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+ The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Future of International Law, by L. Oppenheim
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+
+Project Gutenberg's The Future of International Law, by Lassa Oppenheim
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Future of International Law
+
+Author: Lassa Oppenheim
+
+Release Date: July 31, 2010 [EBook #33302]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by allisonamy and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
+
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+
+
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+
+</pre>
+
+<p class="center"><a class="pagenum_invisible" name="Page_i" id="Page_i" href="#Page_i" title="[Pg i]"></a>
+
+
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+Pamphlet Series of the<br />
+<big>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</big><br />
+<small>DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW</small><br />
+No. 39</p>
+<p><a class="pagenum_invisible" name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii" href="#Page_ii" title="[Pg ii]"></a><br />
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br /></p>
+
+<p><a class="pagenum_invisible" name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii" href="#Page_iii" title="[Pg iii]"></a></p>
+<h1>THE FUTURE OF
+INTERNATIONAL LAW</h1>
+
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap"><big>By L. OPPENHEIM, LL.D.</big></span><br />
+<br />
+<small>MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW<br />
+WHEWELL PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND<br />
+HON. MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN MADRID</small></p>
+
+<p><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br /></p>
+
+<p class="center">OXFORD: AT THE CLARENDON PRESS<br />
+London, Edinburgh, New York, Toronto, Melbourne and Bombay<br />
+HUMPHREY MILFORD<br />
+1921</p>
+
+<p><a class="pagenum_invisible" name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv" href="#Page_iv" title="[Pg iv]"></a>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br /></p>
+
+<p class="center"><small>PRINTED IN ENGLAND<br />
+AT THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS</small></p>
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_v" id="Page_v" href="#Page_v" title="[Pg v]"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="INTRODUCTORY_NOTE" id="INTRODUCTORY_NOTE"></a>INTRODUCTORY NOTE</h2>
+
+
+<p>In a note prepared in 1915 for the English edition,
+Professor Oppenheim stated the circumstances under
+which his tractate on <i>The Future of International Law</i>
+was undertaken and published.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>'This little work,' he said, 'originally written in
+German, was first published in 1911, under the title
+<i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Die Zukunft des Völkerrechts</i> (Leipzig: W. Engelmann),
+as a contribution to the <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Festschrift</i> offered to Professor
+Karl Binding. Events which have since happened
+make it necessary to call the reader's attention to the
+date of original publication.</p>
+
+<p>'The translation into English has been made by
+Dr. John Pawley Bate. In accordance with the wish
+of the author some slight modifications of the original
+text were made before translation. The numbers of
+the paragraphs and the marginal summaries do not
+appear in the original.'</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As was his wont with all his publications, Professor
+Oppenheim had sent the undersigned a copy of the
+German text. The value of 'this little work', as its
+author called it, was at once apparent, and he yielded to
+the suggestion that it be put into English, in order that
+it might be available to English readers in the four
+quarters of the globe. It was accordingly translated, set
+up in type, and was on the point of appearing, when on
+July 28, 1914, the then Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
+declared war upon Serbia; on August 1 the then German
+Empire declared war upon Russia, and two days later
+against France, violated the neutrality of Luxemburg on
+<a class="pagenum" name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi" href="#Page_vi" title="[Pg vi]"></a>the same day, and the neutrality of Belgium on the night
+of the 3rd and 4th of August&mdash;thus beginning the series
+of wars which, taken together, are commonly called the
+World War.</p>
+
+<p>Professor Oppenheim subsequently came to the conclusion
+that it would be better to withhold publication
+until the end of the war. It was done, and the deposit
+of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles on January 10,
+1920, removed this obstacle.</p>
+
+<p>It should be said, however, that Professor Oppenheim
+expressed doubts on more than one occasion as to the
+desirability of its publication, but he allowed himself to
+be persuaded that an English version might be of service
+to the great and worthy cause of international law and
+of international organization. Modesty was not the
+least of his virtues.</p>
+
+<p>From time to time Professor Oppenheim has ventured
+into the same field. In 1918, in the performance of his
+duty 'to lay down such rules and suggest such measures
+as may tend to diminish the evils of war and finally to
+extinguish war between nations', he delivered three
+lectures on <i>The League of Nations and its Problems</i>, as
+holder of the Chair of International Law, founded by
+Dr. Whewell in the University of Cambridge. As in
+<i>The Future of International Law</i>, so in the lectures, he
+started from the Hague Conferences and made the work
+of The Hague the foundation upon which he would base
+any scheme of international organization. The epigraph
+which he put upon the title-page, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">Festina Lente</i>, indicated
+the spirit in which he approached his task and the advice
+which he felt called upon to give to the most casual of
+his readers. In the lectures he took a step in advance&mdash;or
+backward, according to the point of view&mdash;advocating
+that all members of a league of nations should 'agree to
+unite their economic, military, and naval forces against
+any one or more States which resort to arms without<a class="pagenum" name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii" href="#Page_vii" title="[Pg vii]"></a>
+submitting their disputes to International Courts of
+Justice or International Councils of Conciliation'.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of 1919, and after the signature of the
+Treaty of Versailles on June 28 of that year, Professor
+Oppenheim contributed to the <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Revue générale de droit
+international public</i> an article in French on <i>The Essential
+Character of the League of Nations</i>. And what may be
+considered as his final views on the subject are contained
+in the third edition of his <i>Treatise on International Law</i>
+(vol. i, pp. 264-310), the first volume of which appeared
+in 1920. Professor Oppenheim accepted the League of
+Nations, but his eyes were open to its defects as well as
+to its merits.</p>
+
+<p>The partisans of the present League of Nations will
+prefer Professor Oppenheim's later views, as expressed
+in his lectures and in the <i>Treatise on International Law</i>.
+The opponents of the present League of Nations will
+prefer his earlier views, contained in the present publication.
+The future will decide which are the more acceptable.</p>
+
+<p>At the Oxford session of the Institute of International
+Law, held a year to the month before the outbreak of
+the World War, it was the custom of its members to
+pass the evenings together in informal discussion of their
+chosen subject. On one occasion the discussion assumed
+the form of a dialogue between Professor Oppenheim on
+the one hand and Mr. Elihu Root on the other. At an
+unusually late hour the company broke up, and Mr. Root,
+putting out his hand to Professor Oppenheim, said, <span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">'Bon
+soir, cher Maître'.</span></p>
+
+<p style="margin-left: 50%; text-indent: 5em;">
+James Brown Scott,<br />
+<i>Director of the Division of International Law</i>.<br /></p>
+
+<p style="margin-left: 4em; text-indent: -2em;"><span class="smcap">Washington, D.C.</span><br />
+<i>February 28, 1921.</i></p>
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii" href="#Page_viii" title="[Pg viii]"></a><br /></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix" href="#Page_ix" title="[Pg ix]"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2>
+
+
+
+
+<h3>INTRODUCTION</h3>
+
+<ul class="TOC"><li>&nbsp; <span class="ralign">PAGE</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_1">1. International law in the past</a> <span class="ralign">1</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_2">2. No international law in antiquity</a> <span class="ralign">1</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_3">3. How the conception of a family of nations arose</a> <span class="ralign">2</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_4">4. The law of nature as the basis of the law of nations</a> <span class="ralign">2</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_5">5. Positive international law</a> <span class="ralign">4</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_6">6. International legislation initiated by the Congress of Vienna</a> <span class="ralign">4</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_7">7. International Administrative Union</a> <span class="ralign">5</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_8">8. Legislation of the Peace Conferences and of the Naval Conference of London</a> <span class="ralign">5</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_9">9. The Permanent Court of Arbitration and other international courts</a> <span class="ralign">6</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_10">10. The Hague Peace Conferences as a permanent institution</a> <span class="ralign">6</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_11">11. Uncertainty as to the fate of the Declaration of London and of some of the Hague Conventions</a> <span class="ralign">7</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_12">12. The task of the future</a> <span class="ralign">7</span></li></ul>
+
+
+<h3>CHAPTER I<br />
+<br />
+THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF STATES</h3>
+
+<ul class="TOC">
+<li><a href="#Section_13">13. Is the law of nations an anarchic law?</a> <span class="ralign">9</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_14">14. All law is order</a> <span class="ralign">9</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_15">15. The family of nations is a society ruled by law although it does not as yet possess special organs</a> <span class="ralign">10</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_16">16. Not necessary that the family of nations should remain an unorganized society</a> <span class="ralign">11</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_17">17. The pacificist ideal of an organization of the family of nations</a> <span class="ralign">11</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_18">18. The world-state is not desirable</a> <span class="ralign">12</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_19">19. The world-state would not exclude war</a> <span class="ralign">13</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_20">20. War may gradually disappear without a world-state</a> <span class="ralign">14</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_21">21. Importance of pacificism</a> <span class="ralign">15</span><a class="pagenum" name="Page_x" id="Page_x" href="#Page_x" title="[Pg x]"></a></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_22">22. Impossible for the family of nations to organize itself on the model of the state</a> <span class="ralign">16</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_23">23. Impossible to draft a plan for the complete organization of the family of nations</a> <span class="ralign">16</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_24">24. The Permanent Court of Arbitration the nucleus of the future organization of the family of nations</a> <span class="ralign">17</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_25">25. The Hague Peace Conferences as organs of the family of nations</a> <span class="ralign">17</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_26">26. Outlines of a constitution of the family of nations</a> <span class="ralign">18</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_27">27. The proposed constitution leaves state-sovereignty intact</a> <span class="ralign">20</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_28">28. The equality of states</a> <span class="ralign">20</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_29">29. Absence of any executive power</a> <span class="ralign">21</span></li></ul>
+
+
+<h3>CHAPTER II<br />
+<br />
+INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION</h3>
+
+<ul class="TOC">
+<li><a href="#Section_30">30. Quasi-legislation within the domain of international law</a> <span class="ralign">23</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_31">31. Hague Peace Conferences as an organ for international legislation</a> <span class="ralign">24</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_32">32. Difficulties in the way of international legislation. The language question</a> <span class="ralign">25</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_33">33. The opposing interests of the several states</a> <span class="ralign">25</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_34">34. Contrasted methods of drafting</a> <span class="ralign">25</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_35">35. These difficulties distinct from those due to carelessness. Article 23 (<i>h</i>) of the Hague Regulations of land war is an example</a> <span class="ralign">27</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_36">36. The German and the English interpretation of Article 23 (<i>h</i>)</a> <span class="ralign">27</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_37">37. Davis's interpretation of Article 23 (<i>h</i>)</a> <span class="ralign">28</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_38">38. Impossible to reconcile the divergent views about Article 23 (<i>h</i>)</a> <span class="ralign">29</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_39">39. Difficulties due to the fact that international law cannot be made by a majority vote, or repealed save by a unanimous vote. A way out found in the difference between universal and general international law</a> <span class="ralign">30</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_40">40. International laws which are limited in point of time</a> <span class="ralign">31</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_41">41. International legislation no longer to be left to mere chance</a> <span class="ralign">33</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_42">42. The Declaration of London thoroughly prepared beforehand</a> <span class="ralign">34</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_43">43. The preparation of the Declaration a pattern for future international legislation</a> <span class="ralign">34</span><a class="pagenum" name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi" href="#Page_xi" title="[Pg xi]"></a></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_44">44. Intentionally incomplete and fragmentary laws</a> <span class="ralign">35</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_45">45. Interpretation of international statutes</a> <span class="ralign">35</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_46">46. International differences as regards interpretation</a> <span class="ralign">36</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_47">47. Different nations have different canons of interpretation</a> <span class="ralign">37</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_48">48. Controverted interpretation of the Declaration of London an example</a> <span class="ralign">37</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_49">49. Some proposals for the avoidance of difficulties in interpretation</a> <span class="ralign">39</span></li></ul>
+
+
+<h3>CHAPTER III<br />
+<br />
+INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE</h3>
+
+<ul class="TOC">
+<li><a href="#Section_50">50. Law can exist without official administration</a> <span class="ralign">41</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_51">51. The Hague Court of Arbitration as a permanent institution</a> <span class="ralign">41</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_52">52. The proposed International Prize Court and Court of Arbitral Justice</a> <span class="ralign">42</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_53">53. Does the constitution of the International Prize Court violate the principle of the equality of states?</a> <span class="ralign">43</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_54">54. Does the International Prize Court restrict the sovereignty of the several states?</a> <span class="ralign">43</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_55">55. Would the formation of an international Prize Court of Appeal infringe the sovereignty of the several states?</a> <span class="ralign">44</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_56">56. The powers of the International Prize Court do not curtail state-sovereignty</a> <span class="ralign">45</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_57">57. Difference between international courts of arbitration and real international courts of justice</a> <span class="ralign">46</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_58">58. Fundamentals of arbitration in contradistinction to administration of justice by a court</a> <span class="ralign">47</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_59">59. Opposition to a real international court</a> <span class="ralign">48</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_60">60. A real international court does not endanger the peaceable settlement of disputes</a> <span class="ralign">49</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_61">61. Composition of an international court</a> <span class="ralign">50</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_62">62. International courts of appeal a necessity</a> <span class="ralign">51</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_63">63. Are international courts valueless if states are not bound to submit their disputes to them?</a> <span class="ralign">52</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_64">64. What is to be done if a state refuses to accept the decision of an international court?</a> <span class="ralign">54</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_65">65. Executive power not necessary for an international court</a> <span class="ralign">54</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_66">66. Right of intervention by third states and war as <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">ultima ratio</i></a> <span class="ralign">55</span><a class="pagenum" name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii" href="#Page_xii" title="[Pg xii]"></a></li></ul>
+
+
+<h3>CHAPTER IV<br />
+<br />
+THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW</h3>
+
+<ul class="TOC">
+<li><a href="#Section_67">67. New tasks for the science of international law</a> <span class="ralign">56</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_68">68. The science of international law must become positive</a> <span class="ralign">56</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_69">69. The science of international law must be impartial</a> <span class="ralign">58</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_70">70. The science of international law must free itself from the tyranny of phrases</a> <span class="ralign">58</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_71">71. The meaning of '<i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier</i>'</a> <span class="ralign">59</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_72">72. The doctrine of Rousseau concerning war</a> <span class="ralign">60</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_73">73. The science of international law must become international</a> <span class="ralign">63</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_74">74. Necessary to consult foreign literature on international law</a> <span class="ralign">63</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_75">75. Necessary to understand foreign juristic methods</a> <span class="ralign">64</span></li></ul>
+
+
+<h3>CONCLUSION</h3>
+
+<ul class="TOC">
+<li><a href="#Section_76">76. The aims defended are not Utopian</a> <span class="ralign">66</span></li>
+<li><a href="#Section_77">77. Obstacles to progress</a> <span class="ralign">67</span></li></ul>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_1" id="Page_1" href="#Page_1" title="[Pg 1]"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="INTRODUCTION" id="INTRODUCTION"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">International
+law
+in the past.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_1" id="Section_1">1.</a> He who would portray the future of international law
+must first of all be exact in his attitude towards its past and
+present. International law as the law of the international
+community of states, such as is the present-day conception
+of it, is of comparatively modern origin. Science dutifully
+traces it back to Hugo Grotius as its father. In his immortal
+work on the <i>Law of War and of Peace</i> he, with
+masterly touch, focalizes (as it were) all the tendencies
+which asserted themselves during the latter half of the
+middle ages into a law between independent states, in such
+sort that all subsequent development goes back to him.
+Undoubtedly the roots of this law reach back into the
+remotest past of civilization, for independent states, nay,
+independent tribes too, cannot have more or less frequent
+dealings with each other without developing definite
+forms therefor. And so the immunity which must
+everywhere be conceded to ambassadors and heralds will
+probably be the oldest root of international law.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">No international
+law
+in antiquity.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_2" id="Section_2">2.</a> But all attempts to find in the ancient world a law of
+the same kind as modern international law must inevitably
+come to grief on the fact that the idea of a community of
+law between civilized states was entirely foreign to antiquity,
+and only begins to make its gradual appearance in
+the last third of the middle ages. The Jewish ideal of perpetual
+peace and the union of all mankind under <em>One</em> God,
+foreseen in prophetic vision by Isaiah (ii. 2-4), may be taken
+as the first formulation of pacificist doctrine, which of
+course implies a community of law between all states, but<a class="pagenum" name="Page_2" id="Page_2" href="#Page_2" title="[Pg 2]"></a>
+the prophet does not apprehend this community of law as
+an independent idea. This idea was likewise unknown in
+its generality to Greek civilization, although certainly
+looming before it with some clearness in the international
+relations of the Greek city-states one to another. But
+even if we may speak of a law resembling in many respects
+modern international law as prevailing between the states
+of ancient Greece, this law must nevertheless be limited
+to Greek states, foreign states and peoples standing
+outside this community of law as barbarians. On the
+other hand, Roman law possessed, it is true, a mass of
+legal rules for the intercourse between the Roman Empire
+and all foreign states, but these rules were <em>Roman</em> law
+and not rules of an international law such as postulates
+an international community of law.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">How the
+conception
+of a family
+of nations
+arose.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_3" id="Section_3">3.</a> The idea of an international community of law could
+not have obtained acceptance before a time when there
+existed a number of completely independent states, internally
+akin in virtue of a community of intensive civilization
+and continually brought into contact with one another by
+a lively intercourse. It was in this way that an international
+community of law was begotten at the end of
+the middle ages out of Christian civilization and mutual
+intercourse. Grotius and his forerunners would not have
+been able to create international law, had not the conception
+of a community of law between Christian states
+enjoyed a general recognition, and had not international
+intercourse before their day evolved already a large
+number of rules of intercourse, which were based on
+custom and in part on very ancient usages.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The law of
+nature as
+the basis of
+the law of
+nations.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_4" id="Section_4">4.</a> A theoretical basis for the erection of a system of
+international law was provided by the law of nature.
+This likewise is duteously traced back by science to<a class="pagenum" name="Page_3" id="Page_3" href="#Page_3" title="[Pg 3]"></a>
+Grotius, although in this department also he stands on
+the shoulders of his predecessors. The riddle, how it
+was possible to find a foundation for international law
+(as also for constitutional law and other branches of law)
+in the law of nature, which itself reposed upon so unstable
+a basis, is easy of solution for those who contemplate
+the historical development of all law with minds
+clear from prejudice. The contention of the historical
+school that all law springs up 'naturally', like language,
+is chimerical. Wherever a demand for law and order
+imperiously asserts itself, rules of law arise there. Every
+epoch of history produces alike that mode of legal development
+which it needs and that theoretical basis therefor
+which corresponds to its own interpretation of the nature
+of things. Accordingly the growth of law is everywhere
+dependent on, or at least influenced by, a conscious
+or unconscious creation of law. Custom, usage, habit,
+religion, morality, the nature of the thing, tradition,
+reason, the examples of single individuals, and many
+other factors, contribute the material out of which the
+requisite rules of law are built up. Where a strong
+central authority busies itself, year in year out, with
+legislation, expressly enacted law naturally takes the
+foremost place, and customary law makes itself felt to
+a less and less degree. But where such a strong central
+authority does not exist or does not busy itself with
+continuous legislation, then the above-named factors
+exercise a more direct influence upon the development of
+law, should there arise in actual life an imperious demand
+for definite rules of law. The theory of natural law was
+only the mirror held up by legal philosophy, in which
+the rays emitted by these factors were focused into
+a homogeneous image.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_4" id="Page_4" href="#Page_4" title="[Pg 4]"></a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Positive
+international
+law.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_5" id="Section_5">5.</a> That, by the side of his international law, with its
+basis in natural law, there was also a positive international
+law, was not unrecognized by Grotius, but his purpose was
+merely to depict a system of international law which
+should compel universal observance irrespective of time
+and nation. And shortly after Grotius, Zouche and his
+followers did indeed attempt, in opposition to him, to
+formulate just such a positive international law, but it
+could not win for itself, at any rate in the seventeenth
+century, any great recognition; development was overshadowed
+by the system of Grotius, and many of his rules
+of natural law gradually obtained recognition in practice as
+customary law. But the increasing intercourse of states in
+the eighteenth century called forth a more positive school
+of international jurists, and the works of Bynkershoek,
+Moser, and Martens fertilized the soil on which in the
+nineteenth century there could gradually grow a really
+positive theory of international law, even if the scales
+which betoken its past connexion with natural law still
+adhere to the international law of to-day.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">International
+legislation
+initiated by
+the Congress of
+Vienna.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_6" id="Section_6">6.</a> A positive theory of international law was demanded
+by the fact that in the first quarter of the nineteenth
+century, with the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna,
+the quasi-legislative activity of international conventions
+asserted itself for the first time. From then
+onwards, general international law was frequently evolved
+by means of an international convention. It was in this
+way that the permanent neutralization of Switzerland,
+Belgium, and Luxemburg was effected, the navigation of
+the so-called international rivers in Europe declared free,
+the slave-trade abolished, the grades of diplomatic agents
+regulated, privateering abolished, the necessity of effectiveness
+in a blockade recognized, the principle 'free<a class="pagenum" name="Page_5" id="Page_5" href="#Page_5" title="[Pg 5]"></a>
+ships, free goods' finally established, neutral goods on
+enemy ships declared free, rules provided in the interest
+of those wounded in battle, explosive bullets under the
+weight of 400 grammes forbidden, the Suez Canal neutralized,
+and so forth.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">International
+Administrative
+Union.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_7" id="Section_7">7.</a> Another fact of great importance is the endeavour, which
+first manifested itself in the World Postal Union of
+1874, to carry out the international administration of
+common interests, economic and other, by means of more
+or less general international unions. In this way a series
+of international administrative unions, often conjoined
+with special international boards, have been called into
+existence.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Legislation
+of the Peace
+Conferences
+and of the
+Naval Conference
+of
+London.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_8" id="Section_8">8.</a> With the end of the nineteenth and the first
+decade of the twentieth century, in which occur the
+first and second Peace Conferences at The Hague and
+the Naval Conference of London, the development
+of international law enters upon a new and pregnant
+epoch. If hitherto, despite the momentous law-making
+treaties of the nineteenth century, international law
+was essentially a book-law, a system erected by greater
+or smaller authorities on the foundations of state
+practice and in its details often uncertain and contested,
+it is now subjected more and more, and in
+a wide domain, to the legislating influence of law-making
+international conventions. To mention only the principal
+matters: A code has been issued which, full of lacunae
+as it is, nevertheless encompasses the whole area of land
+war; it has been laid down that war shall only be begun
+by a declaration of war; the employment of force for the
+recovery of contract-debts has been forbidden; the rights
+and duties of neutrals in land war and naval war, the
+treatment of enemy merchant vessels at the outbreak of<a class="pagenum" name="Page_6" id="Page_6" href="#Page_6" title="[Pg 6]"></a>
+hostilities, and the conditions of the conversion of merchant
+vessels into men-of-war have been legislatively
+fixed; rules concerning the laying of submarine mines,
+concerning bombardment by naval forces in time of war,
+concerning the application of the principles of the Geneva
+Convention to naval warfare, concerning certain limitations
+on the right of prize in naval warfare have been
+agreed on; many states have concurred in a prohibition
+of the discharge of explosive missiles from air-ships; and
+a code of the rules of naval warfare, so far as it touches
+the trade of neutrals, dealing with the topics of blockade,
+contraband of war, unneutral service, destruction of
+neutral prizes, sale of enemy merchantmen to neutrals,
+enemy property, convoy and so forth, has been agreed
+on, though still unratified.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Permanent
+Court
+of Arbitration
+and
+other international
+courts.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_9" id="Section_9">9.</a> It is noteworthy that the first Hague Conference
+established a permanent international arbitral tribunal
+and that the second Hague Conference decided on the
+establishment of an International Prize Court and produced
+a plan for a standing international court at
+The Hague. Hitherto there have been no international
+courts for the decision of disputes, and if contending
+powers have been ready to refer their disputes to arbitration,
+they have always first had to form an arbitral
+tribunal; but now there is in existence an actual International
+Court of Arbitration, and other international
+courts are in contemplation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Hague
+Peace Conferences
+as
+a permanent
+institution.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_10" id="Section_10">10.</a> Lastly, it is noteworthy that in the Final Act of
+the second Hague Conference a recommendation was
+expressed that the powers should call a third Conference
+in the year 1915, and two years before its meeting should
+appoint a preparatory committee, entrusted, among other
+things, with the task of proposing a system of organiza<a class="pagenum" name="Page_7" id="Page_7" href="#Page_7" title="[Pg 7]"></a>tion
+and procedure for the coming Conference. This
+recommendation gives the first impetus towards making
+the Hague Conferences a permanent institution and so
+ensuring their periodic assembly without the need of
+initiative on the part of some one power or another.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Uncertainty
+as to the fate
+of the
+Declaration
+of London
+and of some
+of the Hague
+Conventions.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_11" id="Section_11">11.</a> Neither all the results of the second Hague Peace
+Conference nor those of the London Naval Conference
+are as yet assured, for the Declaration of London
+has not yet been ratified, and so the fate of the International
+Prize Court is still involved in doubt. The
+fate of some of the numerous conventions of the second
+Hague Conference is still in similar doubt, and many
+of those conventions which have been ratified present
+only a fragmentary and provisional settlement of
+their respective topics. Whatever may be the fate of
+these agreements which are still in suspense, this much
+is certain, that international legislation, international
+administration of justice, and international organization
+occupy the foreground of affairs, have already been in
+part established, and must be in ever-increasing requisition
+by the present and the coming generation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The task of
+the future.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_12" id="Section_12">12.</a> If in the following pages I undertake the discussion
+of these three weighty matters, it is entirely
+foreign to my purpose to peer into the future with the
+eyes of prophecy or to busy my fancy with building
+castles in the air. What I propose is only to place
+in clear light the problems which are now coming into
+view and to furnish some indications which may contribute
+to their successful solution. If it is only to
+happy accident that we owe the assembling of the Peace
+Conferences, and likewise the issues of the same, we must
+all the more attempt in the future to assure success by
+dint of careful deliberation, systematic preparation, and<a class="pagenum" name="Page_8" id="Page_8" href="#Page_8" title="[Pg 8]"></a>
+a purposeful consideration of the problems which press
+for attention. And the science of international law must
+bethink itself and devote itself, with a more exact method
+than has hitherto been usual, to the elaboration of the
+results of past and future Conferences and to the incorporation
+of them in its system.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_9" id="Page_9" href="#Page_9" title="[Pg 9]"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I<br />
+<br />
+THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF STATES</h2>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">Is the law of
+nations an
+anarchic
+law?</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_13" id="Section_13">13.</a> International legislation and administration presuppose
+the existence of law and order within the society
+of states, and this latter topic must therefore be treated
+before the former. International law has been called
+'anarchic law' on the ground that hitherto the society of
+states has not been organized and that it must ever remain
+unorganized on account of the complete sovereignty of
+its members. It seems to me that this position is untenable.
+The idea of anarchy forms a contrast to that of
+law. Law can as little be anarchic as anarchy can be an
+institute of law. The conception of the one excludes the
+other. He who cannot conceive of law apart from a
+superior power enforcing it on its subjects, may perhaps
+call the international society of states anarchic, but then
+he will also have to contest the existence of an international
+law, and, logically, he should also deny the
+possibility of the existence of an international society.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">All law is
+order.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_14" id="Section_14">14.</a> He, however, who identifies law and order, and
+who, whenever he finds in any society rules making
+their appearance which are conceived as compulsory
+for the conduct of its members, speaks of law&mdash;in
+contrast to morality, the observance of which is left
+to the conscience of the members&mdash;will also be able to
+speak of law in a society where there is no relation of
+superior and subject, provided only that the relation
+between the members is regulated in an ordered manner.
+That the international society of states is orderly regulated
+after this wise will be denied by no one who looks<a class="pagenum" name="Page_10" id="Page_10" href="#Page_10" title="[Pg 10]"></a>
+at it without prejudice, and who does not confuse order
+in a society with order of such a kind as is maintained by
+special organs of the society in question.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The family
+of nations
+is a society
+ruled by law
+although it
+does not as
+yet possess
+special
+organs.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_15" id="Section_15">15.</a> The admission that hitherto the international society
+of states has not possessed any special organs, is not an
+admission that it has not been an ordered society. Quite
+the contrary is the case, for numerous rules may be
+pointed to which show that that society is an ordered one.
+There are the rules which relate to the independence of
+each state of all other states, to the equality of all states,
+to their supremacy both personal and territorial, and to
+their responsibility; and in addition there are those rules
+which, exceptionally, allow, or at any rate excuse, certain
+inroads on the legal sphere of other states. And the
+admission that hitherto this society has possessed no
+permanent special organs is not an admission that no
+ways and means are available for the maintenance of
+existing order and for the formation of more thoroughgoing
+order, and for the development of a quasi-legislative
+and administrative activity. Here, too, quite the
+contrary is the case. Every state has possessed and
+possesses numerous organs for its international relations,
+these relations are governed by international conventions
+and international custom, and numerous congresses and
+conferences assemble from time to time, when it is
+a question of making international arrangements of
+a more general character. In this way it has been
+possible, even without permanent organs of the international
+society, to increase and multiply the rules of the
+law of this society. It does not follow, however, that
+this society would not attain its aims better than in the
+past, if it were able to convert itself from an unorganized
+into an organized society.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_11" id="Page_11" href="#Page_11" title="[Pg 11]"></a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Not necessary
+that
+the family of
+nations
+should
+remain an
+unorganized
+society.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_16" id="Section_16">16.</a> The assertion that, because of the unlimited
+sovereignty of its members, the family of nations must
+remain for all time an unorganized society, either has
+in view the organization of international society <em>on the
+model of a state</em>, or is founded on an untenable conception
+of the idea of sovereignty. If the compression
+of the whole world into the form of a single state were
+attained, the states of the day would certainly lose their
+sovereignty and be degraded into provinces. On the
+other hand, however, the sovereignty of the members of
+the international society just as little excludes its organization
+as the fact of the existence of this society excludes
+the sovereignty of its members. Sovereignty as the
+highest earthly authority, which owes allegiance to no
+other power, does not exclude the possibility that the
+sovereign should subject himself to a self-imposed order,
+so long as this order does not place him under any higher
+earthly power. All members of the international society
+thus subject themselves in point of fact to the law of
+nations without suffering the least diminution of their
+sovereignty. But of course, for him to whom sovereignty
+is equivalent to unrestrained power and unlimited arbitrariness
+of conduct, there cannot be any international
+law at all, any more than any constitutional law, seeing
+that international and constitutional law are opposed to
+absolute arbitrariness, even though they recognize that
+a sovereign state is the highest earthly authority.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The pacificist
+ideal of an
+organization
+of the family
+of nations.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_17" id="Section_17">17.</a> Hitherto, the demand for an organization of the
+international society has always issued from the pacificist
+party, in order to render the suppression of war possible.
+In the struggle round the pacificist ideal the
+chief objection has always been the absence of any
+judicial authority over states, and of any supreme execu<a class="pagenum" name="Page_12" id="Page_12" href="#Page_12" title="[Pg 12]"></a>tive
+power, able to compel, in a dispute between states,
+the execution of a judicial decree. Accordingly it has
+been the aim of the pacificists to obtain an organization
+of the international society, such as would compress the
+whole world, or at least whole parts of the world, such
+as Europe and America, into the form of a federal
+state or a system of confederated states. The belief
+is that only in this way can war be got rid of as
+a mode of settling disputes between states, and thereby
+the ever-increasing demands of naval and military
+budgets be avoided.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The world-state
+is not
+desirable.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_18" id="Section_18">18.</a> Whatever else can be urged against a universal
+federal state and the like, it is at the present day no longer
+a physical impossibility. Distance has been so conquered
+by the telegraph, the railway, and the steamboat, that in
+fact the annual assembly of a world-parliament would be
+no impossibility, and in any case a world-government,
+wherever its seat might be, would be able to secure almost
+immediate obedience to its behests in the uttermost parts
+of the earth. There is, indeed, only a quantitative and not
+a qualitative difference between a command issued by the
+British government in London to the remotest part of
+India or Africa, and such a command as, in a federal state
+comprising the whole world, would issue to the remotest
+part of the earth from the central government. Moreover,
+the ever-increasing international intercourse and its results&mdash;the
+expression 'internationalism', to denote this,
+is found to-day in all languages&mdash;has brought the populations
+of the various states so near to one another, and
+has so closely interwoven their interests, that on this
+ground also the theoretical possibility of erecting and
+maintaining a world-state of the federal type cannot be
+denied. But its theoretical and physical possibility<a class="pagenum" name="Page_13" id="Page_13" href="#Page_13" title="[Pg 13]"></a>
+prove absolutely nothing as regards its utility and
+desirability. In spite of all my sympathy with the efforts
+of my idealistic pacificist friends, it is my firm conviction
+that the world-state is in no form practically useful or
+desirable, for it would bring death instead of life. So far
+as we can foresee, the development of mankind is inseparably
+bound up with the national development of the
+different peoples and states. In these conditions variety
+brings life, but unity brings death. Just as the freedom
+and competition of individuals is needed for the healthy
+progress of mankind, so also is the independence and
+rivalry of the various nations. A people that is split up
+into different states may attain its national development
+better in a federal state than in a unitary state, and
+smaller nations and fragments of nations may (let us
+admit) develop better when combined into one state
+which has grown up historically out of several nationalities,
+than each would do in a state of its own, but the rule
+nevertheless remains, that strong nations can develop
+successfully only in an entirely independent and self-supported
+state of their own.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The world-state
+would
+not exclude
+war.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_19" id="Section_19">19.</a> Further, it is by no means sure that war would necessarily
+disappear from a world-state. The example of the
+duel is instructive here. Although forbidden in all civilized
+states and threatened with penalties, it&mdash;certain states excepted&mdash;continues
+to flourish. Enactments being impotent
+where the public sentiment of the dominant class refuses
+them any moral recognition, the duel will not disappear
+so long as the moral attitude of the circles concerned
+demands it as a protection for personal honour. And
+the <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Sonderbund</i> war of 1847 in Switzerland, the American
+war of secession from 1861 to 1865, and the Austro-Prussian
+war of 1866 within the German <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Bund</i>, show<a class="pagenum" name="Page_14" id="Page_14" href="#Page_14" title="[Pg 14]"></a>
+that organization into a confederation of states or into
+a federal state does not necessarily banish war.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">War may
+gradually
+disappear
+without
+a world-state.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_20" id="Section_20">20.</a> On the other hand, the gradual disappearance of war,
+which certainly is a correct ideal, is to be hoped for and
+expected quite apart from any development of a world-state,
+even if neither to-day nor to-morrow can be contemplated
+for the complete realization of this ideal. Many
+states have already entered into numerous agreements
+with other individual states to refer to arbitration disputed
+questions of law and questions about the interpretation
+of treaties, so far as these disputed questions do
+not touch the vital interests, independence, or honour of
+the parties. It is here that further development must
+begin. The man who is not a victim to prejudice asks
+the reasonable question, why should vital interests and
+the independence and honour of states necessarily be
+withdrawn from the domain of judicial decision? If
+individuals in a state submit themselves to the judge's
+sentence, even when their vital interests, their honour,
+their economic independence, aye, and their physical
+existence are in issue, why should it be impossible for
+states to do the same? If only we succeeded in the clear
+enunciation of legal rules for all international relations;
+if only we could succeed in finding independent and
+unbiased men to whose judgment a state could confidently
+submit its cause; if only we could succeed in
+bringing such men together in an independent international
+court&mdash;there would then be no reason why the
+great majority of states should not follow the example of
+the very small minority which has already agreed to
+settle all possible disputes by means of arbitration. The
+objection that a state could not submit its honour, for
+example, to the sentence of a judge is as little entitled to<a class="pagenum" name="Page_15" id="Page_15" href="#Page_15" title="[Pg 15]"></a>
+recognition as is the claim, made by those dominant
+classes which in many states glorify the duel, that men
+of honour could not settle an affair of their honour by
+means of a judge's decree. As long as public sentiment
+concerning international relations remains rooted in its
+present position, it must be confessed that there can
+be no talk of any progress, just as the duel also will not
+disappear as long as there is no success in bringing about
+a change of moral attitude on the part of the classes
+concerned. But by degrees obsolete moral positions are
+undermined by all kinds of influences, then they are
+abandoned and higher positions are adopted in their
+stead.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Importance
+of pacificism.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_21" id="Section_21">21.</a> It is here that the importance and value of the
+modern pacificist movement emerge with clearness.
+Wide circles are caught by this movement, even the
+governments of all countries are no longer able to hold
+aloof from its influence, and its opponents too can no
+longer fight it with nothing but scorn and ridicule.
+Whoever is a believer in the unlimited progress of
+civilization will also believe that a time must come
+when all states will freely bind themselves to submit all
+disputes to judicial or arbitral decision. General disarmament
+will not hasten the dawn of this day, for it can
+only arrive through the deepening of the public sentiment
+with reference to international relations. General disarmament
+will not make wars to cease, but the ceasing of
+war will bring about general disarmament! As already
+said, not to-day nor to-morrow will this time come; we
+stand now only at the very beginning of the developments
+that make for the realization of this ideal. It cannot come
+to pass unless and until international society develops an
+organization of a kind ever tending to perfect itself.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_16" id="Page_16" href="#Page_16" title="[Pg 16]"></a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Impossible
+for the
+family of
+nations to
+organize
+itself on the
+model of the
+state.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_22" id="Section_22">22.</a> How then must and will this organization take
+shape? The proposals which hitherto have been made
+for the organization of the world are freaks of fancy. Of
+notable value as indications of idealistic speculation in the
+midst of an adverse world, they crumble into dust immediately
+they are soberly scrutinized. All proposals which aim
+at the organization of international society after the pattern
+of the organization of the state&mdash;whether a unitary state
+or a federal state, or a system of confederated states&mdash;are
+either impracticable or do not meet the needs of the case.
+Every organization of the community of states must take
+as its starting-point the full sovereignty and the absolute
+equality of states, and must preserve these characters
+intact. There can, therefore, be no talk of a political
+central authority standing above individual states; and
+so the organization in question must be <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">sui generis</i> and
+cannot frame itself on the model of state organization.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Impossible
+to draft
+a plan for
+the complete
+organization
+of the family
+of nations.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_23" id="Section_23">23.</a> It is, however, impossible to draft at the present
+time the plan of such a complete organization in its
+details or even in mere outline. The growth and final
+shaping of the international organization will go hand
+in hand with the progress of the law of nations. Now
+the progress of the law of nations is conditioned by
+the growth of the international community in mental
+strength, and this growth in mental strength in its
+turn is conditioned by the growth in strength and in
+bulk, the broadening and the deepening, of private and
+public international interests, and of private and public
+morale. In the nature of the case this progress can
+mature only very slowly. We have here to do with
+a process of development lasting over many generations
+and probably throughout centuries, the end of which no
+man can foresee. It is enough for us to have the begin<a class="pagenum" name="Page_17" id="Page_17" href="#Page_17" title="[Pg 17]"></a>ning
+of the development before our eyes and, so far as our
+strength and insight extend, to have the opportunity of
+trying to give it its appropriate aim and direction. More
+we cannot do. Much, if not all, depends on whether the
+<em>international</em> interests of individual states become stronger
+than their <em>national</em> interests, for no state puts its hand to
+the task of international organization save when, and
+so far as, its international interests urge it more or less
+irresistibly so to do.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Permanent
+Court
+of Arbitration
+the
+nucleus of
+the future
+organization
+of the family
+of nations.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_24" id="Section_24">24.</a> I said, we have the beginning of the development
+before our eyes. It consists in the erection of the Permanent
+Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and in the permanent
+Bureau attached thereto. Here we have an institution
+belonging not to the individual contracting states but to
+the international society of states in contrast to the
+individual members, and it is open to the use of all
+the individual members. If the Declaration of London
+be ratified, and if (which scarcely admits of doubt) it be
+adopted by all the states which were not represented at
+the Conference of London, then the International Prize
+Court, which was decided on at the second Hague Conference,
+will become a fact. This Court will also become
+an organ of the international community. Mention must
+also be made of the so-called international bureaux of
+the so-called international unions, which have come into
+existence in the period beginning with 1874; for some
+at least of them will develop into organs of international
+society, although they so far are only organs of the respective
+special international unions.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Hague
+Peace Conferences
+as
+organs of
+the family
+of nations.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_25" id="Section_25">25.</a> Reference must in conclusion be made to the
+Hague Peace Conferences themselves, for it is to be
+expected that such Conferences will assemble periodically
+in the future. If success attends the effort to bring all<a class="pagenum" name="Page_18" id="Page_18" href="#Page_18" title="[Pg 18]"></a>
+members of the international community to an agreement,
+in virtue of which a Hague Peace Conference assembles
+at periodic intervals without being called together by
+this or that power, then an organ of international society
+will have arisen, the value of which none can decry. It
+will then be possible to say that the international community
+has become an actually organized society, and
+it will then be no longer open to doubt that the organization
+of this society will gradually become more and more
+developed. Before everything else this at least will then
+be attained, that an organ of the international society of
+states, comparable to the parliaments of individual states,
+will have come into existence, which can attend to international
+legislation as the needs of the time require, and
+can cause a continuous growth in the range of matters submitted
+to international tribunals. All the same, I yield
+myself to no hot-blooded hope of a speedy realization
+of Utopian schemes. Even when this organization is
+already there, progress will be but slight and gradual,
+and will encounter unceasing opposition. Progress in
+this department has always to reckon on a conflict with
+adverse interests and efforts, and it must be expected
+that in the continuous struggle between <em>international</em> and
+<em>national</em> interests the latter will only slowly prepare
+themselves to yield.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Outlines of
+a constitution
+of the
+family of
+nations.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_26" id="Section_26">26.</a> It is not, however, enough that agreement should
+make periodic Peace Conferences a permanent institution.
+The international community must provide itself with
+a constitution, the ground-plan of which would be something
+like the following:</p>
+
+<div class="wider_margin"><p>1. The society of states is composed of all sovereign
+states which mutually recognize each other's
+internal and external independence.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_19" id="Page_19" href="#Page_19" title="[Pg 19]"></a></p>
+
+<p>2. Every recognized sovereign state has the right to
+take part in the Peace Conferences.</p>
+
+<p>3. No state taking part in the Conferences is bound
+by the resolutions of the Conferences without its
+assent. Majority resolutions only bind the members
+of that majority. On the other hand, no
+state is entitled to require that only such resolutions
+be adopted as it assents to.</p>
+
+<p>4. Every participant state has the right to be heard at
+the Conferences, to bring forward proposals, to
+make motions, and to speak on the proposals and
+motions of other participants.</p>
+
+<p>5. A standing international commission shall be appointed
+whose duty it shall be to summon all the
+members of the international community to the
+Conferences, to make previous inquiries as to the
+proposals and motions which are to be brought
+before the Conference and to inform all participants
+of them, and to prepare and carry out all
+other business which the Conferences may from
+time to time entrust to it.</p>
+
+<p>6. Rules of procedure for the Conferences shall be
+elaborated, which shall govern the conduct of
+the proceedings of the Conferences, so that the
+proceedings can follow a defined course without
+degenerating into a time-wasting discussion.</p>
+
+<p>7. The question of the presidency of the Conferences
+shall be settled once for all, so that no room
+be left for quarrels and jealousies about precedence.
+It might perhaps be found expedient
+before every Conference to decide on the presidency
+by lot.</p>
+
+<p>8. All resolutions come into force only when and so far
+as they are ratified by the respective states. On
+the other hand, every state binds itself, once and
+for all, to carry out in good faith the resolutions
+which it has ratified.</p>
+
+<p>9. All states bind themselves to submit to the decisions
+of the international tribunals to which they have
+appealed, so far as these decisions are within the
+competence of the respective tribunals.</p></div><p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_20" id="Page_20" href="#Page_20" title="[Pg 20]"></a></p>
+
+<p>Something like this would be the ground-plan of a constitution
+of the international community. Rules 5-7
+are demanded by the nature of the case; rules 1-4
+and 8-9 contain nothing new, but merely express what
+observation would show to be the legal position at present.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The proposed
+constitution
+leaves state-sovereignty
+intact.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_27" id="Section_27">27.</a> It must be particularly remarked that such a constitution
+can in no way infringe on the full sovereignty of
+individual states. Apart from the fact that the idea of
+sovereignty indicates an absolute independence of any
+higher earthly power, that idea has never acquired a rigid
+and uniformly recognized content. Times and circumstances
+have influenced and shaped it in different states
+and in the mouths of different authorities. This development
+of the idea, an idea which has won a place for itself
+and the retention of which seems desirable despite all
+opposition, may go further still in the future.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The equality
+of states.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_28" id="Section_28">28.</a> The proposed constitution, further, makes no
+inroad at all on the equality of states. This equality
+is the indispensable foundation of international society.
+The idea of equality merely expresses the fact that
+in all resolutions of the international society every
+state, whatever may be its size and political importance,
+obtains one voice and no more than one, that
+every state can be bound by a resolution only with its
+consent, and that no state can exercise jurisdiction over
+another state. It does not and cannot express more.
+In no circumstances is it to be asserted that unanimity
+is a condition for all resolutions of the Conferences, and
+that all resolutions are void to which one or more states
+refuse their consent. Of course, such resolutions bind
+those only who assent to them, and of course unanimous
+resolutions alone can be considered to be universally
+binding. But nothing should hinder the Conferences<a class="pagenum" name="Page_21" id="Page_21" href="#Page_21" title="[Pg 21]"></a>&mdash;and
+so it happened in the two first Conferences&mdash;from
+passing majority resolutions. It must never be lost sight
+of that such majority resolutions do not go to form
+a <em>universal</em> but only a <em>general</em> law of nations. Only he
+who repudiates the necessary distinction between a particular
+and a general and a universal law of nations
+can demand unanimity. Now the development which
+up to the present has taken place in the law of nations
+has shown the necessity of this distinction. It would be
+extremely difficult to enumerate any large number of
+universally accepted rules of the law of nations&mdash;apart
+from those which have obtained recognition as customary
+law. We have only to think of the Declaration of Paris,
+to which some states still refuse assent. History also
+teaches us that the general law of nations has a tendency
+gradually to become the universal law of nations. It is
+therefore permissible, when a forward step which fails
+to gain unanimous approval has become a practical
+matter, for that majority of states which is ready for it
+to take the step by themselves; the dissenting states
+will give in their adhesion in course of time. And if
+and when this should turn out not to be the case,
+such a majority resolution would anyhow represent, in
+a narrower circle of international society, a step forward
+from which there is no obligation to forbear merely
+because others are unwilling to join in taking it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Absence of
+any executive
+power.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_29" id="Section_29">29.</a> This constitution, finally, makes no provision for any
+kind of executive power, and so it avoids the proposal to set
+up in international society an organization resembling that
+of a state. All proposals for an international executive
+authority run counter not only to the idea of sovereignty,
+but also to the ideal of international peace and of international
+law. The aim of this development is not the<a class="pagenum" name="Page_22" id="Page_22" href="#Page_22" title="[Pg 22]"></a>
+coercion of recalcitrant states, but a condition of things
+in which there are no recalcitrant states because every
+state has freely submitted to the obligation to refer
+disputes to the international tribunals and to abide by
+their decision. It is just in this respect that the international
+community of states differs for all time from the
+community of individuals who are united into a state, the
+latter requiring as <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">ultima ratio</i> executive compulsion on
+the part of a central power, while the former consistently
+with its nature and definition can never possess such
+a central power. It will, we must confess, call for a long
+development before such a condition of things is realized,
+and, until this realization is effected, war will not disappear
+but will remain an historic necessity.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_23" id="Page_23" href="#Page_23" title="[Pg 23]"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II<br />
+<br />
+INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION</h2>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">Quasi-legislation
+within
+the domain
+of international
+law.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_30" id="Section_30">30.</a> When we speak of legislation we have in view as
+a rule a state, wherein there is a law-making power which
+acts without reference to the consent of individual subjects.
+For even if in a constitutional state an individual
+does anyhow exercise so much influence upon legislation
+as comes from voting at the election of members of
+parliament, still he has no direct influence, and must
+submit to a law that has been enacted whether he
+approves of it or not. That is why it is asserted that
+there cannot be any talk of legislation in the domain of
+international law. And, in fact, that is so if we adhere
+rigorously to the meaning of the concept 'legislation',
+as developed in the domain of internal state life. The
+nature of the case does not, however, demand so rigid an
+adherence as this; legislation is really nothing more
+than the conscious creation of law in contrast to the
+growth of law out of custom. And it is an admitted fact
+that, side by side with international law developed in
+this latter way, there is an international law which the
+members of the community of states have expressly
+created by agreement. We might therefore quite well
+substitute the term <em>agreeing a law</em> for the term <em>decreeing
+a law</em>,&mdash;but why introduce a new technical term? This
+international 'agreeing a law' does consciously and intentionally
+create law, and it is therefore a source of law.
+And provided that we always bear in mind that this
+source of law operates only through a quasi-legislative<a class="pagenum" name="Page_24" id="Page_24" href="#Page_24" title="[Pg 24]"></a>
+activity, there is no obstacle to speaking, in a borrowed
+sense, of international 'legislation'. Nevertheless, agreeable
+and apt as this term is, it must not lead us to
+assimilate the internal legislation of a state and international
+legislation save in the one respect that in both
+law is made in a direct, conscious and purposive manner,
+in contrast to law that originates in custom.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Hague Peace
+Conferences
+as an organ
+for international
+legislation.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_31" id="Section_31">31.</a> International law of the legislative kind existed
+before the law of the Hague Peace Conferences; it issued
+from the conventions drawn up from time to time at
+congresses and conferences. It was a great step forward
+that the Congress of Vienna was able, for the first time,
+to create general international law by agreement, and
+that thereby general international law of the legislative
+kind could come into existence side by side with the
+customary law of nations. But the nineteenth century
+introduced international legislation only occasionally. If,
+as sketched above, success attends the attempt to make
+the Hague Peace Conferences a permanent institution,
+there would be evolved for the society of states a legislative
+organ corresponding to the parliaments of individual
+states. A wide field opens thus for further international
+legislative activity. Even if the time be not ripe for
+a comprehensive codification of the whole law of nations,
+there is nevertheless a series of matters in need of international
+regulation; for example, extradition, the so-called
+international private law and international criminal
+law, acquisition and loss of nationality, and a series of
+other matters, not to mention matters of international
+administration. Matters which are already governed by
+customary law might also be brought within the domain
+of enacted law, and at the same time could be put as
+regards details upon a surer basis. I have in mind the<a class="pagenum" name="Page_25" id="Page_25" href="#Page_25" title="[Pg 25]"></a>
+law of ambassadors and consuls, the law concerning the
+open sea and territorial waters, the law about merchantmen
+and men-of-war in foreign territorial waters, and
+more of this kind.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Difficulties
+in the way
+of international
+legislation.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_32" id="Section_32">32.</a> The peculiar character of international legislation
+involves, however, difficulties of all sorts.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The
+language
+question.</div>
+
+<p>There is, to begin with, the question of language. Seeing
+that it is impossible to employ all languages in the
+enactment of rules of international law, an agreement
+must be made for adopting some one language for these
+laws, in the same way that French is used at the present
+time. But the difficulty thence arising is not insuperable,
+and is hardly greater than that which is encountered in
+drafting a treaty between peoples whose speech belongs
+to different families. It must, however, be a rigid rule
+that in every case of doubt the text of the law in its
+original language&mdash;not that of a translation into the
+languages of other countries&mdash;is authoritative.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The opposing
+interests of
+the several
+states.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_33" id="Section_33">33.</a> There is, secondly, the difficulty of contenting the
+opposite interests of the members of the community of
+states. But this, too, is in practice not insurmountable.
+Of course, where there is such a brawling between these
+interests that no agreement is possible, there can from
+the outset be no talk of international legislation. This,
+however, is not everywhere the case. On the contrary,
+it is often and in different areas the case, that the <em>international</em>
+interests of states make themselves felt so
+urgently and so cogently that these states are ready to
+sacrifice their particular interests if only a reasonable
+compromise be open to them.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Contrasted
+methods of
+drafting.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_34" id="Section_34">34.</a> There is further the difficulty of finding expression
+in adequate language for the intention of the legislator.
+Even the internal legislation of states suffers under this<a class="pagenum" name="Page_26" id="Page_26" href="#Page_26" title="[Pg 26]"></a>
+difficulty in so far as the art of legislation is still very
+clumsy and undeveloped. For <em>international</em> legislation
+there is in addition the further difficulty that different
+groups of peoples employ very different methods in
+drafting their laws. If we were to give to an Englishman,
+a Frenchman, and a German the task of drafting a law
+upon the same topic, and if they were provided with the
+point of view from which the regulation of individual
+points was to proceed, so that the intention of the draftsmen
+would be the same, three very different drafts would
+nevertheless emerge. The English draft would deal in
+the most concrete manner possible with the situations
+to which it meant to apply; it would adduce as many
+particular cases as possible, and so would run the risk of
+forgetting some series of cases altogether. The German
+draft would be as abstract as is possible, and would
+entirely disregard individual cases, except such as required
+a special treatment; and so it would expose itself to the
+danger that in practice cases would be brought within the
+enactment which were outside the intention of the legislator.
+The French draft would attach more weight to
+principles than to individual points, enunciating principles
+in a legislative manner and leaving it to practice to
+construct out of these principles the rule for the particular
+case. Now, seeing that French is the language of international
+legislation, and so in the editing of drafts at the
+Hague Conferences the lion's share will naturally fall
+to French jurists attending the Conference, it will scarcely
+be possible to prevent the French method of legislation
+from obtaining great influence over international legislation.
+But there is no need for this mode of legislation
+to become dominant. The jurist representatives of other
+states must see to it that the French method is perfected<a class="pagenum" name="Page_27" id="Page_27" href="#Page_27" title="[Pg 27]"></a>
+by their own; the English and the Germans must make
+it their business to bring the drafts into a more concrete
+form, and to split up principles into more abstract rules.
+In this way, it may in time be possible by means of common
+international labour to make essential advance in
+the art of legislation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">These difficulties
+distinct from
+those due
+to carelessness.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_35" id="Section_35">35.</a> But the difficulties inherent in the legislative
+method must not be confused with those which come
+from a careless employment of the method; the latter
+must always be avoided, otherwise we arrive at contradictions
+of interpretation, and these are insuperable.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Article 23 (<i>h</i>)
+of the Hague
+Regulations
+of land war is
+an example.</div>
+
+<p>An example of such carelessness is afforded by the
+incorporation&mdash;at the second Hague Conference&mdash;of a new
+provision in the former Article 23 of the 'Regulations
+respecting the laws of land warfare'. I am referring to
+the provision added under the letter (<i>h</i>), which runs as
+follows: [It is forbidden] 'to declare extinguished,
+suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law, the rights
+and rights of action of the nationals of the adverse party'.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The German
+and the
+English
+interpretation
+of
+Article 23 (<i>h</i>).</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_36" id="Section_36">36.</a> From the German memorandum on the second
+Peace Conference it is quite clear that this additional
+rule, which was proposed by Germany and adopted by
+the Conference, was directed to the alteration of the rule,
+prevailing in several states, whereby during a war the
+subjects of one belligerent lose in the country of the other
+belligerent their <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">persona standi in judicio</i>, and the like.
+It is in this sense, then, that the addition has been unanimously
+interpreted by German literature, with the agreement
+of many foreign writers. The official standpoint
+of England, on the contrary, is that Article 23 (<i>h</i>) has
+nothing whatever to do with the municipal law of the
+belligerent countries. Article 23 (<i>h</i>), so the English Foreign
+Office explains, forms a subdivision of Article 23, which<a class="pagenum" name="Page_28" id="Page_28" href="#Page_28" title="[Pg 28]"></a>
+itself comes under the second section (headed 'Hostilities')
+of the Regulations, and forbids a series of acts
+which otherwise might be resorted to in the exercise of
+hostilities by the members of the contending armies, and
+by their commanding officers. That this interpretation
+is the right one&mdash;so it is further explained by the English
+side&mdash;is shown by the fact that Article 1 of the Convention
+expressly says, with reference to the 'Regulations
+respecting the laws of land warfare', that the contracting
+parties shall issue to their armed land forces instructions
+which shall be in conformity with the 'Regulations
+respecting the laws of land warfare' annexed to the
+Convention. It would therefore be the duty of every
+contracting power to instruct the commanders of its
+forces in an enemy's country (among other things) not
+'to declare extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in
+a court of law, the rights and rights of action of the
+nationals of the adverse party'.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Davis's interpretation
+of
+Article 23 (<i>h</i>)</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_37" id="Section_37">37.</a> This is also the opinion of Davis, one of the
+American delegates to the second Hague Conference; he
+gives the following explanation with regard to Article
+23 (<i>h</i>), in the third edition of his <i>Elements of International
+Law</i> (New York, 1908), p. 578:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>In this article a number of acts are described to
+which neither belligerent is permitted to resort in the
+conduct of his military operations. It was the well-understood
+purpose of the Convention of 1899 to
+impose certain reasonable and wholesome restrictions
+upon the authority of commanding generals and their
+subordinates in the theatre of belligerent activity.
+It is more than probable that this humane and commendable
+purpose would fail of accomplishment if
+a military commander conceived it to be within his
+authority to suspend or nullify their operation, or to
+regard their application as a matter falling within his<a class="pagenum" name="Page_29" id="Page_29" href="#Page_29" title="[Pg 29]"></a>
+administrative discretion. Especially is this true where
+a military officer refuses to receive well-grounded complaints,
+or declines to consider demands for redress, in
+respect to the acts or conduct of the troops under his
+command, from persons subject to the jurisdiction of
+the enemy, who find themselves, for the time being,
+in the territory which he holds in military occupation.
+To provide against such a contingency it was deemed
+wise to add an appropriate declaratory clause to the
+prohibitions of Article 23. The prohibition is included
+in section (<i>h</i>).</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Impossible
+to reconcile
+the divergent
+views about
+Article 23 (<i>h</i>).</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_38" id="Section_38">38.</a> If, from the fact that Davis was an American
+delegate, we may conclude that he represents the government
+view of the United States of North America, we are
+confronted by the fact that official England and America
+adopt an interpretation of Article 23 (<i>h</i>) which is entirely at
+variance with that of Germany, and it is quite impossible
+to build a bridge of reconciliation between the two camps.
+This regrettable fact has its origin simply in the careless
+use of the legislative method. If the German conception
+of Article 23 (<i>h</i>) be the correct one, the lines of subsection
+(<i>h</i>) ought never to have found a shelter in Article 23, for
+they have not the slightest connexion with hostilities
+between the contending forces. If, on the other hand,
+the Anglo-American interpretation be the right one,
+pains should have been taken to secure a wholly different
+draft of the provision in question, for the present wording
+is by no means transparently clear. The protocols of the
+Conference (<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Actes</i>, i, 101; iii, 14, 103) are not sufficiently
+explicit on the matter. The German delegate, <span lang="de" xml:lang="de">Göppert</span>,
+did indeed explain (cf. <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Actes</i>, iii, 103) at the session of the
+first subcommission of the Second Commission on July 3,
+1907, 'that this proposal is in the direction of not limiting
+to corporeal goods the inviolability of enemy property,<a class="pagenum" name="Page_30" id="Page_30" href="#Page_30" title="[Pg 30]"></a>
+and that it has in view the whole domain of obligations
+with the object of forbidding all legislative measures
+which, in time of war, would deprive an enemy subject
+of the right to take proceedings for the performance of
+a contract in the courts of the adverse party'. But we
+shall scarcely go wrong if we assume that the members
+of the Second Commission, who were entrusted with the
+consideration of the 'Regulations respecting the laws of
+land warfare', had not sufficiently realized the full meaning
+of the German proposal. It would otherwise be
+quite unintelligible that the reporter upon the German
+proposal could say (cf. <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Actes</i>, i, 101): 'This addition is
+deemed a very happy attempt to bring out in clear
+language one of the principles admitted in 1899', for
+these 'principles' (concerning the immunity of the
+private property of enemy subjects in land warfare) have
+very little indeed to do with the question of the <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">persona
+standi in judicio</i> of an enemy subject.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Difficulties
+due to the
+fact that
+international
+law cannot
+be made by
+a majority
+vote, or
+repealed save
+by a unanimous
+vote.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_39" id="Section_39">39.</a> A difficulty of a special kind besets international
+legislation, owing to the fact that international rules
+cannot be created by a majority vote, and that, when
+once in existence, they cannot be repealed save by a
+unanimous resolution.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">A way out
+found in the
+difference
+between universal
+and
+general
+international
+law.</div>
+
+<p>But when once we free ourselves from the preconception
+that the equality of states makes it improper for legislative
+conferences to adopt any resolutions which are not
+unanimously supported, there is nothing to prevent
+a substantial result being arrived at even without unanimity.
+At this point the difference between general and
+universal international law furnishes a way out. Rules
+of universal international law must certainly rest on
+unanimity. It is postulated in the equality of states
+that no state can be bound by any law to which it has<a class="pagenum" name="Page_31" id="Page_31" href="#Page_31" title="[Pg 31]"></a>
+not given its consent. But there is naught to prevent
+a legislative conference from framing rules of general
+international law for those states which assent to it and
+leaving the dissentient states out of consideration. If
+the inclusion in a single convention of all the points under
+discussion be avoided, and if the method, adopted at the
+second Peace Conference, of dividing the topics of discussion
+among as many smaller conventions as possible
+be followed, it will always be found possible to secure the
+support of the greater number of states for the regulation
+of any given matter. In no long time thereafter the
+dissentient states will give in their adherence to these
+conventions, either in their existing or some amended
+form. Attention will then be paid also to the consolidation
+of several smaller laws in a single more comprehensive
+statute. The nature of the case and the conditions of
+international life call for concessions without which no
+progress would be practicable. The course of international
+legislation hitherto shows unmistakably that
+the trodden path is the right path. And it must be
+emphasized that it is open to a state to assent to an act
+of international legislation although some one or other
+provision thereof be unacceptable to it. In such a case
+the assent of the state in question is given with a reservation
+as regards the particular article of the Act, so
+that it is in no wise bound by that article. Numerous
+instances of this could be adduced: thus, at the Hague
+Conference of 1907 Germany withheld her assent to some
+of the proposed rules of land war, and England to certain
+articles in Conventions V and XIII.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">International
+laws which
+are limited
+in point of
+time.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_40" id="Section_40">40.</a> So also, the difficulty is not insuperable as regards
+the other point, namely, that international enactments
+when once in existence cannot be repealed or amended<a class="pagenum" name="Page_32" id="Page_32" href="#Page_32" title="[Pg 32]"></a>
+save by a unanimous resolution of the participant states.
+Here, too, the analogy between municipal and international
+legislation must not be pushed too far. Municipal
+legislation can at any time be annulled or altered by the
+sovereign law-maker; but international legislation, for
+want of a sovereign over sovereign states, is not open to
+such treatment. Here there is a way out, which was in
+fact adopted at the second Peace Conference, and also
+at the Naval Conference of London, namely, the enactment
+of laws so limited in duration to a period of years,
+that at the expiry of the period every participant state
+can withdraw. In this way, for example, it was agreed
+that the law about the International Prize Court and the
+Declaration of London should only be in force for twelve
+years, and that any of the powers which were parties
+thereto might withdraw twelve months before the expiry
+of that period, and that, if and as far as no withdrawal
+ensued, these laws should from time to time be continued
+in force automatically for a further period of six years.
+This kind of international legislation, with its time limit
+and the right of denunciation, is to be recommended
+wherever more or less hazardous legislative experiments
+are being made, or where interests are at stake which in
+course of time are liable to such an alteration as obliges
+states to insist on the amendment or repeal of the previously
+made law. For example, the International Prize
+Court as a whole, and its composition, constitution, and
+procedure in particular, form an unparalleled experiment.
+But the fact that its institution is only to be agreed on
+for a period of twelve years facilitates its general acceptance,
+because of the possibility of either abrogating it
+altogether, or of reforming it, should experience show
+this to be necessary.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_33" id="Page_33" href="#Page_33" title="[Pg 33]"></a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">International
+legislation
+no longer
+to be left
+to mere chance.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_41" id="Section_41">41.</a> However this may be, one point must be decisively
+emphasized,&mdash;international legislation can no longer be left
+to mere chance. Apart from the Declaration of London
+and the Geneva Convention, it has always hitherto been
+a more or less happy chance which has controlled international
+legislation. Of conscious legislative consideration
+and deliberation, based on far-reaching, thoroughgoing
+preparation, there is no trace. For example, the
+Declaration of Paris of 1856 was but a by-product of the
+Peace of Paris of the same year. So also the legislation
+of the first Peace Conference was simply due to the anxiety
+to accomplish something positive which might conceal
+the fact that the proposed aim of the Conference&mdash;general
+disarmament, to wit&mdash;had in no wise been realized. At
+the second Peace Conference we did indeed see individual
+states appear with some well-prepared projects of legislation,
+but the preparation was entirely one-sided on the
+part of the states in question, and not general; accordingly,
+the adoption, rejection, amendment, and final
+shaping of these projects were also none the less the result
+of chance. The second Peace Conference itself took
+steps to prevent a repetition of this, calling the attention
+of the powers in its Final Act to the necessity of preparing
+the programme of the future third Conference a sufficient
+time in advance to ensure its deliberations being conducted
+with the necessary authority and expedition:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>In order to attain this object the Conference considers
+that it would be very desirable that, some two
+years before the probable date of the meeting, a preparatory
+committee should be charged by the Governments
+with the task of collecting the various proposals
+to be submitted to the Conference, of ascertaining
+what subjects are ripe for embodiment in an international
+regulation, and of preparing a programme<a class="pagenum" name="Page_34" id="Page_34" href="#Page_34" title="[Pg 34]"></a>
+which the Governments should decide upon in sufficient
+time to enable it to be carefully examined by
+each country.</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Declaration
+of
+London
+thoroughly
+prepared
+beforehand.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_42" id="Section_42">42.</a> In contrast to the rules of the Peace Conferences,
+a really notable and exemplary preparation took place
+in connexion with the Declaration of London, and the
+befitting result was a law excellent alike in matter and in
+form. England, the state which summoned the Naval
+Conference of London, made a collection of the topics
+which would arise, and communicated it to the states
+attending the Conference with the request that they
+would send in full statements on the subjects mentioned.
+After the answers to this request had come in they were
+collated with regard to each of the points on which discussion
+would arise, and <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">bases de discussion</i> were elaborated
+which made a thorough examination of each point
+possible at the Conference. By this means it was at once
+made clear when the different states were in accord and
+when not. The door to compromise was opened. And
+apart from a few vexed questions an agreement was in
+this way successfully reached with regard to a comprehensive
+law resting at every point on exhaustive deliberation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The preparation
+of the
+Declaration
+a pattern
+for future
+international
+legislation.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_43" id="Section_43">43.</a> This model method must be the method of the
+future. If, as indicated in §26 above, Art. 5, a permanent
+commission for the preparation of the Peace Conferences
+be successfully inaugurated, it will be its task to make
+preliminary preparations for the legislative activity of
+the Conferences in the manner just sketched out, and
+chance will no longer have the same part to play as heretofore.
+International legislation will no longer produce
+anything so full of gaps as the 'Regulations respecting
+the laws of land warfare', which leave essential matters<a class="pagenum" name="Page_35" id="Page_35" href="#Page_35" title="[Pg 35]"></a>&mdash;for
+instance, capitulations and armistices&mdash;without any
+adequate regulation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Intentionally
+incomplete
+and fragmentary
+laws.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_44" id="Section_44">44.</a> Of course, where the interests of different states are
+still involved in some uncertainty, or are in such antagonism
+that a complete agreement is impossible, even
+the fullest preparation and most painstaking deliberation
+will not procure a more satisfactory treatment for
+many matters than that the legislation which regulates
+them should be (so to say) only experimental and intentionally
+incomplete and fragmentary in character. Thus,
+for example, the Conventions about the conversion of
+merchantmen into men-of-war and about the use of mines
+in naval war can only be considered as legislative experiments,
+regulating these matters merely temporarily and
+in an incomplete and unsatisfactory manner. But even
+conventions which designedly are full of lacunae have their
+value. They embody all the same an agreement upon
+some important parts of the respective topics, and provide
+a regulation which in every case is better than the chaos
+previously prevailing in the areas in question. They
+also constitute a firm nucleus round which either custom
+or future legislation can develop further regulation.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Interpretation
+of
+international
+statutes.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_45" id="Section_45">45.</a> But even if international legislation attains the
+degree of success suggested, there still remains another
+great difficulty which must indirectly influence legislation
+itself, and that is the interpretation of international
+statutes once they have been enacted. It is notorious
+that no generally received rule of the law of nations exists
+for the interpretation of international treaties. Grotius
+and his successors applied thereto the rules of interpretation
+adopted in Roman law, but these rules, despite their
+aptness, are not recognized as international rules of construction.
+It can scarcely be said, however, that insur<a class="pagenum" name="Page_36" id="Page_36" href="#Page_36" title="[Pg 36]"></a>mountable
+difficulties have arisen hitherto out of this
+situation, for the majority of treaties have been between
+two parties, and the interpretation thereof is the affair of
+the contracting parties exclusively, and can be ultimately
+settled by arbitration. But in the case of general or
+universal international enactments we have to deal with
+conventions between a large number of states or between
+all states, and the question, accordingly, now becomes
+acute.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">International
+differences
+as regards
+interpretation.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_46" id="Section_46">46.</a> The difficulty of solving this question is increased
+by the fact that jurists of different nations are influenced
+by their national idiosyncrasies in the interpretation of
+enactments, and are dependent on the method of their
+school of law. Here are contrarieties which must always
+make themselves powerfully felt. The continental turn
+of mind is abstract, the turn of the English and American
+mind is concrete. Germans, French, and Italians have
+learnt to apply the abstract rules of codified law to
+concrete cases; in their abstract mode of thought
+they believe in general principles of law, and they work
+outwards from these. English and Americans, on the
+contrary, learn their law from decided cases&mdash;'law is that
+which the courts recognize as a coactive rule' is an
+accepted and widely current definition of law in the
+Anglo-American jurisprudence; they regard abstract
+legal rules, which for the most part they do not understand,
+with marked distrust; they work outwards from
+previously decided cases and, when a new case arises,
+they always look for the respects in which it is to be taken
+as covered by previous cases; they turn away as far as
+possible from general principles of law, and always fasten
+on the characteristic features of the particular case.
+If continental jurists may be said to adapt their cases to<a class="pagenum" name="Page_37" id="Page_37" href="#Page_37" title="[Pg 37]"></a>
+the law, English and American jurists may be said to
+adapt the law to their cases. It is obvious that this
+difference of intellectual attitude and of juristic training
+must exercise a far-reaching influence on the interpretation
+and construction of international enactments.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Different
+nations have
+different
+canons of
+interpretation.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_47" id="Section_47">47.</a> It is because of what has just been explained that
+the rules for the interpretation of domestic legislation are
+different with different nations. For example, whilst in
+Germany and France the judge avails himself more or
+less liberally of the <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Materialien</i><a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> of a statute in order to
+arrive at its meaning, the English judge limits himself
+to the strict wording of the text, and utterly refuses to
+listen to an argument based on the historical origin of the
+statute. The English bench, sticking more closely to the
+letter of the law, allows also an extensive or restrictive
+interpretation thereof much more seldom than the continental
+judiciary does.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> It seems impossible to find any single English phrase which gives
+the meaning of <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Materialien</i> in this context. In the <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Materialien</i> of
+a statute is comprised everything officially put on record concerning
+it between the time the draftsman undertakes to draft the measure
+and the time it is placed on the statute-book. For instance, the
+commentary which a draftsman on the Continent always adds to his
+draft, giving the reasons for the provisions of the Bill; the discussions
+in Parliament about the Bill; and the like.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Translator.</span></p></div>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Controverted
+interpretation
+of the
+Declaration
+of London
+an example.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_48" id="Section_48">48.</a> A good illustration of the factors under consideration
+was furnished by the movement in England against
+the ratification of the Declaration of London, and the
+discussion evoked thereby in the press and in Parliament.
+It was asserted that many rules of the Declaration were
+so indefinitely framed as to lie open, castle and keep, to
+the arbitrary inroads of a belligerent interpreter. And
+when the advocates of ratification pointed to the official
+'General Report presented to the Naval Conference by<a class="pagenum" name="Page_38" id="Page_38" href="#Page_38" title="[Pg 38]"></a>
+its Drafting Committee', which gave a satisfying solution
+to the issues raised, the answer came that neither a
+belligerent nor the International Prize Court would be
+bound by the interpretation of the Declaration contained
+in this General Report. It was asserted that the ratification
+of the Declaration would refer only to the text itself,
+and that the General Report, not being thereby ratified,
+would not be binding; only by express extension of the
+ratification to the General Report could the latter bind.</p>
+
+<p>Continental jurisprudence, if my conception of it be
+correct, would stand shaking its head at the whole of this
+discussion. It would ask how there could be any talk of
+ratifying a report, ratification having only to do with
+agreements. And as regards the question of the binding
+character of the General Report, there might indeed be
+some objection on the Continent to the epithet 'binding',
+but, on the other hand, there would be no doubt that the
+interpretation of the Declaration given in the Report
+must be accepted on all sides. The Report expressly
+says:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>We now reach the explanation of the Declaration
+itself, on which we shall try, by summarizing the
+reports already approved by the Conference, to give an
+exact and uncontroversial commentary; this, when
+it has become an official commentary by receiving the
+approval of the Conference, would be fit to serve as
+a guide to the different authorities&mdash;administrative,
+military, and judicial&mdash;who may be called on to
+apply it.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Seeing that the Conference unanimously accepted the
+Report, there is expressed in it and by it the real and true
+meaning of the individual articles of the Declaration as
+the Conference itself understood and intended it. Every
+attempt to procure an inconsistent interpretation must<a class="pagenum" name="Page_39" id="Page_39" href="#Page_39" title="[Pg 39]"></a>
+come to grief on this fact, and so the Report is in this
+sense 'binding'. The ratification of a treaty extends,
+of course, not only to the words themselves, but also to
+their meaning, and if the Conference which produces an
+agreement itself unanimously applies a definite meaning
+to the words of the agreement, there cannot remain any
+doubt that this is the meaning of the verbal text. Nevertheless,
+the contrary was maintained in England by
+a party of men of legal eminence, and the explanation
+of this is only to be found in the fact that these English
+lawyers were applying to the interpretation of the
+Declaration the rules which govern the interpretation of
+English statutes. The only way to enable the English
+Government to ratify the Declaration seems to be a
+statement by the Powers at the time of ratification that
+the interpretation of the Declaration expressed in the
+General Report is accepted on all sides.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Some proposals
+for
+the avoidance
+of
+difficulties
+in interpretation.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_49" id="Section_49">49.</a> However this may be, the illustration adduced is
+sufficient proof that the interpretation of international
+enactments creates a difficulty of its own for international
+legislation. International legislators must bring even
+greater solicitude than municipal legislators to the
+expression of their real meaning in rigid terms. And this
+aim can only be attained by the most assiduous preparation
+and consideration of the contents of the enactment.
+It would be best if these contents were published and
+thereby submitted to expert discussion before they were
+finally accepted at the Conferences. The national jurisconsults
+of the participant states would thus be enabled
+to criticize the proposals and to indicate the points which
+especially need clearing up. It might also be possible to
+consider the enactment, by convention, of an international
+ordinance containing a series of rules for the interpre<a class="pagenum" name="Page_40" id="Page_40" href="#Page_40" title="[Pg 40]"></a>tation
+and construction of all international statutes.
+This much is sure, that the interpretation of international
+statutes must be freer than that of municipal statutes,
+and must therefore be directed rather to the spirit of
+the law than to the meaning of the words used. This is
+all the more requisite because French legal language is
+foreign to most of the states concerned, and because
+it is not to be expected that before ratification they
+should obtain minute information about the meaning of
+every single foreign word employed.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_41" id="Page_41" href="#Page_41" title="[Pg 41]"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III<br />
+<br />
+INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE</h2>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">Law can
+exist without
+official administration.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_50" id="Section_50">50.</a> It is inherent in the nature of law that it should be
+put in question whenever from time to time one party
+raises a claim in the name of the law which the other
+resists in the name of the same law. If, however, it be
+asserted that there cannot be any law where there is no
+official administration of justice, this is a fallacy, and the
+fallacy lies in considering the presence of the elements
+of the more perfect situation to be presupposed in the less
+perfect situation. Beyond a doubt it is the administration
+of law which gives law the certainty that its authority
+will in every case obtain operative effect. But this
+operative effect is obtainable even apart from administration,
+because those who are subject to the law are in
+most cases clear as to its contents, and so they raise no
+question about it, but submit to its application without
+any need of recourse to jurisdictional officials. All the
+same, when a dispute does arise, law needs official
+administration: and, accordingly, in the long run, no
+highly developed legal society can dispense with it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The Hague
+Court of
+Arbitration
+as a permanent
+institution.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_51" id="Section_51">51.</a> Until the end of the nineteenth century the society
+of states possessed no organ which made international
+administration of justice possible. When states had
+made up their mind to have a dispute between them
+settled amicably, they either appointed the head of a
+foreign state or a foreign international jurist as arbiter,
+or they selected a number of persons to form an arbitral
+tribunal. It was a great step forward when the first<a class="pagenum" name="Page_42" id="Page_42" href="#Page_42" title="[Pg 42]"></a>
+Hague Conference established a Permanent Court of
+Arbitration and agreed on international rules of procedure
+for the conduct of this court. And if, seeing that in
+every particular instance the court is ultimately chosen
+by the parties, the expression 'Permanent Court of
+Arbitration' is only a euphemism, nevertheless the
+permanent list of persons from among whom the arbiters
+can be chosen, and, in addition, the Permanent Bureau
+of the Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and, lastly, the
+international rules of procedure, represent at least the
+elements of a permanent court. Thereby an institution
+is obtained which is always available if only parties will
+make use of it, whereas such an institution was entirely
+lacking formerly, and if parties wanted an arbitration
+they had to enter on lengthy arrangements about the
+machinery of the process. And the short experience of
+twelve years has already shown how valuable the institution
+is, and how well adapted to induce disputant states
+to make use of it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The proposed
+International
+Prize Court
+and Court
+of Arbitral
+Justice.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_52" id="Section_52">52.</a> The second Peace Conference took, however,
+another great step forward in the resolution to establish
+an international court of appeal in prize matters, and also
+in the proposal about a really permanent international
+court to exist by the side of the Court of Arbitration.
+And the United States of North America have recently
+entered on negotiations with the object of utilizing
+the International Prize Court, should it come into existence,
+as at the same time a permanent tribunal for all
+legal issues. Here present and future touch hands, and
+these proposed institutions must therefore be discussed.
+Attacks upon them have been made from two sides, it
+being asserted that they infringe the principles of the
+equality and sovereignty of states.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_43" id="Page_43" href="#Page_43" title="[Pg 43]"></a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Does the
+constitution
+of the International
+Prize Court
+violate the
+principle of
+the equality
+of states?</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_53" id="Section_53">53.</a> It is alleged that the principle of equality is violated
+in that the Prize Court is contemplated as consisting of
+fifteen members, so that, while the eight Great
+Powers are always represented by a member, the thirty-seven
+smaller states are only represented by seven
+members who take their seats in the court in rotation
+according to a definite plan. Now it is not clear how the
+principle of equality can be deemed violated thereby.
+This principle has really nothing to do with the constitution
+of an international court so long as no state is
+compelled to submit itself to such a tribunal against its
+will. It would be possible to constitute an international
+court without basing it on the representation of definite
+states, and that is very likely to come to pass in the future,
+when fuller confidence in the international judicature is
+felt. In the proposed composition of the Prize Court
+expression is given, undoubtedly, to the actually existing
+<em>political inequality</em> of states, a matter which, however,
+has not the least connexion with their <em>legal equality</em>.
+This political inequality will never disappear from the
+world, and if in course of time the creation of an international
+judicature is really intended, the realization of
+this idea is only possible subject to the existence of
+political inequality. There is little doubt that when we
+come to the constituting of the Prize Court certain smaller
+states will abstain because no permanent representation
+therein is allotted to them. But it may confidently be
+expected that the recalcitrant states will give in their
+adherence in the future, when they begin to see what
+beneficent results the institution has produced.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Does the
+International
+Prize Court
+restrict the
+sovereignty
+of the several
+states?</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_54" id="Section_54">54.</a> The International Prize Court violates the sovereignty
+of states just as little as it violates the principle
+of equality. No state submitting itself to an international<a class="pagenum" name="Page_44" id="Page_44" href="#Page_44" title="[Pg 44]"></a>
+tribunal submits itself thereby to the power of any other
+earthly sovereign so long as no other power is entrusted
+with the execution of the awards of the international
+tribunal, that is to say, so long as submission to any such
+award rests always and entirely on the voluntary submission
+of the state concerned. If this be not correct,
+then there would also be an invasion of sovereignty
+whenever&mdash;as indeed happens everywhere more or less&mdash;a
+state submits itself to the decrees of its own courts,
+and allows its subjects an appeal to its courts against the
+measures of the government. In the latter, as in the
+former case, what we have is merely the demission to the
+determination of the court of the question whether certain
+acts and claims are consistent with law. He who at the
+present day conceives sovereignty as an unlimited arbitrariness
+of conduct is guilty of an anachronism which is
+everywhere contradicted by the mere fact that there are
+such things as international law and constitutional law.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Would the
+formation of
+an international
+Prize Court
+of Appeal
+infringe the
+sovereignty
+of the several
+states?</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_55" id="Section_55">55.</a> It is next alleged that there is a violation of sovereignty
+in the fact that the proposed Prize Court is a
+court of appeal which is to be competent to reverse the
+decisions of national prize courts. There is nothing in
+this objection also, for it rests on a <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">petitio principii</i>. If
+we but get rid of the preconception that a sovereign state
+can only admit an interpretation of law to be authoritative
+for itself when pronounced by its own courts, no
+reason is visible why an award of an international court
+which upsets an award of a national court should be
+considered an infringement of state sovereignty. He who
+alleges it to be an infringement has really in view, however
+unconsciously, the power of execution which is inherent
+in the decrees of a national court, and he is unable to
+conceive a judicial decree without power of execution.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_45" id="Page_45" href="#Page_45" title="[Pg 45]"></a>
+Judicial declarations of law have, however, as little as
+the essence of law itself to do with power of execution;
+otherwise&mdash;as indeed happens in the case of many persons&mdash;the
+law of nations must be denied any legal character.
+Now, just as that system of law is more complete behind
+which there stands a central authority enforcing it by
+compulsion, so also that judicial activity is more complete
+with which physical power of execution is conjoined.
+But alike in the one and in the other case, physical power
+is not an essential element in the conception. Just as
+there is law which in point of fact is not enforceable by
+any central authority, so there can also be jurisdictional
+functions without any correlative power of execution.
+International administration of justice is, in the nature
+of the case, dissociated from any power of this kind;
+therefore, too, it does not impair the sovereignty of
+states.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The powers
+of the International
+Prize Court
+do not curtail
+state-sovereignty.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_56" id="Section_56">56.</a> It is imagined that a trump card is played when it
+is asserted that Article 7 of the Convention, entered into
+at the second Peace Conference, respecting the Prize
+Court, curtails state-sovereignty when it provides that, in
+default of definite agreement and of generally recognized
+rules of the law of nations, the Prize Court is to give its
+decisions in accordance with the principles of justice and
+equity, and that therefore (so the assertion continues) on
+certain points the Prize Court can make international law
+by itself. Whilst up to the present time custom and
+convention have been the two sources of the law of
+nations, the Prize Court&mdash;so it is said&mdash;is now to be added
+as a third, and the law made by it is to become international
+law without requiring the assent of the several
+states. All this argument rests on a false assumption.
+The article in question endues the Prize Court in certain<a class="pagenum" name="Page_46" id="Page_46" href="#Page_46" title="[Pg 46]"></a>
+points with a law-making power which is simply a <em>delegated</em>
+power. The states which are concerned with the
+Prize Court desire, in the interests of legal security, that
+the tribunal should not declare itself incompetent by
+reason of want of existing rules on any given matter.
+They accordingly delegate to this tribunal the power
+which lies in them collectively of making rules of international
+law, and they prospectively declare themselves
+at one with regard to the rules which the tribunal shall
+declare to be binding in the name of justice and equity.
+Now the Prize Court is not hereby made a special and
+independent source of international law by the side of
+convention, but the law which it declares is law resting
+on an agreement between states. Even in the inner life
+of states we meet with delegation of legislative power to
+a limited degree, and yet this does not mean that the
+authorities in question are raised into special and independent
+sources of law side by side with the government
+of the state. And just as in the inner life of a state
+a delegation of legislative power does not involve an
+infringement of sovereignty, so also the delegation of
+legislative power to the Prize Court involves no infringement
+of the sovereignty of the members of the international
+community of states.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Difference
+between
+international
+courts of
+arbitration
+and real
+international
+courts of
+justice.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_57" id="Section_57">57.</a> The step from the International Court of Arbitration
+to the erection of a real international court is, on
+two grounds, a decided step onward. In the first place,
+an arbitral tribunal is not a court in the real sense of the
+word, for its decisions are not necessarily based on rules
+of law, and it does not necessarily deal with legal matters.
+An arbiter, unless the terms of the reference otherwise
+provide, decides <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">ex aequo et bono</i>, whilst a judge founds
+his decision on rules of law and is only applied to on legal<a class="pagenum" name="Page_47" id="Page_47" href="#Page_47" title="[Pg 47]"></a>
+issues. Valuable as it may be in many cases to withdraw
+a matter from the courts and remit it to arbitration, it
+is in other cases equally valuable to have a cause decided
+in legal fashion by a judge. The experience which we
+have so far had of arbitral tribunals shows that they
+make praiseworthy efforts to arrive at a finding which
+shall as far as possible satisfy both parties, and that they
+have in view a compromise rather than a genuine declaration
+of law. Now the cases are, all the same, numerous
+enough in which the parties want a real, genuine declaration
+of law, and so it would be most valuable if a real
+international court were in existence. In the determination
+to erect an International Prize Court it has
+been recognized that prize cases ought not to be brought,
+from occasion to occasion, before an arbitral tribunal
+and there peaceably arranged, but ought to be decided
+by a real court on the basis of the law of prize. If success
+attends the attempt to convert the Prize Court into a
+general international court or if a special international
+court is created, this would render it possible to have
+other international legal disputes also decided by a real
+court upon naked principles of law. Such a possibility
+is in the interest of the parties and also in that of international
+law itself, for it will be held in higher and surer
+esteem if a court is provided for its authoritative interpretation
+and application.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Fundamentals
+of
+arbitration
+in contradistinction
+to administration
+of
+justice by
+a court.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_58" id="Section_58">58.</a> The second ground referred to is that it is a fundamental
+part of the idea of arbitration that in every case
+the choice of the arbiters as men in whom the parties
+have confidence should be left to the parties themselves,
+whilst it is fundamental in the conception of a court that
+it is once and for all composed of judges appointed independently
+of the choice of the parties and permanently<a class="pagenum" name="Page_48" id="Page_48" href="#Page_48" title="[Pg 48]"></a>
+to adjudicate upon matters of law. Such a court secures
+continuity of jurisprudence, affords a guarantee for the
+most exact examination of questions of fact and of law,
+deems itself to a greater or a less degree bound by its
+previous decisions, contributes thereby to the settlement
+of open legal questions, and furthers the growth of law
+while adding to the respect in which it is held. Nothing
+can heighten the respect in which international law is
+held more than the existence of a real international
+court.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Opposition
+to a real
+international
+court.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_59" id="Section_59">59.</a> But, incredible as it may sound, this is not generally
+recognized. It is just among the old champions of the
+arbitral decision of international disputes that the most
+violent opposition is raised to the erection of a real court
+of justice for international law causes. In such a court
+they see a great danger for the future. The fact that
+arbitration has a tendency to furnish rather a decision
+which is as far as possible satisfactory to both parties
+than one which is based on naked law, is just the respect
+which, in the eyes of many, gives it a higher value than
+a real court possesses. Not <em>jural</em> but <em>peaceable</em> settlement
+of disputes is the motto of these men; they do not
+desiderate justice in the sense of existing law, but equity
+such as contents both parties. And they gain support
+and approval from those who see in the law of nations
+rather a diplomatic than a legal branch of knowledge,
+and who therefore resist the upbuilding of the law of
+nations on the foundation of firmer, more precise, and
+more sharply defined rules on the analogy of the municipal
+law of states. These persons range themselves
+against an international court because such a court would
+apply the rules of the law of nations to disputed cases in
+the same way in which the courts of a state apply the<a class="pagenum" name="Page_49" id="Page_49" href="#Page_49" title="[Pg 49]"></a>
+rules of municipal law to disputed cases arising within
+the state; they prefer diplomatic or, at any rate, arbitral
+settlement of disputes between states to the purely legal
+decision thereof. They also contend that an international
+court without an international power of execution
+is an absurdity.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">A real international
+court does
+not endanger
+the
+peaceable
+settlement
+of disputes.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_60" id="Section_60">60.</a> This last objection has already been dealt with above
+(paragraph 55), where it is shown that a judicial award
+as an authoritative declaration of the legitimate character
+of an act or claim has, in and for itself, nothing to do with
+the governmental execution of the award. But as to the
+fear that the erection of an international court might
+endanger the peaceable settlement of disputes and the
+development of international arbitration, that is certainly
+groundless. The contrary is the case, as is shown
+by the fact that the happy movement towards the
+erection of an international court was initiated by the
+United States of North America. This country, which
+since its entry into the international community of
+states has more than any other championed the idea of
+the arbitral adjustment of disputes, and has in practice
+put it to good use, is well aware of the value of arbitration,
+but, on the other hand, it knows also how to prize the
+purely legal decision of legal questions. It has actually
+happened that a state has not ventured to submit a
+certain dispute to arbitration because it feared that its
+claim would not receive jural treatment in this way. It
+is just because the existence of an international court
+would promote the non-warlike settlement of international
+claims that its erection has been put forward.
+The reason is that even with the most careful selection
+of arbiters, one is never certain beforehand as to the
+quarter whence they will derive their ideas of the <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">aequum<a class="pagenum" name="Page_50" id="Page_50" href="#Page_50" title="[Pg 50]"></a>
+et bonum</i>, whilst with a jural settlement of claims the
+decision rests on the sure basis of law. Further, the
+erection of an international court is not intended to
+cause the suppression of the so-called Permanent Court
+of Arbitration; on the contrary, the machinery of this
+latter is to be retained in full existence, so that the parties
+may in every case be able to choose between the Court of
+Arbitration and a real court. The future will show that
+both can render good service side by side.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Composition
+of an international
+court.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_61" id="Section_61">61.</a> If the erection of an international court comes to
+pass, the equipment of it with competent and worthy
+men will be of the highest importance. Their selection
+will have difficulties of all sorts to overcome. The
+peculiar character of international law, the conflict
+between the positive school and the school which would
+derive international law from natural law, the diversity
+of peoples (consequent on diversity of speech and of
+outlook on law and life) and of legal systems and of
+constitutional conceptions, and the like&mdash;all these bring
+the danger that the court in question should become the
+arena of national jealousies, of empty talk, and of political
+collisions of interest, instead of being the citadel of international
+justice. All depends on the spirit in which the
+different governments make the choice of judges. Let
+regard be paid to a good acquaintance with international
+law joined to independence, judicial aptitude, and steadfastness
+of character. Let what is expected of candidates
+be the representation not of political interests but of the
+interests of international jurisprudence. Let nomination
+be made not of such diplomatists as are conversant with
+the law of nations, but of jurists who, while conversant
+with this branch of law, have had the training required
+of members of the highest state judiciary, and have been<a class="pagenum" name="Page_51" id="Page_51" href="#Page_51" title="[Pg 51]"></a>
+tested in practice. Let men be chosen who are masters
+not only of their own language and of French, but also
+of some other of the most widely diffused languages, and
+who possess an acquaintance with foreign legal systems.
+If this be done, all danger will be avoided. Judges so
+selected will speedily adapt themselves to the <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">milieu</i> of
+the international court and be laid hold of by it, and
+their equipment for their task completed. As things are
+at present, the institution of an international court is an
+unheard-of experiment. But the experiment must be
+made at some time, and the hope may be confidently
+entertained that it will be successful. Petty considerations
+based on the weakness of humanity and doubts as
+to the sincerity of the efforts of states to submit themselves
+voluntarily to international tribunals must be
+silenced. Fear of international entanglements and groupings
+is misplaced. National prejudices and rivalries
+must keep in the background. The big state's disdain
+of the little state and the little state's mistrust of the big
+state must give place to mutual respect. Opposed to the
+hope and confidence that the experiment will succeed
+there are no considerations other than those which have
+been arrayed against every step forward in international
+life. They will disappear like clouds when the sun of
+success has once begun to shine upon the activity of the
+International Court.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">International
+courts of
+appeal a
+necessity.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_62" id="Section_62">62.</a> Obviously it will not be possible in the long run to
+stop at a single international court; the erection over the
+court of first instance of an international court of appeal
+is also a necessity. The proposed Prize Court will indeed
+be itself a court of appeal because it cannot be approached
+until one or two national courts have spoken. But the
+proposed International Court of Justice would be a court<a class="pagenum" name="Page_52" id="Page_52" href="#Page_52" title="[Pg 52]"></a>
+of first instance. Now there are no infallible first-instance
+decisions. Even courts are fallible and make
+mistakes. If this is universally recognized for municipal
+administration of justice, it must be recognized for
+international administration of justice, all the more as
+public and not private interests are then in issue. If
+states are to feel bound to rely on their right rather than
+on their might, and to submit it to a judicial decision, it
+must be possible to carry an appeal against a decision of
+the International Court of Justice to a higher tribunal.
+Many advocates of arbitration will not hear of an appeal.
+In this they may be right as regards a real arbitral decision
+given <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">ex aequo et bono</i>, but their arguments lose all force
+before the nakedly jural decision of a real court.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulties which beset the erection of an international
+court and the appointment of its members may
+lead to the renunciation of the immediate establishment
+of an international court of appeal. But when once the
+International Court is in active working, the demand for
+a court of appeal will be raised and it will not be silenced
+until it has been satisfied. It would be premature to
+make proposals now as to the manner in which such
+a court of appeal ought to be composed, and as to the
+way in which it could be brought into existence. It is
+enough to have pointed to the need for it. Directly this
+need makes itself felt, ways and means will be found for
+supplying it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Are international
+courts valueless
+if states
+are not
+bound to
+submit their
+disputes to
+them?</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_63" id="Section_63">63.</a> We next are faced by the objection, what possible
+value can the establishment of international courts
+possess if it be optional to states either to submit
+their causes to them or to rely on arms for a decision
+of those causes? It is, accordingly, asserted that such
+courts can only be of value if states place themselves<a class="pagenum" name="Page_53" id="Page_53" href="#Page_53" title="[Pg 53]"></a>
+under a permanent obligation to submit to them all or
+at any rate the greater number of their disputes. This
+leads to the question of obligatory arbitration treaties,
+which played so prominent a part at the second Peace
+Conference, and will surely come up again at the third
+Conference. I have not the slightest doubt that the
+third or some later Conference will agree on the obligatory
+reference of certain disputes between states to arbitration,
+but the matter is of quite subordinate importance so far
+as the erection of international courts is in question.
+Any one who contemplates international life and the
+relations of states to one another, without prejudice and
+with open eyes, will see quite clearly that, when once
+there exist international courts, states will voluntarily
+submit a whole series of cases to them. These will, at
+first, admittedly, be cases of smaller importance for the
+most part, but in time more important cases will also
+come to them, provided that the jurisprudence developed
+in them is of high quality, and such as to give states
+a guarantee for decisions at once impartial and purely
+jural and free from all political prepossessions. <em>It is the
+existence of the institution which is the vital question now.</em>
+Once the machinery is there, it will be utilized. In all
+states of the world there are movements and forces at
+work to secure the ordered and law-protected settlement
+of international disputes. The existence of an international
+court will strengthen these movements and forces
+and render them so powerful that states will scarcely be
+able to withdraw themselves from their influence. And
+the time when states were ready to draw the sword on
+every opportunity belongs to the past. Even for the
+strongest state war is now an evil, to which recourse is had
+only as <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">ultima ratio</i>, when no other way out presents itself.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_54" id="Page_54" href="#Page_54" title="[Pg 54]"></a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">What is to
+be done if
+a state
+refuses to
+accept the
+decision of
+an international
+court?</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_64" id="Section_64">64.</a> In conclusion the great question is, what is to
+happen if a state declines to accept the decision of the
+international court to which it has appealed?</p>
+
+<p>Important as this question may be in theory, it is
+a minor one in practice. It will scarcely happen in point
+of fact&mdash;assuming that there is an international court of
+appeal above the court of first instance&mdash;that a state will
+refuse a voluntary acceptance of the award of an international
+court. Only slowly, and only when irresistibly
+compelled by their interests so to do, will states submit
+their disputes to international courts. But when this is
+the case these same interests will also compel them to
+accept the award then made.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Executive
+power not
+necessary
+for an
+international
+court.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_65" id="Section_65">65.</a> We have neither desire nor need to equip these
+courts with executive power. In the internal life of
+states it is necessary for courts to possess executive power
+because the conditions of human nature demand it. Just
+as there will always be individual offenders, so there will
+always be individuals who will only yield to compulsion.
+But states are a different kind of person from individual
+men; their present-day constitution on the generally
+prevalent type has made them, so to say, more moral than
+in the times of absolutism. The personal interests and
+ambition of sovereigns, and their passion for an increase
+of their might, have finished playing their part in the
+life of peoples. The real and true interests of states and
+the welfare of the inhabitants of the state have taken
+the place thereof. Machiavellian principles are no longer
+prevalent everywhere. The mutual intercourse of states
+is carried on in reliance on the sacredness of treaties.
+Peaceable adjustment of state disputes is in the interests
+of the states themselves, for war is nowadays an immense
+moral and economic evil even for the victor state. It may<a class="pagenum" name="Page_55" id="Page_55" href="#Page_55" title="[Pg 55]"></a>
+be that a state will decline to submit its cause to the
+international tribunal because it thinks that its vital
+interests do not allow such submission; but when, after
+weighing its interests, it has once declared itself ready to
+appear before the court, it will also accept the court's
+award. All other motives apart, the strong state will do
+this, because its strength allows it to make voluntary
+submission to the award, and the weak state will also do
+so because war would be hopeless for it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Right of
+intervention
+by third
+states and
+war as <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">ultima
+ratio</i>.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_66" id="Section_66">66.</a> If, however, in spite of all, it should happen that
+a state declined such acceptance of an award, the powers
+who were not parties would have and would use the right
+of intervention. For there can be no doubt of the fact
+that all states which took part in the erection of an international
+court would have a right to intervene if a state
+which entered an appearance before an international
+court should refuse to accept its award. And of course,
+in such a case, war is always waiting in the background
+as an <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">ultima ratio</i>; but it is in the background only that
+it waits; while, apart from the erection of an international
+court, it is standing in the foreground. The
+whole problem shows that the development in question
+cannot be rushed, but must proceed slowly and continuously.
+Step can follow step. The economic and other
+interests of states are more powerful than the will of the
+power-wielders of the day. These interests have begotten
+the law of nations, have driven states to arbitration, have
+called forth the establishment of a Permanent Court of
+Arbitration at The Hague, and are now at work compelling
+the erection of international courts. Let us arm ourselves
+with patience and allow these interests to widen their sway;
+they will bring about a voluntary submission to the judgments
+of the international court on the part of all states.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_56" id="Page_56" href="#Page_56" title="[Pg 56]"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV<br />
+<br />
+THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW</h2>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">New tasks
+for the
+science of
+international
+law.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_67" id="Section_67">67.</a> International organization and legislation and
+the establishment of international courts are the business
+of the Hague Peace Conferences; but to work out the
+new enactments and to turn them to good account and to
+prepare for their practical application, this is the business
+of the science of international law. Science obtains
+thereby a share in the future of the law of nations, and
+quite new tasks are allotted to it. As mentioned earlier,
+the law of nations was, until the first of the Peace Conferences,
+essentially a book-law. Treatises depicted the
+law such as it was growing, in the form of custom, out of
+the practice of states in international intercourse. There
+were only a few international enactments, and there was
+no international court practice. But that state of things
+has now been altered once and for all. International
+enactments appear in greater number. Decisions of
+international courts will follow, just as we already possess
+a number of awards of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
+If science is to be equal to its tasks, it must take
+good heed to itself, it must become wholly positive and
+impartial, it must free itself from the domination of
+phrases, and it must become international.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The science
+of international
+law must
+become
+positive.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_68" id="Section_68">68.</a> It is indispensably requisite that this science should
+be positive in character. What natural law and natural
+law methods have done for the law of nations in the past
+stands high above all doubt, but they have lost their<a class="pagenum" name="Page_57" id="Page_57" href="#Page_57" title="[Pg 57]"></a>
+value and importance for present and future times.
+Now and onwards the task is, in the first place, to ascertain
+and to give precision to the rules which have grown up in
+custom, and in the second place to formulate the enacted
+rules in their full content and in their full bearing. In
+doing so it will come to light that there are many gaps
+not yet regulated by law. Many of these gaps may be
+successfully filled up by a discreet employment of analogy,
+but many others will remain which can only be remedied
+by international legislation or by the development of
+customary law in the practice of the courts or otherwise.
+What science can do here is to make proposals <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">de lege
+ferenda</i> of a politico-jural character, but it cannot and
+may not fill up the gaps. Science may also test and
+criticize, from the politico-jural standpoint, the existing
+rules of customary or enacted law, but, on the other hand,
+it may not contest their operation and applicability, even
+if convinced of their worthlessness. It must not be said
+that these are obvious matters and therefore do not need
+special emphasis. There are many recognized rules of
+customary law the operativeness of which is challenged
+by this or that writer because they offend his sense of
+what is right and proper. As an example thereof let us
+take the refusal by some well-reputed writers to include
+annexation after effective conquest (<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">debellatio</i>) among the
+modes, known to international law, of acquisition of
+state territory. They teach that <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">debellatio</i> has no consequences
+in point of law, but only in point of fact; that it
+rests on naked might and brings the annexed area under
+the power of the victor only in point of fact and not in
+point of law. Here they are putting their politico-jural
+convictions in the place of a generally recognized rule
+of law.<a class="pagenum" name="Page_58" id="Page_58" href="#Page_58" title="[Pg 58]"></a></p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The science
+of international
+law
+must be
+impartial.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_69" id="Section_69">69.</a> Science cannot, however, be genuinely positive
+unless it is impartial and free from political animosities
+and national bias. To believe that it really is at present
+impartial is a great deception. Whoever compares the
+writings of the publicists of the several states runs up
+against the contrary at every step. There is no state
+which in the past has not allowed itself to be guilty of
+offences against international law, but its writers on international
+law seldom admit that this has been the case.
+They perceive the mote in the eye of other nations, but
+not the beam in the eye of their own nation. Their
+writings teem with ungrounded complaints against other
+nations, but scarcely throw the slightest blame on their
+own country. By such a method problems are not
+brought nearer to solution, but only shoved on to one side.
+What is wanted, is that an ear should be lent to the
+principle <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">audiatur et altera pars</i>, that the opponent should
+be heard and his motives weighed. It will then often
+turn out that what was believed to merit reprobation,
+as a breach of law, will show itself to be a one-sided
+but forceful solution of a disputed question. And even
+where a real breach of law has been committed it will be
+worth while to weigh the political motives and interests
+which have driven the perpetrator to it. It must ever be
+kept in mind that at the present day no state lightheartedly
+commits a breach of the law of nations, and
+that, when it does commit such a breach, it is generally
+because it deems its highest political interests to be in
+jeopardy. Such a weighing of motives and interests does
+not mean excusing the breach of law, but only trying to
+understand it.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The science
+of international
+law
+must free
+itself from
+the tyranny
+of phrases.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_70" id="Section_70">70.</a> It is also indispensable that the science should free
+itself from the tyranny of phrases. As things are, there<a class="pagenum" name="Page_59" id="Page_59" href="#Page_59" title="[Pg 59]"></a>
+is scarcely a doctrine of the law of nations which is wholly
+free from the tyranny of phrases. The so-called fundamental
+rights are their arena, and the doctrines of state-sovereignty
+and of the equality of states are in large
+measure dominated by them. Any one who is in touch
+with the application of international law in diplomatic
+practice hears from statesmen every day the complaint
+that books put forth fanciful doctrines instead of the
+actual rules of law. Now it is often not difficult to push
+the irrelevant to one side and to extract what is legally
+essential from the waste of phrase-ridden discourse.
+But there are entire areas in which the tyranny of phrases
+so turns the head that rules which absolutely never were
+rules of law are represented as such. Two conspicuous
+examples may serve to illustrate this statement.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The meaning
+of
+'<i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson
+geht vor
+Kriegsmanier</i>'.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_71" id="Section_71">71.</a> My first example is taken from the use made of
+the German maxim '<i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier</i>'.
+This maxim is a very old one, and there was nothing
+in the law of nations which stood in the way of its
+unreserved acceptance so long as there was no real
+<em>law</em> of war, but the conduct of war rested only on
+a fluctuating number of general <em>usages</em>. The meaning
+of '<em lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">manier</em>' is '<em>usage</em>', and '<i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier</i>'
+means that the usages of war can be pushed aside
+when the reason of war demands it. At the present day,
+however, the conduct of war is no longer entirely under
+the control of <em>usages</em>, but under the control of <em>enacted
+rules of law</em> to be found in the 'Regulations respecting the
+laws of land war', and the application of the old saw to
+these legal rules can only lead to abuses and erroneous
+interpretations. What it says is, in short, nothing else
+than this: If the reason of war demands it, everything
+is permissible. But since the first Hague Peace Conference<a class="pagenum" name="Page_60" id="Page_60" href="#Page_60" title="[Pg 60]"></a>
+that is definitely no longer the case. Article 22
+of the 'Regulations respecting the laws of land war'
+expressly says that belligerents have not an unlimited
+right of choice of means of injuring the enemy. <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson</i>,
+therefore, cannot justify everything. Some enacted
+rules about the conduct of war are, indeed, framed with
+such latitude as to allow scope for the operation of
+<i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson</i>. But most of them do not leave it any
+scope, and they may not remain unobserved even if
+<i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson</i> were to make it desirable. It must be
+admitted that the general principle of the law of nations,
+that such acts as are absolutely necessary for self-preservation
+may be excused even though illegal, is applicable
+to the law of war also. And, further, in the exercise of
+justified reprisals, many enacted rules of war can be set
+aside. But mere <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson</i> never extends so far as to
+dispense with enacted rules of war. Nevertheless numerous
+well-reputed German authors teach the contrary, and
+even those who perceive the falsity of this doctrine still
+retain the old saying and identify <i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson</i> with the
+narrower idea of military necessity. If we are to arrive
+at clearness, if possible abuses are not to receive in
+advance the sheltering protection of law, the maxim
+'<i lang="de" xml:lang="de">Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier</i>' must disappear from
+the science of international law. It has lost its meaning
+and has become an empty but dangerous phrase.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The doctrine
+of Rousseau
+concerning
+war.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_72" id="Section_72">72.</a> My second example is taken from the use to which
+an assertion of Rousseau is commonly put. In his
+<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Contrat Social</i>, Bk. I, ch. iv, is the following passage:
+'War, then, is not a relation of man to man, but a relation
+of states in which private persons are enemies only
+accidentally; not as men nor even as citizens, but as
+soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its<a class="pagenum" name="Page_61" id="Page_61" href="#Page_61" title="[Pg 61]"></a>
+defenders. In a word, each state can only have as
+enemies other states and not men; seeing that no true
+relation can exist between things of different natures.'</p>
+
+<p>It is in this assertion of Rousseau that a basis is found
+for a quite common doctrine to the effect that war is
+a relation only between the belligerent states and their
+contending forces. See how much else has been deduced
+from this principle and demanded on the strength of it!
+That blockade is only permissible in the case of naval
+ports and fortified coast-towns, and not in the case of
+other ports and places. That breach of blockade is as
+little punishable as carriage of contraband, seeing that
+it is but a commercial act of peaceable individuals, it
+being immaterial whether they are subjects of a neutral
+power or of the enemy. That the capture of enemy
+merchant vessels on the high seas is unlawful, because
+these vessels are dedicated to peaceful trade alone, and
+have naught to do with hostilities. That peaceful intercourse,
+and especially commercial intercourse, between
+the subjects of the belligerents cannot be forbidden.
+And more of the same kind.</p>
+
+<p>If now we examine more closely, we find that there is
+a sound principle at the core of Rousseau's doctrine, but
+that the sentence 'war is merely a relation between the
+belligerent states and their contending forces' is an
+empty, untenable phrase. The sound central principle
+is that in fact, according to modern conceptions, war is
+a struggle between the belligerent states, carried on by
+means of their military and naval forces, and that their
+subjects can only be attacked or taken prisoners so far as
+they take part in hostilities, and that, if they behave
+quietly and peaceably, they are spared harsh treatment
+as far as possible. But to assume on that account that<a class="pagenum" name="Page_62" id="Page_62" href="#Page_62" title="[Pg 62]"></a>
+a war in which his state is engaged does not affect a
+subject, and that he is not brought thereby into hostile
+relations to the other side so long as he abstains from any
+active part in hostilities&mdash;this deals a blow in the face
+to all the actual facts of war. Certainly, a peaceable
+subject does enjoy exemption from avoidable severities,
+but he is none the less the object of coercive measures.
+If at the outbreak of a war he be resident in the territory
+of the enemy, cannot he be expelled? If he contribute
+to a loan raised by the enemy, will not his own state
+punish him for treason? Is it not the law of many states
+that if they go to war, an end is put to peaceful intercourse,
+and especially commercial intercourse, between
+their own subjects and the subjects of the enemy state?
+Must not the private person submit to requisitions, pay
+contributions, endure limitations on his freedom of
+movement, and obey the commands of the hostile occupant?
+Is not his property on many occasions&mdash;for
+example, during a siege or a bombardment, or on the field
+of battle&mdash;destroyed without compensation? Must he
+not, if his fatherland is completely conquered and annexed
+by the enemy, reconcile himself to becoming a subject of
+the enemy? Whoever has lived in a district occupied by
+an enemy knows what an empty phrase the assertion is,
+that war is not a hostile relation between a belligerent
+state and the subjects of its enemy. Yet the phrase,
+nevertheless, wanders from book to book and from
+mouth to mouth, and must always be available whenever
+wanted in order to justify some assertion which contradicts
+the recognized rules of warfare. The kernel of
+truth in Rousseau's doctrine is this, that while the soldier
+is put in an actively hostile position, the peaceable subject
+of a belligerent is put in a passively hostile position; but<a class="pagenum" name="Page_63" id="Page_63" href="#Page_63" title="[Pg 63]"></a>
+the doctrine is absolutely misunderstood, although the
+distinction which it asserts is quite commonly recognized.
+And so here also it must be repeated that, if we are to
+arrive at clearness, if baseless claims are not to appear
+under the cover of law, the phrase 'War is only a relation
+between the belligerent states and their contending forces'
+must disappear, as being misleading, from the science of
+international law.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">The science
+of international
+law
+must become
+international.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_73" id="Section_73">73.</a> It is, finally, a pressing necessity that the science
+of international law should become international. The
+science of international law is essentially a branch of the
+science of law, and it can only thrive if this dependence
+be not suppressed. Now the science of law must, of
+necessity, be a national one, even if at the same time it
+employs the comparative method. On this ground the
+science of international law, forming always a part of
+a national science of law, must in this sense be national.
+When, despite this, I insist that it must become international,
+what I have before my eyes is merely the
+requirement that it should not limit itself to the employment
+of national literature and the jurisprudence of
+national courts, and that it must make itself acquainted
+with foreign juristic methods.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Necessary
+to consult
+foreign
+literature
+on international
+law.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_74" id="Section_74">74.</a> There is as yet scarcely any systematic reference
+to foreign literature on international law. Monographs
+may possibly cite the old editions of some wellnigh
+obsolete text-books, but, with individual laudable exceptions,
+there is scarcely any suggestion of the real utilization
+of foreign literature. This defect is, admittedly, to
+be attributed not so much to writers themselves as to the
+fact that foreign literature is for the most part inaccessible
+to them. There ought to be in every state at least <em>one</em>
+library which devotes especial attention to international<a class="pagenum" name="Page_64" id="Page_64" href="#Page_64" title="[Pg 64]"></a>
+law, and makes, on a well-elaborated plan, a judicious
+collection of foreign literature on the subject, particularly
+foreign periodicals.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Necessary to
+understand
+foreign
+juristic
+methods.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_75" id="Section_75">75.</a> In worse plight than even the employment of
+foreign literature is the understanding of foreign juristic
+methods. And yet without such an understanding the
+gates are thrown open for misconceptions, for unfounded
+claims, and for mutual recriminations. How great is the
+divergence of juristic method can only be appreciated by
+one who has practised and been called to the teaching of
+law in different countries. Now, just as the outlook of
+its people is incorporated in the law of every state, so the
+specific mode of thought and the logical attitude of
+any given people are mirrored in its juristic methods.
+Historical tradition, political interdependence, and other
+accidental influences do indeed also play a great part
+therein, but the fundamental factor is the difference of
+modes of thought and points of view. Seeing, then, that
+the law of nations is one and the same for every member
+of the community of states, but that on the other hand
+the science of every state elaborates the law of nations
+on the basis of its national juristic methods, it is unavoidable
+that discord should arise if the science of international
+law of individual states neglect to acquaint itself
+with foreign juristic methods. It is not only in scientific
+treatises, but also in judicial decisions, that expression is
+given to these methods, and the discordance between
+judicial decisions on the same issue given in different
+states is often traceable simply to the difference of
+juristic method. That the law is essentially the same
+is no guarantee that in all countries there will be
+a unanimity of judicial pronouncement on every point
+thereof. If ever&mdash;and it is not outside the range of<a class="pagenum" name="Page_65" id="Page_65" href="#Page_65" title="[Pg 65]"></a>
+practical possibility&mdash;an international agreement, including
+all states, were arrived at concerning all the topics of
+the so-called international private law and international
+criminal law, there would, for the reason under consideration,
+still continue to be no security that the same law
+would in every point receive the same treatment from the
+courts of all countries. In order to attain this end there
+would have to be an international tribunal erected above
+the municipal courts of all states, and its judgments would
+have to be accepted as binding by the municipal courts
+concerned. It is just for this reason that the proposed
+International Prize Court and the proposed permanent
+court for international disputes will aim in the course of
+their practice at securing an identical application of the
+rules of the law of nations. And the joint labours of
+judges of diverse nationalities in these international courts
+will influence their mutual understanding in a manner
+which will be serviceable to the juristic methods of the
+different peoples.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<p><a class="pagenum" name="Page_66" id="Page_66" href="#Page_66" title="[Pg 66]"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CONCLUSION" id="CONCLUSION"></a>CONCLUSION</h2>
+
+
+<div class="sidenote">The aims
+defended are
+not Utopian.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_76" id="Section_76">76.</a> We have reached the end. I have conducted the
+reader over wide areas, and have put before him aims
+which cannot be immediately attained. But these aims
+are not on that account nebulous and Utopian. We are
+already on the way which leads to them, even though
+a long time will still be required before we draw quite
+near. This hope may be with certainty indulged in,
+because the forces at work for the organic development
+of the community of states are ever gathering strength.
+The governments of states may continue an obstinate
+opposition to these forces, but in the end they must give
+way. Economic interests primarily, but many others
+also, prevent individual states from allowing the international
+community of states to remain unorganized any
+longer. Slowly indeed, and only by degrees, and to
+a large extent unwillingly and of compulsion, but nevertheless
+step by step, states will be impelled onwards
+towards a goal still in part unknown. It is amusing to
+observe the parts which individual states play in this
+process of development. At one time it is one power,
+and at another time another power, that is led by its
+interests to seize on the leading rôle, and make progressive
+proposals. At one time a progressive proposal
+is joyfully welcomed, at another it is declined, at another
+time it meets with partial assent and partial dissent.
+In the matter before us the United States of North
+America play a very prominent part; they have the<a class="pagenum" name="Page_67" id="Page_67" href="#Page_67" title="[Pg 67]"></a>
+merit of having taken a most conspicuous share in the
+development of the law of nations, especially of the law
+of neutrality. It was America that moved for the erection
+of a permanent international court, and in any event
+she will not give up the idea even if she cannot secure its
+speedy realization.</p>
+
+<div class="sidenote">Obstacles to
+progress.</div>
+
+<p><a name="Section_77" id="Section_77">77.</a> Favourable as the auspices are for continuous progress,
+there are not wanting, on the other hand, influences
+and circumstances opposed to progress.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, there is national chauvinism, to
+which the existence of a law of nations is hateful, and
+which represents unlimited national self-seeking. Where
+it obtains the upper hand, international conflicts are
+unavoidable, and cannot be composed by a judicial
+sentence. In the second place, there is the fact that the
+political equilibrium, on which the whole law of nations
+rests, presents itself as a system liable to gradual as well
+as to sudden alteration. Were the earth's surface
+permanently divided between equally great and equally
+powerful states, the political equilibrium would be stable,
+but it is rooted in the nature of things that this equilibrium
+can only be unstable. The reason is that individual
+states are subject to a perpetual process of evolution, and
+thereby to perpetual change. This evolution is for one
+state upwards, for another downwards. No state is permanently
+assured against break-up, and it is the break-up
+of existing states and the rise of new states that
+threaten the permanent organization of the international
+community of states with danger. There is also another
+factor demanding attention, and that is the opposition
+between West and East, although the glorious example
+of Japan shows that the nations of the East are indeed
+capable of putting themselves on the plane of Western<a class="pagenum" name="Page_68" id="Page_68" href="#Page_68" title="[Pg 68]"></a>
+civilization, and of taking a place in the sun in the international
+community of states.</p>
+
+<p>However this may be, we must move onward, putting
+our trust in the power of goodness, which in the course
+of history leads mankind under its propitious guidance
+to ever higher degrees of perfection.</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Future of International Law, by Lassa Oppenheim
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+</pre>
+
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