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diff --git a/32701-8.txt b/32701-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..844a57e --- /dev/null +++ b/32701-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10693 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Kant's Theory of Knowledge, by Harold Arthur +Prichard + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Kant's Theory of Knowledge + + +Author: Harold Arthur Prichard + + + +Release Date: June 5, 2010 [eBook #32701] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE*** + + +E-text prepared by Meredith Bach, lizardcry, and the Project Gutenberg +Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page +images generously made available by Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries +(http://www.archive.org/details/toronto) + + + +Note: Images of the original pages are available through + Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See + http://www.archive.org/details/kantknowledge00pricuoft + + +Transcriber's note: + + 1. Text in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_). + + 2. The original text includes Greek characters. For this text + version these letters have been replaced with transliterations + represented within square brackets [Greek: ]. Also greek + letters alpha and beta are represented as [alpha] and [beta] + in this text. + + 3. A subscript is indicated by an underscore followed by the + subscript in curly braces. For example, a_{2} indicates a with + subscript 2. + + 4. Footnotes have been moved to the end of the paragraph + wherein they have been referred to. + + 5. Other than the corrections listed above, printer's + inconsistencies in spelling, punctuation and hyphenation have + been retained. + + + + + +KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE + +by + +H. A. PRICHARD + +Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford + + + + + + + +Oxford +At the Clarendon Press +1909 + +Henry Frowde, M.A. +Publisher to the University of Oxford +London, Edinburgh, New York +Toronto and Melbourne + + + + +PREFACE + + +This book is an attempt to think out the nature and tenability of +Kant's Transcendental Idealism, an attempt animated by the conviction +that even the elucidation of Kant's meaning, apart from any criticism, +is impossible without a discussion on their own merits of the main +issues which he raises. + +My obligations are many and great: to Caird's _Critical Philosophy of +Kant_ and to the translations of Meiklejohn, Max Müller, and Professor +Mahaffy; to Mr. J. A. Smith, Fellow of Balliol College, and to Mr. H. +W. B. Joseph, Fellow of New College, for what I have learned from them +in discussion; to Mr. A. J. Jenkinson, Fellow of Brasenose College, +for reading and commenting on the first half of the MS.; to Mr. H. H. +Joachim, Fellow of Merton College, for making many important +suggestions, especially with regard to matters of translation; to Mr. +Joseph, for reading the whole of the proofs and for making many +valuable corrections; and, above all, to my wife for constant and +unfailing help throughout, and to Professor Cook Wilson, to have been +whose pupil I count the greatest of philosophical good fortunes. Some +years ago it was my privilege to be a member of a class with which +Professor Cook Wilson read a portion of Kant's _Critique of Pure +Reason_, and subsequently I have had the advantage of discussing with +him several of the more important passages. I am especially indebted +to him in my discussion of the following topics: the distinction +between the Sensibility and the Understanding (pp. 27-31, 146-9, +162-6), the term 'form of perception' (pp. 37, 40, 133 fin.-135), the +_Metaphysical Exposition of Space_ (pp. 41-8), Inner Sense (Ch. V, +and pp. 138-9), the _Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories_ (pp. +149-53), Kant's account of 'the reference of representations to an +object' (pp. 178-86), an implication of perspective (p. 90), the +impossibility of a 'theory' of knowledge (p. 245), and the points +considered, pp. 200 med.-202 med., 214 med.-215 med., and 218. The +views expressed in the pages referred to originated from Professor +Cook Wilson, though it must not be assumed that he would accept them +in the form in which they are there stated. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + CHAPTER I PAGE + THE PROBLEM OF THE _Critique_ 1 + + CHAPTER II + THE SENSIBILITY AND THE UNDERSTANDING 27 + + CHAPTER III + SPACE 36 + + CHAPTER IV + PHENOMENA AND THINGS IN THEMSELVES 71 + + NOTE + THE FIRST ANTINOMY 101 + + CHAPTER V + TIME AND INNER SENSE 103 + + CHAPTER VI + KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY 115 + + CHAPTER VII + THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 140 + + CHAPTER VIII + THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 161 + + CHAPTER IX + GENERAL CRITICISM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE + CATEGORIES 214 + + CHAPTER X + THE SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES 246 + + CHAPTER XI + THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES 260 + + CHAPTER XII + THE ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE 268 + + CHAPTER XIII + THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT 308 + + NOTE + THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM 319 + + + + +REFERENCES + + + A = First edition of the _Critique of Pure Reason_. + B = Second edition of the _Critique of Pure Reason_. + Prol. = Kant's _Prolegomena to any future Metaphysic_. + M = Meiklejohn's Translation of the _Critique of Pure Reason_. + Mah. = Mahaffy. Translation of Kant's _Prolegomena to any future + Metaphysic_. (The pages referred to are those of the first + edition; these are also to be found in the text of the + second edition.) + Caird = Caird's _Critical Philosophy of Kant_. + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE PROBLEM OF THE _CRITIQUE_ + + +The problem of the _Critique_ may be stated in outline and +approximately in Kant's own words as follows. + +Human reason is called upon to consider certain questions, which it +cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it +cannot answer. These questions relate to God, freedom of the will, and +immortality. And the name for the subject which has to deal with these +questions is metaphysics. At one time metaphysics was regarded as the +queen of all the sciences, and the importance of its aim justified the +title. At first the subject, propounding as it did a dogmatic system, +exercised a despotic sway. But its subsequent failure brought it into +disrepute. It has constantly been compelled to retrace its steps; +there has been fundamental disagreement among philosophers, and no +philosopher has successfully refuted his critics. Consequently the +current attitude to the subject is one of weariness and indifference. +Yet humanity cannot really be indifferent to such problems; even those +who profess indifference inevitably make metaphysical assertions; and +the current attitude is a sign not of levity but of a refusal to put +up with the illusory knowledge offered by contemporary philosophy. Now +the objects of metaphysics, God, freedom, and immortality, are not +objects of experience in the sense in which a tree or a stone is an +object of experience. Hence our views about them cannot be due to +experience; they must somehow be apprehended by pure reason, i. e. by +thinking and without appeal to experience. Moreover, it is in fact by +thinking that men have always tried to solve the problems concerning +God, freedom, and immortality. What, then, is the cause of the +unsatisfactory treatment of these problems and men's consequent +indifference? It must, in some way, lie in a failure to attain the +sure scientific method, and really consists in the neglect of an +inquiry which should be a preliminary to all others in metaphysics. +Men ought to have begun with a critical investigation of pure reason +itself. Reason should have examined its own nature, to ascertain in +general the extent to which it is capable of attaining knowledge +without the aid of experience. This examination will decide whether +reason is able to deal with the problems of God, freedom, and +immortality at all; and without it no discussion of these problems +will have a solid foundation. It is this preliminary investigation +which the _Critique of Pure Reason_ proposes to undertake. Its aim is +to answer the question, 'How far can reason go, without the material +presented and the aid furnished by experience?' and the result +furnishes the solution, or at least the key to the solution, of all +metaphysical problems. + +Kant's problem, then, is similar to Locke's. Locke states[1] that his +purpose is to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of +human knowledge; and he says, "If, by this inquiry into the nature of +the understanding I can discover the powers thereof; how far they +reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where +they fail us; I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind +of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its +comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; +and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon +examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities." +Thus, to use Dr. Caird's analogy,[2] the task which both Locke and +Kant set themselves resembled that of investigating a telescope, +before turning it upon the stars, to determine its competence for the +work. + + [1] Locke's _Essay_, i, 1, §§ 2, 4. + + [2] Caird, i, 10. + +The above outline of Kant's problem is of course only an outline. Its +definite formulation is expressed in the well-known question, 'How are +_a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?'[3] To determine the meaning +of this question it is necessary to begin with some consideration of +the terms '_a priori_' and 'synthetic'. + + [3] B. 19, M. 12. + +While there is no difficulty in determining what Kant would have +recognized as an _a priori_ judgement, there is difficulty in +determining what he meant by calling such a judgement _a priori_. The +general account is given in the first two sections of the +Introduction. An _a priori_ judgement is introduced as something +opposed to an _a posteriori_ judgement, or a judgement which has its +source in experience. Instances of the latter would be 'This body is +heavy', and 'This body is hot'. The point of the word 'experience' is +that there is direct apprehension of some individual, e. g. an +individual body. To say that a judgement has its source in experience +is of course to imply a distinction between the judgement and +experience, and the word 'source' may be taken to mean that the +judgement depends for its validity upon the experience of the +individual thing to which the judgement relates. An _a priori_ +judgement, then, as first described, is simply a judgement which is +not _a posteriori_. It is independent of all experience; in other +words, its validity does not depend on the experience of individual +things. It might be illustrated by the judgement that all three-sided +figures must have three angles. So far, then, no positive meaning has +been given to _a priori_.[4] + + [4] Kant is careful to exclude from the class of _a priori_ + judgements proper what may be called relatively _a priori_ + judgements, viz. judgements which, though not independent of + all experience, are independent of experience of the facts to + which they relate. "Thus one would say of a man who + undermined the foundations of his house that he might have + known _a priori_ that it would fall down, i. e. that he did + not need to wait for the experience of its actual falling + down. But still he could not know this wholly _a priori_, for + he had first to learn through experience that bodies are + heavy and consequently fall, if their supports are taken + away." (B. 2, M. 2.) + +Kant then proceeds, not as we should expect, to state the positive +meaning of _a priori_; but to give tests for what is _a priori_. Since +a test implies a distinction between itself and what is tested, it is +implied that the meaning of _a priori_ is already known.[5] + + [5] It may be noted that in this passage (Introduction, §§ 1 + and 2) Kant is inconsistent in his use of the term 'pure'. + Pure knowledge is introduced as a species of _a priori_ + knowledge: "_A priori_ knowledge, if nothing empirical is + mixed with it, is called pure". (B. 3, M. 2, 17.) And in + accordance with this, the proposition 'every change has a + cause' is said to be _a priori_ but impure, because the + conception of change can only be derived from experience. Yet + immediately afterwards, pure, being opposed in general to + empirical, can only mean _a priori_. Again, in the phrase + 'pure _a priori_' (B. 4 fin., M. 3 med.), the context shows + that 'pure' adds nothing to '_a priori_', and the proposition + 'every change must have a cause' is expressly given as an + instance of pure _a priori_ knowledge. The inconsistency of + this treatment of the causal rule is explained by the fact + that in the former passage he is thinking of the conception + of change as empirical, while in the latter he is thinking of + the judgement as not empirical. At bottom in this passage + 'pure' simply means _a priori_. + +The tests given are necessity and strict universality.[6] Since +judgements which are necessary and strictly universal cannot be based +on experience, their existence is said to indicate another source of +knowledge. And Kant gives as illustrations, (1) any proposition in +mathematics, and (2) the proposition 'Every change must have a cause'. + + [6] In reality, these tests come to the same thing, for + necessity means the necessity of connexion between the + subject and predicate of a judgement, and since empirical + universality, to which strict universality is opposed, means + numerical universality, as illustrated by the proposition + 'All bodies are heavy', the only meaning left for strict + universality is that of a universality reached not through an + enumeration of instances, but through the apprehension of a + necessity of connexion. + +So far Kant has said nothing which determines the positive meaning of +_a priori_. A clue is, however, to be found in two subsequent phrases. +He says that we may content ourselves with having established as a +fact the pure use of our faculty of knowledge.[7] And he adds that not +only in judgements, but even in conceptions, is an _a priori_ origin +manifest.[8] The second statement seems to make the _a priori_ +character of a judgement consist in its origin. As this origin cannot +be experience, it must, as the first statement implies, lie in our +faculty of knowledge. Kant's point is that the existence of universal +and necessary judgements shows that we must possess a faculty of +knowledge capable of yielding knowledge without appeal to experience. +The term _a priori_, then, has some reference to the existence of this +faculty; in other words, it gives expression to a doctrine of 'innate +ideas'. Perhaps, however, it is hardly fair to press the phrase +'_test_ of _a priori_ judgements'. If so, it may be said that on the +whole, by _a priori_ judgements Kant really means judgements which are +universal and necessary, and that he regards them as implying a +faculty which gives us knowledge without appeal to experience. + + [7] B. 5, M. 4. + + [8] Ibid. + +We may now turn to the term 'synthetic judgement'. Kant distinguishes +analytic and synthetic judgements thus. In any judgement the predicate +B either belongs to the subject A, as something contained (though +covertly) in the conception A, or lies completely outside the +conception A, although it stands in relation to it. In the former case +the judgement is called analytic, in the latter synthetic.[9] 'All +bodies are extended' is an analytic judgement; 'All bodies are heavy' +is synthetic. It immediately follows that only synthetic judgements +extend our knowledge; for in making an analytic judgement we are only +clearing up our conception of the subject. This process yields no new +knowledge, for it only gives us a clearer view of what we know +already. Further, all judgements based on experience are synthetic, +for it would be absurd to base an analytical judgement on experience, +when to make the judgement we need not go beyond our own conceptions. +On the other hand, _a priori_ judgements are sometimes analytic and +sometimes synthetic. For, besides analytical judgements, all +judgements in mathematics and certain judgements which underlie +physics are asserted independently of experience, and they are +synthetic. + + [9] B. 10, M. 7. + +Here Kant is obviously right in vindicating the synthetic character of +mathematical judgements. In the arithmetical judgement 7 + 5 = 12, the +thought of certain units as a group of twelve is no mere repetition of +the thought of them as a group of five added to a group of seven. +Though the same units are referred to, they are regarded differently. +Thus the thought of them as twelve means either that we think of them +as formed by adding one unit to a group of eleven, or that we think of +them as formed by adding two units to a group of ten, and so on. And +the assertion is that the same units, which can be grouped in one way, +can also be grouped in another. Similarly, Kant is right in pointing +out that the geometrical judgement, 'A straight line between two +points is the shortest,' is synthetic, on the ground that the +conception of straightness is purely qualitative,[10] while the +conception of shortest distance implies the thought of quantity. + + [10] Straightness means identity of direction. + +It should now be an easy matter to understand the problem expressed +by the question, 'How are _a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?' +Its substance may be stated thus. The existence of _a posteriori_ +synthetic judgements presents no difficulty. For experience is +equivalent to perception, and, as we suppose, in perception we are +confronted with reality, and apprehend it as it is. If I am asked, +'How do I know that my pen is black or my chair hard?' I answer that +it is because I see or feel it to be so. In such cases, then, when my +assertion is challenged, I appeal to my experience or perception of +the reality to which the assertion relates. My appeal raises no +difficulty because it conforms to the universal belief that if +judgements are to rank as knowledge, they must be made to conform to +the nature of things, and that the conformity is established by appeal +to actual experience of the things. But do _a priori_ synthetic +judgements satisfy this condition? Apparently not. For when I assert +that every straight line is the shortest way between its extremities, +I have not had, and never can have, experience of all possible +straight lines. How then can I be sure that all cases will conform to +my judgement? In fact, how can I anticipate my experience at all? How +can I make an assertion about any individual until I have had actual +experience of it? In an _a priori_ synthetic judgement the mind in +some way, in virtue of its own powers and independently of experience, +makes an assertion to which it claims that reality must conform. Yet +why should reality conform? _A priori_ judgements of the other +kind, viz. analytic judgements, offer no difficulty, since they +are at bottom tautologies, and consequently denial of them is +self-contradictory and meaningless. But there is difficulty where a +judgement asserts that a term B is connected with another term A, B +being neither identical with nor a part of A. In this case there is no +contradiction in asserting that A is not B, and it would seem that +only experience can determine whether all A is or is not B. Otherwise +we are presupposing that things must conform to our ideas about them. +Now metaphysics claims to make _a priori_ synthetic judgements, for it +does not base its results on any appeal to experience. Hence, before +we enter upon metaphysics, we really ought to investigate our right to +make _a priori_ synthetic judgements at all. Therein, in fact, lies +the importance to metaphysics of the existence of such judgements in +mathematics and physics. For it shows that the difficulty is not +peculiar to metaphysics, but is a general one shared by other +subjects; and the existence of such judgements in mathematics is +specially important because there their validity or certainty has +never been questioned.[11] The success of mathematics shows that at any +rate under certain conditions _a priori_ synthetic judgements are +valid, and if we can determine these conditions, we shall be able to +decide whether such judgements are possible in metaphysics. In this +way we shall be able to settle a disputed case of their validity by +examination of an undisputed case. The general problem, however, is +simply to show what it is which makes _a priori_ synthetic judgements +as such possible; and there will be three cases, those of mathematics, +of physics, and of metaphysics. + + [11] Kant points out that this certainty has usually been + attributed to the analytic character of mathematical + judgements, and it is of course vital to his argument that + he should be successful in showing that they are really + synthetic. + +The outline of the solution of this problem is contained in the +Preface to the Second Edition. There Kant urges that the key is to be +found by consideration of mathematics and physics. If the question be +raised as to what it is that has enabled these subjects to advance, in +both cases the answer will be found to lie in a change of method. +"Since the earliest times to which the history of human reason +reaches, mathematics has, among that wonderful nation the Greeks, +followed the safe road of a science. Still it is not to be supposed +that it was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to +construct for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which +reason has only to do with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it +must have remained long in the stage of groping (chiefly among the +Egyptians), and that this change is to be ascribed to a _revolution_, +due to the happy thought of one man, through whose experiment the path +to be followed was rendered unmistakable for future generations, and +the certain way of a science was entered upon and sketched out once +for all.... A new light shone upon the first man (Thales, or whatever +may have been his name) who demonstrated the properties of the +isosceles triangle; for he found that he ought not to investigate +that which he saw in the figure or even the mere conception of the +same, and learn its properties from this, but that he ought to produce +the figure by virtue of that which he himself had thought into it _a +priori_ in accordance with conceptions and had represented (by means +of a construction), and that in order to know something with certainty +_a priori_ he must not attribute to the figure any property other than +that which necessarily follows from that which he has himself +introduced into the figure, in accordance with his conception."[12] + + [12] B. x-xii, M. xxvi. + +Here Kant's point is as follows. Geometry remained barren so long as +men confined themselves either to the empirical study of individual +figures, of which the properties were to be discovered by observation, +or to the consideration of the mere conception of various kinds of +figure, e. g. of an isosceles triangle. In order to advance, men had +in some sense to produce the figure through their own activity, and in +the act of constructing it to recognize that certain features were +necessitated by those features which they had given to the figure in +constructing it. Thus men had to make a triangle by drawing three +straight lines so as to enclose a space, and then to recognize that +three angles must have been made by the same process. In this way the +mind discovered a general rule, which must apply to all cases, because +the mind itself had determined the nature of the cases. A property B +follows from a nature A; all instances of A must possess the property +B, because they have solely that nature A which the mind has given +them and whatever is involved in A. The mind's own rule holds good in +all cases, because the mind has itself determined the nature of the +cases. + +Kant's statements about physics, though not the same, are analogous. +Experiment, he holds, is only fruitful when reason does not follow +nature in a passive spirit, but compels nature to answer its own +questions. Thus, when Torricelli made an experiment to ascertain +whether a certain column of air would sustain a given weight, he had +previously calculated that the quantity of air was just sufficient to +balance the weight, and the significance of the experiment lay in his +expectation that nature would conform to his calculations and in the +vindication of this expectation. Reason, Kant says, must approach +nature not as a pupil but as a judge, and this attitude forms the +condition of progress in physics. + +The examples of mathematics and physics suggest, according to Kant, +that metaphysics may require a similar revolution of standpoint, the +lack of which will account for its past failure. An attempt should +therefore be made to introduce such a change into metaphysics. The +change is this. Hitherto it has been assumed that our knowledge must +conform to objects. This assumption is the real cause of the failure +to extend our knowledge _a priori_, for it limits thought to the +analysis of conceptions, which can only yield tautological judgements. +Let us therefore try the effect of assuming that objects must conform +to our knowledge. Herein lies the Copernican revolution. We find that +this reversal of the ordinary view of the relation of objects to the +mind enables us for the first time to understand the possibility of _a +priori_ synthetic judgements, and even to demonstrate certain laws +which lie at the basis of nature, e. g. the law of causality. It is +true that the reversal also involves the surprising consequence that +our faculty of knowledge is incapable of dealing with the objects of +metaphysics proper, viz. God, freedom, and immortality, for the +assumption limits our knowledge to objects of possible experience. But +this very consequence, viz. the impossibility of metaphysics, serves +to test and vindicate the assumption. For the view that our knowledge +conforms to objects as things in themselves leads us into an insoluble +contradiction when we go on, as we must, to seek for the +unconditioned; while the assumption that objects must, as phenomena, +conform to our way of representing them, removes the contradiction[13]. +Further, though the assumption leads to the denial of speculative +knowledge in the sphere of metaphysics, it is still possible that +reason in its practical aspect may step in to fill the gap. And the +negative result of the assumption may even have a positive value. For +if, as is the case, the moral reason, or reason in its practical +aspect, involves certain postulates concerning God, freedom, and +immortality, which are rejected by the speculative reason, it is +important to be able to show that these objects fall beyond the scope +of the speculative reason. And if we call reliance on these +postulates, as being presuppositions of morality, faith, we may say +that knowledge must be abolished to make room for faith. + + [13] Cf. pp. 101-2. + +This answer to the main problem, given in outline in the Preface, is +undeniably plausible. Yet examination of it suggests two criticisms +which affect Kant's general position. + +In the first place, the parallel of mathematics which suggests the +'Copernican' revolution does not really lead to the results which Kant +supposes. Advance in mathematics is due to the adoption not of any +conscious assumption but of a certain procedure, viz. that by which we +draw a figure and thereby see the necessity of certain relations +within it. To preserve the parallel, the revolution in metaphysics +should have consisted in the adoption of a similar procedure, and +advance should have been made dependent on the application of an at +least quasi-mathematical method to the objects of metaphysics. +Moreover, since these objects are God, freedom, and immortality, the +conclusion should have been that we ought to study God, freedom, and +immortality by somehow constructing them in perception and thereby +gaining insight into the necessity of certain relations. Success or +failure in metaphysics would therefore consist simply in success or +failure to see the necessity of the relations involved. Kant, however, +makes the condition of advance in metaphysics consist in the adoption +not of a method of procedure but of an assumption, viz. that objects +conform to the mind. And it is impossible to see how this assumption +can assist what, on Kant's theory, it ought to have assisted, viz. the +study of God, freedom, and immortality, or indeed the study of +anything. In geometry we presuppose that individual objects conform to +the universal rules of relation which we discover. Now suppose we +describe a geometrical judgement, e. g. that two straight lines cannot +enclose a space, as a mental law, because we are bound to think it +true. Then we may state the presupposition by saying that objects, +e. g. individual pairs of straight lines, must conform to such a mental +law. But the explicit recognition of this presupposition and the +conscious assertion of it in no way assist the solution of particular +geometrical problems. The presupposition is really a condition of +geometrical thinking at all. Without it there is no geometrical +thinking, and the recognition of it places us in no better position +for the study of geometrical problems. Similarly, if we wish to think +out the nature of God, freedom, and immortality, we are not assisted +by assuming that these objects must conform to the laws of our +thinking. We must presuppose this conformity if we are to think at +all, and consciousness of the presupposition puts us in no better +position. What is needed is an insight similar to that which we have +in geometry, i. e. an insight into the necessity of the relations +under consideration such as would enable us to see, for example, that +being a man, as such, involves living for ever. + +Kant has been led into the mistake by a momentary change in the +meaning given to 'metaphysics'. For the moment he is thinking of +metaphysics, not as the inquiry concerned with God, freedom, and +immortality, but as the inquiry which has to deal with the problem as +to how we can know _a priori_. This problem is assisted, at any rate +prima facie, by the assumption that things must conform to the mind. +And this assumption can be said to be suggested by mathematics, +inasmuch as the mathematician presupposes that particular objects must +correspond to the general rules discovered by the mind. From this +point of view Kant's only mistake, if the parallelism is to be +maintained, is that he takes for an assumption which enables the +mathematician to advance a metaphysical presupposition of the advance, +on which the mathematician never reflects, and awareness of which +would in no way assist his mathematics. + +In the second place the 'Copernican' revolution is not strictly the +revolution which Kant supposes it to be. He speaks as though his aim +is precisely to reverse the ordinary view of the relation of the mind +to objects. Instead of the mind being conceived as having to conform +to objects, objects are to be conceived as having to conform to the +mind. But if we consider Kant's real position, we see that these views +are only verbally contrary, since the word object refers to something +different in each case. On the ordinary view objects are something +outside the mind, in the sense of independent of it, and the ideas, +which must conform to objects, are something within the mind, in the +sense of dependent upon it. The conformity then is of something within +the mind to something outside it. Again, the conformity means that one +of the terms, viz. the object, exists first and that then the other +term, the idea, is fitted to or made to correspond to it. Hence the +real contrary of this view is that ideas, within the mind, exist first +and that objects outside the mind, coming into existence afterwards, +must adapt themselves to the ideas. This of course strikes us as +absurd, because we always think of the existence of the object as the +presupposition of the existence of the knowledge of it; we do not +think the existence of the knowledge as the presupposition of the +existence of the object. Hence Kant only succeeds in stating the +contrary of the ordinary view with any plausibility, because in doing +so he makes the term object refer to something which like 'knowledge' +is within the mind. His position is that objects within the mind must +conform to our general ways of knowing. For Kant, therefore, the +conformity is not between something within and something without the +mind, but between two realities within the mind, viz. the individual +object, as object of perception, i. e. a phenomenon, and our general +ways of perceiving and thinking. But this view is only verbally the +contrary of the ordinary view, and consequently Kant does not succeed +in reversing the ordinary view that we know objects independent of or +outside the mind, by bringing our ideas into conformity with them. In +fact, his conclusion is that we do not know this object, i. e. the +thing in itself, at all. Hence his real position should be stated by +saying not that the ordinary view puts the conformity between mind and +things in the wrong way, but that we ought not to speak of conformity +at all. For the thing in itself being unknowable, our ideas can never +be made to conform to it. Kant then only reaches a conclusion which is +apparently the reverse of the ordinary view by substituting another +object for the thing in itself, viz. the phenomenon or appearance of +the thing in itself to us. + +Further, this second line of criticism, if followed out, will be found +to affect his statement of the problem as well as that of its +solution. It will be seen that the problem is mis-stated, and that the +solution offered presupposes it to be mis-stated. His statement of the +problem takes the form of raising a difficulty which the existence of +_a priori_ knowledge presents to the ordinary view, according to which +objects are independent of the mind, and ideas must be brought into +conformity with them. In a synthetic _a priori_ judgement we claim to +discover the nature of certain objects by an act of our thinking, and +independently of actual experience of them. Hence if a supporter of +the ordinary view is asked to justify the conformity of this judgement +or idea with the objects to which it relates, he can give no answer. +The judgement having _ex hypothesi_ been made without reference to the +objects, the belief that the objects must conform to it is the merely +arbitrary supposition that a reality independent of the mind must +conform to the mind's ideas. But Kant, in thus confining the +difficulty to _a priori_ judgements, implies that empirical judgements +present no difficulty to the ordinary view; since they rest upon +actual experience of the objects concerned, they are conformed to the +objects by the very process through which they arise. He thereby fails +to notice that empirical judgements present a precisely parallel +difficulty. It can only be supposed that the conformity of empirical +judgements to their objects is guaranteed by the experience upon which +they rest, if it be assumed that in experience we apprehend objects as +they are. But our experience or perception of individual objects is +just as much mental as the thinking which originates _a priori_ +judgements. If we can question the truth of our thinking, we can +likewise question the truth of our perception. If we can ask whether +our ideas must correspond to their objects, we can likewise ask +whether our perceptions must correspond to them. The problem relates +solely to the correspondence between something within the mind and +something outside it; it applies equally to perceiving and thinking, +and concerns all judgements alike, empirical as well as _a priori_. +Kant, therefore, has no right to imply that empirical judgements raise +no problem, if he finds difficulty in _a priori_ judgements. He is +only able to draw a distinction between them, because, without being +aware that he is doing so, he takes account of the relation of the +object to the subject in the case of an _a priori_ judgement, while in +the case of an empirical judgement he ignores it. In other words, in +dealing with the general connexion between the qualities of an +object, he takes into account the fact that we are thinking it, but, +in dealing with the perception of the coexistence of particular +qualities of an object, he ignores the fact that we are perceiving it. +Further, that the real problem concerns all synthetic judgements alike +is shown by the solution which he eventually reaches. His conclusion +turns out to be that while both empirical and _a priori_ judgements +are valid of phenomena, they are not valid of things in themselves; +i. e. that of things in themselves we know nothing at all, not even +their particular qualities. Since, then, his conclusion is that even +empirical judgements are not valid of things in themselves, it shows +that the problem cannot be confined to _a priori_ judgements, and +therefore constitutes an implicit criticism of his statement of the +problem. + +Must there not, however, be some problem peculiar to _a priori_ +judgements? Otherwise why should Kant have been led to suppose that +his problem concerned them only? Further consideration will show that +there is such a problem, and that it was only owing to the mistake +indicated that Kant treated this problem as identical with that of +which he actually offered a solution. In the universal judgements of +mathematics we apprehend, as we think, general rules of connexion +which must apply to all possible cases. Such judgements, then, +presuppose a conformity between the connexions which we discover and +all possible instances. Now Kant's treatment of this conformity as a +conformity between our ideas and things has two implications. In the +first place, it implies, as has been pointed out, that relation to the +subject, as thinking, is taken into account in the case of the +universal connexion, and that relation to the subject, as perceiving, +is ignored in the case of the individual thing. In the second place, +it implies that what is related to the subject as the object of its +thought must be subjective or mental; that because we have to think +the general connexion, the connexion is only our own idea, the +conformity of things to which may be questioned. But the treatment, to +be consistent, should take account of relation to the subject in both +cases or in neither. If the former alternative be accepted, then the +subjective character attributed by Kant in virtue of this relation to +what is object of thought, and equally attributable to what is object +of perception, reduces the problem to that of the conformity in +general of all ideas, including perceptions, within the mind to things +outside it; and this problem does not relate specially to _a priori_ +judgements. To discover the problem which relates specially to them, +the other alternative must be accepted, that of ignoring relation to +the subject in both cases. The problem then becomes 'What renders +possible or is presupposed by the conformity of individual things to +certain laws of connexion?' And, inasmuch as to deny the conformity is +really to deny that there are laws of connexion,[14] the problem +reduces itself to the question, 'What is the presupposition of the +existence of definite laws of connexion in the world?' And the only +answer possible is that reality is a system or a whole of connected +parts, in other words, that nature is uniform. Thus it turns out that +the problem relates to the uniformity of nature, and that the +question 'How are _a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?' has in +reality nothing to do with the problem of the relation of reality to +the knowing subject, but is concerned solely with the nature of +reality. + + [14] To object that the laws in question, being laws which we + have thought, may not be the true laws, and that therefore + there may still be other laws to which reality conforms, is + of course to reintroduce relation to the thinking subject. + +Further, it is important to see that the alternative of ignoring +relation to the subject is the right one, not only from the point of +view of the problem peculiar to _a priori_ judgements, but also from +the point of view of the nature of knowledge in general. Perceiving +and thinking alike presuppose that reality is immediately object of +the mind, and that the act of apprehension in no way affects or enters +into the nature of what we apprehend about reality. If, for instance, +I assert on the strength of perception that this table is round, I +imply that I see the table, and that the shape which I judge it to +have is not affected by the fact that I am perceiving it; for I mean +that the table really is round. If some one then convinces me that I +have made a mistake owing to an effect of foreshortening, and that the +table is really oval, I amend my assertion, not by saying that the +table is round but only to my apprehension, but by saying that it +looks round. Thereby I cease to predicate roundness of the table +altogether; for I mean that while it still looks round, it is not +really so. The case of universal judgements is similar. The statement +that a straight line is the shortest distance between its extremities +means that it really is so. The fact is presupposed to be in no way +altered by our having apprehended it. Moreover, reality is here just +as much implied to be directly object of the mind as it is in the case +of the singular judgement. Making the judgement consists, as we say, +in _seeing_ the connexion between the direction between two points +and the shortest distance between them. The connexion of real +characteristics is implied to be directly object of thought.[16] Thus +both perceiving and thinking presuppose that the reality to which they +relate is directly object of the mind, and that the character of it +which we apprehend in the resulting judgement is not affected or +altered by the fact that we have had to perceive or conceive the +reality.[17] + + [15] Cf. Bosanquet, _Logic_, vol. ii, p. 2. + + [16] In saying that a universal judgement is an immediate + apprehension of fact, it is of course not meant that it can + be actualized by itself or, so to say, _in vacuo_. Its + actualization obviously presupposes the presentation of + individuals in perception or imagination. Perception or + imagination thus forms the necessary occasion of a universal + judgement, and in that sense mediates it. Moreover, the + universal judgement implies an act of abstraction by which + we specially attend to those universal characters of the + individuals perceived or imagined, which enter into the + judgement. But, though our apprehension of a universal + connexion thus implies a process, and is therefore mediated, + yet the connexion, when we apprehend it, is immediately our + object. There is nothing between it and us. + + [17] For a fuller discussion of the subject see Chh. IV and + VI. + +Kant in the formulation of his problem implicitly admits this +presupposition in the case of perception. He implies that empirical +judgements involve no difficulty, because they rest upon the +perception or experience of the objects to which they relate. On the +other hand, he does not admit the presupposition in the case of +conception, for he implies that in _a priori_ judgements we are not +confronted with reality but are confined to our own ideas. Hence we +ought to ask why Kant is led to adopt an attitude in the latter case +which he does not adopt in the former. The answer appears to be +twofold. In the first place, there is an inveterate tendency to think +of universals, and therefore of the connexions between them, as being +not objective realities[18] but mere ideas. In other words, we tend to +adopt the conceptualist attitude, which regards individuals as the +only reality, and universals as mental fictions. In consequence, we +are apt to think that while in perception, which is of the individual, +we are confronted by reality, in universal judgements, in which we +apprehend connexions between universals, we have before us mere ideas. +Kant may fairly be supposed to have been unconsciously under the +influence of this tendency. In the second place, we apprehend a +universal connexion by the operation of thinking. Thinking is +essentially an activity; and since activity in the ordinary sense in +which we oppose action to knowledge originates something, we tend to +think of the activity of thinking as also originating something, viz. +that which is our object when we think. Hence, since we think of what +is real as independent of us and therefore as something which we may +discover but can in no sense make, we tend to think of the object of +thought as only an idea. On the other hand, what is ordinarily called +perception, though it involves the activity of thinking, also involves +an element in respect of which we are passive. This is the fact +pointed to by Kant's phrase 'objects are _given_ in perception'. In +virtue of this passive element we are inclined to think that in +perception we simply stand before the reality in a passive attitude. +The reality perceived is thought to be, so to say, there, existing +independently of us; relation to the subject is unnoticed because of +our apparently wholly passive attitude. At times, and especially when +he is thinking of the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity, Kant +seems to have been under the influence of this second tendency. + + [18] i. e. as not having a place in the reality which, as we + think, exists independently of the mind. + +The preceding summary of the problem of the _Critique_ represents the +account given in the two Prefaces and the Introduction. According to +this account, the problem arises from the unquestioned existence of _a +priori_ knowledge in mathematics and physics and the problematic +existence of such knowledge in metaphysics, and Kant's aim is to +determine the range within which _a priori_ knowledge is possible. +Thus the problem is introduced as relating to _a priori_ knowledge as +such, no distinction being drawn between its character in different +cases. Nevertheless the actual discussion of the problem in the body +of the _Critique_ implies a fundamental distinction between the nature +of _a priori_ knowledge in mathematics and its nature in physics, and +in order that a complete view of the problem may be given, this +distinction must be stated. + +The 'Copernican' revolution was brought about by consideration of the +facts of mathematics. Kant accepted as an absolute starting-point the +existence in mathematics of true universal and necessary judgements. +He then asked, 'What follows as to the nature of the objects known in +mathematics from the fact that we really know them?' Further, in his +answer he accepted a distinction which he never examined or even +questioned, viz. the distinction between things in themselves and +phenomena.[19] This distinction assumed, Kant inferred from the truth +of mathematics that things in space and time are only phenomena. +According to him mathematicians are able to make the true judgements +that they do make only because they deal with phenomena. Thus Kant in +no way sought to _prove_ the truth of mathematics. On the contrary, he +argued from the truth of mathematics to the nature of the world which +we thereby know. The phenomenal character of the world being thus +established, he was able to reverse the argument and to regard the +phenomenal character of the world as _explaining_ the validity of +mathematical judgements. They are valid, because they relate to +phenomena. And the consideration which led Kant to take mathematics +as his starting-point seems to have been the self-evidence of +mathematical judgements. As we directly apprehend their necessity, +they admit of no reasonable doubt. + + [19] Cf. Ch. IV. This distinction should of course have been + examined by one whose aim it was to determine how far our + knowledge can reach. + + [20] For the self-evidence of mathematics to Kant compare B. + 120, M. 73 and B. 200, M. 121. + +On the other hand, the general principles underlying physics, e. g. +that every change must have a cause, or that in all change the quantum +of matter is constant, appeared to Kant in a different light. Though +certainly not based on experience, they did not seem to him +self-evident.[21] Hence,[22] in the case of these principles, he +sought to give what he did not seek to give in the case of +mathematical judgements, viz. a proof of their truth.[23] The nerve of +the proof lies in the contention that these principles are involved +not merely in any general judgement in physics, e. g. 'All bodies are +heavy,' but even in any singular judgement, e. g. 'This body is +heavy,' and that the validity of singular judgements is universally +conceded. Thus here the fact upon which he takes his stand is not the +admitted truth of the universal judgements under consideration, but +the admitted truth of any singular judgement in physics. His +treatment, then, of the universal judgements of mathematics and that +of the principles underlying physics are distinguished by the fact +that, while he accepts the former as needing no proof, he seeks to +prove the latter from the admitted validity of singular judgements in +physics. At the same time the acceptance of mathematical judgements +and the proof of the _a priori_ principles of physics have for Kant a +common presupposition which distinguishes mathematics and physics from +metaphysics. Like universal judgements in mathematics, singular +judgements in physics, and therefore the principles which they +presuppose, are true only if the objects to which they relate are +phenomena. Both in mathematics and physics, therefore, it is a +condition of _a priori_ knowledge that it relates to phenomena and not +to things in themselves. But, just for this reason, metaphysics is in +a different position; since God, freedom, and immortality can never be +objects of experience, _a priori_ knowledge in metaphysics, and +therefore metaphysics itself, is impossible. Thus for Kant the very +condition, the realization of which justifies the acceptance of +mathematical judgements and enables us to prove the principles of +physics, involves the impossibility of metaphysics. + + [21] This is stated B. 200, M. 121. It is also implied B. + 122, M. 75, B. 263-4, M. 160, and by the argument of the + _Analytic_ generally. + + [22] This appears to be the real cause of the difference of + treatment, though it is not the reason assigned by Kant + himself, cf. B. 120, M. 73-4. + + [23] His remarks about pure natural science in B. 20, M. 13 + and Prol. § 4 sub fin., do not represent the normal attitude + of the _Critique_. + +Further, the distinction drawn between _a priori_ judgements in +mathematics and in physics is largely responsible for the difficulty +of understanding what Kant means by _a priori_. His unfortunate +tendency to explain the term negatively could be remedied if it could +be held either that the term refers solely to mathematical judgements +or that he considers the truth of the law of causality to be +apprehended in the same way that we see that two and two are four. For +an _a priori_ judgement could then be defined as one in which the +mind, on the presentation of an individual in perception or +imagination, and in virtue of its capacity of thinking, apprehends the +necessity of a specific relation. But this definition is precluded by +Kant's view that the law of causality and similar principles, though +_a priori_, are not self-evident. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE SENSIBILITY AND THE UNDERSTANDING + + +The distinction between the sensibility and the understanding[1] is +to Kant fundamental both in itself and in relation to the conclusions +which he reaches. An outline, therefore, of this distinction must +precede any statement or examination of the details of his position. +Unfortunately, in spite of its fundamental character, Kant never +thinks of questioning or criticizing the distinction in the form in +which he draws it, and the presence of certain confusions often +renders it difficult to be sure of his meaning. + + [1] Cf. B. 1, 29, 33, 74-5, 75, 92-4; M. 1, 18, 21, 45-46, + 57. + +The distinction may be stated in his own words thus: "There are two +stems of human knowledge, which perhaps spring from a common but to us +unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding."[2] "Our knowledge +springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first receives +representations[3] (receptivity for impressions); the second is the +power of knowing an object by means of these representations +(spontaneity of conceptions). Through the first an object is _given_ +to us; through the second the object is _thought_ in relation to the +representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Perception +and conceptions constitute, therefore, the elements of all our +knowledge, so that neither conceptions without a perception in some +way corresponding to them, nor perception without conceptions can +yield any knowledge.... Neither of these qualities has a preference +over the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, +and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without +content are empty, perceptions without conceptions are blind. Hence it +is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (i. e. +to add to them the object in perception) as to make its perceptions +intelligible (i. e. to bring them under conceptions). Neither of these +powers or faculties can exchange its function. The understanding +cannot perceive, and the senses cannot think. Only by their union can +knowledge arise."[4] + + [2] B. 29, M. 18 + + [3] For the sake of uniformity _Vorstellung_ has throughout + been translated by 'representation', though sometimes, as in + the present passage, it would be better rendered by + 'presentation'. + + [4] B. 74-5, M. 45-6. + +The distinction so stated appears straightforward and, on the +whole,[5] sound. And it is fairly referred to by Kant as the +distinction between the faculties of perceiving and conceiving or +thinking, provided that the terms perceiving and conceiving or +thinking be taken to indicate a distinction within perception in the +ordinary sense of the word. His meaning can be stated thus: 'All +knowledge requires the realization of two conditions; an individual +must be presented to us in perception, and we as thinking beings must +bring this individual under or recognize it as an instance of some +universal. Thus, in order to judge 'This is a house' or 'That is red' +we need the presence of the house or of the red colour in perception, +and we must 'recognize' the house or the colour, i. e. apprehend the +individual as a member of a certain kind. Suppose either condition +unrealized. Then if we suppose a failure to conceive, i. e. to +apprehend the individual as a member of some kind, we see that our +perception--if it could be allowed to be anything at all--would be +blind i. e. indeterminate, or a mere 'blur'. What we perceived would +be for us as good as nothing. In fact, we could not even say that we +were perceiving. Again, if we suppose that we had merely the +conception of a house, and neither perceived nor had perceived an +individual to which it applied, we see that the conception, being +without application, would be neither knowledge nor an element in +knowledge. Moreover, the content of a conception is derived from +perception; it is only through its relation to perceived individuals +that we become aware of a universal. To know the meaning of 'redness' +we must have experienced individual red things; to know the meaning of +'house' we must at least have had experience of individual men and of +their physical needs. Hence 'conceptions' without 'perceptions' are +void or empty. The existence of conceptions presupposes experience of +corresponding individuals, even though it also implies the activity of +thinking in relation to these individuals.'[6] + + [5] Cf. p. 29, note 1. + + [6] Kant's account implies that he has in view only empirical + knowledge; in any case it only applies to empirical + conceptions. + +Further, it is true to say that as perceiving we are passive; we do +not do anything. This, as has been pointed out, is the element of +truth contained in the statement that objects are _given_ to us. On +the other hand, it may be truly said that as conceiving, in the sense +of bringing an individual under a universal, we are essentially +active. This is presupposed by the notice or attention involved in +perception ordinarily so called, i. e. perception in the full sense +in which it includes conceiving as well as perceiving.[7] Kant, +therefore, is justified in referring to the sensibility as a +'receptivity' and to the understanding as a 'spontaneity'. + + [7] This distinction within perception is of course + compatible with the view that the elements so distinguished + are inseparable. + +The distinction, so stated, appears, as has been already said, +intelligible and, in the main[8], valid. Kant, however, renders the +elucidation of his meaning difficult by combining with this view of +the distinction an incompatible and unwarranted theory of perception. +He supposes,[9] without ever questioning the supposition, that +perception is due to the operation of things outside the mind, which +act upon our sensibility and thereby produce sensations. On this +supposition, what we perceive is not, as the distinction just stated +implies, the thing itself, but a sensation produced by it. +Consequently a problem arises as to the meaning on this supposition of +the statements 'by the sensibility objects are given to us' and 'by +the understanding they are thought'. The former statement must mean +that when a thing affects us there is a sensation. It cannot mean that +by the sensibility we know that there exists a thing which causes the +sensation, for this knowledge would imply the activity of thinking; +nor can it mean that in virtue of the sensibility the thing itself is +presented to us. The latter statement must mean that when sensation +arises, the understanding judges that there is something causing it; +and this assertion must really be _a priori_, because not dependent +upon experience. Unfortunately the two statements so interpreted are +wholly inconsistent with the account of the functions of the +sensibility and the understanding which has just been quoted. + + [8] See p. 29, note 1. + + [9] Cf. B. 1, M. 1. + +Further, this theory of perception has two forms. In its first form +the theory is physical rather than metaphysical, and is based upon +our possession of physical organs. It assumes that the reality to be +apprehended is the world of space and time, and it asserts that by the +action of bodies upon our physical organs our sensibility is affected, +and that thereby sensations are originated in us. Thereupon a problem +arises. For if the contribution of the sensibility to our knowledge +of the physical world is limited to a succession of sensations, +explanation must be given of the fact that we have succeeded with +an experience confined to these sensations in acquiring knowledge +of a world which does not consist of sensations.[10] Kant, in fact, +in the _Aesthetic_ has this problem continually before him, and +tries to solve it. He holds that the mind, by means of its forms of +perception and its conceptions of the understanding, superinduces upon +sensations, as data, spatial and other relations, in such a way that +it acquires knowledge of the spatial world. + + [10] Cf. B. 1 init., M. 1 init.; B. 34, M. 21 sub fin. + +An inherent difficulty, however, of this 'physical' theory of +perception leads to a transformation of it. If, as the theory +supposes, the cause of sensation is outside or beyond the mind, it +cannot be known. Hence the initial assumption that this cause is the +physical world has to be withdrawn, and the cause of sensation comes +to be thought of as the thing in itself of which we can know nothing. +This is undoubtedly the normal form of the theory in Kant's mind. + +It may be objected that to attribute to Kant at any time the physical +form of the theory is to accuse him of an impossibly crude confusion +between things in themselves and the spatial world, and that he can +never have thought that the cause of sensation, being as it is outside +the mind, is spatial. But the answer is to be found in the fact that +the problem just referred to as occupying Kant's attention in the +_Aesthetic_ is only a problem at all so long as the cause of sensation +is thought of as a physical body. For the problem 'How do we, +beginning with mere sensation, come to know a spatial and temporal +world?' is only a problem so long as it is supposed that the cause of +sensation is a spatial and temporal world or a part of it, and that +this world is what we come to know. If the cause of sensation, as +being beyond the mind, is held to be unknowable and so not known to be +spatial or temporal, the problem has disappeared. Corroboration is +given by certain passages[11] in the _Critique_ which definitely +mention 'the senses', a term which refers to bodily organs, and by +others[12] to which meaning can be given only if they are taken to +imply that the objects which affect our sensibility are not unknown +things in themselves, but things known to be spatial. Even the use of +the plural in the term 'things in themselves' implies a tendency to +identify the unknowable reality beyond the mind with bodies in space. +For the implication that different sensations are due to different +things in themselves originates in the view that different sensations +are due to the operation of different spatial bodies. + + [11] E. g. B. 1 init., M. 1 init., and B. 75 fin., M. 46, + lines 12, 13 [for 'the sensuous faculty' should be + substituted 'the senses']. + + [12] E. g. B. 42, lines 11, 12; M. 26, line 13; A. 100, Mah. + 195 ('even in the absence of the object'). Cf. B. 182-3, M. + 110-1 (see pp. 257-8, and note p. 257), and B. 207-10, M. + 126-8 (see pp. 263-5). + +It is now necessary to consider how the distinction between the +sensibility and the understanding contributes to articulate the +problem 'How are _a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?' As has +been pointed out, Kant means by this question, 'How is it possible +that the mind is able, in virtue of its own powers, to make universal +and necessary judgements which anticipate its experience of objects?' +To this question his general answer is that it is possible and only +possible because, so far from ideas, as is generally supposed, having +to conform to things, the things to which our ideas or judgements +relate, viz. phenomena, must conform to the nature of the mind. Now, +if the mind's knowing nature can be divided into the sensibility and +the understanding, the problem becomes 'How is it possible for the +mind to make such judgements in virtue of its sensibility and its +understanding?' And the answer will be that it is possible because the +things concerned, i. e. phenomena, must conform to the sensibility and +the understanding, i. e. to the mind's perceiving and thinking nature. +But both the problem and the answer, so stated, give no clue to the +particular _a priori_ judgements thus rendered possible nor to the +nature of the sensibility and the understanding in virtue of which we +make them. It has been seen, however, that the judgements in question +fall into two classes, those of mathematics and those which form the +presuppositions of physics. And it is Kant's aim to relate these +classes to the sensibility and the understanding respectively. His +view is that mathematical judgements, which, as such, deal with +spatial and temporal relations, are essentially bound up with our +perceptive nature, i. e. with our sensibility, and that the principles +underlying physics are the expression of our thinking nature, i. e. of +our understanding. Hence if the vindication of this relation between +our knowing faculties and the judgements to which they are held to +give rise is approached from the side of our faculties, it must be +shown that our sensitive nature is such as to give rise to +mathematical judgements, and that our understanding or thinking nature +is such as to originate the principles underlying physics. Again, if +the account of this relation is to be adequate, it must be shown to be +exhaustive, i. e. it must be shown that the sensibility and the +understanding give rise to no other judgements. Otherwise there may be +other _a priori_ judgements bound up with the sensibility and the +understanding which the inquiry will have ignored. Kant, therefore, by +his distinction between the sensibility and the understanding, sets +himself another problem, which does not come into sight in the first +formulation of the general question 'How are _a priori_ synthetic +judgements possible?' He has to determine what _a priori_ judgements +are related to the sensibility and to the understanding respectively. +At the same time the distinction gives rise to a division within the +main problem. His chief aim is to discover how it is that _a priori_ +judgements are universally applicable. But, as Kant conceives +the issue, the problem requires different treatment according +as the judgements in question are related to the sensibility or +to the understanding. Hence arises the distinction between the +_Transcendental Aesthetic_ and the _Transcendental Analytic_, the +former dealing with the _a priori_ judgements of mathematics, which +relate to the sensibility, and the latter dealing with the _a priori_ +principles of physics, which originate in the understanding. Again, +within each of these two divisions we have to distinguish two +problems, viz. 'What _a priori_ judgements are essentially related to +the faculty in question?' and 'How is it that they are applicable to +objects?' + +It is important, however, to notice that the distinction between the +sensibility and the understanding, in the form in which it serves as a +basis for distinguishing the _Aesthetic_ and the _Analytic_, is not +identical with or even compatible with the distinction, as Kant states +it when he is considering the distinction in itself and is not +thinking of any theory which is to be based upon it. In the latter +case the sensibility and the understanding are represented as +inseparable faculties involved in _all_ knowledge.[13] Only from the +union of both can knowledge arise. But, regarded as a basis for the +distinction between the _Aesthetic_ and the _Analytic_, they are +implied to be the source of different kinds of knowledge, viz. +mathematics and the principles of physics. It is no answer to this to +urge that Kant afterwards points out that space as an object +presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to sense. No doubt this +admission implies that even the apprehension of spatial relations +involves the activity of the understanding. But the implication is +really inconsistent with the existence of the _Aesthetic_ as a +distinct part of the subject dealing with a special class of _a +priori_ judgements. + + [13] B. 74-5, M. 45-6; cf. pp. 27-9. + + [14] B. 160 note, M. 98 note. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +SPACE + + +It is the aim of the _Aesthetic_ to deal with the _a priori_ knowledge +which relates to the sensibility. This knowledge, according to Kant, +is concerned with space and time. Hence he has to show _firstly_ that +our apprehension of space and time is _a priori_, i. e. that it is not +derived from experience but originates in our apprehending nature; and +_secondly_ that within our apprehending nature this apprehension +belongs to the sensibility and not to the understanding, or, in his +language, that space and time are forms of perception or sensibility. +Further, if his treatment is to be exhaustive, he should also show +_thirdly_ that space and time are the only forms of perception. This, +however, he makes no attempt to do except in one passage,[1] where the +argument fails. The first two points established, Kant is able to +develop his main thesis, viz. that it is a condition of the validity +of the _a priori_ judgements which relate to space and time that these +are characteristics of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. + + [1] B. 58, M. 35. + +It will be convenient to consider his treatment of space and time +separately, and to begin with his treatment of space. It is necessary, +however, first of all to refer to the term 'form of perception'. As +Kant conceives a form of perception, it involves three antitheses. + +(1) As a _form_ of perception it is opposed, as a way or mode of +perceiving, to particular perceptions. + +(2) As a form or mode of _perception_ it is opposed to a form or mode +of _conception_. + +(3) As a form of _perception_ it is also opposed, as a way in which we +apprehend things, to a way in which things are. + +While we may defer consideration of the second and third antitheses, +we should at once give attention to the nature of the first, because +Kant confuses it with two other antitheses. There is no doubt that in +general a _form_ of perception means for Kant a general capacity of +perceiving which, as such, is opposed to the actual perceptions in +which it is manifested. For according to him our spatial perceptions +are not foreign to us, but manifestations of our general perceiving +nature; and this view finds expression in the assertion that space is +a form of perception or of sensibility.[2] + + [2] Cf. B. 43 init., M. 26 med. + +Unfortunately, however, Kant frequently speaks of this form of +perception as if it were the same thing as the actual perception of +empty space.[3] In other words, he implies that such a perception is +possible, and confuses it with a potentiality, i. e. the power of +perceiving that which is spatial. The confusion is possible because it +can be said with some plausibility that a perception of empty +space--if its possibility be allowed--does not inform us about actual +things, but only informs us what must be true of things, if there +prove to be any; such a perception, therefore, can be thought of as a +possibility of knowledge rather than as actual knowledge. + + [3] e. g. B. 34, 35, M. 22; B. 41, M. 25; _Prol._ §§ 9-11. + The commonest expression of the confusion is to be found in + the repeated assertion that space is a pure perception. + +The second confusion is closely related to the first, and arises from +the fact that Kant speaks of space not only as a form of _perception_, +but also as the form of _phenomena_ in opposition to sensation as +their matter. "That which in the phenomenon corresponds to[4] the +sensation I term its matter; but that which effects that the manifold +of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations I call the +form of the phenomenon. Now that in which alone our sensations can be +arranged and placed in a certain form cannot itself be sensation. +Hence while the matter of all phenomena is only given to us _a +posteriori_, their form [i. e. space] must lie ready for them all +together _a priori_ in the mind."[5] Here Kant is clearly under the +influence of his theory of perception.[6] He is thinking that, given +the origination of sensations in us by the thing in itself, it is the +business of the mind to arrange these sensations spatially in order to +attain knowledge of the spatial world.[7] Space being, as it were, +a kind of empty vessel in which sensations are arranged, is said +to be the form of phenomena.[8] Moreover, if we bear in mind that +ultimately bodies in space are for Kant only spatial arrangements +of sensations,[9] we see that the assertion that space is the form +of phenomena is only Kant's way of saying that all bodies are +spatial.[10] Now Kant, in thus asserting that space is the form of +phenomena, is clearly confusing this assertion with the assertion that +space is a form of perception, and he does so in consequence of the +first confusion, viz. that between a capacity of perceiving and an +actual perception of empty space. For in the passage last quoted he +continues thus: "I call all representations[11] _pure_ (in the +transcendental sense) in which nothing is found which belongs to +sensation. Accordingly there will be found _a priori_ in the mind the +pure form of sensuous perceptions in general, wherein all the manifold +of phenomena is perceived in certain relations. This pure form of +sensibility will also itself be called _pure perception_. Thus, +if I abstract from the representation of a body that which the +understanding thinks respecting it, such as substance, force, +divisibility, &c., and also that which belongs to sensation, such as +impenetrability, hardness, colour, &c., something is still left over +for me from this empirical perception, viz. extension and shape. These +belong to pure perception, which exists in the mind _a priori_, even +without an actual object of the senses or a sensation, as a mere form +of sensibility." Here Kant has passed, without any consciousness of a +transition, from treating space as that in which the manifold of +sensation is arranged to treating it as a capacity of perceiving. +Moreover, since Kant in this passage speaks of space as a perception, +and thereby identifies space with the perception of it,[12] the +confusion may be explained thus. The form of phenomena is said to be +the space in which all sensations are arranged, or in which all bodies +are; space, apart from all sensations or bodies, i. e. empty, being +the object of a pure perception, is treated as identical with a pure +perception, viz. the perception of empty space; and the perception of +empty space is treated as identical with a capacity of perceiving that +which is spatial.[13] + + [4] 'Corresponds to' must mean 'is'. + + [5] B. 34, M. 21. + + [6] Cf. pp. 30-2. + + [7] It is impossible, of course, to see how such a process + can give us knowledge of the spatial world, for, whatever + bodies in space are, they are not arrangements of sensations. + Nevertheless, Kant's theory of perception really precludes + him from holding that bodies are anything else than + arrangements of sensations, and he seems at times to accept + this view explicitly, e. g. B. 38, M. 23 (quoted p. 41), + where he speaks of our representing sensations as external + to and next to each other, and, therefore, as in different + places. + + [8] It may be noted that it would have been more natural to + describe the particular shape of the phenomenon (i. e. the + particular spatial arrangement of the sensations) rather than + space as the form of the phenomenon; for the matter to which + the form is opposed is said to be sensation, and that of + which it is the matter is said to be the phenomenon, i. e. + a body in space. + + [9] Cf. note 4, p. 38. + + [10] Cf. _Prol._ § 11 and p. 137. + + [11] Cf. p. 41, note 1. + + [12] Cf. p. 51, note 1. + + [13] The same confusion (and due to the same cause) is + implied _Prol_. § 11, and B. 42 (b), M. 26 (b) first + paragraph. Cf. B. 49 (b), M. 30 (b). + +The existence of the confusion, however, is most easily realized by +asking, 'How did Kant come to think of space and time as the _only_ +forms of perception?' It would seem obvious that the perception of +_anything_ implies a form of perception in the sense of a mode or +capacity of perceiving. To perceive colours implies a capacity for +seeing; to hear noises implies a capacity for hearing. And these +capacities may fairly be called forms of perception. As soon as this +is realized, the conclusion is inevitable that Kant was led to think +of space and time as the only forms of perception, because in this +connexion he was thinking of each as a form of phenomena, i. e. as +something in which all bodies or their states are, or, from the point +of view of our knowledge, as that in which sensuous material is to be +arranged; for there is nothing except space and time in which such +arrangement could plausibly be said to be carried out. + +As has been pointed out, Kant's argument falls into two main parts, +one of which prepares the way for the other. The aim of the former is +to show _firstly_ that our apprehension of space is _a priori_, and +_secondly_ that it belongs to perception and not to conception. The +aim of the latter is to conclude from these characteristics of our +apprehension of space that space is a property not of things in +themselves but only of phenomena. These arguments may be considered in +turn. + +The really valid argument adduced by Kant for the _a priori_ character +of our apprehension of space is based on the nature of geometrical +judgements. The universality of our judgements in geometry is not +based upon experience, i. e. upon the observation of individual things +in space. The necessity of geometrical relations is apprehended +directly in virtue of the mind's own apprehending nature. +Unfortunately in the present context Kant ignores this argument and +substitutes two others, both of which are invalid. + +1. "Space is no empirical conception[14] which has been derived from +external[15] experiences. For in order that certain sensations may be +related to something external to me (that is, to something in a +different part of space from that in which I am), in like manner, in +order that I may represent them as external to and next to each other, +and consequently as not merely different but as in different places, +the representation of space must already exist as a foundation. +Consequently, the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the +relations of external phenomena through experience; but, on the +contrary, this external experience is itself first possible only +through the said representation."[16] Here Kant is thinking that in +order to apprehend, for example, that A is to the right of B we must +first apprehend empty space. He concludes that our apprehension of +space is _a priori_, because we apprehend empty space _before_ we +become aware of the spatial relations of individual objects in it. + + [14] _Begriff_ (conception) here is to be understood loosely + not as something opposed to _Anschauung_ (perception), but as + equivalent to the genus of which _Anschauung_ and _Begriff_ + are species, i. e. _Vorstellung_, which maybe rendered by + 'representation' or 'idea', in the general sense in which + these words are sometimes used to include 'thought' and + 'perception'. + + [15] The next sentence shows that 'external' means, not + 'produced by something external to the mind', but simply + 'spatial'. + + [16] B. 38, M. 23-4. + +To this the following reply may be made. (_a_) The term _a priori_ +applied to an apprehension should mean, not that it arises prior to +experience, but that its validity is independent of experience. (_b_) +That to which the term _a priori_ should be applied is not the +apprehension of empty space, which is individual, but the apprehension +of the nature of space in general, which is universal. (_c_) We do not +apprehend empty space before we apprehend individual spatial relations +of individual bodies or, indeed, at any time. (_d_) Though we come to +apprehend _a priori_ the nature of space in general, the apprehension +is not prior but posterior in time to the apprehension of individual +spatial relations. (_e_) It does not follow from the temporal priority +of our apprehension of individual spatial relations that our +apprehension of the nature of space in general is 'borrowed from +experience', and is therefore not _a priori_. + +2. "We can never represent to ourselves that there is no space, though +we can quite well think that no objects are found in it. It must, +therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of +phenomena, and not as a determination dependent upon them, and it is +an _a priori_ representation, which necessarily underlies external +phenomena."[17] + + [17] B. 38, M. 24. + +Here the premise is simply false. If 'represent' or 'think' means +'believe', we can no more represent or think that there are no +objects in space than that there is no space. If, on the other hand, +'represent' or 'think' means 'make a mental picture of', the assertion +is equally false. Kant is thinking of empty space as a kind of +receptacle for objects, and the _a priori_ character of our +apprehension of space lies, as before, in the supposed fact that +in order to apprehend objects in space we must begin with the +apprehension of empty space. + +The examination of Kant's arguments for the _perceptive_ character +of our apprehension of space is a more complicated matter. By way of +preliminary it should be noticed that they presuppose the possibility +in general of distinguishing features of objects which belong to the +perception of them from others which belong to the conception of them. +In particular, Kant holds that our apprehension of a body as a +substance, as exercising force and as divisible, is due to our +understanding as conceiving it, while our apprehension of it as +extended and as having a shape is due to our sensibility as perceiving +it.[18] The distinction, however, will be found untenable in +principle; and if this be granted, Kant's attempt to distinguish in +this way the extension and shape of an object from its other features +can be ruled out on general grounds. In any case, it must be conceded +that the arguments fail by which he seeks to show that space in +particular belongs to perception. + + [18] B. 35, M. 22 (quoted p. 39). It is noteworthy (1) that + the passage contains no _argument_ to show that extension and + shape are not, equally with divisibility, _thought_ to belong + to an object, (2) that impenetrability, which is here said + to belong to sensation, obviously cannot do so, and (3) that + (as has been pointed out, p. 39) the last sentence of the + paragraph in question presupposes that we have a perception + of empty space, and that this is a _form_ of perception. + +There appears to be no way of distinguishing perception and conception +as the apprehension of different realities[19] except as the +apprehension of the individual and of the universal respectively. +Distinguished in this way, the faculty of perception is that in virtue +of which we apprehend the individual, and the faculty of conception is +that power of reflection in virtue of which a universal is made the +explicit object of thought.[20] If this be granted, the only test for +what is perceived is that it is individual, and the only test for what +is conceived is that it is universal. These are in fact the tests +which Kant uses. But if this be so, it follows that the various +characteristics of objects cannot be divided into those which are +perceived and those which are conceived. For the distinction between +universal and individual is quite general, and applies to all +characteristics of objects alike. Thus, in the case of colour, we can +distinguish colour in general and the individual colours of individual +objects; or, to take a less ambiguous instance, we can distinguish a +particular shade of redness and its individual instances. Further, it +may be said that perception is of the individual shade of red of the +individual object, and that the faculty by which we become explicitly +aware of the particular shade of red in general is that of conception. +The same distinction can be drawn with respect to hardness, or shape, +or any other characteristic of objects. The distinction, then, +between perception and conception can be drawn with respect to any +characteristic of objects, and does not serve to distinguish one from +another. + + [19] And _not_ as mutually involved in the apprehension + of any individual reality. + + [20] This distinction is of course different to that + previously drawn _within_ perception in the full sense + between perception in a narrow sense and conception + (pp. 28-9). + +Kant's arguments to show that our apprehension of space belongs to +perception are two in number, and both are directed to show not, as +they should, that space is a _form_ of perception, but that it is a +_perception_.[21] The first runs thus: "Space is no discursive, or, as +we say, general conception of relations of things in general, but a +pure perception. For, in the first place, we can represent to +ourselves only one space, and if we speak of many spaces we mean +thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Again, these +parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space as the component +parts, as it were, out of which it can be composed, but can be thought +only in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and +consequently the general conception of spaces in general, rests solely +upon limitations."[22] + + [21] Kant uses the phrase 'pure perception'; but 'pure' can + only mean 'not containing sensation', and consequently adds + nothing relevant. + + [22] B. 39, M. 24. The concluding sentences of the paragraph + need not be considered. + +Here Kant is clearly taking the proper test of perception. Its object, +as being an individual, is unique; there is only one of it, whereas +any conception has a plurality of instances. But he reaches his +conclusion by supposing that we first perceive empty space and then +become aware of its parts by dividing it. Parts of space are +essentially limitations of the one space; therefore to apprehend them +we must first apprehend space. And since space is _one_, it must be +object of perception; in other words, space, in the sense of the one +all-embracing space, i. e. the totality of individual spaces, is +something perceived. + +The argument appears open to two objections. In the _first_ place, we +do _not_ perceive space as a whole, and then, by dividing it, come to +apprehend individual spaces. We perceive individual spaces, or, +rather, individual bodies occupying individual spaces.[23] We then +apprehend that these spaces, as spaces, involve an infinity of other +spaces. In other words, it is reflection on the general nature of +space, the apprehension of which is involved in our apprehension of +individual spaces or rather of bodies in space, which gives rise to +the apprehension of the totality[24] of spaces, the apprehension being +an act, not of perception, but of thought or conception. It is +necessary, then, to distinguish (_a_) individual spaces, which we +perceive; (_b_) the nature of space in general, of which we become +aware by reflecting upon the character of perceived individual spaces, +and which we conceive; (_c_) the totality of individual spaces, the +thought of which we reach by considering the nature of space in +general. + + [23] This contention is not refuted by the objection that our + distinct apprehension of an individual space is always bound + up with an indistinct apprehension of the spaces immediately + surrounding it. For our indistinct apprehension cannot be + supposed to be of the whole of the surrounding space. + + [24] It is here assumed that a whole or a totality can be + infinite. Cf. p. 102. + +In the _second_ place, the distinctions just drawn afford no ground +for distinguishing space as something perceived from any other +characteristic of objects as something conceived; for any other +characteristic admits of corresponding distinctions. Thus, with +respect to colour it is possible to distinguish (_a_) individual +colours which we perceive; (_b_) colouredness in general, which we +conceive by reflecting on the common character exhibited by individual +colours and which involves various kinds or species of colouredness; +(_c_) the totality of individual colours, the thought of which is +reached by considering the nature of colouredness in general.[25] + + [25] For a possible objection and the answer thereto, see + note, p. 70. + +Both in the case of colour and in that of space there is to be found +the distinction between universal and individual, and therefore also +that between conception and perception. It may be objected that after +all, as Kant points out, there is only one space, whereas there are +many individual colours. But the assertion that there is only one +space simply means that all individual bodies in space are related +spatially. This will be admitted, if the attempt be made to think of +two bodies as in different spaces and therefore as not related +spatially. Moreover, there is a parallel in the case of colour, since +individual coloured bodies are related by way of colour, e. g. as +brighter and duller; and though such a relation is different from a +relation of bodies in respect of space, the difference is due to the +special nature of the universals conceived, and does not imply a +difference between space and colour in respect of perception and +conception. In any case, space as a whole is not object of perception, +which it must be if Kant is to show that space, as being one, is +perceived; for space in this context must mean the totality of +individual spaces. + +Kant's second argument is stated as follows: "Space is represented as +an infinite _given_ magnitude. Now every conception must indeed be +considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite +number of different possible representations (as their common mark), +and which therefore contains these _under itself_, but no conception +can, as such, be thought of as though it contained _in itself_ an +infinite number of representations. Nevertheless, space is so +conceived, for all parts of space _ad infinitum_ exist simultaneously. +Consequently the original representation of space is an _a priori +perception_ and not a _conception_." In other words, while a +conception implies an infinity of individuals which come under it, the +elements which constitute the conception itself (e. g. that of +triangularity or redness) are not infinite; but the elements which go +to constitute space are infinite, and therefore space is not a +conception but a perception. + +Though, however, space in the sense of the infinity of spaces may be +said to contain an infinite number of spaces if it be meant that it +_is_ these infinite spaces, it does not follow, nor is it true, that +space in this sense is object of perception. + +The aim of the arguments just considered, and stated in § 2 of +the _Aesthetic_, is to establish the two characteristics of our +apprehension of space,[26] from which it is to follow that space is a +property of things only as they appear to us and not as they are in +themselves. This conclusion is drawn in § 4. §§ 2 and 4 therefore +complete the argument. § 3, a passage added in the second edition +of the _Critique_, interrupts the thought, for ignoring § 2, it once +more establishes the _a priori_ and perceptive character of our +apprehension of space, and independently draws the conclusion drawn in +§ 4. Since, however, Kant draws the final conclusion in the same way +in § 3 and in § 4, and since a passage in the _Prolegomena_,[27] of +which § 3 is only a summary, gives a more detailed account of Kant's +thought, attention should be concentrated on § 3, together with the +passage in the _Prolegomena_. + + [26] viz. that it is _a priori_ and a pure perception. + + [27] §§ 6-11. + +It might seem at the outset that since the arguments upon which Kant +bases the premises for his final argument have turned out invalid, the +final argument itself need not be considered. The argument, however, +of § 3 ignores the preceding arguments for the _a priori_ and +perceptive character of our apprehension of space. It returns to the +_a priori_ synthetic character of geometrical judgements, upon which +stress is laid in the Introduction, and appeals to this as the +justification of the _a priori_ and perceptive character of our +apprehension of space. + +The argument of § 3 runs as follows: "Geometry is a science which +determines the properties of space synthetically and yet _a priori_. +What, then, must be the representation of space, in order that such a +knowledge of it may be possible? It must be originally perception, for +from a mere conception no propositions can be deduced which go beyond +the conception, and yet this happens in geometry. But this perception +must be _a priori_, i. e. it must occur in us before all +sense-perception of an object, and therefore must be pure, not +empirical perception. For geometrical propositions are always +apodeictic, i. e. bound up with the consciousness of their necessity +(e. g. space has only three dimensions), and such propositions cannot +be empirical judgements nor conclusions from them." + +"Now how can there exist in the mind an external perception[28] which +precedes[29] the objects themselves, and in which the conception of +them can be determined _a priori_? Obviously not otherwise than in so +far as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal nature of +the subject to be affected by objects and thereby to obtain _immediate +representation_, i. e. _perception_ of them, and consequently only as +the form of the external sense in general."[30] + + [28] 'External perception' can only mean perception of what + is spatial. + + [29] _Vorhergeht._ + + [30] 'Formal nature _to be affected by objects_' is not + relevant to the context. + +Here three steps are taken. From the _synthetic_ character of +geometrical judgements it is concluded that space is not something +which we _conceive_, but something which we _perceive_. From their _a +priori_ character, i. e. from the consciousness of necessity involved, +it is concluded that the perception of space must be _a priori_ in a +new sense, that of taking place _before_ the perception of objects in +it.[31] From the fact that we perceive space before we perceive +objects in it, and thereby are able to anticipate the spatial +relations which condition these objects, it is concluded that space is +only a characteristic of our perceiving nature, and consequently that +space is a property not of things in themselves, but only of things as +perceived by us.[32] + + [31] Cf. B. 42, M. 26 (a) fin., (b) second sentence. + + [32] Cf. B. 43, M. 26-7. + +Two points in this argument are, even on the face of it, paradoxical. +Firstly, the term _a priori_, as applied not to geometrical judgements +but to the perception of space, is given a temporal sense; it means +not something whose validity is independent of experience and which is +the manifestation of the nature of the mind, but something which takes +place before experience. Secondly, the conclusion is not that the +perception of space _is the manifestation of_ the mind's perceiving +nature, but that it _is_ the mind's perceiving nature. For the +conclusion is that space[33] is the formal nature of the subject to be +affected by objects, and therefore the form of the external sense in +general. Plainly, then, Kant here confuses an actual perception and a +form or way of perceiving. These points, however, are more explicit in +the corresponding passage in the _Prolegomena_.[34] + + [33] Kant draws no distinction between space and the + perception of space, or, rather, habitually speaks of space + as a perception. No doubt he considers that his view that + space is only a characteristic of phenomena justifies + the identification of space and the perception of it. + Occasionally, however, he distinguishes them. Thus he + sometimes speaks of the representation of space (e. g. + B. 38-40, M. 23-4); in _Prol._, § 11, he speaks of a pure + perception of space and time; and in B. 40, M. 25, he says + that our representation of space must be perception. But this + language is due to the pressure of the facts, and not to his + general theory; cf. pp. 135-6. + + [34] §§ 6-11. + +It begins thus: "Mathematics carries with it thoroughly apodeictic +certainty, that is, absolute necessity, and, therefore, rests on no +empirical grounds, and consequently is a pure product of reason, and, +besides, is thoroughly synthetical. How, then, is it possible for +human reason to accomplish such knowledge entirely _a priori_?... But +we find that all mathematical knowledge has this peculiarity, that it +must represent its conception previously in _perception_, and indeed +_a priori_, consequently in a perception which is not empirical but +pure, and that otherwise it cannot take a single step. Hence its +judgements are always _intuitive_.... This observation on the nature +of mathematics at once gives us a clue to the first and highest +condition of its possibility, viz. that there must underlie it _a pure +perception_ in which it can exhibit or, as we say, _construct_ all its +conceptions in the concrete and yet _a priori_. If we can discover +this pure perception and its possibility, we may thence easily explain +how _a priori_ synthetical propositions in pure mathematics are +possible, and consequently also how the science itself is possible. +For just as empirical perception enables us without difficulty to +enlarge synthetically in experience the conception which we frame of +an object of perception through new predicates which perception itself +offers us, so pure perception also will do the same, only with the +difference that in this case the synthetical judgement will be _a +priori_ certain and apodeictic, while in the former case it will be +only _a posteriori_ and empirically certain; for the latter [i. e. the +empirical perception on which the _a posteriori_ synthetic judgement +is based] contains only that which is to be found in contingent +empirical perception, while the former [i. e. the pure perception on +which the _a priori_ synthetic judgement is based] contains that which +is bound to be found in pure perception, since, as _a priori_ +perception, it is inseparably connected with the conception _before +all experience_ or individual sense-perception." + +This passage is evidently based upon the account which Kant gives in +the _Doctrine of Method_ of the method of geometry.[35] According to +this account, in order to apprehend, for instance, that a three-sided +figure must have three angles, we must draw in imagination or on paper +an individual figure corresponding to the conception of a three-sided +figure. We then see that the very nature of the act of construction +involves that the figure constructed must possess three angles as well +as three sides. Hence, perception being that by which we apprehend the +individual, a perception is involved in the act by which we form a +geometrical judgement, and the perception can be called _a priori_, in +that it is guided by our _a priori_ apprehension of the necessary +nature of the act of construction, and therefore of the figure +constructed. + + [35] B. 740 ff., M. 434 ff. Compare especially the following: + "_Philosophical_ knowledge is _knowledge of reason_ by means + of _conceptions_; mathematical knowledge is knowledge by + means of the _construction_ of conceptions. But the + _construction_ of a conception means the _a priori_ + presentation of a perception corresponding to it. The + construction of a conception therefore demands a + _non-empirical_ perception, which, therefore, as a + perception, is an _individual_ object, but which none the + less, as the construction of a conception (a universal + representation), must express in the representation universal + validity for all possible perceptions which come under that + conception. Thus I construct a triangle by presenting the + object corresponding to the conception, either by mere + imagination in pure perception, or also, in accordance with + pure perception, on paper in empirical perception, but in + both cases completely _a priori_, without having borrowed + the pattern of it from any experience. The individual drawn + figure is empirical, but nevertheless serves to indicate the + conception without prejudice to its universality, because in + this empirical perception we always attend only to the act of + construction of the conception, to which many determinations, + e. g. the magnitude of the sides and of the angles, are + wholly indifferent, and accordingly abstract from these + differences, which do not change the conception of the + triangle." + +The account in the _Prolegomena_, however, differs from that of the +_Doctrine of Method_ in one important respect. It asserts that the +perception involved in a mathematical judgement not only may, but +must, be pure, i. e. must be a perception in which no spatial object +is present, and it implies that the perception must take place +_before_ all experience of actual objects.[36] Hence _a priori_, +applied to perception, has here primarily, if not exclusively, the +temporal meaning that the perception takes place _antecedently to all +experience_.[37] + + [36] This becomes more explicit in § 8 and ff. + + [37] This is also, and more obviously, implied in §§ 8-11. + +The thought of the passage quoted from the _Prolegomena_ can be stated +thus: 'A mathematical judgement implies the perception of an +individual figure antecedently to all experience. This may be said to +be the first condition of the possibility of mathematical judgements +which is revealed by reflection. There is, however, a prior or higher +condition. The perception of an individual figure involves as its +basis another pure perception. For we can only construct and therefore +perceive an individual figure in empty space. Space is that _in which_ +it must be constructed and perceived. A perception[38] of empty space +is, therefore, necessary. If, then, we can discover how this +perception is possible, we shall be able to explain the possibility of +_a priori_ synthetical judgements of mathematics.' + + [38] _Pure_ perception only means that the space perceived is + empty. + +Kant continues as follows: "But with this step the difficulty seems to +increase rather than to lessen. For henceforward the question is '_How +is it possible to perceive anything a priori?_' A perception is such a +representation as would immediately depend upon the presence of the +object. Hence it seems impossible _originally_ to perceive _a priori_, +because perception would in that case have to take place without an +object to which it might refer, present either formerly or at the +moment, and accordingly could not be perception.... How can +_perception_ of the object precede the object itself?"[39] Kant here +finds himself face to face with the difficulty created by the +preceding section. Perception, as such, involves the actual presence +of an object; yet the pure perception of space involved by +geometry--which, as pure, is the perception of empty space, and which, +as the perception of empty space, is _a priori_ in the sense of +temporally prior to the perception of actual objects--presupposes that +an object is not actually present. + + [39] _Prol._ § 8. + +The solution is given in the next section. "Were our perception +necessarily of such a kind as to represent things _as they are in +themselves_, no perception would take place _a priori_, but would +always be empirical. For I can only know what is contained in the +object in itself, if it is present and given to me. No doubt it is +even then unintelligible how the perception of a present thing should +make me know it as it is in itself, since its qualities cannot migrate +over into my faculty of representation; but, even granting this +possibility, such a perception would not occur _a priori_, i. e. +before the object was presented to me; for without this presentation, +no basis of the relation between my representation and the object can +be imagined; the relation would then have to rest upon inspiration. It +is therefore possible only in one way for my perception to precede the +actuality of the object and to take place as _a priori_ knowledge, +viz. _if it contains nothing but the form of the sensibility, which +precedes in me, the subject, all actual impressions through which I am +affected by objects_. For I can know _a priori_ that objects of the +senses can only be perceived in accordance with this form of the +sensibility. Hence it follows that propositions which concern merely +this form of sensuous perception will be possible and valid for +objects of the senses, and in the same way, conversely, that +perceptions which are possible _a priori_ can never concern any things +other than objects of our senses." + +This section clearly constitutes the turning-point in Kant's argument, +and primarily expresses, in an expanded form, the central doctrine of +§ 3 of the _Aesthetic_, that an external perception anterior to +objects themselves, and in which our conceptions of objects can be +determined _a priori_, is possible, if, and only if, it has its seat +in the subject as its formal nature of being affected by objects, and +consequently as the form of the external sense in general. It argues +that, since this is true, and since geometrical judgements involve +such a perception anterior to objects, space must be only the[40] form +of sensibility. + + [40] _The_ and not _a_, because, for the moment, time is + ignored. + +Now why does Kant think that this conclusion follows? Before we can +answer this question we must remove an initial difficulty. In this +passage Kant unquestionably identifies a form of perception with an +actual perception. It is at once an actual perception and a capacity +of perceiving. This is evident from the words, "It is possible only in +one way for my perception to precede the actuality of the object ... +viz. _if it contains nothing but the form of the sensibility_."[41] +The identification becomes more explicit a little later. "A pure +perception (of space and time) can underlie the empirical perception +of objects, because it is nothing but the mere form of the +sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of the objects, in +that it in fact first makes them possible. Yet this faculty of +perceiving _a priori_ affects not the matter of the phenomenon, i. e. +that in it which is sensation, for this constitutes that which is +empirical, but only its form, viz. space and time."[42] His argument, +however, can be successfully stated without this identification. It is +only necessary to re-write his cardinal assertion in the form 'the +perception of space must be nothing but the _manifestation_ of the +form of the sensibility'. Given this modification, the question +becomes, 'Why does Kant think that the perception of empty space, +involved by geometrical judgements, can be only a manifestation of our +perceiving nature, and not in any way the apprehension of a real +quality of objects?' The answer must be that it is because he thinks +that, while in empirical perception a real object is present, in the +perception of empty space a real object is not present. He regards +this as proving that the latter perception is only of something +subjective or mental. "Space and time, by being pure _a priori_ +perceptions, prove that they are mere forms of our sensibility which +must precede all empirical perception, i. e. sense-perception of +actual objects."[43] His main conclusion now follows easily enough. If +in perceiving empty space we are only apprehending a manifestation of +our perceiving nature, what we apprehend in a geometrical judgement is +really a law of our perceiving nature, and therefore, while it _must_ +apply to our perceptions of objects or to objects as perceived, it +_cannot_ apply to objects apart from our perception, or, at least, +there is no ground for holding that it does so. + + [41] _Prol._, § 9. + + [42] _Prol._, § 11. + + [43] _Prol._, § 10. + +If, however, this fairly represents Kant's thought, it must be allowed +that the conclusion which he should have drawn is different, and even +that the conclusion which he does draw is in reality incompatible with +his starting-point. + +His starting-point is the view that the truth of geometrical +judgements presupposes a perception of empty space, in virtue of which +we can discover rules of spatial relation which must apply to all +spatial objects subsequently perceived. His problem is to discover the +presupposition of this presupposition. The proper answer must be, not +that space is a form of sensibility or a way in which objects appear +to us, but that space is the form of all objects, i. e. that all +objects are spatial.[44] For in that case they must be subject to the +laws of space, and therefore if we can discover these laws by a study +of empty space, the only condition to be satisfied, if the objects of +subsequent perception are to conform to the laws which we discover, is +that all objects should be spatial. Nothing is implied which enables +us to decide whether the objects are objects as they are in themselves +or objects as perceived; for in either case the required result +follows. If in empirical perception we apprehend things only as they +appear to us, and if space is the form of them as they appear to us, +it will no doubt be true that the laws of spatial relation which we +discover must apply to things as they appear to us. But on the other +hand, if in empirical perception we apprehend things as they are, and +if space is their form, i. e. if things are spatial, it will be +equally true that the laws discovered by geometry must apply to things +as they are. + + [44] Kant expresses the assertion that space is the form of + all objects by saying that space is the form of _phenomena_. + This of course renders easy an unconscious transition from + the thesis that space is the form of objects to the quite + different thesis that space is the form of sensibility; cf. + p. 39. + +Again, Kant's starting-point really commits him to the view that space +is a characteristic of things as they are. For--paradoxical though it +may be--his problem is to explain the possibility of _perceiving a +priori_, i. e. of _perceiving_ the characteristics of an object +anterior to the actual presence of the object in perception.[45] This +implies that _empirical_ perception, which involves the actual +presence of the object, involves no difficulty; in other words, it is +implied that empirical perception is of objects as they are. And we +find Kant admitting this to the extent of allowing _for the sake of +argument_ that the perception of a present thing can make us know the +thing as it is in itself.[46] But if empirical perception gives us +things as they are, and if, as is the case, and as Kant really +presupposes, the objects of empirical perception are spatial, then, +since space is their form, the judgements of geometry must relate to +things as they are. It is true that on this view Kant's first +presupposition of geometrical judgements has to be stated by saying +that we are able to perceive a real characteristic of things in space, +before we perceive the things; and, no doubt, Kant thinks this +impossible. According to him, when we perceive empty space no object +is present, and therefore what is before the mind must be merely +mental. But no greater difficulty is involved than that involved in +the corresponding supposition required by Kant's own view. It is +really just as difficult to hold that we can perceive a characteristic +of things as they appear to us _before_ they appear, as to hold that +we can perceive a characteristic of them as they are in themselves +_before_ we perceive them. + + [45] Cf. _Prol._, Section 8. + + [46] _Prol._, § 9 (cf. p. 55). + +The fact is that the real difficulty with which Kant is grappling in +the _Prolegomena_ arises, not from the supposition that spatial bodies +are things in themselves, but from the supposed presupposition of +geometry that we must be able to perceive empty space before we +perceive bodies in it. It is, of course, impossible to defend the +perception of empty space, but _if_ it be maintained, the space +perceived must be conceded to be not, as Kant thinks, something mental +or subjective, but a real characteristic of things. For, as has been +pointed out, the paradox of pure perception is reached solely through +the consideration that, while in empirical perception we perceive +objects, in pure perception we do not, and since the objects of +empirical perception are spatial, space must be a real characteristic +of them. + +The general result of the preceding criticism is that Kant's +conclusion does not follow from the premises by which he supports it. +It should therefore be asked whether it is not possible to take +advantage of this hiatus by presenting the argument for the merely +phenomenal character of space without any appeal to the possibility of +perceiving empty space. For it is clear that what was primarily before +Kant, in writing the _Critique_, was the _a priori_ character of +geometrical judgements themselves, and not the existence of a +perception of empty space which they were held to presuppose.[47] + + [47] The difficulty with which Kant is struggling in the + _Prolegomena_, §§ 6-11, can be stated from a rather different + point of view by saying that the thought that geometrical + judgements imply a perception of empty space led him to apply + the term '_a priori_' to perception as well as to judgement. + The term, _a priori_, applied to judgements has a valid + meaning; it means, not that the judgement is made prior to + all experience, but that it is not based upon experience, + being originated by the mind in virtue of its own powers of + thinking. Applied to perception, however, '_a priori_' must + mean prior to all experience, and, since the object of + perception is essentially individual (cf. B. 741, M. 435), + this use of the term gives rise to the impossible task of + explaining how a perception can take place prior to the + actual experience of an individual in perception (cf. + _Prol._, § 8). + +If, then, the conclusion that space is only the form of sensibility +can be connected with the _a priori_ character of geometrical +judgements without presupposing the existence of a perception of empty +space, his position will be rendered more plausible. + +This can be done as follows. The essential characteristic of a +geometrical judgement is not that it takes place prior to experience, +but that it is not based upon experience. Thus a judgement, arrived at +by an activity of the mind in which it remains within itself and does +not appeal to actual experience of the objects to which the judgement +relates, is implied to hold good of those objects. If the objects were +things as they are in themselves, the validity of the judgement could +not be justified, for it would involve the gratuitous assumption that +a necessity of thought is binding on things which _ex hypothesi_ are +independent of the nature of the mind. If, however, the objects in +question are things as perceived, they will be through and through +conditioned by the mind's perceiving nature; and, consequently, if a +geometrical rule, e. g. that a three-sided figure must have three +angles, is really a law of the mind's perceiving nature, all +individual perceptions, i. e. all objects as perceived by us, will +necessarily conform to the law. Therefore, in the latter case, and in +that only, will the universal validity of geometrical judgements be +justified. Since, then, geometrical judgements are universally valid, +space, which is that of which geometrical laws are the laws, must be +merely a form of perception or a characteristic of objects as +perceived by us. + +This appears to be the best form in which the substance of Kant's +argument, stripped of unessentials, can be stated. It will be +necessary to consider both the argument and its conclusion. + +The argument, so stated, is undeniably plausible. Nevertheless, +examination of it reveals two fatal defects. In the first place, its +starting-point is false. To Kant the paradox of geometrical judgements +lies in the fact that they are not based upon an appeal to experience +of the things to which they relate. It is implied, therefore, that +judgements which are based on experience involve no paradox, and for +the reason that in experience we apprehend things as they are.[48] In +contrast with this, it is implied that in geometrical judgements the +connexion which we apprehend is not real, i. e. does not relate to +things as they are. Otherwise, there would be no difficulty; if in +geometry we apprehended rules of connexion relating to things as they +are, we could allow without difficulty that the things must conform to +them. No such distinction, however, can be drawn between _a priori_ +and empirical judgements. For the necessity of connexion, e. g. +between being a three-sided figure and being a three-angled figure, is +as much a characteristic of things as the empirically-observed shape +of an individual body, e. g. a table. Geometrical judgements, +therefore, cannot be distinguished from empirical judgements on the +ground that in the former the mind remains within itself, and does not +immediately apprehend fact or a real characteristic of reality.[49] +Moreover, since in a geometrical judgement we do in fact think that we +are apprehending a real connexion, i. e. a connexion which applies to +things and to things as they are in themselves, to question the +reality of the connexion is to question the validity of thinking +altogether, and to do this is implicitly to question the validity of +our thought about the nature of our own mind, as well as the validity +of our thought about things independent of the mind. Yet Kant's +argument, in the form in which it has just been stated, presupposes +that our thought is valid at any rate when it is concerned with our +perceptions of things, even if it is not valid when concerned with the +things as they are in themselves. + + [48] Cf. p. 17. + + [49] For the reasons which led Kant to draw this distinction + between empirical and _a priori_ judgements, cf. pp. 21-2. + +This consideration leads to the second criticism. The supposition that +space is only a form of perception, even if it be true, _in no way +assists_ the explanation of the universal validity of geometrical +judgements. Kant's argument really confuses a _necessity_ of relation +with the _consciousness of a necessity_ of relation. No doubt, if it +be a law of our perceiving nature that, whenever we perceive an object +as a three-sided figure, the object as perceived contains three +angles, it follows that any object as perceived will conform to this +law; just as if it be a law of things as they are in themselves that +three-sided figures contain three angles, all three-sided figures will +in themselves have three angles. But what has to be explained is the +universal applicability, not of a law, but of a judgement about a law. +For Kant's real problem is to explain why _our judgement_ that a +three-sided figure must contain three angles must apply to all +three-sided figures. Of course, if it be granted that in the judgement +we apprehend the true law, the problem may be regarded as solved. But +how are we to know that what we judge _is_ the true law? The answer is +in no way facilitated by the supposition that the judgement relates to +our perceiving nature. It can just as well be urged that what we think +to be a necessity of our perceiving nature is not a necessity of it, +as that what we think to be a necessity of things as they are in +themselves is not a necessity of them. The best, or rather the only +possible, answer is simply that that of which we apprehend the +necessity must be true, or, in other words, that we _must_ accept the +validity of thought. Hence nothing is gained by the supposition that +space is a form of sensibility. If what we judge to be necessary is, +as such, valid, a judgement relating to things in themselves will be +as valid as a judgement relating to our perceiving nature.[50] + + [50] The same criticism can be urged against Kant's appeal to + the necessity of _constructing_ geometrical figures. The + conclusion drawn from the necessity of construction is stated + thus: "If the object (the triangle) were something in itself + without relation to you the subject, how could you say that + that which lies necessarily in your subjective conditions of + constructing a triangle must also necessarily belong to the + triangle in itself?" (B. 65, M. 39). Kant's thought is that + the laws of the mind's constructing nature must apply to + objects, if, and only if, the objects are the mind's own + construction. Hence it is open to the above criticism if, in + the criticism, 'construct' be substituted for 'perceive'. + +This difficulty is concealed from Kant by his insistence on the +_perception_ of space involved in geometrical judgements. This leads +him at times to identify the judgement and the perception, and, +therefore, to speak of the judgement as a perception. Thus we find him +saying that mathematical judgements are always _perceptive_,[51] and +that "It is only possible for my perception to precede the actuality +of the object and take place as _a priori_ knowledge, if &c."[52] +Hence, if, in addition, a geometrical judgement, as being a judgement +about a necessity, be identified with a necessity of judging, the +conformity of things to these universal judgements will become the +conformity of things to rules or necessities of our judging, i. e. of +our perceiving nature, and Kant's conclusion will at once follow.[53] +Unfortunately for Kant, a geometrical judgement, however closely +related to a perception, must itself, as the apprehension of what is +necessary and universal, be an act of thought rather than of +perception, and therefore the original problem of the conformity of +things to our mind can be forced upon him again, even after he thinks +that he has solved it, in the new form of that of the conformity +within the mind of perceiving to thinking. + + [51] _Prol._, § 7. + + [52] _Prol._, § 9. + + [53] Cf. (_Introduction_, B. xvii, M. xxix): "But if the + object (as object of the senses) conforms to the nature of + our faculty of perception, I can quite well represent to + myself the possibility of _a priori_ knowledge of it [i. e. + mathematical knowledge]." + +The fact is simply that the universal validity of geometrical +judgements can in no way be 'explained'. It is not in the least +explained or made easier to accept by the supposition that objects +are 'phenomena'. These judgements must be accepted as being what we +presuppose them to be in making them, viz. the direct apprehension of +necessities of relation between real characteristics of real things. +To explain them by reference to the phenomenal character of what is +known is really--though contrary to Kant's intention--to throw doubt +upon their validity; otherwise, they would not need explanation. As a +matter of fact, it is _impossible_ to question their validity. In the +act of judging, doubt is impossible. Doubt can arise only when +we subsequently reflect and temporarily lose our hold upon the +consciousness of necessity in judging.[54] The doubt, however, since +it is non-existent in our geometrical consciousness, is really +groundless,[55] and, therefore, the problem to which it gives rise is +unreal. Moreover if, _per impossibile_, doubt could be raised, it +could not be set at rest. No vindication of a judgement in which we +are conscious of a necessity could do more than take the problem a +stage further back, by basing it upon some other consciousness of a +necessity; and since this latter judgement could be questioned for +precisely the same reason, we should only be embarking upon an +infinite process. + + [54] Cf. Descartes, _Princ. Phil._ i. § 13, and _Medit._ v + sub fin. + + [55] The view that kinds of space other than that with which + we are acquainted are possible, though usually held and + discussed by mathematicians, belongs to them _qua_ + metaphysicians, and not _qua_ mathematicians. + +We may now consider Kant's conclusion in abstraction from the +arguments by which he reaches it. It raises three main difficulties. + +In the first place, it is not the conclusion to be expected from +Kant's own standpoint. The phenomenal character of space is inferred, +not from the fact that we make judgements at all, but from the fact +that we make judgements of a particular kind, viz. _a priori_ +judgements. From this point of view empirical judgements present no +difficulty. It should, therefore, be expected that the qualities which +we attribute to things in empirical judgements are not phenomenal, but +belong to things as they are. Kant himself implies this in drawing his +conclusion concerning the nature of space. "Space does not represent +any quality of things in themselves or things in relation to one +another; that is, it does not represent any determination of things +which would attach to the objects themselves and would remain, even +though we abstracted from all subjective conditions of perception. For +neither absolute nor relative[56] determinations of objects can be +perceived prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, +and therefore not _a priori_."[57] It is, of course, implied that in +experience, where we do not discover determinations of objects prior +to the existence of the objects, we do apprehend determinations of +things as they are in themselves, and not as they are in relation to +us. Thus we should expect the conclusion to be, not that all that we +know is phenomenal--which is Kant's real position--but that spatial +(and temporal) relations alone are phenomenal, i. e. that they alone +are the result of a transmutation due to the nature of our perceiving +faculties.[58] This conclusion would, of course, be absurd, for what +Kant considers to be the empirically known qualities of objects +disappear, if the spatial character of objects is removed. Moreover, +Kant is prevented by his theory of perception from seeing that this is +the real solution of his problem, absurd though it may be. Since +perception is held to arise through the origination of sensations by +things in themselves, empirical knowledge is naturally thought of as +knowledge about sensations, and since sensations are palpably within +the mind, and are held to be due to things in themselves, knowledge +about sensations can be regarded as phenomenal. + + [56] The first sentence shows that 'relative determinations' + means, not 'determinations of objects in relation to us', but + 'determinations of objects in relation to one another.' Cf. + B. 37, M. 23; and B. 66 fin., 67 init., M. 40 (where these + meanings are confused). + + [57] B. 42, M. 26. + + [58] This conclusion is also to be expected because, + inconsistently with his real view, Kant is here (B. 41-2, M. + 25-6) under the influence of the presupposition of our + ordinary consciousness that in perception we are confronted + by things in themselves, known to be spatial, and not by + appearances produced by unknown things in themselves. Cf. (B. + 41, M. 25) "and thereby of obtaining immediate representation + of them [i. e. objects];" and (B. 42, M. 26) "the receptivity + of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily precedes + all perceptions of these objects." These sentences identify + things in themselves and bodies in space, and thereby imply + that in empirical perception we perceive things in themselves + and as they _are_. + +On the other hand, if we consider Kant's conclusion from the point of +view, not of the problem which originates it, but of the distinction +in terms of which he states it, viz. that between things as they are +in themselves and things as perceived by us, we are led to expect the +contrary result. Since perception is the being affected by things, and +since the nature of the affection depends upon the nature of our +capacity of being affected, in _all_ perception the object will become +distorted or transformed, as it were, by our capacity of being +affected. The conclusion, therefore, should be that in all judgements, +empirical as well as _a priori_, we apprehend things only as +perceived. The reason why Kant does not draw this conclusion is +probably that given above, viz. that by the time Kant reaches the +solution of his problem empirical knowledge has come to relate to +sensation only; consequently, it has ceased to occur to him that +empirical judgements could possibly give us knowledge of things as +they are. Nevertheless, Kant should not have retained in his +formulation of the problem a distinction irreconcilable with his +solution of it; and if he had realized that he was doing so he might +have been compelled to modify his whole view. + +The second difficulty is more serious. If the truth of geometrical +judgements presupposes that space is only a property of objects as +perceived by us, it is a paradox that geometricians should be +convinced, as they are, of the truth of their judgements. They +undoubtedly think that their judgements apply to things as they are in +themselves, and not merely as they appear to us. They certainly do not +think that the relations which they discover apply to objects only as +perceived. Not only, therefore, do they not think that bodies in space +are phenomena, but they do not even leave it an open question whether +bodies are phenomena or not. Hence, if Kant be right, they are really +in a state of illusion, for on his view the true geometrical judgement +should include in itself the phenomenal character of spatial +relations; it should be illustrated by expressing Euclid I. 5 in +the form that the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles +triangle belongs to objects as perceived. Kant himself lays this down. +"The proposition 'all objects are beside one another in space' +is valid under[59] the limitation that these things are taken as +objects of our sensuous perception. If I join the condition to the +perception, and say 'all things, as external phenomena, are beside +one another in space', the rule is valid universally, and without +limitation."[60] Kant, then, is in effect allowing that it is possible +for geometricians to make judgements, of the necessity of which +they are convinced, and yet to be wrong; and that, therefore, the +apprehension of the necessity of a judgement is no ground of its +truth. It follows that the truth of geometrical judgements can no +longer be accepted as a starting-point of discussion, and, therefore, +as a ground for inferring the phenomenal character of space. + + [59] A. reads 'only under' + + [60] B. 43, M. 27. + +There seems, indeed, one way of avoiding this consequence, viz. to +suppose that for Kant it was an absolute starting-point, which nothing +would have caused him to abandon, that only those judgements of which +we apprehend the necessity are true. It would, of course, follow that +geometricians would be unable to apprehend the necessity of +geometrical judgements, and therefore to make such judgements, until +they had discovered that things as spatial were only phenomena. It +would not be enough that they should think that the phenomenal or +non-phenomenal character of things as spatial must be left an open +question for the theory of knowledge to decide. In this way the +necessity of admitting the illusory character of geometry would be +avoided. The remedy, however, is at least as bad as the disease. +For it would imply that geometry must be preceded by a theory of +knowledge, which is palpably contrary to fact. Nor could Kant accept +it; for he avowedly bases his theory of knowledge, i. e. his view +that objects as spatial are phenomena, upon the truth of geometry; +this procedure would be circular if the making of true geometrical +judgements was allowed to require the prior adoption of his theory of +knowledge. + +The third difficulty is the most fundamental. Kant's conclusion (and +also, of course, his argument) presupposes the validity of the +distinction between phenomena and things in themselves. If, then, this +distinction should prove untenable in principle, Kant's conclusion +with regard to space must fail on general grounds, and it will even +have been unnecessary to consider his arguments for it. The importance +of the issue, however, requires that it should be considered in a +separate chapter. + + NOTE to page 47. + + The argument is not affected by the contention that, while + the totality of spaces is infinite, the totality of colours + or, at any rate, the totality of instances of some other + characteristic of objects is finite; for this difference + will involve no difference in respect of perception and + conception. In both cases the apprehension that there is a + totality will be reached in the same way, i. e. through the + _conception_ of the characteristic in general, and the + apprehension in the one case that the totality is infinite + and in the other that it is finite will depend on the + apprehension of the special nature of the characteristic in + question. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +PHENOMENA AND THINGS IN THEMSELVES + + +The distinction between phenomena and things in themselves can be best +approached by considering Kant's formulation of the alternative views +of the nature of space and time. "What are space and time? Are they +real existences? Or are they merely determinations or relations of +things, such, however, as would also belong to them in themselves, +even if they were not perceived, or are they attached to the form of +perception only, and consequently to the subjective nature of our +mind, without which these predicates can never be attributed to any +thing?"[1] + + [1] B. 37, M. 23. + +Of these three alternatives, the first can be ignored. It is opposed +to the second, and is the view that space and time are things rather +than relations between things. This opposition falls within the first +member of the wider opposition between things as they are in +themselves and things as they are as perceived, and Kant, and indeed +any one, would allow that if space and time belong to things as they +are in themselves and not to things only as perceived, they are +relations between things rather than things. The real issue, +therefore, lies between the second and third alternatives. Are space +and time relations between things which belong to them both in +themselves and also as perceived by us, or are they relations which +belong to things only as perceived? + +To this question we may at once reply that, inasmuch as it involves an +impossible antithesis, it is wholly unreal. The thought of a property +or a relation which belongs to things as perceived involves a +contradiction. To take Plato's example, suppose that we are looking at +a straight stick, partially immersed in water. If we have not +previously seen the stick, and are ignorant of the laws of refraction, +we say that the stick is bent. If, however, we learn the effect of +refraction, and observe the stick from several positions, we alter our +assertion. We say that the stick is not really bent, but only looks or +appears bent to us. But, if we reflect at all, we do not express our +meaning by saying that the stick _is_ bent to us as perceiving, though +not in reality.[2] The word 'is' essentially relates to what really +is. If, therefore, the phrase 'to us as perceiving' involves an +opposition to the phrase 'in reality', as it must if it is to be a +real qualification of 'is', it cannot rightly be added to the word +'is'. To put the matter more explicitly, the assertion that something +_is_ so and so implies that it is so and so in itself, whether it be +perceived or not, and therefore the assertion that something is so and +so to us as perceiving, though not in itself, is a contradiction in +terms. The phrase 'to us as perceiving', as a restriction upon the +word 'is', merely takes back the precise meaning of the word 'is'. +That to which the phrase can be added is not the word 'is', but the +word 'looks' or 'appears'. We can rightly say that the stick looks or +appears bent to us as perceiving. But even then the addition only +helps to make explicit the essential meaning of 'appears', for +'appears' really means 'appears to us', and 'as perceiving' only +repeats the meaning of 'appears' from the side of the perceiving +subject as opposed to that of the object perceived. The essential +point, however, is thereby brought out that the phrase 'to us as +perceiving' essentially relates not to what a thing is, but to what it +looks or appears to us. + + [2] Similarly, we do not say--if we mean what we say--of a + man who is colour blind that an object which others call blue + _is_ pink to him or to his perception, but that it _looks_ + pink to him. + +What, then, is the proper statement of Kant's view that space is a +determination of things only as they appear to us, and not as they are +in themselves? It should be said that things are not in reality +spatial, but only look or appear spatial to us. It should not be said +that they _are_ spatial for our perception, though not in themselves. +Thus the view properly stated implies that space is an illusion, +inasmuch as it is not a real property of things at all. This +implication, however, is precisely the conclusion which Kant wishes to +avoid. He takes infinite trouble to explain that he does not hold +space and time to be illusions.[3] Though _transcendentally ideal_ +(i. e. though they do not belong to things in themselves), they are +_empirically real_. In other words, space and time are real relations +of _something_, though not of things in themselves. + + [3] B. 44, 52, 53-4, 62-3, 69-70; M. 27, 31-2, 37-8, 41-2; + _Prol._, § 13, Remark iii. + +How, then, does Kant obtain something of which space and time can be +regarded as really relations? He reaches it by a transition which at +first sight seems harmless. In stating the fact of perception he +substitutes for the assertion that things appear so and so to us the +assertion that things produce appearances in us. In this way, instead +of an assertion which relates to the thing and states what it is not +but only appears, he obtains an assertion which introduces a second +reality distinct from the thing, viz. an appearance or phenomenon, and +thereby he gains something other than the thing to which space can be +attached as a real predicate. He thus gains something in respect of +which, with regard to spatial relations we can be said to have +_knowledge_ and not illusion. For the position now is that space, +though not a property of things in themselves, _is_ a property of +phenomena or appearances; in other words, that while things in +themselves are not spatial, phenomena and appearances _are_ spatial. +As evidence of this transition, it is enough to point out that, while +he states the _problem_ in the form 'Are things in themselves spatial +or are they only spatial as appearing to us?'[4] he usually states the +_conclusion_ in the form 'Space is the form of phenomena', i. e. +phenomena are spatial. A transition is thereby implied from 'things as +appearing' to 'appearances'. At the same time, it is clear that Kant +is not aware of the transition, but considers the expressions +equivalent, or, in other words, fails to distinguish them. For both +modes of stating the conclusion are to be found even in the same +sentence. "This predicate [space] is applied to things only in so far +as they appear to us, i. e. are objects of sensibility [i. e. +phenomena]."[5] Again, the common phrase 'things as phenomena' implies +the same confusion. Moreover, if Kant had realized that the transition +was more than one of phraseology he must have seen that it was +necessary to recast his argument. + + [4] This is Kant's way of putting the question which should + be expressed by asking, 'Are things spatial, or do they only + look spatial?' + + [5] B. 43, M. 26. Cf. _Prol._, § 9 fin. with § 10 init. + +It may be said, then, that Kant is compelled to end with a different +distinction from that with which he begins. He begins with the +distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as +they appear to us, the distinction relating to one and the same +reality regarded from two different points of view. He ends with the +distinction between two different realities, things-in-themselves,[6] +external to, in the sense of independent of, the mind, and phenomena +or appearances within it. Yet if his _argument_ is to be valid, the +two distinctions should be identical, for it is the first distinction +to which the argument appeals.[7] In fact, we find him expressing what +is to him the same distinction now in the one way and now in the other +as the context requires. + + [6] It should be noticed that 'things-in-themselves' and + 'things as they are in themselves' have a different meaning. + + [7] Cf. p. 55 and ff. + +The final form of Kant's conclusion, then, is that while things in +themselves are not, or, at least, cannot be known to be spatial, +'phenomena,' or the appearances produced in us by things in +themselves, are spatial. Unfortunately, the conclusion in this form is +no more successful than it is in the former form, that things are +spatial only as perceived. Expressed by the formula 'phenomena are +spatial', it has, no doubt, a certain plausibility; for the word +'phenomena' to some extent conceals the essentially mental character +of what is asserted to be spatial. But the plausibility disappears on +the substitution of 'appearances'--the true equivalent of Kant's +_Erscheinungen_--for 'phenomena'. Just as it is absurd to describe the +fact that the stick only looks bent by saying that, while the stick is +not bent, the appearance which it produces is bent, so it is, even on +the face of it, nonsense to say that while things are not spatial, the +appearances which they produce in us are spatial. For an 'appearance', +being necessarily something mental, cannot possibly be said to be +extended. Moreover, it is really an abuse of the term 'appearance' to +speak of appearances _produced by_ things, for this phrase implies a +false severance of the appearance from the things which appear. If +there are 'appearances' at all, they are appearances _of_ things and +not appearances _produced by_ them. The importance of the distinction +lies in the difference of implication. To speak of appearances +produced by things is to imply that the object of perception is merely +something mental, viz. an appearance. Consequently, access to a +non-mental reality is excluded; for a perception of which the object +is something belonging to the mind's own being cannot justify an +inference to something beyond the mind, and the result is inevitably +solipsism. On the other hand, the phrase 'appearances of things', +whatever defects it may have, at least implies that it is a non-mental +reality which appears, and therefore that in perception we are in +direct relation to it; the phrase, therefore, does not imply from the +very beginning that the apprehension of a non-mental reality is +impossible. + +The objection will probably be raised that this criticism is much too +summary. We do, it will be said, distinguish in ordinary consciousness +between appearance and reality. Consequently there must be some form +in which Kant's distinction between things in themselves and phenomena +and the conclusion based upon it are justified. Moreover, Kant's +reiterated assertion that his view does not imply that space is an +illusion, and that the distinction between the real and the illusory +is possible _within_ phenomena, requires us to consider more closely +whether Kant may not after all be entitled to hold that space is not +an illusion.[8] + + [8] Cf. p. 93 and ff. + +This objection is, of course, reasonable. No one can satisfy himself +of the justice of the above criticisms until he has considered the +real nature of the distinction between appearance and reality. This +distinction must, therefore, be analysed. But before this is done it +is necessary, in order to discover the real issue, to formulate the +lines on which Kant may be defended. 'The reality,' it may be urged, +'which ideally we wish to know must be admitted to exist _in itself_, +in the sense of independently of the perception, and consequently its +nature must be admitted to be independent of perception. Ideally, +then, our desire is to know things[9] as they are in themselves, a +desire sufficiently expressed by the assertion that we desire to know +things, for to know them is to know them as they are, i. e. as they +are independently of perception. Again, since the reality which we +desire to know consists of individuals, and since the apprehension of +an individual implies perception, knowledge of reality requires +perception. If in perception we apprehended reality as it is, no +difficulty would arise. But we do not, for we are compelled to +distinguish what things are, and what they look or appear; and what +they appear essentially relates to perception. We perceive them as +they look or appear and, therefore, not as they are, for what they +look and what they are are _ex hypothesi_ distinguished. And this fact +constitutes a fatal obstacle to knowledge in general. We cannot know +anything as it _is_. At least the negative side of Kant's position +must be justified. We never can know things as they are in themselves. +What then do we know? Two alternative answers may be given. It may be +held that the positive side of Kant's position, though indefensible in +the form that we know things as they appear to us, is valid in the +form that we know what things look or appear. This, no doubt, implies +that our ordinary beliefs about reality are illusory, for what things +look is _ex hypothesi_ different from what they are. But the +implication does not constitute an important departure from Kant's +view. For in any case only that is knowledge proper which relates to +things as they are, and therefore the supposed knowledge of things as +they appear may be discarded without serious loss. On the other hand, +it may be held that the positive side of Kant's position can be +vindicated in the form that, while we do not know things in +themselves,[10] we do know the appearances which they produce in us. +It is true that this view involves the difficulty of maintaining that +appearances are spatial, but the difficulty is not insuperable. +Moreover, in this form the doctrine has the advantage that, unlike the +former, it does not imply that the knowledge which we have is only of +illusions, for instead of implying that our knowledge is merely +knowledge of what things look but really are not, it implies that we +know the real nature of realities of another kind, viz. of +appearances. Again, in this form of the view, it may be possible to +vindicate Kant's doctrine that the distinction between the real and +the illusory is tenable within what we know, for it may be possible to +distinguish within appearances between a 'real' appearance[11] and an +'illusory' appearance.[12]' + + [9] 'Things' is substituted for 'the reality which we believe + to exist independently of perception' in order to conform + to Kant's language. The substitution, of course, has the + implication--which Kant took for granted--that the reality + consists of a plurality of individuals. + + [10] 'Things in themselves' has here to be substituted for + 'things as they are in themselves' in the statement of the + negative side of the position, in order to express the proper + antithesis, which is now that between two things, the one + known and the other unknown, and not that between two points + of view from which one and the same thing is known and not + known respectively. + + [11] _Erscheinung._ + + [12] _Schein._ + +An implication of this defence should be noticed. The issue relates +to the nature of space[13], and may be stated in terms of it. For, +since space is a presupposition of all other properties which the +non-philosophical consciousness attributes to physical things, it +makes no difference whether we say that things _only appear_ heavy, +hard, in motion, &c., or whether we say that things _only appear_ +spatial. In the same way it is a matter of indifference whether we say +that, though things are not heavy, hard, &c., their appearances are +so, or whether we say that, though things are not spatial, their +appearances are so. The issue, then, concerns the possibility of +maintaining either that things only appear spatial, or that the +appearances which they produce are spatial, while the things +themselves are not, or, at least cannot be known to be, spatial. + + [13] We might add time also; but, for a reason which will + appear later (p. 139), it can be neglected. + +The tenability of these alternative positions has to be considered +apart from the argument of the _Aesthetic_, for this, as we have seen, +breaks down. At the outset it is important to realize that these +positions are the product of philosophical reflection, and constitute +general theories of knowledge. As has been pointed out, the +distinction between appearance and reality first arises in our +ordinary or scientific consciousness.[14] In this consciousness we are +compelled to distinguish between appearance and reality with respect +to the details of a reality which, as a whole, or, in principle, we +suppose ourselves to know. Afterwards in our philosophical +consciousness we come to reflect upon this distinction and to raise +the question whether it is not applicable to reality as a whole. We +ask with respect to knowledge in general, and not merely with respect +to certain particular items of knowledge, whether we know or can know +reality, and not merely appearance. The two positions just stated are +alternative ways of answering the question in the negative. They are, +then, philosophical views based upon a distinction found in our +ordinary consciousness. Consequently, in order to decide whether the +distinction will bear the superstructure placed upon it by the +philosophical consciousness, it is necessary to examine the +distinction as it exists in our ordinary consciousness. + + [14] I. e. the consciousness for which the problems are those + of science as opposed to philosophy. + +The distinction is applied in our ordinary consciousness both to the +primary and to the secondary qualities of matter, i. e. to the size, +shape, position and motion of physical bodies, and to their colour, +warmth, &c. We say, for instance, that the moon looks[15] or appears +as large as the sun, though really it is much smaller. We say that +railway lines, though parallel, look convergent, just as we say that +the straight stick in water looks bent. We say that at sunset the sun, +though really below the horizon, looks above it. Again, we say that to +a person who is colour blind the colour of an object looks different +to what it really is, and that the water into which we put our hand +may be warmer than it appears to our touch. + + [15] 'Looks' means 'appears to sight', and 'looks' is + throughout used as synonymous with 'appear', where the + instance under discussion relates to visual perception. + +The case of the primary qualities may be considered first. Since the +instances are identical in principle, and only differ in complexity, +it will be sufficient to analyse the simplest, that of the apparent +convergence of the railway lines. + +Two points at once force themselves upon our notice. In the first +place, we certainly suppose that we perceive the reality which we wish +to know, i. e. the reality which, as we suppose, exists independently +of our perception, and not an 'appearance' of it. It is, as we say, +the real lines which we see. Even the term 'convergent', in the +assertion that the lines look convergent, conveys this implication. +For 'convergent' is essentially a characteristic not of an appearance +but of a reality, in the sense in which something independent of +perception may be opposed as a reality to an 'appearance', which, as +such, presupposes perception. We can say neither that an appearance is +convergent, nor that the appearance of the lines is convergent. Only a +reality similar to the lines, e. g. two roads, can be said to be +convergent. Our ordinary thought, therefore, furnishes no ground for +the view that the object of perception is not the thing, but merely an +appearance of or produced by it. In the second place, the assertion +that the lines _look_ convergent implies considerable knowledge of the +real nature of the reality to which the assertion relates. Both the +terms 'lines' and 'convergent' imply that the reality _is_ spatial. +Further, if the context is such that we mean that, while the lines +look convergent, we do not know their real relation, we imply that +the lines really possess some characteristic which falls within the +genus to which convergence belongs, i. e. we imply that they are +convergent, divergent, or parallel. If, on the other hand, the context +is such that we mean that the lines only look convergent, we imply +that the lines are parallel, and therefore presuppose complete +knowledge in respect of the very characteristic in regard to which we +state what is only appearance. The assertion, then, in respect of a +primary quality, that a thing looks so and so implies knowledge of its +general character as spatial, and ignorance only of a detail; and the +assertion that a thing only looks or appears so and so implies +knowledge of the detail in question. + +Attention may now be drawn to a general difficulty which may be raised +with respect to the use of the terms 'looks' and 'appears'. It may be +stated thus: 'If the lines are not convergent, how is it possible even +to say that they _look_ convergent? Must it not be implied that at +least under _certain_ circumstances we should perceive the lines as +they are? Otherwise, why should we use the words 'look' or 'appear' at +all? Moreover, this implication can be pushed further; for if we +maintain that we perceive the real lines, we may reasonably be asked +whether we must not under _all_ circumstances perceive them as they +are. It seems as though a reality cannot be perceived except as it +is.' It is the view to which this difficulty gives rise which is +mainly responsible for the doctrine that the object of perception is +not the reality, but an appearance. Since we do distinguish between +what things look and what they are, it would seem that the object of +perception cannot be the thing, but only an appearance produced by +it. Moreover, the doctrine gains in plausibility from the existence of +certain illusions in the case of which the reality to which the +illusion relates seems non-existent. For instance, if we look steadily +at the flame of a candle, and then press one eyeball with a finger, we +see, as we say, two candles;[16] but since _ex hypothesi_ there is +only one candle, it seems that what we see must be, not the candle, +but two images or appearances produced by it. + + [16] Cf. Dr. Stout, on 'Things and Sensations' (_Proceedings + of the British Academy_, vol. ii). + +This difficulty is raised in order to draw attention to the fact that, +in the case of the railway lines, where it can be met on its own +ground[17], this is because, and only because, we believe space to be +'real', i. e. to be a characteristic of reality, and because we +understand its nature. The distinction between the actual and the +apparent angle made by two straight lines presupposes a limiting case +in which they coincide. If the line of sight along which we observe +the point of intersection of two lines is known to be at right angles +to both lines, we expect, and rightly expect, to see the angle of +intersection as it is. Again, if we look at a short portion of two +railway lines from a point known to be directly above them, and so +distant that the effects of perspective are imperceptible, we can say +that the lines look what they are, viz. parallel. Thus, from the point +of view of the difficulty which has been raised, there is this +justification in general for saying that two lines _look_ parallel or +_look_ at right angles, that we know that in certain cases what they +look is identical with what they are. In the same way, assertions of +the type that the moon _looks_ as large as the sun receive +justification from our knowledge that two bodies of equal size and +equally distant from the observer _are_ what they look, viz. of the +same size. And in both cases the justification presupposes knowledge +of the reality of space and also such insight into its nature as +enables us to see that in certain cases there must be an identity +between what things look and what they are in respect of certain +spatial relations. Again, in such cases we see that so far is it from +being necessary to think that a thing must be perceived as it is, that +it is not only possible but necessary to distinguish what a thing +looks from what it is, and precisely in consequence of the nature of +space. The visual perception of spatial relations from its very nature +presupposes a particular point of view. Though the perception itself +cannot be spatial, it presupposes a particular point in space as a +standpoint or point of view,[18] and is therefore subject to +conditions of perspective. This is best realized by considering the +supposition that perfect visual powers would enable us to see the +whole of a body at once, and that this perception would be possible if +we had eyes situated all round the body. The supposition obviously +breaks down through the impossibility of combining two or more points +of view in one perception. But if visual perception is necessarily +subject to conditions of perspective, the spatial relations of bodies +can never look what they are except in the limiting case referred to. +Moreover, this distinction is perfectly intelligible, as we should +expect from the necessity which we are under of drawing it. We +understand perfectly why it is that bodies must, in respect of their +spatial relations, look different to what they are, and we do so +solely because we understand the nature of space, and therefore also +the conditions of perspective involved in the perception of what is +spatial. It is, therefore, needless to make the assertion 'Two lines +appear convergent' intelligible by converting the verb 'appears' into +a substantive, viz. an 'appearance', and then making the assertion +relate to an 'appearance'. For--apart from the fact that this would +not achieve the desired end, since no suitable predicate could be +found for the appearance--the assertion that the lines _look_ or +_appear_ convergent is perfectly intelligible in itself, though not +capable of being stated in terms of anything else.[19] If we +generalize this result, we may say that the distinction between +appearance and reality, drawn with regard to the primary qualities of +bodies, throughout presupposes the reality of space, and is made +possible, and indeed necessary, by the nature of space itself. + + [17] Cf., however, p. 87 and pp. 89-91. + + [18] This is, of course, not refuted by the reminder that we + see with two eyes, and that these are in different places. + + [19] It is important to notice that the proper formula to + express what is loosely called 'an appearance' is 'A looks or + appears B', and that this cannot be analysed into anything + more simple and, in particular, into a statement about + 'appearances'. Even in the case of looking at the candle, + there is no need to speak of two 'appearances' or 'images'. + Before we discover the truth, the proper assertion is 'The + body which we perceive looks as if it were two candles', and, + after we discover the truth, the proper assertion is 'The + candle looks as if it were in two places'. + +We may now turn to the way in which we draw the distinction with +respect to the secondary qualities of physical things. It must, it +seems, be admitted that in our ordinary consciousness we treat these +qualities as real qualities of bodies. We say that a bell is noisy; +that sugar is sweet; that roses smell; that a mustard plaster is hot; +that the sky is blue. It must also be admitted that in our ordinary +consciousness we draw a distinction between appearance and reality +_within_ these qualities, just as we do _within_ the primary +qualities. Just as we speak of the right or real shape of a body, so +we speak of its right or real colour, taste, &c., and distinguish +these from its apparent colours, taste, &c., to some individual. We +thereby imply that these qualities are real qualities of bodies, and +that the only difficulty is to determine the particular character of +the quality in a given case. Yet, as the history of philosophy shows, +it takes but little reflection to throw doubt on the reality of these +qualities. The doubt arises not merely from the apparent impossibility +of finding a principle by which to determine the right or real quality +in a given case, but also and mainly from misgivings as to the +possible reality of heat, smell, taste, noise, and colour apart from a +percipient. It must also be admitted that this misgiving is well +founded; in other words, that these supposed real qualities do +presuppose a percipient, and therefore cannot be qualities of things, +since the qualities of a thing must exist independently of the +perception of the thing.[20] This will readily be allowed in the case +of all the secondary qualities except colour. No one, it may +reasonably be said, who is familiar with and really faces the issue, +will maintain that sounds, smells, tastes, and sensations of touch +exist apart from a sensitive subject. So much is this the case, that +when once the issue is raised, it is difficult and, in the end, +impossible to use the word 'appear' in connexion with these qualities. +Thus it is difficult and, in the end, impossible to say that a bell +_appears_ noisy, or that sugar _appears_ sweet. We say, rather, that +the bell and the sugar produce certain sensations[21] in us. + + [20] Cf. pp. 72-3, and 91. + + [21] _Not_ 'appearances'. + +The case of colour, however, is more difficult. From the closeness of +its relation to the shape of bodies, it seems to be a real quality of +bodies, and not something relative to a sensitive subject like the +other secondary qualities. In fact, so intimate seems the relation of +colour to the shape of bodies, that it would seem--as has, of course, +often been argued--that if colour be relative to a sensitive subject, +the primary qualities of bodies must also be relative to a sensitive +subject, on the ground that shape is inseparable from colour.[22] Yet +whether this be so or not, it must, in the end, be allowed that colour +does presuppose a sensitive subject in virtue of its own nature, and +quite apart from the difficulty--which is in itself insuperable--of +determining the right colour of individual bodies. It must, therefore, +be conceded that colour is not a quality of bodies. But if this be +true, the use of the term 'look' or 'appear' in connexion with colour +involves a difficulty which does not arise when it is used in +connexion with the primary qualities. Bodies undoubtedly look or +appear coloured. Now, as has already been suggested,[23] the term +'look' seems to presuppose some identity between what a thing is and +what it looks, and at least the possibility of cases in which they are +what they look--a possibility which, as we have seen, is realized in +the case of the primary qualities. Yet, if colour is not a quality of +bodies, then, with respect to colour, things look what they never are, +or, in other words, are wholly different from what they look;[24] and +since it seems impossible to hold that colour is really a property of +bodies, this conclusion must, in spite of its difficulty, be admitted +to be true. + + [22] Cf. p. 91 note. + + [23] Cf. p. 82. + + [24] It is assumed that there is not even plausibility in the + supposition of continuity or identity between colour proper + and its physical conditions in the way of light vibrations. + +There remain, however, to be noticed two respects in which assertions +concerning what things look in respect of colour agree with +corresponding assertions in respect of the primary qualities. They +imply that what we perceive is a reality, in the sense already +explained.[25] Thus the assertion that the grass looks green implies +that it is a reality which looks green, or, in other words, that the +object of perception is a reality, and not an 'appearance'. Again, +such assertions imply that the reality about which the assertion is +made is spatial. The term 'grass' implies extension, and only what is +extended can be said to look coloured. If it be urged that what looks +coloured need only _look_ extended, it may be replied that the two +considerations which lead us to think that things only _look_ coloured +presuppose that they _are_ spatial. For the two questions, the +consideration of which leads to this conclusion, are, 'What is the +right or real colour of an individual thing?' and 'Has it really any +colour at all, or does it only look coloured?' and neither question is +significant unless the thing to which it refers is understood to be +spatial. + + [25] I. e. in the sense of something which exists + independently of perception. + +We may now return to the main issue. Is it possible to maintain either +(1) the position that only appearances are spatial and possess all the +qualities which imply space, or (2) the position that things only +appear spatial and only appear or look as if they possessed the +qualities which imply space? It may be urged that these questions have +already been implicitly answered in the negative. For the division of +the qualities of things into primary and secondary is exhaustive, and, +as has been shown, the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality', +when drawn with respect to the primary qualities and to colour--the +only secondary quality with respect to which the term 'appears' can +properly be used[26]--presupposes the reality of space. Consequently, +since we do draw the distinction, we must accept the reality of that +which is the condition of drawing it at all. But even though this be +conceded--and the concession is inevitable--the problem cannot be +regarded as solved until we have discovered what it is in the nature +of space which makes both positions untenable. Moreover, the admission +that in the case of colour there is no identity between what things +look and what they are removes at a stroke much of the difficulty of +one position, viz. that we only know what things look or appear, and +not what they are. For the admission makes it impossible to maintain +as a general principle that there must be some identity between what +they look and what they are. Consequently, it seems _possible_ that +things should be wholly different from what they appear, and, if so, +the issue cannot be decided on general grounds. What is in substance +the same point may be expressed differently by saying that just as +things only _look_ coloured, so things may only _look_ spatial. We are +thus again[27] led to see that the issue really turns on the nature of +space and of spatial characteristics in particular. + + [26] Cf. pp. 86-7. + + [27] Cf. p. 79. + +In discussing the distinction between the real and the apparent shape +of bodies, it was argued that while the nature of space makes it +necessary to distinguish in general between what a body looks and what +it is, yet the use of the term _look_ receives justification from the +existence of limiting cases in which what a thing looks and what it is +are identical. The instances considered, however, related to qualities +involving only two dimensions, e. g. convergence and bentness, and it +will be found that the existence of these limiting cases is due solely +to this restriction. If the assertion under consideration involves a +term implying three dimensions, e. g. 'cubical' or 'cylindrical', +there are no such limiting cases. Since our visual perception is +necessarily subject to conditions of perspective, it follows that +although we can and do see a cube, we can never see it as it _is_. +It _is_, so to say, in the way in which a child draws the side of a +house, i. e. with the effect of perspective eliminated; but it never +can be seen in this way. No doubt, our unreflective knowledge of the +nature of perspective enables us to allow for the effect of +perspective, and to ascertain the real shape of a solid object from +what it looks when seen from different points. In fact, the habit of +allowing for the effect of perspective is so thoroughly ingrained in +human beings that the child is not aware that he is making this +allowance, but thinks that he draws the side of the house as he sees +it. Nevertheless, it is true that we never see a cube as it is, and if +we say that a thing looks cubical, we ought only to mean that it looks +precisely what a thing looks which is a cube. + +It is obvious, however, that two dimensions are only an abstraction +from three, and that the spatial relations of bodies, considered +fully, involve three dimensions; in other words, spatial +characteristics are, properly speaking, three-dimensional. It follows +that terms which fully state spatial characteristics can never +express what things look, but only what they are. A body may be +cylindrical, and we may see a cylindrical body; but such a body can +never, strictly speaking, _look_ cylindrical. The opposition, however, +between what a thing _is_ and what it _looks_ implies that what it +_is_ is independent of a percipient, for it is precisely correlation +to a percipient which is implied by 'looking' or 'appearing'. In fact, +it is the view that what a thing really is it is, independently of +a percipient, that forms the real starting-point of Kant's thought. +It follows, then, that the spatial characteristics of things, and +therefore space itself, must belong to what they are in themselves +apart from a percipient, and not to what they look.[28] Consequently, +it is so far from being true that we only know what things look and +not what they are, that in the case of spatial relations we actually +know what things are, even though they never look what they are. + + [28] This consideration disposes of the view that, if colour + is relative to perception, the primary qualities, as being + inseparable from colour, must also be relative to perception; + for it implies that the primary qualities cannot from their + very nature be relative to perception. Moreover, if the + possibility of the separation of the primary qualities from + colour is still doubted, it is only necessary to appeal to + the blind man's ability to apprehend the primary qualities, + though he may not even know what the word 'colour' means. Of + course, it must be admitted that some sensuous elements are + involved in the apprehension of the primary qualities, but + the case of the blind man shows that these may relate to + sight instead of to touch. Moreover, it, of course, does not + follow from the fact that sensuous elements are inseparable + from our perception of bodies that they belong to, and are + therefore inseparable from, the bodies perceived. + +This conclusion, however, seems to present a double difficulty. It is +admitted that we perceive things as they look, and not as they are. +How, then, is it possible for the belief that things _are_ spatial to +arise? For how can we advance from knowledge of what they look to +knowledge of what they are but do not look? Again, given that the +belief has arisen, may it not after all be illusion? No vindication +seems possible. For how can it be possible to base the knowledge of +what things are, independently of perception, upon the knowledge of +what they look? Nevertheless, the answer is simple. In the case of the +perception of what is spatial there is no transition _in principle_ +from knowledge of what things look to knowledge of what things are, +though there is continually such a transition _in respect of details_. +It is, of course, often necessary, and often difficult, to determine +the precise position, shape, &c., of a thing, and if we are to come to +a decision, we must appeal to what the thing looks or appears under +various conditions. But, from the very beginning, our consciousness of +what a thing appears in respect of spatial characteristics implies the +consciousness of it as spatial and therefore also as, in particular, +three-dimensional. If we suppose the latter consciousness absent, any +assertion as to what a thing appears in respect of spatial +characteristics loses significance. Thus, although there is a process +by which we come to learn that railway lines are really parallel, +there is no process by which we come to learn that they are really +spatial. Similarly, although there is a process by which we become +aware that a body is a cube, there is no process by which we become +aware that it has a solid shape of some kind; the process is only +concerned with the determination of the precise shape of the body. +The second difficulty is, therefore, also removed. For if assertions +concerning the apparent shape, &c. of things presuppose the +consciousness that the things _are_ spatial, to say that this +consciousness may be illusory is to say that all statements concerning +what things _appear_, in respect of spatial relations, are equally +illusory. But, since it is wholly impossible to deny that we can and +do state what things appear in this respect, the difficulty must fall +to the ground. + +There remains to be answered the question whether Kant's position is +tenable in its other form, viz. that while we cannot say that reality +is spatial, we can and must say that the appearances which it produces +are spatial. This question, in view of the foregoing, can be answered +as soon as it is stated. We must allow that reality is spatial, since, +as has been pointed out, assertions concerning the apparent shape of +things presuppose that they are spatial. We must equally allow that an +appearance cannot be spatial. For on the one hand, as has just been +shown, space and spatial relations can only qualify something the +existence of which is not relative to perception, since it is +impossible to perceive what is spatial as it is; and on the other hand +an appearance, as being _ex hypothesi_ an appearance to some one, +i. e. to a percipient, must be relative to perception. + +We may say, then, generally, that analysis of the distinction between +appearance and reality, as it is actually drawn in our ordinary +consciousness, shows the falsity of both forms of the philosophical +agnosticism which appeals to the distinction. We know things; not +appearances. We know what things are; and not merely what they appear +but are not. We may also say that Kant cannot possibly be successful +in meeting, at least in respect of space, what he calls 'the easily +foreseen but worthless objection that the ideality of space and of +time would turn the whole sensible world into pure illusion'.[29] For +space, according to him, is not a property of things in themselves; it +cannot, as has been shown, be a property of appearances; to say that +it is a property of things as they appear to us is self-contradictory; +and there is nothing else of which it can be said to be a property. + + [29] _Prol_., § 13, Remark iii. (Cf. p. 100 note.) Cf. the + confused note B. 70, M. 42. (See Dr. Vaihinger's Commentary + on the _Critique_, ii, 488 ff.) + +In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the impossibility that +space[30] and spatial characteristics should qualify appearances +renders untenable Kant's attempt to draw a distinction between reality +and appearance _within_ 'phenomena' or 'appearances'. The passage in +which he tries to do so runs as follows: + + [30] The case of time can be ignored, since, as will be seen + later (pp. 112-14), the contention that space is 'ideal' + really involves the admission that time is real. + +"We generally indeed distinguish in appearances that which essentially +belongs to the perception of them, and is valid for every human +sense in general, from that which belongs to the same perception +accidentally, as valid not for the sensibility in general, but for a +particular state or organization of this or that sense. Accordingly, +we are accustomed to say that the former is knowledge which represents +the object itself, whilst the latter represents only the appearance +of the same. This distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop +here (as is usual) and do not again regard that empirical perception +as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing +which concerns a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental +distinction is lost; and in that case we are after all believing that +we know things in themselves, although in the world of sense, +investigate its objects as profoundly as we may, we have to do with +nothing but appearances. Thus we call the rainbow a mere appearance +during a sunny shower, but the rain the thing in itself; and this is +right, if we understand the latter conception only physically as that +which in universal experience and under all different positions with +regard to the senses is in perception so and so determined and not +otherwise. But if we consider this empirical element[31] in general, +and inquire, without considering its agreement with every human sense, +whether it represents an object in itself (not the raindrops, for +their being phenomena by itself makes them empirical objects), the +question of the relation of the representation to the object is +transcendental; and not only are the raindrops mere appearances, but +even their circular form, nay, even the space in which they fall, +are nothing in themselves but mere modifications or fundamental +dispositions of our sensuous perception; the transcendental object, +however, remains unknown to us."[32] + + [31] _Dieses Empirische._ + + [32] B. 62-3, M. 37-8. _Erscheinung_ is here translated + 'appearance'. + +Kant's meaning is plain. He is anxious to justify the physical +distinction made in our ordinary or non-philosophical consciousness +between a thing in itself and a mere appearance,[33] but at the same +time to show that it falls within appearances, in respect of the +philosophical distinction between things in themselves and appearances +or phenomena. The physical distinction is the first of which we become +aware, and it arises through problems connected with our senses. +Owing, presumably, to the contradictions which would otherwise ensue, +the mind is forced to distinguish between things and the 'appearances' +which they produce, and to recognize that they do not correspond. The +discrepancy is due to the fact that our perceptions are conditioned by +the special positions of our physical organs with regard to the object +of perception, and we discover its real nature by making allowance for +these special positions. We thereby advance in knowledge to the extent +of overcoming an obstacle due to the nature of our senses. But, this +obstacle overcome, philosophical reflection forces upon us another. +The thing which we distinguish in our ordinary consciousness from its +appearances is, after all, only another appearance; and although the +physical problem is solved concerning its accordance with our special +senses, there remains the philosophical problem as to whether this +appearance need correspond to what in the end is the real thing, viz. +that which exists in itself and apart from all perception. The only +possible answer is that it need not. We therefore can only know +appearances and not reality; in other words, we cannot have knowledge +proper. At the same time, our knowledge of appearances is objective to +the extent that the appearances in question are the same for every +one, and for us on various occasions; for the effects due to special +positions of our senses have been removed. If, therefore, we return to +the physical distinction, we see that the 'things' to which it refers +are only a special kind of appearance, viz. that which is the same for +every one, and for us at all times. The physical distinction, then, +being a distinction between one kind of appearance and another, falls +within 'phenomena' or 'appearances'. + + [33] It should be noticed that the passage is, in the main, + expressed in terms of the distinction between 'things' and + 'appearances', and not, as it should be, in terms of the + distinction between what things are and what things appear + or look. + +Now the obvious objection to this line of thought is that the result +of the second or metaphysical application of the distinction between +reality and appearance is to destroy or annul the first or physical +application of it. To oppose the rain, i. e. the raindrops as the +thing in itself to the rainbow as a mere appearance is to imply that +the rain is not an appearance. For though what is opposed to a _mere_ +appearance may still be an appearance, it cannot be called an +appearance at all if it be described as the thing in itself. If it be +only another appearance, it is the same in principle as that to which +it is opposed, and consequently cannot be opposed to it. Thus, if Kant +means by the rain, in distinction from the rainbow, the appearance +when, as we say, we see the circular raindrops, the title of this +appearance to the term thing in itself is no better than that of the +rainbow; it is, in fact, if anything, worse, for the appearance is +actual only under exceptional circumstances. We may never see the +raindrops thus, or in Kant's language, have this 'appearance'; and +therefore, in general, an appearance of this kind is not actual but +only possible. The truth is that we can only distinguish something as +the thing in itself from an appearance, so long as we mean by the +thing in itself what Kant normally means by it, viz. something which +exists independently of perception and is not an appearance at +all.[34] That of which Kant is really thinking, and which he _calls_ +the appearance which is the thing, in distinction from a mere +appearance, is not an appearance; on the contrary, it is the raindrops +themselves, which he describes as circular and as falling through +space, and which, as circular and falling, must exist and have these +characteristics in themselves apart from a percipient. Kant's formula +for an empirical thing, i. e. a thing which is an appearance, viz. +'that which in universal experience and under all different positions +with regard to the senses is in perception so and so determined', is +merely an attempt to achieve the impossible, viz. to combine in one +the characteristics of a thing and an appearance. While the reference +to _perception_ and to _position with regard to the senses_ implies +that what is being defined is an appearance, the reference to +_universal_ experience, to _all_ positions with regard to the senses, +and to that which _is so and so determined_ implies that it is a +thing. But, plainly, mention of position with regard to the senses, if +introduced at all, should refer to the _differences_ in perception due +to the different position of the object in particular cases. There is +nothing of which it can be said that we perceive it in the same way or +that it looks the same from _all_ positions. When Kant speaks of that +which under _all_ different positions with regard to the senses is so +and so determined, he is really referring to something in the +consideration of which all reference to the senses has been discarded; +it is what should be described as that which _in reality and apart +from_ all positions with regard to the senses is so and so determined; +and this, as such, cannot be an appearance. Again, the qualification +of 'is so and so determined' by 'in perception' is merely an attempt +to treat as relative to perception, and so as an appearance, what is +essentially independent of perception.[35] Kant, no doubt, is thinking +of a real presupposition of the process by which we distinguish +between the real and the apparent qualities of bodies, i. e. between +what they are and what they appear. We presuppose that that quality is +really, and not only apparently, a quality of a body, which we and +every one, judging from what it looks under various conditions (i. e. +'in universal experience'), must believe it to possess in itself and +independently of all perception. His mistake is that in formulating +this presupposition he treats as an appearance, and so as relative to +perception, just that which is being distinguished from what, as an +appearance, is relative to perception. + + [34] Hence Kant's protest (B. 45, M. 27), against + illustrating the ideality of space by the 'inadequate' + examples of colour, taste, &c., must be unavailing. For his + contention is that, while the assertion that space is not a + property of things means that it is not a property of things + in themselves, the assertion that colour, for example, is not + a property of a rose only means that it is not a property of + a thing in itself in an empirical sense, i. e. of an + appearance of a special kind. + + [35] Cf. pp. 72-3. + +Underlying the mistake is the identification of perception with +judgement. Our apprehension of what things _are_ is essentially a +matter of thought or judgement, and not of perception. We do not +_perceive_[36] but _think_ a thing as it is. It is true that we can +follow Kant's language so far as to say that our judgement that the +portion of the great circle joining two points on the surface of a +sphere is the shortest way between them _via_ the surface belongs +essentially to the thinking faculty of every intelligent being, and +also that it is valid for all intelligences, in the sense that they +must all hold it to be true; and we can contrast this judgement with a +perception of the portion of the great circle as something which, +though it cannot be said to be invalid, still differs for different +beings according to the position from which they perceive it. Kant, +however, treats the judgement as a _perception_; for if we apply his +general assertion to this instance, we find him saying that what we +judge the portion of the great circle to be essentially belongs to the +_perception_ of it, and is valid for the _sensuous_ faculty of every +human being, and that thereby it can be distinguished from what +belongs to the same perception of a great circle accidentally, e. g. +its apparent colour, which is valid only for a particular organization +of this or that sense.[37] In this way he correlates what the great +circle really is, as well as what it looks, with perception, and so is +able to speak of what it is for perception. But, in fact, what the +great circle is, is correlated with thought, and not with perception; +and if we raise Kant's transcendental problem in reference not to +perception but to thought, it cannot be solved in Kant's agnostic +manner. For it is a presupposition of thinking that things are in +themselves what we think them to be; and from the nature of the case a +presupposition of thinking not only cannot be rightly questioned, but +cannot be questioned at all. + + [36] Cf. pp. 72-3. + + [37] In the _Prol._, § 13, Remark iii, Kant carefully + distinguishes judgement from perception, but destroys the + effect of the distinction by regarding judgement as referring + to what is relative to perception, viz. appearances. + + + + +NOTE ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY + + +Kant holds that the antinomy or contradiction which arises when we +consider the character of the world as spatial and temporal, viz. that +we are equally bound to hold that the world is infinite in space and +time, and that it is finite in space and time, is due to regarding the +world as a thing in itself. He holds that the contradiction +disappears, as soon as it is recognized that the world is only a +phenomenon, for then we find that we need only say that the world is +_capable_ of being extended infinitely in respect of time and +space.[1] Objects in space and time are only phenomena, and, as such, +are actual only in perception. When we say that a past event, or that +a body which we do not perceive, is real, we merely assert the +possibility of a 'perception'. "All events from time immemorial prior +to my existence mean nothing else than the possibility of prolonging +the chain of experience from the present perception upwards to the +conditions which determine this perception according to time."[2] +"That there may be inhabitants of the moon, although no one has ever +seen them, must certainly be admitted, but this assertion only means +that we could come upon them in the possible progress of +experience."[3] The contradictions, therefore, can be avoided by +substituting for the actual infinity of space and time, as relating to +things in themselves, the possible infinity of a series of +'perceptions'. + + [1] B. 532-3, M. 315. + + [2] B. 523, M. 309. + + [3] B. 521, M. 308. + +This contention, if successful, is clearly important. If it could be +shown that the treatment of the world as a thing in itself is the +source of a contradiction, we should have what at least would seem a +strong, if not conclusive, ground for holding that the world is a +phenomenon, and, consequently, that the distinction between phenomena +and things in themselves is valid. + +Professor Cook Wilson has, however, pointed out that Kant's own +doctrine does not avoid the difficulty. For, though, according to +Kant, the infinity of actual representations of spaces and times is +only possible, yet the possibilities of these representations will be +themselves infinite, and, as such, will give rise to contradictions +similar to those involved in the infinity of space and time. Moreover, +as Professor Cook Wilson has also pointed out, there is no +contradiction involved in the thought of the world as spatial and +temporal; for, as we see when we reflect, we always presuppose that +space and time are infinite, and we are only tempted to think that +they must be finite, because, when maintaining that the world must be +a whole, we are apt to make the false assumption, without in any way +questioning it, that any whole must be finite. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +TIME AND INNER SENSE + + +The arguments by which Kant seeks to show that time is not a +determination of things in themselves but only a form of perception +are, _mutatis mutandis_, identical with those used in his treatment of +space.[1] They are, therefore, open to the same criticisms, and need +no separate consideration. + + [1] Cf. B. 46-9, §§ 4, 5 and 6 (a), M. 28-30, §§ 5, 6 and 7 + (a) with B. 38-42, § 2 (1-4), and § (3) to (a) inclusive, M. + 23-6, §§ 2, 3, and 4 (a). The only qualification needed is + that, since the parts of time cannot, like those of space, + be said to exist simultaneously, B. § 4 (5), M. § 5, 5 is + compelled to appeal to a different consideration from that + adduced in the parallel passage on space (B. § 2 (4), M. § 2, + 4). Since, however, B. § 4 (5), M. § 5, 5 introduces no new + matter, but only appeals to the consideration already urged + (B. § 4, 4, M. § 5, 4), this difference can be neglected. B. + § 5, M. § 6 adds a remark about change which does not affect + the main argument. + +Time, however, according to Kant, differs from space in one important +respect. It is the form not of outer but of inner sense; in other +words, while space is the form under which we perceive things, time is +the form under which we perceive ourselves. It is upon this difference +that attention must be concentrated. The existence of the difference +at all is upon general grounds surprising. For since the arguments by +which Kant establishes the character of time as a form of perception +run _pari passu_ with those used in the case of space, we should +expect time, like space, to be a form under which we perceive things; +and, as a matter of fact, it will be found that the only _argument_ +used to show that time is the form of inner, as opposed to outer, +sense is not only independent of Kant's general theory of forms of +sense, but is actually inconsistent with it.[2] Before, however, we +attempt to decide Kant's right to distinguish between inner and outer +sense, we must consider the facts which were before Kant's mind in +making the distinction. + + [2] B. 49 (b), M. 30 (b). See pp. 109-12. + +These facts and, to a large extent, the frame of mind in which Kant +approached them, find expression in the passage in Locke's _Essay_, +which explains the distinction between 'ideas of sensation' and 'ideas +of reflection'. + +"Whence has it [i. e. the mind] all the materials of reason and +knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience.... Our +observation, employed either about external, sensible objects, or +about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected +on, by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all +the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of +knowledge...." + +"First, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do +convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according +to those various ways, wherein those objects do affect them: and thus +we come by those ideas we have of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, +Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those, which we call sensible qualities; +which, when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they, from +external objects, convey into the mind what produces there those +perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending +wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I +call _sensation_." + +"Secondly, The other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the +understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our +own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; +which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do +furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not +be had from things without; and such are Perception, Thinking, +Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the +different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and +observing in ourselves, do, from these, receive into our +understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our +senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and +though it be not sense as having nothing to do with external objects, +yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal +sense. But, as I call the other sensation, so I call this +_reflection_; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets, +by reflecting on its own operations within itself."[3] + + [3] Locke, _Essay_, ii, 1, §§ 2-4. + +Here Locke is thinking of the distinction between two attitudes of +mind, which, however difficult it may be to state satisfactorily, must +in some sense be recognized. The mind, undoubtedly, in virtue of its +powers of perceiving and thinking--or whatever they may be--becomes +through a temporal process aware of a spatial world in its varied +detail. In the first instance, its attention is absorbed in the world +of which it thus becomes aware; subsequently, however, it is in some +way able to direct its attention away from this world to the +activities in virtue of which it has become aware of this world, and +in some sense to make itself its own object. From being conscious it +becomes self-conscious. This process by which the mind turns its +attention back upon itself is said to be a process of 'reflection'. +While we should say that it is by perception that we become aware of +things in the physical world, we should say that it is by reflection +that we become aware of our activities of perceiving, thinking, +willing, &c. Whatever difficulties the thought of self-consciousness +may involve, and however inseparable, and perhaps even temporally +inseparable, the attitudes of consciousness and self-consciousness may +turn out to be, the distinction between these attitudes must be +recognized. The object of the former is the world, and the object of +the latter is in some sense the mind itself; and the attitudes may be +described as that of our ordinary, scientific, or unreflecting +consciousness and that of reflection. + +The significance of Locke's account of this distinction lies for our +purposes in its anticipation of Kant. He states the second attitude, +as well as the first, in terms of sense. Just as in our apprehension +of the world things external to, in the sense of existing +independently of, the mind are said to act on our physical organs or +'senses', and thereby to produce 'perceptions' in the mind, so the +mind is said to become conscious of its own operations by 'sense'. We +should notice, however, that Locke hesitates to use the word 'sense' +in the latter case, on the ground that it involves no operation of +external things (presumably upon our physical organs), though he +thinks that the difficulty is removed by calling the sense in question +'internal'. + +Kant is thinking of the same facts, and also states them in terms of +sense, though allowance must be made for the difference of standpoint, +since for him 'sense', in the case of the external sense, refers not +to the affection of our physical organs by physical bodies, but to the +affection of the mind by things in themselves. Things in themselves +act on our minds and produce in them appearances, or rather +sensations, and outer sense is the mind's capacity for being so +affected by outer things, i. e. things independent of the mind. This +is, in essentials, Kant's statement of the attitude of consciousness, +i. e. of our apprehension of the world which exists independently of +the mind, and which, for him, is the world of things in themselves. He +also follows Locke in giving a parallel account of the attitude of +self-consciousness. He asks, 'How can the subject perceive itself?' +Perception _in man_ is essentially passive; the mind must be +_affected_ by that which it perceives. Consequently, if the mind is to +perceive itself, it must be affected by its own activity; in other +words, there must be an inner sense, i. e. a capacity in virtue of +which the mind is affected by itself.[4] Hence Kant is compelled to +extend his agnosticism to the knowledge of ourselves. Just as we do +not know things, but only the appearances which they produce in +us,[5] so we do not know ourselves, but only the appearances which we +produce in ourselves; and since time is a mode of relation of these +appearances, it is a determination not of ourselves, but only of the +appearances due to ourselves. + + [4] Cf. B. 67 fin., M. 41 init. + + [5] It is here assumed that this is Kant's normal view of the + phenomenal character of our knowledge. Cf. p. 75. + +The above may be said to represent the train of thought by which Kant +arrived at his doctrine of time and the inner sense. It was reached by +combining recognition of the fact that we come to be aware not only of +the details of the physical world, but also of the successive process +on our part by which we have attained this knowledge, with the view +that our apprehension of this successive process is based on 'sense', +just as is our apprehension of the world. But the question remains +whether Kant is, on his own principles, entitled to speak of an inner +sense at all. According to him, knowledge begins with the production +in us of sensations, or, as we ought to say in the present context, +appearances by the action of things in themselves. These sensations or +appearances can reasonably be ascribed to external sense. They may be +ascribed to sense, because they arise through our being _affected_ by +things in themselves. The sense may be called external, because the +object affecting it is external to the mind, i. e. independent of it. +In conformity with this account, internal sense must be the power of +being affected by something internal to the mind, i. e. dependent upon +the mind itself, and since being affected implies the activity of +affecting, it will be the power of being affected by the mind's own +activity.[6] The activity will presumably be that of arranging +spatially the sensations or appearances due to things in +themselves.[7] This activity must be said to produce an affection in +us, the affection being an appearance due to ourselves. Lastly, the +mind must be said to arrange these appearances temporally. Hence it +will be said to follow that we know only the appearances due to +ourselves and not ourselves, and that time is only a determination of +these appearances.[8] + + [6] B. 68 init., M. 41 init. + + [7] The precise nature of the activity makes no difference to + the argument. + + [8] In B. 152 fin., M. 93 fin. Kant expresses his conclusion + in the form that we know ourselves only as we appear to + ourselves, and not as we are in ourselves (cf. p. 75). The + above account, and the criticism which immediately follows, + can be adapted, _mutatis mutandis_, to this form of the view. + +The weakness of the position just stated lies on the surface. It +provides no means of determining whether any affection produced in us +is produced by ourselves rather than by the thing in itself; +consequently we could never say that a given affection was an +appearance due to _ourselves_, and therefore to _inner_ sense. On the +contrary, we should ascribe all affections to things in themselves, +and should, therefore, be unable to recognize an _inner_ sense at all. +In order to recognize an inner sense we must know that certain +affections are due to _our_ activity, and, to do this, we must know +what the activity consists in--for we can only be aware that we are +active by being aware of an activity of ours of a particular +kind--and, therefore, we must know ourselves. Unless, then, we know +ourselves, we cannot call any affections internal. + +If, however, the doctrine of an internal sense is obviously untenable +from Kant's own point of view, why does he hold it? The answer is +that, inconsistently with his general view, he continues to think of +the facts as they really are, and that he is deceived by an ambiguity +into thinking that the facts justify a distinction between internal +and external sense. + +He brings forward only one argument to show that time is the form of +the internal sense. "Time is nothing else than the form of the +internal sense, i. e. of the perception of ourselves and our inner +state. For time cannot be any determination of external phenomena; it +has to do neither with a shape nor a position; on the contrary, it +determines the relation of representations in our internal state."[9] + + [9] B. 49 (b), M. 30 (b). + +To follow this argument it is first necessary to realize a certain +looseness and confusion in the expression of it. The term 'external', +applied to phenomena, has a double meaning. It must mean (1) that of +which the parts are external to one another, i. e. spatial; for the +ground on which time is denied to be a determination of external +phenomena is that it has nothing to do with a shape or a position. It +must also mean (2) external to, in the sense of independent of, the +mind; for it is contrasted with our internal state, and if 'internal', +applied to 'our state', is not to be wholly otiose, it can only serve +to emphasize the contrast between our state and something external to +in the sense of independent of us. Again, 'phenomena,' in the phrase +'external phenomena', can only be an unfortunate expression for +things independent of the mind, these things being here called +phenomena owing to Kant's view that bodies in space are phenomena. +Otherwise, 'phenomena' offers no contrast to 'our state' and to +'representations'. The passage, therefore, presupposes a distinction +between states of ourselves and things in space, the former being +internal to, or dependent upon, and the latter external to, or +independent of, the mind. + +It should now be easy to see that the argument involves a complete +_non sequitur_. The conclusion which is justified is that time is a +form not of things but of our own states. For the fact to which he +appeals is that while things, as being spatial, are not related +temporally, our states are temporally related; and if 'a form' be +understood as a mode of relation, this fact can be expressed by the +formula 'Time is a form not of things but of our own states', the +corresponding formula in the case of space being 'Space is a form not +of our states but of things'. But the conclusion which Kant desires +to draw--and which he, in fact, actually draws--is the quite different +conclusion that time is a form of _perception_ of our states, the +corresponding conclusion in the case of space being that space is a +form of perception of things. For time is to be shown to be the form +of inner sense, i. e. the form of the perception of what is internal +to ourselves, i. e. of our own states.[10] The fact is that the same +unconscious transition takes place in Kant's account of time which, as +we saw,[11] takes place in his account of space. In the case of space, +Kant passes from the assertion that space is a form of things, in the +sense that all things are spatially related--an assertion which he +expresses by saying that space is the form of phenomena--to the quite +different assertion that space is a form of perception, in the sense +of a way in which we perceive things as opposed to a way in which +things are. Similarly, in the case of time, Kant passes from the +assertion that time is the form of our internal states, in the sense +that all our states are temporally related, to the assertion that time +is a way in which we perceive our states as opposed to a way in which +our states really are. Further, the two positions, which he thus fails +to distinguish, are not only different, but incompatible. For if space +is a form of things, and time is a form of our states, space and time +cannot belong only to our mode of perceiving things and ourselves +respectively, and not to the things and ourselves; for _ex hypothesi_ +things _are_ spatially related, and our states _are_ temporally +related. + + [10] Cf. B. 49 (b) line 2, M. 30 (b) line 2 + + [11] Cf. pp. 38-40. + +Kant's procedure, therefore, may be summed up by saying that he +formulates a view which is true but at the same time inconsistent with +his general position, the view, viz. that while things in space are +not temporally related, the acts by which we come to apprehend them +are so related; and further, that he is deceived by the verbally easy +transition from a legitimate way of expressing this view, viz. that +time is the form of our states, to the desired conclusion that time is +the form of inner sense. + +The untenable character of Kant's position with regard to time and the +knowledge of ourselves can be seen in another way. It is not difficult +to show that, in order to prove that we do not know _things_, but only +the appearances which they produce, we must allow that we do know +_ourselves_, and not appearances produced by ourselves, and, +consequently, that time is real and not phenomenal. To show this, it +is only necessary to consider the objection which Kant himself quotes +against his view of time. The objection is important in itself, and +Kant himself remarks that he has heard it so unanimously urged by +intelligent men that he concludes that it must naturally present +itself to every reader to whom his views are novel. According to Kant, +it runs thus: "Changes are real (this is proved by the change of our +own representations, even though all external phenomena, together with +their changes, be denied). Now changes are only possible in time; +therefore time is something real."[12] And he goes on to explain why +this objection is so unanimously brought, even by those who can bring +no intelligible argument against the ideality of space. "The reason is +that men have no hope of proving apodeictically the absolute reality +of space, because they are confronted by idealism, according to which +the reality of external objects is incapable of strict proof, whereas +the reality of the object of our internal senses (of myself and my +state) is immediately clear through consciousness. External objects +might be mere illusion, but the object of our internal senses is to +their mind undeniably something real."[13] + + [12] B. 53, M. 32. + + [13] B. 55, M. 33. + +Here, though Kant does not see it, he is faced with a difficulty from +which there is no escape. On the one hand, according to him, we do not +know things in themselves, i. e. things independent of the mind. In +particular, we cannot know that they are spatial; and the objection +quoted concedes this. On the other hand, we do know phenomena or +the appearances produced by things in themselves. Phenomena or +appearances, however, as he always insists, are essentially states or +determinations of the mind. To the question, therefore, 'Why are we +justified in saying that we do know phenomena, whereas we do not know +the things which produce them?' Kant could only answer that it is +because phenomena are dependent upon the mind, as being its own +states.[14] As the objector is made to say, 'the reality of the object +of our internal senses (of myself and my state) is immediately clear +through consciousness.' If we do not know things in themselves, +because they are independent of the mind, we only know phenomena +because they are dependent upon the mind. Hence Kant is only justified +in denying that we know things in themselves if he concedes that we +really know our own states, and not merely appearances which they +produce. + + [14] Cf. p. 123. + +Again, Kant must allow--as indeed he normally does--that these states +of ours are related by way of succession. Hence, since these states +are really our states and not appearances produced by our states, +these being themselves unknown, time, as a relation of these states, +must itself be real, and not a way in which we apprehend what is real. +It must, so to say, be really in what we apprehend about ourselves, +and not put into it by us as perceiving ourselves. + +The objection, then, comes to this. Kant must at least concede that +we undergo a succession of changing states, even if he holds that +_things_, being independent of the mind, cannot be shown to undergo +such a succession; consequently, he ought to allow that time is not a +way in which we apprehend ourselves, but a real feature of our real +states. Kant's answer[15] does not meet the point, and, in any case, +proceeds on the untenable assumption that it is possible for the +characteristic of a thing to belong to it as perceived, though not +in itself.[16] + + [15] B. 55, M. 33 med. + + [16] Cf. pp. 71-3. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY + + +Kant's theory of space, and, still more, his theory of time, are +bewildering subjects. It is not merely that the facts with which he +deals are complex; his treatment of them is also complicated by his +special theories of 'sense' and of 'forms of perception'. Light, +however, may be thrown upon the problems raised by the _Aesthetic_, +and upon Kant's solution of them, in two ways. In the first place, we +may attempt to vindicate the implication of the preceding criticism, +that the very nature of knowledge presupposes the independent +existence of the reality known, and to show that, in consequence, all +idealism is of the variety known as subjective. In the second place, +we may point out the way in which Kant is misled by failing to realize +(1) the directness of the relation between the knower and the reality +known, and (2) the impossibility of transferring what belongs to one +side of the relation to the other. + +The question whether any reality exists independently of the knowledge +of it may be approached thus. The standpoint of the preceding +criticism of Kant may be described as that of the plain man. It is the +view that the mind comes by a temporal process to apprehend or to know +a spatial world which exists independently of it or of any other mind, +and that the mind knows it as it exists in the independence. 'Now this +view,' it may be replied, 'is exposed to at least one fatal objection. +It presupposes the possibility of knowing the thing in itself, i. e. +something which exists independently of the mind which comes to know +it. Whatever is true, this is not. Whatever be the criticism to which +Kant's doctrine is exposed in detail, it contains one inexpugnable +thesis, viz. that the thing in itself cannot be known. Unless the +physical world stands in essential relation to the mind, it is +impossible to understand how it can be known. This position being +unassailable, any criticism of an idealistic theory must be compatible +with it, and therefore confined to details. Moreover, Kant's view can +be transformed into one which will defy criticism. Its unsatisfactory +character lies in the fact that in regarding the physical world as +dependent on the mind, it really alters the character of the world by +reducing the world to a succession of 'appearances' which, as such, +can only be mental, i. e. can only belong to the mind's own being. +Bodies, as being really appearances in the mind, are regarded as on +the level of transitory mental occurrences, and as thereby at least +resembling feelings and sensations. This consequence, however, can be +avoided by maintaining that the real truth after which Kant was +groping was that knower and known form an inseparable unity, and that, +therefore, any reality which is not itself a knower, or the knowing of +a knower, presupposes a mind which knows it. In that case nothing is +suggested as to the special nature of the reality known, and, in +particular, it is not implied to be a transitory element of the mind's +own being. The contention merely attributes to any reality, conceived +to have the special nature ordinarily attributed to it, the additional +characteristic that it is known. Consequently, on this view, the +physical world can retain the permanence ordinarily attributed to it. +To the objection that, at any rate, _our_ knowledge is transitory, +and that if the world is relative to it the world also must be +transitory, it may be replied--though with some sense of +uneasiness--that the world must be considered relative not to us as +knowers, but to a knower who knows always and completely, and whose +knowing is in some way identical with ours. Further, the view so +transformed has two other advantages. In the first place, it renders +it possible to dispense with what has been called the Mrs. Harris of +philosophy, the thing in itself. As Kant states his position, the +thing in itself must be retained, for it is impossible to believe that +there is no reality other than what is mental. But if the physical +world need not be considered to be a succession of mental occurrences, +it can be considered to be the reality which is not mental. In the +second place, knowledge proper is vindicated, for on this view we do +not know 'only' phenomena; we know the reality which is not mental, +and we know it as it is, for it is as object of knowledge.' + +'Moreover, the contention must be true, and must form the true basis +of idealism. For the driving force of idealism is furnished by the +question, 'How can the mind and reality come into the relation which +we call knowledge?' This question is unanswerable so long as reality +is thought to stand in no essential relation to the knowing mind. +Consequently, in the end, knowledge and reality must be considered +inseparable. Again, even if it be conceded that the mind in some way +gains access to an independent reality, it is impossible to hold that +the mind can really know it. For the reality cannot in the relation of +knowledge be what it is apart from this relation. It must become in +some way modified or altered in the process. Hence the mind cannot on +this view know the reality as it is. On the other hand, if the reality +is essentially relative to a knower, the knower knows it as it is, for +what it is is what it is in this relation.' + +The fundamental objection, however, to this line of thought is that it +contradicts the very nature of knowledge. Knowledge unconditionally +presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the +knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this +independence. It is simply _impossible_ to think that any reality +depends upon our knowledge of it, or upon any knowledge of it. If +there is to be knowledge, there must first _be_ something to be known. +In other words, knowledge is essentially discovery, or the finding of +what already is. If a reality could only be or come to be in virtue of +some activity or process on the part of the mind, that activity or +process would not be 'knowing', but 'making' or 'creating', and to +make and to know must in the end be admitted to be mutually +exclusive.[1] + + [1] Cf. pp. 235-6. + +This presupposition that what is known exists independently of being +known is quite general, and applies to feeling and sensation just as +much as to parts of the physical world. It must in the end be conceded +of a toothache as much as of a stone that it exists independently of +the knowledge of it. There must be a pain to be attended to or +noticed, which exists independently of our attention or notice. The +true reason for asserting feeling and sensation to be dependent on the +mind is that they presuppose not a knowing, but a feeling and a +sentient subject respectively. Again, it is equally presupposed that +knowing in no way alters or modifies the thing known. We can no more +think that in apprehending a reality we do not apprehend it as it is +apart from our knowledge of it, than we can think that its existence +depends upon our knowledge of it. Hence, if 'things in themselves' +means 'things existing independently of the knowledge of them', +knowledge is essentially of 'things in themselves'. It is, therefore, +unnecessary to consider whether idealism is assisted by the +supposition of a non-finite knowing mind, correlated with reality as a +whole. For reality must equally be independent of it. Consequently, if +the issue between idealism and realism is whether the physical world +is or is not dependent on the mind, it cannot turn upon a dependence +in respect of knowledge. + +That the issue does not turn upon knowledge is confirmed by our +instinctive procedure when we are asked whether the various realities +which we suppose ourselves to know depend upon the mind. Our natural +procedure is not to treat them simply as realities and to ask whether, +as realities, they involve a mind to know them, but to treat them as +realities of the particular kind to which they belong, and to consider +relation to the mind of some kind other than that of knowledge. We +should say, for instance, that a toothache or an emotion, as being a +feeling, presupposes a mind capable of feeling, whose feeling it is; +for if the mind be thought of as withdrawn, the pain or the feeling +must also be thought of as withdrawn. We should say that an act of +thinking presupposes a mind which thinks. We should, however, +naturally deny that an act of thinking or knowing, in order to be, +presupposes that it is known either by the thinker whose act it is, or +by any other mind. In other words, we should say that knowing +presupposes a mind, not as something which _knows_ the knowing, but +as something which _does_ the knowing. Again, we should naturally say +that the shape or the weight of a stone is _not_ dependent on the mind +which perceives the stone. The shape, we should say, would disappear +with the disappearance of the stone, but would not disappear with the +disappearance of the mind which perceives the stone. Again, we should +assert that the stone itself, so far from depending on the mind which +perceives it, has an independent being of its own. We might, of +course, find difficulty in deciding whether a reality of some +particular kind, e. g. a colour, is dependent on a mind. But, in any +case, we should think that the ground for decision lay in the special +character of the reality in question, and should not treat it merely +as a reality related to the mind as something known. We should ask, +for instance, whether a colour, as a colour, involves a mind which +sees, and not whether a colour, as a reality, involves its being +known. Our natural procedure, then, is to divide realities into two +classes, those which depend on a mind, and may therefore be called +mental, and those which do not, and to conclude that some realities +depend upon the mind, while others do not. We thereby ignore a +possible dependence of realities on their being known; for not only is +the dependence which we recognize of some other kind, e. g. in respect +of feeling or sentience, but if the dependence were in respect of +knowledge, we could not distinguish in respect of dependence between +one reality and another. + +Further, if reality be allowed to exist independently of knowledge, it +is easy to see that, from the idealist's point of view, Kant's +procedure was essentially right, and that all idealism, when pressed, +must prove subjective; in other words, that the idealist must hold +that the mind can only know what is mental and belongs to its own +being, and that the so-called physical world is merely a succession of +appearances. Moreover, our instinctive procedure[2] is justified. For, +in the first place, since it is impossible to think that a reality +depends for its existence upon being known, it is impossible to reach +an idealistic conclusion by taking into account relation by way of +knowledge; and if this be the relation considered, the only conclusion +can be that all reality is independent of the mind. Again, since +knowledge is essentially of reality as it is apart from its being +known, the assertion that a reality is dependent upon the mind is an +assertion of the kind of thing which it is in itself, apart from its +being known.[3] And when we come to consider what we mean by saying of +a reality that it depends upon the mind, we find we mean that it is in +its own nature of such a kind as to disappear with the disappearance +of the mind, or, more simply, that it is of the kind called mental. +Hence, we can only decide that a particular reality depends upon the +mind by appeal to its special character. We cannot treat it simply as +a reality the relation of which to the mind is solely that of +knowledge. And we can only decide that all reality is dependent upon +the mind by appeal to the special character of all the kinds of +reality of which we are aware. Hence, Kant in the _Aesthetic_, and +Berkeley before him, were essentially right in their procedure. They +both ignored consideration of the world simply as a reality, and +appealed exclusively to its special character, the one arguing that in +its special character as spatial and temporal it presupposed a +percipient, and the other endeavouring to show that the primary +qualities are as relative to perception as the secondary. +Unfortunately for their view, in order to think of bodies in space as +dependent on the mind, it is necessary to think of them as being in +the end only certain sensations or certain combinations of sensations +which may be called appearances. For only sensations or combinations +of them can be thought of as at once dependent on the mind, and +capable with any plausibility of being identified with bodies in +space. In other words, in order to think of the world as dependent on +the mind, we have to think of it as consisting only of a succession of +appearances, and in fact Berkeley, and, at certain times, Kant, did +think of it in this way. + + [2] Cf. p. 119. + + [3] Though not apart from relation to the mind of some other + kind. + +That this is the inevitable result of idealism is not noticed, so long +as it is supposed that the essential relation of realities to the mind +consists in their being known; for, as we have seen, nothing is +thereby implied as to their special nature. To say of a reality that +it is essentially an object of knowledge is merely to add to the +particular nature ordinarily attributed to the existent in question +the further characteristic that it must be known.[4] Moreover, +since in fact, though contrary to the theory, any reality exists +independently of the knowledge of it, when the relation thought of +between a reality and the mind is _solely_ that of knowledge, the +realities can be thought of as independent of the mind. Consequently, +the physical world can be thought to have that independence of the +mind which the ordinary man attributes to it, and, therefore, need not +be conceived as only a succession of appearances. But the advantage of +this form of idealism is really derived from the very fact which it +is the aim of idealism in general to deny. For the conclusion that the +physical world consists of a succession of appearances is only avoided +by taking into account the relation of realities to the mind by way of +knowledge, and, then, without being aware of the inconsistency, making +use of the independent existence of the reality known. + + [4] Cf. p. 116. + +Again, that the real contrary to realism is _subjective_ idealism is +confirmed by the history of the theory of knowledge from Descartes +onwards. For the initial supposition which has originated and +sustained the problem is that in knowledge the mind is, at any rate in +the first instance, confined within itself. This supposition granted, +it has always seemed that, while there is no difficulty in +understanding the mind's acquisition of knowledge of what belongs to +its own being, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand how +it can acquire knowledge of what does not belong to its own being. +Further, since the physical world is ordinarily thought of as +something which does not belong to the mind's own being, the problem +has always been not 'How is it possible to know anything?' but 'How is +it possible to know a particular kind of reality, viz. the physical +world?' Moreover, in consequence of the initial supposition, any +answer to this question has always presupposed that our apprehension +of the physical world is indirect. Since _ex hypothesi_ the mind is +confined within itself, it can only apprehend a reality independent of +it through something within the mind which 'represents' or 'copies' +the reality; and it is perhaps Hume's chief merit that he showed that +no such solution is possible, or, in other words, that, on the given +supposition, knowledge of the physical world is impossible. + +Now the essential weakness of this line of thought lies in the initial +supposition that the mind can only apprehend what belongs to its own +being. It is as much a fact of our experience that we directly +apprehend bodies in space, as that we directly apprehend our feelings +and sensations. And, as has already been shown,[5] what is spatial +cannot be thought to belong to the mind's own being on the ground that +it is relative to perception. Further, if it is legitimate to ask, +'How can we apprehend what does not belong to our being?' it is +equally legitimate to ask, 'How can we apprehend what does belong to +our own being?' It is wholly arbitrary to limit the question to the +one kind of reality. If a question is to be put at all, it should take +the form, 'How is it possible to apprehend anything?' But this +question has only to be put to be discarded. For it amounts to a +demand to _explain_ knowledge; and any answer to it would involve the +derivation of knowledge from what was not knowledge, a task which must +be as impossible as the derivation of space from time or of colour +from sound. Knowledge is _sui generis_, and, as such, cannot be +explained.[6] + + [5] Cf. pp. 89-91. + + [6] This assertion, being self-evident, admits of no direct + proof. A 'proof' can only take the form of showing that + any supposed 'derivation' or 'explanation' of knowledge + presupposes knowledge in that from which it derives it. + Professor Cook Wilson has pointed out that we must understand + what knowing is in order to explain anything at all, so + that any proposed explanation of knowing would necessarily + presuppose that we understood what knowing is. For the + general doctrine, cf. p. 245. + +Moreover, it may be noted that the support which this form of idealism +sometimes receives from an argument which uses the terms 'inside' and +'outside' the mind is unmerited. At first sight it seems a refutation +of the plain man's view to argue thus: 'The plain man believes the +spatial world to exist whether any one knows it or not. Consequently, +he allows that the world is outside the mind. But, to be known, a +reality must be inside the mind. Therefore, the plain man's view +renders knowledge impossible.' But, as soon as it is realized that +'inside the mind' and 'outside the mind' are metaphors, and, +therefore, must take their meaning from their context, it is easy to +see that the argument either rests on an equivocation or assumes the +point at issue. The assertion that the world is outside the mind, +being only a metaphorical expression of the plain man's view, should +only mean that the world is something independent of the mind, as +opposed to something inside the mind, in the sense of dependent upon +it, or mental. But the assertion that, to be known, a reality must be +inside the mind, if it is to be incontestably true, should only mean +that a reality, to be apprehended, must really be object of +apprehension. And in this case 'being inside the mind', since it only +means 'being object of apprehension', is not the opposite of 'being +outside the mind' in the previous assertion. Hence, on this +interpretation, the second assertion is connected with the first only +apparently and by an equivocation; there is really no argument at all. +If, however, the equivocation is to be avoided, 'inside the mind' in +the second assertion must be the opposite of 'outside the mind' in the +first, and consequently the second must mean that a reality, to be +known, must be dependent on the mind, or mental. But in that case the +objection to the plain man's view is a _petitio principii_, and not an +argument. + +Nevertheless, the tendency to think that the only object or, at least, +the only direct object of the mind is something mental still requires +explanation. It seems due to a tendency to treat self-consciousness as +similar to consciousness of the world. When in reflection we turn our +attention away from the world to the activity by which we come to know +it, we tend to think of our knowledge of the world as a reality to be +apprehended similar to the world which we apprehended prior to +reflection. We thereby implicitly treat this knowledge as something +which, like the world, merely _is_ and is not the knowledge of +anything; in other words, we imply that, so far from being knowledge, +i. e. the knowing of a reality, it is precisely that which we +distinguish from knowledge, viz. a reality to be known, +although--since knowledge must be mental--we imply that it is a +reality of the special kind called mental. But if the knowledge upon +which we reflect is thus treated as consisting in a mental reality +which merely _is_, it is implied that in this knowledge the world is +not, at any rate directly, object of the mind, for _ex hypothesi_ a +reality which merely _is_ and is not the knowledge of anything has no +object. Hence it comes to be thought that the only object or, at +least, the only direct object of the mind is this mental reality +itself, which is the object of reflection; in other words, that the +only immediate object of the mind comes to be thought of as its own +idea. The root of the mistake lies in the initial supposition--which, +it may be noted, seems to underlie the whole treatment of knowledge by +empirical psychology--that knowledge can be treated as a reality to be +apprehended, in the way in which any reality which is not knowledge is +a reality to be apprehended. + +We may now revert to that form of idealism which maintains that the +essential relation of reality to the mind is that of _being known_, +in order to consider two lines of argument by which it may be +defended. + +According to the first of these, the view of the plain man either is, +or at least involves, materialism; and materialism is demonstrably +absurd. The plain man's view involves the existence of the physical +world prior to the existence of the knowledge of it, and therefore +also prior to the existence of minds which know it, since it is +impossible to separate the existence of a knowing mind from its actual +knowledge. From this it follows that mere matter, having only the +qualities considered by the physicist, must somehow have originated or +produced knowing and knowing minds. But this production is plainly +impossible. For matter, possessing solely, as it does, characteristics +bound up with extension and motion, cannot possibly have originated +activities of a wholly different kind, or beings capable of exercising +them. + +It may, however, be replied that the supposed consequence, though +absurd, does not really follow from the plain man's realism. +Doubtless, it would be impossible for a universe consisting solely of +the physical world to originate thought or beings capable of thinking. +But the real presupposition of the coming into existence of human +knowledge at a certain stage in the process of the universe is to be +found in the pre-existence, not of a mind or minds which always +actually knew, but simply of a mind or minds in which, under certain +conditions, knowledge is necessarily actualized. A mind cannot be the +product of anything or, at any rate, of anything but a mind. It cannot +be a new reality introduced at some time or other into a universe of +realities of a wholly different order. Therefore, the presupposition +of the present existence of knowledge is the pre-existence of a mind +or minds; it is not implied that its or their knowledge must always +have been actual. In other words, knowing implies the ultimate or +unoriginated existence of beings possessed of the capacity to know. +Otherwise, knowledge would be a merely derivative product, capable of +being stated in terms of something else, and in the end in terms of +matter and motion. This implication is, however, in no wise traversed +by the plain man's realism. For that implies, not that the existence +of the physical world is prior to the existence of a mind, but only +that it is prior to a mind's actual knowledge of the world. + +The second line of thought appeals to the logic of relation. It may be +stated thus. If a term is relative, i. e. is essentially 'of' or +relative to another, that other is essentially relative to it. Just as +a doctor, for instance, is essentially a doctor of a patient, so a +patient is essentially the patient of a doctor. As a ruler implies +subjects, so subjects imply a ruler. As a line essentially has points +at its ends, so points are essentially ends of a line. Now knowledge +is essentially 'of' or relative to reality. Reality, therefore, is +essentially relative to or implies the knowledge of it. And this +correlativity of knowledge and reality finds linguistic confirmation +in the terms 'subject' and 'object'. For, linguistically, just as a +subject is always the subject of an object, so an object is always the +object of a subject. + +Nevertheless, further analysis of the nature of relative terms, and in +particular of knowledge, does not bear out this conclusion. To take +the case of a doctor. It is true that if some one is healing, some one +else is receiving treatment, i. e. is being healed; and 'patient' +being the name for the recipient of treatment, we can express this +fact by saying that a doctor is essentially the doctor of a patient. +Further, it is true that a recipient of treatment implies a giver of +it, as much as a giver of it implies a recipient. Hence we can truly +say that since a doctor is the doctor of a patient, a patient is the +patient of a doctor, meaning thereby that since that to which a doctor +is relative is a patient, a patient must be similarly relative to a +doctor. There is, however, another statement which can be made +concerning a doctor. We can say that a doctor is a doctor of a human +being who is ill, i. e. a sick man. But in this case we cannot go on +to say that since a doctor is a doctor of a sick man, a sick man +implies or is relative to a doctor. For we mean that the kind of +reality capable of being related to a doctor as his patient is a sick +man; and from this it does not follow that a reality of this kind does +stand in this relation. Doctoring implies a sick man; a sick man does +not imply that some one is treating him. We can only say that since a +doctor is the doctor of a sick man, a sick man implies the possibility +of doctoring. In the former case the terms, viz. 'doctor' and +'patient', are inseparable because they signify the relation in +question in different aspects. The relation is one fact which has two +inseparable 'sides', and, consequently, the terms must be inseparable +which signify the relation respectively from the point of view of the +one side and from the point of view of the other. Neither term +signifies the nature of the elements which can stand in the relation. +In the latter case, however, the terms, viz. 'doctor' and 'sick man', +signify respectively the relation in question (in one aspect), and the +nature of one of the elements capable of entering into it; +consequently they are separable. + +Now when it is said that knowledge is essentially knowledge of +reality, the statement is parallel to the assertion that a doctor is +essentially the doctor of a sick man, and not to the assertion that a +doctor is essentially the doctor of a patient. It should mean that +that which is capable of being related to a knower as his object is +something which is or exists; consequently it cannot be said that +since knowledge is of reality, reality must essentially be known. The +parallel to the assertion that a doctor is the doctor of a patient is +the assertion that knowledge is the knowledge of an object; for just +as 'patient' means that which receives treatment from a doctor, so +'object' means that which is known. And here we _can_ go on to make +the further parallel assertion that since knowledge is essentially the +knowledge of an object, an object is essentially an object of +knowledge. Just as 'patient' means a recipient of treatment, or, more +accurately, a sick man under treatment, so 'object' means something +known, or, more accurately, a reality known. And 'knowledge' and +'object of knowledge', like 'doctor' and 'patient', indicate the same +relation, though from different points of view, and, consequently, +when we can use the one term, we can use the other. But to say that an +object (i. e. a reality known) implies the knowledge of it is not to +say that reality implies the knowledge of it, any more than to say +that a patient implies a doctor is to say that a sick man implies a +doctor. + +But a doctor, it might be objected, is not a fair parallel to +knowledge or a knower. A doctor, though an instance of a relative +term, is only an instance of one kind of relative term, that in which +the elements related are capable of existing apart from the relation, +the relation being one in which they can come to stand and cease to +stand. But there is another kind of relative term, in which the +elements related presuppose the relation, and any thought of these +elements involves the thought of the relation. A universal, e. g. +whiteness, is always the universal of certain individuals, viz. +individual whites; an individual, e. g. this white, is always an +individual of a universal, viz. whiteness. A genus is the genus of a +species, and vice versa. A surface is the surface of a volume, and a +volume implies a surface. A point is the end of a line, and a line is +bounded by points. In such cases the very being of the elements +related involves the relation, and, apart from the relation, +disappears. The difference between the two kinds of relative terms can +be seen from the fact that only in the case of the former kind can two +elements be found of which we can say significantly that their +relation is of the kind in question. We can say of two men that they +are related as doctor and patient, or as father and son, for we can +apprehend two beings as men without being aware of them as so related. +But of no two elements is it possible to say that their relation is +that of universal and individual, or of genus and species, or of +surface and volume; for to apprehend elements which are so related we +must apprehend them so related.[7] To apprehend a surface is to +apprehend a surface of a volume. To apprehend a volume is to apprehend +a volume bounded by a surface. To apprehend a universal is to +apprehend it as the universal of an individual, and vice versa.[8] In +the case of relations of this kind, the being of either element which +stands in the relation is relative to that of the other; neither can +be real without the other, as we see if we try to think of one without +the other. And it is at least possible that knowledge and reality or, +speaking more strictly, a knower and reality, are related in this way. + + [7] It is, of course, possible to say significantly that two + elements, A and B, are related as universal and individual, + or as surface and volume, if we are trying to explain what we + mean by 'universal and individual' or 'surface and volume'; + but in that case we are elucidating the relationship through + the already known relation of A and B, and are not giving + information about the hitherto unknown relation of A and B. + + [8] Professor Cook Wilson has pointed out that the + distinction between these two kinds of relation is marked + in language in that, for instance, while we speak of the + 'relation _of_ universal _and_ individual', we speak of + 'the relation _between_ one man _and_ another', or of 'the + relation _of_ one man _to_ another', using, however, the + phrase 'the relation _of_ doctor _and_ patient', when we + consider two men only as in that relation. + + I owe to him recognition of the fact that the use of the word + 'relation' in connexion with such terms as 'universal and + individual' is really justified. + +What is, however, at least a strong presumption against this view is +to be found in the fact that while relations of the second kind are +essentially non-temporal, the relation of knowing is essentially +temporal. The relation of a universal and its individuals, or of a +surface and the volume which it bounds, does not either come to be, or +persist, or cease. On the other hand, it is impossible to think of a +knowing which is susceptible of no temporal predicates and is not +bound up with a process; and the thought of knowing as something which +comes to be involves the thought that the elements which become thus +related exist independently of the relation. Moreover, the real +refutation of the view lies in the fact that, when we consider what we +really think, we find that we think that the relation between a knower +and reality is not of the second kind. If we consider what we mean by +'a reality', we find that we mean by it something which is not +correlative to a mind knowing it. It does not mean something the +thought of which disappears with the thought of a mind actually +knowing it, but something which, though it can be known by a mind, +need not be actually known by a mind. Again, just as we think of a +reality as something which _can_ stand as object in the relation of +knowledge, without necessarily being in this relation, so, as we see +when we reflect, we think of a knowing mind as something which _can_ +stand as subject in this relation without necessarily being in the +relation. For though we think of the capacities which constitute the +nature of a knowing mind as only recognized through their +actualizations, i. e. through actual knowing, we think of the mind +which is possessed of these capacities as something apart from their +actualization. + +It is now possible to direct attention to two characteristics of +perception and knowledge with which Kant's treatment of space and time +conflicts, and the recognition of which reveals his procedure in its +true light. + +It has been already urged that both knowledge and perception--which, +though not identical with knowledge, is presupposed by it--are +essentially of _reality_. Now, in the _first_ place, it is thereby +implied that the relation between the mind and reality in knowledge or +in perception is essentially direct, i. e. that there is no _tertium +quid_ in the form of an 'idea' or a 'representation' between us as +perceiving or knowing and what we perceive or know. In other words, it +is implied that Locke's view is wrong in principle, and, in fact, the +contrary of the truth. In the _second_ place, it is implied that while +the whole fact of perception includes the reality perceived and the +whole fact of knowledge includes the reality known, since both +perception and knowledge are 'of', and therefore inseparable from a +reality, yet the reality perceived or known is essentially distinct +from, and cannot be stated in terms of, the perception or the +knowledge. Just as neither perception nor knowledge can be stated in +terms of the reality perceived or known from which they are +distinguished, so the reality perceived or known cannot be stated in +terms of the perception or the knowledge. In other words, the terms +'perception' and 'knowledge' ought to stand for the activities of +perceiving and knowing respectively, and not for the reality perceived +or known. Similarly, the terms 'idea' and 'representation'--the latter +of which has been used as a synonym for Kant's _Vorstellung_--ought to +stand not for something thought of or represented, but for the act of +thinking or representing. + +Further, this second implication throws light on the proper meaning of +the terms 'form of perception' and 'form of knowledge or of thought'. +For, in accordance with this implication, a 'form of perception' and a +'form of knowledge' ought to refer to the nature of our acts of +perceiving and knowing or thinking respectively, and not to the nature +of the realities perceived or known. Consequently, Kant was right in +making the primary antithesis involved in the term 'form of +perception' that between a way in which we perceive and a way in which +things are, or, in other words, between a characteristic of our +perceiving nature and a characteristic of the reality perceived. +Moreover, Kant was also right in making this distinction a real +antithesis and not a mere distinction within one and the same thing +regarded from two points of view. That which is a form of perception +cannot also be a form of the reality and vice versa. Thus we may +illustrate a perceived form of perception by pointing out that our +apprehension of the physical world (1) is a temporal process, and (2) +is conditioned by perspective. Both the succession and the conditions +of perspective belong to the act of perception, and do not form part +of the nature of the world perceived. And it is significant that in +our ordinary consciousness it never occurs to us to attribute either +the perspective or the time to the reality perceived. Even if it be +difficult in certain cases, as in that of colour, to decide whether +something belongs to our act of perception or not, we never suppose +that it can be _both_ a form of perception _and_ a characteristic of +the reality perceived. We think that if it be the one, it cannot be +the other. + +Moreover, if we pass from perception to knowledge or thought--which in +this context may be treated as identical--and seek to illustrate a +form of knowledge or of thought, we may cite the distinction of +logical subject and logical predicate of a judgement. The distinction +as it should be understood--for it does not necessitate a difference +of grammatical form--may be illustrated by the difference between the +judgements 'Chess is the _most trying of games_' and '_Chess_ is the +most trying of games'. In the former case 'chess' is the logical +subject, in the latter case it is the logical predicate. Now this +distinction clearly does not reside in or belong to the reality about +which we judge; it relates solely to the order of our approach in +thought to various parts of its nature. For, to take the case of the +former judgement, in calling 'chess' its subject, and 'most trying of +games' its predicate, we are asserting that in this judgement we begin +by apprehending the reality of which we are thinking as chess, and +come to apprehend it as the most trying of games. In other words, the +distinction relates solely to the order of our apprehension, and not +to anything in the thing apprehended. + +In view of the preceding, it is possible to make clear the nature of +certain mistakes on Kant's part. In the first place, space, and time +also, so far as we are thinking of the world, and not of our +apprehension of it, as undergoing a temporal process, are essentially +characteristics not of perception but of the reality perceived, and +Kant, in treating space, and time, so regarded, as forms of +perception, is really transferring to the perceiving subject that +which in the whole fact 'perception of an object' or 'object +perceived' belongs to the object. + +Again, if we go on to ask how Kant manages to avoid drawing the +conclusion proper to this transference, viz. that space and time are +not characteristics of any realities at all, but belong solely to the +process by which we come to apprehend them, we see that he does so +because, in effect, he contravenes both the characteristics of +perception referred to. For, in the first place, although in +conformity with his theory he almost always _speaks_ of space and time +in terms of perception,[9] he consistently _treats_ them as features +of the reality perceived, i. e. of phenomena. Thus in arguing that +space and time belong not to the understanding but to the sensibility, +although he uniformly speaks of them as perceptions, his argument +implies that they are objects of perception; for its aim, properly +stated, is to show that space and time are not objects of thought but +objects of perception. Consequently, in his treatment of space and +time, he refers to what are both to him and in fact objects of +perception in terms of perception, and thereby contravenes the second +implication of perception to which attention has been drawn. Again, in +the second place, if we go on to ask how Kant is misled into doing +this, we see that it is because he contravenes the first implication +of perception. In virtue of his theory of perception[10] he interposes +a _tertium quid_ between the reality perceived and the percipient, in +the shape of an 'appearance'. This _tertium quid_ gives him something +which can plausibly be regarded as at once a perception and something +perceived. For, though from the point of view of the thing in itself +an appearance is an appearance or a perception of it, yet, regarded +from the point of view of what it is in itself, an appearance is a +reality perceived of the kind called mental. Hence space and time, +being characteristics of an appearance, can be regarded as at once +characteristics of our perception of a reality, viz. of a thing in +itself, and characteristics of a reality perceived, viz. an +appearance. Moreover, there is another point of view from which the +treatment of bodies in space as appearances or phenomena gives +plausibility to the view that space, though a form of perception, is a +characteristic of a reality. When Kant speaks of space as the form of +phenomena the fact to which he refers is that all bodies are +spatial.[11] He means, not that space is a way in which we perceive +something, but that it is a characteristic of things perceived, which +he _calls_ phenomena, and which _are_ bodies. But, since in his +statement of this fact he substitutes for bodies phenomena, which to +him are perceptions, his statement can be put in the form 'space is +_the form of perceptions_'; and the statement in this form is verbally +almost identical with the statement that space is _a form of +perception_. Consequently, the latter statement, which _should_ mean +that space is a way in which we perceive things, is easily identified +with a statement of which the meaning is that space is a +characteristic of something perceived.[12] + + [9] Cf. p. 51, note 1. + + [10] Cf. p. 30 and ff. + + [11] Cf. p. 39. + + [12] It can be shown in the same way, _mutatis mutandis_ (cp. + p. 111), that the view that time, though the form of inner + perception, is a characteristic of a reality gains + plausibility from Kant's implicit treatment of our states as + appearances due to ourselves. + +Again, Kant's account of time will be found to treat something +represented or perceived as also a perception. We find two consecutive +paragraphs[13] of which the aim is apparently to establish the +contrary conclusions: (1) that time is only the form of our internal +state and not of external phenomena, and (2) that time is the formal +condition of all phenomena, external and internal. + + [13] B. 49-50 (b) and (c), M. 30 (b) and (c). + +To establish the first conclusion, Kant argues that time has nothing +to do with shape or position, but, on the contrary, determines the +relation of representations in our internal state. His meaning is that +we have a succession of perceptions or representations of bodies in +space,[14] and that while the bodies perceived are not related +temporally, our perceptions or representations of them are so +related. Here 'representations' refers to our apprehension, and +is distinguished from what is represented, viz. bodies in space. + + [14] Kant here refers to bodies by the term 'phenomena', but + their character as phenomena is not relevant to his argument. + +How, then, does Kant reach the second result? He remembers that bodies +in space are 'phenomena', i. e. representations. He is, therefore, +able to point out that all representations belong, as determinations +of the mind, to our internal state, whether they have external things, +i. e. bodies in space, for their objects or not, and that, +consequently, they are subject to time. Hence time is concluded to be +the form of all phenomena. In this second argument, however, it is +clear that Kant has passed from his previous treatment of bodies in +space as something represented or perceived to the treatment of them +as themselves representations or perceptions.[15] + + [15] It may be noted that Kant's assertion (B. 50, M. 31) + that time is the immediate condition of internal phenomena, + and thereby also mediately the condition of external + phenomena, does not help to reconcile the two positions. + +In conclusion, we may point out an insoluble difficulty in Kant's +account of time. His treatment of space and time as the forms of outer +and inner sense respectively implies that, while spatial relations +apply to the realities which we perceive, temporal relations apply +solely to our perceptions of them. Unfortunately, however, as Kant in +certain contexts is clearly aware, time also belongs to the realities +perceived. The moon, for instance, moves round the earth. Thus there +are what may be called real successions as well as successions in our +perception. Further, not only are we aware of this distinction in +general, but in particular cases we succeed in distinguishing a +succession of the one kind from a succession of the other. Yet from +Kant's standpoint it would be impossible to distinguish them in +particular cases, and even to be aware of the distinction in general. +For the distinction is possible only so long as a distinction is +allowed between our perceptions and the realities perceived. But for +Kant this distinction has disappeared, for in the end the realities +perceived are merely our perceptions; and time, if it be a +characteristic of anything, must be a characteristic only of our +perceptions. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES + + +The aim of the _Aesthetic_ is to answer the first question of the +_Critique_ propounded in the Introduction, viz. 'How is pure +mathematics possible?'[1] The aim of the _Analytic_ is to answer the +second question, viz. 'How is pure natural science possible?' It has +previously[2] been implied that the two questions are only verbally of +the same kind. Since Kant thinks of the judgements of mathematics as +self-evident, and therefore as admitting of no reasonable doubt[3], +he takes their truth for granted. Hence the question, 'How is pure +mathematics possible?' means 'Granted the truth of mathematical +judgements, what inference can we draw concerning the nature of the +reality to which they relate?'; and the inference is to proceed from +the truth of the judgements to the nature of the reality to which +they relate. Kant, however, considers that the principles underlying +natural science, of which the law of causality is the most prominent, +are not self-evident, and consequently need proof.[4] Hence, the +question, 'How is pure natural science possible?' means 'What +justifies the assertion that the presuppositions of natural science +are true?' and the inference is to proceed from the nature of the +objects of natural science to the truth of the _a priori_ judgements +which relate to them. + + [1] B. 20, M. 13. + + [2] pp. 23-5. + + [3] Cf. p. 24, note 1. + + [4] Cf. p. 24, notes 2 and 3. + +Again, as Kant rightly sees, the vindication of the presuppositions +of natural science, to be complete, requires the discovery upon a +definite principle of _all_ these presuppositions. The clue to this +discovery he finds in the view that, just as the perceptions of space +and time originate in the sensibility, so the _a priori_ conceptions +and laws which underlie natural science originate in the +understanding; for, on this view, the discovery of all the conceptions +and laws which originate in the understanding will be at the same time +the discovery of all the presuppositions of natural science. + +Kant therefore in the _Analytic_ has a twofold problem to solve. +He has firstly to discover the conceptions and laws which belong to +the understanding as such, and secondly to vindicate their application +to individual things. Moreover, although it is obvious that the +conceptions and the laws of the understanding must be closely +related,[5] he reserves them for separate treatment. + + [5] E. g. the conception of 'cause and effect', and the law + that 'all changes take place according to the law of the + connexion between cause and effect'. + +The _Analytic_ is accordingly subdivided into the _Analytic of +Conceptions_ and the _Analytic of Principles_. The _Analytic of +Conceptions_, again, is divided into the _Metaphysical Deduction of +the Categories_, the aim of which is to discover the conceptions +of the understanding, and the _Transcendental Deduction of the +Categories_, the aim of which is to vindicate their validity, +i. e. their applicability to individual things. + +It should further be noticed that, according to Kant, it is the +connexion of the _a priori_ conceptions and laws underlying natural +science with the _understanding_ which constitutes the main difficulty +of the vindication of their validity, and renders necessary an answer +of a different kind to that which would have been possible, if the +validity of mathematical judgements had been in question. + +"We have been able above, with little trouble, to make comprehensible +how the conceptions of space and time, although _a priori_ knowledge, +must necessarily relate to objects and render possible a synthetic +knowledge of them independently of all experience. For since an object +can appear to us, i. e. be an object of empirical perception, only by +means of such pure forms of sensibility, space and time are pure +perceptions, which contain _a priori_ the condition of the possibility +of objects as phenomena, and the synthesis in space and time has +objective validity." + +"On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do not +represent the conditions under which objects are given in perception; +consequently, objects can certainly appear to us without their +necessarily being related to functions of the understanding, and +therefore without the understanding containing _a priori_ the +conditions of these objects. Hence a difficulty appears here, which +we did not meet in the field of sensibility, viz. how _subjective +conditions of thought_ can have _objective validity_, i. e. can +furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects; +for phenomena can certainly be given us in perception without the +functions of the understanding. Let us take, for example, the +conception of cause, which indicates a peculiar kind of synthesis in +which on A something entirely different B is placed[6] according to a +law. It is not _a priori_ clear why phenomena should contain something +of this kind ... and it is consequently doubtful _a priori_, whether +such a conception is not wholly empty, and without any corresponding +object among phenomena. For that objects of sensuous perception must +conform to the formal conditions of the sensibility which lie _a +priori_ in the mind is clear, since otherwise they would not be +objects for us; but that they must also conform to the conditions +which the understanding requires for the synthetical unity of thought +is a conclusion the cogency of which it is not so easy to see. For +phenomena might quite well be so constituted that the understanding +did not find them in conformity with the conditions of its unity, and +everything might lie in such confusion that, e. g. in the succession +of phenomena, nothing might present itself which would offer a rule of +synthesis, and so correspond to the conception of cause and effect, so +that this conception would be quite empty, null, and meaningless. +Phenomena would none the less present objects to our perception, for +perception does not in any way require the functions of thinking."[7] + + [6] _Gesetzt._ + + [7] B. 121-3, M. 75-6. + +This passage, if read in connexion with that immediately preceding +it,[8] may be paraphrased as follows: 'The argument of the _Aesthetic_ +assumes the validity of mathematical judgements, which as such relate +to space and time, and thence it deduces the phenomenal character of +space and time, and of what is contained therein. At the same time the +possibility of questioning the validity of the law of causality, and +of similar principles, may lead us to question even the validity of +mathematical judgements. In the case of mathematical judgements, +however, in consequence of their relation to perception, an answer is +readily forthcoming. We need only reverse the original argument and +appeal directly to the phenomenal character of space and time and of +what is contained in them. Objects in space and time, being +appearances, must conform to the laws according to which we have +appearances; and since space and time are only ways in which we +perceive, or have appearances, mathematical laws, which constitute the +general nature of space and time, are the laws according to which we +have appearances. Mathematical laws, then, constitute the general +structure of appearances, and, as such, enter into the very being +of objects in space and time. But the case is otherwise with the +conceptions and principles underlying natural science. For the law of +causality, for instance, is a law not of our perceiving but of our +thinking nature, and consequently it is not presupposed in the +presentation to us of objects in space and time. Objects in space +and time, being appearances, need conform only to the laws of our +perceiving nature. We have therefore to explain the possibility of +saying that a law of our thinking nature must be valid for objects +which, as conditioned merely by our perceiving nature, are independent +of the laws of our thinking; for phenomena might be so constituted as +not to correspond to the necessities of our thought.' + + [8] B. 120-1, M. 73-4. + +No doubt Kant's _solution_ of this problem in the _Analytic_ involves +an emphatic denial of the central feature of this statement of it, +viz. that phenomena may be given in perception without any help from +the activity of the understanding.[9] Hence it may be urged that this +passage merely expresses a temporary aberration on Kant's part, and +should therefore be ignored. Nevertheless, in spite of this +inconsistency, the view that phenomena may be given in perception +without help from the activity of the understanding forms the basis +of the difference of treatment which Kant thinks necessary for the +vindication of the judgements underlying natural science and for that +of the judgements of mathematics. + + [9] Cf. B. 137-8, M. 85, and B. 160 note, M. 98 note. + +We may now consider how Kant 'discovers' the categories or conceptions +which belong to the understanding as such.[10] His method is sound in +principle. He begins with an account of the understanding in general. +He then determines its essential differentiations. Finally, he argues +that each of these differentiations involves a special conception, +and that therefore these conceptions taken together constitute an +exhaustive list of the conceptions which belong to the understanding. + + [10] B. 91-105, M. 56-63. + +His account of the understanding is expressed thus: "The understanding +was explained above only negatively, as a non-sensuous faculty of +knowledge. Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot have any +perception; consequently, the understanding is no faculty of +perception. But besides perception there is no other kind of +knowledge, except through conceptions. Consequently, the knowledge of +every understanding, or at least of every human understanding, is a +knowledge through conceptions,--not perceptive, but discursive. All +perceptions, as sensuous, depend on affections; conceptions, +therefore, upon functions. By the word function, I understand the +unity of the act of arranging different representations under one +common representation. Conceptions, then, are based on the spontaneity +of thinking, as sensuous perceptions are on the receptivity of +impressions. Now the understanding cannot make any other use of these +conceptions than to judge by means of them. Since no representation, +except only the perception, refers immediately to the object, a +conception is never referred immediately to an object, but to some +other representation thereof, be that a perception or itself a +conception. A judgement, therefore, is the mediate knowledge of an +object, consequently the representation of a representation of it. In +every judgement there is a conception which is valid for many +representations, and among these also comprehends a given +representation, this last being then immediately referred to the +object. For example, in the judgement 'All bodies are divisible', our +conception of the divisible refers to various other conceptions; among +these, however, it is herein particularly referred to the conception +of body, and this conception of body is referred to certain phenomena +which present themselves to us. These objects, therefore, are +mediately represented by the conception of divisibility. Accordingly, +all judgements are functions of unity in our representations, since, +instead of an immediate, a higher representation, which comprehends +this and several others, is used for the knowledge of the object, and +thereby many possible items of knowledge are collected into one. But +we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgements, so that the +_understanding_ in general can be represented as a _faculty of +judging_."[11] + + [11] B. 92-4, M. 56-7. + +It is not worth while to go into all the difficulties of this confused +and artificial passage. Three points are clear upon the surface. In +the first place, the account of the understanding now given differs +from that given earlier in the _Critique_[12] in that, instead of +merely distinguishing, it separates the sensibility and the +understanding, and treats them as contributing, not two inseparable +factors involved in all knowledge, but two kinds of knowledge. In the +second place, the guise of argument is very thin, and while Kant +ostensibly _proves_, he really only _asserts_ that the understanding +is the faculty of judgement. In the third place, in describing +judgement Kant is hampered by trying to oppose it as the mediate +knowledge of an object to perception as the immediate knowledge of an +object. A perception is said to relate immediately to an object; in +contrast with this, a conception is said to relate immediately only to +another conception or to a perception, and mediately to an object +through relation to a perception, either directly or through another +conception. Hence a judgement, as being the use of a conception, viz. +the predicate of the judgement, is said to be the mediate knowledge of +an object. But if this distinction be examined, it will be found that +two kinds of immediate relation are involved, and that the account of +perception is not really compatible with that of judgement. When a +perception is said to relate immediately to an object, the relation in +question is that between a sensation or appearance produced by an +object acting upon or affecting the sensibility and the object which +produces it. But when a conception is said to relate immediately to +another conception or to a perception, the relation in question is +that of universal and particular, i. e. that of genus and species or +of universal and individual. For the conception is said to be 'valid +for' (i. e. to 'apply to') and to 'comprehend' the conception or +perception to which it is immediately related; and again, when a +conception is said to relate mediately to an object, the relation +meant is its 'application' to the object, even though in this case +the application is indirect. Now if a perception to which a +conception is related--either directly or indirectly through another +conception--were an appearance produced by an object, the conception +could never be related to the object in the sense required, viz. that +it applies to it; for an appearance does not _apply to_ but is +_produced_ by the object. Consequently, when Kant is considering a +conception, and therefore also when he is considering a judgement, +which is the use of a conception, he is really thinking of the +perception to which it is related as an _object of_ perception, i. e. +as a perceived individual, and he has ceased to think of a perception +as an appearance produced by an object.[13] Hence in considering +Kant's account of a conception and of judgement, we should ignore his +account of perception, and therefore also his statement that judgement +is the mediate knowledge of an object. + + [12] B. 74-6, M. 45-6. + + [13] Kant, in _illustrating_ the nature of a judgement, + evades the difficulty occasioned by his account of + perception, by illustrating a 'perception' by the 'conception + of body', and 'objects' by 'certain phenomena'. He thereby + covertly substitutes the relation of universal and individual + for the relation of an appearance and the object which causes + it. + +If we do so, we see that Kant's account of judgement simply amounts to +this: 'Judgement is the use of a conception or 'universal'; the use of +a conception or universal consists in bringing under it corresponding +individuals or species. Consequently, judgement is a function +producing unity. If, for instance, we judge 'All bodies are +divisible', we thereby unify 'bodies' with other kinds of divisible +things by bringing them under the conception of divisibility; and if +we judge 'This body is divisible' we thereby unify this divisible +body with others by bringing it and them under the conception of +divisibility.'[14] Again, since 'the understanding in general can be +represented as a _faculty of judging_', it follows that the activity +of the understanding consists in introducing unity into our +representations, by bringing individuals or species--both these being +representations--under the corresponding universal or conception.[15] + + [14] It is not Kant's general account of judgement given in + this passage, but the account of perception incompatible with + it, which leads him to confine his illustrations to universal + judgements. + + [15] We may note three minor points. (1) Kant's definition of + function as 'the unity of the act of arranging [i. e. the act + which produces unity by arranging] different representations + under a common representation' has no justification in its + immediate context, and is occasioned solely by the + forthcoming description of judgement. (2) Kant has no right + to distinguish the activity which _originates_ conceptions, + or upon which they depend, from the activity which _uses_ + conceptions, viz. judgement. For the act of arranging diverse + representations under a common representation which + originates conceptions is the act of judgement as Kant + describes it. (3) It is wholly artificial to speak of + judgement as 'the representation of a representation of an + object'. + +Having explained the nature of the understanding, Kant proceeds to +take the next step. His aim being to connect the understanding with +the categories, and the categories being a plurality, he has to show +that the activity of judgement can be differentiated into several +kinds, each of which must subsequently be shown to involve a special +category. Hence, solely in view of the desired conclusion, and in +spite of the fact that he has described the activity of judgement as +if it were always of the same kind, he passes in effect from the +singular to the plural and asserts that 'all the functions of the +understanding can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the +functions of unity in judgements'. After this preliminary transition, +he proceeds to assert that, if we abstract in general from all content +of a judgement and fix our attention upon the mere form of the +understanding, we find that the function of thinking in a judgement +can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three +subdivisions. These, which are borrowed with slight modifications from +Formal Logic, are expressed as follows.[16] + + I. _Quantity._ + Universal + Particular + Singular. + + II. _Quality._ + Affirmative + Negative + Infinite. + + III. _Relation._ + Categorical + Hypothetical + Disjunctive. + + IV. _Modality._ + Problematic + Assertoric + Apodeictic. + +These distinctions, since they concern only the form of judgements, +belong, according to Kant, to the activity of judgement as such, and +in fact constitute its essential differentiations. + + [16] B. 95, M. 58. + +Now, before we consider whether this is really the case, we should +ask what answer Kant's account of judgement would lead us to expect +to the question 'What are all the functions of unity in judgement?' +The question must mean 'What are the kinds of unity produced by +judgement?' To this question three alternative answers are prima facie +possible. (1) There is only one kind of unity, that of a group of +particulars unified through relation to the corresponding universal. +The special unity produced will differ for different judgements, since +it will depend upon the special universal involved. The kind or form +of unity, however, will always be the same, viz. that of particulars +related through the corresponding universal. For instance, 'plants' +and 'trees' are unified respectively by the judgements 'This body is a +plant' and 'This body is a tree'; for 'this body' is in the one case +related to other 'plants' and in the other case to other 'trees'. And +though the unity produced is different in each case, the kind of unity +is the same; for plants and trees are, as members of a kind, unities +of a special kind distinct from unities of another kind, such as the +parts of a spatial or numerical whole. (2) There are as many kinds of +unity as there are universals. Every group of particulars forms a +unity of a special kind through relation to the corresponding +universal. (3) There are as many kinds of unity as there are highest +universals or _summa genera_. These _summa genera_ are the most +general sources of unity through which individuals are related in +groups, directly or indirectly. The kinds of unity are therefore in +principle the Aristotelian categories, i. e. the highest forms of +being under which all individuals fall. + +Nevertheless, it is easy to see that the second and third answers +should be rejected in favour of the first. For though, according to +Kant, a judgement unifies particulars by bringing them under a +universal, the special universal involved in a given judgement belongs +not to the judgement as such, but to the particulars unified. What +belongs to the judgement as such is simply the fact that the +particulars are brought under a universal. In other words, the +judgement as such determines the kind of unity but not the particular +unity. The judgements 'Gold is a metal' and 'Trees are green', +considered merely as judgements and not as the particular judgements +which they are, involve the same kind of unity, viz. that of +particulars as particulars of a universal; for the distinction between +'metal' and 'green' is a distinction not of kinds of unity but of +unities. Moreover, to anticipate the discussion of Kant's final +conclusion, the moral is that Kant's account of judgement should have +led him to recognize that judgement involves the reality, not of any +special universals or--in Kant's language--conceptions, but of +universality or conception as such. In other words, on his view of +judgement the activity of the understanding implies simply that there +_are_ universals or conceptions; it does not imply the existence of +special conceptions which essentially belong to the understanding, +e. g. that of 'cause' or 'plurality'.[17] + + [17] To this failure in Kant's argument is due the difficulty + in following his transition from 'function' to 'functions' of + judgements. The judgement, as Kant describes it, always does + one and the same thing; it unifies particulars by bringing + them under a universal. This activity does not admit of + differentiation. + +If we now turn to the list of the activities of thought in judgement, +borrowed from Formal Logic, we shall see that it is not in any way +connected with Kant's account of judgement.[18] For if the kinds of +judgement distinguished by Formal Logic are to be regarded as +different ways of unifying, the plurality unified must be allowed to +be not a special kind of group of particulars, but the two conceptions +which constitute the terms of the judgement[19]; and the unity +produced must be allowed to be in no case a special form of the unity +of particulars related through the corresponding universal. Thus the +particular judgement 'Some coroners are doctors' must be said to unify +the conceptions of 'coroner' and of 'doctor', and presumably by means +of the conception of 'plurality'. Again, the hypothetical judgement +'If it rains, the ground will be wet' must be said to unify the +judgements 'It rains' and 'The ground will be wet', and presumably by +means of the conception of 'reason and consequence'. In neither case +can the act of unification be considered a special form of the act of +recognizing particulars as particulars of the corresponding universal. +The fact is that the distinctions drawn by Formal Logic are based on a +view of judgement which is different from, and even incompatible with, +Kant's, and they arise from the attempt to solve a different problem. +The problem before Kant in describing judgement is to distinguish the +understanding from the sensibility, i. e. thought from perception. +Hence he regards judgement as the act of unifying a manifold given in +perception, directly, or indirectly by means of a conception. But this +is not the problem with which Formal Logic is occupied. Formal Logic +assumes judgement to be an act which relates material given to it in +the shape of 'conceptions' or 'judgements' by analysis of this +material, and seeks to discover the various modes of relation thereby +effected. The work of judgement, however, cannot consist _both_ in +relating particulars through a conception _and_ in relating two +conceptions or judgements. + + [18] Moreover, the forms of judgement clearly lack the + systematic character which Kant claims for them. Even if it + be allowed that the subdivisions within the four main heads + of quantity, quality, relation, and modality are based upon + single principles of division, it cannot be said that the + four heads themselves originate from a common principle. + + [19] In the case of the third division, the plurality unified + will be two prior judgements. + +It may be urged that this criticism only affects Kant's argument, but +not his conclusion. Possibly, it may be said, the list of types of +judgement borrowed from Formal Logic really expresses the essential +differentiations of judgement, and, in that case, Kant's only mistake +is that he bases them upon a false or at least inappropriate account +of judgement.[20] Moreover, since this list furnishes Kant with the +'clue' to the categories, provided that it expresses the essential +differentiations of judgement, the particular account of judgement +upon which it is based is a matter of indifference. + + [20] It may be noted that the account cannot be merely + inappropriate to the general problem, if it be _incompatible_ + with that assumed by Formal Logic. + +This contention leads us to consider the last stage of Kant's +argument, in which he deduces the categories in detail from his list +of the forms of judgement. For it is clear that unless the forms of +judgement severally involve the categories, it will not matter whether +these forms are or are not the essential differentiations of +judgement. + +Kant's mode of connecting the categories in detail with the forms of +judgement discovered by Formal Logic is at least as surprising as his +mode of connecting the latter with the nature of judgement in general. +Since the twelve distinctions within the form of judgement are to +serve as a clue to the conceptions which belong to the understanding, +we naturally expect that each distinction will be found directly to +involve a special conception or category, and that therefore, to +discover the categories, we need only look for the special conception +involved in each form of judgement.[21] Again, since the plurality +unified in a judgement of each form is the two conceptions or +judgements which form the matter of the judgement, we should expect +the conception involved in each form of judgement to be merely the +type of relationship established between these conceptions or +judgements. This expectation is confirmed by a cursory glance at the +table of categories.[22] + + I. _Of Quantity._ + Unity + Plurality + Totality. + + II. _Of Quality._ + Reality + Negation + Limitation. + + III. _Of Relation._ + Inherence and Subsistence (_Substantia et Accidens_) + Causality and Dependence (_Cause and Effect_) + Community (_Reciprocity between the agent and patient._) + + IV. _Of Modality._ + Possibility--Impossibility + Existence--Non-existence + Necessity--Contingence. + +If we compare the first division of these categories with the first +division of judgements we naturally think that Kant conceived +singular, particular, and universal judgements to unify their terms +by means of the conceptions of 'one', of 'some', and of 'all' +respectively; and we form corresponding, though less confident, +expectations in the case of the other divisions. + + [21] This expectation is confirmed by Kant's view that + judgement introduces unity into a plurality by means of a + conception. This view leads us to expect that different forms + of judgement--if there be any--will be distinguished by the + different conceptions through which they unify the plurality; + for it will naturally be the different conceptions involved + which are responsible for the different kinds of unity + effected. + + [22] B. 106, M. 64. + +Kant, however, makes no attempt to show that each form of judgement +distinguished by Formal Logic involves a special conception. In fact, +his view is that the activities of thought studied by Formal Logic do +not originate or use any special conceptions at all. For his actual +deduction of the categories[23] is occupied in showing that although +thought, when exercised under the conditions under which it is studied +by Formal Logic, does not originate and use conceptions of its own, it +is able under certain other conditions to originate and use such +conceptions, i. e. categories.[24] Hence if we attend only to the +professed procedure of the deduction, we are compelled to admit that +the deduction not only excludes any use of the 'clue' to the +categories, supposed to be furnished by Formal Logic, but even fails +to deduce them at all. For it does not even nominally attempt to +discover the categories in detail, but reverts to the prior task of +showing merely that there are categories. Doubtless Kant thinks that +the forms of judgement formulated by Formal Logic in some way +_suggest_ the conceptions which become operative in thought under +these other conditions. Nevertheless, it is impossible to see how +these forms of judgement can suggest these conceptions, unless they +actually presuppose them. + +It is clear, however, that the professed link[25] between the forms of +judgement and the categories does not represent the actual process by +which Kant reached his list of categories; for he could never have +reached any list of categories by an argument which was merely +directed to show that there are categories. Moreover, an inspection of +the list shows that he actually reached it partly by noticing the +conceptions which the forms of judgement seemed to presuppose, and +partly by bearing in mind the general conceptions underlying physics +which it was his ultimate aim to vindicate. Since this is the case, +and since the categories can only be connected with the forms of +judgement by showing that they are presupposed in them, the proper +question to be considered from the point of view of the metaphysical +deduction is simply whether the forms of judgement really presuppose +the categories.[26] + + [23] B. 102-5, M. 62-3. + + [24] Cf. p. 166. + + [25] B. 102-5, M. 62-3. + + [26] As we shall see later, the real importance of the + passage in which Kant professes to effect the transition from + the forms of judgement to the categories (B. 102-5, M. 62-3) + lies in its introduction of a new and important line of + thought, on which the transcendental deduction turns. + Consideration of it is therefore deferred to the next + chapter. + +If, however, we examine the forms of judgement distinguished by Formal +Logic, we find that they do not presuppose the categories. To see +this, it is only necessary to examine the four main divisions of +judgement _seriatim_. + +The first division of judgements is said to be a division in respect +of quantity into singular, particular, and universal. So stated, the +division is numerical. It is a division of judgements according as +they make an assertion about one, more than one, or all the members of +a kind. Each species may be said to presuppose (1) the conception of +quantity, and (2) a conception peculiar to itself: the first +presupposing the conception of one member of a kind, the second that +of more than one but less than all members of a kind, the third that +of all members of a kind. Moreover, a judgement of each kind may +perhaps be said to relate the predicate conception to the subject +conception by means of one of these three conceptions. + +The fundamental division, however, into which universal and singular +judgements enter is not numerical at all, and ignores particular +judgements altogether. It is that between such judgements as +'Three-sided figures, as such, are three-angled' and 'This man is +tall'. The essential distinction is that in the universal judgement +the predicate term is apprehended to belong to the subject through +our insight that it is necessitated by the nature of the subject term, +while in the singular judgement our apprehension that the predicate +term belongs to the subject is based upon the perception or experience +of the coexistence of predicate and subject terms in a common subject. +In other words, it is the distinction between an _a priori_ judgement +and a judgement of perception.[27] The merely numerically universal +judgement, and the merely numerically particular judgement[28] are +simply aggregates of singular judgements, and therefore are +indistinguishable in principle from the singular judgement. If then we +ask what conceptions are really presupposed by the kinds of judgement +which Kant seeks to distinguish in the first division, we can only +reply that the universal judgement presupposes the conception of a +connected or systematic whole of attributes, and that the singular +judgement presupposes the conception of the coexistence of two +attributes in a common subject. Neither kind of judgement presupposes +the conception of quantity or the conceptions of unity, plurality, and +totality. + + [27] I owe this view of the distinction to Professor Cook + Wilson's lectures on logic. + + [28] 'Some coroners are doctors' of course in some contexts + means, 'it is possible for a coroner to be a doctor,' and is + therefore not numerical; but understood in this sense it is + merely a weakened form of the universal judgement in which + the connexion apprehended between subject and predicate terms + is incomplete. + +The second division of judgements is said to be a division in respect +of quality into affirmative, negative, and infinite, i. e. into +species which may be illustrated by the judgements, 'A college is a +place of education,' 'A college is not a hotel,' and 'A college is a +not-hotel'. The conceptions involved are said to be those of reality, +of negation, and of limitation respectively. The conception of +limitation may be ignored, since the infinite judgement said to +presuppose it is a fiction. On the other hand, the conceptions of +reality and negation, even if their existence be conceded, cannot be +allowed to be the conceptions presupposed. For when we affirm or deny, +we affirm or deny of something not mere being, but being of a +particular kind. The conceptions presupposed are rather those of +identity and difference. It is only because differences fall within an +identity that we can affirm, and it is only because within an identity +there are differences that we can deny. + +The third division of judgements is said to be in respect of relation +into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgements. Here, +again, the conclusion which Kant desires is clearly impossible. The +categorical judgement may be said to presuppose the conception of +subject and attribute, but not that of substance and accident. The +hypothetical judgement may be conceded to presuppose the conception of +reason and consequence, but it certainly does not presuppose the +conception of cause and effect.[29] Lastly, while the disjunctive +judgement may be said to presuppose the conception of mutually +exclusive species of a genus, it certainly does not presuppose the +conception of reciprocal action between physical things. + + [29] No doubt, as the schematism of the categories shows, + Kant does not think that the hypothetical judgement + _directly_ involves the conception of cause and effect, i. e. + of the relation of necessary succession between the various + states of physical things. The point is, however, that the + hypothetical judgement does not involve it at all. + +The fourth division of judgement is said to be in respect of modality +into assertoric, problematic, and apodeictic, the conceptions +involved being respectively those of possibility and impossibility, of +actuality and non-actuality, and of necessity and contingence. Now, +from the point of view of Kant's argument, these conceptions, like +those which he holds to be involved in the other divisions of +judgement, must be considered to relate to reality and not to our +attitude towards it. Considered in this way, they resolve themselves +into the conceptions of-- + +(1) the impossible (impossibility); +(2) the possible but not actual (possibility, nonexistence); +(3) the actual but not necessary (existence, contingence); +(4) the necessary (necessity). + +But since it must, in the end, be conceded that all fact is necessary, +it is impossible to admit the reality of the conception of the +possible but not actual, and of the actual but not necessary. There +remain, therefore, only the conceptions of the necessary and of the +impossible. In fact, however, the distinctions between the assertoric, +the problematic, and the apodeictical judgement relate to our attitude +to reality and not to reality, and therefore involve no different +conceptions relating to reality. It must, therefore, be admitted +that the 'metaphysical' deduction of the categories breaks down +doubly. Judgement, as Kant describes it, does not involve the +forms of judgement borrowed from Formal Logic as its essential +differentiations; and these forms of judgement do not involve the +categories. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES + + +The aim of the _Transcendental Deduction_ is to show that the +categories, though _a priori_ as originating in the understanding, are +valid, i. e. applicable to individual things. It is the part of the +_Critique_ which has attracted most attention and which is the most +difficult to follow. The difficulty of interpretation is increased +rather than diminished by the complete rewriting of this portion in +the second edition. For the second version, though it does not imply +a change of view, is undoubtedly even more obscure than the first. +It indeed makes one new contribution to the subject by adding an +important link in the argument,[1] but the importance of the link +is nullified by the fact that it is not really the link which it +professes to be. The method of treatment adopted here will be to +consider only the minimum of passages necessary to elucidate Kant's +meaning and to make use primarily of the first edition. + + [1] Cf. p. 206-10. + +It is necessary, however, first to consider the passage in the +_Metaphysical Deduction_ which nominally connects the list of +categories with the list of forms of judgement.[2] For its real +function is to introduce a new and third account of knowledge, which +forms the keynote of the _Transcendental Deduction_.[3] + + [2] B. 102-5, M. 62-3. Cf. pp. 155-6. + + [3] The first two accounts are (1) that of judgement given B. + 92-4, M. 56-8, and (2) that of judgement implicit in the view + that the forms of judgement distinguished by Formal Logic are + functions of unity. In A. 126, Mah. 215, Kant seems to + imply--though untruly--that this new account coincides with + the other two, which he does not distinguish. + +In this passage, the meaning of which it is difficult to state +satisfactorily, Kant's thought appears to be as follows: 'The activity +of thought studied by Formal Logic relates by way of judgement +conceptions previously obtained by an analysis of perceptions. For +instance, it relates the conceptions of body and of divisibility, +obtained by analysis of perceptions of bodies, in the judgement +'Bodies are divisible'. It effects this, however, merely by analysis +of the conception 'body'. Consequently, the resulting knowledge or +judgement, though _a priori_, is only analytic, and the conceptions +involved originate not from thought but from the manifold previously +analysed. But besides the conceptions obtained by analysis of a given +manifold, there are others which belong to thought or the +understanding as such, and in virtue of which thought originates +synthetic _a priori_ knowledge, this activity of thought being that +studied by Transcendental Logic. Two questions therefore arise. +Firstly, how do these conceptions obtain a matter to which they can +apply and without which they would be without content or empty? And, +secondly, how does thought in virtue of these conceptions originate +synthetic _a priori_ knowledge? The first question is easily answered, +for the manifolds of space and time, i. e. individual spaces and +individual times, afford matter of the kind needed to give these +conceptions content. As perceptions (i. e. as objects of perception), +they are that to which a conception can apply, and as pure or _a +priori_ perceptions, they are that to which those conceptions can +apply which are pure or _a priori_, as belonging to the understanding. +The second question can be answered by considering the process by +which this pure manifold of space and time enters into knowledge. All +synthetic knowledge, whether empirical or _a priori_, requires the +realization of three conditions. In the first place, there must be a +manifold given in perception. In the second place, this manifold must +be 'gone through, taken up, and combined'. In other words, if +synthesis be defined as 'the act of joining different representations +to one another and of including their multiplicity in one knowledge', +the manifold must be subjected to an act of synthesis. This is +effected by the imagination. In the third place, this synthesis +produced by the imagination must be brought to a conception, i. e. +brought under a conception which will constitute the synthesis a +unity. This is the work of the understanding. The realization of _a +priori_ knowledge, therefore, will require the realization of the +three conditions in a manner appropriate to its _a priori_ character. +There must be a pure or _a priori_ manifold; this is to be found in +individual spaces and individual times. There must be an act of pure +synthesis of this manifold; this is effected by the pure imagination. +Finally, this pure synthesis must be brought under a conception. This +is effected by the pure understanding by means of its pure or a priori +conceptions, i. e. the categories. This, then, is the process by which +_a priori_ knowledge is originated. The activity of thought or +understanding, however, which unites two conceptions in a judgement by +analysis of them--this being the act studied by Formal Logic--is the +same as that which gives unity to the synthesis of the pure manifold +of perception--this being the act studied by Transcendental Logic. +Consequently, 'the same understanding, and indeed by the same +activities whereby in dealing with conceptions it unifies them in a +judgement by an act of analysis, introduces by means of the +synthetical unity which it produces in the pure manifold of perception +a content into its own conceptions, in consequence of which these +conceptions are called pure conceptions of the understanding,'[4] and +we are entitled to say _a priori_ that these conceptions apply to +objects because they are involved in the process by which we acquire +_a priori_ knowledge of objects.' + + [4] An interpretation of B. 105 init., M. 63 fin. + +A discussion of the various difficulties raised by the general drift +of this passage, as well as by its details,[5] is unnecessary, and +would anticipate discussion of the _Transcendental Deduction_. But it +is necessary to draw attention to three points. + + [5] E. g. Kant's arbitrary assertion that the operation of + counting presupposes the conception of that number which + forms the scale of notation adopted as the source of the + unity of the synthesis. This is of course refuted among other + ways by the fact that a number of units less than the scale + of notation can be counted. + +In the first place, as has been said, Kant here introduces--and +introduces without warning--a totally new account of knowledge. It has +its origin in his theory of perception, according to which knowledge +begins with the production of sensations in us by things in +themselves. Since the spatial world which we come to know consists in +a multiplicity of related elements, it is clear that the isolated data +of sensation have somehow to be combined and unified, if we are to +have this world before us or, in other words, to know it. Moreover, +since these empirical data are subject to space and time as the forms +of perception, individual spaces and individual times, to which the +empirical data will be related, have also to be combined and unified. +On this view, the process of knowledge consists in combining certain +data into an individual whole and in unifying them through a principle +of combination.[6] If the data are empirical, the resulting knowledge +will be empirical; if the data are _a priori_, i. e. individual spaces +and individual times, the resulting knowledge will be _a priori_.[7] +This account of knowledge is new, because, although it treats +knowledge as a process or act of unifying a manifold, it describes a +different act of unification. As Kant first described the faculty of +judgement,[8] it unifies a group of particulars through relation to +the corresponding universal. As Formal Logic, according to Kant, +treats the faculty of judgement, it unifies two conceptions or two +prior judgements into a judgement. As Kant now describes the faculty +of judgement or thought, it unifies an empirical or an _a priori_ +manifold of perception combined into an individual whole, through a +conception which constitutes a principle of unity. The difference +between this last account and the others is also shown by the fact +that while the first two kinds of unification are held to be due to +mere analysis of the material given to thought, the third kind of +unification is held to be superinduced by thought, and to be in no way +capable of being extracted from the material by analysis. Further, +this new account of knowledge does not replace the others, but is +placed side by side with them. For, according to Kant, there exist +_both_ the activity of thought which relates two conceptions in a +judgement,[9] _and_ the activity by which it introduces a unity of its +own into a manifold of perception. Nevertheless, this new account of +knowledge, or rather this account of a new kind of knowledge, must be +the important one; for it is only the process now described for the +first time which produces synthetic as opposed to analytic knowledge. + + [6] Cf. A. 97, Mah. 193, 'Knowledge is a totality of compared + and connected representations.' + + [7] No doubt Kant would allow that at least some categories, + e. g. the conception of cause and effect, are principles of + synthesis of a manifold which at any rate contains an + empirical element, but it _includes_ just one of the + difficulties of the passage that it implies that _a priori_ + knowledge either is, or involves, a synthesis of pure or _a + priori_ elements. + + [8] B. 92-4, M. 56-8. + + [9] Kant, of course, thinks of this activity of thought, + as identical with that which brings particulars under a + conception. + +In the second place, the passage incidentally explains why, according +to Kant, the forms of judgement distinguished by Formal Logic do not +involve the categories.[10] For its doctrine is that while thought, if +exercised under the conditions under which it is studied by Formal +Logic, can only analyse the manifold given to it, and so has, as it +were, to borrow from the manifold the unity through which it relates +the manifold,[11] yet if an _a priori_ manifold be given to it, it can +by means of a conception introduce into the manifold a unity of its +own which could not be discovered by analysis of the manifold. Thus +thought as studied by Formal Logic merely analyses and consequently +does not and cannot make use of conceptions of its own; it can use +conceptions of its own only when an _a priori_ manifold is given to it +to deal with. + + [10] Cf. pp. 155-6. + + [11] In bringing perceptions under a conception, thought, + according to Kant, finds the conception _in_ the perceptions + by analysis of them, and in relating two conceptions in + judgement, it determines the particular form of judgement by + analysis of the conceptions. + +In the third place, there is great difficulty in following the part in +knowledge assigned to the understanding. The synthesis of the manifold +of perception is assigned to the imagination, a faculty which, like +the new kind of knowledge, is introduced without notice. The business +of the understanding is to 'bring this synthesis to conceptions' and +thereby to 'give unity to the synthesis'. Now the question arises +whether 'the activity of giving unity to the synthesis' really means +what it says, i. e. an activity which _unifies_ or _introduces a unity +into_ the synthesis, or whether it only means an activity which +_recognizes_ a unity already given to the synthesis by the +imagination. Prima facie Kant is maintaining that the understanding +really unifies, or introduces the principle of unity. For the +twice-repeated phrase 'give unity to the synthesis' seems unmistakable +in meaning, and the important rôle in knowledge is plainly meant to be +assigned to the understanding. Kant's language, however, is not +decisive; for he speaks of the synthesis of the manifold as that which +'first produces a knowledge which indeed at first may be crude and +confused and therefore needs _analysis_[12]', and he says of the +conceptions which give unity to the synthesis that 'they consist +solely in the _representation_[13] of this necessary synthetical +unity'.[14] Again, 'to bring the synthesis to a conception' may well +be understood to mean 'to recognize the synthesis as an instance of +the conception'; and, since Kant is speaking of knowledge, 'to give +unity to the synthesis' may only mean 'to give unity to the synthesis +_for us_', i. e. 'to make us aware of its unity'. Moreover, +consideration of what thought can possibly achieve with respect to a +synthesis presented to it by the imagination renders it necessary to +hold that the understanding only recognizes the unity of the +synthesis. For if a synthesis has been effected, it must have been +effected in accordance with a principle of construction or synthesis, +and therefore it would seem that the only work left for the +understanding is to discover the principle latent in the procedure of +the imagination. At any rate, if the synthesis does not involve a +principle of synthesis, it is impossible to see how thought can +subsequently introduce a principle. The imagination, then, must be +considered to have already introduced the principle of unity into the +manifold by combining it in accordance with a conception or principle +of combination, and the work of the understanding must be considered +to consist in recognizing that the manifold has been thereby combined +and unified through the conception. We are therefore obliged to accept +one of two alternatives. _Either_ the understanding merely renders the +mind conscious of the procedure of a faculty different from itself, +viz. the imagination, in which case the important rôle in knowledge, +viz. the effecting of the synthesis according to a principle, is +played by a faculty different from the understanding; _or_ the +imagination is the understanding working unreflectively, and the +subsequent process of bringing the synthesis to a conception is merely +a process by which the understanding becomes conscious of its own +procedure. Moreover, it is the latter alternative which we must accept +as more in accordance with the general tenor of Kant's thought. For +the synthesis of the imagination is essentially the outcome of +activity or spontaneity, and, as such, it belongs to the understanding +rather than to the sensibility; in fact we find Kant in one place +actually saying that 'it is one and the same spontaneity which at one +time under the name of imagination, at another time under that of +understanding, introduces connexion into the manifold of +perception'.[15] Further, it should be noted that since the +imagination must be the understanding working unreflectively, and +since it must be that which introduces unity into the manifold, there +is some justification for his use of language which implies that the +understanding is the source of the unity, though it will not be so in +the sense in which the passage under discussion might at first sight +lead us to suppose. + + [12] The italics are mine. + + [13] The italics are mine. + + [14] Cf. the description of the imagination as 'blind'. + + [15] B. 162 note, M. 99 note. Cf. B. 152, M. 93. Similarly at + one point in the passage under discussion (B. 102 fin., M. 62 + med.) the synthesis is expressly attributed to the + spontaneity of thought. + +We can now turn to the argument of the _Transcendental Deduction_ +itself. Kant introduces it in effect by raising the question, 'How is +it that, beginning with the isolated data of sense, we come to acquire +knowledge?' His aim is to show (1) that knowledge requires the +performance of certain operations by the mind upon the manifold of +sense; (2) that this process is a condition not merely of knowledge, +but also of self-consciousness; and (3) that, since the manifold is +capable of entering into knowledge, and since we are capable of being +self-conscious, the categories, whose validity is implied by this +process, are valid. + +Kant begins by pointing out[16] that all knowledge, _a priori_ as well +as empirical, requires the manifold, produced successively in the +mind, to be subjected to three operations. + + [16] A. 95-104, Mah. 194-8. + +1. Since the elements of the manifold are as given mere isolated +units, and since knowledge is the apprehension of a unity of connected +elements, the mind must first run through the multiplicity of sense +and then grasp it together into a whole, i. e. into an image.[17] +This act is an act of synthesis; it is called 'the synthesis of +apprehension' and is ascribed to the imagination. It must be carried +out as much in respect of the pure or _a priori_ elements of space and +time as in respect of the manifold of sensation, for individual spaces +and times contain a multiplicity which, to be apprehended, must be +combined.[18] The necessity of this act of synthesis is emphasized in +the second edition. "We cannot represent anything as combined in the +object without having previously combined it ourselves. Of all +representations, _combination_ is the only one which cannot be given +through objects,[19] but can be originated only by the subject itself +because it is an act of its own activity."[20] + + [17] Cf. A. 120, Mah. 211. + + [18] 'Combine' is used as the verb corresponding to + 'synthesis'. + + [19] I. e. given to us through the operation of things in + themselves upon our sensibility. + + [20] B. 130, M. 80. + +2. Since the data of perception are momentary, and pass away with +perception, the act of grasping them together requires that the mind +shall reproduce the past data in order to combine them with the +present datum. "It is plain that if I draw a line in thought, or wish +to think of the time from one midday to another, or even to represent +to myself a certain number, I must first necessarily grasp in thought +these manifold representations one after another. But if I were +continually to lose from my thoughts the preceding representations +(the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time or the units +successively represented), and were not to reproduce them, while I +proceeded to the succeeding parts, there could never arise a complete +representation, nor any of the thoughts just named, not even the first +and purest fundamental representations of space and time."[21] This +act of reproduction is called 'the synthesis of reproduction in the +imagination'.[22] + + [21] A. 102, Mah. 197. + + [22] The term 'synthesis' is undeserved, and is due to a + desire to find a verbal parallel to the 'synthesis of + apprehension in perception'. For the inappropriateness of + 'reproduction' and of 'imagination' see pp. 239-41. + +Further, the necessity of reproduction brings to light a +characteristic of the synthesis of apprehension. "It is indeed only an +empirical law, according to which representations which have often +followed or accompanied one another in the end become associated, and +so form a connexion, according to which, even in the absence of the +object, one of these representations produces a transition of the mind +to another by a fixed rule. But this law of reproduction presupposes +that phenomena themselves are actually subject to such a rule, and +that in the manifold of their representations there is a concomitance +or sequence, according to a fixed rule; for, without this, our +empirical imagination would never find anything to do suited to its +capacity, and would consequently remain hidden within the depths of +the mind as a dead faculty, unknown to ourselves. If cinnabar were now +red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a man were changed now into +this, now into that animal shape, if our fields were covered on the +longest day, now with fruit, now with ice and snow, then my empirical +faculty of imagination could not even get an opportunity of thinking +of the heavy cinnabar when there occurred the representation of red +colour; or if a certain name were given now to one thing, now to +another, or if the same thing were called now by one and now by +another name, without the control of some rule, to which the phenomena +themselves are already subject, no empirical synthesis of reproduction +could take place." + +"There must then be something which makes this very reproduction of +phenomena possible, by being the _a priori_ foundation of a necessary +synthetical unity of them. But we soon discover it, if we reflect that +phenomena are not things in themselves, but the mere play of our +representations, which in the end resolve themselves into +determinations of our internal sense. For if we can prove that even +our purest _a priori_ perceptions afford us no knowledge, except so +far as they contain such a combination of the manifold as renders +possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction, then this +synthesis of imagination is based, even before all experience, on _a +priori_ principles, and we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis +of the imagination which lies at the foundation of the very +possibility of all experience (as that which necessarily presupposes +the reproducibility of phenomena)."[23] + + [23] A. 100-2, Mah. 195-7. + +In other words, the faculty of reproduction, if it is to get to work, +presupposes that the elements of the manifold are parts of a +necessarily related whole; or, as Kant expresses it later, it +presupposes the _affinity_ of phenomena; and this affinity in turn +presupposes that the synthesis of apprehension by combining the +elements of the manifold on certain principles makes them parts of a +necessarily related whole.[24] + + [24] Cf. A. 113, Mah. 205; A. 121-2, Mah. 211-12; and Caird, + i. 362-3. For a fuller account of these presuppositions, and + for a criticism of them, cf. Ch. IX, p. 219 and ff. + +3. Kant introduces the third operation, which he calls 'the synthesis +of recognition in the conception',[25] as follows: + + [25] This title also is a misnomer due to the desire to give + parallel titles to the three operations involved in + knowledge. There is really only one synthesis referred to, + and the title here should be 'the recognition of the + synthesis in the conception'. + +"Without consciousness that what we are thinking is identical with +what we thought a moment ago, all reproduction in the series of +representations would be in vain. For what we are thinking would be a +new representation at the present moment, which did not at all belong +to the act by which it was bound to have been gradually produced, and +the manifold of the same would never constitute a whole, as lacking +the unity which only consciousness can give it. If in counting I +forget that the units which now hover before my mind have been +gradually added by me to one another, I should not know the generation +of the group through this successive addition of one to one, and +consequently I should not know the number, for this conception +consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis." + +"The word 'conception'[26] might itself lead us to this remark. For +it is this _one_ consciousness which unites the manifold gradually +perceived and then also reproduced into one representation. This +consciousness may often be only weak, so that we connect it with the +production of the representation only in the result but not in the act +itself, i. e. immediately; but nevertheless there must always be one +consciousness, although it lacks striking clearness, and without it +conceptions, and with them knowledge of objects, are wholly +impossible."[27] + + [26] _Begriff._ + + [27] A. 103-4, Mah. 197-8. + +Though the passage is obscure and confused, its general drift is +clear. Kant, having spoken hitherto only of the operation of the +imagination in apprehension and reproduction, now wishes to introduce +the understanding. He naturally returns to the thought of it as that +which recognizes a manifold as unified by a conception, the manifold, +however, being not a group of particulars unified through the +corresponding universal or conception, but the parts of an individual +image, e. g. the parts of a line or the constituent units of a number, +and the conception which unifies it being the principle on which these +parts are combined.[28] His main point is that it is not enough for +knowledge that we should combine the manifold of sense into a whole in +accordance with a specific principle,[29] but we must also be in some +degree conscious of our continuously identical act of combination,[30] +this consciousness being at the same time a consciousness of the +special unity of the manifold. For the conception which forms the +principle of the combination has necessarily two sides; while from our +point of view it is the principle according to which we combine and +which makes our combining activity one, from the point of view of the +manifold it is the special principle[31] by which the manifold is made +_one_. If I am to count a group of five units, I must not only add +them, but also be conscious of my continuously identical act of +addition, this consciousness consisting in the consciousness that I am +successively taking units up to, and only up to, five, and being at +the same time a consciousness that the units are acquiring the unity +of being a group of five. It immediately follows, though Kant does not +explicitly say so, that all knowledge implies self-consciousness. For +the consciousness that we have been combining the manifold on a +certain definite principle is the consciousness of our identity +throughout the process, and, from the side of the manifold, it is just +that consciousness of the manifold as unified by being brought under a +conception which constitutes knowledge. Even though it is Kant's view +that the self-consciousness need only be weak and need only arise +after the act of combination, when we are aware of its result, still, +without it, there will be no consciousness of the manifold as unified +through a conception and therefore no knowledge. Moreover, if the +self-consciousness be weak, the knowledge will be weak also, so that +if it be urged that knowledge in the strictest sense requires the full +consciousness that the manifold is unified through a conception, it +must be allowed that knowledge in this sense requires a full or clear +self-consciousness. + + [28] Cf. pp. 162-9. + + [29] That the combination proceeds on a specific principle + only emerges in this account of the third operation. + + [30] Kant's example shows that this consciousness is not the + mere consciousness of the act of combination as throughout + identical, but the consciousness of it as an identical act of + a particular kind. + + [31] When Kant says 'this conception [i. e. the conception + of the number counted] consists in the consciousness of this + unity of the synthesis', he is momentarily and contrary to + his usual practice speaking of a conception in the sense + of the activity of conceiving a universal, and not in the + sense of the universal conceived. Similarly in appealing to + the meaning of _Begriff_ (conception) he is thinking of + 'conceiving' as the activity of combining a manifold through + a conception. + +As is to be expected, however, the passage involves a difficulty +concerning the respective functions of the imagination and the +understanding. Is the understanding represented as only recognizing a +principle of unity introduced into the manifold by the imagination, or +as also for the first time introducing a principle of unity? At first +sight the latter alternative may seem the right interpretation. For he +says that unless we were conscious that what we are thinking is +identical with what we thought a moment ago, 'what we are thinking +would _be_ a new representation which _did not at all belong_ to the +act by which it was bound to have been gradually produced, and the +manifold of the same _would never_ constitute a whole, as lacking the +unity which only _consciousness can give it_.'[32] Again, in speaking +of a conception--which of course implies the understanding--he +says that 'it is this one consciousness which _unites_ the +manifold gradually perceived and then reproduced into _one_ +representation'.[33] But these statements are not decisive, for he +uses the term 'recognition' in his formula for the work of the +understanding, and he illustrates its work by pointing out that in +counting we must _remember_ that we have added the units. Moreover, +there is a consideration which by itself makes it necessary to accept +the former interpretation. The passage certainly represents the +understanding as recognizing the identical action of the mind in +combining the manifold on a principle, whether or not it also +represents the understanding as the source of this activity. But if +it were the understanding which combined the manifold, there would +be no synthesis which the imagination could be supposed to have +performed,[34] and therefore it could play no part in knowledge at +all, a consequence which must be contrary to Kant's meaning. Further +if, as the general tenor of the deduction shows, the imagination is +really only the understanding working unreflectively,[35] we are able +to understand why Kant should for the moment cease to distinguish +between the imagination and the understanding, and consequently should +use language which implies that the understanding both combines the +manifold on a principle and makes us conscious of our activity in so +doing. Hence we may say that the real meaning of the passage should +be stated thus: 'Knowledge requires one consciousness which, +as imagination, combines the manifold on a definite principle +constituted by a conception,[36] and, as understanding, is to some +extent conscious of its identical activity in so doing, this +self-consciousness being, from the side of the whole produced by the +synthesis, the consciousness of the conception by which the manifold +is unified.' + + [32] The italics are mine. He does not say '_we should not be + conscious_ of what we are thinking as the same representation + and as belonging [Greek: ktl]., _and we should not be + conscious_ of the manifold as constituting a whole. + + [33] The italics are mine. + + [34] There could not, of course, be two syntheses, the one + being and the other not being upon a principle. + + [35] Cf. pp. 168-9. + + [36] In view of Kant's subsequent account of the function of + the categories it should be noticed that, according to the + present passage, the conception involved in an act of + knowledge is the conception not of an 'object in general', + but of 'an object of the particular kind which constitutes + the individual whole produced by the combination a whole of + the particular kind that it is of', and that, in accordance + with this, the self-consciousness involved is not the mere + consciousness that our combining activity is identical + throughout, but the consciousness that it is an identical + activity of a particular kind, e. g. that of counting five + units. Cf. pp. 184 fin.-186, 190-2, and 206-7. + +Hitherto there has been no mention of an _object_ of knowledge, and +since knowledge is essentially knowledge of an object, Kant's next +task is to give such an account of an object of knowledge as will show +that the processes already described are precisely those which give +our representations, i. e. the manifold of sense, relation to an +object, and consequently yield knowledge. + +He begins by raising the question, 'What do we mean by the phrase 'an +object of representations'?'[37] He points out that a phenomenon, since +it is a mere sensuous representation, and not a thing in itself +existing independently of the faculty of representations, is just not +an object. To the question, therefore, 'What is meant by an object +corresponding to knowledge and therefore distinct from it?' we are +bound to answer from the point of view of the distinction between +phenomena and things in themselves, that the object is something in +general = _x_, i. e. the thing in itself of which we know only +_that_ it is and not _what_ it is. There is, however, another point +of view from which we can say something more about an object of +representations and the correspondence of our representations to it, +viz. that from which we consider what is involved in the thought of +the relation of knowledge or of a representation to its object. "We +find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object +carries with it something of necessity, since its object is regarded +as that which prevents our cognitions[38] being determined at random +or capriciously, and causes them to be determined _a priori_ in a +certain way, because in that they are to relate to an object, they +must necessarily also, in relation to it, agree with one another, that +is to say, they must have that unity which constitutes the conception +of an object."[39] + + [37] _Vorstellung_ in the present passage is perhaps better + rendered 'idea', but representation has been retained for the + sake of uniformity. + + [38] _Erkenntnisse._ + + [39] A. 104, Mah. 199. + +Kant's meaning seems to be this: 'If we think of certain +representations, e. g. certain lines[40] or the representations of +extension, impenetrability, and shape,[41] as related to an object, +e. g. to an individual triangle or an individual body, we think that +they must be mutually consistent or, in other words, that they must +have the unity of being parts of a necessarily related whole or +system, this unity in fact constituting the conception of an object +in general, in distinction from the conception of an object of a +particular kind. The latter thought in turn involves the thought of +the object of representations as that which prevents them being +anything whatever and in fact makes them parts of a system. The +thought therefore of representations as related to an object carries +with it the thought of a certain necessity, viz. the necessary or +systematic unity introduced into the representations by the object. +Hence by an object of representations we mean something which +introduces into the representations a systematic unity which +constitutes the nature of an object in general, and the relatedness of +representations to, or their correspondence with, an object involves +their systematic unity.'[42] + + [40] Cf. A. 105, Mah. 199. + + [41] Cf. A. 106, Mah. 200. + + [42] It may be noticed that possession of the unity of a + system does not really distinguish 'an object' from any other + whole of parts, nor in particular from 'a representation'. + Any whole of parts must be a systematic unity. + +Certain points, however, should be noticed. In the _first_ place, Kant +is for the moment tacitly ignoring his own theory of knowledge, in +accordance with which the object proper, i. e. the thing in itself, is +unknowable, and is reverting to the ordinary conception of knowledge +as really _knowledge_ of its object. For the elements which are said, +in virtue of being related to an object, to agree and to have the +unity which constitutes the conception of an object must be elements +of an object which we know; for if the assertion that they agree is +to be significant, they must be determinate parts or qualities of the +object, e. g. the sides of an individual triangle or the +impenetrability or shape of an individual body, and therefore it is +implied that we know that the object has these parts or qualities. In +the _second_ place, both the problem which Kant raises and the clue +which he offers for its solution involve an impossible separation of +knowledge or a representation from its object. Kant begins with the +thought of a phenomenon as a mere representation which, as mental, and +as the representation of an object, is just not an object, and asks, +'What is meant by the object of it?' He finds the clue to the answer +in the thought that though a representation or idea when considered in +itself is a mere mental modification, yet, when considered as related +to an object, it is subject to a certain necessity. In fact, however, +an idea or knowledge is essentially an idea or knowledge of an object, +and we are bound to think of it as such. There is no meaning whatever +in saying that the thought of an idea as related to an object carries +with it something of necessity, for to say so implies that it is +possible to think of it as unrelated to an object. Similarly there is +really no meaning in the question, 'What is meant by an object +corresponding to knowledge or to an idea?' for this in the same way +implies that we can first think of an idea as unrelated to an object +and then ask, 'What can be meant by an object corresponding to +it?'[43] In the _third_ place, Kant only escapes the absurdity +involved in the thought of a mere idea or a mere representation +by treating representations either as parts or as qualities of an +object. For although he speaks of our cognitions,[44] i. e. of our +representations, as being determined by the object, he says that they +must agree, i. e. they must have that unity which constitutes the +conception of an object, and he illustrates representations by the +sides of an individual triangle and the impenetrability and shape of +an individual body, which are just as 'objective' as the objects to +which they relate. The fact is that he really treats a representation +not as his problem requires that it should be treated, i. e. as a +representation of something, but as something represented,[45] i. e. +as something of which we are aware, viz. a part or a quality of an +object. In the _fourth_ place, not only is that which Kant speaks of +as related to an object really not a representation, but also--as we +see if we consider the fact which Kant has in mind--that to which he +speaks of it as related is really not _an_ object but _one and the +same object to which another so-called representation is related_. For +what Kant says is that representations as related to an object must +agree among themselves. But this statement, to be significant, implies +that the object to which various representations are related is _one +and the same_. Otherwise why should the representations agree? In +view, therefore, of these last two considerations we must admit that +the real thought underlying Kant's statement should be expressed thus: +'We find that the thought that _two or more parts or qualities of an +object_ relate to _one and the same object_ carries with it a certain +necessity, since this object is considered to be that which _prevents +these parts or qualities which we know it to possess_ from being +determined at random, because by being related to _one and the same +object_, they must agree among themselves.' The importance of the +correction lies in the fact that what Kant is stating is not what he +thinks he is stating. He is really stating the implication of the +thought that two or more qualities or parts of some object or other, +which, as such, already relate to an object, relate to one and the +same object. He thinks he is stating the implication of the thought +that a representation which in itself has no relation to an object, +has relation to an object. And since his problem is simply to +determine what constitutes the relatedness to an object of that which +in itself is a mere representation, the distinction is important; for +it shows that he really elucidates it by an implication respecting +something which already has relation to an object and is not a mental +modification at all, but a quality or a part of an object. + + [43] Cf. pp. 230-3. + + [44] _Erkenntnisse._ + + [45] _Vorgestellt._ + +Kant continues thus: "But it is clear that, since we have to do only +with the manifold of our representations, and the _x_, which +corresponds to them (the object), since it is to be something distinct +from all our representations, is for us nothing, the unity which the +object necessitates can be nothing else than the formal unity of +consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations." +[I. e. since the object which produces systematic unity in our +representations is after all only the unknown thing in itself, viz. +_x_,[46] any of the parts or qualities of which it is impossible to +know, that to which it gives unity can be only our representations +and not its own parts or qualities. For, since we do not know any +of its parts or qualities, these representations cannot be its +parts or qualities. Consequently, the unity produced by this _x_ +can only be the formal unity of the combination of the manifold in +consciousness.[47]] "Then and then only do we say that we know the +object," [i. e. we know that the manifold relates to an object[48]] +"if we have produced synthetical unity in the manifold of perception. +But this unity would be impossible, if the perception could not be +produced by means of such a function of synthesis according to a rule +as renders the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary, and a +conception in which the manifold unifies itself possible. Thus we +think a triangle as an object, in that we are conscious of the +combination of three straight lines in accordance with a rule by which +such a perception can at any time be presented. This _unity of the +rule_ determines all the manifold and limits it to conditions which +make the unity of apperception possible, and the conception of this +unity is the representation of the object=_x_, which I think through +the aforesaid predicates of a triangle." [I. e., apparently, 'to +conceive this unity of the rule is to represent to myself the object +_x_, i. e. the thing in itself,[49] of which I come to think by means +of the rule of combination.'] + + [46] Cf. p. 183, note 2. + + [47] 'The formal unity' means not the unity peculiar to any + particular synthesis, but the character shared by all + syntheses of being a systematic whole. + + [48] The final sense is the same whether 'object' be here + understood to refer to the thing in itself or to a + phenomenon. + + [49] A comparison of this passage (A. 104-5, Mah. 198-9) with + A. 108-9, Mah. 201-2 (which seems to reproduce A. 104-5, Mah. + 198-9), B. 522-3, M. 309 and A. 250, Mah. 224, seems to + render it absolutely necessary to understand by _x_, and by + the transcendental object, the thing in itself. Cf. also B. + 236, M. 143 ('so soon as I raise my conception of an object + to the transcendental meaning thereof, the house is not a + thing in itself but only a phenomenon, i. e. a representation + of which the transcendental object is unknown'), A. 372, Mah. + 247 and A. 379, Mah. 253. + +In this passage several points claim attention. In the _first_ place, +it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that in the second +sentence the argument is exactly reversed. Up to this point, it is +the thing in itself which produces unity in our representations. +Henceforward it is we who produce the unity by our activity of +combining the manifold. The discrepancy cannot be explained away, and +its existence can only be accounted for by the exigencies of Kant's +position. When he is asking 'What is meant by the object (beyond the +mind) corresponding to our representations?' he has to think of the +unity of the representations as due to the object. But when he is +asking 'How does the manifold of sense become unified?' his view that +all synthesis is due to the mind compels him to hold that the unity is +produced by us. In the _second_ place, the passage introduces a second +object in addition to the thing in itself, viz. the phenomenal object, +e. g. a triangle considered as a whole of parts unified on a definite +principle.[50] It is this object which, as the object that we know, is +henceforward prominent in the first edition, and has exclusive +attention in the second. The connexion between this object and the +thing in itself appears to lie in the consideration that we are only +justified in holding that the manifold of sense is related to a thing +in itself when we have unified it and therefore know it to be a unity, +and that to know it to be a unity is _ipso facto_ to be aware of it as +related to a phenomenal object; in other words, the knowledge that the +manifold is related to an object beyond consciousness is acquired +through our knowledge of its relatedness to an object within +consciousness. In the _third_ place, in view of Kant's forthcoming +vindication of the categories, it is important to notice that the +process by which the manifold is said to acquire relation to an +object is illustrated by a synthesis on a particular principle which +constitutes the phenomenal object an object of a particular kind. The +synthesis which enables us to recognize three lines as an object is +not a synthesis based on general principles constituted by the +categories, but a synthesis based on the particular principle that the +three lines must be so put together as to form an enclosed space. +Moreover, it should be noticed that the need of a particular principle +is really inconsistent with his view that relation to an object gives +the manifold the systematic unity which constitutes the conception of +an object, or that at least a [Greek: hysteron proteron] is involved. +For if the knowledge that certain representations form a systematic +unity justifies our holding that they relate to an object, it would +seem that in order to know that they relate to an object we need not +know the special character of their unity. Yet, as Kant states the +facts, we really have to know the special character of their unity in +order to know that they possess systematic unity in general.[51] +_Lastly_, it is easy to see the connexion of this account of an object +of representations with the preceding account of the synthesis +involved in knowledge. Kant had said that knowledge requires a +synthesis of the imagination in accordance with a definite principle, +and the recognition of the principle of the synthesis by the +understanding. From this point of view it is clear that the aim of the +present passage is to show that this process yields knowledge of an +object; for it shows that this process yields knowledge of a +phenomenal object of a particular kind, e. g. of a triangle or of a +body, and that this object as such refers to what after all is _the_ +object, viz. the thing in itself. + + [50] Compare 'The object of our perceptions is merely that + something of which the conception expresses such a necessity + of synthesis' (A. 106, Mah. 200), and 'An object is that in + the conception of which the manifold of a given perception is + united' (B. 137, M. 84). Cf. also A. 108, Mah. 201. + + [51] Kant's position is no doubt explained by the fact that + since the object corresponding to our representations is the + thing in itself, and since we only know that this is of the + same kind in the case of every representation, it can only be + thought of as producing systematic unity, and not a unity of + a particular kind. The position is also in part due to the + fact that the principles of synthesis involved by the + phenomenal object are usually thought of by Kant as the + categories; these of course can only contribute a general + kind of unity, and not the special kind of unity belonging to + an individual object. + +The position reached by Kant so far is this. Knowledge, as being +knowledge of an object, consists in a process by which the manifold of +perception acquires relation to an object. This process again is a +process of combination of the manifold into a systematic whole upon a +definite principle, accompanied by the consciousness in some degree of +the act of combination, and therefore also of the acquisition by the +manifold of the definite unity which forms the principle of +combination. In virtue of this process there is said to be 'unity of +consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold', a phrase which the +context justifies us in understanding as a condensed expression for a +situation in which (1) the manifold of sense is a unity of necessarily +related parts, (2) there is _consciousness_ of this unity, and (3) the +consciousness which combines and is conscious of combining the +manifold, as being necessarily one and the same throughout this +process, is itself a unity. + +Kant then proceeds to introduce what he evidently considers the +keystone of his system, viz. 'transcendental apperception.' + +"There is always a transcendental condition at the basis of any +necessity. Hence we must be able to find a transcendental ground of +the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our +perceptions, and therefore also of the conceptions of objects in +general, consequently also of all objects of experience, a ground +without which it would be impossible to think any object for our +perceptions; for this object is no more than that something, the +conception of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis." + +"Now this original and transcendental condition is no other than +_transcendental apperception_. The consciousness of self according to +the determinations of our state in internal sense-perception is merely +empirical, always changeable; there can be no fixed or permanent self +in this stream of internal phenomena, and this consciousness is +usually called _internal sense_ or _empirical apperception_. That +which is _necessarily_ to be represented as numerically identical +cannot be thought as such by means of empirical data. The condition +which is to make such a transcendental presupposition valid must be +one which precedes all experience, and makes experience itself +possible." + +"Now no cognitions[52] can occur in us, no combination and unity of +them with one another, without that unity of consciousness which +precedes all data of perception, and by relation to which alone all +representation of objects is possible. This pure original unchangeable +consciousness I shall call _transcendental apperception_. That it +deserves this name is clear from the fact that even the purest +objective unity, viz. that of _a priori_ conceptions (space and time) +is only possible by relation of perceptions to it. The numerical unity +of this apperception therefore forms the _a priori_ foundation of all +conceptions, just as the multiplicity of space and time is the +foundation of the perceptions of the sensibility."[53] + + [52] _Erkenntnisse._ + + [53] A. 106-7, Mah. 200-1. + +The argument is clearly meant to be 'transcendental' in character; in +other words, Kant continues to argue from the existence of knowledge +to the existence of its presuppositions. We should therefore expect +the passage to do two things: firstly, to show what it is which is +presupposed by the 'unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the +manifold'[54]; and secondly, to show that this presupposition deserves +the title 'transcendental apperception'. Unfortunately Kant introduces +'transcendental apperception' after the manner in which he introduced +the 'sensibility', the 'imagination' and the 'understanding', as if it +were a term with which every one is familiar, and which therefore +needs little explanation. To interpret the passage, it seems necessary +to take it in close connexion with the preceding account of the three +'syntheses' involved in knowledge, and to bear in mind that, as a +comparison of passages will show, the term 'apperception', which Kant +borrows from Leibniz, always has for Kant a reference to consciousness +of self or self-consciousness. If this be done, the meaning of the +passage seems to be as follows: + + [54] We should have expected this to have been already + accomplished. For according to the account already + considered, it is we who by our imagination introduce + necessity into the synthesis of the manifold and by our + understanding become conscious of it. We shall therefore not + be surprised to find that 'transcendental apperception' is + really only ourselves as exercising imagination and + understanding in a new guise. + +'To vindicate the existence of a self which is necessarily one and the +same throughout its representations, and which is capable of being +aware of its own identity throughout, it is useless to appeal to that +consciousness of ourselves which we have when we reflect upon our +successive states. For, although in being conscious of our states we +are conscious of ourselves we are not conscious of ourselves as +unchanging. The self as going through successive states is changing, +and even if in fact its states did not change, its identity would be +only contingent; it need not continue unchanged. Consequently, the +only course possible is to show that the self-consciousness in +question is presupposed in any experience or knowledge. Now it is so +presupposed. For, as we have already shown, the relation of +representations to an object presupposes one consciousness which +combines and unifies them, and is at the same time conscious of the +identity of its own action in unifying them. This consciousness is the +ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold. +It may fairly be called transcendental, because even a conception +which relates to space or time, and therefore is the most remote from +sensation, presupposes one consciousness which combines and unifies +the manifold of space and time through the conception, and is +conscious of the identity of its own action in so doing. It may, +therefore, be regarded as the presupposition of _all_ conceiving or +bringing a manifold under a conception, and therefore of all +knowledge. Consequently, since knowledge is possible, i. e. since the +manifold of representations can be related to an object, there must be +one self capable of being aware of its own identity throughout its +representations.' + +At this point of Kant's argument, however, there seems to occur an +inversion of the thought. Hitherto, Kant has been arguing from the +possibility of knowledge to the possibility of the consciousness of +our own identity. But in the next paragraph he appears to reverse this +procedure and to argue from the possibility of self-consciousness to +the possibility of knowledge. + +"But it is just this transcendental unity of apperception[55] which +forms, from all possible phenomena which can be together in one +experience, a connexion of them according to laws. For this unity of +consciousness would be impossible, if the mind in the knowledge of the +manifold could not become conscious of the identity of the function +whereby it unites the manifold synthetically in one knowledge. +Consequently, the original and necessary consciousness of the identity +of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary +unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to conceptions, +i. e. according to rules which not only make them necessarily +reproducible, but thereby determine an object for their perception, +i. e. determine the conception of something in which they are +necessarily connected. For the mind could not possibly think the +identity of itself in the manifold of its representations, and this +indeed _a priori_, if it had not before its eyes the identity of its +action which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is +empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible its +connexion according to rules." + + [55] Kant seems here and elsewhere to use the phrase + 'transcendental unity of apperception' as synonymous with + 'transcendental apperception', the reason, presumably, being + that transcendental apperception is a unity. + +The argument seems indisputably to be as follows: 'The mind is +necessarily able to be aware of its own identity throughout its +manifold representations. To be aware of this, it must be aware of the +identity of the activity by which it combines the manifold of +representations into a systematic whole. Therefore it must be capable +of combining, and of being conscious of its activity in combining, all +phenomena which can be its representations into such a whole. But +this process, from the point of view of the representations combined, +is the process by which they become related to an object and so enter +into knowledge. Therefore, since we are capable of being conscious of +our identity with respect to all phenomena which can be our +representations, the process of combination and consciousness of +combination which constitutes knowledge must be possible with respect +to them.' Thus the thought of this and the preceding paragraph seems +to involve a circle. First the possibility of self-consciousness is +deduced from the possibility of knowledge, and then the possibility of +knowledge is deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness. + +An issue therefore arises, the importance of which can be seen by +reference to the final aim of the 'deduction', viz. the vindication of +the categories. The categories are 'fundamental conceptions which +enable us to think objects in general[56] for phenomena'[57]; in other +words, they are the principles of the synthesis by which the manifold +of sense becomes related to an object. Hence, if this be granted, the +proof that the categories are applicable to objects consists in +showing that the manifold can be subjected to this synthesis. The +question therefore arises whether Kant's real starting-point for +establishing the possibility of this synthesis and therefore the +applicability of the categories, is to be found in the possibility +of knowledge, or in the possibility of self-consciousness, or in +both. In other words, does Kant start from the position that all +representations must be capable of being related to an object, or +from the position that we must be capable of being conscious of our +identity with respect to all of them, or from both? + + [56] _Objecte überhaupt_, i. e. objects of any kind in + distinction not from objects of a particular kind but from no + objects at all. + + [57] A. 111, Mah. 204 + +Prima facie the second position is the more plausible basis for the +desired conclusion. On the one hand, it does not seem obvious that the +manifold _must_ be capable of being related to an object; for even if +it be urged that otherwise we should have only 'a random play of +representations, less than a dream'[58], it may be replied, that this +might be or might come to be the case. On the other hand, the fact +that our representations are ours necessarily seems to presuppose that +we are identical subjects of these representations, and recognition of +this fact is the consciousness of our identity. + + [58] A. 112, Mah. 204. + +If we turn to the text for an answer to this question, we find that +Kant seems not only to use both starting-points, but even to regard +them as equivalents. Thus in introducing the categories[59] Kant +begins by appealing to the necessity for knowledge that +representations should relate to an object. + + [59] A. 110-12, Mah. 203-4. + +"Unity of synthesis according to empirical conceptions would be purely +contingent, and were these not based on a transcendental ground of +unity, it would be possible for a confused crowd of phenomena to fill +our soul, without the possibility of experience ever arising +therefrom. But then also all relation of knowledge to objects would +fall away, because knowledge would lack connexion according to +universal and necessary laws; it would be thoughtless perception but +never knowledge, and therefore for us as good as nothing." + +"The _a priori_ conditions of any possible experience whatever are at +the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of +experience. Now I assert that the above mentioned _categories_ are +nothing but _the conditions of thinking in any possible experience_, +just as _space and time_ are the _conditions of perception_ requisite +for the same. The former therefore are also fundamental conceptions by +which we think objects in general for phenomena, and are therefore +objectively valid _a priori_--which is exactly what we wished to +know." + +The next sentence, however, bases the necessity of the categories on +the possibility of self-consciousness, without giving any indication +that a change of standpoint is involved. + +"But the possibility, nay, even the necessity, of these categories +rests on the relation which the whole sensibility, and with it also +all possible phenomena, have to original apperception, a relation +which forces everything to conform to the conditions of the +thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, i. e. to stand under +universal functions of synthesis, i. e. of synthesis according to +conceptions, as that wherein alone apperception can prove _a priori_ +its thorough-going and necessary identity." + +Finally, the conclusion of the paragraph seems definitely to treat +both starting-points as really the same.[60] "Thus the conception of a +cause is nothing but a synthesis (of the consequent in the time series +with other phenomena) _according to conceptions_; and without such a +unity, which has its _a priori_ rule and subjects phenomena to itself, +thorough-going and universal and therefore necessary unity of +consciousness in the manifold of sense-perceptions would not be met +with. But then also these perceptions would belong to no experience, +consequently they would have no object, and would be nothing but a +blind play of representations, less than a dream." + + [60] Cf. A. 113, Mah. 205-6 and A. 108-10, Mah. 202-3. + +The fact is that since for Kant the synthesis of representations in +accordance with the categories, accompanied by the consciousness of +it, is at once the necessary and sufficient condition of the +relatedness of representations to an object and of the consciousness +of our identity with respect to them, it seems to him to be one and +the same thing whether, in vindicating the synthesis, we appeal to the +possibility of knowledge or to the possibility of self-consciousness, +and it even seems possible to argue, _via_ the synthesis, from +knowledge to self-consciousness and vice versa. + +Nevertheless, it remains true that the vindication of the categories +is different, according as it is based upon the possibility of +relating representations to an object or upon the possibility of +becoming self-conscious with respect to them. It also remains true +that Kant vindicates the categories in both ways. For while, in +expounding the three so-called syntheses involved in knowledge, he is +vindicating the categories from the point of view of knowledge, when +he comes to speak of transcendental apperception, of which the central +characteristic is the consciousness of self involved, there is a +shifting of the centre of gravity. Instead of treating representations +as something which can become related to an object, he now treats +them as something of which, as belonging to a self, the self must +be capable of being conscious as its own, and argues that a +synthesis in accordance with the categories is required for this +self-consciousness. It must be admitted then--and the admission is +only to be made with reluctance--that when Kant reaches transcendental +apperception, he really adopts a new starting-point,[61] and that the +passage which introduces transcendental apperception by showing it to +be implied in knowledge[62] only serves to conceal from Kant the fact +that, from the point of view of the deduction of the categories, he is +really assuming without proof the possibility of self-consciousness +with respect to all our representations, as a new basis for argument. + + [61] The existence of this new starting-point is more + explicit, A. 116-7 (and note), Mah. 208 (and note), and A. + 122, Mah. 212. + + [62] A. 107, Mah. 200. + +The approach to the categories from the side of self-consciousness is, +however, more prominent in the second edition, and consequently we +naturally turn to it for more light on this side of Kant's position. +There Kant vindicates the necessity of the synthesis from the side of +self-consciousness as follows:[63] + + [63] The main clauses have been numbered for convenience of + reference. + +"[1.] It must be possible that the 'I think' should accompany all my +representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me +which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would +be either impossible or at least for me nothing. [2.] That +representation which can be given before all thought is called +_perception_. All the manifold of perception has therefore a necessary +relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold +is found. [3.] But this representation[64] [i. e. the 'I think'] is an +act of _spontaneity_, i. e. it cannot be regarded as belonging to +sensibility. I call it _pure apperception_, to distinguish it from +_empirical apperception_, or _original apperception_ also, because it +is that self-consciousness which, while it gives birth to the +representation 'I think', which must be capable of accompanying all +others and is one and the same in all consciousness, cannot itself be +accompanied by any other.[65] [4.] I also call the unity of it the +_transcendental_ unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the +possibility of _a priori_ knowledge arising from it. For the manifold +representations which are given in a perception would not all of them +be _my_ representations, if they did not all belong to one +self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even though I am +not conscious of them as such), they must necessarily conform to the +condition under which alone they _can_ stand together in a universal +self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all belong to me. +From this original connexion much can be concluded." + + [64] This is an indisputable case of the use of + representation in the sense of something represented or + presented. + + [65] I. e. consciousness of our identity is final; we cannot, + for instance, go further back to a consciousness of the + consciousness of our identity. + +[5.] "That is to say, this thorough-going identity of the apperception +of a manifold given in perception contains a synthesis of +representations,[66] and is possible only through the consciousness of +this synthesis.[67] [6.] For the empirical consciousness which +accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary, and +without relation to the identity of the subject. [7.] This relation, +therefore, takes place not by my merely accompanying every +representation with consciousness, but by my _adding_ one +representation to another, and being conscious of the synthesis of +them. [8.] Consequently, only because I can connect a manifold of +given representations _in one consciousness_, is it possible for me to +represent to myself the _identity of consciousness in these +representations_; i. e. the _analytical_ unity of apperception is +possible only under the presupposition of a _synthetical_ unity. [9.] +The thought, 'These representations given in perception belong all of +them to me' is accordingly just the same as, 'I unite them in one +self-consciousness, or at least can so unite them;' [10.] and although +this thought is not itself as yet the consciousness of the _synthesis_ +of representations, it nevertheless presupposes the possibility of +this synthesis; that is to say, it is only because I can comprehend +the manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I call them +all _my_ representations; for otherwise I should have as many-coloured +and varied a self as I have representations of which I am conscious. +[11.] Synthetical unity of the manifold of perceptions, as given _a +priori_, is therefore the ground of the identity of apperception +itself, which precedes _a priori_ all _my_ determinate thinking. [12.] +But connexion does not lie in the objects, nor can it be borrowed from +them through perception and thereby first taken up into the +understanding, but it is always an operation of the understanding +which itself is nothing more than the faculty of connecting _a +priori_, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under +the unity of apperception, which principle is the highest in all human +knowledge." + + [66] I understand this to mean 'This through and through + identical consciousness of myself as the identical subject of + a manifold given in perception involves a synthesis of + representations'. + + [67] The drift of the passage as a whole (cf. especially + § 16) seems to show that here 'the synthesis of + representations' means 'their connectedness' and not + 'the act of connecting them'. + +[13.] "Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is +indeed an identical, and therefore an analytical, proposition, but +nevertheless it declares a synthesis of the manifold given in a +perception to be necessary, without which the thorough-going identity +of self-consciousness cannot be thought. [14.] For through the Ego, as +a simple representation, is given no manifold content; in perception, +which is different from it, a manifold can only be given, and through +_connexion_ in one consciousness it can be thought. An understanding, +through whose self-consciousness all the manifold would _eo ipso_ be +given, would _perceive_; our understanding can only _think_ and must +seek its perception in the senses. [15.] I am, therefore, conscious of +the identical self, in relation to the manifold of representations +given to me in a perception, because I call all those representations +_mine_, which constitute _one_. [16.] But this is the same as to say +that I am conscious _a priori_ of a necessary synthesis of them, which +is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which +all representations given to me stand, but also under which they must +be brought through a synthesis."[68] + + [68] B. 131-5, M. 81-4. + +Though this passage involves many difficulties, the main drift of it +is clear. Kant is anxious to establish the fact that the manifold of +sense must be capable of being combined on principles, which +afterwards turn out to be the categories, by showing this to be +involved in the fact that we must be capable of being conscious of +ourselves as the identical subject of all our representations. To do +this, he seeks to prove in the first paragraph that self-consciousness +in this sense must be possible, and in the second that this +self-consciousness presupposes the synthesis of the manifold. + +Examination of the argument, however, shows that the view that +self-consciousness must be possible is, so far as Kant is +concerned,[69] an assumption for which Kant succeeds in giving no +reason at all, and that even if it be true, it cannot form a basis +from which to deduce the possibility of the synthesis. + + [69] Cf. p. 204, note 3. + +Before, however, we attempt to prove this, it is necessary to draw +attention to three features of the argument. In the _first_ place, it +implies a somewhat different account of self-consciousness to that +implied in the passages of the first edition which we have already +considered. Self-consciousness, instead of being the consciousness of +the identity of our activity in combining the manifold, is now +primarily the consciousness of ourselves as identical subjects of all +our representations, i. e. it is what Kant calls the analytical unity +of apperception; and consequently it is somewhat differently related +to the activity of synthesis involved in knowledge. Instead of being +regarded as the consciousness of this activity, it is regarded as +presupposing the consciousness of the product of this activity, i. e. +of the connectedness[70] of the manifold produced by the activity, +this consciousness being what Kant calls the synthetical unity of +apperception.[71] In the _second_ place, it is plain that Kant's view +is not that self-consciousness involves the consciousness of our +representations as a connected whole, but that it involves the +consciousness of them as capable of being connected by a synthesis. +Yet, if it is only because I can connect (and therefore apprehend as +connected) a manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I +can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these +representations, self-consciousness really requires the consciousness +of our representations as _already_ connected; the mere consciousness +of our representations as _capable_ of being connected would not be +enough. The explanation of the inconsistency seems to lie in the fact +that the synthetic unity of which Kant is thinking is the unity +of nature. For, as Kant of course was aware, in our ordinary +consciousness we do not apprehend the interconnexion of the parts +of nature in detail, but only believe that there is such an +interconnexion; consequently he naturally weakened the conclusion +which he ought to have drawn, viz. that self-consciousness presupposes +consciousness of the synthesis, in order to make it conform to the +facts of our ordinary consciousness. Yet, if his _argument_ is +to be defended, its conclusion must be taken in the form that +self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of the actual synthesis +or connexion and not merely of the possibility of it. In the _third_ +place, Kant twice in this passage[72] definitely makes the act of +synthesis, which his argument maintains to be the condition of +_consciousness of the identity_ of ourselves, the condition of the +_identity_ of ourselves. The fact is that, on Kant's view, the act of +synthesis of the representations is really a condition of their +belonging to one self, the self being presupposed to be a self capable +of self-consciousness.[73] + + [70] More accurately, 'of the possibility of the + connectedness'. + + [71] The same view seems implied A. 117-8, Mah. 208. Kant + apparently thinks of this consciousness as also a + self-consciousness (cf. § 9), though it seems that he should + have considered it rather as a condition of + self-consciousness, cf. p. 204, note 2. + + [72] Sections 6 and 10. + + [73] Cf. pp. 202-3. + +We may now turn to the first of the two main points to be considered, +viz. the reason given by Kant for holding that self-consciousness must +be possible. In the first paragraph (§§ 1-4) Kant appears twice to +state a reason, viz. in §§ 1 and 4. What is meant by the first +sentence, "It must be possible that the 'I think' should accompany all +my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me +which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would +either be impossible or at least for me nothing"? It is difficult to +hold that 'my representations' here means objects of which I am aware, +and that the thesis to be established is that I must be capable of +being conscious of my own identity throughout all awareness or thought +of objects. For the next sentence refers to perceptions as +representations which can be given previously to all thought, and +therefore, presumably, as something of which I am not necessarily +aware. Again, the ground adduced for the thesis would be in part a +mere restatement of it, and in part nonsense. It would be 'otherwise +something would be apprehended with respect to which I could not be +aware that I was apprehending it; in other words, I could not +apprehend it [since otherwise I could be aware that I was apprehending +it]', the last words being incapable of any interpretation. It is much +more probable that though Kant is leading up to self-consciousness, +the phrase 'I think' here refers not to 'consciousness that I am +thinking', but to 'thinking'. He seems to mean 'It must be possible to +apprehend all my 'affections' (i. e. sensations or appearances in me), +for otherwise I should have an affection of which I could not be +aware; in other words, there could be no such affection, or at least +it would be of no possible importance to me.'[74] And on this +interpretation self-consciousness is not introduced till § 3, and +then only surreptitiously. On neither interpretation, however, does +Kant give the vestige of a _reason_ for the possibility of +self-consciousness. Again, it seems clear that in § 4 'my +representations', and 'representations which belong to me' mean +objects of which I am aware (i. e. something presented); for he says +of my representations, not that I may not be conscious of them--which +he should have said if 'my representations' meant my mental affections +of which I could become conscious--but that I may not be conscious of +them as my representations. Consequently in § 4 he is merely asserting +that I must be able to be conscious of my identity throughout my +awareness of objects. So far, then, we find merely the _assertion_ +that self-consciousness must be possible.[75] + + [74] A third alternative is to understand Kant to be thinking + of all thought as self-conscious, i. e. as thinking + accompanied by the consciousness of thinking. But since in + that case Kant would be arguing from thinking as _thinking_, + i. e. as apprehending objects, the possibility of + self-consciousness would only be glaringly assumed. + + [75] The same is true of A. 116 and A. 117 note, Mah. 208, + where Kant also appears to be offering what he considers to + be an argument. + +In the next paragraph[76]--which is clearly meant to be the important +one--Kant, though he can hardly be said to be aware of it, seems to +_assume_ that it is the very nature of a knowing self, not only to be +identical throughout its thoughts or apprehendings, but to be capable +of being conscious of its own identity. § 6 runs: "The empirical +consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself +fragmentary, and without relation to the identity of the subject." +Kant is saying that if there existed merely a consciousness of A which +was not at the same time a consciousness of B and a consciousness +of B which was not at the same time a consciousness of A, these +consciousnesses would not be the consciousnesses belonging to one +self. But this is only true, if the one self to which the +consciousness of A and the consciousness of B are to belong must be +capable of being aware of its own identity. Otherwise it might be one +self which apprehended A and then, forgetting A, apprehended B. No +doubt in that case the self could not be aware of its own identity in +apprehending A and in apprehending B, but none the less it would _be_ +identical in so doing. We reach the same conclusion if we consider the +concluding sentence of § 10. "It is only because I can comprehend the +manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I call them all +my representations; for otherwise I should have as many-coloured and +varied a self as I have representations of which I am conscious." +Doubtless if I am to _be aware of_ myself as the same in apprehending +A and B, then, in coming to apprehend B, I must continue to apprehend +A, and therefore must apprehend A and B as related; and such a +consciousness on Kant's view involves a synthesis. But if I am merely +to _be_ the same subject which apprehends A and B, or rather if the +apprehension of A and that of B are merely to _be_ apprehensions on +the part of one and the same subject, no such consciousness of A and B +as related and, therefore, no synthesis is involved. + + [76] §§ 5-11. + +Again, the third paragraph assumes the possibility of +self-consciousness as the starting-point for argument. The thought[77] +seems to be this: 'For a self to be aware of its own identity, there +must be a manifold in relation to which it can apprehend itself as one +and the same throughout. An understanding which was perceptive, i. e. +which originated objects by its own act of thinking, would necessarily +by its own thinking originate a manifold in relation to which it could +be aware of its own identity in thinking, and therefore its +self-consciousness would need no synthesis. But our understanding, +which is not perceptive, requires a manifold to be given to it, in +relation to which it can be aware of its own identity by means of a +synthesis of the manifold.' If this be the thought, it is clearly +presupposed that _any_ understanding must be capable of being +conscious of its own identity.[78] + + [77] Cf. B. 138 fin.-139 init., M. 85 fin. + + [78] B. 139 init., M. 85 fin. also assumes that it is + impossible for a mind to be a unity without being able to be + conscious of its unity. + +Further, it is easy to see how Kant came to take for granted the +possibility of self-consciousness, in the sense of the consciousness +of ourselves as the identical subject of all our representations. He +approaches self-consciousness with the presupposition derived from his +analysis of knowledge that our apprehension of a manifold does not +consist in separate apprehensions of its elements, but is one +apprehension or consciousness of the elements as related.[79] He +thinks of this as a general presupposition of all apprehension of a +manifold, and, of course, to discover this presupposition is to be +self-conscious. To recognize the oneness of our apprehension is to be +conscious of our own identity.[80] + + [79] It is in consequence of this that the statement that 'a + manifold of representations belongs to me' means, with the + probable exception of § 1, not, 'I am aware of A, I am aware + of B, I am aware of C,' but, 'I am aware, in one act of + awareness, of A B C as related' (= ABC are 'connected in' or + 'belong to' one consciousness). Cf. §§ 4, 8 ('in one + consciousness'), 9, 10 ('in one consciousness'), and A. 116, + Mah. 208 ('These representations only represent anything in + me by belonging with all the rest to one consciousness + [accepting Erdmann's emendation _mit allen anderen_], in + which at any rate they can be connected'). + + [80] The above criticism of Kant's thought has not implied + that it may not be true that a knowing mind is, as such, + capable of being aware of its own unity; the argument has + only been that Kant's proof is unsuccessful. + +Again, to pass to the second main point to be considered,[81] +Kant has no justification for arguing from the possibility of +self-consciousness to that of the synthesis. This can be seen from the +mere form of his argument. Kant, as has been said, seems first to +establish the possibility of self-consciousness, and thence to +conclude that a synthesis must be possible. But if, as it is his point +to urge, consciousness of our identity only takes place through +consciousness of the synthesis, this method of argument must be +invalid. It would clearly be necessary to know that the synthesis is +possible, _before_ and _in order that_ we could know that +self-consciousness is possible. An objector has only to urge that the +manifold might be such that it could not be combined into a systematic +whole, in order to secure the admission that in that case +self-consciousness would not be possible. + + [81] Cf. p. 198. + +Nevertheless, the passage under consideration may be said to lay bare +an important presupposition of self-consciousness. It is true that +self-consciousness would be impossible, if we merely apprehended the +parts of the world in isolation. To be conscious that I who am +perceiving C perceived B and A, I must be conscious at once of A, B, +and C, in one act of consciousness or apprehension. To be conscious +separately of A and B and C is not to be conscious of A and B and C. +And, to be conscious of A and B and C in one act of consciousness, I +must apprehend A, B, and C as related, i. e. as forming parts of a +whole or system. Hence it is only because our consciousness of A, B, +and C is never the consciousness of a mere A, a mere B, and a mere C, +but is always the consciousness of A B C as elements in one world that +we can be conscious of our identity in apprehending A, B, and C. If +_per impossibile_ our apprehension be supposed to cease to be an +apprehension of a plurality of objects in relation, self-consciousness +must be supposed to cease also. At the same time, it is impossible to +argue from the consciousness of our identity in apprehending to the +consciousness of what is apprehended as a unity, and thence to the +existence of that unity. For, apart from the consideration that in +fact all thinking presupposes the relatedness or--what is the same +thing--the necessary relatedness of objects to one another, and that +therefore any assertion to the contrary is meaningless, the +consciousness of objects as a unity is a condition of the +consciousness of our identity, and therefore any doubt that can be +raised in regard to the former can be raised equally with regard to +the latter. + +We may now pass to the concluding portion of the deduction. For the +purpose of considering it, we may sum up the results of the preceding +discussion by saying that Kant establishes the synthesis of the +manifold on certain principles by what are really two independent +lines of thought. The manifold may be regarded either as something +which, in order to enter into knowledge, must be given relation to an +object, or as something with respect to which self-consciousness must +be possible. Regarded in either way, the manifold, according to Kant, +involves a process of synthesis on certain principles, which makes it +a systematic unity. Now Kant introduces the categories by maintaining +that they are the principles of synthesis in question. "I assert that +the above mentioned _categories_ are nothing but the _conditions of +thinking in a possible experience_.... They are fundamental +conceptions by which we think objects in general for phenomena."[82] +A synthesis according to the categories is 'that wherein alone +apperception can prove _a priori_ its thorough-going and necessary +identity'.[83] In the first edition this identification is simply +asserted, but in the second Kant offers a proof.[84] + + [82] A. 111, Mah. 204. Cf. A. 119, Mah. 210. + + [83] A. 112, Mah. 204. + + [84] Cf. p. 161. + +Before, however, we consider the proof, it is necessary to refer +to a difficulty which seems to have escaped Kant altogether. The +preceding account of the synthesis involved in knowledge and in +self-consciousness implies, as his illustrations conclusively show, +that the synthesis requires a particular principle which constitutes +the individual manifold a whole of a particular kind.[85] But, if this +be the case, it is clear that the categories, which are merely +conceptions of an object in general, and are consequently quite +general, cannot possibly be sufficient for the purpose. And since the +manifold in itself includes no synthesis and therefore no principle of +synthesis, Kant fails to give any account of the source of the +particular principles of synthesis required for particular acts of +knowledge.[86] This difficulty--which admits of no solution--is +concealed from Kant in two ways. In the first place, when he describes +what really must be stated as the process by which parts or qualities +of an object become related to an object of a particular kind, he +thinks that he is describing a process by which representations become +related to an object in general.[87] Secondly, he thinks of the +understanding as the source of general principles of synthesis, +individual syntheses and the particular principles involved being +attributed to the imagination; and so, when he comes to consider the +part played in knowledge by the understanding, he is apt to ignore the +need of particular principles.[88] Hence, Kant's proof that the +categories are the principles of synthesis can at best be taken only +as a proof that the categories, though not sufficient for the +synthesis, are involved in it. + + [85] Cf. p. 177, note 2, and p. 185. + + [86] Cf. pp. 215-17. + + [87] Cf. pp. 181-2. + + [88] Cf. p. 217. + +The proof runs thus: + +"I could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians +give of a judgement in general. It is, according to them, the +representation of a relation between two conceptions...." + +"But if I examine more closely the relation of given +representations[89] in every judgement, and distinguish it, as +belonging to the understanding, from their relation according to the +laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective +validity), I find that a judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing +given representations under the _objective_ unity of apperception. +This is what is intended by the term of relation 'is' in judgements, +which is meant to distinguish the objective unity of given +representations from the subjective. For this term indicates the +relation of these representations to the original apperception, and +also their _necessary unity_, even though the judgement itself is +empirical, and therefore contingent, e. g. 'Bodies are heavy.' By this +I do not mean that these representations _necessarily_ belong _to each +other_ in empirical perception, but that they belong to each other _by +means of the necessary unity_ of apperception in the synthesis of +perceptions, that is, according to principles of the objective +determination of all our representations, in so far as knowledge can +arise from them, these principles being all derived from the principle +of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way alone can +there arise from this relation _a judgement_, that is, a relation +which is _objectively valid_, and is adequately distinguished from the +relation of the very same representations which would be only +subjectively valid, e. g. according to laws of association. According +to these laws, I could only say, 'If I carry a body, I feel an +impression of weight', but not 'It, the body, _is_ heavy'; for this is +tantamount to saying, 'These two representations are connected in the +object, that is, without distinction as to the condition of the +subject, and are not merely connected together in the perception, +however often it may be repeated.'"[90] + + [89] _Erkenntnisse_ here is clearly used as a synonym for + representations. Cf. A. 104, Mah. 199. + + [90] B. 140-2, M. 86-8; cf. _Prol._, §§ 18-20. + +This ground for the identification of the categories with the +principles of synthesis involved in knowledge may be ignored, as on +the face of it unsuccessful. For the argument is that since the +activity by which the synthesis is affected is that of judgement, the +conceptions shown by the _Metaphysical Deduction_ to be involved in +judgement must constitute the principles of synthesis. But it is +essential to this argument that the present account of judgement and +that which forms the basis of the _Metaphysical Deduction_ should be +the same; and this is plainly not the case.[91] Judgement is now +represented as an act by which we relate the manifold of sense in +certain necessary ways as parts of the physical world,[92] whereas in +the _Metaphysical_ _Deduction_ it was treated as an act by which we +relate conceptions; and Kant now actually says that this latter +account is faulty. Hence even if the metaphysical deduction had +successfully derived the categories from the account of judgement +which it presupposed, the present argument would not justify the +identification of the categories so deduced with the principles of +synthesis. The fact is that Kant's vindication of the categories is in +substance independent of the _Metaphysical Deduction_. Kant's real +thought, as opposed to his formal presentation of it, is simply that +when we come to consider what are the principles of synthesis involved +in the reference of the manifold to an object, we find that they are +the categories.[93] The success, then, of this step in Kant's +vindication of the categories is independent of that of the +metaphysical deduction, and depends solely upon the question whether +the principles of synthesis involved in knowledge are in fact the +categories. + + [91] Cf. Caird, i. 348-9 note. + + [92] We may notice in passing that this passage renders + explicit the extreme difficulty of Kant's view that 'the + objective unity of apperception' is the unity of the parts of + nature or of the physical world. How can the 'very same + representations' stand at once in the subjective relation of + association and in the objective relation which consists in + their being related as parts of nature? There is plainly + involved a transition from representation, in the sense of + the apprehension of something, to representation, in the + sense of something apprehended. It is objects apprehended + which are objectively related; it is our apprehensions of + objects which are associated, cf. pp. 233 and 281-2. Current + psychology seems to share Kant's mistake in its doctrine of + association of ideas, by treating the elements associated, + which are really apprehensions of objects, as if they were + objects apprehended. + + [93] Cf. A. 112, Mah. 204; B. 162, M. 99. + +The substance of Kant's vindication of the categories may therefore be +epitomized thus: 'We may take either of two starting-points. On the +one hand, we may start from the fact that our experience is no mere +dream, but an intelligent experience in which we are aware of a world +of individual objects. This fact is conceded even by those who, like +Hume, deny that we are aware of any necessity of relation between +these objects. We may then go on to ask how it comes about that, +beginning as we do with a manifold of sense given in succession, we +come to apprehend this world of individual objects. If we do so, we +find that there is presupposed a synthesis on our part of the manifold +upon principles constituted by the categories. + +To deny, therefore, that the manifold is so connected is implicitly to +deny that we have an apprehension of objects at all. But the existence +of this apprehension is plainly a fact which even Hume did not +dispute. On the other hand, we may start with the equally obvious fact +that we must be capable of apprehending our own identity throughout +our apprehension of the manifold of sense, and look for the +presupposition of this fact. If we do this, we again find that there +is involved a combination of the manifold according to the +categories.' + +In conclusion, attention may be drawn to two points. In the first +place, Kant completes his account by at once emphasizing and +explaining the paradoxical character of his conclusion. "Accordingly, +the order and conformity to law in the phenomena which we call +_nature_ we ourselves introduce, and we could never find it there, +if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally placed it +there."[94] "However exaggerated or absurd then it may sound to say +that the understanding itself is the source of the laws of nature and +consequently of the formal unity of nature, such an assertion is +nevertheless correct and in accordance with the object, i. e. with +experience."[95] The explanation of the paradox is found in the fact +that objects of nature are phenomena. "But if we reflect that this +nature is in itself nothing else than a totality[96] of phenomena and +consequently no thing in itself but merely a number of representations +of the mind, we shall not be surprised that only in the radical +faculty of all our knowledge, viz. transcendental apperception, do we +see it in that unity through which alone it can be called object of +all possible experience, i. e. nature."[97] "It is no more surprising +that the laws of the phenomena in nature must agree with the +understanding and with its _a priori_ form, that is, its faculty of +connecting the manifold in general, than that the phenomena themselves +must agree with the _a priori_ form of our sensuous perception. For +laws exist in the phenomena as little as phenomena exist in +themselves; on the contrary, laws exist only relatively to the subject +in which the phenomena inhere, so far as it has understanding, just as +phenomena exist only relatively to the subject, so far as it has +senses. To things in themselves their conformity to law would +necessarily also belong independently of an understanding which knows +them. But phenomena are only representations of things which exist +unknown in respect of what they may be in themselves. But, as mere +representations, they stand under no law of connexion except that +which the connecting faculty prescribes."[98] + + [94] A. 125, Mah. 214. + + [95] A. 127, Mah. 216. + + [96] _Inbegriff._ + + [97] A. 114, Mah. 206. + + [98] B. 164, M. 100. + +In the second place, this last paragraph contains the real reason from +the point of view of the deduction[99] of the categories for what may +be called the negative side of his doctrine, viz. that the categories +only apply to objects of experience and not to things in themselves. +According to Kant, we can only say that certain principles of +connexion apply to a reality into which we introduce the connexion. +Things in themselves, if connected, are connected in themselves and +apart from us. Hence there can be no guarantee that any principles of +connexion which we might assert them to possess are those which they +do possess. + + [99] The main passage (B. 146-9, M. 90-2), in which he argues + that the categories do not apply to things in themselves, + ignores the account of a conception as a principle of + synthesis, upon which the deduction turns, and returns to the + earlier account of a conception as something opposed to a + perception, i. e. as that by which an object is thought as + opposed to a perception by which an object is given. + Consequently, it argues merely that the categories, as + conceptions, are empty or without an object, unless an object + is given in perception, and that, since things in themselves + are not objects of perception, the categories are no more + applicable to things in themselves than are any other + conceptions. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +GENERAL CRITICISM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES + + +The preceding account of Kant's vindication of the categories has +included much criticism. But the criticism has been as far as possible +restricted to details, and has dealt with matters of principle only so +far as has been necessary in order to follow Kant's thought. We must +now consider the position as a whole, even though this may involve +some repetition.[1] The general difficulties of the position may be +divided into two kinds, (1) difficulties involved in the working out +of the theory, even if its main principles are not questioned, and (2) +difficulties involved in accepting its main principles at all. + + [1] Difficulties connected with Kant's view of + self-consciousness will be ignored, as having been + sufficiently considered. + +The initial difficulty of the first kind, which naturally strikes the +reader, concerns the possibility of performing the synthesis. The mind +has certain general ways of combining the manifold, viz. the +categories. But on general grounds we should expect the mind to +possess only one mode of combining the manifold. For the character of +the manifold to be combined cannot affect the mind's power of +combination, and, if the power of the mind consists in combining, the +combining should always be of the same kind. Thus, suppose the +manifold given to the mind to be combined consisted of musical notes, +we could think of the mind's power of combination as exercised in +combining the notes by way of succession, _provided that_ this be +regarded as the only mode of combination. But if the mind were thought +also capable of combining notes by way of simultaneity, we should at +once be confronted with the insoluble problem of determining why the +one mode of combination was exercised in any given case rather than +the other. If, several kinds of synthesis being allowed, this +difficulty be avoided by the supposition that, not being incompatible, +they are all exercised together, we have the alternative task of +explaining how the same manifold can be combined in each of these +ways. As a matter of fact, Kant thinks of manifolds of different kinds +as combined or related in different ways; thus events are related +causally and quantities quantitatively. But since, on Kant's view, the +manifold as given is unrelated and all combination comes from the +mind, the mind should not be held capable of combining manifolds of +different kinds differently. Otherwise the manifold would in its own +nature imply the need of a particular kind of synthesis, and would +therefore not be unrelated. + +Suppose, however, we waive the difficulty involved in the plurality of +the categories. There remains the equally fundamental difficulty that +any single principle of synthesis contains in itself no ground for the +different ways of its application.[2] Suppose it to be conceded that +in the apprehension of definite shapes we combine the manifold in +accordance with the conception of figure, and, for the purpose of the +argument, that the conception of figure can be treated as equivalent +to the category of quantity. It is plain that we apprehend different +shapes, e. g. lines[3] and triangles[4], of which, if we take into +account differences of relative length of sides, there is an infinite +variety, and houses,[5] which may also have an infinite variety of +shape. But there is nothing in the mind's capacity of relating the +manifold by way of figure to determine it to combine a given manifold +into a figure of one kind rather than into a figure of any other kind; +for to combine the manifold into a particular shape, there is needed +not merely the thought of a figure in general, but the thought of a +definite figure. No 'cue' can be furnished by the manifold itself, for +any such cue would involve the conception of a particular figure, and +would therefore imply that the particular synthesis was implicit in +the manifold itself, in which case it would not be true that all +synthesis comes from the mind. + + [2] Cf. p. 207. + + [3] B. 137, M. 85. + + [4] A. 105, Mah. 199. + + [5] B. 162, M. 99. + +This difficulty takes a somewhat different form in the case of the +categories of relation. To take the case of cause and effect, +the conception of which, according to Kant, is involved in our +apprehension of a succession, Kant's view seems to be that we become +aware of two elements of the manifold A B as a succession of events in +the world of nature by combining them as necessarily successive in a +causal order, in which the state of affairs which precedes B and which +contains A contains something upon which B must follow (i. e. a cause +of B), which therefore makes it necessary that B must follow A.[6] But +if we are to do this, we must in some way succeed in selecting or +picking out from among the elements of the manifold that element A +which is to be thus combined with B. We therefore need something more +than the category. It is not enough that we should think that B has a +cause; we must think of something in particular as the cause of B, +and we must think of it either as coexistent with, or as identical +with, A. + + [6] Cf. pp. 291-3. + +Kant fails to notice this second difficulty,[7] and up to a certain +point avoids it owing to his distinction between the imagination and +the understanding. For he thinks of the understanding as the source of +general principles of synthesis, viz. the categories, and attributes +individual syntheses to the imagination. Hence the individual +syntheses, which involve particular principles, are already effected +before the understanding comes into play. But to throw the work of +effecting individual syntheses upon the imagination is only to evade +the difficulty. For in the end, as has been pointed out,[8] the +imagination must be the understanding working unreflectively, and, +whether this is so or not, some account must be given of the way in +which the imagination furnishes the particular principles of synthesis +required. + + [7] We should have expected Kant to have noticed this + difficulty in A. 105, Mah. 199, where he describes what is + involved in the relation of representations to an object, for + his instance of representations becoming so related is the + process of combining elements into a triangle, which plainly + requires a synthesis of a very definite kind. For the reasons + of his failure to notice the difficulty cf. p. 207. + + [8] Pp. 168-9. + +The third and last main difficulty of the first kind concerns the +relation of the elements of the manifold and the kinds of synthesis +by which they are combined. This involves the distinction between +relating in general and terms to be related. For to perform a +synthesis is in general to relate, and the elements to be combined +are the terms to be related.[9] Now it is only necessary to take +instances to realize that the possibility of relating terms in certain +ways involves two presuppositions, which concern respectively the +general and the special nature of the terms to be related. + + [9] 'To relate' is used rather than 'to recognize as + related', in order to conform to Kant's view of knowledge. + But if it be desired to take the argument which follows in + connexion with knowledge proper (cf. p. 242), it is only + necessary to substitute throughout 'to recognize as related' + for 'to relate' and to make the other changes consequent + thereon. + +In the first place, it is clear that the general nature of the terms +must correspond with or be adapted to the general nature of the +relationship to be effected. Thus if two terms are to be related as +more or less loud, they must be sounds, since the relation in question +is one in respect of sound and not, e. g., of time or colour or space. +Similarly, terms to be related as right and left must be bodies in +space, right and left being a spatial relation. Again, only human +beings can be related as parent and child. Kant's doctrine, however, +does not conform to this presupposition. For the manifold to be +related consists solely of sensations, and of individual spaces, and +perhaps individual times, as elements of pure perception; and such a +manifold is not of the kind required. Possibly individual spaces may +be regarded as adequate terms to be related or combined into +geometrical figures, e. g. into lines or triangles. But a house as a +synthesis of a manifold cannot be a synthesis of spaces, or of times, +or of sensations. Its parts are bodies, which, whatever they may be, +are neither sensations nor spaces nor times, nor combinations of them. +In reality they are substances of a special kind. Again, the relation +of cause and effect is not a relation of sensations or spaces or +times, but of successive states of physical things or substances, the +relation consisting in the necessity of their succession. + +In the second place, it is clear that the special nature of the +relation to be effected presupposes a special nature on the part of +the terms to be related. If one sound is to be related to another by +way of the octave, that other must be its octave. If one quantity is +to be related to another as the double of it, that quantity must be +twice as large as the other. In the same way, proceeding to Kant's +instances, we see that if we are to combine or relate a manifold into +a triangle, and therefore into a triangle of a particular size and +shape, the elements of the manifold must be lines, and lines of a +particular size. If we are to combine a manifold into a house, and +therefore into a house of a certain shape and size, the manifold must +consist of bodies of a suitable shape and size. If we are to relate a +manifold by way of necessary succession, the manifold must be such +that it can be so related; in other words, if we are to relate an +element X of the manifold with some other Y as the necessary +antecedent of X, there must be some definite element Y which is +connected with, and always occurs along with, X. To put the matter +generally, we may say that the manifold must be adapted to or 'fit' +the categories not only, as has been pointed out, in the sense that it +must be of the right kind, but also in the sense that its individual +elements must have that orderly character which enables them to be +related according to the categories. + +Now it is plain from Kant's vindication of what he calls the affinity +of phenomena,[10] that he recognizes the existence of this +presupposition. But the question arises whether this vindication can +be successful. For since the manifold is originated by the thing in +itself, it seems prima facie impossible to prove that the elements of +the manifold must have affinity, and so be capable of being related +according to the categories. Before, however, we consider the chief +passage in which Kant tries to make good his position, we may notice a +defence which might naturally be offered on his behalf. It might be +said that he establishes the conformity of the manifold to the +categories at least hypothetically, i. e. upon the supposition that +the manifold is capable of entering into knowledge, and also upon the +supposition that we are capable of being conscious of our identity +with respect to it; for upon either supposition any element of the +manifold must be capable of being combined with all the rest into one +world of nature. Moreover, it might be added that these suppositions +are justified, for our experience is not a mere dream, but is +throughout the consciousness of a world, and we are self-conscious +throughout our experience; and therefore it is clear that the manifold +does in fact 'fit' the categories. But the retort is obvious. Any +actual conformity of the manifold to the categories would upon this +view be at best but an empirical fact, and, although, if the +conformity ceased, we should cease to be aware of a world and of +ourselves, no reason has been or can be given why the conformity +should not cease. + + [10] Cf. A. 100-2, Mah. 195-7 (quoted pp. 171-2); A. 113, + Mah. 205; A. 121-2, Mah. 211-2. + +The passage in which Kant vindicates the affinity of phenomena in the +greatest detail is the following: + +"We will now try to exhibit the necessary connexion of the +understanding with phenomena by means of the categories, by beginning +from below, i. e. from the empirical end. The first that is given us +is a phenomenon, which if connected with consciousness is called +perception[11].... But because every phenomenon contains a manifold, +and consequently different perceptions are found in the mind scattered +and single, a connexion of them is necessary, which they cannot have +in mere sense. There is, therefore, in us an active power of synthesis +of this manifold, which we call imagination, and the action of which, +when exercised immediately upon perceptions, I call apprehension. The +business of the imagination, that is to say, is to bring the manifold +of intuition[12] into an _image_; it must, therefore, first receive +the impressions into its activity, i. e. apprehend them." + + [11] _Wahrnehmung._ + + [12] _Anschauung._ + +"But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not +by itself produce an image and a connexion of the impressions, unless +there were a subjective ground in virtue of which one perception, from +which the mind has passed to another, is summoned to join that which +follows, and thus whole series of perceptions are presented, i. e. a +reproductive power of imagination, which power, however, is also only +empirical." + +"But if representations reproduced one another at haphazard just as +they happened to meet together, once more no determinate connexion +would arise, but merely chaotic heaps of them, and consequently no +knowledge would arise; therefore the reproduction of them must have a +rule, according to which a representation enters into connexion with +this rather than with another in the imagination. This subjective and +_empirical_ ground of reproduction according to rules is called the +_association_ of representations." + +"But now, if this unity of association had not also an objective +ground, so that it was impossible that phenomena should be apprehended +by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible +synthetic unity of this apprehension, it would also be a pure accident +that phenomena were adapted to a connected system of human knowledge. +For although we should have the power of associating perceptions, it +would still remain wholly undetermined and accidental whether they +were associable; and in the event of their not being so, a multitude +of perceptions and even perhaps a whole sensibility would be possible, +in which much empirical consciousness would be met with in my mind, +but divided and without belonging to _one_ consciousness of myself, +which however is impossible. For only in that I ascribe all +perceptions to one consciousness (the original apperception) can I say +of all of them that I am conscious of them. There must therefore be an +objective ground, i. e. a ground to be recognized _a priori_ before +all empirical laws of the imagination, on which rests the possibility, +nay even the necessity, of a law which extends throughout all +phenomena, according to which we regard them without exception as such +data of the senses, as are in themselves associable and subjected to +universal rules of a thorough-going connexion in reproduction. This +objective ground of all association of phenomena I call the _affinity_ +of phenomena. But we can meet this nowhere else than in the principle +of the unity of apperception as regards all cognitions which are to +belong to me. According to it, all phenomena without exception must so +enter into the mind or be apprehended as to agree with the unity of +apperception, which agreement would be impossible without synthetical +unity in their connexion, which therefore is also objectively +necessary." + +"The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one +consciousness (the original apperception) is therefore the necessary +condition even of all possible perception, and the affinity of all +phenomena (near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis +in the imagination, which is _a priori_ founded upon rules." + +"The imagination is therefore also a power of _a priori_ synthesis, +for which reason we give it the name of the productive imagination; +and so far as it, in relation to all the manifold of the phenomenon, +has no further aim than the necessary unity in the synthesis of the +phenomenon, it can be called the transcendental function of the +imagination. It is therefore strange indeed, but nevertheless clear +from the preceding, that only by means of this transcendental function +of the imagination does even the affinity of phenomena, and with it +their association and, through this, lastly their reproduction +according to laws, and consequently experience itself become possible, +because without it no conceptions of objects would ever come together +into one experience."[13] + + [13] A. 119-23, Mah. 210-3. + +If it were not for the last two paragraphs[14], we should understand +this difficult passage to be substantially identical in meaning with +the defence of the affinity of phenomena just given.[15] We should +understand Kant to be saying (1) that the synthesis which knowledge +requires presupposes not merely a faculty of association on our part +by which we reproduce elements of the manifold according to rules, but +also an affinity on the part of the manifold to be apprehended, which +enables our faculty of association to get to work, and (2) that this +affinity can be vindicated as a presupposition at once of knowledge +and of self-consciousness. + + [14] And also the first and last sentence of the fourth + paragraph, where Kant speaks not of 'phenomena which are to + be apprehended', but of the 'apprehension of phenomena' as + necessarily agreeing with the unity of apperception. + + [15] p. 220. + +In view, however, of the fact that, according to the last two +paragraphs, the affinity is due to the imagination,[16] it seems +necessary to interpret the passage thus: + + [16] It should be noted that in the last paragraph but one + Kant does not say '_our knowledge_ that phenomena must have + affinity is a consequence of _our knowledge_ that there must + be a synthesis of the imagination', but 'the affinity of all + phenomena is a consequence of a synthesis in the + imagination'. And the last paragraph precludes the view that + in making the latter statement he meant the former. Cf. also + A. 101, Mah. 196. + +'Since the given manifold of sense consists of isolated elements, this +manifold, in order to enter into knowledge, must be combined into an +image. This combination is effected by the imagination, which however +must first apprehend the elements one by one.' + +'But this apprehension of the manifold by the imagination could +produce no image, unless the imagination also possessed the power of +reproducing past elements of the manifold, and, if knowledge is to +arise, of reproducing them according to rules. This faculty of +reproduction by which, on perceiving the element A, we are led to +think of or reproduce a past element B--B being reproduced according +to some rule--rather than C or D is called the faculty of association; +and since the rules according to which it works depend on empirical +conditions, and therefore cannot be anticipated _a priori_, it may be +called the subjective ground of reproduction.' + +'But if the image produced by association is to play a part in +knowledge, the empirical faculty of reproduction is not a sufficient +condition or ground of it. A further condition is implied, which may +be called objective in the sense that it is _a priori_ and prior to +all empirical laws of imagination. This condition is that the act by +which the data of sense enter the mind or are apprehended, i. e. the +act by which the imagination _apprehends and combines_ the data of +sense into a sensuous image, must _make_ the elements such that they +have affinity, and therefore such that they can subsequently be +recognized as parts of a necessarily related whole.[17] Unless this +condition is satisfied, even if we possessed the faculty of +association, our experience would be a chaos of disconnected elements, +and we could not be self-conscious, which is impossible. Starting, +therefore, with the principle that we must be capable of being +self-conscious with respect to all the elements of the manifold, we +can lay down _a priori_ that this condition is a fact.' + + [17] On this interpretation 'entering the mind' or 'being + apprehended' in the fourth paragraph does not refer merely to + the apprehension of elements one by one, which is preliminary + to the act of combining them, but includes the act by which + they are combined. If so, Kant's argument formally involves a + circle. For in the second and third paragraphs he argues that + the synthesis of perceptions involves reproduction according + to rules, and then, in the fourth paragraph, he argues that + this reproduction presupposes a synthesis of perceptions. We + may, however, perhaps regard his argument as being in + substance that knowledge involves _re_production by the + imagination of elements capable of connexion, and that this + reproduction involves _pro_duction by the imagination of the + data of sense, which are to be reproduced, into an image. + +'It follows, then, that the affinity or connectedness of the data of +sense presupposed by the _re_production which is presupposed in +knowledge, is actually produced by the _pro_ductive faculty of +imagination, which, in combining the data into a sensuous image, +gives them the unity required.' + +If, as it seems necessary to believe, this be the correct +interpretation of the passage,[18] Kant is here trying to carry out +to the full his doctrine that _all_ unity or connectedness comes from +the mind's activity. He is maintaining that the imagination, acting +_pro_ductively on the data of sense and thereby combining them into an +image, gives the data a connectedness which the understanding can +subsequently recognize. But to maintain this is, of course, only to +throw the problem one stage further back. If reproduction, in order to +enter into knowledge, implies a manifold which has such connexion that +it is capable of being reproduced according to rules, so the +production of sense-elements into a coherent image in turn implies +sense-elements capable of being so combined. The act of combination +cannot confer upon them or introduce into them a unity which they do +not already possess. + + [18] If the preceding interpretation (pp. 223-4) be thought + the correct one, it must be admitted that Kant's vindication + of the affinity breaks down for the reason given, p. 220. + +The fact is that this step in Kant's argument exhibits the final +breakdown of his view that all unity or connectedness or relatedness +is conferred upon the data of sense by the activity of the mind. +Consequently, this forms a convenient point at which to consider what +seems to be the fundamental mistake of this view. The mistake stated +in its most general form appears to be that, misled by his theory of +perception, he regards 'terms' as given by things in themselves +acting on the sensibility, and 'relations' as introduced by the +understanding,[19] whereas the fact is that in the sense in which terms +can be said to be given, relations can and must also be said to be +given. + + [19] The understanding being taken to include the + imagination, as being the faculty of _spontaneity_ in + distinction from the _passive_ sensibility. + +To realize that this is the case, we need only consider Kant's +favourite instance of knowledge, the apprehension of a straight line. +According to him, this presupposes that there is given to us a +manifold, which--whether he admits it or not--must really be parts of +the line, and that we combine this manifold on a principle involved in +the nature of straightness. Now suppose that the manifold given is the +parts AB, BC, CD, DE of the line AE. It is clearly only possible to +recognize AB and BC as contiguous parts of a straight line, if we +immediately apprehend that AB and BC form one line of which these +parts are identical in direction. Otherwise, we might just as well +join AB and BC at a right angle, and in fact at any angle; we need not +even make AB and BC contiguous.[20] Similarly, the relation of BC to +CD and of CD to DE must be just as immediately apprehended as the +parts themselves. Is there, however, any relation of which it could be +said that it is not given, and to which therefore Kant's doctrine +might seem to apply? There is. Suppose AB, BC, CD to be of such a size +that, though we can see AB and BC, or BC and CD, together, we cannot +see AB and CD together. It is clear that in this case we can only +learn that AB and CD are parts of the same straight line through an +inference. We have to infer that, because each is in the same straight +line with BC, the one is in the same straight line with the other. +Here the fact that AB and CD are in the same straight line is not +immediately apprehended. This relation, therefore, may be said not to +be given; and, from Kant's point of view, we could say that we +introduce this relation into the manifold through our activity of +thinking, which combines AB and CD together in accordance with the +principle that two straight lines which are in the same line with a +third are in line with one another. Nevertheless, this case is no +exception to the general principle that relations must be given +equally with terms; for we only become aware of the relation between +AB and CD, which is not given, because we are already aware of other +relations, viz. those between AB and BC, and BC and CD, which are +given. Relations then, or, in Kant's language, particular syntheses +must be said to be given, in the sense in which the elements to be +combined can be said to be given. + + [20] In order to meet a possible objection, it may be pointed + out that if AB and BC be given in isolation, the contiguity + implied in referring to them as A_B_ and _B_C will not be + known. + +Further, we can better see the nature of Kant's mistake in this +respect, if we bear in mind that Kant originally and rightly +introduced the distinction between the sensibility and the +understanding as that between the passive faculty by which an +individual is given or presented to us and the active faculty by which +we bring an individual under, or recognize it as an instance of a +universal.[21] For we then see that Kant in the _Transcendental +Deduction_, by treating what is given by the sensibility as terms and +what is contributed by the understanding as relations, is really +confusing the distinction between a relation and its terms with that +between universal and individual; in other words, he says of terms +what ought to be said of individuals, and of relations what ought to +be said of universals. That the confusion is a confusion, and not a +legitimate identification, it is easy to see. For, on the one hand, a +relation between terms is as much an individual as either of the +terms. That a body A is to the right of a body B is as much an +individual fact as either A or B.[22] And if terms, as being +individuals, belong to perception and are given, in the sense that +they are in an immediate relation to us, relations, as being +individuals, equally belong to perception and are given. On the other +hand, individual terms just as much as individual relations imply +corresponding universals. An individual body implies 'bodiness', just +as much as the fact that a body A is to the right of a body B implies +the relationship of 'being to the right of something'. And if, as is +the case, thinking or conceiving in distinction from perceiving, is +that activity by which we recognize an individual, given in +perception, as one of a kind, conceiving is involved as much in the +apprehension of a term as in the apprehension of a relation. The +apprehension of 'this red body' as much involves the recognition of an +individual as an instance of a kind, i. e. as much involves an act of +the understanding, as does the apprehension of the fact that it is +brighter than some other body. + + [21] Cf. pp. 27-9. + + [22] I can attach no meaning to Mr. Bertrand Russell's + assertion that relations have no instances. See _The + Principles of Mathematics_, § 55. + +Kant has failed to notice this confusion for two reasons. In the first +place, beginning in the _Analytic_ with the thought that the thing in +itself, by acting on our sensibility, produces isolated sense data, he +is led to adopt a different view of the understanding from that which +he originally gave, and to conceive its business as consisting in +relating these data. In the second place, by distinguishing the +imagination from the understanding, he is able to confine the +understanding to being the source of universals or principles of +relation in distinction from individual relations.[23] Since, however, +as has been pointed out, and as Kant himself sees at times, the +imagination is the understanding working unreflectively, this +limitation cannot be successful. + + [23] Cf. p. 217. + +There remain for consideration the difficulties of the second kind, +i. e. the difficulties involved in accepting its main principles at +all. These are of course the most important. Throughout the deduction +Kant is attempting to formulate the nature of knowledge. According to +him, it consists in an activity of the mind by which it combines the +manifold of sense on certain principles and is to some extent aware +that it does so, and by which it thereby gives the manifold relation +to an object. Now the fundamental and final objection to this account +is that what it describes is not knowledge at all. The justice of this +objection may be seen by considering the two leading thoughts +underlying the view, which, though closely connected, may be treated +separately. These are the thought of knowledge as a process by which +representations acquire relation to an object, and the thought of +knowledge as a process of synthesis. + +It is in reality meaningless to speak of 'a process by which +representations or ideas acquire relation to an object'.[24] The +phrase must mean a process by which a mere apprehension, which, as +such, is not the apprehension of an object, becomes the apprehension +of an object. Apprehension, however, is essentially and from the very +beginning the apprehension of an object, i. e. of a reality +apprehended. If there is no object which the apprehension is 'of', +there is no apprehension. It is therefore wholly meaningless to speak +of a process by which an apprehension _becomes_ the apprehension of an +object. If when we reflected we were not aware of an object, i. e. a +reality apprehended, we could not be aware of our apprehension; for +our apprehension is the apprehension of it, and is itself only +apprehended in relation to, though in distinction from, it. It is +therefore impossible to suppose a condition of mind in which, knowing +what 'apprehension' means, we proceed to ask, 'What is meant by an +object of it?' and 'How does an apprehension become related to an +object?'; for both questions involve the thought of a mere +representation, i. e. of an apprehension which as yet is not the +apprehension of anything. + + [24] Cf. p. 180, and pp. 280-3. + +These questions, when their real nature is exhibited, are plainly +absurd. Kant's special theory, however, enables him to evade the real +absurdity involved. For, according to his view, a representation is +the representation or apprehension of something only from the point of +view of the thing in itself. As an appearance or perhaps more strictly +speaking as a sensation, it has also a being of its own which is not +relative[25]; and from this point of view it _is_ possible to speak of +'mere' representations and to raise questions which presuppose their +reality.[26] + + [25] Cf. p. 137 init. + + [26] The absurdity of the problem really propounded is also + concealed from Kant in the way indicated, pp. 180 fin.-181 + init. + +But this remedy, if remedy it can be called, is at least as bad as the +disease. For, in the first place, the change of standpoint is +necessarily illegitimate. An appearance or sensation is not from any +point of view a representation in the proper sense, i. e. a +representation or apprehension of something. It is simply a reality to +be apprehended, of the special kind called mental. If it be called a +representation, the word must have a new meaning; it must mean +something represented, or presented,[27] i. e. object of apprehension, +with the implication that what is presented, or is object of +apprehension, is mental or a modification of the mind. Kant therefore +only avoids the original absurdity by an illegitimate change of +standpoint, the change being concealed by a tacit transition in the +meaning of representation. In the second place, the change of +standpoint only saves the main problem from being absurd by rendering +it insoluble. For if a representation be taken to be an appearance or +a sensation, the main problem becomes that of explaining how it is +that, beginning with the apprehension of mere appearances or +sensations, we come to apprehend an object, in the sense of an object +in nature, which, as such, is not an appearance or sensation but a +part of the physical world. But if the immediate object of +apprehension were in this way confined to appearances, which are, to +use Kant's phrase, determinations of our mind, our apprehension would +be limited to these appearances, and any apprehension of an object in +nature would be impossible.[28] In fact, it is just the view that the +immediate object of apprehension consists in a determination of the +mind which forms the basis of the solipsist position. Kant's own +solution involves an absurdity at least as great as that involved in +the thought of a mere representation, in the proper sense of +representation. For the solution is that appearances or sensations +become related to an object, in the sense of an object in nature, by +being combined on certain principles. Yet it is plainly impossible to +combine appearances or sensations into an object in nature. If a +triangle, or a house, or 'a freezing of water'[29] is the result of +any process of combination, the elements combined must be respectively +lines, and bricks, and physical events; these are objects in the sense +in which the whole produced by the combination is an object, and are +certainly not appearances or sensations. Kant conceals the difficulty +from himself by the use of language to which he is not entitled. For +while his instances of objects are always of the kind indicated, he +persists in calling the manifold combined 'representations', i. e. +presented mental modifications. This procedure is of course +facilitated for him by his view that nature is a phenomenon or +appearance, but the difficulty which it presents to the reader +culminates when he speaks of the very same representations as having +both a subjective and an objective relation, i. e. as being both +modifications of the mind and parts of nature.[30] + + [27] _Vorgestellt._ + + [28] Cf. p. 123. + + [29] B. 162, M. 99. + + [30] B. 139-42, M. 87-8. Cf. 209, note 3, and pp. 281-2. + +We may now turn to Kant's thought of knowledge as a process of +synthesis. When Kant speaks of synthesis, the kind of synthesis of +which he usually is thinking is that of spatial elements into a +spatial whole; and although he refers to other kinds, e. g. of units +into numbers, and of events into a temporal series, nevertheless it is +the thought of spatial synthesis which guides his view. Now we must in +the end admit that the spatial synthesis of which he is thinking is +really the _construction_ or _making_ of spatial objects in the +literal sense. It would be rightly illustrated by making figures out +of matches or spelicans, or by drawing a circle with compasses, or by +building a house out of bricks. Further, if we extend this view of the +process of which Kant is thinking, we have to allow that the process +of synthesis in which, according to Kant, knowledge consists is that +of making or constructing parts of the physical world, and in fact the +physical world itself, out of elements given in perception.[31] The +deduction throughout presupposes that the synthesis is really +_manufacture_, and Kant is at pains to emphasize the fact. "The order +and conformity to law in the phenomena which we call _nature_ we +ourselves introduce, and we could not find it there, if we or the +nature of our mind had not originally placed it there."[32] He +naturally rejoices in the manufacture, because it is just this which +makes the categories valid. If knowing is really making, the +principles of synthesis must apply to the reality known, because it is +by these very principles that the reality is made. Moreover, +recognition of this fact enables us to understand certain features of +his view which would otherwise be inexplicable. For if the synthesis +consists in literal construction, we are able to understand why Kant +should think (1) that in the process of knowledge the mind +_introduces_ order into the manifold, (2) that the mind is limited in +its activity of synthesis by having to conform to certain principles +of construction which constitute the nature of the understanding, and +(3) that the manifold of phenomena must possess affinity. If, for +example, we build a house, it can be said (1) that we introduce into +the materials a plan or principle of arrangement which they do not +possess in themselves, (2) that the particular plan is limited by, and +must conform to, the laws of spatial relation and to the general +presuppositions of physics, such as the uniformity of nature, and (3) +that only such materials are capable of the particular combination as +possess a nature suitable to it. Moreover, if, for Kant, knowing is +really making, we are able to understand two other prominent features +of his view. We can understand why Kant should lay so much stress upon +the 'recognition' of the synthesis, and upon the self-consciousness +involved in knowledge. For if the synthesis of the manifold is really +the making of an object, it results merely in the existence of the +object; knowledge of it is still to be effected. Consequently, +knowledge of the object only finds a place in Kant's view by the +_recognition_ (on the necessity of which he insists) of the manifold +as combined on a principle. This recognition, which Kant considers +only an element in knowledge, is really the knowledge itself. Again, +since the reality to be known is a whole of parts which we construct +on a principle, we know that it is such a whole, and therefore that +'the manifold is related to one object', because, and only because, we +know that we have combined the elements on a principle. +Self-consciousness therefore _must_ be inseparable from consciousness +of an object. + + [31] It is for this reason that the mathematical + illustrations of the synthesis are the most plausible for his + theory. While we can be said to construct geometrical + figures, and while the construction of geometrical figures + can easily be mistaken for the apprehension of them, we + cannot with any plausibility be said to construct the + physical world. + + [32] A. 125, Mah. 214. Cf. the other passages quoted pp. + 211-12. + +The fundamental objection to this account of knowledge seems so +obvious as to be hardly worth stating; it is of course that knowing +and making are not the same. The very nature of knowing presupposes +that the thing known is already made, or, to speak more accurately, +already exists.[33] In other words, knowing is essentially the +discovery of what already is. Even if the reality known happens to be +something which we make, e. g. a house, the knowing it is distinct +from the making it, and, so far from being identical with the making, +presupposes that the reality in question is already made. Music and +poetry are, no doubt, realities which in some sense are 'made' or +'composed', but the apprehension of them is distinct from and +presupposes the process by which they are composed. + + [33] Cf. Ch. VI. + +How difficult it is to resolve knowing into making may be seen by +consideration of a difficulty in the interpretation of Kant's phrase +'relation of the manifold to an object', to which no allusion has yet +been made. When it is said that a certain manifold is related to, or +stands[34] in relation to, an object, does the relatedness referred to +consist in the fact that the manifold is combined into a whole, or in +the fact that we are conscious of the combination, or in both? If we +accept the first alternative we must allow that, while relatedness to +an object implies a process of synthesis, yet the relatedness, and +therefore the synthesis, have nothing to do with knowledge. For the +relatedness of the manifold to an object will be the combination of +the elements of the manifold as parts of an object constructed, and +the process of synthesis involved will be that by which the object is +constructed. This process of synthesis will have nothing to do with +knowledge; for since it is merely the process by which the object is +constructed, knowledge so far is not effected at all, and no clue is +given to the way in which it comes about. If, however, we accept the +second alternative, we have to allow that while relatedness to an +object has to do with knowledge, yet it in no way implies a process of +synthesis. For since in that case it consists in the fact that we are +conscious of the manifold as together forming an object, it in no way +implies that the object has been produced by a process of synthesis. +Kant, of course, would accept the third alternative. For, firstly, +since it is knowledge which he is describing, the phrase 'relatedness +to an object' cannot refer simply to the _existence_ of a combination +of the manifold, and of a process by which it has been produced; its +meaning must include _consciousness_ of the combination. In the second +place, it is definitely his view that we cannot represent anything as +combined in the object without having previously combined it +ourselves.[35] Moreover, it is just with respect to this connexion +between the synthesis and the consciousness of the synthesis that his +reduction of knowing to making helps him; for to make an object, e. g. +a house, is to make it consciously, i. e. to combine materials on a +principle of which we are aware. Since, then, the combining of which +he speaks is really making, it seems to him impossible to combine a +manifold without being aware of the nature of the act of combination, +and therefore of the nature of the whole thereby produced.[36] But +though this is clearly Kant's view, it is not justified. In the first +place, 'relatedness of the manifold to an object' ought not to refer +_both_ to its combination in a whole _and_ to our consciousness of the +combination; and in strictness it should refer to the former only. For +as referring to the former it indicates a relation of the manifold _to +the object_, as being the parts of the object, and as referring to the +latter it indicates a relation of the manifold _to us_, as being +apprehended by us as the parts of the object. But two relations which, +though they are of one and the same thing, are nevertheless relations +of it to two different things, should not be referred to by the same +phrase. Moreover, since the relatedness is referred to as relatedness +to an object, the phrase properly indicates the relation of the +manifold to an object, and not to us as apprehending it. Again, in the +second place, Kant cannot successfully maintain that the phrase is +primarily a loose expression for our consciousness of the manifold as +related to an object, and that since this implies a process of +synthesis, the phrase may fairly include in its meaning the thought of +the combination of the manifold by us into a whole. For although Kant +asserts--and with some plausibility--that we can only apprehend as +combined what we have ourselves combined, yet when we consider this +assertion seriously we see it to be in no sense true. + + [34] A. 109, Mah. 202. + + [35] B. 130, M. 80. + + [36] To say that 'combining', in the sense of making, + _really_ presupposes consciousness of the nature of the whole + produced, would be inconsistent with the previous assertion + that even where the reality known is something made, the + knowledge of it presupposes that the reality is already made. + Strictly speaking, the activity of combining presupposes + consciousness not of the whole which we _succeed_ in + producing, but of the whole which we _want_ to produce. + + It may be noted that, from the point of view of the above + argument, the activity of combining presupposes actual + consciousness of the act of combination and of its principle, + and does not imply merely the possibility of it. Kant, of + course, does not hold this. + +The general conclusion, therefore, to be drawn is that the process of +synthesis by which the manifold is said to become related to an object +is a process not of knowledge but of construction in the literal +sense, and that it leaves knowledge of the thing constructed still to +be effected. But if knowing is obviously different from making, why +should Kant have apparently felt no difficulty in resolving knowing +into making? Three reasons may be given. + +In the first place, the very question, 'What does the process of +knowing consist in?' at least suggests that knowing can be resolved +into and stated in terms of something else. In this respect it +resembles the modern phrase '_theory_ of knowledge'. Moreover, since +it is plain that in knowing we are active, the question is apt to +assume the form, 'What do we _do_ when we know or think?' and since +one of the commonest forms of doing something is to perform a physical +operation on physical things, whereby we effect a recombination of +them on some plan, it is natural to try to resolve knowing into this +kind of doing, i. e. into making in a wide sense of the word. + +In the second place, Kant never relaxed his hold upon the thing in +itself. Consequently, there always remained for him a reality which +existed in itself and was not made by us. This was to him the +fundamental reality, and the proper object of knowledge, although +unfortunately inaccessible to _our_ faculties of knowing. Hence to +Kant it did not seriously matter that an inferior reality, viz. the +phenomenal world, was made by us in the process of knowing. + +In the third place, it is difficult, if not impossible, to read the +_Deduction_ without realizing that Kant failed to distinguish knowing +from that formation of mental imagery which accompanies knowing. The +process of synthesis, if it is even to seem to constitute knowledge +and to involve the validity of the categories, must really be a +process by which we construct, and recognize our construction of, +an individual reality in nature out of certain physical data. +Nevertheless, it is plain that what Kant normally describes as the +process of synthesis is really the process by which we construct an +imaginary picture of a reality in nature not present to perception, +i. e. by which we imagine to ourselves what it would look like if we +were present to perceive it. This is implied by his continued use of +the terms 'reproduction' and 'imagination' in describing the +synthesis. To be aware of an object of past perception, it is +necessary, according to him, that the object should be _re_produced. +It is thereby implied that the object of our present awareness is not +the object of past perception, but a mental image which copies or +reproduces it. The same implication is conveyed by his use of the term +'imagination' to describe the faculty by which the synthesis is +effected; for 'imagination' normally means the power of making a +mental image of something not present to perception, and this +interpretation is confirmed by Kant's own description of the +imagination as 'the faculty of representing an object even without +its presence in perception'.[37] Further, that Kant really fails +to distinguish the construction of mental imagery from literal +construction is shown by the fact that, although he insists that +the formation of an image and reproduction are both necessary for +knowledge, he does not consistently adhere to this. For his general +view is that the elements combined and recognized as combined are the +original data of sense, and not reproductions of them which together +form an image, and his instances imply that the elements retained in +thought, i. e. the elements of which we are aware subsequently to +perception, are the elements originally perceived, e. g. the parts of +a line or the units counted.[38] Moreover, in one passage Kant +definitely describes certain _objects_ of _perception_ taken together +as an _image_ of that 'kind' of which, when taken together, they are +an instance. "If I place five points one after another, . . . . . this +is an image of the number five."[39] Now, if it be granted that Kant +has in mind normally the process of imagining, we can see why he found +no difficulty in the thought of knowledge as construction. For while +we cannot reasonably speak of making _an object of knowledge_, we can +reasonably speak of making _a mental image_ through our own activity, +and also of making it in accordance with the categories and the +empirical laws which presuppose them. Moreover, the ease with which it +is possible to take the imagining which accompanies knowing for +knowing[40]--the image formed being taken to be the object known and +the forming it being taken to be the knowing it--renders it easy to +transfer the thought of construction to the knowledge itself. The only +defect, however, under which the view labours is the important one +that, whatever be the extent to which imagination must accompany +knowledge, it is distinct from knowledge. To realize the difference we +have only to notice that the process by which we present to ourselves +in imagination realities not present to perception presupposes, and is +throughout guided by, the knowledge of them. It should be noted, +however, that, although the process of which Kant is normally thinking +is doubtless that of constructing mental imagery, his real view must +be that knowledge consists in constructing a world out of the data of +sense, or, more accurately, as his instances show, out of the objects +of isolated perceptions, e. g. parts of a line or units to be counted. +Otherwise the final act of recognition would be an apprehension not of +the world of nature, but of an image of it. + + [37] B. 152, M. 93; cf. also Mah. 211, A. 120. + + [38] Cf. A. 102-3, Mah. 197-8. The fact is that the appeal to + reproduction is a useless device intended by Kant--and by + 'empirical psychologists'--to get round the difficulty of + allowing that in the apprehension (in memory or otherwise) of + a reality not present to perception, we are really aware of + the reality. The difficulty is in reality due to a + sensationalistic standpoint, avowed or unavowed, and the + device is useless, because the assumption has in the end to + be made, covertly or otherwise, that we are really aware of + the reality in question. + + [39] B. 179, M. 109. Cf. the whole passage B. 176-81, M. + 107-10 (part quoted pp. 249-51), and p. 251. + + [40] Cf. Locke and Hume. + +'This criticism,' it may be said, 'is too sweeping. It may be true +that the process which Kant describes is really making in the literal +sense and not knowing, but Kant's mistake may have been merely that of +thinking of the wrong kind of synthesis. For both ordinary language +and that of philosophical discussion imply that synthesis plays some +part in knowledge. Thus we find in ordinary language the phrases +'_putting_ 2 and 2 _together_' and '2 and 2 _make_ 4'. Even in +philosophical discussions we find it said that a complex conception, +e. g. gold, is a _synthesis_ of simple conceptions, e. g. yellowness, +weight, &c.; that in judgement we _relate_ or _refer_ the predicate to +the subject; and that in inference we _construct_ reality, though only +mentally or ideally. Further, in any case it is by thinking or knowing +that the world comes to be _for us_; the more we think, the more of +reality there is for us. Hence at least the world _for us_ or _our_ +world is due to our activity of knowing, and so is in some sense made +by us, i. e. by our relating activity.' + +This position, however, seems in reality to be based on a simple but +illegitimate transition, viz. the transition to the assertion that in +knowing we relate, or combine, or construct from the assertion that in +knowing we recognize as related, or combined, or constructed--the last +two terms being retained to preserve the parallelism.[41] While the +latter assertion may be said to be true, although the terms 'combined' +and 'constructed' should be rejected as misleading, the former +assertion must be admitted to be wholly false, i. e. true in no sense +whatever. Moreover, the considerations adduced in favour of the +position should, it seems, be met by a flat denial of their truth or, +if not, of their relevance. For when it is said that _our_ world, or +the world _for us_, is due to our activity of thinking, and so is in +some sense _made_ by us, all that should be meant is that our +_apprehending_ the world as whatever we apprehend it to be +_presupposes_ activity on our part. But since the activity is after +all only the activity itself of apprehending or knowing, this +assertion is only a way of saying that apprehending or knowing is not +a condition of mind which can be produced in us _ab extra_, but is +something which we have to do for ourselves. Nothing is implied to be +made. If anything is to be said to be made, it must be not our world +but our activity of apprehending the world; but even we and our +activity of apprehending the world are not related as maker and thing +made. Again, to speak of a complex conception, e. g. gold, and to say +that it involves a synthesis of simple conceptions by the mind is mere +'conceptualism'. If, as we ought to do, we replace the term +'conception' by 'universal', and speak of gold as a synthesis of +universals, any suggestion that the mind performs the synthesis will +vanish, for a 'synthesis of universals' will mean simply a connexion +of universals. All that is mental is our apprehension of their +connexion. Again, in judgement we cannot be said to _relate_ predicate +to subject. Such an assertion would mean either that we relate a +conception to a conception, or a conception to a reality[42], or a +reality to a reality; and, on any of these interpretations, it is +plainly false. To retain the language of 'relation' or of +'combination' at all, we must say that in judgement we recognize real +elements as related or combined. Again, when we infer, we do not +construct, ideally or otherwise. 'Ideal construction'[43] is a +contradiction in terms, unless it refers solely to mental imagining, +in which case it is not inference. Construction which is not 'ideal', +i. e. literal construction, plainly cannot constitute the nature of +inference; for inference would cease to be inference, if by it we +made, and did not apprehend, a necessity of connexion. Again, the +phrase '2 and 2 _make_ 4' does not justify the view that in some sense +we 'make' reality. It of course suggests that 2 and 2 are not 4 until +they are added, i. e. that the addition makes them 4.[44] But the +language is only appropriate when we are literally making a group of 4 +by physically placing 2 pairs of bodies in one group. Where we are +counting, we should say merely that 2 and 2 _are_ 4. Lastly, it must +be allowed that the use of the phrase 'putting two and two together', +to describe an inference from facts not quite obviously connected, is +loose and inexact. If we meet a dog with a blood-stained mouth and +shortly afterwards see a dead fowl, we may be said to put two and two +together and to conclude thereby that the dog killed the fowl. But, +strictly speaking, in drawing the inference we do not put anything +together. We certainly do not put together the facts that the mouth of +the dog is blood-stained and that the fowl has just been killed. We do +not even put the premises together, i. e. our apprehensions of these +facts. What takes place should be described by saying simply that +seeing that the fowl is killed, we also remember that the dog's mouth +was stained, and then apprehend a connexion between these facts. + + [41] Cf. Caird, i. 394, where Dr. Caird speaks of 'the + distinction of the activity of thought from the matter which + it _combines or recognizes as combined_ in the idea of an + object'. (The italics are mine.) The context seems to + indicate that the phrase is meant to express the truth, and + not merely Kant's view. + + [42] Cf. the account of judgement in Mr. Bradley's _Logic_. + + + [43] Cf. the account of inference in Mr. Bradley's _Logic_. + + [44] Cf. Bradley, _Logic_, pp. 370 and 506. + +The fact seems to be that the thought of synthesis in no way helps to +elucidate the nature of knowing, and that the mistake in principle +which underlies Kant's view lies in the implicit supposition that it +is possible to elucidate the nature of knowledge by means of something +other than itself. Knowledge is _sui generis_ and therefore a 'theory' +of it is impossible. Knowledge is simply knowledge, and any attempt to +state it in terms of something else must end in describing something +which is not knowledge.[45] + + [45] Cf. p. 124. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES + + +As has already been pointed out,[1] the _Analytic_ is divided into +two parts, the _Analytic of Conceptions_, of which the aim is to +discover and vindicate the validity of the categories, and the +_Analytic of Principles_, of which the aim is to determine the use +of the categories in judgement. The latter part, which has now to be +considered, is subdivided into two. It has, according to Kant, firstly +to determine the sensuous conditions under which the categories are +used, and secondly to discover the _a priori_ principles involved in +the categories, as exercised under these sensuous conditions, such, +for instance, as the law that all changes take place according to +the law of cause and effect. The first problem is dealt with in +the chapter on the 'schematism of the pure conceptions of the +understanding', the second in the chapter on the 'system of all +principles of the pure understanding'. + + [1] p. 141. + +We naturally feel a preliminary difficulty with respect to the +existence of this second part of the _Analytic_ at all. It seems clear +that if the first part is successful, the second must be unnecessary. +For if Kant is in a position to lay down that the categories must +apply to objects, no special conditions of their application need be +subsequently determined. If, for instance, it can be laid down that +the category of quantity must apply to objects, it is implied either +that there are no special conditions of its application, or that they +have already been discovered and shown to exist. Again, to assert the +applicability of the categories is really to assert the existence of +principles, and in fact of just those principles which it is the aim +of the _System of Principles_ to prove. Thus to assert the +applicability of the categories of quantity and of cause and effect is +to assert respectively the principles that all objects of perception +are extensive quantities, and that all changes take place according +to the law of cause and effect. The _Deduction of the Categories_ +therefore, if successful, must have already proved the principles +now to be vindicated; and it is a matter for legitimate surprise +that we find Kant in the _System of Principles_ giving proofs of +these principles which make no appeal to the _Deduction of the +Categories_.[2] On the other hand, for the existence of the account of +the schematism of the categories Kant has a better show of reason. For +the conceptions derived in the _Metaphysical Deduction_ from the +nature of formal judgement are in themselves too abstract to be the +conceptions which are to be shown applicable to the sensible world, +since all the latter involve the thought of time. Thus, the conception +of cause and effect derived from the nature of the hypothetical +judgement includes no thought of time, while the conception of which +he wishes to show the validity is that of necessary succession in +time. Hence the conceptions discovered by analysis of formal judgement +have in some way to be rendered more concrete in respect of time. The +account of the schematism, therefore, is an attempt to get out of the +false position reached by appealing to Formal Logic for the list of +categories. Nevertheless, the mention of a sensuous condition under +which alone the categories can be employed[3] should have suggested to +Kant that the transcendental deduction was defective, and, in fact, in +the second version of the transcendental deduction two paragraphs[4] +are inserted which take account of this sensuous condition. + + [2] The cause of Kant's procedure is, of course, to be found + in the unreal way in which he isolates conception from + judgement. + + [3] B. 175, M. 106. + + [4] B. §§ 24 and 26, M. §§ 20 and 22. + +The beginning of Kant's account of schematism may be summarized thus: +'Whenever we subsume an individual object of a certain kind, e. g. +a plate, under a conception, e. g. a circle, the object and the +conception must be homogeneous, that is to say, the individual must +possess the characteristic which constitutes the conception, or, in +other words, must be an instance of it. Pure conceptions, however, and +empirical perceptions, i. e. objects of empirical perception, are +quite heterogeneous. We do not, for instance, perceive cases of cause +and effect. Hence the problem arises, 'How is it possible to subsume +objects of empirical perception under pure conceptions?' The +possibility of this subsumption presupposes a _tertium quid_, which is +homogeneous both with the object of empirical perception and with the +conception, and so makes the subsumption mediately possible. This +_tertium quid_ must be, on the one side, intellectual and, on the +other side, sensuous. It is to be found in a 'transcendental +determination of time', i. e. a conception involving time and involved +in experience. For in the first place this is on the one side +intellectual and on the other sensuous, and in the second place it +is so far homogeneous with the category which constitutes its unity +that it is universal and rests on an _a priori_ rule, and so far +homogeneous with the phenomenon that all phenomena are in time[5]. +Such transcendental determinations of time are the schemata of the +pure conceptions of the understanding.' Kant continues as follows: + + [5] It may be noted that the argument here really fails. For + though phenomena as involving temporal relations, might + possibly be said to be instances of a transcendental + determination of time, the fact that the latter agrees with + the corresponding category by being universal and _a priori_ + does not constitute it homogeneous with the category, in the + sense required for subsumption, viz. that it is an instance + of or a species of the category. + +"The schema is in itself always a mere product of the imagination. +But since the synthesis of the imagination has for its aim no single +perception, but merely unity in the determination of the sensibility, +the schema should be distinguished from the image. Thus, if I place +five points one after another, . . . . . this is an image of the +number five. On the other hand, if I only just think a number in +general--no matter what it may be, five or a hundred--this thinking +is rather the representation of a method of representing in an image +a group (e. g. a thousand), in conformity with a certain conception, +than the image itself, an image which, in the instance given, I should +find difficulty in surveying and comparing with the conception. Now +this representation of a general procedure of the imagination to +supply its image to a conception, I call the schema of this +conception." + +"The fact is that it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie +at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could +ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For it +would not attain the generality of the conception which makes it valid +for all triangles, whether right-angled, acute-angled, &c., but would +always be limited to one part only of this sphere. The schema of the +triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and signifies a rule +of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in +space. An object of experience or an image of it always falls short of +the empirical conception to a far greater degree than does the schema; +the empirical conception always relates immediately to the schema of +the imagination as a rule for the determination of our perception in +conformity with a certain general conception. The conception of 'dog' +signifies a rule according to which my imagination can draw the +general outline of the figure of a four-footed animal, without being +limited to any particular single form which experience presents to me, +or indeed to any possible image that I can represent to myself _in +concreto_. This schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena +and their mere form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul, +whose true modes of action we are not likely ever to discover from +Nature and unveil. Thus much only can we say: the _image_ is a product +of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, while the +_schema_ of sensuous conceptions (such as of figures in space) is a +product and, as it were, a monogram of the pure _a priori_ +imagination, through which, and according to which, images first +become possible, though the images must be connected with the +conception only by means of the schema which they express, and are in +themselves not fully adequate to it. On the other hand, the schema of +a pure conception of the understanding is something which cannot be +brought to an image; on the contrary, it is only the pure synthesis in +accordance with a rule of unity according to conceptions in general, a +rule of unity which the category expresses, and it is a transcendental +product of the imagination which concerns the determination of the +inner sense in general according to conditions of its form (time) +with reference to all representations, so far as these are to be +connected _a priori_ in one conception according to the unity of +apperception."[6] + + [6] B. 179-81, M. 109-10. + +Now, in order to determine whether schemata can constitute the desired +link between the pure conceptions or categories and the manifold of +sense, it is necessary to follow closely this account of a schema. +Kant unquestionably in this passage treats as a mental image related +to a conception what really is, and what on his own theory ought to +have been, an individual object related to a conception, i. e. an +instance of it. In other words, he takes a mental image of an +individual for the individual itself.[7] On the one hand, he treats a +schema of a conception throughout as the thought of a procedure of the +imagination to present to the conception its _image_, and he opposes +schemata not to objects but to _images_; on the other hand, his +problem concerns subsumption under a conception, and what is subsumed +must be an instance of the conception, i. e. an individual object of +the kind in question.[8] Again, in asserting that if I place five +points one after another, . . . . . this is an image of the number +five, he is actually saying that an individual group of five points is +an image of a group of five in general.[9] Further, if the process of +schematizing is to enter--as it must--into knowledge of the phenomenal +world, what Kant here speaks of as the images related to a conception +must be taken to be individual instances of the conception, whatever +his language may be. For, in order to enter into knowledge, the +process referred to must be that by which _objects of experience_ are +constructed. Hence the passage should be interpreted as if throughout +there had been written for 'image' 'individual instance' or more +simply 'instance'. Again, the process of schematizing, although +_introduced_ simply as a process by which an individual is to be +subsumed indirectly under a conception, is assumed in the passage +quoted to be a process of _synthesis_. Hence we may say that the +process of schematizing is a process by which we combine the manifold +of perception into an individual whole in accordance with a +conception, and that the schema of a conception is the thought of the +rule of procedure on our part by which we combine the manifold in +accordance with the conception, and so bring the manifold under the +conception. Thus the schema of the conception of 100 is the thought of +a process of synthesis by which we combine say 10 groups of 10 units +into 100, and the schematizing of the conception of 100 is the process +by which we do so. Here it is essential to notice three points. In the +first place, the schema is a conception which relates not to the +reality apprehended but to us. It is the thought of a rule of +procedure on our part by which an instance of a conception is +constructed, and not the thought of a characteristic of the reality +constructed. For instance, the thought of a rule by which we can +combine points to make 100 is a thought which concerns us and not the +points; it is only the conception corresponding to this schema, viz. +the thought of 100, which concerns the points. In the second place, +although the thought of time is involved in the schema, the succession +in question lies not in the object, but in our act of construction +or apprehension. In the third place, the schema presupposes the +corresponding conception and the process of schematizing directly +brings the manifold of perception under the conception. Thus the +thought of combining 10 groups of 10 units to make 100 presupposes the +thought of 100, and the process of combination brings the units under +the conception of 100. + + [7] Cf. pp. 240-1. The mistake is, of course, facilitated by + the fact that 'objects in nature', being for Kant only + 'appearances', resemble mental images more closely than they + do as usually conceived. + + [8] Cf. B. 176, M. 107. That individuals are really referred + to is also implied in the assertion that 'the synthesis of + imagination has for its aim no single _perception_, but + merely unity in the determination of sensibility'. (The + italics are mine.) + + [9] Two sentences treat individual objects and images as + if they might be mentioned indifferently. "An object of + experience or an image of it always falls short of the + empirical conception to a far greater degree than does + the schema." "The conception of a 'dog' signifies a rule + according to which my imagination can draw the general + outline of the figure of a four-footed animal without being + limited to any single particular form which experience + presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can + represent to myself _in concreto_." + +If, however, we go on to ask what is required of schemata and of the +process of schematizing, if they are to enable the manifold to be +subsumed under the categories, we see that each of these three +characteristics makes it impossible for them to fulfil this purpose. +For firstly, an individual manifold A has to be brought under a +category B. Since _ex hypothesi_ this cannot be effected directly, +there is needed a mediating conception C. C, therefore, it would seem, +must be at once a species of B and a conception of which A is an +instance. In any case C must be a conception relating to the reality +to be known, and not to any process of knowing on our part, and, +again, it must be more concrete than B. This is borne out by the list +of the schemata of the categories. But, although a schema may be said +to be more concrete than the corresponding conception, in that it +presupposes the conception, it neither is nor involves a more +concrete conception of an _object_ and in fact, as has been pointed +out, relates not to the reality to be known but to the process on our +part by which we construct or apprehend it.[10] In the second place, +the time in respect of which the category B has to be made more +concrete must relate to the object, and not to the successive process +by which we apprehend it, whereas the time involved in a schema +concerns the latter and not the former. In the third place, from the +point of view of the categories, the process of schematizing should be +a process whereby we combine the manifold into a whole A in accordance +with the conception C, and thereby render _possible_ the subsumption +of A under the category B. If it be a process which actually subsumes +the manifold under B, it will _actually_ perform that, the very +impossibility of which has made it necessary to postulate such a +process at all. For, according to Kant, it is just the fact that the +manifold cannot be subsumed directly under the categories that renders +schematism necessary. Yet, on Kant's general account of a schema, the +schematizing must actually bring a manifold under the corresponding +conception. If we present to ourselves an individual triangle by +successively joining three lines according to the conception of a +triangle, i. e. so that they enclose a space, we are directly bringing +the manifold, i. e. the lines, under the conception of a triangle. +Again, if we present to ourselves an instance of a group of 100 by +combining 10 groups of 10 units of any kind, we are directly bringing +the units under the conception of 100. If this consideration be +applied to the schematism of a category, we see that the process said +to be necessary because a certain other process is impossible is the +very process said to be impossible. + + [10] It may be objected that, from Kant's point of view, the + thought of a rule of construction, and the thought of the + principle of the whole to be constructed, are the same thing + from different points of view. But if this be insisted on, + the schema and its corresponding conception become the same + thing regarded from different points of view; consequently + the schema will not be a more concrete conception of an + object than the corresponding conception, but it will be the + conception itself. + +If, therefore, Kant succeeds in finding schemata of the categories in +detail in the sense in which they are required for the solution of his +problem, i. e. in the sense of more concrete conceptions involving the +thought of time and relating to objects, we should expect either that +he ignores his general account of a schema, or that if he appeals to +it, the appeal is irrelevant. This we find to be the case. His account +of the first two transcendental schemata makes a wholly irrelevant +appeal to the temporal process of synthesis on our part, while his +account of the remaining schemata makes no attempt to appeal to it at +all. + +"The pure _schema_ of _quantity_, as a conception of the +understanding, is _number_, a representation which comprises the +successive addition of one to one (homogeneous elements). Accordingly, +number is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold +of a homogeneous perception in general, in that I generate time itself +in the apprehension of the perception."[11] + + [11] B. 182, M. 110. + +It is clear that this passage, whatever its precise interpretation may +be,[12] involves a confusion between the thought of counting and that +of number. The thought of number relates to objects of apprehension +and does not involve the thought of time. The thought of counting, +which presupposes the thought of number, relates to our apprehension +of objects and involves the thought of time; it is the thought of a +successive process on our part by which we count the number of units +contained in what we already know to consist of units.[13] Now we must +assume that the schema of quantity is really what Kant says it is, +viz. number, or to express it more accurately, the thought of number, +and not the thought of counting, with which he wrongly identifies it. +For his main problem is to find conceptions which at once are more +concrete than the categories and, at the same time, like the +categories, relate to objects, and the thought of counting, though +more concrete than that of number, does not relate to objects. Three +consequences follow. In the first place, although the schema of +quantity, i. e. the thought of number, is more concrete than the +thought of quantity,[14] it is not, as it should be, more concrete in +respect of time; for the thought of number does not include the +thought of time. Secondly, the thought of time is only introduced into +the schema of quantity irrelevantly by reference to the temporal +process of _counting_, by which we come to apprehend the number of a +given group of units. Thirdly, the schema of quantity is only in +appearance connected with the nature of a schema in general, as Kant +describes it, by a false identification of the thought of number with +the thought of the process on our part by which we count groups of +units, i. e. numbers. + + [12] The drift of the passage would seem to be this: 'If we + are to present to ourselves an instance of a quantity, we + must successively combine similar units until they form a + quantity. This process involves the thought of a successive + process by which we add units according to the conception of + a quantity. This thought is the thought of number, and since + by it we present to ourselves an instance of a quantity, it + is the schema of quantity.' But if this be its drift, + considerations of sense demand that it should be rewritten, + at least to the following extent: 'If we are to present to + ourselves an instance of a _particular_ quantity [which will + really be a particular number, for it must be regarded as + discrete, (cf. B. 212, M. 128 fin., 129 init.)] e. g. three, + we must successively combine units until they form _that_ + quantity. This process involves the thought of a successive + process, by which we add units according to the conception of + _that_ quantity. This thought is the thought of a particular + number, and since by it we present to ourselves an instance + of _that_ quantity, this thought is the schema of _that_ + quantity.' If this rewriting be admitted to be necessary, it + must be allowed that Kant has confused (_a_) the thoughts of + particular quantities and of particular numbers with those of + quantity and of number in general respectively, (_b_) the + thought of a particular quantity with that of a particular + number (for the process referred to presupposes that the + particular quantity taken is known to consist of a number of + equal units) and (_c_) the thought of counting with that of + number. + + [13] This statement is, of course, not meant as a definition + of counting, but as a means of bringing out the distinction + between a process of counting and a number. + + [14] For the thought of a number is the thought of a quantity + of a special kind, viz. of a quantity made up of a number of + similar units without remainder. + +The account of the schema of reality, the second category, runs as +follows: "Reality is in the pure conception of the understanding that +which corresponds to a sensation in general, that therefore of which +the conception in itself indicates a being (in time), while negation +is that of which the conception indicates a not being (in time). Their +opposition, therefore, arises in the distinction between one and the +same time as filled or empty. Since time is only the form of +perception, consequently of objects as phenomena, that which in +objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all +objects as things in themselves (thinghood, reality).[15] Now every +sensation has a degree or magnitude by which it can fill the same +time, i. e. the internal sense, in respect of the same representation +of an object, more or less, until it vanishes into nothing ( = 0 = +_negatio_). There is, therefore, a relation and connexion between +reality and negation, or rather a transition from the former to the +latter, which makes every reality representable as a _quantum_; and +the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something so far as it +fills time, is just this continuous and uniform generation of the +reality in time, as we descend in time from the sensation which has a +certain degree, down to the vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend +from negation to the magnitude thereof."[16] + + [15] It is difficult to see how Kant could meet the criticism + that here, contrary to his intention, he is treating physical + objects as things in themselves. Cf. p. 265. + + [16] B. 182-3, M. 110-11. + +This passage, if it be taken in connexion with the account of the +anticipations of perception,[17] seems to have the following meaning: +'In thinking of something as a reality, we think of it as that which +corresponds to, i. e. produces, a sensation, and therefore as +something which, like the sensation, is in time; and just as every +sensation, which, as such, occupies time, has a certain degree of +intensity, so has the reality which produces it. Now to produce for +ourselves an instance of a reality in this sense, we must add units of +reality till a reality of the required degree is produced, and the +thought of this method on our part of constructing an individual +reality is the schema of reality.' But if this represents Kant's +meaning, the schema of reality relates only to our process of +apprehension, and therefore is not a conception which relates to +objects and is more concrete than the corresponding category in +respect of time. Moreover, it is matter for surprise that in the case +of this category Kant should have thought schematism necessary, for +time is actually included in his own statement of the category. + + [17] B. 207-18, M. 125-32. + +The account of the schemata of the remaining categories need not be +considered. It merely _asserts_ that certain conceptions relating +to objects and involving the thought of time are the schemata +corresponding to the remaining categories, without any attempt to +connect them with the nature of a schema. Thus, the schema of +substance is asserted to be the _permanence_ of the real _in time_, +that of cause the _succession_ of the manifold, in so far as that +succession is subjected to a rule, that of interaction the +_coexistence_ of the determinations or accidents of one substance +with those of another according to a universal rule.[18] Again, the +schemata of possibility, of actuality and of necessity are said to be +respectively the accordance of the synthesis of representations with +the conditions of time in general, existence in a determined time, and +existence of an object in all time. + + [18] The italics are mine. + +The main confusion pervading the chapter is of course that between +temporal relations which concern the process of apprehension and +temporal relations which concern the realities apprehended. Kant is +continually referring to the former as if they were the latter. The +cause of this confusion lies in Kant's reduction of physical realities +to representations. Since, according to him, these realities are only +our representations, all temporal relations are really relations of +our representations, and these relations have to be treated at one +time as relations of our apprehensions, and at another as relations of +the realities apprehended, as the context requires. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES + + +As has been pointed out,[1] the aim of the second part of the +_Analytic of Principles_ is to determine the _a priori_ principles +involved in the use of the categories under the necessary sensuous +conditions. These principles Kant divides into four classes, +corresponding to the four groups of categories, and he calls +them respectively 'axioms of perception', 'anticipations of +sense-perception', 'analogies of experience', and 'postulates of +empirical thought'. The first two and the last two classes are grouped +together as 'mathematical' and 'dynamical' respectively, on the ground +that the former group concerns the perception of objects, i. e. their +nature apprehended in perception, while the latter group concerns +their existence, and that consequently, since assertions concerning +the existence of objects presuppose the realization of empirical +conditions which assertions concerning their nature do not, only the +former possesses an absolute necessity and an immediate evidence such +as is found in mathematics.[2] + + [1] p. 246. + + [2] The assertion that all perceptions (i. e. all objects of + perception) are extensive quantities relates, according to + Kant, to the nature of objects, while the assertion that an + event must have a necessary antecedent affirms that such an + antecedent must exist, but gives no clue to its specific + nature. Compare "But the existence of phenomena cannot be + known _a priori_, and although we could be led in this way to + infer the fact of some existence, we should not know this + existence determinately, i. e. we could not anticipate the + respect in which the empirical perception of it differed from + that of other existences". (B. 221, M. 134). Kant seems to + think that the fact that the dynamical principles relate to + the existence of objects is a sufficient justification of + their name. + + It needs but little reflection to see that the distinctions + which Kant draws between the mathematical and the dynamical + principles must break down. + +These two groups of principles are not, as their names might suggest, +principles within mathematics and physics, but presuppositions of +mathematics and physics respectively. Kant also claims appropriateness +for the special terms used of each minor group to indicate the kind of +principles in question, viz. 'axioms', 'anticipations', 'analogies', +'postulates'. But it may be noted as an indication of the +artificiality of the scheme that each of the first two groups contains +only one principle, although Kant refers to them in the plural as +axioms and anticipations respectively, and although the existence of +three categories corresponding to each group would suggest the +existence of three principles. + +The axiom of perception is that 'All perceptions are extensive +quantities'. The proof of it runs thus: + +"An extensive quantity I call that in which the representation of the +parts renders possible the representation of the whole (and therefore +necessarily precedes it). I cannot represent to myself any line, +however small it may be, without drawing it in thought, that is, +without generating from a point all its parts one after another, and +thereby first drawing this perception. Precisely the same is the case +with every, even the smallest, time.... Since the pure perception in +all phenomena is either time or space, every phenomenon as a +perception is an extensive quantity, because it can be known in +apprehension only by a successive synthesis (of part with part). All +phenomena, therefore, are already perceived as aggregates (groups of +previously given parts), which is not the case with quantities of +every kind, but only with those which are represented and apprehended +by us as _extensive_."[3] + + [3] B. 203-4, M. 123. + +Kant opposes an extensive quantity to an intensive quantity or a +quantity which has a degree. "That quantity which is apprehended +only as unity and in which plurality can be represented only by +approximation to negation = 0, I call _intensive quantity_."[4] The +aspect of this ultimate distinction which underlies Kant's mode of +stating it is that only an extensive quantity is a whole, i. e. +something made up of parts. Thus a mile can be said to be made up +of two half-miles, but a velocity of one foot per second, though +comparable with a velocity of half a foot per second, cannot be said +to be made up of two such velocities; it is essentially one and +indivisible. Hence, from Kant's point of view, it follows that it is +only an extensive magnitude which can, and indeed must, be apprehended +through a successive synthesis of the parts. The proof of the axiom +seems to be simply this: 'All phenomena as objects of perception are +subject to the forms of perception, space and time. Space and time are +[homogeneous manifolds, and therefore] extensive quantities, only +to be apprehended by a successive synthesis of the parts. Hence +phenomena, or objects of experience, must also be extensive +quantities, to be similarly apprehended.' And Kant goes on to add that +it is for this reason that geometry and pure mathematics generally +apply to objects of experience. + + [4] B. 210, M. 127. + +We need only draw attention to three points. Firstly, no justification +is given of the term 'axiom'. Secondly, the argument does not really +appeal to the doctrine of the categories, but only to the character +of space and time as forms of perception. Thirdly, it need not appeal +to space and time as forms of perception in the proper sense of ways +in which we apprehend objects, but only in the sense of ways in which +objects are related[5]; in other words, it need not appeal to Kant's +theory of knowledge. The conclusion follows simply from the nature of +objects as spatially and temporally related, whether they are +phenomena or not. It may be objected that Kant's thesis is that _all_ +objects of perception are extensive quantities, and that unless space +and time are allowed to be ways in which _we must perceive_ objects, +we cannot say that all objects will be spatially and temporally +related, and so extensive quantities. But to this it may be replied +that it is only true that all objects of perception are extensive +quantities if the term 'object of perception' be restricted to parts +of the physical world, i. e. to just those realities which Kant is +thinking of as spatially and temporally related,[6] and that this +restriction is not justified, since a sensation or a pain which has +only intensive quantity is just as much entitled to be called an +object of perception. + + [5] Cf. pp. 37-9. + + [6] The context shows that Kant is thinking only of such + temporal relations as belong to the physical world, and not + of those which belong to us as apprehending it. Cf. p. 139. + +The anticipation of sense-perception consists in the principle that +'In all phenomena, the real, which is an object of sensation, has +intensive magnitude, i. e. a degree'. The proof is stated thus: + +"Apprehension merely by means of sensation fills only one moment +(that is, if I do not take into consideration the succession of many +sensations). Sensation, therefore, as that in the phenomenon the +apprehension of which is not a successive synthesis advancing from +parts to a complete representation, has no extensive quantity; the +lack of sensation in one and the same moment would represent it as +empty, consequently = 0. Now that which in the empirical perception +corresponds to sensation is reality (_realitas phaenomenon_); that +which corresponds to the lack of it is negation = 0. But every +sensation is capable of a diminution, so that it can decrease and thus +gradually vanish. Therefore, between reality in the phenomenon and +negation there exists a continuous connexion of many possible +intermediate sensations, the difference of which from each other is +always smaller than that between the given sensation and zero, or +complete negation. That is to say, the real in the phenomenon has +always a quantity, which, however, is not found in apprehension, since +apprehension takes place by means of mere sensation in one moment and +not by a successive synthesis of many sensations, and therefore does +not proceed from parts to the whole. Consequently, it has a quantity, +but not an extensive quantity." + +"Now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity, and in which +plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation = 0, +I call an _intensive quantity_. Every reality, therefore, in a +phenomenon has intensive quantity, that is, a degree."[7] + + [7] B. 209-10, M. 127. + +In other words, 'We can lay down _a priori_ that all sensations have a +certain degree of intensity, and that between a sensation of a given +intensity and the total absence of sensation there is possible an +infinite number of sensations varying in intensity from nothing to +that degree of intensity. Therefore the real, which corresponds to +sensation, can also be said _a priori_ to admit of an infinite variety +of degree.' + +Though the principle established is of little intrinsic importance, +the account of it is noticeable for two reasons. In the first place, +although Kant clearly means by the 'real corresponding to sensation' a +body in space, and regards it as a phenomenon, it is impossible to see +how he can avoid the charge that he in fact treats it as a thing in +itself.[8] For the correspondence must consist in the fact that the +real causes or excites sensation in us, and therefore the real, i. e. +a body in space, is implied to be a thing in itself. In fact, Kant +himself speaks of considering the real in the phenomenon as the cause +of sensation,[9] and, in a passage added in the second edition, after +proving that sensation must have an intensive quantity, he says that, +corresponding to the intensive quantity of sensation, an intensive +quantity, i. e. _a degree of influence on sense_, must be attributed +to all objects of sense-perception.[10] The difficulty of consistently +maintaining that the real, which corresponds to sensation, is a +phenomenon is, of course, due to the impossibility of distinguishing +between reality and appearance within phenomena.[11] + + [8] Cf. p. 257 note. + + [9] B. 210, M. 128. + + [10] B. 208, M. 126. The italics are mine. Cf. from the same + passage, "Phenomena contain, over and above perception, the + materials for some object (through which is represented + something existing in space and time), i. e. they contain the + real of sensation as a merely subjective representation of + which we can only become conscious that _the subject is + affected_, and which we relate _to an object in general_." + (The italics are mine.) + + [11] Cf. pp. 94-100. + +In the second place, Kant expressly allows that in this anticipation +we succeed in discovering _a priori_ a characteristic of sensation, +although sensation constitutes that empirical element in phenomena, +which on Kant's general view cannot be apprehended _a priori_. + +"Nevertheless, this anticipation of sense-perception must always be +somewhat surprising to an inquirer who is used to transcendental +reflection, and is thereby rendered cautious. It leads us to feel some +misgiving as to whether the understanding can anticipate such a +synthetic proposition as that respecting the degree of all that is +real in phenomena, and consequently respecting the possibility of the +internal distinction of sensation itself, if we abstract from its +empirical quality. There remains, therefore, a problem not unworthy of +solution, viz. 'How can the understanding pronounce synthetically and +_a priori_ upon phenomena in this respect, and thus anticipate +phenomena even in that which is specially and merely empirical, viz. +that which concerns sensations?'"[12] But although Kant recognizes +that the anticipation is surprising, he is not led to revise his +general theory, as being inconsistent with the existence of the +anticipation. He indeed makes an attempt[13] to deal with the +difficulty; but his solution consists not in showing that the +anticipation is consistent with his general theory--as he should have +done, if the theory was to be retained--but in showing that, in the +case of the degree of sensation, we do apprehend the nature of +sensation _a priori_. + + [12] B. 217, M. 131; cf. B. 209, M. 127. + + [13] B. 217-18, M. 132. + +Strangely enough, Hume finds himself face to face with what is in +principle the same difficulty, and treats it in a not dissimilar way. +"There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove, +that 'tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their +correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allow'd, that +the several distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or +those of sounds, which are convey'd by the hearing, are really +different from each other, tho' at the same time resembling. Now if +this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the +different shades of the same colour, that each of them produces a +distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this shou'd be deny'd, +'tis possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour +insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow +any of the means to be different, you cannot without absurdity deny +the extremes to be the same. Suppose therefore a person to have +enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well +acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade +of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet +with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single +one, be plac'd before him, descending gradually from the deepest to +the lightest; 'tis plain that he will perceive a blank, where that +shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater +distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any +other. Now I ask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own +imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the +idea of that particular shade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him +by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he +can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not +always derived from the correspondent impressions; tho' the instance +is so particular and singular, that 'tis scarce worth our observing, +and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general +maxim."[14] + + [14] Hume, _Treatise_, Bk. I, Part 1, § 1. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE + + +Each of the three categories of relation, i. e. those of substance and +accident, of cause and effect, and of interaction between agent and +patient involves, according to Kant, a special principle, and these +special principles he calls 'analogies of experience'. They are stated +thus:[1] (1) In all changes of phenomena the substance is permanent, +and its quantity in nature is neither increased nor diminished. (2) +All changes take place according to the law of the connexion of cause +and effect. (3) All substances, so far as they can be perceived in +space as coexistent, are in complete interaction. The justification of +the term _analogy_ of experience is as follows. In mathematics an +analogy is a formula which asserts the equality of two _quantitative_ +relations, and is such that, if three of the terms are given, we can +discover the fourth, e. g. if we know that _a_ : _b_ = _c_ : _d_, and +that _a_ = 2, _b_ = 4, _c_ = 6 we can discover that _d_ = 12. But in +philosophy an analogy is the assertion of the equality of two +_qualitative_ relations and is such that, if three of the terms are +given, we can discover, not the fourth, but only the relation of the +third to the fourth, though at the same time we are furnished with a +clue whereby to search for the fourth in experience. In this +philosophical sense, the principles involved in the categories of +relation are analogies. For instance, the principles of causality can +be stated in the form 'Any known event _X_ is to _some other_ event +_Y_, whatever it be, as effect to cause'; so stated, it clearly +informs us not of the character of _Y_ but only of the fact that there +must be a _Y_, i. e. a necessary antecedent, though at the same time +this knowledge enables us to search in experience for the special +character of _Y_. + + [1] The formulation of them in the first edition is slightly + different. + +The principles to be established relate to the two kinds of temporal +relation apprehended in the world of nature, viz. coexistence and +succession. The _method_ of proof, which is to be gathered from the +proofs themselves rather than from Kant's general remarks[2] on the +subject, is the same in each case. Kant expressly rejects any proof +which is 'dogmatical' or 'from conceptions', e. g. any attempt to show +that the very conception of change presupposes the thought of an +identical subject of change.[3] The proof is transcendental in +character, i. e. it argues that the principle to be established is a +condition of the possibility of _apprehending_ the temporal relation +in question, e. g. that the existence of a permanent subject of change +is presupposed in any _apprehension_ of change. It assumes that we +become aware of sequences and coexistences in the world of nature by a +process which begins with a succession of mere perceptions, i. e. +perceptions which are so far not the perceptions of a sequence or of a +coexistence or indeed of anything;[4] and it seeks to show that this +process involves an appeal to one of the principles in question--the +particular principle involved depending on the temporal relation +apprehended--and consequently, that since we do apprehend this +temporal relation, which, as belonging to the world of nature, must be +distinct from any temporal relation of our perceptions, the principle +appealed to is valid. + + [2] B. 218-24, M. 132-6; and B. 262-5, M. 159-61. + + [3] B. 263-4, M. 160-1; B. 289, M. 174-5. + + [4] This assumption is of course analogous to the assumption + which underlies the _Transcendental Deduction of the + Categories_, that knowledge begins with the successive + origination in us of isolated data of sense. + +The proof of the first analogy is given somewhat differently in the +first edition, and in a passage added in the second. The earlier +version, which is a better expression of the attitude underlying +Kant's general remarks on the analogy, is as follows: + +"Our _apprehension_ of the manifold of a phenomenon is always +successive, and is therefore always changing. By it alone, therefore, +we can never determine whether this manifold, as an object of +experience, is coexistent or successive, unless there lies at the base +of it something that exists _always_, that is, something _enduring_ +and _permanent_, of which all succession and coexistence are nothing +but so many ways (_modi_ of time) in which the permanent exists. Only +in the permanent, then, are time relations possible (for simultaneity +and succession are the only relations in time); i. e. the permanent is +the _substratum_ of the empirical representation of time itself, in +which alone all time-determination is possible. Permanence expresses +in general time, as the persisting correlate of all existence of +phenomena, of all change, and of all concomitance.... Only through the +permanent does _existence_ in different parts of the successive series +of time gain a _quantity_ which we call _duration_. For, in mere +succession, existence is always vanishing and beginning, and never +has the least quantity. Without this permanent, then, no time +relation is possible. Now, time in itself cannot be perceived[5]; +consequently this permanent in phenomena is the substratum of all +time-determination, and therefore also the condition of the +possibility of all synthetic unity of sense-perceptions, that is, of +experience, and in this permanent all existence and all change in time +can only be regarded as a mode of the existence of that which endures +and is permanent. Therefore in all phenomena the permanent is the +object itself, i. e. the substance (_phenomenon_); but all that +changes or can change belongs only to the way in which this substance +or substances exist, consequently to their determinations."[6] +"Accordingly since substance cannot change in existence, its quantity +in nature can neither be increased nor diminished."[7] The argument +becomes plainer if it be realized that in the interval between the two +editions, Kant came to think that the permanent in question was matter +or bodies in space.[8] "We find that in order to give something +_permanent_ in perception corresponding to the conception of +_substance_ (and thereby to exhibit the objective reality of this +conception), we need a perception _in space_ (of matter), because +space alone has permanent determinations, while time, and consequently +everything which is in the internal sense, is continually flowing."[9] + + [5] _Wahrgenommen._ + + [6] A. 182-4 and B. 225-7, M. 137-8. This formulation of the + conclusion is adapted only to the form in which the first + analogy is stated in the first edition, viz. "All phenomena + contain the permanent (_substance_) as the object itself and + the changeable as its mere determination, i. e. as a way + in which the object exists." Hence a sentence from the + conclusion of the proof added in the second edition is quoted + to elucidate Kant's meaning; its doctrine is as legitimate a + conclusion of the argument given in the first edition as of + that peculiar to the second. + + [7] B. 225, M. 137. + + [8] Cf. Caird, i. 541-2. + + [9] B. 291, M. 176 (in 2nd ed. only). Cf. B. 277 fin.-278 + init., M. 168 (in 2nd ed. only). + +Kant's thought appears to be as follows: 'Our apprehension of the +manifold consists of a series of successive acts in which we apprehend +its elements one by one and in isolation. This apprehension, +therefore, does not enable us to determine that its elements are +temporally related either as successive or as coexistent.[10] In order +to determine this, we must apprehend the elements of the manifold as +related to something permanent. For a succession proper, i. e. a +change, is a succession of states or determinations of something +permanent or unchanging. A mere succession which is not a succession +of states of something which remains identical is an unconnected +series of endings and beginnings, and with respect to it, 'duration', +which has meaning with regard to changes, i. e. successions proper, +has no meaning at all. Similarly, coexistence is a coexistence of +states of two permanents. Hence, to apprehend elements of the manifold +as successive or coexistent, we must apprehend them in relation to a +permanent or permanents. Therefore, to apprehend a coexistence or a +succession, we must perceive something permanent. But this permanent +something cannot be time, for time cannot be perceived. It must +therefore be a permanent in phenomena; and this must be the object +itself or the substance of a phenomenon, i. e. the substratum of the +changes which it undergoes, or that of which the elements of the +manifold are states or modifications.[11] Consequently, there must be +a permanent substance of a phenomenon, and the quantity of substances +taken together must be constant.' + + [10] The account of the first analogy as a whole makes it + necessary to think that Kant in the first two sentences of + the proof quoted does not mean exactly what he says, what he + says being due to a desire to secure conformity with his + treatment of the second and third analogies. What he _says_ + suggests (1) that he is about to discuss the implications, + not of the process by which we come to apprehend the manifold + as temporally related in one of the two ways possible, i. e. + either as successive or as coexistent, but of the process by + which we decide whether the relation of the manifold which we + already know to be temporal is that of succession or that of + coexistence, and (2) that the necessity for this process is + due to the fact that our _apprehension_ of the manifold is + always successive. The context, however, refutes both + suggestions, and in any case it is the special function of + the processes which involve the second and third analogies to + determine the relations of the manifold as that of succession + and that of coexistence respectively. + + [11] Cf. B. 225, M. 137 (first half). + +Now, if Kant's thought has been here represented fairly, it is open to +the following comments. In the first place, even if his position be +right in the main, Kant should not introduce the thought of the +_quantity_ of substance, and speak of the quantity as constant. For he +thereby implies that in a plurality of substances--if such a plurality +can in the end be admitted--there may be total extinction of, or +partial loss in, some, if only there be a corresponding compensation +in others; whereas such extinction and creation would be inconsistent +with the nature of a substance.[12] Even Kant himself speaks of having +established the impossibility of the origin and extinction of +substance.[13] + + [12] I owe this comment to Professor Cook Wilson. + + [13] B. 232-3, M. 141 fin. + +In the second place, it is impossible to see how it can be legitimate +for Kant to speak of a permanent substratum of change at all.[14] For +phenomena or appearances neither are nor imply the substratum of which +Kant is thinking. They might be held to imply ourselves as the +identical substratum of which they are successive states, but this +view would be irrelevant to, if not inconsistent with, Kant's +doctrine. It is all very well to _say_ that the substratum is to be +found in matter, i. e. in bodies in space,[15] but the assertion is +incompatible with the phenomenal character of the world; for the +sensations or appearances produced in us by the thing in itself cannot +be successive states of bodies in space. In the third place, in spite +of Kant's protests against any proof which is 'dogmatical' or 'from +conceptions', such a proof really forms the basis of his thought. For +if the argument is to proceed not from the nature of change as such +but from the possibility of perceiving change, it must not take into +account any implications of the possibility of perceiving change which +rest upon implications of the nature of change as such. Yet this is +what the argument does. For the reason really given for the view that +the apprehension of change involves the apprehension of the manifold +as related to a permanent substratum is that a change, as such, +implies a permanent substratum. It is only because change is held to +imply a substratum that we are said to be able to apprehend a change +only in relation to a substratum. Moreover, shortly afterwards, Kant, +apparently without realizing what he is doing, actually uses what is, +on the very face of it, the dogmatic method, and in accordance with it +develops the implications of the perception of change. "Upon this +permanence is based the justification of the conception of _change_. +Coming into being and perishing are not changes of that which comes to +be or perishes. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on +another mode of existence of the same object. Hence everything which +changes _endures_ and only its _condition changes_.... Change, +therefore, can be perceived only in substances, and absolute coming to +be or perishing, which does not concern merely a determination of the +permanent, cannot be a possible perception."[16] Surely the fact that +Kant is constrained in spite of himself to use the dogmatic method is +some indication that it is the right method. It is in reality +impossible to make any discoveries about change, or indeed about +anything, except by consideration of the nature of the thing itself; +no study of the conditions under which it can be apprehended can throw +any light upon its nature.[17] Lastly, although the supposition is not +so explicit as the corresponding supposition made in the case of the +other analogies, Kant's argument really assumes, and assumes wrongly, +the existence of a process by which, starting with the successive +apprehension of elements of the manifold in isolation, we come to +apprehend them as temporally related. + + [14] The term 'permanent' is retained to conform to Kant's + language. Strictly speaking, only a state of that which + changes can be said to persist or to be permanent; for the + substratum of change is not susceptible of any temporal + predicates. Cf. p. 306. + + [15] B. 291, M. 176. + + [16] B. 230-1, M. 176. + + [17] Cf. pp. 300-1. + +The deduction of the second and third analogies argues that the +principles of causality and reciprocal action are involved +respectively in the processes by which we become aware of successions +and of coexistences in the world of nature. From this point of view it +would seem that the first analogy is a presupposition of the others, +and that the process which involves the first is presupposed by the +process which involves the others. It would seem that it is only upon +the conclusion of a process by which, beginning with the successive +apprehension of elements of the manifold in isolation, we come to +apprehend them as _either_ successive or coexistent elements in the +world of nature, that there can arise a process by which we come to +decide _whether_ the specific relation is that of succession or of +coexistence. For if the latter process can take place independently of +the former, i. e. if it can start from the successive apprehension of +the manifold, the former process will be unnecessary, and in that +case the vindication of the first analogy will be invalid. It is +necessary, however, to distinguish between Kant's nominal and his +actual procedure. Though he nominally regards the first analogy as the +presupposition of the others,[18] he really does not. For he does not +in fact treat the process which involves the validity of the first +analogy as an antecedent condition of the processes which involve the +validity of the others. On the contrary, the latter processes begin +_ab initio_ with the mere successive apprehension of the manifold, +i. e. they begin at a stage where we are not aware of any relation in +the physical world at all; and Kant, in his account of them, nowhere +urges that they involve the first analogy.[19] + + [18] Cf. B. 229, M. 140; B. 232-3, M. 141-2; and Caird, i. + 545 and ff. + + [19] This is not disproved by B. 247-51, M. 150-2, which + involves a different conception of cause and effect. + +Moreover, just because Kant does not face the difficulties involved in +the thought of a process which begins in this way until he comes to +vindicate causality, it is only when we come to this vindication that +we realize the real nature of his deduction of the analogies, and, in +particular, of that of the first. + +Kant, prompted no doubt by his desire to answer Hume, treats the +principle of causality very fully. The length of the discussion, +however, is due not so much to the complication of the argument as to +Kant's desire to make his meaning unmistakable; his account consists +mainly in a repetition of what is substantially the same argument no +less than five times. Hence it will suffice to consider those passages +which best express Kant's meaning. At the same time, the prominence of +the principle of causality in Kant's theory, and in the history of +philosophy generally, and also the way in which Kant's treatment of +it reveals the true nature of his general position, makes it necessary +to consider these passages in some detail. + +Hume had denied that we are justified in asserting any causal +connexion, i. e. any necessity of succession in the various events +which we perceive, but even this denial presupposed that we do +apprehend particular sequences in the world of nature, and therefore +that we succeed in distinguishing between a sequence of events in +nature and a mere sequence of perceptions, such as is also to be found +when we apprehend a coexistence of bodies in space. Kant urges, in +effect, that this denial renders it impossible to explain, as we +should be able to do, the possibility of making the distinction in +question, which even the denial itself presupposes that we make. +Holding, with Hume, that in all cases of perception what we are +directly aware of is a succession of perceptions, he contends that it +is necessary to explain how in certain cases we succeed in passing +from the knowledge of our successive perceptions to the knowledge of a +succession in what we perceive. How is it that we know, when, as we +say, we see a boat going down stream, that there is a succession in +what we perceive, and not merely a succession in our perception of it, +as is the case when, as we say, we see the parts of a house? Hume, +according to Kant, cannot answer this question; he has only the right +to say that in all cases we have a succession of perceptions; for in +reality an answer to the question will show that the acquisition of +this knowledge involves an appeal to the principle of causality. +Since, then, we do in fact, as even Hume implicitly allowed, succeed +in distinguishing between a succession in objects in nature and a +succession in our apprehension of them, the law of causality must be +true. "It is only under this presupposition (i. e. of causality) that +even the experience of an event is possible."[20] + + [20] B. 240, M. 146. For the general view, cf. Caird, i. + 556-61. + +Kant begins[21] his proof as follows: "Our apprehension of the +manifold of a phenomenon is always successive. The representations of +the parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one another in the +object also is a second point for reflection which is not contained in +the first."[22] But, before he can continue, the very nature of these +opening sentences compels him to consider a general problem which they +raise. The distinction referred to between a succession in our +apprehensions or representations and a succession in the object +implies an object distinct from the apprehensions or representations. +What, then, can be meant by such an object? For prima facie, if we +ignore the thing in itself as unknowable, there is no object; there +are only representations. But, in that case, what can be meant by a +succession in the object? Kant is therefore once more[23] forced to +consider the question 'What is meant by object of representations?' +although on this occasion with special reference to the meaning of a +succession in the object; and the vindication of causality is bound up +with the answer. The answer is stated thus: + + [21] The preceding paragraph is an addition of the second + edition. + + [22] B. 234, M. 142. + + [23] Cf. A. 104-5, Mah. 198-9, and pp. 178-86 and 230-3. + +"Now we may certainly give the name of object to everything, and even +to every representation, so far as we are conscious thereof; but what +this word may mean in the case of phenomena, not in so far as they (as +representations) are objects, but in so far as they only indicate an +object, is a question requiring deeper consideration. So far as they, +as representations only, are at the same time objects of +consciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension, +i. e. reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we must +therefore say, 'The manifold of phenomena is always produced +successively in the mind'. If phenomena were things in themselves, no +man would be able to infer from the succession of the representations +of their manifold how this manifold is connected in the object. For +after all we have to do only with our representations; how things may +be in themselves, without regard to the representations through which +they affect us, is wholly outside the sphere of our knowledge. Now, +although phenomena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless +the only thing which can be given to us as data for knowledge, it is +my business to show what kind of connexion in time belongs to the +manifold in phenomena themselves, while the representation of this +manifold in apprehension is always successive. Thus, for example, the +apprehension of the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands +before me is successive. Now arises the question, whether the manifold +of this house itself is in itself also successive, which of course no +one will grant. But, so soon as I raise my conceptions of an object to +the transcendental meaning thereof, the house is not a thing in +itself, but only a phenomenon, i. e. a representation, the +transcendental object of which is unknown. What, then, am I to +understand by the question, 'How may the manifold be connected in the +phenomenon itself (which is nevertheless nothing in itself)?' Here +that which lies in the successive apprehension is regarded as +representation, while the phenomenon which is given me, although it +is nothing more than a complex of these representations, is regarded +as the object thereof, with which my conception, drawn from the +representations of apprehension, is to agree. It is soon seen that, +since agreement of knowledge with the object is truth, we can ask here +only for the formal conditions of empirical truth, and that the +phenomenon, in opposition to the representations of apprehension, can +only be represented as the object of the same, distinct therefrom, if +it stands under a rule, which distinguishes it from every other +apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of conjunction of the +manifold. That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of this +necessary rule of apprehension is the object."[24] + + [24] B. 234-6, M. 143-4. Cf. B. 242, M. 147. + +This passage is only intelligible if we realize the _impasse_ into +which Kant has been led by his doctrine that objects, i. e. realities +in the physical world, are only representations or ideas. As has +already been pointed out,[25] an apprehension is essentially +inseparable from a reality of which it is the apprehension. In other +words, an apprehension is always the apprehension of a reality, and a +reality apprehended, i. e. an object of apprehension, cannot be stated +in terms of the apprehension of it. We never confuse an apprehension +and its object; nor do we take the temporal relations which belong to +the one for the temporal relations which belong to the other, for +these relations involve different terms which are never confused, viz. +apprehensions and the objects apprehended. Now Kant, by his doctrine +of the unknowability of the thing in itself, has really deprived +himself of an object of apprehension or, in his language, of an +object of representations. For it is the thing in itself which is, +properly speaking, the object of the representations of which he is +thinking, i. e. representations of a reality in nature; and yet the +thing in itself, being on his view inapprehensible, can never be for +him an object in the proper sense, i. e. a reality apprehended. Hence +he is only able to state the fact of knowledge in terms of mere +apprehensions, or ideas, or representations--the particular name is a +matter of indifference--and consequently his efforts to recover an +object of apprehension are fruitless. As a matter of fact, these +efforts only result in the assertion that the object of +representations consists in the representations themselves related in +a certain necessary way. But this view is open to two fatal +objections. In the first place, a complex of representations is just +not an object in the proper sense, i. e. a reality apprehended. It +essentially falls on the subject side of the distinction between an +apprehension and the reality apprehended. The _complexity_ of a +complex of representations in no way divests it of the character which +it has as a complex of _representations_. In the second place, on this +view the same terms have to enter at once into two incompatible +relations. Representations have to be related successively as our +representations or apprehensions--as in fact they are related--and, at +the same time, successively or otherwise, as the case may be, as parts +of the object apprehended, viz. a reality in nature. In other words, +the same terms have to enter into both a subjective and an objective +relation, i. e. both a relation concerning us, the knowing subjects, +and a relation concerning the object which we know.[26] "A phenomenon +in opposition to the representations of apprehension can only be +represented as the object of the same, distinct therefrom, if it +stands under a rule which distinguishes it from _every other_ +apprehension, and renders necessary a mode of conjunction of the +manifold."[27] A representation, however, cannot be so related by a +rule to another representation, for the rule meant relates to +realities in nature, and, however much Kant may try to maintain the +contrary, two representations, not being realities in nature, cannot +be so related. Kant is in fact only driven to treat rules of nature as +relating to representations, because there is nothing else to which he +can regard them as relating. The result is that he is unable to +justify the very distinction, the implications of which it is his aim +to discover, and he is unable to do so for the very reason which would +have rendered Hume unable to justify it. Like Hume, he is committed to +a philosophical vocabulary which makes it meaningless to speak of +relations of objects at all in distinction from relations of +apprehensions. It has been said that for Kant the road to objectivity +lay through necessity.[28] But whatever Kant may have thought, in +point of fact there is no road to objectivity, and, in particular, no +road through necessity. No necessity in the relation between two +representations can render the relation objective, i. e. a relation +between objects. No doubt the successive acts in which we come to +apprehend the world are necessarily related; we certainly do not +suppose their order to be fortuitous. Nevertheless, their relations +are not in consequence a relation of realities apprehended. + + [25] pp. 133-4; cf. pp. 180 and 230-1. + + [26] Cf. p. 209, note 3, and p. 233. + + [27] The italics are mine. + + [28] Caird, i. 557. + +Kant only renders his own view plausible by treating an apprehension +or representation as if it consisted in a sensation or an appearance. +A sensation or an appearance, so far from being the apprehension of +anything, is in fact a reality which can be apprehended, of the kind +called mental. Hence it can be treated as an object, i. e. something +apprehended or presented, though not really as an object in nature. On +the other hand, from the point of view of the thing in itself it can +be treated as only an apprehension, even though it is an unsuccessful +apprehension. Thus, for Kant, there is something which can with some +plausibility be treated as an object as well as an apprehension, and +therefore as capable of standing in both a subjective and an objective +relation to other realities of the same kind.[29] + + [29] Cf. pp. 137 and 231. + +If we now turn to the passage under discussion, we find it easy to +vindicate the justice of the criticism that Kant, inconsistently with +the distinction which he desires to elucidate, treats the same thing +as at once the representation of an object and the object represented. +He is trying to give such an account of 'object of representations' as +will explain what is meant by a succession in an object in nature, +i. e. a phenomenon, in distinction from the succession in our +apprehension of it. In order to state this distinction at all, he has +to speak of what enters into the two successions as different. "It is +my business to show what sort of connexion in time belongs to the +_manifold_ in phenomena themselves, while the _representation_ of this +manifold in apprehension is always successive."[30] Here an element of +the manifold is distinguished from the representation of it. Yet Kant, +though he thus distinguishes them, repeatedly identifies them; in +other words, he identifies a representation with that of which it is a +representation, viz. an element in or part of the object itself. "_Our +apprehension_ of the manifold of the phenomenon is always successive. +_The representations_ of the parts succeed one another. Whether _they_ +[i. e. _the representations_[31]] succeed one another _in the object_ +also, is a second point for reflection.... So far as they [i. e. +phenomena], as representations only, are at the same time objects of +consciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension, +i. e. reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we must +therefore say, _'The manifold of phenomena_ is always produced +successively in the mind'. If phenomena were things in themselves, no +man would be able to infer from the succession of the representations +how _this manifold_ is connected _in the object_.... The phenomenon, +in opposition to the representations of apprehension, can only be +represented as the object of the same, distinct therefrom, if it +stands under a rule, which distinguishes _it_ from every _other_ +representation and which renders necessary a mode of conjunction of +the manifold."[32] + + [30] The italics are mine. + + [31] This is implied both by the use of 'also' and by the + context. + + [32] The italics are mine. + +Since Kant in introducing his vindication of causality thus identifies +elements in the object apprehended (i. e. the manifold of phenomena) +with the apprehensions of them, we approach the vindication itself +with the expectation that he will identify a causal rule, which +consists in a necessity in the succession of objects, viz. of events +in nature, with the necessity in the succession of our apprehensions +of them. This expectation turns out justified. The following passage +adequately expresses the vindication: + +"Let us now proceed to our task. That something happens, i. e. that +something or some state comes to be which before was not, cannot be +empirically perceived, unless a phenomenon precedes, which does not +contain in itself this state; for a reality which follows upon an +empty time, and therefore a coming into existence preceded by no state +of things, can just as little be apprehended as empty time itself. +Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which follows +upon another perception. But because this is the case with all +synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above[33] in the phenomenon +of a house, the apprehension of an event is thereby not yet +distinguished from other apprehensions. But I notice also, that if in +a phenomenon which contains an event, I call the preceding state of my +perception A, and the following state B, B can only follow A in +apprehension, while the perception A cannot follow B but can only +precede it. For example, I see a ship float down a stream. My +perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its +place higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that in +the apprehension of this phenomenon the vessel should be perceived +first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the +order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined, +and apprehension is bound to this order. In the former example of a +house, my perceptions in apprehension could begin at the roof and end +at the foundation, or begin below and end above; in the same way they +could apprehend the manifold of the empirical perception from left to +right, or from right to left. Accordingly, in the series of these +perceptions, there was no determined order, which necessitated my +beginning at a certain point, in order to combine the manifold +empirically. But this rule is always to be found in the perception of +that which happens, and it makes the order of the successive +perceptions (in the apprehension of this phenomenon) _necessary_." + + [33] B. 235-6, M. 143 (quoted p. 279). + +"In the present case, therefore, I shall have to derive the +_subjective sequence_ of apprehension from the _objective sequence_ of +phenomena, for otherwise the former is wholly undetermined, and does +not distinguish one phenomenon from another. The former alone proves +nothing as to the connexion of the manifold in the object, for it is +wholly arbitrary. The latter, therefore [i. e. the objective sequence +of phenomena[34]], will consist in that order of the manifold of the +phenomenon, according to which the apprehension of the one (that which +happens) follows that of the other (that which precedes) _according to +a rule_. In this way alone can I be justified in saying of the +phenomenon itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence +is to be found therein, which is the same as to say that I cannot +arrange my apprehension otherwise than in just this sequence." + + [34] The sense is not affected if 'the latter' be understood + to refer to the connexion of the manifold in the object. + +"In conformity with such a rule, therefore, there must exist in that +which in general precedes an event the condition of a rule, according +to which this event follows always and necessarily, but I cannot +conversely go back from the event, and determine (by apprehension) +that which precedes it. For no phenomenon goes back from the +succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does +certainly relate to _some preceding point of time_; on the other hand, +the advance from a given time to the determinate succeeding time is +necessary. Therefore, because there certainly is something which +follows, I must relate it necessarily to something else in general, +which precedes, and upon which it follows in conformity with a rule, +that is necessarily, so that the event, as the conditioned, affords +certain indication of some condition, while this condition determines +the event." + +"If we suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event +must follow in conformity with a rule, all sequence of perception +would exist only in apprehension, i. e. would be merely subjective, +but it would not thereby be objectively determined which of the +perceptions must in fact be the preceding and which the succeeding +one. We should in this manner have only a play of representations, +which would not be related to any object, i. e. no phenomenon would be +distinguished through our perception in respect of time relations from +any other, because the succession in apprehension is always of the +same kind, and so there is nothing in the phenomenon to determine the +succession, so as to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. +I could therefore not say that in the phenomenon two states follow +each other, but only that one apprehension follows on another, a fact +which is merely _subjective_ and does not determine any object, and +cannot therefore be considered as knowledge of an object (not even in +the phenomenon)." + +"If therefore we experience that something happens, we always thereby +presuppose that something precedes, on which it follows according to a +rule. For otherwise, I should not say of the object, that it follows, +because the mere sequence in my apprehension, if it is not determined +by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not justify the +assumption of a sequence in the object. It is therefore always in +reference to a rule, according to which phenomena are determined in +their sequence (i. e. as they happen) by the preceding state, that I +make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it is +solely upon this presupposition that even the experience of something +which happens is possible."[35] + + [35] B. 236-41, M. 144-6. + +The meaning of the first paragraph is plain. Kant is saying that when +we reflect upon the process by which we come to apprehend the world of +nature, we can lay down two propositions. The first is that the +process is equally successive whether the object apprehended be a +succession in nature or a coexistence of bodies in space, so that the +knowledge that we have a succession of apprehensions would not by +itself enable us to decide whether the object of the apprehensions is +a sequence or not. The second proposition is that, nevertheless, there +is this difference between the succession of our apprehensions where +we apprehend a succession and where we apprehend a coexistence, that +in the former case, and in that only, the succession of our +apprehensions is irreversible or, in other words, is the expression of +a rule of order which makes it a necessary succession. So far we find +no mention of causality, i. e. of a necessity of succession in +objects, but only a necessity of succession in our apprehension of +them. So far, again, we find no contribution to the problem of +explaining how we distinguish between successive perceptions which are +the perceptions of an event and those which are not. For it is +reasonable to object that it is only possible to say that the order of +our perceptions is irreversible, if and because we already know that +what we have been perceiving is an event, and that therefore any +attempt to argue from the irreversibility of our perceptions to the +existence of a sequence in the object must involve a [Greek: hysteron +proteron]. And it is clear that, if irreversibility in our perceptions +were the only irreversibility to which appeal could be made, even Kant +would not have supposed that the apprehension of a succession was +reached through belief in an irreversibility. + +The next paragraph, of which the interpretation is difficult, appears +to introduce a causal rule, i. e. an irreversibility in objects, by +identifying it with the irreversibility in our perceptions of which +Kant has been speaking. The first step to this identification is taken +by the assertion: "In the present case, therefore, I shall have to +derive the subjective sequence of perceptions from the objective +sequence of phenomena.... The latter will consist in the order of the +_manifold of the phenomenon_, according to which _the apprehension_ of +the one (that which happens) follows that of the other (that which +precedes) according to a rule."[36] Here Kant definitely implies that +an objective sequence, i. e. an order or sequence of the _manifold_ of +a phenomenon, consists in a sequence of _perceptions or apprehensions_ +of which the order is necessary or according to a rule; in other +words, that a succession of perceptions in the special case where the +succession is necessary is a succession of events perceived.[37] This +implication enables us to understand the meaning of the assertion that +'we must therefore derive the subjective sequence of perceptions from +the objective sequence of phenomena', and to see its connexion with +the preceding paragraph. It means, 'in view of the fact that in all +apprehensions of a succession, and in them alone, the sequence of +perceptions is irreversible, we are justified in saying that a given +sequence of perceptions is the apprehension of a succession, if we +know that the sequence is irreversible; in that case we must be +apprehending a real succession, for an irreversible sequence of +perceptions _is_ a sequence of events perceived.' Having thus implied +that irreversibility of perceptions constitutes them events perceived, +he is naturally enough able to go on to speak of the irreversibility +of perceptions as if it were the same thing as an irreversibility of +events perceived, and thus to bring in a causal rule. "In this way +alone [i. e. only by deriving the subjective from the objective +sequence] can I be justified in saying of the phenomenon itself, and +not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence is to be found therein, +_which is the same as to say_ that I cannot _arrange_ my apprehension +otherwise than in just this sequence. In conformity with _such a +rule_, therefore, there must exist in that which in general precedes +_an event_ the condition of a rule, according to which _this event +follows always and necessarily_."[38] Here the use of the word +'arrange'[39] and the statement about the rule in the next sentence +imply that Kant has now come to think of the rule of succession as a +causal rule relating to the objective succession. Moreover, if any +doubt remains as to whether Kant really confuses the two +irreversibilities or necessities of succession, it is removed by the +last paragraph of the passage quoted. "If therefore we experience that +something happens, we always thereby presuppose that something +precedes on which _it_ follows according to a rule. For otherwise I +should not say of the object that _it_ follows; because the mere +succession of my apprehension, if _it_ is not determined by a rule in +relation to something preceding, does not justify the assumption of a +succession in the object. It is therefore always in reference to a +rule, according to which _phenomena_ are determined in their sequence +(i. e. as they happen) by the preceding state, that I make my +subjective sequence (of apprehension) objective."[40] The fact is +simply that Kant _must_ identify the two irreversibilities, because, +as has been pointed out, he has only one set of terms to be related as +irreversible, viz. the elements of the manifold, which have to be, +from one point of view, elements of an object and, from another, +representations or apprehensions of it. + + [36] The italics are mine. 'According to which' does not + appear to indicate that the two orders referred to are + different. + + [37] Cf. B. 242 fin., M. 147 fin. + + [38] The italics are mine + + [39] _Anstellen._ + + [40] The italics are mine. + +As soon, therefore, as the real nature of Kant's vindication of +causality has been laid bare, it is difficult to describe it as an +argument at all. He is anxious to show that in apprehending A B as a +real or objective succession we presuppose that they are elements in a +causal order of succession. Yet in support of his contention he points +only to the quite different fact that where we apprehend a succession +A B, we think of the _perception_ of A and the _perception_ of B as +elements in a necessary but subjective succession. + +Before we attempt to consider the facts with which Kant is dealing, we +must refer to a feature in Kant's account to which no allusion has +been made. We should on the whole expect from the passage quoted that, +in the case where we regard two perceptions A B as necessarily +successive and therefore as constituting an objective succession, the +necessity of succession consists in the fact that A is the cause of B. +This, however, is apparently not Kant's view; on the contrary, he +seems to hold that, in thinking of A B as an objective succession, we +presuppose not that A causes B, but only that the state of affairs +which precedes B, and which therefore includes A, contains a cause of +B, the coexistence or identity of this cause with A rendering the +particular succession A B necessary. "Thus [if I perceive that +something happens] it arises that there comes to be an order among our +representations in which the present (so far as it has taken place) +points to some preceding state as a correlate, _though a still +undetermined correlate_,[41] of this event which is given, and this +correlate relates to the event by determining the event as its +consequence, and connects the event with itself necessarily in the +series of time."[42] + + [41] The italics are mine. + + [42] B. 244, M. 148. Cf. B. 243, M. 148 (first half) and B. + 239, M. 145 (second paragraph). The same implication is to + be found in his formulation of the rule involved in the + perception of an event, e. g. "In conformity with such a + rule, there must exist in that which in general precedes an + event, the condition of a rule, according to which this event + follows always and necessarily." Here the condition of a rule + is the necessary antecedent of the event, whatever it may be. + +The fact is that Kant is in a difficulty which he feels obscurely +himself. He seems driven to this view for two reasons. If he were to +maintain that A was necessarily the cause of B, he would be +maintaining that all observed sequences are causal, i. e. that in them +the antecedent and consequent are always cause and effect, which is +palpably contrary to fact. Again, his aim is to show that we become +aware of a succession by presupposing the law of causality. This law, +however, is quite general, and only asserts that _something_ must +precede an event upon which it follows always and necessarily. Hence +by itself it palpably gives no means of determining whether this +something is A rather than anything else.[43] Therefore if he were +to maintain that the antecedent member of an apprehended objective +succession must be thought of as its cause, the analogy would +obviously provide no means of determining the antecedent member, and +therefore the succession itself, for the succession must be the +sequence of B upon some definite antecedent. On the other hand, the +view that the cause of B need not be A only incurs the same difficulty +in a rather less obvious form. For, even on this view, the argument +implies that in order to apprehend two individual perceptions A B as +an objective succession, we must know that A _must_ precede B, and the +presupposition that B implies a cause in the state of affairs +preceding B in no way enables us to say either that A coexists with +the cause, or that it is identical with it, and therefore that it must +precede B. + + [43] Cf. B. 165, M. 101, where Kant points out that the + determination of particular laws of nature requires + experience. + +Nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as certain that Kant did not think +of A, the apprehended antecedent of B, as necessarily the cause of B, +for his language is both ambiguous and inconsistent. When he considers +the apprehension of a succession from the side of the successive +perceptions, he at least tends to think of A B as cause and +effect;[44] and it may well be that in discussing the problem from +the side of the law of causality, he means the cause of B to be A, +although the generality of the law compels him to refer to it as +_something_ upon which B follows according to a rule. + + [44] He definitely implies this, B. 234, M. 142. + +Further, it should be noticed that to allow as Kant, in effect, does +elsewhere[45], that experience is needed to determine the cause of B is +really to concede that the apprehension of objective successions is +_prior to_, and _presupposed by_, any process which appeals to the +principle of causality; for if the principle of causality does not by +itself enable us to determine the cause of B, it cannot do more than +enable us to pick out the cause of B among events known to precede B +independently of the principle. Hence, from this point of view, there +can be no process such as Kant is trying to describe, and therefore +its precise nature is a matter of indifference. + + [45] Cf. B. 165, M. 101, where Kant points out that the + determination of particular laws of nature requires + experience. + +We may now turn to the facts. There is, it seems, no such thing as a +process by which, beginning with the knowledge of successive +apprehensions or representations, of the object of which we are +unaware, we come to be aware of their object. Still less is there a +process--and it is really this which Kant is trying to describe--by +which, so beginning, we come to apprehend these successive +representations as objects, i. e. as parts of the physical world, +through the thought of them as necessarily related. We may take Kant's +instance of our apprehension of a boat going down stream. We do not +first apprehend two perceptions of which the object is undetermined +and then decide that their object is a succession rather than a +coexistence. Still less do we first apprehend two perceptions or +representations and then decide that they are related as successive +events in the physical world. From the beginning we apprehend a real +sequence, viz. the fact that the boat having left one place is +arriving at another; there is no process _to_ this apprehension. In +other words, from the beginning we are aware of real elements, viz. of +events in nature, and we are aware of them as really related, viz. as +successive in nature. This must be so. For if we begin with the +awareness of two mere perceptions, we could never thence reach the +knowledge that their object was a succession, or even the knowledge +that they had an object; nor, so beginning, could we become aware of +the perceptions themselves as successive events in the physical world. +For suppose, _per impossibile_, the existence of a process by which we +come to be aware of two elements A and B as standing in a relation of +sequence in the physical world. In the first place, A and B, with the +awareness of which we begin, must be, and be known to be, real or +objective, and not perceptions or apprehensions; otherwise we could +never come to apprehend them as related in the physical world. In the +second place, A and B must be, and be known to be, real with the +reality of a physical event, otherwise we could never come to +apprehend them as related by way of succession in the physical world. +If A and B were bodies, as they are when we apprehend the parts of a +house, they could never be apprehended as successive. In other words, +the process by which, on Kant's view, A and B become, and become known +to be, events presupposes that they already are, and are known to be, +events. Again, even if it be granted that A and B are real events, it +is clear that there can be no process by which we come to apprehend +them as successive. For if we apprehended events A and B separately, +we could never thence advance to the apprehension of their relation, +or, in other words, we could never discover which came first. Kant +himself saw clearly that the perception of A followed by the +perception of B does not by itself yield the perception that B follows +A. In fact it was this insight which formed the starting-point of his +discussion.[46] Unfortunately, instead of concluding that the +apprehension of a succession is ultimate and underivable from a more +primitive apprehension, he tried to formulate the nature of the +process by which, starting from such a succession of perceptions, we +reach the apprehension of a succession. The truth is simply that there +is and can be no _process to_ the apprehension of a succession; in +other words, that we do and must apprehend a real succession +immediately or not at all. The same considerations can of course be +supplied _mutatis mutandis_ to the apprehension of the coexistence of +bodies in space, e. g. of the parts of a house. + + [46] Cf. B. 237, M. 144. + +It may be objected that this denial of the existence of the process +which Kant is trying to describe must at least be an overstatement. +For the assertion that the apprehension of a succession or of a +coexistence is immediate may seem to imply that the apprehension of +the course of a boat or of the shape of a house involves no process at +all; yet either apprehension clearly takes time and so must involve a +process. But though a process is obviously involved, it is not a +process from the apprehension of what is not a succession to the +apprehension of a succession, but a process from the apprehension of +one succession to that of another. It is the process by which we pass +from the apprehension of one part of a succession which may have, and +which it is known may have, other parts to the apprehension of what +is, and what is known to be, another part of the same succession. +Moreover, the assertion that the apprehension of a succession must be +immediate does not imply that it may not be reached by a process. It +is not inconsistent with the obvious fact that to apprehend that the +boat is now turning a corner is really to apprehend that what before +was going straight is now changing its course, and therefore +presupposes a previous apprehension of the boat's course as straight. +It only implies that the apprehension of a succession, if reached by a +process at all, is not reached by a process of which the +starting-point is not itself the apprehension of a succession. + +Nevertheless, a plausible defence of Kant's treatment of causality can +be found, which may be formulated thus: 'Time, just as much as space, +is a sphere within which we have to distinguish between appearance and +reality. For instance, when moving in a lift, we see, as we say, the +walls moving, while the lift remains stationary. When sitting in a +train which is beginning to move out of a station, we see, as we say, +another train beginning to move, although it is in fact standing +still. When looking at distant trees from a fast train, we see, as we +say, the buildings in the intermediate space moving backwards. In +these cases the events seen are not real, and we only succeed in +determining what is really happening, by a process which presupposes +the law of causality. Thus, in the last case we only believe that the +intermediate buildings do not move, by realizing that, given the +uniformity of nature, belief in their motion is incompatible with what +we believe on the strength of experience of these buildings on other +occasions and of the rest of the world. These cases prove the +existence of a process which enables us, and is required to enable us, +to decide whether a given change is objective or subjective, i. e. +whether it lies in the reality apprehended or in our apprehension of +it; and this process involves an appeal to causality. Kant's mistake +lay in his choice of illustrations. His illustrations implied that the +process which involves causality is one by which we distinguish a +succession in the object apprehended from another relation in the +object, viz. a coexistence of bodies. But he ought to have taken +illustrations which implied that the process is one by which we +distinguish a succession in the object from a succession in our +perception of it. In other words, the illustrations should, like those +just given, have illustrated the process by which we distinguish an +objective from a subjective change, and not a process by which we +distinguish an objective change from something else also objective. +Consequently, Kant's conclusion and his _general_ method of treatment +are right, even if, misled by his instances, he supports his position +by arguments which are wrong.' + +This defence is, however, open to the following reply: 'At first sight +the cases taken undoubtedly seem to illustrate a process in which we +seek to discover whether a certain change belongs to objects or only +to our apprehension of them, and in which we appeal to causality in +arriving at a decision. But this is only because we ignore the +relativity of motion. To take the third case: our first statement of +the facts is that we saw the intermediate buildings moving, but that +subsequent reflection on the results of other experience forced us to +conclude that the change perceived was after all only in our +apprehension and not in the things apprehended. The statement, +however, that we saw the buildings moving really assumes that we, the +observers, were stationary; and it states too much. What we really +perceived was a relative changing of position between us, the near +buildings, and the distant trees. This is a fact, and the apprehension +of it, therefore, does not afterwards prove mistaken. It is equally +compatible with motion on the part of the trees, or of the buildings, +or of the observers, or of a combination of them; and that for which +an appeal to causality is needed is the problem of deciding which of +these alternatives is correct. Moreover, the perceived relative change +of position is objective; it concerns the things apprehended. Hence, +in this case too, it can be said that we perceive an objective +succession from the beginning, and that the appeal to causality is +only needed to determine something further about it. It is useless to +urge that to be aware of an event is to be aware of it in all its +definiteness, and that this awareness admittedly involves an appeal to +causality; for it is easy to see that unless our awareness of the +relative motion formed the starting-point of any subsequent process in +which we appealed to the law of causality, we could never use the law +to determine which body really moved.' + +Two remarks may be made in conclusion. In the first place, the basis +of Kant's account, viz. the view that in our apprehension of the world +we advance from the apprehension of a succession of perceptions to +the apprehension of objects perceived, involves a [Greek: hysteron +proteron]. As Kant himself in effect urges in the _Refutation of +Idealism_,[47] self-consciousness, in the sense of the consciousness +of the successive process in which we apprehend the world, is plainly +only attained by reflecting upon our apprehension of the world. We +first apprehend the world and only by subsequent reflection become +aware of our activity in apprehending it. Even if consciousness of +the world must lead to, and so is in a sense inseparable from, +self-consciousness, it is none the less its presupposition. + + [47] Cf. p. 320. + +In the second place, it seems that the true vindication of causality, +like that of the first analogy, lies in the dogmatic method which Kant +rejects. It consists in insight into the fact that it is of the very +nature of a physical event to be an element in a process of change +undergone by a system of substances in space, this process being +through and through necessary in the sense that any event (i. e. the +attainment of any state by a substance) is the outcome of certain +preceding events (i. e. the previous attainment of certain states by +it and other substances), and is similarly the condition of certain +subsequent events.[48] To attain this insight, we have only to reflect +upon what we really mean by a 'physical event'. The vindication can +also be expressed in the form that the very _thought_ of a physical +event presupposes the _thought_ of it as an element in a necessary +process of change--provided, however, that no distinction is implied +between the nature of a thing and what we think its nature to be. But +to vindicate causality in this way is to pursue the dogmatic method; +it is to argue from the nature, or, to use Kant's phrase, from the +conception, of a physical event. On the other hand, it seems that the +method of arguing transcendentally, or from the possibility of +perceiving events, must be doomed to failure in principle. For if, as +has been argued to be the case,[49] apprehension is essentially the +apprehension of a reality as it exists independently of the +apprehension of it, only those characteristics can be attributed to +it, as characteristics which it must have if it is to be apprehended, +which belong to it in its own nature or in virtue of its being what it +is. It can only be because we think that a thing has some +characteristic in virtue of its own nature, and so think +'dogmatically', that we can think that in apprehending it we must +apprehend it as having that characteristic.[50] + + [48] This statement of course includes the third analogy. + + [49] Cf. Chh. IV and VI. + + [50] Cf. p. 275. + +There remains to be considered Kant's proof of the third analogy, +i. e. the principle that all substances, so far as they can be +perceived in space as coexistent, are in thorough-going interaction. +The account is extremely confused, and it is difficult to extract from +it a consistent view. We shall consider here the version added in the +second edition, as being the fuller and the less unintelligible. + +"Things are _coexistent_, when in empirical intuition[51] the +perception[52] of the one can follow upon the perception of the other, +and vice versa (which cannot occur in the temporal succession of +phenomena, as we have shown in the second principle). Thus I can +direct my perception first to the moon and afterwards to the earth, or +conversely, first to the earth and then to the moon, and because the +perceptions of these objects can reciprocally follow each other, I say +that they coexist. Now coexistence is the existence of the manifold in +the same time. But we cannot perceive time itself, so as to conclude +from the fact that things are placed in the same time that the +perceptions of them can follow each other reciprocally. The synthesis +of the imagination in apprehension, therefore, would only give us each +of these perceptions as existing in the subject when the other is +absent and vice versa; but it would not give us that the objects are +coexistent, i. e. that, if the one exists, the other also exists in +the same time, and that this is necessary in order that the +perceptions can follow each other reciprocally. Hence there is needed +a conception-of-the-understanding[53] of the reciprocal sequence of +the determinations of these things coexisting externally to one +another, in order to say that the reciprocal succession of perceptions +is grounded in the object, and thereby to represent the coexistence as +objective. But the relation of substances in which the one contains +determinations the ground of which is contained in the other is the +relation of influence, and if, reciprocally, the former contains the +ground of the determinations in the latter, it is the relation of +community or interaction. Consequently, the coexistence of substances +in space cannot be known in experience otherwise than under the +presupposition of their interaction; this is therefore also the +condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of +experience."[54] + + [51] _Anschauung._ + + [52] _Wahrnehmung._ + + [53] _Verstandesbegriff._ + + [54] B. 257-8, M. 156-7. + +The proof begins, as we should expect, in a way parallel to that of +causality. Just as Kant had apparently argued that we learn that a +succession of perceptions is the perception of a sequence when we find +the order of the perceptions to be irreversible, so he now definitely +asserts that we learn that certain perceptions are the perceptions of +a coexistence of bodies in space when we find that the order of the +perceptions is reversible, or, to use Kant's language, that there can +be a reciprocal sequence of the perceptions. This beginning, if read +by itself, seems as though it should also be the end. There seems +nothing more which need be said. Just as we should have expected Kant +to have completed his account of the apprehension of a succession when +he pointed out that it is distinguished by the irreversibility of the +perceptions, so here we should expect him to have said enough when he +points out that the earth and the moon are said to be coexistent +because our perceptions of them can follow one another reciprocally. + +The analogy, however, has in some way to be brought in, and to this +the rest of the proof is devoted. In order to consider how this is +done, we must first consider the nature of the analogy itself. Kant +speaks of 'a conception-of-the-understanding of the reciprocal +sequence of the determinations of things which coexist externally to +one another'; and he says that 'that relation of substances in which +the one contains determinations, the ground of which is contained in +the other substance, is the relation of influence'. His meaning can be +illustrated thus. Suppose two bodies, A, a lump of ice, and B, a fire, +close together, yet at such a distance that they can be observed in +succession. Suppose that A passes through changes of temperature a_{1} +a_{2} a_{3} ... in certain times, the changes ending in states +[alpha]_{1} [alpha]_{2} [alpha]_{3} ..., and that B passes through +changes of temperature b_{1} b_{2} b_{3} ... in the same times, the +changes ending in states [beta]_{1} [beta]_{2} [beta]_{3}. Suppose +also, as we must, that A and B interact, i. e. that A in passing +through its changes conditions the changes through which B passes, and +therefore also the states in which B ends, and vice versa, so that +a_{2} and [alpha]_{2} will be the outcome not of a_{1} and [alpha]_{1} +alone, but of a_{1} and [alpha]_{1}, and b_{1} and [beta]_{1} jointly. +Then we can say (1) that A and B are in the relation of influence, and +also of interaction or reciprocal influence, in the sense that they +_mutually_ (not alternately) determine one another's states. Again, if +we first perceive A in the state [alpha]_1 by a perception A_{1}, then +B in the state [beta]_{2} by a perception B_{2}, then A in the state +[alpha]_{3} by a perception A_{3} and so on, we can speak (2) of a +reciprocal sequence of perceptions, in the sense of a sequence of +perceptions in which alternately a perception of B follows a +perception of A and a perception of A follows a perception of B; for +first a perception of B, viz. B_{2}, follows a perception of A, viz. +A_{1}, and then a perception of A, viz. A_{3}, follows a perception of +B, viz. B_{2}. We can also speak (3) of a reciprocal sequence of the +determinations of two things in the sense of a necessary succession of +states which _alternately_ are states of A and of B; for [alpha]_{1}, +which is perceived first, can be said to contribute to determine +[beta]_{2}, which is perceived next, and [beta]_{2} can be said to +contribute to determine [alpha]_{3}, which is perceived next, and so +on; and this reciprocal sequence can be said to be involved in the +very nature of interaction. Further, it can be said (4) that if we +perceive A and B alternately, and so only in the states [alpha]_{1} +[alpha]_{3} ... [beta]_{2} [beta]_{4} ... respectively, we can +only fill in the blanks, i. e. discover the states [alpha]_{2} +[alpha]_{4} ... [beta]_{1} [beta]_{3} ... _coexistent_ with [beta]_{2} +[beta]_{4} ... and [alpha]_{1} [alpha]_{3} ... respectively, if we +presuppose the thought of interaction. For it is only possible to use +the observed states as a clue to the unobserved states, if we +presuppose that the observed states are members of a necessary +succession of which the unobserved states are also members and +therefore have partially determined and been determined by the +observed states. Hence it may be said that the determination of the +unobserved states coexistent with the observed states presupposes the +thought of interaction. + +How then does Kant advance from the assertion that the apprehension of +a coexistence requires the knowledge that our _perceptions_ can be +reciprocally sequent to the assertion that it presupposes the thought +that the _determinations of phenomena_ are reciprocally sequent? The +passage in which the transition is effected is obscure and confused, +but it is capable of interpretation as soon as we see that it is +intended to run parallel to the proof of the second analogy which is +added in the second edition.[55] Kant apparently puts to himself the +question, 'How are we to know when we have a reciprocal sequence of +perceptions from which we can infer a coexistence in what we +perceived?' and apparently answers it thus: 'Since we cannot perceive +time, and therefore cannot perceive objects as dated in time with +respect to one another, we cannot begin with the apprehension of the +coexistence of two objects, and thence infer the possibility of +reciprocal sequence in our perceptions. This being so, the synthesis +of imagination in apprehension can indeed combine these perceptions +[these now being really considered as determinations or states of an +object perceived] in a reciprocal sequence, but there is so far no +guarantee that the sequence produced by the synthesis is not an +arbitrary product of the imagination, and therefore we cannot think of +it as a reciprocal sequence in objects. In order to think of such a +reciprocal sequence as not arbitrary but as constituting a real +sequence in objects [ = 'as grounded in the object'], we must think of +the states reciprocally sequent [as necessarily related and therefore] +as successive states of two coexisting substances which interact or +mutually determine one another's successive states. Only then shall we +be able to think of the coexistence of objects involved in the +reciprocal sequence as an objective fact, and not merely as an +arbitrary product of the imagination.' But, if this fairly expresses +Kant's meaning, his argument is clearly vitiated by two confusions. In +the first place, it confuses a subjective sequence of perceptions +which are alternately perceptions of A and of B, two bodies in space, +with an objective sequence of perceived states of bodies, [alpha]_{1} +[beta]_{2} [alpha]_{3} [beta]_{4}, which are alternately states of two +bodies A and B, the same thing being regarded at once as a perception +and as a state of a physical object. In the second place, mainly in +consequence of the first confusion, it confuses the necessity that the +perceptions of A and of B can follow one another alternately with the +necessity of succession in the alternately perceived states of A and B +as interacting. Moreover, there is really a change in the cases under +consideration. The case with which he begins, i. e. when he is +considering merely the reciprocal sequence of perceptions, is the +successive perceptions of two _bodies in space_ alternately, e. g. of +the moon and the earth, the nature of their states at the time of +perception not being in question. But the case with which he ends is +the successive perception of the _states of two bodies_ alternately, +e. g. of the states of the fire and of the lump of ice. Moreover, it +is only in the latter case that the objective relation apprehended is +that of coexistence in the proper sense, and in the sense which Kant +intends throughout, viz. that of being contemporaneous in distinction +from being successive. For when we say that two bodies, e. g. the moon +and the earth, coexist, we should only mean that both exist, and not, +as Kant means, that they are contemporaneous. For to a substance, +being as it is the substratum of changes, we can ascribe no temporal +predicates. That which changes cannot be said either to begin, or to +end, or to exist at a certain moment of time, or, therefore, to exist +contemporaneously with, or after, or before anything else; it cannot +even be said to persist through a portion of time or, to use the +phrase of the first analogy, to be permanent. It will be objected +that, though the cases are different, yet the transition from the one +to the other is justified, for it is precisely Kant's point that the +existence together of two substances in space can only be discovered +by consideration of their successive states under the presupposition +that they mutually determine one another's states. "Besides the mere +fact of existence there must be something by which A determines the +place in time for B, and conversely B the place for A, because only +under this condition can these substances be empirically represented +as coexistent."[56] The objection, however, should be met by two +considerations, each of which is of some intrinsic importance. In the +first place, the apprehension of a body in space in itself involves +the apprehension that it exists together with all other bodies in +space, for the apprehension of something as spatial involves the +apprehension of it as spatially related to, and therefore as existing +together with, everything else which is spatial. No process, +therefore, such as Kant describes is required in order that we may +learn that it exists along with some other body. In the second place, +that for which the principle of interaction is really required is not, +as Kant supposes, the determination of the coexistence of an +unperceived body with a perceived body, but the determination of that +unperceived state of a body already known to exist which is coexistent +with a perceived state of a perceived body. As has been pointed out, +if we perceive A and B alternately in the states [alpha]_{1} +[beta]_{2} [alpha]_{3} [beta]_{4} ... we need the thought of +interaction to determine the nature of [beta]_{1} [alpha]_{2} +[beta]_{3} [alpha]_{4} ... Thus it appears that Kant in his +vindication of the third analogy omits altogether to notice the one +process which really presupposes it. + + [55] B. 233-4, M. 142. + + [56] B. 259, M. 157. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT + + +The postulates of empirical thought, which correspond to the +categories of modality, are stated as follows: + +"1. That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience +(according to perception and conceptions) is _possible_. + +2. That which is connected with the material conditions of experience +(sensation) is _actual_. + +3. That of which the connexion with the actual is determined according +to universal conditions of experience is _necessary_ (exists +necessarily)."[1] + + [1] B. 265-6, M. 161. + +These principles, described as only 'explanations of the conceptions +of possibility, actuality, and necessity as employed in experience', +are really treated as principles by which we decide what is possible, +what is actual, and what is necessary. The three conceptions involved +do not, according to Kant, enlarge our knowledge of the nature of +objects, but only 'express their relation to the faculty of +knowledge'[2]; i. e. they only concern our ability to apprehend an +object whose nature is already determined for us otherwise as at least +possible, or as real, or as even necessary. Moreover, it is because +these principles do not enlarge our knowledge of the nature of objects +that they are called postulates; for a postulate in geometry, from +which science the term is borrowed (e. g. that it is possible with a +given line to describe a circle from a given point), does not augment +the conception of the figure to which it relates, but only asserts the +possibility of the conception itself.[3] The discussion of these +principles is described, contrary to the terminology adopted in the +case of the preceding principles, as 'explanation' and not as 'proof'. +The discussion, however, certainly includes a proof of them, for it is +Kant's main object to _prove_ that these principles constitute the +general character of what can be asserted to be possible, actual, or +necessary respectively. Again, as before, the basis of proof lies in a +theory of knowledge, and in particular in Kant's theory of knowledge; +for it consists in the principle that everything knowable must conform +to the conditions involved in its being an object of possible +experience. + + [2] B. 266, M. 161. Cf. B. 286-7, M. 173-4. + + [3] B. 286-7, M. 173-4. + +To understand these principles and the proof of them, we must notice +certain preliminary considerations. In the _first_ place, the very +problem of distinguishing the possible, the actual, and the necessary +presupposes the existence of distinctions which may prove open to +question. It presupposes that something may be possible without being +actual, and again that something may be actual without being +necessary. In the _second_ place, Kant's mode of approaching the +problem assumes that we can begin with a conception of an object, +e. g. of a man with six toes, and then ask whether the object of it is +possible, whether, if possible, it is also actual, and whether, if +actual, it is also necessary. In other words, it assumes the +possibility of separating what is conceived from what is possible, and +therefore _a fortiori_ from what is actual,[4] and from what is +necessary. _Thirdly_, in this context, as in most others, Kant in +speaking of a conception is thinking, to use Locke's phraseology, not +of a 'simple' conception, such as that of equality or of redness, but +of a 'complex' conception, such as that of a centaur, or of a triangle +in the sense of a three-sided three-angled figure. It is the +apprehension of a 'complex' of elements.[5] _Fourthly_, what is said +to be possible, real, or necessary is not the conception but the +corresponding object. The question is not, for instance, whether the +conception of a triangle or of a centaur is possible, actual, or +necessary, but whether a triangle or a centaur is possible, actual, or +necessary. Kant sometimes speaks loosely of conceptions as +possible,[6] but the terms which he normally and, from the point of +view of his theory, rightly applies to conceptions are 'objectively +real' and 'fictitious'.[7] _Lastly_, Kant distinguishes 'objectively +real' and 'fictitious' conceptions in two ways. He speaks of +establishing the objective reality of a conception as consisting in +establishing the possibility of a corresponding object,[8] implying +therefore that a fictitious conception is a conception of which the +corresponding object is not known to be possible. Again, he describes +as fictitious new conceptions of substances, powers, and interactions, +which we might form from the material offered to us by perception +without borrowing from experience itself the example of their +connexions, e. g. the conception of a power of the mind to perceive +the future; and he says that the possibility of these conceptions +(i. e. the possibility of corresponding objects) cannot, like that of +the categories, be acquired _a priori_ through their being conditions +on which all experience depends, but must be discovered empirically or +not at all. Of such conceptions he says that, without being based upon +experience and its known laws, they are arbitrary syntheses which, +although they contain no contradiction, have no claim to objective +reality, and therefore to the possibility of corresponding objects.[9] +He implies, therefore, that the object of a conception can be said to +be possible only when the conception is the apprehension of a complex +of elements together with the apprehension--which, if not _a priori_, +must be based upon experience--that they are connected. Hence a +conception may be regarded as 'objectively real', or as 'fictitious' +according as it is the apprehension of a complex of elements +accompanied by the apprehension that they are connected, or the +apprehension of a complex of elements not so accompanied. + + [4] The view that 'in the mere conception of a thing no sign + of its existence is to be found' (B. 272, M. 165) forms, of + course, the basis of Kant's criticism of the ontological + argument for the existence of God. Cf. _Dialectic_, Bk. II, + Ch. III, § 4. + + [5] Cf. 'a conception which includes in itself a synthesis' + (B. 267 med., M. 162 med.). + + [6] E. g. B. 269 fin., M. 163 fin.; B. 270 med., M. 164 init. + The formulation which really expresses Kant's thought is to + be found B. 266 med., M. 161 fin.; B. 268 init., M. 162 fin.; + B. 268 med., M. 163 init.; and B. 270 med., M. 164 init. + + [7] _Gedichtete._ + + [8] B. 268 init., M. 162 fin. + + [9] B. 269-70, M. 163-4. + +It is now possible to state Kant's problem more precisely. With regard +to a given complex conception he wishes to determine the way in which +we can answer the questions (1) 'Has the conception a possible object +to correspond to it', or, in other words, 'Is the conception +'objectively real' or 'fictitious'?' (2) 'Given that a corresponding +object is possible, is it also real?' (3) 'Given that it is real, is +it also necessary?' + +The substance of Kant's answer to this problem may be stated thus: +'The most obvious guarantee of the objective reality of a conception, +i. e. of the possibility of a corresponding object, is the experience +of such an object. For instance, our experience of water guarantees +the objective reality of the conception of a liquid which expands as +it solidifies. This appeal to experience, however, takes us beyond the +possibility of the object to its reality, for the experience +vindicates the possibility of the object only through its reality. +Moreover, here the basis of our assertion of possibility is only +empirical, whereas our aim is to discover the conceptions of which the +objects can be determined _a priori_ to be possible. What then is the +answer to this, the real problem? To take the case of cause and +effect, we cannot reach any conclusion by the mere study of the +conception of cause and effect. For although the conception of a +necessary succession contains no contradiction, the necessary +succession of events is a mere arbitrary synthesis as far as our +thought of it is concerned; we have no direct insight into the +necessity. Therefore we cannot argue from this conception to the +possibility of a corresponding object, viz. a necessarily successive +series of events in nature. We can, however, say that that synthesis +is not arbitrary but necessary to which any object must conform, if it +is to be an object of experience. From this point of view we can say +that there must be a possible object corresponding to the conception +of cause and effect, because only as subjected to this synthesis are +there objects of experience at all. Hence, if we take this point of +view, we can say generally that all spatial and temporal conceptions, +as constituting the conditions of perceiving in experience, and all +the categories, as constituting the conditions of conceiving in +experience, must have possible objects. In other words, 'that which +agrees with the formal conditions of experience (according to +perception and conceptions) is _possible_'. Again, if we know that +the object of a conception is possible, how are we to determine +whether it is also actual? It is clear that, since we cannot advance +from the mere conception, objectively real though it may be, to the +reality of the corresponding object, we need perception. The case, +however, where the corresponding object is directly perceived may be +ignored, for it involves no inference or process of thought; the +appeal is to experience alone. Therefore the question to be considered +is, 'How do we determine the actuality of the object of a conception +comparatively _a priori_, i. e. without direct experience of it[10]?' +The answer must be that we do so by finding it to be 'connected +with an actual perception in accordance with the analogies of +experience'[11]. For instance, we must establish the actuality of an +object corresponding to the conception of a volcanic eruption by +showing it to be involved, in accordance with the analogies (and with +particular empirical laws), in the state of a place which we are now +perceiving. In other words, we can say that 'that which is connected +with the material conditions of existence (sensation) is _actual_'. +Finally, since we cannot learn the existence of any object of +experience wholly _a priori_, but only relatively to another existence +already given, the necessity of the existence of an object can never +be known from conceptions, but only from its connexion with what is +perceived; this necessity, however, is not the necessity of the +existence of a substance, but only the necessity of connexion of an +unobserved state of a substance with some observed state of a +substance. Therefore we can (and indeed must) say of an unobserved +object corresponding to a conception, not only that it is real, but +also that it is necessary, when we know it to be connected with a +perceived reality 'according to universal conditions of experience'; +but the necessity can be attributed only to states of substances and +not to substances themselves.' + + [10] Cf. B. 279, M. 169 and p. 4, note 1. + + [11] B. 273, M. 165. + +Throughout this account there runs one fatal mistake, that of +supposing that we can separate our knowledge of things as possible, as +actual, and as necessary. Even if this supposition be tenable in +certain cases,[12] it is not tenable in respect of the objects of a +complex conception, with which Kant is dealing. If we know the object +of a complex conception to be possible, we already know it to be +actual, and if we know it to be actual, we already know it to be +necessary. A complex conception in the proper sense is the +apprehension of a complex of elements together with the apprehension +of, or insight into, their connexion.[13] Thus, in the case of the +conception of a triangle we see that the possession of three sides +necessitates the possession of three angles. From such a conception +must be distinguished Kant's 'fictitious' conception, i. e. the +apprehension of a complex of elements without the apprehension of +connexion between them. Thus, in the case of the conception of a man +with six toes, there is no apprehension of connexion between the +possession of the characteristics indicated by the term 'man' and the +possession of six toes. In such a case, since we do not apprehend any +connexion between the elements, we do not really 'conceive' or 'think' +the object in question, e. g. a man with six toes. Now in the case of +a complex conception proper, it is impossible to think of a +corresponding individual as only possible. The question 'Is a +triangle, in the sense of a figure with three sides and three angles, +possible?' really means 'Is it possible for a three-sided figure to +have three angles?' To this question we can only answer that we see +that a three-sided figure can have three angles, because we see that +it must have, and therefore has, and can have, three angles; in other +words, that we see a triangle in the sense in question to be possible, +because we see it to be necessary, and, therefore, actual, and +possible. It cannot be argued that our insight is limited to the fact +that if there are three-sided figures they must be three-angled, and +that therefore we only know a triangle in the sense in question to be +possible. Our apprehension of the fact that the possession of three +sides necessitates the possession of three angles presupposes +knowledge of the existence of three-sided figures, for it is only in +an actual three-sided figure that we can apprehend the necessity. It +may, however, be objected that the question ought to mean simply 'Is a +three-sided figure possible?' and that, understood in this sense, it +cannot be answered in a similar way. Nevertheless, a similar answer is +the right answer. For the question 'Is a three-sided figure possible?' +really means 'Is it possible for three straight lines to form a +figure, i. e. to enclose a space?' and we can only answer it for +ourselves by seeing that a group of three straight lines or +directions, no two of which are parallel, must, as such, enclose a +space, this insight presupposing the apprehension of an actual group +of three straight lines. It may be said, therefore, that we can only +determine the possibility of the object of a complex conception in +the proper sense, through an act in which we apprehend its necessity +and its actuality at once. It is only where conceptions are +'fictitious', and so not properly conceptions, that appeal to +experience is necessary. The question 'Is an object corresponding to +the conception of a man with six toes possible?' presupposes the +reality of man and asks whether any man can have six toes. If we +understood the nature of man and could thereby apprehend either that +the possession of six toes was, or that it was not, involved in one of +the possible differentiations of man, we could decide the question of +possibility _a priori_, i. e. through our conceiving alone without an +appeal to experience; but we could do so only because we apprehended +either that a certain kind of man with six toes was necessary and +actual, or that such a man was impossible and not actual. If, however, +as is the case, we do not understand the nature of man, we can only +decide the question of possibility by an appeal to experience, i. e. +to the experience of a corresponding object, or of an object from +which the existence of such an object could be inferred. Here, +therefore--assuming the required experience to be forthcoming--we +can appeal to Kant's formula and say that we know that such a man, +i. e. an object corresponding to the conception, is actual, as +being connected with the material conditions of experience. But the +perception which constitutes the material conditions of experience +in the case in question is only of use because it carries us beyond +possibility to actuality, and appeal to it is only necessary because +the object is not really conceived or, in other words, because the +so-called conception is not really a conception. + + [12] For instance, it might at least be _argued_ that we know + space to be actual without knowing it to be necessary. + + [13] _Not_ 'together with the apprehension _that_ the + elements are connected'. Cf. p. 311. + +Kant really treats his 'objectively real' conceptions as if they were +'fictitious', even though he speaks of them as complete. Consequently, +his conceptions not being conceptions proper, he is necessarily led to +hold that an appeal to experience is needed in order to establish the +reality of a corresponding object. Yet, this being so, he should have +asked himself whether, without an appeal to perception, we could even +say that a corresponding object was possible. That he did not ask this +question is partly due to the fact that he attributes the form and the +matter of knowledge to different sources, viz. to the mind and to +things in themselves. While the conceptions involved in the forms of +perception, space, and time, and also the categories are the +manifestations of the mind's own nature, sensations, which form the +matter of knowledge, are due to the action of things in themselves on +our sensibility, and of this activity we can say nothing. Hence, from +the point of view of our mind--and since we do not know things in +themselves, this is the only point of view we can take--the existence +of sensations, and therefore of objects, which must be given in +perception, is wholly contingent and only to be discovered through +experience. On the other hand, since the forms of perception and +conception necessarily determine in certain ways the nature of +objects, _if_ there prove to be any objects, the conceptions involved +may be thought to determine what objects are possible, even though the +very existence of the objects is uncertain. Nevertheless, on his own +principles, Kant should have allowed that, apart from perception, we +could discover _a priori_ at least the reality, even if not the +necessity, of the objects of these conceptions. For his general view +is that the forms of perception and the categories are only actualized +on the occasion of the stimulus afforded by the action of things in +themselves on the sensibility. Hence the fact that the categories and +forms of perception are actualized--a fact implied in the very +existence of the _Critique_--involves the existence of objects +corresponding to the categories and to the conceptions involved in the +forms of perception. On Kant's own principles, therefore, we could say +_a priori_ that there must be objects corresponding to these +conceptions, even though their nature in detail could only be filled +in by experience.[14] + + [14] Cf. Caird, i. 604-5. + + + + +NOTE ON THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM + + +This well-known passage[1] practically replaces a long section,[2] +contained only in the first edition, on the fourth paralogism of +pure reason. Its aim is to vindicate against 'idealism' the reality +of objects in space, and it is for this reason inserted after the +discussion of the second postulate. The interest which it has excited +is due to Kant's use of language which at least seems to imply that +bodies in space are things in themselves, and therefore that here he +really abandons his main thesis. + + [1] B. 274-9, M. 167-9. Cf. B. xxxix (note), M. xl (note). + + [2] A. 367-80, Mah. 241-53. + +Idealism is the general name which Kant gives to any view which +questions or denies the reality of the physical world; and, as has +been pointed out before,[3] he repeatedly tries to defend himself +against the charge of being an idealist in this general sense. This +passage is the expression of his final attempt. Kant begins by +distinguishing two forms which idealism can take according as it +regards the existence of objects in space as false and _impossible_, +or as doubtful and _indemonstrable_. His own view, which regards their +existence as certain and demonstrable, and which he elsewhere[4] +calls transcendental idealism, constitutes a third form. The first +form is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley. This view, Kant says, +is unavoidable, if space be regarded as a property of things in +themselves, and the basis of it has been destroyed in the _Aesthetic_. +The second form is the problematic idealism of Descartes, according to +which we are immediately aware only of our own existence, and belief +in the existence of bodies in space can be only an inference, and an +uncertain inference, from the immediate apprehension of our own +existence. This view, according to Kant, is the outcome of a +philosophical attitude of mind, in that it demands that a belief +should be proved, and apparently--to judge from what Kant says of +Berkeley--it does not commit Descartes to the view that bodies in +space, if their reality can be vindicated, are things in themselves. + + [3] Cf. p. 76. + + [4] A. 369, Mah. 243; cf. B. 44, M. 27. + +The assertion that the _Aesthetic_ has destroyed the basis of +Berkeley's view, taken together with the drift of the _Refutation_ +as a whole, and especially of Remark I, renders it clear that the +_Refutation_ is directed against Descartes and not Berkeley. Kant +regards himself as having already refuted Berkeley's view, as he +here states it, viz. that the existence of objects in space is +_impossible_, on the ground that it arose from the mistake of +supposing that space, if real at all, must be a property of things in +themselves, whereas the _Aesthetic_ has as he thinks, shown that space +can be, and in point of fact is, a property of phenomena. He now wants +to prove--compatibly with their character as phenomena--that the +existence of bodies in space is not even, as Descartes contends, +_doubtful_. To prove this he seeks to show that Descartes is wrong in +supposing that we have no immediate experience of these objects. His +method is to argue that reflection shows that internal experience +presupposes external experience, i. e. that unless we were directly +aware of spatial objects, we could not be aware of the succession of +our own states, and consequently that it is an inversion to hold that +we must reach the knowledge of objects in space, if at all, by an +inference from the immediate apprehension of our own states. + +An examination of the proof itself, however, forces us to allow that +Kant, without realizing what he is doing, really abandons the view +that objects in space are phenomena, and uses an argument the very +nature of which implies that these objects are things in themselves. +The proof runs thus: + +_Theorem._ "The mere but empirically determined consciousness of my +own existence proves the existence of objects in space external to +me." + +"_Proof._ I am conscious of my own existence as determined in +time. All time-determination presupposes something permanent in +perception.[5] This permanent, however, cannot be an intuition[6] +in me. For all grounds of determination of my own existence, which +can be found in me, are representations, and as such themselves need +a permanent different from them, in relation to which their change +and consequently my existence in the time in which they change can +be determined.[7] The perception of this permanent, therefore, is +possible only through a _thing_ external to me, and not through the +mere _representation_ of a thing external to me. Consequently, the +determination of my existence in time is possible only through the +existence of actual things, which I perceive external to me. Now +consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness +of the possibility of this time-determination; hence it is necessarily +connected also with the existence of things external to me, as the +condition of time-determination, i. e. the consciousness of my own +existence, is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the +existence of other things external to me."[8] + + [5] _Wahrnehmung._ + + [6] _Anschauung._ + + [7] The text has been corrected in accordance with Kant's + note in the preface to the second edition, B. xxxix, M. xl. + + [8] B. 275-6, M. 167. + +The nature of the argument is clear. 'In order to be conscious, as +I am, of a determinate succession of my states, I must perceive +something permanent as that in relation to which alone I can perceive +my states as having a definite order.[9] But this permanent cannot be +a perception in me, for in that case it would only be a representation +of mine, which, as such, could only be apprehended in relation to +another permanent. Consequently, this permanent must be a thing +external to me and not a representation of a thing external to me. +Consequently, the consciousness of my own existence, which is +necessarily a consciousness of my successive states, involves the +immediate consciousness of things external to me.' + + [9] Cf. Kant's proof of the first analogy. + +Here there is no way of avoiding the conclusion that Kant is deceived +by the ambiguity of the phrase 'a thing external to me' into thinking +that he has given a proof of the existence of bodies in space which is +compatible with the view that they are only phenomena, although in +reality the proof presupposes that they are things in themselves. In +the 'proof', the phrase 'a thing external to me' must have a double +meaning. It must mean a thing external to my body, i. e. any body +which is not my body; in other words, it must be a loose expression +for a body in space. For, though the 'proof' makes us appeal to the +spatial character of things external to me, the _Refutation_ as a +whole, and especially Remark II, shows that it is of bodies in space +that he is thinking throughout. The phrase must also, and primarily, +mean a thing external to, in the sense of independent of, my mind, +i. e. a thing in itself. For the nerve of the argument consists in the +contention that the permanent the perception of which is required for +the consciousness of my successive states must be a _thing_ external +to me in opposition to the representation of a thing external to me, +and a thing external to me in opposition to a thing external to me can +only be a thing in itself. On the other hand, in Kant's conclusion, +'a thing external to me' can only mean a body in space, this being +supposed to be a phenomenon; for his aim is to establish the reality +of bodies in space compatibly with his general view that they are only +phenomena. The proof therefore requires that things external to me, in +order that they may render possible the consciousness of my successive +states, should have the very character which is withheld from them in +the conclusion, viz. that of existing independently of me; in other +words, if Kant establishes the existence of bodies in space at all, +he does so only at the cost of allowing that they are things in +themselves.[10] + + [10] The ambiguity of the phrase 'external to me' is pointed + out in the suppressed account of the fourth paralogism, + where it is expressly declared that objects in space are + only representations. (A. 372-3, Mah. 247). Possibly the + introduction of an argument which turns on the view that they + are not representations may have had something to do with the + suppression. + +Nevertheless, the _Refutation_ may be considered to suggest the proper +refutation of Descartes. It is possible to ignore Kant's demand for a +permanent as a condition of the apprehension of our successive states, +and to confine attention to his remark that he has shown that external +experience is really immediate, and that only by means of it is the +consciousness of our existence as determined in time possible.[11] If +we do so, we may consider the _Refutation_ as suggesting the view that +Descartes' position is precisely an inversion of the truth; in other +words, that our consciousness of the world, so far from being an +uncertain inference from the consciousness of our successive states, +is in reality a presupposition of the latter consciousness, in that +this latter consciousness only arises through reflection upon the +former, and that therefore Descartes' admission of the validity of +self-consciousness implicitly involves the admission _a fortiori_ of +the validity of our consciousness of the world.[12] + + [11] B. 277, M. 167 fin. + + [12] Cf. Caird, i. 632 and ff. + + + Oxford: Printed at the Clarendon Press by HORACE HART, M.A. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE*** + + +******* This file should be named 32701-8.txt or 32701-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/3/2/7/0/32701 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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