of the +battle, which has so unjustly involved him in lasting discredit with the +historians, though not with the seamen, he said in his defence before +the Court Martial: "I may be bold to say that I have had time and cause +enough to think of it, and that, upon my word, were the battle to be +fought over again, I do not know how to mend it, under the same +circumstances." Again, as to his general conduct of the campaign, he +said: "It is true that the French made no great advantage of their +victory though they put us to a great charge in keeping up the militia; +but had I fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the +whole kingdom had lain open to an invasion. What, then, would have +become of us in the absence of his Majesty and most of the land forces? +As it was, most men were in fear that the French would invade; but I was +always of another opinion; for I always said that, _whilst we had a +fleet in being_, they would not dare to make an attempt." + +This is the first appearance of the phrase "a fleet in being" in the +terminology of naval warfare. Its reappearance in our own day and its +frequent employment in naval discussion are due to the masterly analysis +of Torrington's strategy and tactics which the late Admiral Colomb gave +in his illuminating work on _Naval Warfare_. In order to avoid giving it +the extreme expression which, according to Admiral Mahan, it has +received from some writers, and involving it in that extreme +misconception which he thinks it has undergone at the hands of +others--or it may be of the same--I have thought it worth while to +examine at some length the campaign which gave rise to it so as to +ascertain exactly what was in the mind of Torrington when he first used +it. It is plain that Torrington held, as all great seamen have held, +that the primary object of every belligerent is to destroy the armed +forces of the enemy. He was so circumstanced that he could not do that +himself, because the forces which might have been at his disposal for +the purpose, had the circumstances been other than they were, were so +divided and dispersed that the enemy might overcome them in detail. That +the enemy would do this, if he could, he did not doubt, and it was +equally certain that it must be his immediate object to prevent his +doing it. His own force being by far the strongest of the three opposed +to Tourville, it must be upon him that the brunt of the conflict would +fall. Nothing would suit him better than that Tourville should turn +back and attempt to force a battle on either Killigrew or Shovel to the +westward, because in that case he could hang upon Tourville's rear and +flanks and take any opportunity that offered to get past him and +concentrate the British forces to the westward of him. But Tourville +gave him no such opportunity. He pressed him hard and might have pressed +him back even to the Gunfleet if Torrington had not been ordered by Mary +and her advisers to give battle "upon any advantage of the wind." But +even in fighting the battle, which his own judgment told him ought not +to be fought, he never lost sight of the paramount necessity of so +fighting it as to give Tourville no decisive advantage. The victory was +a barren one to Tourville. It gave him no command of the sea and for +that reason he was unable to prosecute any enterprise of invasion. The +command of the sea remained in dispute, and unless the dispute could be +decided in Tourville's favour he would have fought and won the battle of +Beachy Head in vain, as the event showed that he did. Torrington held +that his "fleet in being," even after the reverse at Beachy Head, was a +sufficient bar to the further enterprises of Tourville, nor can +Tourville's subsequent action be explained on any other hypothesis than +that he shared Torrington's opinion and acted on it. + +The truth is, that the doctrine of the fleet in being, as understood +and illustrated by Torrington, is in reality the counterpart and +complement of the doctrine of the command of the sea as expounded above. +"I consider," said the late Sir Geoffrey Hornby, a strategist and +tactician of unrivalled authority in his time, "that I have command of +the sea when I am able to tell my Government that they can move an +expedition to any point without fear of interference from an enemy's +fleet." This condition cannot be satisfied so long as the enemy has a +fleet in being, that is a fleet strategically at large, not itself in +command of the sea, but strong enough to deny that command to its +adversary by strategic and tactical dispositions adapted to the +circumstances of the case. Thus command of the sea and a fleet in being +are mutually exclusive terms. So long as a hostile fleet is in being +there is no command of the sea; so soon as the command of the sea is +established there is no hostile fleet in being. Each of these +propositions is the complement of the other. + +Nevertheless, the mere statement of these abstract propositions solves +none of the concrete problems of naval warfare. War is not governed by +phrases. It is governed by stern and inexorable realities. The question +whether a particular fleet in any particular circumstances is or is not +a fleet in being is not a question of theory, it is a question of fact. +The answer to it depends on the spirit, purpose, tenacity, and +strategic insight of those who control its movements. No fleet is a +fleet in being unless inspired by what may be called the _animus +pugnandi_, that is, unless, if and when the opportunity offers, it is +prepared to strike a blow at all hazards. For this reason the Russian +fleet in Sebastopol at the time of the invasion of the Crimea was not a +fleet in being, although it had a splendid opportunity, which a Nelson +would assuredly have found too tempting to be resisted, of showing its +mettle when the French warships were employed as transports; and the +allies might have been made to pay heavily for their neglect to blockade +it had it been inspired by an effective _animus pugnandi_. On the other +hand, the four ill-fated Spanish cruisers which crossed the Atlantic to +take part in the Cuban war were a true fleet in being, however inferior +and forlorn, and were so regarded by the United States authorities so +long as they remained strategically at large. Even when two of them and +two destroyers were known to be in Santiago, the Secretary of the United +States Navy telegraphed to Admiral Sampson, "Essential to know if all +four Spanish cruisers in Santiago. Military expedition must wait this +information." The same thing happened in the war between Russia and +Japan. The first act of Japan in that war was by a torpedo attack on the +Russian fleet at Port Arthur, so to depress the _animus pugnandi_ of +the latter as practically to deprive it for a time of the character of +a fleet in being--a character which it only partially recovered +afterwards under the brief influence of the heroic but ill-fated +Makaroff. This being accomplished, the invasion of Manchuria ensued as a +matter of course. The ascendency thus established by the Japanese fleet +at the outset, though assailed more than once, was nevertheless +maintained throughout the subsequent operations until the Russian fleet +at Port Arthur, deprived of the little character it ever possessed as a +true fleet in being, was reduced to the condition of what Admiral Mahan +has aptly called a "fortress fleet," and was surrendered at the fall of +the fortress. Many other illustrations of the principle of the fleet in +being might be given. The history of naval warfare is full of them. But +they need not be multiplied as they all point the same moral. That moral +is, that a fleet in being to be of any use must be inspired by a +determined and persistent _animus pugnandi_. It must not be a mere +"fortress fleet." Torrington can never have imagined for a moment that +the fleet which, in spite of the disastrous orders of Mary and her +council, he had saved from destruction, would by its mere existence +prevent a French invasion. He had kept it in being in order that he +might use it offensively whenever occasion should arise, well knowing +that so long as it maintained that disposition Tourville would be +paralysed for offence. "Whilst we observe the French," he said, "they +cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running a great +hazard." Such hazards may be run for an adequate object, and to +determine rightly when they may be run and when they may not is perhaps +the most searching test of a naval commander's capacity and insight. It +is a psychological question rather than a strategic one. Such a +commander must know whether his adversary's _animus pugnandi_ is so keen +and so unflinching as to invest his fleet, albeit inferior, with the +true character of a fleet in being, or whether, on the other hand, it is +so feeble as to turn it into a mere fortress fleet. But that is only to +say that in war the man always counts for far more than the machine, +that the best commander is a man "with whom," as Admiral Mahan says of +Nelson, "moral effect is never in excess of the facts of the case, whose +imagination produces to him no paralysing picture of remote +contingencies." _Bene ausus vana contemnere_, as Livy says of +Alexander's conquest of Darius, is the eternal secret of successful +war. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +DISPUTED COMMAND IN GENERAL + + +The condition of disputed command of the sea is the normal condition at +the outbreak of any war in which operations at sea are involved between +two belligerents of approximately equal strength, or indeed between any +two belligerents, the weaker of whom is sufficiently inspired by the +_animus pugnandi_--or it may be by other motives rather political than +strategic in character--to try conclusions with his adversary in the +open. This follows immediately from the nature of command of the sea, +which is, it will be remembered, the effective control over the maritime +communications of the waters in dispute. I must here repeat, that the +phrase command of the sea has no definite meaning in time of peace. No +nation nowadays seeks in time of peace to control maritime +communications, that is, to exercise any authority or constraint over +any ships, whether warships or merchant vessels--other than those flying +its own flag--which traverse the seas on their lawful occasions. There +was, indeed, a time when England claimed what was called the +"sovereignty of the seas," that is, the right to exact at all times +certain marks of deference to her flag, in the form of certain salutes +of ceremony, from all ships traversing the seas surrounding the British +Islands, the narrow seas as they were called. But that is an entirely +different thing from the command of the sea in a strategic sense, and +has in fact no connection with it. It has long been abandoned and it +need only be mentioned here in order to be carefully distinguished from +the latter. Any nation seeking to exercise or secure the command of the +sea in this sense would in so doing engage in an act of war, and would +be regarded as so engaging by any other nation whose rights and +interests were in any way affected by the act. Hence the difference +between the two is plain. The claim to the sovereignty of the seas and +the exaction of the ceremonial observance--the lowering of a flag or a +sail--which symbolized it, was not in itself an act of war, though it +might lead to war if the claim were resisted. An attempt to assert or +secure the command of the sea is, on the other hand, in itself an act of +war and would never be made by any nation not prepared to take the +consequence in the instant outbreak of hostilities. + +For what is it that a nation seeks to do when it attempts to exercise or +secure the command of the sea? It seeks to do nothing more and nothing +less than to deny freedom of access to the waters in dispute to the +ships, whether warships or merchant ships, of some other nation. It +denies the common right of highway, which is the essential attribute of +the sea, to that other nation, and seeks to secure the monopoly of that +right for itself. In other words, it seeks to drive its adversary's +warships from the sea, and either by the capture of his merchant vessels +to appropriate the wealth they contain or by destroying them to deprive +the adversary of its enjoyment. This is all that naval warfare as such +can do. If the enemy is not constrained by the destruction of his +warships and the extinction of his maritime commerce to submit to his +victorious adversary's will, other agencies, not exclusively naval in +character, must be employed to bring about that consummation. This means +that military force must be brought into operation, either for the +invasion of the defeated adversary's territory or for the occupation of +some of his possessions lying across the seas, if he has any. If he has +none, or if such as he has are not worth taking or holding--either as a +permanent possession or as what is called a material guarantee to be +used in the subsequent negotiations for peace--then the only alternative +is invasion. But that is a subject which demands a chapter to itself. + +It rarely happens, however, that a great naval Power is devoid of +transmarine possessions altogether, or that such as it holds are +esteemed by it to be of so little value or importance that their +seizure by an enemy would leave matters _in statu quo_. Sea power is, as +a rule, the outcome of a flourishing maritime commerce. Maritime +commerce as it expands, tends, even apart from direct colonization, to +bring territorial occupation in its train. The origin and history of the +British rule in India is a signal illustration of this tendency. There +are other causes of territorial expansion across the seas, as Admiral +Mahan has pointed out in his latest work on _Naval Strategy_, but it is +a rule which admits of no exceptions that territorial possessions across +the seas, however they may have been acquired, compel the Power which +holds them to develop a navy which, in the last resort, must be capable +of defending them. It was not, indeed, the needs of maritime commerce +which induced the United States to acquire Puerto Rico and the +Philippines. Their acquisition was, as it were, a by-product of +victorious sea power. But the vast expansion of the United States Navy +which the last dozen years have witnessed is the direct result and the +logical consequence of their acquisition. + +Applying these principles to the defence of the British Empire we see at +once that the command of the sea, in the sense already defined, is +essential to its successful prosecution. The case is not merely +exceptional, it is absolutely unique. The British Isles might recover +from the effects of a successful invasion, as other countries have done +in like case. But the destruction of their maritime commerce would ruin +them irretrievably, even if no invasion were undertaken. Half the +maritime commerce of the world is carried on under the British flag. The +whole of that commerce would be suppressed if an enemy once secured the +command of the sea. The British Isles would be starved out in a few +weeks. Whether an enemy so situated would decide to invade or +invest--that is, so to impede our commerce that only an insignificant +fraction of it could by evasion reach our ports--is a question not so +much of strategy as of the economics of warfare. But really it hardly +matters a pin which he decided to do. We should have to submit in either +case. What would happen to our Dominions, Dependencies, and Colonies is +plain. Those which are defenceless the enemy would seize if he thought +it worth his while. In the case supposed they could obtain no military +assistance from the mother-country. But those which could defend +themselves he would have to overcome, if he could, by fighting. The +great Dominions of the Empire would not fall into an enemy's lap merely +because he had compelled the United Kingdom to sue for peace. To subdue +them by force of arms would be a very formidable undertaking. + +Such are the tremendous effects of an adverse command of the sea on an +insular kingdom and an oceanic empire, which carries on--not by virtue +of any artificial monopoly, but solely by virtue of its hardly won +ascendency in the economic struggle for existence--half the maritime +commerce of the world. On the other hand, its effects on any nation +which does not depend on the sea for its existence can never be so +overwhelming and may even be insignificant. Germany was very little +affected by the command of the sea enjoyed by France in the War of 1870. +But in view of the enormous growth of German maritime commerce in recent +years, a superiority of France at sea equal to that which she enjoyed in +1870 would now be a much more serious menace to Germany. In all such +cases the issue must be decided by military operations suitable to the +circumstances and the occasion--operations in which naval force may take +an indispensable part even though it may not directly decide the issue. +It was, for example, the United States army that captured Santiago and +secured the deliverance of Cuba; but it was the United States Navy alone +that enabled the troops to be in Cuba at all and to do what they did +there. Again, in the war between Russia and Japan it was the capture of +Port Arthur and the final overthrow at Tsu-Shima of all that remained of +Russia's effective naval forces that induced Russia to entertain +overtures for peace. But the reduction of Port Arthur was mainly the +work of the military arm and the continued successes of the Japanese +armies in Manchuria must have contributed largely to Russia's surrender. +These successes were, it is true, rendered possible by the Japanese Navy +alone. It cannot be said that the Japanese ever held the undisputed +command of the sea until after Tsu-Shima had been fought and won. But at +the very outset of the war they established such an ascendency over the +Russian naval forces in Far Eastern waters that the latter were in the +end reduced to something less than even a "fortress fleet." At Port +Arthur, writes Admiral Mahan, the fleet was "neither a fortress fleet, +for except the guns mounted from it, the fleet contributed nothing to +the defence of the place; nor yet a fleet in being, for it was never +used as such." Its _animus pugnandi_ was fatally depressed on the first +night of the war, and finally extinguished after the action of August +10. + +The truth is, that in all the larger achievements of sea power--those, +that is, to which a combination of naval and military force is +indispensable--it is impossible to disengage the influence of one of +these factors on the final issue from that of the other, and perhaps +idle to attempt do to so. They act, as it were, like a chemical +combination, not like the resultant of two separate but correlated +mechanical forces, and their joint effect may be just as different from +what might be the effect of either acting separately as water is +different from the oxygen and hydrogen of which it is composed. But +their operation in this wise can only begin after the command of the sea +has been secured, or at least has been so far established as to reduce +to a negligible quantity the risk of conducting military operations +across seas of which the command is still nominally in dispute. Now +there are several phases or stages in the enterprise of securing the +command of the sea; but they all depend on the power and the will to +fight for it. There is no absolute command of the sea, except in the +case of hostilities between two belligerents, separated by the sea, one +of whom has no naval force at all. The solitary case in history of this +situation is that of the War in South Africa. A similar situation would +arise if one of two belligerents had completely destroyed all the +effective naval force of the other. But that is a situation of which +history affords few, if any, examples. Between these two extremes lies +the whole history of naval warfare. + +There is, moreover, one characteristic of naval warfare which has no +exact counterpart in the conduct of military enterprises on land. This +is the power which a naval belligerent has of withdrawing his sea-going +force out of the reach of the sea-going force of the enemy by placing it +in sheltered harbours too strongly fortified for the enemy to reduce by +naval power alone. The only effective answer to this which the superior +belligerent can make is, as has already been shown, to establish a +blockade of the ports in question. This procedure is analogous to, but +not identical with, the investment by military forces of a fortress in +which an army has found shelter in the interior of the enemy's country. +But the essential difference is that the land fortress can be completely +invested so that no food or other supplies can reach it, whereas a sea +fortress cannot, unless it is situated on a small island, be completely +invested by naval force alone. In the one case, even if no assault is +attempted, starvation must sooner or later bring about the surrender of +the fortress together with any military force it contains, whereas in +the other the blockaded port being, as a rule, in open communication +with its own national territory, cannot be reduced by starvation. +Moreover, for reasons already explained, a maritime fortress cannot +nowadays be so closely blockaded as to prevent the exit of small craft +almost at all times or even to prevent the exit of squadrons of +battleships in circumstances favourable to the enterprise. Now the exit +of small craft equipped for torpedo attack is a much more serious threat +to the blockader than the exit of small craft, not so equipped, was in +the old days of close blockade. In those days small craft could do no +harm to ships of the line or even to frigates, whereas a torpedo craft +is nowadays in certain circumstances the equal and more than the equal +of a battleship. For these reasons the escape from a blockaded port of a +squadron of battleships might easily be regarded by the blockading enemy +as a less serious and even much more welcome incident of the campaign +than the frequent issue of swarms of torpedo craft skilfully handled, +daringly navigated, and sternly resolved to do or die in the attempt to +reduce the battle superiority of the enemy. + +It follows from these premisses that a naval blockade--or a connected +series of blockades--can never be regarded as equivalent to an +established command of the sea. At its best it can only achieve a +temporary command of the sea in a state of unstable and easily disturbed +equilibrium. At its worst, that is when it is least close and least +effective, and when the _animus pugnandi_ of the enemy is unimpaired and +not to be intimidated, and is therefore ready at all times to take +advantage of "an opportunity too tempting to be resisted," it amounts to +a state of things in which the "fleet in being" becomes the dominant +factor of the situation. It is mainly a psychological problem and +scarcely a strategic problem at all to determine when the actual +situation approximates to either of these extremes, and the principle +embodied in the words _bene ausus vana contemnere_ is the key to the +solution of this problem. If the blockaded fleet is merely a fortress +fleet, or not even that, as was the Russian fleet at Port Arthur for +some time after the first night of the war, and even more after the +critical but indecisive conflict of August 10, then it is legitimate, as +Togo triumphantly showed, to regard the situation so established as so +far equivalent to a temporary command of the sea that military +operations, involving the security of oversea transit and the continuity +of oversea supply, might be undertaken with no greater risk than is +always inseparable from a vigorous initiative in war. But had the +Russian naval commanders been inspired--as, perhaps, the ill-fated +Makaroff alone was--with a genuine _animus pugnandi_, they might have +perceived that their one chance of bringing all the Japanese +enterprises, naval and military, to nought, was by fighting Togo's fleet +"to a frazzle," even if their own fleet perished in the conflict. Then +the Baltic Fleet, if it had any fight in it at all, must have made short +work of what remained of Togo's fleet, and the Japanese communications +with Manchuria being thereby severed, Russia might have dictated her own +terms of peace. The real lesson of that war is not that a true fleet in +being can ever be safely neglected, but that a fleet which can be +neglected with impunity is no true fleet in being. It should never be +forgotten that the problems of naval warfare are essentially +psychological and not mechanical in their nature. Their ultimate +determining factors are not material and ponderable forces operating +with measurable certainty, but those immaterial and imponderable forces +of the human mind and will which can be measured by no standard other +than the result. By the material standard so popular in these days, and +withal so full of fallacy, Nelson should have been defeated at Trafalgar +and Rozhdestvensky should have been victorious at Tsu-Shima. + +It is, of course, idle to press the doctrine of the command of the sea +and the principle of the fleet in being so far as to affirm that no +military enterprise of any kind can be prosecuted across the sea unless +an unassailable command of the sea has first been established. Such a +proposition is disallowed by the whole course of naval history, which +is, in truth, for the most part, the history of the command of the sea +remaining in dispute, often for long periods, between two belligerents, +the balance inclining sometimes to one side and sometimes to the other, +according to the fortune of war. The whole question is in the main one +of degree and of circumstances. Broadly speaking, it may be said that +the larger the military enterprise contemplated the more complete must +be the command of the sea before it can be prosecuted with success and +the more certain the assurance of its continuance in unimpaired +efficiency until the objects of the enterprise are accomplished. +Conversely, the strength, even if inferior, of the fleet in being, its +strategic disposition, its tactical efficiency, and, above all, its +_animus pugnandi_ must all be accurately gauged by a naval commander +before he can safely decide that a military expedition of any magnitude +can be undertaken without fear of interference from an enemy's fleet. It +was the neglect of these principles that ruined the Athenian expedition +to Syracuse. It was equally the neglect of the same principles that +entailed the failure of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and the ultimate +surrender of the army he had deserted there. It was the politic +recognition of them that, as Admiral Mahan has shown in a brilliant +passage, compelled Hannibal to undertake the arduous passage of the Alps +for the purpose of invading Italy instead of transporting his troops by +sea. + +The limits of legitimate enterprise across seas of which the command +although firmly gripped is not unassailably established, are perhaps +best illustrated by the story of Craig's expedition to Malta and Sicily +towards the close of the Trafalgar campaign. This remarkable episode, +which has received less attention than it deserves from most historians, +has been represented by Mr Julian Corbett in his instructive work on +_The Campaign of Trafalgar_ as the masterly offensive stroke by which +Pitt hoped to abate, and, if it might be, to overthrow the military +ascendency which Napoleon had established in Europe. That view has not +been universally accepted by Mr Corbett's critics, but the episode is +entitled to close attention for the light it throws on the central +problem of naval warfare. Pitt had concluded a treaty with Russia, which +involved not merely naval but military co-operation with that Power in +the Mediterranean. Craig's expedition was the shape which the military +co-operation was to take. It consisted of some five thousand troops, and +when it embarked in April 1805 it was convoyed by only two ships of the +line in its transit over seas which, for all the Government which +dispatched it knew, might be infested at the time by more than one fleet +of the enemy. + +Here, then, is a case in which the doctrine of the command of the sea +and the principle of the fleet in being might seem to be violated in a +crucial fashion. But the men who directed the arms of England in those +days knew what they were about. Long before they allowed the expedition +to start they had established a close and, as they thought, an effective +blockade of all the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports in which either +French or Spanish warships ready for sea were to be found. Nevertheless +we have here a signal illustration of the essential difference between a +command of the sea which has been made absolute by the destruction of +the enemy's available naval forces--as was practically the case after +Trafalgar--and one which is only virtual and potential, because, +although the enemy's fleets have for the time been masked or sealed up +in their ports, they may, should the fortune of war so determine, resume +at any time the position and functions of a true fleet in being. On the +strength of a command of the sea of this merely contingent and potential +character Pitt and his naval advisers had persuaded themselves that the +way to the Mediterranean was open for the transit of troops. Craig's +transports, accordingly, put to sea on April 19. But a week before +Villeneuve with his fleet had left Toulon for the last time, had evaded +Nelson's watch, and passing rapidly through the Straits, had called off +Cadiz, and picking up such Spanish ships as were there had disappeared +into space, no man knowing whither he had gone. He might have gone to +the East Indies, he might have gone to the West Indies, as in fact he +did, or he might be cruising unmolested in waters where he could hardly +fail to come across Craig's transports with their weak escort of two +ships of the line. It was a situation which no one had foreseen or +regarded as more than a contingency too remote to be guarded against +when Craig's expedition was allowed to start. How Nelson viewed the +situation may be seen from his reply to the Admiralty, written on his +receipt of the first intimation that the expedition was about to start. + +"As the 'Fisgard' sailed from Gibraltar on the 9th instant, two hours +after the enemy's fleet from Toulon had passed the Straits, I have to +hope she would arrive time enough in the Channel to give their Lordships +information of this circumstance _and to prevent the Rear-Admiral and +Troops before mentioned_"--that is Craig's expedition--"_from leaving +Spithead_." In other words, Nelson held quite plainly that had the +Admiralty known that Villeneuve was at sea outside the Straits they +would not have allowed Craig to start. That Nelson was right in this +assumption is proved by the fact that acting on the inspiration of +Barham--perhaps the greatest strategist that ever presided at +Whitehall--the Admiralty, as soon as they had grasped the situation, +sent orders to Calder off Ferrol, that if he came in contact with the +expedition he was to send it back to Plymouth or Cork under cruiser +escort and retain the two ships of the line which had so far escorted it +under his own command. The fact was that if Craig's expedition once +passed Finisterre it would find itself totally without the naval +protection on which the Admiralty relied when it was dispatched. +Villeneuve was outside the Straits no one knew where, and had been +reinforced by the Spanish ships from Cadiz. Nelson, whose exact +whereabouts was equally unknown to the Admiralty, was detained in the +Mediterranean by baffling winds and also by the necessity of making +sure before quitting his station that Villeneuve had not gone to the +Levant. Orde, who had been blockading Cadiz with a weak squadron which +had to retire on Villeneuve's approach, had convinced himself, on +grounds not without cogency, that Villeneuve was making for the +northward, and had, quite correctly on this hypothesis, fallen back on +the fleet blockading Brest, being ignorant of the peril to which Craig +was exposed. Thus Craig's expedition seemed to be going straight to its +doom unless Calder could intercept it and give it orders to return. +However, Craig and Knight, whose flag flew in one of the ships of the +line escorting the expedition, passed Finisterre without communicating +with Calder, and having by this time got wind of their peril, they +hurried into Lisbon, there to await developments in comparative safety, +though their presence caused great embarrassment to the Portuguese +Government and raised a diplomatic storm. It was not until Craig and +Knight had ascertained that Villeneuve was out of the way and that +Nelson had passed the Straits that they put to sea again and met Nelson +off Cape St Vincent. Nelson had by this time satisfied himself, after an +exhaustive survey of the situation, that Villeneuve had gone to the West +Indies, and resolved to follow him there as soon as he had sped the +expedition on its appointed way. But so apprehensive was he of the +Spanish ships remaining at Carthagena, that, inferior to Villeneuve as +he was, he detached the "Royal Sovereign" from his own squadron, and +placed her under Knight's command. It only remains to add that the +expedition reached its destination in safety and that its result was the +Battle of Maida, fought in the following year--the first battle in which +Napoleon's troops crossed bayonets with British infantry and were beaten +by an inferior force. The expedition was also the indirect cause of the +Battle of Trafalgar itself, for it was in order to frustrate the +coalition with Russia of which it was the instrument that Napoleon had +ordered Villeneuve to make for the Mediterranean when he finally left +Cadiz to encounter Nelson on his path. Thus was it, as Mr Corbett says, +"to prove the insidious drop of poison--the little sting--that was to +infect Napoleon's empire with decay and to force his hand with so +tremendous a result." + +Yet it very nearly miscarried at the outset. Nelson and Barham--between +them a combination of warlike energy and strategic insight, without a +parallel in the history of naval warfare--both realized the tremendous +risks it ran. It may be argued that had Villeneuve gone to the north he +would have found himself in the thick of British squadrons closing in on +Brest and vastly superior in force. Yet Allemand, who had escaped a few +weeks later from Rochefort, was able to cruise in these very waters for +over five months without being brought to book. It is true that the +destruction or capture of five thousand British troops would not +seriously have affected the larger issues of the naval campaign, but it +would have broken up the coalition with Russia by which Pitt set so much +store, and which Mr Corbett at any rate represents as having exercised a +decisive influence on the ultimate fortunes of Napoleon. The moral of +the whole story seems to be that competent strategists--for the world +has known none more competent and none more intrepid than Nelson and +Barham--will not risk even a minor expedition at sea unless its line of +advance is sufficiently controlled by superior naval force to ensure its +unmolested transit. The principle thus exhibited in the case of a minor +expedition manifestly applies with immensely increased force to those +larger expeditions which assume the dimensions of an invasion. It was +not until long after Trafalgar had been fought, and the command of the +sea had been secured beyond the possibility of challenge, that the +campaigns in the Peninsula were undertaken--campaigns which ended and +were always intended to end, should the fortune of war so decree, in the +invasion of France and the overthrow of Napoleon. This opens up the +whole question of invasion, which will be discussed in the next +chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +INVASION + + +England has not been invaded since A.D. 1066, when, the country having +no fleet in being, William the Conqueror effected a landing and +subjugated the kingdom. During the eight centuries and more that have +since elapsed, every country in Europe has been invaded and its capital +occupied, in many cases more than once. It is by no means for lack of +attempts to invade her that England has been spared the calamity of +invasion for more than eight hundred years. It is not because she has +had at all times--it may indeed be doubted if she has had at any +time--organized military force sufficient to repel an invader, if he +could not be stopped at sea. It is because she can only be invaded +across the sea, and because whenever the attempt has been made she has +always had naval force sufficient to bring the enterprise to nought. It +is merely a truism to say that the invasion of hostile territory across +the sea is a much more difficult and hazardous enterprise than the +crossing of a land frontier by organized military force. But it is no +truism to say that the reason why it is so much more difficult and more +hazardous is that there is no real parallel between the two cases. I +assume a vigorous defensive on the part of the adversary assailed in +both cases--a defensive which, though commonly so called, is really +offensive in its nature. The essential difference lies in this, that two +countries which are separated by the sea have no common frontier. Each +has its own frontier at the limit of its territorial waters, but between +these two there lies a region common to both and from which neither can +be excluded except by the superior naval force of the other. + +For the moment an expeditionary force emerges from its own territorial +waters--which may be any distance from a few miles up to many thousands +of miles from the territorial waters of the adversary to be assailed--it +must be prepared to defend itself, and naval force alone can afford it +an adequate measure of defence. Military forces embarked in transports +are defenceless and practically unarmed. They cannot defend themselves +with their own arms, nor can the transports which carry them be so armed +as to afford adequate defence against the smallest warship afloat, least +of all against torpedo craft. Hence, unless the sea to be traversed has +been cleared of the naval forces of the enemy beforehand, the invading +military force must be covered by a naval force sufficient to overcome +any naval force which the enemy is able to bring against it. If the +latter can bring a fleet--as he must be able to do if the invasion is +to be prevented--the covering fleet must be able to beat any fleet that +he can bring. That condition being satisfied, however, it is clear that +the covering fleet must be terribly hampered and handicapped in the +ensuing conflict by the presence of a huge and unwieldy assemblage of +unarmed transports filled with disarmed men, and by the consequent +necessity of defending it against the attack of those portions of the +enemy's naval force to which, albeit not suitable for engaging in the +principal conflict, the transports would offer an otherwise defenceless +prey. Hence the escorting fleet must be stronger than its adversary in a +far larger proportion than it need be if naval issues pure and simple +were alone at stake--so strong indeed that, if the transports were out +of the way, its victory might be taken as certain. But if that is so it +is manifest that the prospects of successful invasion would be +immeasurably improved by seeking to decide the naval issue first--as +Tourville very properly did in the Beachy Head campaign--and keeping the +transports in hand and in port until it had been decided in favour of +the intending invader. This is the eternal dilemma of invasion across a +sea of which the command has not previously been secured. If you are not +strong enough to dispose of the enemy's naval force you are certainly +not strong enough to escort an invading force--itself helpless +afloat--across the sea in his teeth. If you are strong enough to do this +you will certainly be wise to beat him first, because then there will be +nothing left to prevent the transit of your troops. In other words, +command of the sea, if not absolutely and in all cases indispensable to +a successful invasion, is at any rate the only certain way of ensuring +its success. + +Naval history from first to last is full of illustrations of the +principles here expounded. I will examine one or two of them, and I must +take my illustrations mainly from the naval history of Britain, first, +because Britain, being an island, is the only country in Europe which +cannot be invaded except across the sea, and secondly, because Britain +for that very reason has often been subjected to attempts at invasion +and has always frustrated them by denying to her adversary that +sufficiency of sea control which, if history is any guide, is essential +to successful invasion. But first I will examine two cases which might +at first sight seem to militate against the principles I have +enunciated. The brilliant campaign of Cæsar which ended in the overthrow +of Pompey and his cause at Pharsalus, was opened by Cæsar's desperate +venture of carrying his army across the Adriatic to the coast of Epirus, +although Pompey's fleet was in full command of the waters traversed. +This is one of those exceptions which may be said to prove the rule. +Cæsar had no alternative. Pompey was in Illyria, and if Cæsar could not +overthrow Pompey on that side of the Adriatic it was certain that Pompey +would overthrow Cæsar on the other side. For this reason, and perhaps +for this reason alone, Cæsar was compelled to undertake a venture which +he must have known to be desperate. How desperate it was is shown by the +fact that, not having transports enough to carry more than half his army +at once, he had to send his transports back as soon as he had landed, +and they were all destroyed on their way back to Brundusium. Antony his +lieutenant did, indeed, succeed after a time in getting the remainder of +his army across, but not before Cæsar had been reduced to the utmost +straits. The whole enterprise moreover was not, strictly speaking, an +invasion of hostile territory. The inhabitants of the territory occupied +by both combatants were neutral as between them, and were willing to +furnish Cæsar with such scanty supplies as they had. Again, an army in +those days needed no ammunition except the sword which each soldier +carried on his person, and that kind of ammunition was not expended in +fighting. Hence Cæsar had no occasion to concern himself with the +security of his communications across the sea--a consideration which +weighs with overwhelming force on the commander of a modern oversea +expedition. "A modern army," as the late Lord Wolseley said, "is such a +complicated organism that any interruption in the line of communications +tends to break up and destroy its very life." An army marches on its +belly. If it cannot be fed it cannot fight. After the Battle of Talavera +Wellington was so paralysed by the failure of the Spanish authorities to +supply his troops with food that he had to abandon the offensive for a +time and to retreat towards his own line of communication with the sea. +Cæsar on the other hand abandoned the sea, which could not feed him, and +trusted to the resources of the country. The difference is vital. The +one risk that Cæsar ran was the destruction of his army afloat, and that +he ran not because he chose but because he must. The risk of destruction +on land he was prepared to run, and this, at any rate, was, as the event +proved, a case of _bene ausus vana contemnere_. + +Again, Napoleon's descent on Egypt is another exception which proves the +rule, and proves it still more conclusively. Napoleon evaded Nelson's +fleet and landed his army in Egypt. The army so landed left Egypt in +British transports, having laid down its arms and surrendered just +before the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens; and but for the timely +conclusion of that short-lived armistice, every French soldier who +survived the Egyptian campaign might have seen the inside of a British +prison. This was because Napoleon, who never fathomed the secrets of the +sea, chose to think that to evade a hostile fleet was the same thing as +to defeat it. He managed for a time to escape Nelson's attentions by the +skin of his teeth, and fondly fancied that because he had done so the +dominion of the East was won. He was quickly undeceived by the Battle of +the Nile. That victory destroyed the fleet which had escorted his army +to Egypt and thereby made it impossible for the army ever to return +except by consent of the Power which he never could vanquish on the sea. +The Battle of the Nile, wrote a Frenchman in Egypt, "is a calamity which +leaves us here as children totally lost to the mother country. Nothing +but peace can restore us to her." Nothing but the so-called Peace of +Amiens did restore them. If it be argued, as it often has been, that +Napoleon's successful descent on Egypt proves that military enterprises +of large moment may sometimes be undertaken without first securing the +command of the sea to be traversed, surely the Battle of the Nile and +its sequel are a triumphant refutation of such an argument. Such +enterprises are merely a roundabout way of presenting the belligerent +who retains the command of the sea with as many prisoners of war as +survive from the original expedition. + +I need not labour the point which the unbroken testimony of history +from the time of the Norman Conquest has established, that all attempts +to invade England have been made in the past and must be made in the +future across a sea not commanded by the intending invader. If he has +secured the command of the sea beforehand, there is nothing to prevent +the invasion except the consideration that he can attain his end--that +is, the subjugation of the nation's will--at less cost to himself. That +being premised, let us consider how the intending invader will set about +his task. There are three ways, and three ways only. First, he may seek +to overpower the British naval defence on the seas, that is to obtain +the command of the sea. If he can do that, the whole thing is done. Or +secondly, he may collect the military forces destined for the invasion +in ports suitable for the purpose, and when all is ready he may cover +their embarkation and transit by a naval force sufficient to overcome +any naval force which this country can direct against it. I have already +shown, however, that a force sufficient to do this with any certainty, +or even with any reasonable prospect of success, must needs be more than +sufficient to overpower the British naval defence and thereby to secure +the command of the sea, if the enemy were freed from the entangling and +wellnigh disabling necessity of providing for the safe conduct of an +unwieldy host of otherwise defenceless transports. In other words he is +putting the cart before the horse, a procedure which has never yet +succeeded in getting the cart to its destination. This second +alternative is then merely a clumsy and extremely inefficient way of +attaining the same end as the first, and need only be mentioned in order +to exclude it from further consideration. + +There remains only a third alternative. This is to assemble the invading +military force at suitable ports as before, and to attempt to engage the +attention of the defending naval force by operations at a distance for a +time sufficient to secure the unmolested transit of the military +expedition. This is the method which has nearly always been employed by +an enemy projecting an invasion of this country. It has never yet +succeeded, because it always leads in the end to a situation which is +practically indistinguishable from that involved in the second +alternative, which I have already discussed and excluded. The naval and +the military elements in the enterprise of invasion being now, by the +hypothesis, separated in space and for that reason incapable of being +very exactly combined in time, a whole series of highly indeterminate +factors is thereby introduced into the problem to be solved by the +invader. There are elements of naval force, to wit, all manner of small +craft, which are not required for the main conflict of fleets--and it +is this conflict which alone can secure the command of the sea--but +which are eminently adapted for the impeachment and destruction of +unarmed transports. These will be employed in the blockade of the ports +in which the military forces are collecting. If the assailant employs +similar craft to drive the blockaders away, the defender will bring up +larger craft to stiffen his blockading flotillas. The invading force +will therefore still be impeded and impeached. The process thus goes on +until, if it is not otherwise decided by the conflict of the main fleets +at a distance, the contending naval forces of both sides are attracted +to the scene of the proposed embarkation, there to fight it out in the +conditions involved in the second alternative considered above, +conditions which I have already shown to be the least favourable to the +would-be invader. In a masterly analysis Mr Julian Corbett has shown +that the British defence against a threatened invasion has always been +conducted on these lines, that the primary objective of the defence has +been the troops and their transports, and that the vigorous pursuit of +this objective has always resulted in a decision being obtained as +between the main fleets of the two belligerents. That the decision has +always been in favour of the British arms is at once a lesson and a +warning--a lesson that immunity from invasion can only be ensured by +superiority at sea, a warning that such superiority can only be secured +by the adequate preparation, the judicious disposition, and the skilful +handling of the naval forces to be employed, as well as by an +unflinching _animus pugnandi_. But no nation which goes to war can hope +for more or be content with less than the opportunity of obtaining a +decision in these conditions. The issue lies on the knees of the gods. + +A few illustrations may here be cited. We have seen how in the Beachy +Head campaign Tourville, having failed to force a decision on +Torrington's fleet in being, could not turn aside with Torrington at his +heels and Killigrew and Shovel on his flank to bring over an invading +force from France. He was paralysed by that abiding characteristic of +French naval strategy which impelled the French naval commanders to fix +their eye on ulterior objects and blinded them to the fact that the best +way to attain those objects was to destroy the naval forces of the enemy +whenever the opportunity offered of so obtaining a decision. Hence their +preference for the leeward position in action, their constant reluctance +to fight a decisive action, their habitual direction of their fire at +the masts and sails of the enemy rather than at his hulls, and in +Tourville's case his failure to annihilate Torrington's fleet in being, +resulting in the total miscarriage of the schemes for invasion, to be +followed by internal insurrection, which, as Admiral Colomb has shown, +were the kernel of the French plan of campaign. In the case of the +Armada in the previous century, the task of invasion was entrusted to +Parma, who had collected troops for the purpose, and vessels for their +transport, in the ports of the Spanish Netherlands. But Justin of Nassau +kept a close watch outside, and Parma could not move. He summoned Medina +Sidonia with the Armada to his assistance, but he summoned him in vain, +for the Armada, harassed throughout the Channel, and, as it were, smoked +out of Calais, was finally shattered at Gravelines. Precisely the same +thing happened in the eighteenth century during the Seven Years' War. +Troops and transports were being collected in the Morbihan, but their +exit was blocked by a British naval force stationed off the ports. +Conflans with the French main fleet was at Brest, and there he was +blockaded by Hawke. Evading the blockade, Conflans put to sea and +straightway went to release the troops and transports, hopelessly +blockaded in the Morbihan. But Hawke swooped down on him and destroyed +him in Quiberon Bay, Boscawen having previously destroyed at Lagos the +fleet which De La Clue was bringing from Toulon to effect a junction +with Conflans. + +One more illustration may be cited, and I will treat it at some length, +because it presents certain features which give it peculiar +significance in relation to current controversies. This is the projected +invasion of England by France in 1744. It is, so far as I know, the +solitary instance in our naval history which shows the enemy framing his +plans on the lines of what is now known as "a bolt from the blue"--that +is, he projected a surprise invasion, at a time when the two countries +were nominally at peace, in the hope that the first overt act of the war +he was contemplating might be the landing of his troops on British soil. +In 1743, when this project was conceived, England and France were, as I +have said, nominally at peace, but troops belonging to both had fought +at Dettingen, not in any direct quarrel of their own, but because +England was supporting Maria Theresa and France was supporting her +enemies. The fleets of both Powers were jealously watching each other in +the Mediterranean, a situation which led early in 1744 to the too +notorious action of Mathews off Toulon. Nevertheless, until the very end +of 1743 no direct conflict with France was anticipated by the English +Government. + +Yet France was already secretly preparing her "bolt from the blue." She +had resolved to support the Pretender's cause and to prepare an invasion +of England in which the Pretender's son was to take part, and on landing +in England to rally his party to the overthrow of the Hanoverian +dynasty. The bolt was to be launched from Dunkirk and directed at the +Thames, the intention being to land the invading force at Blackwall. +Some ten thousand French troops to be employed in the expedition were +sent into winter-quarters in and around Dunkirk, but this aroused no +suspicion in England, because this region was the natural place for the +left flank of the French army to winter in, and Dunkirk contained no +transports at the time. Transports were, however, being taken up under +false charter-parties at French ports on the Atlantic and in the +Channel, and were ordered as soon as ready to rendezvous secretly and +separately at Dunkirk. At first the intention was for the expeditionary +force to make its attempt without any support from the French fleet. But +Marshal Saxe, who was to command it and knew that the Thames and its +adjacent waters were never denuded of naval force sufficient to make +short work of a fleet of unarmed transports, flatly declined to +entertain this project and demanded adequate naval support for the +enterprise. Accordingly a powerful fleet, held to be sufficient to +contain or defeat any British fleet that was thought likely to be able +to challenge it, was fitted out with all secrecy at Brest and placed +under the command of De Roquefeuil. Even he was not told its +destination, and false rumours on the subject were allowed to circulate +among those who were concerned in its preparation. + +So far everything seemed to be going well. The blow was timed for the +first week in January, but the usual delays occurred, and for a month or +more after the date originally fixed, the expeditionary force and its +escort were separated by the whole length of northern France. Yet even +before the date originally fixed, England had got wind of the +preparations. From the middle of December Brest had been kept under +watch, and orders had been issued to the dockyards to prepare for sea as +many ships of the line as were available. These preparations were +continued, without intermission, until the end of January, the purpose +and destination of the armament at Brest still being unknown. Then two +alarming pieces of intelligence reached England at the same time. One +was that Roquefeuil had put to sea on January 26 (O.S.) with twenty-one +sail of the line, and before being lost sight of by the British cruiser +told off to watch him, had been seen to be clearly standing to the +northward. The other was that Prince Charles, the son of the Pretender, +had left Rome and had landed without hindrance in France. This, being a +direct violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, was naturally held to give to +the sailing of the Brest fleet the complexion of a direct hostile +intent. It was on February 1 that these facts were known, and on +February 2, Sir John Norris, a veteran of Barfleur and La Hogue, who was +now well over eighty years of age, but as the event showed was still +fully equal to the task entrusted to him, was ordered to hoist his flag +at Portsmouth and to "take the most effectual measures to prevent the +making of any descent on the Kingdoms." Norris hoisted his flag on the +6th, and by the 18th he had eighteen sail of the line under his command. +Subsequently his force was increased to twenty. Nothing was known of the +movements of the French fleet since January 29, when the frigate set to +watch it had finally lost sight of it. It was in fact still off the +mouth of the Channel, baffled by adverse winds and gales and vainly +seeking to make headway against them. If it had gone to the +Mediterranean, Mathews off Toulon would be placed in grave jeopardy, and +there were some projects for detaching a powerful squadron of Norris's +ships to his support. If, on the other hand, it was aiming at the +Channel, Norris with his whole force would be none too strong to +encounter and defeat it. This was Norris's dilemma, and it was not until +February 9 that he learned from the Duke of Newcastle that an embargo +had been laid on all shipping at Dunkirk, where some fifty vessels of +one hundred and fifty to two hundred tons had by this time assembled. +These might at a pinch and for a short transit be estimated to be +capable of transporting some ten thousand troops. But an embargo, +although clear proof of hostile intent, was not necessarily a sign of +impending invasion. It was a common expedient, preliminary to war, +whereby you deprived your enemy of ships and men very necessary to his +purposes and secured ships and men equally necessary to your own. Hence +no strategic connexion could with any certainty be held to exist between +the embargo at Dunkirk and the sailing of the French fleet from Brest. +On the other hand it was clearly dangerous to uncover the Channel so +long as the destination of the Brest fleet was unknown, and, although +Newcastle had suggested to Norris that he should divide his fleet and +send the major part of it to reinforce Mathews in the Mediterranean, yet +Norris strongly demurred to the suggestion, and before the time came to +act on it the situation had so far developed as to disallow it +altogether. On February 11, Norris received information that a French +fleet of at least sixteen sail of the line had been seen the day before +off the Start. This convinced him that the French had some scheme to the +eastward in hand; and as he had frigates watching the Channel between +the Isle of Wight and Cape Barfleur he was equally convinced that the +French had so far no appreciable armed force to the eastward of him. +Newcastle, however, did not share this conviction. He had received +numerous reports of movements of French ships in the Channel to the +eastward of the Isle of Wight and other information which pointed to a +concentration at Dunkirk. As a matter of fact no French men-of-war were +at this time east of the Isle of Wight, and the vessels reported to +Newcastle must have been transports making for Dunkirk and magnified +into ships of the line by the fog of war. Newcastle, accordingly, +ordered Norris to go forthwith to the Downs. Foul winds prevented Norris +from sailing at once from St Helen's, and on the 13th, the day before he +did sail, he received further information which confirmed his conviction +that the French were still to the westward. But Newcastle's orders +remained peremptory, and on the 14th he sailed with eighteen ships, and +anchored in the Downs on the 17th. There he found two more ships +awaiting him, while two others were on their way to join him from +Plymouth. + +I pause here for a moment to point out that Norris's desire, over-ruled +by Newcastle, to remain at Portsmouth was thoroughly well advised. He +knew that there was naval force enough in the Thames and the Downs to +dispose of any expedition coming from Dunkirk unless it were escorted by +the Brest fleet, or by a very considerable detachment therefrom. He was +well assured that no such detachment could have eluded the vigilance of +his frigates, and he felt that in these circumstances he could better +impeach Roquefeuil by lying in wait for him at Spithead or St Helen's +than by preceding him to the Downs. How right he was in this +appreciation will be seen from a closer consideration of the movements +of the French fleet. It was not until February 13 that Roquefeuil +received his final orders off the Start. He was directed to detach De +Baraille, his second in command, with five ships. These were to go +forthwith to Dunkirk and escort Saxe's expedition, while he himself with +the remainder of his fleet was to blockade Norris at Portsmouth and +defeat him if he could. But Roquefeuil and his council of war found +these orders too hazardous for execution. They resolved not to divide +the fleet until at least Norris, presumed to be at Portsmouth, had been +disposed of. On the 17th, the day on which Norris had anchored in the +Downs, they looked into Spithead and persuaded themselves that they had +seen Norris there with eleven sail of the line. Judging that the weather +was too bad for a successful blockade, Roquefeuil then passed on up the +Channel, convinced that Norris was now behind him with too weak a force +to be of any effect. Baraille was then sent on with his detachment to +Dunkirk, but by this time Saxe had lost heart and declined to sail +until Roquefeuil's whole fleet was at hand to escort him. + +It never was at hand to escort him, and the expedition never sailed. +Roquefeuil, with his fleet now greatly reduced, anchored off Dungeness +on the 22nd, and never got any further. What had happened in the +meanwhile was this. Norris remained in the Downs, being held there for +some time by a gale. He was not unaware of what was going on at Dunkirk, +but he hesitated to proceed thither lest the French fleet behind him +should be covering another expedition coming from some French port in +the Channel. He sent to reconnoitre, however, and on the 21st received +information that four sixty-gun ships--these were, no doubt, Baraille's +detachment--were at anchor off Gravelines, and there covering the +transports at Dunkirk. On the 22nd, Roquefeuil appeared off Dungeness +and anchored there. As soon as he knew Roquefeuil's whereabouts, Norris +resolved to attack him without delay. The wind, being N.W., was +favourable to his enterprise, and at the same time made it impossible +for the expedition to leave Dunkirk. Should the wind change before +Roquefeuil was brought to action and defeated, Norris held that he was +strong enough to detach a force to impeach Saxe and Baraille, and at the +same time to give a good account of Roquefeuil. But matters did not +exactly turn out in this wise. On the 24th Norris left the Downs, with a +light wind from the N.W., and an ebb tide in his favour, making for +Dungeness, where Roquefeuil was still lying. His appearance in the +offing was Roquefeuil's first information that Norris was to the +eastward of him in superior force, and it greatly disconcerted +Roquefeuil. He held a hasty council of war and decided to cut and run. +By this time the tide had turned and the wind had fallen, so that he +could not stir until the tide again began to ebb. Norris, similarly +disabled, had anchored some few miles to the eastward, intending to make +his attack as soon as wind and tide allowed. But during the night a +furious gale from the N.E. sprang up, which drove most of Norris's ships +from their anchors, and when daylight came the French were nowhere to be +seen. Roquefeuil had slipped his cables, and with the gale behind him +was hurrying back to Brest. Norris went after him as far as Beachy Head, +but there gave up the chase and returned to the Downs, to make sure that +Saxe and Baraille, for whom the wind was now favourable, might find +their way barred should they attempt to set sail. The transports, +however, were by now in no position to move, nor was either Saxe or +Baraille in any mind to allow them to move. They both realized that the +game was up. The troops were in the transports, and they suffered +greatly in the gale that frustrated Norris' attack on Roquefeuil. But +that was merely an accident of warfare. It was not the gale that +shattered the expedition, nor did it save England from invasion. On the +contrary, while it played havoc with the transports and troops at +Dunkirk, it also saved Roquefeuil's fleet from destruction at Dungeness. +But, gale or no gale, the transports and troops never could have crossed +so long as Norris held on to the Downs. Nor could they have crossed had +Norris been allowed to remain at Portsmouth as he desired; for in that +case Baraille could not have been detached. + +To point the moral of this memorable story, I cannot do better than +quote Mr Julian Corbett's comment on it. "The whole attempt, it will be +seen, with everything in its favour, had exhibited the normal course of +degradation. For all the nicely framed plan and perfect deception, the +inherent difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as +usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy's battle fleet with his +transports, and we on our part were able to forestall it with every +advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of a central mass on a +revealed and certain line of passage." We were certainly taken at a +disadvantage at the outset, for the "bolt from the blue" was preparing +some time before any one in England got wind of it. The country had +been largely denuded of troops for foreign enterprises, Scotland was +deeply disaffected, the Jacobites were full of hope and intrigue, the +Ministry was supine and feeble, the navy was deplorably weak in home +waters, and such ships as were available had been dispersed to their +ports for refit. Nevertheless with all these conditions in its favour +the projected "bolt from the blue" was detected and anticipated--tardily, +it is true, and with no great sagacity except on the part of Norris--long +before the expedition was ready to start. Surely the moral needs no +further pointing. + +By these instances, and others which might be quoted, the law seems to +be established that in default of an assured command of the sea the +fleet which seeks to cover an invasion is drawn by irresistible +attraction towards the place of embarkation, and that the same +attraction brings it there--if not earlier--into conflict with the +superior forces of the enemy. If in the Trafalgar campaign, which I have +no space to examine in detail, the law does not seem to operate to the +extent that it did in the other cases examined, that is only because the +disposition of the British fleets was so masterly that Napoleon never +got the opportunity he yearned for of bringing his fleets to the place +of embarkation. They were outmanoeuvred beforehand and finally +overthrown at Trafalgar. + +There is indeed a fourth alternative which has been advanced by some +speculative writers, though history lends it no countenance, and it has +never, I believe, been taken seriously by any naval authority of repute. +I cannot take it seriously myself. It assumes that some naval Power, +suitably situated as regards this country, might without either +provocation or overt international dispute, clandestinely take up +transport--either a comparatively small number of very large merchant +vessels or a very large number of barges, lighters, or what not to be +towed by steam vessels--might clandestinely put an army with all its +necessary _impedimenta_ on board the transports so provided and then +clandestinely, and without either notice or warning, send them to sea, +with or without escort, with intent to effect a landing at some suitable +point on the English coast. The whole theory seems to me to involve at +least three monstrous improbabilities: first, a piratical intent on the +part of a civilized nation; secondly, a concealment of such intent in +conditions wellnigh incompatible with the degree of secrecy required; +and thirdly, a precision and a punctuality of movement in the operations +of embarkation, transit, and landing of which history affords no +example, while naval opinion and experience scoff at them as utterly +impracticable. Of course the future may not resemble the past, and naval +wars of the future may not be conducted on a pattern sealed by the +unbroken teaching of over eight hundred years. But that is an assumption +which I cannot seriously entertain. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +COMMERCE IN WAR + + +The maritime trade of a nation at war has always been regarded by the +other belligerent as his legitimate prey. In the Dutch Wars the +suppression of the enemy's commerce was the main objective of both +parties to the conflict. In all wars in which either belligerent has any +commerce afloat worth considering one belligerent may always be expected +to do all that he can for its capture or suppression, while the other +will do as much as he can for its defence. In proportion to the volume +and value of the national trade afloat is the potency of its destruction +as an agency for bringing the national will into submission. If, for +example, the maritime trade of England could be suppressed by her +enemies, England would thereby be vanquished. Her commerce is her +life-blood. On the other hand there are nations, very powerful in war, +which either by reason of their geographical position, or because their +oversea trade is no vital element in their national economy, would +suffer comparatively little in like circumstances. It thus appears that +the volume and value of the national trade afloat is the measure of the +efforts which an enemy is likely to make for its suppression. But it is +not directly the measure of the efforts which a nation so assailed must +make for its defence. The measure of these efforts is determined not by +the volume and value of the trade to be protected but by the amount and +character of the naval force which the enemy can employ in assailing it. +In the Boer War British maritime commerce was unassailed and +uninterrupted in all parts of the world, and yet not a single ship of +the British Navy was directly employed in its protection. If on the +other hand England were at war with a naval Power of the first rank, she +might have to employ the whole of her naval resources in securing the +free transit of her maritime commerce. So long as she can do this with +success she need give no thought to the menace of possible invasion. A +command of the sea so far established as to secure freedom of transit +for the vast and ubiquitous maritime commerce of this country is also, +of necessity, so far established as to deny free transit to the +transports of an enemy seeking to invade. The greater includes the less. + +It may at first sight seem to be an anomaly--some, indeed, would +represent it as a mere survival of barbarism--that whereas in war on +land the private property of an enemy's subjects is, by the established +law and custom of civilized nations, not liable to capture or +destruction without compensation to its owners, the opposite rule still +prevails in war at sea. But a little consideration will, I think, show +that the analogy sought to be established between the two cases is a +very imperfect one. War on land does _ipso facto_ suspend in large +measure the free transport of commerce in transit. As between the two +belligerents it interrupts it altogether. Moreover, throughout the +territory occupied by the enemy, the railways, and in large measure the +roads, are practically monopolized for the movements of his troops and +the transport of his supplies--in a word for the maintenance of his +communications. There can have been little or no consignment of goods +from Paris to Berlin or _vice versa_ during the war of 1870, and even +though at certain stages of the war goods might have been consigned, +say, from Lyons to Geneva, or from Lille to Brussels, yet such cases are +really only the counterparts of the frequent failure of one +belligerent's cruisers to intercept the merchant vessels of the other on +the high seas. Again, in the case of a beleaguered fortress, the +besiegers would never dream of allowing a convoy of food or of munitions +of war--or for the matter of that of merchandise of any kind--to enter +the fortress. They would intercept it as a matter of course, and if +necessary they would appropriate it to their own use. The upshot of it +all is that even in war on land the transit of all commerce, albeit the +private property of some one, is practically suspended within the area +of the territory occupied, and very seriously impeded throughout the +whole country subject to invasion. It is not, therefore, true to say +without many qualifications that in war private property is respected on +land and not respected at sea. The only difference that I can discern is +that by the law and custom of nations private property cannot be +appropriated on land, whereas at sea it can. But this difference is not +really essential. The essential thing in both cases is that the wealth +of the enemy is diminished and the credit of his traders destroyed--a +far more important matter in these days than the destruction of this or +that cargo of his goods--by the suspension of that interchange of +commodities with other nations which is the chief element of national +prosperity, and may be, as in the case of England, the indispensable +condition of national existence. Indeed, although private property on +land is exempt from capture, and at sea it is not, yet there are many +nations which would suffer far more from the interruption of their +mercantile communications which war on land entails than they would from +the destruction of their commerce at sea. + +For these reasons I hold that the proposed exemption of private property +from capture or molestation at sea is a chimerical one. War is +essentially an act of violence. It operates by the destruction of human +life as well as by all other agencies which are likely to subdue the +enemy's will. Among these agencies the capture or destruction of +commerce afloat is by far the most humane since it entails the least +sacrifice of life, limb, or liberty, and at the same time its coercive +pressure may in some cases, though not in all, be the most effective +instrument for compelling the enemy's submission. Moreover, it is not +proposed to exempt from capture or destruction such merchant vessels of +the enemy--or even of a neutral for that matter--as attempt to break a +blockade. Now the modern conditions of blockade are such that the +warships conducting it may be stationed hundreds of miles from the +blockaded port or ports, and their outlying cruisers, remaining in touch +with each other and with the main body, may be much further afield. +Within the area of the organized patrol thus established, every vessel +seeking to enter a blockaded port or to issue from it will still be +liable to capture. In these conditions the proposal to exempt the +remainder of the enemy's private property afloat from capture would be a +mockery. There would not be enough of such property afloat to pay for +the cost of capture. + +It is an axiom of naval warfare that an assured command of the sea is at +once the best defence for commerce afloat and an indispensable +condition for any such attack on it as is likely to have any appreciable +effect in subduing the enemy's will. War is an affair not of pin-pricks +but of smashing blows. "The harassment and distress," says Admiral +Mahan, "caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce +will be conceded by all. It is doubtless a most important secondary +operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned until war +itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure +sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a +most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of +cheapness to the representatives of a people." Here again we may discern +some of the larger implications of that potent and far-reaching agency +of naval warfare, the command of the sea. If a belligerent not aiming at +the command of the sea, and having no sufficient naval force wherewithal +to secure it, thinks to crush his enemy by directing sporadic attacks on +his commerce, he will, if history is any guide, soon find out his +mistake. His naval forces available for this purpose, are, by the +hypothesis, inferior to those of the enemy. It is certain that they will +sooner or later be hunted down and destroyed. Moreover, the mercantile +flag of the weaker belligerent will, as I have shown, disappear from the +sea from the very outset of the conflict; and the maritime commerce of +such a belligerent must be of very insignificant volume if the loss +entailed by its suppression is not greater than that likely to be +inflicted by such a belligerent on the enemy's commerce which crosses +the seas under the _ægis_ of a flag which commands them. Admiral Mahan +has estimated that during the whole of the war of the French Revolution +and Empire the direct loss to England "by the operation of hostile +cruisers did not exceed 2-1/2 per cent. of the commerce of the Empire; +and that this loss was partially made good by the prize ships and +merchandise taken by its own naval vessels and privateers." It should be +noted, however, that the Royal Commission on Food Supply was of opinion +that 4 per cent. would be a more accurate estimate. It is also well +known that during the same period the maritime commerce of England was +doubled in volume while that of France was annihilated. In point of fact +the risks run in war by commerce afloat are measured very exactly by the +degree in which the flag which covers it has secured the command of the +sea--that is, be it always remembered, the control of the maritime +communications affected. During the War of American Independence, when +British supremacy at sea was seriously challenged and at times was in +grave jeopardy--owing quite as much to faulty disposition as to +inferiority of force--premiums of fifteen guineas per cent. were paid in +1782 on ships trading to the Far East; whereas from the spring of 1793 +until the close of the struggle with Napoleon no premiums exceeding half +that rate were paid. Yet to the very end of the war British merchant +vessels were being seized even in the Channel almost every day. There +is, however, good reason to think that many of these seizures were in +reality collusive operations undertaken for the purpose of carrying on +clandestinely the direct trade with the Continent which Napoleon sought +in vain to suppress. The full history of the memorable conflict between +the Berlin Decrees of Napoleon and the British Orders in Council, is +still to be written. Some very illuminating side-lights are thrown on it +by Mr David Hannay in a volume entitled _The Sea-Trader, His Friends and +Enemies_. + +It would seem to follow from these premisses--fortified as they are by +other historical examples that might be cited--that of two belligerents +in a naval war, that one which establishes and maintains an effective +command of the sea will be absolute master of the maritime commerce of +the other, while his own maritime commerce, though not entirely immune, +will suffer no such decisive losses as will determine or even materially +affect the course and issue of the war; and that he may indeed emerge +from the war much stronger and more prosperous than he was at the +beginning. Such is assuredly the teaching of history, and although vast +changes have taken place alike in respect of the methods, opportunities, +implements, and international conventions of naval war and in respect of +the conditions, volume, and national importance of maritime commerce, +yet I think it can be shown that the sum total of these changes has made +on the whole rather for the advantage of the superior belligerent than +otherwise. In the first place privateering--formerly a very effective +weapon in the hands of the weaker belligerent--is now abolished. It is +true that the Declaration of Paris, which recorded and ratified its +abolition, has not been formally accepted by all the naval Powers of the +world; but it is also true that since its promulgation no naval Power +has sought to revive privateering. It is indeed held by some that the +right claimed by certain maritime Powers to convert merchant ships of +their own nationality into warships by arming and commissioning them on +the high seas is, or may be, equivalent to the revival of privateering +in its most dangerous and aggressive form. But those who argue thus +appear to overlook the fact that this process of conversion on the high +seas is by the Seventh Convention of the Second Hague Conference hedged +round with a series of restrictions which differentiate the warship thus +improvised very sharply from the privateer of the past. The following +are the leading provisions of this Convention:-- + +1. A merchant ship converted into a warship cannot have the rights and +duties appertaining to vessels having that status unless it is under the +direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power the +flag of which it flies. + +2. Merchant ships converted into warships must bear the external marks +which distinguish the warships of their nationality. + +3. The commander must be in the service of the State and duly +commissioned by the proper authorities. His name must figure on the list +of the officers of the fighting fleet. + +4. The crew must be subject to military discipline. + +5. Every merchant ship converted into a warship is bound to observe in +its operations the laws and customs of war. + +6. A belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must, as +soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of its warships. + +This Convention has been accepted and ratified by all the great maritime +Powers. It is true that it gives the converted merchant ship what may be +called the dog's privilege of taking a first bite with impunity, but it +makes it very difficult for any second bite to be taken. Such a vessel +may as a merchant ship have obtained coal and other supplies in a +neutral port before conversion, but she cannot after conversion return +to the same or another neutral port and repeat the process; nor can she +easily play the game which some have attributed to her of being a +merchant ship one day, a warship the next, and a merchant ship again on +the third. Further, as a weapon to be employed against England in +particular, the method of conversion here prescribed would seem to be +largely discounted by the fact that this country could, if it were so +disposed, convert as many merchant ships into warships in this way as +all the rest of the world put together. + +It will be argued, perhaps, that a belligerent when hard pressed will +not respect the provisions of a mere paper Convention, but will, if it +suits him, treat them as non-existent. In that case it is not easy to +see why he should ever have accepted and ratified them. The preamble of +this very Convention recites that "whereas the contracting Powers have +been unable to come to an agreement on the question whether the +conversion of a merchant ship into a warship may take place upon the +high seas, it is understood that the question of the place where such +conversion is effected remains outside the scope of this agreement, and +is in no way affected by the following rules." In other words some of +the very Powers which have ratified the Convention as it stands +categorically declined to add to it a provision forbidding altogether +the conversion of a merchant ship into a warship on the high seas. If +this does not mean that, while reserving their freedom of action in this +respect, they are prepared to abide by the provisions of a Convention +which they have not less categorically accepted and ratified we are +driven to the absurd conclusion that all International Law is a nullity. + +Secondly, the practical disappearance of the sailing ship from the seas +has profoundly modified all the pre-existing conditions affecting the +attack and defence of commerce afloat. In the days of sailing, all +vessels were compelled to sail according to the wind, that is, to take +devious courses whenever the wind was adverse, so that some of them +might at all times be found scattered over very wide areas of the seas +connecting the ports of departure with those of arrival. Accordingly the +sporadic attack on commerce by isolated warships cruising at large +within the limits of trade routes, which might be hundreds of miles in +width, was often productive of very appreciable results. There were few +blank coverts on the seas to be drawn. Nowadays a steamer can always +take the most direct course to her destination. As a consequence, trade +routes have now been narrowed down to what may more fittingly be called +lines of communication, and these lines possess the true characteristic +of all lines, namely, that they have practically no breadth. Thus the +areas bounded by these lines are nowadays all blank coverts. Any one who +happens to cross the Atlantic, as I have crossed it more than once, by +one of the less frequented routes, will know that the number of vessels +sighted in a voyage quite as long as any warship could take without +coaling may often be counted on the fingers of one hand. Another +characteristic of these lines is that though their points of departure +and destination are fixed, yet the lines joining these points may be +varied if necessary to such an extent that any warship hovering about +their ordinary direction would be thrown entirely off the scent. On the +other hand their ports of departure and destination being fixed, the +lines of communication must inevitably converge as they approach these +points. There are other points also more in the open at which several +lines of communication may intersect. At these "terminal and focal +points," as Mr Corbett has aptly called them, the belligerent, being by +hypothesis inferior to his adversary, must needs endeavour to +concentrate his attack on his enemy's commerce, because at any other +points the game would not be worth the candle. But it is precisely at +these points that the superior adversary will concentrate his defence, +and being superior, will take care to do so in force sufficient for the +purpose. So far as the remaining portions of the lines of communication +need any direct defence at all this can be afforded, if and when +necessary, by collecting the merchant ships about to traverse them into +convoys and giving them an escort sufficiently powerful to deal +effectually with attacks which from the nature of the case can only be +sporadic and intermittent. Be it remembered that the last thing a +warship bent on commerce destruction wants is to encounter an enemy in +superior or even in equal force. The moment she does so her game is up. + +Thirdly, the substitution of steam for sails has very largely reduced +the enduring mobility of the commerce-destroying warship. In time of war +no warship will ever go further from the nearest available supply of +coal than is represented by considerably less than half of the distance +that she can steam at full speed with her bunkers full. If she does so +she runs the risk, if chased, of burning her last pound of coal before +she has reached shelter. Coaling at sea is only possible in exceptional +circumstances, and is in any case a very tedious operation. A warship +which attempts it will be taken at a great disadvantage if an enemy +catches her in the process. Colliers, moreover, are exposed to capture +while proceeding to the appointed rendezvous, and if they fail to reach +it the warship awaiting them will be placed in extreme danger. All these +difficulties and dangers may be surmounted once and again, but they must +needs put a tremendous handicap in the long run on the commerce-destroying +efforts of a belligerent who is not superior to his adversary at sea. +Of course if he is superior at sea the enemy's commerce will be at his +mercy, and nothing can prevent its destruction or at least its total +suppression. But that is not the hypothesis we are considering. + +Fourthly, the power of the modern warship to send her prizes into court +for adjudication, or to destroy them off-hand on capture is much more +limited than was that of her sailing predecessor. If she sends them into +port she must either put a prize crew on board or escort them herself. +In the former case the prizes, and in the latter case both prizes and +their captors are liable to recapture, a liability which becomes the +greater in proportion as the enemy is superior at sea. As to the former +alternative, moreover, the crew of a modern man-of-war is highly +specialized, and in particular its engine-room complement, which must +furnish a portion of every prize crew, is at the outset no greater than +is required for the full fighting efficiency of the ship. It is +probable, therefore, that the captor would in nearly all cases adopt the +alternative of destroying his prizes at sea. In that case there will be +no prize money for any one concerned, but that is perhaps a minor +consideration. A far more important consideration is that before +destroying the prize the captor must take its crew on board and provide +food and accommodation for them. Any other course would be sheer piracy +and would inevitably lead to drastic reprisals. Now, before the captor +had destroyed many prizes in this fashion--especially if even one of +them happened to be a passenger steamer well filled with passengers--she +would find herself gravely embarrassed by the number of her prisoners, +and the need of providing for them even in the roughest fashion. A +captain having to fight his ship even with a few hundreds of prisoners +on board would be in no very enviable position. + +The foregoing are the leading considerations which appear to me to +govern the problem of the attack and defence of maritime commerce in +modern conditions of naval warfare. I have discussed the question in +greater detail in a work entitled _Nelson and Other Naval Studies_, and +as I have seen no reason to abandon or substantially to modify the +conclusions there formulated, I reproduce them here for the sake of +completeness:-- + +1. All experience shows that commerce-destroying never has been, and +never can be, a primary object of naval war. + +2. There is nothing in the changes which modern times have witnessed in +the methods and appliances of naval warfare to suggest that the +experience of former wars is no longer applicable. + +3. Such experience as there is of modern war points to the same +conclusion and enforces it. + +4. The case of the "Alabama," rightly understood, does not disallow this +conclusion but rather confirms it. + +5. Though the volume of maritime commerce has vastly increased, the +number of units of naval force capable of assailing it has decreased in +far greater proportion. + +6. Privateering is, and remains abolished, not merely by the fiat of +International Law, but by changes in the methods and appliances of +navigation and naval warfare which have rendered the privateer entirely +obsolete. + +7. Maritime commerce is much less assailable than in former times, +because the introduction of steam has confined its course to definite +trade routes of extremely narrow width, and has almost denuded the sea +of commerce outside these limits. + +8. The modern commerce destroyer is confined to a comparatively narrow +radius of action by the inexorable limits of her coal supply. If she +destroys her prizes she must forgo the prize money and find +accommodation for the crews and passengers of the ships destroyed. If +she sends them into port she must deplete her engine-room complement and +thereby gravely impair her own efficiency. + +9. Torpedo craft are of little or no use for commerce destruction except +in certain well-defined areas where special measures can be taken for +checking their depredations. + +Of course all this depends on the one fundamental assumption that the +commerce to be defended belongs to a Power which can, and does, command +the sea. On no other condition can maritime commerce be defended at +all. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE + + +A warship, considered in the abstract, may be defined as a vessel +employed, and generally constructed, for the purpose of conveying across +the seas to the place of conflict, the weapons that are to be used in +conflict, the men who are to use them, and all such stores, whether of +food or other supplies, as will give to the vessel as large a measure of +enduring mobility as is compatible with her displacement. If we confine +our attention to the period posterior to the employment of the gun on +shipboard as the principal weapon of offence, and if we regard the +torpedo as a particular kind of projectile, and the tube from which it +is discharged as a particular kind of gun, we may condense this +definition into the modern formula that a warship is a floating +gun-carriage. With the methods and implements of sea warfare anterior to +the introduction of the gun we need not concern ourselves. They belong +to the archæology of the subject. It suffices to point out that in all +periods of naval warfare the nature of the principal weapon employed, +and to some extent that of the motive power available, have not only +governed the structure of the ship and determined the practicable limit +of its displacement, but have also exercised a dominant influence over +the ordering of fleets and their disposition in action. Sea tactics have +never been more elaborate than they were in the last days of the galley +period which came to an end with the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, less +than a score of years before the defeat of the Armada in 1588. But the +substitution of sails for oars as the motive power of the warship and +the more general employment of the gun as the principal weapon of +offence necessarily entailed radical changes in the tactical methods +which had been slowly evolved during the galley period. At first all was +confusion and a sea-fight was reduced for a time to a very disorderly +and tumultuous affair. "We went down in no order," wrote an officer who +was present at Trafalgar, "but every man to take his bird." This is a +very inaccurate and even more unintelligent account of the tactics +pursued at Trafalgar; but it might very well stand for a picturesque +summary of the tactical confusion which prevailed at the period of the +Armada and for half a century afterwards. + +Gradually, however, order was again evolved out of the prevailing chaos. +But it was not the old order. It was a new order based on the +predominance of the gun and its disposition on board the ship. To go +down in no order and for each man to take his bird would mean that each +ship, whether large or small, would be free as far as circumstances +permitted to select an adversary not disproportioned in strength to +herself, so that there was no very pressing need for the fleet to +consist of homogeneous units, nor for the elimination of comparatively +small craft from a general engagement. But in the course of the Dutch +Wars the practice was slowly evolved of fighting in a compact or +close-hauled line, the ships being ranged in a line ahead--that is, each +succeeding ship following in the wake of her next ahead--in order to +give free play to the guns disposed mainly on the broadside, and being, +for purposes of mutual support, disposed as closely to each other as was +compatible with individual freedom of evolution and manoeuvre. This +disposition necessarily involved the exclusion from the line of battle +of all vessels below a certain average or standard of fighting strength, +since it was no longer possible for "every man to take his bird" and a +weak ship might find herself in conflict with an adversary of +overpowering strength in the enemy's line. Hence the main fighting +forces of naval belligerents came in time to be composed entirely of +"ships fit to lie in a line," as Torrington phrased it, of "capital +ships," as they were frequently called in former days, of "line of +battle ships" or "ships of the line," as afterwards they were more +commonly called, or of "battleships" as is nowadays the accepted +appellation. Other elements of naval force not "fit to lie in a line" +were also required, as I am about to show, and took different forms at +different times, but the root of the whole evolution lies in the +elimination of the non-capital ship from the main fighting line. In a +very instructive chapter of his _Naval Warfare_, Admiral Colomb has +traced the whole course of this gradual "Differentiation of Naval +Force." But for my purpose it suffices to cite the briefer exposition of +a French writer quoted by Admiral Mahan in his _Influence of Sea Power +upon History_:-- + +"With the increase of the power of the ship of war, and with the +perfecting of its sea and warlike qualities, there has come an equal +progress in the art of utilizing them.... As naval evolutions become +more skilful, their importance grows from day to day. To these +evolutions there is needed a base, a point from which they depart and to +which they return. A fleet of warships must always be ready to meet an +enemy; logically, therefore, this point of departure for naval +evolutions must be the order of battle. Now since the disappearance of +galleys, almost all the artillery is found upon the sides of a ship of +war. Hence it is the beam that must necessarily and always be turned +toward the enemy. On the other hand it is necessary that the sight of +the latter must never be interrupted by a friendly ship. Only one +formation allows the ships of the same fleet to satisfy fully these +conditions. That formation is the line ahead. The line, therefore, is +imposed as the only order of battle, and consequently as the basis of +all fleet tactics. In order that this line of battle, this long thin +line of guns, may not be injured or broken at some point weaker than the +rest, there is at the same time felt to be the necessity of putting in +it only ships which, if not of equal force, have at least equally strong +sides. Logically it follows, at the same moment in which the line ahead +became definitely the order for battle, there was established the +distinction between the 'ships of the line' alone destined for a place +therein, and the lighter ships meant for other uses." + +But the need for other and lighter ships "meant for other uses" and not +"fit to lie in a line," is equally demonstrable. The function of +battleships is to act in concert. They must therefore be concentrated in +fleets sufficiently strong to give a good account of the enemy's fleets +opposed to them. This does not necessarily mean that all the fleets of a +belligerent must be concentrated in a single position. But it does mean +that if disposed in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy they +must be so disposed and connected, that, moving on interior lines, they +can always bring a superior force to the point of contact with the +enemy. Subject to this paramount condition, that of being able to +concentrate more rapidly than the enemy can, dispersal of naval +force--not of units but of organized fighting fleets--is generally a +better disposition than extreme concentration. But it is a fatal error +in strategy so to disperse your fleets as to expose them to the risk of +being overpowered by the enemy in detail. + +The fleets of capital ships thus organized, and disposed as occasion may +require and sound strategy dictate, are not, however, by any means to be +regarded as autonomous and self-sufficing organisms. They are rather to +be regarded as the moving base of a much larger organization, much more +widely dispersed, consisting of lighter vessels not fit to lie in a +line, but specially adapted to discharge functions which capital ships +cannot as such discharge, yet which are indispensable either to the full +efficiency of the latter or to the maintenance of an effective command +of the sea. The first of these functions is the collection and rapid +transmission of intelligence as to the enemy's dispositions and +movements over as wide an area of the waters in dispute as is compatible +with communication rapid enough to allow of counter-movements being made +before it is too late. The development of wireless telegraphy has +largely extended this area, but it is not without limits in practice, +and those limits are already narrower than the extreme range of a single +transmission by wireless telegraphy. For example, a warship in the +Levant might, if the conditions were exceptionally favourable, +communicate by direct wireless with another warship in the Orkneys. But +the information thus transmitted would hardly be likely directly to +influence the movements and dispositions of the latter. If it did it +would probably not be through the immediate initiative of the Admiral +commanding in the North Sea, but through the supreme control of all the +naval forces of the belligerent affected, exercised through the General +Staff of the Navy at the seat of Government. It may here be remarked in +passing that the development of wireless telegraphy will probably be +found in war to strengthen this supreme control and to weaken to that +extent the independent and isolated initiative of individual +Commanders-in-Chief. But that is not necessarily a disadvantage, and +even so far as it is disadvantage at all it is more than balanced by the +immense corresponding advantage of keeping the War Staff at all times in +direct touch with every part of the field of naval operations, and +thereby making it the focus of all available information, and the +directing authority for all the larger strategy of the campaign. Except +in degree, moreover, there is nothing new in this. When Nelson was +returning across the Atlantic, after chasing Villeneuve out of the West +Indies, his only way of informing the Admiralty of the nature of the +situation was to send on Bettesworth in the brig "Curieux" with his +news. Nowadays a modern "Curieux" would be able to send on the news as +soon as she came within fifteen hundred or possibly two thousand miles +from the British Isles, and Nelson at the same distance might have +received his orders direct from the Admiralty. But the special point to +note is that as soon as Bettesworth's information was received at the +Admiralty, Barham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, instantly issued +orders which profoundly modified the dispositions of the fleets engaged +in blockading the French ports and led directly to Calder's action off +Finisterre, and in the sequel to the abandonment by Napoleon of all his +projects of invasion and the destruction of the allied fleets at +Trafalgar. There were giants in those days both afloat and ashore. But +the giants afloat did not resent the interference of the giants ashore, +and, as Mr Corbett has shown, the Trafalgar campaign was conducted with +consummate sagacity by Barham, who embodied in himself the War Staff of +the time. + +Such is the transcendent importance of intelligence, and of its +collection, transmission, collation, interpretation, and translation +into supreme executive orders. Its collection and transmission is mainly +the function of cruising ships disposed either individually or in small +groups for the purpose, and at such a distance from the main body of +battleships as is not incompatible with the movements of the latter +being controlled and directed, either by their immediate commanders, or +by the War Staff at the centre, according to the information received +from the outlying cruisers. Such cruising vessels may vary in size and +strength from the modern battle-cruiser, so heavily armed and armoured +as to be not incapable of taking a place, on occasion, in the line of +battle, down to the smallest torpedo craft which is endowed with +sufficient enduring mobility to enable her to keep the sea and to cruise +as near as may be to the enemy's ports. I have already indicated the +other collateral functions which will have to be discharged by torpedo +craft in case of a blockade and pointed out the vital distinction which +differentiates them from the small craft of the past in that in certain +circumstances they are capable of taking a formidable part in a fleet +action even as against the most powerful battleships. But we are here +considering them solely from the point of view of their cruising +functions, whether as guarding their own shores or watching those of the +enemy with a view to fighting on occasion and to observation at all +times. Their supports will be cruisers of larger size, disposed at +suitable distances in the rear, and themselves supported in like manner +by successive cordons or patrols of cruisers increasing in size and +power, until we come to the battle fleet as the concentrated nucleus of +the whole organization. This is merely an abstract or diagrammatic +exposition of such an organization, and it is of course liable to almost +infinite variation in the infinite variety of warlike operations at sea, +but it serves to exhibit the _rationale_ of the differentiation of naval +force into battleships, cruisers, and small craft. + +It has sometimes been argued that, inasmuch as the torpedo craft is, or +may be, in certain conditions, more than a match for even the biggest +battleship, battleships together with all intermediate ships between the +battleship and the torpedo vessel, are not unlikely to be some day +regarded as superfluous and in consequence to be discarded altogether +from the naval armament of even a first-class maritime Power. It is true +that the range and accuracy of the torpedo have latterly undergone an +immense development, so that a range of even ten thousand yards or five +sea-miles is no longer beyond its powers. It is true that the +development of the submarine vessel has vastly intensified the menace of +the torpedo and it may soon be true that the development of aircraft +will add a new and very formidable menace to the supremacy of the +battleship. But except for this last consideration, which is at present +exceedingly speculative, a little reflection will disclose the +underlying fallacy of arguments of this kind. The enduring mobility of +the torpedo craft is necessarily limited. It is incapable of that wide +range of action which is required of warships if they are to establish +and maintain any effective command of the sea. It is exceedingly +vulnerable to ships of a larger size, and of more ample enduring +mobility. These again will be vulnerable in their turn to ships of a +still larger size and thus the logic of the situation brings us back to +the battleship once more with its characteristic functions. It may +perhaps be urged that this chain of argument takes too little account of +the submarine vessel which is at present singularly invulnerable because +for the most part invisible to any vessels, whether big or little, which +operate only on the surface and even if discovered betimes by the +latter, is not very readily assailable by them. But of two things one. +Either the submarine vessel will remain small and therefore weak, and +lacking in enduring mobility, in which case it can never establish and +maintain an effective command of the sea. Or it will grow indefinitely +in size, in which case it will fall under the inexorable stress of the +logic which brings us back once more to the battleship. It may be that +the battleship of the still distant future will be a submersible +battleship. But many exceedingly complex problems of construction and +stability will have to be solved before that consummation is reached. + +Lastly, the specific function of the so-called battle-cruiser would seem +to need some further elucidation. At first sight this hybrid type of +vessel might seem to be an anomalous intrusion into the time-honoured +hierarchy of battleship, cruiser, and small craft, which the ripe +experience of many wars, battles, and campaigns had finally established +in the last golden days of the sailing ship period. It is indeed held by +some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a hybrid +and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can be +given. In face of these opinions I cannot presume to dogmatize on the +subject. But some not wholly irrelevant considerations may be advanced. +The battle-cruiser is, as its name implies, a vessel not only fitted by +the nature of its armour and armament "to lie in a line," whenever +occasion may require, but also exceedingly well qualified by its armour +and armament, and still more by its speed, to discharge many of the +functions of a cruiser either alone or in company with other cruisers. +In this latter capacity, it can overhaul nearly every merchant ship +afloat, it can scout far and wide, it can push home a vital +reconnaissance in cases where a weaker and slower cruiser would have to +run away if she could, it can serve as a rallying point to a squadron of +smaller cruisers engaged in the defence of this or that vital line of +communication, and alone or in company with a consort of the same type +it can hold the terminal and focal points of any such line against +almost any number of hostile cruisers inferior in defensive and +offensive powers to itself. Such are its powers and capacities when +acting as a cruiser proper. But it may be thought that in the stress of +conflict it will have very little opportunity of displaying these very +exceptional powers because an admiral in command of a fighting fleet +will never, when anticipating an engagement with the enemy, consent to +weaken his fighting line by detaching so powerful a unit for scouting or +other cruising purposes. That is as it may be. It will depend on many +circumstances of the moment not to be clearly anticipated or defined +beforehand; on the strength of the enemy's force, on the personality, +sagacity, and fortitude of the admiral--whether he is or is not a man of +the mettle and temper ascribed to Nelson by Admiral Mahan in a passage +already quoted--on the comparative need as determined by the +circumstances of the moment of scouting for information, of cruising +for the defence of trade, or of strengthening the battle line for a +decisive conflict to the uttermost extent of the nation's resources. It +is unbecoming to assume that in the crisis of his country's fate an +admiral will act either as a fool or as a poltroon. It is the country's +fault if a man capable of so acting is placed in supreme command, and +for that there is no remedy. But it is sounder to assume that the +admiral selected for command is a man not incapable of disposing his +force to the best advantage. "We must," said Lord Goschen, on one +occasion, "put our trust in Providence and a good admiral." If a nation +cannot find a good admiral in its need it is idle to trust in +Providence. + +It remains to consider the function of the battle-cruiser in the line of +battle. The lines of battle in former times were often composed of ships +of varying size and power. There was a legitimate prejudice against +ships of excessive size, although their superior power in action was +recognized--we have the unimpeachable testimony on that point of +Nelson's Hardy, a man of unrivalled fighting experience to whom Nelson +himself attributed "an intuitive right judgment"--because they were +unhandy in manoeuvre and slow in sailing as compared with ships of more +moderate dimensions. But except for difficulties of docking--a very +serious consideration from the financial point of view--hardly any +limit can be assigned to the size of the modern warship on these +particular grounds. Quite the contrary. Other things being equal, the +bigger the ship the higher the speed, and it is well known that ships of +the Dreadnought type are as handy to steer as a torpedo boat. For +tactical reasons, moreover, it is not expedient to lengthen the line of +battle unduly. Hence there is a manifest advantage in concentrating +offensive power, as far as may be, in single units. On the other hand, +the experience and practice of the eighteenth century showed +conclusively that there was also a distinct advantage in having in the +line of battle a certain number of ships which, being smaller than their +consorts, were more handy and faster sailing than the latter. The enemy +might not want to fight. Very often he did not, and by crowding all +possible sail he did his best to get away. In this case the only way to +bring him to action was for the pursuing admiral to order "a general +chase"--that is, to direct his ships, disregarding the precise line of +battle, to hurry on with all possible sail after the enemy so that the +fastest ships of the pursuing fleet might bring individually to action +the laggards of the retreating fleet and hold them until the main body +of the pursuing fleet came up. In this case the retreating admiral must +either return to the succour of his ships astern and thereby accept the +general action which he sought to avoid, or abandon his overtaken ships +to the enemy without attempting to rescue them. Hawke's action in +Quiberon Bay and Duncan's action off Camperdown are two of the most +memorable examples of this particular mode of attack, and their +brilliant results are a striking testimony to its efficacy. If ever in +the naval battles of the future it becomes expedient for an admiral to +order a general chase, it stands to reason that ships of the +battle-cruiser type will be invaluable for the purpose. Their speed will +enable them to hold the tail of the enemy's line, and their power will +enable them to crush it unless the retreating admiral who seeks to avoid +a decisive action turns back to succour such of his ships as are +assailed and thereby renders a decisive action inevitable. + +There is, moreover, another function to be assigned to the +battle-cruiser in a general action, and that is a function which was +defined once for all by Nelson himself in the immortal memorandum in +which he explained to his captains the mode of attack he proposed to +carry out at Trafalgar. "I have," wrote Nelson, "made up my mind to keep +the fleet in that position of sailing ... that the order of sailing is +to be the order of battle, placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen +ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight _of the fastest sailing +two-decked ships_ which will always make, if wanted, a line of +twenty-four sail, on whichever line the Commander-in-Chief may direct." +Owing to the lack of ships this disposition was not adopted on the day +of Trafalgar, but the principle involved is not affected by that +circumstance. That principle is that a squadron of the fastest sailing +ships in the fleet was to be detached from the two fighting lines +entrusted with the initial attack, and reserved or "refused" until the +development of the main attack had disclosed to the Commander-in-Chief +the point at which the impact of this "advanced squadron" would by +superior concentration on that point secure that the enemy should there +be decisively overpowered. The essence of the matter is that the ships +so employed should by virtue of their superior speed be endowed with a +tactical mobility sufficient to enable them to discharge the function +assigned to them. I need hardly insist on the close analogy which +subsists between Nelson's "advanced squadron" and a modern squadron of +battle-cruisers similarly employed, and although the conflict of modern +warships must needs differ in many essential respects from the conflicts +of sailing ships in Nelson's days, yet I think a clear and authoritative +exposition of one at least of the uses and functions of the +battle-cruiser in a fleet action may still be found in what I have +called elsewhere "the last tactical word of the greatest master of sea +tactics the world has ever known, the final and flawless disposition of +sailing ships marshalled for combat." + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY OF NAVAL FORCE + + +The measure of naval strength required by any State is determined mainly +by the naval strength of its possible adversaries in the event of war, +and only in a secondary degree by the volume of the maritime interests +which it has to defend. Paradoxical as the latter half of this +proposition may seem at first sight, it can easily be shown to be sound. +The maritime interests, territorial and commercial, of the British +Empire are beyond all comparison greater than those of any other State +in the world; but if no other State possessed a naval force strong +enough to assail them seriously, it is manifest that the naval force +required to defend them need be no greater than is sufficient to +overcome the assailant, and would not therefore be determined in any +degree by the volume of the interests to be defended. Each State +determines for itself the measure of naval strength which it judges to +be necessary to its security. No State expects to have to encounter the +whole world in arms or makes its provision in view of any such +chimerical contingency. The utmost that any State can do is to adjust +its naval policy to a rational estimate of all the reasonably probable +contingencies of international conflict, due regard being had to the +extent of its financial resources and to such other requirements of +national defence as circumstances impose on it. Germany, for example, +has proclaimed to all the world in the preamble to the Navy Law of 1900 +that-- + +"In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing +conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a +battle fleet of such strength that even for the most powerful naval +adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own +supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that +the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval +Power, for, as a rule, a great naval Power will not be in a position to +concentrate all its forces against us." + +I am not concerned in any way with the political aspects of this +memorable declaration. But its bearing on the naval policy of the +British Empire is manifest and direct. England is beyond all question +"the greatest naval Power" in the world. The declaration of Germany thus +lays upon England the indefeasible obligation of taking care that by no +efforts of any other Power shall her "own supremacy"--that is her +capacity to secure and maintain the command of the sea in all reasonably +probable contingencies of international conflict--be rendered doubtful. +There is no State in the world on which decisive defeat at sea would +inflict such irretrievable disaster as it would on England and her +Empire. These islands would be open to invasion--and if to invasion to +conquest and subjugation--the commerce of the whole Empire would be +annihilated, and the Empire itself would be dismembered. I need not +attempt to determine what measure of naval strength is required to avert +this unspeakable calamity. It suffices to say that whatever the measure +may be it must be provided and maintained at all hazards. That is merely +the axiomatic expression of the things that belong to our peace. + +It will be observed that the German declaration assumes that "a great +naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its +forces against" a single adversary. This raises at once the question of +the distribution of naval force, or of what has been called the peace +strategy of position. I shall endeavour to discuss the problem with as +little reference as may be to an actual state of war between any two +individual and specific naval Powers. I shall merely assume that of two +possible belligerents one is so far stronger than the other as to look +with confidence to being able in the event of war to secure and maintain +its own command of the sea; and in order not to complicate the problem +unduly I shall include in the term "belligerent" not merely a single +Power but an alliance of one or more separate Powers, while still +adhering to the assumption that the relative strength of the two +belligerents is as defined above. If England is one of the Powers +affected it is manifest from what has already been said that this +assumption is a legitimate one. + +In such a situation it stands to reason that the concentration of the +whole force of the stronger belligerent against the whole force equally +concentrated of the weaker belligerent would not be necessary and would +very rarely be expedient. The stronger belligerent would of course seek, +in time of war, so to dispose his forces as to make it impossible for +the weaker fleets of his adversary to take the sea without being brought +to a decisive action, and he would so order his peace strategy of +position as to further that paramount purpose. But it does not follow +that being superior in the measure above defined he would need to +concentrate all his available forces for that purpose. He would +concentrate so much of his forces as would ensure victory in the +encounters anticipated--so far as mere numbers apart from fighting +efficiency can ensure victory--and the residue would be available for +other and subsidiary purposes. If there were no residue, then the +required superiority would not have been attained, and the belligerent +who has neglected to attain it must take the consequences. One of these +consequences would certainly be that the other and subsidiary purposes +above mentioned would have to be neglected until the main issue was +decided, and if these purposes were of any moment he would have so far +to pay the penalty of his neglect. Nothing is more fatal in warfare than +to attempt to be equally strong everywhere. If you cannot do everything +you desire at once you must concentrate all your energies on doing the +most important and the most vital things first. When the tree is cut +down the branches will fall of themselves. The history of the War of +American Independence is full of illustrations of the neglect of this +paramount principle. England was worsted much more by faulty +distribution than by insufficiency of force. + +At the same time it must be observed that the outlying and subsidiary +purposes of the conflict cannot be of vital moment so long as the +superior belligerent is at firm grips with the central forces of his +adversary. We are dealing with the assumption that of two belligerents +one is so far superior to the other that he may entertain a reasonable +confidence of being able to deny the command of the sea to his adversary +and in the end to secure it for himself. It is an essential part of this +assumption that the forces of the superior belligerent will be so +disposed as to make it exceedingly difficult and, subject to the fortune +of war, practically impossible for any considerable portion of the +enemy's forces to act on a vigorous offensive without being speedily +brought to book by a superior force of his adversary, and that the peace +strategy of the latter will have been ordered to that end. So long as +this is the case the virtual command of the sea will be in the hands of +the superior belligerent, even though his forces may be so concentrated, +in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy, as to leave many +regions of the sea apparently unguarded. They are adequately guarded by +the fact that the enemy is _ex hypothesi_ unable to reach them--or if by +a successful evasion of his adversary's guard he manages to send a +detachment, large or small, to aim at some outlying objective, the +initial superiority of force possessed by his adversary will always +enable the latter to send a superior force in pursuit of the fugitive. +Much harm may be done before the fugitive is brought to book, but no +State, however strong, need ever expect to go to war without running +risks and suffering occasional and partial reverses. + +It is thus a pure delusion to assume, as loose thinkers on the subject +too often assume, that the command of the sea must be either surrendered +or imperilled by a superior belligerent who, apparently neglecting +those regions of the sea which are not immediately assailed or +threatened, concentrates his forces in the positions best calculated to +enable him to get the better of his adversary, or who in time of peace +so orders his strategy of position as to secure that advantage at once +should war unhappily break out. Not long ago the Leader of the +Opposition in the House of Commons used the following words:--"Ten years +ago we not only had the command of the sea, but we had the command of +every sea. We have the command of no sea in the world except the North +Sea at this moment." Those who have followed and assimilated the +exposition of the true meaning of the command of the sea given in these +pages will readily discern how mischievous a travesty of that meaning is +contained in these words. There is, as I have shown, no such thing as a +command of the sea in time of peace. The phrase is merely a definition +of the paramount objective of naval warfare as such. Ten years ago we +had no command of any sea because we were not at war with any naval +Power. The concentration of a large portion of our naval forces in the +North Sea is no surrender of our command of the sea in any part of the +world, because that command does not exist, never has existed in time of +peace, and never can exist even in time of war until we have fought for +it and secured it. The concentration in question is, together with the +simultaneous disposition of the residue of our naval forces in different +parts of the world, merely the expression of that peace strategy of +position which, in the judgment of those who are responsible for it, is +best calculated in the more probable, yet possibly quite remote, +contingencies of international conflict, to enable our fleets to get the +better of our enemies and thereby ultimately to secure the command of +the sea in any and every part of the world in which we have maritime +interests to defend. There are, it is true, some disadvantages involved +in a close and sustained concentration of naval forces, especially in +home waters. Naval officers lose in breadth and variety of experience +and in the self-reliance which comes of independent command, while the +prestige of the flag is in some measure diminished by the infrequency of +its appearance in distant seas. But these, after all, are subsidiary +considerations which must be subordinated to the paramount needs of a +sound strategy, whether offensive or defensive. + +It follows from the foregoing exposition of the principles which govern +the strategic distribution of naval force in peace and war that a great +naval Power must often maintain fleets of considerable strength in +distant seas. England has for many generations maintained such a fleet +in the Mediterranean, and it is hard to see how any reasonably probable +change in the international situation could absolve her from that +obligation. There are other and more distant stations on which she has +maintained and still does maintain squadrons in a strength which has +varied greatly from time to time in accordance with the changing phases +of international relations and of strategic requirements as affected +thereby. The measure of these requirements is determined from time to +time by the known strength of the hostile forces which would have to be +encountered in any reasonably probable contingencies of international +conflict. But there is one antecedent requirement which is common to all +considerable detachments of naval force in distant waters. In order to +maintain their efficiency and mobility they must have a naval base +conveniently situated within the limits of their station to which they +may resort from time to time for repair, refit, and supply. The need for +supply at the base is less paramount than that for refit and repair, +because it is manifest that the control of maritime communications which +has enabled the requisite stores to reach the base will also enable them +to reach the ships themselves, wherever they may be at the moment. But +for all refit and repair which cannot be effected by the ships' +companies themselves, with the aid of an attached repair ship, the +ships must go to the base, and that base must be furnished with docks +capable of receiving them. + +It is essential to note that the base is there for the sake of the +ships. The ships are not there for the sake of the base. It is a fatal +inversion of all sound principles of naval strategy to suppose that the +ships owe, or can afford, to the base any other form of defence than +that which is inherent in their paramount and primary task of +controlling the maritime communications which lead to it. So long as +they can do this the base will be exposed only to such attacks as can be +delivered by a force which has evaded but not defeated the naval guard, +and to this extent the base must be fortified and garrisoned; for, of +course, if the naval guard has been decisively defeated, the control of +maritime communications has passed into the hands of the enemy, and +nothing but the advance of a relieving naval force, too strong for the +enemy to resist, can prevent the base being invested from the sea and +ultimately reduced. It will be seen from this how absurd it is ever to +speak of a naval base as commanding the adjacent seas. As such it does +not command, and never can command, any portion of the sea which lies +beyond the range of its own guns. All that it ever does or can do is, by +its resources for repair, refit, and supply, to enable the fleet based +upon it constantly to renew its efficiency and mobility, and thereby to +discharge its appointed task of controlling the maritime communications +entrusted to its keeping. But such command is in all cases exercised by +the fleet and not by the base. If the fleet is not there or not equal to +its task, the mere possession of the base is nearly always a source of +weakness and not of strength to the naval Power which holds it. + +It is held by some that the occupation of naval bases in distant seas by +a Power which is not strong enough to make sure of controlling the +maritime communications which alone give to such bases their strategic +value and importance is a great advantage to such a Power and a +corresponding disadvantage to all its possible adversaries in war. It +will readily be seen from what has been said that this is in large +measure a delusion. As against a weaker adversary than itself the +occupation of such bases may be an appreciable advantage to the Power +which holds them, but only if the adversary in question has in the +waters affected interests which are too important to be sacrificed +without a struggle. On the other hand, as against an adversary strong +enough to secure the command of the sea and determined to hold it at all +hazards, the occupation of such distant bases can very rarely be of any +advantage to the weaker belligerent and may very often expose him to +reverses which, if not positively disastrous, must always be +exceedingly mortifying. Of two things one. Either the belligerent in +such a plight must detach a naval force sufficient to cover the outlying +base, and thus, by dispersing naval forces which he desired to keep +concentrated, he must expose his detachment to destruction by a stronger +force of the enemy, or he must leave the base to its fate, in which case +it is certain to fall in the long run. In point of fact the occupation +of distant bases by any naval Power is merely the giving of hostages to +any and every other Power which in the day of conflict can establish its +command of the sea. That is the plain philosophy of the whole question. + +It only remains to consider very briefly the question of the supply of +fleets operating in distant waters. In a very interesting and suggestive +paper on the "Supply and Communications of a Fleet," Admiral Sir Cyprian +Bridge has pointed out that "in time of peace as well as in time of war +there is a continuous consumption of the articles of various kinds used +on board ship, viz., naval stores, ordnance stores, engineers' stores, +victualling stores, coal, water, etc." Of these the consumption of +victualling stores is alone constant, being determined by the number of +men to be victualled from day to day. The consumption of nearly all the +other stores will vary greatly according as the ship is more or less at +sea, and it is safe to say that for a given number of ships the +consumption will be much greater in time of war, especially in coal, +engineers' stores, and ordnance stores, than it is in time of peace. But +in peace conditions Admiral Bridge estimated that for a fleet consisting +of four battleships, four large cruisers, four second-class cruisers, +thirteen smaller vessels of various kinds, and three torpedo craft, +together with their auxiliaries, the _minimum_ requirements for six +months--assuming that the ships started with full supplies, and that +they returned to their principal base at the end of the period--would be +about 6750 tons of stores and ammunition, and 46,000 tons of coal, +without including fresh water. The requirements of water would not be +less than 30,000 tons in the six months, and of this the ships could +distil about half without greatly increasing their coal consumption; the +remainder, some 15,000 or 16,000 tons, would have to be brought to them. +In time of war the requirements of coal would probably be nearly three +times as great as in time of peace, and the requirements of +ammunition--estimated in time of peace at 1140 tons--might easily be ten +times as great. Thus in addition to the foregoing figures we have 16,000 +tons of water, and in war time a further _minimum_ addition of some +90,000 tons of coal and 10,260 tons of ammunition, making in all a round +total of 170,000 tons for a fleet of the size specified, which was +approximately the strength of the China Fleet, under the command of +Admiral Bridge, at the time when his paper was written. + +All these supplies have to be delivered or obtained periodically and at +convenient intervals in the course of every six months. They are +supplies which the ships must obtain as often as they want them without +necessarily going back to their principal base for the purpose, and even +the principal base must obtain them periodically from the home sources +of supply. There are two alternative ways of maintaining this continuous +stream of supply. One is that in advance of the principal base, what is +called a secondary base should be established from which the ships can +obtain the stores required, a continuous stream of transports bringing +the stores required to the secondary base from sources farther afield, +either from the principal base or from the home sources of supply. The +other method is to have no secondary base--which, since it contains +indispensable stores, must be furnished with some measure of local +defence, and which, as a place of storage, may turn out to be in quite +the wrong place for the particular operations in hand--but to seize and +occupy a "flying base," neither permanent nor designated beforehand, but +selected for the occasion according to the exigencies of the strategic +situation, and capable of being shifted at will in response to any +change in those exigencies. History shows that the latter method has +been something like the normal procedure in war alike in times past and +in the present day. The alternative method is perhaps rather adapted to +the convenience of peace conditions than to the exigencies of war +requirements. During his watch on Toulon Nelson established a flying +base at Maddalena Bay, in Sardinia, and very rarely used the more +distant permanent base at Gibraltar. Togo, as I have stated in an +earlier chapter, established a flying base first at the Elliot Islands +and afterwards at Dalny, during the war in the Far East. Instances might +easily be multiplied to show in which direction the experience of war +points, and how far that direction has been deflected by the possibly +deceptive teaching of peace. I shall not, however, presume to pronounce +_ex cathedrâ_ between two alternative methods each of which is +sanctioned by high naval authority. I will only remark in conclusion +that though the establishment of permanent secondary bases may, in +certain exceptional cases, be defensible and even expedient, yet their +multiplication, beyond such exceptional cases of proved and acknowledged +expediency, is very greatly to be deprecated. The old rule +applies--_Entia non sunt præter necessitatem multiplicanda._ + + * * * * * + +My task is now finished--I will not say completed, for the subject of +naval warfare is far too vast to be exhausted within the narrow compass +of a Manual. I should hardly exaggerate if I said that nearly every +paragraph I have written might be expanded into a chapter, and every +chapter into a volume, and that even so the subject would not be +exhausted. All I have endeavoured to do is to expound briefly and in +simple language the nature of naval warfare, its inherent limitations as +an agency for subduing an enemy's will, the fundamental principles which +underlie its methods, and the concrete problems which the application of +those methods presents. Tactical questions I have not touched at all; +strategic questions only incidentally, and so far as they were +implicated in the discussion of methods. Political issues and questions +of international policy I have eschewed as far as might be, and so far +as it was necessary to deal with them I have endeavoured to do so in +broad and abstract terms. Of the many shortcomings in my handling of the +subject no one can be more conscious than I am myself. Yet I must +anticipate one criticism which is not unlikely to be made, and that is +that I have repeated and insisted on certain phrases and ideas such as +"command of the sea," "control of maritime communications," "the fleet +in being," "blockade," and the like, until they might almost be +regarded as an obsession. Rightly or wrongly that has, at any rate, been +done of deliberate intent. The phrases in question are in all men's +mouths. The ideas they stand for are constantly misunderstood, +misinterpreted, and misapplied. I hold that, rightly understood, they +embody the whole philosophy of naval warfare. I have therefore lost no +opportunity of insisting on them, knowing full well that it is only by +frequent iteration that sound ideas can be implanted in minds not +attuned to their reception. + + + + +INDEX + + +Aircraft, 121 + +Alabama, the, 109 + +Alexander, his conquest of Darius, 48 + +Allemand, his escape from Rochefort, 66, 67 + +Amiens, Peace of, 73 + +_Animus pugnandi_, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 58, 59, 61, 78 + +Antony, Mark, 72 + +Armada, the, 79, 112 + + +Bacon, quoted, 6 + +Baraille, De, his part in the Dunkirk campaign, 87, 88 + +Barham, Lord, 18, 64; + and Nelson, 66, 67; + his conduct of the Trafalgar campaign, 118 + +Base, flying, 142; + naval, 137 + +Battle-cruiser, its functions, 122-128 + +Beachy Head, Battle of, 32, 35; + campaign of, 70, 78 + +Berlin Decrees, 100 + +Bettesworth, 118 + +Blockade, 17; + a form of disputed command, 20-29; + military, its methods, 23; + military and commercial, 21 + +Bolt from the blue, 80, 89 + +Boscawen, at Lagos, 79 + +Brest, 33, 35; + blockaded by Cornwallis, 30; + blockaded by Hawke, 79; + De Roquefeuil at, 81, 82 + +Bridge, Admiral Sir Cyprian, on a fleet in being, 31; + on supply and communications of a fleet, 140; + his estimate of Torrington, 32, 40; + on Torrington's trial, 42 + +Brundusium, Cæsar at, 72 + + +Cadiz, Killigrew at, 34 + +Cæsar, his Pharsalian campaign, 71, 72 + +Calais, the Armada at, 79 + +Calder, his action off Finisterre, 118; + Barham's instructions to, 64 + +Camperdown, Duncan at, 126 + +Cape St Vincent, meeting of Nelson with Craig and Knight off, 65 + +Capital ships, 113 + +Carthagena, Spanish ships at, 66 + +Charles, Prince, 82 + +Château-Renault, 33, 35 + +Clausewitz, his definition of war, 4; + on limited and unlimited war, 5, 22 + +Colomb, Admiral, on differentiation of naval force, 114; + on Torrington's strategy, 40, 43, 79 + +Command of the sea, 6, 10, 11-19, 20, 21, 50, 52, 54, 71, 94, 98, 121, +133, 134, 135; + its true meaning, 15, 135; + no meaning except in war, 15, 135 + +Command of the sea, disputed, in general, 49-67 + +Commerce, maritime, extent of British, 53; + in war, 93-110; + its modern conditions, 101-110 + +Concentration of naval force, its conditions, 132 + +Conflans, at Brest, 79 + +Corbett, Mr Julian, 62, 67; + on the Dunkirk campaign, 89; + on commerce in war, 105; + on Craig's expedition, 61, 66; + on projects of invasion, 77; + on the Trafalgar campaign, 118 + +Cornwallis, and the blockade of Brest, 18, 30 + +Craft, small, 57, 76 + +Craig, his expedition to the Mediterranean, 61-67 + +Cuba, its deliverance by the United States, 54 + + +Dalny, Togo at, 26, 143 + +Dettingen, 80 + +Downs, the, Norris ordered to, 85 + +Duncan, at Camperdown, 126 + +Dungeness, Roquefeuil anchors at, 87; + Norris at, 88; + Norris and Roquefeuil at, 89 + +Dunkirk, troops collected at, 81; + embargo at, 83; + Saxe and Baraille at, 88 + + +Egypt, Napoleon's descent on, 73 + +Elliott Islands, Togo at, 26, 143 + +Embargo, at Dunkirk, 83 + + +Farragut, 7 + +Fleets, and base, their true relation, 138 + +Fleet in being, phrase first used by Torrington, 42; + defined, 45, 58; + a form of disputed command, 30-48 + +Fleets, supply of, 140 + +Food Supply, Royal Commission on, 99 + +Fortress fleet, 48, 58; + Admiral Mahan on, 47, 55 + + +Ganteaume, at Brest, 31 + +General chase, 125 + +General Staff, the, 117 + +Germany, Navy Law of 1900, 130 + +Goschen, Lord, quoted, 124 + +Gravelines, 79, 87 + +Gunfleet, the, 37, 40, 44 + + +Hague Conference, 102 + +Hannay, Mr David, 100 + +Hannibal, his passage of the Alps, 61 + +Hardy, Nelson's, on big ships, 124 + +Hawke, 32; + blockades Brest 79; + at Quiberon Bay, 126 + +Hornby, Sir Geoffrey, on the command of the sea, 45 + + +Invasion, 51, 68-92; + dilemma of, 70 + +Invasion over sea, three ways of, 75 + + +James II., 32 + +Justin of Nassau, and the Armada, 79 + + +Killigrew, Vice-Admiral, 34, 37, 39, 40, 44, 78; + his expedition to Cadiz, 34; + his return to Plymouth, 35. + +Knight, Rear-Admiral, escorts Craig, 65 + + +Lagos, Boscawen and De La Clue at, 79 + +Lepanto, Battle of, 112 + +Line of battle, the, 113 + +Lisbon, Craig and Knight at, 65 + +Lissa, Battle of, 8 + +Louis XIV., 33 + + +Maddalena Bay, Nelson's base at, 143 + +Mahan, Admiral, on commerce at sea, 98, 99; + on a fleet in being, 31, 43; + on a fortress fleet, 47, 55; + on Hannibal's passage of the Alps, 61; + on Nelson, 48, 123; + on territorial expansion, 52 + +Maida, Battle of, 66 + +Makaroff, Admiral, 47, 59 + +Manchuria, 59; Japanese successes in, 55 + +Maria Theresa, 80 + +Mary, Queen, her orders to Torrington, 40, 44 + +Mathews, his action off Toulon, 80; + in the Mediterranean, 83, 84 + +Medina Sidonia, and the Armada, 79 + +Mediterranean, the, England's position in, 136, 137 + +Merchant vessels, conversion of into warships at sea, 101-104 + +Morbihan, the, troops collected in, 79 + + +Napoleon, 30, 31; and the campaign of Trafalgar, 18, 19; + his descent on Egypt, 61, 73; + his ignorance of the sea, 74 + +Naval force, differentiation of, 111-128; + distribution and supply of, 129-145 + +Naval strength, measure of, 129 + +Naval warfare, defined, 1; + special characteristic of, 56; + its limitations, 51; + philosophy of, 145; + its primary aim, 14 + +Nelson, 18, 32, 46, 123; + his advanced squadron, 127; + and Barham, 66, 67; + his base at Maddalena Bay, 143; + on the blockade of Toulon, 22; + on Craig's expedition, 64; + evaded by Napoleon, 73; + evaded by Villeneuve, 63; + at Trafalgar, 60; + his Trafalgar Memorandum, 126; + his pursuit of Villeneuve, 37, 38 + +Newcastle, Duke of, 83 + +Nile, Battle of the, 74 + +Norman Conquest, the, 68, 75 + +Norris, Sir John, 83; + in the Downs, 87; + leaves the Downs, 88; + and Roquefeuil at Dungeness, 89; + at St Helen's, 85, 86 + +North Sea, concentration in, 135 + + +Orde, Sir John, raises the blockade of Cadiz, 65 + +Orders in Council, the British, 100 + + +Parma, Duke of, and the Armada, 79 + +Peace strategy of position, 131, 132, 136 + +Philippines, the, acquired by the United States, 52 + +Pitt, 61, 62, 63, 67 + +Plymouth, Killigrew at, 35 + +Pompey, at Pharsalus, 71, 72 + +Port Arthur, 27; + how blockaded by Togo, 26, 143; + its capture by Japan, 54, 55; + first Japanese attack on, 46; + Russian fleet at, 47, 58 + +Pretender, the, 80 + +Privateering, 99, 101 + +Property, private, at sea, 95-97 + +Puerto Rico, acquired by the United States, 52 + + +Quiberon Bay, Battle of, 79, 126 + + +Rochefort, Allemand escapes from, 66, 67 + +Roquefeuil, De, at Brest, 81, 82; + anchors at Dungeness, 87; + puts to sea, 82; + and Norris at Dungeness, 89; + off the Start, 84, 86 + +Rozhdestvensky, at Tsu-Shima, 60 + + +Sampson, Admiral, 46 + +Santiago, 46; + its capture by the United States, 54 + +Saxe, Marshal, at Dunkirk, 81; + with Baraille at Dunkirk, 88 + +Sea, its characteristics, 13 + +Sea power, 6, 10, 13, 52, 55 + +Sea transport, 14 + +Sebastopol, siege of, 6, 46 + +Shovel, Sir Cloudesley, 33, 35, 39, 40, 44, 78 + +Sovereignty of the Seas, 49, 50 + +St Helen's, Norris at, 85, 86 + +Start, the, De Roquefeuil off, 84, 86 + +Submarine, the, 24, 120, 121 + +Supply, of fleets, two alternative methods of, 142 + +Syracuse, Athenian expedition to, 61 + + +Talavera, Battle of, 73 + +Teignmouth, French raid on, 42 + +Telegraphy, wireless, 26, 117 + +Togo, Admiral, 59; + his method of blockading Port Arthur, 26, 143 + +Torbay, Tourville's projected descent on, 33 + +Torpedo craft, 24, 57, 69, 120 + +Torpedo, the locomotive, 24 + +Torrington, Arthur Herbert, Earl of, 34, 35, 36, 47, 78; + anchors at Beachy Head, 41; + Admiral Bridge on, 32, 40, 42; + Colomb on, 43; + on a fleet in being, 32, 42; + ordered to give battle, 44; + his strategy, 38, 39; + tried by Court Martial, 42; + warns Mary and her Council, 40 + +Toulon, Château-Renault at, 33 + +Tourville, 33, 34, 43, 44, 48, 70, 78; + at Brest, 35; + in the Channel, 36 + +Trade routes, 104 + +Trafalgar, 63; + campaign of, 90, 91; + and Craig's expedition, 61; + its significance, 19 + +Tsu-Shima, Battle of, its effects, 54, 55 + + +Utrecht, Treaty of, 82 + + +Villeneuve, pursued by Nelson, 37; + driven out of the West Indies, 38; + leaves Toulon, 63 + + +War, defined, 1; + its origin, 2; + its primary object, 4; + of American Independence, 99, 133; + Boer, 8, 56, 94; + civil, 1, 2; + Crimean, 6; + Cuban, 9, 46; + in the Far East, 9; + of 1859, 7; + of 1866, 7; + of 1870, 8, 54; + of Secession in America, 2, 7; + the Seven Years', 79 + +Wars, the Dutch, 93, 113 + +War Staff, 118, 119 + +Wellington, 73; + his Peninsular Campaigns, 19 + +William the Conqueror, 68 + +William III., 32 + +Wolseley, Lord, on communications, 73 + + + + +PRINTED BY + +TURNBULL AND SPEARS, + +EDINBURGH + + + + +THE + +CAMBRIDGE MANUALS + +OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE + + Published by the Cambridge University Press under the general + editorship of P. Giles, Litt.D., Master of Emmanuel College, and A.C. + Seward, F.R.S., Professor of Botany in the University of Cambridge. + + A series of handy volumes dealing with a wide range of subjects and + bringing the results of modern research and intellectual activity + within the reach both of the student and of the ordinary reader. + +80 VOLUMES NOW READY + + +HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY + +42 Ancient Assyria. By Rev. C.H.W. Johns, Litt.D. + +51 Ancient Babylonia. By Rev. C.H.W. Johns, Litt.D. + +40 A History of Civilization in Palestine. By Prof. R.A.S. Macalister, +M.A., F.S.A. + +78 The Peoples of India. By J.D. Anderson, M.A. + +49 China and the Manchus. By Prof. H.A. Giles, LL.D. + +79 The Evolution of Modern Japan. By J.H. Longford. + +43 The Civilization of Ancient Mexico. By Lewis Spence. + +60 The Vikings. By Prof. Allen Mawer, M.A. + +24 New Zealand. By the Hon. Sir Robert Stout, K.C.M.G., LL.D., and +J. Logan Stout, LL.B. (N.Z.). + +76 Naval Warfare. By J.R. Thursfield, M.A. + +15 The Ground Plan of the English Parish Church. By A. Hamilton Thompson, +M.A., F.S.A. + +16 The Historical Growth of the English Parish Church. By A. Hamilton +Thompson, M.A., F.S.A. + +68 English Monasteries. By A.H. Thompson, M.A., F.S.A. + +50 Brasses. By J.S.M. Ward, B.A., F.R.Hist.S. + +59 Ancient Stained and Painted Glass. By F.S. Eden. + +80 A Grammar of Heraldry. By W.H. St J. Hope, Litt.D. + + +ECONOMICS + +70 Copartnership in Industry. By C.R. Fay, M.A. + +6 Cash and Credit. By D.A. Barker. + +67 The Theory of Money. By D.A. Barker. + + +LITERARY HISTORY + +8 The Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews. By the Rev. E.G. King, +D.D. + +21 The Early Religious Poetry of Persia. By the Rev. Prof. J. Hope +Moulton, D.D., D.Theol. (Berlin). + +9 The History of the English Bible. By John Brown, D.D. + +12 English Dialects from the Eighth Century to the Present Day. By +W.W. Skeat, Litt.D., D.C.L., F.B.A. + +22 King Arthur in History and Legend. By Prof. W. Lewis Jones, M.A. + +54 The Icelandic Sagas. By W.A. Craigie, LL.D. + +23 Greek Tragedy. By J.T. Sheppard, M.A. + +33 The Ballad in Literature. By T.F. Henderson. + +37 Goethe and the Twentieth Century. By Prof. J.G. Robertson, M.A., +Ph.D. + +39 The Troubadours. By the Rev. H.J. Chaytor, M.A. + +66 Mysticism in English Literature. By Miss C.F.E. Spurgeon. + + +PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION + +4 The Idea of God in Early Religions. By Dr F.B. Jevons. + +57 Comparative Religion. By Dr F.B. Jevons. + +69 Plato: Moral and Political Ideals. By Mrs J. Adam. + +26 The Moral Life and Moral Worth. By Prof. Sorley, Litt.D. + +3 The English Puritans. By John Brown, D.D. + +11 An Historical Account of the Rise and Development of +Presbyterianism in Scotland. By the Rt Hon. the Lord Balfour of +Burleigh, K.T., G.C.M.G. + +41 Methodism. By Rev. H.B. Workman, D.Lit. + + +EDUCATION + +38 Life in the Medieval University. By R.S. Rait, M.A. + + +LAW + +13 The Administration of Justice in Criminal Matters (in England and +Wales). By G. Glover Alexander, M.A., LL.M. + + +BIOLOGY + +1 The Coming of Evolution. By Prof. J.W. Judd, C.B., F.R.S. + +2 Heredity in the Light of Recent Research. By L. Doncaster, M.A. + +25 Primitive Animals. By Geoffrey Smith, M.A. + +73 The Life-story of Insects. By Prof. G.H. Carpenter. + +48 The Individual in the Animal Kingdom. By J.S. Huxley, B.A. + +27 Life in the Sea. By James Johnstone, B.Sc. + +75 Pearls. By Prof. W.J. Dakin. + +28 The Migration of Birds. By T.A. Coward. + +36 Spiders. By C. Warburton, M.A. + +61 Bees and Wasps. By O.H. Latter, M.A. + +46 House Flies. By C.G. Hewitt, D.Sc. + +32 Earthworms and their Allies. By F.E. Beddard, F.R.S. + +74 The Flea. By H. Russell. + +64 The Wanderings of Animals. By H.F. Gadow, F.R.S. + + +ANTHROPOLOGY + +20 The Wanderings of Peoples. By Dr A.C. Haddon, F.R.S. + +29 Prehistoric Man. By Dr W.L.H. Duckworth. + + +GEOLOGY + +35 Rocks and their Origins. By Prof. Grenville A.J. Cole. + +44 The Work of Rain and Rivers. By T.G. Bonney, Sc.D. + +7 The Natural History of Coal. By Dr E.A. Newell Arber. + +30 The Natural History of Clay. By Alfred B. Searle. + +34 The Origin of Earthquakes. By C. Davison, Sc.D., F.G.S. + +62 Submerged Forests. By Clement Reid, F.R.S. + +72 The Fertility of the Soil. By E.J. Russell, D.Sc. + + +BOTANY + +5 Plant-Animals: a Study in Symbiosis. By Prof. F.W. Keeble. + +10 Plant-Life on Land. By Prof. F.O. Bower, Sc.D., F.R.S. + +19 Links with the Past in the Plant-World. By Prof. A.C. Seward, +F.R.S. + + +PHYSICS + +52 The Earth. By Prof. J.H. Poynting, F.R.S. + +53 The Atmosphere. By A.J. Berry, M.A. + +65 Beyond the Atom. By John Cox, M.A. + +55 The Physical Basis of Music. By A. Wood, M.A. + +71 Natural Sources of Energy. By Prof. A.H. Gibson, D.Sc. + + +PSYCHOLOGY + +14 An Introduction to Experimental Psychology. By Dr. C.S. Myers. + +45 The Psychology of Insanity. By Bernard Hart, M.D. + +77 The Beautiful. By Vernon Lee. + + +INDUSTRIAL AND MECHANICAL SCIENCE + +31 The Modern Locomotive. By C. Edgar Allen, A.M.I.Mech.E. + +56 The Modern Warship. By E.L. Attwood. + +17 Aerial Locomotion. By E.H. Harper, M.A., and Allan E. Ferguson, +B.Sc. + +18 Electricity in Locomotion. By A.G. Whyte, B.Sc. + +63 Wireless Telegraphy. By Prof. C.L. Fortescue, M.A. + +58 The Story of a Loaf of Bread. By Prof. T.B. Wood, M.A. + +47 Brewing. By A. Chaston Chapman, F.I.C. + + * * * * * + + "A very valuable series of books which combine in a very happy way a + popular presentation of scientific truth along with the accuracy of + treatment which in such subjects is essential.... In their general + appearance, and in the quality of their binding, print, and paper, + these volumes are perhaps the most satisfactory of all those which + offer to the inquiring layman the hardly earned products of technical + and specialist research."--_Spectator_ + + "A complete set of these manuals is as essential to the equipment of + a good school as is an encyclopaedia.... We can conceive no better + series of handy books for ready reference than those represented by + the Cambridge Manuals."--_School World_ + + Cambridge University Press + C.F. Clay, Manager + LONDON: Fetter Lane, E.C. + EDINBURGH: 100 Princes Street + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Naval Warfare, by James R. Thursfield + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAVAL WARFARE *** + +***** This file should be named 33445-8.txt or 33445-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/3/4/4/33445/ + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Graeme Mackreth and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/33445-8.zip b/33445-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8999e46 --- /dev/null +++ b/33445-8.zip diff --git a/33445-h.zip b/33445-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..082dfe9 --- /dev/null +++ b/33445-h.zip diff --git a/33445-h/33445-h.htm b/33445-h/33445-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..138f3cc --- /dev/null +++ b/33445-h/33445-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,4611 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Naval warfare, by James R. Thursfield. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; } + + + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + } + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + + + body{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + + .pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + } /* page numbers */ + + + .blockquot{margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 10%;} + + + + + .center {text-align: center;} + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + .u {text-decoration: underline;} + + .TOC {list-style-type: upper-roman; + margin-left: 3em; + text-align: left; + line-height: 150%;} + + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Naval Warfare, by James R. Thursfield + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Naval Warfare + +Author: James R. Thursfield + +Release Date: August 16, 2010 [EBook #33445] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAVAL WARFARE *** + + + + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Graeme Mackreth and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p class="center"> +<img src="images/illus03.jpg" alt="cover" /> +</p> + + + + +<p class='center' style="margin-top: 5em;">The Cambridge Manuals of Science and +Literature</p> + + +<h1>NAVAL WARFARE +</h1> + + +<p class='center' style="margin-top: 10em;"><small> +CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS<br /> +<br /> +London: FETTER LANE, E.C.<br /> +<br /> +C.F. CLAY, <span class="smcap">Manager</span></small></p> + +<p class="center"> +<img src="images/illus01.jpg" alt="badge" /> +</p> + +<p class='center'><small> +Edinburgh: 100 PRINCES STREET<br /> +Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.<br /> +Leipzig: F.A. BROCKHAUS<br /> +New York: G.P. PUTNAM'S SONS<br /> +Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., <span class="smcap">Ltd.</span></small></p> + + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 5em;" > +<img src="images/illus02.jpg" alt="frontispiece" /> +</p> + + + + + +<p class='center'><i>With the exception of the coat of arms at the foot, the design on the +title page is a reproduction of one used by the earliest known Cambridge +printer, John Siberch, 1521</i></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> + + + + +<div> +<p style="margin-left: 5.5em;"> +<a href='#INTRODUCTION'><b><span class="smcap">Introduction by Sir Charles Ottley</span></b></a> <br /> + +<a href="#PREFACE"><b><span class="smcap">Preface</span> </b> </a> +</p> +<ul class="TOC"> + <li><a href='#CHAPTER_I'><b><span class="smcap">Introductory</span></b></a></li> + + <li><a href='#CHAPTER_II'><b><span class="smcap">The Command of the Sea</span></b></a> </li> + + <li><a href='#CHAPTER_III'><b><span class="smcap">Disputed Command—Blockade</span></b></a> </li> + +<li><a href='#CHAPTER_IV'><b> <span class="smcap">Disputed Command—the Fleet in Being</span> </b></a> </li> + + <li><a href='#CHAPTER_V'><b><span class="smcap">Disputed Command in general</span></b></a></li> + + <li><a href='#CHAPTER_VI'><b><span class="smcap">Invasion</span></b></a> </li> + +<li><a href='#CHAPTER_VII'><b><span class="smcap">Commerce in War</span></b></a></li> + + <li><a href='#CHAPTER_VIII'><b><span class="smcap">The Differentiation of Naval Force</span> </b></a></li> + + <li><a href='#CHAPTER_IX'><b><span class="smcap">The Distribution and Supply of Naval Force</span></b></a> </li> +</ul> +<p style="margin-left: 5.5em;"> +<a href="#INDEX"><b><span class="smcap">Index</span> </b></a> </p> +</div> + + + +<h2><a name="INTRODUCTION" id="INTRODUCTION"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span>The title chosen by its author for this little volume would assuredly +commend it to the Naval Service, even if that author's name were not—as +it is—a household word with more than one generation of naval officers. +But to such of the general public as are not yet familiar with Mr +Thursfield's writings a brief word of introduction may perhaps be +useful. For the matters herein dealt with are by no means of interest +only to the naval profession. They have their bearing also on every +calling and trade. In these days when national policy is at the mercy of +the ballot-box, it is not too much to say that a right understanding of +the principles of maritime warfare is almost as desirable amongst +civilians as amongst professional sailors.</p> + +<p>Regrettable indeed would it be if the mere fact that this little book +bears a more or less technical title should tempt the careless to skip +its pages or pitch it to that dreary limbo which attends even the best +of text-books on subjects which we think do not concern us. The fruits +of naval victory, the calamities attendant on naval defeat are matters<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> +which will come home—in Bacon's classic phrase—to the business and the +bosoms of all of us, landsmen and seamen alike. Most Englishmen are at +least dimly aware of this. They realise, more or less reluctantly +perhaps, that a decisive British defeat at sea under modern conditions +would involve unspeakable consequences, consequences not merely fatal to +the structure of the Empire but destructive also of the roots of our +national life and of the well-being of almost all individuals in these +islands.</p> + +<p>Elementary prudence insists on adequate safeguards against evils so +supreme, and amongst those safeguards the education of the people to-day +occupies a foremost place. Our Empire's destinies for good and evil are +now in the hands of the masses of the people. Sincerely as all lovers of +ordered freedom may rejoice in this devolution of political power to the +people, thoughtful men will be apt to reflect that an uninstructed crowd +is seldom right in its collective action. If Ministerial responsibility +has dwindled, <i>pro tanto</i> that of each one of His Majesty's lieges has +enormously increased; and it is more incumbent on the nation's rank and +file to-day than ever in the past to equip themselves with the knowledge +necessary to enable them to record their votes aright.</p> + +<p>It is from this point of view that this Manual should be read. It +epitomises the principles upon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span> which success in naval warfare depends. +It shows how the moral factor in all cases and at every epoch dominates +and controls the material; how the "<i>animus pugnandi</i>," as Mr Thursfield +calls it, the desire to get at the enemy in "anything that floats," +transcends every other weapon in a nation's armoury; how if that spirit +is present, all other difficulties can be surmounted, and how without it +the thickest armour, the biggest all-shattering guns shrivel in battle +to the measure of mere useless scrap iron.</p> + +<p>This is the message of the book for the seaman. But—and this is of the +essence of the whole matter—for the landsman it has also a lesson of a +very different kind. His responsibility is for the material factor in +naval war. Let him note the supreme value of the moral factor; let him +encourage it with all possible honour and homage, but let him not limit +his contribution to the nation's fighting capital to any mere empty +lip-service of this kind. The moral factor is primarily the sailor's +business. The landsman's duty is to see to it that when war comes our +sailors are sent to sea, not in "anything that floats" but in the most +modern and perfect types of warship that human ingenuity can design.</p> + +<p>How can this fundamental duty be brought home to the individual +Englishman? Certainly not by asking him to master the niceties of +modern<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> naval technique, matters on which every nation must trust to its +experts. But, the broad principles of naval warfare are to-day precisely +as they were at Salamis or Lepanto; and to a people such as ours, whose +history from its dawn has been moulded by maritime conditions, and which +to-day more than ever depends upon free oversea communications for its +continued existence, these broad principles governing naval warfare have +so real a significance that they may wisely be studied by all classes of +the community.</p> + +<p>Tactics indeed have profoundly altered, and from age to age may be +expected to change indefinitely. But so long as the sea remains naval +warfare will turn upon the command of the sea; a "Fleet in Being" will +not cease to be as real a threat to its foe as it was in the days of +Torrington; invasion of oversea territory will always be limited by the +same inexorable factors which for centuries have told in favour of the +British race and have kept the fields of England inviolate from the +tread of a conqueror.</p> + +<p>There are indications that still more heavy sacrifices will be demanded +from the British taxpayer for the upkeep of the Fleet in the future than +has been the case even in the recent past. Nothing but iron necessity +can justify this unfruitful expenditure, this alienation of the +national<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> resources in men and money to the purposes of destruction. +Even as it is, naval administrators are finding it increasingly +difficult to carry all sections of politicians and the whole of the +masses of this country with them in these ever-increasing demands. The +best way of ensuring that future generations of Englishmen will rise to +the necessary height of a patriotic sense of duty and will record their +votes in support of such reasonable demands is to prepare their minds by +an elementary knowledge of what naval warfare really means.</p> + +<p>No Englishman, so far as the writer is aware, is better fitted than Mr +Thursfield to undertake this task, and this little book is a very +excellent example of the way in which that task should be fulfilled. It +unites—very necessarily—a high degree of condensation with a +simplicity of language and a lucidity of exposition both alike +admirable. And Mr Thursfield's right to be heard on naval questions is +second to that of no civilian in these islands. His relations with the +British Navy have been for more than a quarter of a century of the +closest kind. His reputation in the particular field of literary +endeavour which he has made his own ranks high amongst writers as +celebrated as Admiral Mahan, Sir George Sydenham Clarke (Lord Sydenham), +the late Sir John Colomb, and his brother the late Admiral P.H. Colomb, +Sir<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> J.K. Laughton, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Admiral Sir R.N. +Custance, Mr Julian Corbett, Mr David Hannay, Mr Archibald Hurd, and +others. In the domain of naval history, its philosophy and its +literature, he has done brilliant work. When it is added that Mr +Thursfield is known to have been, for many years, one of the chief naval +advisers of <i>The Times</i>, enough will probably have been said to ensure a +sympathetic attention for this the veteran author's latest publication.</p> + +<p style="margin-left: 40em;"> +C.L. OTTLEY +</p> + +<p><i>24th July 1913</i></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE</h2> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span>Intelligent readers of this little Manual will perceive at once that it +pretends to be nothing more than an introduction, quite elementary in +character, to the study of naval warfare, its history, and its +principles as displayed in its history. As such, I trust it may be found +useful by those of my countrymen who desire to approach the naval +problems which are constantly being brought to their notice and +consideration with sound judgment and an intelligent grasp of the +principles involved in their solution. It is the result of much study +and of a sustained intimacy with the sea service, both afloat and +ashore, such as few civilians have been privileged to enjoy in greater +measure. Even so, I should have thought it right, as a civilian, to +offer some apology for undertaking to deal with so highly technical and +professional a subject, were I not happily relieved of that obligation +by the kindness of my friend Rear-Admiral Sir Charles L. Ottley, who +has, at the instance of the Editors of this series, contributed to this +volume an Introduction in which my qualifications are set forth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> with an +appreciation which I cannot but regard as far too flattering. It would +ill become me to add a single word—unless it were of deprecation—to +credentials expounded on such high authority.</p> + +<p>I should hope that readers who have found this volume useful to them +will not confine their studies to it. Abundant materials for a deeper +and more comprehensive study of the subject will be found in the several +works incidentally mentioned or quoted in my text, and in the writings +of those other contemporary authors with whom Sir Charles Ottley has +done me the high honour to associate myself. In these several works +further guidance to a still more sustained study of the subject will be +found, and in this regard I would specially mention the admirable <i>Short +History of the Royal Navy</i>, by Mr David Hannay—two volumes which, in +addition to their other and more conspicuous merits, contain a +well-selected list of authorities to be consulted prefixed to each +chapter. These references, which in truth cover the whole subject, will, +I trust, better serve the purpose of the advanced or advancing student +than any such Bibliography as I could compile on a scale commensurate +with the form and purpose of the present Manual.</p> + +<p>Readers of my other writings on naval topics will, perhaps, observe that +in one or two cases, where the same topics had to be discussed, I have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> +not hesitated to reproduce, with or without modification, the language I +had previously employed. This has been done deliberately. The topics so +treated fell naturally and, indeed, necessarily within the scope of the +present volume. To exclude them because I had discussed them elsewhere +was impossible. Wherever I found I could improve the language previously +employed in the direction of greater lucidity and precision I have done +so to the best of my ability, so that the passages in question are close +paraphrases rather than mere transcripts of those which occur elsewhere. +But I have not attempted to disguise or weaken by paraphrase any +passages which still seemed to me to convey my meaning better than any +other words I could choose.</p> + +<p>Changes in the methods, though not in the principles, of naval warfare +are in these days so rapid and often so sudden that one or two topics +have emerged into public prominence even since the present volume was in +type. I desire therefore to take this opportunity of adding a few +supplementary remarks on them. The first, and possibly in the long run +the most far-reaching of these topics, is that of aviation, which I have +only mentioned incidentally in the text. That aviation is still in its +infancy is a truism. But to forecast the scope and direction of its +evolution is as yet impossible.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span> For the moment it may perhaps be said +that its offensive capacity—its capacity, that is, to determine or even +materially to affect the larger issues of naval warfare—is +inconsiderable. I say nothing of the future, whether immediate or +remote. Any day may witness developments which will give entirely new +aspects to the whole problem. In the meanwhile the chief functions of +aircraft in war will probably be, for some time to come, those of +scouting, observation, and the collection and transmission of +intelligence not obtainable by any other means. Offensive functions of a +more direct and formidable character will doubtless be developed in +time, and may be developed soon; but as I am no prophet I cannot attempt +to forecast the direction of the evolution, to determine its limits, or +to indicate its probable effects on the methods of naval warfare as +expounded in the following pages. I will, however, advance two +propositions which will not, I believe, be gainsaid by competent +authorities. They are true for the moment, though how long they may +remain true I do not know. One is that no aircraft yet constructed can +take or keep the air in all conditions of weather. The number of days in +the year in which it can do so in safety can only be represented by the +formula 365-<i>x</i>, in which <i>x</i> is as yet an unknown quantity, though it +is no doubt a quantity which will diminish<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> as the art of aviation is +developed. The other is that there is as yet no known method of +navigating an aircraft with accuracy and precision out of sight of land. +The air-currents by which it is affected are imperceptible to those +embarked, variable and indeterminate in their force and direction, and +quite incapable of being charted beforehand. In these conditions an +airman who sought to steer by compass alone, say, from Bermuda to New +York, might perchance find himself either at Halifax, on the one hand, +or at Charleston on the other.</p> + +<p>In my chapter on "Invasion" no mention is made of those subsidiary forms +of military enterprise across the sea which are known as raids. I have +treated invasion as an enterprise having for its object the subjugation +of the country invaded, or at least the subjection of its people and +their rulers to the enemy's will. As such it requires a force +commensurate in numbers with the object to be attained, and it stands to +reason that this force must needs be so large that its chances of +evading the vigilance of an enemy who is in effective command of the sea +must always be infinitesimal. A raid, on the other hand, is an +enterprise of much lesser magnitude and much smaller moment. Its method +is to elude the enemy's naval guard at this or that point of his +territory; and, having done so, its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span> +confusion and to do as much harm as they can—which may be considerable +before their sea communications are severed by the defending naval force +assumed to be still in effective command of the sea affected. If that +command is maintained, the troops engaged in the raid must inevitably be +reduced sooner or later to the condition of a forlorn hope which has +failed. If, on the other hand, that command is overthrown, then the +troops aforesaid may prove to be the advanced guard of an invasion to +follow. Thus, although a successful raid may sometimes be carried out in +the teeth of an adverse command of the sea, yet it cannot be converted +into an invasion until that adverse command has been assailed and +overthrown. It is thus essentially fugitive in character, possibly very +effective as a diversion, certain to be mortifying to the belligerent +assailed, and not at all unlikely to cause him much injury and even more +alarm, but quite incapable of deciding the larger issues of the conflict +so long as his command of the sea remains unchallenged. It is perhaps +expedient to say this much on the subject, because the programme of the +Naval Manœuvres of this year is known to have included a series of +raids of this fugitive character. Whether, or to what extent, any of +these operations were<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span> adjudged to have been successful I do not know. I +am only concerned to point out that, whether successful or not, their +utmost success can throw little or no light on the problem of invasion +unless in the course of the same operations the defenders' command of +the sea was adjudged to have been overthrown.</p> + +<p>In my chapter on "The Differentiation of Naval Force" I endeavoured to +define the functions of the so-called "battle-cruiser" and to forecast +its special uses in war. At the same time I pointed out that "it is held +by some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a +hybrid and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can +be given." It would appear that the views of these high authorities have +now been adopted, in some measure at least, by the Admiralty. Since the +chapter in question was in type it has been officially announced that +the battle-cruiser has been placed in temporary, and perhaps permanent, +abeyance. Its place is to be taken by a special type of fast battleship, +vessels in every way fit to lie in a line and yet, at the same time, +endowed with qualities which, without unduly increasing their size and +displacement, will enable them to discharge the special functions which +I assigned to the battle-cruiser in the line of battle. This is done by +employing oil instead of coal as the source of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a></span> ship's motive power. +The change thus adumbrated would seem to be in the natural order of +evolution, and at the same time to be in large measure one rather of +nomenclature than of substance. The battle-cruiser, as its name implies, +is itself essentially a fast battleship in one aspect and an exceedingly +powerful cruiser in another. In the fast battleship which is to replace +it, the battle function will be still further developed at the expense +of the cruiser function. But its speed will still qualify it to be +employed as a cruiser whenever occasion serves or necessity requires, +just as the battle-cruiser was qualified to lie in a line and do its +special work in a fleet action. The main difference is that the fast +battleship is much less likely to be employed as a cruiser than the +battle-cruiser was; but I pointed out in the text that the employment +even of the battle-cruiser in cruiser functions proper was likely to be +only occasional and subsidiary.</p> + +<p>The decision to use oil as the exclusive source of the motive power of +fast battleships, and of certain types of small cruisers of exceptional +speed, is undoubtedly a very significant one. It may be taken to point +to a time when oil only will be employed in the propulsion of warships +and coal will be discarded altogether. But that consummation can only be +reached when the internal combustion engine has been much more highly +developed for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a> </span>purposes of marine propulsion than it is at present. At +present oil is only employed in large warships for the purpose of +producing steam by the external combustion of the oil. But it may be +anticipated that a process of evolution, now in its initial stages in +the Diesel and other internal combustion engines, will in course of time +result in the production of an internal combustion engine capable of +propelling the largest ships at any speed that is now attainable by +existing methods. When that stage is reached oil will, for economic +reasons alone, undoubtedly hold the field for all purposes of propulsion +in warships. It is held by some that this country will then be placed at +a great disadvantage, inasmuch as it possesses a monopoly of the best +steam coal, whereas it has no monopoly of oil at all, and probably no +sufficient domestic supply of it to meet the needs of the Fleet in time +of war. But oil can be stored as easily as coal and, unlike coal, it +does not deteriorate in storage. To bring it in sufficient supplies from +abroad in time of war should be no more difficult for a Power which +commands the sea than to bring in the supplies of food and raw material +on which this country depends at all times for its very existence. +Moreover, even if we continued to depend on coal alone, that coal, +together with other supplies in large quantities, must, as I have shown +in my last chapter, be carried across the seas in a continuous<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a></span> stream +to our fleets in distant waters, and one of the great advantages of oil +over coal is that it can be transferred with the greatest ease to the +warships requiring it at any rendezvous on the high seas, whether in +home waters or at the uttermost ends of the globe, which may be most +conveniently situated for the conduct of the operations in hand. For +these reasons I hold that no serious apprehension need be entertained +lest the supply of oil to our warships should fail so long as we hold +the command of the sea. If ever we lost the command of the sea we should +not be worrying about the supply of oil. Oil or no oil, we should be +starving, destitute and defenceless.</p> + +<p>It only remains for me to express my gratitude to my friend Sir Charles +Ottley, not merely for an Introduction in which I cannot but fear that +he has allowed his friendship to get the better of his judgment, but +also for his kindness in devoting so much of his scanty leisure to the +reading of my proofs and the making of many valuable suggestions +thereon. I have also to thank my friend Captain Herbert W. Richmond, +R.N., for his unselfish kindness in allowing me to make use of his notes +on the Dunkirk campaign which he has closely studied in the original +papers preserved at the Admiralty and the Record Office. To my son, +Lieutenant H.G. Thursfield, R.N., I am also indebted for many<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[Pg xxiii]</a></span> valuable +suggestions. Finally, my acknowledgments are due to the Editors of this +series and the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for their +uniform courtesy and consideration.</p> + +<p style="margin-left: 40em;"> +J.R.T. +</p> + +<p><i>4th September 1913.</i></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>NAVAL WARFARE</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<p class='center'>INTRODUCTORY<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + + +<p>War is the armed conflict of national wills, an appeal to force as +between nation and nation. Naval warfare is that part of the conflict +which takes place on the seas. The civilized world is divided into +separate, independent States or nations, each sovereign within its own +borders. Each State pursues its own ideas and aims and embodies them in +a national policy; and so far as this policy affects only its own +citizens, it is subject to no control except that of the national +conscience and the national sense of the public welfare. Within the +State itself civil war may arise when internal dissensions divide the +nation into two parties, of which either pursues a policy to which the +other refuses to submit. In this case, unless the two parties agree to +separate without conflict, as was done by Sweden and Norway a few years +ago, an armed conflict ensues and the nation is divided into two +belligerent States which may or may not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> become, according to the +fortune of war, separate, independent, and sovereign in the end. The +great example of this in our own time was the War of Secession in +America, which, happily for both parties, ended without disruption, in +the surrender of the weaker of the two, and after a time in a complete +reconciliation between them.</p> + +<p>Thus war may arise between two parties in a single State, and when it +does the two parties become, to all intents and purposes, separate, +independent, and sovereign States for the time being, and are, for the +most part, so regarded and treated by other independent States not +taking part in the conflict. For this reason, though the origin of a +civil war may differ widely in all its circumstances and conditions from +that of a war between two separate States, sovereign and independent <i>ab +initio</i>, yet as soon as a state of war is established, as distinct from +that of a puny revolt or a petty rebellion, there is, for a student of +war, no practical difference between a civil war and any other kind of +war. Both fall under the definition of war as the armed conflict of +national wills.</p> + +<p>Between two separate, sovereign, independent nations a state of war +arises in this wise. We have seen that the internal policy of an +independent State is subject to no direct external control. But States +do not exist in isolation. Their citizens<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> trade with the citizens of +other States, seeking to exchange the products of their respective +industries to the advantage of both. As they grow in prosperity, wealth, +and population, their capital seeks employment in other lands, and their +surplus population seeks an outlet in such regions of the earth as are +open to their occupation. Thus arise external relations between one +State and another, and the interests affected by these relations are +often found—and perhaps still more often believed—by one State to be +at variance with those of another. In pursuit of these interests—which, +as they grow and expand, become embodied in great consolidated kingdoms, +great colonial empires, or great imperial dependencies, and tend to be +regarded in time as paramount to all other national interests—each +State formulates and pursues an external policy of its own which may or +may not be capable of amicable adjustment to the policy of other States +engaged in similar enterprises. It is the function of diplomacy to +effect adjustments such as these where it can. It succeeds much more +often than it fails. Conflicting policies are deflected by mutual +agreement and concession so as to avoid the risk of collision, and each +State, without abandoning its policy, modifies it and adjusts it to the +exigencies of the occasion. Sometimes, however, diplomacy fails, either +because the conflicting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> policies are really irreconcilable, or because +passion, prejudice, national ambition, or international misunderstanding +induces the citizens of both States and their rulers so to regard them. +In that case, if neither State is prepared so to deflect its policy as +to avert collision, war ensues. The policy remains unchanged, but the +means of further pursuing it, otherwise than by an appeal to force, are +exhausted. War is thus, according to the famous definition of +Clausewitz, the pursuit of national policy by other means than those +which mere diplomacy has at its command—in other words by the conflict +of armed force. Each State now seeks to bend its enemy's will to its own +and to impose its policy upon him.</p> + +<p>The means of pursuing this policy vary almost indefinitely. But inasmuch +as war is essentially the conflict of armed force, the primary object of +each belligerent must in all cases be to subdue, and, in the last +resort, to destroy the armed forces of the adversary. When that is done +all is done that war can do. How to do this most speedily and most +effectively is the fundamental problem of war. There is no cut-and-dried +solution of the problem, because although war may be considered, as it +has been considered above, in the abstract, it is the most concrete of +all human arts and, subject to the fundamental principle above +enunciated, its particular forms may, and indeed must, vary with the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +circumstances and conditions of each particular war. Many commentators +on war distinguishing, with Clausewitz, between "limited" and +"unlimited" war, would further insist that the forms of war must vary +with its objects. I cannot follow this distinction, which seems to me to +be inconsistent with the fundamental proposition of Clausewitz, to the +effect that war is the pursuit of policy by means of the conflict of +armed force. If you desire your policy to prevail you must take the best +means that are open to you to make it prevail. It is worse than useless +to dissipate your energies in the pursuit of any purpose, however +important in itself, which does not directly conduce, and conduce better +than any other purpose you could pursue, to that paramount end. The only +limitation of your efforts that you can tolerate is that they should +involve the least expenditure of energy that may be necessary to make +your policy prevail. But that is a question of the economics of war; it +is not a question of "limited war" or of "war for a limited object." +Your sole object is to bend the enemy to your will. That object is +essentially an unlimited one, or one that is limited only by the extent +of the efforts which the enemy makes to withstand you. The only sure way +of attaining this object is to destroy his armed forces. If he submits +before this is done it is he that limits the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> war, not you. Bacon's +unimpeachable maxim in this regard is often misinterpreted. "This much +is certain," he says, "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and +may take as much or as little of the war as he will." That is +indisputable, but its postulate is that the belligerent has secured the +command of the sea; that is, as I shall show hereafter, that he has +subdued, if not destroyed, the armed forces of the enemy afloat. Having +done that he may, in a certain sense, take as much or as little of the +war as he chooses; but he must always take as much as will compel the +enemy to come to terms.</p> + +<p>Naval warfare is no essential part of the armed conflict between +contending States. In some cases it exercises a decisive influence on +the conduct and issue of the conflict, in others none at all or next to +none. But sea power, that is, the advantage which a nation at war +derives from its superiority at sea, may largely affect the issue of a +war, even though no naval engagements of any moment may take place. In +the Crimean War the unchallenged supremacy of England and France on the +seas alone made it possible for the Allies to invade the Crimea and +undertake the siege of Sebastopol; while the naval campaigns of the +Allies in the Baltic, although they resulted in no decisive naval +operation, yet largely contributed to the success of the Allied arms<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> in +the Crimea by compelling Russia to keep in the north large bodies of +troops which might otherwise have turned the scale against the Allies in +the South. In the War of 1859, between France and Austria, with the +Sardinian kingdom allied to the former, the superiority of the Allies at +sea enabled considerable portions of the French army to be transported +from French to Piedmontese ports, and by threatening the flank of the +Austrian line of advance, it accelerated the concentration of the Allies +on the Ticino. It also enabled the Allies to maintain a close blockade +of the Austrian ports in the Adriatic, and might have led to an attack +from the sea on the Austrian rear in Venetia had not the military +reverses of Austria in Lombardy brought the war to an end. In the War of +Secession in America the issue was largely determined, or at least +accelerated, by the close but not impenetrable blockade established by +the North over the ports and coasts of the South, and by the +co-operation of Farragut on the Mississippi with the Federal land forces +in that region. On the other hand, in the War of 1866 there was no naval +conflict worth mentioning between Austria and Prussia, because Prussia +had no navy to speak of; but as Italy, a naval Power, was the ally of +Prussia, and as Austria had a small but very efficient naval force led +by a great naval commander, the conflict between these two Powers<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> led +to the Battle of Lissa, in which the Italian fleet was decisively +defeated, though the triumph of Prussia over the armies of Austria saved +Italy from the worst consequences of defeat, and indeed obtained for +her, in spite of her military reverses on land, the coveted possession +of Venetia. In the War of 1870 again, although the supremacy of France +on the seas was never seriously challenged by Prussia, yet her collapse +on land was so sudden and complete that her superiority at sea availed +her little or nothing. The maritime trade of Prussia was annihilated for +the time, but it was then too insignificant a factor in the economic +fabric of Prussia for its destruction to count for much, and the fleets +of France rode triumphant in the North Sea and the Baltic; but finding +no ships to fight, having no troops to land, and giving a wide berth to +fortifications with which they were ill-equipped—as ships always are +and always must be—to contend without support from the military arm, +their presence was little more than an idle and futile demonstration. In +the Boer War the influence of England's unchallenged supremacy at sea, +albeit latent, was decisive. The Boers had no naval force of any kind; +but no nation not secure in its dominion of the seas could have +undertaken such a war as England then had to wage, and it was perhaps +only the paramount sea power of this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> country that prevented the +conflict taking a form and assuming dimensions that would have taxed +British endurance to the uttermost and must almost certainly have +entailed the loss of South Africa to the Empire. Certain naval features +of the Cuban War between Spain and the United States, and of the War in +the Far East between Russia and Japan, will be more conveniently +considered in subsequent chapters of this manual.</p> + +<p>The normal correlation and interdependence of naval and military forces +in the armed conflict of national wills is sufficiently illustrated by +the foregoing examples. In certain abnormal and exceptional cases each +can act and produce the desired effect without the other. In a few +extreme cases it is hard to see how either could act at all. If, for +instance, Spain and Switzerland were to fall out, how could either +attack the other? They have no common frontier, and though Spain has a +navy, Switzerland has no seaboard. Cases where naval conflict alone has +decided the issue are those of the early wars between England and +Holland. Neither could reach the other except across the sea, there was +no territorial issue directly involved, and the object of both +combatants was to secure a monopoly of maritime commerce. But as +territorial issues, and territorial issues involving the sea and +affected by it directly or indirectly, are nearly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> always at stake in +great wars, history affords few examples of great international +conflicts in which sea power does not enter as a factor, often of +supreme importance.</p> + +<p>It must of course enter as a factor of paramount importance in any war +between an insular State and a continental one—as in the war between +Russia and Japan—or between two continental States which—as in the war +between Spain and the United States—have no common frontier on land. +War being the armed conflict of national wills, it is manifest that the +opposing wills cannot in cases such as these be brought into armed +conflict unless one State or the other is in a position to operate on +the sea. The first move in such a conflict must of necessity be made, by +one belligerent or the other, on the sea. This involves the conception +of "the command of the sea," and as this is the fundamental conception +of naval warfare as such, our analysis of naval warfare must begin with +an exposition of what is meant by the command of the sea.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE COMMAND OF THE SEA<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span></p> + + +<p>We have seen that when two States go to war the primary object of each +is to subdue and if possible to destroy the armed forces of the other. +Until that is done either completely, or to such an extent as to induce +the defeated belligerent to submit, the conflict of wills cannot be +determined, and the two States cannot return to those normal relations, +involving no violence or force, which constitute a state of peace. If +they have a common frontier this circumstance indicates what is, as a +general rule, the best and most efficient way of securing the object to +be attained. The armed forces of both belligerents lie at the outset +within their respective frontiers. If those of either can be constrained +by the superior strategy of the other to keep within their own +territory, the initial advantage lies with the belligerent who has so +constrained them, and the war has in common parlance been carried into +the enemy's country. In other words, the invasion of the enemy's +territory has begun, and pressure has been brought to bear on his will +which, if maintained without intermission and with an intensity duly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> +proportioned to its growing extent, must in the end subdue it. To this +there is no alternative. To invade the enemy's territory at all is to +inflict a reverse on his armed forces, which would assuredly have +prevented the invasion if they could. The territory in the rear of the +invading army is in greater or less degree brought under the control of +the invader and thereby temporarily lost to the invaded State. If this +process is continued the authority and the resources of the invaded +State are progressively diminished, until at last when the capital is +occupied and the remainder of the invaded country lies open to the +advance of the invader, the defeated State must sue for peace on such +terms as the invader may concede, because it has nothing left to fight +for, and no force wherewithal to fight. This is of course merely an +abstract and generalized description of the course of a war on land, but +I need not consider its concrete details nor analyse any of the +conditions which may, and in the concrete often do, impede or deflect +its course, because my sole purpose is to show how armed force operates +in the abstract to subdue the will of the belligerent who is worsted in +the conflict. It operates by the destruction of his armed forces, by the +occupation of his territory, and by the consequent extinction of his +authority and appropriation of his resources. He can only recover the +latter and liberate his territory by submitting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> to such terms as the +invader may dictate or concede.</p> + +<p>Naval warfare aims at the same primary object, namely, the destruction +of the enemy's armed forces afloat; but it cannot by itself produce the +same decisive effect, because there is no territory which naval force, +as such, can occupy and appropriate. The sea is not territory. It is not +nor can it be made subject to the authority of an enemy in the same +sense that the land can, nor does it possess any resources in itself +such as on the land can be appropriated to the disadvantage and ultimate +discomfiture of a belligerent whose territory has been invaded. The sea +is the common highway of all nations, and the exclusive possession of +none. Apart from its fisheries, which, outside the territorial waters of +any particular State, are open to all nations, it is of no use, except +as a highway, to any State. But its use as a highway is the root of all +sea power, the foundation of all naval warfare. It is only by this +highway that an island State can be invaded, only by this highway that +an island State, or a State having no common frontier with its +adversary, can encounter and subdue the armed forces of the enemy, +whether on sea or on land.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the sea as a highway differs in many important respects from +such highways or other lines of communication as serve for the transit<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> +and transport of armed forces and their necessary supplies on land. In +one sense it is all highway, that is, it can be traversed in every +direction by ships, wherever there is water enough for them to float. +For military purposes land transit is confined to such highways as are +suitable to the march of an army accompanied by artillery and heavy +baggage and supply trains, or to such railways as can more expeditiously +serve the same purpose. Hence an army advancing in an enemy's country +cannot advance on a very broad front, nor can it outmarch its baggage +and other supplies except for a very limited time and for some +exceptional purpose. Sea transport is subject to no such limitations. +Ships carry their own supplies with them, and a fleet of ships, whether +of transports or of warships, can move on as broad a front as is +compatible with the exercise of due control over their combined +movements. Moreover, within certain limits and with certain exceptions, +where the waters to be traversed are narrow, ships and fleets can vary +their line of transit and advance to such an extent as to render the +discovery of their whereabouts a matter of some difficulty. The same +conditions affect the transit of such merchant vessels as, carrying the +flag of one belligerent, are liable to capture by the other. Hence the +primary aim of all naval warfare is and must be so to control the lines +of communication<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> which traverse the seas affected, that the enemy +cannot move his warships from one point to another without encountering +a superior force of his adversary, and that his merchant ships cannot +prosecute their voyages without running extreme risk of capture by the +way. This is called, in time-honoured phraseology, securing the command +of the sea, and the true meaning of this phrase is nothing more nor less +than the effective control of all such maritime communications as are or +can be affected by the operations of either belligerent. This control +may extend, according to circumstances, to all the navigable seas of the +globe, or it may be confined, for all practical purposes, to the waters +adjacent to the respective territories of the two belligerents. In +theory, however, its effect is unlimited, and so it must be in practice, +where the territories of one belligerent or the other are widely +scattered over the globe. That is the sense in which "the sea is all +one."</p> + +<p>It is important to note that the phrase "command of the sea" has no +definite meaning except in war. In time of peace no State claims to +command the sea or to control it in any way. But in any war in which +naval force is engaged each belligerent seeks to secure the command of +the sea for himself and to deny it to his enemy, that is to close the +highway which the sea affords in time of peace to his warships and his +merchant vessels alike. As regards the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> enemy's warships, moreover, he +seeks to secure his own command by their destruction or capture. This is +not always possible, because if the naval forces of the two belligerents +are very unequally matched, it is always open to the weaker of the two +to decline the conflict by keeping his main fleets in ports unassailable +by naval force alone, and seeking to reduce the superiority of his +adversary by assailing him incessantly with torpedo craft. He may also +attempt the hazardous enterprise of sending out isolated cruisers to +prey upon his adversary's commerce afloat. But in the case supposed, +where the superiority of one side is so great as to compel the main +fleets of the other to seek the protection of their fortified ports, +such an enterprise is, as I shall show in a subsequent chapter, not only +extremely hazardous in itself, but quite incapable of inflicting such +loss on the superior adversary as would be likely to induce him to +abandon the conflict.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless the command of the sea is not established, or at best it is +only partially, and it may be only temporarily, established by driving +the main fleets of the enemy into ports which are inaccessible to naval +force alone. They must not only be driven there but compelled to remain +there. This has generally been done in the past, and according to many, +but not all, naval authorities, it will generally have to be done in the +future by the operation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> known as blockade, whereby the enemy is +prevented from coming out, or is compelled if he does come out to fight +a superior force lying in wait outside. As a matter of fact, inasmuch as +a blockade to be really deterrent must be conducted by a blockading +force superior to that which is blockaded—for otherwise the latter need +not shun an engagement in the open with the former—it can rarely be the +interest of the blockader to prevent the exit of his adversary, since by +the hypothesis if he could get him out he could beat him. But the +blockade must nevertheless be maintained, because, although the +blockaded fleet cannot by that means be destroyed, it can, at any rate, +be immobilized and wiped off the board so long as it remains where it +is.</p> + +<p>The situation in which a blockade is set up by one belligerent and +submitted to by the other is not identical with an effective command of +the sea, though in certain circumstances it may approximate very closely +to it. The blockaded forces may not be so thoroughly intimidated by the +superior forces of the blockaders that they could not or would not, if +they could, seek a favourable opportunity for breaking or evading the +blockade imposed upon them. They may merely be waiting in a position +unassailable by naval force alone until the blockading forces are so +weakened through incessant torpedo attack, through the wear and tear +inflicted on them<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> by the nature of the service on which they are +engaged, through stress of weather, through the periodical necessity +which compels even the best found ships to withdraw temporarily from the +blockade for the purposes of repair, refit, and replenishment of their +stores, and through the fatigue imposed on their officers and crews by +the incessant vigilance which a blockade requires as to afford them a +favourable opportunity of challenging a decision in the open. Or, again, +if the forces of the blockaded belligerent are distributed between two +or more of his fortified ports, he may attempt an evasion of the +blockade at two or more of them for the purpose of combining the forces +thus liberated and attacking one or more of the blockading fleets in +superior force before they can re-establish their own superiority by +concentration. Broadly speaking, this was the plan of operations +adopted, or rather attempted, by Napoleon in the memorable campaign +which ended at Trafalgar. It was frustrated by the persistent energy of +Nelson, by the masterly dispositions of Barham at the Admiralty, by the +tenacity with which Cornwallis maintained the blockade at Brest, and by +the instinctive sagacity with which other commanders of the several +blockading and cruising squadrons nearly always did the right thing at +the right moment, divined Barham's purpose, and carried it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> out almost +automatically. Practically, Napoleon was beaten and his projected +invasion of England was abandoned many weeks before Trafalgar was won. +But the command of the sea was not thereby secured to England. It needed +Trafalgar and the destruction of the French and Spanish Fleets there +accomplished to effect that consummation. England thenceforth remained +in effective and almost undisputed command of the sea, and the +Peninsular campaigns of Wellington were for the first time rendered +possible. The contrasted phases of the conflict before and after +Trafalgar are perhaps the best illustration in history of the vast and +vital difference between a command of the sea in dispute and a command +of the sea established. Trafalgar was the turning-point in the long +conflict between England and Napoleon.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<p class='center'>DISPUTED COMMAND—BLOCKADE<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span></p> + + +<p>I have so far treated blockade as the initial stage of a struggle for +the command of the sea. That appears to me to be the logical order of +treatment, because when two naval Powers go to war it is almost certain +that the stronger of the two will at the outset attempt to blockade the +naval forces of the other. The same thing is likely to happen even if +the two are approximately equal in naval force, but in that case the +blockade is not likely to be of long duration, because both sides will +be eager to obtain a decision in the open. The command of the sea is a +matter of such vital moment to both sides that each must needs seek to +obtain it as soon and as completely as possible, and the only certain +way to obtain it is by the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy. +The advantage of putting to sea first is in naval warfare the equivalent +or counterpart of the advantage in land warfare of first crossing the +enemy's frontier. If that advantage is pushed home and the enemy is +still unready it must lead to a blockade. It is, moreover, quite +possible that even if both belligerents are equally ready—I am<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> here +assuming them to be approximately equal in force—one or other, if not +both, may think it better strategy to await developments before risking +everything in an attempt to secure an immediate decision. In point of +fact, the difference between this policy and the policy of a declared +blockade is, as I am about to show, almost imperceptible, especially in +modern conditions of naval warfare. It is therefore necessary to +consider the subject of blockade more in detail. Other subjects closely +associated with this will also have to be considered in some detail +before we can grasp the full purport and extent of what is meant by the +command of the sea.</p> + +<p>There are two kinds of blockade—military and commercial. The former +includes the latter, but the latter does not necessarily involve the +former, except in the sense that armed naval force is necessary to +maintain it. By a commercial blockade a belligerent seeks to intercept +the maritime commerce of the enemy, to prevent any vessels, whether +enemy or neutral, from reaching his ports, and at the same time to +prevent their egress to the same extent. This in certain circumstances +may be a very effective agency for bending or breaking the enemy's will +and compelling his submission, but I reserve its consideration for more +detailed treatment hereafter. It is with military blockade that I am +here more especially concerned.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span></p> + +<p>We have seen that the paramount purpose of all naval warfare, and, +indeed, of all warfare, is the destruction of the armed forces of the +enemy. His armed forces are in the last resort the sole instrument of +his will, and their destruction to such an extent as is necessary to +subdue his will is the sole agency by which peace can be restored. +Whatever the extent of the war, whether it is limited or unlimited, in +the sense assigned to those words by Clausewitz and his followers, the +conflict of national wills out of which the quarrel arose must in some +way be composed, either by concessions on both sides or by the complete +subjection of one side to the other, before it can come to an end. It +follows that the main object of a military blockade can rarely be to +keep the enemy's forces sealed up, masked, and to that extent +immobilized in the blockaded ports. Its real object is to secure that if +they do come out they shall be observed, shadowed, and followed until +such time as they can be encountered by a superior force, and if +possible destroyed. The classical text on this topic is a letter written +on August 1, 1804, by Nelson to the Lord Mayor of London, acknowledging +a vote of thanks passed by the Corporation, and addressed to Nelson as +commanding the fleet blockading Toulon. Nelson said in his reply: "I beg +to inform your Lordship that the port of Toulon has never been blockaded +by me: quite<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> the reverse—every opportunity has been offered to the +enemy to put to sea, for it is there that we hope to realize the hopes +and expectations of our country, and I trust that they will not be +disappointed." What Nelson here meant was that the so-called blockade of +the port—it was a common, but, as he held, an erroneous expression—was +merely incidental to the operation he was conducting. His main objective +was the armed forces of the enemy lying unassailable within the +blockaded port. He could not make them put to sea but he gave them every +opportunity of doing so. So far from wishing to keep them in, his one +desire was to get them out into the open, "for it is there that we hope +to realize the hopes and expectations of our country"—that is to get a +decision in favour of the British arms.</p> + +<p>Now, this being the object of a military blockade, its methods will be +subordinated to that object. In the days of sailing ships the method +which commended itself to the best naval authorities of the time was to +have an inshore squadron, consisting mainly of frigates and smaller +craft, but strengthened if necessary by a few capital ships, generally +two-deckers, closely watching the entrance to the port, but keeping +outside the range of its land defences. This was supported at a greater +distance in the offing by the main blockading fleet of heavier ships<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> of +the line, cruising within narrow limits and keeping close touch with the +inshore squadron. Such a method is no longer practicable owing to the +development of steam navigation, and to the introduction into naval +warfare of the locomotive torpedo, and of special vessels designed to +make the attack of this weapon extremely formidable and extremely +difficult to parry. The inshore squadron of the old days was liable to +no attack which it could not parry if in sufficient force, and if too +hardly pressed it could always fall back on the main blockading fleet, +which was unassailable except by a corresponding force of the enemy. The +advent of the torpedo and of its characteristic craft has changed all +this. No naval Power can now afford to place its battleships at a fixed +station, or even in close touch with a fixed rendezvous, which is within +reach of an enemy's torpedo craft. The torpedo vessel which operates +only on the surface is, it is true, formidable only at night; in the +daytime it is powerless in attack and extremely vulnerable. But the +submarine is equally formidable in the daytime, and its attack even in +the daytime is far more insidious and difficult to parry than that of +the surface torpedo vessel is at night. The effective range of the +surface torpedo vessel is thus, for practical purposes, half the +distance which it can traverse in any given direction from its base +between dusk<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> and dawn—say from one hundred to two hundred miles, +according to its speed and the season of the year. The speed of the +submarine is much less, but it can keep the sea for many days together, +sinking beneath the surface whenever it is threatened with attack. It +can also approach a battleship or fleet of battleships in the same +submerged condition, and experience has already demonstrated that its +advance in that condition to within striking distance is extremely +difficult to detect. Moreover, even if its presence is detected in time, +the only certain defence against it is for the battleship to steam away +from it at a speed greater than any submarine has ever attained or is +likely to attain in the submerged condition. It should further be noted +that torpedo craft engaged in offensive operations of this character are +not confined to the blockaded port as a base. Any sheltered anchorage +will serve their purpose, provided it is sufficiently fortified to +resist such attacks from the sea as may be anticipated.</p> + +<p>Thus, in the conditions established by the advent of the torpedo and its +characteristic craft, there would seem to be only two alternatives open +to a fleet of battleships engaged in blockade operations. Either it must +be stationed in some sheltered anchorage outside the radius of action of +the enemy's surface torpedo craft, and if within that radius<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> adequately +defended against torpedo attack—as Togo established a flying base for +the use of his fleet, first at the Elliot Islands and afterwards at +Dalny, for the purpose of blockading Port Arthur; or it must cruise in +the open outside the same limits, keeping in touch with its advanced +cruisers and flotillas by means of wireless telegraphy, and thereby +dispensing with anything like a fixed rendezvous. It is not, perhaps, +imperative that it should always cruise entirely outside the prescribed +radius, because experience in modern naval manœuvres has frequently +shown that it is a very difficult thing for torpedo craft, moving at +random, to discover a fleet which is constantly shifting its position at +high speed, especially when they are at any moment liable to attack from +cruisers and torpedo craft of the other side.</p> + +<p>Thus a modern blockade will, so far as battle fleets are concerned, be +of necessity rather a watching blockade than a masking or sealing up +blockade. If the two belligerents are unequal in naval strength it will +probably take some such form as the following. The weaker belligerent +will at the outset keep his battle fleet in his fortified ports. The +stronger may do the same, but he will be under no such paramount +inducement to do so. Both sides will, however, send out their torpedo +craft and supporting cruisers with intent to do as much harm as they can +to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> the armed forces of the enemy. If one belligerent can get his +torpedo craft to sea before the enemy is ready, he will, if he is the +stronger of the two, forthwith attempt to establish as close and +sustained a watch of the ports sheltering the enemy's armed forces as +may be practicable; if he is the weaker, he will attempt sporadic +attacks on the ports of his adversary and on such of his warships as may +be found in the open. If the enemy is so incautious as to have placed +any of his capital ships or other important craft in a position open to +the assault of torpedo craft—as Russia did at Port Arthur at the +opening of the war with Japan—or if he has been so lacking in vigilance +and forethought as not to have taken timely and adequate measures for +meeting sporadic attacks of the kind indicated, such attacks may be very +effective and may even go so far to redress the balance of naval +strength as to encourage the originally weaker belligerent to seek a +decision in the open. But the forces of the stronger belligerent must be +very badly handled and disposed for anything of the kind to take place. +The advantage of superior force is a tremendous one. If it is associated +with energy, determination, initiative, and skill of disposition no more +than equal to those of the assailant, it is overwhelming. The +sea-keeping capacity, or what has been called the enduring mobility, of +torpedo craft, is comparatively<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> small. Their coal-supply is limited, +especially when they are steaming at full speed, and they carry no very +large reserve of torpedoes. They must, therefore, very frequently return +to a base to replenish their supplies. The superior enemy is, it is +true, subject to the same disabilities, but being superior he has more +torpedo craft to spare and more cruisers to attack the torpedo craft of +the enemy and their own escort of cruisers. When the raiding torpedo +craft return to their base he will make it very difficult for them to +get in and just as difficult for them to get out again. He will suffer +losses, of course, for there is no superiority of force that will confer +immunity in that respect in war. But even between equal forces, equally +well led and handled, there is no reason to suppose that the losses of +one side will be more than equal to those of the other; whereas if one +side is appreciably superior to the other it is reasonable to suppose +that it will inflict greater losses on the enemy than it suffers itself, +while even if the losses are equal the residue of the stronger force +will still be greater than that of the weaker. It is true that the whole +art of war, whether on sea or on land, consists in so disposing your +armed forces, both strategically and tactically, that you may be +superior to the enemy at the critical point and moment, and that success +in this supreme art is no inherent prerogative of the belligerent whose<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> +aggregate forces are superior to those of his adversary. But this is +only to say that success in war is not an affair of numbers alone. It is +an affair of numbers combined with hard fighting and skilful +disposition.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<p class='center'>DISPUTED COMMAND—THE FLEET IN BEING<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span></p> + + +<p>We have seen that blockade is only a means to an end, that end being the +destruction or surrender of the armed forces of the enemy. We have seen +also that that end cannot be obtained by blockade alone. All that a +military blockade can do is by a judicious disposition of superior +force, either to prevent the enemy coming out at all, or to secure that +if he does come out he shall be brought to action. The former method is +only applicable where the blockader's superiority of force is so great +that his adversary cannot venture at the outset to encounter his main +fleets in the open, and in that case the establishment of a blockade of +this character is for many purposes practically tantamount to securing +the command of the sea to the blockader so long as the blockade can be +maintained. Such a situation, however, can very rarely arise. There are +very few instances of it in naval history, and there are likely to be +fewer in the future than there have been in the past. The closest +blockade ever established and maintained was that of Brest by Cornwallis +from 1803 to 1805, when Napoleon was projecting the invasion<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> of +England. Yet it would be too much to say that during those strenuous +years Ganteaume never could have got out, had he been so minded, and it +is not to be forgotten that for some time during the crisis of the +campaign he was forbidden by Napoleon to make the attempt. Moreover, +such a situation, even when it does arise, amounts at best to a +stalemate, not to a checkmate. It leaves the enemy's fleet "a fleet in +being," immobilized and wiped off the board for the moment, but +nevertheless so operating as to immobilize the blockading fleet in so +far as the chief effort of the latter must be concentrated on +maintaining the blockade.</p> + +<p>It is necessary to dwell at some length on this conception of "a fleet +in being." Admiral Mahan, the great historian of sea power—whose high +authority all students of naval warfare will readily acknowledge and +rarely attempt to dispute—speaks of it in his <i>Life of Nelson</i> as a +doctrine or opinion which "has received extreme expression ... and +apparently undergone extreme misconception." On the other hand, Admiral +Sir Cyprian Bridge tells us in the <i>Encyclopædia Britannica</i> (<i>s.v.</i> +"Sea-Power") that "the principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the +bottom of all sound strategy." Of a principle which, according to one +high authority, lies at the bottom of all sound strategy, and according +to another has received extreme expression and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> undergone misconception +equally extreme, it is plainly essential that a true conception should +be obtained before it can be applied to the elucidation of any of the +problems of naval warfare. Now what is this much-debated principle? It +is best to go to the fountain-head for its elucidation. The phrase "a +fleet in being" was first used by Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, in +his defence before the Court Martial which tried and acquitted him for +his conduct of the naval campaign of 1690, and especially of the Battle +of Beachy Head, which was the leading event—none too glorious for +British arms—of that campaign. "Both as a strategist and as a +tactician," says Admiral Bridge, "Torrington was immeasurably ahead of +his contemporaries. The only English admirals who can be placed above +him are Hawke and Nelson." Yet he was regarded by many of his +contemporaries, and has been represented by many historians, merely as +the incapable seaman who failed to win the Battle of Beachy Head, and +thereby jeopardized the safety of the kingdom at a very critical time.</p> + +<p>The situation was as follows. The country was divided between the +partisans of James II. and the supporters of William III. James was in +Ireland, where his strength was greatest, and William had gone thither +to encounter him, his transit having been covered by a small squadron of +six men-of-war,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovel. The army +was with William in Ireland, and Great Britain could only be defended on +land by a hastily levied militia. Its sole effective defence was the +fleet; and the fleet, although reinforced by a Dutch contingent, was, +for the moment, insufficient to defend it. The chief reliance of James +was upon the friendship and forces, naval and military, of Louis XIV. +Here was a case in which the security of England against insurrection at +home and invasion from abroad depended on the sufficiency and capacity +of her fleets to maintain the command of the sea—that is, either to +defeat the enemy's naval forces or to keep them at bay, and thereby to +deny freedom of transit to any military forces that Louis might attempt +to launch against British territory. The French king resolved to make a +determined attempt to wrest the command of the sea from his adversaries, +and by overpowering the allied fleets of England and Holland in the +Channel, to open the way for a successful invasion and a successful +insurrection to follow. A great fleet was collected at Brest, under the +supreme command of Tourville, and a squadron from Toulon under +Château-Renault was ordered to join him in the Channel, so as to enable +him to threaten London, to foment a Jacobite insurrection in the +capital, to land troops in Torbay, and to occupy the Irish Channel in +such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> force as to prevent the return of William and his army.</p> + +<p>Now, of course, none of these objects could be attained unless the +allied fleets in the Channel and adjacent waters could be either +decisively defeated in the open or else so intimidated by the superior +forces of the enemy as to decline a conflict and retire to some place of +safety. On the broad principle that the paramount object of all warfare +is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, Tourville, if he +felt himself strong enough, was bound to seek out the allied fleet and +challenge it to a decisive combat. On the same principle, Torrington, if +he felt himself strong enough, was bound to pursue the same aggressive +strategy, and by thoroughly beating the French to frustrate all their +objects at once. But Torrington was not strong enough and knew that he +was not strong enough. He had foreseen the crisis and warned his +superiors betimes, entreating them to take adequate measures for dealing +with it. They took no such measures. On the contrary, the dispositions +they made were calculated rather to aggravate the danger than to avert +it. Early in the year a fleet of sixteen sail of the line under +Killigrew had been sent in charge of a convoy to Cadiz with orders to +prevent, if possible, the exit of the Toulon fleet from the +Mediterranean and to follow it up should it make good its escape. This<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> +strategy was unimpeachable if only Killigrew could make sure of +intercepting Château-Renault and defeating him, and if the naval forces +left in home waters when Killigrew was detached were sufficient to give +a good account of the fleet that Tourville was collecting at Brest. But +in its results it was disastrous, for Killigrew, delayed by weather and +by the many preoccupations, commercial and strategic, entailed by his +instructions was unable either to bar the passage of the Toulon fleet or +to overtake it during its progress towards the Channel. Hence +Château-Renault was able to effect his junction with Tourville +unmolested, while Killigrew did not reach Plymouth until after the +battle of Beachy Head had been fought, when, Tourville being victorious +in the Channel, he was obliged to carry his squadron into the Hamoaze so +as to be out of harm's way. Shovel, having escorted the king and his +troops to Ireland, was equally unable to carry out his orders to join +Torrington in the Channel, since Tourville stood in the way. Hence, +although fully alive to the strategic value, in certain contingencies, +of the forces under Killigrew and Shovel, Torrington was compelled to +rely mainly on the force under his immediate command, the insufficiency +of which he had many months before pointed out and vainly implored his +superiors to redress.</p> + +<p>The result of all this was that no adequate steps<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> were, or could be, +taken, to prevent the advance of Tourville in greatly superior force +into the Channel. Torrington hoisted his flag in the Downs at the end of +May, and even then the Dutch contingent had not joined in the numbers +promised. Hence it was impossible to keep scouts out to the westward as +the Dutch had undertaken to do, and the first definite intelligence that +Torrington received of the advance of the French was the information +that on June 23 they were anchored in great force to the westward of the +Isle of Wight. Three days later, having in the meanwhile received a +Dutch reinforcement bringing his force up to fifty-five sail of the line +and twenty fire-ships, he offered them battle in that position, but it +was declined. His own comment on this hazardous adventure may here be +quoted: "I do acknowledge my first intention of attacking them, a +rashness that will admit of no better excuse than that, though I did +believe them stronger than we are, I did not believe it to so great a +degree.... Their great strength and caution have put soberer thoughts +into my head, and have made me very heartily give God thanks they +declined the battle yesterday; and indeed I shall not think myself very +unhappy if I can get rid of them without fighting, unless it may be upon +equaller terms than I can at present see any prospect of.... A council +of war I called this morning<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> unanimously agreed we are by all manner of +means to shun fighting with them, especially if they have the wind of +us; and retire, if we cannot avoid it otherwise, even to the Gunfleet, +the only place we can with any manner of probability make our account +good with them in the condition we are in. We have now had a pretty good +view of their fleet, which consists of near, if not quite, eighty +men-of-war fit to lie in a line and thirty fire-ships; a strength that +puts me beside hopes of success, if we should fight, and really may not +only endanger the losing of the fleet, but at least the quiet of our +country too; for if we are beaten they, being absolute masters of the +sea, will be at great liberty of doing many things they dare not attempt +while we observe them and are in a possibility of joining Vice-Admiral +Killigrew and our ships to the westward. If I find a possibility, I will +get by them to the westward to join those ships; if not, I mean to +follow the result of the council of war."</p> + +<p>The strategy here indicated is plain, and, in my judgment, sound. It may +be profitably compared with that of Nelson as explained to his captains +during his return from the West Indies whither he had pursued +Villeneuve. Villeneuve was on his way back to European waters and Nelson +hoped to overtake him. He had eleven ships of the line in his fleet and +Villeneuve was known to have not less<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> than eighteen. Yet, though Nelson +did not shrink from an engagement on his own terms, he was resolved not +to force one inopportunely. "Do not," he said to his captains, "imagine +I am one of those hot-brained people who fight at immense disadvantage +without an adequate object. My object is partly gained"—that is, +Villeneuve had been driven out of the West Indies. "If we meet them we +shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail of +the line, and therefore do not be surprised if I do not fall on them +immediately; we won't part without a battle. I think they will be glad +to leave me alone, if I will let them alone; which I will do, either +till we approach the shores of Europe, or they give an advantage too +tempting to be resisted." Torrington's attitude was the same as +Nelson's, except perhaps that he lacked the ardent faith to say with +Nelson, "We won't part without a battle." He would not think himself +very unhappy if he could get rid of Tourville without a battle. But the +situations of the two men were different. Nelson knew, as he said +himself, that "by the time that the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, +they will do us no harm this year." If, that is, by the sacrifice of +eleven ships of his own he could wipe out eighteen or twenty of the +enemy, destroying some and disabling as many as he could of the rest, he +would leave the balance of naval force still strongly in favour<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> of his +country, more strongly in fact than if he fought no action at all. +Torrington, on the other hand, knew that "if we are beaten they, being +absolute masters of the sea, will be at great liberty of doing many +things they dare not attempt while we observe them and are in a +possibility of joining Vice-Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the +westward." Killigrew and Shovel had twenty-two sail of the line between +them, and Torrington, in the dispatch above quoted, had requested that +they should be ordered to advance to Portsmouth, whence, if the French +pursued him to the eastward, they might be able to join him "over the +flats" of the Thames. As he had fifty-five sail of the line himself, +with a possibility of reinforcements from Chatham, the concentration off +the Thames of the whole of the forces available would have enabled him +to encounter Tourville on something like equal terms; and from that, +assuredly, he would not have shrunk. Meanwhile he would wait, watch, +observe, and pursue a defensive strategy. If Tourville should withdraw +to the westward he would follow him and get past him if he could, and in +that case, having picked up Killigrew and Shovel, he would be in a +position to take the offensive on no very unequal terms and not to part +from Tourville without a battle.</p> + +<p>But the strategy of Torrington—admirable and unimpeachable as, +according to such high authorities<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> as Admiral Bridge and the late +Admiral Colomb, it was—did not at all commend itself to Mary and her +Council, who, during William's absence in Ireland, were left in charge +of the kingdom. They wanted a battle, although Torrington had plainly +told them that it could not be a victory and might result in a +disastrous and even fatal defeat. "We apprehend," they said in a +dispatch purporting to come from Mary herself, "the consequences of your +retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal, that we choose rather you +should, upon any advantage of the wind, give battle to the enemy than +retreat further than is necessary to get an advantage upon the enemy." +Torrington, of course, never intended to retire to the Gunfleet—which +was an anchorage protected by sandbanks off the coast of Essex to the +north of the Thames—if he could avoid doing so. But unless he went +there, there was no advantage to be got upon the enemy by retreating to +the eastward, because there alone could he get reinforcements from +Chatham and possibly be joined by Killigrew and Shovel "over the flats"; +which is what he meant by saying that the Gunfleet was "the only place +we can with any manner of probability make our account with them in the +position we are in." On the other hand, if the French gave him an +opportunity he would, if he could, get past them to the westward and +there join Killigrew and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> Shovel in a position of much greater +advantage. But in his actual situation, not being one of "those +hot-brained people who fight at immense disadvantage without an adequate +object," he knew that a battle was the last thing which he ought to risk +and the first that the French must desire. However, as a loyal seaman, +who knew how to obey orders, he did as he was told. The French had +pressed him as far as Beachy Head and there he gave battle, taking care +so to fight as to risk as little as possible. He was beaten, as he +expected to be, and the Dutch, who had been the most hotly engaged, were +very severely handled by the French. But though his losses were +considerable, for he had to destroy some of his ships to prevent their +falling into the hands of the enemy, he saved his fleet from the +destruction which must have befallen it had he fought otherwise than he +did. As the day advanced and the battle raged, the wind dropped and the +tide began to ebb. Torrington, taking advantage of this, anchored his +fleet, while the French drifted away to the westward. When the tide +again began to flow he again took advantage of it and retreated to the +eastward. The French made some show of pursuit, but Torrington made good +his retreat into the Thames, where, the buoys having been taken up, the +French could not follow him. Finally, the French withdrew from the +Channel, having accomplished nothing beyond<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> an insignificant raid on +Teignmouth. Torrington was tried by Court Martial and acquitted, though +he was never again employed afloat. But the fact remains that, as +Admiral Bridge says, "most seamen were at the time, have been since, and +still are in agreement with Torrington." As to his conduct of the +battle, which has so unjustly involved him in lasting discredit with the +historians, though not with the seamen, he said in his defence before +the Court Martial: "I may be bold to say that I have had time and cause +enough to think of it, and that, upon my word, were the battle to be +fought over again, I do not know how to mend it, under the same +circumstances." Again, as to his general conduct of the campaign, he +said: "It is true that the French made no great advantage of their +victory though they put us to a great charge in keeping up the militia; +but had I fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the +whole kingdom had lain open to an invasion. What, then, would have +become of us in the absence of his Majesty and most of the land forces? +As it was, most men were in fear that the French would invade; but I was +always of another opinion; for I always said that, <i>whilst we had a +fleet in being</i>, they would not dare to make an attempt."</p> + +<p>This is the first appearance of the phrase "a fleet in being" in the +terminology of naval warfare.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> Its reappearance in our own day and its +frequent employment in naval discussion are due to the masterly analysis +of Torrington's strategy and tactics which the late Admiral Colomb gave +in his illuminating work on <i>Naval Warfare</i>. In order to avoid giving it +the extreme expression which, according to Admiral Mahan, it has +received from some writers, and involving it in that extreme +misconception which he thinks it has undergone at the hands of +others—or it may be of the same—I have thought it worth while to +examine at some length the campaign which gave rise to it so as to +ascertain exactly what was in the mind of Torrington when he first used +it. It is plain that Torrington held, as all great seamen have held, +that the primary object of every belligerent is to destroy the armed +forces of the enemy. He was so circumstanced that he could not do that +himself, because the forces which might have been at his disposal for +the purpose, had the circumstances been other than they were, were so +divided and dispersed that the enemy might overcome them in detail. That +the enemy would do this, if he could, he did not doubt, and it was +equally certain that it must be his immediate object to prevent his +doing it. His own force being by far the strongest of the three opposed +to Tourville, it must be upon him that the brunt of the conflict would +fall. Nothing would suit him better than that Tourville<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> should turn +back and attempt to force a battle on either Killigrew or Shovel to the +westward, because in that case he could hang upon Tourville's rear and +flanks and take any opportunity that offered to get past him and +concentrate the British forces to the westward of him. But Tourville +gave him no such opportunity. He pressed him hard and might have pressed +him back even to the Gunfleet if Torrington had not been ordered by Mary +and her advisers to give battle "upon any advantage of the wind." But +even in fighting the battle, which his own judgment told him ought not +to be fought, he never lost sight of the paramount necessity of so +fighting it as to give Tourville no decisive advantage. The victory was +a barren one to Tourville. It gave him no command of the sea and for +that reason he was unable to prosecute any enterprise of invasion. The +command of the sea remained in dispute, and unless the dispute could be +decided in Tourville's favour he would have fought and won the battle of +Beachy Head in vain, as the event showed that he did. Torrington held +that his "fleet in being," even after the reverse at Beachy Head, was a +sufficient bar to the further enterprises of Tourville, nor can +Tourville's subsequent action be explained on any other hypothesis than +that he shared Torrington's opinion and acted on it.</p> + +<p>The truth is, that the doctrine of the fleet in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> being, as understood +and illustrated by Torrington, is in reality the counterpart and +complement of the doctrine of the command of the sea as expounded above. +"I consider," said the late Sir Geoffrey Hornby, a strategist and +tactician of unrivalled authority in his time, "that I have command of +the sea when I am able to tell my Government that they can move an +expedition to any point without fear of interference from an enemy's +fleet." This condition cannot be satisfied so long as the enemy has a +fleet in being, that is a fleet strategically at large, not itself in +command of the sea, but strong enough to deny that command to its +adversary by strategic and tactical dispositions adapted to the +circumstances of the case. Thus command of the sea and a fleet in being +are mutually exclusive terms. So long as a hostile fleet is in being +there is no command of the sea; so soon as the command of the sea is +established there is no hostile fleet in being. Each of these +propositions is the complement of the other.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the mere statement of these abstract propositions solves +none of the concrete problems of naval warfare. War is not governed by +phrases. It is governed by stern and inexorable realities. The question +whether a particular fleet in any particular circumstances is or is not +a fleet in being is not a question of theory, it is a question of fact. +The answer to it depends on the spirit, purpose,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> tenacity, and +strategic insight of those who control its movements. No fleet is a +fleet in being unless inspired by what may be called the <i>animus +pugnandi</i>, that is, unless, if and when the opportunity offers, it is +prepared to strike a blow at all hazards. For this reason the Russian +fleet in Sebastopol at the time of the invasion of the Crimea was not a +fleet in being, although it had a splendid opportunity, which a Nelson +would assuredly have found too tempting to be resisted, of showing its +mettle when the French warships were employed as transports; and the +allies might have been made to pay heavily for their neglect to blockade +it had it been inspired by an effective <i>animus pugnandi</i>. On the other +hand, the four ill-fated Spanish cruisers which crossed the Atlantic to +take part in the Cuban war were a true fleet in being, however inferior +and forlorn, and were so regarded by the United States authorities so +long as they remained strategically at large. Even when two of them and +two destroyers were known to be in Santiago, the Secretary of the United +States Navy telegraphed to Admiral Sampson, "Essential to know if all +four Spanish cruisers in Santiago. Military expedition must wait this +information." The same thing happened in the war between Russia and +Japan. The first act of Japan in that war was by a torpedo attack on the +Russian fleet at Port Arthur, so to depress the <i>animus pugnandi</i> of +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> latter as practically to deprive it for a time of the character of +a fleet in being—a character which it only partially recovered +afterwards under the brief influence of the heroic but ill-fated +Makaroff. This being accomplished, the invasion of Manchuria ensued as a +matter of course. The ascendency thus established by the Japanese fleet +at the outset, though assailed more than once, was nevertheless +maintained throughout the subsequent operations until the Russian fleet +at Port Arthur, deprived of the little character it ever possessed as a +true fleet in being, was reduced to the condition of what Admiral Mahan +has aptly called a "fortress fleet," and was surrendered at the fall of +the fortress. Many other illustrations of the principle of the fleet in +being might be given. The history of naval warfare is full of them. But +they need not be multiplied as they all point the same moral. That moral +is, that a fleet in being to be of any use must be inspired by a +determined and persistent <i>animus pugnandi</i>. It must not be a mere +"fortress fleet." Torrington can never have imagined for a moment that +the fleet which, in spite of the disastrous orders of Mary and her +council, he had saved from destruction, would by its mere existence +prevent a French invasion. He had kept it in being in order that he +might use it offensively whenever occasion should arise, well knowing +that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> so long as it maintained that disposition Tourville would be +paralysed for offence. "Whilst we observe the French," he said, "they +cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running a great +hazard." Such hazards may be run for an adequate object, and to +determine rightly when they may be run and when they may not is perhaps +the most searching test of a naval commander's capacity and insight. It +is a psychological question rather than a strategic one. Such a +commander must know whether his adversary's <i>animus pugnandi</i> is so keen +and so unflinching as to invest his fleet, albeit inferior, with the +true character of a fleet in being, or whether, on the other hand, it is +so feeble as to turn it into a mere fortress fleet. But that is only to +say that in war the man always counts for far more than the machine, +that the best commander is a man "with whom," as Admiral Mahan says of +Nelson, "moral effect is never in excess of the facts of the case, whose +imagination produces to him no paralysing picture of remote +contingencies." <i>Bene ausus vana contemnere</i>, as Livy says of +Alexander's conquest of Darius, is the eternal secret of successful +war.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<p class='center'>DISPUTED COMMAND IN GENERAL<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p> + + +<p>The condition of disputed command of the sea is the normal condition at +the outbreak of any war in which operations at sea are involved between +two belligerents of approximately equal strength, or indeed between any +two belligerents, the weaker of whom is sufficiently inspired by the +<i>animus pugnandi</i>—or it may be by other motives rather political than +strategic in character—to try conclusions with his adversary in the +open. This follows immediately from the nature of command of the sea, +which is, it will be remembered, the effective control over the maritime +communications of the waters in dispute. I must here repeat, that the +phrase command of the sea has no definite meaning in time of peace. No +nation nowadays seeks in time of peace to control maritime +communications, that is, to exercise any authority or constraint over +any ships, whether warships or merchant vessels—other than those flying +its own flag—which traverse the seas on their lawful occasions. There +was, indeed, a time when England claimed what was called the +"sovereignty<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> of the seas," that is, the right to exact at all times +certain marks of deference to her flag, in the form of certain salutes +of ceremony, from all ships traversing the seas surrounding the British +Islands, the narrow seas as they were called. But that is an entirely +different thing from the command of the sea in a strategic sense, and +has in fact no connection with it. It has long been abandoned and it +need only be mentioned here in order to be carefully distinguished from +the latter. Any nation seeking to exercise or secure the command of the +sea in this sense would in so doing engage in an act of war, and would +be regarded as so engaging by any other nation whose rights and +interests were in any way affected by the act. Hence the difference +between the two is plain. The claim to the sovereignty of the seas and +the exaction of the ceremonial observance—the lowering of a flag or a +sail—which symbolized it, was not in itself an act of war, though it +might lead to war if the claim were resisted. An attempt to assert or +secure the command of the sea is, on the other hand, in itself an act of +war and would never be made by any nation not prepared to take the +consequence in the instant outbreak of hostilities.</p> + +<p>For what is it that a nation seeks to do when it attempts to exercise or +secure the command of the sea? It seeks to do nothing more and nothing +less than to deny freedom of access to the waters in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> dispute to the +ships, whether warships or merchant ships, of some other nation. It +denies the common right of highway, which is the essential attribute of +the sea, to that other nation, and seeks to secure the monopoly of that +right for itself. In other words, it seeks to drive its adversary's +warships from the sea, and either by the capture of his merchant vessels +to appropriate the wealth they contain or by destroying them to deprive +the adversary of its enjoyment. This is all that naval warfare as such +can do. If the enemy is not constrained by the destruction of his +warships and the extinction of his maritime commerce to submit to his +victorious adversary's will, other agencies, not exclusively naval in +character, must be employed to bring about that consummation. This means +that military force must be brought into operation, either for the +invasion of the defeated adversary's territory or for the occupation of +some of his possessions lying across the seas, if he has any. If he has +none, or if such as he has are not worth taking or holding—either as a +permanent possession or as what is called a material guarantee to be +used in the subsequent negotiations for peace—then the only alternative +is invasion. But that is a subject which demands a chapter to itself.</p> + +<p>It rarely happens, however, that a great naval Power is devoid of +transmarine possessions altogether, or that such as it holds are +esteemed by it to be of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> so little value or importance that their +seizure by an enemy would leave matters <i>in statu quo</i>. Sea power is, as +a rule, the outcome of a flourishing maritime commerce. Maritime +commerce as it expands, tends, even apart from direct colonization, to +bring territorial occupation in its train. The origin and history of the +British rule in India is a signal illustration of this tendency. There +are other causes of territorial expansion across the seas, as Admiral +Mahan has pointed out in his latest work on <i>Naval Strategy</i>, but it is +a rule which admits of no exceptions that territorial possessions across +the seas, however they may have been acquired, compel the Power which +holds them to develop a navy which, in the last resort, must be capable +of defending them. It was not, indeed, the needs of maritime commerce +which induced the United States to acquire Puerto Rico and the +Philippines. Their acquisition was, as it were, a by-product of +victorious sea power. But the vast expansion of the United States Navy +which the last dozen years have witnessed is the direct result and the +logical consequence of their acquisition.</p> + +<p>Applying these principles to the defence of the British Empire we see at +once that the command of the sea, in the sense already defined, is +essential to its successful prosecution. The case is not merely +exceptional, it is absolutely unique. The British<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> Isles might recover +from the effects of a successful invasion, as other countries have done +in like case. But the destruction of their maritime commerce would ruin +them irretrievably, even if no invasion were undertaken. Half the +maritime commerce of the world is carried on under the British flag. The +whole of that commerce would be suppressed if an enemy once secured the +command of the sea. The British Isles would be starved out in a few +weeks. Whether an enemy so situated would decide to invade or +invest—that is, so to impede our commerce that only an insignificant +fraction of it could by evasion reach our ports—is a question not so +much of strategy as of the economics of warfare. But really it hardly +matters a pin which he decided to do. We should have to submit in either +case. What would happen to our Dominions, Dependencies, and Colonies is +plain. Those which are defenceless the enemy would seize if he thought +it worth his while. In the case supposed they could obtain no military +assistance from the mother-country. But those which could defend +themselves he would have to overcome, if he could, by fighting. The +great Dominions of the Empire would not fall into an enemy's lap merely +because he had compelled the United Kingdom to sue for peace. To subdue +them by force of arms would be a very formidable undertaking.</p> + +<p>Such are the tremendous effects of an adverse<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> command of the sea on an +insular kingdom and an oceanic empire, which carries on—not by virtue +of any artificial monopoly, but solely by virtue of its hardly won +ascendency in the economic struggle for existence—half the maritime +commerce of the world. On the other hand, its effects on any nation +which does not depend on the sea for its existence can never be so +overwhelming and may even be insignificant. Germany was very little +affected by the command of the sea enjoyed by France in the War of 1870. +But in view of the enormous growth of German maritime commerce in recent +years, a superiority of France at sea equal to that which she enjoyed in +1870 would now be a much more serious menace to Germany. In all such +cases the issue must be decided by military operations suitable to the +circumstances and the occasion—operations in which naval force may take +an indispensable part even though it may not directly decide the issue. +It was, for example, the United States army that captured Santiago and +secured the deliverance of Cuba; but it was the United States Navy alone +that enabled the troops to be in Cuba at all and to do what they did +there. Again, in the war between Russia and Japan it was the capture of +Port Arthur and the final overthrow at Tsu-Shima of all that remained of +Russia's effective naval forces that induced Russia to entertain +overtures for peace. But the reduction of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> Port Arthur was mainly the +work of the military arm and the continued successes of the Japanese +armies in Manchuria must have contributed largely to Russia's surrender. +These successes were, it is true, rendered possible by the Japanese Navy +alone. It cannot be said that the Japanese ever held the undisputed +command of the sea until after Tsu-Shima had been fought and won. But at +the very outset of the war they established such an ascendency over the +Russian naval forces in Far Eastern waters that the latter were in the +end reduced to something less than even a "fortress fleet." At Port +Arthur, writes Admiral Mahan, the fleet was "neither a fortress fleet, +for except the guns mounted from it, the fleet contributed nothing to +the defence of the place; nor yet a fleet in being, for it was never +used as such." Its <i>animus pugnandi</i> was fatally depressed on the first +night of the war, and finally extinguished after the action of August +10.</p> + +<p>The truth is, that in all the larger achievements of sea power—those, +that is, to which a combination of naval and military force is +indispensable—it is impossible to disengage the influence of one of +these factors on the final issue from that of the other, and perhaps +idle to attempt do to so. They act, as it were, like a chemical +combination, not like the resultant of two separate but correlated +mechanical forces, and their joint effect may be just as different from +what might be the effect of either acting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> separately as water is +different from the oxygen and hydrogen of which it is composed. But +their operation in this wise can only begin after the command of the sea +has been secured, or at least has been so far established as to reduce +to a negligible quantity the risk of conducting military operations +across seas of which the command is still nominally in dispute. Now +there are several phases or stages in the enterprise of securing the +command of the sea; but they all depend on the power and the will to +fight for it. There is no absolute command of the sea, except in the +case of hostilities between two belligerents, separated by the sea, one +of whom has no naval force at all. The solitary case in history of this +situation is that of the War in South Africa. A similar situation would +arise if one of two belligerents had completely destroyed all the +effective naval force of the other. But that is a situation of which +history affords few, if any, examples. Between these two extremes lies +the whole history of naval warfare.</p> + +<p>There is, moreover, one characteristic of naval warfare which has no +exact counterpart in the conduct of military enterprises on land. This +is the power which a naval belligerent has of withdrawing his sea-going +force out of the reach of the sea-going force of the enemy by placing it +in sheltered harbours too strongly fortified for the enemy to reduce by +naval power alone. The only effective answer to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> this which the superior +belligerent can make is, as has already been shown, to establish a +blockade of the ports in question. This procedure is analogous to, but +not identical with, the investment by military forces of a fortress in +which an army has found shelter in the interior of the enemy's country. +But the essential difference is that the land fortress can be completely +invested so that no food or other supplies can reach it, whereas a sea +fortress cannot, unless it is situated on a small island, be completely +invested by naval force alone. In the one case, even if no assault is +attempted, starvation must sooner or later bring about the surrender of +the fortress together with any military force it contains, whereas in +the other the blockaded port being, as a rule, in open communication +with its own national territory, cannot be reduced by starvation. +Moreover, for reasons already explained, a maritime fortress cannot +nowadays be so closely blockaded as to prevent the exit of small craft +almost at all times or even to prevent the exit of squadrons of +battleships in circumstances favourable to the enterprise. Now the exit +of small craft equipped for torpedo attack is a much more serious threat +to the blockader than the exit of small craft, not so equipped, was in +the old days of close blockade. In those days small craft could do no +harm to ships of the line or even to frigates, whereas a torpedo craft +is nowadays in certain circumstances the equal and more than the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> equal +of a battleship. For these reasons the escape from a blockaded port of a +squadron of battleships might easily be regarded by the blockading enemy +as a less serious and even much more welcome incident of the campaign +than the frequent issue of swarms of torpedo craft skilfully handled, +daringly navigated, and sternly resolved to do or die in the attempt to +reduce the battle superiority of the enemy.</p> + +<p>It follows from these premisses that a naval blockade—or a connected +series of blockades—can never be regarded as equivalent to an +established command of the sea. At its best it can only achieve a +temporary command of the sea in a state of unstable and easily disturbed +equilibrium. At its worst, that is when it is least close and least +effective, and when the <i>animus pugnandi</i> of the enemy is unimpaired and +not to be intimidated, and is therefore ready at all times to take +advantage of "an opportunity too tempting to be resisted," it amounts to +a state of things in which the "fleet in being" becomes the dominant +factor of the situation. It is mainly a psychological problem and +scarcely a strategic problem at all to determine when the actual +situation approximates to either of these extremes, and the principle +embodied in the words <i>bene ausus vana contemnere</i> is the key to the +solution of this problem. If the blockaded fleet is merely a fortress +fleet, or not even that, as was the Russian fleet at Port Arthur for +some time after the first<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> night of the war, and even more after the +critical but indecisive conflict of August 10, then it is legitimate, as +Togo triumphantly showed, to regard the situation so established as so +far equivalent to a temporary command of the sea that military +operations, involving the security of oversea transit and the continuity +of oversea supply, might be undertaken with no greater risk than is +always inseparable from a vigorous initiative in war. But had the +Russian naval commanders been inspired—as, perhaps, the ill-fated +Makaroff alone was—with a genuine <i>animus pugnandi</i>, they might have +perceived that their one chance of bringing all the Japanese +enterprises, naval and military, to nought, was by fighting Togo's fleet +"to a frazzle," even if their own fleet perished in the conflict. Then +the Baltic Fleet, if it had any fight in it at all, must have made short +work of what remained of Togo's fleet, and the Japanese communications +with Manchuria being thereby severed, Russia might have dictated her own +terms of peace. The real lesson of that war is not that a true fleet in +being can ever be safely neglected, but that a fleet which can be +neglected with impunity is no true fleet in being. It should never be +forgotten that the problems of naval warfare are essentially +psychological and not mechanical in their nature. Their ultimate +determining factors are not material and ponderable forces operating +with measurable certainty, but those immaterial<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> and imponderable forces +of the human mind and will which can be measured by no standard other +than the result. By the material standard so popular in these days, and +withal so full of fallacy, Nelson should have been defeated at Trafalgar +and Rozhdestvensky should have been victorious at Tsu-Shima.</p> + +<p>It is, of course, idle to press the doctrine of the command of the sea +and the principle of the fleet in being so far as to affirm that no +military enterprise of any kind can be prosecuted across the sea unless +an unassailable command of the sea has first been established. Such a +proposition is disallowed by the whole course of naval history, which +is, in truth, for the most part, the history of the command of the sea +remaining in dispute, often for long periods, between two belligerents, +the balance inclining sometimes to one side and sometimes to the other, +according to the fortune of war. The whole question is in the main one +of degree and of circumstances. Broadly speaking, it may be said that +the larger the military enterprise contemplated the more complete must +be the command of the sea before it can be prosecuted with success and +the more certain the assurance of its continuance in unimpaired +efficiency until the objects of the enterprise are accomplished. +Conversely, the strength, even if inferior, of the fleet in being, its +strategic<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> disposition, its tactical efficiency, and, above all, its +<i>animus pugnandi</i> must all be accurately gauged by a naval commander +before he can safely decide that a military expedition of any magnitude +can be undertaken without fear of interference from an enemy's fleet. It +was the neglect of these principles that ruined the Athenian expedition +to Syracuse. It was equally the neglect of the same principles that +entailed the failure of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and the ultimate +surrender of the army he had deserted there. It was the politic +recognition of them that, as Admiral Mahan has shown in a brilliant +passage, compelled Hannibal to undertake the arduous passage of the Alps +for the purpose of invading Italy instead of transporting his troops by +sea.</p> + +<p>The limits of legitimate enterprise across seas of which the command +although firmly gripped is not unassailably established, are perhaps +best illustrated by the story of Craig's expedition to Malta and Sicily +towards the close of the Trafalgar campaign. This remarkable episode, +which has received less attention than it deserves from most historians, +has been represented by Mr Julian Corbett in his instructive work on +<i>The Campaign of Trafalgar</i> as the masterly offensive stroke by which +Pitt hoped to abate, and, if it might be, to overthrow the military +ascendency which Napoleon had established in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> Europe. That view has not +been universally accepted by Mr Corbett's critics, but the episode is +entitled to close attention for the light it throws on the central +problem of naval warfare. Pitt had concluded a treaty with Russia, which +involved not merely naval but military co-operation with that Power in +the Mediterranean. Craig's expedition was the shape which the military +co-operation was to take. It consisted of some five thousand troops, and +when it embarked in April 1805 it was convoyed by only two ships of the +line in its transit over seas which, for all the Government which +dispatched it knew, might be infested at the time by more than one fleet +of the enemy.</p> + +<p>Here, then, is a case in which the doctrine of the command of the sea +and the principle of the fleet in being might seem to be violated in a +crucial fashion. But the men who directed the arms of England in those +days knew what they were about. Long before they allowed the expedition +to start they had established a close and, as they thought, an effective +blockade of all the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports in which either +French or Spanish warships ready for sea were to be found. Nevertheless +we have here a signal illustration of the essential difference between a +command of the sea which has been made absolute by the destruction of +the enemy's available naval forces—as was practically the case<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> after +Trafalgar—and one which is only virtual and potential, because, +although the enemy's fleets have for the time been masked or sealed up +in their ports, they may, should the fortune of war so determine, resume +at any time the position and functions of a true fleet in being. On the +strength of a command of the sea of this merely contingent and potential +character Pitt and his naval advisers had persuaded themselves that the +way to the Mediterranean was open for the transit of troops. Craig's +transports, accordingly, put to sea on April 19. But a week before +Villeneuve with his fleet had left Toulon for the last time, had evaded +Nelson's watch, and passing rapidly through the Straits, had called off +Cadiz, and picking up such Spanish ships as were there had disappeared +into space, no man knowing whither he had gone. He might have gone to +the East Indies, he might have gone to the West Indies, as in fact he +did, or he might be cruising unmolested in waters where he could hardly +fail to come across Craig's transports with their weak escort of two +ships of the line. It was a situation which no one had foreseen or +regarded as more than a contingency too remote to be guarded against +when Craig's expedition was allowed to start. How Nelson viewed the +situation may be seen from his reply to the Admiralty, written on his +receipt of the first intimation that the expedition was about to start.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span></p> + +<p>"As the 'Fisgard' sailed from Gibraltar on the 9th instant, two hours +after the enemy's fleet from Toulon had passed the Straits, I have to +hope she would arrive time enough in the Channel to give their Lordships +information of this circumstance <i>and to prevent the Rear-Admiral and +Troops before mentioned</i>"—that is Craig's expedition—"<i>from leaving +Spithead</i>." In other words, Nelson held quite plainly that had the +Admiralty known that Villeneuve was at sea outside the Straits they +would not have allowed Craig to start. That Nelson was right in this +assumption is proved by the fact that acting on the inspiration of +Barham—perhaps the greatest strategist that ever presided at +Whitehall—the Admiralty, as soon as they had grasped the situation, +sent orders to Calder off Ferrol, that if he came in contact with the +expedition he was to send it back to Plymouth or Cork under cruiser +escort and retain the two ships of the line which had so far escorted it +under his own command. The fact was that if Craig's expedition once +passed Finisterre it would find itself totally without the naval +protection on which the Admiralty relied when it was dispatched. +Villeneuve was outside the Straits no one knew where, and had been +reinforced by the Spanish ships from Cadiz. Nelson, whose exact +whereabouts was equally unknown to the Admiralty, was detained in the +Mediterranean by baffling winds and also by the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> necessity of making +sure before quitting his station that Villeneuve had not gone to the +Levant. Orde, who had been blockading Cadiz with a weak squadron which +had to retire on Villeneuve's approach, had convinced himself, on +grounds not without cogency, that Villeneuve was making for the +northward, and had, quite correctly on this hypothesis, fallen back on +the fleet blockading Brest, being ignorant of the peril to which Craig +was exposed. Thus Craig's expedition seemed to be going straight to its +doom unless Calder could intercept it and give it orders to return. +However, Craig and Knight, whose flag flew in one of the ships of the +line escorting the expedition, passed Finisterre without communicating +with Calder, and having by this time got wind of their peril, they +hurried into Lisbon, there to await developments in comparative safety, +though their presence caused great embarrassment to the Portuguese +Government and raised a diplomatic storm. It was not until Craig and +Knight had ascertained that Villeneuve was out of the way and that +Nelson had passed the Straits that they put to sea again and met Nelson +off Cape St Vincent. Nelson had by this time satisfied himself, after an +exhaustive survey of the situation, that Villeneuve had gone to the West +Indies, and resolved to follow him there as soon as he had sped the +expedition on its appointed way. But so apprehensive was he of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> the +Spanish ships remaining at Carthagena, that, inferior to Villeneuve as +he was, he detached the "Royal Sovereign" from his own squadron, and +placed her under Knight's command. It only remains to add that the +expedition reached its destination in safety and that its result was the +Battle of Maida, fought in the following year—the first battle in which +Napoleon's troops crossed bayonets with British infantry and were beaten +by an inferior force. The expedition was also the indirect cause of the +Battle of Trafalgar itself, for it was in order to frustrate the +coalition with Russia of which it was the instrument that Napoleon had +ordered Villeneuve to make for the Mediterranean when he finally left +Cadiz to encounter Nelson on his path. Thus was it, as Mr Corbett says, +"to prove the insidious drop of poison—the little sting—that was to +infect Napoleon's empire with decay and to force his hand with so +tremendous a result."</p> + +<p>Yet it very nearly miscarried at the outset. Nelson and Barham—between +them a combination of warlike energy and strategic insight, without a +parallel in the history of naval warfare—both realized the tremendous +risks it ran. It may be argued that had Villeneuve gone to the north he +would have found himself in the thick of British squadrons closing in on +Brest and vastly superior in force. Yet Allemand, who had escaped a few +weeks<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> later from Rochefort, was able to cruise in these very waters for +over five months without being brought to book. It is true that the +destruction or capture of five thousand British troops would not +seriously have affected the larger issues of the naval campaign, but it +would have broken up the coalition with Russia by which Pitt set so much +store, and which Mr Corbett at any rate represents as having exercised a +decisive influence on the ultimate fortunes of Napoleon. The moral of +the whole story seems to be that competent strategists—for the world +has known none more competent and none more intrepid than Nelson and +Barham—will not risk even a minor expedition at sea unless its line of +advance is sufficiently controlled by superior naval force to ensure its +unmolested transit. The principle thus exhibited in the case of a minor +expedition manifestly applies with immensely increased force to those +larger expeditions which assume the dimensions of an invasion. It was +not until long after Trafalgar had been fought, and the command of the +sea had been secured beyond the possibility of challenge, that the +campaigns in the Peninsula were undertaken—campaigns which ended and +were always intended to end, should the fortune of war so decree, in the +invasion of France and the overthrow of Napoleon. This opens up the +whole question of invasion, which will be discussed in the next +chapter.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<p class='center'>INVASION<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span></p> + + +<p>England has not been invaded since <span class="smcap">A.D.</span> 1066, when, the country +having no fleet in being, William the Conqueror effected a landing and +subjugated the kingdom. During the eight centuries and more that have +since elapsed, every country in Europe has been invaded and its capital +occupied, in many cases more than once. It is by no means for lack of +attempts to invade her that England has been spared the calamity of +invasion for more than eight hundred years. It is not because she has +had at all times—it may indeed be doubted if she has had at any +time—organized military force sufficient to repel an invader, if he +could not be stopped at sea. It is because she can only be invaded +across the sea, and because whenever the attempt has been made she has +always had naval force sufficient to bring the enterprise to nought. It +is merely a truism to say that the invasion of hostile territory across +the sea is a much more difficult and hazardous enterprise than the +crossing of a land frontier by organized military force. But it is no +truism to say that the reason why it is so much more difficult and more<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> +hazardous is that there is no real parallel between the two cases. I +assume a vigorous defensive on the part of the adversary assailed in +both cases—a defensive which, though commonly so called, is really +offensive in its nature. The essential difference lies in this, that two +countries which are separated by the sea have no common frontier. Each +has its own frontier at the limit of its territorial waters, but between +these two there lies a region common to both and from which neither can +be excluded except by the superior naval force of the other.</p> + +<p>For the moment an expeditionary force emerges from its own territorial +waters—which may be any distance from a few miles up to many thousands +of miles from the territorial waters of the adversary to be assailed—it +must be prepared to defend itself, and naval force alone can afford it +an adequate measure of defence. Military forces embarked in transports +are defenceless and practically unarmed. They cannot defend themselves +with their own arms, nor can the transports which carry them be so armed +as to afford adequate defence against the smallest warship afloat, least +of all against torpedo craft. Hence, unless the sea to be traversed has +been cleared of the naval forces of the enemy beforehand, the invading +military force must be covered by a naval force sufficient to overcome +any naval force which the enemy is able to bring against it. If the +latter can<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> bring a fleet—as he must be able to do if the invasion is +to be prevented—the covering fleet must be able to beat any fleet that +he can bring. That condition being satisfied, however, it is clear that +the covering fleet must be terribly hampered and handicapped in the +ensuing conflict by the presence of a huge and unwieldy assemblage of +unarmed transports filled with disarmed men, and by the consequent +necessity of defending it against the attack of those portions of the +enemy's naval force to which, albeit not suitable for engaging in the +principal conflict, the transports would offer an otherwise defenceless +prey. Hence the escorting fleet must be stronger than its adversary in a +far larger proportion than it need be if naval issues pure and simple +were alone at stake—so strong indeed that, if the transports were out +of the way, its victory might be taken as certain. But if that is so it +is manifest that the prospects of successful invasion would be +immeasurably improved by seeking to decide the naval issue first—as +Tourville very properly did in the Beachy Head campaign—and keeping the +transports in hand and in port until it had been decided in favour of +the intending invader. This is the eternal dilemma of invasion across a +sea of which the command has not previously been secured. If you are not +strong enough to dispose of the enemy's naval force you are certainly +not strong enough to escort an invading<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> force—itself helpless +afloat—across the sea in his teeth. If you are strong enough to do this +you will certainly be wise to beat him first, because then there will be +nothing left to prevent the transit of your troops. In other words, +command of the sea, if not absolutely and in all cases indispensable to +a successful invasion, is at any rate the only certain way of ensuring +its success.</p> + +<p>Naval history from first to last is full of illustrations of the +principles here expounded. I will examine one or two of them, and I must +take my illustrations mainly from the naval history of Britain, first, +because Britain, being an island, is the only country in Europe which +cannot be invaded except across the sea, and secondly, because Britain +for that very reason has often been subjected to attempts at invasion +and has always frustrated them by denying to her adversary that +sufficiency of sea control which, if history is any guide, is essential +to successful invasion. But first I will examine two cases which might +at first sight seem to militate against the principles I have +enunciated. The brilliant campaign of Cæsar which ended in the overthrow +of Pompey and his cause at Pharsalus, was opened by Cæsar's desperate +venture of carrying his army across the Adriatic to the coast of Epirus, +although Pompey's fleet was in full command of the waters traversed. +This is one of those <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>exceptions which may be said to prove the rule. +Cæsar had no alternative. Pompey was in Illyria, and if Cæsar could not +overthrow Pompey on that side of the Adriatic it was certain that Pompey +would overthrow Cæsar on the other side. For this reason, and perhaps +for this reason alone, Cæsar was compelled to undertake a venture which +he must have known to be desperate. How desperate it was is shown by the +fact that, not having transports enough to carry more than half his army +at once, he had to send his transports back as soon as he had landed, +and they were all destroyed on their way back to Brundusium. Antony his +lieutenant did, indeed, succeed after a time in getting the remainder of +his army across, but not before Cæsar had been reduced to the utmost +straits. The whole enterprise moreover was not, strictly speaking, an +invasion of hostile territory. The inhabitants of the territory occupied +by both combatants were neutral as between them, and were willing to +furnish Cæsar with such scanty supplies as they had. Again, an army in +those days needed no ammunition except the sword which each soldier +carried on his person, and that kind of ammunition was not expended in +fighting. Hence Cæsar had no occasion to concern himself with the +security of his communications across the sea—a consideration which +weighs with overwhelming force on the commander of a modern<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> oversea +expedition. "A modern army," as the late Lord Wolseley said, "is such a +complicated organism that any interruption in the line of communications +tends to break up and destroy its very life." An army marches on its +belly. If it cannot be fed it cannot fight. After the Battle of Talavera +Wellington was so paralysed by the failure of the Spanish authorities to +supply his troops with food that he had to abandon the offensive for a +time and to retreat towards his own line of communication with the sea. +Cæsar on the other hand abandoned the sea, which could not feed him, and +trusted to the resources of the country. The difference is vital. The +one risk that Cæsar ran was the destruction of his army afloat, and that +he ran not because he chose but because he must. The risk of destruction +on land he was prepared to run, and this, at any rate, was, as the event +proved, a case of <i>bene ausus vana contemnere</i>.</p> + +<p>Again, Napoleon's descent on Egypt is another exception which proves the +rule, and proves it still more conclusively. Napoleon evaded Nelson's +fleet and landed his army in Egypt. The army so landed left Egypt in +British transports, having laid down its arms and surrendered just +before the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens; and but for the timely +conclusion of that short-lived armistice, every French soldier who +survived the Egyptian campaign might have seen the inside of a British<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> +prison. This was because Napoleon, who never fathomed the secrets of the +sea, chose to think that to evade a hostile fleet was the same thing as +to defeat it. He managed for a time to escape Nelson's attentions by the +skin of his teeth, and fondly fancied that because he had done so the +dominion of the East was won. He was quickly undeceived by the Battle of +the Nile. That victory destroyed the fleet which had escorted his army +to Egypt and thereby made it impossible for the army ever to return +except by consent of the Power which he never could vanquish on the sea. +The Battle of the Nile, wrote a Frenchman in Egypt, "is a calamity which +leaves us here as children totally lost to the mother country. Nothing +but peace can restore us to her." Nothing but the so-called Peace of +Amiens did restore them. If it be argued, as it often has been, that +Napoleon's successful descent on Egypt proves that military enterprises +of large moment may sometimes be undertaken without first securing the +command of the sea to be traversed, surely the Battle of the Nile and +its sequel are a triumphant refutation of such an argument. Such +enterprises are merely a roundabout way of presenting the belligerent +who retains the command of the sea with as many prisoners of war as +survive from the original expedition.</p> + +<p>I need not labour the point which the unbroken<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> testimony of history +from the time of the Norman Conquest has established, that all attempts +to invade England have been made in the past and must be made in the +future across a sea not commanded by the intending invader. If he has +secured the command of the sea beforehand, there is nothing to prevent +the invasion except the consideration that he can attain his end—that +is, the subjugation of the nation's will—at less cost to himself. That +being premised, let us consider how the intending invader will set about +his task. There are three ways, and three ways only. First, he may seek +to overpower the British naval defence on the seas, that is to obtain +the command of the sea. If he can do that, the whole thing is done. Or +secondly, he may collect the military forces destined for the invasion +in ports suitable for the purpose, and when all is ready he may cover +their embarkation and transit by a naval force sufficient to overcome +any naval force which this country can direct against it. I have already +shown, however, that a force sufficient to do this with any certainty, +or even with any reasonable prospect of success, must needs be more than +sufficient to overpower the British naval defence and thereby to secure +the command of the sea, if the enemy were freed from the entangling and +wellnigh disabling necessity of providing for the safe conduct of an +unwieldy host of otherwise defenceless<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> transports. In other words he is +putting the cart before the horse, a procedure which has never yet +succeeded in getting the cart to its destination. This second +alternative is then merely a clumsy and extremely inefficient way of +attaining the same end as the first, and need only be mentioned in order +to exclude it from further consideration.</p> + +<p>There remains only a third alternative. This is to assemble the invading +military force at suitable ports as before, and to attempt to engage the +attention of the defending naval force by operations at a distance for a +time sufficient to secure the unmolested transit of the military +expedition. This is the method which has nearly always been employed by +an enemy projecting an invasion of this country. It has never yet +succeeded, because it always leads in the end to a situation which is +practically indistinguishable from that involved in the second +alternative, which I have already discussed and excluded. The naval and +the military elements in the enterprise of invasion being now, by the +hypothesis, separated in space and for that reason incapable of being +very exactly combined in time, a whole series of highly indeterminate +factors is thereby introduced into the problem to be solved by the +invader. There are elements of naval force, to wit, all manner of small +craft, which are not required for the main conflict of fleets—and it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +is this conflict which alone can secure the command of the sea—but +which are eminently adapted for the impeachment and destruction of +unarmed transports. These will be employed in the blockade of the ports +in which the military forces are collecting. If the assailant employs +similar craft to drive the blockaders away, the defender will bring up +larger craft to stiffen his blockading flotillas. The invading force +will therefore still be impeded and impeached. The process thus goes on +until, if it is not otherwise decided by the conflict of the main fleets +at a distance, the contending naval forces of both sides are attracted +to the scene of the proposed embarkation, there to fight it out in the +conditions involved in the second alternative considered above, +conditions which I have already shown to be the least favourable to the +would-be invader. In a masterly analysis Mr Julian Corbett has shown +that the British defence against a threatened invasion has always been +conducted on these lines, that the primary objective of the defence has +been the troops and their transports, and that the vigorous pursuit of +this objective has always resulted in a decision being obtained as +between the main fleets of the two belligerents. That the decision has +always been in favour of the British arms is at once a lesson and a +warning—a lesson that immunity from invasion can only be ensured by +superiority at sea, a warning<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> that such superiority can only be secured +by the adequate preparation, the judicious disposition, and the skilful +handling of the naval forces to be employed, as well as by an +unflinching <i>animus pugnandi</i>. But no nation which goes to war can hope +for more or be content with less than the opportunity of obtaining a +decision in these conditions. The issue lies on the knees of the gods.</p> + +<p>A few illustrations may here be cited. We have seen how in the Beachy +Head campaign Tourville, having failed to force a decision on +Torrington's fleet in being, could not turn aside with Torrington at his +heels and Killigrew and Shovel on his flank to bring over an invading +force from France. He was paralysed by that abiding characteristic of +French naval strategy which impelled the French naval commanders to fix +their eye on ulterior objects and blinded them to the fact that the best +way to attain those objects was to destroy the naval forces of the enemy +whenever the opportunity offered of so obtaining a decision. Hence their +preference for the leeward position in action, their constant reluctance +to fight a decisive action, their habitual direction of their fire at +the masts and sails of the enemy rather than at his hulls, and in +Tourville's case his failure to annihilate Torrington's fleet in being, +resulting in the total miscarriage of the schemes for invasion, to be +followed by internal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> insurrection, which, as Admiral Colomb has shown, +were the kernel of the French plan of campaign. In the case of the +Armada in the previous century, the task of invasion was entrusted to +Parma, who had collected troops for the purpose, and vessels for their +transport, in the ports of the Spanish Netherlands. But Justin of Nassau +kept a close watch outside, and Parma could not move. He summoned Medina +Sidonia with the Armada to his assistance, but he summoned him in vain, +for the Armada, harassed throughout the Channel, and, as it were, smoked +out of Calais, was finally shattered at Gravelines. Precisely the same +thing happened in the eighteenth century during the Seven Years' War. +Troops and transports were being collected in the Morbihan, but their +exit was blocked by a British naval force stationed off the ports. +Conflans with the French main fleet was at Brest, and there he was +blockaded by Hawke. Evading the blockade, Conflans put to sea and +straightway went to release the troops and transports, hopelessly +blockaded in the Morbihan. But Hawke swooped down on him and destroyed +him in Quiberon Bay, Boscawen having previously destroyed at Lagos the +fleet which De La Clue was bringing from Toulon to effect a junction +with Conflans.</p> + +<p>One more illustration may be cited, and I will treat it at some length, +because it presents certain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> features which give it peculiar +significance in relation to current controversies. This is the projected +invasion of England by France in 1744. It is, so far as I know, the +solitary instance in our naval history which shows the enemy framing his +plans on the lines of what is now known as "a bolt from the blue"—that +is, he projected a surprise invasion, at a time when the two countries +were nominally at peace, in the hope that the first overt act of the war +he was contemplating might be the landing of his troops on British soil. +In 1743, when this project was conceived, England and France were, as I +have said, nominally at peace, but troops belonging to both had fought +at Dettingen, not in any direct quarrel of their own, but because +England was supporting Maria Theresa and France was supporting her +enemies. The fleets of both Powers were jealously watching each other in +the Mediterranean, a situation which led early in 1744 to the too +notorious action of Mathews off Toulon. Nevertheless, until the very end +of 1743 no direct conflict with France was anticipated by the English +Government.</p> + +<p>Yet France was already secretly preparing her "bolt from the blue." She +had resolved to support the Pretender's cause and to prepare an invasion +of England in which the Pretender's son was to take part, and on landing +in England<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> to rally his party to the overthrow of the Hanoverian +dynasty. The bolt was to be launched from Dunkirk and directed at the +Thames, the intention being to land the invading force at Blackwall. +Some ten thousand French troops to be employed in the expedition were +sent into winter-quarters in and around Dunkirk, but this aroused no +suspicion in England, because this region was the natural place for the +left flank of the French army to winter in, and Dunkirk contained no +transports at the time. Transports were, however, being taken up under +false charter-parties at French ports on the Atlantic and in the +Channel, and were ordered as soon as ready to rendezvous secretly and +separately at Dunkirk. At first the intention was for the expeditionary +force to make its attempt without any support from the French fleet. But +Marshal Saxe, who was to command it and knew that the Thames and its +adjacent waters were never denuded of naval force sufficient to make +short work of a fleet of unarmed transports, flatly declined to +entertain this project and demanded adequate naval support for the +enterprise. Accordingly a powerful fleet, held to be sufficient to +contain or defeat any British fleet that was thought likely to be able +to challenge it, was fitted out with all secrecy at Brest and placed +under the command of De Roquefeuil. Even he was not told its +destination,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> and false rumours on the subject were allowed to circulate +among those who were concerned in its preparation.</p> + +<p>So far everything seemed to be going well. The blow was timed for the +first week in January, but the usual delays occurred, and for a month or +more after the date originally fixed, the expeditionary force and its +escort were separated by the whole length of northern France. Yet even +before the date originally fixed, England had got wind of the +preparations. From the middle of December Brest had been kept under +watch, and orders had been issued to the dockyards to prepare for sea as +many ships of the line as were available. These preparations were +continued, without intermission, until the end of January, the purpose +and destination of the armament at Brest still being unknown. Then two +alarming pieces of intelligence reached England at the same time. One +was that Roquefeuil had put to sea on January 26 (O.S.) with twenty-one +sail of the line, and before being lost sight of by the British cruiser +told off to watch him, had been seen to be clearly standing to the +northward. The other was that Prince Charles, the son of the Pretender, +had left Rome and had landed without hindrance in France. This, being a +direct violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, was naturally held to give to +the sailing of the Brest fleet the complexion of a direct hostile<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> +intent. It was on February 1 that these facts were known, and on +February 2, Sir John Norris, a veteran of Barfleur and La Hogue, who was +now well over eighty years of age, but as the event showed was still +fully equal to the task entrusted to him, was ordered to hoist his flag +at Portsmouth and to "take the most effectual measures to prevent the +making of any descent on the Kingdoms." Norris hoisted his flag on the +6th, and by the 18th he had eighteen sail of the line under his command. +Subsequently his force was increased to twenty. Nothing was known of the +movements of the French fleet since January 29, when the frigate set to +watch it had finally lost sight of it. It was in fact still off the +mouth of the Channel, baffled by adverse winds and gales and vainly +seeking to make headway against them. If it had gone to the +Mediterranean, Mathews off Toulon would be placed in grave jeopardy, and +there were some projects for detaching a powerful squadron of Norris's +ships to his support. If, on the other hand, it was aiming at the +Channel, Norris with his whole force would be none too strong to +encounter and defeat it. This was Norris's dilemma, and it was not until +February 9 that he learned from the Duke of Newcastle that an embargo +had been laid on all shipping at Dunkirk, where some fifty vessels of +one hundred and fifty to two hundred tons had by this time assembled. +These<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> might at a pinch and for a short transit be estimated to be +capable of transporting some ten thousand troops. But an embargo, +although clear proof of hostile intent, was not necessarily a sign of +impending invasion. It was a common expedient, preliminary to war, +whereby you deprived your enemy of ships and men very necessary to his +purposes and secured ships and men equally necessary to your own. Hence +no strategic connexion could with any certainty be held to exist between +the embargo at Dunkirk and the sailing of the French fleet from Brest. +On the other hand it was clearly dangerous to uncover the Channel so +long as the destination of the Brest fleet was unknown, and, although +Newcastle had suggested to Norris that he should divide his fleet and +send the major part of it to reinforce Mathews in the Mediterranean, yet +Norris strongly demurred to the suggestion, and before the time came to +act on it the situation had so far developed as to disallow it +altogether. On February 11, Norris received information that a French +fleet of at least sixteen sail of the line had been seen the day before +off the Start. This convinced him that the French had some scheme to the +eastward in hand; and as he had frigates watching the Channel between +the Isle of Wight and Cape Barfleur he was equally convinced that the +French had so far no appreciable armed force to the eastward of him.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> +Newcastle, however, did not share this conviction. He had received +numerous reports of movements of French ships in the Channel to the +eastward of the Isle of Wight and other information which pointed to a +concentration at Dunkirk. As a matter of fact no French men-of-war were +at this time east of the Isle of Wight, and the vessels reported to +Newcastle must have been transports making for Dunkirk and magnified +into ships of the line by the fog of war. Newcastle, accordingly, +ordered Norris to go forthwith to the Downs. Foul winds prevented Norris +from sailing at once from St Helen's, and on the 13th, the day before he +did sail, he received further information which confirmed his conviction +that the French were still to the westward. But Newcastle's orders +remained peremptory, and on the 14th he sailed with eighteen ships, and +anchored in the Downs on the 17th. There he found two more ships +awaiting him, while two others were on their way to join him from +Plymouth.</p> + +<p>I pause here for a moment to point out that Norris's desire, over-ruled +by Newcastle, to remain at Portsmouth was thoroughly well advised. He +knew that there was naval force enough in the Thames and the Downs to +dispose of any expedition coming from Dunkirk unless it were escorted by +the Brest fleet, or by a very considerable detachment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> therefrom. He was +well assured that no such detachment could have eluded the vigilance of +his frigates, and he felt that in these circumstances he could better +impeach Roquefeuil by lying in wait for him at Spithead or St Helen's +than by preceding him to the Downs. How right he was in this +appreciation will be seen from a closer consideration of the movements +of the French fleet. It was not until February 13 that Roquefeuil +received his final orders off the Start. He was directed to detach De +Baraille, his second in command, with five ships. These were to go +forthwith to Dunkirk and escort Saxe's expedition, while he himself with +the remainder of his fleet was to blockade Norris at Portsmouth and +defeat him if he could. But Roquefeuil and his council of war found +these orders too hazardous for execution. They resolved not to divide +the fleet until at least Norris, presumed to be at Portsmouth, had been +disposed of. On the 17th, the day on which Norris had anchored in the +Downs, they looked into Spithead and persuaded themselves that they had +seen Norris there with eleven sail of the line. Judging that the weather +was too bad for a successful blockade, Roquefeuil then passed on up the +Channel, convinced that Norris was now behind him with too weak a force +to be of any effect. Baraille was then sent on with his detachment to +Dunkirk, but by this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> time Saxe had lost heart and declined to sail +until Roquefeuil's whole fleet was at hand to escort him.</p> + +<p>It never was at hand to escort him, and the expedition never sailed. +Roquefeuil, with his fleet now greatly reduced, anchored off Dungeness +on the 22nd, and never got any further. What had happened in the +meanwhile was this. Norris remained in the Downs, being held there for +some time by a gale. He was not unaware of what was going on at Dunkirk, +but he hesitated to proceed thither lest the French fleet behind him +should be covering another expedition coming from some French port in +the Channel. He sent to reconnoitre, however, and on the 21st received +information that four sixty-gun ships—these were, no doubt, Baraille's +detachment—were at anchor off Gravelines, and there covering the +transports at Dunkirk. On the 22nd, Roquefeuil appeared off Dungeness +and anchored there. As soon as he knew Roquefeuil's whereabouts, Norris +resolved to attack him without delay. The wind, being N.W., was +favourable to his enterprise, and at the same time made it impossible +for the expedition to leave Dunkirk. Should the wind change before +Roquefeuil was brought to action and defeated, Norris held that he was +strong enough to detach a force to impeach Saxe and Baraille, and at the +same time to give a good account of Roquefeuil.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> But matters did not +exactly turn out in this wise. On the 24th Norris left the Downs, with a +light wind from the N.W., and an ebb tide in his favour, making for +Dungeness, where Roquefeuil was still lying. His appearance in the +offing was Roquefeuil's first information that Norris was to the +eastward of him in superior force, and it greatly disconcerted +Roquefeuil. He held a hasty council of war and decided to cut and run. +By this time the tide had turned and the wind had fallen, so that he +could not stir until the tide again began to ebb. Norris, similarly +disabled, had anchored some few miles to the eastward, intending to make +his attack as soon as wind and tide allowed. But during the night a +furious gale from the N.E. sprang up, which drove most of Norris's ships +from their anchors, and when daylight came the French were nowhere to be +seen. Roquefeuil had slipped his cables, and with the gale behind him +was hurrying back to Brest. Norris went after him as far as Beachy Head, +but there gave up the chase and returned to the Downs, to make sure that +Saxe and Baraille, for whom the wind was now favourable, might find +their way barred should they attempt to set sail. The transports, +however, were by now in no position to move, nor was either Saxe or +Baraille in any mind to allow them to move. They both realized that the +game was up. The troops were in the transports, and they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> suffered +greatly in the gale that frustrated Norris' attack on Roquefeuil. But +that was merely an accident of warfare. It was not the gale that +shattered the expedition, nor did it save England from invasion. On the +contrary, while it played havoc with the transports and troops at +Dunkirk, it also saved Roquefeuil's fleet from destruction at Dungeness. +But, gale or no gale, the transports and troops never could have crossed +so long as Norris held on to the Downs. Nor could they have crossed had +Norris been allowed to remain at Portsmouth as he desired; for in that +case Baraille could not have been detached.</p> + +<p>To point the moral of this memorable story, I cannot do better than +quote Mr Julian Corbett's comment on it. "The whole attempt, it will be +seen, with everything in its favour, had exhibited the normal course of +degradation. For all the nicely framed plan and perfect deception, the +inherent difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as +usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy's battle fleet with his +transports, and we on our part were able to forestall it with every +advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of a central mass on a +revealed and certain line of passage." We were certainly taken at a +disadvantage at the outset, for the "bolt from the blue" was preparing +some time before any one in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> England got wind of it. The country had +been largely denuded of troops for foreign enterprises, Scotland was +deeply disaffected, the Jacobites were full of hope and intrigue, the +Ministry was supine and feeble, the navy was deplorably weak in home +waters, and such ships as were available had been dispersed to their +ports for refit. Nevertheless with all these conditions in its favour +the projected "bolt from the blue" was detected and +anticipated—tardily, it is true, and with no great sagacity except on +the part of Norris—long before the expedition was ready to start. +Surely the moral needs no further pointing.</p> + +<p>By these instances, and others which might be quoted, the law seems to +be established that in default of an assured command of the sea the +fleet which seeks to cover an invasion is drawn by irresistible +attraction towards the place of embarkation, and that the same +attraction brings it there—if not earlier—into conflict with the +superior forces of the enemy. If in the Trafalgar campaign, which I have +no space to examine in detail, the law does not seem to operate to the +extent that it did in the other cases examined, that is only because the +disposition of the British fleets was so masterly that Napoleon never +got the opportunity he yearned for of bringing his fleets to the place +of embarkation. They were<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> outmanœuvred beforehand and finally +overthrown at Trafalgar.</p> + +<p>There is indeed a fourth alternative which has been advanced by some +speculative writers, though history lends it no countenance, and it has +never, I believe, been taken seriously by any naval authority of repute. +I cannot take it seriously myself. It assumes that some naval Power, +suitably situated as regards this country, might without either +provocation or overt international dispute, clandestinely take up +transport—either a comparatively small number of very large merchant +vessels or a very large number of barges, lighters, or what not to be +towed by steam vessels—might clandestinely put an army with all its +necessary <i>impedimenta</i> on board the transports so provided and then +clandestinely, and without either notice or warning, send them to sea, +with or without escort, with intent to effect a landing at some suitable +point on the English coast. The whole theory seems to me to involve at +least three monstrous improbabilities: first, a piratical intent on the +part of a civilized nation; secondly, a concealment of such intent in +conditions wellnigh incompatible with the degree of secrecy required; +and thirdly, a precision and a punctuality of movement in the operations +of embarkation, transit, and landing of which history affords no +example, while naval opinion and experience scoff at them as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> utterly +impracticable. Of course the future may not resemble the past, and naval +wars of the future may not be conducted on a pattern sealed by the +unbroken teaching of over eight hundred years. But that is an assumption +which I cannot seriously entertain.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<p class='center'>COMMERCE IN WAR<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span></p> + + +<p>The maritime trade of a nation at war has always been regarded by the +other belligerent as his legitimate prey. In the Dutch Wars the +suppression of the enemy's commerce was the main objective of both +parties to the conflict. In all wars in which either belligerent has any +commerce afloat worth considering one belligerent may always be expected +to do all that he can for its capture or suppression, while the other +will do as much as he can for its defence. In proportion to the volume +and value of the national trade afloat is the potency of its destruction +as an agency for bringing the national will into submission. If, for +example, the maritime trade of England could be suppressed by her +enemies, England would thereby be vanquished. Her commerce is her +life-blood. On the other hand there are nations, very powerful in war, +which either by reason of their geographical position, or because their +oversea trade is no vital element in their national economy, would +suffer comparatively little in like circumstances. It thus appears that +the volume and value of the national trade afloat<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> is the measure of the +efforts which an enemy is likely to make for its suppression. But it is +not directly the measure of the efforts which a nation so assailed must +make for its defence. The measure of these efforts is determined not by +the volume and value of the trade to be protected but by the amount and +character of the naval force which the enemy can employ in assailing it. +In the Boer War British maritime commerce was unassailed and +uninterrupted in all parts of the world, and yet not a single ship of +the British Navy was directly employed in its protection. If on the +other hand England were at war with a naval Power of the first rank, she +might have to employ the whole of her naval resources in securing the +free transit of her maritime commerce. So long as she can do this with +success she need give no thought to the menace of possible invasion. A +command of the sea so far established as to secure freedom of transit +for the vast and ubiquitous maritime commerce of this country is also, +of necessity, so far established as to deny free transit to the +transports of an enemy seeking to invade. The greater includes the less.</p> + +<p>It may at first sight seem to be an anomaly—some, indeed, would +represent it as a mere survival of barbarism—that whereas in war on +land the private property of an enemy's subjects is, by the established +law and custom of civilized nations,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> not liable to capture or +destruction without compensation to its owners, the opposite rule still +prevails in war at sea. But a little consideration will, I think, show +that the analogy sought to be established between the two cases is a +very imperfect one. War on land does <i>ipso facto</i> suspend in large +measure the free transport of commerce in transit. As between the two +belligerents it interrupts it altogether. Moreover, throughout the +territory occupied by the enemy, the railways, and in large measure the +roads, are practically monopolized for the movements of his troops and +the transport of his supplies—in a word for the maintenance of his +communications. There can have been little or no consignment of goods +from Paris to Berlin or <i>vice versa</i> during the war of 1870, and even +though at certain stages of the war goods might have been consigned, +say, from Lyons to Geneva, or from Lille to Brussels, yet such cases are +really only the counterparts of the frequent failure of one +belligerent's cruisers to intercept the merchant vessels of the other on +the high seas. Again, in the case of a beleaguered fortress, the +besiegers would never dream of allowing a convoy of food or of munitions +of war—or for the matter of that of merchandise of any kind—to enter +the fortress. They would intercept it as a matter of course, and if +necessary they would appropriate it to their own use. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> upshot of it +all is that even in war on land the transit of all commerce, albeit the +private property of some one, is practically suspended within the area +of the territory occupied, and very seriously impeded throughout the +whole country subject to invasion. It is not, therefore, true to say +without many qualifications that in war private property is respected on +land and not respected at sea. The only difference that I can discern is +that by the law and custom of nations private property cannot be +appropriated on land, whereas at sea it can. But this difference is not +really essential. The essential thing in both cases is that the wealth +of the enemy is diminished and the credit of his traders destroyed—a +far more important matter in these days than the destruction of this or +that cargo of his goods—by the suspension of that interchange of +commodities with other nations which is the chief element of national +prosperity, and may be, as in the case of England, the indispensable +condition of national existence. Indeed, although private property on +land is exempt from capture, and at sea it is not, yet there are many +nations which would suffer far more from the interruption of their +mercantile communications which war on land entails than they would from +the destruction of their commerce at sea.</p> + +<p>For these reasons I hold that the proposed exemption of private property +from capture or molestation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> at sea is a chimerical one. War is +essentially an act of violence. It operates by the destruction of human +life as well as by all other agencies which are likely to subdue the +enemy's will. Among these agencies the capture or destruction of +commerce afloat is by far the most humane since it entails the least +sacrifice of life, limb, or liberty, and at the same time its coercive +pressure may in some cases, though not in all, be the most effective +instrument for compelling the enemy's submission. Moreover, it is not +proposed to exempt from capture or destruction such merchant vessels of +the enemy—or even of a neutral for that matter—as attempt to break a +blockade. Now the modern conditions of blockade are such that the +warships conducting it may be stationed hundreds of miles from the +blockaded port or ports, and their outlying cruisers, remaining in touch +with each other and with the main body, may be much further afield. +Within the area of the organized patrol thus established, every vessel +seeking to enter a blockaded port or to issue from it will still be +liable to capture. In these conditions the proposal to exempt the +remainder of the enemy's private property afloat from capture would be a +mockery. There would not be enough of such property afloat to pay for +the cost of capture.</p> + +<p>It is an axiom of naval warfare that an assured command of the sea is at +once the best defence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> for commerce afloat and an indispensable +condition for any such attack on it as is likely to have any appreciable +effect in subduing the enemy's will. War is an affair not of pin-pricks +but of smashing blows. "The harassment and distress," says Admiral +Mahan, "caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce +will be conceded by all. It is doubtless a most important secondary +operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned until war +itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure +sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a +most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of +cheapness to the representatives of a people." Here again we may discern +some of the larger implications of that potent and far-reaching agency +of naval warfare, the command of the sea. If a belligerent not aiming at +the command of the sea, and having no sufficient naval force wherewithal +to secure it, thinks to crush his enemy by directing sporadic attacks on +his commerce, he will, if history is any guide, soon find out his +mistake. His naval forces available for this purpose, are, by the +hypothesis, inferior to those of the enemy. It is certain that they will +sooner or later be hunted down and destroyed. Moreover, the mercantile +flag of the weaker belligerent will, as I have shown, disappear from the +sea<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> from the very outset of the conflict; and the maritime commerce of +such a belligerent must be of very insignificant volume if the loss +entailed by its suppression is not greater than that likely to be +inflicted by such a belligerent on the enemy's commerce which crosses +the seas under the <i>ægis</i> of a flag which commands them. Admiral Mahan +has estimated that during the whole of the war of the French Revolution +and Empire the direct loss to England "by the operation of hostile +cruisers did not exceed 2½ per cent. of the commerce of the Empire; +and that this loss was partially made good by the prize ships and +merchandise taken by its own naval vessels and privateers." It should be +noted, however, that the Royal Commission on Food Supply was of opinion +that 4 per cent. would be a more accurate estimate. It is also well +known that during the same period the maritime commerce of England was +doubled in volume while that of France was annihilated. In point of fact +the risks run in war by commerce afloat are measured very exactly by the +degree in which the flag which covers it has secured the command of the +sea—that is, be it always remembered, the control of the maritime +communications affected. During the War of American Independence, when +British supremacy at sea was seriously challenged and at times was in +grave jeopardy—owing quite<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> as much to faulty disposition as to +inferiority of force—premiums of fifteen guineas per cent. were paid in +1782 on ships trading to the Far East; whereas from the spring of 1793 +until the close of the struggle with Napoleon no premiums exceeding half +that rate were paid. Yet to the very end of the war British merchant +vessels were being seized even in the Channel almost every day. There +is, however, good reason to think that many of these seizures were in +reality collusive operations undertaken for the purpose of carrying on +clandestinely the direct trade with the Continent which Napoleon sought +in vain to suppress. The full history of the memorable conflict between +the Berlin Decrees of Napoleon and the British Orders in Council, is +still to be written. Some very illuminating side-lights are thrown on it +by Mr David Hannay in a volume entitled <i>The Sea-Trader, His Friends and +Enemies</i>.</p> + +<p>It would seem to follow from these premisses—fortified as they are by +other historical examples that might be cited—that of two belligerents +in a naval war, that one which establishes and maintains an effective +command of the sea will be absolute master of the maritime commerce of +the other, while his own maritime commerce, though not entirely immune, +will suffer no such decisive losses as will determine or even materially +affect the course<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> and issue of the war; and that he may indeed emerge +from the war much stronger and more prosperous than he was at the +beginning. Such is assuredly the teaching of history, and although vast +changes have taken place alike in respect of the methods, opportunities, +implements, and international conventions of naval war and in respect of +the conditions, volume, and national importance of maritime commerce, +yet I think it can be shown that the sum total of these changes has made +on the whole rather for the advantage of the superior belligerent than +otherwise. In the first place privateering—formerly a very effective +weapon in the hands of the weaker belligerent—is now abolished. It is +true that the Declaration of Paris, which recorded and ratified its +abolition, has not been formally accepted by all the naval Powers of the +world; but it is also true that since its promulgation no naval Power +has sought to revive privateering. It is indeed held by some that the +right claimed by certain maritime Powers to convert merchant ships of +their own nationality into warships by arming and commissioning them on +the high seas is, or may be, equivalent to the revival of privateering +in its most dangerous and aggressive form. But those who argue thus +appear to overlook the fact that this process of conversion on the high +seas is by the Seventh Convention of the Second<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> Hague Conference hedged +round with a series of restrictions which differentiate the warship thus +improvised very sharply from the privateer of the past. The following +are the leading provisions of this Convention:—</p> + +<p>1. A merchant ship converted into a warship cannot have the rights and +duties appertaining to vessels having that status unless it is under the +direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power the +flag of which it flies.</p> + +<p>2. Merchant ships converted into warships must bear the external marks +which distinguish the warships of their nationality.</p> + +<p>3. The commander must be in the service of the State and duly +commissioned by the proper authorities. His name must figure on the list +of the officers of the fighting fleet.</p> + +<p>4. The crew must be subject to military discipline.</p> + +<p>5. Every merchant ship converted into a warship is bound to observe in +its operations the laws and customs of war.</p> + +<p>6. A belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must, as +soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of its warships.</p> + +<p>This Convention has been accepted and ratified by all the great maritime +Powers. It is true that it gives the converted merchant ship what may be +called the dog's privilege of taking a first bite with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> impunity, but it +makes it very difficult for any second bite to be taken. Such a vessel +may as a merchant ship have obtained coal and other supplies in a +neutral port before conversion, but she cannot after conversion return +to the same or another neutral port and repeat the process; nor can she +easily play the game which some have attributed to her of being a +merchant ship one day, a warship the next, and a merchant ship again on +the third. Further, as a weapon to be employed against England in +particular, the method of conversion here prescribed would seem to be +largely discounted by the fact that this country could, if it were so +disposed, convert as many merchant ships into warships in this way as +all the rest of the world put together.</p> + +<p>It will be argued, perhaps, that a belligerent when hard pressed will +not respect the provisions of a mere paper Convention, but will, if it +suits him, treat them as non-existent. In that case it is not easy to +see why he should ever have accepted and ratified them. The preamble of +this very Convention recites that "whereas the contracting Powers have +been unable to come to an agreement on the question whether the +conversion of a merchant ship into a warship may take place upon the +high seas, it is understood that the question of the place where such +conversion is effected remains outside the scope<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> of this agreement, and +is in no way affected by the following rules." In other words some of +the very Powers which have ratified the Convention as it stands +categorically declined to add to it a provision forbidding altogether +the conversion of a merchant ship into a warship on the high seas. If +this does not mean that, while reserving their freedom of action in this +respect, they are prepared to abide by the provisions of a Convention +which they have not less categorically accepted and ratified we are +driven to the absurd conclusion that all International Law is a nullity.</p> + +<p>Secondly, the practical disappearance of the sailing ship from the seas +has profoundly modified all the pre-existing conditions affecting the +attack and defence of commerce afloat. In the days of sailing, all +vessels were compelled to sail according to the wind, that is, to take +devious courses whenever the wind was adverse, so that some of them +might at all times be found scattered over very wide areas of the seas +connecting the ports of departure with those of arrival. Accordingly the +sporadic attack on commerce by isolated warships cruising at large +within the limits of trade routes, which might be hundreds of miles in +width, was often productive of very appreciable results. There were few +blank coverts on the seas to be drawn. Nowadays a steamer can always +take the most direct course to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> her destination. As a consequence, trade +routes have now been narrowed down to what may more fittingly be called +lines of communication, and these lines possess the true characteristic +of all lines, namely, that they have practically no breadth. Thus the +areas bounded by these lines are nowadays all blank coverts. Any one who +happens to cross the Atlantic, as I have crossed it more than once, by +one of the less frequented routes, will know that the number of vessels +sighted in a voyage quite as long as any warship could take without +coaling may often be counted on the fingers of one hand. Another +characteristic of these lines is that though their points of departure +and destination are fixed, yet the lines joining these points may be +varied if necessary to such an extent that any warship hovering about +their ordinary direction would be thrown entirely off the scent. On the +other hand their ports of departure and destination being fixed, the +lines of communication must inevitably converge as they approach these +points. There are other points also more in the open at which several +lines of communication may intersect. At these "terminal and focal +points," as Mr Corbett has aptly called them, the belligerent, being by +hypothesis inferior to his adversary, must needs endeavour to +concentrate his attack on his enemy's commerce, because at any other +points the game would not be worth the candle.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> But it is precisely at +these points that the superior adversary will concentrate his defence, +and being superior, will take care to do so in force sufficient for the +purpose. So far as the remaining portions of the lines of communication +need any direct defence at all this can be afforded, if and when +necessary, by collecting the merchant ships about to traverse them into +convoys and giving them an escort sufficiently powerful to deal +effectually with attacks which from the nature of the case can only be +sporadic and intermittent. Be it remembered that the last thing a +warship bent on commerce destruction wants is to encounter an enemy in +superior or even in equal force. The moment she does so her game is up.</p> + +<p>Thirdly, the substitution of steam for sails has very largely reduced +the enduring mobility of the commerce-destroying warship. In time of war +no warship will ever go further from the nearest available supply of +coal than is represented by considerably less than half of the distance +that she can steam at full speed with her bunkers full. If she does so +she runs the risk, if chased, of burning her last pound of coal before +she has reached shelter. Coaling at sea is only possible in exceptional +circumstances, and is in any case a very tedious operation. A warship +which attempts it will be taken at a great disadvantage if an enemy +catches her in the process. Colliers, moreover, are exposed to capture +while<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> proceeding to the appointed rendezvous, and if they fail to reach +it the warship awaiting them will be placed in extreme danger. All these +difficulties and dangers may be surmounted once and again, but they must +needs put a tremendous handicap in the long run on the +commerce-destroying efforts of a belligerent who is not superior to his +adversary at sea. Of course if he is superior at sea the enemy's +commerce will be at his mercy, and nothing can prevent its destruction +or at least its total suppression. But that is not the hypothesis we are +considering.</p> + +<p>Fourthly, the power of the modern warship to send her prizes into court +for adjudication, or to destroy them off-hand on capture is much more +limited than was that of her sailing predecessor. If she sends them into +port she must either put a prize crew on board or escort them herself. +In the former case the prizes, and in the latter case both prizes and +their captors are liable to recapture, a liability which becomes the +greater in proportion as the enemy is superior at sea. As to the former +alternative, moreover, the crew of a modern man-of-war is highly +specialized, and in particular its engine-room complement, which must +furnish a portion of every prize crew, is at the outset no greater than +is required for the full fighting efficiency of the ship. It is +probable, therefore, that the captor would in nearly all cases adopt the +alternative of destroying<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> his prizes at sea. In that case there will be +no prize money for any one concerned, but that is perhaps a minor +consideration. A far more important consideration is that before +destroying the prize the captor must take its crew on board and provide +food and accommodation for them. Any other course would be sheer piracy +and would inevitably lead to drastic reprisals. Now, before the captor +had destroyed many prizes in this fashion—especially if even one of +them happened to be a passenger steamer well filled with passengers—she +would find herself gravely embarrassed by the number of her prisoners, +and the need of providing for them even in the roughest fashion. A +captain having to fight his ship even with a few hundreds of prisoners +on board would be in no very enviable position.</p> + +<p>The foregoing are the leading considerations which appear to me to +govern the problem of the attack and defence of maritime commerce in +modern conditions of naval warfare. I have discussed the question in +greater detail in a work entitled <i>Nelson and Other Naval Studies</i>, and +as I have seen no reason to abandon or substantially to modify the +conclusions there formulated, I reproduce them here for the sake of +completeness:—</p> + +<p>1. All experience shows that commerce-destroying never has been, and +never can be, a primary object of naval war.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span></p> + +<p>2. There is nothing in the changes which modern times have witnessed in +the methods and appliances of naval warfare to suggest that the +experience of former wars is no longer applicable.</p> + +<p>3. Such experience as there is of modern war points to the same +conclusion and enforces it.</p> + +<p>4. The case of the "Alabama," rightly understood, does not disallow this +conclusion but rather confirms it.</p> + +<p>5. Though the volume of maritime commerce has vastly increased, the +number of units of naval force capable of assailing it has decreased in +far greater proportion.</p> + +<p>6. Privateering is, and remains abolished, not merely by the fiat of +International Law, but by changes in the methods and appliances of +navigation and naval warfare which have rendered the privateer entirely +obsolete.</p> + +<p>7. Maritime commerce is much less assailable than in former times, +because the introduction of steam has confined its course to definite +trade routes of extremely narrow width, and has almost denuded the sea +of commerce outside these limits.</p> + +<p>8. The modern commerce destroyer is confined to a comparatively narrow +radius of action by the inexorable limits of her coal supply. If she +destroys her prizes she must forgo the prize money and find +accommodation for the crews and passengers of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> the ships destroyed. If +she sends them into port she must deplete her engine-room complement and +thereby gravely impair her own efficiency.</p> + +<p>9. Torpedo craft are of little or no use for commerce destruction except +in certain well-defined areas where special measures can be taken for +checking their depredations.</p> + +<p>Of course all this depends on the one fundamental assumption that the +commerce to be defended belongs to a Power which can, and does, command +the sea. On no other condition can maritime commerce be defended at +all.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p> + + +<p>A warship, considered in the abstract, may be defined as a vessel +employed, and generally constructed, for the purpose of conveying across +the seas to the place of conflict, the weapons that are to be used in +conflict, the men who are to use them, and all such stores, whether of +food or other supplies, as will give to the vessel as large a measure of +enduring mobility as is compatible with her displacement. If we confine +our attention to the period posterior to the employment of the gun on +shipboard as the principal weapon of offence, and if we regard the +torpedo as a particular kind of projectile, and the tube from which it +is discharged as a particular kind of gun, we may condense this +definition into the modern formula that a warship is a floating +gun-carriage. With the methods and implements of sea warfare anterior to +the introduction of the gun we need not concern ourselves. They belong +to the archæology of the subject. It suffices to point out that in all +periods of naval warfare the nature of the principal weapon employed, +and to some extent that of the motive power available,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> have not only +governed the structure of the ship and determined the practicable limit +of its displacement, but have also exercised a dominant influence over +the ordering of fleets and their disposition in action. Sea tactics have +never been more elaborate than they were in the last days of the galley +period which came to an end with the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, less +than a score of years before the defeat of the Armada in 1588. But the +substitution of sails for oars as the motive power of the warship and +the more general employment of the gun as the principal weapon of +offence necessarily entailed radical changes in the tactical methods +which had been slowly evolved during the galley period. At first all was +confusion and a sea-fight was reduced for a time to a very disorderly +and tumultuous affair. "We went down in no order," wrote an officer who +was present at Trafalgar, "but every man to take his bird." This is a +very inaccurate and even more unintelligent account of the tactics +pursued at Trafalgar; but it might very well stand for a picturesque +summary of the tactical confusion which prevailed at the period of the +Armada and for half a century afterwards.</p> + +<p>Gradually, however, order was again evolved out of the prevailing chaos. +But it was not the old order. It was a new order based on the +predominance of the gun and its disposition on board the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> ship. To go +down in no order and for each man to take his bird would mean that each +ship, whether large or small, would be free as far as circumstances +permitted to select an adversary not disproportioned in strength to +herself, so that there was no very pressing need for the fleet to +consist of homogeneous units, nor for the elimination of comparatively +small craft from a general engagement. But in the course of the Dutch +Wars the practice was slowly evolved of fighting in a compact or +close-hauled line, the ships being ranged in a line ahead—that is, each +succeeding ship following in the wake of her next ahead—in order to +give free play to the guns disposed mainly on the broadside, and being, +for purposes of mutual support, disposed as closely to each other as was +compatible with individual freedom of evolution and manœuvre. This +disposition necessarily involved the exclusion from the line of battle +of all vessels below a certain average or standard of fighting strength, +since it was no longer possible for "every man to take his bird" and a +weak ship might find herself in conflict with an adversary of +overpowering strength in the enemy's line. Hence the main fighting +forces of naval belligerents came in time to be composed entirely of +"ships fit to lie in a line," as Torrington phrased it, of "capital +ships," as they were frequently called in former days, of "line of +battle ships"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> or "ships of the line," as afterwards they were more +commonly called, or of "battleships" as is nowadays the accepted +appellation. Other elements of naval force not "fit to lie in a line" +were also required, as I am about to show, and took different forms at +different times, but the root of the whole evolution lies in the +elimination of the non-capital ship from the main fighting line. In a +very instructive chapter of his <i>Naval Warfare</i>, Admiral Colomb has +traced the whole course of this gradual "Differentiation of Naval +Force." But for my purpose it suffices to cite the briefer exposition of +a French writer quoted by Admiral Mahan in his <i>Influence of Sea Power +upon History</i>:—</p> + +<p>"With the increase of the power of the ship of war, and with the +perfecting of its sea and warlike qualities, there has come an equal +progress in the art of utilizing them.... As naval evolutions become +more skilful, their importance grows from day to day. To these +evolutions there is needed a base, a point from which they depart and to +which they return. A fleet of warships must always be ready to meet an +enemy; logically, therefore, this point of departure for naval +evolutions must be the order of battle. Now since the disappearance of +galleys, almost all the artillery is found upon the sides of a ship of +war. Hence it is the beam that must necessarily and always be turned +toward the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> enemy. On the other hand it is necessary that the sight of +the latter must never be interrupted by a friendly ship. Only one +formation allows the ships of the same fleet to satisfy fully these +conditions. That formation is the line ahead. The line, therefore, is +imposed as the only order of battle, and consequently as the basis of +all fleet tactics. In order that this line of battle, this long thin +line of guns, may not be injured or broken at some point weaker than the +rest, there is at the same time felt to be the necessity of putting in +it only ships which, if not of equal force, have at least equally strong +sides. Logically it follows, at the same moment in which the line ahead +became definitely the order for battle, there was established the +distinction between the 'ships of the line' alone destined for a place +therein, and the lighter ships meant for other uses."</p> + +<p>But the need for other and lighter ships "meant for other uses" and not +"fit to lie in a line," is equally demonstrable. The function of +battleships is to act in concert. They must therefore be concentrated in +fleets sufficiently strong to give a good account of the enemy's fleets +opposed to them. This does not necessarily mean that all the fleets of a +belligerent must be concentrated in a single position. But it does mean +that if disposed in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy they +must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> be so disposed and connected, that, moving on interior lines, they +can always bring a superior force to the point of contact with the +enemy. Subject to this paramount condition, that of being able to +concentrate more rapidly than the enemy can, dispersal of naval +force—not of units but of organized fighting fleets—is generally a +better disposition than extreme concentration. But it is a fatal error +in strategy so to disperse your fleets as to expose them to the risk of +being overpowered by the enemy in detail.</p> + +<p>The fleets of capital ships thus organized, and disposed as occasion may +require and sound strategy dictate, are not, however, by any means to be +regarded as autonomous and self-sufficing organisms. They are rather to +be regarded as the moving base of a much larger organization, much more +widely dispersed, consisting of lighter vessels not fit to lie in a +line, but specially adapted to discharge functions which capital ships +cannot as such discharge, yet which are indispensable either to the full +efficiency of the latter or to the maintenance of an effective command +of the sea. The first of these functions is the collection and rapid +transmission of intelligence as to the enemy's dispositions and +movements over as wide an area of the waters in dispute as is compatible +with communication rapid enough to allow of counter-movements being made +before it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> is too late. The development of wireless telegraphy has +largely extended this area, but it is not without limits in practice, +and those limits are already narrower than the extreme range of a single +transmission by wireless telegraphy. For example, a warship in the +Levant might, if the conditions were exceptionally favourable, +communicate by direct wireless with another warship in the Orkneys. But +the information thus transmitted would hardly be likely directly to +influence the movements and dispositions of the latter. If it did it +would probably not be through the immediate initiative of the Admiral +commanding in the North Sea, but through the supreme control of all the +naval forces of the belligerent affected, exercised through the General +Staff of the Navy at the seat of Government. It may here be remarked in +passing that the development of wireless telegraphy will probably be +found in war to strengthen this supreme control and to weaken to that +extent the independent and isolated initiative of individual +Commanders-in-Chief. But that is not necessarily a disadvantage, and +even so far as it is disadvantage at all it is more than balanced by the +immense corresponding advantage of keeping the War Staff at all times in +direct touch with every part of the field of naval operations, and +thereby making it the focus of all available information, and the +directing authority for all the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> larger strategy of the campaign. Except +in degree, moreover, there is nothing new in this. When Nelson was +returning across the Atlantic, after chasing Villeneuve out of the West +Indies, his only way of informing the Admiralty of the nature of the +situation was to send on Bettesworth in the brig "Curieux" with his +news. Nowadays a modern "Curieux" would be able to send on the news as +soon as she came within fifteen hundred or possibly two thousand miles +from the British Isles, and Nelson at the same distance might have +received his orders direct from the Admiralty. But the special point to +note is that as soon as Bettesworth's information was received at the +Admiralty, Barham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, instantly issued +orders which profoundly modified the dispositions of the fleets engaged +in blockading the French ports and led directly to Calder's action off +Finisterre, and in the sequel to the abandonment by Napoleon of all his +projects of invasion and the destruction of the allied fleets at +Trafalgar. There were giants in those days both afloat and ashore. But +the giants afloat did not resent the interference of the giants ashore, +and, as Mr Corbett has shown, the Trafalgar campaign was conducted with +consummate sagacity by Barham, who embodied in himself the War Staff of +the time.</p> + +<p>Such is the transcendent importance of intelligence,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> and of its +collection, transmission, collation, interpretation, and translation +into supreme executive orders. Its collection and transmission is mainly +the function of cruising ships disposed either individually or in small +groups for the purpose, and at such a distance from the main body of +battleships as is not incompatible with the movements of the latter +being controlled and directed, either by their immediate commanders, or +by the War Staff at the centre, according to the information received +from the outlying cruisers. Such cruising vessels may vary in size and +strength from the modern battle-cruiser, so heavily armed and armoured +as to be not incapable of taking a place, on occasion, in the line of +battle, down to the smallest torpedo craft which is endowed with +sufficient enduring mobility to enable her to keep the sea and to cruise +as near as may be to the enemy's ports. I have already indicated the +other collateral functions which will have to be discharged by torpedo +craft in case of a blockade and pointed out the vital distinction which +differentiates them from the small craft of the past in that in certain +circumstances they are capable of taking a formidable part in a fleet +action even as against the most powerful battleships. But we are here +considering them solely from the point of view of their cruising +functions, whether as guarding their own shores or watching those of the +enemy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> with a view to fighting on occasion and to observation at all +times. Their supports will be cruisers of larger size, disposed at +suitable distances in the rear, and themselves supported in like manner +by successive cordons or patrols of cruisers increasing in size and +power, until we come to the battle fleet as the concentrated nucleus of +the whole organization. This is merely an abstract or diagrammatic +exposition of such an organization, and it is of course liable to almost +infinite variation in the infinite variety of warlike operations at sea, +but it serves to exhibit the <i>rationale</i> of the differentiation of naval +force into battleships, cruisers, and small craft.</p> + +<p>It has sometimes been argued that, inasmuch as the torpedo craft is, or +may be, in certain conditions, more than a match for even the biggest +battleship, battleships together with all intermediate ships between the +battleship and the torpedo vessel, are not unlikely to be some day +regarded as superfluous and in consequence to be discarded altogether +from the naval armament of even a first-class maritime Power. It is true +that the range and accuracy of the torpedo have latterly undergone an +immense development, so that a range of even ten thousand yards or five +sea-miles is no longer beyond its powers. It is true that the +development of the submarine vessel has vastly intensified the menace of +the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span>torpedo and it may soon be true that the development of aircraft +will add a new and very formidable menace to the supremacy of the +battleship. But except for this last consideration, which is at present +exceedingly speculative, a little reflection will disclose the +underlying fallacy of arguments of this kind. The enduring mobility of +the torpedo craft is necessarily limited. It is incapable of that wide +range of action which is required of warships if they are to establish +and maintain any effective command of the sea. It is exceedingly +vulnerable to ships of a larger size, and of more ample enduring +mobility. These again will be vulnerable in their turn to ships of a +still larger size and thus the logic of the situation brings us back to +the battleship once more with its characteristic functions. It may +perhaps be urged that this chain of argument takes too little account of +the submarine vessel which is at present singularly invulnerable because +for the most part invisible to any vessels, whether big or little, which +operate only on the surface and even if discovered betimes by the +latter, is not very readily assailable by them. But of two things one. +Either the submarine vessel will remain small and therefore weak, and +lacking in enduring mobility, in which case it can never establish and +maintain an effective command of the sea. Or it will grow indefinitely +in size, in which case it will fall under the inexorable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> stress of the +logic which brings us back once more to the battleship. It may be that +the battleship of the still distant future will be a submersible +battleship. But many exceedingly complex problems of construction and +stability will have to be solved before that consummation is reached.</p> + +<p>Lastly, the specific function of the so-called battle-cruiser would seem +to need some further elucidation. At first sight this hybrid type of +vessel might seem to be an anomalous intrusion into the time-honoured +hierarchy of battleship, cruiser, and small craft, which the ripe +experience of many wars, battles, and campaigns had finally established +in the last golden days of the sailing ship period. It is indeed held by +some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a hybrid +and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can be +given. In face of these opinions I cannot presume to dogmatize on the +subject. But some not wholly irrelevant considerations may be advanced. +The battle-cruiser is, as its name implies, a vessel not only fitted by +the nature of its armour and armament "to lie in a line," whenever +occasion may require, but also exceedingly well qualified by its armour +and armament, and still more by its speed, to discharge many of the +functions of a cruiser either alone or in company with other cruisers. +In this latter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> capacity, it can overhaul nearly every merchant ship +afloat, it can scout far and wide, it can push home a vital +reconnaissance in cases where a weaker and slower cruiser would have to +run away if she could, it can serve as a rallying point to a squadron of +smaller cruisers engaged in the defence of this or that vital line of +communication, and alone or in company with a consort of the same type +it can hold the terminal and focal points of any such line against +almost any number of hostile cruisers inferior in defensive and +offensive powers to itself. Such are its powers and capacities when +acting as a cruiser proper. But it may be thought that in the stress of +conflict it will have very little opportunity of displaying these very +exceptional powers because an admiral in command of a fighting fleet +will never, when anticipating an engagement with the enemy, consent to +weaken his fighting line by detaching so powerful a unit for scouting or +other cruising purposes. That is as it may be. It will depend on many +circumstances of the moment not to be clearly anticipated or defined +beforehand; on the strength of the enemy's force, on the personality, +sagacity, and fortitude of the admiral—whether he is or is not a man of +the mettle and temper ascribed to Nelson by Admiral Mahan in a passage +already quoted—on the comparative need as determined by the +circumstances of the moment of scouting for information,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> of cruising +for the defence of trade, or of strengthening the battle line for a +decisive conflict to the uttermost extent of the nation's resources. It +is unbecoming to assume that in the crisis of his country's fate an +admiral will act either as a fool or as a poltroon. It is the country's +fault if a man capable of so acting is placed in supreme command, and +for that there is no remedy. But it is sounder to assume that the +admiral selected for command is a man not incapable of disposing his +force to the best advantage. "We must," said Lord Goschen, on one +occasion, "put our trust in Providence and a good admiral." If a nation +cannot find a good admiral in its need it is idle to trust in +Providence.</p> + +<p>It remains to consider the function of the battle-cruiser in the line of +battle. The lines of battle in former times were often composed of ships +of varying size and power. There was a legitimate prejudice against +ships of excessive size, although their superior power in action was +recognized—we have the unimpeachable testimony on that point of +Nelson's Hardy, a man of unrivalled fighting experience to whom Nelson +himself attributed "an intuitive right judgment"—because they were +unhandy in manœuvre and slow in sailing as compared with ships of +more moderate dimensions. But except for difficulties of docking—a very +serious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> consideration from the financial point of view—hardly any +limit can be assigned to the size of the modern warship on these +particular grounds. Quite the contrary. Other things being equal, the +bigger the ship the higher the speed, and it is well known that ships of +the Dreadnought type are as handy to steer as a torpedo boat. For +tactical reasons, moreover, it is not expedient to lengthen the line of +battle unduly. Hence there is a manifest advantage in concentrating +offensive power, as far as may be, in single units. On the other hand, +the experience and practice of the eighteenth century showed +conclusively that there was also a distinct advantage in having in the +line of battle a certain number of ships which, being smaller than their +consorts, were more handy and faster sailing than the latter. The enemy +might not want to fight. Very often he did not, and by crowding all +possible sail he did his best to get away. In this case the only way to +bring him to action was for the pursuing admiral to order "a general +chase"—that is, to direct his ships, disregarding the precise line of +battle, to hurry on with all possible sail after the enemy so that the +fastest ships of the pursuing fleet might bring individually to action +the laggards of the retreating fleet and hold them until the main body +of the pursuing fleet came up. In this case the retreating admiral must +either return to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> succour of his ships astern and thereby accept the +general action which he sought to avoid, or abandon his overtaken ships +to the enemy without attempting to rescue them. Hawke's action in +Quiberon Bay and Duncan's action off Camperdown are two of the most +memorable examples of this particular mode of attack, and their +brilliant results are a striking testimony to its efficacy. If ever in +the naval battles of the future it becomes expedient for an admiral to +order a general chase, it stands to reason that ships of the +battle-cruiser type will be invaluable for the purpose. Their speed will +enable them to hold the tail of the enemy's line, and their power will +enable them to crush it unless the retreating admiral who seeks to avoid +a decisive action turns back to succour such of his ships as are +assailed and thereby renders a decisive action inevitable.</p> + +<p>There is, moreover, another function to be assigned to the +battle-cruiser in a general action, and that is a function which was +defined once for all by Nelson himself in the immortal memorandum in +which he explained to his captains the mode of attack he proposed to +carry out at Trafalgar. "I have," wrote Nelson, "made up my mind to keep +the fleet in that position of sailing ... that the order of sailing is +to be the order of battle, placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen +ships each, with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> an advanced squadron of eight <i>of the fastest sailing +two-decked ships</i> which will always make, if wanted, a line of +twenty-four sail, on whichever line the Commander-in-Chief may direct." +Owing to the lack of ships this disposition was not adopted on the day +of Trafalgar, but the principle involved is not affected by that +circumstance. That principle is that a squadron of the fastest sailing +ships in the fleet was to be detached from the two fighting lines +entrusted with the initial attack, and reserved or "refused" until the +development of the main attack had disclosed to the Commander-in-Chief +the point at which the impact of this "advanced squadron" would by +superior concentration on that point secure that the enemy should there +be decisively overpowered. The essence of the matter is that the ships +so employed should by virtue of their superior speed be endowed with a +tactical mobility sufficient to enable them to discharge the function +assigned to them. I need hardly insist on the close analogy which +subsists between Nelson's "advanced squadron" and a modern squadron of +battle-cruisers similarly employed, and although the conflict of modern +warships must needs differ in many essential respects from the conflicts +of sailing ships in Nelson's days, yet I think a clear and authoritative +exposition of one at least of the uses and functions of the +battle-cruiser in a fleet action may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> still be found in what I have +called elsewhere "the last tactical word of the greatest master of sea +tactics the world has ever known, the final and flawless disposition of +sailing ships marshalled for combat."</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY OF NAVAL FORCE<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span></p> + + +<p>The measure of naval strength required by any State is determined mainly +by the naval strength of its possible adversaries in the event of war, +and only in a secondary degree by the volume of the maritime interests +which it has to defend. Paradoxical as the latter half of this +proposition may seem at first sight, it can easily be shown to be sound. +The maritime interests, territorial and commercial, of the British +Empire are beyond all comparison greater than those of any other State +in the world; but if no other State possessed a naval force strong +enough to assail them seriously, it is manifest that the naval force +required to defend them need be no greater than is sufficient to +overcome the assailant, and would not therefore be determined in any +degree by the volume of the interests to be defended. Each State +determines for itself the measure of naval strength which it judges to +be necessary to its security. No State expects to have to encounter the +whole world in arms or makes its provision in view of any such +chimerical contingency. The utmost that any State can do is to adjust +its naval<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> policy to a rational estimate of all the reasonably probable +contingencies of international conflict, due regard being had to the +extent of its financial resources and to such other requirements of +national defence as circumstances impose on it. Germany, for example, +has proclaimed to all the world in the preamble to the Navy Law of 1900 +that—</p> + +<p>"In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing +conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a +battle fleet of such strength that even for the most powerful naval +adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own +supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that +the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval +Power, for, as a rule, a great naval Power will not be in a position to +concentrate all its forces against us."</p> + +<p>I am not concerned in any way with the political aspects of this +memorable declaration. But its bearing on the naval policy of the +British Empire is manifest and direct. England is beyond all question +"the greatest naval Power" in the world. The declaration of Germany thus +lays upon England the indefeasible obligation of taking care that by no +efforts of any other Power shall her "own supremacy"—that is her +capacity to secure and maintain the command of the sea in all reasonably +probable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> contingencies of international conflict—be rendered doubtful. +There is no State in the world on which decisive defeat at sea would +inflict such irretrievable disaster as it would on England and her +Empire. These islands would be open to invasion—and if to invasion to +conquest and subjugation—the commerce of the whole Empire would be +annihilated, and the Empire itself would be dismembered. I need not +attempt to determine what measure of naval strength is required to avert +this unspeakable calamity. It suffices to say that whatever the measure +may be it must be provided and maintained at all hazards. That is merely +the axiomatic expression of the things that belong to our peace.</p> + +<p>It will be observed that the German declaration assumes that "a great +naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its +forces against" a single adversary. This raises at once the question of +the distribution of naval force, or of what has been called the peace +strategy of position. I shall endeavour to discuss the problem with as +little reference as may be to an actual state of war between any two +individual and specific naval Powers. I shall merely assume that of two +possible belligerents one is so far stronger than the other as to look +with confidence to being able in the event of war to secure and maintain +its own command of the sea; and in order not to complicate the problem<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> +unduly I shall include in the term "belligerent" not merely a single +Power but an alliance of one or more separate Powers, while still +adhering to the assumption that the relative strength of the two +belligerents is as defined above. If England is one of the Powers +affected it is manifest from what has already been said that this +assumption is a legitimate one.</p> + +<p>In such a situation it stands to reason that the concentration of the +whole force of the stronger belligerent against the whole force equally +concentrated of the weaker belligerent would not be necessary and would +very rarely be expedient. The stronger belligerent would of course seek, +in time of war, so to dispose his forces as to make it impossible for +the weaker fleets of his adversary to take the sea without being brought +to a decisive action, and he would so order his peace strategy of +position as to further that paramount purpose. But it does not follow +that being superior in the measure above defined he would need to +concentrate all his available forces for that purpose. He would +concentrate so much of his forces as would ensure victory in the +encounters anticipated—so far as mere numbers apart from fighting +efficiency can ensure victory—and the residue would be available for +other and subsidiary purposes. If there were no residue, then the +required superiority would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> not have been attained, and the belligerent +who has neglected to attain it must take the consequences. One of these +consequences would certainly be that the other and subsidiary purposes +above mentioned would have to be neglected until the main issue was +decided, and if these purposes were of any moment he would have so far +to pay the penalty of his neglect. Nothing is more fatal in warfare than +to attempt to be equally strong everywhere. If you cannot do everything +you desire at once you must concentrate all your energies on doing the +most important and the most vital things first. When the tree is cut +down the branches will fall of themselves. The history of the War of +American Independence is full of illustrations of the neglect of this +paramount principle. England was worsted much more by faulty +distribution than by insufficiency of force.</p> + +<p>At the same time it must be observed that the outlying and subsidiary +purposes of the conflict cannot be of vital moment so long as the +superior belligerent is at firm grips with the central forces of his +adversary. We are dealing with the assumption that of two belligerents +one is so far superior to the other that he may entertain a reasonable +confidence of being able to deny the command of the sea to his adversary +and in the end to secure it for himself. It is an essential part of this +assumption<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> that the forces of the superior belligerent will be so +disposed as to make it exceedingly difficult and, subject to the fortune +of war, practically impossible for any considerable portion of the +enemy's forces to act on a vigorous offensive without being speedily +brought to book by a superior force of his adversary, and that the peace +strategy of the latter will have been ordered to that end. So long as +this is the case the virtual command of the sea will be in the hands of +the superior belligerent, even though his forces may be so concentrated, +in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy, as to leave many +regions of the sea apparently unguarded. They are adequately guarded by +the fact that the enemy is <i>ex hypothesi</i> unable to reach them—or if by +a successful evasion of his adversary's guard he manages to send a +detachment, large or small, to aim at some outlying objective, the +initial superiority of force possessed by his adversary will always +enable the latter to send a superior force in pursuit of the fugitive. +Much harm may be done before the fugitive is brought to book, but no +State, however strong, need ever expect to go to war without running +risks and suffering occasional and partial reverses.</p> + +<p>It is thus a pure delusion to assume, as loose thinkers on the subject +too often assume, that the command of the sea must be either surrendered +or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> imperilled by a superior belligerent who, apparently neglecting +those regions of the sea which are not immediately assailed or +threatened, concentrates his forces in the positions best calculated to +enable him to get the better of his adversary, or who in time of peace +so orders his strategy of position as to secure that advantage at once +should war unhappily break out. Not long ago the Leader of the +Opposition in the House of Commons used the following words:—"Ten years +ago we not only had the command of the sea, but we had the command of +every sea. We have the command of no sea in the world except the North +Sea at this moment." Those who have followed and assimilated the +exposition of the true meaning of the command of the sea given in these +pages will readily discern how mischievous a travesty of that meaning is +contained in these words. There is, as I have shown, no such thing as a +command of the sea in time of peace. The phrase is merely a definition +of the paramount objective of naval warfare as such. Ten years ago we +had no command of any sea because we were not at war with any naval +Power. The concentration of a large portion of our naval forces in the +North Sea is no surrender of our command of the sea in any part of the +world, because that command does not exist, never has existed in time of +peace, and never can exist even in time of war until<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> we have fought for +it and secured it. The concentration in question is, together with the +simultaneous disposition of the residue of our naval forces in different +parts of the world, merely the expression of that peace strategy of +position which, in the judgment of those who are responsible for it, is +best calculated in the more probable, yet possibly quite remote, +contingencies of international conflict, to enable our fleets to get the +better of our enemies and thereby ultimately to secure the command of +the sea in any and every part of the world in which we have maritime +interests to defend. There are, it is true, some disadvantages involved +in a close and sustained concentration of naval forces, especially in +home waters. Naval officers lose in breadth and variety of experience +and in the self-reliance which comes of independent command, while the +prestige of the flag is in some measure diminished by the infrequency of +its appearance in distant seas. But these, after all, are subsidiary +considerations which must be subordinated to the paramount needs of a +sound strategy, whether offensive or defensive.</p> + +<p>It follows from the foregoing exposition of the principles which govern +the strategic distribution of naval force in peace and war that a great +naval Power must often maintain fleets of considerable strength in +distant seas. England has for many generations maintained such a fleet +in the Mediterranean,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> and it is hard to see how any reasonably probable +change in the international situation could absolve her from that +obligation. There are other and more distant stations on which she has +maintained and still does maintain squadrons in a strength which has +varied greatly from time to time in accordance with the changing phases +of international relations and of strategic requirements as affected +thereby. The measure of these requirements is determined from time to +time by the known strength of the hostile forces which would have to be +encountered in any reasonably probable contingencies of international +conflict. But there is one antecedent requirement which is common to all +considerable detachments of naval force in distant waters. In order to +maintain their efficiency and mobility they must have a naval base +conveniently situated within the limits of their station to which they +may resort from time to time for repair, refit, and supply. The need for +supply at the base is less paramount than that for refit and repair, +because it is manifest that the control of maritime communications which +has enabled the requisite stores to reach the base will also enable them +to reach the ships themselves, wherever they may be at the moment. But +for all refit and repair which cannot be effected by the ships' +companies themselves, with the aid of an attached repair ship,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> the +ships must go to the base, and that base must be furnished with docks +capable of receiving them.</p> + +<p>It is essential to note that the base is there for the sake of the +ships. The ships are not there for the sake of the base. It is a fatal +inversion of all sound principles of naval strategy to suppose that the +ships owe, or can afford, to the base any other form of defence than +that which is inherent in their paramount and primary task of +controlling the maritime communications which lead to it. So long as +they can do this the base will be exposed only to such attacks as can be +delivered by a force which has evaded but not defeated the naval guard, +and to this extent the base must be fortified and garrisoned; for, of +course, if the naval guard has been decisively defeated, the control of +maritime communications has passed into the hands of the enemy, and +nothing but the advance of a relieving naval force, too strong for the +enemy to resist, can prevent the base being invested from the sea and +ultimately reduced. It will be seen from this how absurd it is ever to +speak of a naval base as commanding the adjacent seas. As such it does +not command, and never can command, any portion of the sea which lies +beyond the range of its own guns. All that it ever does or can do is, by +its resources for repair, refit, and supply, to enable the fleet based +upon it constantly to renew its efficiency<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> and mobility, and thereby to +discharge its appointed task of controlling the maritime communications +entrusted to its keeping. But such command is in all cases exercised by +the fleet and not by the base. If the fleet is not there or not equal to +its task, the mere possession of the base is nearly always a source of +weakness and not of strength to the naval Power which holds it.</p> + +<p>It is held by some that the occupation of naval bases in distant seas by +a Power which is not strong enough to make sure of controlling the +maritime communications which alone give to such bases their strategic +value and importance is a great advantage to such a Power and a +corresponding disadvantage to all its possible adversaries in war. It +will readily be seen from what has been said that this is in large +measure a delusion. As against a weaker adversary than itself the +occupation of such bases may be an appreciable advantage to the Power +which holds them, but only if the adversary in question has in the +waters affected interests which are too important to be sacrificed +without a struggle. On the other hand, as against an adversary strong +enough to secure the command of the sea and determined to hold it at all +hazards, the occupation of such distant bases can very rarely be of any +advantage to the weaker belligerent and may very often expose him to +reverses which, if not positively<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> disastrous, must always be +exceedingly mortifying. Of two things one. Either the belligerent in +such a plight must detach a naval force sufficient to cover the outlying +base, and thus, by dispersing naval forces which he desired to keep +concentrated, he must expose his detachment to destruction by a stronger +force of the enemy, or he must leave the base to its fate, in which case +it is certain to fall in the long run. In point of fact the occupation +of distant bases by any naval Power is merely the giving of hostages to +any and every other Power which in the day of conflict can establish its +command of the sea. That is the plain philosophy of the whole question.</p> + +<p>It only remains to consider very briefly the question of the supply of +fleets operating in distant waters. In a very interesting and suggestive +paper on the "Supply and Communications of a Fleet," Admiral Sir Cyprian +Bridge has pointed out that "in time of peace as well as in time of war +there is a continuous consumption of the articles of various kinds used +on board ship, viz., naval stores, ordnance stores, engineers' stores, +victualling stores, coal, water, etc." Of these the consumption of +victualling stores is alone constant, being determined by the number of +men to be victualled from day to day. The consumption of nearly all the +other stores will vary greatly according as the ship is more or less at +sea, and it is safe to say that for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> a given number of ships the +consumption will be much greater in time of war, especially in coal, +engineers' stores, and ordnance stores, than it is in time of peace. But +in peace conditions Admiral Bridge estimated that for a fleet consisting +of four battleships, four large cruisers, four second-class cruisers, +thirteen smaller vessels of various kinds, and three torpedo craft, +together with their auxiliaries, the <i>minimum</i> requirements for six +months—assuming that the ships started with full supplies, and that +they returned to their principal base at the end of the period—would be +about 6750 tons of stores and ammunition, and 46,000 tons of coal, +without including fresh water. The requirements of water would not be +less than 30,000 tons in the six months, and of this the ships could +distil about half without greatly increasing their coal consumption; the +remainder, some 15,000 or 16,000 tons, would have to be brought to them. +In time of war the requirements of coal would probably be nearly three +times as great as in time of peace, and the requirements of +ammunition—estimated in time of peace at 1140 tons—might easily be ten +times as great. Thus in addition to the foregoing figures we have 16,000 +tons of water, and in war time a further <i>minimum</i> addition of some +90,000 tons of coal and 10,260 tons of ammunition, making in all a round +total of 170,000 tons for a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> fleet of the size specified, which was +approximately the strength of the China Fleet, under the command of +Admiral Bridge, at the time when his paper was written.</p> + +<p>All these supplies have to be delivered or obtained periodically and at +convenient intervals in the course of every six months. They are +supplies which the ships must obtain as often as they want them without +necessarily going back to their principal base for the purpose, and even +the principal base must obtain them periodically from the home sources +of supply. There are two alternative ways of maintaining this continuous +stream of supply. One is that in advance of the principal base, what is +called a secondary base should be established from which the ships can +obtain the stores required, a continuous stream of transports bringing +the stores required to the secondary base from sources farther afield, +either from the principal base or from the home sources of supply. The +other method is to have no secondary base—which, since it contains +indispensable stores, must be furnished with some measure of local +defence, and which, as a place of storage, may turn out to be in quite +the wrong place for the particular operations in hand—but to seize and +occupy a "flying base," neither permanent nor designated beforehand, but +selected for the occasion according to the exigencies of the strategic +situation,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> and capable of being shifted at will in response to any +change in those exigencies. History shows that the latter method has +been something like the normal procedure in war alike in times past and +in the present day. The alternative method is perhaps rather adapted to +the convenience of peace conditions than to the exigencies of war +requirements. During his watch on Toulon Nelson established a flying +base at Maddalena Bay, in Sardinia, and very rarely used the more +distant permanent base at Gibraltar. Togo, as I have stated in an +earlier chapter, established a flying base first at the Elliot Islands +and afterwards at Dalny, during the war in the Far East. Instances might +easily be multiplied to show in which direction the experience of war +points, and how far that direction has been deflected by the possibly +deceptive teaching of peace. I shall not, however, presume to pronounce +<i>ex cathedrâ</i> between two alternative methods each of which is +sanctioned by high naval authority. I will only remark in conclusion +that though the establishment of permanent secondary bases may, in +certain exceptional cases, be defensible and even expedient, yet their +multiplication, beyond such exceptional cases of proved and acknowledged +expediency, is very greatly to be deprecated. The old rule +applies—<i>Entia non sunt præter necessitatem multiplicanda.</i></p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span>My task is now finished—I will not say completed, for the subject of +naval warfare is far too vast to be exhausted within the narrow compass +of a Manual. I should hardly exaggerate if I said that nearly every +paragraph I have written might be expanded into a chapter, and every +chapter into a volume, and that even so the subject would not be +exhausted. All I have endeavoured to do is to expound briefly and in +simple language the nature of naval warfare, its inherent limitations as +an agency for subduing an enemy's will, the fundamental principles which +underlie its methods, and the concrete problems which the application of +those methods presents. Tactical questions I have not touched at all; +strategic questions only incidentally, and so far as they were +implicated in the discussion of methods. Political issues and questions +of international policy I have eschewed as far as might be, and so far +as it was necessary to deal with them I have endeavoured to do so in +broad and abstract terms. Of the many shortcomings in my handling of the +subject no one can be more conscious than I am myself. Yet I must +anticipate one criticism which is not unlikely to be made, and that is +that I have repeated and insisted on certain phrases and ideas such as +"command of the sea," "control of maritime communications," "the fleet +in being," "blockade," and the like, until they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> might almost be +regarded as an obsession. Rightly or wrongly that has, at any rate, been +done of deliberate intent. The phrases in question are in all men's +mouths. The ideas they stand for are constantly misunderstood, +misinterpreted, and misapplied. I hold that, rightly understood, they +embody the whole philosophy of naval warfare. I have therefore lost no +opportunity of insisting on them, knowing full well that it is only by +frequent iteration that sound ideas can be implanted in minds not +attuned to their reception.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX"></a>INDEX</h2> + + +<p> <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> +Aircraft, <a href="#Page_121">121</a><br /> + +Alabama, the, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br /> + +Alexander, his conquest of Darius, <a href="#Page_48">48</a><br /> + +Allemand, his escape from Rochefort, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> + +Amiens, Peace of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> + +<i>Animus pugnandi</i>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a><br /> + +Antony, Mark, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> + +Armada, the, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br /> + +<br /> +Bacon, quoted, <a href="#Page_6">6</a><br /> + +Baraille, De, his part in the Dunkirk campaign, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> + +Barham, Lord, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Nelson, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his conduct of the Trafalgar campaign, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></span><br /> + +Base, flying, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">naval, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></span><br /> + +Battle-cruiser, its functions, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>-128<br /> + +Beachy Head, Battle of, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">campaign of, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></span><br /> + +Berlin Decrees, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> + +Bettesworth, <a href="#Page_118">118</a><br /> + +Blockade, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a form of disputed command, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>-29;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">military, its methods, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">military and commercial, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></span><br /> + +Bolt from the blue, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br /> + +Boscawen, at Lagos, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> + +Brest, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">blockaded by Cornwallis, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">blockaded by Hawke, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">De Roquefeuil at, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span><br /> + +Bridge, Admiral Sir Cyprian, on a fleet in being, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on supply and communications of a fleet, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his estimate of Torrington, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Torrington's trial, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></span><br /> + +Brundusium, Cæsar at, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> + +<br /> +Cadiz, Killigrew at, <a href="#Page_34">34</a><br /> + +Cæsar, his Pharsalian campaign, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> + +Calais, the Armada at, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> + +Calder, his action off Finisterre, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Barham's instructions to, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br /> + +Camperdown, Duncan at, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> + +Cape St Vincent, meeting of Nelson with Craig and Knight off, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br /> + +Capital ships, <a href="#Page_113">113</a><br /> + +Carthagena, Spanish ships at, <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br /> + +Charles, Prince, <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> + +Château-Renault, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a><br /> + +Clausewitz, his definition of war, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on limited and unlimited war, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></span><br /> + +Colomb, Admiral, on differentiation of naval force, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Torrington's strategy, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></span><br /> + +Command of the sea, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>-19, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its true meaning, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">no meaning except in war, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></span><br /> + +Command of the sea, disputed, in general, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>-67<br /> + +Commerce, maritime, extent of British, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in war, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>-110;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its modern conditions, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>-110</span><br /> + +Concentration of naval force, its conditions, <a href="#Page_132">132</a><br /> + +Conflans, at Brest, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> + +Corbett, Mr Julian, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the Dunkirk campaign, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on commerce in war, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Craig's expedition, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on projects of invasion, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the Trafalgar campaign, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></span><br /> + +Cornwallis, and the blockade of Brest, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> + +Craft, small, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br /> + +Craig, his expedition to the Mediterranean, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>-67<br /> + +Cuba, its deliverance by the United States, <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br /> + +<br /> +Dalny, Togo at, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a><br /> + +Dettingen, <a href="#Page_80">80</a><br /> + +Downs, the, Norris ordered to, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br /> + +Duncan, at Camperdown, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> + +Dungeness, Roquefeuil anchors at, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Norris at, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Norris and Roquefeuil at, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></span><br /> + +Dunkirk, troops collected at, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">embargo at, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Saxe and Baraille at, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></span><br /> + +<br /> +Egypt, Napoleon's descent on, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> + +Elliott Islands, Togo at, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a><br /> + +Embargo, at Dunkirk, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> + +<br /> +Farragut, <a href="#Page_7">7</a><br /> + +Fleets, and base, their true relation, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> + +Fleet in being, phrase first used by Torrington, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a form of disputed command, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>-48</span><br /> + +Fleets, supply of, <a href="#Page_140">140</a><br /> + +Food Supply, Royal Commission on, <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br /> + +Fortress fleet, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Admiral Mahan on, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></span><br /> + +<br /> +Ganteaume, at Brest, <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br /> + +General chase, <a href="#Page_125">125</a><br /> + +General Staff, the, <a href="#Page_117">117</a><br /> + +Germany, Navy Law of 1900, <a href="#Page_130">130</a><br /> + +Goschen, Lord, quoted, <a href="#Page_124">124</a><br /> + +Gravelines, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> + +Gunfleet, the, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a><br /> + +<br /> +Hague Conference, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br /> + +Hannay, Mr David, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> + +Hannibal, his passage of the Alps, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> + +Hardy, Nelson's, on big ships, <a href="#Page_124">124</a><br /> + +Hawke, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">blockades Brest <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">at Quiberon Bay, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></span><br /> + +Hornby, Sir Geoffrey, on the command of the sea, <a href="#Page_45">45</a><br /> + +<br /> +Invasion, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>-92;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">dilemma of, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></span><br /> + +Invasion over sea, three ways of, <a href="#Page_75">75</a><br /> + +<br /> +James II., <a href="#Page_32">32</a><br /> + +Justin of Nassau, and the Armada, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> + +<br /> +Killigrew, Vice-Admiral, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his expedition to Cadiz, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his return to Plymouth, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.</span><br /> + +Knight, Rear-Admiral, escorts Craig, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br /> +<br /> + +Lagos, Boscawen and De La Clue at, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> + +Lepanto, Battle of, <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br /> + +Line of battle, the, <a href="#Page_113">113</a><br /> + +Lisbon, Craig and Knight at, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br /> + +Lissa, Battle of, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br /> + +Louis XIV., <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> + +<br /> +Maddalena Bay, Nelson's base at, <a href="#Page_143">143</a><br /> + +Mahan, Admiral, on commerce at sea, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on a fleet in being, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on a fortress fleet, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Hannibal's passage of the Alps, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Nelson, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on territorial expansion, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> + +Maida, Battle of, <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br /> + +Makaroff, Admiral, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br /> + +Manchuria, 59;<br /><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese successes in, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></span><br /> + +Maria Theresa, <a href="#Page_80">80</a><br /> + +Mary, Queen, her orders to Torrington, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a><br /> + +Mathews, his action off Toulon, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the Mediterranean, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></span><br /> + +Medina Sidonia, and the Armada, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> + +Mediterranean, the, England's position in, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> + +Merchant vessels, conversion of into warships at sea, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>-104<br /> + +Morbihan, the, troops collected in, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> + +<br /> +Napoleon, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, 31; <span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the campaign of Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his descent on Egypt, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his ignorance of the sea, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></span><br /> + +Naval force, differentiation of, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>-128;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distribution and supply of, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>-145</span><br /> + +Naval strength, measure of, <a href="#Page_129">129</a><br /> + +Naval warfare, defined, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">special characteristic of, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its limitations, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">philosophy of, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its primary aim, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></span><br /> + +Nelson, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, 46, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his advanced squadron, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Barham, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his base at Maddalena Bay, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the blockade of Toulon, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Craig's expedition, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">evaded by Napoleon, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">evaded by Villeneuve, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">at Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his Trafalgar Memorandum, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his pursuit of Villeneuve, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></span><br /> + +Newcastle, Duke of, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> + +Nile, Battle of the, <a href="#Page_74">74</a><br /> + +Norman Conquest, the, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a><br /> + +Norris, Sir John, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the Downs, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">leaves the Downs, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Roquefeuil at Dungeness, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">at St Helen's, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></span><br /> + +North Sea, concentration in, <a href="#Page_135">135</a><br /> + +<br /> +Orde, Sir John, raises the blockade of Cadiz, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br /> + +Orders in Council, the British, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> + +<br /> +Parma, Duke of, and the Armada, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> + +Peace strategy of position, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br /> + +Philippines, the, acquired by the United States, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> + +Pitt, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> + +Plymouth, Killigrew at, <a href="#Page_35">35</a><br /> + +Pompey, at Pharsalus, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> + +Port Arthur, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">how blockaded by Togo, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its capture by Japan, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">first Japanese attack on, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Russian fleet at, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></span><br /> + +Pretender, the, <a href="#Page_80">80</a><br /> + +Privateering, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> + +Property, private, at sea, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>-97<br /> + +Puerto Rico, acquired by the United States, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> + +<br /> +Quiberon Bay, Battle of, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a><br /> +<br /> + +Rochefort, Allemand escapes from, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> + +Roquefeuil, De, at Brest, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">anchors at Dungeness, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">puts to sea, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Norris at Dungeness, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">off the Start, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></span><br /> + +Rozhdestvensky, at Tsu-Shima, <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br /> + +<br /> +Sampson, Admiral, <a href="#Page_46">46</a><br /> + +Santiago, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its capture by the United States, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></span><br /> + +Saxe, Marshal, at Dunkirk, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">with Baraille at Dunkirk, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></span><br /> + +Sea, its characteristics, <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br /> + +Sea power, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br /> + +Sea transport, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> + +Sebastopol, siege of, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a><br /> + +Shovel, Sir Cloudesley, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a><br /> + +Sovereignty of the Seas, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a><br /> + +St Helen's, Norris at, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> + +Start, the, De Roquefeuil off, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> + +Submarine, the, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a><br /> + +Supply, of fleets, two alternative methods of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br /> + +Syracuse, Athenian expedition to, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> + +<br /> +Talavera, Battle of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> + +Teignmouth, French raid on, <a href="#Page_42">42</a><br /> + +Telegraphy, wireless, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a><br /> + +Togo, Admiral, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his method of blockading Port Arthur, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></span><br /> + +Torbay, Tourville's projected descent on, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> + +Torpedo craft, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br /> + +Torpedo, the locomotive, <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br /> + +Torrington, Arthur Herbert, Earl of, 34, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, 78;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">anchors at Beachy Head, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Admiral Bridge on, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Colomb on, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on a fleet in being, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ordered to give battle, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his strategy, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">tried by Court Martial, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">warns Mary and her Council, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></span><br /> + +Toulon, Château-Renault at, 33<br /> + +Tourville, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">at Brest, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the Channel, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></span><br /> + +Trade routes, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> + +Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">campaign of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Craig's expedition, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its significance, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></span><br /> + +Tsu-Shima, Battle of, its effects, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br /> + +<br /> +Utrecht, Treaty of, <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> + +<br /> +Villeneuve, pursued by Nelson, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">driven out of the West Indies, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">leaves Toulon, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></span><br /> + +<br /> +War, defined, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its origin, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its primary object, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of American Independence, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Boer, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">civil, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Crimean, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Cuban, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the Far East, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of 1859, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of 1866, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of 1870, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of Secession in America, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the Seven Years', <a href="#Page_79">79</a></span><br /> + +Wars, the Dutch, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a><br /> + +War Staff, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br /> + +Wellington, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his Peninsular Campaigns, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></span><br /> + +William the Conqueror, <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br /> + +William III., <a href="#Page_32">32</a><br /> +Wolseley, Lord, on communications, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> +</p> + + + + +<p class='center' style="margin-top: 5em;" ><small> +PRINTED BY<br /> + +TURNBULL AND SPEARS,<br /> + +EDINBURGH</small> +</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>THE + +CAMBRIDGE MANUALS</h2> + +<h3>OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE</h3> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Published by the Cambridge University Press under the general +editorship of P. Giles, Litt.D., Master of Emmanuel College, and A.C. +Seward, F.R.S., Professor of Botany in the University of Cambridge.</p></div> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>A series of handy volumes dealing with a wide range of subjects and +bringing the results of modern research and intellectual activity +within the reach both of the student and of the ordinary reader.</p></div> + +<p>80 VOLUMES NOW READY</p> + +<p><span class="u">HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY</span></p> +<div class="blockquot"> +<p> +42 Ancient Assyria. By Rev. C.H.W. Johns, Litt.D.<br /> + +51 Ancient Babylonia. By Rev. C.H.W. Johns, Litt.D.<br /> + +40 A History of Civilization in Palestine. By Prof. R.A.S. Macalister, M.A., F.S.A.<br /> + +78 The Peoples of India. By J.D. Anderson, M.A.<br /> + +49 China and the Manchus. By Prof. H.A. Giles, LL.D.<br /> + +79 The Evolution of Modern Japan. By J.H. Longford.<br /> + +43 The Civilization of Ancient Mexico. By Lewis Spence.<br /> + +60 The Vikings. By Prof. Allen Mawer, M.A.<br /> + +24 New Zealand. By the Hon. Sir Robert Stout, K.C.M.G., LL.D., and J. Logan Stout, LL.B. (N.Z.).<br /> + +76 Naval Warfare. By J.R. Thursfield, M.A.<br /> + +15 The Ground Plan of the English Parish Church. By A. Hamilton Thompson, M.A., F.S.A.<br /> + + +16 The Historical Growth of the English Parish Church. By A. Hamilton +Thompson, M.A., F.S.A.<br /> + +68 English Monasteries. By A.H. Thompson, M.A., F.S.A.<br /> + +50 Brasses. By J.S.M. Ward, B.A., F.R.Hist.S.<br /> + +59 Ancient Stained and Painted Glass. By F.S. Eden.<br /> + +80 A Grammar of Heraldry. By W.H. St J. Hope, Litt.D.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">ECONOMICS</span></p> +<div class="blockquot"> +<p>70 Copartnership in Industry. By C.R. Fay, M.A.<br /> + +6 Cash and Credit. By D.A. Barker.<br /> + +67 The Theory of Money. By D.A. Barker.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">LITERARY HISTORY</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>8 The Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews. By the Rev. E.G. King, +D.D.<br /> + +21 The Early Religious Poetry of Persia. By the Rev. Prof. J. Hope +Moulton, D.D., D.Theol. (Berlin).<br /> + +9 The History of the English Bible. By John Brown, D.D.<br /> + +12 English Dialects from the Eighth Century to the Present Day. By +W.W. Skeat, Litt.D., D.C.L., F.B.A.<br /> + +22 King Arthur in History and Legend. By Prof. W. Lewis Jones, M.A.<br /> + +54 The Icelandic Sagas. By W.A. Craigie, LL.D.<br /> + +23 Greek Tragedy. By J.T. Sheppard, M.A.<br /> + +33 The Ballad in Literature. By T.F. Henderson.<br /> + +37 Goethe and the Twentieth Century. By Prof. J.G. Robertson, M.A., +Ph.D.<br /> + +39 The Troubadours. By the Rev. H.J. Chaytor, M.A.<br /> + +66 Mysticism in English Literature. By Miss C.F.E. Spurgeon.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>4 The Idea of God in Early Religions. By Dr F.B. Jevons.<br /> + +57 Comparative Religion. By Dr F.B. Jevons.<br /> + +69 Plato: Moral and Political Ideals. By Mrs J. Adam.<br /> + +26 The Moral Life and Moral Worth. By Prof. Sorley, Litt.D.<br /> + +3 The English Puritans. By John Brown, D.D.<br /> + +11 An Historical Account of the Rise and Development of +Presbyterianism in Scotland. By the Rt Hon. the Lord Balfour of +Burleigh, K.T., G.C.M.G. +<br /> +41 Methodism. By Rev. H.B. Workman, D.Lit.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">EDUCATION</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>38 Life in the Medieval University. By R.S. Rait, M.A.</p></div> + +<p><span class="u">LAW</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>13 The Administration of Justice in Criminal Matters (in England and +Wales). By G. Glover Alexander, M.A., LL.M.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">BIOLOGY</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>1 The Coming of Evolution. By Prof. J.W. Judd, C.B., F.R.S.<br /> + +2 Heredity in the Light of Recent Research. By L. Doncaster, M.A.<br /> + +25 Primitive Animals. By Geoffrey Smith, M.A.<br /> + +73 The Life-story of Insects. By Prof. G.H. Carpenter.<br /> + +48 The Individual in the Animal Kingdom. By J.S. Huxley, B.A.<br /> + +27 Life in the Sea. By James Johnstone, B.Sc.<br /> + +75 Pearls. By Prof. W.J. Dakin.<br /> + +28 The Migration of Birds. By T.A. Coward.<br /> + +36 Spiders. By C. Warburton, M.A.<br /> + +61 Bees and Wasps. By O.H. Latter, M.A.<br /> + +46 House Flies. By C.G. Hewitt, D.Sc.<br /> + +32 Earthworms and their Allies. By F.E. Beddard, F.R.S.<br /> + +74 The Flea. By H. Russell.<br /> + +64 The Wanderings of Animals. By H.F. Gadow, F.R.S.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">ANTHROPOLOGY</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>20 The Wanderings of Peoples. By Dr A.C. Haddon, F.R.S.<br /> + +29 Prehistoric Man. By Dr W.L.H. Duckworth.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">GEOLOGY</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>35 Rocks and their Origins. By Prof. Grenville A.J. Cole.<br /> + +44 The Work of Rain and Rivers. By T.G. Bonney, Sc.D.<br /> + +7 The Natural History of Coal. By Dr E.A. Newell Arber.<br /> + +30 The Natural History of Clay. By Alfred B. Searle.<br /> + +34 The Origin of Earthquakes. By C. Davison, Sc.D., F.G.S.<br /> + +62 Submerged Forests. By Clement Reid, F.R.S.<br /> + +72 The Fertility of the Soil. By E.J. Russell, D.Sc.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">BOTANY</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>5 Plant-Animals: a Study in Symbiosis. By Prof. F.W. Keeble.<br /> + +10 Plant-Life on Land. By Prof. F.O. Bower, Sc.D., F.R.S.<br /> + +19 Links with the Past in the Plant-World. By Prof. A.C. Seward, +F.R.S.</p></div> + +<p><span class="u">PHYSICS</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>52 The Earth. By Prof. J.H. Poynting, F.R.S.<br /> + +53 The Atmosphere. By A.J. Berry, M.A.<br /> + +65 Beyond the Atom. By John Cox, M.A.<br /> + +55 The Physical Basis of Music. By A. Wood, M.A.<br /> + +71 Natural Sources of Energy. By Prof. A.H. Gibson, D.Sc.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">PSYCHOLOGY</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>14 An Introduction to Experimental Psychology. By Dr. C.S. Myers.<br /> + +45 The Psychology of Insanity. By Bernard Hart, M.D.<br /> + +77 The Beautiful. By Vernon Lee.</p></div> + + +<p><span class="u">INDUSTRIAL AND MECHANICAL SCIENCE</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>31 The Modern Locomotive. By C. Edgar Allen, A.M.I.Mech.E.<br /> + +56 The Modern Warship. By E.L. Attwood.<br /> + +17 Aerial Locomotion. By E.H. Harper, M.A., and Allan E. Ferguson, +B.Sc.<br /> + +18 Electricity in Locomotion. By A.G. Whyte, B.Sc.<br /> + +63 Wireless Telegraphy. By Prof. C.L. Fortescue, M.A.<br /> + +58 The Story of a Loaf of Bread. By Prof. T.B. Wood, M.A.<br /> + +47 Brewing. By A. Chaston Chapman, F.I.C.</p></div> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"A very valuable series of books which combine in a very happy way a +popular presentation of scientific truth along with the accuracy of +treatment which in such subjects is essential.... In their general +appearance, and in the quality of their binding, print, and paper, +these volumes are perhaps the most satisfactory of all those which +offer to the inquiring layman the hardly earned products of technical +and specialist research."—<i>Spectator</i></p> + +<p>"A complete set of these manuals is as essential to the equipment of +a good school as is an encyclopaedia.... We can conceive no better +series of handy books for ready reference than those represented by +the Cambridge Manuals."—<i>School World</i></p></div> + +<p class='center'> +Cambridge University Press<br /> +C.F. Clay, Manager<br /> +LONDON: Fetter Lane, E.C.<br /> +EDINBURGH: 100 Princes Street +</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Naval Warfare, by James R. Thursfield + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAVAL WARFARE *** + +***** This file should be named 33445-h.htm or 33445-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/3/4/4/33445/ + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Graeme Mackreth and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + +</pre> + +</body> +</html> + diff --git a/33445-h/images/illus01.jpg b/33445-h/images/illus01.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..faf1641 --- /dev/null +++ b/33445-h/images/illus01.jpg diff --git a/33445-h/images/illus02.jpg b/33445-h/images/illus02.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8a252a --- /dev/null +++ b/33445-h/images/illus02.jpg diff --git a/33445-h/images/illus03.jpg b/33445-h/images/illus03.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e91f11c --- /dev/null +++ b/33445-h/images/illus03.jpg diff --git a/33445.txt b/33445.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..beb646b --- /dev/null +++ b/33445.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4542 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Naval Warfare, by James R. Thursfield + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Naval Warfare + +Author: James R. Thursfield + +Release Date: August 16, 2010 [EBook #33445] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAVAL WARFARE *** + + + + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Graeme Mackreth and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + +The Cambridge Manuals of Science and +Literature + + + + +NAVAL WARFARE + + + + +CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS + +London: FETTER LANE, E.C. + +C.F. CLAY, MANAGER + +[Illustration] + + Edinburgh: 100 PRINCES STREET + Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO. + Leipzig: F.A. BROCKHAUS + New York: G.P. PUTNAM'S SONS + Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD. + + +_All rights reserved_ + + + + + NAVAL + WARFARE + + BY + + JAMES R. THURSFIELD + + M.A. + Hon. Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford + + WITH AN INTRODUCTION + + by Rear-Admiral + SIR CHARLES L. OTTLEY + K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O. + + Sometime Director of Naval Intelligence + and Secretary to the Committee of + Imperial Defence + + Cambridge: + at the University Press + + New York: + G.P. Putnam's Sons + + 1913 + + + + +_With the exception of the coat of arms at the foot, the design on the +title page is a reproduction of one used by the earliest known Cambridge +printer, John Siberch, 1521_ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE +INTRODUCTION BY SIR CHARLES OTTLEY vii + +PREFACE xiii + + +CHAP. + +I. INTRODUCTORY 1 + +II. THE COMMAND OF THE SEA 11 + +III. DISPUTED COMMAND--BLOCKADE 20 + +IV. DISPUTED COMMAND--THE FLEET IN BEING 30 + +V. DISPUTED COMMAND IN GENERAL 49 + +VI. INVASION 68 + +VII. COMMERCE IN WAR 93 + +VIII. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE 111 + +IX. THE DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY OF NAVAL FORCE 129 + +INDEX 147 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +The title chosen by its author for this little volume would assuredly +commend it to the Naval Service, even if that author's name were not--as +it is--a household word with more than one generation of naval officers. +But to such of the general public as are not yet familiar with Mr +Thursfield's writings a brief word of introduction may perhaps be +useful. For the matters herein dealt with are by no means of interest +only to the naval profession. They have their bearing also on every +calling and trade. In these days when national policy is at the mercy of +the ballot-box, it is not too much to say that a right understanding of +the principles of maritime warfare is almost as desirable amongst +civilians as amongst professional sailors. + +Regrettable indeed would it be if the mere fact that this little book +bears a more or less technical title should tempt the careless to skip +its pages or pitch it to that dreary limbo which attends even the best +of text-books on subjects which we think do not concern us. The fruits +of naval victory, the calamities attendant on naval defeat are matters +which will come home--in Bacon's classic phrase--to the business and the +bosoms of all of us, landsmen and seamen alike. Most Englishmen are at +least dimly aware of this. They realise, more or less reluctantly +perhaps, that a decisive British defeat at sea under modern conditions +would involve unspeakable consequences, consequences not merely fatal to +the structure of the Empire but destructive also of the roots of our +national life and of the well-being of almost all individuals in these +islands. + +Elementary prudence insists on adequate safeguards against evils so +supreme, and amongst those safeguards the education of the people to-day +occupies a foremost place. Our Empire's destinies for good and evil are +now in the hands of the masses of the people. Sincerely as all lovers of +ordered freedom may rejoice in this devolution of political power to the +people, thoughtful men will be apt to reflect that an uninstructed crowd +is seldom right in its collective action. If Ministerial responsibility +has dwindled, _pro tanto_ that of each one of His Majesty's lieges has +enormously increased; and it is more incumbent on the nation's rank and +file to-day than ever in the past to equip themselves with the knowledge +necessary to enable them to record their votes aright. + +It is from this point of view that this Manual should be read. It +epitomises the principles upon which success in naval warfare depends. +It shows how the moral factor in all cases and at every epoch dominates +and controls the material; how the "_animus pugnandi_," as Mr Thursfield +calls it, the desire to get at the enemy in "anything that floats," +transcends every other weapon in a nation's armoury; how if that spirit +is present, all other difficulties can be surmounted, and how without it +the thickest armour, the biggest all-shattering guns shrivel in battle +to the measure of mere useless scrap iron. + +This is the message of the book for the seaman. But--and this is of the +essence of the whole matter--for the landsman it has also a lesson of a +very different kind. His responsibility is for the material factor in +naval war. Let him note the supreme value of the moral factor; let him +encourage it with all possible honour and homage, but let him not limit +his contribution to the nation's fighting capital to any mere empty +lip-service of this kind. The moral factor is primarily the sailor's +business. The landsman's duty is to see to it that when war comes our +sailors are sent to sea, not in "anything that floats" but in the most +modern and perfect types of warship that human ingenuity can design. + +How can this fundamental duty be brought home to the individual +Englishman? Certainly not by asking him to master the niceties of +modern naval technique, matters on which every nation must trust to its +experts. But, the broad principles of naval warfare are to-day precisely +as they were at Salamis or Lepanto; and to a people such as ours, whose +history from its dawn has been moulded by maritime conditions, and which +to-day more than ever depends upon free oversea communications for its +continued existence, these broad principles governing naval warfare have +so real a significance that they may wisely be studied by all classes of +the community. + +Tactics indeed have profoundly altered, and from age to age may be +expected to change indefinitely. But so long as the sea remains naval +warfare will turn upon the command of the sea; a "Fleet in Being" will +not cease to be as real a threat to its foe as it was in the days of +Torrington; invasion of oversea territory will always be limited by the +same inexorable factors which for centuries have told in favour of the +British race and have kept the fields of England inviolate from the +tread of a conqueror. + +There are indications that still more heavy sacrifices will be demanded +from the British taxpayer for the upkeep of the Fleet in the future than +has been the case even in the recent past. Nothing but iron necessity +can justify this unfruitful expenditure, this alienation of the +national resources in men and money to the purposes of destruction. +Even as it is, naval administrators are finding it increasingly +difficult to carry all sections of politicians and the whole of the +masses of this country with them in these ever-increasing demands. The +best way of ensuring that future generations of Englishmen will rise to +the necessary height of a patriotic sense of duty and will record their +votes in support of such reasonable demands is to prepare their minds by +an elementary knowledge of what naval warfare really means. + +No Englishman, so far as the writer is aware, is better fitted than Mr +Thursfield to undertake this task, and this little book is a very +excellent example of the way in which that task should be fulfilled. It +unites--very necessarily--a high degree of condensation with a +simplicity of language and a lucidity of exposition both alike +admirable. And Mr Thursfield's right to be heard on naval questions is +second to that of no civilian in these islands. His relations with the +British Navy have been for more than a quarter of a century of the +closest kind. His reputation in the particular field of literary +endeavour which he has made his own ranks high amongst writers as +celebrated as Admiral Mahan, Sir George Sydenham Clarke (Lord Sydenham), +the late Sir John Colomb, and his brother the late Admiral P.H. Colomb, +Sir J.K. Laughton, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Admiral Sir R.N. +Custance, Mr Julian Corbett, Mr David Hannay, Mr Archibald Hurd, and +others. In the domain of naval history, its philosophy and its +literature, he has done brilliant work. When it is added that Mr +Thursfield is known to have been, for many years, one of the chief naval +advisers of _The Times_, enough will probably have been said to ensure a +sympathetic attention for this the veteran author's latest publication. + +C.L. OTTLEY + +_24th July 1913_ + + + + +PREFACE + + +Intelligent readers of this little Manual will perceive at once that it +pretends to be nothing more than an introduction, quite elementary in +character, to the study of naval warfare, its history, and its +principles as displayed in its history. As such, I trust it may be found +useful by those of my countrymen who desire to approach the naval +problems which are constantly being brought to their notice and +consideration with sound judgment and an intelligent grasp of the +principles involved in their solution. It is the result of much study +and of a sustained intimacy with the sea service, both afloat and +ashore, such as few civilians have been privileged to enjoy in greater +measure. Even so, I should have thought it right, as a civilian, to +offer some apology for undertaking to deal with so highly technical and +professional a subject, were I not happily relieved of that obligation +by the kindness of my friend Rear-Admiral Sir Charles L. Ottley, who +has, at the instance of the Editors of this series, contributed to this +volume an Introduction in which my qualifications are set forth with an +appreciation which I cannot but regard as far too flattering. It would +ill become me to add a single word--unless it were of deprecation--to +credentials expounded on such high authority. + +I should hope that readers who have found this volume useful to them +will not confine their studies to it. Abundant materials for a deeper +and more comprehensive study of the subject will be found in the several +works incidentally mentioned or quoted in my text, and in the writings +of those other contemporary authors with whom Sir Charles Ottley has +done me the high honour to associate myself. In these several works +further guidance to a still more sustained study of the subject will be +found, and in this regard I would specially mention the admirable _Short +History of the Royal Navy_, by Mr David Hannay--two volumes which, in +addition to their other and more conspicuous merits, contain a +well-selected list of authorities to be consulted prefixed to each +chapter. These references, which in truth cover the whole subject, will, +I trust, better serve the purpose of the advanced or advancing student +than any such Bibliography as I could compile on a scale commensurate +with the form and purpose of the present Manual. + +Readers of my other writings on naval topics will, perhaps, observe that +in one or two cases, where the same topics had to be discussed, I have +not hesitated to reproduce, with or without modification, the language I +had previously employed. This has been done deliberately. The topics so +treated fell naturally and, indeed, necessarily within the scope of the +present volume. To exclude them because I had discussed them elsewhere +was impossible. Wherever I found I could improve the language previously +employed in the direction of greater lucidity and precision I have done +so to the best of my ability, so that the passages in question are close +paraphrases rather than mere transcripts of those which occur elsewhere. +But I have not attempted to disguise or weaken by paraphrase any +passages which still seemed to me to convey my meaning better than any +other words I could choose. + +Changes in the methods, though not in the principles, of naval warfare +are in these days so rapid and often so sudden that one or two topics +have emerged into public prominence even since the present volume was in +type. I desire therefore to take this opportunity of adding a few +supplementary remarks on them. The first, and possibly in the long run +the most far-reaching of these topics, is that of aviation, which I have +only mentioned incidentally in the text. That aviation is still in its +infancy is a truism. But to forecast the scope and direction of its +evolution is as yet impossible. For the moment it may perhaps be said +that its offensive capacity--its capacity, that is, to determine or even +materially to affect the larger issues of naval warfare--is +inconsiderable. I say nothing of the future, whether immediate or +remote. Any day may witness developments which will give entirely new +aspects to the whole problem. In the meanwhile the chief functions of +aircraft in war will probably be, for some time to come, those of +scouting, observation, and the collection and transmission of +intelligence not obtainable by any other means. Offensive functions of a +more direct and formidable character will doubtless be developed in +time, and may be developed soon; but as I am no prophet I cannot attempt +to forecast the direction of the evolution, to determine its limits, or +to indicate its probable effects on the methods of naval warfare as +expounded in the following pages. I will, however, advance two +propositions which will not, I believe, be gainsaid by competent +authorities. They are true for the moment, though how long they may +remain true I do not know. One is that no aircraft yet constructed can +take or keep the air in all conditions of weather. The number of days in +the year in which it can do so in safety can only be represented by the +formula 365-_x_, in which _x_ is as yet an unknown quantity, though it +is no doubt a quantity which will diminish as the art of aviation is +developed. The other is that there is as yet no known method of +navigating an aircraft with accuracy and precision out of sight of land. +The air-currents by which it is affected are imperceptible to those +embarked, variable and indeterminate in their force and direction, and +quite incapable of being charted beforehand. In these conditions an +airman who sought to steer by compass alone, say, from Bermuda to New +York, might perchance find himself either at Halifax, on the one hand, +or at Charleston on the other. + +In my chapter on "Invasion" no mention is made of those subsidiary forms +of military enterprise across the sea which are known as raids. I have +treated invasion as an enterprise having for its object the subjugation +of the country invaded, or at least the subjection of its people and +their rulers to the enemy's will. As such it requires a force +commensurate in numbers with the object to be attained, and it stands to +reason that this force must needs be so large that its chances of +evading the vigilance of an enemy who is in effective command of the sea +must always be infinitesimal. A raid, on the other hand, is an +enterprise of much lesser magnitude and much smaller moment. Its method +is to elude the enemy's naval guard at this or that point of his +territory; and, having done so, its purpose is to land troops at some +vulnerable point of the territory assailed, there to create alarm and +confusion and to do as much harm as they can--which may be considerable +before their sea communications are severed by the defending naval force +assumed to be still in effective command of the sea affected. If that +command is maintained, the troops engaged in the raid must inevitably be +reduced sooner or later to the condition of a forlorn hope which has +failed. If, on the other hand, that command is overthrown, then the +troops aforesaid may prove to be the advanced guard of an invasion to +follow. Thus, although a successful raid may sometimes be carried out in +the teeth of an adverse command of the sea, yet it cannot be converted +into an invasion until that adverse command has been assailed and +overthrown. It is thus essentially fugitive in character, possibly very +effective as a diversion, certain to be mortifying to the belligerent +assailed, and not at all unlikely to cause him much injury and even more +alarm, but quite incapable of deciding the larger issues of the conflict +so long as his command of the sea remains unchallenged. It is perhaps +expedient to say this much on the subject, because the programme of the +Naval Manoeuvres of this year is known to have included a series of +raids of this fugitive character. Whether, or to what extent, any of +these operations were adjudged to have been successful I do not know. I +am only concerned to point out that, whether successful or not, their +utmost success can throw little or no light on the problem of invasion +unless in the course of the same operations the defenders' command of +the sea was adjudged to have been overthrown. + +In my chapter on "The Differentiation of Naval Force" I endeavoured to +define the functions of the so-called "battle-cruiser" and to forecast +its special uses in war. At the same time I pointed out that "it is held +by some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a +hybrid and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can +be given." It would appear that the views of these high authorities have +now been adopted, in some measure at least, by the Admiralty. Since the +chapter in question was in type it has been officially announced that +the battle-cruiser has been placed in temporary, and perhaps permanent, +abeyance. Its place is to be taken by a special type of fast battleship, +vessels in every way fit to lie in a line and yet, at the same time, +endowed with qualities which, without unduly increasing their size and +displacement, will enable them to discharge the special functions which +I assigned to the battle-cruiser in the line of battle. This is done by +employing oil instead of coal as the source of the ship's motive power. +The change thus adumbrated would seem to be in the natural order of +evolution, and at the same time to be in large measure one rather of +nomenclature than of substance. The battle-cruiser, as its name implies, +is itself essentially a fast battleship in one aspect and an exceedingly +powerful cruiser in another. In the fast battleship which is to replace +it, the battle function will be still further developed at the expense +of the cruiser function. But its speed will still qualify it to be +employed as a cruiser whenever occasion serves or necessity requires, +just as the battle-cruiser was qualified to lie in a line and do its +special work in a fleet action. The main difference is that the fast +battleship is much less likely to be employed as a cruiser than the +battle-cruiser was; but I pointed out in the text that the employment +even of the battle-cruiser in cruiser functions proper was likely to be +only occasional and subsidiary. + +The decision to use oil as the exclusive source of the motive power of +fast battleships, and of certain types of small cruisers of exceptional +speed, is undoubtedly a very significant one. It may be taken to point +to a time when oil only will be employed in the propulsion of warships +and coal will be discarded altogether. But that consummation can only be +reached when the internal combustion engine has been much more highly +developed for purposes of marine propulsion than it is at present. At +present oil is only employed in large warships for the purpose of +producing steam by the external combustion of the oil. But it may be +anticipated that a process of evolution, now in its initial stages in +the Diesel and other internal combustion engines, will in course of time +result in the production of an internal combustion engine capable of +propelling the largest ships at any speed that is now attainable by +existing methods. When that stage is reached oil will, for economic +reasons alone, undoubtedly hold the field for all purposes of propulsion +in warships. It is held by some that this country will then be placed at +a great disadvantage, inasmuch as it possesses a monopoly of the best +steam coal, whereas it has no monopoly of oil at all, and probably no +sufficient domestic supply of it to meet the needs of the Fleet in time +of war. But oil can be stored as easily as coal and, unlike coal, it +does not deteriorate in storage. To bring it in sufficient supplies from +abroad in time of war should be no more difficult for a Power which +commands the sea than to bring in the supplies of food and raw material +on which this country depends at all times for its very existence. +Moreover, even if we continued to depend on coal alone, that coal, +together with other supplies in large quantities, must, as I have shown +in my last chapter, be carried across the seas in a continuous stream +to our fleets in distant waters, and one of the great advantages of oil +over coal is that it can be transferred with the greatest ease to the +warships requiring it at any rendezvous on the high seas, whether in +home waters or at the uttermost ends of the globe, which may be most +conveniently situated for the conduct of the operations in hand. For +these reasons I hold that no serious apprehension need be entertained +lest the supply of oil to our warships should fail so long as we hold +the command of the sea. If ever we lost the command of the sea we should +not be worrying about the supply of oil. Oil or no oil, we should be +starving, destitute and defenceless. + +It only remains for me to express my gratitude to my friend Sir Charles +Ottley, not merely for an Introduction in which I cannot but fear that +he has allowed his friendship to get the better of his judgment, but +also for his kindness in devoting so much of his scanty leisure to the +reading of my proofs and the making of many valuable suggestions +thereon. I have also to thank my friend Captain Herbert W. Richmond, +R.N., for his unselfish kindness in allowing me to make use of his notes +on the Dunkirk campaign which he has closely studied in the original +papers preserved at the Admiralty and the Record Office. To my son, +Lieutenant H.G. Thursfield, R.N., I am also indebted for many valuable +suggestions. Finally, my acknowledgments are due to the Editors of this +series and the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for their +uniform courtesy and consideration. + +J.R.T. + +_4th September 1913._ + + + + +NAVAL WARFARE + + + + +CHAPTER I + +INTRODUCTORY + + +War is the armed conflict of national wills, an appeal to force as +between nation and nation. Naval warfare is that part of the conflict +which takes place on the seas. The civilized world is divided into +separate, independent States or nations, each sovereign within its own +borders. Each State pursues its own ideas and aims and embodies them in +a national policy; and so far as this policy affects only its own +citizens, it is subject to no control except that of the national +conscience and the national sense of the public welfare. Within the +State itself civil war may arise when internal dissensions divide the +nation into two parties, of which either pursues a policy to which the +other refuses to submit. In this case, unless the two parties agree to +separate without conflict, as was done by Sweden and Norway a few years +ago, an armed conflict ensues and the nation is divided into two +belligerent States which may or may not become, according to the +fortune of war, separate, independent, and sovereign in the end. The +great example of this in our own time was the War of Secession in +America, which, happily for both parties, ended without disruption, in +the surrender of the weaker of the two, and after a time in a complete +reconciliation between them. + +Thus war may arise between two parties in a single State, and when it +does the two parties become, to all intents and purposes, separate, +independent, and sovereign States for the time being, and are, for the +most part, so regarded and treated by other independent States not +taking part in the conflict. For this reason, though the origin of a +civil war may differ widely in all its circumstances and conditions from +that of a war between two separate States, sovereign and independent _ab +initio_, yet as soon as a state of war is established, as distinct from +that of a puny revolt or a petty rebellion, there is, for a student of +war, no practical difference between a civil war and any other kind of +war. Both fall under the definition of war as the armed conflict of +national wills. + +Between two separate, sovereign, independent nations a state of war +arises in this wise. We have seen that the internal policy of an +independent State is subject to no direct external control. But States +do not exist in isolation. Their citizens trade with the citizens of +other States, seeking to exchange the products of their respective +industries to the advantage of both. As they grow in prosperity, wealth, +and population, their capital seeks employment in other lands, and their +surplus population seeks an outlet in such regions of the earth as are +open to their occupation. Thus arise external relations between one +State and another, and the interests affected by these relations are +often found--and perhaps still more often believed--by one State to be +at variance with those of another. In pursuit of these interests--which, +as they grow and expand, become embodied in great consolidated kingdoms, +great colonial empires, or great imperial dependencies, and tend to be +regarded in time as paramount to all other national interests--each +State formulates and pursues an external policy of its own which may or +may not be capable of amicable adjustment to the policy of other States +engaged in similar enterprises. It is the function of diplomacy to +effect adjustments such as these where it can. It succeeds much more +often than it fails. Conflicting policies are deflected by mutual +agreement and concession so as to avoid the risk of collision, and each +State, without abandoning its policy, modifies it and adjusts it to the +exigencies of the occasion. Sometimes, however, diplomacy fails, either +because the conflicting policies are really irreconcilable, or because +passion, prejudice, national ambition, or international misunderstanding +induces the citizens of both States and their rulers so to regard them. +In that case, if neither State is prepared so to deflect its policy as +to avert collision, war ensues. The policy remains unchanged, but the +means of further pursuing it, otherwise than by an appeal to force, are +exhausted. War is thus, according to the famous definition of +Clausewitz, the pursuit of national policy by other means than those +which mere diplomacy has at its command--in other words by the conflict +of armed force. Each State now seeks to bend its enemy's will to its own +and to impose its policy upon him. + +The means of pursuing this policy vary almost indefinitely. But inasmuch +as war is essentially the conflict of armed force, the primary object of +each belligerent must in all cases be to subdue, and, in the last +resort, to destroy the armed forces of the adversary. When that is done +all is done that war can do. How to do this most speedily and most +effectively is the fundamental problem of war. There is no cut-and-dried +solution of the problem, because although war may be considered, as it +has been considered above, in the abstract, it is the most concrete of +all human arts and, subject to the fundamental principle above +enunciated, its particular forms may, and indeed must, vary with the +circumstances and conditions of each particular war. Many commentators +on war distinguishing, with Clausewitz, between "limited" and +"unlimited" war, would further insist that the forms of war must vary +with its objects. I cannot follow this distinction, which seems to me to +be inconsistent with the fundamental proposition of Clausewitz, to the +effect that war is the pursuit of policy by means of the conflict of +armed force. If you desire your policy to prevail you must take the best +means that are open to you to make it prevail. It is worse than useless +to dissipate your energies in the pursuit of any purpose, however +important in itself, which does not directly conduce, and conduce better +than any other purpose you could pursue, to that paramount end. The only +limitation of your efforts that you can tolerate is that they should +involve the least expenditure of energy that may be necessary to make +your policy prevail. But that is a question of the economics of war; it +is not a question of "limited war" or of "war for a limited object." +Your sole object is to bend the enemy to your will. That object is +essentially an unlimited one, or one that is limited only by the extent +of the efforts which the enemy makes to withstand you. The only sure way +of attaining this object is to destroy his armed forces. If he submits +before this is done it is he that limits the war, not you. Bacon's +unimpeachable maxim in this regard is often misinterpreted. "This much +is certain," he says, "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and +may take as much or as little of the war as he will." That is +indisputable, but its postulate is that the belligerent has secured the +command of the sea; that is, as I shall show hereafter, that he has +subdued, if not destroyed, the armed forces of the enemy afloat. Having +done that he may, in a certain sense, take as much or as little of the +war as he chooses; but he must always take as much as will compel the +enemy to come to terms. + +Naval warfare is no essential part of the armed conflict between +contending States. In some cases it exercises a decisive influence on +the conduct and issue of the conflict, in others none at all or next to +none. But sea power, that is, the advantage which a nation at war +derives from its superiority at sea, may largely affect the issue of a +war, even though no naval engagements of any moment may take place. In +the Crimean War the unchallenged supremacy of England and France on the +seas alone made it possible for the Allies to invade the Crimea and +undertake the siege of Sebastopol; while the naval campaigns of the +Allies in the Baltic, although they resulted in no decisive naval +operation, yet largely contributed to the success of the Allied arms in +the Crimea by compelling Russia to keep in the north large bodies of +troops which might otherwise have turned the scale against the Allies in +the South. In the War of 1859, between France and Austria, with the +Sardinian kingdom allied to the former, the superiority of the Allies at +sea enabled considerable portions of the French army to be transported +from French to Piedmontese ports, and by threatening the flank of the +Austrian line of advance, it accelerated the concentration of the Allies +on the Ticino. It also enabled the Allies to maintain a close blockade +of the Austrian ports in the Adriatic, and might have led to an attack +from the sea on the Austrian rear in Venetia had not the military +reverses of Austria in Lombardy brought the war to an end. In the War of +Secession in America the issue was largely determined, or at least +accelerated, by the close but not impenetrable blockade established by +the North over the ports and coasts of the South, and by the +co-operation of Farragut on the Mississippi with the Federal land forces +in that region. On the other hand, in the War of 1866 there was no naval +conflict worth mentioning between Austria and Prussia, because Prussia +had no navy to speak of; but as Italy, a naval Power, was the ally of +Prussia, and as Austria had a small but very efficient naval force led +by a great naval commander, the conflict between these two Powers led +to the Battle of Lissa, in which the Italian fleet was decisively +defeated, though the triumph of Prussia over the armies of Austria saved +Italy from the worst consequences of defeat, and indeed obtained for +her, in spite of her military reverses on land, the coveted possession +of Venetia. In the War of 1870 again, although the supremacy of France +on the seas was never seriously challenged by Prussia, yet her collapse +on land was so sudden and complete that her superiority at sea availed +her little or nothing. The maritime trade of Prussia was annihilated for +the time, but it was then too insignificant a factor in the economic +fabric of Prussia for its destruction to count for much, and the fleets +of France rode triumphant in the North Sea and the Baltic; but finding +no ships to fight, having no troops to land, and giving a wide berth to +fortifications with which they were ill-equipped--as ships always are +and always must be--to contend without support from the military arm, +their presence was little more than an idle and futile demonstration. In +the Boer War the influence of England's unchallenged supremacy at sea, +albeit latent, was decisive. The Boers had no naval force of any kind; +but no nation not secure in its dominion of the seas could have +undertaken such a war as England then had to wage, and it was perhaps +only the paramount sea power of this country that prevented the +conflict taking a form and assuming dimensions that would have taxed +British endurance to the uttermost and must almost certainly have +entailed the loss of South Africa to the Empire. Certain naval features +of the Cuban War between Spain and the United States, and of the War in +the Far East between Russia and Japan, will be more conveniently +considered in subsequent chapters of this manual. + +The normal correlation and interdependence of naval and military forces +in the armed conflict of national wills is sufficiently illustrated by +the foregoing examples. In certain abnormal and exceptional cases each +can act and produce the desired effect without the other. In a few +extreme cases it is hard to see how either could act at all. If, for +instance, Spain and Switzerland were to fall out, how could either +attack the other? They have no common frontier, and though Spain has a +navy, Switzerland has no seaboard. Cases where naval conflict alone has +decided the issue are those of the early wars between England and +Holland. Neither could reach the other except across the sea, there was +no territorial issue directly involved, and the object of both +combatants was to secure a monopoly of maritime commerce. But as +territorial issues, and territorial issues involving the sea and +affected by it directly or indirectly, are nearly always at stake in +great wars, history affords few examples of great international +conflicts in which sea power does not enter as a factor, often of +supreme importance. + +It must of course enter as a factor of paramount importance in any war +between an insular State and a continental one--as in the war between +Russia and Japan--or between two continental States which--as in the war +between Spain and the United States--have no common frontier on land. +War being the armed conflict of national wills, it is manifest that the +opposing wills cannot in cases such as these be brought into armed +conflict unless one State or the other is in a position to operate on +the sea. The first move in such a conflict must of necessity be made, by +one belligerent or the other, on the sea. This involves the conception +of "the command of the sea," and as this is the fundamental conception +of naval warfare as such, our analysis of naval warfare must begin with +an exposition of what is meant by the command of the sea. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE COMMAND OF THE SEA + + +We have seen that when two States go to war the primary object of each +is to subdue and if possible to destroy the armed forces of the other. +Until that is done either completely, or to such an extent as to induce +the defeated belligerent to submit, the conflict of wills cannot be +determined, and the two States cannot return to those normal relations, +involving no violence or force, which constitute a state of peace. If +they have a common frontier this circumstance indicates what is, as a +general rule, the best and most efficient way of securing the object to +be attained. The armed forces of both belligerents lie at the outset +within their respective frontiers. If those of either can be constrained +by the superior strategy of the other to keep within their own +territory, the initial advantage lies with the belligerent who has so +constrained them, and the war has in common parlance been carried into +the enemy's country. In other words, the invasion of the enemy's +territory has begun, and pressure has been brought to bear on his will +which, if maintained without intermission and with an intensity duly +proportioned to its growing extent, must in the end subdue it. To this +there is no alternative. To invade the enemy's territory at all is to +inflict a reverse on his armed forces, which would assuredly have +prevented the invasion if they could. The territory in the rear of the +invading army is in greater or less degree brought under the control of +the invader and thereby temporarily lost to the invaded State. If this +process is continued the authority and the resources of the invaded +State are progressively diminished, until at last when the capital is +occupied and the remainder of the invaded country lies open to the +advance of the invader, the defeated State must sue for peace on such +terms as the invader may concede, because it has nothing left to fight +for, and no force wherewithal to fight. This is of course merely an +abstract and generalized description of the course of a war on land, but +I need not consider its concrete details nor analyse any of the +conditions which may, and in the concrete often do, impede or deflect +its course, because my sole purpose is to show how armed force operates +in the abstract to subdue the will of the belligerent who is worsted in +the conflict. It operates by the destruction of his armed forces, by the +occupation of his territory, and by the consequent extinction of his +authority and appropriation of his resources. He can only recover the +latter and liberate his territory by submitting to such terms as the +invader may dictate or concede. + +Naval warfare aims at the same primary object, namely, the destruction +of the enemy's armed forces afloat; but it cannot by itself produce the +same decisive effect, because there is no territory which naval force, +as such, can occupy and appropriate. The sea is not territory. It is not +nor can it be made subject to the authority of an enemy in the same +sense that the land can, nor does it possess any resources in itself +such as on the land can be appropriated to the disadvantage and ultimate +discomfiture of a belligerent whose territory has been invaded. The sea +is the common highway of all nations, and the exclusive possession of +none. Apart from its fisheries, which, outside the territorial waters of +any particular State, are open to all nations, it is of no use, except +as a highway, to any State. But its use as a highway is the root of all +sea power, the foundation of all naval warfare. It is only by this +highway that an island State can be invaded, only by this highway that +an island State, or a State having no common frontier with its +adversary, can encounter and subdue the armed forces of the enemy, +whether on sea or on land. + +Moreover, the sea as a highway differs in many important respects from +such highways or other lines of communication as serve for the transit +and transport of armed forces and their necessary supplies on land. In +one sense it is all highway, that is, it can be traversed in every +direction by ships, wherever there is water enough for them to float. +For military purposes land transit is confined to such highways as are +suitable to the march of an army accompanied by artillery and heavy +baggage and supply trains, or to such railways as can more expeditiously +serve the same purpose. Hence an army advancing in an enemy's country +cannot advance on a very broad front, nor can it outmarch its baggage +and other supplies except for a very limited time and for some +exceptional purpose. Sea transport is subject to no such limitations. +Ships carry their own supplies with them, and a fleet of ships, whether +of transports or of warships, can move on as broad a front as is +compatible with the exercise of due control over their combined +movements. Moreover, within certain limits and with certain exceptions, +where the waters to be traversed are narrow, ships and fleets can vary +their line of transit and advance to such an extent as to render the +discovery of their whereabouts a matter of some difficulty. The same +conditions affect the transit of such merchant vessels as, carrying the +flag of one belligerent, are liable to capture by the other. Hence the +primary aim of all naval warfare is and must be so to control the lines +of communication which traverse the seas affected, that the enemy +cannot move his warships from one point to another without encountering +a superior force of his adversary, and that his merchant ships cannot +prosecute their voyages without running extreme risk of capture by the +way. This is called, in time-honoured phraseology, securing the command +of the sea, and the true meaning of this phrase is nothing more nor less +than the effective control of all such maritime communications as are or +can be affected by the operations of either belligerent. This control +may extend, according to circumstances, to all the navigable seas of the +globe, or it may be confined, for all practical purposes, to the waters +adjacent to the respective territories of the two belligerents. In +theory, however, its effect is unlimited, and so it must be in practice, +where the territories of one belligerent or the other are widely +scattered over the globe. That is the sense in which "the sea is all +one." + +It is important to note that the phrase "command of the sea" has no +definite meaning except in war. In time of peace no State claims to +command the sea or to control it in any way. But in any war in which +naval force is engaged each belligerent seeks to secure the command of +the sea for himself and to deny it to his enemy, that is to close the +highway which the sea affords in time of peace to his warships and his +merchant vessels alike. As regards the enemy's warships, moreover, he +seeks to secure his own command by their destruction or capture. This is +not always possible, because if the naval forces of the two belligerents +are very unequally matched, it is always open to the weaker of the two +to decline the conflict by keeping his main fleets in ports unassailable +by naval force alone, and seeking to reduce the superiority of his +adversary by assailing him incessantly with torpedo craft. He may also +attempt the hazardous enterprise of sending out isolated cruisers to +prey upon his adversary's commerce afloat. But in the case supposed, +where the superiority of one side is so great as to compel the main +fleets of the other to seek the protection of their fortified ports, +such an enterprise is, as I shall show in a subsequent chapter, not only +extremely hazardous in itself, but quite incapable of inflicting such +loss on the superior adversary as would be likely to induce him to +abandon the conflict. + +Nevertheless the command of the sea is not established, or at best it is +only partially, and it may be only temporarily, established by driving +the main fleets of the enemy into ports which are inaccessible to naval +force alone. They must not only be driven there but compelled to remain +there. This has generally been done in the past, and according to many, +but not all, naval authorities, it will generally have to be done in the +future by the operation known as blockade, whereby the enemy is +prevented from coming out, or is compelled if he does come out to fight +a superior force lying in wait outside. As a matter of fact, inasmuch as +a blockade to be really deterrent must be conducted by a blockading +force superior to that which is blockaded--for otherwise the latter need +not shun an engagement in the open with the former--it can rarely be the +interest of the blockader to prevent the exit of his adversary, since by +the hypothesis if he could get him out he could beat him. But the +blockade must nevertheless be maintained, because, although the +blockaded fleet cannot by that means be destroyed, it can, at any rate, +be immobilized and wiped off the board so long as it remains where it +is. + +The situation in which a blockade is set up by one belligerent and +submitted to by the other is not identical with an effective command of +the sea, though in certain circumstances it may approximate very closely +to it. The blockaded forces may not be so thoroughly intimidated by the +superior forces of the blockaders that they could not or would not, if +they could, seek a favourable opportunity for breaking or evading the +blockade imposed upon them. They may merely be waiting in a position +unassailable by naval force alone until the blockading forces are so +weakened through incessant torpedo attack, through the wear and tear +inflicted on them by the nature of the service on which they are +engaged, through stress of weather, through the periodical necessity +which compels even the best found ships to withdraw temporarily from the +blockade for the purposes of repair, refit, and replenishment of their +stores, and through the fatigue imposed on their officers and crews by +the incessant vigilance which a blockade requires as to afford them a +favourable opportunity of challenging a decision in the open. Or, again, +if the forces of the blockaded belligerent are distributed between two +or more of his fortified ports, he may attempt an evasion of the +blockade at two or more of them for the purpose of combining the forces +thus liberated and attacking one or more of the blockading fleets in +superior force before they can re-establish their own superiority by +concentration. Broadly speaking, this was the plan of operations +adopted, or rather attempted, by Napoleon in the memorable campaign +which ended at Trafalgar. It was frustrated by the persistent energy of +Nelson, by the masterly dispositions of Barham at the Admiralty, by the +tenacity with which Cornwallis maintained the blockade at Brest, and by +the instinctive sagacity with which other commanders of the several +blockading and cruising squadrons nearly always did the right thing at +the right moment, divined Barham's purpose, and carried it out almost +automatically. Practically, Napoleon was beaten and his projected +invasion of England was abandoned many weeks before Trafalgar was won. +But the command of the sea was not thereby secured to England. It needed +Trafalgar and the destruction of the French and Spanish Fleets there +accomplished to effect that consummation. England thenceforth remained +in effective and almost undisputed command of the sea, and the +Peninsular campaigns of Wellington were for the first time rendered +possible. The contrasted phases of the conflict before and after +Trafalgar are perhaps the best illustration in history of the vast and +vital difference between a command of the sea in dispute and a command +of the sea established. Trafalgar was the turning-point in the long +conflict between England and Napoleon. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +DISPUTED COMMAND--BLOCKADE + + +I have so far treated blockade as the initial stage of a struggle for +the command of the sea. That appears to me to be the logical order of +treatment, because when two naval Powers go to war it is almost certain +that the stronger of the two will at the outset attempt to blockade the +naval forces of the other. The same thing is likely to happen even if +the two are approximately equal in naval force, but in that case the +blockade is not likely to be of long duration, because both sides will +be eager to obtain a decision in the open. The command of the sea is a +matter of such vital moment to both sides that each must needs seek to +obtain it as soon and as completely as possible, and the only certain +way to obtain it is by the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy. +The advantage of putting to sea first is in naval warfare the equivalent +or counterpart of the advantage in land warfare of first crossing the +enemy's frontier. If that advantage is pushed home and the enemy is +still unready it must lead to a blockade. It is, moreover, quite +possible that even if both belligerents are equally ready--I am here +assuming them to be approximately equal in force--one or other, if not +both, may think it better strategy to await developments before risking +everything in an attempt to secure an immediate decision. In point of +fact, the difference between this policy and the policy of a declared +blockade is, as I am about to show, almost imperceptible, especially in +modern conditions of naval warfare. It is therefore necessary to +consider the subject of blockade more in detail. Other subjects closely +associated with this will also have to be considered in some detail +before we can grasp the full purport and extent of what is meant by the +command of the sea. + +There are two kinds of blockade--military and commercial. The former +includes the latter, but the latter does not necessarily involve the +former, except in the sense that armed naval force is necessary to +maintain it. By a commercial blockade a belligerent seeks to intercept +the maritime commerce of the enemy, to prevent any vessels, whether +enemy or neutral, from reaching his ports, and at the same time to +prevent their egress to the same extent. This in certain circumstances +may be a very effective agency for bending or breaking the enemy's will +and compelling his submission, but I reserve its consideration for more +detailed treatment hereafter. It is with military blockade that I am +here more especially concerned. + +We have seen that the paramount purpose of all naval warfare, and, +indeed, of all warfare, is the destruction of the armed forces of the +enemy. His armed forces are in the last resort the sole instrument of +his will, and their destruction to such an extent as is necessary to +subdue his will is the sole agency by which peace can be restored. +Whatever the extent of the war, whether it is limited or unlimited, in +the sense assigned to those words by Clausewitz and his followers, the +conflict of national wills out of which the quarrel arose must in some +way be composed, either by concessions on both sides or by the complete +subjection of one side to the other, before it can come to an end. It +follows that the main object of a military blockade can rarely be to +keep the enemy's forces sealed up, masked, and to that extent +immobilized in the blockaded ports. Its real object is to secure that if +they do come out they shall be observed, shadowed, and followed until +such time as they can be encountered by a superior force, and if +possible destroyed. The classical text on this topic is a letter written +on August 1, 1804, by Nelson to the Lord Mayor of London, acknowledging +a vote of thanks passed by the Corporation, and addressed to Nelson as +commanding the fleet blockading Toulon. Nelson said in his reply: "I beg +to inform your Lordship that the port of Toulon has never been blockaded +by me: quite the reverse--every opportunity has been offered to the +enemy to put to sea, for it is there that we hope to realize the hopes +and expectations of our country, and I trust that they will not be +disappointed." What Nelson here meant was that the so-called blockade of +the port--it was a common, but, as he held, an erroneous expression--was +merely incidental to the operation he was conducting. His main objective +was the armed forces of the enemy lying unassailable within the +blockaded port. He could not make them put to sea but he gave them every +opportunity of doing so. So far from wishing to keep them in, his one +desire was to get them out into the open, "for it is there that we hope +to realize the hopes and expectations of our country"--that is to get a +decision in favour of the British arms. + +Now, this being the object of a military blockade, its methods will be +subordinated to that object. In the days of sailing ships the method +which commended itself to the best naval authorities of the time was to +have an inshore squadron, consisting mainly of frigates and smaller +craft, but strengthened if necessary by a few capital ships, generally +two-deckers, closely watching the entrance to the port, but keeping +outside the range of its land defences. This was supported at a greater +distance in the offing by the main blockading fleet of heavier ships of +the line, cruising within narrow limits and keeping close touch with the +inshore squadron. Such a method is no longer practicable owing to the +development of steam navigation, and to the introduction into naval +warfare of the locomotive torpedo, and of special vessels designed to +make the attack of this weapon extremely formidable and extremely +difficult to parry. The inshore squadron of the old days was liable to +no attack which it could not parry if in sufficient force, and if too +hardly pressed it could always fall back on the main blockading fleet, +which was unassailable except by a corresponding force of the enemy. The +advent of the torpedo and of its characteristic craft has changed all +this. No naval Power can now afford to place its battleships at a fixed +station, or even in close touch with a fixed rendezvous, which is within +reach of an enemy's torpedo craft. The torpedo vessel which operates +only on the surface is, it is true, formidable only at night; in the +daytime it is powerless in attack and extremely vulnerable. But the +submarine is equally formidable in the daytime, and its attack even in +the daytime is far more insidious and difficult to parry than that of +the surface torpedo vessel is at night. The effective range of the +surface torpedo vessel is thus, for practical purposes, half the +distance which it can traverse in any given direction from its base +between dusk and dawn--say from one hundred to two hundred miles, +according to its speed and the season of the year. The speed of the +submarine is much less, but it can keep the sea for many days together, +sinking beneath the surface whenever it is threatened with attack. It +can also approach a battleship or fleet of battleships in the same +submerged condition, and experience has already demonstrated that its +advance in that condition to within striking distance is extremely +difficult to detect. Moreover, even if its presence is detected in time, +the only certain defence against it is for the battleship to steam away +from it at a speed greater than any submarine has ever attained or is +likely to attain in the submerged condition. It should further be noted +that torpedo craft engaged in offensive operations of this character are +not confined to the blockaded port as a base. Any sheltered anchorage +will serve their purpose, provided it is sufficiently fortified to +resist such attacks from the sea as may be anticipated. + +Thus, in the conditions established by the advent of the torpedo and its +characteristic craft, there would seem to be only two alternatives open +to a fleet of battleships engaged in blockade operations. Either it must +be stationed in some sheltered anchorage outside the radius of action of +the enemy's surface torpedo craft, and if within that radius adequately +defended against torpedo attack--as Togo established a flying base for +the use of his fleet, first at the Elliot Islands and afterwards at +Dalny, for the purpose of blockading Port Arthur; or it must cruise in +the open outside the same limits, keeping in touch with its advanced +cruisers and flotillas by means of wireless telegraphy, and thereby +dispensing with anything like a fixed rendezvous. It is not, perhaps, +imperative that it should always cruise entirely outside the prescribed +radius, because experience in modern naval manoeuvres has frequently +shown that it is a very difficult thing for torpedo craft, moving at +random, to discover a fleet which is constantly shifting its position at +high speed, especially when they are at any moment liable to attack from +cruisers and torpedo craft of the other side. + +Thus a modern blockade will, so far as battle fleets are concerned, be +of necessity rather a watching blockade than a masking or sealing up +blockade. If the two belligerents are unequal in naval strength it will +probably take some such form as the following. The weaker belligerent +will at the outset keep his battle fleet in his fortified ports. The +stronger may do the same, but he will be under no such paramount +inducement to do so. Both sides will, however, send out their torpedo +craft and supporting cruisers with intent to do as much harm as they can +to the armed forces of the enemy. If one belligerent can get his +torpedo craft to sea before the enemy is ready, he will, if he is the +stronger of the two, forthwith attempt to establish as close and +sustained a watch of the ports sheltering the enemy's armed forces as +may be practicable; if he is the weaker, he will attempt sporadic +attacks on the ports of his adversary and on such of his warships as may +be found in the open. If the enemy is so incautious as to have placed +any of his capital ships or other important craft in a position open to +the assault of torpedo craft--as Russia did at Port Arthur at the +opening of the war with Japan--or if he has been so lacking in vigilance +and forethought as not to have taken timely and adequate measures for +meeting sporadic attacks of the kind indicated, such attacks may be very +effective and may even go so far to redress the balance of naval +strength as to encourage the originally weaker belligerent to seek a +decision in the open. But the forces of the stronger belligerent must be +very badly handled and disposed for anything of the kind to take place. +The advantage of superior force is a tremendous one. If it is associated +with energy, determination, initiative, and skill of disposition no more +than equal to those of the assailant, it is overwhelming. The +sea-keeping capacity, or what has been called the enduring mobility, of +torpedo craft, is comparatively small. Their coal-supply is limited, +especially when they are steaming at full speed, and they carry no very +large reserve of torpedoes. They must, therefore, very frequently return +to a base to replenish their supplies. The superior enemy is, it is +true, subject to the same disabilities, but being superior he has more +torpedo craft to spare and more cruisers to attack the torpedo craft of +the enemy and their own escort of cruisers. When the raiding torpedo +craft return to their base he will make it very difficult for them to +get in and just as difficult for them to get out again. He will suffer +losses, of course, for there is no superiority of force that will confer +immunity in that respect in war. But even between equal forces, equally +well led and handled, there is no reason to suppose that the losses of +one side will be more than equal to those of the other; whereas if one +side is appreciably superior to the other it is reasonable to suppose +that it will inflict greater losses on the enemy than it suffers itself, +while even if the losses are equal the residue of the stronger force +will still be greater than that of the weaker. It is true that the whole +art of war, whether on sea or on land, consists in so disposing your +armed forces, both strategically and tactically, that you may be +superior to the enemy at the critical point and moment, and that success +in this supreme art is no inherent prerogative of the belligerent whose +aggregate forces are superior to those of his adversary. But this is +only to say that success in war is not an affair of numbers alone. It is +an affair of numbers combined with hard fighting and skilful +disposition. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +DISPUTED COMMAND--THE FLEET IN BEING + + +We have seen that blockade is only a means to an end, that end being the +destruction or surrender of the armed forces of the enemy. We have seen +also that that end cannot be obtained by blockade alone. All that a +military blockade can do is by a judicious disposition of superior +force, either to prevent the enemy coming out at all, or to secure that +if he does come out he shall be brought to action. The former method is +only applicable where the blockader's superiority of force is so great +that his adversary cannot venture at the outset to encounter his main +fleets in the open, and in that case the establishment of a blockade of +this character is for many purposes practically tantamount to securing +the command of the sea to the blockader so long as the blockade can be +maintained. Such a situation, however, can very rarely arise. There are +very few instances of it in naval history, and there are likely to be +fewer in the future than there have been in the past. The closest +blockade ever established and maintained was that of Brest by Cornwallis +from 1803 to 1805, when Napoleon was projecting the invasion of +England. Yet it would be too much to say that during those strenuous +years Ganteaume never could have got out, had he been so minded, and it +is not to be forgotten that for some time during the crisis of the +campaign he was forbidden by Napoleon to make the attempt. Moreover, +such a situation, even when it does arise, amounts at best to a +stalemate, not to a checkmate. It leaves the enemy's fleet "a fleet in +being," immobilized and wiped off the board for the moment, but +nevertheless so operating as to immobilize the blockading fleet in so +far as the chief effort of the latter must be concentrated on +maintaining the blockade. + +It is necessary to dwell at some length on this conception of "a fleet +in being." Admiral Mahan, the great historian of sea power--whose high +authority all students of naval warfare will readily acknowledge and +rarely attempt to dispute--speaks of it in his _Life of Nelson_ as a +doctrine or opinion which "has received extreme expression ... and +apparently undergone extreme misconception." On the other hand, Admiral +Sir Cyprian Bridge tells us in the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_ (_s.v._ +"Sea-Power") that "the principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the +bottom of all sound strategy." Of a principle which, according to one +high authority, lies at the bottom of all sound strategy, and according +to another has received extreme expression and undergone misconception +equally extreme, it is plainly essential that a true conception should +be obtained before it can be applied to the elucidation of any of the +problems of naval warfare. Now what is this much-debated principle? It +is best to go to the fountain-head for its elucidation. The phrase "a +fleet in being" was first used by Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, in +his defence before the Court Martial which tried and acquitted him for +his conduct of the naval campaign of 1690, and especially of the Battle +of Beachy Head, which was the leading event--none too glorious for +British arms--of that campaign. "Both as a strategist and as a +tactician," says Admiral Bridge, "Torrington was immeasurably ahead of +his contemporaries. The only English admirals who can be placed above +him are Hawke and Nelson." Yet he was regarded by many of his +contemporaries, and has been represented by many historians, merely as +the incapable seaman who failed to win the Battle of Beachy Head, and +thereby jeopardized the safety of the kingdom at a very critical time. + +The situation was as follows. The country was divided between the +partisans of James II. and the supporters of William III. James was in +Ireland, where his strength was greatest, and William had gone thither +to encounter him, his transit having been covered by a small squadron of +six men-of-war, under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovel. The army +was with William in Ireland, and Great Britain could only be defended on +land by a hastily levied militia. Its sole effective defence was the +fleet; and the fleet, although reinforced by a Dutch contingent, was, +for the moment, insufficient to defend it. The chief reliance of James +was upon the friendship and forces, naval and military, of Louis XIV. +Here was a case in which the security of England against insurrection at +home and invasion from abroad depended on the sufficiency and capacity +of her fleets to maintain the command of the sea--that is, either to +defeat the enemy's naval forces or to keep them at bay, and thereby to +deny freedom of transit to any military forces that Louis might attempt +to launch against British territory. The French king resolved to make a +determined attempt to wrest the command of the sea from his adversaries, +and by overpowering the allied fleets of England and Holland in the +Channel, to open the way for a successful invasion and a successful +insurrection to follow. A great fleet was collected at Brest, under the +supreme command of Tourville, and a squadron from Toulon under +Chateau-Renault was ordered to join him in the Channel, so as to enable +him to threaten London, to foment a Jacobite insurrection in the +capital, to land troops in Torbay, and to occupy the Irish Channel in +such force as to prevent the return of William and his army. + +Now, of course, none of these objects could be attained unless the +allied fleets in the Channel and adjacent waters could be either +decisively defeated in the open or else so intimidated by the superior +forces of the enemy as to decline a conflict and retire to some place of +safety. On the broad principle that the paramount object of all warfare +is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, Tourville, if he +felt himself strong enough, was bound to seek out the allied fleet and +challenge it to a decisive combat. On the same principle, Torrington, if +he felt himself strong enough, was bound to pursue the same aggressive +strategy, and by thoroughly beating the French to frustrate all their +objects at once. But Torrington was not strong enough and knew that he +was not strong enough. He had foreseen the crisis and warned his +superiors betimes, entreating them to take adequate measures for dealing +with it. They took no such measures. On the contrary, the dispositions +they made were calculated rather to aggravate the danger than to avert +it. Early in the year a fleet of sixteen sail of the line under +Killigrew had been sent in charge of a convoy to Cadiz with orders to +prevent, if possible, the exit of the Toulon fleet from the +Mediterranean and to follow it up should it make good its escape. This +strategy was unimpeachable if only Killigrew could make sure of +intercepting Chateau-Renault and defeating him, and if the naval forces +left in home waters when Killigrew was detached were sufficient to give +a good account of the fleet that Tourville was collecting at Brest. But +in its results it was disastrous, for Killigrew, delayed by weather and +by the many preoccupations, commercial and strategic, entailed by his +instructions was unable either to bar the passage of the Toulon fleet or +to overtake it during its progress towards the Channel. Hence +Chateau-Renault was able to effect his junction with Tourville +unmolested, while Killigrew did not reach Plymouth until after the +battle of Beachy Head had been fought, when, Tourville being victorious +in the Channel, he was obliged to carry his squadron into the Hamoaze so +as to be out of harm's way. Shovel, having escorted the king and his +troops to Ireland, was equally unable to carry out his orders to join +Torrington in the Channel, since Tourville stood in the way. Hence, +although fully alive to the strategic value, in certain contingencies, +of the forces under Killigrew and Shovel, Torrington was compelled to +rely mainly on the force under his immediate command, the insufficiency +of which he had many months before pointed out and vainly implored his +superiors to redress. + +The result of all this was that no adequate steps were, or could be, +taken, to prevent the advance of Tourville in greatly superior force +into the Channel. Torrington hoisted his flag in the Downs at the end of +May, and even then the Dutch contingent had not joined in the numbers +promised. Hence it was impossible to keep scouts out to the westward as +the Dutch had undertaken to do, and the first definite intelligence that +Torrington received of the advance of the French was the information +that on June 23 they were anchored in great force to the westward of the +Isle of Wight. Three days later, having in the meanwhile received a +Dutch reinforcement bringing his force up to fifty-five sail of the line +and twenty fire-ships, he offered them battle in that position, but it +was declined. His own comment on this hazardous adventure may here be +quoted: "I do acknowledge my first intention of attacking them, a +rashness that will admit of no better excuse than that, though I did +believe them stronger than we are, I did not believe it to so great a +degree.... Their great strength and caution have put soberer thoughts +into my head, and have made me very heartily give God thanks they +declined the battle yesterday; and indeed I shall not think myself very +unhappy if I can get rid of them without fighting, unless it may be upon +equaller terms than I can at present see any prospect of.... A council +of war I called this morning unanimously agreed we are by all manner of +means to shun fighting with them, especially if they have the wind of +us; and retire, if we cannot avoid it otherwise, even to the Gunfleet, +the only place we can with any manner of probability make our account +good with them in the condition we are in. We have now had a pretty good +view of their fleet, which consists of near, if not quite, eighty +men-of-war fit to lie in a line and thirty fire-ships; a strength that +puts me beside hopes of success, if we should fight, and really may not +only endanger the losing of the fleet, but at least the quiet of our +country too; for if we are beaten they, being absolute masters of the +sea, will be at great liberty of doing many things they dare not attempt +while we observe them and are in a possibility of joining Vice-Admiral +Killigrew and our ships to the westward. If I find a possibility, I will +get by them to the westward to join those ships; if not, I mean to +follow the result of the council of war." + +The strategy here indicated is plain, and, in my judgment, sound. It may +be profitably compared with that of Nelson as explained to his captains +during his return from the West Indies whither he had pursued +Villeneuve. Villeneuve was on his way back to European waters and Nelson +hoped to overtake him. He had eleven ships of the line in his fleet and +Villeneuve was known to have not less than eighteen. Yet, though Nelson +did not shrink from an engagement on his own terms, he was resolved not +to force one inopportunely. "Do not," he said to his captains, "imagine +I am one of those hot-brained people who fight at immense disadvantage +without an adequate object. My object is partly gained"--that is, +Villeneuve had been driven out of the West Indies. "If we meet them we +shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail of +the line, and therefore do not be surprised if I do not fall on them +immediately; we won't part without a battle. I think they will be glad +to leave me alone, if I will let them alone; which I will do, either +till we approach the shores of Europe, or they give an advantage too +tempting to be resisted." Torrington's attitude was the same as +Nelson's, except perhaps that he lacked the ardent faith to say with +Nelson, "We won't part without a battle." He would not think himself +very unhappy if he could get rid of Tourville without a battle. But the +situations of the two men were different. Nelson knew, as he said +himself, that "by the time that the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, +they will do us no harm this year." If, that is, by the sacrifice of +eleven ships of his own he could wipe out eighteen or twenty of the +enemy, destroying some and disabling as many as he could of the rest, he +would leave the balance of naval force still strongly in favour of his +country, more strongly in fact than if he fought no action at all. +Torrington, on the other hand, knew that "if we are beaten they, being +absolute masters of the sea, will be at great liberty of doing many +things they dare not attempt while we observe them and are in a +possibility of joining Vice-Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the +westward." Killigrew and Shovel had twenty-two sail of the line between +them, and Torrington, in the dispatch above quoted, had requested that +they should be ordered to advance to Portsmouth, whence, if the French +pursued him to the eastward, they might be able to join him "over the +flats" of the Thames. As he had fifty-five sail of the line himself, +with a possibility of reinforcements from Chatham, the concentration off +the Thames of the whole of the forces available would have enabled him +to encounter Tourville on something like equal terms; and from that, +assuredly, he would not have shrunk. Meanwhile he would wait, watch, +observe, and pursue a defensive strategy. If Tourville should withdraw +to the westward he would follow him and get past him if he could, and in +that case, having picked up Killigrew and Shovel, he would be in a +position to take the offensive on no very unequal terms and not to part +from Tourville without a battle. + +But the strategy of Torrington--admirable and unimpeachable as, +according to such high authorities as Admiral Bridge and the late +Admiral Colomb, it was--did not at all commend itself to Mary and her +Council, who, during William's absence in Ireland, were left in charge +of the kingdom. They wanted a battle, although Torrington had plainly +told them that it could not be a victory and might result in a +disastrous and even fatal defeat. "We apprehend," they said in a +dispatch purporting to come from Mary herself, "the consequences of your +retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal, that we choose rather you +should, upon any advantage of the wind, give battle to the enemy than +retreat further than is necessary to get an advantage upon the enemy." +Torrington, of course, never intended to retire to the Gunfleet--which +was an anchorage protected by sandbanks off the coast of Essex to the +north of the Thames--if he could avoid doing so. But unless he went +there, there was no advantage to be got upon the enemy by retreating to +the eastward, because there alone could he get reinforcements from +Chatham and possibly be joined by Killigrew and Shovel "over the flats"; +which is what he meant by saying that the Gunfleet was "the only place +we can with any manner of probability make our account with them in the +position we are in." On the other hand, if the French gave him an +opportunity he would, if he could, get past them to the westward and +there join Killigrew and Shovel in a position of much greater +advantage. But in his actual situation, not being one of "those +hot-brained people who fight at immense disadvantage without an adequate +object," he knew that a battle was the last thing which he ought to risk +and the first that the French must desire. However, as a loyal seaman, +who knew how to obey orders, he did as he was told. The French had +pressed him as far as Beachy Head and there he gave battle, taking care +so to fight as to risk as little as possible. He was beaten, as he +expected to be, and the Dutch, who had been the most hotly engaged, were +very severely handled by the French. But though his losses were +considerable, for he had to destroy some of his ships to prevent their +falling into the hands of the enemy, he saved his fleet from the +destruction which must have befallen it had he fought otherwise than he +did. As the day advanced and the battle raged, the wind dropped and the +tide began to ebb. Torrington, taking advantage of this, anchored his +fleet, while the French drifted away to the westward. When the tide +again began to flow he again took advantage of it and retreated to the +eastward. The French made some show of pursuit, but Torrington made good +his retreat into the Thames, where, the buoys having been taken up, the +French could not follow him. Finally, the French withdrew from the +Channel, having accomplished nothing beyond an insignificant raid on +Teignmouth. Torrington was tried by Court Martial and acquitted, though +he was never again employed afloat. But the fact remains that, as +Admiral Bridge says, "most seamen were at the time, have been since, and +still are in agreement with Torrington." As to his conduct of the +battle, which has so unjustly involved him in lasting discredit with the +historians, though not with the seamen, he said in his defence before +the Court Martial: "I may be bold to say that I have had time and cause +enough to think of it, and that, upon my word, were the battle to be +fought over again, I do not know how to mend it, under the same +circumstances." Again, as to his general conduct of the campaign, he +said: "It is true that the French made no great advantage of their +victory though they put us to a great charge in keeping up the militia; +but had I fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the +whole kingdom had lain open to an invasion. What, then, would have +become of us in the absence of his Majesty and most of the land forces? +As it was, most men were in fear that the French would invade; but I was +always of another opinion; for I always said that, _whilst we had a +fleet in being_, they would not dare to make an attempt." + +This is the first appearance of the phrase "a fleet in being" in the +terminology of naval warfare. Its reappearance in our own day and its +frequent employment in naval discussion are due to the masterly analysis +of Torrington's strategy and tactics which the late Admiral Colomb gave +in his illuminating work on _Naval Warfare_. In order to avoid giving it +the extreme expression which, according to Admiral Mahan, it has +received from some writers, and involving it in that extreme +misconception which he thinks it has undergone at the hands of +others--or it may be of the same--I have thought it worth while to +examine at some length the campaign which gave rise to it so as to +ascertain exactly what was in the mind of Torrington when he first used +it. It is plain that Torrington held, as all great seamen have held, +that the primary object of every belligerent is to destroy the armed +forces of the enemy. He was so circumstanced that he could not do that +himself, because the forces which might have been at his disposal for +the purpose, had the circumstances been other than they were, were so +divided and dispersed that the enemy might overcome them in detail. That +the enemy would do this, if he could, he did not doubt, and it was +equally certain that it must be his immediate object to prevent his +doing it. His own force being by far the strongest of the three opposed +to Tourville, it must be upon him that the brunt of the conflict would +fall. Nothing would suit him better than that Tourville should turn +back and attempt to force a battle on either Killigrew or Shovel to the +westward, because in that case he could hang upon Tourville's rear and +flanks and take any opportunity that offered to get past him and +concentrate the British forces to the westward of him. But Tourville +gave him no such opportunity. He pressed him hard and might have pressed +him back even to the Gunfleet if Torrington had not been ordered by Mary +and her advisers to give battle "upon any advantage of the wind." But +even in fighting the battle, which his own judgment told him ought not +to be fought, he never lost sight of the paramount necessity of so +fighting it as to give Tourville no decisive advantage. The victory was +a barren one to Tourville. It gave him no command of the sea and for +that reason he was unable to prosecute any enterprise of invasion. The +command of the sea remained in dispute, and unless the dispute could be +decided in Tourville's favour he would have fought and won the battle of +Beachy Head in vain, as the event showed that he did. Torrington held +that his "fleet in being," even after the reverse at Beachy Head, was a +sufficient bar to the further enterprises of Tourville, nor can +Tourville's subsequent action be explained on any other hypothesis than +that he shared Torrington's opinion and acted on it. + +The truth is, that the doctrine of the fleet in being, as understood +and illustrated by Torrington, is in reality the counterpart and +complement of the doctrine of the command of the sea as expounded above. +"I consider," said the late Sir Geoffrey Hornby, a strategist and +tactician of unrivalled authority in his time, "that I have command of +the sea when I am able to tell my Government that they can move an +expedition to any point without fear of interference from an enemy's +fleet." This condition cannot be satisfied so long as the enemy has a +fleet in being, that is a fleet strategically at large, not itself in +command of the sea, but strong enough to deny that command to its +adversary by strategic and tactical dispositions adapted to the +circumstances of the case. Thus command of the sea and a fleet in being +are mutually exclusive terms. So long as a hostile fleet is in being +there is no command of the sea; so soon as the command of the sea is +established there is no hostile fleet in being. Each of these +propositions is the complement of the other. + +Nevertheless, the mere statement of these abstract propositions solves +none of the concrete problems of naval warfare. War is not governed by +phrases. It is governed by stern and inexorable realities. The question +whether a particular fleet in any particular circumstances is or is not +a fleet in being is not a question of theory, it is a question of fact. +The answer to it depends on the spirit, purpose, tenacity, and +strategic insight of those who control its movements. No fleet is a +fleet in being unless inspired by what may be called the _animus +pugnandi_, that is, unless, if and when the opportunity offers, it is +prepared to strike a blow at all hazards. For this reason the Russian +fleet in Sebastopol at the time of the invasion of the Crimea was not a +fleet in being, although it had a splendid opportunity, which a Nelson +would assuredly have found too tempting to be resisted, of showing its +mettle when the French warships were employed as transports; and the +allies might have been made to pay heavily for their neglect to blockade +it had it been inspired by an effective _animus pugnandi_. On the other +hand, the four ill-fated Spanish cruisers which crossed the Atlantic to +take part in the Cuban war were a true fleet in being, however inferior +and forlorn, and were so regarded by the United States authorities so +long as they remained strategically at large. Even when two of them and +two destroyers were known to be in Santiago, the Secretary of the United +States Navy telegraphed to Admiral Sampson, "Essential to know if all +four Spanish cruisers in Santiago. Military expedition must wait this +information." The same thing happened in the war between Russia and +Japan. The first act of Japan in that war was by a torpedo attack on the +Russian fleet at Port Arthur, so to depress the _animus pugnandi_ of +the latter as practically to deprive it for a time of the character of +a fleet in being--a character which it only partially recovered +afterwards under the brief influence of the heroic but ill-fated +Makaroff. This being accomplished, the invasion of Manchuria ensued as a +matter of course. The ascendency thus established by the Japanese fleet +at the outset, though assailed more than once, was nevertheless +maintained throughout the subsequent operations until the Russian fleet +at Port Arthur, deprived of the little character it ever possessed as a +true fleet in being, was reduced to the condition of what Admiral Mahan +has aptly called a "fortress fleet," and was surrendered at the fall of +the fortress. Many other illustrations of the principle of the fleet in +being might be given. The history of naval warfare is full of them. But +they need not be multiplied as they all point the same moral. That moral +is, that a fleet in being to be of any use must be inspired by a +determined and persistent _animus pugnandi_. It must not be a mere +"fortress fleet." Torrington can never have imagined for a moment that +the fleet which, in spite of the disastrous orders of Mary and her +council, he had saved from destruction, would by its mere existence +prevent a French invasion. He had kept it in being in order that he +might use it offensively whenever occasion should arise, well knowing +that so long as it maintained that disposition Tourville would be +paralysed for offence. "Whilst we observe the French," he said, "they +cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running a great +hazard." Such hazards may be run for an adequate object, and to +determine rightly when they may be run and when they may not is perhaps +the most searching test of a naval commander's capacity and insight. It +is a psychological question rather than a strategic one. Such a +commander must know whether his adversary's _animus pugnandi_ is so keen +and so unflinching as to invest his fleet, albeit inferior, with the +true character of a fleet in being, or whether, on the other hand, it is +so feeble as to turn it into a mere fortress fleet. But that is only to +say that in war the man always counts for far more than the machine, +that the best commander is a man "with whom," as Admiral Mahan says of +Nelson, "moral effect is never in excess of the facts of the case, whose +imagination produces to him no paralysing picture of remote +contingencies." _Bene ausus vana contemnere_, as Livy says of +Alexander's conquest of Darius, is the eternal secret of successful +war. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +DISPUTED COMMAND IN GENERAL + + +The condition of disputed command of the sea is the normal condition at +the outbreak of any war in which operations at sea are involved between +two belligerents of approximately equal strength, or indeed between any +two belligerents, the weaker of whom is sufficiently inspired by the +_animus pugnandi_--or it may be by other motives rather political than +strategic in character--to try conclusions with his adversary in the +open. This follows immediately from the nature of command of the sea, +which is, it will be remembered, the effective control over the maritime +communications of the waters in dispute. I must here repeat, that the +phrase command of the sea has no definite meaning in time of peace. No +nation nowadays seeks in time of peace to control maritime +communications, that is, to exercise any authority or constraint over +any ships, whether warships or merchant vessels--other than those flying +its own flag--which traverse the seas on their lawful occasions. There +was, indeed, a time when England claimed what was called the +"sovereignty of the seas," that is, the right to exact at all times +certain marks of deference to her flag, in the form of certain salutes +of ceremony, from all ships traversing the seas surrounding the British +Islands, the narrow seas as they were called. But that is an entirely +different thing from the command of the sea in a strategic sense, and +has in fact no connection with it. It has long been abandoned and it +need only be mentioned here in order to be carefully distinguished from +the latter. Any nation seeking to exercise or secure the command of the +sea in this sense would in so doing engage in an act of war, and would +be regarded as so engaging by any other nation whose rights and +interests were in any way affected by the act. Hence the difference +between the two is plain. The claim to the sovereignty of the seas and +the exaction of the ceremonial observance--the lowering of a flag or a +sail--which symbolized it, was not in itself an act of war, though it +might lead to war if the claim were resisted. An attempt to assert or +secure the command of the sea is, on the other hand, in itself an act of +war and would never be made by any nation not prepared to take the +consequence in the instant outbreak of hostilities. + +For what is it that a nation seeks to do when it attempts to exercise or +secure the command of the sea? It seeks to do nothing more and nothing +less than to deny freedom of access to the waters in dispute to the +ships, whether warships or merchant ships, of some other nation. It +denies the common right of highway, which is the essential attribute of +the sea, to that other nation, and seeks to secure the monopoly of that +right for itself. In other words, it seeks to drive its adversary's +warships from the sea, and either by the capture of his merchant vessels +to appropriate the wealth they contain or by destroying them to deprive +the adversary of its enjoyment. This is all that naval warfare as such +can do. If the enemy is not constrained by the destruction of his +warships and the extinction of his maritime commerce to submit to his +victorious adversary's will, other agencies, not exclusively naval in +character, must be employed to bring about that consummation. This means +that military force must be brought into operation, either for the +invasion of the defeated adversary's territory or for the occupation of +some of his possessions lying across the seas, if he has any. If he has +none, or if such as he has are not worth taking or holding--either as a +permanent possession or as what is called a material guarantee to be +used in the subsequent negotiations for peace--then the only alternative +is invasion. But that is a subject which demands a chapter to itself. + +It rarely happens, however, that a great naval Power is devoid of +transmarine possessions altogether, or that such as it holds are +esteemed by it to be of so little value or importance that their +seizure by an enemy would leave matters _in statu quo_. Sea power is, as +a rule, the outcome of a flourishing maritime commerce. Maritime +commerce as it expands, tends, even apart from direct colonization, to +bring territorial occupation in its train. The origin and history of the +British rule in India is a signal illustration of this tendency. There +are other causes of territorial expansion across the seas, as Admiral +Mahan has pointed out in his latest work on _Naval Strategy_, but it is +a rule which admits of no exceptions that territorial possessions across +the seas, however they may have been acquired, compel the Power which +holds them to develop a navy which, in the last resort, must be capable +of defending them. It was not, indeed, the needs of maritime commerce +which induced the United States to acquire Puerto Rico and the +Philippines. Their acquisition was, as it were, a by-product of +victorious sea power. But the vast expansion of the United States Navy +which the last dozen years have witnessed is the direct result and the +logical consequence of their acquisition. + +Applying these principles to the defence of the British Empire we see at +once that the command of the sea, in the sense already defined, is +essential to its successful prosecution. The case is not merely +exceptional, it is absolutely unique. The British Isles might recover +from the effects of a successful invasion, as other countries have done +in like case. But the destruction of their maritime commerce would ruin +them irretrievably, even if no invasion were undertaken. Half the +maritime commerce of the world is carried on under the British flag. The +whole of that commerce would be suppressed if an enemy once secured the +command of the sea. The British Isles would be starved out in a few +weeks. Whether an enemy so situated would decide to invade or +invest--that is, so to impede our commerce that only an insignificant +fraction of it could by evasion reach our ports--is a question not so +much of strategy as of the economics of warfare. But really it hardly +matters a pin which he decided to do. We should have to submit in either +case. What would happen to our Dominions, Dependencies, and Colonies is +plain. Those which are defenceless the enemy would seize if he thought +it worth his while. In the case supposed they could obtain no military +assistance from the mother-country. But those which could defend +themselves he would have to overcome, if he could, by fighting. The +great Dominions of the Empire would not fall into an enemy's lap merely +because he had compelled the United Kingdom to sue for peace. To subdue +them by force of arms would be a very formidable undertaking. + +Such are the tremendous effects of an adverse command of the sea on an +insular kingdom and an oceanic empire, which carries on--not by virtue +of any artificial monopoly, but solely by virtue of its hardly won +ascendency in the economic struggle for existence--half the maritime +commerce of the world. On the other hand, its effects on any nation +which does not depend on the sea for its existence can never be so +overwhelming and may even be insignificant. Germany was very little +affected by the command of the sea enjoyed by France in the War of 1870. +But in view of the enormous growth of German maritime commerce in recent +years, a superiority of France at sea equal to that which she enjoyed in +1870 would now be a much more serious menace to Germany. In all such +cases the issue must be decided by military operations suitable to the +circumstances and the occasion--operations in which naval force may take +an indispensable part even though it may not directly decide the issue. +It was, for example, the United States army that captured Santiago and +secured the deliverance of Cuba; but it was the United States Navy alone +that enabled the troops to be in Cuba at all and to do what they did +there. Again, in the war between Russia and Japan it was the capture of +Port Arthur and the final overthrow at Tsu-Shima of all that remained of +Russia's effective naval forces that induced Russia to entertain +overtures for peace. But the reduction of Port Arthur was mainly the +work of the military arm and the continued successes of the Japanese +armies in Manchuria must have contributed largely to Russia's surrender. +These successes were, it is true, rendered possible by the Japanese Navy +alone. It cannot be said that the Japanese ever held the undisputed +command of the sea until after Tsu-Shima had been fought and won. But at +the very outset of the war they established such an ascendency over the +Russian naval forces in Far Eastern waters that the latter were in the +end reduced to something less than even a "fortress fleet." At Port +Arthur, writes Admiral Mahan, the fleet was "neither a fortress fleet, +for except the guns mounted from it, the fleet contributed nothing to +the defence of the place; nor yet a fleet in being, for it was never +used as such." Its _animus pugnandi_ was fatally depressed on the first +night of the war, and finally extinguished after the action of August +10. + +The truth is, that in all the larger achievements of sea power--those, +that is, to which a combination of naval and military force is +indispensable--it is impossible to disengage the influence of one of +these factors on the final issue from that of the other, and perhaps +idle to attempt do to so. They act, as it were, like a chemical +combination, not like the resultant of two separate but correlated +mechanical forces, and their joint effect may be just as different from +what might be the effect of either acting separately as water is +different from the oxygen and hydrogen of which it is composed. But +their operation in this wise can only begin after the command of the sea +has been secured, or at least has been so far established as to reduce +to a negligible quantity the risk of conducting military operations +across seas of which the command is still nominally in dispute. Now +there are several phases or stages in the enterprise of securing the +command of the sea; but they all depend on the power and the will to +fight for it. There is no absolute command of the sea, except in the +case of hostilities between two belligerents, separated by the sea, one +of whom has no naval force at all. The solitary case in history of this +situation is that of the War in South Africa. A similar situation would +arise if one of two belligerents had completely destroyed all the +effective naval force of the other. But that is a situation of which +history affords few, if any, examples. Between these two extremes lies +the whole history of naval warfare. + +There is, moreover, one characteristic of naval warfare which has no +exact counterpart in the conduct of military enterprises on land. This +is the power which a naval belligerent has of withdrawing his sea-going +force out of the reach of the sea-going force of the enemy by placing it +in sheltered harbours too strongly fortified for the enemy to reduce by +naval power alone. The only effective answer to this which the superior +belligerent can make is, as has already been shown, to establish a +blockade of the ports in question. This procedure is analogous to, but +not identical with, the investment by military forces of a fortress in +which an army has found shelter in the interior of the enemy's country. +But the essential difference is that the land fortress can be completely +invested so that no food or other supplies can reach it, whereas a sea +fortress cannot, unless it is situated on a small island, be completely +invested by naval force alone. In the one case, even if no assault is +attempted, starvation must sooner or later bring about the surrender of +the fortress together with any military force it contains, whereas in +the other the blockaded port being, as a rule, in open communication +with its own national territory, cannot be reduced by starvation. +Moreover, for reasons already explained, a maritime fortress cannot +nowadays be so closely blockaded as to prevent the exit of small craft +almost at all times or even to prevent the exit of squadrons of +battleships in circumstances favourable to the enterprise. Now the exit +of small craft equipped for torpedo attack is a much more serious threat +to the blockader than the exit of small craft, not so equipped, was in +the old days of close blockade. In those days small craft could do no +harm to ships of the line or even to frigates, whereas a torpedo craft +is nowadays in certain circumstances the equal and more than the equal +of a battleship. For these reasons the escape from a blockaded port of a +squadron of battleships might easily be regarded by the blockading enemy +as a less serious and even much more welcome incident of the campaign +than the frequent issue of swarms of torpedo craft skilfully handled, +daringly navigated, and sternly resolved to do or die in the attempt to +reduce the battle superiority of the enemy. + +It follows from these premisses that a naval blockade--or a connected +series of blockades--can never be regarded as equivalent to an +established command of the sea. At its best it can only achieve a +temporary command of the sea in a state of unstable and easily disturbed +equilibrium. At its worst, that is when it is least close and least +effective, and when the _animus pugnandi_ of the enemy is unimpaired and +not to be intimidated, and is therefore ready at all times to take +advantage of "an opportunity too tempting to be resisted," it amounts to +a state of things in which the "fleet in being" becomes the dominant +factor of the situation. It is mainly a psychological problem and +scarcely a strategic problem at all to determine when the actual +situation approximates to either of these extremes, and the principle +embodied in the words _bene ausus vana contemnere_ is the key to the +solution of this problem. If the blockaded fleet is merely a fortress +fleet, or not even that, as was the Russian fleet at Port Arthur for +some time after the first night of the war, and even more after the +critical but indecisive conflict of August 10, then it is legitimate, as +Togo triumphantly showed, to regard the situation so established as so +far equivalent to a temporary command of the sea that military +operations, involving the security of oversea transit and the continuity +of oversea supply, might be undertaken with no greater risk than is +always inseparable from a vigorous initiative in war. But had the +Russian naval commanders been inspired--as, perhaps, the ill-fated +Makaroff alone was--with a genuine _animus pugnandi_, they might have +perceived that their one chance of bringing all the Japanese +enterprises, naval and military, to nought, was by fighting Togo's fleet +"to a frazzle," even if their own fleet perished in the conflict. Then +the Baltic Fleet, if it had any fight in it at all, must have made short +work of what remained of Togo's fleet, and the Japanese communications +with Manchuria being thereby severed, Russia might have dictated her own +terms of peace. The real lesson of that war is not that a true fleet in +being can ever be safely neglected, but that a fleet which can be +neglected with impunity is no true fleet in being. It should never be +forgotten that the problems of naval warfare are essentially +psychological and not mechanical in their nature. Their ultimate +determining factors are not material and ponderable forces operating +with measurable certainty, but those immaterial and imponderable forces +of the human mind and will which can be measured by no standard other +than the result. By the material standard so popular in these days, and +withal so full of fallacy, Nelson should have been defeated at Trafalgar +and Rozhdestvensky should have been victorious at Tsu-Shima. + +It is, of course, idle to press the doctrine of the command of the sea +and the principle of the fleet in being so far as to affirm that no +military enterprise of any kind can be prosecuted across the sea unless +an unassailable command of the sea has first been established. Such a +proposition is disallowed by the whole course of naval history, which +is, in truth, for the most part, the history of the command of the sea +remaining in dispute, often for long periods, between two belligerents, +the balance inclining sometimes to one side and sometimes to the other, +according to the fortune of war. The whole question is in the main one +of degree and of circumstances. Broadly speaking, it may be said that +the larger the military enterprise contemplated the more complete must +be the command of the sea before it can be prosecuted with success and +the more certain the assurance of its continuance in unimpaired +efficiency until the objects of the enterprise are accomplished. +Conversely, the strength, even if inferior, of the fleet in being, its +strategic disposition, its tactical efficiency, and, above all, its +_animus pugnandi_ must all be accurately gauged by a naval commander +before he can safely decide that a military expedition of any magnitude +can be undertaken without fear of interference from an enemy's fleet. It +was the neglect of these principles that ruined the Athenian expedition +to Syracuse. It was equally the neglect of the same principles that +entailed the failure of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and the ultimate +surrender of the army he had deserted there. It was the politic +recognition of them that, as Admiral Mahan has shown in a brilliant +passage, compelled Hannibal to undertake the arduous passage of the Alps +for the purpose of invading Italy instead of transporting his troops by +sea. + +The limits of legitimate enterprise across seas of which the command +although firmly gripped is not unassailably established, are perhaps +best illustrated by the story of Craig's expedition to Malta and Sicily +towards the close of the Trafalgar campaign. This remarkable episode, +which has received less attention than it deserves from most historians, +has been represented by Mr Julian Corbett in his instructive work on +_The Campaign of Trafalgar_ as the masterly offensive stroke by which +Pitt hoped to abate, and, if it might be, to overthrow the military +ascendency which Napoleon had established in Europe. That view has not +been universally accepted by Mr Corbett's critics, but the episode is +entitled to close attention for the light it throws on the central +problem of naval warfare. Pitt had concluded a treaty with Russia, which +involved not merely naval but military co-operation with that Power in +the Mediterranean. Craig's expedition was the shape which the military +co-operation was to take. It consisted of some five thousand troops, and +when it embarked in April 1805 it was convoyed by only two ships of the +line in its transit over seas which, for all the Government which +dispatched it knew, might be infested at the time by more than one fleet +of the enemy. + +Here, then, is a case in which the doctrine of the command of the sea +and the principle of the fleet in being might seem to be violated in a +crucial fashion. But the men who directed the arms of England in those +days knew what they were about. Long before they allowed the expedition +to start they had established a close and, as they thought, an effective +blockade of all the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports in which either +French or Spanish warships ready for sea were to be found. Nevertheless +we have here a signal illustration of the essential difference between a +command of the sea which has been made absolute by the destruction of +the enemy's available naval forces--as was practically the case after +Trafalgar--and one which is only virtual and potential, because, +although the enemy's fleets have for the time been masked or sealed up +in their ports, they may, should the fortune of war so determine, resume +at any time the position and functions of a true fleet in being. On the +strength of a command of the sea of this merely contingent and potential +character Pitt and his naval advisers had persuaded themselves that the +way to the Mediterranean was open for the transit of troops. Craig's +transports, accordingly, put to sea on April 19. But a week before +Villeneuve with his fleet had left Toulon for the last time, had evaded +Nelson's watch, and passing rapidly through the Straits, had called off +Cadiz, and picking up such Spanish ships as were there had disappeared +into space, no man knowing whither he had gone. He might have gone to +the East Indies, he might have gone to the West Indies, as in fact he +did, or he might be cruising unmolested in waters where he could hardly +fail to come across Craig's transports with their weak escort of two +ships of the line. It was a situation which no one had foreseen or +regarded as more than a contingency too remote to be guarded against +when Craig's expedition was allowed to start. How Nelson viewed the +situation may be seen from his reply to the Admiralty, written on his +receipt of the first intimation that the expedition was about to start. + +"As the 'Fisgard' sailed from Gibraltar on the 9th instant, two hours +after the enemy's fleet from Toulon had passed the Straits, I have to +hope she would arrive time enough in the Channel to give their Lordships +information of this circumstance _and to prevent the Rear-Admiral and +Troops before mentioned_"--that is Craig's expedition--"_from leaving +Spithead_." In other words, Nelson held quite plainly that had the +Admiralty known that Villeneuve was at sea outside the Straits they +would not have allowed Craig to start. That Nelson was right in this +assumption is proved by the fact that acting on the inspiration of +Barham--perhaps the greatest strategist that ever presided at +Whitehall--the Admiralty, as soon as they had grasped the situation, +sent orders to Calder off Ferrol, that if he came in contact with the +expedition he was to send it back to Plymouth or Cork under cruiser +escort and retain the two ships of the line which had so far escorted it +under his own command. The fact was that if Craig's expedition once +passed Finisterre it would find itself totally without the naval +protection on which the Admiralty relied when it was dispatched. +Villeneuve was outside the Straits no one knew where, and had been +reinforced by the Spanish ships from Cadiz. Nelson, whose exact +whereabouts was equally unknown to the Admiralty, was detained in the +Mediterranean by baffling winds and also by the necessity of making +sure before quitting his station that Villeneuve had not gone to the +Levant. Orde, who had been blockading Cadiz with a weak squadron which +had to retire on Villeneuve's approach, had convinced himself, on +grounds not without cogency, that Villeneuve was making for the +northward, and had, quite correctly on this hypothesis, fallen back on +the fleet blockading Brest, being ignorant of the peril to which Craig +was exposed. Thus Craig's expedition seemed to be going straight to its +doom unless Calder could intercept it and give it orders to return. +However, Craig and Knight, whose flag flew in one of the ships of the +line escorting the expedition, passed Finisterre without communicating +with Calder, and having by this time got wind of their peril, they +hurried into Lisbon, there to await developments in comparative safety, +though their presence caused great embarrassment to the Portuguese +Government and raised a diplomatic storm. It was not until Craig and +Knight had ascertained that Villeneuve was out of the way and that +Nelson had passed the Straits that they put to sea again and met Nelson +off Cape St Vincent. Nelson had by this time satisfied himself, after an +exhaustive survey of the situation, that Villeneuve had gone to the West +Indies, and resolved to follow him there as soon as he had sped the +expedition on its appointed way. But so apprehensive was he of the +Spanish ships remaining at Carthagena, that, inferior to Villeneuve as +he was, he detached the "Royal Sovereign" from his own squadron, and +placed her under Knight's command. It only remains to add that the +expedition reached its destination in safety and that its result was the +Battle of Maida, fought in the following year--the first battle in which +Napoleon's troops crossed bayonets with British infantry and were beaten +by an inferior force. The expedition was also the indirect cause of the +Battle of Trafalgar itself, for it was in order to frustrate the +coalition with Russia of which it was the instrument that Napoleon had +ordered Villeneuve to make for the Mediterranean when he finally left +Cadiz to encounter Nelson on his path. Thus was it, as Mr Corbett says, +"to prove the insidious drop of poison--the little sting--that was to +infect Napoleon's empire with decay and to force his hand with so +tremendous a result." + +Yet it very nearly miscarried at the outset. Nelson and Barham--between +them a combination of warlike energy and strategic insight, without a +parallel in the history of naval warfare--both realized the tremendous +risks it ran. It may be argued that had Villeneuve gone to the north he +would have found himself in the thick of British squadrons closing in on +Brest and vastly superior in force. Yet Allemand, who had escaped a few +weeks later from Rochefort, was able to cruise in these very waters for +over five months without being brought to book. It is true that the +destruction or capture of five thousand British troops would not +seriously have affected the larger issues of the naval campaign, but it +would have broken up the coalition with Russia by which Pitt set so much +store, and which Mr Corbett at any rate represents as having exercised a +decisive influence on the ultimate fortunes of Napoleon. The moral of +the whole story seems to be that competent strategists--for the world +has known none more competent and none more intrepid than Nelson and +Barham--will not risk even a minor expedition at sea unless its line of +advance is sufficiently controlled by superior naval force to ensure its +unmolested transit. The principle thus exhibited in the case of a minor +expedition manifestly applies with immensely increased force to those +larger expeditions which assume the dimensions of an invasion. It was +not until long after Trafalgar had been fought, and the command of the +sea had been secured beyond the possibility of challenge, that the +campaigns in the Peninsula were undertaken--campaigns which ended and +were always intended to end, should the fortune of war so decree, in the +invasion of France and the overthrow of Napoleon. This opens up the +whole question of invasion, which will be discussed in the next +chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +INVASION + + +England has not been invaded since A.D. 1066, when, the country having +no fleet in being, William the Conqueror effected a landing and +subjugated the kingdom. During the eight centuries and more that have +since elapsed, every country in Europe has been invaded and its capital +occupied, in many cases more than once. It is by no means for lack of +attempts to invade her that England has been spared the calamity of +invasion for more than eight hundred years. It is not because she has +had at all times--it may indeed be doubted if she has had at any +time--organized military force sufficient to repel an invader, if he +could not be stopped at sea. It is because she can only be invaded +across the sea, and because whenever the attempt has been made she has +always had naval force sufficient to bring the enterprise to nought. It +is merely a truism to say that the invasion of hostile territory across +the sea is a much more difficult and hazardous enterprise than the +crossing of a land frontier by organized military force. But it is no +truism to say that the reason why it is so much more difficult and more +hazardous is that there is no real parallel between the two cases. I +assume a vigorous defensive on the part of the adversary assailed in +both cases--a defensive which, though commonly so called, is really +offensive in its nature. The essential difference lies in this, that two +countries which are separated by the sea have no common frontier. Each +has its own frontier at the limit of its territorial waters, but between +these two there lies a region common to both and from which neither can +be excluded except by the superior naval force of the other. + +For the moment an expeditionary force emerges from its own territorial +waters--which may be any distance from a few miles up to many thousands +of miles from the territorial waters of the adversary to be assailed--it +must be prepared to defend itself, and naval force alone can afford it +an adequate measure of defence. Military forces embarked in transports +are defenceless and practically unarmed. They cannot defend themselves +with their own arms, nor can the transports which carry them be so armed +as to afford adequate defence against the smallest warship afloat, least +of all against torpedo craft. Hence, unless the sea to be traversed has +been cleared of the naval forces of the enemy beforehand, the invading +military force must be covered by a naval force sufficient to overcome +any naval force which the enemy is able to bring against it. If the +latter can bring a fleet--as he must be able to do if the invasion is +to be prevented--the covering fleet must be able to beat any fleet that +he can bring. That condition being satisfied, however, it is clear that +the covering fleet must be terribly hampered and handicapped in the +ensuing conflict by the presence of a huge and unwieldy assemblage of +unarmed transports filled with disarmed men, and by the consequent +necessity of defending it against the attack of those portions of the +enemy's naval force to which, albeit not suitable for engaging in the +principal conflict, the transports would offer an otherwise defenceless +prey. Hence the escorting fleet must be stronger than its adversary in a +far larger proportion than it need be if naval issues pure and simple +were alone at stake--so strong indeed that, if the transports were out +of the way, its victory might be taken as certain. But if that is so it +is manifest that the prospects of successful invasion would be +immeasurably improved by seeking to decide the naval issue first--as +Tourville very properly did in the Beachy Head campaign--and keeping the +transports in hand and in port until it had been decided in favour of +the intending invader. This is the eternal dilemma of invasion across a +sea of which the command has not previously been secured. If you are not +strong enough to dispose of the enemy's naval force you are certainly +not strong enough to escort an invading force--itself helpless +afloat--across the sea in his teeth. If you are strong enough to do this +you will certainly be wise to beat him first, because then there will be +nothing left to prevent the transit of your troops. In other words, +command of the sea, if not absolutely and in all cases indispensable to +a successful invasion, is at any rate the only certain way of ensuring +its success. + +Naval history from first to last is full of illustrations of the +principles here expounded. I will examine one or two of them, and I must +take my illustrations mainly from the naval history of Britain, first, +because Britain, being an island, is the only country in Europe which +cannot be invaded except across the sea, and secondly, because Britain +for that very reason has often been subjected to attempts at invasion +and has always frustrated them by denying to her adversary that +sufficiency of sea control which, if history is any guide, is essential +to successful invasion. But first I will examine two cases which might +at first sight seem to militate against the principles I have +enunciated. The brilliant campaign of Caesar which ended in the overthrow +of Pompey and his cause at Pharsalus, was opened by Caesar's desperate +venture of carrying his army across the Adriatic to the coast of Epirus, +although Pompey's fleet was in full command of the waters traversed. +This is one of those exceptions which may be said to prove the rule. +Caesar had no alternative. Pompey was in Illyria, and if Caesar could not +overthrow Pompey on that side of the Adriatic it was certain that Pompey +would overthrow Caesar on the other side. For this reason, and perhaps +for this reason alone, Caesar was compelled to undertake a venture which +he must have known to be desperate. How desperate it was is shown by the +fact that, not having transports enough to carry more than half his army +at once, he had to send his transports back as soon as he had landed, +and they were all destroyed on their way back to Brundusium. Antony his +lieutenant did, indeed, succeed after a time in getting the remainder of +his army across, but not before Caesar had been reduced to the utmost +straits. The whole enterprise moreover was not, strictly speaking, an +invasion of hostile territory. The inhabitants of the territory occupied +by both combatants were neutral as between them, and were willing to +furnish Caesar with such scanty supplies as they had. Again, an army in +those days needed no ammunition except the sword which each soldier +carried on his person, and that kind of ammunition was not expended in +fighting. Hence Caesar had no occasion to concern himself with the +security of his communications across the sea--a consideration which +weighs with overwhelming force on the commander of a modern oversea +expedition. "A modern army," as the late Lord Wolseley said, "is such a +complicated organism that any interruption in the line of communications +tends to break up and destroy its very life." An army marches on its +belly. If it cannot be fed it cannot fight. After the Battle of Talavera +Wellington was so paralysed by the failure of the Spanish authorities to +supply his troops with food that he had to abandon the offensive for a +time and to retreat towards his own line of communication with the sea. +Caesar on the other hand abandoned the sea, which could not feed him, and +trusted to the resources of the country. The difference is vital. The +one risk that Caesar ran was the destruction of his army afloat, and that +he ran not because he chose but because he must. The risk of destruction +on land he was prepared to run, and this, at any rate, was, as the event +proved, a case of _bene ausus vana contemnere_. + +Again, Napoleon's descent on Egypt is another exception which proves the +rule, and proves it still more conclusively. Napoleon evaded Nelson's +fleet and landed his army in Egypt. The army so landed left Egypt in +British transports, having laid down its arms and surrendered just +before the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens; and but for the timely +conclusion of that short-lived armistice, every French soldier who +survived the Egyptian campaign might have seen the inside of a British +prison. This was because Napoleon, who never fathomed the secrets of the +sea, chose to think that to evade a hostile fleet was the same thing as +to defeat it. He managed for a time to escape Nelson's attentions by the +skin of his teeth, and fondly fancied that because he had done so the +dominion of the East was won. He was quickly undeceived by the Battle of +the Nile. That victory destroyed the fleet which had escorted his army +to Egypt and thereby made it impossible for the army ever to return +except by consent of the Power which he never could vanquish on the sea. +The Battle of the Nile, wrote a Frenchman in Egypt, "is a calamity which +leaves us here as children totally lost to the mother country. Nothing +but peace can restore us to her." Nothing but the so-called Peace of +Amiens did restore them. If it be argued, as it often has been, that +Napoleon's successful descent on Egypt proves that military enterprises +of large moment may sometimes be undertaken without first securing the +command of the sea to be traversed, surely the Battle of the Nile and +its sequel are a triumphant refutation of such an argument. Such +enterprises are merely a roundabout way of presenting the belligerent +who retains the command of the sea with as many prisoners of war as +survive from the original expedition. + +I need not labour the point which the unbroken testimony of history +from the time of the Norman Conquest has established, that all attempts +to invade England have been made in the past and must be made in the +future across a sea not commanded by the intending invader. If he has +secured the command of the sea beforehand, there is nothing to prevent +the invasion except the consideration that he can attain his end--that +is, the subjugation of the nation's will--at less cost to himself. That +being premised, let us consider how the intending invader will set about +his task. There are three ways, and three ways only. First, he may seek +to overpower the British naval defence on the seas, that is to obtain +the command of the sea. If he can do that, the whole thing is done. Or +secondly, he may collect the military forces destined for the invasion +in ports suitable for the purpose, and when all is ready he may cover +their embarkation and transit by a naval force sufficient to overcome +any naval force which this country can direct against it. I have already +shown, however, that a force sufficient to do this with any certainty, +or even with any reasonable prospect of success, must needs be more than +sufficient to overpower the British naval defence and thereby to secure +the command of the sea, if the enemy were freed from the entangling and +wellnigh disabling necessity of providing for the safe conduct of an +unwieldy host of otherwise defenceless transports. In other words he is +putting the cart before the horse, a procedure which has never yet +succeeded in getting the cart to its destination. This second +alternative is then merely a clumsy and extremely inefficient way of +attaining the same end as the first, and need only be mentioned in order +to exclude it from further consideration. + +There remains only a third alternative. This is to assemble the invading +military force at suitable ports as before, and to attempt to engage the +attention of the defending naval force by operations at a distance for a +time sufficient to secure the unmolested transit of the military +expedition. This is the method which has nearly always been employed by +an enemy projecting an invasion of this country. It has never yet +succeeded, because it always leads in the end to a situation which is +practically indistinguishable from that involved in the second +alternative, which I have already discussed and excluded. The naval and +the military elements in the enterprise of invasion being now, by the +hypothesis, separated in space and for that reason incapable of being +very exactly combined in time, a whole series of highly indeterminate +factors is thereby introduced into the problem to be solved by the +invader. There are elements of naval force, to wit, all manner of small +craft, which are not required for the main conflict of fleets--and it +is this conflict which alone can secure the command of the sea--but +which are eminently adapted for the impeachment and destruction of +unarmed transports. These will be employed in the blockade of the ports +in which the military forces are collecting. If the assailant employs +similar craft to drive the blockaders away, the defender will bring up +larger craft to stiffen his blockading flotillas. The invading force +will therefore still be impeded and impeached. The process thus goes on +until, if it is not otherwise decided by the conflict of the main fleets +at a distance, the contending naval forces of both sides are attracted +to the scene of the proposed embarkation, there to fight it out in the +conditions involved in the second alternative considered above, +conditions which I have already shown to be the least favourable to the +would-be invader. In a masterly analysis Mr Julian Corbett has shown +that the British defence against a threatened invasion has always been +conducted on these lines, that the primary objective of the defence has +been the troops and their transports, and that the vigorous pursuit of +this objective has always resulted in a decision being obtained as +between the main fleets of the two belligerents. That the decision has +always been in favour of the British arms is at once a lesson and a +warning--a lesson that immunity from invasion can only be ensured by +superiority at sea, a warning that such superiority can only be secured +by the adequate preparation, the judicious disposition, and the skilful +handling of the naval forces to be employed, as well as by an +unflinching _animus pugnandi_. But no nation which goes to war can hope +for more or be content with less than the opportunity of obtaining a +decision in these conditions. The issue lies on the knees of the gods. + +A few illustrations may here be cited. We have seen how in the Beachy +Head campaign Tourville, having failed to force a decision on +Torrington's fleet in being, could not turn aside with Torrington at his +heels and Killigrew and Shovel on his flank to bring over an invading +force from France. He was paralysed by that abiding characteristic of +French naval strategy which impelled the French naval commanders to fix +their eye on ulterior objects and blinded them to the fact that the best +way to attain those objects was to destroy the naval forces of the enemy +whenever the opportunity offered of so obtaining a decision. Hence their +preference for the leeward position in action, their constant reluctance +to fight a decisive action, their habitual direction of their fire at +the masts and sails of the enemy rather than at his hulls, and in +Tourville's case his failure to annihilate Torrington's fleet in being, +resulting in the total miscarriage of the schemes for invasion, to be +followed by internal insurrection, which, as Admiral Colomb has shown, +were the kernel of the French plan of campaign. In the case of the +Armada in the previous century, the task of invasion was entrusted to +Parma, who had collected troops for the purpose, and vessels for their +transport, in the ports of the Spanish Netherlands. But Justin of Nassau +kept a close watch outside, and Parma could not move. He summoned Medina +Sidonia with the Armada to his assistance, but he summoned him in vain, +for the Armada, harassed throughout the Channel, and, as it were, smoked +out of Calais, was finally shattered at Gravelines. Precisely the same +thing happened in the eighteenth century during the Seven Years' War. +Troops and transports were being collected in the Morbihan, but their +exit was blocked by a British naval force stationed off the ports. +Conflans with the French main fleet was at Brest, and there he was +blockaded by Hawke. Evading the blockade, Conflans put to sea and +straightway went to release the troops and transports, hopelessly +blockaded in the Morbihan. But Hawke swooped down on him and destroyed +him in Quiberon Bay, Boscawen having previously destroyed at Lagos the +fleet which De La Clue was bringing from Toulon to effect a junction +with Conflans. + +One more illustration may be cited, and I will treat it at some length, +because it presents certain features which give it peculiar +significance in relation to current controversies. This is the projected +invasion of England by France in 1744. It is, so far as I know, the +solitary instance in our naval history which shows the enemy framing his +plans on the lines of what is now known as "a bolt from the blue"--that +is, he projected a surprise invasion, at a time when the two countries +were nominally at peace, in the hope that the first overt act of the war +he was contemplating might be the landing of his troops on British soil. +In 1743, when this project was conceived, England and France were, as I +have said, nominally at peace, but troops belonging to both had fought +at Dettingen, not in any direct quarrel of their own, but because +England was supporting Maria Theresa and France was supporting her +enemies. The fleets of both Powers were jealously watching each other in +the Mediterranean, a situation which led early in 1744 to the too +notorious action of Mathews off Toulon. Nevertheless, until the very end +of 1743 no direct conflict with France was anticipated by the English +Government. + +Yet France was already secretly preparing her "bolt from the blue." She +had resolved to support the Pretender's cause and to prepare an invasion +of England in which the Pretender's son was to take part, and on landing +in England to rally his party to the overthrow of the Hanoverian +dynasty. The bolt was to be launched from Dunkirk and directed at the +Thames, the intention being to land the invading force at Blackwall. +Some ten thousand French troops to be employed in the expedition were +sent into winter-quarters in and around Dunkirk, but this aroused no +suspicion in England, because this region was the natural place for the +left flank of the French army to winter in, and Dunkirk contained no +transports at the time. Transports were, however, being taken up under +false charter-parties at French ports on the Atlantic and in the +Channel, and were ordered as soon as ready to rendezvous secretly and +separately at Dunkirk. At first the intention was for the expeditionary +force to make its attempt without any support from the French fleet. But +Marshal Saxe, who was to command it and knew that the Thames and its +adjacent waters were never denuded of naval force sufficient to make +short work of a fleet of unarmed transports, flatly declined to +entertain this project and demanded adequate naval support for the +enterprise. Accordingly a powerful fleet, held to be sufficient to +contain or defeat any British fleet that was thought likely to be able +to challenge it, was fitted out with all secrecy at Brest and placed +under the command of De Roquefeuil. Even he was not told its +destination, and false rumours on the subject were allowed to circulate +among those who were concerned in its preparation. + +So far everything seemed to be going well. The blow was timed for the +first week in January, but the usual delays occurred, and for a month or +more after the date originally fixed, the expeditionary force and its +escort were separated by the whole length of northern France. Yet even +before the date originally fixed, England had got wind of the +preparations. From the middle of December Brest had been kept under +watch, and orders had been issued to the dockyards to prepare for sea as +many ships of the line as were available. These preparations were +continued, without intermission, until the end of January, the purpose +and destination of the armament at Brest still being unknown. Then two +alarming pieces of intelligence reached England at the same time. One +was that Roquefeuil had put to sea on January 26 (O.S.) with twenty-one +sail of the line, and before being lost sight of by the British cruiser +told off to watch him, had been seen to be clearly standing to the +northward. The other was that Prince Charles, the son of the Pretender, +had left Rome and had landed without hindrance in France. This, being a +direct violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, was naturally held to give to +the sailing of the Brest fleet the complexion of a direct hostile +intent. It was on February 1 that these facts were known, and on +February 2, Sir John Norris, a veteran of Barfleur and La Hogue, who was +now well over eighty years of age, but as the event showed was still +fully equal to the task entrusted to him, was ordered to hoist his flag +at Portsmouth and to "take the most effectual measures to prevent the +making of any descent on the Kingdoms." Norris hoisted his flag on the +6th, and by the 18th he had eighteen sail of the line under his command. +Subsequently his force was increased to twenty. Nothing was known of the +movements of the French fleet since January 29, when the frigate set to +watch it had finally lost sight of it. It was in fact still off the +mouth of the Channel, baffled by adverse winds and gales and vainly +seeking to make headway against them. If it had gone to the +Mediterranean, Mathews off Toulon would be placed in grave jeopardy, and +there were some projects for detaching a powerful squadron of Norris's +ships to his support. If, on the other hand, it was aiming at the +Channel, Norris with his whole force would be none too strong to +encounter and defeat it. This was Norris's dilemma, and it was not until +February 9 that he learned from the Duke of Newcastle that an embargo +had been laid on all shipping at Dunkirk, where some fifty vessels of +one hundred and fifty to two hundred tons had by this time assembled. +These might at a pinch and for a short transit be estimated to be +capable of transporting some ten thousand troops. But an embargo, +although clear proof of hostile intent, was not necessarily a sign of +impending invasion. It was a common expedient, preliminary to war, +whereby you deprived your enemy of ships and men very necessary to his +purposes and secured ships and men equally necessary to your own. Hence +no strategic connexion could with any certainty be held to exist between +the embargo at Dunkirk and the sailing of the French fleet from Brest. +On the other hand it was clearly dangerous to uncover the Channel so +long as the destination of the Brest fleet was unknown, and, although +Newcastle had suggested to Norris that he should divide his fleet and +send the major part of it to reinforce Mathews in the Mediterranean, yet +Norris strongly demurred to the suggestion, and before the time came to +act on it the situation had so far developed as to disallow it +altogether. On February 11, Norris received information that a French +fleet of at least sixteen sail of the line had been seen the day before +off the Start. This convinced him that the French had some scheme to the +eastward in hand; and as he had frigates watching the Channel between +the Isle of Wight and Cape Barfleur he was equally convinced that the +French had so far no appreciable armed force to the eastward of him. +Newcastle, however, did not share this conviction. He had received +numerous reports of movements of French ships in the Channel to the +eastward of the Isle of Wight and other information which pointed to a +concentration at Dunkirk. As a matter of fact no French men-of-war were +at this time east of the Isle of Wight, and the vessels reported to +Newcastle must have been transports making for Dunkirk and magnified +into ships of the line by the fog of war. Newcastle, accordingly, +ordered Norris to go forthwith to the Downs. Foul winds prevented Norris +from sailing at once from St Helen's, and on the 13th, the day before he +did sail, he received further information which confirmed his conviction +that the French were still to the westward. But Newcastle's orders +remained peremptory, and on the 14th he sailed with eighteen ships, and +anchored in the Downs on the 17th. There he found two more ships +awaiting him, while two others were on their way to join him from +Plymouth. + +I pause here for a moment to point out that Norris's desire, over-ruled +by Newcastle, to remain at Portsmouth was thoroughly well advised. He +knew that there was naval force enough in the Thames and the Downs to +dispose of any expedition coming from Dunkirk unless it were escorted by +the Brest fleet, or by a very considerable detachment therefrom. He was +well assured that no such detachment could have eluded the vigilance of +his frigates, and he felt that in these circumstances he could better +impeach Roquefeuil by lying in wait for him at Spithead or St Helen's +than by preceding him to the Downs. How right he was in this +appreciation will be seen from a closer consideration of the movements +of the French fleet. It was not until February 13 that Roquefeuil +received his final orders off the Start. He was directed to detach De +Baraille, his second in command, with five ships. These were to go +forthwith to Dunkirk and escort Saxe's expedition, while he himself with +the remainder of his fleet was to blockade Norris at Portsmouth and +defeat him if he could. But Roquefeuil and his council of war found +these orders too hazardous for execution. They resolved not to divide +the fleet until at least Norris, presumed to be at Portsmouth, had been +disposed of. On the 17th, the day on which Norris had anchored in the +Downs, they looked into Spithead and persuaded themselves that they had +seen Norris there with eleven sail of the line. Judging that the weather +was too bad for a successful blockade, Roquefeuil then passed on up the +Channel, convinced that Norris was now behind him with too weak a force +to be of any effect. Baraille was then sent on with his detachment to +Dunkirk, but by this time Saxe had lost heart and declined to sail +until Roquefeuil's whole fleet was at hand to escort him. + +It never was at hand to escort him, and the expedition never sailed. +Roquefeuil, with his fleet now greatly reduced, anchored off Dungeness +on the 22nd, and never got any further. What had happened in the +meanwhile was this. Norris remained in the Downs, being held there for +some time by a gale. He was not unaware of what was going on at Dunkirk, +but he hesitated to proceed thither lest the French fleet behind him +should be covering another expedition coming from some French port in +the Channel. He sent to reconnoitre, however, and on the 21st received +information that four sixty-gun ships--these were, no doubt, Baraille's +detachment--were at anchor off Gravelines, and there covering the +transports at Dunkirk. On the 22nd, Roquefeuil appeared off Dungeness +and anchored there. As soon as he knew Roquefeuil's whereabouts, Norris +resolved to attack him without delay. The wind, being N.W., was +favourable to his enterprise, and at the same time made it impossible +for the expedition to leave Dunkirk. Should the wind change before +Roquefeuil was brought to action and defeated, Norris held that he was +strong enough to detach a force to impeach Saxe and Baraille, and at the +same time to give a good account of Roquefeuil. But matters did not +exactly turn out in this wise. On the 24th Norris left the Downs, with a +light wind from the N.W., and an ebb tide in his favour, making for +Dungeness, where Roquefeuil was still lying. His appearance in the +offing was Roquefeuil's first information that Norris was to the +eastward of him in superior force, and it greatly disconcerted +Roquefeuil. He held a hasty council of war and decided to cut and run. +By this time the tide had turned and the wind had fallen, so that he +could not stir until the tide again began to ebb. Norris, similarly +disabled, had anchored some few miles to the eastward, intending to make +his attack as soon as wind and tide allowed. But during the night a +furious gale from the N.E. sprang up, which drove most of Norris's ships +from their anchors, and when daylight came the French were nowhere to be +seen. Roquefeuil had slipped his cables, and with the gale behind him +was hurrying back to Brest. Norris went after him as far as Beachy Head, +but there gave up the chase and returned to the Downs, to make sure that +Saxe and Baraille, for whom the wind was now favourable, might find +their way barred should they attempt to set sail. The transports, +however, were by now in no position to move, nor was either Saxe or +Baraille in any mind to allow them to move. They both realized that the +game was up. The troops were in the transports, and they suffered +greatly in the gale that frustrated Norris' attack on Roquefeuil. But +that was merely an accident of warfare. It was not the gale that +shattered the expedition, nor did it save England from invasion. On the +contrary, while it played havoc with the transports and troops at +Dunkirk, it also saved Roquefeuil's fleet from destruction at Dungeness. +But, gale or no gale, the transports and troops never could have crossed +so long as Norris held on to the Downs. Nor could they have crossed had +Norris been allowed to remain at Portsmouth as he desired; for in that +case Baraille could not have been detached. + +To point the moral of this memorable story, I cannot do better than +quote Mr Julian Corbett's comment on it. "The whole attempt, it will be +seen, with everything in its favour, had exhibited the normal course of +degradation. For all the nicely framed plan and perfect deception, the +inherent difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as +usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy's battle fleet with his +transports, and we on our part were able to forestall it with every +advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of a central mass on a +revealed and certain line of passage." We were certainly taken at a +disadvantage at the outset, for the "bolt from the blue" was preparing +some time before any one in England got wind of it. The country had +been largely denuded of troops for foreign enterprises, Scotland was +deeply disaffected, the Jacobites were full of hope and intrigue, the +Ministry was supine and feeble, the navy was deplorably weak in home +waters, and such ships as were available had been dispersed to their +ports for refit. Nevertheless with all these conditions in its favour +the projected "bolt from the blue" was detected and anticipated--tardily, +it is true, and with no great sagacity except on the part of Norris--long +before the expedition was ready to start. Surely the moral needs no +further pointing. + +By these instances, and others which might be quoted, the law seems to +be established that in default of an assured command of the sea the +fleet which seeks to cover an invasion is drawn by irresistible +attraction towards the place of embarkation, and that the same +attraction brings it there--if not earlier--into conflict with the +superior forces of the enemy. If in the Trafalgar campaign, which I have +no space to examine in detail, the law does not seem to operate to the +extent that it did in the other cases examined, that is only because the +disposition of the British fleets was so masterly that Napoleon never +got the opportunity he yearned for of bringing his fleets to the place +of embarkation. They were outmanoeuvred beforehand and finally +overthrown at Trafalgar. + +There is indeed a fourth alternative which has been advanced by some +speculative writers, though history lends it no countenance, and it has +never, I believe, been taken seriously by any naval authority of repute. +I cannot take it seriously myself. It assumes that some naval Power, +suitably situated as regards this country, might without either +provocation or overt international dispute, clandestinely take up +transport--either a comparatively small number of very large merchant +vessels or a very large number of barges, lighters, or what not to be +towed by steam vessels--might clandestinely put an army with all its +necessary _impedimenta_ on board the transports so provided and then +clandestinely, and without either notice or warning, send them to sea, +with or without escort, with intent to effect a landing at some suitable +point on the English coast. The whole theory seems to me to involve at +least three monstrous improbabilities: first, a piratical intent on the +part of a civilized nation; secondly, a concealment of such intent in +conditions wellnigh incompatible with the degree of secrecy required; +and thirdly, a precision and a punctuality of movement in the operations +of embarkation, transit, and landing of which history affords no +example, while naval opinion and experience scoff at them as utterly +impracticable. Of course the future may not resemble the past, and naval +wars of the future may not be conducted on a pattern sealed by the +unbroken teaching of over eight hundred years. But that is an assumption +which I cannot seriously entertain. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +COMMERCE IN WAR + + +The maritime trade of a nation at war has always been regarded by the +other belligerent as his legitimate prey. In the Dutch Wars the +suppression of the enemy's commerce was the main objective of both +parties to the conflict. In all wars in which either belligerent has any +commerce afloat worth considering one belligerent may always be expected +to do all that he can for its capture or suppression, while the other +will do as much as he can for its defence. In proportion to the volume +and value of the national trade afloat is the potency of its destruction +as an agency for bringing the national will into submission. If, for +example, the maritime trade of England could be suppressed by her +enemies, England would thereby be vanquished. Her commerce is her +life-blood. On the other hand there are nations, very powerful in war, +which either by reason of their geographical position, or because their +oversea trade is no vital element in their national economy, would +suffer comparatively little in like circumstances. It thus appears that +the volume and value of the national trade afloat is the measure of the +efforts which an enemy is likely to make for its suppression. But it is +not directly the measure of the efforts which a nation so assailed must +make for its defence. The measure of these efforts is determined not by +the volume and value of the trade to be protected but by the amount and +character of the naval force which the enemy can employ in assailing it. +In the Boer War British maritime commerce was unassailed and +uninterrupted in all parts of the world, and yet not a single ship of +the British Navy was directly employed in its protection. If on the +other hand England were at war with a naval Power of the first rank, she +might have to employ the whole of her naval resources in securing the +free transit of her maritime commerce. So long as she can do this with +success she need give no thought to the menace of possible invasion. A +command of the sea so far established as to secure freedom of transit +for the vast and ubiquitous maritime commerce of this country is also, +of necessity, so far established as to deny free transit to the +transports of an enemy seeking to invade. The greater includes the less. + +It may at first sight seem to be an anomaly--some, indeed, would +represent it as a mere survival of barbarism--that whereas in war on +land the private property of an enemy's subjects is, by the established +law and custom of civilized nations, not liable to capture or +destruction without compensation to its owners, the opposite rule still +prevails in war at sea. But a little consideration will, I think, show +that the analogy sought to be established between the two cases is a +very imperfect one. War on land does _ipso facto_ suspend in large +measure the free transport of commerce in transit. As between the two +belligerents it interrupts it altogether. Moreover, throughout the +territory occupied by the enemy, the railways, and in large measure the +roads, are practically monopolized for the movements of his troops and +the transport of his supplies--in a word for the maintenance of his +communications. There can have been little or no consignment of goods +from Paris to Berlin or _vice versa_ during the war of 1870, and even +though at certain stages of the war goods might have been consigned, +say, from Lyons to Geneva, or from Lille to Brussels, yet such cases are +really only the counterparts of the frequent failure of one +belligerent's cruisers to intercept the merchant vessels of the other on +the high seas. Again, in the case of a beleaguered fortress, the +besiegers would never dream of allowing a convoy of food or of munitions +of war--or for the matter of that of merchandise of any kind--to enter +the fortress. They would intercept it as a matter of course, and if +necessary they would appropriate it to their own use. The upshot of it +all is that even in war on land the transit of all commerce, albeit the +private property of some one, is practically suspended within the area +of the territory occupied, and very seriously impeded throughout the +whole country subject to invasion. It is not, therefore, true to say +without many qualifications that in war private property is respected on +land and not respected at sea. The only difference that I can discern is +that by the law and custom of nations private property cannot be +appropriated on land, whereas at sea it can. But this difference is not +really essential. The essential thing in both cases is that the wealth +of the enemy is diminished and the credit of his traders destroyed--a +far more important matter in these days than the destruction of this or +that cargo of his goods--by the suspension of that interchange of +commodities with other nations which is the chief element of national +prosperity, and may be, as in the case of England, the indispensable +condition of national existence. Indeed, although private property on +land is exempt from capture, and at sea it is not, yet there are many +nations which would suffer far more from the interruption of their +mercantile communications which war on land entails than they would from +the destruction of their commerce at sea. + +For these reasons I hold that the proposed exemption of private property +from capture or molestation at sea is a chimerical one. War is +essentially an act of violence. It operates by the destruction of human +life as well as by all other agencies which are likely to subdue the +enemy's will. Among these agencies the capture or destruction of +commerce afloat is by far the most humane since it entails the least +sacrifice of life, limb, or liberty, and at the same time its coercive +pressure may in some cases, though not in all, be the most effective +instrument for compelling the enemy's submission. Moreover, it is not +proposed to exempt from capture or destruction such merchant vessels of +the enemy--or even of a neutral for that matter--as attempt to break a +blockade. Now the modern conditions of blockade are such that the +warships conducting it may be stationed hundreds of miles from the +blockaded port or ports, and their outlying cruisers, remaining in touch +with each other and with the main body, may be much further afield. +Within the area of the organized patrol thus established, every vessel +seeking to enter a blockaded port or to issue from it will still be +liable to capture. In these conditions the proposal to exempt the +remainder of the enemy's private property afloat from capture would be a +mockery. There would not be enough of such property afloat to pay for +the cost of capture. + +It is an axiom of naval warfare that an assured command of the sea is at +once the best defence for commerce afloat and an indispensable +condition for any such attack on it as is likely to have any appreciable +effect in subduing the enemy's will. War is an affair not of pin-pricks +but of smashing blows. "The harassment and distress," says Admiral +Mahan, "caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce +will be conceded by all. It is doubtless a most important secondary +operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned until war +itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure +sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a +most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of +cheapness to the representatives of a people." Here again we may discern +some of the larger implications of that potent and far-reaching agency +of naval warfare, the command of the sea. If a belligerent not aiming at +the command of the sea, and having no sufficient naval force wherewithal +to secure it, thinks to crush his enemy by directing sporadic attacks on +his commerce, he will, if history is any guide, soon find out his +mistake. His naval forces available for this purpose, are, by the +hypothesis, inferior to those of the enemy. It is certain that they will +sooner or later be hunted down and destroyed. Moreover, the mercantile +flag of the weaker belligerent will, as I have shown, disappear from the +sea from the very outset of the conflict; and the maritime commerce of +such a belligerent must be of very insignificant volume if the loss +entailed by its suppression is not greater than that likely to be +inflicted by such a belligerent on the enemy's commerce which crosses +the seas under the _aegis_ of a flag which commands them. Admiral Mahan +has estimated that during the whole of the war of the French Revolution +and Empire the direct loss to England "by the operation of hostile +cruisers did not exceed 2-1/2 per cent. of the commerce of the Empire; +and that this loss was partially made good by the prize ships and +merchandise taken by its own naval vessels and privateers." It should be +noted, however, that the Royal Commission on Food Supply was of opinion +that 4 per cent. would be a more accurate estimate. It is also well +known that during the same period the maritime commerce of England was +doubled in volume while that of France was annihilated. In point of fact +the risks run in war by commerce afloat are measured very exactly by the +degree in which the flag which covers it has secured the command of the +sea--that is, be it always remembered, the control of the maritime +communications affected. During the War of American Independence, when +British supremacy at sea was seriously challenged and at times was in +grave jeopardy--owing quite as much to faulty disposition as to +inferiority of force--premiums of fifteen guineas per cent. were paid in +1782 on ships trading to the Far East; whereas from the spring of 1793 +until the close of the struggle with Napoleon no premiums exceeding half +that rate were paid. Yet to the very end of the war British merchant +vessels were being seized even in the Channel almost every day. There +is, however, good reason to think that many of these seizures were in +reality collusive operations undertaken for the purpose of carrying on +clandestinely the direct trade with the Continent which Napoleon sought +in vain to suppress. The full history of the memorable conflict between +the Berlin Decrees of Napoleon and the British Orders in Council, is +still to be written. Some very illuminating side-lights are thrown on it +by Mr David Hannay in a volume entitled _The Sea-Trader, His Friends and +Enemies_. + +It would seem to follow from these premisses--fortified as they are by +other historical examples that might be cited--that of two belligerents +in a naval war, that one which establishes and maintains an effective +command of the sea will be absolute master of the maritime commerce of +the other, while his own maritime commerce, though not entirely immune, +will suffer no such decisive losses as will determine or even materially +affect the course and issue of the war; and that he may indeed emerge +from the war much stronger and more prosperous than he was at the +beginning. Such is assuredly the teaching of history, and although vast +changes have taken place alike in respect of the methods, opportunities, +implements, and international conventions of naval war and in respect of +the conditions, volume, and national importance of maritime commerce, +yet I think it can be shown that the sum total of these changes has made +on the whole rather for the advantage of the superior belligerent than +otherwise. In the first place privateering--formerly a very effective +weapon in the hands of the weaker belligerent--is now abolished. It is +true that the Declaration of Paris, which recorded and ratified its +abolition, has not been formally accepted by all the naval Powers of the +world; but it is also true that since its promulgation no naval Power +has sought to revive privateering. It is indeed held by some that the +right claimed by certain maritime Powers to convert merchant ships of +their own nationality into warships by arming and commissioning them on +the high seas is, or may be, equivalent to the revival of privateering +in its most dangerous and aggressive form. But those who argue thus +appear to overlook the fact that this process of conversion on the high +seas is by the Seventh Convention of the Second Hague Conference hedged +round with a series of restrictions which differentiate the warship thus +improvised very sharply from the privateer of the past. The following +are the leading provisions of this Convention:-- + +1. A merchant ship converted into a warship cannot have the rights and +duties appertaining to vessels having that status unless it is under the +direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power the +flag of which it flies. + +2. Merchant ships converted into warships must bear the external marks +which distinguish the warships of their nationality. + +3. The commander must be in the service of the State and duly +commissioned by the proper authorities. His name must figure on the list +of the officers of the fighting fleet. + +4. The crew must be subject to military discipline. + +5. Every merchant ship converted into a warship is bound to observe in +its operations the laws and customs of war. + +6. A belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must, as +soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of its warships. + +This Convention has been accepted and ratified by all the great maritime +Powers. It is true that it gives the converted merchant ship what may be +called the dog's privilege of taking a first bite with impunity, but it +makes it very difficult for any second bite to be taken. Such a vessel +may as a merchant ship have obtained coal and other supplies in a +neutral port before conversion, but she cannot after conversion return +to the same or another neutral port and repeat the process; nor can she +easily play the game which some have attributed to her of being a +merchant ship one day, a warship the next, and a merchant ship again on +the third. Further, as a weapon to be employed against England in +particular, the method of conversion here prescribed would seem to be +largely discounted by the fact that this country could, if it were so +disposed, convert as many merchant ships into warships in this way as +all the rest of the world put together. + +It will be argued, perhaps, that a belligerent when hard pressed will +not respect the provisions of a mere paper Convention, but will, if it +suits him, treat them as non-existent. In that case it is not easy to +see why he should ever have accepted and ratified them. The preamble of +this very Convention recites that "whereas the contracting Powers have +been unable to come to an agreement on the question whether the +conversion of a merchant ship into a warship may take place upon the +high seas, it is understood that the question of the place where such +conversion is effected remains outside the scope of this agreement, and +is in no way affected by the following rules." In other words some of +the very Powers which have ratified the Convention as it stands +categorically declined to add to it a provision forbidding altogether +the conversion of a merchant ship into a warship on the high seas. If +this does not mean that, while reserving their freedom of action in this +respect, they are prepared to abide by the provisions of a Convention +which they have not less categorically accepted and ratified we are +driven to the absurd conclusion that all International Law is a nullity. + +Secondly, the practical disappearance of the sailing ship from the seas +has profoundly modified all the pre-existing conditions affecting the +attack and defence of commerce afloat. In the days of sailing, all +vessels were compelled to sail according to the wind, that is, to take +devious courses whenever the wind was adverse, so that some of them +might at all times be found scattered over very wide areas of the seas +connecting the ports of departure with those of arrival. Accordingly the +sporadic attack on commerce by isolated warships cruising at large +within the limits of trade routes, which might be hundreds of miles in +width, was often productive of very appreciable results. There were few +blank coverts on the seas to be drawn. Nowadays a steamer can always +take the most direct course to her destination. As a consequence, trade +routes have now been narrowed down to what may more fittingly be called +lines of communication, and these lines possess the true characteristic +of all lines, namely, that they have practically no breadth. Thus the +areas bounded by these lines are nowadays all blank coverts. Any one who +happens to cross the Atlantic, as I have crossed it more than once, by +one of the less frequented routes, will know that the number of vessels +sighted in a voyage quite as long as any warship could take without +coaling may often be counted on the fingers of one hand. Another +characteristic of these lines is that though their points of departure +and destination are fixed, yet the lines joining these points may be +varied if necessary to such an extent that any warship hovering about +their ordinary direction would be thrown entirely off the scent. On the +other hand their ports of departure and destination being fixed, the +lines of communication must inevitably converge as they approach these +points. There are other points also more in the open at which several +lines of communication may intersect. At these "terminal and focal +points," as Mr Corbett has aptly called them, the belligerent, being by +hypothesis inferior to his adversary, must needs endeavour to +concentrate his attack on his enemy's commerce, because at any other +points the game would not be worth the candle. But it is precisely at +these points that the superior adversary will concentrate his defence, +and being superior, will take care to do so in force sufficient for the +purpose. So far as the remaining portions of the lines of communication +need any direct defence at all this can be afforded, if and when +necessary, by collecting the merchant ships about to traverse them into +convoys and giving them an escort sufficiently powerful to deal +effectually with attacks which from the nature of the case can only be +sporadic and intermittent. Be it remembered that the last thing a +warship bent on commerce destruction wants is to encounter an enemy in +superior or even in equal force. The moment she does so her game is up. + +Thirdly, the substitution of steam for sails has very largely reduced +the enduring mobility of the commerce-destroying warship. In time of war +no warship will ever go further from the nearest available supply of +coal than is represented by considerably less than half of the distance +that she can steam at full speed with her bunkers full. If she does so +she runs the risk, if chased, of burning her last pound of coal before +she has reached shelter. Coaling at sea is only possible in exceptional +circumstances, and is in any case a very tedious operation. A warship +which attempts it will be taken at a great disadvantage if an enemy +catches her in the process. Colliers, moreover, are exposed to capture +while proceeding to the appointed rendezvous, and if they fail to reach +it the warship awaiting them will be placed in extreme danger. All these +difficulties and dangers may be surmounted once and again, but they must +needs put a tremendous handicap in the long run on the commerce-destroying +efforts of a belligerent who is not superior to his adversary at sea. +Of course if he is superior at sea the enemy's commerce will be at his +mercy, and nothing can prevent its destruction or at least its total +suppression. But that is not the hypothesis we are considering. + +Fourthly, the power of the modern warship to send her prizes into court +for adjudication, or to destroy them off-hand on capture is much more +limited than was that of her sailing predecessor. If she sends them into +port she must either put a prize crew on board or escort them herself. +In the former case the prizes, and in the latter case both prizes and +their captors are liable to recapture, a liability which becomes the +greater in proportion as the enemy is superior at sea. As to the former +alternative, moreover, the crew of a modern man-of-war is highly +specialized, and in particular its engine-room complement, which must +furnish a portion of every prize crew, is at the outset no greater than +is required for the full fighting efficiency of the ship. It is +probable, therefore, that the captor would in nearly all cases adopt the +alternative of destroying his prizes at sea. In that case there will be +no prize money for any one concerned, but that is perhaps a minor +consideration. A far more important consideration is that before +destroying the prize the captor must take its crew on board and provide +food and accommodation for them. Any other course would be sheer piracy +and would inevitably lead to drastic reprisals. Now, before the captor +had destroyed many prizes in this fashion--especially if even one of +them happened to be a passenger steamer well filled with passengers--she +would find herself gravely embarrassed by the number of her prisoners, +and the need of providing for them even in the roughest fashion. A +captain having to fight his ship even with a few hundreds of prisoners +on board would be in no very enviable position. + +The foregoing are the leading considerations which appear to me to +govern the problem of the attack and defence of maritime commerce in +modern conditions of naval warfare. I have discussed the question in +greater detail in a work entitled _Nelson and Other Naval Studies_, and +as I have seen no reason to abandon or substantially to modify the +conclusions there formulated, I reproduce them here for the sake of +completeness:-- + +1. All experience shows that commerce-destroying never has been, and +never can be, a primary object of naval war. + +2. There is nothing in the changes which modern times have witnessed in +the methods and appliances of naval warfare to suggest that the +experience of former wars is no longer applicable. + +3. Such experience as there is of modern war points to the same +conclusion and enforces it. + +4. The case of the "Alabama," rightly understood, does not disallow this +conclusion but rather confirms it. + +5. Though the volume of maritime commerce has vastly increased, the +number of units of naval force capable of assailing it has decreased in +far greater proportion. + +6. Privateering is, and remains abolished, not merely by the fiat of +International Law, but by changes in the methods and appliances of +navigation and naval warfare which have rendered the privateer entirely +obsolete. + +7. Maritime commerce is much less assailable than in former times, +because the introduction of steam has confined its course to definite +trade routes of extremely narrow width, and has almost denuded the sea +of commerce outside these limits. + +8. The modern commerce destroyer is confined to a comparatively narrow +radius of action by the inexorable limits of her coal supply. If she +destroys her prizes she must forgo the prize money and find +accommodation for the crews and passengers of the ships destroyed. If +she sends them into port she must deplete her engine-room complement and +thereby gravely impair her own efficiency. + +9. Torpedo craft are of little or no use for commerce destruction except +in certain well-defined areas where special measures can be taken for +checking their depredations. + +Of course all this depends on the one fundamental assumption that the +commerce to be defended belongs to a Power which can, and does, command +the sea. On no other condition can maritime commerce be defended at +all. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE + + +A warship, considered in the abstract, may be defined as a vessel +employed, and generally constructed, for the purpose of conveying across +the seas to the place of conflict, the weapons that are to be used in +conflict, the men who are to use them, and all such stores, whether of +food or other supplies, as will give to the vessel as large a measure of +enduring mobility as is compatible with her displacement. If we confine +our attention to the period posterior to the employment of the gun on +shipboard as the principal weapon of offence, and if we regard the +torpedo as a particular kind of projectile, and the tube from which it +is discharged as a particular kind of gun, we may condense this +definition into the modern formula that a warship is a floating +gun-carriage. With the methods and implements of sea warfare anterior to +the introduction of the gun we need not concern ourselves. They belong +to the archaeology of the subject. It suffices to point out that in all +periods of naval warfare the nature of the principal weapon employed, +and to some extent that of the motive power available, have not only +governed the structure of the ship and determined the practicable limit +of its displacement, but have also exercised a dominant influence over +the ordering of fleets and their disposition in action. Sea tactics have +never been more elaborate than they were in the last days of the galley +period which came to an end with the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, less +than a score of years before the defeat of the Armada in 1588. But the +substitution of sails for oars as the motive power of the warship and +the more general employment of the gun as the principal weapon of +offence necessarily entailed radical changes in the tactical methods +which had been slowly evolved during the galley period. At first all was +confusion and a sea-fight was reduced for a time to a very disorderly +and tumultuous affair. "We went down in no order," wrote an officer who +was present at Trafalgar, "but every man to take his bird." This is a +very inaccurate and even more unintelligent account of the tactics +pursued at Trafalgar; but it might very well stand for a picturesque +summary of the tactical confusion which prevailed at the period of the +Armada and for half a century afterwards. + +Gradually, however, order was again evolved out of the prevailing chaos. +But it was not the old order. It was a new order based on the +predominance of the gun and its disposition on board the ship. To go +down in no order and for each man to take his bird would mean that each +ship, whether large or small, would be free as far as circumstances +permitted to select an adversary not disproportioned in strength to +herself, so that there was no very pressing need for the fleet to +consist of homogeneous units, nor for the elimination of comparatively +small craft from a general engagement. But in the course of the Dutch +Wars the practice was slowly evolved of fighting in a compact or +close-hauled line, the ships being ranged in a line ahead--that is, each +succeeding ship following in the wake of her next ahead--in order to +give free play to the guns disposed mainly on the broadside, and being, +for purposes of mutual support, disposed as closely to each other as was +compatible with individual freedom of evolution and manoeuvre. This +disposition necessarily involved the exclusion from the line of battle +of all vessels below a certain average or standard of fighting strength, +since it was no longer possible for "every man to take his bird" and a +weak ship might find herself in conflict with an adversary of +overpowering strength in the enemy's line. Hence the main fighting +forces of naval belligerents came in time to be composed entirely of +"ships fit to lie in a line," as Torrington phrased it, of "capital +ships," as they were frequently called in former days, of "line of +battle ships" or "ships of the line," as afterwards they were more +commonly called, or of "battleships" as is nowadays the accepted +appellation. Other elements of naval force not "fit to lie in a line" +were also required, as I am about to show, and took different forms at +different times, but the root of the whole evolution lies in the +elimination of the non-capital ship from the main fighting line. In a +very instructive chapter of his _Naval Warfare_, Admiral Colomb has +traced the whole course of this gradual "Differentiation of Naval +Force." But for my purpose it suffices to cite the briefer exposition of +a French writer quoted by Admiral Mahan in his _Influence of Sea Power +upon History_:-- + +"With the increase of the power of the ship of war, and with the +perfecting of its sea and warlike qualities, there has come an equal +progress in the art of utilizing them.... As naval evolutions become +more skilful, their importance grows from day to day. To these +evolutions there is needed a base, a point from which they depart and to +which they return. A fleet of warships must always be ready to meet an +enemy; logically, therefore, this point of departure for naval +evolutions must be the order of battle. Now since the disappearance of +galleys, almost all the artillery is found upon the sides of a ship of +war. Hence it is the beam that must necessarily and always be turned +toward the enemy. On the other hand it is necessary that the sight of +the latter must never be interrupted by a friendly ship. Only one +formation allows the ships of the same fleet to satisfy fully these +conditions. That formation is the line ahead. The line, therefore, is +imposed as the only order of battle, and consequently as the basis of +all fleet tactics. In order that this line of battle, this long thin +line of guns, may not be injured or broken at some point weaker than the +rest, there is at the same time felt to be the necessity of putting in +it only ships which, if not of equal force, have at least equally strong +sides. Logically it follows, at the same moment in which the line ahead +became definitely the order for battle, there was established the +distinction between the 'ships of the line' alone destined for a place +therein, and the lighter ships meant for other uses." + +But the need for other and lighter ships "meant for other uses" and not +"fit to lie in a line," is equally demonstrable. The function of +battleships is to act in concert. They must therefore be concentrated in +fleets sufficiently strong to give a good account of the enemy's fleets +opposed to them. This does not necessarily mean that all the fleets of a +belligerent must be concentrated in a single position. But it does mean +that if disposed in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy they +must be so disposed and connected, that, moving on interior lines, they +can always bring a superior force to the point of contact with the +enemy. Subject to this paramount condition, that of being able to +concentrate more rapidly than the enemy can, dispersal of naval +force--not of units but of organized fighting fleets--is generally a +better disposition than extreme concentration. But it is a fatal error +in strategy so to disperse your fleets as to expose them to the risk of +being overpowered by the enemy in detail. + +The fleets of capital ships thus organized, and disposed as occasion may +require and sound strategy dictate, are not, however, by any means to be +regarded as autonomous and self-sufficing organisms. They are rather to +be regarded as the moving base of a much larger organization, much more +widely dispersed, consisting of lighter vessels not fit to lie in a +line, but specially adapted to discharge functions which capital ships +cannot as such discharge, yet which are indispensable either to the full +efficiency of the latter or to the maintenance of an effective command +of the sea. The first of these functions is the collection and rapid +transmission of intelligence as to the enemy's dispositions and +movements over as wide an area of the waters in dispute as is compatible +with communication rapid enough to allow of counter-movements being made +before it is too late. The development of wireless telegraphy has +largely extended this area, but it is not without limits in practice, +and those limits are already narrower than the extreme range of a single +transmission by wireless telegraphy. For example, a warship in the +Levant might, if the conditions were exceptionally favourable, +communicate by direct wireless with another warship in the Orkneys. But +the information thus transmitted would hardly be likely directly to +influence the movements and dispositions of the latter. If it did it +would probably not be through the immediate initiative of the Admiral +commanding in the North Sea, but through the supreme control of all the +naval forces of the belligerent affected, exercised through the General +Staff of the Navy at the seat of Government. It may here be remarked in +passing that the development of wireless telegraphy will probably be +found in war to strengthen this supreme control and to weaken to that +extent the independent and isolated initiative of individual +Commanders-in-Chief. But that is not necessarily a disadvantage, and +even so far as it is disadvantage at all it is more than balanced by the +immense corresponding advantage of keeping the War Staff at all times in +direct touch with every part of the field of naval operations, and +thereby making it the focus of all available information, and the +directing authority for all the larger strategy of the campaign. Except +in degree, moreover, there is nothing new in this. When Nelson was +returning across the Atlantic, after chasing Villeneuve out of the West +Indies, his only way of informing the Admiralty of the nature of the +situation was to send on Bettesworth in the brig "Curieux" with his +news. Nowadays a modern "Curieux" would be able to send on the news as +soon as she came within fifteen hundred or possibly two thousand miles +from the British Isles, and Nelson at the same distance might have +received his orders direct from the Admiralty. But the special point to +note is that as soon as Bettesworth's information was received at the +Admiralty, Barham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, instantly issued +orders which profoundly modified the dispositions of the fleets engaged +in blockading the French ports and led directly to Calder's action off +Finisterre, and in the sequel to the abandonment by Napoleon of all his +projects of invasion and the destruction of the allied fleets at +Trafalgar. There were giants in those days both afloat and ashore. But +the giants afloat did not resent the interference of the giants ashore, +and, as Mr Corbett has shown, the Trafalgar campaign was conducted with +consummate sagacity by Barham, who embodied in himself the War Staff of +the time. + +Such is the transcendent importance of intelligence, and of its +collection, transmission, collation, interpretation, and translation +into supreme executive orders. Its collection and transmission is mainly +the function of cruising ships disposed either individually or in small +groups for the purpose, and at such a distance from the main body of +battleships as is not incompatible with the movements of the latter +being controlled and directed, either by their immediate commanders, or +by the War Staff at the centre, according to the information received +from the outlying cruisers. Such cruising vessels may vary in size and +strength from the modern battle-cruiser, so heavily armed and armoured +as to be not incapable of taking a place, on occasion, in the line of +battle, down to the smallest torpedo craft which is endowed with +sufficient enduring mobility to enable her to keep the sea and to cruise +as near as may be to the enemy's ports. I have already indicated the +other collateral functions which will have to be discharged by torpedo +craft in case of a blockade and pointed out the vital distinction which +differentiates them from the small craft of the past in that in certain +circumstances they are capable of taking a formidable part in a fleet +action even as against the most powerful battleships. But we are here +considering them solely from the point of view of their cruising +functions, whether as guarding their own shores or watching those of the +enemy with a view to fighting on occasion and to observation at all +times. Their supports will be cruisers of larger size, disposed at +suitable distances in the rear, and themselves supported in like manner +by successive cordons or patrols of cruisers increasing in size and +power, until we come to the battle fleet as the concentrated nucleus of +the whole organization. This is merely an abstract or diagrammatic +exposition of such an organization, and it is of course liable to almost +infinite variation in the infinite variety of warlike operations at sea, +but it serves to exhibit the _rationale_ of the differentiation of naval +force into battleships, cruisers, and small craft. + +It has sometimes been argued that, inasmuch as the torpedo craft is, or +may be, in certain conditions, more than a match for even the biggest +battleship, battleships together with all intermediate ships between the +battleship and the torpedo vessel, are not unlikely to be some day +regarded as superfluous and in consequence to be discarded altogether +from the naval armament of even a first-class maritime Power. It is true +that the range and accuracy of the torpedo have latterly undergone an +immense development, so that a range of even ten thousand yards or five +sea-miles is no longer beyond its powers. It is true that the +development of the submarine vessel has vastly intensified the menace of +the torpedo and it may soon be true that the development of aircraft +will add a new and very formidable menace to the supremacy of the +battleship. But except for this last consideration, which is at present +exceedingly speculative, a little reflection will disclose the +underlying fallacy of arguments of this kind. The enduring mobility of +the torpedo craft is necessarily limited. It is incapable of that wide +range of action which is required of warships if they are to establish +and maintain any effective command of the sea. It is exceedingly +vulnerable to ships of a larger size, and of more ample enduring +mobility. These again will be vulnerable in their turn to ships of a +still larger size and thus the logic of the situation brings us back to +the battleship once more with its characteristic functions. It may +perhaps be urged that this chain of argument takes too little account of +the submarine vessel which is at present singularly invulnerable because +for the most part invisible to any vessels, whether big or little, which +operate only on the surface and even if discovered betimes by the +latter, is not very readily assailable by them. But of two things one. +Either the submarine vessel will remain small and therefore weak, and +lacking in enduring mobility, in which case it can never establish and +maintain an effective command of the sea. Or it will grow indefinitely +in size, in which case it will fall under the inexorable stress of the +logic which brings us back once more to the battleship. It may be that +the battleship of the still distant future will be a submersible +battleship. But many exceedingly complex problems of construction and +stability will have to be solved before that consummation is reached. + +Lastly, the specific function of the so-called battle-cruiser would seem +to need some further elucidation. At first sight this hybrid type of +vessel might seem to be an anomalous intrusion into the time-honoured +hierarchy of battleship, cruiser, and small craft, which the ripe +experience of many wars, battles, and campaigns had finally established +in the last golden days of the sailing ship period. It is indeed held by +some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a hybrid +and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can be +given. In face of these opinions I cannot presume to dogmatize on the +subject. But some not wholly irrelevant considerations may be advanced. +The battle-cruiser is, as its name implies, a vessel not only fitted by +the nature of its armour and armament "to lie in a line," whenever +occasion may require, but also exceedingly well qualified by its armour +and armament, and still more by its speed, to discharge many of the +functions of a cruiser either alone or in company with other cruisers. +In this latter capacity, it can overhaul nearly every merchant ship +afloat, it can scout far and wide, it can push home a vital +reconnaissance in cases where a weaker and slower cruiser would have to +run away if she could, it can serve as a rallying point to a squadron of +smaller cruisers engaged in the defence of this or that vital line of +communication, and alone or in company with a consort of the same type +it can hold the terminal and focal points of any such line against +almost any number of hostile cruisers inferior in defensive and +offensive powers to itself. Such are its powers and capacities when +acting as a cruiser proper. But it may be thought that in the stress of +conflict it will have very little opportunity of displaying these very +exceptional powers because an admiral in command of a fighting fleet +will never, when anticipating an engagement with the enemy, consent to +weaken his fighting line by detaching so powerful a unit for scouting or +other cruising purposes. That is as it may be. It will depend on many +circumstances of the moment not to be clearly anticipated or defined +beforehand; on the strength of the enemy's force, on the personality, +sagacity, and fortitude of the admiral--whether he is or is not a man of +the mettle and temper ascribed to Nelson by Admiral Mahan in a passage +already quoted--on the comparative need as determined by the +circumstances of the moment of scouting for information, of cruising +for the defence of trade, or of strengthening the battle line for a +decisive conflict to the uttermost extent of the nation's resources. It +is unbecoming to assume that in the crisis of his country's fate an +admiral will act either as a fool or as a poltroon. It is the country's +fault if a man capable of so acting is placed in supreme command, and +for that there is no remedy. But it is sounder to assume that the +admiral selected for command is a man not incapable of disposing his +force to the best advantage. "We must," said Lord Goschen, on one +occasion, "put our trust in Providence and a good admiral." If a nation +cannot find a good admiral in its need it is idle to trust in +Providence. + +It remains to consider the function of the battle-cruiser in the line of +battle. The lines of battle in former times were often composed of ships +of varying size and power. There was a legitimate prejudice against +ships of excessive size, although their superior power in action was +recognized--we have the unimpeachable testimony on that point of +Nelson's Hardy, a man of unrivalled fighting experience to whom Nelson +himself attributed "an intuitive right judgment"--because they were +unhandy in manoeuvre and slow in sailing as compared with ships of more +moderate dimensions. But except for difficulties of docking--a very +serious consideration from the financial point of view--hardly any +limit can be assigned to the size of the modern warship on these +particular grounds. Quite the contrary. Other things being equal, the +bigger the ship the higher the speed, and it is well known that ships of +the Dreadnought type are as handy to steer as a torpedo boat. For +tactical reasons, moreover, it is not expedient to lengthen the line of +battle unduly. Hence there is a manifest advantage in concentrating +offensive power, as far as may be, in single units. On the other hand, +the experience and practice of the eighteenth century showed +conclusively that there was also a distinct advantage in having in the +line of battle a certain number of ships which, being smaller than their +consorts, were more handy and faster sailing than the latter. The enemy +might not want to fight. Very often he did not, and by crowding all +possible sail he did his best to get away. In this case the only way to +bring him to action was for the pursuing admiral to order "a general +chase"--that is, to direct his ships, disregarding the precise line of +battle, to hurry on with all possible sail after the enemy so that the +fastest ships of the pursuing fleet might bring individually to action +the laggards of the retreating fleet and hold them until the main body +of the pursuing fleet came up. In this case the retreating admiral must +either return to the succour of his ships astern and thereby accept the +general action which he sought to avoid, or abandon his overtaken ships +to the enemy without attempting to rescue them. Hawke's action in +Quiberon Bay and Duncan's action off Camperdown are two of the most +memorable examples of this particular mode of attack, and their +brilliant results are a striking testimony to its efficacy. If ever in +the naval battles of the future it becomes expedient for an admiral to +order a general chase, it stands to reason that ships of the +battle-cruiser type will be invaluable for the purpose. Their speed will +enable them to hold the tail of the enemy's line, and their power will +enable them to crush it unless the retreating admiral who seeks to avoid +a decisive action turns back to succour such of his ships as are +assailed and thereby renders a decisive action inevitable. + +There is, moreover, another function to be assigned to the +battle-cruiser in a general action, and that is a function which was +defined once for all by Nelson himself in the immortal memorandum in +which he explained to his captains the mode of attack he proposed to +carry out at Trafalgar. "I have," wrote Nelson, "made up my mind to keep +the fleet in that position of sailing ... that the order of sailing is +to be the order of battle, placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen +ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight _of the fastest sailing +two-decked ships_ which will always make, if wanted, a line of +twenty-four sail, on whichever line the Commander-in-Chief may direct." +Owing to the lack of ships this disposition was not adopted on the day +of Trafalgar, but the principle involved is not affected by that +circumstance. That principle is that a squadron of the fastest sailing +ships in the fleet was to be detached from the two fighting lines +entrusted with the initial attack, and reserved or "refused" until the +development of the main attack had disclosed to the Commander-in-Chief +the point at which the impact of this "advanced squadron" would by +superior concentration on that point secure that the enemy should there +be decisively overpowered. The essence of the matter is that the ships +so employed should by virtue of their superior speed be endowed with a +tactical mobility sufficient to enable them to discharge the function +assigned to them. I need hardly insist on the close analogy which +subsists between Nelson's "advanced squadron" and a modern squadron of +battle-cruisers similarly employed, and although the conflict of modern +warships must needs differ in many essential respects from the conflicts +of sailing ships in Nelson's days, yet I think a clear and authoritative +exposition of one at least of the uses and functions of the +battle-cruiser in a fleet action may still be found in what I have +called elsewhere "the last tactical word of the greatest master of sea +tactics the world has ever known, the final and flawless disposition of +sailing ships marshalled for combat." + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY OF NAVAL FORCE + + +The measure of naval strength required by any State is determined mainly +by the naval strength of its possible adversaries in the event of war, +and only in a secondary degree by the volume of the maritime interests +which it has to defend. Paradoxical as the latter half of this +proposition may seem at first sight, it can easily be shown to be sound. +The maritime interests, territorial and commercial, of the British +Empire are beyond all comparison greater than those of any other State +in the world; but if no other State possessed a naval force strong +enough to assail them seriously, it is manifest that the naval force +required to defend them need be no greater than is sufficient to +overcome the assailant, and would not therefore be determined in any +degree by the volume of the interests to be defended. Each State +determines for itself the measure of naval strength which it judges to +be necessary to its security. No State expects to have to encounter the +whole world in arms or makes its provision in view of any such +chimerical contingency. The utmost that any State can do is to adjust +its naval policy to a rational estimate of all the reasonably probable +contingencies of international conflict, due regard being had to the +extent of its financial resources and to such other requirements of +national defence as circumstances impose on it. Germany, for example, +has proclaimed to all the world in the preamble to the Navy Law of 1900 +that-- + +"In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing +conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a +battle fleet of such strength that even for the most powerful naval +adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own +supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that +the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval +Power, for, as a rule, a great naval Power will not be in a position to +concentrate all its forces against us." + +I am not concerned in any way with the political aspects of this +memorable declaration. But its bearing on the naval policy of the +British Empire is manifest and direct. England is beyond all question +"the greatest naval Power" in the world. The declaration of Germany thus +lays upon England the indefeasible obligation of taking care that by no +efforts of any other Power shall her "own supremacy"--that is her +capacity to secure and maintain the command of the sea in all reasonably +probable contingencies of international conflict--be rendered doubtful. +There is no State in the world on which decisive defeat at sea would +inflict such irretrievable disaster as it would on England and her +Empire. These islands would be open to invasion--and if to invasion to +conquest and subjugation--the commerce of the whole Empire would be +annihilated, and the Empire itself would be dismembered. I need not +attempt to determine what measure of naval strength is required to avert +this unspeakable calamity. It suffices to say that whatever the measure +may be it must be provided and maintained at all hazards. That is merely +the axiomatic expression of the things that belong to our peace. + +It will be observed that the German declaration assumes that "a great +naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its +forces against" a single adversary. This raises at once the question of +the distribution of naval force, or of what has been called the peace +strategy of position. I shall endeavour to discuss the problem with as +little reference as may be to an actual state of war between any two +individual and specific naval Powers. I shall merely assume that of two +possible belligerents one is so far stronger than the other as to look +with confidence to being able in the event of war to secure and maintain +its own command of the sea; and in order not to complicate the problem +unduly I shall include in the term "belligerent" not merely a single +Power but an alliance of one or more separate Powers, while still +adhering to the assumption that the relative strength of the two +belligerents is as defined above. If England is one of the Powers +affected it is manifest from what has already been said that this +assumption is a legitimate one. + +In such a situation it stands to reason that the concentration of the +whole force of the stronger belligerent against the whole force equally +concentrated of the weaker belligerent would not be necessary and would +very rarely be expedient. The stronger belligerent would of course seek, +in time of war, so to dispose his forces as to make it impossible for +the weaker fleets of his adversary to take the sea without being brought +to a decisive action, and he would so order his peace strategy of +position as to further that paramount purpose. But it does not follow +that being superior in the measure above defined he would need to +concentrate all his available forces for that purpose. He would +concentrate so much of his forces as would ensure victory in the +encounters anticipated--so far as mere numbers apart from fighting +efficiency can ensure victory--and the residue would be available for +other and subsidiary purposes. If there were no residue, then the +required superiority would not have been attained, and the belligerent +who has neglected to attain it must take the consequences. One of these +consequences would certainly be that the other and subsidiary purposes +above mentioned would have to be neglected until the main issue was +decided, and if these purposes were of any moment he would have so far +to pay the penalty of his neglect. Nothing is more fatal in warfare than +to attempt to be equally strong everywhere. If you cannot do everything +you desire at once you must concentrate all your energies on doing the +most important and the most vital things first. When the tree is cut +down the branches will fall of themselves. The history of the War of +American Independence is full of illustrations of the neglect of this +paramount principle. England was worsted much more by faulty +distribution than by insufficiency of force. + +At the same time it must be observed that the outlying and subsidiary +purposes of the conflict cannot be of vital moment so long as the +superior belligerent is at firm grips with the central forces of his +adversary. We are dealing with the assumption that of two belligerents +one is so far superior to the other that he may entertain a reasonable +confidence of being able to deny the command of the sea to his adversary +and in the end to secure it for himself. It is an essential part of this +assumption that the forces of the superior belligerent will be so +disposed as to make it exceedingly difficult and, subject to the fortune +of war, practically impossible for any considerable portion of the +enemy's forces to act on a vigorous offensive without being speedily +brought to book by a superior force of his adversary, and that the peace +strategy of the latter will have been ordered to that end. So long as +this is the case the virtual command of the sea will be in the hands of +the superior belligerent, even though his forces may be so concentrated, +in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy, as to leave many +regions of the sea apparently unguarded. They are adequately guarded by +the fact that the enemy is _ex hypothesi_ unable to reach them--or if by +a successful evasion of his adversary's guard he manages to send a +detachment, large or small, to aim at some outlying objective, the +initial superiority of force possessed by his adversary will always +enable the latter to send a superior force in pursuit of the fugitive. +Much harm may be done before the fugitive is brought to book, but no +State, however strong, need ever expect to go to war without running +risks and suffering occasional and partial reverses. + +It is thus a pure delusion to assume, as loose thinkers on the subject +too often assume, that the command of the sea must be either surrendered +or imperilled by a superior belligerent who, apparently neglecting +those regions of the sea which are not immediately assailed or +threatened, concentrates his forces in the positions best calculated to +enable him to get the better of his adversary, or who in time of peace +so orders his strategy of position as to secure that advantage at once +should war unhappily break out. Not long ago the Leader of the +Opposition in the House of Commons used the following words:--"Ten years +ago we not only had the command of the sea, but we had the command of +every sea. We have the command of no sea in the world except the North +Sea at this moment." Those who have followed and assimilated the +exposition of the true meaning of the command of the sea given in these +pages will readily discern how mischievous a travesty of that meaning is +contained in these words. There is, as I have shown, no such thing as a +command of the sea in time of peace. The phrase is merely a definition +of the paramount objective of naval warfare as such. Ten years ago we +had no command of any sea because we were not at war with any naval +Power. The concentration of a large portion of our naval forces in the +North Sea is no surrender of our command of the sea in any part of the +world, because that command does not exist, never has existed in time of +peace, and never can exist even in time of war until we have fought for +it and secured it. The concentration in question is, together with the +simultaneous disposition of the residue of our naval forces in different +parts of the world, merely the expression of that peace strategy of +position which, in the judgment of those who are responsible for it, is +best calculated in the more probable, yet possibly quite remote, +contingencies of international conflict, to enable our fleets to get the +better of our enemies and thereby ultimately to secure the command of +the sea in any and every part of the world in which we have maritime +interests to defend. There are, it is true, some disadvantages involved +in a close and sustained concentration of naval forces, especially in +home waters. Naval officers lose in breadth and variety of experience +and in the self-reliance which comes of independent command, while the +prestige of the flag is in some measure diminished by the infrequency of +its appearance in distant seas. But these, after all, are subsidiary +considerations which must be subordinated to the paramount needs of a +sound strategy, whether offensive or defensive. + +It follows from the foregoing exposition of the principles which govern +the strategic distribution of naval force in peace and war that a great +naval Power must often maintain fleets of considerable strength in +distant seas. England has for many generations maintained such a fleet +in the Mediterranean, and it is hard to see how any reasonably probable +change in the international situation could absolve her from that +obligation. There are other and more distant stations on which she has +maintained and still does maintain squadrons in a strength which has +varied greatly from time to time in accordance with the changing phases +of international relations and of strategic requirements as affected +thereby. The measure of these requirements is determined from time to +time by the known strength of the hostile forces which would have to be +encountered in any reasonably probable contingencies of international +conflict. But there is one antecedent requirement which is common to all +considerable detachments of naval force in distant waters. In order to +maintain their efficiency and mobility they must have a naval base +conveniently situated within the limits of their station to which they +may resort from time to time for repair, refit, and supply. The need for +supply at the base is less paramount than that for refit and repair, +because it is manifest that the control of maritime communications which +has enabled the requisite stores to reach the base will also enable them +to reach the ships themselves, wherever they may be at the moment. But +for all refit and repair which cannot be effected by the ships' +companies themselves, with the aid of an attached repair ship, the +ships must go to the base, and that base must be furnished with docks +capable of receiving them. + +It is essential to note that the base is there for the sake of the +ships. The ships are not there for the sake of the base. It is a fatal +inversion of all sound principles of naval strategy to suppose that the +ships owe, or can afford, to the base any other form of defence than +that which is inherent in their paramount and primary task of +controlling the maritime communications which lead to it. So long as +they can do this the base will be exposed only to such attacks as can be +delivered by a force which has evaded but not defeated the naval guard, +and to this extent the base must be fortified and garrisoned; for, of +course, if the naval guard has been decisively defeated, the control of +maritime communications has passed into the hands of the enemy, and +nothing but the advance of a relieving naval force, too strong for the +enemy to resist, can prevent the base being invested from the sea and +ultimately reduced. It will be seen from this how absurd it is ever to +speak of a naval base as commanding the adjacent seas. As such it does +not command, and never can command, any portion of the sea which lies +beyond the range of its own guns. All that it ever does or can do is, by +its resources for repair, refit, and supply, to enable the fleet based +upon it constantly to renew its efficiency and mobility, and thereby to +discharge its appointed task of controlling the maritime communications +entrusted to its keeping. But such command is in all cases exercised by +the fleet and not by the base. If the fleet is not there or not equal to +its task, the mere possession of the base is nearly always a source of +weakness and not of strength to the naval Power which holds it. + +It is held by some that the occupation of naval bases in distant seas by +a Power which is not strong enough to make sure of controlling the +maritime communications which alone give to such bases their strategic +value and importance is a great advantage to such a Power and a +corresponding disadvantage to all its possible adversaries in war. It +will readily be seen from what has been said that this is in large +measure a delusion. As against a weaker adversary than itself the +occupation of such bases may be an appreciable advantage to the Power +which holds them, but only if the adversary in question has in the +waters affected interests which are too important to be sacrificed +without a struggle. On the other hand, as against an adversary strong +enough to secure the command of the sea and determined to hold it at all +hazards, the occupation of such distant bases can very rarely be of any +advantage to the weaker belligerent and may very often expose him to +reverses which, if not positively disastrous, must always be +exceedingly mortifying. Of two things one. Either the belligerent in +such a plight must detach a naval force sufficient to cover the outlying +base, and thus, by dispersing naval forces which he desired to keep +concentrated, he must expose his detachment to destruction by a stronger +force of the enemy, or he must leave the base to its fate, in which case +it is certain to fall in the long run. In point of fact the occupation +of distant bases by any naval Power is merely the giving of hostages to +any and every other Power which in the day of conflict can establish its +command of the sea. That is the plain philosophy of the whole question. + +It only remains to consider very briefly the question of the supply of +fleets operating in distant waters. In a very interesting and suggestive +paper on the "Supply and Communications of a Fleet," Admiral Sir Cyprian +Bridge has pointed out that "in time of peace as well as in time of war +there is a continuous consumption of the articles of various kinds used +on board ship, viz., naval stores, ordnance stores, engineers' stores, +victualling stores, coal, water, etc." Of these the consumption of +victualling stores is alone constant, being determined by the number of +men to be victualled from day to day. The consumption of nearly all the +other stores will vary greatly according as the ship is more or less at +sea, and it is safe to say that for a given number of ships the +consumption will be much greater in time of war, especially in coal, +engineers' stores, and ordnance stores, than it is in time of peace. But +in peace conditions Admiral Bridge estimated that for a fleet consisting +of four battleships, four large cruisers, four second-class cruisers, +thirteen smaller vessels of various kinds, and three torpedo craft, +together with their auxiliaries, the _minimum_ requirements for six +months--assuming that the ships started with full supplies, and that +they returned to their principal base at the end of the period--would be +about 6750 tons of stores and ammunition, and 46,000 tons of coal, +without including fresh water. The requirements of water would not be +less than 30,000 tons in the six months, and of this the ships could +distil about half without greatly increasing their coal consumption; the +remainder, some 15,000 or 16,000 tons, would have to be brought to them. +In time of war the requirements of coal would probably be nearly three +times as great as in time of peace, and the requirements of +ammunition--estimated in time of peace at 1140 tons--might easily be ten +times as great. Thus in addition to the foregoing figures we have 16,000 +tons of water, and in war time a further _minimum_ addition of some +90,000 tons of coal and 10,260 tons of ammunition, making in all a round +total of 170,000 tons for a fleet of the size specified, which was +approximately the strength of the China Fleet, under the command of +Admiral Bridge, at the time when his paper was written. + +All these supplies have to be delivered or obtained periodically and at +convenient intervals in the course of every six months. They are +supplies which the ships must obtain as often as they want them without +necessarily going back to their principal base for the purpose, and even +the principal base must obtain them periodically from the home sources +of supply. There are two alternative ways of maintaining this continuous +stream of supply. One is that in advance of the principal base, what is +called a secondary base should be established from which the ships can +obtain the stores required, a continuous stream of transports bringing +the stores required to the secondary base from sources farther afield, +either from the principal base or from the home sources of supply. The +other method is to have no secondary base--which, since it contains +indispensable stores, must be furnished with some measure of local +defence, and which, as a place of storage, may turn out to be in quite +the wrong place for the particular operations in hand--but to seize and +occupy a "flying base," neither permanent nor designated beforehand, but +selected for the occasion according to the exigencies of the strategic +situation, and capable of being shifted at will in response to any +change in those exigencies. History shows that the latter method has +been something like the normal procedure in war alike in times past and +in the present day. The alternative method is perhaps rather adapted to +the convenience of peace conditions than to the exigencies of war +requirements. During his watch on Toulon Nelson established a flying +base at Maddalena Bay, in Sardinia, and very rarely used the more +distant permanent base at Gibraltar. Togo, as I have stated in an +earlier chapter, established a flying base first at the Elliot Islands +and afterwards at Dalny, during the war in the Far East. Instances might +easily be multiplied to show in which direction the experience of war +points, and how far that direction has been deflected by the possibly +deceptive teaching of peace. I shall not, however, presume to pronounce +_ex cathedra_ between two alternative methods each of which is +sanctioned by high naval authority. I will only remark in conclusion +that though the establishment of permanent secondary bases may, in +certain exceptional cases, be defensible and even expedient, yet their +multiplication, beyond such exceptional cases of proved and acknowledged +expediency, is very greatly to be deprecated. The old rule +applies--_Entia non sunt praeter necessitatem multiplicanda._ + + * * * * * + +My task is now finished--I will not say completed, for the subject of +naval warfare is far too vast to be exhausted within the narrow compass +of a Manual. I should hardly exaggerate if I said that nearly every +paragraph I have written might be expanded into a chapter, and every +chapter into a volume, and that even so the subject would not be +exhausted. All I have endeavoured to do is to expound briefly and in +simple language the nature of naval warfare, its inherent limitations as +an agency for subduing an enemy's will, the fundamental principles which +underlie its methods, and the concrete problems which the application of +those methods presents. Tactical questions I have not touched at all; +strategic questions only incidentally, and so far as they were +implicated in the discussion of methods. Political issues and questions +of international policy I have eschewed as far as might be, and so far +as it was necessary to deal with them I have endeavoured to do so in +broad and abstract terms. Of the many shortcomings in my handling of the +subject no one can be more conscious than I am myself. Yet I must +anticipate one criticism which is not unlikely to be made, and that is +that I have repeated and insisted on certain phrases and ideas such as +"command of the sea," "control of maritime communications," "the fleet +in being," "blockade," and the like, until they might almost be +regarded as an obsession. Rightly or wrongly that has, at any rate, been +done of deliberate intent. The phrases in question are in all men's +mouths. The ideas they stand for are constantly misunderstood, +misinterpreted, and misapplied. I hold that, rightly understood, they +embody the whole philosophy of naval warfare. I have therefore lost no +opportunity of insisting on them, knowing full well that it is only by +frequent iteration that sound ideas can be implanted in minds not +attuned to their reception. + + + + +INDEX + + +Aircraft, 121 + +Alabama, the, 109 + +Alexander, his conquest of Darius, 48 + +Allemand, his escape from Rochefort, 66, 67 + +Amiens, Peace of, 73 + +_Animus pugnandi_, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 58, 59, 61, 78 + +Antony, Mark, 72 + +Armada, the, 79, 112 + + +Bacon, quoted, 6 + +Baraille, De, his part in the Dunkirk campaign, 87, 88 + +Barham, Lord, 18, 64; + and Nelson, 66, 67; + his conduct of the Trafalgar campaign, 118 + +Base, flying, 142; + naval, 137 + +Battle-cruiser, its functions, 122-128 + +Beachy Head, Battle of, 32, 35; + campaign of, 70, 78 + +Berlin Decrees, 100 + +Bettesworth, 118 + +Blockade, 17; + a form of disputed command, 20-29; + military, its methods, 23; + military and commercial, 21 + +Bolt from the blue, 80, 89 + +Boscawen, at Lagos, 79 + +Brest, 33, 35; + blockaded by Cornwallis, 30; + blockaded by Hawke, 79; + De Roquefeuil at, 81, 82 + +Bridge, Admiral Sir Cyprian, on a fleet in being, 31; + on supply and communications of a fleet, 140; + his estimate of Torrington, 32, 40; + on Torrington's trial, 42 + +Brundusium, Caesar at, 72 + + +Cadiz, Killigrew at, 34 + +Caesar, his Pharsalian campaign, 71, 72 + +Calais, the Armada at, 79 + +Calder, his action off Finisterre, 118; + Barham's instructions to, 64 + +Camperdown, Duncan at, 126 + +Cape St Vincent, meeting of Nelson with Craig and Knight off, 65 + +Capital ships, 113 + +Carthagena, Spanish ships at, 66 + +Charles, Prince, 82 + +Chateau-Renault, 33, 35 + +Clausewitz, his definition of war, 4; + on limited and unlimited war, 5, 22 + +Colomb, Admiral, on differentiation of naval force, 114; + on Torrington's strategy, 40, 43, 79 + +Command of the sea, 6, 10, 11-19, 20, 21, 50, 52, 54, 71, 94, 98, 121, +133, 134, 135; + its true meaning, 15, 135; + no meaning except in war, 15, 135 + +Command of the sea, disputed, in general, 49-67 + +Commerce, maritime, extent of British, 53; + in war, 93-110; + its modern conditions, 101-110 + +Concentration of naval force, its conditions, 132 + +Conflans, at Brest, 79 + +Corbett, Mr Julian, 62, 67; + on the Dunkirk campaign, 89; + on commerce in war, 105; + on Craig's expedition, 61, 66; + on projects of invasion, 77; + on the Trafalgar campaign, 118 + +Cornwallis, and the blockade of Brest, 18, 30 + +Craft, small, 57, 76 + +Craig, his expedition to the Mediterranean, 61-67 + +Cuba, its deliverance by the United States, 54 + + +Dalny, Togo at, 26, 143 + +Dettingen, 80 + +Downs, the, Norris ordered to, 85 + +Duncan, at Camperdown, 126 + +Dungeness, Roquefeuil anchors at, 87; + Norris at, 88; + Norris and Roquefeuil at, 89 + +Dunkirk, troops collected at, 81; + embargo at, 83; + Saxe and Baraille at, 88 + + +Egypt, Napoleon's descent on, 73 + +Elliott Islands, Togo at, 26, 143 + +Embargo, at Dunkirk, 83 + + +Farragut, 7 + +Fleets, and base, their true relation, 138 + +Fleet in being, phrase first used by Torrington, 42; + defined, 45, 58; + a form of disputed command, 30-48 + +Fleets, supply of, 140 + +Food Supply, Royal Commission on, 99 + +Fortress fleet, 48, 58; + Admiral Mahan on, 47, 55 + + +Ganteaume, at Brest, 31 + +General chase, 125 + +General Staff, the, 117 + +Germany, Navy Law of 1900, 130 + +Goschen, Lord, quoted, 124 + +Gravelines, 79, 87 + +Gunfleet, the, 37, 40, 44 + + +Hague Conference, 102 + +Hannay, Mr David, 100 + +Hannibal, his passage of the Alps, 61 + +Hardy, Nelson's, on big ships, 124 + +Hawke, 32; + blockades Brest 79; + at Quiberon Bay, 126 + +Hornby, Sir Geoffrey, on the command of the sea, 45 + + +Invasion, 51, 68-92; + dilemma of, 70 + +Invasion over sea, three ways of, 75 + + +James II., 32 + +Justin of Nassau, and the Armada, 79 + + +Killigrew, Vice-Admiral, 34, 37, 39, 40, 44, 78; + his expedition to Cadiz, 34; + his return to Plymouth, 35. + +Knight, Rear-Admiral, escorts Craig, 65 + + +Lagos, Boscawen and De La Clue at, 79 + +Lepanto, Battle of, 112 + +Line of battle, the, 113 + +Lisbon, Craig and Knight at, 65 + +Lissa, Battle of, 8 + +Louis XIV., 33 + + +Maddalena Bay, Nelson's base at, 143 + +Mahan, Admiral, on commerce at sea, 98, 99; + on a fleet in being, 31, 43; + on a fortress fleet, 47, 55; + on Hannibal's passage of the Alps, 61; + on Nelson, 48, 123; + on territorial expansion, 52 + +Maida, Battle of, 66 + +Makaroff, Admiral, 47, 59 + +Manchuria, 59; Japanese successes in, 55 + +Maria Theresa, 80 + +Mary, Queen, her orders to Torrington, 40, 44 + +Mathews, his action off Toulon, 80; + in the Mediterranean, 83, 84 + +Medina Sidonia, and the Armada, 79 + +Mediterranean, the, England's position in, 136, 137 + +Merchant vessels, conversion of into warships at sea, 101-104 + +Morbihan, the, troops collected in, 79 + + +Napoleon, 30, 31; and the campaign of Trafalgar, 18, 19; + his descent on Egypt, 61, 73; + his ignorance of the sea, 74 + +Naval force, differentiation of, 111-128; + distribution and supply of, 129-145 + +Naval strength, measure of, 129 + +Naval warfare, defined, 1; + special characteristic of, 56; + its limitations, 51; + philosophy of, 145; + its primary aim, 14 + +Nelson, 18, 32, 46, 123; + his advanced squadron, 127; + and Barham, 66, 67; + his base at Maddalena Bay, 143; + on the blockade of Toulon, 22; + on Craig's expedition, 64; + evaded by Napoleon, 73; + evaded by Villeneuve, 63; + at Trafalgar, 60; + his Trafalgar Memorandum, 126; + his pursuit of Villeneuve, 37, 38 + +Newcastle, Duke of, 83 + +Nile, Battle of the, 74 + +Norman Conquest, the, 68, 75 + +Norris, Sir John, 83; + in the Downs, 87; + leaves the Downs, 88; + and Roquefeuil at Dungeness, 89; + at St Helen's, 85, 86 + +North Sea, concentration in, 135 + + +Orde, Sir John, raises the blockade of Cadiz, 65 + +Orders in Council, the British, 100 + + +Parma, Duke of, and the Armada, 79 + +Peace strategy of position, 131, 132, 136 + +Philippines, the, acquired by the United States, 52 + +Pitt, 61, 62, 63, 67 + +Plymouth, Killigrew at, 35 + +Pompey, at Pharsalus, 71, 72 + +Port Arthur, 27; + how blockaded by Togo, 26, 143; + its capture by Japan, 54, 55; + first Japanese attack on, 46; + Russian fleet at, 47, 58 + +Pretender, the, 80 + +Privateering, 99, 101 + +Property, private, at sea, 95-97 + +Puerto Rico, acquired by the United States, 52 + + +Quiberon Bay, Battle of, 79, 126 + + +Rochefort, Allemand escapes from, 66, 67 + +Roquefeuil, De, at Brest, 81, 82; + anchors at Dungeness, 87; + puts to sea, 82; + and Norris at Dungeness, 89; + off the Start, 84, 86 + +Rozhdestvensky, at Tsu-Shima, 60 + + +Sampson, Admiral, 46 + +Santiago, 46; + its capture by the United States, 54 + +Saxe, Marshal, at Dunkirk, 81; + with Baraille at Dunkirk, 88 + +Sea, its characteristics, 13 + +Sea power, 6, 10, 13, 52, 55 + +Sea transport, 14 + +Sebastopol, siege of, 6, 46 + +Shovel, Sir Cloudesley, 33, 35, 39, 40, 44, 78 + +Sovereignty of the Seas, 49, 50 + +St Helen's, Norris at, 85, 86 + +Start, the, De Roquefeuil off, 84, 86 + +Submarine, the, 24, 120, 121 + +Supply, of fleets, two alternative methods of, 142 + +Syracuse, Athenian expedition to, 61 + + +Talavera, Battle of, 73 + +Teignmouth, French raid on, 42 + +Telegraphy, wireless, 26, 117 + +Togo, Admiral, 59; + his method of blockading Port Arthur, 26, 143 + +Torbay, Tourville's projected descent on, 33 + +Torpedo craft, 24, 57, 69, 120 + +Torpedo, the locomotive, 24 + +Torrington, Arthur Herbert, Earl of, 34, 35, 36, 47, 78; + anchors at Beachy Head, 41; + Admiral Bridge on, 32, 40, 42; + Colomb on, 43; + on a fleet in being, 32, 42; + ordered to give battle, 44; + his strategy, 38, 39; + tried by Court Martial, 42; + warns Mary and her Council, 40 + +Toulon, Chateau-Renault at, 33 + +Tourville, 33, 34, 43, 44, 48, 70, 78; + at Brest, 35; + in the Channel, 36 + +Trade routes, 104 + +Trafalgar, 63; + campaign of, 90, 91; + and Craig's expedition, 61; + its significance, 19 + +Tsu-Shima, Battle of, its effects, 54, 55 + + +Utrecht, Treaty of, 82 + + +Villeneuve, pursued by Nelson, 37; + driven out of the West Indies, 38; + leaves Toulon, 63 + + +War, defined, 1; + its origin, 2; + its primary object, 4; + of American Independence, 99, 133; + Boer, 8, 56, 94; + civil, 1, 2; + Crimean, 6; + Cuban, 9, 46; + in the Far East, 9; + of 1859, 7; + of 1866, 7; + of 1870, 8, 54; + of Secession in America, 2, 7; + the Seven Years', 79 + +Wars, the Dutch, 93, 113 + +War Staff, 118, 119 + +Wellington, 73; + his Peninsular Campaigns, 19 + +William the Conqueror, 68 + +William III., 32 + +Wolseley, Lord, on communications, 73 + + + + +PRINTED BY + +TURNBULL AND SPEARS, + +EDINBURGH + + + + +THE + +CAMBRIDGE MANUALS + +OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE + + Published by the Cambridge University Press under the general + editorship of P. Giles, Litt.D., Master of Emmanuel College, and A.C. + Seward, F.R.S., Professor of Botany in the University of Cambridge. + + A series of handy volumes dealing with a wide range of subjects and + bringing the results of modern research and intellectual activity + within the reach both of the student and of the ordinary reader. + +80 VOLUMES NOW READY + + +HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY + +42 Ancient Assyria. By Rev. C.H.W. Johns, Litt.D. + +51 Ancient Babylonia. By Rev. C.H.W. Johns, Litt.D. + +40 A History of Civilization in Palestine. By Prof. R.A.S. Macalister, +M.A., F.S.A. + +78 The Peoples of India. By J.D. Anderson, M.A. + +49 China and the Manchus. By Prof. H.A. Giles, LL.D. + +79 The Evolution of Modern Japan. By J.H. Longford. + +43 The Civilization of Ancient Mexico. By Lewis Spence. + +60 The Vikings. By Prof. Allen Mawer, M.A. + +24 New Zealand. By the Hon. Sir Robert Stout, K.C.M.G., LL.D., and +J. Logan Stout, LL.B. (N.Z.). + +76 Naval Warfare. By J.R. Thursfield, M.A. + +15 The Ground Plan of the English Parish Church. By A. Hamilton Thompson, +M.A., F.S.A. + +16 The Historical Growth of the English Parish Church. By A. Hamilton +Thompson, M.A., F.S.A. + +68 English Monasteries. By A.H. Thompson, M.A., F.S.A. + +50 Brasses. By J.S.M. Ward, B.A., F.R.Hist.S. + +59 Ancient Stained and Painted Glass. By F.S. Eden. + +80 A Grammar of Heraldry. By W.H. St J. Hope, Litt.D. + + +ECONOMICS + +70 Copartnership in Industry. By C.R. Fay, M.A. + +6 Cash and Credit. By D.A. Barker. + +67 The Theory of Money. By D.A. Barker. + + +LITERARY HISTORY + +8 The Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews. By the Rev. E.G. King, +D.D. + +21 The Early Religious Poetry of Persia. By the Rev. Prof. J. Hope +Moulton, D.D., D.Theol. (Berlin). + +9 The History of the English Bible. By John Brown, D.D. + +12 English Dialects from the Eighth Century to the Present Day. By +W.W. Skeat, Litt.D., D.C.L., F.B.A. + +22 King Arthur in History and Legend. By Prof. W. Lewis Jones, M.A. + +54 The Icelandic Sagas. By W.A. Craigie, LL.D. + +23 Greek Tragedy. By J.T. Sheppard, M.A. + +33 The Ballad in Literature. By T.F. Henderson. + +37 Goethe and the Twentieth Century. By Prof. J.G. Robertson, M.A., +Ph.D. + +39 The Troubadours. By the Rev. H.J. Chaytor, M.A. + +66 Mysticism in English Literature. By Miss C.F.E. Spurgeon. + + +PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION + +4 The Idea of God in Early Religions. By Dr F.B. Jevons. + +57 Comparative Religion. By Dr F.B. Jevons. + +69 Plato: Moral and Political Ideals. By Mrs J. Adam. + +26 The Moral Life and Moral Worth. By Prof. Sorley, Litt.D. + +3 The English Puritans. By John Brown, D.D. + +11 An Historical Account of the Rise and Development of +Presbyterianism in Scotland. By the Rt Hon. the Lord Balfour of +Burleigh, K.T., G.C.M.G. + +41 Methodism. By Rev. H.B. Workman, D.Lit. + + +EDUCATION + +38 Life in the Medieval University. By R.S. Rait, M.A. + + +LAW + +13 The Administration of Justice in Criminal Matters (in England and +Wales). By G. Glover Alexander, M.A., LL.M. + + +BIOLOGY + +1 The Coming of Evolution. By Prof. J.W. Judd, C.B., F.R.S. + +2 Heredity in the Light of Recent Research. By L. Doncaster, M.A. + +25 Primitive Animals. By Geoffrey Smith, M.A. + +73 The Life-story of Insects. By Prof. G.H. Carpenter. + +48 The Individual in the Animal Kingdom. By J.S. Huxley, B.A. + +27 Life in the Sea. By James Johnstone, B.Sc. + +75 Pearls. By Prof. W.J. Dakin. + +28 The Migration of Birds. By T.A. Coward. + +36 Spiders. By C. Warburton, M.A. + +61 Bees and Wasps. By O.H. Latter, M.A. + +46 House Flies. By C.G. Hewitt, D.Sc. + +32 Earthworms and their Allies. By F.E. Beddard, F.R.S. + +74 The Flea. By H. Russell. + +64 The Wanderings of Animals. By H.F. Gadow, F.R.S. + + +ANTHROPOLOGY + +20 The Wanderings of Peoples. By Dr A.C. Haddon, F.R.S. + +29 Prehistoric Man. By Dr W.L.H. Duckworth. + + +GEOLOGY + +35 Rocks and their Origins. By Prof. Grenville A.J. Cole. + +44 The Work of Rain and Rivers. By T.G. Bonney, Sc.D. + +7 The Natural History of Coal. By Dr E.A. Newell Arber. + +30 The Natural History of Clay. By Alfred B. Searle. + +34 The Origin of Earthquakes. By C. Davison, Sc.D., F.G.S. + +62 Submerged Forests. By Clement Reid, F.R.S. + +72 The Fertility of the Soil. By E.J. Russell, D.Sc. + + +BOTANY + +5 Plant-Animals: a Study in Symbiosis. By Prof. F.W. Keeble. + +10 Plant-Life on Land. By Prof. F.O. Bower, Sc.D., F.R.S. + +19 Links with the Past in the Plant-World. By Prof. A.C. Seward, +F.R.S. + + +PHYSICS + +52 The Earth. By Prof. J.H. Poynting, F.R.S. + +53 The Atmosphere. By A.J. Berry, M.A. + +65 Beyond the Atom. By John Cox, M.A. + +55 The Physical Basis of Music. By A. Wood, M.A. + +71 Natural Sources of Energy. By Prof. A.H. Gibson, D.Sc. + + +PSYCHOLOGY + +14 An Introduction to Experimental Psychology. By Dr. C.S. Myers. + +45 The Psychology of Insanity. By Bernard Hart, M.D. + +77 The Beautiful. By Vernon Lee. + + +INDUSTRIAL AND MECHANICAL SCIENCE + +31 The Modern Locomotive. By C. Edgar Allen, A.M.I.Mech.E. + +56 The Modern Warship. By E.L. Attwood. + +17 Aerial Locomotion. By E.H. Harper, M.A., and Allan E. Ferguson, +B.Sc. + +18 Electricity in Locomotion. By A.G. Whyte, B.Sc. + +63 Wireless Telegraphy. By Prof. C.L. Fortescue, M.A. + +58 The Story of a Loaf of Bread. By Prof. T.B. Wood, M.A. + +47 Brewing. By A. Chaston Chapman, F.I.C. + + * * * * * + + "A very valuable series of books which combine in a very happy way a + popular presentation of scientific truth along with the accuracy of + treatment which in such subjects is essential.... In their general + appearance, and in the quality of their binding, print, and paper, + these volumes are perhaps the most satisfactory of all those which + offer to the inquiring layman the hardly earned products of technical + and specialist research."--_Spectator_ + + "A complete set of these manuals is as essential to the equipment of + a good school as is an encyclopaedia.... We can conceive no better + series of handy books for ready reference than those represented by + the Cambridge Manuals."--_School World_ + + Cambridge University Press + C.F. Clay, Manager + LONDON: Fetter Lane, E.C. + EDINBURGH: 100 Princes Street + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Naval Warfare, by James R. Thursfield + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAVAL WARFARE *** + +***** This file should be named 33445.txt or 33445.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/3/4/4/33445/ + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Graeme Mackreth and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/33445.zip b/33445.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..fada3d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/33445.zip diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6579dd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #33445 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/33445) |
