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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Secret Diplomatic History of The Eighteenth
+Century, by Karl Marx
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Secret Diplomatic History of The Eighteenth Century
+
+Author: Karl Marx
+
+Editor: Eleanor Marx Aveling
+
+Release Date: May 14, 2010 [EBook #32370]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Martin Pettit and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Demy 8vo, pp._ 656, xvi. 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+THE EASTERN QUESTION.
+
+Letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the Crimean War.
+
+By KARL MARX.
+
+Edited by ELEANOR MARX AVELING and EDWARD AVELING.
+
+
+                         OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.
+
+     "With all Marx's faults and his extravagant abuse of high political
+     personages, one cannot but admire the man's strength of mind, the
+     courage of his opinions, and his scorn and contempt for everything
+     small, petty, and mean. Although many and great changes have taken
+     place since these papers appeared, they are still valuable not only
+     for the elucidation of the past, but also for throwing a clearer
+     light upon the present as also upon the future."--_Westminster
+     Review._
+
+     "All that Marx's hand set itself to do, it did with all its might,
+     and in this volume, as in the rest of his work, we see the
+     indefatigable energy, the wonderful grasp of detail, and the keen
+     and marvellous foresight of a master mind."--_Justice._
+
+     "A very masterly analysis of the condition, political, economic and
+     social, of the Turkish Empire, which is as true to-day as when it
+     was written."--_Daily Chronicle._
+
+     "The letters contain an enormous amount of well-digested
+     information, and display great critical acumen, amounting in some
+     cases almost to prevision. The biographical interest of the volume
+     is also pronounced, for prominent men of that period are dissected
+     and analysed with a vigour and freedom which are as refreshing to
+     readers as they would be disconcerting to their subjects were they
+     alive. A perusal of the book must greatly tend to a clearer
+     perception of the later Eastern issues, which are now engaging the
+     attention and testing the diplomatic talents of the ambassadors at
+     Constantinople."--_Liverpool Post._
+
+
+LONDON: SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
+
+BY
+
+KARL MARX
+
+Edited by his Daughter ELEANOR MARX AVELING
+
+[Illustration: Logo]
+
+LONDON
+SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED
+PATERNOSTER SQUARE
+1899
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+BUTLER & TANNER,
+THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,
+FROME, AND LONDON.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+PUBLISHER'S PREFACE
+
+In the Preface to "The Eastern Question," by Karl Marx, published in
+1897, the Editors, Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, referred to
+two series of papers entitled "The Story of the Life of Lord
+Palmerston," and "Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century,"
+which they promised to publish at an early date.
+
+Mrs. Aveling did not live long enough to see these papers through the
+press, but she left them in such a forward state, and we have had so
+many inquiries about them since, that we venture to issue them without
+Mrs. Aveling's final revision in two shilling pamphlets.
+
+THE PUBLISHERS.
+
+
+
+
+Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+NO. 1. MR. RONDEAU TO HORACE WALPOLE.
+
+"PETERSBURG, _17th August, 1736_.[1]
+
+" ... I heartily wish ... that the Turks could be brought to condescend
+to make the first step, for this Court seems resolved to hearken to
+nothing till that is done, to mortify the Porte, that has on all
+occasions spoken of the Russians with the greatest contempt, which the
+Czarina and her present Ministers cannot bear. Instead of being obliged
+to Sir Everard Fawkner and Mr. Thalman (the former the British, the
+latter the Dutch Ambassador at Constantinople), for informing them of
+the good dispositions of the Turks, Count Oestermann will not be
+persuaded that the Porte is sincere, and seemed very much surprised that
+they had written to them (the Russian Cabinet) without order of the King
+and the States-General, or without being desired by the Grand Vizier,
+and that their letter had not been concerted with the Emperor's Minister
+at Constantinople.... I have shown Count Biron and Count Oestermann the
+two letters the Grand Vizier has written to the King, and at the same
+time told these gentlemen that as there was in them several hard
+reflections on this Court, I should not have communicated them if they
+had not been so desirous to see them. Count Biron said that was nothing,
+for they were used to be treated in this manner by the Turks. I desired
+their Excellencies not to let the Porte know that they had seen these
+letters, which would sooner aggravate matters than contribute to make
+them up...."
+
+
+NO. 2. SIR GEORGE MACARTNEY TO THE EARL OF SANDWICH.
+
+"ST. PETERSBURG, _1st (12th) March, 1765_.
+
+"Most Secret.[2]
+
+" ... Yesterday M. Panin[3] and the Vice-Chancellor, together with M.
+Osten, the Danish Minister, signed a treaty of alliance between this
+Court and that of Copenhagen. By one of the articles, a war with Turkey
+is made a _casus foederis_; and whenever that event happens, Denmark
+binds herself to pay Russia a subsidy of 500,000 roubles per annum, by
+quarterly payments. Denmark also, by a most secret article, promises to
+disengage herself from all French connections, demanding only a limited
+time to endeavour to obtain the arrears due to her by the Court of
+France. At all events, she is immediately to enter into all the views of
+Russia in Sweden, and to act entirely, though not openly, with her in
+that kingdom. Either I am deceived or M. Gross[4] has misunderstood his
+instructions, when he told your lordship that Russia intended to stop
+short, and leave all the burden of Sweden upon England. However desirous
+this Court may be that we should pay a large proportion of every
+pecuniary engagement, yet, I am assured, she will always choose to take
+the lead at Stockholm. Her design, her ardent wish, is to make a common
+cause with England and Denmark, for the total annihilation of the French
+interest there. This certainly cannot be done without a considerable
+expense; but Russia, at present, does not seem unreasonable enough to
+expect that WE SHOULD PAY THE WHOLE. It has been hinted to me that
+�1,500 per annum, on our part, would be sufficient to support our
+interest, and absolutely prevent the French from ever getting at
+Stockholm again.
+
+"The Swedes, highly sensible of, and very much mortified at, the
+dependent situation they have been in for many years, are extremely
+jealous of every Power that intermeddles in their affairs, and
+particularly so of their neighbours the Russians. This is the reason
+assigned to me for this Court's desiring that we and they should act
+upon SEPARATE bottoms, still preserving between our respective Ministers
+a confidence without reserve. That our first care should be, not to
+establish a faction under the name of a Russian or of an English
+faction; but, as even the wisest men are imposed upon by a mere name, to
+endeavour to have OUR friends distinguished as the friends of liberty
+and independence. At present we have a superiority, and the generality
+of the nation is persuaded how very ruinous their French connections
+have been, and, if continued, how very destructive they will be of their
+true interests. M. Panin does by no means desire that the smallest
+change should be made in the constitution of Sweden.[5] He wishes that
+the royal authority might be preserved without being augmented, and that
+the privileges of the people should be continued without violation. He
+was not, however, without his fears of the ambitious and intriguing
+spirit of the Queen, but the great ministerial vigilance of Count
+Oestermann has now entirely quieted his apprehensions on that head.
+
+"By this new alliance with Denmark, and by the success in Sweden, which
+this Court has no doubt of, if properly seconded, M. Panin will, in some
+measure, have brought to bear his grand scheme of uniting the Powers of
+the North.[6] Nothing, then, will be wanted to render it entirely
+perfect, but the conclusion of a treaty alliance with Great Britain. I
+am persuaded this Court desires it most ardently. The Empress has
+expressed herself more than once, in terms that marked it strongly. Her
+ambition is to form, by such an union, a certain counterpoise to the
+family compact,[7] and to disappoint, as much as possible, all the views
+of the Courts of Vienna and Versailles, against which she is irritated
+with uncommon resentment. I am not, however, to conceal from your
+lordship that we can have no hope of any such alliance, unless we agree,
+by some secret article, to pay a subsidy in case of a Turkish war, for
+no money will be desired from us, except upon an emergency of that
+nature. I flatter myself I have persuaded this Court of the
+unreasonableness of expecting any subsidy in time of peace, and that an
+alliance upon an equal footing will be more safe and more honourable for
+both nations. I can assure your lordship that a Turkish war's being a
+_casus foederis_, inserted either in the body of the treaty or in a
+secret article, will be a _sine qu� non_ in every negotiation we may
+have to open with this Court. The obstinacy of M. Panin upon that point
+is owing to the accident I am going to mention. When the treaty between
+the Emperor and the King of Prussia was in agitation, the Count
+Bestoucheff, who is a mortal enemy to the latter, proposed the Turkish
+clause, persuaded that the King of Prussia would never submit to it, and
+flattering himself with the hopes of blowing up that negotiation by his
+refusal. But this old politician, it seemed, was mistaken in his
+conjecture, for his Majesty immediately consented to the proposal on
+condition that Russia should make no alliance with any other Power but
+on the same terms.[8] This is the real fact, and to confirm it, a few
+days since, Count Solme, the Prussian Minister, came to visit me, and
+told me that if this Court had any intention of concluding an alliance
+with ours without such a clause, he had orders to oppose it in the
+strongest manner. Hints have been given me that if Great Britain were
+less inflexible in that article, Russia will be less inflexible in the
+article of export duties in the Treaty of Commerce, which M. Gross told
+your lordship this Court would never depart from. I was assured at the
+same time, by a person in the highest degree of confidence with M.
+Panin, that if we entered upon the Treaty of Alliance the Treaty of
+Commerce would go on with it _passibus �quis_; that then the latter
+would be entirely taken out of the hands of the College of Trade, where
+so many cavils and altercations had been made, and would be settled only
+between the Minister and myself, and that he was sure it would be
+concluded to our satisfaction, provided the Turkish clause was admitted
+into the Treaty of Alliance. I was told, also, that in case the
+Spaniards attacked Portugal, we might have 15,000 Russians in our pay to
+send upon that service. I must entreat your lordship on no account to
+mention to M. Gross the secret article of the Danish Treaty.... That
+gentleman, I am afraid, is no well-wisher to England."[9]
+
+
+NO. 3.--SIR JAMES HARRIS TO LORD GRANTHAM.
+
+"Petersburg, 16 (27 August), 1782.
+
+"(Private.)
+
+" ... On my arrival here I found the Court very different from what it
+had been described to me. So far from any partiality to England, its
+bearings were entirely French. The King of Prussia (then in possession
+of the Empress' ear) was exerting his influence against us. Count Panin
+assisted him powerfully; Lacy and Corberon, the Bourbon Ministers, were
+artful and intriguing; Prince Potemkin had been wrought upon by them;
+and the whole tribe which surrounded the Empress--the Schuwaloffs,
+Stroganoffs, and Chernicheffs--were what they still are, _gar�ons
+perruquiers de Paris_. Events seconded their endeavours. The assistance
+the French affected to afford Russia in settling its disputes with the
+Porte, and the two Courts being immediately after united as mediators at
+the Peace of Teschen, contributed not a little to reconcile them to each
+other. I was, therefore, not surprised that all my negotiations with
+Count Panin, _from February, 1778, to July, 1779_, should be
+unsuccessful, as he meant to prevent, not to promote, an alliance. It
+was in vain we made concessions to obtain it. He ever started fresh
+difficulties; had ever fresh obstacles ready. A very serious evil
+resulted, in the meanwhile, from my apparent confidence in him. He
+availed himself of it to convey in his reports to the Empress, not the
+language I employed, and the sentiments I actually expressed, but the
+language and sentiments he wished I should employ and express. He was
+equally careful to conceal her opinions and feelings from me; and while
+he described England to her as obstinate, and overbearing, and reserved,
+he described the Empress to me as displeased, disgusted, and indifferent
+to our concerns; and he was so convinced that, by this double
+misrepresentation, he had shut up every avenue of success that, at the
+time when I presented to him the Spanish declaration, he ventured to say
+to me, ministerially, '_That Great Britain had, by its own haughty
+conduct, brought down all its misfortunes on itself; that they were now
+at their height; that we must consent to any concession to obtain peace;
+and that we could expect neither assistance from our friends nor
+forbearance from our enemies._' I had temper enough not to give way to
+my feelings on this occasion.... I applied, without loss of time, to
+Prince Potemkin, and, by his means, the Empress _condescended_ to see me
+alone at Peterhoff. I was so fortunate in this interview, as not only to
+efface all bad impressions she had against us, but by stating in its
+true light, our situation, and THE INSEPARABLE INTERESTS OF GREAT
+BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, to raise in her mind a decided resolution to assist
+us. _This resolution she declared to me in express words._ When this
+transpired--and Count Panin was the first who knew it--he became my
+implacable and inveterate enemy. He not only thwarted by falsehoods and
+by a most undue exertion of his influence my public negotiations, but
+employed every means the lowest and most vindictive malice could suggest
+to depreciate and injure me personally; and from the very infamous
+accusations with which he charged me, had I been prone to fear, I might
+have apprehended the most infamous attacks at his hands. This relentless
+persecution still continues; it has outlived his Ministry.
+_Notwithstanding the positive assurances I had received from the Empress
+herself_, he found means, first to stagger, and afterwards to alter her
+resolutions. He was, indeed, very officiously assisted by his Prussian
+Majesty, who, at the time, was as much bent on oversetting our interest
+as he now seems eager to restore it. I was not, however, disheartened by
+this first disappointment, and, by redoubling my efforts, _I have twice
+more, during the course of my mission, brought the Empress to the verge_
+(!) _of standing forth our professed friend_, and, each time, my
+_expectations were grounded on assurances from her own mouth_. The first
+was when _our enemies conjured up the armed_ neutrality;[10] the other
+WHEN MINORCA WAS OFFERED HER. Although, on the first of these occasions,
+I found the same opposition from the same quarter I had experienced
+before, yet I am compelled to say that the principal cause of my failure
+was attributable to the very awkward manner in which we replied to the
+famous neutral declaration of February, 1780. As I well knew from what
+quarter the blow would come, I was prepared to parry it. _My opinion
+was: 'If England feels itself strong enough to do without Russia, let it
+reject at once these new-fangled doctrines; but if its situation is such
+as to want assistance, let it yield to the necessity of the hour,
+recognise them as far as they relate to_ RUSSIA ALONE, _and by a
+well-timed act of complaisance insure itself a powerful friend._'[11] My
+opinion was _not_ received; an ambiguous and trimming answer was given;
+_we seemed equally afraid to accept or dismiss them. I was instructed
+secretly to oppose, but avowedly to acquiesce in them_, and some
+unguarded expressions of one of its then confidential servants, made use
+of in speaking to Mr. Simolin, in direct contradiction to the temperate
+and cordial language that Minister had heard from Lord Stormont,
+_irritated_ the Empress to the last degree, and completed the _dislike_
+and _bad opinion_ she entertained of that Administration.[12] Our
+enemies took advantage of these _circumstances_.... I SUGGESTED THE IDEA
+OF GIVING UP MINORCA TO THE EMPRESS, _because, as it was evident to me
+we should at the peace be compelled to make sacrifices, it seemed to me
+wiser to make them to our friends than to our enemies_. THE IDEA WAS
+ADOPTED AT HOME IN ITS WHOLE EXTENT,[13] _and nothing could be more
+perfectly calculated to the meridian of this Court than the judicious
+instructions I received on this occasion from Lord Stormont. Why_ this
+project failed I am still at a loss to learn. _I never knew the Empress
+incline so strongly to any one measure as she did to this, before I had
+my full powers to treat, nor was I ever more astonished than when I
+found her shrink from her purpose when they arrived._ I imputed it at
+the same time, in my own mind, to the _rooted aversion she had for our
+Ministry_, and her _total want of confidence in them_; but I since am
+more strongly disposed to believe that she consulted the Emperor (of
+Austria) on the subject, and that he not only prevailed on her to
+decline the offer, but betrayed the secret to France, and that it thus
+became public. I cannot otherwise account for this rapid _change of
+sentiment in the Empress_, particularly as _Prince Potemkin_ (whatever
+he might be in other transactions) was certainly in this _cordial and
+sincere_ in his support, and both from what I saw at the time, and from
+what has since come to my knowledge, _had its success at heart as much
+as myself_. You will observe, my lord, that _the idea of bringing the
+Empress forward as a friendly mediatrix went hand-in-hand with the
+proposed cession of Minorca_. As this idea has given rise to what has
+since followed, and involved us in all the dilemmas of the present
+mediation, it will be necessary for me to explain what my views then
+were, and to exculpate myself from the blame of having placed my Court
+in so embarrassing a situation, _my wish and intention was that she
+should be sole mediatrix without an adjoint_; if you have perused what
+passed between her and me, in December, 1780, your lordship will readily
+perceive how very potent reasons I had to imagine she would be a
+friendly and even a partial one.[14] I knew, indeed, she was unequal to
+the task; but I knew, too, how greatly _her vanity_ would be flattered
+by this distinction, and was well aware that when once engaged she would
+persist, and be inevitably involved in our quarrel, particularly when it
+should appear (and appear it would) that we had _gratified_ her with
+Minorca. The annexing to the mediation the other (Austrian) Imperial
+Court entirely overthrew this plan. It not only afforded her a pretence
+for not keeping her word, but piqued and mortified her; and it was under
+this impression that she made over the whole business to the colleague
+we had given her, and ordered her Minister at Vienna to subscribe
+implicitly to whatever the Court proposed. Hence all the evils which
+have since arisen, and hence those we at this moment experience. I
+myself could never be brought to believe that the Court of Vienna, as
+long as Prince Kaunitz directs its measures, can mean England any good
+or France any harm. It was not with that view that I endeavoured to
+promote its influence here, but because _I found that of Prussia in
+constant opposition to me_; and because I thought that if I could by any
+means smite this, I should get rid of my greatest obstacle. I was
+mistaken, and, by a singular fatality, the Courts of Vienna and Berlin
+seem never to have agreed in anything but in the disposition to
+prejudice us here by turns.[15] The proposal relative to Minorca was the
+last attempt I made to induce the Empress to stand forth. I had
+exhausted my strength and resources; the freedom with which I had spoken
+in my last interview with her, though respectful, had _displeased_; and
+_from this period to the removal of the late Administration_, I have
+been reduced to act on the defensive.... I have had more difficulty in
+preventing the Empress from doing harm than I ever had in attempting to
+engage her to do us good. It was to prevent evil, that I inclined
+strongly for the acceptation of _her single mediation between us and
+Holland, when her Imperial Majesty first offered it_. The _extreme
+dissatisfaction_ she expressed _at our refusal_ justified my opinion;
+and I TOOK UPON ME, when it was proposed a second time, _to urge the
+necessity of its being agreed to_ (ALTHOUGH I KNEW IT TO BE IN
+CONTRADICTION OF THE SENTIMENTS OF MY PRINCIPAL), since I firmly
+believed, had we again declined it, the Empress would, in a _moment of
+anger_, have joined the Dutch against us. As it is, _all has gone on
+well_; our _judicious_ conduct has transferred to them the _ill-humour_
+she originally was in with us, and she now is as partial to our cause as
+she was before partial to theirs. _Since the new Ministry in England, my
+road has been made smoother_; the great and new path struck out by _your
+predecessor,[16] and which you, my lord, pursue_, has operated a most
+advantageous change in our favour upon the Continent. Nothing, indeed,
+but events which come home to her, will, I believe, ever induce her
+Imperial Majesty to take an active part; but there is now a _strong glow
+of friendship_ in our favour; she approves our measures; she _trusts_
+our Ministry, and _she gives way to that predilection she certainly has
+for our nation_. Our enemies know and feel this; it keeps them in awe.
+This is a succinct but accurate sketch of what has passed at this Court
+from the day of my arrival at Petersburg to the present hour. Several
+inferences may be deduced from it.[17] That the Empress is led by her
+passions, not by reason and argument; that her prejudices are very
+strong, easily acquired, and, when once fixed, irremovable; while, on
+the contrary, there is no sure road to her good opinion; that even when
+obtained, it is subject to perpetual fluctuation, and liable to be
+biassed by the most trifling incidents; that till she is fairly embarked
+in a plan, no assurances can be depended on; but that when once fairly
+embarked, she never retracts, and may be carried any length; that with
+very bright parts, an elevated mind, an uncommon sagacity, she wants
+_judgment_, _precision of idea_, _reflection_, _and_ L'ESPRIT DE
+COMBINAISON(!!) That her Ministers are either ignorant of, or
+indifferent to, the welfare of the State, and act from a passive
+submission to her will, or from motives of party and private
+interests."[18]
+
+
+4. (MANUSCRIPT) ACCOUNT OF RUSSIA DURING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE REIGN
+OF THE EMPEROR PAUL, DRAWN UP BY THE REV. L. K. PITT, CHAPLAIN TO THE
+FACTORY OF ST. PETERSBURG, AND A NEAR RELATIVE OF WILLIAM PITT.[19]
+
+_Extract._
+
+
+     "There can scarcely exist a doubt concerning the real sentiments of
+     the late Empress of Russia on the great points which have, within
+     the last few years, convulsed the whole system of European
+     politics. She certainly felt from the beginning the fatal tendency
+     of the new principles, but was not, perhaps, displeased to see
+     every European Power exhausting itself in a struggle which raised,
+     in proportion to its violence, her own importance. It is more than
+     probable that the state of the newly acquired provinces in Poland
+     was likewise a point which had considerable influence over the
+     political conduct of Catherine. The fatal effects resulting from an
+     apprehension of revolt in the late seat of conquest seem to have
+     been felt in a very great degree by the combined Powers, who in the
+     early period of the Revolution were so near reinstating the regular
+     Government in France. The same dread of revolt in Poland, which
+     divided the attention of the combined Powers and hastened their
+     retreat, deterred likewise the late Empress of Russia from entering
+     on the great theatre of war, until a combination of circumstances
+     rendered the progress of the French armies a more dangerous evil
+     than any which could possibly result to the Russian Empire from
+     active operations.... The last words which the Empress was known to
+     utter were addressed to her Secretary when she dismissed him on the
+     morning on which she was seized: 'Tell Prince' (Zuboff), she said,
+     'to come to me at twelve, and to remind me of signing the Treaty of
+     Alliance with England.'"
+
+
+Having entered into ample considerations on the Emperor Paul's acts and
+extravagances, the Rev. Mr. Pitt continues as follows:
+
+
+     "When these considerations are impressed on the mind, the nature of
+     the late secession from the coalition, and of the incalculable
+     indignities offered to the Government of Great Britain, can alone
+     be fairly estimated.... BUT THE TIES WHICH BIND HER (GREAT BRITAIN)
+     TO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE ARE FORMED BY NATURE, AND INVIOLABLE. United,
+     these nations might almost brave the united world; divided, the
+     strength and importance of each is FUNDAMENTALLY impaired. England
+     has reason to regret with Russia that the imperial sceptre should
+     be thus inconsistently wielded, but it is the sovereign of Russia
+     alone who divides the Empires."
+
+
+The reverend gentleman concludes his account by the words:
+
+
+     "As far as human foresight can at this moment penetrate, the
+     despair of an enraged individual seems a more probable means to
+     terminate the present scene of oppression than any more systematic
+     combination of measures to restore the throne of Russia to its
+     dignity and importance."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] This letter relates to the war against Turkey, commenced by the
+Empress Ann in 1735. The British diplomatist at St. Petersburg is
+reporting about his endeavours to induce Russia to conclude peace with
+the Turks. The passages omitted are irrelevant.
+
+[2] England was at that time negotiating a commercial treaty with
+Russia.
+
+[3] To this time it has remained among historians a point of
+controversy, whether or not Panin was in the pay of Frederick II. of
+Prussia, and whether he was so behind the back of Catherine, or at her
+bidding. There can exist no doubt that Catherine II., in order to
+identify foreign Courts with Russian Ministers, allowed Russian
+Ministers ostensibly to identify themselves with foreign Courts. As to
+Panin in particular, the question is, however, decided by an authentic
+document which we believe has never been published. It proves that,
+having once become the man of Frederick II., he was forced to remain so
+at the risk of his honour, fortune and life.
+
+[4] The Russian Minister at London.
+
+[5] The oligarchic Constitution set up by the Senate after the death of
+Charles XII.
+
+[6] Thus we learn from Sir George Macartney that what is commonly known
+as Lord Chatham's "grand conception of the Northern Alliance," was, in
+fact, Panin's "grand scheme of uniting the Powers of the North." Chatham
+was duped into fathering the Muscovite plan.
+
+[7] The compact between the Bourbons of France and Spain concluded at
+Paris on August, 1761.
+
+[8] This was a subterfuge on the part of Frederick II. The manner in
+which Frederick was forced into the arms of the Russian Alliance is
+plainly told by M. Koch, the French professor of diplomacy and teacher
+of Talleyrand. "Frederick II.," he says, "having been abandoned by the
+Cabinet of London, could not but attach himself to Russia." (See his
+_History of the Revolutions in Europe_.)
+
+[9] Horace Walpole characterises his epoch by the words--"_It was the
+mode of the times to be paid by one favour for receiving another._" At
+all events, it will be seen from the text that such was the mode of
+Russia in transacting business with England. The Earl of Sandwich, to
+whom Sir George Macartney could dare to address the above despatch,
+distinguished himself, ten years later, in 1775, as First Lord of the
+Admiralty, in the North Administration, by the vehement opposition he
+made to Lord Chatham's motion for an equitable _adjustment of the
+American difficulties_. "He could not believe it (Chatham's motion) _the
+production of a British peer_; it appeared to him rather _the work of
+some American_." In 1777, we find Sandwich again blustering: "he would
+hazard every drop of blood, as well as the last shilling of the national
+treasure, rather than allow Great Britain to be defied, bullied, and
+dictated to, by her disobedient and rebellious subjects." Foremost as
+the Earl of Sandwich was in entangling England in war with her North
+American colonies, with France, Spain, and Holland, we behold him
+constantly accused in Parliament by Fox, Burke, Pitt, etc., "of keeping
+the naval force inadequate to the defence of the country; of
+intentionally opposing small English forces where he knew the enemy to
+have concentrated large ones; of utter mismanagement of the service in
+all its departments," etc. (See debates of the House of Commons of 11th
+March, 1778; 31st March, 1778; February, 1779; Fox's motion of censure
+on Lord Sandwich; 9th April, 1779, address to the King for the dismissal
+of Lord Sandwich from his service, on account of misconduct in service;
+7th February, 1782, Fox's motion that there had been gross mismanagement
+in the administration of naval affairs during the year 1781.) On this
+occasion Pitt imputed to Lord Sandwich "all our naval disasters and
+disgraces." The ministerial majority against the motion amounted to only
+22 in a House of 388. On the 22nd February, 1782, a similar motion
+against Lord Sandwich was only negatived by a majority of 19 in a House
+of 453. Such, indeed, was the character of the Earl of Sandwich's
+Administration that more than thirty distinguished officers quitted the
+naval service, or declared they could not act under the existing system.
+In point of fact, during his whole tenure of office, serious
+apprehensions were entertained of the consequences of the dissensions
+then prevalent in the navy. Besides, the Earl of Sandwich was openly
+accused, and, as far as circumstantial evidence goes, convicted of
+PECULATION. (See debates of the House of Lords, 31st March, 1778; 9th
+April, 1779, and _seq._) When the motion for his removal from office was
+negatived on April 9th 1779, thirty-nine peers entered their protest.
+
+[10] Sir James Harris affects to believe that Catherine II. was not the
+author of, but a convert to, the armed neutrality of 1780. It is one of
+the grand stratagems of the Court of St. Petersburg to give to its own
+schemes the form of proposals suggested to and pressed on itself by
+foreign Courts. Russian diplomacy delights in those _qu� pro quo_. Thus
+the Court of Florida Bianca was made the responsible editor of the armed
+neutrality, and, from a report that vain-glorious Spaniard addressed to
+Carlos III., one may see how immensely he felt flattered at the idea of
+having not only hatched the armed neutrality but allured Russia into
+abetting it.
+
+[11] This same Sir James Harris, perhaps more familiar to the reader
+under the name of the Earl of Malmesbury, is extolled by English
+historians as the man who prevented England from surrendering the right
+of search in the Peace Negotiations of 1782-83.
+
+[12] It might be inferred from this passage and similar ones occurring
+in the text, that Catherine II. had caught a real Tartar in Lord North,
+whose Administration Sir James Harris is pointing at. Any such delusion
+will disappear before the simple statement that the first partition of
+Poland took place under Lord North's Administration, without any protest
+on his part. In 1773 Catherine's war against Turkey still continuing,
+and her conflicts with Sweden growing serious, France made preparations
+to send a powerful fleet into the Baltic. D'Aiguillon, the French
+Minister of Foreign Affairs, communicated this plan to Lord Stormont,
+the then English Ambassador at Paris. In a long conversation,
+D'Aiguillon dwelt largely on the ambitious designs of Russia, and the
+common interest that ought to blend France and England into a joint
+resistance against them. In answer to this confidential communication,
+he was informed by the English Ambassador that, "if France sent her
+ships into the Baltic, they would instantly be followed by a British
+fleet; that the presence of two fleets would have no more effect than a
+neutrality; and however the British Court might desire to preserve the
+harmony now subsisting between England and France, it was impossible to
+foresee the contingencies that might arise from accidental collision."
+In consequence of these representations, D'Aiguillon countermanded the
+squadron at Brest, but gave new orders for the equipment of an armament
+at Toulon. "On receiving intelligence of these renewed preparations, the
+British Cabinet made instant and vigorous demonstrations of resistance;
+Lord Stormont was ordered to declare that every argument used respecting
+the Baltic applied equally to the Mediterranean. A memorial also was
+presented to the French Minister, accompanied by a demand that it should
+be laid before the King and Council. This produced the desired effect;
+the armament was countermanded, the sailors disbanded, and the chances
+of an extensive warfare avoided."
+
+"_Lord North_," says the complacent writer from whom we have borrowed
+the last lines, "_thus effectually served the cause of his ally_
+(Catherine II.), _and facilitated the treaty of peace_ (of
+Kutchuk-Kainardji) _between Russia and the Porte_." Catherine II.
+rewarded Lord North's good services, first by withholding the aid she
+had promised him in case of a war between England and the North American
+Colonies, and in the second place, by conjuring up and leading the armed
+neutrality against England. Lord North DARED NOT _repay, as he was
+advised by Sir James Harris_, this treacherous breach of faith by giving
+up to Russia, and to _Russia alone_, the maritime rights of Great
+Britain. Hence the irritation in the nervous system of the Czarina; the
+hysterical fancy she caught all at once of "entertaining a bad opinion"
+of Lord North, of "disliking" him, of feeling a "rooted aversion"
+against him, of being afflicted with "a total want of confidence," etc.
+In order to give the Shelburne Administration a warning example, Sir
+James Harris draws up a minute psychological picture of the feelings of
+the Czarina, and the disgrace incurred by the North Administration, for
+having wounded these same feelings. His prescription is very simple:
+surrender to Russia, as our friend, everything for asking which we would
+consider every other Power our enemy.
+
+[13] It is then a fact that the English Government, not satisfied with
+having made Russia a Baltic power, strove hard to make her a
+Mediterranean power too. The offer of the surrender of Minorca appears
+to have been made to Catherine II. at the end of 1779, or the beginning
+of 1780, shortly after Lord Stormont's entrance into the North
+Cabinet--the same Lord Stormont we have seen thwarting the French
+attempts at resistance against Russia, and whom even Sir James Harris
+cannot deny the merit of having written "_instructions perfectly
+calculated to the meridian of the Court of St. Petersburg_." While Lord
+North's Cabinet, at the suggestion of Sir James Harris, offered Minorca
+to the _Muscovites_, the English Commoners and people were still
+trembling for fear lest the _Hanoverians_ (?) should wrest out of their
+hands "one of the keys of the Mediterranean." On the 26th of October,
+1775, the King, in his opening speech, had informed Parliament, amongst
+other things, that he had Sir James Graham's own words, when asked why
+they should not have kept up some blockade pending the settlement of the
+"plan," "_They did not take that responsibility upon themselves._" The
+responsibility of executing their orders! The despatch we have quoted is
+the only despatch read, except one of a later date. The despatch, said
+to be sent on the 5th of April, in which "the Admiral is ordered to use
+the _largest discretionary power_ in blockading the Russian ports in the
+Black Sea," is not read, nor any replies from Admiral Dundas. The
+Admiralty sent _Hanoverian_ troops to Gibraltar and Port Mahon
+(Minorca), to replace such British regiments as should be drawn from
+those garrisons for service in America. An amendment to the address was
+proposed by Lord John Cavendish, strongly condemning "the confiding
+_such important fortresses as Gibraltar and Port Mahon to foreigners_."
+After very stormy debates, in which the measure of entrusting Gibraltar
+and Minorca, "_the keys of the Mediterranean_," as they were called, to
+_foreigners_, was furiously attacked; Lord North, acknowledging himself
+the adviser of the measure, felt obliged to bring in a _bill of
+indemnity_. However, these foreigners, these Hanoverians, were the
+English King's own subjects. Having virtually surrendered Minorca to
+Russia in 1780, Lord North was, of course, quite justified in treating,
+on November 22, 1781, in the House of Commons, "with utter scorn the
+insinuation that _Ministers were in the pay of France_."
+
+Let us remark, _en passant_, that Lord North, one of the most base and
+mischievous Ministers England can boast of, perfectly mastered the art
+of keeping the House in perpetual laughter. So had Lord Sunderland. So
+has Lord Palmerston.
+
+[14] Lord North having been supplanted by the Rockingham Administration,
+on March 27, 1782, the celebrated Fox forwarded peace proposals to
+Holland through the mediation of the _Russian_ Minister. Now what were
+the consequences of the _Russian mediation_ so much vaunted by this Sir
+James Harris, the servile account keeper of the Czarina's sentiments,
+humours, and feelings? While preliminary articles of peace had been
+convened with France, Spain, and the American States, it was found
+impossible to arrive at any such preliminary agreement with Holland.
+Nothing but a simple cessation of hostilities was to be obtained from
+it. So powerful proved the _Russian mediation_, that on the 2nd
+September, 1783, just one day before the conclusion of _definitive
+treaties_ with America, France, and Spain, Holland condescended to
+accede to _preliminaries of peace_, and this not in consequence of the
+_Russian mediation_, but through the influence of _France_.
+
+[15] How much was England not prejudiced by the Courts of Vienna and
+Paris thwarting the plan of the British Cabinet of ceding Minorca to
+Russia, and by Frederick of Prussia's resistance against the great
+Chatham's scheme of a Northern Alliance under Muscovite auspices.
+
+[16] The predecessor is Fox. Sir James Harris establishes a complete
+scale of British Administrations, according to the degree in which they
+enjoyed the favour of his almighty Czarina. In spite of Lord Stormont,
+the Earl of Sandwich, Lord North, and Sir James Harris himself; in spite
+of the partition of Poland, the bullying of D'Aiguillon, the treaty of
+Kutchuk-Kainardji, and the intended cession of Minorca--Lord North's
+Administration is relegated to the bottom of the heavenly ladder; far
+above it has climbed the Rockingham Administration, whose soul was Fox,
+notorious for his subsequent intrigues with Catherine; but at the top we
+behold the Shelburne Administration, whose Chancellor of the Exchequer
+was the celebrated William Pitt. As to Lord Shelburne himself, Burke
+exclaimed in the House of Commons, that "if he was not a Catalina or
+Borgia in morals, it must not be ascribed to anything but his
+understanding."
+
+[17] Sir James Harris forgets deducing the main inference, that the
+Ambassador of England is the agent of Russia.
+
+[18] In the 18th century, English diplomatists' despatches, bearing on
+their front the sacramental inscription, "Private," are despatches to be
+withheld from the King by the Minister to whom they are addressed. That
+such was the case may be seen from Lord Mahon's _History of England_.
+
+[19] "To be burnt after my death." Such are the words prefixed to the
+manuscript by the gentleman whom it was addressed to.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+The documents published in the first chapter extend from the reign of
+the Empress Ann to the commencement of the reign of the Emperor Paul,
+thus encompassing the greater part of the 18th century. At the end of
+that century it had become, as stated by the Rev. Mr. Pitt, the openly
+professed and orthodox dogma of English diplomacy, "_that the ties which
+bind Great Britain to the Russian Empire are formed by nature, and
+inviolable_."
+
+In perusing these documents, there is something that startles us even
+more than their contents--viz., their form. All these letters are
+"confidential," "private," "secret," "most secret"; but in spite of
+secrecy, privacy, and confidence, the English statesmen converse among
+each other about Russia and her rulers in a tone of awful reserve,
+abject servility, and cynical submission, which would strike us even in
+the public despatches of Russian statesmen. To conceal intrigues against
+foreign nations secrecy is recurred to by Russian diplomatists. The same
+method is adopted by English diplomatists freely to express their
+devotion to a foreign Court. The secret despatches of Russian
+diplomatists are fumigated with some equivocal perfume. It is one part
+the _fum�e de fausset�_, as the Duke of St. Simon has it, and the other
+part that coquettish display of one's own superiority and cunning which
+stamps upon the reports of the French Secret Police their indelible
+character. Even the master despatches of Pozzo di Borgo are tainted with
+this common blot of the _lit�rature de mauvais lieu_. In this point the
+English secret despatches prove much superior. They do not affect
+superiority but silliness. For instance, can there be anything more
+silly than Mr. Rondeau informing Horace Walpole that he has betrayed to
+the Russian Minister the letters addressed by the Turkish Grand Vizier
+to the King of England, but that he had told "at the same time those
+gentlemen that as there were several hard reflections on the Russian
+Court he should not have communicated them, _if they had not been so
+anxious to see them_," and then told their excellencies not to tell the
+Porte that they had seen them (those letters)! At first view the infamy
+of the act is drowned in the silliness of the man. Or, take Sir George
+Macartney. Can there be anything more silly than his happiness that
+Russia seemed "reasonable" enough not to expect that England "should pay
+the WHOLE EXPENSES" for Russia's "choosing to take the lead at
+Stockholm"; or his "flattering himself" that he had "persuaded the
+Russian Court" not to be so "unreasonable" as to ask from England, in a
+time of peace, subsidies for a time of war against Turkey (then the ally
+of England); or his warning the Earl of Sandwich "not to mention" to the
+Russian Ambassador at London the secrets mentioned to himself by the
+Russian Chancellor at St. Petersburg? Or can there be anything more
+silly than Sir James Harris confidentially whispering into the ear of
+Lord Grantham that Catherine II. was devoid of "judgment, precision of
+idea, reflection, and _l'esprit de combinaison_"?[20]
+
+On the other hand, take the cool impudence with which Sir George
+Macartney informs his minister that because the Swedes were extremely
+jealous of, and mortified at, their dependence on Russia, England was
+directed by the Court of St. Petersburg to do its work at Stockholm,
+under the British colours of liberty and independence! Or Sir James
+Harris advising England to surrender to Russia Minorca and the right of
+search, and the monopoly of mediation in the affairs of the world--not
+in order to gain any material advantage, or even a formal engagement on
+the part of Russia, but only "a strong glow of friendship" from the
+Empress, and the transfer to France of her "ill humour."
+
+The secret Russian despatches proceed on the very plain line that
+Russia knows herself to have no common interests whatever with other
+nations, but that every nation must be persuaded separately to have
+common interests with Russia to the exclusion of every other nation. The
+English despatches, on the contrary, never dare so much as hint that
+Russia has common interests with England, but only endeavour to convince
+England that she has Russian interests. The English diplomatists
+themselves tell us that this was the single argument they pleaded, when
+placed face to face with Russian potentates.
+
+If the English despatches we have laid before the public were addressed
+to private friends, they would only brand with infamy the ambassadors
+who wrote them. Secretly addressed as they are to the British Government
+itself, they nail it for ever to the pillory of history; and,
+instinctively, this seems to have been felt, even by Whig writers,
+because none has dared to publish them.
+
+The question naturally arises from which epoch this Russian character of
+English diplomacy, become traditionary in the course of the 18th
+century, does date its origin. To clear up this point we must go back to
+the time of Peter the Great, which, consequently, will form the
+principal subject of our researches. We propose to enter upon this task
+by reprinting some English pamphlets, written at the time of Peter I.,
+and which have either escaped the attention of modern historians, or
+appeared to them to merit none. However, they will suffice for refuting
+the prejudice common to Continental and English writers, that the
+designs of Russia were not understood or suspected in England until at a
+later, and too late, epoch; that the diplomatic relations between
+England and Russia were but the natural offspring of the mutual material
+interests of the two countries; and that, therefore, in accusing the
+British statesmen of the 18th century of Russianism we should commit an
+unpardonable hysteron-proteron. If we have shown by the English
+despatches that, at the time of the Empress Ann, England already
+betrayed her own allies to Russia, it will be seen from the pamphlets we
+are now about to reprint that, even before the epoch of Ann, at the
+very epoch of Russian ascendency in Europe, springing up at the time of
+Peter I., the plans of Russia were understood, and the connivance of
+British statesmen at these plans was denounced by English writers.
+
+The first pamphlet we lay before the public is called _The Northern
+Crisis_. It was printed in London in 1716, and relates to the intended
+Dano-Anglo-Russian _invasion of Skana_ (Schonen).
+
+During the year 1715 a northern alliance for the partition, not of
+Sweden proper, but of what we may call the Swedish Empire, had been
+concluded between Russia, Denmark, Poland, Prussia, and Hanover. That
+partition forms the first grand act of modern diplomacy--the logical
+premiss to the partition of Poland. The partition treaties relating to
+Spain have engrossed the interest of posterity because they were the
+forerunners of the War of Succession, and the partition of Poland drew
+even a larger audience because its last act was played upon a
+contemporary stage. However, it cannot be denied that it was the
+partition of the Swedish Empire which inaugurated the modern era of
+international policy. The partition treaty not even pretended to have a
+pretext, save the misfortune of its intended victim. For the first time
+in Europe the violation of all treaties was not only made, but
+proclaimed the common basis of a new treaty. Poland herself, in the drag
+of Russia, and personated by that commonplace of immorality, Augustus
+II., Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, was pushed into the
+foreground of the conspiracy, thus signing her own death-warrant, and
+not even enjoying the privilege reserved by Polyphemus to Odysseus--to
+be last eaten. Charles XII. predicted her fate in the manifesto flung
+against King Augustus and the Czar, from his voluntary exile at Bender.
+The manifesto is dated January 28, 1711.
+
+The participation in this partition treaty threw England within the
+orbit of Russia, towards whom, since the days of the "Glorious
+Revolution," she had more and more gravitated. George I., as King of
+England, was bound to a defensive alliance with Sweden by the treaty of
+1700. Not only as King of England, but as Elector of Hanover, he was
+one of the guarantees, and even of the direct parties to the treaty of
+Travendal, which secured to Sweden what the partition treaty intended
+stripping her of. Even his German electoral dignity he partly owed to
+that treaty. However, as Elector of Hanover he declared war against
+Sweden, which he waged as King of England.
+
+In 1715 the confederates had divested Sweden of her German provinces,
+and to effect that end introduced the Muscovite on the German soil. In
+1716 they agreed to invade Sweden Proper--to attempt an armed descent
+upon Schonen--the southern extremity of Sweden now constituting the
+districts of Malmoe and Christianstadt. Consequently Peter of Russia
+brought with him from Germany a Muscovite army, which was scattered over
+Zealand, thence to be conveyed to Schonen, under the protection of the
+English and Dutch fleets sent into the Baltic, on the false pretext of
+protecting trade and navigation. Already in 1715, when Charles XII. was
+besieged in Stralsund, eight English men-of-war, lent by England to
+Hanover, and by Hanover to Denmark, had openly reinforced the Danish
+navy, and even hoisted the Danish flag. In 1716 the British navy was
+commanded by his Czarish Majesty in person.
+
+Everything being ready for the invasion of Schonen, there arose a
+difficulty from a side where it was least expected. Although the treaty
+stipulated only for 30,000 Muscovites, Peter, in his magnanimity, had
+landed 40,000 on Zealand; but now that he was to send them on the errand
+to Schonen, he all at once discovered that out of the 40,000 he could
+spare but 15,000. This declaration not only paralysed the military plan
+of the confederates, it seemed to threaten the security of Denmark and
+of Frederick IV., its king, as great part of the Muscovite army,
+supported by the Russian fleet, occupied Copenhagen. One of the generals
+of Frederick proposed suddenly to fall with the Danish cavalry upon the
+Muscovites and to exterminate them, while the English men-of-war should
+burn the Russian fleet. Averse to any perfidy which required some
+greatness of will, some force of character, and some contempt of
+personal danger, Frederick IV. rejected the bold proposal, and limited
+himself to assuming an attitude of defence. He then wrote a begging
+letter to the Czar, intimating that he had given up his Schonen fancy,
+and requested the Czar to do the same and find his way home: a request
+the latter could not but comply with. When Peter at last left Denmark
+with his army, the Danish Court thought fit to communicate to the Courts
+of Europe a public account of the incidents and transactions which had
+frustrated the intended descent upon Schonen--and this document forms
+the starting point of _The Northern Crisis_.
+
+In a letter addressed to Baron G�rtz, dated from London, January 23,
+1717, by Count Gyllenborg, there occur some passages in which the
+latter, the then Swedish ambassador at the Court of St. James's, seems
+to profess himself the author of _The Northern Crisis_, the title of
+which he does not, however, quote. Yet any idea of his having written
+that powerful pamphlet will disappear before the slightest perusal of
+the Count's authenticated writings, such as his letters to G�rtz.
+
+
+"THE NORTHERN CRISIS; OR IMPARTIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE POLICIES OF THE
+CZAR; OCCASIONED BY MYNHEER VON STOCKEN'S REASONS FOR DELAYING THE
+DESCENT UPON SCHONEN. A TRUE COPY OF WHICH IS PREFIXED, VERBALLY
+TRANSLATED AFTER THE TENOR OF THAT IN THE GERMAN SECRETARY'S OFFICE IN
+COPENHAGEN, OCTOBER 10, 1716. LONDON, 1716.
+
+1.--_Preface_---- ... 'Tis (the present pamphlet) not fit for lawyers'
+clerks, but it is highly convenient to be read by those who are proper
+students in the laws of nations; 'twill be but lost time for any
+stock-jobbing, trifling dealer in Exchange-Alley to look beyond the
+preface on't, but every merchant in England (more especially those who
+trade to the Baltic) will find his account in it. The Dutch (as the
+courants and postboys have more than once told us) are about to mend
+their hands, if they can, in several articles of trade with the Czar,
+and they have been a long time about it to little purpose. Inasmuch as
+they are such a frugal people, they are good examples for the imitation
+of our traders; but if we can outdo them for once, in the means of
+projecting a better and more expeditious footing to go upon, for the
+emolument of us both, let us, for once, be wise enough to set the
+example, and let them, for once, be our imitators. This little treatise
+will show a pretty plain way how we may do it, as to our trade in the
+Baltic, at this juncture. I desire no little _coffee-house politician_
+to meddle with it; but to give him even a disrelish for my company. I
+must let him know that he is not fit for mine. Those who are even
+proficients in state science, will find in it matter highly fit to
+employ all their powers of speculation, which they ever before past
+negligently by, and thought (too cursorily) were not worth the
+regarding. No outrageous party-man will find it at all for his purpose;
+but every _honest Whig_ and every _honest Tory_ may each of them read
+it, not only without either of their disgusts, but with the satisfaction
+of them both.... 'Tis not fit, in fine, for a mad, hectoring,
+Presbyterian Whig, or a raving, fretful, dissatisfied, Jacobite Tory."
+
+
+2.--THE REASONS HANDED ABOUT BY MYNHEER VON STOCKEN FOR DELAYING THE
+DESCENT UPON SCHONEN.
+
+"There being no doubt, but most courts will be surprised that the
+descent upon Schonen has not been put into execution, notwithstanding
+the great preparations made for that purpose; and that all his Czarish
+Majesty's troops, who were in Germany, were transported to Zealand, not
+without great trouble and danger, partly by his own gallies, and partly
+by his Danish Majesty's and other vessels; and that the said descent is
+deferred till another time. His Danish Majesty hath therefore, in order
+to clear himself of all imputation and reproach, thought fit to order,
+that the following true account of this affair should be given to all
+impartial persons. Since the Swedes were entirely driven out of their
+_German_ dominions, there was, according to all the rules of policy, and
+reasons of war, no other way left, than vigorously to attack the still
+obstinate King of Sweden, in the very heart of his country; thereby,
+with God's assistance, to force him to a lasting, good and advantageous
+peace for the allies. The King of Denmark and his Czarish Majesty were
+both of this opinion, and did, in order to put so good a design in
+execution, agree upon an interview, which at last (notwithstanding his
+Danish Majesty's presence, upon the account of Norway's being invaded,
+was most necessary in his own capital, and that the Muscovite
+ambassador, M. Dolgorouky, had given quite other assurances) was held at
+Ham and Horn, near Hamburgh, after his Danish Majesty had stayed there
+six weeks for the Czar. In this conference it was, on the 3rd of June,
+agreed between both their Majesties, after several debates, that the
+descent upon Schonen should positively be undertaken this year, and
+everything relating to the forwarding the same was entirely consented
+to. Hereupon his Danish Majesty made all haste for his return to his
+dominions, and gave orders to work day and night to get his fleet ready
+to put to sea. The transport ships were also gathered from all parts of
+his dominions, both with inexpressible charges and great prejudice to
+his subjects' trade. Thus, his Majesty (as the Czar himself upon his
+arrival at Copenhagen owned) did his utmost to provide all necessaries,
+and to forward the descent, upon whose success everything depended. It
+happened, however, in the meanwhile, and before the descent was agreed
+upon in the conference at Ham and Horn, that his Danish Majesty was
+obliged to secure his invaded and much oppressed kingdom of Norway, by
+sending thither a considerable squadron out of his fleet, under the
+command of Vice-Admiral Gabel, which squadron could not be recalled
+before the enemy had left that kingdom, without endangering a great part
+thereof; so that out of necessity the said Vice-Admiral was forced to
+tarry there till the 12th of July, when his Danish Majesty sent him
+express orders to return with all possible speed, wind and weather
+permitting; but this blowing for some time contrary, he was
+detained.... The Swedes were all the while powerful at sea, and his
+Czarish Majesty himself did not think it advisable that the remainder of
+the Danish, in conjunction with the men-of-war then at Copenhagen,
+should go to convoy the Russian troops from Rostock, before the
+above-mentioned squadron under Vice-Admiral Gabel was arrived. This
+happening at last in the month of August, the confederate fleet put to
+sea; and the transporting of the said troops hither to Zealand was put
+in execution, though with a great deal of trouble and danger, but it
+took up so much time that the descent could not be ready till September
+following. Now, when all these preparations, as well for the descent as
+the embarking the armies, were entirely ready, his Danish Majesty
+assured himself that the descent should be made within a few days, at
+farthest by the 21st of September. The Russian Generals and Ministers
+first raised some difficulties to those of Denmark, and afterwards, on
+the 17th September, declared in an appointed conference, that his
+Czarish Majesty, considering the present situation of affairs, was of
+opinion that neither forage nor provision could be had in Schonen, and
+that consequently the descent was not advisable to be attempted this
+year, but ought to be put off till next spring. It may easily be
+imagined how much his Danish Majesty was surprised at this; especially
+seeing the Czar, if he had altered his opinion, as to this design so
+solemnly concerted, might have declared it sooner, and thereby saved his
+Danish Majesty several tons of gold, spent upon the necessary
+preparations. His Danish Majesty did, however, in a letter dated the
+20th of September, amply represent to the Czar, that although the season
+was very much advanced, the descent might, nevertheless, easily be
+undertaken with such a superior force, as to get a footing in Schonen,
+where being assured there had been a very plentiful harvest, he did not
+doubt but subsistence might be found; besides, that having an open
+communication with his own countries, it might easily be transported
+from thence. His Danish Majesty alleged also several weighty reasons why
+the descent was either to be made this year, or the thoughts of making
+it next spring entirely be laid aside. _Nor did he alone make these
+moving remonstrances to the Czar_; BUT HIS BRITISH MAJESTY'S MINISTER
+RESIDING HERE, AS WELL AS ADMIRAL NORRIS, _seconded the same also in a
+very pressing manner_; AND BY EXPRESS ORDER OF THE KING, THEIR MASTER,
+_endeavoured to bring the Czar into their opinion, and to persuade him
+to go on with the descent_; but his Czarish Majesty declared by his
+answer, that he would adhere to the resolution that he had once taken
+concerning this delay of making the descent; but if his Danish Majesty
+was resolved to venture on the descent, that he then, according to the
+treaty made near Straelsund, would assist him only with the 15
+battalions and 1,000 horse therein stipulated; that next spring he would
+comply with everything else, and neither could or would declare himself
+farther in this affair. Since then, his Danish Majesty could not,
+without running so great a hazard, undertake so great a work alone with
+his own army and the said 15 battalions; he desired, in another letter
+of the 23rd September, his Czarish Majesty would be pleased to add 13
+battalions of his troops, in which case his Danish Majesty would still
+this year attempt the descent; but even this could not be obtained from
+his Czarish Majesty, who absolutely refused it by his ambassador on the
+24th ditto: whereupon his Danish Majesty, in his letter of the 26th,
+declared to the Czar, that since things stood thus, he desired none of
+his troops, but that they might be all speedily transported out of his
+dominions; that so the transport, whose freight stood him in 40,000 rix
+dollars per month, might be discharged, and his subjects eased of the
+intolerable contributions they now underwent. This he could not do less
+than agree to; and accordingly, all the Russian troops are already
+embarked, and intend for certain to go from here with the first
+favourable wind. It must be left to Providence and time, to discover
+what may have induced the Czar to a resolution so prejudicial to the
+Northern Alliance, and most advantageous to the common enemy.
+
+If we would take a true survey of men, and lay them open in a proper
+light to the eye of our intellects, _we must_ first _consider their
+natures_ and then _their ends_; and by this method of examination,
+though their conduct is, seemingly, full of intricate mazes and
+perplexities, and winding round with infinite meanders of state-craft,
+we shall be able to dive into the deepest recesses, make our way through
+the most puzzling labyrinths, and at length come to the most abstruse
+means of bringing about the master secrets of their minds, and to
+unriddle their utmost mysteries.... The Czar ... is, by nature, of a
+great and enterprising spirit, and of a genius thoroughly politic; and
+as for his ends, the manner of his own Government, where he sways
+arbitrary lord over the estates and honours of his people, must make
+him, if all the policies in the world could by far-distant aims promise
+him accession and accumulation of empire and wealth, be everlastingly
+laying schemes for the achieving of both with the extremest cupidity and
+ambition. Whatever ends an insatiate desire of opulency, and a boundless
+thirst for dominion, can ever put him upon, to satisfy their craving and
+voracious appetites, those must, most undoubtedly, be his.
+
+The next questions we are to put to ourselves are these three:
+
+1. By what means can he gain these ends?
+
+2. How far from him, and in what place, can these ends be best obtained?
+
+3. And by what time, using all proper methods and succeeding in them,
+may he obtain these ends?
+
+The possessions of the Czar were prodigious, vast in extent; the people
+all at his nod, all his downright arrant slaves, and all the wealth of
+the country his own at a word's command. But then the country, though
+large in ground, was not quite so in produce. Every vassal had his gun,
+and was to be a soldier upon call; but there was never a soldier among
+them, nor a man that understood the calling; and though he had all their
+wealth, they had no commerce of consequence, and little ready money; and
+consequently his treasury, when he had amassed all he could, very bare
+and empty. He was then but in an indifferent condition to satisfy those
+two natural appetites, when he had neither wealth to support a
+soldiery, nor a soldiery trained in the art of war. The first token this
+Prince gave of an aspiring genius, and of an ambition that is noble and
+necessary in a monarch who has a mind to flourish, was to believe none
+of his subjects more wise than himself, or more fit to govern. He did
+so, and looked upon his own proper person as the most fit to travel out
+among the other realms of the world and study politics for the advancing
+of his dominions. He then seldom pretended to any warlike dispositions
+against those who were instructed in the science of arms; his military
+dealings lay mostly with the Turks and Tartars, who, as they had numbers
+as well as he, had them likewise composed, as well as his, of a rude,
+uncultivated mob, and they appeared in the field like a raw,
+undisciplined militia. In this his Christian neighbours liked him well,
+insomuch as he was a kind of stay or stopgap to the infidels. But when
+he came to look into the more polished parts of the Christian world, he
+set out towards it, from the very threshold, like a natural-born
+politician. He was not for learning the game by trying chances and
+venturing losses in the field so soon; no, he went upon the maxim _that
+it was, at that time of day, expedient and necessary for him to carry,
+like Samson, his strength in his head, and not in his arms_. He had
+then, he knew, but very few commodious places for commerce of his own,
+and those all situated in the _White Sea_, too remote, frozen up the
+most part of the year, and not at all fit for a fleet of men-of-war; but
+he knew of many more commodious ones of his neighbours in the Baltic,
+and within his reach whenever he could strengthen his hands to lay hold
+of them. He had a longing eye towards them; but with prudence seemingly
+turned his head another way, and secretly entertained the pleasant
+thought that he should come at them all in good time. Not to give any
+jealousy, he endeavours for no help from his neighbours to instruct his
+men in arms. That was like asking a skilful person, one intended to
+fight a duel with, to teach him first how to fence. _He went over to
+Great Britain_, where he knew that potent kingdom could, as yet, have no
+jealousies of his growth of power, and in the eye of which his vast
+extent of nation lay neglected and unconsidered and overlooked, as I am
+afraid it is to this very day. He was present at all our exercises,
+looked into all our laws, inspected our military, civil, and
+ecclesiastical regimen of affairs; yet this was the least he then
+wanted; this was the slightest part of his errand. But by degrees, when
+he grew familiar with our people, he visited our docks, pretending not
+to have any prospect of profit, but only to take a huge delight (the
+effect of curiosity only) to see our manner of building ships. He kept
+his court, as one may say, in our shipyard, so industrious was he in
+affording them his continual Czarish presence, and to his immortal glory
+for art and industry be it spoken, that the great Czar, by stooping
+often to the employ, could handle an axe with the best artificer of them
+all; and the monarch having a good mathematical head of his own, grew in
+some time a very expert royal shipwright. A ship or two for his
+diversion made and sent him, and then two or three more, and after that
+two or three more, would signify just nothing at all, if they were
+granted to be sold to him by the _Maritime Powers_, that could, at will,
+lord it over the sea. It would be a puny inconsiderable matter, and not
+worth the regarding. Well, but then, over and above this, he had
+artfully insinuated himself into the goodwill of many of our best
+workmen, and won their hearts by his good-natured familiarities and
+condescension among them. To turn this to his service, he offered many
+very large premiums and advantages to go and settle in his country,
+which they gladly accepted of. A little after he sends over some private
+ministers and officers to negotiate for more workmen, for land officers,
+and likewise for picked and chosen good seamen, who might be advanced
+and promoted to offices by going there. Nay, even to this day, any
+expert seaman that is upon our traffic to the port of Archangel, if he
+has the least spark of ambition and any ardent desire to be in office,
+he need but offer himself to the sea-service of the Czar, and he is a
+lieutenant immediately. Over and above this, that Prince has even found
+the way to take by force into his service out of our merchant ships as
+many of their ablest seamen as he pleased, giving the masters the same
+number of raw Muscovites in their place, whom they afterwards were
+forced in their own defence to make fit for their own use. Neither is
+this all; he had, during the last war, many hundreds of his subjects,
+both noblemen and common sailors, on board _ours, the French and the
+Dutch fleets_; and he has all along maintained, and still maintains
+numbers of them in _ours and the Dutch yards_.
+
+But seeing he looked all along upon all these endeavours towards
+improving himself and his subjects as superfluous, whilst a seaport was
+wanting, where he might build a fleet of his own, and from whence he
+might himself export the products of his country, and import those of
+others; and finding the King of Sweden possessed of the most convenient
+ones, I mean Narva and Revel, which he knew that Prince never could nor
+would amicably part with, he at last resolved to wrest them out of his
+hands by force. His _Swedish_ Majesty's tender youth seemed the fittest
+time for this enterprise, but even then he would not run the hazard
+alone. He drew in other princes to divide the spoil with him. And the
+_Kings of Denmark and Poland_ were weak enough to serve as instruments
+to forward the great and ambitious views of the Czar. It is true, he met
+with a mighty hard rub at his very first setting out; his whole army
+being entirely defeated by a handful of Swedes at Narva. But it was his
+good luck that his Swedish Majesty, instead of improving so great a
+victory against him, turned immediately his arms against the King of
+Poland, against whom he was personally piqued, and that so much the
+more, inasmuch as he had taken that Prince for one of his best friends,
+and was just upon the point of concluding with him the strictest
+alliance when he unexpectedly invaded the Swedish Livonia, and besieged
+Riga. This was, in all respects, what the Czar could most have wished
+for; and foreseeing that the longer the war in Poland lasted, the more
+time should he have both to retrieve his first loss, and to gain Narva,
+he took care it should be spun out to as great a length as possible; for
+which end he never sent the King of Poland succour enough to make him
+too strong for the King of Sweden; who, on the other hand, though he
+gained one signal victory after the other, yet never could subdue his
+enemy as long as he received continual reinforcements from his
+hereditary country. And had not his Swedish Majesty, contrary to most
+people's expectations, marched directly into Saxony itself, and thereby
+forced the King of Poland to peace, the Czar would have had leisure
+enough in all conscience to bring his designs to greater maturity. This
+peace was one of the greatest disappointments the Czar ever met with,
+whereby he became singly engaged in the war. He had, however, the
+comfort of having beforehand taken _Narva_, and laid a foundation to his
+favourite town _Petersburg_, and to the seaport, the docks, and the vast
+magazines there; all which works, to what perfection they are now
+brought, let them tell who, with surprise, have seen them.
+
+He (Peter) used all endeavours to bring matters to an accommodation. He
+proffered very advantageous conditions; _Petersburg_ only, a trifle as
+he pretended, which he had set his heart upon, he would retain; and even
+for that he was willing some other way to give satisfaction. But the
+King of Sweden was too well acquainted with the importance of that place
+to leave it in the hands of an ambitious prince, and thereby to give him
+an inlet into the Baltic. This was the only time since the defeat at
+Narva that the Czar's arms had no other end than that of self-defence.
+They might, perhaps, even have fallen short therein, had not the King of
+Sweden (through whose persuasion is still a mystery), instead of
+marching the shortest way to Novgorod and to Moscow, turned towards
+Ukrain, where his army, after great losses and sufferings, was at last
+entirely defeated at Pultowa. As this was a fatal period to the Swedish
+successes, so how great a deliverance it was to the Muscovites, may be
+gathered from the Czar's celebrating every year, with great solemnity,
+the anniversary of that day, from which his ambitious thoughts began to
+soar still higher. The whole of _Livonia_, _Estland_, and the best and
+greatest part of _Finland_ was now what he demanded, after which,
+though he might for the present condescend to give peace to the
+remaining part of Sweden, he knew he could easily even add that to his
+conquests whenever he pleased. The only obstacle he had to fear in these
+his projects was from his northern neighbours; but as the _Maritime
+Powers_, and even the neighbouring princes in Germany, were then so
+intent upon their war against France, that they seemed entirely
+neglectful of that of the North, so there remained only Denmark and
+Poland to be jealous of. The former of these kingdoms had, ever since
+King William, of glorious memory, compelled it to make peace with
+Holstein and, consequently, with Sweden, enjoyed an uninterrupted
+tranquillity, during which it had time, by a free trade and considerable
+subsidies from the maritime powers to enrich itself, and was in a
+condition, by joining itself to Sweden, as it was its interest to do, to
+stop the Czar's progresses, and timely to prevent its own danger from
+them. The other, I mean Poland, was now quietly under the government of
+King Stanislaus, who, owing in a manner his crown to the King of Sweden,
+could not, out of gratitude, as well as real concern for the interest of
+his country, fail opposing the designs of a too aspiring neighbour. The
+Czar was too cunning not to find out a remedy for all this: he
+represented to the King of Denmark how low the King of Sweden was now
+brought, and how fair an opportunity he had, during that Prince's long
+absence, to clip entirely his wings, and to aggrandize himself at his
+expense. In King Augustus he raised the long-hid resentment for the loss
+of the Polish Crown, which he told him he might now recover without the
+least difficulty. Thus both these Princes were immediately caught. The
+Danes declared war against Sweden without so much as a tolerable
+pretence, and made a descent upon Schonen, where they were soundly
+beaten for their pains. King Augustus re-entered Poland, where
+everything has ever since continued in the greatest disorder, and _that
+in a great measure owing to Muscovite intrigues_. It happened, indeed,
+that these new confederates, whom the Czar had only drawn in to serve
+his ambition, became at first more necessary to his preservation than
+he had thought; for the Turks having declared a war against him, they
+hindered the Swedish arms from joining with them to attack him; but that
+storm being soon over, through the Czar's wise behaviour and the avarice
+and folly of the Grand Vizier, he then made the intended use both of
+these his friends, as well as of them he afterwards, through hopes of
+gain, persuaded into his alliance, which was to lay all the burthen and
+hazard of the war upon them, in order entirely to weaken them, together
+with Sweden, whilst _he was preparing himself to swallow the one after
+the other_. He has put them on one difficult attempt after the other;
+their armies have been considerably lessened by battles and long sieges,
+whilst his own were either employed in easier conquests, and more
+profitable to him, or kept at the vast expense of neutral princes--near
+enough at hand to come up to demand a share of the booty without having
+struck a blow in getting it. His behaviour has been as cunning at sea,
+where his fleet has always kept out of harm's way and at a great
+distance whenever there was any likelihood of an engagement between the
+Danes and the Swedes. He hoped that when these two nations had ruined
+one another's fleets, his might then ride master in the Baltic. All this
+while he had taken care to make his men improve, by the example of
+foreigners and under their command, in the art of war.... His fleets
+will soon considerably outnumber the Swedish and the Danish ones joined
+together. He need not fear their being a hindrance from his giving a
+finishing stroke to this great and glorious undertaking. Which done,
+_let us look to ourselves; he will then most certainly become our rival,
+and as dangerous to us as he is now neglected_. We then may, perhaps,
+though too late, call to mind what our own ministers and merchants have
+told us of his designs of carrying on alone all the northern trade, and
+of getting all that from Turkey and Persia into his hands through the
+rivers which he is joining and making navigable from the Caspian, or the
+Black Sea, to his Petersburg. _We shall then wonder at our blindness
+that we did not suspect his designs_ when we heard the prodigious works
+he has done at Petersburg and Revel; of which last place, the _Daily
+Courant_, dated November 23, says:
+
+
+     "HAGUE, _Nov. 17_.
+
+     "The captains of the men-of-war of the States, who have been at
+     Revel, advise that the Czar has put that port and the
+     fortifications of the place into such a condition of defence that
+     it may pass for one of the most considerable fortresses, not only
+     of the Baltic, but even of Europe."
+
+
+Leave we him now, as to his sea affairs, commerce and manufactures, and
+other works both of his policy and power, and let us view him in regard
+to his proceedings in this last campaign, especially as to that so much
+talked of descent, he, in conjunction with his allies, was to make upon
+Schonen, and we shall find that even therein he has acted with his usual
+cunning. There is no doubt but the King of Denmark was the first that
+proposed this descent. He found that nothing but a speedy end to a war
+he had so rashly and unjustly begun, could save his country from ruin
+and from the bold attempts of the King of Sweden, either against Norway,
+or against Zealand and Copenhagen. To treat separately with that prince
+was a thing he could not do, as foreseeing that he would not part with
+an inch of ground to so unfair an enemy; and he was afraid that a
+Congress for a general place, supposing the King of Sweden would consent
+to it upon the terms proposed by his enemies, would draw the
+negotiations out beyond what the situation of his affairs could bear. He
+invites, therefore, all his confederates to make a home thrust at the
+King of Sweden, by a descent into his country, where, having defeated
+him, as by the superiority of the forces to be employed in that design
+he hoped they should, they might force him to an immediate peace on such
+terms as they themselves pleased. I don't know how far the rest of his
+confederates came into that project; but neither the _Prussian_ nor the
+_Hanoverian_ Court appeared _openly_ in that project, _and how far our
+English fleet, under Sir John Norris, was to have forwarded it, I have
+nothing to say, but leave others to judge out of the King of Denmark's
+own declaration_: but the Czar came readily into it. He got thereby a
+new pretence to carry the war one campaign more at other people's
+expense; to march his troops into the Empire again, and to have them
+quartered and maintained, first in Mecklenburg and then in Zealand. In
+the meantime he had his eyes upon _Wismar_, and upon a Swedish island
+called _Gotland_. If, by surprise, he could get the first out of the
+hands of his confederates, he then had a good seaport, whither to
+transport his troops when he pleased into _Germany_, without asking the
+King of _Prussia's_ leave for a free passage through his territories;
+and if, by a sudden descent, he could dislodge the _Swedes_ out of the
+other, he then became master of the best port in the Baltic. He
+miscarried, however, in both these projects; for Wismar was too well
+guarded to be surprised; and he found his confederates would not give
+him a helping hand towards conquering Gotland. After this he began to
+look with another eye upon the descent to be made upon Schonen. He found
+it equally contrary to his interest, whether it succeeded or not. For if
+he did, and the King was thereby forced to a general peace, he knew his
+interests therein would be least regarded; having already notice enough
+of his confederates being ready to sacrifice them, provided they got
+their own terms. If he did not succeed, then, besides the loss of the
+flower of an army he had trained and disciplined with so much care, as
+he very well foresaw that the English fleet would hinder the King of
+Sweden from attempting anything against Denmark; so he justly feared the
+whole shock would fall upon him, and he be thereby forced to surrender
+all he had taken from Sweden. These considerations made him entirely
+resolved not to make one of the descent; but he did not care to declare
+it till as late as possible: first, that he might the longer have his
+troops maintained at the Danish expense; secondly, that it might be too
+late for the King of Denmark to demand the necessary troops from his
+other confederates, and to make the descent without him; and, lastly,
+that by putting the Dane to a vast expense in making necessary
+preparations, he might still weaken him more, and, therefore, make him
+now the more dependent on him, and hereafter a more easy prey.
+
+Thus he very carefully dissembles his real thoughts, till just when the
+descent was to be made, and then he, all of a sudden, refuses joining
+it, and defers it till next spring, with this averment, _that he will
+then be as good as his word_. But mark him, as some of our newspapers
+tell us, under this restriction, _unless he can get an advantageous
+peace of Sweden_. This passage, together with the common report we now
+have of his treating a separate peace with the King of Sweden, is a new
+instance of his cunning and policy. He has there two strings to his bow,
+of which one must serve his turn. There is no doubt but the Czar knows
+that an accommodation between him and the King of Sweden must be very
+difficult to bring about. For as he, on the one side, should never
+consent to part with those seaports, for the getting of which he began
+this war, and which are absolutely necessary towards carrying on his
+great and vast designs; so the King of Sweden would look upon it as
+directly contrary to his interest to yield up these same seaports, if
+possibly he could hinder it. But then again, the Czar is so well
+acquainted with the great and heroic spirit of his Swedish Majesty, that
+he does not question his yielding, rather in point of interest than
+nicety of honour. From hence it is, he rightly judges, that his Swedish
+Majesty must be less exasperated against him who, though he began an
+unjust war, has very often paid dearly for it, and carried it on all
+along through various successes than against some confederates; that
+taking an opportunity of his Swedish Majesty's misfortunes, fell upon
+him in an ungenerous manner, and made a partition treaty of his
+provinces. The Czar, still more to accommodate himself to the genius of
+his great enemy, unlike his confederates, who, upon all occasions,
+spared no reflections and even very unbecoming ones (bullying memorials
+and hectoring manifestoes), spoke all along with the utmost civility of
+his brother Charles as he calls him, maintains him to be the greatest
+general in Europe, and even publicly avers, he will more trust a word
+from him than the greatest assurances, oaths, nay, even treaties with
+his confederates. These kind of civilities may, perhaps, make a deeper
+impression upon the noble mind of the King of Sweden, and he be
+persuaded rather to sacrifice a real interest to a generous enemy, than
+to gratify, in things of less moment, those by whom he has been ill, and
+even inhumanly used. But if this should not succeed, the Czar is still a
+gainer by having made his confederates uneasy at these his separate
+negotiations; and as we find by the newspapers, the more solicitous to
+keep him ready to their confederacy, which must cost them very large
+proffers and promises. In the meantime he leaves the Dane and the Swede
+securely bound up together in war, and weakening one another as fast as
+they can, and he turns towards the Empire and views the Protestant
+Princes there; and, under many specious pretences, not only marches and
+counter-marches about their several territories his troops that came
+back from Denmark, but makes also slowly advance towards Germany those
+whom he has kept this great while in Poland, under pretence to help the
+King against his dissatisfied subjects, whose commotions all the while
+he was the greatest fomenter of. He considers the Emperor is in war with
+the Turks, and therefore has found, by too successful experience, how
+little his Imperial Majesty is able to show his authority in protecting
+the members of the Empire. His troops remain in Mecklenburg,
+notwithstanding their departure is highly insisted upon. His replies to
+all the demands on that subject are filled with such reasons as if he
+would give new laws to the Empire.
+
+Now let us suppose that the King of Sweden should think it more
+honourable to make a peace with the Czar, and to carry the force of his
+resentment against his less generous enemies, what a stand will then the
+princes of the empire, even those that unadvisedly drew in 40,000
+Muscovites, to secure the tranquillity of that empire against 10,000 or
+12,000 Swedes,--I say what stand will they be able to make against him
+while the Emperor is already engaged in war with the Turks? and the
+Poles, when they are once in peace among themselves (if after the
+miseries of so long a war they are in a condition to undertake anything)
+are by treaty obliged to join their aids against that common enemy of
+Christianity.
+
+Some will say I make great and sudden rises from very small beginnings.
+My answer is, that I would have such an objector look back and reflect
+why I show him, from such a speck of entity, at his first origin,
+growing, through more improbable and almost insuperable difficulties, to
+such a bulk as he has already attained to, and _whereby, as his
+advocates, the Dutch themselves own, he is grown too formidable for the
+repose, not only of his neighbours, but of Europe in general_.
+
+But then, again, they will say he has no pretence either to make a peace
+with the Swede separately from the Dane or to make war upon other
+princes, some of whom he is bound in alliance with. Whoever thinks these
+objections not answered must have considered the Czar neither as to his
+nature or to his ends. The Dutch own further, _that he made war against
+Sweden without any specious pretence_. He that made war without any
+specious pretence may make a peace without any specious pretence, and
+make a new war without any specious pretence for it too. His Imperial
+Majesty (of Austria), like a wise Prince, when he was obliged to make
+war with the Ottomans, made it, as in policy, he should, powerfully.
+But, in the meantime, may not the Czar, who is a wise and potent Prince
+too, follow the example upon the neighbouring Princes round him that are
+Protestants? If he should, I tremble to speak it, it is not impossible,
+but in this age of Christianity _the Protestant religion should, in a
+great measure, be abolished_; and that among the Christians, the
+_Greeks_ and _Romans_ may once more come to be the only Pretenders for
+Universal Empire. The pure possibility carries with it warning enough
+for the Maritime Powers, and all the other Protestant Princes, to
+mediate a peace for Sweden, and strengthen his arms again, without which
+no preparations can put them sufficiently upon their guard; and this
+must be done early and betimes, _before the King of Sweden, either out
+of despair or revenge, throws himself into the Czar's hands_. For 'tis a
+certain maxim (which all Princes ought, and the Czar seems at this time
+to observe too much for the repose of Christendom) that a wise man must
+not stand for ceremony, and only _turn_ with opportunities. No, he must
+even _run_ with them. For the Czar's part, I will venture to say so much
+in his commendation, that he will hardly suffer himself to be overtaken
+that way. He seems to act just as the tide serves. There is nothing
+which contributes more to the making our undertakings prosperous than
+the taking of times and opportunities; for time carrieth with it the
+seasons of opportunities of business. If you let them slip, all your
+designs are rendered unsuccessful.
+
+In short, things seem now come to that _crisis_ that peace should as
+soon as possible be procured to the Swede, with such advantageous
+articles as are consistent with the nicety of his honour to accept, and
+with the safety of the Protestant interest, that he should have offered
+to him, which can be scarce less than all the possessions which he
+formerly had in the Empire. As in all other things, so in politics, a
+long-tried certainty must be preferred before an uncertainty, tho'
+grounded on ever so probable suppositions. Now can there be anything
+more certain, than that the provinces Sweden has had in the Empire, were
+given to it to make it the nearer at hand and the better able to secure
+the Protestant interest, which, together with the liberties of the
+Empire it just then had saved? Can there be anything more certain than
+that that kingdom has, by those means, upon all occasions, secured that
+said interest now near fourscore years? Can there be anything more
+certain than, as to his present Swedish Majesty, that I may use the
+words of a letter her late Majesty, Queen Anne, wrote to him (Charles
+XII.), and _in the time of a Whig Ministry too_, viz.: "That, as a true
+Prince, hero and Christian, the chief end of his endeavours has been the
+promotion of the fear of God among men: and that without insisting on
+his own particular interest."
+
+On the other hand, is it not very uncertain whether those princes, who,
+by sharing among them the Swedish provinces in the Empire, are now going
+to set up as protectors of the Protestant interests there, exclusive of
+the Swedes, will be able to do it? _Denmark_ is already so low, and will
+in all appearance be so much lower still before the end of the war,
+that very little assistance can be expected from it in a great many
+years. In _Saxony_, the prospect is but too dismal under a Popish
+prince, so that there remain only the two illustrious houses of Hanover
+and Brandenburg of all the Protestant princes, powerful enough to lead
+the rest. Let us therefore only make a parallel between what now happens
+in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, and what may happen to the Protestant
+interest, and we shall soon find how we may be mistaken in our
+reckoning. That said poor Duchy has been most miserably ruined by the
+Muscovite troops, and it is still so; the Electors of Brandenburg and
+Hanover are obliged, both as directors of the circle of Lower Saxony, as
+neighbours, and Protestant Princes, to rescue a fellow state of the
+Empire, and a Protestant country, from so cruel an oppression of a
+foreign Power. But, pray, what have they done? The Elector of
+Brandenburg, cautious lest the Muscovites might on one side invade his
+electorate, and on the other side from Livonia and Poland, his kingdom
+of Prussia; and the Elector of Hanover having the same wise caution as
+to his hereditary countries, have not upon this, though very pressing
+occasion, thought it for their interest, to use any other means than
+representations. But pray with what success? The Muscovites are still in
+Mecklenburg, and if at last they march out of it, it will be when the
+country is so ruined that they cannot there subsist any longer.
+
+It seems the King of Sweden should be restored to all that he has lost
+on the side of the Czar; and this appears the _joint interest of both
+the Maritime Powers_. This may they please to undertake: _Holland_,
+because it is a maxim there "that the Czar grows too great, and must not
+be suffered to settle in the Baltic, and that Sweden must not be
+abandoned"; _Great Britain_, because, if the Czar compasses his vast and
+prodigious views, he will, by the ruin and conquest of Sweden, become
+our nearer and more dreadful neighbour. Besides, we are bound to it by a
+treaty concluded in the year 1700, between King William and the present
+King of Sweden, by virtue of which King William assisted the King of
+Sweden, when in more powerful circumstances, with all that he desired,
+with great sums of money, several hundred pieces of cloth, and
+considerable quantities of gunpowder.
+
+But _some Politicians (whom nothing can make jealous of the growing
+strength and abilities of the Czar) though they are even foxes and
+vulpones in the art, either will not see_ or _pretend they cannot see_
+how the Czar can ever be able to make so great a progress in power as to
+hurt us here in our island. To them it is easy to repeat the same answer
+a hundred times over, if they would be so kind as to take it at last,
+viz., _that what has been may be again_; and that they did not see how
+he could reach the height of power, which he has already arrived at,
+after, I must confess, a very incredible manner. Let those _incredulous_
+people look narrowly into the _nature_ and the _ends_ and the _designs_
+of this great monarch; they will find that they are laid very deep, and
+that his plans carry in them a prodigious deal of prudence and
+foresight, and his ends are at the long run brought about by a kind of
+magic in policy; and will they not after that own that we ought to fear
+everything from him? As he desires that the designs with which he
+labours may not prove abortive, so he does not assign them a certain day
+of their birth, but leaves them to the natural productions of fit times
+and occasions, like those curious artists in China, who temper the mould
+this day of which a vessel may be made a hundred years hence.
+
+There is another sort of short-sighted politicians among us, who have
+more of cunning court intrigue and immediate statecraft in them than of
+true policy and concern for their country's interest. These gentlemen
+pin entirely their faith upon other people's sleeves; ask as to
+everything that is proposed to them, how it is liked at Court? what the
+opinion of their party is concerning it? and if the contrary party is
+for or against it? Hereby they rule their judgment, and it is enough for
+their cunning leaders to brand anything with _Whiggism_ or _Jacobitism_,
+for to make these people, without any further inquiry into the matter,
+blindly espouse it or oppose it. This, it seems, is at present the case
+of the subject we are upon. Anything said or written in favour of
+Sweden and the King thereof, is immediately said to come from a
+_Jacobite_ pen, and thus reviled and rejected, without being read or
+considered. Nay, I have heard gentlemen go so far as to maintain
+publicly, and with all the vehemence in the world, that the King of
+Sweden was a Roman Catholic, and that the Czar was a good Protestant.
+This, indeed, is one of the greatest misfortunes our country labours
+under, and till we begin to see with our own eyes, and inquire ourselves
+into the truth of things, we shall be led away, God knows whither, at
+last. The serving of Sweden according to our treaties and real interest
+has nothing to do with our party causes. Instead of seeking for and
+taking hold of any pretence to undo Sweden, we ought openly to assist
+it. Could our Protestant succession have a better friend or a bolder
+champion?
+
+I shall conclude this by thus shortly recapitulating what I have said.
+That since the Czar has not only replied to the King of Denmark
+entreating the contrary, but also answered our Admiral Norris, that he
+would persist in his resolution to delay the descent upon Schonen, and
+is said by other newspapers to resolve not to make it then, if he can
+have peace with Sweden; every Prince, and we more particularly, ought to
+be jealous of his having some such design as I mention in view, and
+consult how to prevent them, and to clip, in time, his too aspiring
+wings, which cannot be effectually done, first, without the Maritime
+Powers please to begin to keep him in some check and awe, and 'tis to be
+hoped a certain potent nation, that has helped him forward, can, in some
+measure, bring him back, and may then speak to this great enterpriser in
+the language of a countryman in Spain, who coming to an image enshrined,
+the first making whereof he could well remember, and not finding all the
+respectful usage he expected,--"You need not," quoth he, "be so proud,
+for we have known you from a plum-tree." The next only way is to
+restore, by a peace, to the King of Sweden what he has lost; that checks
+his (the Czar's) power immediately, and on that side nothing else can. I
+wish it may not at last be found true, that those who have been
+fighting against that King have, in the main, been fighting against
+themselves. If the Swede ever has his dominions again, and lowers the
+high spirit of the Czar, still he may say by his neighbours, as an old
+Greek hero did, whom his countrymen constantly sent into exile whenever
+he had done them a service, but were forced to call him back to their
+aid, whenever they wanted success. "These people," quoth he, "are always
+using me like the palm-tree. They will be breaking my branches
+continually, and yet, if there comes a storm, they run to me, and can't
+find a better place for shelter." But if he has them not, I shall only
+exclaim a phrase out of Terence's "Andria":
+
+
+     "Hoccine credibile est aut memorabile
+     Tanta vecordia innata cuiquam ut siet,
+     Ut malis gaudeant?"
+
+
+4. POSTSCRIPT.--I flatter myself that this little history is of that
+curious nature, and on matters hitherto so unobserved, that I consider
+it, with pride, as a valuable New Year's gift to the present world; and
+that posterity will accept it, as the like, for many years after, and
+read it over on that anniversary, and call it their _Warning Piece_. I
+must have my _Exegi-Monumentum_ as well as others.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[20] Or, to follow this affectation of silliness into more recent times,
+is there anything in diplomatic history that could match Lord
+Palmerston's proposal made to Marshal Soult (in 1839), to storm the
+Dardanelles, in order to afford the Sultan the support of the
+Anglo-French fleet against Russia?
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+To understand a limited historical epoch, we must step beyond its
+limits, and compare it with other historical epochs. To judge
+Governments and their acts, we must measure them by their own times and
+the conscience of their contemporaries. Nobody will condemn a British
+statesman of the 17th century for acting on a belief in witchcraft, if
+he find Bacon himself ranging demonology in the catalogue of science. On
+the other hand, if the Stanhopes, the Walpoles, the Townshends, etc.,
+were suspected, opposed, and denounced in their own country by their own
+contemporaries as tools or accomplices of Russia, it will no longer do
+to shelter their policy behind the convenient screen of prejudice and
+ignorance common to their time. At the head of the historical evidence
+we have to sift, we place, therefore, long-forgotten English pamphlets
+printed at the very time of Peter I. These preliminary _pi�ces des
+proc�s_ we shall, however, limit to three pamphlets, which, from three
+different points of view, illustrate the conduct of England towards
+Sweden. The first, the _Northern Crisis_ (given in Chapter II.),
+revealing the general system of Russia, and the dangers accruing to
+England from the Russification of Sweden; the second, called _The
+Defensive Treaty_, judging the acts of England by the Treaty of 1700;
+and the third, entitled _Truth is but Truth, however it is Timed_,
+proving that the new-fangled schemes which magnified Russia into the
+paramount Power of the Baltic were in flagrant opposition to the
+traditionary policy England had pursued during the course of a whole
+century.
+
+The pamphlet called _The Defensive Treaty_ bears no date of publication.
+Yet in one passage it states that, for reinforcing the Danish fleet,
+eight English men-of-war were left at Copenhagen "_the year before the
+last_," and in another passage alludes to the assembling of the
+confederate fleet for the Schonen expedition as having occurred "_last
+summer_." As the former event took place in 1715, and the latter towards
+the end of the summer of 1716, it is evident that the pamphlet was
+written and published in the earlier part of the year 1717. The
+Defensive Treaty between England and Sweden, the single articles of
+which the pamphlet comments upon in the form of queries, was concluded
+in 1700 between William III. and Charles XII., and was not to expire
+before 1719. Yet, during almost the whole of this period, we find
+England continually assisting Russia and waging war against Sweden,
+either by secret intrigue or open force, although the treaty was never
+rescinded nor war ever declared. This fact is, perhaps, even less
+strange than the _conspiration de silence_ under which modern historians
+have succeeded in burying it, and among them historians by no means
+sparing of censure against the British Government of that time, for
+having, without any previous declaration of war, destroyed the Spanish
+fleet in the Sicilian waters. But then, at least, England was not bound
+to Spain by a defensive treaty. How, then, are we to explain this
+contrary treatment of similar cases? The piracy committed against Spain
+was one of the weapons which the Whig Ministers, seceding from the
+Cabinet in 1717, caught hold of to harass their remaining colleagues.
+When the latter stepped forward in 1718, and urged Parliament to declare
+war against Spain, Sir Robert Walpole rose from his seat in the Commons,
+and in a most virulent speech denounced the late ministerial acts "as
+contrary to the laws of nations, and a breach of solemn treaties."
+"Giving sanction to them in the manner proposed," he said, "could have
+no other view than to screen ministers, who were conscious of having
+done something amiss, and who, having begun a war against Spain, would
+now make it the Parliament's war." The treachery against Sweden and the
+connivance at the plans of Russia, never happening to afford the
+ostensible pretext for a family quarrel amongst the Whig rulers (they
+being rather unanimous on these points), never obtained the honours of
+historical criticism so lavishly spent upon the Spanish incident.
+
+How apt modern historians generally are to receive their cue from the
+official tricksters themselves, is best shown by their reflections on
+the commercial interests of England with respect to Russia and Sweden.
+Nothing has been more exaggerated than the dimensions of the trade
+opened to Great Britain by the huge market of the Russia of Peter the
+Great, and his immediate successors. Statements bearing not the
+slightest touch of criticism have been allowed to creep from one
+book-shelf to another, till they became at last historical household
+furniture, to be inherited by every successive historian, without even
+the _beneficium inventarii_. Some incontrovertible statistical figures
+will suffice to blot out these hoary common-places.
+
+
+         BRITISH COMMERCE FROM 1697-1700.
+
+                                          �
+     Export to Russia                   58,884
+     Import from Russia                112,252
+                                     ---------
+                  Total                171,136
+
+     Export to Sweden                   57,555
+     Import from Sweden                212,094
+                                     ---------
+                  Total                269,649
+
+
+During the same period the total
+
+
+                                         �
+     Export of England amounted to   3,525,906
+     Import                          3,482,586
+                                     ---------
+                  Total              7,008,492
+
+
+In 1716, after all the Swedish provinces in the Baltic, and on the Gulfs
+of Finland and Bothnia, had fallen into the hands of Peter I., the
+
+
+                                 �
+     Export to Russia was     113,154
+     Import from Russia       197,270
+                             --------
+                  Total       310,424
+
+     Export to Sweden          24,101
+     Import from Sweden       136,959
+                             --------
+                  Total       161,060
+
+
+At the same time, the total of English exports and imports together
+reached about �10,000,000. It will be seen from these figures, when
+compared with those of 1697-1700, that the increase in the Russian trade
+is balanced by the decrease in the Swedish trade, and that what was
+added to the one was subtracted from the other.
+
+In 1730, the
+
+
+                                     �
+     Export to Russia was          46,275
+     Import from Russia           258,802
+                                 --------
+                  Total           305,077
+
+
+Fifteen years, then, after the consolidation in the meanwhile of the
+Muscovite settlement on the Baltic, the British trade with Russia had
+fallen off by �5,347. The general trade of England reaching in 1730 the
+sum of �16,329,001, the Russian trade amounted not yet to 1/53rd of its
+total value. Again, thirty years later, in 1760, the account between
+Great Britain and Russia stands thus:
+
+
+                                         �
+     Import from Russia (in 1760)     536,504
+     Export to Russia                  39,761
+                                     --------
+                  Total              �576,265
+
+
+while the general trade of England amounted to �26,361,760. Comparing
+these figures with those of 1706, we find that the total of the Russian
+commerce, after nearly half a century, has increased by the trifling sum
+of only �265,841. That England suffered positive loss by her new
+commercial relations with Russia under Peter I. and Catherine I.
+becomes evident on comparing, on the one side, the export and import
+figures, and on the other, the sums expended on the frequent naval
+expeditions to the Baltic which England undertook during the lifetime of
+Charles XII., in order to break down his resistance to Russia, and,
+after his death, on the professed necessity of checking the maritime
+encroachments of Russia.
+
+Another glance at the statistical data given for the years 1697, 1700,
+1716, 1730, and 1760, will show that the British _export_ trade to
+Russia was continually falling off, save in 1716, when Russia engrossed
+the whole Swedish trade on the eastern coast of the Baltic and the Gulf
+of Bothnia, and had not yet found the opportunity of subjecting it to
+her own regulations. From �58,884, at which the British exports to
+Russia stood during 1697-1700, when Russia was still precluded from the
+Baltic, they had sunk to �46,275 in 1730, and to �39,761 in 1760,
+showing a decrease of �19,123, or about 1/3rd of their original amount
+in 1700. If, then, since, the absorption of the Swedish provinces by
+Russia, the British market proved expanding for Russia raw produce, the
+Russian market, on its side, proved straitening for British
+manufacturers, a feature of that trade which could hardly recommend it
+at a time when the Balance of Trade doctrine ruled supreme. To trace the
+circumstances which produced the increase of the Anglo-Russian trade
+under Catherine II. would lead us too far from the period we are
+considering.
+
+On the whole, then, we arrive at the following conclusions: During the
+first sixty years of the eighteenth century the total Anglo-Russian
+trade formed but a very diminutive fraction of the general trade of
+England, say less than 1/45th. Its sudden increase during the earliest
+years of Peter's sway over the Baltic did not at all affect the general
+balance of British trade, as it was a simple transfer from its Swedish
+account to its Russian account. In the later times of Peter I., as well
+as under his immediate successors, Catherine I. and Anne, the
+Anglo-Russian trade was positively declining; during the whole epoch,
+dating from the final settlement of Russia in the Baltic provinces, the
+export of British manufactures to Russia was continually falling off, so
+that at its end it stood one-third lower than at its beginning, when
+that trade was still confined to the port of Archangel. Neither the
+contemporaries of Peter I., nor the next British generation reaped any
+benefit from the advancement of Russia to the Baltic. In general the
+Baltic trade of Great Britain was at that time trifling in regard of the
+capital involved, but important in regard of its character. It afforded
+England the raw produce for its maritime stores. That from the latter
+point of view the Baltic was in safer keeping in the hands of Sweden
+than in those of Russia, was not only proved by the pamphlets we are
+reprinting, but fully understood by the British Ministers themselves.
+Stanhope writing, for instance, to Townshend on October 16th, 1716:
+
+
+     "It is certain that if the Czar be let alone three years, he will
+     be absolute master in those seas."[21]
+
+
+If, then, neither the navigation nor the general commerce of England was
+interested in the treacherous support given to Russia against Sweden,
+there existed, indeed, one small fraction of British merchants whose
+interests were identical with the Russian ones--the Russian Trade
+Company. It was this gentry that raised a cry against Sweden. See, for
+instance:
+
+
+     "Several grievances of the English merchants in their trade into
+     the dominions of the King of Sweden, whereby it does appear how
+     dangerous it may be for the English nation to depend on Sweden only
+     for the supply of the naval stores, when they might be amply
+     furnished with the like stores from the dominions of the Emperor of
+     Russia."
+
+     "The case of the merchants trading to Russia" (a petition to
+     Parliament), etc.
+
+
+It was they who in the years 1714, 1715, and 1716, regularly assembled
+twice a week before the opening of Parliament, to draw up in public
+meetings the complaints of the British merchantmen against Sweden. On
+this small fraction the Ministers relied; they were even busy in getting
+up its demonstrations, as may be seen from the letters addressed by
+Count Gyllenborg to Baron G�rtz, dated 4th of November and 4th of
+December, 1716, wanting, as they did, but the shadow of a pretext to
+drive their "mercenary Parliament," as Gyllenborg calls it, where they
+liked. The influence of these British merchants trading to Russia was
+again exhibited in the year 1765, and our own times have witnessed the
+working for his interest, of a Russian merchant at the head of the Board
+of Trade, and of a Chancellor of the Exchequer in the interest of a
+cousin engaged in the Archangel trade.
+
+The oligarchy which, after the "glorious revolution," usurped wealth and
+power at the cost of the mass of the British people, was, of course,
+forced to look out for allies, not only abroad, but also at home. The
+latter they found in what the French would call _la haute bourgeoisie_,
+as represented by the Bank of England, the money-lenders, State
+creditors, East India and other trading corporations, the great
+manufacturers, etc. How tenderly they managed the material interests of
+that class may be learned from the whole of their domestic
+legislation--Bank Acts, Protectionist enactments, Poor Regulations, etc.
+As to their _foreign policy_, they wanted to give it the appearance at
+least of being altogether regulated by the mercantile interest, an
+appearance the more easily to be produced, as the exclusive interest of
+one or the other small fraction of that class would, of course, be
+always identified with this or that Ministerial measure. The interested
+fraction then raised the commerce and navigation cry, which the nation
+stupidly re-echoed.
+
+At that time, then, there devolved on the Cabinet, at least, the _onus_
+of inventing _mercantile pretexts_, however futile, for their measures
+of foreign policy. In our own epoch, British Ministers have thrown this
+burden on foreign nations, leaving to the French, the Germans, etc.,
+the irksome task of discovering the _secret_ and _hidden_ mercantile
+springs of their actions. Lord Palmerston, for instance, takes a step
+apparently the most damaging to the material interests of Great Britain.
+Up starts a State philosopher, on the other side of the Atlantic, or of
+the Channel, or in the heart of Germany, who puts his head to the rack
+to dig out the mysteries of the mercantile Machiavelism of "perfide
+Albion," of which Palmerston is supposed the unscrupulous and
+unflinching executor. We will, _en passant_, show, by a few modern
+instances, what desperate shifts those foreigners have been driven to,
+who feel themselves obliged to interpret Palmerston's acts by what they
+imagine to be the English commercial policy. In his valuable _Histoire
+Politique et Sociale des Principaut�s Danubiennes_, M. Elias Regnault,
+startled by the Russian conduct, before and during the years 1848-49 of
+Mr. Colquhoun, the British Consul at Bucharest, suspects that England
+has some secret material interest in keeping down the trade of the
+Principalities. The late Dr. Cunibert, private physician of old Milosh,
+in his most interesting account of the Russian intrigues in Servia,
+gives a curious relation of the manner in which Lord Palmerston, through
+the instrumentality of Colonel Hodges, betrayed Milosh to Russia by
+feigning to support him against her. Fully believing in the personal
+integrity of Hodges, and the patriotic zeal of Palmerston, Dr. Cunibert
+is found to go a step further than M. Elias Regnault. He suspects
+England of being interested in putting down Turkish commerce generally.
+General Mieroslawski, in his last work on Poland, is not very far from
+intimating that mercantile Machiavelism instigated England to sacrifice
+her own _prestige_ in Asia Minor, by the surrender of Kars. As a last
+instance may serve the present lucubrations of the Paris papers, hunting
+after the secret springs of commercial jealousy, which induce Palmerston
+to oppose the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez canal.
+
+To return to our subject. The mercantile pretext hit upon by the
+Townshends, Stanhopes, etc., for the hostile demonstrations against
+Sweden, was the following. Towards the end of 1713, Peter I. had
+ordered all the hemp and other produce of his dominions, destined for
+export, to be carried to St. Petersburg instead of Archangel. Then the
+Swedish Regency, during the absence of Charles XII., and Charles XII.
+himself, after his return from Bender, declared all the Baltic ports,
+occupied by the Russians, to be blockaded. Consequently, English ships,
+breaking through the blockade, were confiscated. The English Ministry
+then asserted that British merchantmen had the right of trading to those
+ports according to Article XVII. of the Defensive Treaty of 1700, by
+which English commerce, with the exception of contraband of war, was
+allowed to go on with ports of the enemy. The absurdity and falsehood of
+this pretext being fully exposed in the pamphlet we are about to
+reprint, we will only remark that the case had been more than once
+decided against commercial nations, not bound, like England, by treaty
+to defend the integrity of the Swedish Empire. In the year 1561, when
+the Russians took Narva, and laboured hard to establish their commerce
+there, the Hanse towns, chiefly L�beck, tried to possess themselves of
+this traffic. Eric XIV., then King of Sweden, resisted their
+pretensions. The city of L�beck represented this resistance as
+altogether new, as they had carried on their commerce with the Russians
+time out of mind, and pleaded the common right of nations to navigate in
+the Baltic, provided their vessels carried no contraband of war. The
+King replied that he did not dispute the Hanse towns the liberty of
+trading with Russia, but only with Narva, which was no Russian port. In
+the year 1579 again, the Russians having broken the suspension of arms
+with Sweden, the Danes likewise claimed the navigation to Narva, by
+virtue of their treaty, but King John was as firm in maintaining the
+contrary, as was his brother Eric.
+
+In her open demonstrations of hostility against the King of Sweden, as
+well as in the false pretence on which they were founded, England seemed
+only to follow in the track of Holland, which declaring the confiscation
+of its ships to be piracy, had issued two proclamations against Sweden
+in 1714.
+
+In one respect, the case of the States-General was the same as that of
+England. King William had concluded the Defensive Treaty as well for
+Holland as for England. Besides, Article XVI., in the Treaty of
+Commerce, concluded between Holland and Sweden in 1703, expressly
+stipulated that no navigation ought to be allowed to the ports blocked
+up by either of the confederates. The then common Dutch cant that "there
+was no hindering traders from carrying their merchandise where they
+will," was the more impudent as, during the war, ending with the Peace
+of Ryswick, the Dutch Republic had declared all France to be blocked up,
+forbidden the neutral Powers all trade with that kingdom, and caused all
+their ships that went there or came thence to be brought up without any
+regard to the nature of their cargoes.
+
+In another respect, the situation of Holland was different from that of
+England. Fallen from its commercial and maritime grandeur, Holland had
+then already entered upon its epoch of decline. Like Genoa and Venice,
+when new roads of commerce had dispossessed them of their old mercantile
+supremacy, it was forced to lend out to other nations its capital, grown
+too large for the vessels of its own commerce. Its fatherland had begun
+to lie there where the best interest for its capital was paid. Russia,
+therefore, proved an immense market, less for the commerce than for the
+outlay of capital and men. To this moment Holland has remained the
+banker of Russia. At the time of Peter they supplied Russia with ships,
+officers, arms, and money, so that his fleet, as a contemporary writer
+remarks, ought to have been called a Dutch rather than a Muscovite one.
+They gloried in having sent the first European merchant ship to St.
+Petersburg, and returned the commercial privileges they had obtained
+from Peter, or hoped to obtain from him, by that fawning meanness which
+characterizes their intercourse with Japan. Here, then, was quite
+another solid foundation than in England for the Russianism of
+statesmen, whom Peter I. had entrapped during his stay at Amsterdam, and
+the Hague in 1697, whom he afterwards directed by his ambassadors, and
+with whom he renewed his personal influence during his renewed stay at
+Amsterdam in 1716-17. Yet, if the paramount influence England exercised
+over Holland during the first _decennia_ of the 18th century be
+considered, there can remain no doubt that the proclamations against
+Sweden by the States-General would never have been issued, if not with
+the previous consent and at the instigation of England. The intimate
+connection between the English and Dutch Governments served more than
+once the former to put up precedents in the name of Holland, which they
+were resolved to act upon in the name of England. On the other hand, it
+is no less certain that the Dutch statesmen were employed by the Czar to
+influence the British ones. Thus Horace Walpole, the brother of the
+"Father of Corruption," the brother-in-law of the Minister, Townshend,
+and the British Ambassador at the Hague during 1715-16, was evidently
+inveigled into the Russian interest by his Dutch friends. Thus, as we
+shall see by-and-by, Theyls, the Secretary to the Dutch Embassy at
+Constantinople, at the most critical period of the deadly struggle
+between Charles XII. and Peter I., managed affairs at the same time for
+the Embassies of England and Holland at the Sublime Porte. This Theylls,
+in a print of his, openly claims it as a merit with his nation to have
+been the devoted and rewarded agent of Russian intrigue.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[21] In the year 1657, when the Courts of Denmark and Brandenburg
+intended engaging the Muscovites to fall upon Sweden, they instructed
+their Minister so to manage the affair that the Czar might by no means
+get any footing in the Baltic, because "they did not know what to do
+with so troublesome a neighbour." (See Puffendorf's _History of
+Brandenburg_.)
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+     "_The Defensive Treaty concluded in the year 1700, between his late
+     Majesty, King William, of ever-glorious memory, and his present
+     Swedish Majesty, King Charles XII. Published at the earnest desire
+     of several members of both Houses of Parliament._
+
+
+     'Nec rumpite foedera pacis,
+     Nec regnis pr�ferte fidem.'
+                                 --SILIUS, _Lip._ II.
+
+
+"_Article I._ Establishes between the Kings of Sweden and England 'a
+sincere and constant friendship for ever, a league and good
+correspondence, so that they shall never mutually or separately molest
+one another's kingdoms, provinces, colonies, or subjects, wheresoever
+situated, _nor shall they suffer or agree that this should be done by
+others, etc._'
+
+"_Article II._ 'Moreover, each of the Allies, his heirs and successors,
+shall be obliged to take care of, and promote, as much as in him lies,
+the profit and honour of the other, to detect and give notice to his
+other ally (as soon as it shall come to his own knowledge) of all
+imminent dangers, conspiracies, and hostile designs formed against him,
+to withstand them as much as possible, and to prevent them both by
+advice and assistance; and therefore _it shall not be lawful for either
+of the Allies, either by themselves or any other whatsoever, to act,
+treat, or endeavour anything to the prejudice or loss of the other_, his
+lands or dominions whatsoever or wheresoever, whether by land or sea;
+that one shall in no wise favour the other's foes, either rebels or
+enemies, to the prejudice of his Ally,' etc.
+
+"_Query I._ How the words marked in italics agree with our present
+conduct, when our fleet acts in conjunction with the enemies of Sweden,
+_the Czar commands our fleet, our Admiral enters into Councils of War,
+and is not only privy to all their designs, but together with our own
+Minister at Copenhagen_ (as the King of Denmark has himself owned it in
+a public declaration), _pushed on the Northern Confederates to an
+enterprise entirely destructive to our Ally Sweden, I mean the descent
+designed last summer upon Schonen_?
+
+"_Query II._ In what manner we also must explain that passage in the
+first article by which it is stipulated that one Ally shall not either
+by themselves or any other whatsoever, act, treat, or endeavour anything
+to the loss of the other's lands and dominions; to justify in particular
+our leaving in the year 1715, even when the season was so far advanced
+as no longer to admit of our usual pretence of conveying and protecting
+our trade, which was then got already safe home, eight men-of-war in the
+Baltic, with orders to join in one line of battle with the Danes,
+whereby we made them so much superior in number to the Swedish fleet,
+that it could not come to the relief of Straelsund, and whereby _we
+chiefly occasioned Sweden's entirely losing its German Provinces_, and
+even the _extreme danger his Swedish Majesty ran in his own person_, in
+crossing the sea, before the surrender of the town.
+
+"_Article III._ By a special defensive treaty, the Kings of Sweden and
+England mutually oblige themselves, 'in a strict alliance, to defend one
+another mutually, as well as their kingdoms, territories, provinces,
+states, subjects, possessions, as their rights and liberties of
+navigation and commerce, as well in the Northern, Deucalidonian,
+Western, and Britannic Sea, commonly called the Channel, the Baltic, the
+Sound; as also of the privileges and prerogatives of each of the Allies
+belonging to them, by virtue of treaties and agreements, as well as by
+received customs, the laws of nations, hereditary right, against any
+aggressors or invaders and molesters in Europe by sea or land, etc.'
+
+"_Query._ It being by the law of nations an indisputable right and
+prerogative of any king or people, in case of a great necessity or
+threatening ruin, to use all such means they themselves shall judge most
+necessary for their preservation; it having moreover been a constant
+prerogative and practice of the Swedes, for these several hundred years,
+in case of a war with their most dreadful enemies the Muscovites, to
+hinder all trade with them in the Baltic; and since it is also
+stipulated in this article that amongst other things, _one Ally ought to
+defend the prerogatives belonging to the other, even by received
+customs, and the law of nations_: how come we now, the King of Sweden
+stands more than ever in need of using that prerogative, not only to
+dispute it, but also to take thereof a pretence for an open hostility
+against him?
+
+"_Articles IV., V., VI., and VII._ fix the strength of the auxiliary
+forces England and Sweden are to send each other in case the territory
+of either of these powers should be invaded, or its navigation 'molested
+or hindered' in one of the seas enumerated in Article III. The invasion
+of the _German_ provinces of Sweden is expressly included as a _casus
+foederis_.
+
+"_Article VIII._ stipulates that that Ally who is not attacked shall
+first act the part of a pacific mediator; but, the mediation having
+proved a failure, 'the aforesaid forces shall be sent without delay; nor
+shall the confederates desist before the injured party shall be
+satisfied in all things.'
+
+"_Article IX._ That Ally that requires the stipulated 'help, has to
+choose whether he will have the above-named army either all or any,
+either in soldiers, ships, ammunition, or money.'
+
+"_Article X._ Ships and armies serve under 'the command of him that
+required them.'
+
+"_Article XI._ 'But if it should happen that the above-mentioned forces
+should not be proportionable to the danger, as supposing that perhaps
+the aggressor should be assisted by the forces of some other
+confederates of his, then one of the Allies, after previous request,
+shall be obliged to help the other that is injured, with greater forces,
+such as he shall be able to raise with safety and convenience, both by
+sea and land....'
+
+"_Article XII._ 'It shall be lawful for either of the Allies and their
+subjects to bring their men-of-war into one another's harbours, and to
+winter there.' Peculiar negotiations about this point shall take place
+at Stockholm, but 'in the meanwhile, the articles of treaty concluded at
+London, 1661, relating to the navigation and commerce shall remain, in
+their full force, as much as if they were inserted here word for word.'
+
+"_Article XIII._ ' ... The subjects of either of the Allies ... shall no
+way, either by sea or land, serve them (the enemies of either of the
+Allies), either as mariners or soldiers, and therefore it shall be
+forbid them upon severe penalty.'
+
+"_Article XIV._ 'If it happens that either of the confederate kings ...
+should be engaged in a war against a common enemy, or be molested by any
+other neighbouring king ... in his own kingdoms or provinces ... to the
+hindering of which, he that requires help may by the force of this
+treaty himself be obliged to send help: then that Ally so molested shall
+not be obliged to send the promised help....'
+
+"_Query I._ Whether in our conscience we don't think the King of Sweden
+most unjustly attacked by all his enemies; whether consequently we are
+not convinced that we owe him the assistance stipulated in these
+Articles; whether he has not demanded the same from us, and why it has
+hitherto been refused him?
+
+"_Query II._ These articles, setting forth in the most expressing terms,
+in what manner Great Britain and Sweden ought to assist one another, can
+either of these two Allies take upon him to prescribe to the other who
+requires his assistance a way of lending him it not expressed in the
+treaty; and if that other Ally does not think it for his interest to
+accept of the same, but still insists upon the performance of the
+treaty, can he from thence take a pretence, not only to withhold the
+stipulated assistance, but also to use his Ally in a hostile way, and to
+join with his enemies against him? If this is not justifiable, as even
+common sense tells us it is not, how can the reason stand good, which we
+allege amongst others, for using the King of Sweden as we do, _id est_,
+that demanding a literal performance of his alliance with us, _he would
+not accept the treaty of neutrality for his German provinces_, which we
+proposed to him some years ago, a treaty which, not to mention its
+partiality in favour of the enemies of Sweden, and that it was
+calculated only for our own interest, and for to prevent all disturbance
+in the empire, whilst we were engaged in a war against France, the King
+of Sweden had so much less reason to rely upon, as he was to conclude it
+with those very enemies, that had every one of them broken several
+treaties in beginning the present war against him, and as it was to be
+guaranteed by those powers, who were also every one of them guarantees
+of the broken treaties, without having performed their guarantee?
+
+"_Query III._ How can we make the words in the 7th Article, _that in
+assisting our injured Ally we shall not desist before he shall be
+satisfied in all things_, agree with our endeavouring, to the contrary,
+to help the enemies of that Prince, though all unjust aggressors, not
+only to take one province after the other from him, but also to remain
+undisturbed possessors thereof, blaming all along the King of Sweden for
+not tamely submitting thereunto?
+
+"_Query IV._ The treaty concluded in the year 1661, between Great
+Britain and Sweden, being in the 11th Article confirmed, and the said
+treaty forbidding expressly one of the confederates _either himself or
+his subjects to lend or to sell to the other's enemies, men-of-war or
+ships of defence_; the 13th Article of this present treaty forbidding
+also expressly the subjects of either of the Allies _to help anyways the
+enemies of the other, to the inconvenience and loss of such an Ally_;
+should we not have accused the Swedes of the most notorious breach of
+this treaty, had they, during our late war with the French, lent them
+their own fleet, the better to execute any design of theirs against us,
+or had they, notwithstanding our representations to the contrary,
+suffered their subjects to furnish the French with ships of 50, 60, and
+70 guns! Now, if we turn the tables, and remember upon how many
+occasions our fleet has of late been entirely subservient to the designs
+of the enemies of Sweden, even in most critical times, and that _the
+Czar of Muscovy has actually above a dozen English-built ships_ in his
+fleet, will it not be very difficult for us to excuse in ourselves what
+we should most certainly have blamed, if done by others?
+
+"_Article XVII._ The obligation shall not be so far extended as that all
+friendship and mutual commerce with the enemies of that Ally (that
+requires the help) shall be taken away; for supposing that one of the
+confederates should send his auxiliaries, and should not be engaged in
+the war himself, it shall then be lawful for the subjects to trade and
+commerce with that enemy of that Ally that is engaged in the war, also
+directly and safely to merchandise with such enemies, for all goods not
+expressly forbid and called contraband, as in a special treaty of
+commerce hereafter shall be appointed.
+
+"_Query I._ This Article being the only one out of twenty-two whose
+performance we have now occasion to insist upon from the Swedes, the
+question will be whether we ourselves, in regard to Sweden, have
+performed all the other articles as it was our part to do, and whether
+in demanding of the King of Sweden the executing of this Article, we
+have promised that we would also do our duty as to all the rest; if not,
+may not the Swedes say that we complain unjustly of the breach of one
+single Article, when we ourselves may perhaps be found guilty of having
+in the most material points either not executed or even acted against
+the whole treaty?
+
+"_Query II._ Whether the liberty of commerce one Ally is, by virtue of
+this Article, to enjoy with the other's enemies, ought to have no
+limitation at all, neither as to time nor place; in short, whether it
+ought even to be extended so far as to destroy the very end of this
+Treaty, which is the promoting the safety and security of one another's
+kingdoms?
+
+"_Query III._ Whether in case the French had in the late wars made
+themselves masters of Ireland or Scotland, and either in new-made
+seaports, or the old ones, endeavoured by trade still more firmly to
+establish themselves in their new conquest, we, in such a case, should
+have thought the Swedes our true allies and friends, had they insisted
+upon this Article to trade with the French in the said seaports taken
+from us, and to furnish them there with several necessaries of war, nay,
+even with armed ships, whereby the French might the easier have annoyed
+us here in England?
+
+"_Query IV._ Whether, if we had gone about to hinder a trade so
+prejudicial to us, and in order thereunto brought up all Swedish ships
+going to the said seaports, we should not highly have exclaimed against
+the Swedes, had they taken from thence a pretence to join their fleet
+with the French, to occasion the losing of any of our dominions, and
+even to encourage the invasion upon us, have their fleet at hand to
+promote the same?
+
+"_Query V._ Whether upon an impartial examination this would not have
+been a case exactly parallel to that we insist upon, as to a free Trade
+to the seaports the Czar has taken from Sweden, and to our present
+behaviour, upon the King of Sweden's hindering the same?
+
+"_Query VI._ Whether we have not ever since Oliver Cromwell's time till
+1710, in all our wars with France and Holland, without any urgent
+necessity at all, brought up and confiscated Swedish ships, though not
+going to any prohibited ports, and that to a far greater number and
+value, than all those the Swedes have now taken from us, and whether the
+Swedes have ever taken a pretence from thence to join with our enemies,
+and to send whole squadrons of ships to their assistance?
+
+"_Query VII._ Whether, if we inquire narrowly into the state of
+commerce, as it has been carried on for these many years, we shall not
+find that the trade of the above-mentioned places was not so very
+necessary to us, at least not so far as to be put into the balance with
+the preservation of a Protestant confederate nation, much less to give
+us a just reason _to make war against that nation, which, though not
+declared, has done it more harm than the united efforts of all its
+enemies_?
+
+"_Query VIII._ Whether, if it happened two years ago, that this trade
+became something more necessary to us than formerly, it is not easily
+proved, that it was occasioned only by the Czar's forcing us out of our
+old channel of trade to Archangel, and bringing us to Petersburg, and
+our complying therewith. So that all the inconveniences we laboured
+under upon that account ought to have been laid to the Czar's door, and
+not to the King of Sweden's?
+
+"_Query IX._ Whether the Czar did not in the very beginning of 1715
+again permit us to trade our old way to Archangel, and whether our
+Ministers had not notice thereof a great while before our fleet was sent
+that year to protect our _trade to Petersburg_, which by this alteration
+in the Czar's resolution was become as unnecessary for us as before?
+
+"_Query X._ Whether the King of Sweden had not declared, that if we
+would forbear trading to _Petersburg_, etc., which he looked upon as
+ruinous to his kingdom, he would in no manner disturb our trade, neither
+in the Baltic nor anywhere else; but that in case we would not give him
+this slight proof of our friendship, he should be excused if the
+innocent came to suffer with the guilty?
+
+"_Query XI._ Whether, by our insisting upon the trade to the ports
+prohibited by the King of Sweden, which besides it being unnecessary to
+us, hardly makes one part in ten of that we carry on in the Baltic, we
+have not drawn upon us the hazards that our trade has run all this
+while, been ourselves the occasion of our great expenses in fitting out
+fleets for its protection, and by our joining with the enemies of
+Sweden, fully justified his Swedish Majesty's resentment; had it ever
+gone so far as to seize and confiscate without distinction all our ships
+and effects, wheresoever he found them, either within or without his
+kingdoms?
+
+"_Query XII._ If we were so tender of our trade to the northern ports in
+general, ought we not in policy rather to have considered the hazard
+that trade runs by the approaching ruin of Sweden, and _by the Czar's
+becoming the whole and sole master of the Baltic, and all the naval
+stores we want from thence_? Have we not also suffered greater hardships
+and losses in the said trade from the Czar, than that amounting only to
+sixty odd thousand pounds (whereof, by the way, two parts in three may
+perhaps be disputable), which provoked us first to send twenty
+men-of-war in the Baltic with order to attack the Swedes wherever they
+met them? And yet, did not this very Czar, this very aspiring and
+dangerous prince, _last summer command the whole confederate fleet_, as
+it was called, _of which our men-of-war made the most considerable part?
+The first instance that ever was of a Foreign Potentate having the
+command given him of the English fleet, the bulwark of our nation_; and
+did not our said men-of-war afterwards convey his (the Czar's) transport
+ships and troops on board of them, in their return from Zealand,
+_protecting them from the Swedish fleet_, which else would have made a
+considerable havoc amongst them?
+
+"_Query XIII._ Suppose now, we had, on the contrary, taken hold of the
+great and many complaints our merchants have made of the ill-usage they
+meet from the Czar, to have sent our fleet to show our resentment
+against that prince, to prevent his great and pernicious designs even to
+us, _to assist Sweden pursuant to this Treaty_, and effectually to
+restore the peace in the North, would not that have been more for our
+interest, more necessary, more honourable and just, and more according
+to our Treaty; and would not the several 100,000 pounds these our
+Northern expeditions have cost the nation, have been thus better
+employed?
+
+"_Query XIV._ If the preserving and securing our trade against the
+Swedes has been the only and real object of all our measures, as to the
+Northern affairs, how came we the year before the last to leave eight
+men-of-war in the Baltic and at Copenhagen, when we had no more trade
+there to protect, and how came Admiral Norris last summer, although he
+and the Dutch together made up the number of twenty-six men-of-war, and
+consequently were too strong for the Swedes, to attempt anything against
+our trade under their convoy; yet to lay above two whole months of the
+best season in the Sound, without convoying our and the Dutch
+merchantmen to the several ports they were bound for, whereby they were
+kept in the Baltic so late that their return could not but be very
+hazardous, as it even proved, both to them and our men-of-war
+themselves? Will not the world be apt to think that the hopes of forcing
+the King of Sweden to an inglorious and disadvantageous peace, by which
+the Duchies of Bremen and Verden ought to be added to the Hanover
+dominions, or that some other such view, foreign, if not contrary, to
+the true and old interest of Great Britain, had then a greater influence
+upon all these our proceedings than _the pretended care of our trade_?
+
+"_Article XVIII._ For as much as it seems convenient for the
+preservation of the liberty of navigation and commerce in the Baltic
+Sea, that a firm and exact friendship should be kept between the Kings
+of Sweden and Denmark; and whereas the former Kings of Sweden and
+Denmark did oblige themselves mutually, not only by the public Articles
+of Peace made in the camp of Copenhagen, on the 27th of May, 1660, and
+by the ratifications of the agreement interchanged on both sides,
+sacredly and inviolably to observe all and every one of the clauses
+comprehended in the said agreement, but also declared together to ...
+Charles II., King of Great Britain ... a little before the treaty
+concluded between England and Sweden in the year 1665, that they would
+stand sincerely ... to all ... of the Articles of the said peace ...
+whereupon Charles II., with the approbation and consent of both the
+forementioned Kings of Sweden and Denmark, took upon himself a little
+after the Treaty concluded between England and Sweden, 1st March, 1665,
+to wit 9th October, 1665, guarantee of the same agreements.... Whereas
+an instrument of peace between ... the Kings of Sweden and Denmark
+happened to be soon after these concluded at Lunden in Schonen, in 1679,
+which contains an express transaction, and repetition and confirmation
+of the Treaties concluded at Roskild, Copenhagen, and Westphalia;
+therefore ... the King of Great Britain binds himself by the force of
+this Treaty ... that if either of the Kings of Sweden and Denmark shall
+consent to the violation, either of all the agreements, or of one or
+more articles comprehended in them, and consequently if either of the
+Kings shall to the prejudice of the person, provinces, territories,
+islands, goods, dominions and rights of the other, which by the force of
+the agreements so often repeated, and made in the camp of Copenhagen, on
+the 27th of May, 1660, as also of those made in the ... peace at Lunden
+in Schonen in 1679, were attributed to every one that was interested and
+comprehended in the words of the peace, should either by himself or by
+others, presume, or secretly design or attempt, or by open molestations,
+or by any injury, or by any violence of arms, attempt anything; that
+then the ... King of Great Britain ... shall first of all, by his
+interposition, perform all the offices of a friend and princely ally,
+which may serve towards the keeping inviolable all the frequently
+mentioned agreements, and of every article comprehended in them, and
+consequently towards the preservation of peace between both kings; that
+afterwards if the King, who is the beginner of such prejudice, or any
+molestation or injury, contrary to all agreements, and contrary to any
+articles comprehended in them, shall refuse after being admonished ...
+then the King of Great Britain ... shall ... assist him that is injured
+as by the present agreements between the Kings of Great Britain and
+Sweden in such cases is determined and agreed.
+
+"_Query._ Does not this article expressly tell us how to remedy the
+disturbances our trade in the Baltic might suffer, in case of a
+misunderstanding betwixt the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, by obliging
+both these Princes to keep all the Treaties of Peace that have been
+concluded between them from 1660-1670, and in case either of them should
+in an hostile manner act against the said Treaties, by assisting the
+other against the aggressor? How comes it then that we don't make use of
+so just a remedy against an evil we are so great sufferers by? Can
+anybody, though ever so partial, deny but the King of Denmark, though
+seemingly a sincere friend to the King of Sweden, from the peace of
+Travendahl till he went out of Saxony against the Muscovites, fell very
+unjustly upon him immediately after, taking ungenerously advantage of
+the fatal battle of Pultava? Is not then the King of Denmark the
+violator of all the above-mentioned Treaties, and consequently the true
+author of the disturbances our trade meets with in the Baltic? Why in
+God's name don't we, according to this article, assist Sweden against
+him, and why do we, on the contrary, declare openly against the injured
+King of Sweden, send hectoring and threatening memorials to him, upon
+the least advantage he has over his enemies, as we did last summer upon
+his entering Norway, and even order our fleets to act openly against him
+in conjunction with the Danes?
+
+"_Article XIX._ There shall be 'stricter confederacy and union between
+the above-mentioned Kings of Great Britain and Sweden, for the future,
+_for the defence and preservation of the Protestant, Evangelic, and
+reformed religion_.'
+
+"_Query I._ How do we, according to this article, join with Sweden to
+_assert, protect, and preserve the Protestant religion_? Don't we suffer
+that nation, which has always been a bulwark to the said religion, most
+unmercifully to be torn to pieces?... _Don't we ourselves give a helping
+hand towards its destruction?_ And why all this? Because our merchants
+have lost their ships to the value of sixty odd thousand pounds. _For
+this loss, and nothing else, was the pretended reason why, in the year
+1715, we sent our fleet in the Baltic, at the expense of �200,000_; and
+as to what our merchants have suffered since, suppose we attribute it to
+our threatening memorials as well as open hostilities against the King
+of Sweden, must we not even then own that that Prince's resentment has
+been very moderate?
+
+"_Query II._ How can other Princes, and especially our fellow
+Protestants, think us sincere in what we have made them believe as to
+our zeal in spending millions of lives and money for to secure the
+Protestant interest only in one single branch of it, _I mean the
+Protestant succession here_, when they see that that succession has
+hardly taken place, before we, only for sixty odd thousand pounds, (for
+let us always remember that this paltry sum was the first pretence for
+our quarrelling with Sweden) go about to undermine the very foundation
+of that interest in general, by helping, as we do, entirely to sacrifice
+Sweden, the old and sincere protector of the Protestants, to its
+neighbours, of which some are professed Papists, some worse, and some,
+at least, but lukewarm Protestants?
+
+"_Article XX._ Therefore, that a reciprocal faith of the Allies and
+their perseverance in this agreement may appear ... both the
+fore-mentioned kings mutually oblige themselves, and declare that ...
+they will not depart a tittle from the genuine and common sense of all
+and every article of this treaty under any pretences of friendship,
+profit, former treaty, agreement, and promise, or upon any colour
+whatsoever: but that they will most fully and readily, either by
+themselves, or ministers, or subjects, put in execution whatsoever they
+have promised in this treaty ... without any hesitation, exception, or
+excuse....
+
+"_Query I._ Inasmuch as this article sets forth that, at the time of
+concluding of the treaty, we were under no engagement contrary to it,
+and that it were highly unjust should we afterwards, and while this
+treaty is in force, which is eighteen years after the day it was signed,
+have entered into any such engagements, how can we justify to the world
+our late proceedings against the King of Sweden, which naturally seem
+the consequences of a treaty either of our own making with the enemies
+of that Prince, _or of some Court or other that at present influences
+our measures_?
+
+"_Query II._ The words in this article ... how in the name of honour,
+faith, and justice, do they agree with the _little and pitiful
+pretences_ we now make use of, not only for not assisting Sweden,
+pursuant to this treaty, _but even for going about so heartily as we do
+to destroy it_?
+
+"_Article XXI._ This defensive treaty shall last for eighteen years,
+before the end of which the confederate kings may ... again treat.
+
+"_Ratification of the abovesaid treaty._ We, having seen and considered
+this treaty, have approved and confirmed the same in all and every
+particular article and clause as by the present. We do approve the same
+for us, our heirs, and successors; assuring and promising our princely
+word that we shall perform and observe sincerely and in good earnest all
+those things that are therein contained, for the better confirmation
+whereof we have ordered our great seal of England to be put to these
+presents, which were given at our palace of Kensington, 25th of
+February, in the year of our Lord 1700, and in the 11th year of our
+reign (Gulielmus Rex).[22]
+
+"_Query._ How can any of us that declares himself for the late happy
+revolution, and that is a true and grateful lover of King William's for
+ever-glorious memory ... yet bear with the least patience, that the said
+treaty should (that I may again use the words of the 20th article) be
+_departed from, under any pretence of profit, or upon any colour
+whatsoever_, especially so insignificant and trifling a one as that
+which has been made use of for two years together to employ our ships,
+our men, and our money, _to accomplish the ruin of Sweden_, that same
+Sweden whose defence and preservation this great and wise monarch of
+ours has so solemnly promised, and which he always looked upon to be of
+the utmost necessity for to secure the Protestant interest in Europe?"
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[22] The treaty was concluded at the Hague on the 6th and 16th January,
+1700, and ratified by William III. on February 5th, 1700.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+Before entering upon an analysis of the pamphlet headed, "_Truth is but
+truth, as it is timed_," with which we shall conclude the _Introduction_
+to the Diplomatic Revelations, some preliminary remarks on the general
+history of Russian politics appear opportune.
+
+The overwhelming influence of Russia has taken Europe at different
+epochs by surprise, startled the peoples of the West, and been submitted
+to as a fatality, or resisted only by convulsions. But alongside the
+fascination exercised by Russia, there runs an ever-reviving scepticism,
+dogging her like a shadow, growing with her growth, mingling shrill
+notes of irony with the cries of agonising peoples, and mocking her very
+grandeur as a histrionic attitude taken up to dazzle and to cheat. Other
+empires have met with similar doubts in their infancy; Russia has become
+a colossus without outliving them. She affords the only instance in
+history of an immense empire, the very existence of whose power, even
+after world-wide achievements, has never ceased to be treated like a
+matter of faith rather than like a matter of fact. From the outset of
+the eighteenth century to our days, no author, whether he intended to
+exalt or to check Russia, thought it possible to dispense with first
+proving her existence.
+
+But whether we be spiritualists or materialists with respect to
+Russia--whether we consider her power as a palpable fact, or as the mere
+vision of the guilt-stricken consciences of the European peoples--the
+question remains the same: "How did this power, or this phantom of a
+power, contrive to assume such dimensions as to rouse on the one side
+the passionate assertion, and on the other the angry denial of its
+threatening the world with a rehearsal of Universal Monarchy?" At the
+beginning of the eighteenth century Russia was regarded as a mushroom
+creation extemporised by the genius of Peter the Great. Schloezer
+thought it a discovery to have found out that she possessed a past; and
+in modern times, writers, like Fallmerayer, unconsciously following in
+the track beaten by Russian historians, have deliberately asserted that
+the northern spectre which frightens the Europe of the nineteenth
+century already overshadowed the Europe of the ninth century. With them
+the policy of Russia begins with the first Ruriks, and has, with some
+interruptions indeed, been systematically continued to the present hour.
+
+Ancient maps of Russia are unfolded before us, displaying even larger
+European dimensions than she can boast of now: her perpetual movement of
+aggrandizement from the ninth to the eleventh century is anxiously
+pointed out; we are shown Oleg launching 88,000 men against Byzantium,
+fixing his shield as a trophy on the gate of that capital, and dictating
+an ignominious treaty to the Lower Empire; Igor making it tributary;
+Sviataslaff glorying, "the Greeks supply me with gold, costly stuffs,
+rice, fruits and wine; Hungary furnishes cattle and horses; from Russia
+I draw honey, wax, furs, and men"; Vladimir conquering the Crimea and
+Livonia, extorting a daughter from the Greek Emperor, as Napoleon did
+from the German Emperor, blending the military sway of a northern
+conqueror with the theocratic despotism of the Porphyro-geniti, and
+becoming at once the master of his subjects on earth, and their
+protector in heaven.
+
+Yet, in spite of the plausible parallelism suggested by these
+reminiscences, the policy of the first Ruriks differs fundamentally from
+that of modern Russia. It was nothing more nor less than the policy of
+the German barbarians inundating Europe--the history of the modern
+nations beginning only after the deluge has passed away. The Gothic
+period of Russia in particular forms but a chapter of the Norman
+conquests. As the empire of Charlemagne precedes the foundation of
+modern France, Germany, and Italy, so the empire of the Ruriks precedes
+the foundation of Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic Settlements, Turkey,
+and Muscovy itself. The rapid movement of aggrandizement was not the
+result of deep-laid schemes, but the natural offspring of the primitive
+organization of Norman conquest--vassalship without fiefs, or fiefs
+consisting only in tributes--the necessity of fresh conquests being kept
+alive by the uninterrupted influx of new Varangian adventurers, panting
+for glory and plunder. The chiefs, becoming anxious for repose, were
+compelled by the Faithful Band to move on, and in Russian, as in French
+Normandy, there arrived the moment when the chiefs despatched on new
+predatory excursions their uncontrollable and insatiable
+companions-in-arms with the single view to get rid of them. Warfare and
+organization of conquest on the part of the first Ruriks differ in no
+point from those of the Normans in the rest of Europe. If Slavonian
+tribes were subjected not only by the sword, but also by mutual
+convention, this singularity is due to the exceptional position of those
+tribes, placed between a northern and eastern invasion, and embracing
+the former as a protection from the latter. The same magic charm which
+attracted other northern barbarians to the Rome of the West attracted
+the Varangians to the Rome of the East. The very migration of the
+Russian capital--Rurik fixing it at Novgorod, Oleg removing it to Kiev,
+and Sviataslaff attempting to establish it in Bulgaria--proves beyond
+doubt that the invader was only feeling his way, and considered Russia
+as a mere halting-place from which to wander on in search of an empire
+in the South. If modern Russia covets the possession of Constantinople
+to establish her dominion over the world, the Ruriks were, on the
+contrary, forced by the resistance of Byzantium, under Zimiskes,
+definitively to establish their dominion in Russia.
+
+It may be objected that victors and vanquished amalgamated more quickly
+in Russia than in any other conquest of the northern barbarians, that
+the chiefs soon commingled themselves with the Slavonians--as shown by
+their marriages and their names. But then, it should be recollected that
+the Faithful Band, which formed at once their guard and their privy
+council, remained exclusively composed of Varangians; that Vladimir,
+who marks the summit, and Yaroslav, who marks the commencing decline of
+Gothic Russia, were seated on her throne by the arms of the Varangians.
+If any Slavonian influence is to be acknowledged in this epoch, it is
+that of Novgorod, a Slavonian State, the traditions, policy, and
+tendencies of which were so antagonistic to those of modern Russia that
+the one could found her existence only on the ruins of the other. Under
+Yaroslav the supremacy of the Varangians is broken, but simultaneously
+with it disappears the conquering tendency of the first period, and the
+decline of Gothic Russia begins. The history of that decline, more still
+than that of the conquest and formation, proves the exclusively Gothic
+character of the Empire of the Ruriks.
+
+The incongruous, unwieldy, and precocious Empire heaped together by the
+Ruriks, like the other empires of similar growth, is broken up into
+appanages, divided and subdivided among the descendants of the
+conquerors, dilacerated by feudal wars, rent to pieces by the
+intervention of foreign peoples. The paramount authority of the Grand
+Prince vanishes before the rival claims of seventy princes of the blood.
+The attempt of Andrew of Susdal at recomposing some large limbs of the
+empire by the removal of the capital from Kiev to Vladimir proves
+successful only in propagating the decomposition from the South to the
+centre. Andrew's third successor resigns even the last shadow of
+supremacy, the title of Grand Prince, and the merely nominal homage
+still offered him. The appanages to the South and to the West become by
+turns Lithuanian, Polish, Hungarian, Livonian, Swedish. Kiev itself, the
+ancient capital, follows destinies of its own, after having dwindled
+down from a seat of the Grand Princedom to the territory of a city.
+Thus, the Russia of the Normans completely disappears from the stage,
+and the few weak reminiscences in which it still outlived itself,
+dissolve before the terrible apparition of Genghis Khan. The bloody mire
+of Mongolian slavery, not the rude glory of the Norman epoch, forms the
+cradle of Muscovy, and modern Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy.
+
+The Tartar yoke lasted from 1237 to 1462--more than two centuries; a
+yoke not only crushing, but dishonouring and withering the very soul of
+the people that fell its prey. The Mongol Tartars established a rule of
+systematic terror, devastation and wholesale massacre forming its
+institutions. Their numbers being scanty in proportion to their enormous
+conquests, they wanted to magnify them by a halo of consternation, and
+to thin, by wholesale slaughter, the populations which might rise in
+their rear. In their creations of desert they were, besides, led by the
+same economical principle which has depopulated the Highlands of
+Scotland and the Campagna di Roma--the conversion of men into sheep, and
+of fertile lands and populous abodes into pasturage.
+
+The Tartar yoke had already lasted a hundred years before Muscovy
+emerged from its obscurity. To entertain discord among the Russian
+princes, and secure their servile submission, the Mongols had restored
+the dignity of the Grand Princedom. The strife among the Russian princes
+for this dignity was, as a modern author has it, "an abject strife--the
+strife of slaves, whose chief weapon was calumny, and who were always
+ready to denounce each other to their cruel rulers; wrangling for a
+degraded throne, whence they could not move but with plundering,
+parricidal hands--hands filled with gold and stained with gore; which
+they dared not ascend without grovelling, nor retain but on their knees,
+prostrate and trembling beneath the scimitar of a Tartar, always ready
+to roll under his feet those servile crowns, and the heads by which they
+were worn." It was in this infamous strife that the Moscow branch won at
+last the race. In 1328 the crown of the Grand Princedom, wrested from
+the branch of Tver by dint of denunciation and assassination, was picked
+up at the feet of Usbeck Khan by Yury, the elder brother of Ivan Kalita.
+Ivan I. Kalita, and Ivan III., surnamed the Great, personate Muscovy
+rising by means of the Tartar yoke, and Muscovy getting an independent
+power by the disappearance of the Tartar rule. The whole policy of
+Muscovy, from its first entrance into the historical arena, is resumed
+in the history of these two individuals.
+
+The policy of Ivan Kalita was simply this: to play the abject tool of
+the Khan, thus to borrow his power, and then to turn it round upon his
+princely rivals and his own subjects. To attain this end, he had to
+insinuate himself with the Tartars by dint of cynical adulation, by
+frequent journeys to the Golden Horde, by humble prayers for the hand of
+Mongol princesses, by a display of unbounded zeal for the Khan's
+interest, by the unscrupulous execution of his orders, by atrocious
+calumnies against his own kinsfolk, by blending in himself the
+characters of the Tartar's hangman, sycophant, and slave-in-chief. He
+perplexed the Khan by continuous revelations of secret plots. Whenever
+the branch of Tver betrayed a velleit� of national independence, he
+hurried to the Horde to denounce it. Wherever he met with resistance, he
+introduced the Tartar to trample it down. But it was not sufficient to
+act a character; to make it acceptable, gold was required. Perpetual
+bribery of the Khan and his grandees was the only sure foundation upon
+which to raise his fabric of deception and usurpation. But how was the
+slave to get the money wherewith to bribe the master? He persuaded the
+Khan to instal him his tax-gatherer throughout all the Russian
+appanages. Once invested with this function, he extorted money under
+false pretences. The wealth accumulated by the dread held out of the
+Tartar name, he used to corrupt the Tartars themselves. By a bribe he
+induced the primate to transfer his episcopal seat from Vladimir to
+Moscow, thus making the latter the capital of the empire, because the
+religious capital, and coupling the power of the Church with that of his
+throne. By a bribe he allured the Boyards of the rival princes into
+treason against their chiefs, and attracted them to himself as their
+centre. By the joint influence of the Mahometan Tartar, the Greek
+Church, and the Boyards, he unites the princes holding appanages into a
+crusade against the most dangerous of them--the prince of Tver; and then
+having driven his recent allies by bold attempts at usurpation into
+resistance against himself, into a war for the public good, he draws not
+the sword but hurries to the Khan. By bribes and delusion again, he
+seduces him into assassinating his kindred rivals under the most cruel
+torments. It was the traditional policy of the Tartar to check the
+Russian princes the one by the other, to feed their dissensions, to
+cause their forces to equiponderate, and to allow none to consolidate
+himself. Ivan Kalita converts the Khan into the tool by which he rids
+himself of his most dangerous competitors, and weighs down every
+obstacle to his own usurping march. He does not conquer the appanages,
+but surreptitiously turns the rights of the Tartar conquest to his
+exclusive profit. He secures the succession of his son through the same
+means by which he had raised the Grand Princedom of Muscovy, that
+strange compound of princedom and serfdom. During his whole reign he
+swerves not once from the line of policy he had traced to himself;
+clinging to it with a tenacious firmness, and executing it with
+methodical boldness. Thus he becomes the founder of the Muscovite power,
+and characteristically his people call him Kalita--that is, the purse,
+because it was the purse and not the sword with which he cut his way.
+The very period of his reign witnesses the sudden growth of the
+Lithuanian power which dismembers the Russian appanages from the West,
+while the Tartar squeezes them into one mass from the East. Ivan, while
+he dared not repulse the one disgrace, seemed anxious to exaggerate the
+other. He was not to be seduced from following up his ends by the
+allurements of glory, the pangs of conscience, or the lassitude of
+humiliation. His whole system may be expressed in a few words: the
+machiavelism of the usurping slave. His own weakness--his slavery--he
+turned into the mainspring of his strength.
+
+The policy traced by Ivan I. Kalita is that of his successors; they had
+only to enlarge the circle of its application. They followed it up
+laboriously, gradually, inflexibly. From Ivan I. Kalita, we may,
+therefore, pass at once to Ivan III., surnamed the Great.
+
+At the commencement of his reign (1462-1505) Ivan III. was still a
+tributary to the Tartars; his authority was still contested by the
+princes holding appanages; Novgorod, the head of the Russian republics,
+reigned over the north of Russia; Poland-Lithuania was striving for the
+conquest of Muscovy; lastly, the Livonian knights were not yet disarmed.
+At the end of his reign we behold Ivan III. seated on an independent
+throne, at his side the daughter of the last emperor of Byzantium, at
+his feet Kasan, and the remnant of the Golden Horde flocking to his
+court; Novgorod and the other Russian republics enslaved--Lithuania
+diminished, and its king a tool in Ivan's hands--the Livonian knights
+vanquished. Astonished Europe, at the commencement of Ivan's reign,
+hardly aware of the existence of Muscovy, hemmed in between the Tartar
+and the Lithuanian, was dazzled by the sudden appearance of an immense
+empire on its eastern confines, and Sultan Bajazet himself, before whom
+Europe trembled, heard for the first time the haughty language of the
+Muscovite. How, then, did Ivan accomplish these high deeds? Was he a
+hero? The Russian historians themselves show him up a confessed coward.
+
+Let us shortly survey his principal contests, in the sequence in which
+he undertook and concluded them--his contests with the Tartars, with
+Novgorod, with the princes holding appanages, and lastly with
+Lithuania-Poland.
+
+Ivan rescued Muscovy from the Tartar yoke, not by one bold stroke, but
+by the patient labour of about twenty years. He did not break the yoke,
+but disengaged himself by stealth. Its overthrow, accordingly, has more
+the look of the work of nature than the deed of man. When the Tartar
+monster expired at last, Ivan appeared at its deathbed like a physician,
+who prognosticated and speculated on death rather than like a warrior
+who imparted it. The character of every people enlarges with its
+enfranchisement from a foreign yoke; that of Muscovy in the hands of
+Ivan seems to diminish. Compare only Spain in its struggles against the
+Arabs with Muscovy in its struggles against the Tartars.
+
+At the period of Ivan's accession to the throne, the Golden Horde had
+long since been weakened, internally by fierce feuds, externally by the
+separation from them of the Nogay Tartars, the eruption of Timour
+Tamerlane, the rise of the Cossacks, and the hostility of the Crimean
+Tartars. Muscovy, on the contrary, by steadily pursuing the policy
+traced by Ivan Kalita, had grown to a mighty mass, crushed, but at the
+same time compactly united by the Tartar chain. The Khans, as if struck
+by a charm, had continued to remain instruments of Muscovite
+aggrandizement and concentration. By calculation they had added to the
+power of the Greek Church, which, in the hand of the Muscovite grand
+princes, proved the deadliest weapon against them.
+
+In rising against the Horde, the Muscovite had not to invent but only to
+imitate the Tartars themselves. But Ivan did not rise. He humbly
+acknowledged himself a slave of the Golden Horde. By bribing a Tartar
+woman he seduced the Khan into commanding the withdrawal from Muscovy of
+the Mongol residents. By similar and imperceptible and surreptitious
+steps he duped the Khan into successive concessions, all ruinous to his
+sway. He thus did not conquer, but filch strength. He does not drive,
+but manoeuvre his enemy out of his strongholds. Still continuing to
+prostrate himself before the Khan's envoys, and to proclaim himself his
+tributary, he eludes the payment of the tribute under false pretences,
+employing all the stratagems of a fugitive slave who dare not front his
+owner, but only steal out of his reach. At last the Mongol awakes from
+his torpor, and the hour of battle sounds. Ivan, trembling at the mere
+semblance of an armed encounter, attempts to hide himself behind his own
+fear, and to disarm the fury of his enemy by withdrawing the object upon
+which to wreak his vengeance. He is only saved by the intervention of
+the Crimean Tartars, his allies. Against a second invasion of the Horde,
+he ostentatiously gathers together such disproportionate forces that the
+mere rumour of their number parries the attack. At the third invasion,
+from the midst of 200,000 men, he absconds a disgraced deserter.
+Reluctantly dragged back, he attempts to haggle for conditions of
+slavery, and at last, pouring into his army his own servile fear, he
+involves it in a general and disorderly flight. Muscovy was then
+anxiously awaiting its irretrievable doom, when it suddenly hears that
+by an attack on their capital made by the Crimean Khan, the Golden Horde
+has been forced to withdraw, and has, on its retreat, been destroyed by
+the Cossacks and Nogay Tartars. Thus defeat was turned into success, and
+Ivan had overthrown the Golden Horde, not by fighting it himself, but by
+challenging it through a feigned desire of combat into offensive
+movements, which exhausted its remnants of vitality and exposed it to
+the fatal blows of the tribes of its own race whom he had managed to
+turn into his allies. He caught one Tartar with another Tartar. As the
+immense danger he had himself summoned proved unable to betray him into
+one single trait of manhood, so his miraculous triumph did not infatuate
+him even for one moment. With cautious circumspection he dared not
+incorporate Kasan with Muscovy, but made it over to sovereigns belonging
+to the family of Menghi-Ghirei, his Crimean ally, to hold it, as it
+were, in trust for Muscovy. With the spoils of the vanquished Tartar, he
+enchained the victorious Tartar. But if too prudent to assume, with the
+eye-witnesses of his disgrace, the airs of a conqueror, this impostor
+did fully understand how the downfall of the Tartar empire must dazzle
+at a distance--with what halo of glory it would encircle him, and how it
+would facilitate a magnificent entry among the European Powers.
+Accordingly he assumed abroad the theatrical attitude of the conqueror,
+and, indeed, succeeded in hiding under a mask of proud susceptibility
+and irritable haughtiness the obtrusiveness of the Mongol serf, who
+still remembered kissing the stirrup of the Khan's meanest envoy. He
+aped in more subdued tone the voice of his old masters, which terrified
+his soul. Some standing phrases of modern Russian diplomacy, such as the
+magnanimity, the wounded dignity of the master, are borrowed from the
+diplomatic instructions of Ivan III.
+
+After the surrender of Kasan, he set out on a long-planned expedition
+against Novgorod, the head of the Russian republics. If the overthrow of
+the Tartar yoke was, in his eyes, the first condition of Muscovite
+greatness, the overthrow of Russian freedom was the second. As the
+republic of Viatka had declared itself neutral between Muscovy and the
+Horde, and the republic of Tskof, with its twelve cities, had shown
+symptoms of disaffection, Ivan flattered the latter and affected to
+forget the former, meanwhile concentrating all his forces against
+Novgorod the Great, with the doom of which he knew the fate of the rest
+of the Russian republics to be sealed. By the prospect of sharing in
+this rich booty, he drew after him the princes holding appanages, while
+he inveigled the boyards by working upon their blind hatred of
+Novgorodian democracy. Thus he contrived to march three armies upon
+Novgorod and to overwhelm it by disproportionate force. But then, in
+order not to keep his word to the princes, not to forfeit his immutable
+"Vos non vobis," at the same time apprehensive, lest Novgorod should not
+yet have become digestible from the want of preparatory treatment, he
+thought fit to exhibit a sudden moderation; to content himself with a
+ransom and the acknowledgment of his suzerainty; but into the act of
+submission of the republic he smuggled some ambiguous words which made
+him its supreme judge and legislator. Then he fomented the dissensions
+between the patricians and plebeians raging as well in Novgorod as at
+Florence. Of some complaints of the plebeians he took occasion to
+introduce himself again into the city, to have its nobles, whom he knew
+to be hostile to himself, sent to Moscow loaded with chains, and to
+break the ancient law of the republic that "none of its citizens should
+ever be tried or punished out of the limits of its own territory." From
+that moment he became supreme arbiter. "Never," say the annalists,
+"never since Rurik had such an event happened; never had the grand
+princes of Kiev and Vladimir seen the Novgorodians come and submit to
+them as their judges. Ivan alone could reduce Novgorod to that degree of
+humiliation." Seven years were employed by Ivan to corrupt the republic
+by the exercise of his judicial authority. Then, when he found its
+strength worn out, he thought the moment ripe for declaring himself. To
+doff his own mask of moderation, he wanted, on the part of Novgorod, a
+breach of the peace. As he had simulated calm endurance, so he
+simulated now a sudden burst of passion. Having bribed an envoy of the
+republic to address him during a public audience with the name of
+sovereign, he claimed, at once, all the rights of a despot--the
+self-annihilation of the republic.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+One feature characteristic of the Slavonic race must strike every
+observer. Almost everywhere it confined itself to an inland country,
+leaving the sea-borders to non-Slavonic tribes. Finno-Tartaric tribes
+held the shores of the Black Sea, Lithuanians and Fins those of the
+Baltic and White Sea. Wherever they touched the sea-board, as in the
+Adriatic and part of the Baltic, the Slavonians had soon to submit to
+foreign rule. The Russian people shared this common fate of the
+Slavonian race. Their home, at the time they first appear in history,
+was the country about the sources and upper course of the Volga and its
+tributaries, the Dnieper, Don, and Northern Dwina. Nowhere did their
+territory touch the sea except at the extremity of the Gulf of Finland.
+Nor had they before Peter the Great proved able to conquer any maritime
+outlet beside that of the White Sea, which, during three-fourths of the
+year, is itself enchained and immovable. The spot where Petersburg now
+stands had been for a thousand years past contested ground between Fins,
+Swedes, and Russians. All the remaining extent of coast from Polangen,
+near Memel, to Torrea, the whole coast of the Black Sea, from Akerman to
+Redut Kaleh, has been conquered later on. And, as if to witness the
+anti-maritime peculiarity of the Slavonic race, of all this line of
+coast, no portion of the Baltic coast has really adopted Russian
+nationality. Nor has the Circassian and Mingrelian east coast of the
+Black Sea. It is only the coast of the White Sea, as far as it was worth
+cultivating, some portion of the northern coast of the Black Sea, and
+part of the coast of the Sea of Azof, that have really been peopled with
+Russian inhabitants, who, however, despite the new circumstances in
+which they are placed, still refrain from taking to the sea, and
+obstinately stick to the land-lopers' traditions of their ancestors.
+
+From the very outset, Peter the Great broke through all the traditions
+of the Slavonic race. "It is water that Russia wants." These words he
+addressed as a rebuke to Prince Cantemir are inscribed on the title-page
+of his life. The conquest of the Sea of Azof was aimed at in his first
+war with Turkey, the conquest of the Baltic in his war against Sweden,
+the conquest of the Black Sea in his second war against the Porte, and
+the conquest of the Caspian Sea in his fraudulent intervention in
+Persia. For a system of local encroachment, land was sufficient; for a
+system of universal aggression, water had become indispensable. It was
+but by the conversion of Muscovy from a country wholly of land into a
+sea-bordering empire, that the traditional limits of the Muscovite
+policy could be superseded and merged into that bold synthesis which,
+blending the encroaching method of the Mongol slave with the
+world-conquering tendencies of the Mongol master, forms the life-spring
+of modern Russian diplomacy.
+
+It has been said that no great nation has ever existed, or been able to
+exist, in such an inland position as that of the original empire of
+Peter the Great; that none has ever submitted thus to see its coasts and
+the mouths of its rivers torn away from it; that Russia could no more
+leave the mouth of the Neva, the natural outlet for the produce of
+Northern Russia, in the hands of the Swedes, than the mouths of the Don,
+Dnieper, and Bug, and the Straits of Kertch, in the hands of nomadic and
+plundering Tartars; that the Baltic provinces, from their very
+geographical configuration, are naturally a corollary to whichever
+nation holds the country behind them; that, in one word, Peter, in this
+quarter, at least, but took hold of what was absolutely necessary for
+the natural development of his country. From this point of view, Peter
+the Great intended, by his war against Sweden, only rearing a Russian
+Liverpool, and endowing it with its indispensable strip of coast.
+
+But then, one great fact is slighted over, the _tour de force_ by which
+he transferred the capital of the Empire from the inland centre to the
+maritime extremity, the characteristic boldness with which he erected
+the new capital on the first strip of Baltic coast he conquered, almost
+within gunshot of the frontier, thus deliberately giving his dominions
+an _eccentric centre_. To transfer the throne of the Czars from Moscow
+to Petersburg was to place it in a position where it could not be safe,
+even from insult, until the whole coast from Libau to Tornea was
+subdued--a work not completed till 1809, by the conquest of Finland.
+"St. Petersburg is the window from which Russia can overlook Europe,"
+said Algarotti. It was from the first a defiance to the Europeans, an
+incentive to further conquest to the Russians. The fortifications in our
+own days of Russian Poland are only a further step in the execution of
+the same idea. Modlin, Warsaw, Ivangorod, are more than citadels to keep
+a rebellious country in check. They are the same menace to the west
+which Petersburg, in its immediate bearing, was a hundred years ago to
+the north. They are to transform Russia into Panslavonia, as the Baltic
+provinces were to transform Muscovy into Russia.
+
+Petersburg, the _eccentric centre_ of the empire, pointed at once to a
+periphery still to be drawn.
+
+It is, then, not the mere conquest of the Baltic provinces which
+separates the policy of Peter the Great from that of his ancestors, but
+it is the transfer of the capital which reveals the true meaning of his
+Baltic conquests. Petersburg was not like Muscovy, the centre of a race,
+but the seat of a government; not the slow work of a people, but the
+instantaneous creation of a man; not the medium from which the
+peculiarities of an inland people radiate, but the maritime extremity
+where they are lost; not the traditionary nucleus of a national
+development, but the deliberately chosen abode of a cosmopolitan
+intrigue. By the transfer of the capital, Peter cut off the natural
+ligaments which bound up the encroaching system of the old Muscovite
+Czars with the natural abilities and aspirations of the great Russian
+race. By planting his capital on the margin of a sea, he put to open
+defiance the anti-maritime instincts of that race, and degraded it to a
+mere weight in his political mechanism. Since the 16th century Muscovy
+had made no important acquisitions but on the side of Siberia, and to
+the 16th century the dubious conquests made towards the west and the
+south were only brought about by direct agency on the east. By the
+transfer of the capital, Peter proclaimed that he, on the contrary,
+intended working on the east and the immediately neighbouring countries
+through the agency of the west. If the agency through the east was
+narrowly circumscribed by the stationary character and the limited
+relations of Asiatic peoples, the agency through the west became at once
+illimited and universal from the movable character and the all-sided
+relations of Western Europe. The transfer of the capital denoted this
+intended change of agency, which the conquest of the Baltic provinces
+afforded the means of achieving, by securing at once to Russia the
+supremacy among the neighbouring Northern States; by putting it into
+immediate and constant contact with all points of Europe; by laying the
+basis of a material bond with the maritime Powers, which by this
+conquest became dependent on Russia for their naval stores; a dependence
+not existing as long as Muscovy, the country that produced the great
+bulk of the naval stores, had got no outlets of its own; while Sweden,
+the Power that held these outlets, had not got the country lying behind
+them.
+
+If the Muscovite Czars, who worked their encroachments by the agency
+principally of the Tartar Khans, were obliged to _tartarize_ Muscovy,
+Peter the Great, who resolved upon working through the agency of the
+west, was obliged to _civilize_ Russia. In grasping upon the Baltic
+provinces, he seized at once the tools necessary for this process. They
+afforded him not only the diplomatists and the generals, the brains with
+which to execute his system of political and military action on the
+west, they yielded him, at the same time, a crop of bureaucrats,
+schoolmasters, and drill-sergeants, who were to drill Russians into that
+varnish of civilization that adapts them to the technical appliances of
+the Western peoples, without imbuing them with their ideas.
+
+Neither the Sea of Azof, nor the Black Sea, nor the Caspian Sea, could
+open to Peter this direct passage to Europe. Besides, during his
+lifetime still Taganrog, Azof, the Black Sea, with its new-formed
+Russian fleets, ports, and dockyards, were again abandoned or given up
+to the Turk. The Persian conquest, too, proved a premature enterprise.
+Of the four wars which fill the military life of Peter the Great, his
+first war, that against Turkey, the fruits of which were lost in a
+second Turkish war, continued in one respect the traditionary struggle
+with the Tartars. In another respect, it was but the prelude to the war
+against Sweden, of which the second Turkish war forms an episode and the
+Persian war an epilogue. Thus the war against Sweden, lasting during
+twenty-one years, almost absorbs the military life of Peter the Great.
+Whether we consider its purpose, its results, or its endurance, we may
+justly call it _the_ war of Peter the Great. His whole creation hinges
+upon the conquest of the Baltic coast.
+
+Now, suppose we were altogether ignorant of the details of his
+operations, military and diplomatic. The mere fact that the conversion
+of Muscovy into Russia was brought about by its transformation from a
+half-Asiatic inland country into the paramount maritime Power of the
+Baltic, would it not enforce upon us the conclusion that England, the
+greatest maritime Power of that epoch--a maritime Power lying, too, at
+the very gates of the Baltic, where, since the middle of the 17th
+century, she had maintained the attitude of supreme arbiter--that
+England must have had her hand in this great change, that she must have
+proved the main prop or the main impediment of the plans of Peter the
+Great, that during the long protracted and deadly struggle between
+Sweden and Russia she must have turned the balance, that if we do not
+find her straining every nerve in order to save the Swede we may be sure
+of her having employed all the means at her disposal for furthering the
+Muscovite? And yet, in what is commonly called history, England does
+hardly appear on the plan of this grand drama, and is represented as a
+spectator rather than as an actor. Real history will show that the
+Khans of the Golden Horde were no more instrumental in realizing the
+plans of Ivan III. and his predecessors than the rulers of England were
+in realizing the plans of Peter I. and his successors.
+
+The pamphlets which we have reprinted, written as they were by English
+contemporaries of Peter the Great, are far from concurring in the common
+delusions of later historians. They emphatically denounce England as the
+mightiest tool of Russia. The same position is taken up by the pamphlet
+of which we shall now give a short analysis, and with which we shall
+conclude the introduction to the diplomatic revelations. It is entitled,
+"_Truth is but Truth as it is timed; or, our Ministry's present measures
+against the Muscovite vindicated_, etc., etc. Humbly dedicated to the
+House of C., London, 1719."
+
+The former pamphlets we have reprinted, were written at, or shortly
+after, the time when, to use the words of a modern admirer of Russia,
+"Peter traversed the Baltic Sea as master at the head of the combined
+squadrons of all the northern Powers, England included, which gloried in
+sailing under his orders." In 1719, however, when _Truth is but Truth_
+was published, the face of affairs seemed altogether changed. Charles
+XII. was dead, and the English Government now pretended to side with
+Sweden, and to wage war against Russia. There are other circumstances
+connected with this anonymous pamphlet which claim particular notice. It
+purports to be an extract from a relation, which, on his return from
+Muscovy, in August, 1715, its author, by order of George I., drew up and
+handed over to Viscount Townshend, then Secretary of State.
+
+
+     "It happens," says he, "to be an advantage that at present I may
+     own to have been the first so happy to foresee, or honest to
+     forewarn our Court here, of the absolute necessity of our then
+     breaking with the Czar, and shutting him out again of the Baltic."
+     "My relation discovered his aim as to other States, and even to the
+     German Empire, to which, although an inland Power, he had offered
+     to annex Livonia as an Electorate, so that he could but be admitted
+     as an elector. It drew attention to the Czar's then contemplated
+     assumption of the title of Autocrator. Being head of the Greek
+     Church he would be owned by the other potentates as head of the
+     Greek Empire. I am not to say how reluctant we would be to
+     acknowledge that title, since we have already made an ambassador
+     treat him with the title of Imperial Majesty, which the Swede has
+     never yet condescended to."
+
+
+For some time attached to the British Embassy in Muscovy, our author, as
+he states, was later on "_dismissed the service, because the Czar
+desired it_," having made sure that
+
+
+     "I had given our Court such light into his affairs as is contained
+     in this paper; for which I beg leave to appeal to the King, and to
+     vouch the Viscount Townshend, who heard his Majesty give that
+     vindication." "And yet, notwithstanding all this, I have been for
+     these five years past kept soliciting for a very long arrear still
+     due, and whereof I contracted the greatest part in executing a
+     commission for her late Majesty."
+
+
+The anti-Muscovite attitude, suddenly assumed by the Stanhope Cabinet,
+our author looks to in rather a sceptic mood.
+
+
+     "I do not pretend to foreclose, by this paper, the Ministry of that
+     applause due to them from the public, when they shall satisfy us as
+     to what the motives were which made them, till but yesterday,
+     straiten the Swede in everything, although then our ally as much as
+     now; or strengthen, by all the ways they could, the Czar, although
+     under no tie, but barely that of amity with Great Britain.... At
+     the minute I write this I learn that the gentleman who brought the
+     Muscovites, not yet three years ago, as a royal navy, not under our
+     protection, on their first appearance in the Baltic, is again
+     authorized by the persons now in power, to give the Czar a second
+     meeting in these seas. For what reason or to what good end?"
+
+
+The gentleman hinted at is Admiral Norris, whose Baltic campaign against
+Peter I. seems, indeed, to be the original pattern upon which the recent
+naval campaigns of Admirals Napier and Dundas were cut out.
+
+The restoration to Sweden of the Baltic provinces is required by the
+commercial as well as the political interest of Great Britain. Such is
+the pith of our author's argument:
+
+
+     "Trade is become the very life of our State; and what food is to
+     life, naval stores are to a fleet. The whole trade we drive with
+     all the other nations of the earth, at best, is but lucrative;
+     this, of the north, is indispensably needful, and may not be
+     improperly termed the _sacra embole_ of Great Britain, as being
+     its chiefest foreign vent, for the support of all our trade, and
+     our safety at home. As woollen manufactures and minerals are the
+     staple commodities of Great Britain, so are likewise naval stores
+     those of Muscovy, as also of all those very provinces in the Baltic
+     which the Czar has so lately wrested from the crown of Sweden.
+     Since those provinces have been in the Czar's possession, Pernan is
+     entirely waste. At Revel we have not one British merchant left, and
+     all the trade which was formerly at Narwa is now brought to
+     Petersburg.... The Swede could never possibly engross the trade of
+     our subjects, because those seaports in his hands were but so many
+     thoroughfares from whence these commodities were uttered, the
+     places of their produce or manufacture lying behind those ports, in
+     the dominions of the Czar. But, if left to the Czar, these Baltic
+     ports are no more thoroughfares, but peculiar magazines from the
+     inland countries of the Czar's own dominions. Having already
+     Archangel in the White Sea, to leave him but any seaport in the
+     Baltic were to put no less in his hands than the _two keys of the
+     general magazines of all the naval stores of Europe_; it being
+     known that Danes, Swedes, Poles, and Prussians have but single and
+     distinct branches of those commodities in their several dominions.
+     If the Czar should thus engross 'the supply of what we cannot do
+     without,' where then is our fleet? Or, indeed, where is the
+     security for all our trade to any part of the earth besides?"
+
+
+If, then, the interest of British commerce requires to exclude the Czar
+from the Baltic, the interest of our State ought to be no less a spur to
+quicken us to that attempt. By the interest of our State I would be
+understood to mean neither the party measures of a Ministry, nor any
+foreign motives of a Court, but precisely what is, and ever must be, the
+immediate concern, either for the safety, ease, dignity, or emolument of
+the Crown, as well as the common weal of Great Britain. With respect to
+the Baltic, it has "from the earliest period of our naval power" always
+been considered a fundamental interest of our State: first, to prevent
+the rise there of any new maritime Power; and, secondly, to maintain the
+balance of power between Denmark and Sweden.
+
+
+     "One instance of the wisdom and foresight of our _then truly
+     British statesmen_ is the peace at Stalboa, in the year 1617. James
+     the First was the mediator of that treaty, by which the Muscovite
+     was obliged to give up all the provinces which he then was
+     possessed of in the Baltic, and to be barely an inland Power on
+     this side of Europe."
+
+
+The same policy of preventing a new maritime Power from starting in the
+Baltic was acted upon by Sweden and Denmark.
+
+
+     "Who knows not that the Emperor's attempt to get a seaport in
+     Pomerania weighed no less with the great Gustavus than any other
+     motive for carrying his arms even into the bowels of the house of
+     Austria? What befel, at the times of Charles Gustavus, the crown of
+     Poland itself, who, besides it being in those days by far the
+     mightiest of any of the northern Powers, had then a long stretch of
+     coast on, and some ports in, the Baltic? The Danes, though then in
+     alliance with Poland, would never allow them, even for their
+     assistance against the Swedes, to have a fleet in the Baltic, but
+     destroyed the Polish ships wherever they could meet them."
+
+
+As to the maintenance of the balance of power between the established
+maritime States of the Baltic, the tradition of British policy is no
+less clear. "When the Swedish power gave us some uneasiness there by
+threatening to crush Denmark," the honour of our country was kept up by
+retrieving the then inequality of the balance of power.
+
+The Commonwealth of England sent in a squadron to the Baltic which
+brought on the treaty of Roskild (1658), afterwards confirmed at
+Copenhagen (1660). The fire of straw kindled by the Danes in the times
+of King William III. was as speedily quenched by George Rock in the
+treaty of Copenhagen.
+
+Such was the hereditary British policy.
+
+
+     "It never entered into the mind of the politicians of those times
+     in order to bring the scale again to rights, to find out the happy
+     _expedient of raising a third naval Power_ for framing a juster
+     balance in the Baltic.... Who has taken this counsel against Tyre,
+     the crowning city, whose merchants are princes, whose traffickers
+     are the honourables of the earth? _Ego autem neminem nomino, quare
+     irasci mihi nemo poterit, nisi qui ante de se noluerit confiteri._
+     Posterity will be under some difficulty to believe that this could
+     be the _work of any of the persons now in power_ ... that _we_ have
+     opened; _St. Petersburg to the Czar solely at our own expense, and
+     without any risk to him_...."
+
+
+The safest line of policy would be to return to the treaty of Itolbowa,
+and to suffer the Muscovite no longer "to nestle in the Baltic." Yet,
+it may be said, that in "the present state of affairs" it would be
+"difficult to retrieve the advantage we have lost by not curbing, when
+it was more easy, the growth of the Muscovite power." A middle course
+may be thought more convenient.
+
+
+     "If we should find it consistent with the welfare of our State that
+     the Muscovite have an inlet into the Baltic, as having, of all the
+     princes of Europe, a country that can be made most beneficial to
+     its prince, by uttering its produce to foreign markets. In this
+     case, it were but reasonable to expect, on the other hand, that in
+     return for our complying so far with his interest, for the
+     improvement of his country, his Czarish Majesty, on his part,
+     should demand nothing that may tend to the disturbance of another;
+     and, therefore, contenting himself with ships of trade, should
+     demand none of war."
+
+     "We should thus preclude his hopes of being ever more than an
+     inland Power," but "obviate every objection of using the Czar worse
+     than any Sovereign Prince may expect. I shall not for this give an
+     instance of a Republic of Genoa, or another in the Baltic itself,
+     of the Duke of Courland; but will assign Poland and Prussia, who,
+     though both now crowned heads, have ever contented themselves with
+     the freedom of an open traffic, without insisting on a fleet. Or
+     the treaty of Falczin, between the Turk and Muscovite, by which
+     Peter was forced not only to restore Asoph, and to part with all
+     his men-of-war in those parts, but also to content himself with the
+     bare freedom of traffic in the Black Sea. Even an inlet in the
+     Baltic for trade is much beyond what he could morally have promised
+     himself not yet so long ago on the issue of his war with Sweden."
+
+
+If the Czar refuse to agree to such "a healing temperament," we shall
+have "nothing to regret but the time we lost to exert all the means that
+Heaven has made us master of, to reduce him to a peace advantageous to
+Great Britain." War would become inevitable. In that case
+
+
+     "it ought no less to animate our Ministry to pursue their present
+     measures, than fire with indignation the breast of every honest
+     Briton that a Czar of Muscovy, who owes his naval skill to our
+     instructions, and his grandeur to our forbearance, should so soon
+     deny to Great Britain the terms which so few years ago he was fain
+     to take up with from the Sublime Porte."
+
+     "'Tis every way our interest to have the Swede restored to those
+     provinces which the Muscovite has wrested from that crown in the
+     Baltic. _Great Britain can no longer hold the balance in that
+     sea_," since she "_has raised the Muscovite to be a maritime Power
+     there_.... Had we performed the articles of our alliance made by
+     King William with the crown of Sweden, that gallant nation would
+     ever have been a bar strong enough against the Czar coming into the
+     Baltic.... Time must confirm us, that the Muscovite's _expulsion
+     from the Baltic_ is _now_ the principal end of our Ministry."
+
+
+Butler & Tanner. The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Secret Diplomatic History of The
+Eighteenth Century, by Karl Marx
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+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" />
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+      The Project Gutenberg eBook of Secret Diplomatic History Of The Eighteenth Century, by Karl Marx.
+    </title>
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+         text-align: center; /* all headings centered */
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+
+
+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Secret Diplomatic History of The Eighteenth
+Century, by Karl Marx
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Secret Diplomatic History of The Eighteenth Century
+
+Author: Karl Marx
+
+Editor: Eleanor Marx Aveling
+
+Release Date: May 14, 2010 [EBook #32370]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Martin Pettit and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+<div class = "mynote"><p class="center">Transcriber's Note:<br /><br />
+A Table of Contents has been added.<br /><br />Page
+numbers appear in the right margin.<br />Click on the page number to see an image of the original page.</p></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1"></a>[<a href="images/005.png">1</a>]</span></p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h1>SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY<br />OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY</h1>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2"></a>[<a href="images/006.png">2</a>]</span></p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>Demy 8vo, pp.</i> 656, xvi. 10<i>s.</i> 6<i>d.</i></p>
+
+<h2>THE EASTERN QUESTION.</h2>
+
+<p class="center">Letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the<br />Crimean War.</p>
+
+<h3>By KARL MARX.</h3>
+
+<p class="center">Edited by <span class="smcap">Eleanor Marx Aveling</span> and <span class="smcap">Edward Aveling</span>.</p>
+
+<hr class="smler" />
+
+<p class="center">OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"With all Marx's faults and his extravagant abuse of high political
+personages, one cannot but admire the man's strength of mind, the
+courage of his opinions, and his scorn and contempt for everything
+small, petty, and mean. Although many and great changes have taken
+place since these papers appeared, they are still valuable not only
+for the elucidation of the past, but also for throwing a clearer
+light upon the present as also upon the future."&mdash;<i>Westminster Review.</i></p>
+
+<p>"All that Marx's hand set itself to do, it did with all its might,
+and in this volume, as in the rest of his work, we see the
+indefatigable energy, the wonderful grasp of detail, and the keen
+and marvellous foresight of a master mind."&mdash;<i>Justice.</i></p>
+
+<p>"A very masterly analysis of the condition, political, economic and
+social, of the Turkish Empire, which is as true to-day as when it
+was written."&mdash;<i>Daily Chronicle.</i></p>
+
+<p>"The letters contain an enormous amount of well-digested
+information, and display great critical acumen, amounting in some
+cases almost to prevision. The biographical interest of the volume
+is also pronounced, for prominent men of that period are dissected
+and analysed with a vigour and freedom which are as refreshing to
+readers as they would be disconcerting to their subjects were they
+alive. A perusal of the book must greatly tend to a clearer
+perception of the later Eastern issues, which are now engaging the
+attention and testing the diplomatic talents of the ambassadors at
+Constantinople."&mdash;<i>Liverpool Post.</i></p></blockquote>
+
+<hr class="smler" />
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">London</span>: SWAN SONNENSCHEIN &amp; CO., <span class="smcap">Limited</span>.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3"></a>[<a href="images/007.png">3</a>]</span></p>
+
+<h1>SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY</h1>
+
+<h3>OF</h3>
+
+<h1>THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY</h1>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h4>BY</h4>
+
+<h2>KARL MARX</h2>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h3>Edited by his Daughter<br />ELEANOR MARX AVELING</h3>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<div class="center"><img src="images/logo.jpg" width='119' height='150' alt="Logo" /></div>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h4>LONDON</h4>
+
+<h3>SWAN SONNENSCHEIN &amp; CO., LIMITED</h3>
+
+<h4>PATERNOSTER SQUARE<br />1899</h4>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4"></a>[<a href="images/008.png">4</a>]</span></p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Butler &amp; Tanner,</span><br />
+<span class="smcap">The Selwood Printing Works,</span><br />
+<span class="smcap">Frome, and London.</span></p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5"></a>[<a href="images/009.png">5</a>]</span></p>
+
+<h2>PUBLISHER'S PREFACE</h2>
+
+<p>In the Preface to "The Eastern Question," by Karl Marx, published in
+1897, the Editors, Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, referred to
+two series of papers entitled "The Story of the Life of Lord
+Palmerston," and "Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century,"
+which they promised to publish at an early date.</p>
+
+<p>Mrs. Aveling did not live long enough to see these papers through the
+press, but she left them in such a forward state, and we have had so
+many inquiries about them since, that we venture to issue them without
+Mrs. Aveling's final revision in two shilling pamphlets.</p>
+
+<p class="right">THE PUBLISHERS.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h2>CONTENTS.</h2>
+
+<table class="tbrk" summary="CONTENTS">
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">CHAPTER I</td>
+    <td><span class="s12">&nbsp;</span><a href="#Page_7">7</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">CHAPTER II</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_22">22</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">CHAPTER III</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_49">49</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">CHAPTER IV</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_60">60</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">CHAPTER V</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_74">74</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">CHAPTER VI</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_86">86</a></td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6"></a>[<a href="images/010.png">6</a>]</span></p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7"></a>[<a href="images/011.png">7</a>]</span></p>
+
+<h1>Secret Diplomatic History of the<br />Eighteenth Century</h1>
+
+<h2>CHAPTER I</h2>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">No. 1. Mr. Rondeau to Horace Walpole.</span></p>
+
+<p class="right">"<span class="smcap">Petersburg</span>, <i>17th August, 1736</i>.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p>
+
+<p>" ... I heartily wish ... that the Turks could be brought to condescend
+to make the first step, for this Court seems resolved to hearken to
+nothing till that is done, to mortify the Porte, that has on all
+occasions spoken of the Russians with the greatest contempt, which the
+Czarina and her present Ministers cannot bear. Instead of being obliged
+to Sir Everard Fawkner and Mr. Thalman (the former the British, the
+latter the Dutch Ambassador at Constantinople), for informing them of
+the good dispositions of the Turks, Count Oestermann will not be
+persuaded that the Porte is sincere, and seemed very much surprised that
+they had written to them (the Russian Cabinet) without order of the King
+and the States-General, or without being desired by the Grand Vizier,
+and that their letter had not been concerted with the Emperor's Minister
+at Constantinople.... I have shown Count Biron and Count Oestermann the
+two letters the Grand Vizier has written to the King, and at the same
+time told these gentlemen that as there was in them several hard
+reflections on this Court,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8"></a>[<a href="images/012.png">8</a>]</span> I should not have communicated them if they
+had not been so desirous to see them. Count Biron said that was nothing,
+for they were used to be treated in this manner by the Turks. I desired
+their Excellencies not to let the Porte know that they had seen these
+letters, which would sooner aggravate matters than contribute to make them up...."</p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">No. 2. Sir George Macartney to the Earl of Sandwich.</span></p>
+
+<p class="right">"<span class="smcap">St. Petersburg</span>, <i>1st (12th) March, 1765</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"Most Secret.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
+
+<p>" ... Yesterday M. Panin<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> and the Vice-Chancellor, together with M.
+Osten, the Danish Minister, signed a treaty of alliance between this
+Court and that of Copenhagen. By one of the articles, a war with Turkey
+is made a <i>casus f&oelig;deris</i>; and whenever that event happens, Denmark
+binds herself to pay Russia a subsidy of 500,000 roubles per annum, by
+quarterly payments. Denmark also, by a most secret article, promises to
+disengage herself from all French connections, demanding only a limited
+time to endeavour to obtain the arrears due to her by the Court of
+France. At all events, she is immediately to enter into all the views of
+Russia in Sweden, and to act entirely, though not openly, with her in
+that kingdom. Either I am deceived or M. Gross<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> has misunderstood his
+instructions, when he told your lordship that Russia intended to stop
+short, and leave all the burden of Sweden upon England. However desirous
+this Court may be that we should pay a large proportion of every
+pecuniary engagement, yet, I am assured,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9"></a>[<a href="images/013.png">9</a>]</span> she will always choose to take
+the lead at Stockholm. Her design, her ardent wish, is to make a common
+cause with England and Denmark, for the total annihilation of the French
+interest there. This certainly cannot be done without a considerable
+expense; but Russia, at present, does not seem unreasonable enough to
+expect that <span class="smaller">WE SHOULD PAY THE WHOLE</span>. It has been hinted to me that
+&pound;1,500 per annum, on our part, would be sufficient to support our
+interest, and absolutely prevent the French from ever getting at Stockholm again.</p>
+
+<p>"The Swedes, highly sensible of, and very much mortified at, the
+dependent situation they have been in for many years, are extremely
+jealous of every Power that intermeddles in their affairs, and
+particularly so of their neighbours the Russians. This is the reason
+assigned to me for this Court's desiring that we and they should act
+upon <span class="smaller">SEPARATE</span> bottoms, still preserving between our respective Ministers
+a confidence without reserve. That our first care should be, not to
+establish a faction under the name of a Russian or of an English
+faction; but, as even the wisest men are imposed upon by a mere name, to
+endeavour to have <span class="smaller">OUR</span> friends distinguished as the friends of liberty
+and independence. At present we have a superiority, and the generality
+of the nation is persuaded how very ruinous their French connections
+have been, and, if continued, how very destructive they will be of their
+true interests. M. Panin does by no means desire that the smallest
+change should be made in the constitution of Sweden.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> He wishes that
+the royal authority might be preserved without being augmented, and that
+the privileges of the people should be continued without violation. He
+was not, however, without his fears of the ambitious and intriguing
+spirit of the Queen, but the great ministerial vigilance of Count
+Oestermann has now entirely quieted his apprehensions on that head.</p>
+
+<p>"By this new alliance with Denmark, and by the success in Sweden, which
+this Court has no doubt of, if properly seconded, M. Panin will, in some
+measure, have brought to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10"></a>[<a href="images/014.png">10</a>]</span> bear his grand scheme of uniting the Powers of
+the North.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Nothing, then, will be wanted to render it entirely
+perfect, but the conclusion of a treaty alliance with Great Britain. I
+am persuaded this Court desires it most ardently. The Empress has
+expressed herself more than once, in terms that marked it strongly. Her
+ambition is to form, by such an union, a certain counterpoise to the
+family compact,<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and to disappoint, as much as possible, all the views
+of the Courts of Vienna and Versailles, against which she is irritated
+with uncommon resentment. I am not, however, to conceal from your
+lordship that we can have no hope of any such alliance, unless we agree,
+by some secret article, to pay a subsidy in case of a Turkish war, for
+no money will be desired from us, except upon an emergency of that
+nature. I flatter myself I have persuaded this Court of the
+unreasonableness of expecting any subsidy in time of peace, and that an
+alliance upon an equal footing will be more safe and more honourable for
+both nations. I can assure your lordship that a Turkish war's being a
+<i>casus f&oelig;deris</i>, inserted either in the body of the treaty or in a
+secret article, will be a <i>sine qu&acirc; non</i> in every negotiation we may
+have to open with this Court. The obstinacy of M. Panin upon that point
+is owing to the accident I am going to mention. When the treaty between
+the Emperor and the King of Prussia was in agitation, the Count
+Bestoucheff, who is a mortal enemy to the latter, proposed the Turkish
+clause, persuaded that the King of Prussia would never submit to it, and
+flattering himself with the hopes of blowing up that negotiation by his
+refusal. But this old politician, it seemed, was mistaken in his
+conjecture, for his Majesty immediately consented to the proposal on
+condition that Russia should make no alliance with any other Power but
+on the same terms.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> This is the real fact, and to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11"></a>[<a href="images/015.png">11</a>]</span>confirm it, a few
+days since, Count Solme, the Prussian Minister, came to visit me, and
+told me that if this Court had any intention of concluding an alliance
+with ours without such a clause, he had orders to oppose it in the
+strongest manner. Hints have been given me that if Great Britain were
+less inflexible in that article, Russia will be less inflexible in the
+article of export duties in the Treaty of Commerce, which M. Gross told
+your lordship this Court would never depart from. I was assured at the
+same time, by a person in the highest degree of confidence with M.
+Panin, that if we entered upon the Treaty of Alliance the Treaty of
+Commerce would go on with it <i>passibus &aelig;quis</i>; that then the latter
+would be entirely taken out of the hands of the College of Trade, where
+so many cavils and altercations had been made, and would be settled only
+between the Minister and myself, and that he was sure it would be
+concluded to our satisfaction, provided the Turkish clause was admitted
+into the Treaty of Alliance. I was told, also, that in case the
+Spaniards attacked Portugal, we might have 15,000 Russians in our pay to
+send upon that service. I must entreat your lordship on no account to
+mention to M. Gross the secret article of the Danish Treaty.... That
+gentleman, I am afraid, is no well-wisher to England."<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12"></a>[<a href="images/016.png">12</a>]</span></p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">No. 3.&mdash;Sir James Harris to Lord Grantham.</span></p>
+
+<p class="right">"Petersburg, 16 (27 August), 1782.</p>
+
+<p>"(Private.)</p>
+
+<p>" ... On my arrival here I found the Court very different from what it
+had been described to me. So far from any partiality to England, its
+bearings were entirely French. The King of Prussia (then in possession
+of the Empress' ear) was exerting his influence against us. Count Panin
+assisted him powerfully; Lacy and Corberon, the Bourbon Ministers, were
+artful and intriguing; Prince Potemkin had been wrought upon by them;
+and the whole tribe which surrounded the Empress&mdash;the Schuwaloffs,
+Stroganoffs, and Chernicheffs&mdash;were what they still are, <i>gar&ccedil;ons
+perruquiers de Paris</i>. Events seconded their endeavours. The assistance
+the French affected to afford Russia in settling its disputes with the
+Porte, and the two Courts being immediately after united as mediators at
+the Peace of Teschen, contributed not a little to reconcile them to each
+other. I was, therefore, not surprised that all my negotiations with
+Count Panin, <i>from February, 1778, to July, 1779</i>, should be
+unsuccessful, as he meant to prevent, not to promote, an alliance. It
+was in vain we made concessions to obtain it. He ever started fresh
+difficulties; had ever fresh obstacles ready. A very serious evil
+resulted, in the meanwhile, from my apparent confidence in him. He
+availed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13"></a>[<a href="images/017.png">13</a>]</span> himself of it to convey in his reports to the Empress, not the
+language I employed, and the sentiments I actually expressed, but the
+language and sentiments he wished I should employ and express. He was
+equally careful to conceal her opinions and feelings from me; and while
+he described England to her as obstinate, and overbearing, and reserved,
+he described the Empress to me as displeased, disgusted, and indifferent
+to our concerns; and he was so convinced that, by this double
+misrepresentation, he had shut up every avenue of success that, at the
+time when I presented to him the Spanish declaration, he ventured to say
+to me, ministerially, '<i>That Great Britain had, by its own haughty
+conduct, brought down all its misfortunes on itself; that they were now
+at their height; that we must consent to any concession to obtain peace;
+and that we could expect neither assistance from our friends nor
+forbearance from our enemies.</i>' I had temper enough not to give way to
+my feelings on this occasion.... I applied, without loss of time, to
+Prince Potemkin, and, by his means, the Empress <i>condescended</i> to see me
+alone at Peterhoff. I was so fortunate in this interview, as not only to
+efface all bad impressions she had against us, but by stating in its
+true light, our situation, and <span class="smcap">the inseparable interests of Great
+Britain and Russia</span>, to raise in her mind a decided resolution to assist
+us. <i>This resolution she declared to me in express words.</i> When this
+transpired&mdash;and Count Panin was the first who knew it&mdash;he became my
+implacable and inveterate enemy. He not only thwarted by falsehoods and
+by a most undue exertion of his influence my public negotiations, but
+employed every means the lowest and most vindictive malice could suggest
+to depreciate and injure me personally; and from the very infamous
+accusations with which he charged me, had I been prone to fear, I might
+have apprehended the most infamous attacks at his hands. This relentless
+persecution still continues; it has outlived his Ministry.
+<i>Notwithstanding the positive assurances I had received from the Empress
+herself</i>, he found means, first to stagger, and afterwards to alter her
+resolutions. He was, indeed, very officiously assisted by his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14"></a>[<a href="images/018.png">14</a>]</span> Prussian
+Majesty, who, at the time, was as much bent on oversetting our interest
+as he now seems eager to restore it. I was not, however, disheartened by
+this first disappointment, and, by redoubling my efforts, <i>I have twice
+more, during the course of my mission, brought the Empress to the verge</i>
+(!) <i>of standing forth our professed friend</i>, and, each time, my
+<i>expectations were grounded on assurances from her own mouth</i>. The first
+was when <i>our enemies conjured up the armed</i> neutrality;<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> the other
+<span class="smcap">when Minorca was offered her</span>. Although, on the first of these occasions,
+I found the same opposition from the same quarter I had experienced
+before, yet I am compelled to say that the principal cause of my failure
+was attributable to the very awkward manner in which we replied to the
+famous neutral declaration of February, 1780. As I well knew from what
+quarter the blow would come, I was prepared to parry it. <i>My opinion
+was: 'If England feels itself strong enough to do without Russia, let it
+reject at once these new-fangled doctrines; but if its situation is such
+as to want assistance, let it yield to the necessity of the hour,
+recognise them as far as they relate to</i> <span class="smcap">Russia alone</span>, <i>and by a
+well-timed act of complaisance insure itself a powerful friend.</i>'<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> My
+opinion was <i>not</i> received; an ambiguous and trimming answer was given;
+<i>we seemed equally afraid to accept or dismiss them. I was instructed
+secretly to oppose, but avowedly to acquiesce in them</i>, and some
+unguarded expressions of one of its then confidential servants, made use
+of in speaking to Mr. Simolin, in direct contradiction to the temperate
+and cordial language that Minister had heard from Lord Stormont,
+<i>irritated</i> the Empress to the last degree, and completed the <i>dislike</i>
+and <i>bad opinion</i> she <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15"></a>[<a href="images/019.png">15</a>]</span>entertained of that Administration.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Our
+enemies took advantage of these <i>circumstances</i>.... <span class="smcap">I suggested the idea
+of giving up Minorca to the Empress</span>, <i>because, as it was evident to me
+we should at the peace be compelled to make sacrifices, it seemed to me
+wiser to make them to our friends than to our enemies</i>. <span class="smcap">The idea was
+adopted at home in its whole extent</span>,<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> <i>and nothing could be more
+perfectly</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16"></a>[<a href="images/020.png">16</a>]</span> <i>calculated to the meridian of this Court than the judicious
+instructions I received on this occasion from Lord Stormont. Why</i> this
+project failed I am still at a loss to learn. <i>I never knew the Empress
+incline so strongly to any one measure as she did to this, before I had
+my full powers to treat, nor was I ever more astonished than when I
+found her shrink from her purpose when they arrived.</i> I imputed it at
+the same time, in my own mind, to the <i>rooted aversion she had for our
+Ministry</i>, and her <i>total want of confidence in them</i>; but I since am
+more strongly disposed to believe that she consulted the Emperor (of
+Austria) on the subject, and that he not only prevailed on her to
+decline the offer, but betrayed the secret to France, and that it thus
+became public. I cannot otherwise account for this rapid <i>change of
+sentiment in the Empress</i>, particularly as <i>Prince Potemkin</i> (whatever
+he might be in other transactions) was certainly in this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17"></a>[<a href="images/021.png">17</a>]</span> <i>cordial and
+sincere</i> in his support, and both from what I saw at the time, and from
+what has since come to my knowledge, <i>had its success at heart as much
+as myself</i>. You will observe, my lord, that <i>the idea of bringing the
+Empress forward as a friendly mediatrix went hand-in-hand with the
+proposed cession of Minorca</i>. As this idea has given rise to what has
+since followed, and involved us in all the dilemmas of the present
+mediation, it will be necessary for me to explain what my views then
+were, and to exculpate myself from the blame of having placed my Court
+in so embarrassing a situation, <i>my wish and intention was that she
+should be sole mediatrix without an adjoint</i>; if you have perused what
+passed between her and me, in December, 1780, your lordship will readily
+perceive how very potent reasons I had to imagine she would be a
+friendly and even a partial one.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> I knew, indeed, she was unequal to
+the task; but I knew, too, how greatly <i>her vanity</i> would be flattered
+by this distinction, and was well aware that when once engaged she would
+persist, and be inevitably involved in our quarrel, particularly when it
+should appear (and appear it would) that we had <i>gratified</i> her with
+Minorca. The annexing to the mediation the other (Austrian) Imperial
+Court entirely overthrew this plan. It not only afforded her a pretence
+for not keeping her word, but piqued and mortified her; and it was under
+this impression that she made over the whole business to the colleague
+we had given her, and ordered her Minister at Vienna to subscribe
+implicitly to whatever the Court proposed. Hence all the evils which
+have since arisen, and hence those we at this moment experience. I
+myself could<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18"></a>[<a href="images/022.png">18</a>]</span> never be brought to believe that the Court of Vienna, as
+long as Prince Kaunitz directs its measures, can mean England any good
+or France any harm. It was not with that view that I endeavoured to
+promote its influence here, but because <i>I found that of Prussia in
+constant opposition to me</i>; and because I thought that if I could by any
+means smite this, I should get rid of my greatest obstacle. I was
+mistaken, and, by a singular fatality, the Courts of Vienna and Berlin
+seem never to have agreed in anything but in the disposition to
+prejudice us here by turns.<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> The proposal relative to Minorca was the
+last attempt I made to induce the Empress to stand forth. I had
+exhausted my strength and resources; the freedom with which I had spoken
+in my last interview with her, though respectful, had <i>displeased</i>; and
+<i>from this period to the removal of the late Administration</i>, I have
+been reduced to act on the defensive.... I have had more difficulty in
+preventing the Empress from doing harm than I ever had in attempting to
+engage her to do us good. It was to prevent evil, that I inclined
+strongly for the acceptation of <i>her single mediation between us and
+Holland, when her Imperial Majesty first offered it</i>. The <i>extreme
+dissatisfaction</i> she expressed <i>at our refusal</i> justified my opinion;
+and I <span class="smaller">TOOK UPON ME</span>, when it was proposed a second time, <i>to urge the
+necessity of its being agreed to</i> (<span class="smaller">ALTHOUGH I KNEW IT TO BE IN
+CONTRADICTION OF THE SENTIMENTS OF MY PRINCIPAL</span>), since I firmly
+believed, had we again declined it, the Empress would, in a <i>moment of
+anger</i>, have joined the Dutch against us. As it is, <i>all has gone on
+well</i>; our <i>judicious</i> conduct has transferred to them the <i>ill-humour</i>
+she originally was in with us, and she now is as partial to our cause as
+she was before partial to theirs. <i>Since the new Ministry in England, my
+road has been made smoother</i>; the great and new path struck out by <i>your
+predecessor,</i><a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> <i>and</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19"></a>[<a href="images/023.png">19</a>]</span> <i>which you, my lord, pursue</i>, has operated a most
+advantageous change in our favour upon the Continent. Nothing, indeed,
+but events which come home to her, will, I believe, ever induce her
+Imperial Majesty to take an active part; but there is now a <i>strong glow
+of friendship</i> in our favour; she approves our measures; she <i>trusts</i>
+our Ministry, and <i>she gives way to that predilection she certainly has
+for our nation</i>. Our enemies know and feel this; it keeps them in awe.
+This is a succinct but accurate sketch of what has passed at this Court
+from the day of my arrival at Petersburg to the present hour. Several
+inferences may be deduced from it.<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> That the Empress is led by her
+passions, not by reason and argument; that her prejudices are very
+strong, easily acquired, and, when once fixed, irremovable; while, on
+the contrary, there is no sure road to her good opinion; that even when
+obtained, it is subject to perpetual fluctuation, and liable to be
+biassed by the most trifling incidents; that till she is fairly embarked
+in a plan, no assurances can be depended on; but that when once fairly
+embarked, she never retracts, and may be carried any length; that with
+very bright parts, an elevated mind, an uncommon sagacity, she wants
+<i>judgment</i>, <i>precision of idea</i>, <i>reflection</i>, <i>and</i> <span class="smaller">L'ESPRIT DE
+COMBINAISON</span>(!!) That her Ministers are either ignorant of, or
+indifferent to, the welfare of the State, and act from a passive
+submission to her will, or from motives of party and private
+interests."<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20"></a>[<a href="images/024.png">20</a>]</span></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>4. <span class="smcap">(Manuscript) Account of Russia during the commencement of the Reign
+of the Emperor Paul, drawn up by the Rev. L. K. Pitt, Chaplain to the
+Factory of St. Petersburg, and a near Relative of William Pitt.</span><a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p class="center"><i>Extract.</i></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"There can scarcely exist a doubt concerning the real sentiments of
+the late Empress of Russia on the great points which have, within
+the last few years, convulsed the whole system of European
+politics. She certainly felt from the beginning the fatal tendency
+of the new principles, but was not, perhaps, displeased to see
+every European Power exhausting itself in a struggle which raised,
+in proportion to its violence, her own importance. It is more than
+probable that the state of the newly acquired provinces in Poland
+was likewise a point which had considerable influence over the
+political conduct of Catherine. The fatal effects resulting from an
+apprehension of revolt in the late seat of conquest seem to have
+been felt in a very great degree by the combined Powers, who in the
+early period of the Revolution were so near reinstating the regular
+Government in France. The same dread of revolt in Poland, which
+divided the attention of the combined Powers and hastened their
+retreat, deterred likewise the late Empress of Russia from entering
+on the great theatre of war, until a combination of circumstances
+rendered the progress of the French armies a more dangerous evil
+than any which could possibly result to the Russian Empire from
+active operations.... The last words which the Empress was known to
+utter were addressed to her Secretary when she dismissed him on the
+morning on which she was seized: 'Tell Prince' (Zuboff), she said,
+'to come to me at twelve, and to remind me of signing the Treaty of
+Alliance with England.'"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Having entered into ample considerations on the Emperor Paul's acts and
+extravagances, the Rev. Mr. Pitt continues as follows:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"When these considerations are impressed on the mind, the nature of
+the late secession from the coalition, and of the incalculable
+indignities offered to the Government of Great Britain, can alone
+be fairly estimated.... <span class="smcap">But the ties which bind her (Great Britain)
+to the Russian Empire are formed by nature, and inviolable.</span> United,
+these nations might almost brave the united world; divided,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21"></a>[<a href="images/025.png">21</a>]</span> the
+strength and importance of each is <span class="smaller">FUNDAMENTALLY</span> impaired. England
+has reason to regret with Russia that the imperial sceptre should
+be thus inconsistently wielded, but it is the sovereign of Russia
+alone who divides the Empires."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The reverend gentleman concludes his account by the words:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"As far as human foresight can at this moment penetrate, the
+despair of an enraged individual seems a more probable means to
+terminate the present scene of oppression than any more systematic
+combination of measures to restore the throne of Russia to its
+dignity and importance."</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> This letter relates to the war against Turkey, commenced by
+the Empress Ann in 1735. The British diplomatist at St. Petersburg is
+reporting about his endeavours to induce Russia to conclude peace with
+the Turks. The passages omitted are irrelevant.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> England was at that time negotiating a commercial treaty
+with Russia.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> To this time it has remained among historians a point of
+controversy, whether or not Panin was in the pay of Frederick II. of
+Prussia, and whether he was so behind the back of Catherine, or at her
+bidding. There can exist no doubt that Catherine II., in order to
+identify foreign Courts with Russian Ministers, allowed Russian
+Ministers ostensibly to identify themselves with foreign Courts. As to
+Panin in particular, the question is, however, decided by an authentic
+document which we believe has never been published. It proves that,
+having once become the man of Frederick II., he was forced to remain so
+at the risk of his honour, fortune and life.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The Russian Minister at London.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The oligarchic Constitution set up by the Senate after the
+death of Charles XII.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Thus we learn from Sir George Macartney that what is
+commonly known as Lord Chatham's "grand conception of the Northern
+Alliance," was, in fact, Panin's "grand scheme of uniting the Powers of
+the North." Chatham was duped into fathering the Muscovite plan.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The compact between the Bourbons of France and Spain
+concluded at Paris on August, 1761.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> This was a subterfuge on the part of Frederick II. The
+manner in which Frederick was forced into the arms of the Russian
+Alliance is plainly told by M. Koch, the French professor of diplomacy
+and teacher of Talleyrand. "Frederick II.," he says, "having been
+abandoned by the Cabinet of London, could not but attach himself to
+Russia." (See his <i>History of the Revolutions in Europe</i>.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Horace Walpole characterises his epoch by the words&mdash;"<i>It
+was the mode of the times to be paid by one favour for receiving
+another.</i>" At all events, it will be seen from the text that such was
+the mode of Russia in transacting business with England. The Earl of
+Sandwich, to whom Sir George Macartney could dare to address the above
+despatch, distinguished himself, ten years later, in 1775, as First Lord
+of the Admiralty, in the North Administration, by the vehement
+opposition he made to Lord Chatham's motion for an equitable <i>adjustment
+of the American difficulties</i>. "He could not believe it (Chatham's
+motion) <i>the production of a British peer</i>; it appeared to him rather
+<i>the work of some American</i>." In 1777, we find Sandwich again
+blustering: "he would hazard every drop of blood, as well as the last
+shilling of the national treasure, rather than allow Great Britain to be
+defied, bullied, and dictated to, by her disobedient and rebellious
+subjects." Foremost as the Earl of Sandwich was in entangling England in
+war with her North American colonies, with France, Spain, and Holland,
+we behold him constantly accused in Parliament by Fox, Burke, Pitt,
+etc., "of keeping the naval force inadequate to the defence of the
+country; of intentionally opposing small English forces where he knew
+the enemy to have concentrated large ones; of utter mismanagement of the
+service in all its departments," etc. (See debates of the House of
+Commons of 11th March, 1778; 31st March, 1778; February, 1779; Fox's
+motion of censure on Lord Sandwich; 9th April, 1779, address to the King
+for the dismissal of Lord Sandwich from his service, on account of
+misconduct in service; 7th February, 1782, Fox's motion that there had
+been gross mismanagement in the administration of naval affairs during
+the year 1781.) On this occasion Pitt imputed to Lord Sandwich "all our
+naval disasters and disgraces." The ministerial majority against the
+motion amounted to only 22 in a House of 388. On the 22nd February,
+1782, a similar motion against Lord Sandwich was only negatived by a
+majority of 19 in a House of 453. Such, indeed, was the character of the
+Earl of Sandwich's Administration that more than thirty distinguished
+officers quitted the naval service, or declared they could not act under
+the existing system. In point of fact, during his whole tenure of
+office, serious apprehensions were entertained of the consequences of
+the dissensions then prevalent in the navy. Besides, the Earl of
+Sandwich was openly accused, and, as far as circumstantial evidence
+goes, convicted of <span class="smcap">Peculation</span>. (See debates of the House of Lords, 31st
+March, 1778; 9th April, 1779, and <i>seq.</i>) When the motion for his
+removal from office was negatived on April 9th 1779, thirty-nine peers
+entered their protest.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Sir James Harris affects to believe that Catherine II. was
+not the author of, but a convert to, the armed neutrality of 1780. It is
+one of the grand stratagems of the Court of St. Petersburg to give to
+its own schemes the form of proposals suggested to and pressed on itself
+by foreign Courts. Russian diplomacy delights in those <i>qu&aelig; pro quo</i>.
+Thus the Court of Florida Bianca was made the responsible editor of the
+armed neutrality, and, from a report that vain-glorious Spaniard
+addressed to Carlos III., one may see how immensely he felt flattered at
+the idea of having not only hatched the armed neutrality but allured
+Russia into abetting it.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> This same Sir James Harris, perhaps more familiar to the
+reader under the name of the Earl of Malmesbury, is extolled by English
+historians as the man who prevented England from surrendering the right
+of search in the Peace Negotiations of 1782-83.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> It might be inferred from this passage and similar ones
+occurring in the text, that Catherine II. had caught a real Tartar in
+Lord North, whose Administration Sir James Harris is pointing at. Any
+such delusion will disappear before the simple statement that the first
+partition of Poland took place under Lord North's Administration,
+without any protest on his part. In 1773 Catherine's war against Turkey
+still continuing, and her conflicts with Sweden growing serious, France
+made preparations to send a powerful fleet into the Baltic. D'Aiguillon,
+the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, communicated this plan to Lord
+Stormont, the then English Ambassador at Paris. In a long conversation,
+D'Aiguillon dwelt largely on the ambitious designs of Russia, and the
+common interest that ought to blend France and England into a joint
+resistance against them. In answer to this confidential communication,
+he was informed by the English Ambassador that, "if France sent her
+ships into the Baltic, they would instantly be followed by a British
+fleet; that the presence of two fleets would have no more effect than a
+neutrality; and however the British Court might desire to preserve the
+harmony now subsisting between England and France, it was impossible to
+foresee the contingencies that might arise from accidental collision."
+In consequence of these representations, D'Aiguillon countermanded the
+squadron at Brest, but gave new orders for the equipment of an armament
+at Toulon. "On receiving intelligence of these renewed preparations, the
+British Cabinet made instant and vigorous demonstrations of resistance;
+Lord Stormont was ordered to declare that every argument used respecting
+the Baltic applied equally to the Mediterranean. A memorial also was
+presented to the French Minister, accompanied by a demand that it should
+be laid before the King and Council. This produced the desired effect;
+the armament was countermanded, the sailors disbanded, and the chances
+of an extensive warfare avoided."</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Lord North</i>," says the complacent writer from whom we have borrowed
+the last lines, "<i>thus effectually served the cause of his ally</i>
+(Catherine II.), <i>and facilitated the treaty of peace</i> (of
+Kutchuk-Kainardji) <i>between Russia and the Porte</i>." Catherine II.
+rewarded Lord North's good services, first by withholding the aid she
+had promised him in case of a war between England and the North American
+Colonies, and in the second place, by conjuring up and leading the armed
+neutrality against England. Lord North <span class="smaller">DARED NOT</span> <i>repay, as he was
+advised by Sir James Harris</i>, this treacherous breach of faith by giving
+up to Russia, and to <i>Russia alone</i>, the maritime rights of Great
+Britain. Hence the irritation in the nervous system of the Czarina; the
+hysterical fancy she caught all at once of "entertaining a bad opinion"
+of Lord North, of "disliking" him, of feeling a "rooted aversion"
+against him, of being afflicted with "a total want of confidence," etc.
+In order to give the Shelburne Administration a warning example, Sir
+James Harris draws up a minute psychological picture of the feelings of
+the Czarina, and the disgrace incurred by the North Administration, for
+having wounded these same feelings. His prescription is very simple:
+surrender to Russia, as our friend, everything for asking which we would
+consider every other Power our enemy.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> It is then a fact that the English Government, not
+satisfied with having made Russia a Baltic power, strove hard to make
+her a Mediterranean power too. The offer of the surrender of Minorca
+appears to have been made to Catherine II. at the end of 1779, or the
+beginning of 1780, shortly after Lord Stormont's entrance into the North
+Cabinet&mdash;the same Lord Stormont we have seen thwarting the French
+attempts at resistance against Russia, and whom even Sir James Harris
+cannot deny the merit of having written "<i>instructions perfectly
+calculated to the meridian of the Court of St. Petersburg</i>." While Lord
+North's Cabinet, at the suggestion of Sir James Harris, offered Minorca
+to the <i>Muscovites</i>, the English Commoners and people were still
+trembling for fear lest the <i>Hanoverians</i> (?) should wrest out of their
+hands "one of the keys of the Mediterranean." On the 26th of October,
+1775, the King, in his opening speech, had informed Parliament, amongst
+other things, that he had Sir James Graham's own words, when asked why
+they should not have kept up some blockade pending the settlement of the
+"plan," "<i>They did not take that responsibility upon themselves.</i>" The
+responsibility of executing their orders! The despatch we have quoted is
+the only despatch read, except one of a later date. The despatch, said
+to be sent on the 5th of April, in which "the Admiral is ordered to use
+the <i>largest discretionary power</i> in blockading the Russian ports in the
+Black Sea," is not read, nor any replies from Admiral Dundas. The
+Admiralty sent <i>Hanoverian</i> troops to Gibraltar and Port Mahon
+(Minorca), to replace such British regiments as should be drawn from
+those garrisons for service in America. An amendment to the address was
+proposed by Lord John Cavendish, strongly condemning "the confiding
+<i>such important fortresses as Gibraltar and Port Mahon to foreigners</i>."
+After very stormy debates, in which the measure of entrusting Gibraltar
+and Minorca, "<i>the keys of the Mediterranean</i>," as they were called, to
+<i>foreigners</i>, was furiously attacked; Lord North, acknowledging himself
+the adviser of the measure, felt obliged to bring in a <i>bill of
+indemnity</i>. However, these foreigners, these Hanoverians, were the
+English King's own subjects. Having virtually surrendered Minorca to
+Russia in 1780, Lord North was, of course, quite justified in treating,
+on November 22, 1781, in the House of Commons, "with utter scorn the
+insinuation that <i>Ministers were in the pay of France</i>."</p>
+
+<p>Let us remark, <i>en passant</i>, that Lord North, one of the most base and
+mischievous Ministers England can boast of, perfectly mastered the art
+of keeping the House in perpetual laughter. So had Lord Sunderland. So
+has Lord Palmerston.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Lord North having been supplanted by the Rockingham
+Administration, on March 27, 1782, the celebrated Fox forwarded peace
+proposals to Holland through the mediation of the <i>Russian</i> Minister.
+Now what were the consequences of the <i>Russian mediation</i> so much
+vaunted by this Sir James Harris, the servile account keeper of the
+Czarina's sentiments, humours, and feelings? While preliminary articles
+of peace had been convened with France, Spain, and the American States,
+it was found impossible to arrive at any such preliminary agreement with
+Holland. Nothing but a simple cessation of hostilities was to be
+obtained from it. So powerful proved the <i>Russian mediation</i>, that on
+the 2nd September, 1783, just one day before the conclusion of
+<i>definitive treaties</i> with America, France, and Spain, Holland
+condescended to accede to <i>preliminaries of peace</i>, and this not in
+consequence of the <i>Russian mediation</i>, but through the influence of <i>France</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> How much was England not prejudiced by the Courts of
+Vienna and Paris thwarting the plan of the British Cabinet of ceding
+Minorca to Russia, and by Frederick of Prussia's resistance against the
+great Chatham's scheme of a Northern Alliance under Muscovite auspices.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The predecessor is Fox. Sir James Harris establishes a
+complete scale of British Administrations, according to the degree in
+which they enjoyed the favour of his almighty Czarina. In spite of Lord
+Stormont, the Earl of Sandwich, Lord North, and Sir James Harris
+himself; in spite of the partition of Poland, the bullying of
+D'Aiguillon, the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, and the intended cession
+of Minorca&mdash;Lord North's Administration is relegated to the bottom of
+the heavenly ladder; far above it has climbed the Rockingham
+Administration, whose soul was Fox, notorious for his subsequent
+intrigues with Catherine; but at the top we behold the Shelburne
+Administration, whose Chancellor of the Exchequer was the celebrated
+William Pitt. As to Lord Shelburne himself, Burke exclaimed in the House
+of Commons, that "if he was not a Catalina or Borgia in morals, it must
+not be ascribed to anything but his understanding."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Sir James Harris forgets deducing the main inference, that
+the Ambassador of England is the agent of Russia.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> In the 18th century, English diplomatists' despatches,
+bearing on their front the sacramental inscription, "Private," are
+despatches to be withheld from the King by the Minister to whom they are
+addressed. That such was the case may be seen from Lord Mahon's <i>History of England</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> "To be burnt after my death." Such are the words prefixed
+to the manuscript by the gentleman whom it was addressed to.</p></div></div>
+
+<hr  />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22"></a>[<a href="images/026.png">22</a>]</span></p>
+
+<h2>CHAPTER II</h2>
+
+<p>The documents published in the first chapter extend from the reign of
+the Empress Ann to the commencement of the reign of the Emperor Paul,
+thus encompassing the greater part of the 18th century. At the end of
+that century it had become, as stated by the Rev. Mr. Pitt, the openly
+professed and orthodox dogma of English diplomacy, "<i>that the ties which
+bind Great Britain to the Russian Empire are formed by nature, and inviolable</i>."</p>
+
+<p>In perusing these documents, there is something that startles us even
+more than their contents&mdash;viz., their form. All these letters are
+"confidential," "private," "secret," "most secret"; but in spite of
+secrecy, privacy, and confidence, the English statesmen converse among
+each other about Russia and her rulers in a tone of awful reserve,
+abject servility, and cynical submission, which would strike us even in
+the public despatches of Russian statesmen. To conceal intrigues against
+foreign nations secrecy is recurred to by Russian diplomatists. The same
+method is adopted by English diplomatists freely to express their
+devotion to a foreign Court. The secret despatches of Russian
+diplomatists are fumigated with some equivocal perfume. It is one part
+the <i>fum&eacute;e de fausset&eacute;</i>, as the Duke of St. Simon has it, and the other
+part that coquettish display of one's own superiority and cunning which
+stamps upon the reports of the French Secret Police their indelible
+character. Even the master despatches of Pozzo di Borgo are tainted with
+this common blot of the <i>lit&eacute;rature de mauvais lieu</i>. In this point the
+English secret despatches prove much superior. They do not affect
+superiority but silliness. For instance, can there be anything more
+silly than Mr. Rondeau informing Horace Walpole that he has betrayed to
+the Russian<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23"></a>[<a href="images/027.png">23</a>]</span> Minister the letters addressed by the Turkish Grand Vizier
+to the King of England, but that he had told "at the same time those
+gentlemen that as there were several hard reflections on the Russian
+Court he should not have communicated them, <i>if they had not been so
+anxious to see them</i>," and then told their excellencies not to tell the
+Porte that they had seen them (those letters)! At first view the infamy
+of the act is drowned in the silliness of the man. Or, take Sir George
+Macartney. Can there be anything more silly than his happiness that
+Russia seemed "reasonable" enough not to expect that England "should pay
+the <span class="smaller">WHOLE EXPENSES</span>" for Russia's "choosing to take the lead at
+Stockholm"; or his "flattering himself" that he had "persuaded the
+Russian Court" not to be so "unreasonable" as to ask from England, in a
+time of peace, subsidies for a time of war against Turkey (then the ally
+of England); or his warning the Earl of Sandwich "not to mention" to the
+Russian Ambassador at London the secrets mentioned to himself by the
+Russian Chancellor at St. Petersburg? Or can there be anything more
+silly than Sir James Harris confidentially whispering into the ear of
+Lord Grantham that Catherine II. was devoid of "judgment, precision of
+idea, reflection, and <i>l'esprit de combinaison</i>"?<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, take the cool impudence with which Sir George
+Macartney informs his minister that because the Swedes were extremely
+jealous of, and mortified at, their dependence on Russia, England was
+directed by the Court of St. Petersburg to do its work at Stockholm,
+under the British colours of liberty and independence! Or Sir James
+Harris advising England to surrender to Russia Minorca and the right of
+search, and the monopoly of mediation in the affairs of the world&mdash;not
+in order to gain any material advantage, or even a formal engagement on
+the part of Russia, but only "a strong glow of friendship" from the
+Empress, and the transfer to France of her "ill humour."</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24"></a>[<a href="images/028.png">24</a>]</span></p><p>The secret Russian despatches proceed on the very plain line that
+Russia knows herself to have no common interests whatever with other
+nations, but that every nation must be persuaded separately to have
+common interests with Russia to the exclusion of every other nation. The
+English despatches, on the contrary, never dare so much as hint that
+Russia has common interests with England, but only endeavour to convince
+England that she has Russian interests. The English diplomatists
+themselves tell us that this was the single argument they pleaded, when
+placed face to face with Russian potentates.</p>
+
+<p>If the English despatches we have laid before the public were addressed
+to private friends, they would only brand with infamy the ambassadors
+who wrote them. Secretly addressed as they are to the British Government
+itself, they nail it for ever to the pillory of history; and,
+instinctively, this seems to have been felt, even by Whig writers,
+because none has dared to publish them.</p>
+
+<p>The question naturally arises from which epoch this Russian character of
+English diplomacy, become traditionary in the course of the 18th
+century, does date its origin. To clear up this point we must go back to
+the time of Peter the Great, which, consequently, will form the
+principal subject of our researches. We propose to enter upon this task
+by reprinting some English pamphlets, written at the time of Peter I.,
+and which have either escaped the attention of modern historians, or
+appeared to them to merit none. However, they will suffice for refuting
+the prejudice common to Continental and English writers, that the
+designs of Russia were not understood or suspected in England until at a
+later, and too late, epoch; that the diplomatic relations between
+England and Russia were but the natural offspring of the mutual material
+interests of the two countries; and that, therefore, in accusing the
+British statesmen of the 18th century of Russianism we should commit an
+unpardonable hysteron-proteron. If we have shown by the English
+despatches that, at the time of the Empress Ann, England already
+betrayed her own allies to Russia, it will be seen from the pamphlets we
+are now<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25"></a>[<a href="images/029.png">25</a>]</span> about to reprint that, even before the epoch of Ann, at the
+very epoch of Russian ascendency in Europe, springing up at the time of
+Peter I., the plans of Russia were understood, and the connivance of
+British statesmen at these plans was denounced by English writers.</p>
+
+<p>The first pamphlet we lay before the public is called <i>The Northern
+Crisis</i>. It was printed in London in 1716, and relates to the intended
+Dano-Anglo-Russian <i>invasion of Skana</i> (Schonen).</p>
+
+<p>During the year 1715 a northern alliance for the partition, not of
+Sweden proper, but of what we may call the Swedish Empire, had been
+concluded between Russia, Denmark, Poland, Prussia, and Hanover. That
+partition forms the first grand act of modern diplomacy&mdash;the logical
+premiss to the partition of Poland. The partition treaties relating to
+Spain have engrossed the interest of posterity because they were the
+forerunners of the War of Succession, and the partition of Poland drew
+even a larger audience because its last act was played upon a
+contemporary stage. However, it cannot be denied that it was the
+partition of the Swedish Empire which inaugurated the modern era of
+international policy. The partition treaty not even pretended to have a
+pretext, save the misfortune of its intended victim. For the first time
+in Europe the violation of all treaties was not only made, but
+proclaimed the common basis of a new treaty. Poland herself, in the drag
+of Russia, and personated by that commonplace of immorality, Augustus
+II., Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, was pushed into the
+foreground of the conspiracy, thus signing her own death-warrant, and
+not even enjoying the privilege reserved by Polyphemus to Odysseus&mdash;to
+be last eaten. Charles XII. predicted her fate in the manifesto flung
+against King Augustus and the Czar, from his voluntary exile at Bender.
+The manifesto is dated January 28, 1711.</p>
+
+<p>The participation in this partition treaty threw England within the
+orbit of Russia, towards whom, since the days of the "Glorious
+Revolution," she had more and more gravitated. George I., as King of
+England, was bound to a defensive alliance with Sweden by the treaty of
+1700. Not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26"></a>[<a href="images/030.png">26</a>]</span> only as King of England, but as Elector of Hanover, he was
+one of the guarantees, and even of the direct parties to the treaty of
+Travendal, which secured to Sweden what the partition treaty intended
+stripping her of. Even his German electoral dignity he partly owed to
+that treaty. However, as Elector of Hanover he declared war against
+Sweden, which he waged as King of England.</p>
+
+<p>In 1715 the confederates had divested Sweden of her German provinces,
+and to effect that end introduced the Muscovite on the German soil. In
+1716 they agreed to invade Sweden Proper&mdash;to attempt an armed descent
+upon Schonen&mdash;the southern extremity of Sweden now constituting the
+districts of Malmoe and Christianstadt. Consequently Peter of Russia
+brought with him from Germany a Muscovite army, which was scattered over
+Zealand, thence to be conveyed to Schonen, under the protection of the
+English and Dutch fleets sent into the Baltic, on the false pretext of
+protecting trade and navigation. Already in 1715, when Charles XII. was
+besieged in Stralsund, eight English men-of-war, lent by England to
+Hanover, and by Hanover to Denmark, had openly reinforced the Danish
+navy, and even hoisted the Danish flag. In 1716 the British navy was
+commanded by his Czarish Majesty in person.</p>
+
+<p>Everything being ready for the invasion of Schonen, there arose a
+difficulty from a side where it was least expected. Although the treaty
+stipulated only for 30,000 Muscovites, Peter, in his magnanimity, had
+landed 40,000 on Zealand; but now that he was to send them on the errand
+to Schonen, he all at once discovered that out of the 40,000 he could
+spare but 15,000. This declaration not only paralysed the military plan
+of the confederates, it seemed to threaten the security of Denmark and
+of Frederick IV., its king, as great part of the Muscovite army,
+supported by the Russian fleet, occupied Copenhagen. One of the generals
+of Frederick proposed suddenly to fall with the Danish cavalry upon the
+Muscovites and to exterminate them, while the English men-of-war should
+burn the Russian fleet. Averse to any perfidy which required some
+greatness of will, some force of character, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27"></a>[<a href="images/031.png">27</a>]</span> some contempt of
+personal danger, Frederick IV. rejected the bold proposal, and limited
+himself to assuming an attitude of defence. He then wrote a begging
+letter to the Czar, intimating that he had given up his Schonen fancy,
+and requested the Czar to do the same and find his way home: a request
+the latter could not but comply with. When Peter at last left Denmark
+with his army, the Danish Court thought fit to communicate to the Courts
+of Europe a public account of the incidents and transactions which had
+frustrated the intended descent upon Schonen&mdash;and this document forms
+the starting point of <i>The Northern Crisis</i>.</p>
+
+<p>In a letter addressed to Baron G&ouml;rtz, dated from London, January 23,
+1717, by Count Gyllenborg, there occur some passages in which the
+latter, the then Swedish ambassador at the Court of St. James's, seems
+to profess himself the author of <i>The Northern Crisis</i>, the title of
+which he does not, however, quote. Yet any idea of his having written
+that powerful pamphlet will disappear before the slightest perusal of
+the Count's authenticated writings, such as his letters to G&ouml;rtz.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<span class="smcap">The Northern Crisis; or Impartial Reflections on the Policies of the
+Czar; occasioned by Mynheer Von Stocken's Reasons for delaying the
+descent upon Schonen. A true copy of which is prefixed, verbally
+translated after the tenor of that in the German Secretary's Office in
+Copenhagen, October 10, 1716. London, 1716.</span></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>1.&mdash;<i>Preface</i>&mdash;&mdash; ... 'Tis (the present pamphlet) not fit for lawyers'
+clerks, but it is highly convenient to be read by those who are proper
+students in the laws of nations; 'twill be but lost time for any
+stock-jobbing, trifling dealer in Exchange-Alley to look beyond the
+preface on't, but every merchant in England (more especially those who
+trade to the Baltic) will find his account in it. The Dutch (as the
+courants and postboys have more than once told us)<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28"></a>[<a href="images/032.png">28</a>]</span> are about to mend
+their hands, if they can, in several articles of trade with the Czar,
+and they have been a long time about it to little purpose. Inasmuch as
+they are such a frugal people, they are good examples for the imitation
+of our traders; but if we can outdo them for once, in the means of
+projecting a better and more expeditious footing to go upon, for the
+emolument of us both, let us, for once, be wise enough to set the
+example, and let them, for once, be our imitators. This little treatise
+will show a pretty plain way how we may do it, as to our trade in the
+Baltic, at this juncture. I desire no little <i>coffee-house politician</i>
+to meddle with it; but to give him even a disrelish for my company. I
+must let him know that he is not fit for mine. Those who are even
+proficients in state science, will find in it matter highly fit to
+employ all their powers of speculation, which they ever before past
+negligently by, and thought (too cursorily) were not worth the
+regarding. No outrageous party-man will find it at all for his purpose;
+but every <i>honest Whig</i> and every <i>honest Tory</i> may each of them read
+it, not only without either of their disgusts, but with the satisfaction
+of them both.... 'Tis not fit, in fine, for a mad, hectoring,
+Presbyterian Whig, or a raving, fretful, dissatisfied, Jacobite Tory."</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>2.&mdash;<span class="smcap">The reasons handed about by Mynheer Von Stocken for delaying the
+descent upon Schonen.</span></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>"There being no doubt, but most courts will be surprised that the
+descent upon Schonen has not been put into execution, notwithstanding
+the great preparations made for that purpose; and that all his Czarish
+Majesty's troops, who were in Germany, were transported to Zealand, not
+without great trouble and danger, partly by his own gallies, and partly
+by his Danish Majesty's and other vessels; and that the said descent is
+deferred till another time. His Danish Majesty hath therefore, in order
+to clear himself of all imputation and reproach, thought fit to order,
+that the following true account of this affair should be given to all
+impartial persons. Since the Swedes were entirely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29"></a>[<a href="images/033.png">29</a>]</span> driven out of their
+<i>German</i> dominions, there was, according to all the rules of policy, and
+reasons of war, no other way left, than vigorously to attack the still
+obstinate King of Sweden, in the very heart of his country; thereby,
+with God's assistance, to force him to a lasting, good and advantageous
+peace for the allies. The King of Denmark and his Czarish Majesty were
+both of this opinion, and did, in order to put so good a design in
+execution, agree upon an interview, which at last (notwithstanding his
+Danish Majesty's presence, upon the account of Norway's being invaded,
+was most necessary in his own capital, and that the Muscovite
+ambassador, M. Dolgorouky, had given quite other assurances) was held at
+Ham and Horn, near Hamburgh, after his Danish Majesty had stayed there
+six weeks for the Czar. In this conference it was, on the 3rd of June,
+agreed between both their Majesties, after several debates, that the
+descent upon Schonen should positively be undertaken this year, and
+everything relating to the forwarding the same was entirely consented
+to. Hereupon his Danish Majesty made all haste for his return to his
+dominions, and gave orders to work day and night to get his fleet ready
+to put to sea. The transport ships were also gathered from all parts of
+his dominions, both with inexpressible charges and great prejudice to
+his subjects' trade. Thus, his Majesty (as the Czar himself upon his
+arrival at Copenhagen owned) did his utmost to provide all necessaries,
+and to forward the descent, upon whose success everything depended. It
+happened, however, in the meanwhile, and before the descent was agreed
+upon in the conference at Ham and Horn, that his Danish Majesty was
+obliged to secure his invaded and much oppressed kingdom of Norway, by
+sending thither a considerable squadron out of his fleet, under the
+command of Vice-Admiral Gabel, which squadron could not be recalled
+before the enemy had left that kingdom, without endangering a great part
+thereof; so that out of necessity the said Vice-Admiral was forced to
+tarry there till the 12th of July, when his Danish Majesty sent him
+express orders to return with all possible speed, wind and weather
+permitting; but this blowing for some time <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30"></a>[<a href="images/034.png">30</a>]</span>contrary, he was
+detained.... The Swedes were all the while powerful at sea, and his
+Czarish Majesty himself did not think it advisable that the remainder of
+the Danish, in conjunction with the men-of-war then at Copenhagen,
+should go to convoy the Russian troops from Rostock, before the
+above-mentioned squadron under Vice-Admiral Gabel was arrived. This
+happening at last in the month of August, the confederate fleet put to
+sea; and the transporting of the said troops hither to Zealand was put
+in execution, though with a great deal of trouble and danger, but it
+took up so much time that the descent could not be ready till September
+following. Now, when all these preparations, as well for the descent as
+the embarking the armies, were entirely ready, his Danish Majesty
+assured himself that the descent should be made within a few days, at
+farthest by the 21st of September. The Russian Generals and Ministers
+first raised some difficulties to those of Denmark, and afterwards, on
+the 17th September, declared in an appointed conference, that his
+Czarish Majesty, considering the present situation of affairs, was of
+opinion that neither forage nor provision could be had in Schonen, and
+that consequently the descent was not advisable to be attempted this
+year, but ought to be put off till next spring. It may easily be
+imagined how much his Danish Majesty was surprised at this; especially
+seeing the Czar, if he had altered his opinion, as to this design so
+solemnly concerted, might have declared it sooner, and thereby saved his
+Danish Majesty several tons of gold, spent upon the necessary
+preparations. His Danish Majesty did, however, in a letter dated the
+20th of September, amply represent to the Czar, that although the season
+was very much advanced, the descent might, nevertheless, easily be
+undertaken with such a superior force, as to get a footing in Schonen,
+where being assured there had been a very plentiful harvest, he did not
+doubt but subsistence might be found; besides, that having an open
+communication with his own countries, it might easily be transported
+from thence. His Danish Majesty alleged also several weighty reasons why
+the descent was either to be made this year, or the thoughts of making
+it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31"></a>[<a href="images/035.png">31</a>]</span> next spring entirely be laid aside. <i>Nor did he alone make these
+moving remonstrances to the Czar</i>; <span class="smcap">but his British Majesty's Minister
+residing here, as well as Admiral Norris</span>, <i>seconded the same also in a
+very pressing manner</i>; <span class="smcap">and by express order of the King, their master</span>,
+<i>endeavoured to bring the Czar into their opinion, and to persuade him
+to go on with the descent</i>; but his Czarish Majesty declared by his
+answer, that he would adhere to the resolution that he had once taken
+concerning this delay of making the descent; but if his Danish Majesty
+was resolved to venture on the descent, that he then, according to the
+treaty made near Straelsund, would assist him only with the 15
+battalions and 1,000 horse therein stipulated; that next spring he would
+comply with everything else, and neither could or would declare himself
+farther in this affair. Since then, his Danish Majesty could not,
+without running so great a hazard, undertake so great a work alone with
+his own army and the said 15 battalions; he desired, in another letter
+of the 23rd September, his Czarish Majesty would be pleased to add 13
+battalions of his troops, in which case his Danish Majesty would still
+this year attempt the descent; but even this could not be obtained from
+his Czarish Majesty, who absolutely refused it by his ambassador on the
+24th ditto: whereupon his Danish Majesty, in his letter of the 26th,
+declared to the Czar, that since things stood thus, he desired none of
+his troops, but that they might be all speedily transported out of his
+dominions; that so the transport, whose freight stood him in 40,000 rix
+dollars per month, might be discharged, and his subjects eased of the
+intolerable contributions they now underwent. This he could not do less
+than agree to; and accordingly, all the Russian troops are already
+embarked, and intend for certain to go from here with the first
+favourable wind. It must be left to Providence and time, to discover
+what may have induced the Czar to a resolution so prejudicial to the
+Northern Alliance, and most advantageous to the common enemy.</p>
+
+<p>If we would take a true survey of men, and lay them open in a proper
+light to the eye of our intellects, <i>we must</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32"></a>[<a href="images/036.png">32</a>]</span> first <i>consider their
+natures</i> and then <i>their ends</i>; and by this method of examination,
+though their conduct is, seemingly, full of intricate mazes and
+perplexities, and winding round with infinite meanders of state-craft,
+we shall be able to dive into the deepest recesses, make our way through
+the most puzzling labyrinths, and at length come to the most abstruse
+means of bringing about the master secrets of their minds, and to
+unriddle their utmost mysteries.... The Czar ... is, by nature, of a
+great and enterprising spirit, and of a genius thoroughly politic; and
+as for his ends, the manner of his own Government, where he sways
+arbitrary lord over the estates and honours of his people, must make
+him, if all the policies in the world could by far-distant aims promise
+him accession and accumulation of empire and wealth, be everlastingly
+laying schemes for the achieving of both with the extremest cupidity and
+ambition. Whatever ends an insatiate desire of opulency, and a boundless
+thirst for dominion, can ever put him upon, to satisfy their craving and
+voracious appetites, those must, most undoubtedly, be his.</p>
+
+<p>The next questions we are to put to ourselves are these three:</p>
+
+<p>1. By what means can he gain these ends?</p>
+
+<p>2. How far from him, and in what place, can these ends be best obtained?</p>
+
+<p>3. And by what time, using all proper methods and succeeding in them,
+may he obtain these ends?</p>
+
+<p>The possessions of the Czar were prodigious, vast in extent; the people
+all at his nod, all his downright arrant slaves, and all the wealth of
+the country his own at a word's command. But then the country, though
+large in ground, was not quite so in produce. Every vassal had his gun,
+and was to be a soldier upon call; but there was never a soldier among
+them, nor a man that understood the calling; and though he had all their
+wealth, they had no commerce of consequence, and little ready money; and
+consequently his treasury, when he had amassed all he could, very bare
+and empty. He was then but in an indifferent condition to satisfy those
+two natural appetites, when he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33"></a>[<a href="images/037.png">33</a>]</span> had neither wealth to support a
+soldiery, nor a soldiery trained in the art of war. The first token this
+Prince gave of an aspiring genius, and of an ambition that is noble and
+necessary in a monarch who has a mind to flourish, was to believe none
+of his subjects more wise than himself, or more fit to govern. He did
+so, and looked upon his own proper person as the most fit to travel out
+among the other realms of the world and study politics for the advancing
+of his dominions. He then seldom pretended to any warlike dispositions
+against those who were instructed in the science of arms; his military
+dealings lay mostly with the Turks and Tartars, who, as they had numbers
+as well as he, had them likewise composed, as well as his, of a rude,
+uncultivated mob, and they appeared in the field like a raw,
+undisciplined militia. In this his Christian neighbours liked him well,
+insomuch as he was a kind of stay or stopgap to the infidels. But when
+he came to look into the more polished parts of the Christian world, he
+set out towards it, from the very threshold, like a natural-born
+politician. He was not for learning the game by trying chances and
+venturing losses in the field so soon; no, he went upon the maxim <i>that
+it was, at that time of day, expedient and necessary for him to carry,
+like Samson, his strength in his head, and not in his arms</i>. He had
+then, he knew, but very few commodious places for commerce of his own,
+and those all situated in the <i>White Sea</i>, too remote, frozen up the
+most part of the year, and not at all fit for a fleet of men-of-war; but
+he knew of many more commodious ones of his neighbours in the Baltic,
+and within his reach whenever he could strengthen his hands to lay hold
+of them. He had a longing eye towards them; but with prudence seemingly
+turned his head another way, and secretly entertained the pleasant
+thought that he should come at them all in good time. Not to give any
+jealousy, he endeavours for no help from his neighbours to instruct his
+men in arms. That was like asking a skilful person, one intended to
+fight a duel with, to teach him first how to fence. <i>He went over to
+Great Britain</i>, where he knew that potent kingdom could, as yet, have no
+jealousies of his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34"></a>[<a href="images/038.png">34</a>]</span> growth of power, and in the eye of which his vast
+extent of nation lay neglected and unconsidered and overlooked, as I am
+afraid it is to this very day. He was present at all our exercises,
+looked into all our laws, inspected our military, civil, and
+ecclesiastical regimen of affairs; yet this was the least he then
+wanted; this was the slightest part of his errand. But by degrees, when
+he grew familiar with our people, he visited our docks, pretending not
+to have any prospect of profit, but only to take a huge delight (the
+effect of curiosity only) to see our manner of building ships. He kept
+his court, as one may say, in our shipyard, so industrious was he in
+affording them his continual Czarish presence, and to his immortal glory
+for art and industry be it spoken, that the great Czar, by stooping
+often to the employ, could handle an axe with the best artificer of them
+all; and the monarch having a good mathematical head of his own, grew in
+some time a very expert royal shipwright. A ship or two for his
+diversion made and sent him, and then two or three more, and after that
+two or three more, would signify just nothing at all, if they were
+granted to be sold to him by the <i>Maritime Powers</i>, that could, at will,
+lord it over the sea. It would be a puny inconsiderable matter, and not
+worth the regarding. Well, but then, over and above this, he had
+artfully insinuated himself into the goodwill of many of our best
+workmen, and won their hearts by his good-natured familiarities and
+condescension among them. To turn this to his service, he offered many
+very large premiums and advantages to go and settle in his country,
+which they gladly accepted of. A little after he sends over some private
+ministers and officers to negotiate for more workmen, for land officers,
+and likewise for picked and chosen good seamen, who might be advanced
+and promoted to offices by going there. Nay, even to this day, any
+expert seaman that is upon our traffic to the port of Archangel, if he
+has the least spark of ambition and any ardent desire to be in office,
+he need but offer himself to the sea-service of the Czar, and he is a
+lieutenant immediately. Over and above this, that Prince has even found
+the way to take by force into his service out of our merchant ships<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35"></a>[<a href="images/039.png">35</a>]</span> as
+many of their ablest seamen as he pleased, giving the masters the same
+number of raw Muscovites in their place, whom they afterwards were
+forced in their own defence to make fit for their own use. Neither is
+this all; he had, during the last war, many hundreds of his subjects,
+both noblemen and common sailors, on board <i>ours, the French and the
+Dutch fleets</i>; and he has all along maintained, and still maintains
+numbers of them in <i>ours and the Dutch yards</i>.</p>
+
+<p>But seeing he looked all along upon all these endeavours towards
+improving himself and his subjects as superfluous, whilst a seaport was
+wanting, where he might build a fleet of his own, and from whence he
+might himself export the products of his country, and import those of
+others; and finding the King of Sweden possessed of the most convenient
+ones, I mean Narva and Revel, which he knew that Prince never could nor
+would amicably part with, he at last resolved to wrest them out of his
+hands by force. His <i>Swedish</i> Majesty's tender youth seemed the fittest
+time for this enterprise, but even then he would not run the hazard
+alone. He drew in other princes to divide the spoil with him. And the
+<i>Kings of Denmark and Poland</i> were weak enough to serve as instruments
+to forward the great and ambitious views of the Czar. It is true, he met
+with a mighty hard rub at his very first setting out; his whole army
+being entirely defeated by a handful of Swedes at Narva. But it was his
+good luck that his Swedish Majesty, instead of improving so great a
+victory against him, turned immediately his arms against the King of
+Poland, against whom he was personally piqued, and that so much the
+more, inasmuch as he had taken that Prince for one of his best friends,
+and was just upon the point of concluding with him the strictest
+alliance when he unexpectedly invaded the Swedish Livonia, and besieged
+Riga. This was, in all respects, what the Czar could most have wished
+for; and foreseeing that the longer the war in Poland lasted, the more
+time should he have both to retrieve his first loss, and to gain Narva,
+he took care it should be spun out to as great a length as possible; for
+which end he never sent<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36"></a>[<a href="images/040.png">36</a>]</span> the King of Poland succour enough to make him
+too strong for the King of Sweden; who, on the other hand, though he
+gained one signal victory after the other, yet never could subdue his
+enemy as long as he received continual reinforcements from his
+hereditary country. And had not his Swedish Majesty, contrary to most
+people's expectations, marched directly into Saxony itself, and thereby
+forced the King of Poland to peace, the Czar would have had leisure
+enough in all conscience to bring his designs to greater maturity. This
+peace was one of the greatest disappointments the Czar ever met with,
+whereby he became singly engaged in the war. He had, however, the
+comfort of having beforehand taken <i>Narva</i>, and laid a foundation to his
+favourite town <i>Petersburg</i>, and to the seaport, the docks, and the vast
+magazines there; all which works, to what perfection they are now
+brought, let them tell who, with surprise, have seen them.</p>
+
+<p>He (Peter) used all endeavours to bring matters to an accommodation. He
+proffered very advantageous conditions; <i>Petersburg</i> only, a trifle as
+he pretended, which he had set his heart upon, he would retain; and even
+for that he was willing some other way to give satisfaction. But the
+King of Sweden was too well acquainted with the importance of that place
+to leave it in the hands of an ambitious prince, and thereby to give him
+an inlet into the Baltic. This was the only time since the defeat at
+Narva that the Czar's arms had no other end than that of self-defence.
+They might, perhaps, even have fallen short therein, had not the King of
+Sweden (through whose persuasion is still a mystery), instead of
+marching the shortest way to Novgorod and to Moscow, turned towards
+Ukrain, where his army, after great losses and sufferings, was at last
+entirely defeated at Pultowa. As this was a fatal period to the Swedish
+successes, so how great a deliverance it was to the Muscovites, may be
+gathered from the Czar's celebrating every year, with great solemnity,
+the anniversary of that day, from which his ambitious thoughts began to
+soar still higher. The whole of <i>Livonia</i>, <i>Estland</i>, and the best and
+greatest part of <i>Finland</i> was now what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37"></a>[<a href="images/041.png">37</a>]</span> he demanded, after which,
+though he might for the present condescend to give peace to the
+remaining part of Sweden, he knew he could easily even add that to his
+conquests whenever he pleased. The only obstacle he had to fear in these
+his projects was from his northern neighbours; but as the <i>Maritime
+Powers</i>, and even the neighbouring princes in Germany, were then so
+intent upon their war against France, that they seemed entirely
+neglectful of that of the North, so there remained only Denmark and
+Poland to be jealous of. The former of these kingdoms had, ever since
+King William, of glorious memory, compelled it to make peace with
+Holstein and, consequently, with Sweden, enjoyed an uninterrupted
+tranquillity, during which it had time, by a free trade and considerable
+subsidies from the maritime powers to enrich itself, and was in a
+condition, by joining itself to Sweden, as it was its interest to do, to
+stop the Czar's progresses, and timely to prevent its own danger from
+them. The other, I mean Poland, was now quietly under the government of
+King Stanislaus, who, owing in a manner his crown to the King of Sweden,
+could not, out of gratitude, as well as real concern for the interest of
+his country, fail opposing the designs of a too aspiring neighbour. The
+Czar was too cunning not to find out a remedy for all this: he
+represented to the King of Denmark how low the King of Sweden was now
+brought, and how fair an opportunity he had, during that Prince's long
+absence, to clip entirely his wings, and to aggrandize himself at his
+expense. In King Augustus he raised the long-hid resentment for the loss
+of the Polish Crown, which he told him he might now recover without the
+least difficulty. Thus both these Princes were immediately caught. The
+Danes declared war against Sweden without so much as a tolerable
+pretence, and made a descent upon Schonen, where they were soundly
+beaten for their pains. King Augustus re-entered Poland, where
+everything has ever since continued in the greatest disorder, and <i>that
+in a great measure owing to Muscovite intrigues</i>. It happened, indeed,
+that these new confederates, whom the Czar had only drawn in to serve
+his ambition, became at first more necessary to his preservation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38"></a>[<a href="images/042.png">38</a>]</span> than
+he had thought; for the Turks having declared a war against him, they
+hindered the Swedish arms from joining with them to attack him; but that
+storm being soon over, through the Czar's wise behaviour and the avarice
+and folly of the Grand Vizier, he then made the intended use both of
+these his friends, as well as of them he afterwards, through hopes of
+gain, persuaded into his alliance, which was to lay all the burthen and
+hazard of the war upon them, in order entirely to weaken them, together
+with Sweden, whilst <i>he was preparing himself to swallow the one after
+the other</i>. He has put them on one difficult attempt after the other;
+their armies have been considerably lessened by battles and long sieges,
+whilst his own were either employed in easier conquests, and more
+profitable to him, or kept at the vast expense of neutral princes&mdash;near
+enough at hand to come up to demand a share of the booty without having
+struck a blow in getting it. His behaviour has been as cunning at sea,
+where his fleet has always kept out of harm's way and at a great
+distance whenever there was any likelihood of an engagement between the
+Danes and the Swedes. He hoped that when these two nations had ruined
+one another's fleets, his might then ride master in the Baltic. All this
+while he had taken care to make his men improve, by the example of
+foreigners and under their command, in the art of war.... His fleets
+will soon considerably outnumber the Swedish and the Danish ones joined
+together. He need not fear their being a hindrance from his giving a
+finishing stroke to this great and glorious undertaking. Which done,
+<i>let us look to ourselves; he will then most certainly become our rival,
+and as dangerous to us as he is now neglected</i>. We then may, perhaps,
+though too late, call to mind what our own ministers and merchants have
+told us of his designs of carrying on alone all the northern trade, and
+of getting all that from Turkey and Persia into his hands through the
+rivers which he is joining and making navigable from the Caspian, or the
+Black Sea, to his Petersburg. <i>We shall then wonder at our blindness
+that we did not suspect his designs</i> when we heard the prodigious works
+he has done at Petersburg and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39"></a>[<a href="images/043.png">39</a>]</span> Revel; of which last place, the <i>Daily
+Courant</i>, dated November 23, says:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p class="right">"<span class="smcap">Hague</span>, <i>Nov. 17</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"The captains of the men-of-war of the States, who have been at
+Revel, advise that the Czar has put that port and the
+fortifications of the place into such a condition of defence that
+it may pass for one of the most considerable fortresses, not only
+of the Baltic, but even of Europe."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Leave we him now, as to his sea affairs, commerce and manufactures, and
+other works both of his policy and power, and let us view him in regard
+to his proceedings in this last campaign, especially as to that so much
+talked of descent, he, in conjunction with his allies, was to make upon
+Schonen, and we shall find that even therein he has acted with his usual
+cunning. There is no doubt but the King of Denmark was the first that
+proposed this descent. He found that nothing but a speedy end to a war
+he had so rashly and unjustly begun, could save his country from ruin
+and from the bold attempts of the King of Sweden, either against Norway,
+or against Zealand and Copenhagen. To treat separately with that prince
+was a thing he could not do, as foreseeing that he would not part with
+an inch of ground to so unfair an enemy; and he was afraid that a
+Congress for a general place, supposing the King of Sweden would consent
+to it upon the terms proposed by his enemies, would draw the
+negotiations out beyond what the situation of his affairs could bear. He
+invites, therefore, all his confederates to make a home thrust at the
+King of Sweden, by a descent into his country, where, having defeated
+him, as by the superiority of the forces to be employed in that design
+he hoped they should, they might force him to an immediate peace on such
+terms as they themselves pleased. I don't know how far the rest of his
+confederates came into that project; but neither the <i>Prussian</i> nor the
+<i>Hanoverian</i> Court appeared <i>openly</i> in that project, <i>and how far our
+English fleet, under Sir John Norris, was to have forwarded it, I have
+nothing to say, but leave others to judge out of the King of Denmark's
+own declaration</i>: but the Czar came readily into it. He got thereby a
+new pretence to carry the war<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40"></a>[<a href="images/044.png">40</a>]</span> one campaign more at other people's
+expense; to march his troops into the Empire again, and to have them
+quartered and maintained, first in Mecklenburg and then in Zealand. In
+the meantime he had his eyes upon <i>Wismar</i>, and upon a Swedish island
+called <i>Gotland</i>. If, by surprise, he could get the first out of the
+hands of his confederates, he then had a good seaport, whither to
+transport his troops when he pleased into <i>Germany</i>, without asking the
+King of <i>Prussia's</i> leave for a free passage through his territories;
+and if, by a sudden descent, he could dislodge the <i>Swedes</i> out of the
+other, he then became master of the best port in the Baltic. He
+miscarried, however, in both these projects; for Wismar was too well
+guarded to be surprised; and he found his confederates would not give
+him a helping hand towards conquering Gotland. After this he began to
+look with another eye upon the descent to be made upon Schonen. He found
+it equally contrary to his interest, whether it succeeded or not. For if
+he did, and the King was thereby forced to a general peace, he knew his
+interests therein would be least regarded; having already notice enough
+of his confederates being ready to sacrifice them, provided they got
+their own terms. If he did not succeed, then, besides the loss of the
+flower of an army he had trained and disciplined with so much care, as
+he very well foresaw that the English fleet would hinder the King of
+Sweden from attempting anything against Denmark; so he justly feared the
+whole shock would fall upon him, and he be thereby forced to surrender
+all he had taken from Sweden. These considerations made him entirely
+resolved not to make one of the descent; but he did not care to declare
+it till as late as possible: first, that he might the longer have his
+troops maintained at the Danish expense; secondly, that it might be too
+late for the King of Denmark to demand the necessary troops from his
+other confederates, and to make the descent without him; and, lastly,
+that by putting the Dane to a vast expense in making necessary
+preparations, he might still weaken him more, and, therefore, make him
+now the more dependent on him, and hereafter a more easy prey.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41"></a>[<a href="images/045.png">41</a>]</span></p><p>Thus he very carefully dissembles his real thoughts, till just when the
+descent was to be made, and then he, all of a sudden, refuses joining
+it, and defers it till next spring, with this averment, <i>that he will
+then be as good as his word</i>. But mark him, as some of our newspapers
+tell us, under this restriction, <i>unless he can get an advantageous
+peace of Sweden</i>. This passage, together with the common report we now
+have of his treating a separate peace with the King of Sweden, is a new
+instance of his cunning and policy. He has there two strings to his bow,
+of which one must serve his turn. There is no doubt but the Czar knows
+that an accommodation between him and the King of Sweden must be very
+difficult to bring about. For as he, on the one side, should never
+consent to part with those seaports, for the getting of which he began
+this war, and which are absolutely necessary towards carrying on his
+great and vast designs; so the King of Sweden would look upon it as
+directly contrary to his interest to yield up these same seaports, if
+possibly he could hinder it. But then again, the Czar is so well
+acquainted with the great and heroic spirit of his Swedish Majesty, that
+he does not question his yielding, rather in point of interest than
+nicety of honour. From hence it is, he rightly judges, that his Swedish
+Majesty must be less exasperated against him who, though he began an
+unjust war, has very often paid dearly for it, and carried it on all
+along through various successes than against some confederates; that
+taking an opportunity of his Swedish Majesty's misfortunes, fell upon
+him in an ungenerous manner, and made a partition treaty of his
+provinces. The Czar, still more to accommodate himself to the genius of
+his great enemy, unlike his confederates, who, upon all occasions,
+spared no reflections and even very unbecoming ones (bullying memorials
+and hectoring manifestoes), spoke all along with the utmost civility of
+his brother Charles as he calls him, maintains him to be the greatest
+general in Europe, and even publicly avers, he will more trust a word
+from him than the greatest assurances, oaths, nay, even treaties with
+his confederates. These kind of civilities may, perhaps, make a deeper
+impression upon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42"></a>[<a href="images/046.png">42</a>]</span> the noble mind of the King of Sweden, and he be
+persuaded rather to sacrifice a real interest to a generous enemy, than
+to gratify, in things of less moment, those by whom he has been ill, and
+even inhumanly used. But if this should not succeed, the Czar is still a
+gainer by having made his confederates uneasy at these his separate
+negotiations; and as we find by the newspapers, the more solicitous to
+keep him ready to their confederacy, which must cost them very large
+proffers and promises. In the meantime he leaves the Dane and the Swede
+securely bound up together in war, and weakening one another as fast as
+they can, and he turns towards the Empire and views the Protestant
+Princes there; and, under many specious pretences, not only marches and
+counter-marches about their several territories his troops that came
+back from Denmark, but makes also slowly advance towards Germany those
+whom he has kept this great while in Poland, under pretence to help the
+King against his dissatisfied subjects, whose commotions all the while
+he was the greatest fomenter of. He considers the Emperor is in war with
+the Turks, and therefore has found, by too successful experience, how
+little his Imperial Majesty is able to show his authority in protecting
+the members of the Empire. His troops remain in Mecklenburg,
+notwithstanding their departure is highly insisted upon. His replies to
+all the demands on that subject are filled with such reasons as if he
+would give new laws to the Empire.</p>
+
+<p>Now let us suppose that the King of Sweden should think it more
+honourable to make a peace with the Czar, and to carry the force of his
+resentment against his less generous enemies, what a stand will then the
+princes of the empire, even those that unadvisedly drew in 40,000
+Muscovites, to secure the tranquillity of that empire against 10,000 or
+12,000 Swedes,&mdash;I say what stand will they be able to make against him
+while the Emperor is already engaged in war with the Turks? and the
+Poles, when they are once in peace among themselves (if after the
+miseries of so long a war they are in a condition to undertake anything)
+are by treaty obliged to join their aids against that common enemy of Christianity.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43"></a>[<a href="images/047.png">43</a>]</span></p><p>Some will say I make great and sudden rises from very small beginnings.
+My answer is, that I would have such an objector look back and reflect
+why I show him, from such a speck of entity, at his first origin,
+growing, through more improbable and almost insuperable difficulties, to
+such a bulk as he has already attained to, and <i>whereby, as his
+advocates, the Dutch themselves own, he is grown too formidable for the
+repose, not only of his neighbours, but of Europe in general</i>.</p>
+
+<p>But then, again, they will say he has no pretence either to make a peace
+with the Swede separately from the Dane or to make war upon other
+princes, some of whom he is bound in alliance with. Whoever thinks these
+objections not answered must have considered the Czar neither as to his
+nature or to his ends. The Dutch own further, <i>that he made war against
+Sweden without any specious pretence</i>. He that made war without any
+specious pretence may make a peace without any specious pretence, and
+make a new war without any specious pretence for it too. His Imperial
+Majesty (of Austria), like a wise Prince, when he was obliged to make
+war with the Ottomans, made it, as in policy, he should, powerfully.
+But, in the meantime, may not the Czar, who is a wise and potent Prince
+too, follow the example upon the neighbouring Princes round him that are
+Protestants? If he should, I tremble to speak it, it is not impossible,
+but in this age of Christianity <i>the Protestant religion should, in a
+great measure, be abolished</i>; and that among the Christians, the
+<i>Greeks</i> and <i>Romans</i> may once more come to be the only Pretenders for
+Universal Empire. The pure possibility carries with it warning enough
+for the Maritime Powers, and all the other Protestant Princes, to
+mediate a peace for Sweden, and strengthen his arms again, without which
+no preparations can put them sufficiently upon their guard; and this
+must be done early and betimes, <i>before the King of Sweden, either out
+of despair or revenge, throws himself into the Czar's hands</i>. For 'tis a
+certain maxim (which all Princes ought, and the Czar seems at this time
+to observe too much for the repose of Christendom) that a wise man must
+not stand for ceremony, and only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44"></a>[<a href="images/048.png">44</a>]</span> <i>turn</i> with opportunities. No, he must
+even <i>run</i> with them. For the Czar's part, I will venture to say so much
+in his commendation, that he will hardly suffer himself to be overtaken
+that way. He seems to act just as the tide serves. There is nothing
+which contributes more to the making our undertakings prosperous than
+the taking of times and opportunities; for time carrieth with it the
+seasons of opportunities of business. If you let them slip, all your
+designs are rendered unsuccessful.</p>
+
+<p>In short, things seem now come to that <i>crisis</i> that peace should as
+soon as possible be procured to the Swede, with such advantageous
+articles as are consistent with the nicety of his honour to accept, and
+with the safety of the Protestant interest, that he should have offered
+to him, which can be scarce less than all the possessions which he
+formerly had in the Empire. As in all other things, so in politics, a
+long-tried certainty must be preferred before an uncertainty, tho'
+grounded on ever so probable suppositions. Now can there be anything
+more certain, than that the provinces Sweden has had in the Empire, were
+given to it to make it the nearer at hand and the better able to secure
+the Protestant interest, which, together with the liberties of the
+Empire it just then had saved? Can there be anything more certain than
+that that kingdom has, by those means, upon all occasions, secured that
+said interest now near fourscore years? Can there be anything more
+certain than, as to his present Swedish Majesty, that I may use the
+words of a letter her late Majesty, Queen Anne, wrote to him (Charles
+XII.), and <i>in the time of a Whig Ministry too</i>, viz.: "That, as a true
+Prince, hero and Christian, the chief end of his endeavours has been the
+promotion of the fear of God among men: and that without insisting on
+his own particular interest."</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, is it not very uncertain whether those princes, who,
+by sharing among them the Swedish provinces in the Empire, are now going
+to set up as protectors of the Protestant interests there, exclusive of
+the Swedes, will be able to do it? <i>Denmark</i> is already so low, and will
+in all appearance be so much lower still before the end of the war,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45"></a>[<a href="images/049.png">45</a>]</span>
+that very little assistance can be expected from it in a great many
+years. In <i>Saxony</i>, the prospect is but too dismal under a Popish
+prince, so that there remain only the two illustrious houses of Hanover
+and Brandenburg of all the Protestant princes, powerful enough to lead
+the rest. Let us therefore only make a parallel between what now happens
+in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, and what may happen to the Protestant
+interest, and we shall soon find how we may be mistaken in our
+reckoning. That said poor Duchy has been most miserably ruined by the
+Muscovite troops, and it is still so; the Electors of Brandenburg and
+Hanover are obliged, both as directors of the circle of Lower Saxony, as
+neighbours, and Protestant Princes, to rescue a fellow state of the
+Empire, and a Protestant country, from so cruel an oppression of a
+foreign Power. But, pray, what have they done? The Elector of
+Brandenburg, cautious lest the Muscovites might on one side invade his
+electorate, and on the other side from Livonia and Poland, his kingdom
+of Prussia; and the Elector of Hanover having the same wise caution as
+to his hereditary countries, have not upon this, though very pressing
+occasion, thought it for their interest, to use any other means than
+representations. But pray with what success? The Muscovites are still in
+Mecklenburg, and if at last they march out of it, it will be when the
+country is so ruined that they cannot there subsist any longer.</p>
+
+<p>It seems the King of Sweden should be restored to all that he has lost
+on the side of the Czar; and this appears the <i>joint interest of both
+the Maritime Powers</i>. This may they please to undertake: <i>Holland</i>,
+because it is a maxim there "that the Czar grows too great, and must not
+be suffered to settle in the Baltic, and that Sweden must not be
+abandoned"; <i>Great Britain</i>, because, if the Czar compasses his vast and
+prodigious views, he will, by the ruin and conquest of Sweden, become
+our nearer and more dreadful neighbour. Besides, we are bound to it by a
+treaty concluded in the year 1700, between King William and the present
+King of Sweden, by virtue of which King William assisted the King of
+Sweden, when in more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46"></a>[<a href="images/050.png">46</a>]</span>powerful circumstances, with all that he desired,
+with great sums of money, several hundred pieces of cloth, and
+considerable quantities of gunpowder.</p>
+
+<p>But <i>some Politicians (whom nothing can make jealous of the growing
+strength and abilities of the Czar) though they are even foxes and
+vulpones in the art, either will not see</i> or <i>pretend they cannot see</i>
+how the Czar can ever be able to make so great a progress in power as to
+hurt us here in our island. To them it is easy to repeat the same answer
+a hundred times over, if they would be so kind as to take it at last,
+viz., <i>that what has been may be again</i>; and that they did not see how
+he could reach the height of power, which he has already arrived at,
+after, I must confess, a very incredible manner. Let those <i>incredulous</i>
+people look narrowly into the <i>nature</i> and the <i>ends</i> and the <i>designs</i>
+of this great monarch; they will find that they are laid very deep, and
+that his plans carry in them a prodigious deal of prudence and
+foresight, and his ends are at the long run brought about by a kind of
+magic in policy; and will they not after that own that we ought to fear
+everything from him? As he desires that the designs with which he
+labours may not prove abortive, so he does not assign them a certain day
+of their birth, but leaves them to the natural productions of fit times
+and occasions, like those curious artists in China, who temper the mould
+this day of which a vessel may be made a hundred years hence.</p>
+
+<p>There is another sort of short-sighted politicians among us, who have
+more of cunning court intrigue and immediate statecraft in them than of
+true policy and concern for their country's interest. These gentlemen
+pin entirely their faith upon other people's sleeves; ask as to
+everything that is proposed to them, how it is liked at Court? what the
+opinion of their party is concerning it? and if the contrary party is
+for or against it? Hereby they rule their judgment, and it is enough for
+their cunning leaders to brand anything with <i>Whiggism</i> or <i>Jacobitism</i>,
+for to make these people, without any further inquiry into the matter,
+blindly espouse it or oppose it. This, it seems, is at present the case
+of the subject we are upon. Anything said or written<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47"></a>[<a href="images/051.png">47</a>]</span> in favour of
+Sweden and the King thereof, is immediately said to come from a
+<i>Jacobite</i> pen, and thus reviled and rejected, without being read or
+considered. Nay, I have heard gentlemen go so far as to maintain
+publicly, and with all the vehemence in the world, that the King of
+Sweden was a Roman Catholic, and that the Czar was a good Protestant.
+This, indeed, is one of the greatest misfortunes our country labours
+under, and till we begin to see with our own eyes, and inquire ourselves
+into the truth of things, we shall be led away, God knows whither, at
+last. The serving of Sweden according to our treaties and real interest
+has nothing to do with our party causes. Instead of seeking for and
+taking hold of any pretence to undo Sweden, we ought openly to assist
+it. Could our Protestant succession have a better friend or a bolder champion?</p>
+
+<p>I shall conclude this by thus shortly recapitulating what I have said.
+That since the Czar has not only replied to the King of Denmark
+entreating the contrary, but also answered our Admiral Norris, that he
+would persist in his resolution to delay the descent upon Schonen, and
+is said by other newspapers to resolve not to make it then, if he can
+have peace with Sweden; every Prince, and we more particularly, ought to
+be jealous of his having some such design as I mention in view, and
+consult how to prevent them, and to clip, in time, his too aspiring
+wings, which cannot be effectually done, first, without the Maritime
+Powers please to begin to keep him in some check and awe, and 'tis to be
+hoped a certain potent nation, that has helped him forward, can, in some
+measure, bring him back, and may then speak to this great enterpriser in
+the language of a countryman in Spain, who coming to an image enshrined,
+the first making whereof he could well remember, and not finding all the
+respectful usage he expected,&mdash;"You need not," quoth he, "be so proud,
+for we have known you from a plum-tree." The next only way is to
+restore, by a peace, to the King of Sweden what he has lost; that checks
+his (the Czar's) power immediately, and on that side nothing else can. I
+wish it may not at last be found true, that those who have been
+fighting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48"></a>[<a href="images/052.png">48</a>]</span> against that King have, in the main, been fighting against
+themselves. If the Swede ever has his dominions again, and lowers the
+high spirit of the Czar, still he may say by his neighbours, as an old
+Greek hero did, whom his countrymen constantly sent into exile whenever
+he had done them a service, but were forced to call him back to their
+aid, whenever they wanted success. "These people," quoth he, "are always
+using me like the palm-tree. They will be breaking my branches
+continually, and yet, if there comes a storm, they run to me, and can't
+find a better place for shelter." But if he has them not, I shall only
+exclaim a phrase out of Terence's "Andria":</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<div>"Hoccine credibile est aut memorabile</div>
+<div>Tanta vecordia innata cuiquam ut siet,</div>
+<div>Ut malis gaudeant?"</div>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>4. <span class="smcap">Postscript.</span>&mdash;I flatter myself that this little history is of that
+curious nature, and on matters hitherto so unobserved, that I consider
+it, with pride, as a valuable New Year's gift to the present world; and
+that posterity will accept it, as the like, for many years after, and
+read it over on that anniversary, and call it their <i>Warning Piece</i>. I
+must have my <i>Exegi-Monumentum</i> as well as others.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Or, to follow this affectation of silliness into more
+recent times, is there anything in diplomatic history that could match
+Lord Palmerston's proposal made to Marshal Soult (in 1839), to storm the
+Dardanelles, in order to afford the Sultan the support of the
+Anglo-French fleet against Russia?</p></div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49"></a>[<a href="images/053.png">49</a>]</span></p>
+
+<h2>CHAPTER III</h2>
+
+<p>To understand a limited historical epoch, we must step beyond its
+limits, and compare it with other historical epochs. To judge
+Governments and their acts, we must measure them by their own times and
+the conscience of their contemporaries. Nobody will condemn a British
+statesman of the 17th century for acting on a belief in witchcraft, if
+he find Bacon himself ranging demonology in the catalogue of science. On
+the other hand, if the Stanhopes, the Walpoles, the Townshends, etc.,
+were suspected, opposed, and denounced in their own country by their own
+contemporaries as tools or accomplices of Russia, it will no longer do
+to shelter their policy behind the convenient screen of prejudice and
+ignorance common to their time. At the head of the historical evidence
+we have to sift, we place, therefore, long-forgotten English pamphlets
+printed at the very time of Peter I. These preliminary <i>pi&egrave;ces des
+proc&egrave;s</i> we shall, however, limit to three pamphlets, which, from three
+different points of view, illustrate the conduct of England towards
+Sweden. The first, the <i>Northern Crisis</i> (given in Chapter II.),
+revealing the general system of Russia, and the dangers accruing to
+England from the Russification of Sweden; the second, called <i>The
+Defensive Treaty</i>, judging the acts of England by the Treaty of 1700;
+and the third, entitled <i>Truth is but Truth, however it is Timed</i>,
+proving that the new-fangled schemes which magnified Russia into the
+paramount Power of the Baltic were in flagrant opposition to the
+traditionary policy England had pursued during the course of a whole century.</p>
+
+<p>The pamphlet called <i>The Defensive Treaty</i> bears no date of publication.
+Yet in one passage it states that,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50"></a>[<a href="images/054.png">50</a>]</span> for reinforcing the Danish fleet,
+eight English men-of-war were left at Copenhagen "<i>the year before the
+last</i>," and in another passage alludes to the assembling of the
+confederate fleet for the Schonen expedition as having occurred "<i>last
+summer</i>." As the former event took place in 1715, and the latter towards
+the end of the summer of 1716, it is evident that the pamphlet was
+written and published in the earlier part of the year 1717. The
+Defensive Treaty between England and Sweden, the single articles of
+which the pamphlet comments upon in the form of queries, was concluded
+in 1700 between William III. and Charles XII., and was not to expire
+before 1719. Yet, during almost the whole of this period, we find
+England continually assisting Russia and waging war against Sweden,
+either by secret intrigue or open force, although the treaty was never
+rescinded nor war ever declared. This fact is, perhaps, even less
+strange than the <i>conspiration de silence</i> under which modern historians
+have succeeded in burying it, and among them historians by no means
+sparing of censure against the British Government of that time, for
+having, without any previous declaration of war, destroyed the Spanish
+fleet in the Sicilian waters. But then, at least, England was not bound
+to Spain by a defensive treaty. How, then, are we to explain this
+contrary treatment of similar cases? The piracy committed against Spain
+was one of the weapons which the Whig Ministers, seceding from the
+Cabinet in 1717, caught hold of to harass their remaining colleagues.
+When the latter stepped forward in 1718, and urged Parliament to declare
+war against Spain, Sir Robert Walpole rose from his seat in the Commons,
+and in a most virulent speech denounced the late ministerial acts "as
+contrary to the laws of nations, and a breach of solemn treaties."
+"Giving sanction to them in the manner proposed," he said, "could have
+no other view than to screen ministers, who were conscious of having
+done something amiss, and who, having begun a war against Spain, would
+now make it the Parliament's war." The treachery against Sweden and the
+connivance at the plans of Russia, never happening to afford the
+ostensible pretext for a family quarrel amongst<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51"></a>[<a href="images/055.png">51</a>]</span> the Whig rulers (they
+being rather unanimous on these points), never obtained the honours of
+historical criticism so lavishly spent upon the Spanish incident.</p>
+
+<p>How apt modern historians generally are to receive their cue from the
+official tricksters themselves, is best shown by their reflections on
+the commercial interests of England with respect to Russia and Sweden.
+Nothing has been more exaggerated than the dimensions of the trade
+opened to Great Britain by the huge market of the Russia of Peter the
+Great, and his immediate successors. Statements bearing not the
+slightest touch of criticism have been allowed to creep from one
+book-shelf to another, till they became at last historical household
+furniture, to be inherited by every successive historian, without even
+the <i>beneficium inventarii</i>. Some incontrovertible statistical figures
+will suffice to blot out these hoary common-places.</p>
+
+<table summary="British Commerce from 1697-1700">
+  <tr>
+    <td colspan="2"><span class="smcap">British Commerce from 1697-1700.</span></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td class="center">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&pound;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Export to Russia</td>
+    <td>58,884</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Import from Russia</td>
+    <td>112,252</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td>&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left"><span class="s6">&nbsp;</span>Total</td>
+    <td>171,136</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Export to Sweden</td>
+    <td>57,555</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Import from Sweden</td>
+    <td>212,094</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td>&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left"><span class="s6">&nbsp;</span>Total</td>
+    <td>269,649</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>During the same period the total</p>
+
+<table summary="Export of England">
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td class="center">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&pound;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Export of England amounted to&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>3,525,906</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Import</td>
+    <td>3,482,586</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td>&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left"><span class="s6">&nbsp;</span>Total</td>
+    <td>7,008,492</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>In 1716, after all the Swedish provinces in the Baltic, and on the Gulfs
+of Finland and Bothnia, had fallen into the hands of Peter I., the</p>
+
+<table summary="Export of England in 1716">
+  <tr>
+    <td><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52"></a>[<a href="images/056.png">52</a>]</span></td>
+    <td class="center">&nbsp;&nbsp;&pound;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Export to Russia was&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>113,154</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Import from Russia</td>
+    <td>197,270</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td>&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left"><span class="s6">&nbsp;</span>Total</td>
+    <td>310,424</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;</td>
+    <td></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Export to Sweden</td>
+    <td>24,101</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Import from Sweden</td>
+    <td>136,959</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td>&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left"><span class="s6">&nbsp;</span>Total</td>
+    <td>161,060</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>At the same time, the total of English exports and imports together
+reached about &pound;10,000,000. It will be seen from these figures, when
+compared with those of 1697-1700, that the increase in the Russian trade
+is balanced by the decrease in the Swedish trade, and that what was
+added to the one was subtracted from the other.</p>
+
+<p>In 1730, the</p>
+
+<table summary="Export of England in 1730">
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td class="center">&nbsp;&nbsp;&pound;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Export to Russia was&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>46,275</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Import from Russia</td>
+    <td>258,802</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td>&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left"><span class="s6">&nbsp;</span>Total</td>
+    <td>305,077</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>Fifteen years, then, after the consolidation in the meanwhile of the
+Muscovite settlement on the Baltic, the British trade with Russia had
+fallen off by &pound;5,347. The general trade of England reaching in 1730 the
+sum of &pound;16,329,001, the Russian trade amounted not yet to 1/53rd of its
+total value. Again, thirty years later, in 1760, the account between
+Great Britain and Russia stands thus:</p>
+
+<table summary="Export of England in 1760">
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td class="center">&nbsp;&nbsp;&pound;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Import from Russia (in 1760)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
+    <td>536,504</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left">Export to Russia</td>
+    <td>39,761</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td></td>
+    <td>&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="left"><span class="s6">&nbsp;</span>Total</td>
+    <td>&pound;576,265</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>while the general trade of England amounted to &pound;26,361,760. Comparing
+these figures with those of 1706, we find that the total of the Russian
+commerce, after nearly half a century, has increased by the trifling sum
+of only &pound;265,841. That England suffered positive loss by her new
+commercial<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53"></a>[<a href="images/057.png">53</a>]</span> relations with Russia under Peter I. and Catherine I.
+becomes evident on comparing, on the one side, the export and import
+figures, and on the other, the sums expended on the frequent naval
+expeditions to the Baltic which England undertook during the lifetime of
+Charles XII., in order to break down his resistance to Russia, and,
+after his death, on the professed necessity of checking the maritime
+encroachments of Russia.</p>
+
+<p>Another glance at the statistical data given for the years 1697, 1700,
+1716, 1730, and 1760, will show that the British <i>export</i> trade to
+Russia was continually falling off, save in 1716, when Russia engrossed
+the whole Swedish trade on the eastern coast of the Baltic and the Gulf
+of Bothnia, and had not yet found the opportunity of subjecting it to
+her own regulations. From &pound;58,884, at which the British exports to
+Russia stood during 1697-1700, when Russia was still precluded from the
+Baltic, they had sunk to &pound;46,275 in 1730, and to &pound;39,761 in 1760,
+showing a decrease of &pound;19,123, or about 1/3rd of their original amount
+in 1700. If, then, since, the absorption of the Swedish provinces by
+Russia, the British market proved expanding for Russia raw produce, the
+Russian market, on its side, proved straitening for British
+manufacturers, a feature of that trade which could hardly recommend it
+at a time when the Balance of Trade doctrine ruled supreme. To trace the
+circumstances which produced the increase of the Anglo-Russian trade
+under Catherine II. would lead us too far from the period we are considering.</p>
+
+<p>On the whole, then, we arrive at the following conclusions: During the
+first sixty years of the eighteenth century the total Anglo-Russian
+trade formed but a very diminutive fraction of the general trade of
+England, say less than 1/45th. Its sudden increase during the earliest
+years of Peter's sway over the Baltic did not at all affect the general
+balance of British trade, as it was a simple transfer from its Swedish
+account to its Russian account. In the later times of Peter I., as well
+as under his immediate successors, Catherine I. and Anne, the
+Anglo-Russian trade was positively declining; during the whole epoch,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54"></a>[<a href="images/058.png">54</a>]</span>
+dating from the final settlement of Russia in the Baltic provinces, the
+export of British manufactures to Russia was continually falling off, so
+that at its end it stood one-third lower than at its beginning, when
+that trade was still confined to the port of Archangel. Neither the
+contemporaries of Peter I., nor the next British generation reaped any
+benefit from the advancement of Russia to the Baltic. In general the
+Baltic trade of Great Britain was at that time trifling in regard of the
+capital involved, but important in regard of its character. It afforded
+England the raw produce for its maritime stores. That from the latter
+point of view the Baltic was in safer keeping in the hands of Sweden
+than in those of Russia, was not only proved by the pamphlets we are
+reprinting, but fully understood by the British Ministers themselves.
+Stanhope writing, for instance, to Townshend on October 16th, 1716:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"It is certain that if the Czar be let alone three years, he will
+be absolute master in those seas."<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>If, then, neither the navigation nor the general commerce of England was
+interested in the treacherous support given to Russia against Sweden,
+there existed, indeed, one small fraction of British merchants whose
+interests were identical with the Russian ones&mdash;the Russian Trade
+Company. It was this gentry that raised a cry against Sweden. See, for instance:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Several grievances of the English merchants in their trade into
+the dominions of the King of Sweden, whereby it does appear how
+dangerous it may be for the English nation to depend on Sweden only
+for the supply of the naval stores, when they might be amply
+furnished with the like stores from the dominions of the Emperor of Russia."</p>
+
+<p>"The case of the merchants trading to Russia" (a petition to Parliament), etc.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55"></a>[<a href="images/059.png">55</a>]</span></p><p>It was they who in the years 1714, 1715, and 1716, regularly assembled
+twice a week before the opening of Parliament, to draw up in public
+meetings the complaints of the British merchantmen against Sweden. On
+this small fraction the Ministers relied; they were even busy in getting
+up its demonstrations, as may be seen from the letters addressed by
+Count Gyllenborg to Baron G&ouml;rtz, dated 4th of November and 4th of
+December, 1716, wanting, as they did, but the shadow of a pretext to
+drive their "mercenary Parliament," as Gyllenborg calls it, where they
+liked. The influence of these British merchants trading to Russia was
+again exhibited in the year 1765, and our own times have witnessed the
+working for his interest, of a Russian merchant at the head of the Board
+of Trade, and of a Chancellor of the Exchequer in the interest of a
+cousin engaged in the Archangel trade.</p>
+
+<p>The oligarchy which, after the "glorious revolution," usurped wealth and
+power at the cost of the mass of the British people, was, of course,
+forced to look out for allies, not only abroad, but also at home. The
+latter they found in what the French would call <i>la haute bourgeoisie</i>,
+as represented by the Bank of England, the money-lenders, State
+creditors, East India and other trading corporations, the great
+manufacturers, etc. How tenderly they managed the material interests of
+that class may be learned from the whole of their domestic
+legislation&mdash;Bank Acts, Protectionist enactments, Poor Regulations, etc.
+As to their <i>foreign policy</i>, they wanted to give it the appearance at
+least of being altogether regulated by the mercantile interest, an
+appearance the more easily to be produced, as the exclusive interest of
+one or the other small fraction of that class would, of course, be
+always identified with this or that Ministerial measure. The interested
+fraction then raised the commerce and navigation cry, which the nation stupidly re-echoed.</p>
+
+<p>At that time, then, there devolved on the Cabinet, at least, the <i>onus</i>
+of inventing <i>mercantile pretexts</i>, however futile, for their measures
+of foreign policy. In our own epoch, British Ministers have thrown this
+burden on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56"></a>[<a href="images/060.png">56</a>]</span> foreign nations, leaving to the French, the Germans, etc.,
+the irksome task of discovering the <i>secret</i> and <i>hidden</i> mercantile
+springs of their actions. Lord Palmerston, for instance, takes a step
+apparently the most damaging to the material interests of Great Britain.
+Up starts a State philosopher, on the other side of the Atlantic, or of
+the Channel, or in the heart of Germany, who puts his head to the rack
+to dig out the mysteries of the mercantile Machiavelism of "perfide
+Albion," of which Palmerston is supposed the unscrupulous and
+unflinching executor. We will, <i>en passant</i>, show, by a few modern
+instances, what desperate shifts those foreigners have been driven to,
+who feel themselves obliged to interpret Palmerston's acts by what they
+imagine to be the English commercial policy. In his valuable <i>Histoire
+Politique et Sociale des Principaut&eacute;s Danubiennes</i>, M. Elias Regnault,
+startled by the Russian conduct, before and during the years 1848-49 of
+Mr. Colquhoun, the British Consul at Bucharest, suspects that England
+has some secret material interest in keeping down the trade of the
+Principalities. The late Dr. Cunibert, private physician of old Milosh,
+in his most interesting account of the Russian intrigues in Servia,
+gives a curious relation of the manner in which Lord Palmerston, through
+the instrumentality of Colonel Hodges, betrayed Milosh to Russia by
+feigning to support him against her. Fully believing in the personal
+integrity of Hodges, and the patriotic zeal of Palmerston, Dr. Cunibert
+is found to go a step further than M. Elias Regnault. He suspects
+England of being interested in putting down Turkish commerce generally.
+General Mieroslawski, in his last work on Poland, is not very far from
+intimating that mercantile Machiavelism instigated England to sacrifice
+her own <i>prestige</i> in Asia Minor, by the surrender of Kars. As a last
+instance may serve the present lucubrations of the Paris papers, hunting
+after the secret springs of commercial jealousy, which induce Palmerston
+to oppose the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez canal.</p>
+
+<p>To return to our subject. The mercantile pretext hit upon by the
+Townshends, Stanhopes, etc., for the hostile demonstrations against
+Sweden, was the following. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57"></a>[<a href="images/061.png">57</a>]</span>Towards the end of 1713, Peter I. had
+ordered all the hemp and other produce of his dominions, destined for
+export, to be carried to St. Petersburg instead of Archangel. Then the
+Swedish Regency, during the absence of Charles XII., and Charles XII.
+himself, after his return from Bender, declared all the Baltic ports,
+occupied by the Russians, to be blockaded. Consequently, English ships,
+breaking through the blockade, were confiscated. The English Ministry
+then asserted that British merchantmen had the right of trading to those
+ports according to Article XVII. of the Defensive Treaty of 1700, by
+which English commerce, with the exception of contraband of war, was
+allowed to go on with ports of the enemy. The absurdity and falsehood of
+this pretext being fully exposed in the pamphlet we are about to
+reprint, we will only remark that the case had been more than once
+decided against commercial nations, not bound, like England, by treaty
+to defend the integrity of the Swedish Empire. In the year 1561, when
+the Russians took Narva, and laboured hard to establish their commerce
+there, the Hanse towns, chiefly L&uuml;beck, tried to possess themselves of
+this traffic. Eric XIV., then King of Sweden, resisted their
+pretensions. The city of L&uuml;beck represented this resistance as
+altogether new, as they had carried on their commerce with the Russians
+time out of mind, and pleaded the common right of nations to navigate in
+the Baltic, provided their vessels carried no contraband of war. The
+King replied that he did not dispute the Hanse towns the liberty of
+trading with Russia, but only with Narva, which was no Russian port. In
+the year 1579 again, the Russians having broken the suspension of arms
+with Sweden, the Danes likewise claimed the navigation to Narva, by
+virtue of their treaty, but King John was as firm in maintaining the
+contrary, as was his brother Eric.</p>
+
+<p>In her open demonstrations of hostility against the King of Sweden, as
+well as in the false pretence on which they were founded, England seemed
+only to follow in the track of Holland, which declaring the confiscation
+of its ships to be piracy, had issued two proclamations against Sweden in 1714.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58"></a>[<a href="images/062.png">58</a>]</span></p><p>In one respect, the case of the States-General was the same as that of
+England. King William had concluded the Defensive Treaty as well for
+Holland as for England. Besides, Article XVI., in the Treaty of
+Commerce, concluded between Holland and Sweden in 1703, expressly
+stipulated that no navigation ought to be allowed to the ports blocked
+up by either of the confederates. The then common Dutch cant that "there
+was no hindering traders from carrying their merchandise where they
+will," was the more impudent as, during the war, ending with the Peace
+of Ryswick, the Dutch Republic had declared all France to be blocked up,
+forbidden the neutral Powers all trade with that kingdom, and caused all
+their ships that went there or came thence to be brought up without any
+regard to the nature of their cargoes.</p>
+
+<p>In another respect, the situation of Holland was different from that of
+England. Fallen from its commercial and maritime grandeur, Holland had
+then already entered upon its epoch of decline. Like Genoa and Venice,
+when new roads of commerce had dispossessed them of their old mercantile
+supremacy, it was forced to lend out to other nations its capital, grown
+too large for the vessels of its own commerce. Its fatherland had begun
+to lie there where the best interest for its capital was paid. Russia,
+therefore, proved an immense market, less for the commerce than for the
+outlay of capital and men. To this moment Holland has remained the
+banker of Russia. At the time of Peter they supplied Russia with ships,
+officers, arms, and money, so that his fleet, as a contemporary writer
+remarks, ought to have been called a Dutch rather than a Muscovite one.
+They gloried in having sent the first European merchant ship to St.
+Petersburg, and returned the commercial privileges they had obtained
+from Peter, or hoped to obtain from him, by that fawning meanness which
+characterizes their intercourse with Japan. Here, then, was quite
+another solid foundation than in England for the Russianism of
+statesmen, whom Peter I. had entrapped during his stay at Amsterdam, and
+the Hague in 1697, whom he afterwards directed by his ambassadors, and
+with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59"></a>[<a href="images/063.png">59</a>]</span> whom he renewed his personal influence during his renewed stay at
+Amsterdam in 1716-17. Yet, if the paramount influence England exercised
+over Holland during the first <i>decennia</i> of the 18th century be
+considered, there can remain no doubt that the proclamations against
+Sweden by the States-General would never have been issued, if not with
+the previous consent and at the instigation of England. The intimate
+connection between the English and Dutch Governments served more than
+once the former to put up precedents in the name of Holland, which they
+were resolved to act upon in the name of England. On the other hand, it
+is no less certain that the Dutch statesmen were employed by the Czar to
+influence the British ones. Thus Horace Walpole, the brother of the
+"Father of Corruption," the brother-in-law of the Minister, Townshend,
+and the British Ambassador at the Hague during 1715-16, was evidently
+inveigled into the Russian interest by his Dutch friends. Thus, as we
+shall see by-and-by, Theyls, the Secretary to the Dutch Embassy at
+Constantinople, at the most critical period of the deadly struggle
+between Charles XII. and Peter I., managed affairs at the same time for
+the Embassies of England and Holland at the Sublime Porte. This Theylls,
+in a print of his, openly claims it as a merit with his nation to have
+been the devoted and rewarded agent of Russian intrigue.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> In the year 1657, when the Courts of Denmark and
+Brandenburg intended engaging the Muscovites to fall upon Sweden, they
+instructed their Minister so to manage the affair that the Czar might by
+no means get any footing in the Baltic, because "they did not know what
+to do with so troublesome a neighbour." (See Puffendorf's <i>History of
+Brandenburg</i>.)</p></div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60"></a>[<a href="images/064.png">60</a>]</span></p>
+
+<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<i>The Defensive Treaty concluded in the year 1700, between his late
+Majesty, King William, of ever-glorious memory, and his present
+Swedish Majesty, King Charles XII. Published at the earnest desire
+of several members of both Houses of Parliament.</i></p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<div>'Nec rumpite f&oelig;dera pacis,</div>
+<div>Nec regnis pr&aelig;ferte fidem.'</div>
+<div><span class="s12">&nbsp;</span>&mdash;<span class="smcap">Silius</span>, <i>Lip.</i> II.</div>
+</div></div></blockquote>
+
+<p>"<i>Article I.</i> Establishes between the Kings of Sweden and England 'a
+sincere and constant friendship for ever, a league and good
+correspondence, so that they shall never mutually or separately molest
+one another's kingdoms, provinces, colonies, or subjects, wheresoever
+situated, <i>nor shall they suffer or agree that this should be done by others, etc.</i>'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article II.</i> 'Moreover, each of the Allies, his heirs and successors,
+shall be obliged to take care of, and promote, as much as in him lies,
+the profit and honour of the other, to detect and give notice to his
+other ally (as soon as it shall come to his own knowledge) of all
+imminent dangers, conspiracies, and hostile designs formed against him,
+to withstand them as much as possible, and to prevent them both by
+advice and assistance; and therefore <i>it shall not be lawful for either
+of the Allies, either by themselves or any other whatsoever, to act,
+treat, or endeavour anything to the prejudice or loss of the other</i>, his
+lands or dominions whatsoever or wheresoever, whether by land or sea;
+that one shall in no wise favour the other's foes, either rebels or
+enemies, to the prejudice of his Ally,' etc.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query I.</i> How the words marked in italics agree with our present
+conduct, when our fleet acts in conjunction with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61"></a>[<a href="images/065.png">61</a>]</span> the enemies of Sweden,
+<i>the Czar commands our fleet, our Admiral enters into Councils of War,
+and is not only privy to all their designs, but together with our own
+Minister at Copenhagen</i> (as the King of Denmark has himself owned it in
+a public declaration), <i>pushed on the Northern Confederates to an
+enterprise entirely destructive to our Ally Sweden, I mean the descent
+designed last summer upon Schonen</i>?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query II.</i> In what manner we also must explain that passage in the
+first article by which it is stipulated that one Ally shall not either
+by themselves or any other whatsoever, act, treat, or endeavour anything
+to the loss of the other's lands and dominions; to justify in particular
+our leaving in the year 1715, even when the season was so far advanced
+as no longer to admit of our usual pretence of conveying and protecting
+our trade, which was then got already safe home, eight men-of-war in the
+Baltic, with orders to join in one line of battle with the Danes,
+whereby we made them so much superior in number to the Swedish fleet,
+that it could not come to the relief of Straelsund, and whereby <i>we
+chiefly occasioned Sweden's entirely losing its German Provinces</i>, and
+even the <i>extreme danger his Swedish Majesty ran in his own person</i>, in
+crossing the sea, before the surrender of the town.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article III.</i> By a special defensive treaty, the Kings of Sweden and
+England mutually oblige themselves, 'in a strict alliance, to defend one
+another mutually, as well as their kingdoms, territories, provinces,
+states, subjects, possessions, as their rights and liberties of
+navigation and commerce, as well in the Northern, Deucalidonian,
+Western, and Britannic Sea, commonly called the Channel, the Baltic, the
+Sound; as also of the privileges and prerogatives of each of the Allies
+belonging to them, by virtue of treaties and agreements, as well as by
+received customs, the laws of nations, hereditary right, against any
+aggressors or invaders and molesters in Europe by sea or land, etc.'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query.</i> It being by the law of nations an indisputable right and
+prerogative of any king or people, in case of a great necessity or
+threatening ruin, to use all such means they themselves shall judge most
+necessary for their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62"></a>[<a href="images/066.png">62</a>]</span>preservation; it having moreover been a constant
+prerogative and practice of the Swedes, for these several hundred years,
+in case of a war with their most dreadful enemies the Muscovites, to
+hinder all trade with them in the Baltic; and since it is also
+stipulated in this article that amongst other things, <i>one Ally ought to
+defend the prerogatives belonging to the other, even by received
+customs, and the law of nations</i>: how come we now, the King of Sweden
+stands more than ever in need of using that prerogative, not only to
+dispute it, but also to take thereof a pretence for an open hostility against him?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Articles IV., V., VI., and VII.</i> fix the strength of the auxiliary
+forces England and Sweden are to send each other in case the territory
+of either of these powers should be invaded, or its navigation 'molested
+or hindered' in one of the seas enumerated in Article III. The invasion
+of the <i>German</i> provinces of Sweden is expressly included as a <i>casus f&oelig;deris</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article VIII.</i> stipulates that that Ally who is not attacked shall
+first act the part of a pacific mediator; but, the mediation having
+proved a failure, 'the aforesaid forces shall be sent without delay; nor
+shall the confederates desist before the injured party shall be
+satisfied in all things.'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article IX.</i> That Ally that requires the stipulated 'help, has to
+choose whether he will have the above-named army either all or any,
+either in soldiers, ships, ammunition, or money.'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article X.</i> Ships and armies serve under 'the command of him that required them.'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XI.</i> 'But if it should happen that the above-mentioned forces
+should not be proportionable to the danger, as supposing that perhaps
+the aggressor should be assisted by the forces of some other
+confederates of his, then one of the Allies, after previous request,
+shall be obliged to help the other that is injured, with greater forces,
+such as he shall be able to raise with safety and convenience, both by sea and land....'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XII.</i> 'It shall be lawful for either of the Allies<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63"></a>[<a href="images/067.png">63</a>]</span> and their
+subjects to bring their men-of-war into one another's harbours, and to
+winter there.' Peculiar negotiations about this point shall take place
+at Stockholm, but 'in the meanwhile, the articles of treaty concluded at
+London, 1661, relating to the navigation and commerce shall remain, in
+their full force, as much as if they were inserted here word for word.'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XIII.</i> ' ... The subjects of either of the Allies ... shall no
+way, either by sea or land, serve them (the enemies of either of the
+Allies), either as mariners or soldiers, and therefore it shall be
+forbid them upon severe penalty.'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XIV.</i> 'If it happens that either of the confederate kings ...
+should be engaged in a war against a common enemy, or be molested by any
+other neighbouring king ... in his own kingdoms or provinces ... to the
+hindering of which, he that requires help may by the force of this
+treaty himself be obliged to send help: then that Ally so molested shall
+not be obliged to send the promised help....'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query I.</i> Whether in our conscience we don't think the King of Sweden
+most unjustly attacked by all his enemies; whether consequently we are
+not convinced that we owe him the assistance stipulated in these
+Articles; whether he has not demanded the same from us, and why it has
+hitherto been refused him?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query II.</i> These articles, setting forth in the most expressing terms,
+in what manner Great Britain and Sweden ought to assist one another, can
+either of these two Allies take upon him to prescribe to the other who
+requires his assistance a way of lending him it not expressed in the
+treaty; and if that other Ally does not think it for his interest to
+accept of the same, but still insists upon the performance of the
+treaty, can he from thence take a pretence, not only to withhold the
+stipulated assistance, but also to use his Ally in a hostile way, and to
+join with his enemies against him? If this is not justifiable, as even
+common sense tells us it is not, how can the reason stand good, which we
+allege amongst others, for using the King of Sweden as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64"></a>[<a href="images/068.png">64</a>]</span> we do, <i>id est</i>,
+that demanding a literal performance of his alliance with us, <i>he would
+not accept the treaty of neutrality for his German provinces</i>, which we
+proposed to him some years ago, a treaty which, not to mention its
+partiality in favour of the enemies of Sweden, and that it was
+calculated only for our own interest, and for to prevent all disturbance
+in the empire, whilst we were engaged in a war against France, the King
+of Sweden had so much less reason to rely upon, as he was to conclude it
+with those very enemies, that had every one of them broken several
+treaties in beginning the present war against him, and as it was to be
+guaranteed by those powers, who were also every one of them guarantees
+of the broken treaties, without having performed their guarantee?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query III.</i> How can we make the words in the 7th Article, <i>that in
+assisting our injured Ally we shall not desist before he shall be
+satisfied in all things</i>, agree with our endeavouring, to the contrary,
+to help the enemies of that Prince, though all unjust aggressors, not
+only to take one province after the other from him, but also to remain
+undisturbed possessors thereof, blaming all along the King of Sweden for
+not tamely submitting thereunto?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query IV.</i> The treaty concluded in the year 1661, between Great
+Britain and Sweden, being in the 11th Article confirmed, and the said
+treaty forbidding expressly one of the confederates <i>either himself or
+his subjects to lend or to sell to the other's enemies, men-of-war or
+ships of defence</i>; the 13th Article of this present treaty forbidding
+also expressly the subjects of either of the Allies <i>to help anyways the
+enemies of the other, to the inconvenience and loss of such an Ally</i>;
+should we not have accused the Swedes of the most notorious breach of
+this treaty, had they, during our late war with the French, lent them
+their own fleet, the better to execute any design of theirs against us,
+or had they, notwithstanding our representations to the contrary,
+suffered their subjects to furnish the French with ships of 50, 60, and
+70 guns! Now, if we turn the tables, and remember upon how many
+occasions our fleet has of late been entirely subservient to the designs
+of the enemies of Sweden,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65"></a>[<a href="images/069.png">65</a>]</span> even in most critical times, and that <i>the
+Czar of Muscovy has actually above a dozen English-built ships</i> in his
+fleet, will it not be very difficult for us to excuse in ourselves what
+we should most certainly have blamed, if done by others?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XVII.</i> The obligation shall not be so far extended as that all
+friendship and mutual commerce with the enemies of that Ally (that
+requires the help) shall be taken away; for supposing that one of the
+confederates should send his auxiliaries, and should not be engaged in
+the war himself, it shall then be lawful for the subjects to trade and
+commerce with that enemy of that Ally that is engaged in the war, also
+directly and safely to merchandise with such enemies, for all goods not
+expressly forbid and called contraband, as in a special treaty of
+commerce hereafter shall be appointed.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query I.</i> This Article being the only one out of twenty-two whose
+performance we have now occasion to insist upon from the Swedes, the
+question will be whether we ourselves, in regard to Sweden, have
+performed all the other articles as it was our part to do, and whether
+in demanding of the King of Sweden the executing of this Article, we
+have promised that we would also do our duty as to all the rest; if not,
+may not the Swedes say that we complain unjustly of the breach of one
+single Article, when we ourselves may perhaps be found guilty of having
+in the most material points either not executed or even acted against
+the whole treaty?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query II.</i> Whether the liberty of commerce one Ally is, by virtue of
+this Article, to enjoy with the other's enemies, ought to have no
+limitation at all, neither as to time nor place; in short, whether it
+ought even to be extended so far as to destroy the very end of this
+Treaty, which is the promoting the safety and security of one another's kingdoms?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query III.</i> Whether in case the French had in the late wars made
+themselves masters of Ireland or Scotland, and either in new-made
+seaports, or the old ones, endeavoured by trade still more firmly to
+establish themselves in their new conquest, we, in such a case, should
+have thought the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66"></a>[<a href="images/070.png">66</a>]</span> Swedes our true allies and friends, had they insisted
+upon this Article to trade with the French in the said seaports taken
+from us, and to furnish them there with several necessaries of war, nay,
+even with armed ships, whereby the French might the easier have annoyed
+us here in England?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query IV.</i> Whether, if we had gone about to hinder a trade so
+prejudicial to us, and in order thereunto brought up all Swedish ships
+going to the said seaports, we should not highly have exclaimed against
+the Swedes, had they taken from thence a pretence to join their fleet
+with the French, to occasion the losing of any of our dominions, and
+even to encourage the invasion upon us, have their fleet at hand to
+promote the same?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query V.</i> Whether upon an impartial examination this would not have
+been a case exactly parallel to that we insist upon, as to a free Trade
+to the seaports the Czar has taken from Sweden, and to our present
+behaviour, upon the King of Sweden's hindering the same?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query VI.</i> Whether we have not ever since Oliver Cromwell's time till
+1710, in all our wars with France and Holland, without any urgent
+necessity at all, brought up and confiscated Swedish ships, though not
+going to any prohibited ports, and that to a far greater number and
+value, than all those the Swedes have now taken from us, and whether the
+Swedes have ever taken a pretence from thence to join with our enemies,
+and to send whole squadrons of ships to their assistance?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query VII.</i> Whether, if we inquire narrowly into the state of
+commerce, as it has been carried on for these many years, we shall not
+find that the trade of the above-mentioned places was not so very
+necessary to us, at least not so far as to be put into the balance with
+the preservation of a Protestant confederate nation, much less to give
+us a just reason <i>to make war against that nation, which, though not
+declared, has done it more harm than the united efforts of all its enemies</i>?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query VIII.</i> Whether, if it happened two years ago, that this trade
+became something more necessary to us than<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67"></a>[<a href="images/071.png">67</a>]</span> formerly, it is not easily
+proved, that it was occasioned only by the Czar's forcing us out of our
+old channel of trade to Archangel, and bringing us to Petersburg, and
+our complying therewith. So that all the inconveniences we laboured
+under upon that account ought to have been laid to the Czar's door, and
+not to the King of Sweden's?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query IX.</i> Whether the Czar did not in the very beginning of 1715
+again permit us to trade our old way to Archangel, and whether our
+Ministers had not notice thereof a great while before our fleet was sent
+that year to protect our <i>trade to Petersburg</i>, which by this alteration
+in the Czar's resolution was become as unnecessary for us as before?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query X.</i> Whether the King of Sweden had not declared, that if we
+would forbear trading to <i>Petersburg</i>, etc., which he looked upon as
+ruinous to his kingdom, he would in no manner disturb our trade, neither
+in the Baltic nor anywhere else; but that in case we would not give him
+this slight proof of our friendship, he should be excused if the
+innocent came to suffer with the guilty?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query XI.</i> Whether, by our insisting upon the trade to the ports
+prohibited by the King of Sweden, which besides it being unnecessary to
+us, hardly makes one part in ten of that we carry on in the Baltic, we
+have not drawn upon us the hazards that our trade has run all this
+while, been ourselves the occasion of our great expenses in fitting out
+fleets for its protection, and by our joining with the enemies of
+Sweden, fully justified his Swedish Majesty's resentment; had it ever
+gone so far as to seize and confiscate without distinction all our ships
+and effects, wheresoever he found them, either within or without his kingdoms?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query XII.</i> If we were so tender of our trade to the northern ports in
+general, ought we not in policy rather to have considered the hazard
+that trade runs by the approaching ruin of Sweden, and <i>by the Czar's
+becoming the whole and sole master of the Baltic, and all the naval
+stores we want from thence</i>? Have we not also suffered greater hardships
+and losses in the said trade from the Czar, than that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68"></a>[<a href="images/072.png">68</a>]</span> amounting only to
+sixty odd thousand pounds (whereof, by the way, two parts in three may
+perhaps be disputable), which provoked us first to send twenty
+men-of-war in the Baltic with order to attack the Swedes wherever they
+met them? And yet, did not this very Czar, this very aspiring and
+dangerous prince, <i>last summer command the whole confederate fleet</i>, as
+it was called, <i>of which our men-of-war made the most considerable part?
+The first instance that ever was of a Foreign Potentate having the
+command given him of the English fleet, the bulwark of our nation</i>; and
+did not our said men-of-war afterwards convey his (the Czar's) transport
+ships and troops on board of them, in their return from Zealand,
+<i>protecting them from the Swedish fleet</i>, which else would have made a
+considerable havoc amongst them?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query XIII.</i> Suppose now, we had, on the contrary, taken hold of the
+great and many complaints our merchants have made of the ill-usage they
+meet from the Czar, to have sent our fleet to show our resentment
+against that prince, to prevent his great and pernicious designs even to
+us, <i>to assist Sweden pursuant to this Treaty</i>, and effectually to
+restore the peace in the North, would not that have been more for our
+interest, more necessary, more honourable and just, and more according
+to our Treaty; and would not the several 100,000 pounds these our
+Northern expeditions have cost the nation, have been thus better employed?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query XIV.</i> If the preserving and securing our trade against the
+Swedes has been the only and real object of all our measures, as to the
+Northern affairs, how came we the year before the last to leave eight
+men-of-war in the Baltic and at Copenhagen, when we had no more trade
+there to protect, and how came Admiral Norris last summer, although he
+and the Dutch together made up the number of twenty-six men-of-war, and
+consequently were too strong for the Swedes, to attempt anything against
+our trade under their convoy; yet to lay above two whole months of the
+best season in the Sound, without convoying our and the Dutch
+merchantmen to the several ports they were bound for, whereby they were
+kept in the Baltic so late that their return could not but be very
+hazardous, as it even proved,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69"></a>[<a href="images/073.png">69</a>]</span> both to them and our men-of-war
+themselves? Will not the world be apt to think that the hopes of forcing
+the King of Sweden to an inglorious and disadvantageous peace, by which
+the Duchies of Bremen and Verden ought to be added to the Hanover
+dominions, or that some other such view, foreign, if not contrary, to
+the true and old interest of Great Britain, had then a greater influence
+upon all these our proceedings than <i>the pretended care of our trade</i>?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XVIII.</i> For as much as it seems convenient for the
+preservation of the liberty of navigation and commerce in the Baltic
+Sea, that a firm and exact friendship should be kept between the Kings
+of Sweden and Denmark; and whereas the former Kings of Sweden and
+Denmark did oblige themselves mutually, not only by the public Articles
+of Peace made in the camp of Copenhagen, on the 27th of May, 1660, and
+by the ratifications of the agreement interchanged on both sides,
+sacredly and inviolably to observe all and every one of the clauses
+comprehended in the said agreement, but also declared together to ...
+Charles II., King of Great Britain ... a little before the treaty
+concluded between England and Sweden in the year 1665, that they would
+stand sincerely ... to all ... of the Articles of the said peace ...
+whereupon Charles II., with the approbation and consent of both the
+forementioned Kings of Sweden and Denmark, took upon himself a little
+after the Treaty concluded between England and Sweden, 1st March, 1665,
+to wit 9th October, 1665, guarantee of the same agreements.... Whereas
+an instrument of peace between ... the Kings of Sweden and Denmark
+happened to be soon after these concluded at Lunden in Schonen, in 1679,
+which contains an express transaction, and repetition and confirmation
+of the Treaties concluded at Roskild, Copenhagen, and Westphalia;
+therefore ... the King of Great Britain binds himself by the force of
+this Treaty ... that if either of the Kings of Sweden and Denmark shall
+consent to the violation, either of all the agreements, or of one or
+more articles comprehended in them, and consequently if either of the
+Kings<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70"></a>[<a href="images/074.png">70</a>]</span> shall to the prejudice of the person, provinces, territories,
+islands, goods, dominions and rights of the other, which by the force of
+the agreements so often repeated, and made in the camp of Copenhagen, on
+the 27th of May, 1660, as also of those made in the ... peace at Lunden
+in Schonen in 1679, were attributed to every one that was interested and
+comprehended in the words of the peace, should either by himself or by
+others, presume, or secretly design or attempt, or by open molestations,
+or by any injury, or by any violence of arms, attempt anything; that
+then the ... King of Great Britain ... shall first of all, by his
+interposition, perform all the offices of a friend and princely ally,
+which may serve towards the keeping inviolable all the frequently
+mentioned agreements, and of every article comprehended in them, and
+consequently towards the preservation of peace between both kings; that
+afterwards if the King, who is the beginner of such prejudice, or any
+molestation or injury, contrary to all agreements, and contrary to any
+articles comprehended in them, shall refuse after being admonished ...
+then the King of Great Britain ... shall ... assist him that is injured
+as by the present agreements between the Kings of Great Britain and
+Sweden in such cases is determined and agreed.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query.</i> Does not this article expressly tell us how to remedy the
+disturbances our trade in the Baltic might suffer, in case of a
+misunderstanding betwixt the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, by obliging
+both these Princes to keep all the Treaties of Peace that have been
+concluded between them from 1660-1670, and in case either of them should
+in an hostile manner act against the said Treaties, by assisting the
+other against the aggressor? How comes it then that we don't make use of
+so just a remedy against an evil we are so great sufferers by? Can
+anybody, though ever so partial, deny but the King of Denmark, though
+seemingly a sincere friend to the King of Sweden, from the peace of
+Travendahl till he went out of Saxony against the Muscovites, fell very
+unjustly upon him immediately after, taking ungenerously advantage of
+the fatal battle of Pultava? Is not then the King of Denmark the
+violator of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71"></a>[<a href="images/075.png">71</a>]</span> all the above-mentioned Treaties, and consequently the true
+author of the disturbances our trade meets with in the Baltic? Why in
+God's name don't we, according to this article, assist Sweden against
+him, and why do we, on the contrary, declare openly against the injured
+King of Sweden, send hectoring and threatening memorials to him, upon
+the least advantage he has over his enemies, as we did last summer upon
+his entering Norway, and even order our fleets to act openly against him
+in conjunction with the Danes?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XIX.</i> There shall be 'stricter confederacy and union between
+the above-mentioned Kings of Great Britain and Sweden, for the future,
+<i>for the defence and preservation of the Protestant, Evangelic, and reformed religion</i>.'</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query I.</i> How do we, according to this article, join with Sweden to
+<i>assert, protect, and preserve the Protestant religion</i>? Don't we suffer
+that nation, which has always been a bulwark to the said religion, most
+unmercifully to be torn to pieces?... <i>Don't we ourselves give a helping
+hand towards its destruction?</i> And why all this? Because our merchants
+have lost their ships to the value of sixty odd thousand pounds. <i>For
+this loss, and nothing else, was the pretended reason why, in the year
+1715, we sent our fleet in the Baltic, at the expense of &pound;200,000</i>; and
+as to what our merchants have suffered since, suppose we attribute it to
+our threatening memorials as well as open hostilities against the King
+of Sweden, must we not even then own that that Prince's resentment has
+been very moderate?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query II.</i> How can other Princes, and especially our fellow
+Protestants, think us sincere in what we have made them believe as to
+our zeal in spending millions of lives and money for to secure the
+Protestant interest only in one single branch of it, <i>I mean the
+Protestant succession here</i>, when they see that that succession has
+hardly taken place, before we, only for sixty odd thousand pounds, (for
+let us always remember that this paltry sum was the first pretence for
+our quarrelling with Sweden) go about to undermine the very foundation
+of that interest in general, by helping, as we do, entirely to sacrifice
+Sweden, the old and sincere<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72"></a>[<a href="images/076.png">72</a>]</span> protector of the Protestants, to its
+neighbours, of which some are professed Papists, some worse, and some,
+at least, but lukewarm Protestants?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XX.</i> Therefore, that a reciprocal faith of the Allies and
+their perseverance in this agreement may appear ... both the
+fore-mentioned kings mutually oblige themselves, and declare that ...
+they will not depart a tittle from the genuine and common sense of all
+and every article of this treaty under any pretences of friendship,
+profit, former treaty, agreement, and promise, or upon any colour
+whatsoever: but that they will most fully and readily, either by
+themselves, or ministers, or subjects, put in execution whatsoever they
+have promised in this treaty ... without any hesitation, exception, or excuse....</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query I.</i> Inasmuch as this article sets forth that, at the time of
+concluding of the treaty, we were under no engagement contrary to it,
+and that it were highly unjust should we afterwards, and while this
+treaty is in force, which is eighteen years after the day it was signed,
+have entered into any such engagements, how can we justify to the world
+our late proceedings against the King of Sweden, which naturally seem
+the consequences of a treaty either of our own making with the enemies
+of that Prince, <i>or of some Court or other that at present influences our measures</i>?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query II.</i> The words in this article ... how in the name of honour,
+faith, and justice, do they agree with the <i>little and pitiful
+pretences</i> we now make use of, not only for not assisting Sweden,
+pursuant to this treaty, <i>but even for going about so heartily as we do
+to destroy it</i>?</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Article XXI.</i> This defensive treaty shall last for eighteen years,
+before the end of which the confederate kings may ... again treat.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Ratification of the abovesaid treaty.</i> We, having seen and considered
+this treaty, have approved and confirmed the same in all and every
+particular article and clause as by the present. We do approve the same
+for us, our heirs, and successors; assuring and promising our princely
+word that we shall perform and observe sincerely and in good earnest all
+those things that are therein contained, for the better<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73"></a>[<a href="images/077.png">73</a>]</span> confirmation
+whereof we have ordered our great seal of England to be put to these
+presents, which were given at our palace of Kensington, 25th of
+February, in the year of our Lord 1700, and in the 11th year of our
+reign (Gulielmus Rex).<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query.</i> How can any of us that declares himself for the late happy
+revolution, and that is a true and grateful lover of King William's for
+ever-glorious memory ... yet bear with the least patience, that the said
+treaty should (that I may again use the words of the 20th article) be
+<i>departed from, under any pretence of profit, or upon any colour
+whatsoever</i>, especially so insignificant and trifling a one as that
+which has been made use of for two years together to employ our ships,
+our men, and our money, <i>to accomplish the ruin of Sweden</i>, that same
+Sweden whose defence and preservation this great and wise monarch of
+ours has so solemnly promised, and which he always looked upon to be of
+the utmost necessity for to secure the Protestant interest in Europe?"</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> The treaty was concluded at the Hague on the 6th and 16th
+January, 1700, and ratified by William III. on February 5th, 1700.</p></div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74"></a>[<a href="images/078.png">74</a>]</span></p>
+
+<h2>CHAPTER V</h2>
+
+<p>Before entering upon an analysis of the pamphlet headed, "<i>Truth is but
+truth, as it is timed</i>," with which we shall conclude the <i>Introduction</i>
+to the Diplomatic Revelations, some preliminary remarks on the general
+history of Russian politics appear opportune.</p>
+
+<p>The overwhelming influence of Russia has taken Europe at different
+epochs by surprise, startled the peoples of the West, and been submitted
+to as a fatality, or resisted only by convulsions. But alongside the
+fascination exercised by Russia, there runs an ever-reviving scepticism,
+dogging her like a shadow, growing with her growth, mingling shrill
+notes of irony with the cries of agonising peoples, and mocking her very
+grandeur as a histrionic attitude taken up to dazzle and to cheat. Other
+empires have met with similar doubts in their infancy; Russia has become
+a colossus without outliving them. She affords the only instance in
+history of an immense empire, the very existence of whose power, even
+after world-wide achievements, has never ceased to be treated like a
+matter of faith rather than like a matter of fact. From the outset of
+the eighteenth century to our days, no author, whether he intended to
+exalt or to check Russia, thought it possible to dispense with first
+proving her existence.</p>
+
+<p>But whether we be spiritualists or materialists with respect to
+Russia&mdash;whether we consider her power as a palpable fact, or as the mere
+vision of the guilt-stricken consciences of the European peoples&mdash;the
+question remains the same: "How did this power, or this phantom of a
+power, contrive to assume such dimensions as to rouse on the one side
+the passionate assertion, and on the other the angry denial of its
+threatening the world with a rehearsal of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75"></a>[<a href="images/079.png">75</a>]</span> Universal Monarchy?" At the
+beginning of the eighteenth century Russia was regarded as a mushroom
+creation extemporised by the genius of Peter the Great. Schloezer
+thought it a discovery to have found out that she possessed a past; and
+in modern times, writers, like Fallmerayer, unconsciously following in
+the track beaten by Russian historians, have deliberately asserted that
+the northern spectre which frightens the Europe of the nineteenth
+century already overshadowed the Europe of the ninth century. With them
+the policy of Russia begins with the first Ruriks, and has, with some
+interruptions indeed, been systematically continued to the present hour.</p>
+
+<p>Ancient maps of Russia are unfolded before us, displaying even larger
+European dimensions than she can boast of now: her perpetual movement of
+aggrandizement from the ninth to the eleventh century is anxiously
+pointed out; we are shown Oleg launching 88,000 men against Byzantium,
+fixing his shield as a trophy on the gate of that capital, and dictating
+an ignominious treaty to the Lower Empire; Igor making it tributary;
+Sviataslaff glorying, "the Greeks supply me with gold, costly stuffs,
+rice, fruits and wine; Hungary furnishes cattle and horses; from Russia
+I draw honey, wax, furs, and men"; Vladimir conquering the Crimea and
+Livonia, extorting a daughter from the Greek Emperor, as Napoleon did
+from the German Emperor, blending the military sway of a northern
+conqueror with the theocratic despotism of the Porphyro-geniti, and
+becoming at once the master of his subjects on earth, and their
+protector in heaven.</p>
+
+<p>Yet, in spite of the plausible parallelism suggested by these
+reminiscences, the policy of the first Ruriks differs fundamentally from
+that of modern Russia. It was nothing more nor less than the policy of
+the German barbarians inundating Europe&mdash;the history of the modern
+nations beginning only after the deluge has passed away. The Gothic
+period of Russia in particular forms but a chapter of the Norman
+conquests. As the empire of Charlemagne precedes the foundation of
+modern France, Germany, and Italy, so the empire of the Ruriks precedes
+the foundation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76"></a>[<a href="images/080.png">76</a>]</span> of Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic Settlements, Turkey,
+and Muscovy itself. The rapid movement of aggrandizement was not the
+result of deep-laid schemes, but the natural offspring of the primitive
+organization of Norman conquest&mdash;vassalship without fiefs, or fiefs
+consisting only in tributes&mdash;the necessity of fresh conquests being kept
+alive by the uninterrupted influx of new Varangian adventurers, panting
+for glory and plunder. The chiefs, becoming anxious for repose, were
+compelled by the Faithful Band to move on, and in Russian, as in French
+Normandy, there arrived the moment when the chiefs despatched on new
+predatory excursions their uncontrollable and insatiable
+companions-in-arms with the single view to get rid of them. Warfare and
+organization of conquest on the part of the first Ruriks differ in no
+point from those of the Normans in the rest of Europe. If Slavonian
+tribes were subjected not only by the sword, but also by mutual
+convention, this singularity is due to the exceptional position of those
+tribes, placed between a northern and eastern invasion, and embracing
+the former as a protection from the latter. The same magic charm which
+attracted other northern barbarians to the Rome of the West attracted
+the Varangians to the Rome of the East. The very migration of the
+Russian capital&mdash;Rurik fixing it at Novgorod, Oleg removing it to Kiev,
+and Sviataslaff attempting to establish it in Bulgaria&mdash;proves beyond
+doubt that the invader was only feeling his way, and considered Russia
+as a mere halting-place from which to wander on in search of an empire
+in the South. If modern Russia covets the possession of Constantinople
+to establish her dominion over the world, the Ruriks were, on the
+contrary, forced by the resistance of Byzantium, under Zimiskes,
+definitively to establish their dominion in Russia.</p>
+
+<p>It may be objected that victors and vanquished amalgamated more quickly
+in Russia than in any other conquest of the northern barbarians, that
+the chiefs soon commingled themselves with the Slavonians&mdash;as shown by
+their marriages and their names. But then, it should be recollected that
+the Faithful Band, which formed at once their guard and their privy
+council, remained exclusively<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77"></a>[<a href="images/081.png">77</a>]</span> composed of Varangians; that Vladimir,
+who marks the summit, and Yaroslav, who marks the commencing decline of
+Gothic Russia, were seated on her throne by the arms of the Varangians.
+If any Slavonian influence is to be acknowledged in this epoch, it is
+that of Novgorod, a Slavonian State, the traditions, policy, and
+tendencies of which were so antagonistic to those of modern Russia that
+the one could found her existence only on the ruins of the other. Under
+Yaroslav the supremacy of the Varangians is broken, but simultaneously
+with it disappears the conquering tendency of the first period, and the
+decline of Gothic Russia begins. The history of that decline, more still
+than that of the conquest and formation, proves the exclusively Gothic
+character of the Empire of the Ruriks.</p>
+
+<p>The incongruous, unwieldy, and precocious Empire heaped together by the
+Ruriks, like the other empires of similar growth, is broken up into
+appanages, divided and subdivided among the descendants of the
+conquerors, dilacerated by feudal wars, rent to pieces by the
+intervention of foreign peoples. The paramount authority of the Grand
+Prince vanishes before the rival claims of seventy princes of the blood.
+The attempt of Andrew of Susdal at recomposing some large limbs of the
+empire by the removal of the capital from Kiev to Vladimir proves
+successful only in propagating the decomposition from the South to the
+centre. Andrew's third successor resigns even the last shadow of
+supremacy, the title of Grand Prince, and the merely nominal homage
+still offered him. The appanages to the South and to the West become by
+turns Lithuanian, Polish, Hungarian, Livonian, Swedish. Kiev itself, the
+ancient capital, follows destinies of its own, after having dwindled
+down from a seat of the Grand Princedom to the territory of a city.
+Thus, the Russia of the Normans completely disappears from the stage,
+and the few weak reminiscences in which it still outlived itself,
+dissolve before the terrible apparition of Genghis Khan. The bloody mire
+of Mongolian slavery, not the rude glory of the Norman epoch, forms the
+cradle of Muscovy, and modern Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78"></a>[<a href="images/082.png">78</a>]</span></p><p>The Tartar yoke lasted from 1237 to 1462&mdash;more than two centuries; a
+yoke not only crushing, but dishonouring and withering the very soul of
+the people that fell its prey. The Mongol Tartars established a rule of
+systematic terror, devastation and wholesale massacre forming its
+institutions. Their numbers being scanty in proportion to their enormous
+conquests, they wanted to magnify them by a halo of consternation, and
+to thin, by wholesale slaughter, the populations which might rise in
+their rear. In their creations of desert they were, besides, led by the
+same economical principle which has depopulated the Highlands of
+Scotland and the Campagna di Roma&mdash;the conversion of men into sheep, and
+of fertile lands and populous abodes into pasturage.</p>
+
+<p>The Tartar yoke had already lasted a hundred years before Muscovy
+emerged from its obscurity. To entertain discord among the Russian
+princes, and secure their servile submission, the Mongols had restored
+the dignity of the Grand Princedom. The strife among the Russian princes
+for this dignity was, as a modern author has it, "an abject strife&mdash;the
+strife of slaves, whose chief weapon was calumny, and who were always
+ready to denounce each other to their cruel rulers; wrangling for a
+degraded throne, whence they could not move but with plundering,
+parricidal hands&mdash;hands filled with gold and stained with gore; which
+they dared not ascend without grovelling, nor retain but on their knees,
+prostrate and trembling beneath the scimitar of a Tartar, always ready
+to roll under his feet those servile crowns, and the heads by which they
+were worn." It was in this infamous strife that the Moscow branch won at
+last the race. In 1328 the crown of the Grand Princedom, wrested from
+the branch of Tver by dint of denunciation and assassination, was picked
+up at the feet of Usbeck Khan by Yury, the elder brother of Ivan Kalita.
+Ivan I. Kalita, and Ivan III., surnamed the Great, personate Muscovy
+rising by means of the Tartar yoke, and Muscovy getting an independent
+power by the disappearance of the Tartar rule. The whole policy of
+Muscovy, from its first entrance into the historical arena, is resumed
+in the history of these two individuals.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79"></a>[<a href="images/083.png">79</a>]</span></p><p>The policy of Ivan Kalita was simply this: to play the abject tool of
+the Khan, thus to borrow his power, and then to turn it round upon his
+princely rivals and his own subjects. To attain this end, he had to
+insinuate himself with the Tartars by dint of cynical adulation, by
+frequent journeys to the Golden Horde, by humble prayers for the hand of
+Mongol princesses, by a display of unbounded zeal for the Khan's
+interest, by the unscrupulous execution of his orders, by atrocious
+calumnies against his own kinsfolk, by blending in himself the
+characters of the Tartar's hangman, sycophant, and slave-in-chief. He
+perplexed the Khan by continuous revelations of secret plots. Whenever
+the branch of Tver betrayed a velleit&eacute; of national independence, he
+hurried to the Horde to denounce it. Wherever he met with resistance, he
+introduced the Tartar to trample it down. But it was not sufficient to
+act a character; to make it acceptable, gold was required. Perpetual
+bribery of the Khan and his grandees was the only sure foundation upon
+which to raise his fabric of deception and usurpation. But how was the
+slave to get the money wherewith to bribe the master? He persuaded the
+Khan to instal him his tax-gatherer throughout all the Russian
+appanages. Once invested with this function, he extorted money under
+false pretences. The wealth accumulated by the dread held out of the
+Tartar name, he used to corrupt the Tartars themselves. By a bribe he
+induced the primate to transfer his episcopal seat from Vladimir to
+Moscow, thus making the latter the capital of the empire, because the
+religious capital, and coupling the power of the Church with that of his
+throne. By a bribe he allured the Boyards of the rival princes into
+treason against their chiefs, and attracted them to himself as their
+centre. By the joint influence of the Mahometan Tartar, the Greek
+Church, and the Boyards, he unites the princes holding appanages into a
+crusade against the most dangerous of them&mdash;the prince of Tver; and then
+having driven his recent allies by bold attempts at usurpation into
+resistance against himself, into a war for the public good, he draws not
+the sword but hurries to the Khan. By bribes and delusion again, he
+seduces him into<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80"></a>[<a href="images/084.png">80</a>]</span> assassinating his kindred rivals under the most cruel
+torments. It was the traditional policy of the Tartar to check the
+Russian princes the one by the other, to feed their dissensions, to
+cause their forces to equiponderate, and to allow none to consolidate
+himself. Ivan Kalita converts the Khan into the tool by which he rids
+himself of his most dangerous competitors, and weighs down every
+obstacle to his own usurping march. He does not conquer the appanages,
+but surreptitiously turns the rights of the Tartar conquest to his
+exclusive profit. He secures the succession of his son through the same
+means by which he had raised the Grand Princedom of Muscovy, that
+strange compound of princedom and serfdom. During his whole reign he
+swerves not once from the line of policy he had traced to himself;
+clinging to it with a tenacious firmness, and executing it with
+methodical boldness. Thus he becomes the founder of the Muscovite power,
+and characteristically his people call him Kalita&mdash;that is, the purse,
+because it was the purse and not the sword with which he cut his way.
+The very period of his reign witnesses the sudden growth of the
+Lithuanian power which dismembers the Russian appanages from the West,
+while the Tartar squeezes them into one mass from the East. Ivan, while
+he dared not repulse the one disgrace, seemed anxious to exaggerate the
+other. He was not to be seduced from following up his ends by the
+allurements of glory, the pangs of conscience, or the lassitude of
+humiliation. His whole system may be expressed in a few words: the
+machiavelism of the usurping slave. His own weakness&mdash;his slavery&mdash;he
+turned into the mainspring of his strength.</p>
+
+<p>The policy traced by Ivan I. Kalita is that of his successors; they had
+only to enlarge the circle of its application. They followed it up
+laboriously, gradually, inflexibly. From Ivan I. Kalita, we may,
+therefore, pass at once to Ivan III., surnamed the Great.</p>
+
+<p>At the commencement of his reign (1462-1505) Ivan III. was still a
+tributary to the Tartars; his authority was still contested by the
+princes holding appanages; Novgorod, the head of the Russian republics,
+reigned over the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81"></a>[<a href="images/085.png">81</a>]</span> north of Russia; Poland-Lithuania was striving for the
+conquest of Muscovy; lastly, the Livonian knights were not yet disarmed.
+At the end of his reign we behold Ivan III. seated on an independent
+throne, at his side the daughter of the last emperor of Byzantium, at
+his feet Kasan, and the remnant of the Golden Horde flocking to his
+court; Novgorod and the other Russian republics enslaved&mdash;Lithuania
+diminished, and its king a tool in Ivan's hands&mdash;the Livonian knights
+vanquished. Astonished Europe, at the commencement of Ivan's reign,
+hardly aware of the existence of Muscovy, hemmed in between the Tartar
+and the Lithuanian, was dazzled by the sudden appearance of an immense
+empire on its eastern confines, and Sultan Bajazet himself, before whom
+Europe trembled, heard for the first time the haughty language of the
+Muscovite. How, then, did Ivan accomplish these high deeds? Was he a
+hero? The Russian historians themselves show him up a confessed coward.</p>
+
+<p>Let us shortly survey his principal contests, in the sequence in which
+he undertook and concluded them&mdash;his contests with the Tartars, with
+Novgorod, with the princes holding appanages, and lastly with Lithuania-Poland.</p>
+
+<p>Ivan rescued Muscovy from the Tartar yoke, not by one bold stroke, but
+by the patient labour of about twenty years. He did not break the yoke,
+but disengaged himself by stealth. Its overthrow, accordingly, has more
+the look of the work of nature than the deed of man. When the Tartar
+monster expired at last, Ivan appeared at its deathbed like a physician,
+who prognosticated and speculated on death rather than like a warrior
+who imparted it. The character of every people enlarges with its
+enfranchisement from a foreign yoke; that of Muscovy in the hands of
+Ivan seems to diminish. Compare only Spain in its struggles against the
+Arabs with Muscovy in its struggles against the Tartars.</p>
+
+<p>At the period of Ivan's accession to the throne, the Golden Horde had
+long since been weakened, internally by fierce feuds, externally by the
+separation from them of the Nogay Tartars, the eruption of Timour
+Tamerlane, the rise<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82"></a>[<a href="images/086.png">82</a>]</span> of the Cossacks, and the hostility of the Crimean
+Tartars. Muscovy, on the contrary, by steadily pursuing the policy
+traced by Ivan Kalita, had grown to a mighty mass, crushed, but at the
+same time compactly united by the Tartar chain. The Khans, as if struck
+by a charm, had continued to remain instruments of Muscovite
+aggrandizement and concentration. By calculation they had added to the
+power of the Greek Church, which, in the hand of the Muscovite grand
+princes, proved the deadliest weapon against them.</p>
+
+<p>In rising against the Horde, the Muscovite had not to invent but only to
+imitate the Tartars themselves. But Ivan did not rise. He humbly
+acknowledged himself a slave of the Golden Horde. By bribing a Tartar
+woman he seduced the Khan into commanding the withdrawal from Muscovy of
+the Mongol residents. By similar and imperceptible and surreptitious
+steps he duped the Khan into successive concessions, all ruinous to his
+sway. He thus did not conquer, but filch strength. He does not drive,
+but man&oelig;uvre his enemy out of his strongholds. Still continuing to
+prostrate himself before the Khan's envoys, and to proclaim himself his
+tributary, he eludes the payment of the tribute under false pretences,
+employing all the stratagems of a fugitive slave who dare not front his
+owner, but only steal out of his reach. At last the Mongol awakes from
+his torpor, and the hour of battle sounds. Ivan, trembling at the mere
+semblance of an armed encounter, attempts to hide himself behind his own
+fear, and to disarm the fury of his enemy by withdrawing the object upon
+which to wreak his vengeance. He is only saved by the intervention of
+the Crimean Tartars, his allies. Against a second invasion of the Horde,
+he ostentatiously gathers together such disproportionate forces that the
+mere rumour of their number parries the attack. At the third invasion,
+from the midst of 200,000 men, he absconds a disgraced deserter.
+Reluctantly dragged back, he attempts to haggle for conditions of
+slavery, and at last, pouring into his army his own servile fear, he
+involves it in a general and disorderly flight. Muscovy was then<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83"></a>[<a href="images/087.png">83</a>]</span>
+anxiously awaiting its irretrievable doom, when it suddenly hears that
+by an attack on their capital made by the Crimean Khan, the Golden Horde
+has been forced to withdraw, and has, on its retreat, been destroyed by
+the Cossacks and Nogay Tartars. Thus defeat was turned into success, and
+Ivan had overthrown the Golden Horde, not by fighting it himself, but by
+challenging it through a feigned desire of combat into offensive
+movements, which exhausted its remnants of vitality and exposed it to
+the fatal blows of the tribes of its own race whom he had managed to
+turn into his allies. He caught one Tartar with another Tartar. As the
+immense danger he had himself summoned proved unable to betray him into
+one single trait of manhood, so his miraculous triumph did not infatuate
+him even for one moment. With cautious circumspection he dared not
+incorporate Kasan with Muscovy, but made it over to sovereigns belonging
+to the family of Menghi-Ghirei, his Crimean ally, to hold it, as it
+were, in trust for Muscovy. With the spoils of the vanquished Tartar, he
+enchained the victorious Tartar. But if too prudent to assume, with the
+eye-witnesses of his disgrace, the airs of a conqueror, this impostor
+did fully understand how the downfall of the Tartar empire must dazzle
+at a distance&mdash;with what halo of glory it would encircle him, and how it
+would facilitate a magnificent entry among the European Powers.
+Accordingly he assumed abroad the theatrical attitude of the conqueror,
+and, indeed, succeeded in hiding under a mask of proud susceptibility
+and irritable haughtiness the obtrusiveness of the Mongol serf, who
+still remembered kissing the stirrup of the Khan's meanest envoy. He
+aped in more subdued tone the voice of his old masters, which terrified
+his soul. Some standing phrases of modern Russian diplomacy, such as the
+magnanimity, the wounded dignity of the master, are borrowed from the
+diplomatic instructions of Ivan III.</p>
+
+<p>After the surrender of Kasan, he set out on a long-planned expedition
+against Novgorod, the head of the Russian republics. If the overthrow of
+the Tartar yoke was, in his eyes, the first condition of Muscovite
+greatness, the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84"></a>[<a href="images/088.png">84</a>]</span>overthrow of Russian freedom was the second. As the
+republic of Viatka had declared itself neutral between Muscovy and the
+Horde, and the republic of Tskof, with its twelve cities, had shown
+symptoms of disaffection, Ivan flattered the latter and affected to
+forget the former, meanwhile concentrating all his forces against
+Novgorod the Great, with the doom of which he knew the fate of the rest
+of the Russian republics to be sealed. By the prospect of sharing in
+this rich booty, he drew after him the princes holding appanages, while
+he inveigled the boyards by working upon their blind hatred of
+Novgorodian democracy. Thus he contrived to march three armies upon
+Novgorod and to overwhelm it by disproportionate force. But then, in
+order not to keep his word to the princes, not to forfeit his immutable
+"Vos non vobis," at the same time apprehensive, lest Novgorod should not
+yet have become digestible from the want of preparatory treatment, he
+thought fit to exhibit a sudden moderation; to content himself with a
+ransom and the acknowledgment of his suzerainty; but into the act of
+submission of the republic he smuggled some ambiguous words which made
+him its supreme judge and legislator. Then he fomented the dissensions
+between the patricians and plebeians raging as well in Novgorod as at
+Florence. Of some complaints of the plebeians he took occasion to
+introduce himself again into the city, to have its nobles, whom he knew
+to be hostile to himself, sent to Moscow loaded with chains, and to
+break the ancient law of the republic that "none of its citizens should
+ever be tried or punished out of the limits of its own territory." From
+that moment he became supreme arbiter. "Never," say the annalists,
+"never since Rurik had such an event happened; never had the grand
+princes of Kiev and Vladimir seen the Novgorodians come and submit to
+them as their judges. Ivan alone could reduce Novgorod to that degree of
+humiliation." Seven years were employed by Ivan to corrupt the republic
+by the exercise of his judicial authority. Then, when he found its
+strength worn out, he thought the moment ripe for declaring himself. To
+doff his own mask of moderation, he wanted, on the part of Novgorod, a
+breach<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85"></a>[<a href="images/089.png">85</a>]</span> of the peace. As he had simulated calm endurance, so he
+simulated now a sudden burst of passion. Having bribed an envoy of the
+republic to address him during a public audience with the name of
+sovereign, he claimed, at once, all the rights of a despot&mdash;the
+self-annihilation of the republic.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86"></a>[<a href="images/090.png">86</a>]</span></p>
+
+<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2>
+
+<p>One feature characteristic of the Slavonic race must strike every
+observer. Almost everywhere it confined itself to an inland country,
+leaving the sea-borders to non-Slavonic tribes. Finno-Tartaric tribes
+held the shores of the Black Sea, Lithuanians and Fins those of the
+Baltic and White Sea. Wherever they touched the sea-board, as in the
+Adriatic and part of the Baltic, the Slavonians had soon to submit to
+foreign rule. The Russian people shared this common fate of the
+Slavonian race. Their home, at the time they first appear in history,
+was the country about the sources and upper course of the Volga and its
+tributaries, the Dnieper, Don, and Northern Dwina. Nowhere did their
+territory touch the sea except at the extremity of the Gulf of Finland.
+Nor had they before Peter the Great proved able to conquer any maritime
+outlet beside that of the White Sea, which, during three-fourths of the
+year, is itself enchained and immovable. The spot where Petersburg now
+stands had been for a thousand years past contested ground between Fins,
+Swedes, and Russians. All the remaining extent of coast from Polangen,
+near Memel, to Torrea, the whole coast of the Black Sea, from Akerman to
+Redut Kaleh, has been conquered later on. And, as if to witness the
+anti-maritime peculiarity of the Slavonic race, of all this line of
+coast, no portion of the Baltic coast has really adopted Russian
+nationality. Nor has the Circassian and Mingrelian east coast of the
+Black Sea. It is only the coast of the White Sea, as far as it was worth
+cultivating, some portion of the northern coast of the Black Sea, and
+part of the coast of the Sea of Azof, that have really been peopled with
+Russian inhabitants, who, however, despite the new circumstances in
+which they are placed, still refrain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87"></a>[<a href="images/091.png">87</a>]</span> from taking to the sea, and
+obstinately stick to the land-lopers' traditions of their ancestors.</p>
+
+<p>From the very outset, Peter the Great broke through all the traditions
+of the Slavonic race. "It is water that Russia wants." These words he
+addressed as a rebuke to Prince Cantemir are inscribed on the title-page
+of his life. The conquest of the Sea of Azof was aimed at in his first
+war with Turkey, the conquest of the Baltic in his war against Sweden,
+the conquest of the Black Sea in his second war against the Porte, and
+the conquest of the Caspian Sea in his fraudulent intervention in
+Persia. For a system of local encroachment, land was sufficient; for a
+system of universal aggression, water had become indispensable. It was
+but by the conversion of Muscovy from a country wholly of land into a
+sea-bordering empire, that the traditional limits of the Muscovite
+policy could be superseded and merged into that bold synthesis which,
+blending the encroaching method of the Mongol slave with the
+world-conquering tendencies of the Mongol master, forms the life-spring
+of modern Russian diplomacy.</p>
+
+<p>It has been said that no great nation has ever existed, or been able to
+exist, in such an inland position as that of the original empire of
+Peter the Great; that none has ever submitted thus to see its coasts and
+the mouths of its rivers torn away from it; that Russia could no more
+leave the mouth of the Neva, the natural outlet for the produce of
+Northern Russia, in the hands of the Swedes, than the mouths of the Don,
+Dnieper, and Bug, and the Straits of Kertch, in the hands of nomadic and
+plundering Tartars; that the Baltic provinces, from their very
+geographical configuration, are naturally a corollary to whichever
+nation holds the country behind them; that, in one word, Peter, in this
+quarter, at least, but took hold of what was absolutely necessary for
+the natural development of his country. From this point of view, Peter
+the Great intended, by his war against Sweden, only rearing a Russian
+Liverpool, and endowing it with its indispensable strip of coast.</p>
+
+<p>But then, one great fact is slighted over, the <i>tour de force</i> by which
+he transferred the capital of the Empire from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88"></a>[<a href="images/092.png">88</a>]</span> inland centre to the
+maritime extremity, the characteristic boldness with which he erected
+the new capital on the first strip of Baltic coast he conquered, almost
+within gunshot of the frontier, thus deliberately giving his dominions
+an <i>eccentric centre</i>. To transfer the throne of the Czars from Moscow
+to Petersburg was to place it in a position where it could not be safe,
+even from insult, until the whole coast from Libau to Tornea was
+subdued&mdash;a work not completed till 1809, by the conquest of Finland.
+"St. Petersburg is the window from which Russia can overlook Europe,"
+said Algarotti. It was from the first a defiance to the Europeans, an
+incentive to further conquest to the Russians. The fortifications in our
+own days of Russian Poland are only a further step in the execution of
+the same idea. Modlin, Warsaw, Ivangorod, are more than citadels to keep
+a rebellious country in check. They are the same menace to the west
+which Petersburg, in its immediate bearing, was a hundred years ago to
+the north. They are to transform Russia into Panslavonia, as the Baltic
+provinces were to transform Muscovy into Russia.</p>
+
+<p>Petersburg, the <i>eccentric centre</i> of the empire, pointed at once to a
+periphery still to be drawn.</p>
+
+<p>It is, then, not the mere conquest of the Baltic provinces which
+separates the policy of Peter the Great from that of his ancestors, but
+it is the transfer of the capital which reveals the true meaning of his
+Baltic conquests. Petersburg was not like Muscovy, the centre of a race,
+but the seat of a government; not the slow work of a people, but the
+instantaneous creation of a man; not the medium from which the
+peculiarities of an inland people radiate, but the maritime extremity
+where they are lost; not the traditionary nucleus of a national
+development, but the deliberately chosen abode of a cosmopolitan
+intrigue. By the transfer of the capital, Peter cut off the natural
+ligaments which bound up the encroaching system of the old Muscovite
+Czars with the natural abilities and aspirations of the great Russian
+race. By planting his capital on the margin of a sea, he put to open
+defiance the anti-maritime instincts of that race, and degraded it to a
+mere weight in his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89"></a>[<a href="images/093.png">89</a>]</span>political mechanism. Since the 16th century Muscovy
+had made no important acquisitions but on the side of Siberia, and to
+the 16th century the dubious conquests made towards the west and the
+south were only brought about by direct agency on the east. By the
+transfer of the capital, Peter proclaimed that he, on the contrary,
+intended working on the east and the immediately neighbouring countries
+through the agency of the west. If the agency through the east was
+narrowly circumscribed by the stationary character and the limited
+relations of Asiatic peoples, the agency through the west became at once
+illimited and universal from the movable character and the all-sided
+relations of Western Europe. The transfer of the capital denoted this
+intended change of agency, which the conquest of the Baltic provinces
+afforded the means of achieving, by securing at once to Russia the
+supremacy among the neighbouring Northern States; by putting it into
+immediate and constant contact with all points of Europe; by laying the
+basis of a material bond with the maritime Powers, which by this
+conquest became dependent on Russia for their naval stores; a dependence
+not existing as long as Muscovy, the country that produced the great
+bulk of the naval stores, had got no outlets of its own; while Sweden,
+the Power that held these outlets, had not got the country lying behind them.</p>
+
+<p>If the Muscovite Czars, who worked their encroachments by the agency
+principally of the Tartar Khans, were obliged to <i>tartarize</i> Muscovy,
+Peter the Great, who resolved upon working through the agency of the
+west, was obliged to <i>civilize</i> Russia. In grasping upon the Baltic
+provinces, he seized at once the tools necessary for this process. They
+afforded him not only the diplomatists and the generals, the brains with
+which to execute his system of political and military action on the
+west, they yielded him, at the same time, a crop of bureaucrats,
+schoolmasters, and drill-sergeants, who were to drill Russians into that
+varnish of civilization that adapts them to the technical appliances of
+the Western peoples, without imbuing them with their ideas.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90"></a>[<a href="images/094.png">90</a>]</span></p><p>Neither the Sea of Azof, nor the Black Sea, nor the Caspian Sea, could
+open to Peter this direct passage to Europe. Besides, during his
+lifetime still Taganrog, Azof, the Black Sea, with its new-formed
+Russian fleets, ports, and dockyards, were again abandoned or given up
+to the Turk. The Persian conquest, too, proved a premature enterprise.
+Of the four wars which fill the military life of Peter the Great, his
+first war, that against Turkey, the fruits of which were lost in a
+second Turkish war, continued in one respect the traditionary struggle
+with the Tartars. In another respect, it was but the prelude to the war
+against Sweden, of which the second Turkish war forms an episode and the
+Persian war an epilogue. Thus the war against Sweden, lasting during
+twenty-one years, almost absorbs the military life of Peter the Great.
+Whether we consider its purpose, its results, or its endurance, we may
+justly call it <i>the</i> war of Peter the Great. His whole creation hinges
+upon the conquest of the Baltic coast.</p>
+
+<p>Now, suppose we were altogether ignorant of the details of his
+operations, military and diplomatic. The mere fact that the conversion
+of Muscovy into Russia was brought about by its transformation from a
+half-Asiatic inland country into the paramount maritime Power of the
+Baltic, would it not enforce upon us the conclusion that England, the
+greatest maritime Power of that epoch&mdash;a maritime Power lying, too, at
+the very gates of the Baltic, where, since the middle of the 17th
+century, she had maintained the attitude of supreme arbiter&mdash;that
+England must have had her hand in this great change, that she must have
+proved the main prop or the main impediment of the plans of Peter the
+Great, that during the long protracted and deadly struggle between
+Sweden and Russia she must have turned the balance, that if we do not
+find her straining every nerve in order to save the Swede we may be sure
+of her having employed all the means at her disposal for furthering the
+Muscovite? And yet, in what is commonly called history, England does
+hardly appear on the plan of this grand drama, and is represented as a
+spectator rather than as an actor. Real history will show that the
+Khans<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91"></a>[<a href="images/095.png">91</a>]</span> of the Golden Horde were no more instrumental in realizing the
+plans of Ivan III. and his predecessors than the rulers of England were
+in realizing the plans of Peter I. and his successors.</p>
+
+<p>The pamphlets which we have reprinted, written as they were by English
+contemporaries of Peter the Great, are far from concurring in the common
+delusions of later historians. They emphatically denounce England as the
+mightiest tool of Russia. The same position is taken up by the pamphlet
+of which we shall now give a short analysis, and with which we shall
+conclude the introduction to the diplomatic revelations. It is entitled,
+"<i>Truth is but Truth as it is timed; or, our Ministry's present measures
+against the Muscovite vindicated</i>, etc., etc. Humbly dedicated to the
+House of C., London, 1719."</p>
+
+<p>The former pamphlets we have reprinted, were written at, or shortly
+after, the time when, to use the words of a modern admirer of Russia,
+"Peter traversed the Baltic Sea as master at the head of the combined
+squadrons of all the northern Powers, England included, which gloried in
+sailing under his orders." In 1719, however, when <i>Truth is but Truth</i>
+was published, the face of affairs seemed altogether changed. Charles
+XII. was dead, and the English Government now pretended to side with
+Sweden, and to wage war against Russia. There are other circumstances
+connected with this anonymous pamphlet which claim particular notice. It
+purports to be an extract from a relation, which, on his return from
+Muscovy, in August, 1715, its author, by order of George I., drew up and
+handed over to Viscount Townshend, then Secretary of State.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"It happens," says he, "to be an advantage that at present I may
+own to have been the first so happy to foresee, or honest to
+forewarn our Court here, of the absolute necessity of our then
+breaking with the Czar, and shutting him out again of the Baltic."
+"My relation discovered his aim as to other States, and even to the
+German Empire, to which, although an inland Power, he had offered
+to annex Livonia as an Electorate, so that he could but be admitted
+as an elector. It drew attention to the Czar's then contemplated
+assumption of the title of Autocrator. Being head of the Greek
+Church he would be owned by the other potentates as head of the
+Greek Empire. I am not to say<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92"></a>[<a href="images/096.png">92</a>]</span> how reluctant we would be to
+acknowledge that title, since we have already made an ambassador
+treat him with the title of Imperial Majesty, which the Swede has
+never yet condescended to."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>For some time attached to the British Embassy in Muscovy, our author, as
+he states, was later on "<i>dismissed the service, because the Czar
+desired it</i>," having made sure that</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I had given our Court such light into his affairs as is contained
+in this paper; for which I beg leave to appeal to the King, and to
+vouch the Viscount Townshend, who heard his Majesty give that
+vindication." "And yet, notwithstanding all this, I have been for
+these five years past kept soliciting for a very long arrear still
+due, and whereof I contracted the greatest part in executing a
+commission for her late Majesty."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The anti-Muscovite attitude, suddenly assumed by the Stanhope Cabinet,
+our author looks to in rather a sceptic mood.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I do not pretend to foreclose, by this paper, the Ministry of that
+applause due to them from the public, when they shall satisfy us as
+to what the motives were which made them, till but yesterday,
+straiten the Swede in everything, although then our ally as much as
+now; or strengthen, by all the ways they could, the Czar, although
+under no tie, but barely that of amity with Great Britain.... At
+the minute I write this I learn that the gentleman who brought the
+Muscovites, not yet three years ago, as a royal navy, not under our
+protection, on their first appearance in the Baltic, is again
+authorized by the persons now in power, to give the Czar a second
+meeting in these seas. For what reason or to what good end?"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The gentleman hinted at is Admiral Norris, whose Baltic campaign against
+Peter I. seems, indeed, to be the original pattern upon which the recent
+naval campaigns of Admirals Napier and Dundas were cut out.</p>
+
+<p>The restoration to Sweden of the Baltic provinces is required by the
+commercial as well as the political interest of Great Britain. Such is
+the pith of our author's argument:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Trade is become the very life of our State; and what food is to
+life, naval stores are to a fleet. The whole trade we drive with
+all the other nations of the earth, at best, is but lucrative;
+this, of the north, is indispensably needful, and may not be
+improperly termed the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93"></a>[<a href="images/097.png">93</a>]</span><i>sacra embole</i> of Great Britain, as being
+its chiefest foreign vent, for the support of all our trade, and
+our safety at home. As woollen manufactures and minerals are the
+staple commodities of Great Britain, so are likewise naval stores
+those of Muscovy, as also of all those very provinces in the Baltic
+which the Czar has so lately wrested from the crown of Sweden.
+Since those provinces have been in the Czar's possession, Pernan is
+entirely waste. At Revel we have not one British merchant left, and
+all the trade which was formerly at Narwa is now brought to
+Petersburg.... The Swede could never possibly engross the trade of
+our subjects, because those seaports in his hands were but so many
+thoroughfares from whence these commodities were uttered, the
+places of their produce or manufacture lying behind those ports, in
+the dominions of the Czar. But, if left to the Czar, these Baltic
+ports are no more thoroughfares, but peculiar magazines from the
+inland countries of the Czar's own dominions. Having already
+Archangel in the White Sea, to leave him but any seaport in the
+Baltic were to put no less in his hands than the <i>two keys of the
+general magazines of all the naval stores of Europe</i>; it being
+known that Danes, Swedes, Poles, and Prussians have but single and
+distinct branches of those commodities in their several dominions.
+If the Czar should thus engross 'the supply of what we cannot do
+without,' where then is our fleet? Or, indeed, where is the
+security for all our trade to any part of the earth besides?"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>If, then, the interest of British commerce requires to exclude the Czar
+from the Baltic, the interest of our State ought to be no less a spur to
+quicken us to that attempt. By the interest of our State I would be
+understood to mean neither the party measures of a Ministry, nor any
+foreign motives of a Court, but precisely what is, and ever must be, the
+immediate concern, either for the safety, ease, dignity, or emolument of
+the Crown, as well as the common weal of Great Britain. With respect to
+the Baltic, it has "from the earliest period of our naval power" always
+been considered a fundamental interest of our State: first, to prevent
+the rise there of any new maritime Power; and, secondly, to maintain the
+balance of power between Denmark and Sweden.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"One instance of the wisdom and foresight of our <i>then truly
+British statesmen</i> is the peace at Stalboa, in the year 1617. James
+the First was the mediator of that treaty, by which the Muscovite
+was obliged to give up all the provinces which he then was
+possessed of in the Baltic, and to be barely an inland Power on
+this side of Europe."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94"></a>[<a href="images/098.png">94</a>]</span></p><p>The same policy of preventing a new maritime Power from starting in the
+Baltic was acted upon by Sweden and Denmark.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Who knows not that the Emperor's attempt to get a seaport in
+Pomerania weighed no less with the great Gustavus than any other
+motive for carrying his arms even into the bowels of the house of
+Austria? What befel, at the times of Charles Gustavus, the crown of
+Poland itself, who, besides it being in those days by far the
+mightiest of any of the northern Powers, had then a long stretch of
+coast on, and some ports in, the Baltic? The Danes, though then in
+alliance with Poland, would never allow them, even for their
+assistance against the Swedes, to have a fleet in the Baltic, but
+destroyed the Polish ships wherever they could meet them."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As to the maintenance of the balance of power between the established
+maritime States of the Baltic, the tradition of British policy is no
+less clear. "When the Swedish power gave us some uneasiness there by
+threatening to crush Denmark," the honour of our country was kept up by
+retrieving the then inequality of the balance of power.</p>
+
+<p>The Commonwealth of England sent in a squadron to the Baltic which
+brought on the treaty of Roskild (1658), afterwards confirmed at
+Copenhagen (1660). The fire of straw kindled by the Danes in the times
+of King William III. was as speedily quenched by George Rock in the
+treaty of Copenhagen.</p>
+
+<p>Such was the hereditary British policy.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"It never entered into the mind of the politicians of those times
+in order to bring the scale again to rights, to find out the happy
+<i>expedient of raising a third naval Power</i> for framing a juster
+balance in the Baltic.... Who has taken this counsel against Tyre,
+the crowning city, whose merchants are princes, whose traffickers
+are the honourables of the earth? <i>Ego autem neminem nomino, quare
+irasci mihi nemo poterit, nisi qui ante de se noluerit confiteri.</i>
+Posterity will be under some difficulty to believe that this could
+be the <i>work of any of the persons now in power</i> ... that <i>we</i> have
+opened; <i>St. Petersburg to the Czar solely at our own expense, and
+without any risk to him</i>...."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The safest line of policy would be to return to the treaty of Itolbowa,
+and to suffer the Muscovite no longer "to nestle<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95"></a>[<a href="images/099.png">95</a>]</span> in the Baltic." Yet,
+it may be said, that in "the present state of affairs" it would be
+"difficult to retrieve the advantage we have lost by not curbing, when
+it was more easy, the growth of the Muscovite power." A middle course
+may be thought more convenient.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"If we should find it consistent with the welfare of our State that
+the Muscovite have an inlet into the Baltic, as having, of all the
+princes of Europe, a country that can be made most beneficial to
+its prince, by uttering its produce to foreign markets. In this
+case, it were but reasonable to expect, on the other hand, that in
+return for our complying so far with his interest, for the
+improvement of his country, his Czarish Majesty, on his part,
+should demand nothing that may tend to the disturbance of another;
+and, therefore, contenting himself with ships of trade, should
+demand none of war."</p>
+
+<p>"We should thus preclude his hopes of being ever more than an
+inland Power," but "obviate every objection of using the Czar worse
+than any Sovereign Prince may expect. I shall not for this give an
+instance of a Republic of Genoa, or another in the Baltic itself,
+of the Duke of Courland; but will assign Poland and Prussia, who,
+though both now crowned heads, have ever contented themselves with
+the freedom of an open traffic, without insisting on a fleet. Or
+the treaty of Falczin, between the Turk and Muscovite, by which
+Peter was forced not only to restore Asoph, and to part with all
+his men-of-war in those parts, but also to content himself with the
+bare freedom of traffic in the Black Sea. Even an inlet in the
+Baltic for trade is much beyond what he could morally have promised
+himself not yet so long ago on the issue of his war with Sweden."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>If the Czar refuse to agree to such "a healing temperament," we shall
+have "nothing to regret but the time we lost to exert all the means that
+Heaven has made us master of, to reduce him to a peace advantageous to
+Great Britain." War would become inevitable. In that case</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"it ought no less to animate our Ministry to pursue their present
+measures, than fire with indignation the breast of every honest
+Briton that a Czar of Muscovy, who owes his naval skill to our
+instructions, and his grandeur to our forbearance, should so soon
+deny to Great Britain the terms which so few years ago he was fain
+to take up with from the Sublime Porte."</p>
+
+<p>"'Tis every way our interest to have the Swede restored to those
+provinces which the Muscovite has wrested from that crown in the
+Baltic. <i>Great Britain can no longer hold the balance in that
+sea</i>,"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96"></a>[<a href="images/100.png">96</a>]</span> since she "<i>has raised the Muscovite to be a maritime Power
+there</i>.... Had we performed the articles of our alliance made by
+King William with the crown of Sweden, that gallant nation would
+ever have been a bar strong enough against the Czar coming into the
+Baltic.... Time must confirm us, that the Muscovite's <i>expulsion
+from the Baltic</i> is <i>now</i> the principal end of our Ministry."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<hr class="smler" />
+
+<p class="center">Butler &amp; Tanner. The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London.</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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+Eighteenth Century, by Karl Marx
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+</body>
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@@ -0,0 +1,3669 @@
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Secret Diplomatic History of The Eighteenth
+Century, by Karl Marx
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Secret Diplomatic History of The Eighteenth Century
+
+Author: Karl Marx
+
+Editor: Eleanor Marx Aveling
+
+Release Date: May 14, 2010 [EBook #32370]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Martin Pettit and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Demy 8vo, pp._ 656, xvi. 10_s._ 6_d._
+
+THE EASTERN QUESTION.
+
+Letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the Crimean War.
+
+By KARL MARX.
+
+Edited by ELEANOR MARX AVELING and EDWARD AVELING.
+
+
+                         OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.
+
+     "With all Marx's faults and his extravagant abuse of high political
+     personages, one cannot but admire the man's strength of mind, the
+     courage of his opinions, and his scorn and contempt for everything
+     small, petty, and mean. Although many and great changes have taken
+     place since these papers appeared, they are still valuable not only
+     for the elucidation of the past, but also for throwing a clearer
+     light upon the present as also upon the future."--_Westminster
+     Review._
+
+     "All that Marx's hand set itself to do, it did with all its might,
+     and in this volume, as in the rest of his work, we see the
+     indefatigable energy, the wonderful grasp of detail, and the keen
+     and marvellous foresight of a master mind."--_Justice._
+
+     "A very masterly analysis of the condition, political, economic and
+     social, of the Turkish Empire, which is as true to-day as when it
+     was written."--_Daily Chronicle._
+
+     "The letters contain an enormous amount of well-digested
+     information, and display great critical acumen, amounting in some
+     cases almost to prevision. The biographical interest of the volume
+     is also pronounced, for prominent men of that period are dissected
+     and analysed with a vigour and freedom which are as refreshing to
+     readers as they would be disconcerting to their subjects were they
+     alive. A perusal of the book must greatly tend to a clearer
+     perception of the later Eastern issues, which are now engaging the
+     attention and testing the diplomatic talents of the ambassadors at
+     Constantinople."--_Liverpool Post._
+
+
+LONDON: SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
+
+BY
+
+KARL MARX
+
+Edited by his Daughter ELEANOR MARX AVELING
+
+[Illustration: Logo]
+
+LONDON
+SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED
+PATERNOSTER SQUARE
+1899
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+BUTLER & TANNER,
+THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,
+FROME, AND LONDON.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+PUBLISHER'S PREFACE
+
+In the Preface to "The Eastern Question," by Karl Marx, published in
+1897, the Editors, Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, referred to
+two series of papers entitled "The Story of the Life of Lord
+Palmerston," and "Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century,"
+which they promised to publish at an early date.
+
+Mrs. Aveling did not live long enough to see these papers through the
+press, but she left them in such a forward state, and we have had so
+many inquiries about them since, that we venture to issue them without
+Mrs. Aveling's final revision in two shilling pamphlets.
+
+THE PUBLISHERS.
+
+
+
+
+Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+
+NO. 1. MR. RONDEAU TO HORACE WALPOLE.
+
+"PETERSBURG, _17th August, 1736_.[1]
+
+" ... I heartily wish ... that the Turks could be brought to condescend
+to make the first step, for this Court seems resolved to hearken to
+nothing till that is done, to mortify the Porte, that has on all
+occasions spoken of the Russians with the greatest contempt, which the
+Czarina and her present Ministers cannot bear. Instead of being obliged
+to Sir Everard Fawkner and Mr. Thalman (the former the British, the
+latter the Dutch Ambassador at Constantinople), for informing them of
+the good dispositions of the Turks, Count Oestermann will not be
+persuaded that the Porte is sincere, and seemed very much surprised that
+they had written to them (the Russian Cabinet) without order of the King
+and the States-General, or without being desired by the Grand Vizier,
+and that their letter had not been concerted with the Emperor's Minister
+at Constantinople.... I have shown Count Biron and Count Oestermann the
+two letters the Grand Vizier has written to the King, and at the same
+time told these gentlemen that as there was in them several hard
+reflections on this Court, I should not have communicated them if they
+had not been so desirous to see them. Count Biron said that was nothing,
+for they were used to be treated in this manner by the Turks. I desired
+their Excellencies not to let the Porte know that they had seen these
+letters, which would sooner aggravate matters than contribute to make
+them up...."
+
+
+NO. 2. SIR GEORGE MACARTNEY TO THE EARL OF SANDWICH.
+
+"ST. PETERSBURG, _1st (12th) March, 1765_.
+
+"Most Secret.[2]
+
+" ... Yesterday M. Panin[3] and the Vice-Chancellor, together with M.
+Osten, the Danish Minister, signed a treaty of alliance between this
+Court and that of Copenhagen. By one of the articles, a war with Turkey
+is made a _casus foederis_; and whenever that event happens, Denmark
+binds herself to pay Russia a subsidy of 500,000 roubles per annum, by
+quarterly payments. Denmark also, by a most secret article, promises to
+disengage herself from all French connections, demanding only a limited
+time to endeavour to obtain the arrears due to her by the Court of
+France. At all events, she is immediately to enter into all the views of
+Russia in Sweden, and to act entirely, though not openly, with her in
+that kingdom. Either I am deceived or M. Gross[4] has misunderstood his
+instructions, when he told your lordship that Russia intended to stop
+short, and leave all the burden of Sweden upon England. However desirous
+this Court may be that we should pay a large proportion of every
+pecuniary engagement, yet, I am assured, she will always choose to take
+the lead at Stockholm. Her design, her ardent wish, is to make a common
+cause with England and Denmark, for the total annihilation of the French
+interest there. This certainly cannot be done without a considerable
+expense; but Russia, at present, does not seem unreasonable enough to
+expect that WE SHOULD PAY THE WHOLE. It has been hinted to me that
+L1,500 per annum, on our part, would be sufficient to support our
+interest, and absolutely prevent the French from ever getting at
+Stockholm again.
+
+"The Swedes, highly sensible of, and very much mortified at, the
+dependent situation they have been in for many years, are extremely
+jealous of every Power that intermeddles in their affairs, and
+particularly so of their neighbours the Russians. This is the reason
+assigned to me for this Court's desiring that we and they should act
+upon SEPARATE bottoms, still preserving between our respective Ministers
+a confidence without reserve. That our first care should be, not to
+establish a faction under the name of a Russian or of an English
+faction; but, as even the wisest men are imposed upon by a mere name, to
+endeavour to have OUR friends distinguished as the friends of liberty
+and independence. At present we have a superiority, and the generality
+of the nation is persuaded how very ruinous their French connections
+have been, and, if continued, how very destructive they will be of their
+true interests. M. Panin does by no means desire that the smallest
+change should be made in the constitution of Sweden.[5] He wishes that
+the royal authority might be preserved without being augmented, and that
+the privileges of the people should be continued without violation. He
+was not, however, without his fears of the ambitious and intriguing
+spirit of the Queen, but the great ministerial vigilance of Count
+Oestermann has now entirely quieted his apprehensions on that head.
+
+"By this new alliance with Denmark, and by the success in Sweden, which
+this Court has no doubt of, if properly seconded, M. Panin will, in some
+measure, have brought to bear his grand scheme of uniting the Powers of
+the North.[6] Nothing, then, will be wanted to render it entirely
+perfect, but the conclusion of a treaty alliance with Great Britain. I
+am persuaded this Court desires it most ardently. The Empress has
+expressed herself more than once, in terms that marked it strongly. Her
+ambition is to form, by such an union, a certain counterpoise to the
+family compact,[7] and to disappoint, as much as possible, all the views
+of the Courts of Vienna and Versailles, against which she is irritated
+with uncommon resentment. I am not, however, to conceal from your
+lordship that we can have no hope of any such alliance, unless we agree,
+by some secret article, to pay a subsidy in case of a Turkish war, for
+no money will be desired from us, except upon an emergency of that
+nature. I flatter myself I have persuaded this Court of the
+unreasonableness of expecting any subsidy in time of peace, and that an
+alliance upon an equal footing will be more safe and more honourable for
+both nations. I can assure your lordship that a Turkish war's being a
+_casus foederis_, inserted either in the body of the treaty or in a
+secret article, will be a _sine qua non_ in every negotiation we may
+have to open with this Court. The obstinacy of M. Panin upon that point
+is owing to the accident I am going to mention. When the treaty between
+the Emperor and the King of Prussia was in agitation, the Count
+Bestoucheff, who is a mortal enemy to the latter, proposed the Turkish
+clause, persuaded that the King of Prussia would never submit to it, and
+flattering himself with the hopes of blowing up that negotiation by his
+refusal. But this old politician, it seemed, was mistaken in his
+conjecture, for his Majesty immediately consented to the proposal on
+condition that Russia should make no alliance with any other Power but
+on the same terms.[8] This is the real fact, and to confirm it, a few
+days since, Count Solme, the Prussian Minister, came to visit me, and
+told me that if this Court had any intention of concluding an alliance
+with ours without such a clause, he had orders to oppose it in the
+strongest manner. Hints have been given me that if Great Britain were
+less inflexible in that article, Russia will be less inflexible in the
+article of export duties in the Treaty of Commerce, which M. Gross told
+your lordship this Court would never depart from. I was assured at the
+same time, by a person in the highest degree of confidence with M.
+Panin, that if we entered upon the Treaty of Alliance the Treaty of
+Commerce would go on with it _passibus aequis_; that then the latter
+would be entirely taken out of the hands of the College of Trade, where
+so many cavils and altercations had been made, and would be settled only
+between the Minister and myself, and that he was sure it would be
+concluded to our satisfaction, provided the Turkish clause was admitted
+into the Treaty of Alliance. I was told, also, that in case the
+Spaniards attacked Portugal, we might have 15,000 Russians in our pay to
+send upon that service. I must entreat your lordship on no account to
+mention to M. Gross the secret article of the Danish Treaty.... That
+gentleman, I am afraid, is no well-wisher to England."[9]
+
+
+NO. 3.--SIR JAMES HARRIS TO LORD GRANTHAM.
+
+"Petersburg, 16 (27 August), 1782.
+
+"(Private.)
+
+" ... On my arrival here I found the Court very different from what it
+had been described to me. So far from any partiality to England, its
+bearings were entirely French. The King of Prussia (then in possession
+of the Empress' ear) was exerting his influence against us. Count Panin
+assisted him powerfully; Lacy and Corberon, the Bourbon Ministers, were
+artful and intriguing; Prince Potemkin had been wrought upon by them;
+and the whole tribe which surrounded the Empress--the Schuwaloffs,
+Stroganoffs, and Chernicheffs--were what they still are, _garcons
+perruquiers de Paris_. Events seconded their endeavours. The assistance
+the French affected to afford Russia in settling its disputes with the
+Porte, and the two Courts being immediately after united as mediators at
+the Peace of Teschen, contributed not a little to reconcile them to each
+other. I was, therefore, not surprised that all my negotiations with
+Count Panin, _from February, 1778, to July, 1779_, should be
+unsuccessful, as he meant to prevent, not to promote, an alliance. It
+was in vain we made concessions to obtain it. He ever started fresh
+difficulties; had ever fresh obstacles ready. A very serious evil
+resulted, in the meanwhile, from my apparent confidence in him. He
+availed himself of it to convey in his reports to the Empress, not the
+language I employed, and the sentiments I actually expressed, but the
+language and sentiments he wished I should employ and express. He was
+equally careful to conceal her opinions and feelings from me; and while
+he described England to her as obstinate, and overbearing, and reserved,
+he described the Empress to me as displeased, disgusted, and indifferent
+to our concerns; and he was so convinced that, by this double
+misrepresentation, he had shut up every avenue of success that, at the
+time when I presented to him the Spanish declaration, he ventured to say
+to me, ministerially, '_That Great Britain had, by its own haughty
+conduct, brought down all its misfortunes on itself; that they were now
+at their height; that we must consent to any concession to obtain peace;
+and that we could expect neither assistance from our friends nor
+forbearance from our enemies._' I had temper enough not to give way to
+my feelings on this occasion.... I applied, without loss of time, to
+Prince Potemkin, and, by his means, the Empress _condescended_ to see me
+alone at Peterhoff. I was so fortunate in this interview, as not only to
+efface all bad impressions she had against us, but by stating in its
+true light, our situation, and THE INSEPARABLE INTERESTS OF GREAT
+BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, to raise in her mind a decided resolution to assist
+us. _This resolution she declared to me in express words._ When this
+transpired--and Count Panin was the first who knew it--he became my
+implacable and inveterate enemy. He not only thwarted by falsehoods and
+by a most undue exertion of his influence my public negotiations, but
+employed every means the lowest and most vindictive malice could suggest
+to depreciate and injure me personally; and from the very infamous
+accusations with which he charged me, had I been prone to fear, I might
+have apprehended the most infamous attacks at his hands. This relentless
+persecution still continues; it has outlived his Ministry.
+_Notwithstanding the positive assurances I had received from the Empress
+herself_, he found means, first to stagger, and afterwards to alter her
+resolutions. He was, indeed, very officiously assisted by his Prussian
+Majesty, who, at the time, was as much bent on oversetting our interest
+as he now seems eager to restore it. I was not, however, disheartened by
+this first disappointment, and, by redoubling my efforts, _I have twice
+more, during the course of my mission, brought the Empress to the verge_
+(!) _of standing forth our professed friend_, and, each time, my
+_expectations were grounded on assurances from her own mouth_. The first
+was when _our enemies conjured up the armed_ neutrality;[10] the other
+WHEN MINORCA WAS OFFERED HER. Although, on the first of these occasions,
+I found the same opposition from the same quarter I had experienced
+before, yet I am compelled to say that the principal cause of my failure
+was attributable to the very awkward manner in which we replied to the
+famous neutral declaration of February, 1780. As I well knew from what
+quarter the blow would come, I was prepared to parry it. _My opinion
+was: 'If England feels itself strong enough to do without Russia, let it
+reject at once these new-fangled doctrines; but if its situation is such
+as to want assistance, let it yield to the necessity of the hour,
+recognise them as far as they relate to_ RUSSIA ALONE, _and by a
+well-timed act of complaisance insure itself a powerful friend._'[11] My
+opinion was _not_ received; an ambiguous and trimming answer was given;
+_we seemed equally afraid to accept or dismiss them. I was instructed
+secretly to oppose, but avowedly to acquiesce in them_, and some
+unguarded expressions of one of its then confidential servants, made use
+of in speaking to Mr. Simolin, in direct contradiction to the temperate
+and cordial language that Minister had heard from Lord Stormont,
+_irritated_ the Empress to the last degree, and completed the _dislike_
+and _bad opinion_ she entertained of that Administration.[12] Our
+enemies took advantage of these _circumstances_.... I SUGGESTED THE IDEA
+OF GIVING UP MINORCA TO THE EMPRESS, _because, as it was evident to me
+we should at the peace be compelled to make sacrifices, it seemed to me
+wiser to make them to our friends than to our enemies_. THE IDEA WAS
+ADOPTED AT HOME IN ITS WHOLE EXTENT,[13] _and nothing could be more
+perfectly calculated to the meridian of this Court than the judicious
+instructions I received on this occasion from Lord Stormont. Why_ this
+project failed I am still at a loss to learn. _I never knew the Empress
+incline so strongly to any one measure as she did to this, before I had
+my full powers to treat, nor was I ever more astonished than when I
+found her shrink from her purpose when they arrived._ I imputed it at
+the same time, in my own mind, to the _rooted aversion she had for our
+Ministry_, and her _total want of confidence in them_; but I since am
+more strongly disposed to believe that she consulted the Emperor (of
+Austria) on the subject, and that he not only prevailed on her to
+decline the offer, but betrayed the secret to France, and that it thus
+became public. I cannot otherwise account for this rapid _change of
+sentiment in the Empress_, particularly as _Prince Potemkin_ (whatever
+he might be in other transactions) was certainly in this _cordial and
+sincere_ in his support, and both from what I saw at the time, and from
+what has since come to my knowledge, _had its success at heart as much
+as myself_. You will observe, my lord, that _the idea of bringing the
+Empress forward as a friendly mediatrix went hand-in-hand with the
+proposed cession of Minorca_. As this idea has given rise to what has
+since followed, and involved us in all the dilemmas of the present
+mediation, it will be necessary for me to explain what my views then
+were, and to exculpate myself from the blame of having placed my Court
+in so embarrassing a situation, _my wish and intention was that she
+should be sole mediatrix without an adjoint_; if you have perused what
+passed between her and me, in December, 1780, your lordship will readily
+perceive how very potent reasons I had to imagine she would be a
+friendly and even a partial one.[14] I knew, indeed, she was unequal to
+the task; but I knew, too, how greatly _her vanity_ would be flattered
+by this distinction, and was well aware that when once engaged she would
+persist, and be inevitably involved in our quarrel, particularly when it
+should appear (and appear it would) that we had _gratified_ her with
+Minorca. The annexing to the mediation the other (Austrian) Imperial
+Court entirely overthrew this plan. It not only afforded her a pretence
+for not keeping her word, but piqued and mortified her; and it was under
+this impression that she made over the whole business to the colleague
+we had given her, and ordered her Minister at Vienna to subscribe
+implicitly to whatever the Court proposed. Hence all the evils which
+have since arisen, and hence those we at this moment experience. I
+myself could never be brought to believe that the Court of Vienna, as
+long as Prince Kaunitz directs its measures, can mean England any good
+or France any harm. It was not with that view that I endeavoured to
+promote its influence here, but because _I found that of Prussia in
+constant opposition to me_; and because I thought that if I could by any
+means smite this, I should get rid of my greatest obstacle. I was
+mistaken, and, by a singular fatality, the Courts of Vienna and Berlin
+seem never to have agreed in anything but in the disposition to
+prejudice us here by turns.[15] The proposal relative to Minorca was the
+last attempt I made to induce the Empress to stand forth. I had
+exhausted my strength and resources; the freedom with which I had spoken
+in my last interview with her, though respectful, had _displeased_; and
+_from this period to the removal of the late Administration_, I have
+been reduced to act on the defensive.... I have had more difficulty in
+preventing the Empress from doing harm than I ever had in attempting to
+engage her to do us good. It was to prevent evil, that I inclined
+strongly for the acceptation of _her single mediation between us and
+Holland, when her Imperial Majesty first offered it_. The _extreme
+dissatisfaction_ she expressed _at our refusal_ justified my opinion;
+and I TOOK UPON ME, when it was proposed a second time, _to urge the
+necessity of its being agreed to_ (ALTHOUGH I KNEW IT TO BE IN
+CONTRADICTION OF THE SENTIMENTS OF MY PRINCIPAL), since I firmly
+believed, had we again declined it, the Empress would, in a _moment of
+anger_, have joined the Dutch against us. As it is, _all has gone on
+well_; our _judicious_ conduct has transferred to them the _ill-humour_
+she originally was in with us, and she now is as partial to our cause as
+she was before partial to theirs. _Since the new Ministry in England, my
+road has been made smoother_; the great and new path struck out by _your
+predecessor,[16] and which you, my lord, pursue_, has operated a most
+advantageous change in our favour upon the Continent. Nothing, indeed,
+but events which come home to her, will, I believe, ever induce her
+Imperial Majesty to take an active part; but there is now a _strong glow
+of friendship_ in our favour; she approves our measures; she _trusts_
+our Ministry, and _she gives way to that predilection she certainly has
+for our nation_. Our enemies know and feel this; it keeps them in awe.
+This is a succinct but accurate sketch of what has passed at this Court
+from the day of my arrival at Petersburg to the present hour. Several
+inferences may be deduced from it.[17] That the Empress is led by her
+passions, not by reason and argument; that her prejudices are very
+strong, easily acquired, and, when once fixed, irremovable; while, on
+the contrary, there is no sure road to her good opinion; that even when
+obtained, it is subject to perpetual fluctuation, and liable to be
+biassed by the most trifling incidents; that till she is fairly embarked
+in a plan, no assurances can be depended on; but that when once fairly
+embarked, she never retracts, and may be carried any length; that with
+very bright parts, an elevated mind, an uncommon sagacity, she wants
+_judgment_, _precision of idea_, _reflection_, _and_ L'ESPRIT DE
+COMBINAISON(!!) That her Ministers are either ignorant of, or
+indifferent to, the welfare of the State, and act from a passive
+submission to her will, or from motives of party and private
+interests."[18]
+
+
+4. (MANUSCRIPT) ACCOUNT OF RUSSIA DURING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE REIGN
+OF THE EMPEROR PAUL, DRAWN UP BY THE REV. L. K. PITT, CHAPLAIN TO THE
+FACTORY OF ST. PETERSBURG, AND A NEAR RELATIVE OF WILLIAM PITT.[19]
+
+_Extract._
+
+
+     "There can scarcely exist a doubt concerning the real sentiments of
+     the late Empress of Russia on the great points which have, within
+     the last few years, convulsed the whole system of European
+     politics. She certainly felt from the beginning the fatal tendency
+     of the new principles, but was not, perhaps, displeased to see
+     every European Power exhausting itself in a struggle which raised,
+     in proportion to its violence, her own importance. It is more than
+     probable that the state of the newly acquired provinces in Poland
+     was likewise a point which had considerable influence over the
+     political conduct of Catherine. The fatal effects resulting from an
+     apprehension of revolt in the late seat of conquest seem to have
+     been felt in a very great degree by the combined Powers, who in the
+     early period of the Revolution were so near reinstating the regular
+     Government in France. The same dread of revolt in Poland, which
+     divided the attention of the combined Powers and hastened their
+     retreat, deterred likewise the late Empress of Russia from entering
+     on the great theatre of war, until a combination of circumstances
+     rendered the progress of the French armies a more dangerous evil
+     than any which could possibly result to the Russian Empire from
+     active operations.... The last words which the Empress was known to
+     utter were addressed to her Secretary when she dismissed him on the
+     morning on which she was seized: 'Tell Prince' (Zuboff), she said,
+     'to come to me at twelve, and to remind me of signing the Treaty of
+     Alliance with England.'"
+
+
+Having entered into ample considerations on the Emperor Paul's acts and
+extravagances, the Rev. Mr. Pitt continues as follows:
+
+
+     "When these considerations are impressed on the mind, the nature of
+     the late secession from the coalition, and of the incalculable
+     indignities offered to the Government of Great Britain, can alone
+     be fairly estimated.... BUT THE TIES WHICH BIND HER (GREAT BRITAIN)
+     TO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE ARE FORMED BY NATURE, AND INVIOLABLE. United,
+     these nations might almost brave the united world; divided, the
+     strength and importance of each is FUNDAMENTALLY impaired. England
+     has reason to regret with Russia that the imperial sceptre should
+     be thus inconsistently wielded, but it is the sovereign of Russia
+     alone who divides the Empires."
+
+
+The reverend gentleman concludes his account by the words:
+
+
+     "As far as human foresight can at this moment penetrate, the
+     despair of an enraged individual seems a more probable means to
+     terminate the present scene of oppression than any more systematic
+     combination of measures to restore the throne of Russia to its
+     dignity and importance."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] This letter relates to the war against Turkey, commenced by the
+Empress Ann in 1735. The British diplomatist at St. Petersburg is
+reporting about his endeavours to induce Russia to conclude peace with
+the Turks. The passages omitted are irrelevant.
+
+[2] England was at that time negotiating a commercial treaty with
+Russia.
+
+[3] To this time it has remained among historians a point of
+controversy, whether or not Panin was in the pay of Frederick II. of
+Prussia, and whether he was so behind the back of Catherine, or at her
+bidding. There can exist no doubt that Catherine II., in order to
+identify foreign Courts with Russian Ministers, allowed Russian
+Ministers ostensibly to identify themselves with foreign Courts. As to
+Panin in particular, the question is, however, decided by an authentic
+document which we believe has never been published. It proves that,
+having once become the man of Frederick II., he was forced to remain so
+at the risk of his honour, fortune and life.
+
+[4] The Russian Minister at London.
+
+[5] The oligarchic Constitution set up by the Senate after the death of
+Charles XII.
+
+[6] Thus we learn from Sir George Macartney that what is commonly known
+as Lord Chatham's "grand conception of the Northern Alliance," was, in
+fact, Panin's "grand scheme of uniting the Powers of the North." Chatham
+was duped into fathering the Muscovite plan.
+
+[7] The compact between the Bourbons of France and Spain concluded at
+Paris on August, 1761.
+
+[8] This was a subterfuge on the part of Frederick II. The manner in
+which Frederick was forced into the arms of the Russian Alliance is
+plainly told by M. Koch, the French professor of diplomacy and teacher
+of Talleyrand. "Frederick II.," he says, "having been abandoned by the
+Cabinet of London, could not but attach himself to Russia." (See his
+_History of the Revolutions in Europe_.)
+
+[9] Horace Walpole characterises his epoch by the words--"_It was the
+mode of the times to be paid by one favour for receiving another._" At
+all events, it will be seen from the text that such was the mode of
+Russia in transacting business with England. The Earl of Sandwich, to
+whom Sir George Macartney could dare to address the above despatch,
+distinguished himself, ten years later, in 1775, as First Lord of the
+Admiralty, in the North Administration, by the vehement opposition he
+made to Lord Chatham's motion for an equitable _adjustment of the
+American difficulties_. "He could not believe it (Chatham's motion) _the
+production of a British peer_; it appeared to him rather _the work of
+some American_." In 1777, we find Sandwich again blustering: "he would
+hazard every drop of blood, as well as the last shilling of the national
+treasure, rather than allow Great Britain to be defied, bullied, and
+dictated to, by her disobedient and rebellious subjects." Foremost as
+the Earl of Sandwich was in entangling England in war with her North
+American colonies, with France, Spain, and Holland, we behold him
+constantly accused in Parliament by Fox, Burke, Pitt, etc., "of keeping
+the naval force inadequate to the defence of the country; of
+intentionally opposing small English forces where he knew the enemy to
+have concentrated large ones; of utter mismanagement of the service in
+all its departments," etc. (See debates of the House of Commons of 11th
+March, 1778; 31st March, 1778; February, 1779; Fox's motion of censure
+on Lord Sandwich; 9th April, 1779, address to the King for the dismissal
+of Lord Sandwich from his service, on account of misconduct in service;
+7th February, 1782, Fox's motion that there had been gross mismanagement
+in the administration of naval affairs during the year 1781.) On this
+occasion Pitt imputed to Lord Sandwich "all our naval disasters and
+disgraces." The ministerial majority against the motion amounted to only
+22 in a House of 388. On the 22nd February, 1782, a similar motion
+against Lord Sandwich was only negatived by a majority of 19 in a House
+of 453. Such, indeed, was the character of the Earl of Sandwich's
+Administration that more than thirty distinguished officers quitted the
+naval service, or declared they could not act under the existing system.
+In point of fact, during his whole tenure of office, serious
+apprehensions were entertained of the consequences of the dissensions
+then prevalent in the navy. Besides, the Earl of Sandwich was openly
+accused, and, as far as circumstantial evidence goes, convicted of
+PECULATION. (See debates of the House of Lords, 31st March, 1778; 9th
+April, 1779, and _seq._) When the motion for his removal from office was
+negatived on April 9th 1779, thirty-nine peers entered their protest.
+
+[10] Sir James Harris affects to believe that Catherine II. was not the
+author of, but a convert to, the armed neutrality of 1780. It is one of
+the grand stratagems of the Court of St. Petersburg to give to its own
+schemes the form of proposals suggested to and pressed on itself by
+foreign Courts. Russian diplomacy delights in those _quae pro quo_. Thus
+the Court of Florida Bianca was made the responsible editor of the armed
+neutrality, and, from a report that vain-glorious Spaniard addressed to
+Carlos III., one may see how immensely he felt flattered at the idea of
+having not only hatched the armed neutrality but allured Russia into
+abetting it.
+
+[11] This same Sir James Harris, perhaps more familiar to the reader
+under the name of the Earl of Malmesbury, is extolled by English
+historians as the man who prevented England from surrendering the right
+of search in the Peace Negotiations of 1782-83.
+
+[12] It might be inferred from this passage and similar ones occurring
+in the text, that Catherine II. had caught a real Tartar in Lord North,
+whose Administration Sir James Harris is pointing at. Any such delusion
+will disappear before the simple statement that the first partition of
+Poland took place under Lord North's Administration, without any protest
+on his part. In 1773 Catherine's war against Turkey still continuing,
+and her conflicts with Sweden growing serious, France made preparations
+to send a powerful fleet into the Baltic. D'Aiguillon, the French
+Minister of Foreign Affairs, communicated this plan to Lord Stormont,
+the then English Ambassador at Paris. In a long conversation,
+D'Aiguillon dwelt largely on the ambitious designs of Russia, and the
+common interest that ought to blend France and England into a joint
+resistance against them. In answer to this confidential communication,
+he was informed by the English Ambassador that, "if France sent her
+ships into the Baltic, they would instantly be followed by a British
+fleet; that the presence of two fleets would have no more effect than a
+neutrality; and however the British Court might desire to preserve the
+harmony now subsisting between England and France, it was impossible to
+foresee the contingencies that might arise from accidental collision."
+In consequence of these representations, D'Aiguillon countermanded the
+squadron at Brest, but gave new orders for the equipment of an armament
+at Toulon. "On receiving intelligence of these renewed preparations, the
+British Cabinet made instant and vigorous demonstrations of resistance;
+Lord Stormont was ordered to declare that every argument used respecting
+the Baltic applied equally to the Mediterranean. A memorial also was
+presented to the French Minister, accompanied by a demand that it should
+be laid before the King and Council. This produced the desired effect;
+the armament was countermanded, the sailors disbanded, and the chances
+of an extensive warfare avoided."
+
+"_Lord North_," says the complacent writer from whom we have borrowed
+the last lines, "_thus effectually served the cause of his ally_
+(Catherine II.), _and facilitated the treaty of peace_ (of
+Kutchuk-Kainardji) _between Russia and the Porte_." Catherine II.
+rewarded Lord North's good services, first by withholding the aid she
+had promised him in case of a war between England and the North American
+Colonies, and in the second place, by conjuring up and leading the armed
+neutrality against England. Lord North DARED NOT _repay, as he was
+advised by Sir James Harris_, this treacherous breach of faith by giving
+up to Russia, and to _Russia alone_, the maritime rights of Great
+Britain. Hence the irritation in the nervous system of the Czarina; the
+hysterical fancy she caught all at once of "entertaining a bad opinion"
+of Lord North, of "disliking" him, of feeling a "rooted aversion"
+against him, of being afflicted with "a total want of confidence," etc.
+In order to give the Shelburne Administration a warning example, Sir
+James Harris draws up a minute psychological picture of the feelings of
+the Czarina, and the disgrace incurred by the North Administration, for
+having wounded these same feelings. His prescription is very simple:
+surrender to Russia, as our friend, everything for asking which we would
+consider every other Power our enemy.
+
+[13] It is then a fact that the English Government, not satisfied with
+having made Russia a Baltic power, strove hard to make her a
+Mediterranean power too. The offer of the surrender of Minorca appears
+to have been made to Catherine II. at the end of 1779, or the beginning
+of 1780, shortly after Lord Stormont's entrance into the North
+Cabinet--the same Lord Stormont we have seen thwarting the French
+attempts at resistance against Russia, and whom even Sir James Harris
+cannot deny the merit of having written "_instructions perfectly
+calculated to the meridian of the Court of St. Petersburg_." While Lord
+North's Cabinet, at the suggestion of Sir James Harris, offered Minorca
+to the _Muscovites_, the English Commoners and people were still
+trembling for fear lest the _Hanoverians_ (?) should wrest out of their
+hands "one of the keys of the Mediterranean." On the 26th of October,
+1775, the King, in his opening speech, had informed Parliament, amongst
+other things, that he had Sir James Graham's own words, when asked why
+they should not have kept up some blockade pending the settlement of the
+"plan," "_They did not take that responsibility upon themselves._" The
+responsibility of executing their orders! The despatch we have quoted is
+the only despatch read, except one of a later date. The despatch, said
+to be sent on the 5th of April, in which "the Admiral is ordered to use
+the _largest discretionary power_ in blockading the Russian ports in the
+Black Sea," is not read, nor any replies from Admiral Dundas. The
+Admiralty sent _Hanoverian_ troops to Gibraltar and Port Mahon
+(Minorca), to replace such British regiments as should be drawn from
+those garrisons for service in America. An amendment to the address was
+proposed by Lord John Cavendish, strongly condemning "the confiding
+_such important fortresses as Gibraltar and Port Mahon to foreigners_."
+After very stormy debates, in which the measure of entrusting Gibraltar
+and Minorca, "_the keys of the Mediterranean_," as they were called, to
+_foreigners_, was furiously attacked; Lord North, acknowledging himself
+the adviser of the measure, felt obliged to bring in a _bill of
+indemnity_. However, these foreigners, these Hanoverians, were the
+English King's own subjects. Having virtually surrendered Minorca to
+Russia in 1780, Lord North was, of course, quite justified in treating,
+on November 22, 1781, in the House of Commons, "with utter scorn the
+insinuation that _Ministers were in the pay of France_."
+
+Let us remark, _en passant_, that Lord North, one of the most base and
+mischievous Ministers England can boast of, perfectly mastered the art
+of keeping the House in perpetual laughter. So had Lord Sunderland. So
+has Lord Palmerston.
+
+[14] Lord North having been supplanted by the Rockingham Administration,
+on March 27, 1782, the celebrated Fox forwarded peace proposals to
+Holland through the mediation of the _Russian_ Minister. Now what were
+the consequences of the _Russian mediation_ so much vaunted by this Sir
+James Harris, the servile account keeper of the Czarina's sentiments,
+humours, and feelings? While preliminary articles of peace had been
+convened with France, Spain, and the American States, it was found
+impossible to arrive at any such preliminary agreement with Holland.
+Nothing but a simple cessation of hostilities was to be obtained from
+it. So powerful proved the _Russian mediation_, that on the 2nd
+September, 1783, just one day before the conclusion of _definitive
+treaties_ with America, France, and Spain, Holland condescended to
+accede to _preliminaries of peace_, and this not in consequence of the
+_Russian mediation_, but through the influence of _France_.
+
+[15] How much was England not prejudiced by the Courts of Vienna and
+Paris thwarting the plan of the British Cabinet of ceding Minorca to
+Russia, and by Frederick of Prussia's resistance against the great
+Chatham's scheme of a Northern Alliance under Muscovite auspices.
+
+[16] The predecessor is Fox. Sir James Harris establishes a complete
+scale of British Administrations, according to the degree in which they
+enjoyed the favour of his almighty Czarina. In spite of Lord Stormont,
+the Earl of Sandwich, Lord North, and Sir James Harris himself; in spite
+of the partition of Poland, the bullying of D'Aiguillon, the treaty of
+Kutchuk-Kainardji, and the intended cession of Minorca--Lord North's
+Administration is relegated to the bottom of the heavenly ladder; far
+above it has climbed the Rockingham Administration, whose soul was Fox,
+notorious for his subsequent intrigues with Catherine; but at the top we
+behold the Shelburne Administration, whose Chancellor of the Exchequer
+was the celebrated William Pitt. As to Lord Shelburne himself, Burke
+exclaimed in the House of Commons, that "if he was not a Catalina or
+Borgia in morals, it must not be ascribed to anything but his
+understanding."
+
+[17] Sir James Harris forgets deducing the main inference, that the
+Ambassador of England is the agent of Russia.
+
+[18] In the 18th century, English diplomatists' despatches, bearing on
+their front the sacramental inscription, "Private," are despatches to be
+withheld from the King by the Minister to whom they are addressed. That
+such was the case may be seen from Lord Mahon's _History of England_.
+
+[19] "To be burnt after my death." Such are the words prefixed to the
+manuscript by the gentleman whom it was addressed to.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+The documents published in the first chapter extend from the reign of
+the Empress Ann to the commencement of the reign of the Emperor Paul,
+thus encompassing the greater part of the 18th century. At the end of
+that century it had become, as stated by the Rev. Mr. Pitt, the openly
+professed and orthodox dogma of English diplomacy, "_that the ties which
+bind Great Britain to the Russian Empire are formed by nature, and
+inviolable_."
+
+In perusing these documents, there is something that startles us even
+more than their contents--viz., their form. All these letters are
+"confidential," "private," "secret," "most secret"; but in spite of
+secrecy, privacy, and confidence, the English statesmen converse among
+each other about Russia and her rulers in a tone of awful reserve,
+abject servility, and cynical submission, which would strike us even in
+the public despatches of Russian statesmen. To conceal intrigues against
+foreign nations secrecy is recurred to by Russian diplomatists. The same
+method is adopted by English diplomatists freely to express their
+devotion to a foreign Court. The secret despatches of Russian
+diplomatists are fumigated with some equivocal perfume. It is one part
+the _fumee de faussete_, as the Duke of St. Simon has it, and the other
+part that coquettish display of one's own superiority and cunning which
+stamps upon the reports of the French Secret Police their indelible
+character. Even the master despatches of Pozzo di Borgo are tainted with
+this common blot of the _literature de mauvais lieu_. In this point the
+English secret despatches prove much superior. They do not affect
+superiority but silliness. For instance, can there be anything more
+silly than Mr. Rondeau informing Horace Walpole that he has betrayed to
+the Russian Minister the letters addressed by the Turkish Grand Vizier
+to the King of England, but that he had told "at the same time those
+gentlemen that as there were several hard reflections on the Russian
+Court he should not have communicated them, _if they had not been so
+anxious to see them_," and then told their excellencies not to tell the
+Porte that they had seen them (those letters)! At first view the infamy
+of the act is drowned in the silliness of the man. Or, take Sir George
+Macartney. Can there be anything more silly than his happiness that
+Russia seemed "reasonable" enough not to expect that England "should pay
+the WHOLE EXPENSES" for Russia's "choosing to take the lead at
+Stockholm"; or his "flattering himself" that he had "persuaded the
+Russian Court" not to be so "unreasonable" as to ask from England, in a
+time of peace, subsidies for a time of war against Turkey (then the ally
+of England); or his warning the Earl of Sandwich "not to mention" to the
+Russian Ambassador at London the secrets mentioned to himself by the
+Russian Chancellor at St. Petersburg? Or can there be anything more
+silly than Sir James Harris confidentially whispering into the ear of
+Lord Grantham that Catherine II. was devoid of "judgment, precision of
+idea, reflection, and _l'esprit de combinaison_"?[20]
+
+On the other hand, take the cool impudence with which Sir George
+Macartney informs his minister that because the Swedes were extremely
+jealous of, and mortified at, their dependence on Russia, England was
+directed by the Court of St. Petersburg to do its work at Stockholm,
+under the British colours of liberty and independence! Or Sir James
+Harris advising England to surrender to Russia Minorca and the right of
+search, and the monopoly of mediation in the affairs of the world--not
+in order to gain any material advantage, or even a formal engagement on
+the part of Russia, but only "a strong glow of friendship" from the
+Empress, and the transfer to France of her "ill humour."
+
+The secret Russian despatches proceed on the very plain line that
+Russia knows herself to have no common interests whatever with other
+nations, but that every nation must be persuaded separately to have
+common interests with Russia to the exclusion of every other nation. The
+English despatches, on the contrary, never dare so much as hint that
+Russia has common interests with England, but only endeavour to convince
+England that she has Russian interests. The English diplomatists
+themselves tell us that this was the single argument they pleaded, when
+placed face to face with Russian potentates.
+
+If the English despatches we have laid before the public were addressed
+to private friends, they would only brand with infamy the ambassadors
+who wrote them. Secretly addressed as they are to the British Government
+itself, they nail it for ever to the pillory of history; and,
+instinctively, this seems to have been felt, even by Whig writers,
+because none has dared to publish them.
+
+The question naturally arises from which epoch this Russian character of
+English diplomacy, become traditionary in the course of the 18th
+century, does date its origin. To clear up this point we must go back to
+the time of Peter the Great, which, consequently, will form the
+principal subject of our researches. We propose to enter upon this task
+by reprinting some English pamphlets, written at the time of Peter I.,
+and which have either escaped the attention of modern historians, or
+appeared to them to merit none. However, they will suffice for refuting
+the prejudice common to Continental and English writers, that the
+designs of Russia were not understood or suspected in England until at a
+later, and too late, epoch; that the diplomatic relations between
+England and Russia were but the natural offspring of the mutual material
+interests of the two countries; and that, therefore, in accusing the
+British statesmen of the 18th century of Russianism we should commit an
+unpardonable hysteron-proteron. If we have shown by the English
+despatches that, at the time of the Empress Ann, England already
+betrayed her own allies to Russia, it will be seen from the pamphlets we
+are now about to reprint that, even before the epoch of Ann, at the
+very epoch of Russian ascendency in Europe, springing up at the time of
+Peter I., the plans of Russia were understood, and the connivance of
+British statesmen at these plans was denounced by English writers.
+
+The first pamphlet we lay before the public is called _The Northern
+Crisis_. It was printed in London in 1716, and relates to the intended
+Dano-Anglo-Russian _invasion of Skana_ (Schonen).
+
+During the year 1715 a northern alliance for the partition, not of
+Sweden proper, but of what we may call the Swedish Empire, had been
+concluded between Russia, Denmark, Poland, Prussia, and Hanover. That
+partition forms the first grand act of modern diplomacy--the logical
+premiss to the partition of Poland. The partition treaties relating to
+Spain have engrossed the interest of posterity because they were the
+forerunners of the War of Succession, and the partition of Poland drew
+even a larger audience because its last act was played upon a
+contemporary stage. However, it cannot be denied that it was the
+partition of the Swedish Empire which inaugurated the modern era of
+international policy. The partition treaty not even pretended to have a
+pretext, save the misfortune of its intended victim. For the first time
+in Europe the violation of all treaties was not only made, but
+proclaimed the common basis of a new treaty. Poland herself, in the drag
+of Russia, and personated by that commonplace of immorality, Augustus
+II., Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, was pushed into the
+foreground of the conspiracy, thus signing her own death-warrant, and
+not even enjoying the privilege reserved by Polyphemus to Odysseus--to
+be last eaten. Charles XII. predicted her fate in the manifesto flung
+against King Augustus and the Czar, from his voluntary exile at Bender.
+The manifesto is dated January 28, 1711.
+
+The participation in this partition treaty threw England within the
+orbit of Russia, towards whom, since the days of the "Glorious
+Revolution," she had more and more gravitated. George I., as King of
+England, was bound to a defensive alliance with Sweden by the treaty of
+1700. Not only as King of England, but as Elector of Hanover, he was
+one of the guarantees, and even of the direct parties to the treaty of
+Travendal, which secured to Sweden what the partition treaty intended
+stripping her of. Even his German electoral dignity he partly owed to
+that treaty. However, as Elector of Hanover he declared war against
+Sweden, which he waged as King of England.
+
+In 1715 the confederates had divested Sweden of her German provinces,
+and to effect that end introduced the Muscovite on the German soil. In
+1716 they agreed to invade Sweden Proper--to attempt an armed descent
+upon Schonen--the southern extremity of Sweden now constituting the
+districts of Malmoe and Christianstadt. Consequently Peter of Russia
+brought with him from Germany a Muscovite army, which was scattered over
+Zealand, thence to be conveyed to Schonen, under the protection of the
+English and Dutch fleets sent into the Baltic, on the false pretext of
+protecting trade and navigation. Already in 1715, when Charles XII. was
+besieged in Stralsund, eight English men-of-war, lent by England to
+Hanover, and by Hanover to Denmark, had openly reinforced the Danish
+navy, and even hoisted the Danish flag. In 1716 the British navy was
+commanded by his Czarish Majesty in person.
+
+Everything being ready for the invasion of Schonen, there arose a
+difficulty from a side where it was least expected. Although the treaty
+stipulated only for 30,000 Muscovites, Peter, in his magnanimity, had
+landed 40,000 on Zealand; but now that he was to send them on the errand
+to Schonen, he all at once discovered that out of the 40,000 he could
+spare but 15,000. This declaration not only paralysed the military plan
+of the confederates, it seemed to threaten the security of Denmark and
+of Frederick IV., its king, as great part of the Muscovite army,
+supported by the Russian fleet, occupied Copenhagen. One of the generals
+of Frederick proposed suddenly to fall with the Danish cavalry upon the
+Muscovites and to exterminate them, while the English men-of-war should
+burn the Russian fleet. Averse to any perfidy which required some
+greatness of will, some force of character, and some contempt of
+personal danger, Frederick IV. rejected the bold proposal, and limited
+himself to assuming an attitude of defence. He then wrote a begging
+letter to the Czar, intimating that he had given up his Schonen fancy,
+and requested the Czar to do the same and find his way home: a request
+the latter could not but comply with. When Peter at last left Denmark
+with his army, the Danish Court thought fit to communicate to the Courts
+of Europe a public account of the incidents and transactions which had
+frustrated the intended descent upon Schonen--and this document forms
+the starting point of _The Northern Crisis_.
+
+In a letter addressed to Baron Goertz, dated from London, January 23,
+1717, by Count Gyllenborg, there occur some passages in which the
+latter, the then Swedish ambassador at the Court of St. James's, seems
+to profess himself the author of _The Northern Crisis_, the title of
+which he does not, however, quote. Yet any idea of his having written
+that powerful pamphlet will disappear before the slightest perusal of
+the Count's authenticated writings, such as his letters to Goertz.
+
+
+"THE NORTHERN CRISIS; OR IMPARTIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE POLICIES OF THE
+CZAR; OCCASIONED BY MYNHEER VON STOCKEN'S REASONS FOR DELAYING THE
+DESCENT UPON SCHONEN. A TRUE COPY OF WHICH IS PREFIXED, VERBALLY
+TRANSLATED AFTER THE TENOR OF THAT IN THE GERMAN SECRETARY'S OFFICE IN
+COPENHAGEN, OCTOBER 10, 1716. LONDON, 1716.
+
+1.--_Preface_---- ... 'Tis (the present pamphlet) not fit for lawyers'
+clerks, but it is highly convenient to be read by those who are proper
+students in the laws of nations; 'twill be but lost time for any
+stock-jobbing, trifling dealer in Exchange-Alley to look beyond the
+preface on't, but every merchant in England (more especially those who
+trade to the Baltic) will find his account in it. The Dutch (as the
+courants and postboys have more than once told us) are about to mend
+their hands, if they can, in several articles of trade with the Czar,
+and they have been a long time about it to little purpose. Inasmuch as
+they are such a frugal people, they are good examples for the imitation
+of our traders; but if we can outdo them for once, in the means of
+projecting a better and more expeditious footing to go upon, for the
+emolument of us both, let us, for once, be wise enough to set the
+example, and let them, for once, be our imitators. This little treatise
+will show a pretty plain way how we may do it, as to our trade in the
+Baltic, at this juncture. I desire no little _coffee-house politician_
+to meddle with it; but to give him even a disrelish for my company. I
+must let him know that he is not fit for mine. Those who are even
+proficients in state science, will find in it matter highly fit to
+employ all their powers of speculation, which they ever before past
+negligently by, and thought (too cursorily) were not worth the
+regarding. No outrageous party-man will find it at all for his purpose;
+but every _honest Whig_ and every _honest Tory_ may each of them read
+it, not only without either of their disgusts, but with the satisfaction
+of them both.... 'Tis not fit, in fine, for a mad, hectoring,
+Presbyterian Whig, or a raving, fretful, dissatisfied, Jacobite Tory."
+
+
+2.--THE REASONS HANDED ABOUT BY MYNHEER VON STOCKEN FOR DELAYING THE
+DESCENT UPON SCHONEN.
+
+"There being no doubt, but most courts will be surprised that the
+descent upon Schonen has not been put into execution, notwithstanding
+the great preparations made for that purpose; and that all his Czarish
+Majesty's troops, who were in Germany, were transported to Zealand, not
+without great trouble and danger, partly by his own gallies, and partly
+by his Danish Majesty's and other vessels; and that the said descent is
+deferred till another time. His Danish Majesty hath therefore, in order
+to clear himself of all imputation and reproach, thought fit to order,
+that the following true account of this affair should be given to all
+impartial persons. Since the Swedes were entirely driven out of their
+_German_ dominions, there was, according to all the rules of policy, and
+reasons of war, no other way left, than vigorously to attack the still
+obstinate King of Sweden, in the very heart of his country; thereby,
+with God's assistance, to force him to a lasting, good and advantageous
+peace for the allies. The King of Denmark and his Czarish Majesty were
+both of this opinion, and did, in order to put so good a design in
+execution, agree upon an interview, which at last (notwithstanding his
+Danish Majesty's presence, upon the account of Norway's being invaded,
+was most necessary in his own capital, and that the Muscovite
+ambassador, M. Dolgorouky, had given quite other assurances) was held at
+Ham and Horn, near Hamburgh, after his Danish Majesty had stayed there
+six weeks for the Czar. In this conference it was, on the 3rd of June,
+agreed between both their Majesties, after several debates, that the
+descent upon Schonen should positively be undertaken this year, and
+everything relating to the forwarding the same was entirely consented
+to. Hereupon his Danish Majesty made all haste for his return to his
+dominions, and gave orders to work day and night to get his fleet ready
+to put to sea. The transport ships were also gathered from all parts of
+his dominions, both with inexpressible charges and great prejudice to
+his subjects' trade. Thus, his Majesty (as the Czar himself upon his
+arrival at Copenhagen owned) did his utmost to provide all necessaries,
+and to forward the descent, upon whose success everything depended. It
+happened, however, in the meanwhile, and before the descent was agreed
+upon in the conference at Ham and Horn, that his Danish Majesty was
+obliged to secure his invaded and much oppressed kingdom of Norway, by
+sending thither a considerable squadron out of his fleet, under the
+command of Vice-Admiral Gabel, which squadron could not be recalled
+before the enemy had left that kingdom, without endangering a great part
+thereof; so that out of necessity the said Vice-Admiral was forced to
+tarry there till the 12th of July, when his Danish Majesty sent him
+express orders to return with all possible speed, wind and weather
+permitting; but this blowing for some time contrary, he was
+detained.... The Swedes were all the while powerful at sea, and his
+Czarish Majesty himself did not think it advisable that the remainder of
+the Danish, in conjunction with the men-of-war then at Copenhagen,
+should go to convoy the Russian troops from Rostock, before the
+above-mentioned squadron under Vice-Admiral Gabel was arrived. This
+happening at last in the month of August, the confederate fleet put to
+sea; and the transporting of the said troops hither to Zealand was put
+in execution, though with a great deal of trouble and danger, but it
+took up so much time that the descent could not be ready till September
+following. Now, when all these preparations, as well for the descent as
+the embarking the armies, were entirely ready, his Danish Majesty
+assured himself that the descent should be made within a few days, at
+farthest by the 21st of September. The Russian Generals and Ministers
+first raised some difficulties to those of Denmark, and afterwards, on
+the 17th September, declared in an appointed conference, that his
+Czarish Majesty, considering the present situation of affairs, was of
+opinion that neither forage nor provision could be had in Schonen, and
+that consequently the descent was not advisable to be attempted this
+year, but ought to be put off till next spring. It may easily be
+imagined how much his Danish Majesty was surprised at this; especially
+seeing the Czar, if he had altered his opinion, as to this design so
+solemnly concerted, might have declared it sooner, and thereby saved his
+Danish Majesty several tons of gold, spent upon the necessary
+preparations. His Danish Majesty did, however, in a letter dated the
+20th of September, amply represent to the Czar, that although the season
+was very much advanced, the descent might, nevertheless, easily be
+undertaken with such a superior force, as to get a footing in Schonen,
+where being assured there had been a very plentiful harvest, he did not
+doubt but subsistence might be found; besides, that having an open
+communication with his own countries, it might easily be transported
+from thence. His Danish Majesty alleged also several weighty reasons why
+the descent was either to be made this year, or the thoughts of making
+it next spring entirely be laid aside. _Nor did he alone make these
+moving remonstrances to the Czar_; BUT HIS BRITISH MAJESTY'S MINISTER
+RESIDING HERE, AS WELL AS ADMIRAL NORRIS, _seconded the same also in a
+very pressing manner_; AND BY EXPRESS ORDER OF THE KING, THEIR MASTER,
+_endeavoured to bring the Czar into their opinion, and to persuade him
+to go on with the descent_; but his Czarish Majesty declared by his
+answer, that he would adhere to the resolution that he had once taken
+concerning this delay of making the descent; but if his Danish Majesty
+was resolved to venture on the descent, that he then, according to the
+treaty made near Straelsund, would assist him only with the 15
+battalions and 1,000 horse therein stipulated; that next spring he would
+comply with everything else, and neither could or would declare himself
+farther in this affair. Since then, his Danish Majesty could not,
+without running so great a hazard, undertake so great a work alone with
+his own army and the said 15 battalions; he desired, in another letter
+of the 23rd September, his Czarish Majesty would be pleased to add 13
+battalions of his troops, in which case his Danish Majesty would still
+this year attempt the descent; but even this could not be obtained from
+his Czarish Majesty, who absolutely refused it by his ambassador on the
+24th ditto: whereupon his Danish Majesty, in his letter of the 26th,
+declared to the Czar, that since things stood thus, he desired none of
+his troops, but that they might be all speedily transported out of his
+dominions; that so the transport, whose freight stood him in 40,000 rix
+dollars per month, might be discharged, and his subjects eased of the
+intolerable contributions they now underwent. This he could not do less
+than agree to; and accordingly, all the Russian troops are already
+embarked, and intend for certain to go from here with the first
+favourable wind. It must be left to Providence and time, to discover
+what may have induced the Czar to a resolution so prejudicial to the
+Northern Alliance, and most advantageous to the common enemy.
+
+If we would take a true survey of men, and lay them open in a proper
+light to the eye of our intellects, _we must_ first _consider their
+natures_ and then _their ends_; and by this method of examination,
+though their conduct is, seemingly, full of intricate mazes and
+perplexities, and winding round with infinite meanders of state-craft,
+we shall be able to dive into the deepest recesses, make our way through
+the most puzzling labyrinths, and at length come to the most abstruse
+means of bringing about the master secrets of their minds, and to
+unriddle their utmost mysteries.... The Czar ... is, by nature, of a
+great and enterprising spirit, and of a genius thoroughly politic; and
+as for his ends, the manner of his own Government, where he sways
+arbitrary lord over the estates and honours of his people, must make
+him, if all the policies in the world could by far-distant aims promise
+him accession and accumulation of empire and wealth, be everlastingly
+laying schemes for the achieving of both with the extremest cupidity and
+ambition. Whatever ends an insatiate desire of opulency, and a boundless
+thirst for dominion, can ever put him upon, to satisfy their craving and
+voracious appetites, those must, most undoubtedly, be his.
+
+The next questions we are to put to ourselves are these three:
+
+1. By what means can he gain these ends?
+
+2. How far from him, and in what place, can these ends be best obtained?
+
+3. And by what time, using all proper methods and succeeding in them,
+may he obtain these ends?
+
+The possessions of the Czar were prodigious, vast in extent; the people
+all at his nod, all his downright arrant slaves, and all the wealth of
+the country his own at a word's command. But then the country, though
+large in ground, was not quite so in produce. Every vassal had his gun,
+and was to be a soldier upon call; but there was never a soldier among
+them, nor a man that understood the calling; and though he had all their
+wealth, they had no commerce of consequence, and little ready money; and
+consequently his treasury, when he had amassed all he could, very bare
+and empty. He was then but in an indifferent condition to satisfy those
+two natural appetites, when he had neither wealth to support a
+soldiery, nor a soldiery trained in the art of war. The first token this
+Prince gave of an aspiring genius, and of an ambition that is noble and
+necessary in a monarch who has a mind to flourish, was to believe none
+of his subjects more wise than himself, or more fit to govern. He did
+so, and looked upon his own proper person as the most fit to travel out
+among the other realms of the world and study politics for the advancing
+of his dominions. He then seldom pretended to any warlike dispositions
+against those who were instructed in the science of arms; his military
+dealings lay mostly with the Turks and Tartars, who, as they had numbers
+as well as he, had them likewise composed, as well as his, of a rude,
+uncultivated mob, and they appeared in the field like a raw,
+undisciplined militia. In this his Christian neighbours liked him well,
+insomuch as he was a kind of stay or stopgap to the infidels. But when
+he came to look into the more polished parts of the Christian world, he
+set out towards it, from the very threshold, like a natural-born
+politician. He was not for learning the game by trying chances and
+venturing losses in the field so soon; no, he went upon the maxim _that
+it was, at that time of day, expedient and necessary for him to carry,
+like Samson, his strength in his head, and not in his arms_. He had
+then, he knew, but very few commodious places for commerce of his own,
+and those all situated in the _White Sea_, too remote, frozen up the
+most part of the year, and not at all fit for a fleet of men-of-war; but
+he knew of many more commodious ones of his neighbours in the Baltic,
+and within his reach whenever he could strengthen his hands to lay hold
+of them. He had a longing eye towards them; but with prudence seemingly
+turned his head another way, and secretly entertained the pleasant
+thought that he should come at them all in good time. Not to give any
+jealousy, he endeavours for no help from his neighbours to instruct his
+men in arms. That was like asking a skilful person, one intended to
+fight a duel with, to teach him first how to fence. _He went over to
+Great Britain_, where he knew that potent kingdom could, as yet, have no
+jealousies of his growth of power, and in the eye of which his vast
+extent of nation lay neglected and unconsidered and overlooked, as I am
+afraid it is to this very day. He was present at all our exercises,
+looked into all our laws, inspected our military, civil, and
+ecclesiastical regimen of affairs; yet this was the least he then
+wanted; this was the slightest part of his errand. But by degrees, when
+he grew familiar with our people, he visited our docks, pretending not
+to have any prospect of profit, but only to take a huge delight (the
+effect of curiosity only) to see our manner of building ships. He kept
+his court, as one may say, in our shipyard, so industrious was he in
+affording them his continual Czarish presence, and to his immortal glory
+for art and industry be it spoken, that the great Czar, by stooping
+often to the employ, could handle an axe with the best artificer of them
+all; and the monarch having a good mathematical head of his own, grew in
+some time a very expert royal shipwright. A ship or two for his
+diversion made and sent him, and then two or three more, and after that
+two or three more, would signify just nothing at all, if they were
+granted to be sold to him by the _Maritime Powers_, that could, at will,
+lord it over the sea. It would be a puny inconsiderable matter, and not
+worth the regarding. Well, but then, over and above this, he had
+artfully insinuated himself into the goodwill of many of our best
+workmen, and won their hearts by his good-natured familiarities and
+condescension among them. To turn this to his service, he offered many
+very large premiums and advantages to go and settle in his country,
+which they gladly accepted of. A little after he sends over some private
+ministers and officers to negotiate for more workmen, for land officers,
+and likewise for picked and chosen good seamen, who might be advanced
+and promoted to offices by going there. Nay, even to this day, any
+expert seaman that is upon our traffic to the port of Archangel, if he
+has the least spark of ambition and any ardent desire to be in office,
+he need but offer himself to the sea-service of the Czar, and he is a
+lieutenant immediately. Over and above this, that Prince has even found
+the way to take by force into his service out of our merchant ships as
+many of their ablest seamen as he pleased, giving the masters the same
+number of raw Muscovites in their place, whom they afterwards were
+forced in their own defence to make fit for their own use. Neither is
+this all; he had, during the last war, many hundreds of his subjects,
+both noblemen and common sailors, on board _ours, the French and the
+Dutch fleets_; and he has all along maintained, and still maintains
+numbers of them in _ours and the Dutch yards_.
+
+But seeing he looked all along upon all these endeavours towards
+improving himself and his subjects as superfluous, whilst a seaport was
+wanting, where he might build a fleet of his own, and from whence he
+might himself export the products of his country, and import those of
+others; and finding the King of Sweden possessed of the most convenient
+ones, I mean Narva and Revel, which he knew that Prince never could nor
+would amicably part with, he at last resolved to wrest them out of his
+hands by force. His _Swedish_ Majesty's tender youth seemed the fittest
+time for this enterprise, but even then he would not run the hazard
+alone. He drew in other princes to divide the spoil with him. And the
+_Kings of Denmark and Poland_ were weak enough to serve as instruments
+to forward the great and ambitious views of the Czar. It is true, he met
+with a mighty hard rub at his very first setting out; his whole army
+being entirely defeated by a handful of Swedes at Narva. But it was his
+good luck that his Swedish Majesty, instead of improving so great a
+victory against him, turned immediately his arms against the King of
+Poland, against whom he was personally piqued, and that so much the
+more, inasmuch as he had taken that Prince for one of his best friends,
+and was just upon the point of concluding with him the strictest
+alliance when he unexpectedly invaded the Swedish Livonia, and besieged
+Riga. This was, in all respects, what the Czar could most have wished
+for; and foreseeing that the longer the war in Poland lasted, the more
+time should he have both to retrieve his first loss, and to gain Narva,
+he took care it should be spun out to as great a length as possible; for
+which end he never sent the King of Poland succour enough to make him
+too strong for the King of Sweden; who, on the other hand, though he
+gained one signal victory after the other, yet never could subdue his
+enemy as long as he received continual reinforcements from his
+hereditary country. And had not his Swedish Majesty, contrary to most
+people's expectations, marched directly into Saxony itself, and thereby
+forced the King of Poland to peace, the Czar would have had leisure
+enough in all conscience to bring his designs to greater maturity. This
+peace was one of the greatest disappointments the Czar ever met with,
+whereby he became singly engaged in the war. He had, however, the
+comfort of having beforehand taken _Narva_, and laid a foundation to his
+favourite town _Petersburg_, and to the seaport, the docks, and the vast
+magazines there; all which works, to what perfection they are now
+brought, let them tell who, with surprise, have seen them.
+
+He (Peter) used all endeavours to bring matters to an accommodation. He
+proffered very advantageous conditions; _Petersburg_ only, a trifle as
+he pretended, which he had set his heart upon, he would retain; and even
+for that he was willing some other way to give satisfaction. But the
+King of Sweden was too well acquainted with the importance of that place
+to leave it in the hands of an ambitious prince, and thereby to give him
+an inlet into the Baltic. This was the only time since the defeat at
+Narva that the Czar's arms had no other end than that of self-defence.
+They might, perhaps, even have fallen short therein, had not the King of
+Sweden (through whose persuasion is still a mystery), instead of
+marching the shortest way to Novgorod and to Moscow, turned towards
+Ukrain, where his army, after great losses and sufferings, was at last
+entirely defeated at Pultowa. As this was a fatal period to the Swedish
+successes, so how great a deliverance it was to the Muscovites, may be
+gathered from the Czar's celebrating every year, with great solemnity,
+the anniversary of that day, from which his ambitious thoughts began to
+soar still higher. The whole of _Livonia_, _Estland_, and the best and
+greatest part of _Finland_ was now what he demanded, after which,
+though he might for the present condescend to give peace to the
+remaining part of Sweden, he knew he could easily even add that to his
+conquests whenever he pleased. The only obstacle he had to fear in these
+his projects was from his northern neighbours; but as the _Maritime
+Powers_, and even the neighbouring princes in Germany, were then so
+intent upon their war against France, that they seemed entirely
+neglectful of that of the North, so there remained only Denmark and
+Poland to be jealous of. The former of these kingdoms had, ever since
+King William, of glorious memory, compelled it to make peace with
+Holstein and, consequently, with Sweden, enjoyed an uninterrupted
+tranquillity, during which it had time, by a free trade and considerable
+subsidies from the maritime powers to enrich itself, and was in a
+condition, by joining itself to Sweden, as it was its interest to do, to
+stop the Czar's progresses, and timely to prevent its own danger from
+them. The other, I mean Poland, was now quietly under the government of
+King Stanislaus, who, owing in a manner his crown to the King of Sweden,
+could not, out of gratitude, as well as real concern for the interest of
+his country, fail opposing the designs of a too aspiring neighbour. The
+Czar was too cunning not to find out a remedy for all this: he
+represented to the King of Denmark how low the King of Sweden was now
+brought, and how fair an opportunity he had, during that Prince's long
+absence, to clip entirely his wings, and to aggrandize himself at his
+expense. In King Augustus he raised the long-hid resentment for the loss
+of the Polish Crown, which he told him he might now recover without the
+least difficulty. Thus both these Princes were immediately caught. The
+Danes declared war against Sweden without so much as a tolerable
+pretence, and made a descent upon Schonen, where they were soundly
+beaten for their pains. King Augustus re-entered Poland, where
+everything has ever since continued in the greatest disorder, and _that
+in a great measure owing to Muscovite intrigues_. It happened, indeed,
+that these new confederates, whom the Czar had only drawn in to serve
+his ambition, became at first more necessary to his preservation than
+he had thought; for the Turks having declared a war against him, they
+hindered the Swedish arms from joining with them to attack him; but that
+storm being soon over, through the Czar's wise behaviour and the avarice
+and folly of the Grand Vizier, he then made the intended use both of
+these his friends, as well as of them he afterwards, through hopes of
+gain, persuaded into his alliance, which was to lay all the burthen and
+hazard of the war upon them, in order entirely to weaken them, together
+with Sweden, whilst _he was preparing himself to swallow the one after
+the other_. He has put them on one difficult attempt after the other;
+their armies have been considerably lessened by battles and long sieges,
+whilst his own were either employed in easier conquests, and more
+profitable to him, or kept at the vast expense of neutral princes--near
+enough at hand to come up to demand a share of the booty without having
+struck a blow in getting it. His behaviour has been as cunning at sea,
+where his fleet has always kept out of harm's way and at a great
+distance whenever there was any likelihood of an engagement between the
+Danes and the Swedes. He hoped that when these two nations had ruined
+one another's fleets, his might then ride master in the Baltic. All this
+while he had taken care to make his men improve, by the example of
+foreigners and under their command, in the art of war.... His fleets
+will soon considerably outnumber the Swedish and the Danish ones joined
+together. He need not fear their being a hindrance from his giving a
+finishing stroke to this great and glorious undertaking. Which done,
+_let us look to ourselves; he will then most certainly become our rival,
+and as dangerous to us as he is now neglected_. We then may, perhaps,
+though too late, call to mind what our own ministers and merchants have
+told us of his designs of carrying on alone all the northern trade, and
+of getting all that from Turkey and Persia into his hands through the
+rivers which he is joining and making navigable from the Caspian, or the
+Black Sea, to his Petersburg. _We shall then wonder at our blindness
+that we did not suspect his designs_ when we heard the prodigious works
+he has done at Petersburg and Revel; of which last place, the _Daily
+Courant_, dated November 23, says:
+
+
+     "HAGUE, _Nov. 17_.
+
+     "The captains of the men-of-war of the States, who have been at
+     Revel, advise that the Czar has put that port and the
+     fortifications of the place into such a condition of defence that
+     it may pass for one of the most considerable fortresses, not only
+     of the Baltic, but even of Europe."
+
+
+Leave we him now, as to his sea affairs, commerce and manufactures, and
+other works both of his policy and power, and let us view him in regard
+to his proceedings in this last campaign, especially as to that so much
+talked of descent, he, in conjunction with his allies, was to make upon
+Schonen, and we shall find that even therein he has acted with his usual
+cunning. There is no doubt but the King of Denmark was the first that
+proposed this descent. He found that nothing but a speedy end to a war
+he had so rashly and unjustly begun, could save his country from ruin
+and from the bold attempts of the King of Sweden, either against Norway,
+or against Zealand and Copenhagen. To treat separately with that prince
+was a thing he could not do, as foreseeing that he would not part with
+an inch of ground to so unfair an enemy; and he was afraid that a
+Congress for a general place, supposing the King of Sweden would consent
+to it upon the terms proposed by his enemies, would draw the
+negotiations out beyond what the situation of his affairs could bear. He
+invites, therefore, all his confederates to make a home thrust at the
+King of Sweden, by a descent into his country, where, having defeated
+him, as by the superiority of the forces to be employed in that design
+he hoped they should, they might force him to an immediate peace on such
+terms as they themselves pleased. I don't know how far the rest of his
+confederates came into that project; but neither the _Prussian_ nor the
+_Hanoverian_ Court appeared _openly_ in that project, _and how far our
+English fleet, under Sir John Norris, was to have forwarded it, I have
+nothing to say, but leave others to judge out of the King of Denmark's
+own declaration_: but the Czar came readily into it. He got thereby a
+new pretence to carry the war one campaign more at other people's
+expense; to march his troops into the Empire again, and to have them
+quartered and maintained, first in Mecklenburg and then in Zealand. In
+the meantime he had his eyes upon _Wismar_, and upon a Swedish island
+called _Gotland_. If, by surprise, he could get the first out of the
+hands of his confederates, he then had a good seaport, whither to
+transport his troops when he pleased into _Germany_, without asking the
+King of _Prussia's_ leave for a free passage through his territories;
+and if, by a sudden descent, he could dislodge the _Swedes_ out of the
+other, he then became master of the best port in the Baltic. He
+miscarried, however, in both these projects; for Wismar was too well
+guarded to be surprised; and he found his confederates would not give
+him a helping hand towards conquering Gotland. After this he began to
+look with another eye upon the descent to be made upon Schonen. He found
+it equally contrary to his interest, whether it succeeded or not. For if
+he did, and the King was thereby forced to a general peace, he knew his
+interests therein would be least regarded; having already notice enough
+of his confederates being ready to sacrifice them, provided they got
+their own terms. If he did not succeed, then, besides the loss of the
+flower of an army he had trained and disciplined with so much care, as
+he very well foresaw that the English fleet would hinder the King of
+Sweden from attempting anything against Denmark; so he justly feared the
+whole shock would fall upon him, and he be thereby forced to surrender
+all he had taken from Sweden. These considerations made him entirely
+resolved not to make one of the descent; but he did not care to declare
+it till as late as possible: first, that he might the longer have his
+troops maintained at the Danish expense; secondly, that it might be too
+late for the King of Denmark to demand the necessary troops from his
+other confederates, and to make the descent without him; and, lastly,
+that by putting the Dane to a vast expense in making necessary
+preparations, he might still weaken him more, and, therefore, make him
+now the more dependent on him, and hereafter a more easy prey.
+
+Thus he very carefully dissembles his real thoughts, till just when the
+descent was to be made, and then he, all of a sudden, refuses joining
+it, and defers it till next spring, with this averment, _that he will
+then be as good as his word_. But mark him, as some of our newspapers
+tell us, under this restriction, _unless he can get an advantageous
+peace of Sweden_. This passage, together with the common report we now
+have of his treating a separate peace with the King of Sweden, is a new
+instance of his cunning and policy. He has there two strings to his bow,
+of which one must serve his turn. There is no doubt but the Czar knows
+that an accommodation between him and the King of Sweden must be very
+difficult to bring about. For as he, on the one side, should never
+consent to part with those seaports, for the getting of which he began
+this war, and which are absolutely necessary towards carrying on his
+great and vast designs; so the King of Sweden would look upon it as
+directly contrary to his interest to yield up these same seaports, if
+possibly he could hinder it. But then again, the Czar is so well
+acquainted with the great and heroic spirit of his Swedish Majesty, that
+he does not question his yielding, rather in point of interest than
+nicety of honour. From hence it is, he rightly judges, that his Swedish
+Majesty must be less exasperated against him who, though he began an
+unjust war, has very often paid dearly for it, and carried it on all
+along through various successes than against some confederates; that
+taking an opportunity of his Swedish Majesty's misfortunes, fell upon
+him in an ungenerous manner, and made a partition treaty of his
+provinces. The Czar, still more to accommodate himself to the genius of
+his great enemy, unlike his confederates, who, upon all occasions,
+spared no reflections and even very unbecoming ones (bullying memorials
+and hectoring manifestoes), spoke all along with the utmost civility of
+his brother Charles as he calls him, maintains him to be the greatest
+general in Europe, and even publicly avers, he will more trust a word
+from him than the greatest assurances, oaths, nay, even treaties with
+his confederates. These kind of civilities may, perhaps, make a deeper
+impression upon the noble mind of the King of Sweden, and he be
+persuaded rather to sacrifice a real interest to a generous enemy, than
+to gratify, in things of less moment, those by whom he has been ill, and
+even inhumanly used. But if this should not succeed, the Czar is still a
+gainer by having made his confederates uneasy at these his separate
+negotiations; and as we find by the newspapers, the more solicitous to
+keep him ready to their confederacy, which must cost them very large
+proffers and promises. In the meantime he leaves the Dane and the Swede
+securely bound up together in war, and weakening one another as fast as
+they can, and he turns towards the Empire and views the Protestant
+Princes there; and, under many specious pretences, not only marches and
+counter-marches about their several territories his troops that came
+back from Denmark, but makes also slowly advance towards Germany those
+whom he has kept this great while in Poland, under pretence to help the
+King against his dissatisfied subjects, whose commotions all the while
+he was the greatest fomenter of. He considers the Emperor is in war with
+the Turks, and therefore has found, by too successful experience, how
+little his Imperial Majesty is able to show his authority in protecting
+the members of the Empire. His troops remain in Mecklenburg,
+notwithstanding their departure is highly insisted upon. His replies to
+all the demands on that subject are filled with such reasons as if he
+would give new laws to the Empire.
+
+Now let us suppose that the King of Sweden should think it more
+honourable to make a peace with the Czar, and to carry the force of his
+resentment against his less generous enemies, what a stand will then the
+princes of the empire, even those that unadvisedly drew in 40,000
+Muscovites, to secure the tranquillity of that empire against 10,000 or
+12,000 Swedes,--I say what stand will they be able to make against him
+while the Emperor is already engaged in war with the Turks? and the
+Poles, when they are once in peace among themselves (if after the
+miseries of so long a war they are in a condition to undertake anything)
+are by treaty obliged to join their aids against that common enemy of
+Christianity.
+
+Some will say I make great and sudden rises from very small beginnings.
+My answer is, that I would have such an objector look back and reflect
+why I show him, from such a speck of entity, at his first origin,
+growing, through more improbable and almost insuperable difficulties, to
+such a bulk as he has already attained to, and _whereby, as his
+advocates, the Dutch themselves own, he is grown too formidable for the
+repose, not only of his neighbours, but of Europe in general_.
+
+But then, again, they will say he has no pretence either to make a peace
+with the Swede separately from the Dane or to make war upon other
+princes, some of whom he is bound in alliance with. Whoever thinks these
+objections not answered must have considered the Czar neither as to his
+nature or to his ends. The Dutch own further, _that he made war against
+Sweden without any specious pretence_. He that made war without any
+specious pretence may make a peace without any specious pretence, and
+make a new war without any specious pretence for it too. His Imperial
+Majesty (of Austria), like a wise Prince, when he was obliged to make
+war with the Ottomans, made it, as in policy, he should, powerfully.
+But, in the meantime, may not the Czar, who is a wise and potent Prince
+too, follow the example upon the neighbouring Princes round him that are
+Protestants? If he should, I tremble to speak it, it is not impossible,
+but in this age of Christianity _the Protestant religion should, in a
+great measure, be abolished_; and that among the Christians, the
+_Greeks_ and _Romans_ may once more come to be the only Pretenders for
+Universal Empire. The pure possibility carries with it warning enough
+for the Maritime Powers, and all the other Protestant Princes, to
+mediate a peace for Sweden, and strengthen his arms again, without which
+no preparations can put them sufficiently upon their guard; and this
+must be done early and betimes, _before the King of Sweden, either out
+of despair or revenge, throws himself into the Czar's hands_. For 'tis a
+certain maxim (which all Princes ought, and the Czar seems at this time
+to observe too much for the repose of Christendom) that a wise man must
+not stand for ceremony, and only _turn_ with opportunities. No, he must
+even _run_ with them. For the Czar's part, I will venture to say so much
+in his commendation, that he will hardly suffer himself to be overtaken
+that way. He seems to act just as the tide serves. There is nothing
+which contributes more to the making our undertakings prosperous than
+the taking of times and opportunities; for time carrieth with it the
+seasons of opportunities of business. If you let them slip, all your
+designs are rendered unsuccessful.
+
+In short, things seem now come to that _crisis_ that peace should as
+soon as possible be procured to the Swede, with such advantageous
+articles as are consistent with the nicety of his honour to accept, and
+with the safety of the Protestant interest, that he should have offered
+to him, which can be scarce less than all the possessions which he
+formerly had in the Empire. As in all other things, so in politics, a
+long-tried certainty must be preferred before an uncertainty, tho'
+grounded on ever so probable suppositions. Now can there be anything
+more certain, than that the provinces Sweden has had in the Empire, were
+given to it to make it the nearer at hand and the better able to secure
+the Protestant interest, which, together with the liberties of the
+Empire it just then had saved? Can there be anything more certain than
+that that kingdom has, by those means, upon all occasions, secured that
+said interest now near fourscore years? Can there be anything more
+certain than, as to his present Swedish Majesty, that I may use the
+words of a letter her late Majesty, Queen Anne, wrote to him (Charles
+XII.), and _in the time of a Whig Ministry too_, viz.: "That, as a true
+Prince, hero and Christian, the chief end of his endeavours has been the
+promotion of the fear of God among men: and that without insisting on
+his own particular interest."
+
+On the other hand, is it not very uncertain whether those princes, who,
+by sharing among them the Swedish provinces in the Empire, are now going
+to set up as protectors of the Protestant interests there, exclusive of
+the Swedes, will be able to do it? _Denmark_ is already so low, and will
+in all appearance be so much lower still before the end of the war,
+that very little assistance can be expected from it in a great many
+years. In _Saxony_, the prospect is but too dismal under a Popish
+prince, so that there remain only the two illustrious houses of Hanover
+and Brandenburg of all the Protestant princes, powerful enough to lead
+the rest. Let us therefore only make a parallel between what now happens
+in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, and what may happen to the Protestant
+interest, and we shall soon find how we may be mistaken in our
+reckoning. That said poor Duchy has been most miserably ruined by the
+Muscovite troops, and it is still so; the Electors of Brandenburg and
+Hanover are obliged, both as directors of the circle of Lower Saxony, as
+neighbours, and Protestant Princes, to rescue a fellow state of the
+Empire, and a Protestant country, from so cruel an oppression of a
+foreign Power. But, pray, what have they done? The Elector of
+Brandenburg, cautious lest the Muscovites might on one side invade his
+electorate, and on the other side from Livonia and Poland, his kingdom
+of Prussia; and the Elector of Hanover having the same wise caution as
+to his hereditary countries, have not upon this, though very pressing
+occasion, thought it for their interest, to use any other means than
+representations. But pray with what success? The Muscovites are still in
+Mecklenburg, and if at last they march out of it, it will be when the
+country is so ruined that they cannot there subsist any longer.
+
+It seems the King of Sweden should be restored to all that he has lost
+on the side of the Czar; and this appears the _joint interest of both
+the Maritime Powers_. This may they please to undertake: _Holland_,
+because it is a maxim there "that the Czar grows too great, and must not
+be suffered to settle in the Baltic, and that Sweden must not be
+abandoned"; _Great Britain_, because, if the Czar compasses his vast and
+prodigious views, he will, by the ruin and conquest of Sweden, become
+our nearer and more dreadful neighbour. Besides, we are bound to it by a
+treaty concluded in the year 1700, between King William and the present
+King of Sweden, by virtue of which King William assisted the King of
+Sweden, when in more powerful circumstances, with all that he desired,
+with great sums of money, several hundred pieces of cloth, and
+considerable quantities of gunpowder.
+
+But _some Politicians (whom nothing can make jealous of the growing
+strength and abilities of the Czar) though they are even foxes and
+vulpones in the art, either will not see_ or _pretend they cannot see_
+how the Czar can ever be able to make so great a progress in power as to
+hurt us here in our island. To them it is easy to repeat the same answer
+a hundred times over, if they would be so kind as to take it at last,
+viz., _that what has been may be again_; and that they did not see how
+he could reach the height of power, which he has already arrived at,
+after, I must confess, a very incredible manner. Let those _incredulous_
+people look narrowly into the _nature_ and the _ends_ and the _designs_
+of this great monarch; they will find that they are laid very deep, and
+that his plans carry in them a prodigious deal of prudence and
+foresight, and his ends are at the long run brought about by a kind of
+magic in policy; and will they not after that own that we ought to fear
+everything from him? As he desires that the designs with which he
+labours may not prove abortive, so he does not assign them a certain day
+of their birth, but leaves them to the natural productions of fit times
+and occasions, like those curious artists in China, who temper the mould
+this day of which a vessel may be made a hundred years hence.
+
+There is another sort of short-sighted politicians among us, who have
+more of cunning court intrigue and immediate statecraft in them than of
+true policy and concern for their country's interest. These gentlemen
+pin entirely their faith upon other people's sleeves; ask as to
+everything that is proposed to them, how it is liked at Court? what the
+opinion of their party is concerning it? and if the contrary party is
+for or against it? Hereby they rule their judgment, and it is enough for
+their cunning leaders to brand anything with _Whiggism_ or _Jacobitism_,
+for to make these people, without any further inquiry into the matter,
+blindly espouse it or oppose it. This, it seems, is at present the case
+of the subject we are upon. Anything said or written in favour of
+Sweden and the King thereof, is immediately said to come from a
+_Jacobite_ pen, and thus reviled and rejected, without being read or
+considered. Nay, I have heard gentlemen go so far as to maintain
+publicly, and with all the vehemence in the world, that the King of
+Sweden was a Roman Catholic, and that the Czar was a good Protestant.
+This, indeed, is one of the greatest misfortunes our country labours
+under, and till we begin to see with our own eyes, and inquire ourselves
+into the truth of things, we shall be led away, God knows whither, at
+last. The serving of Sweden according to our treaties and real interest
+has nothing to do with our party causes. Instead of seeking for and
+taking hold of any pretence to undo Sweden, we ought openly to assist
+it. Could our Protestant succession have a better friend or a bolder
+champion?
+
+I shall conclude this by thus shortly recapitulating what I have said.
+That since the Czar has not only replied to the King of Denmark
+entreating the contrary, but also answered our Admiral Norris, that he
+would persist in his resolution to delay the descent upon Schonen, and
+is said by other newspapers to resolve not to make it then, if he can
+have peace with Sweden; every Prince, and we more particularly, ought to
+be jealous of his having some such design as I mention in view, and
+consult how to prevent them, and to clip, in time, his too aspiring
+wings, which cannot be effectually done, first, without the Maritime
+Powers please to begin to keep him in some check and awe, and 'tis to be
+hoped a certain potent nation, that has helped him forward, can, in some
+measure, bring him back, and may then speak to this great enterpriser in
+the language of a countryman in Spain, who coming to an image enshrined,
+the first making whereof he could well remember, and not finding all the
+respectful usage he expected,--"You need not," quoth he, "be so proud,
+for we have known you from a plum-tree." The next only way is to
+restore, by a peace, to the King of Sweden what he has lost; that checks
+his (the Czar's) power immediately, and on that side nothing else can. I
+wish it may not at last be found true, that those who have been
+fighting against that King have, in the main, been fighting against
+themselves. If the Swede ever has his dominions again, and lowers the
+high spirit of the Czar, still he may say by his neighbours, as an old
+Greek hero did, whom his countrymen constantly sent into exile whenever
+he had done them a service, but were forced to call him back to their
+aid, whenever they wanted success. "These people," quoth he, "are always
+using me like the palm-tree. They will be breaking my branches
+continually, and yet, if there comes a storm, they run to me, and can't
+find a better place for shelter." But if he has them not, I shall only
+exclaim a phrase out of Terence's "Andria":
+
+
+     "Hoccine credibile est aut memorabile
+     Tanta vecordia innata cuiquam ut siet,
+     Ut malis gaudeant?"
+
+
+4. POSTSCRIPT.--I flatter myself that this little history is of that
+curious nature, and on matters hitherto so unobserved, that I consider
+it, with pride, as a valuable New Year's gift to the present world; and
+that posterity will accept it, as the like, for many years after, and
+read it over on that anniversary, and call it their _Warning Piece_. I
+must have my _Exegi-Monumentum_ as well as others.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[20] Or, to follow this affectation of silliness into more recent times,
+is there anything in diplomatic history that could match Lord
+Palmerston's proposal made to Marshal Soult (in 1839), to storm the
+Dardanelles, in order to afford the Sultan the support of the
+Anglo-French fleet against Russia?
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+To understand a limited historical epoch, we must step beyond its
+limits, and compare it with other historical epochs. To judge
+Governments and their acts, we must measure them by their own times and
+the conscience of their contemporaries. Nobody will condemn a British
+statesman of the 17th century for acting on a belief in witchcraft, if
+he find Bacon himself ranging demonology in the catalogue of science. On
+the other hand, if the Stanhopes, the Walpoles, the Townshends, etc.,
+were suspected, opposed, and denounced in their own country by their own
+contemporaries as tools or accomplices of Russia, it will no longer do
+to shelter their policy behind the convenient screen of prejudice and
+ignorance common to their time. At the head of the historical evidence
+we have to sift, we place, therefore, long-forgotten English pamphlets
+printed at the very time of Peter I. These preliminary _pieces des
+proces_ we shall, however, limit to three pamphlets, which, from three
+different points of view, illustrate the conduct of England towards
+Sweden. The first, the _Northern Crisis_ (given in Chapter II.),
+revealing the general system of Russia, and the dangers accruing to
+England from the Russification of Sweden; the second, called _The
+Defensive Treaty_, judging the acts of England by the Treaty of 1700;
+and the third, entitled _Truth is but Truth, however it is Timed_,
+proving that the new-fangled schemes which magnified Russia into the
+paramount Power of the Baltic were in flagrant opposition to the
+traditionary policy England had pursued during the course of a whole
+century.
+
+The pamphlet called _The Defensive Treaty_ bears no date of publication.
+Yet in one passage it states that, for reinforcing the Danish fleet,
+eight English men-of-war were left at Copenhagen "_the year before the
+last_," and in another passage alludes to the assembling of the
+confederate fleet for the Schonen expedition as having occurred "_last
+summer_." As the former event took place in 1715, and the latter towards
+the end of the summer of 1716, it is evident that the pamphlet was
+written and published in the earlier part of the year 1717. The
+Defensive Treaty between England and Sweden, the single articles of
+which the pamphlet comments upon in the form of queries, was concluded
+in 1700 between William III. and Charles XII., and was not to expire
+before 1719. Yet, during almost the whole of this period, we find
+England continually assisting Russia and waging war against Sweden,
+either by secret intrigue or open force, although the treaty was never
+rescinded nor war ever declared. This fact is, perhaps, even less
+strange than the _conspiration de silence_ under which modern historians
+have succeeded in burying it, and among them historians by no means
+sparing of censure against the British Government of that time, for
+having, without any previous declaration of war, destroyed the Spanish
+fleet in the Sicilian waters. But then, at least, England was not bound
+to Spain by a defensive treaty. How, then, are we to explain this
+contrary treatment of similar cases? The piracy committed against Spain
+was one of the weapons which the Whig Ministers, seceding from the
+Cabinet in 1717, caught hold of to harass their remaining colleagues.
+When the latter stepped forward in 1718, and urged Parliament to declare
+war against Spain, Sir Robert Walpole rose from his seat in the Commons,
+and in a most virulent speech denounced the late ministerial acts "as
+contrary to the laws of nations, and a breach of solemn treaties."
+"Giving sanction to them in the manner proposed," he said, "could have
+no other view than to screen ministers, who were conscious of having
+done something amiss, and who, having begun a war against Spain, would
+now make it the Parliament's war." The treachery against Sweden and the
+connivance at the plans of Russia, never happening to afford the
+ostensible pretext for a family quarrel amongst the Whig rulers (they
+being rather unanimous on these points), never obtained the honours of
+historical criticism so lavishly spent upon the Spanish incident.
+
+How apt modern historians generally are to receive their cue from the
+official tricksters themselves, is best shown by their reflections on
+the commercial interests of England with respect to Russia and Sweden.
+Nothing has been more exaggerated than the dimensions of the trade
+opened to Great Britain by the huge market of the Russia of Peter the
+Great, and his immediate successors. Statements bearing not the
+slightest touch of criticism have been allowed to creep from one
+book-shelf to another, till they became at last historical household
+furniture, to be inherited by every successive historian, without even
+the _beneficium inventarii_. Some incontrovertible statistical figures
+will suffice to blot out these hoary common-places.
+
+
+         BRITISH COMMERCE FROM 1697-1700.
+
+                                          L
+     Export to Russia                   58,884
+     Import from Russia                112,252
+                                     ---------
+                  Total                171,136
+
+     Export to Sweden                   57,555
+     Import from Sweden                212,094
+                                     ---------
+                  Total                269,649
+
+
+During the same period the total
+
+
+                                         L
+     Export of England amounted to   3,525,906
+     Import                          3,482,586
+                                     ---------
+                  Total              7,008,492
+
+
+In 1716, after all the Swedish provinces in the Baltic, and on the Gulfs
+of Finland and Bothnia, had fallen into the hands of Peter I., the
+
+
+                                 L
+     Export to Russia was     113,154
+     Import from Russia       197,270
+                             --------
+                  Total       310,424
+
+     Export to Sweden          24,101
+     Import from Sweden       136,959
+                             --------
+                  Total       161,060
+
+
+At the same time, the total of English exports and imports together
+reached about L10,000,000. It will be seen from these figures, when
+compared with those of 1697-1700, that the increase in the Russian trade
+is balanced by the decrease in the Swedish trade, and that what was
+added to the one was subtracted from the other.
+
+In 1730, the
+
+
+                                     L
+     Export to Russia was          46,275
+     Import from Russia           258,802
+                                 --------
+                  Total           305,077
+
+
+Fifteen years, then, after the consolidation in the meanwhile of the
+Muscovite settlement on the Baltic, the British trade with Russia had
+fallen off by L5,347. The general trade of England reaching in 1730 the
+sum of L16,329,001, the Russian trade amounted not yet to 1/53rd of its
+total value. Again, thirty years later, in 1760, the account between
+Great Britain and Russia stands thus:
+
+
+                                         L
+     Import from Russia (in 1760)     536,504
+     Export to Russia                  39,761
+                                     --------
+                  Total              L576,265
+
+
+while the general trade of England amounted to L26,361,760. Comparing
+these figures with those of 1706, we find that the total of the Russian
+commerce, after nearly half a century, has increased by the trifling sum
+of only L265,841. That England suffered positive loss by her new
+commercial relations with Russia under Peter I. and Catherine I.
+becomes evident on comparing, on the one side, the export and import
+figures, and on the other, the sums expended on the frequent naval
+expeditions to the Baltic which England undertook during the lifetime of
+Charles XII., in order to break down his resistance to Russia, and,
+after his death, on the professed necessity of checking the maritime
+encroachments of Russia.
+
+Another glance at the statistical data given for the years 1697, 1700,
+1716, 1730, and 1760, will show that the British _export_ trade to
+Russia was continually falling off, save in 1716, when Russia engrossed
+the whole Swedish trade on the eastern coast of the Baltic and the Gulf
+of Bothnia, and had not yet found the opportunity of subjecting it to
+her own regulations. From L58,884, at which the British exports to
+Russia stood during 1697-1700, when Russia was still precluded from the
+Baltic, they had sunk to L46,275 in 1730, and to L39,761 in 1760,
+showing a decrease of L19,123, or about 1/3rd of their original amount
+in 1700. If, then, since, the absorption of the Swedish provinces by
+Russia, the British market proved expanding for Russia raw produce, the
+Russian market, on its side, proved straitening for British
+manufacturers, a feature of that trade which could hardly recommend it
+at a time when the Balance of Trade doctrine ruled supreme. To trace the
+circumstances which produced the increase of the Anglo-Russian trade
+under Catherine II. would lead us too far from the period we are
+considering.
+
+On the whole, then, we arrive at the following conclusions: During the
+first sixty years of the eighteenth century the total Anglo-Russian
+trade formed but a very diminutive fraction of the general trade of
+England, say less than 1/45th. Its sudden increase during the earliest
+years of Peter's sway over the Baltic did not at all affect the general
+balance of British trade, as it was a simple transfer from its Swedish
+account to its Russian account. In the later times of Peter I., as well
+as under his immediate successors, Catherine I. and Anne, the
+Anglo-Russian trade was positively declining; during the whole epoch,
+dating from the final settlement of Russia in the Baltic provinces, the
+export of British manufactures to Russia was continually falling off, so
+that at its end it stood one-third lower than at its beginning, when
+that trade was still confined to the port of Archangel. Neither the
+contemporaries of Peter I., nor the next British generation reaped any
+benefit from the advancement of Russia to the Baltic. In general the
+Baltic trade of Great Britain was at that time trifling in regard of the
+capital involved, but important in regard of its character. It afforded
+England the raw produce for its maritime stores. That from the latter
+point of view the Baltic was in safer keeping in the hands of Sweden
+than in those of Russia, was not only proved by the pamphlets we are
+reprinting, but fully understood by the British Ministers themselves.
+Stanhope writing, for instance, to Townshend on October 16th, 1716:
+
+
+     "It is certain that if the Czar be let alone three years, he will
+     be absolute master in those seas."[21]
+
+
+If, then, neither the navigation nor the general commerce of England was
+interested in the treacherous support given to Russia against Sweden,
+there existed, indeed, one small fraction of British merchants whose
+interests were identical with the Russian ones--the Russian Trade
+Company. It was this gentry that raised a cry against Sweden. See, for
+instance:
+
+
+     "Several grievances of the English merchants in their trade into
+     the dominions of the King of Sweden, whereby it does appear how
+     dangerous it may be for the English nation to depend on Sweden only
+     for the supply of the naval stores, when they might be amply
+     furnished with the like stores from the dominions of the Emperor of
+     Russia."
+
+     "The case of the merchants trading to Russia" (a petition to
+     Parliament), etc.
+
+
+It was they who in the years 1714, 1715, and 1716, regularly assembled
+twice a week before the opening of Parliament, to draw up in public
+meetings the complaints of the British merchantmen against Sweden. On
+this small fraction the Ministers relied; they were even busy in getting
+up its demonstrations, as may be seen from the letters addressed by
+Count Gyllenborg to Baron Goertz, dated 4th of November and 4th of
+December, 1716, wanting, as they did, but the shadow of a pretext to
+drive their "mercenary Parliament," as Gyllenborg calls it, where they
+liked. The influence of these British merchants trading to Russia was
+again exhibited in the year 1765, and our own times have witnessed the
+working for his interest, of a Russian merchant at the head of the Board
+of Trade, and of a Chancellor of the Exchequer in the interest of a
+cousin engaged in the Archangel trade.
+
+The oligarchy which, after the "glorious revolution," usurped wealth and
+power at the cost of the mass of the British people, was, of course,
+forced to look out for allies, not only abroad, but also at home. The
+latter they found in what the French would call _la haute bourgeoisie_,
+as represented by the Bank of England, the money-lenders, State
+creditors, East India and other trading corporations, the great
+manufacturers, etc. How tenderly they managed the material interests of
+that class may be learned from the whole of their domestic
+legislation--Bank Acts, Protectionist enactments, Poor Regulations, etc.
+As to their _foreign policy_, they wanted to give it the appearance at
+least of being altogether regulated by the mercantile interest, an
+appearance the more easily to be produced, as the exclusive interest of
+one or the other small fraction of that class would, of course, be
+always identified with this or that Ministerial measure. The interested
+fraction then raised the commerce and navigation cry, which the nation
+stupidly re-echoed.
+
+At that time, then, there devolved on the Cabinet, at least, the _onus_
+of inventing _mercantile pretexts_, however futile, for their measures
+of foreign policy. In our own epoch, British Ministers have thrown this
+burden on foreign nations, leaving to the French, the Germans, etc.,
+the irksome task of discovering the _secret_ and _hidden_ mercantile
+springs of their actions. Lord Palmerston, for instance, takes a step
+apparently the most damaging to the material interests of Great Britain.
+Up starts a State philosopher, on the other side of the Atlantic, or of
+the Channel, or in the heart of Germany, who puts his head to the rack
+to dig out the mysteries of the mercantile Machiavelism of "perfide
+Albion," of which Palmerston is supposed the unscrupulous and
+unflinching executor. We will, _en passant_, show, by a few modern
+instances, what desperate shifts those foreigners have been driven to,
+who feel themselves obliged to interpret Palmerston's acts by what they
+imagine to be the English commercial policy. In his valuable _Histoire
+Politique et Sociale des Principautes Danubiennes_, M. Elias Regnault,
+startled by the Russian conduct, before and during the years 1848-49 of
+Mr. Colquhoun, the British Consul at Bucharest, suspects that England
+has some secret material interest in keeping down the trade of the
+Principalities. The late Dr. Cunibert, private physician of old Milosh,
+in his most interesting account of the Russian intrigues in Servia,
+gives a curious relation of the manner in which Lord Palmerston, through
+the instrumentality of Colonel Hodges, betrayed Milosh to Russia by
+feigning to support him against her. Fully believing in the personal
+integrity of Hodges, and the patriotic zeal of Palmerston, Dr. Cunibert
+is found to go a step further than M. Elias Regnault. He suspects
+England of being interested in putting down Turkish commerce generally.
+General Mieroslawski, in his last work on Poland, is not very far from
+intimating that mercantile Machiavelism instigated England to sacrifice
+her own _prestige_ in Asia Minor, by the surrender of Kars. As a last
+instance may serve the present lucubrations of the Paris papers, hunting
+after the secret springs of commercial jealousy, which induce Palmerston
+to oppose the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez canal.
+
+To return to our subject. The mercantile pretext hit upon by the
+Townshends, Stanhopes, etc., for the hostile demonstrations against
+Sweden, was the following. Towards the end of 1713, Peter I. had
+ordered all the hemp and other produce of his dominions, destined for
+export, to be carried to St. Petersburg instead of Archangel. Then the
+Swedish Regency, during the absence of Charles XII., and Charles XII.
+himself, after his return from Bender, declared all the Baltic ports,
+occupied by the Russians, to be blockaded. Consequently, English ships,
+breaking through the blockade, were confiscated. The English Ministry
+then asserted that British merchantmen had the right of trading to those
+ports according to Article XVII. of the Defensive Treaty of 1700, by
+which English commerce, with the exception of contraband of war, was
+allowed to go on with ports of the enemy. The absurdity and falsehood of
+this pretext being fully exposed in the pamphlet we are about to
+reprint, we will only remark that the case had been more than once
+decided against commercial nations, not bound, like England, by treaty
+to defend the integrity of the Swedish Empire. In the year 1561, when
+the Russians took Narva, and laboured hard to establish their commerce
+there, the Hanse towns, chiefly Luebeck, tried to possess themselves of
+this traffic. Eric XIV., then King of Sweden, resisted their
+pretensions. The city of Luebeck represented this resistance as
+altogether new, as they had carried on their commerce with the Russians
+time out of mind, and pleaded the common right of nations to navigate in
+the Baltic, provided their vessels carried no contraband of war. The
+King replied that he did not dispute the Hanse towns the liberty of
+trading with Russia, but only with Narva, which was no Russian port. In
+the year 1579 again, the Russians having broken the suspension of arms
+with Sweden, the Danes likewise claimed the navigation to Narva, by
+virtue of their treaty, but King John was as firm in maintaining the
+contrary, as was his brother Eric.
+
+In her open demonstrations of hostility against the King of Sweden, as
+well as in the false pretence on which they were founded, England seemed
+only to follow in the track of Holland, which declaring the confiscation
+of its ships to be piracy, had issued two proclamations against Sweden
+in 1714.
+
+In one respect, the case of the States-General was the same as that of
+England. King William had concluded the Defensive Treaty as well for
+Holland as for England. Besides, Article XVI., in the Treaty of
+Commerce, concluded between Holland and Sweden in 1703, expressly
+stipulated that no navigation ought to be allowed to the ports blocked
+up by either of the confederates. The then common Dutch cant that "there
+was no hindering traders from carrying their merchandise where they
+will," was the more impudent as, during the war, ending with the Peace
+of Ryswick, the Dutch Republic had declared all France to be blocked up,
+forbidden the neutral Powers all trade with that kingdom, and caused all
+their ships that went there or came thence to be brought up without any
+regard to the nature of their cargoes.
+
+In another respect, the situation of Holland was different from that of
+England. Fallen from its commercial and maritime grandeur, Holland had
+then already entered upon its epoch of decline. Like Genoa and Venice,
+when new roads of commerce had dispossessed them of their old mercantile
+supremacy, it was forced to lend out to other nations its capital, grown
+too large for the vessels of its own commerce. Its fatherland had begun
+to lie there where the best interest for its capital was paid. Russia,
+therefore, proved an immense market, less for the commerce than for the
+outlay of capital and men. To this moment Holland has remained the
+banker of Russia. At the time of Peter they supplied Russia with ships,
+officers, arms, and money, so that his fleet, as a contemporary writer
+remarks, ought to have been called a Dutch rather than a Muscovite one.
+They gloried in having sent the first European merchant ship to St.
+Petersburg, and returned the commercial privileges they had obtained
+from Peter, or hoped to obtain from him, by that fawning meanness which
+characterizes their intercourse with Japan. Here, then, was quite
+another solid foundation than in England for the Russianism of
+statesmen, whom Peter I. had entrapped during his stay at Amsterdam, and
+the Hague in 1697, whom he afterwards directed by his ambassadors, and
+with whom he renewed his personal influence during his renewed stay at
+Amsterdam in 1716-17. Yet, if the paramount influence England exercised
+over Holland during the first _decennia_ of the 18th century be
+considered, there can remain no doubt that the proclamations against
+Sweden by the States-General would never have been issued, if not with
+the previous consent and at the instigation of England. The intimate
+connection between the English and Dutch Governments served more than
+once the former to put up precedents in the name of Holland, which they
+were resolved to act upon in the name of England. On the other hand, it
+is no less certain that the Dutch statesmen were employed by the Czar to
+influence the British ones. Thus Horace Walpole, the brother of the
+"Father of Corruption," the brother-in-law of the Minister, Townshend,
+and the British Ambassador at the Hague during 1715-16, was evidently
+inveigled into the Russian interest by his Dutch friends. Thus, as we
+shall see by-and-by, Theyls, the Secretary to the Dutch Embassy at
+Constantinople, at the most critical period of the deadly struggle
+between Charles XII. and Peter I., managed affairs at the same time for
+the Embassies of England and Holland at the Sublime Porte. This Theylls,
+in a print of his, openly claims it as a merit with his nation to have
+been the devoted and rewarded agent of Russian intrigue.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[21] In the year 1657, when the Courts of Denmark and Brandenburg
+intended engaging the Muscovites to fall upon Sweden, they instructed
+their Minister so to manage the affair that the Czar might by no means
+get any footing in the Baltic, because "they did not know what to do
+with so troublesome a neighbour." (See Puffendorf's _History of
+Brandenburg_.)
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+     "_The Defensive Treaty concluded in the year 1700, between his late
+     Majesty, King William, of ever-glorious memory, and his present
+     Swedish Majesty, King Charles XII. Published at the earnest desire
+     of several members of both Houses of Parliament._
+
+
+     'Nec rumpite foedera pacis,
+     Nec regnis praeferte fidem.'
+                                 --SILIUS, _Lip._ II.
+
+
+"_Article I._ Establishes between the Kings of Sweden and England 'a
+sincere and constant friendship for ever, a league and good
+correspondence, so that they shall never mutually or separately molest
+one another's kingdoms, provinces, colonies, or subjects, wheresoever
+situated, _nor shall they suffer or agree that this should be done by
+others, etc._'
+
+"_Article II._ 'Moreover, each of the Allies, his heirs and successors,
+shall be obliged to take care of, and promote, as much as in him lies,
+the profit and honour of the other, to detect and give notice to his
+other ally (as soon as it shall come to his own knowledge) of all
+imminent dangers, conspiracies, and hostile designs formed against him,
+to withstand them as much as possible, and to prevent them both by
+advice and assistance; and therefore _it shall not be lawful for either
+of the Allies, either by themselves or any other whatsoever, to act,
+treat, or endeavour anything to the prejudice or loss of the other_, his
+lands or dominions whatsoever or wheresoever, whether by land or sea;
+that one shall in no wise favour the other's foes, either rebels or
+enemies, to the prejudice of his Ally,' etc.
+
+"_Query I._ How the words marked in italics agree with our present
+conduct, when our fleet acts in conjunction with the enemies of Sweden,
+_the Czar commands our fleet, our Admiral enters into Councils of War,
+and is not only privy to all their designs, but together with our own
+Minister at Copenhagen_ (as the King of Denmark has himself owned it in
+a public declaration), _pushed on the Northern Confederates to an
+enterprise entirely destructive to our Ally Sweden, I mean the descent
+designed last summer upon Schonen_?
+
+"_Query II._ In what manner we also must explain that passage in the
+first article by which it is stipulated that one Ally shall not either
+by themselves or any other whatsoever, act, treat, or endeavour anything
+to the loss of the other's lands and dominions; to justify in particular
+our leaving in the year 1715, even when the season was so far advanced
+as no longer to admit of our usual pretence of conveying and protecting
+our trade, which was then got already safe home, eight men-of-war in the
+Baltic, with orders to join in one line of battle with the Danes,
+whereby we made them so much superior in number to the Swedish fleet,
+that it could not come to the relief of Straelsund, and whereby _we
+chiefly occasioned Sweden's entirely losing its German Provinces_, and
+even the _extreme danger his Swedish Majesty ran in his own person_, in
+crossing the sea, before the surrender of the town.
+
+"_Article III._ By a special defensive treaty, the Kings of Sweden and
+England mutually oblige themselves, 'in a strict alliance, to defend one
+another mutually, as well as their kingdoms, territories, provinces,
+states, subjects, possessions, as their rights and liberties of
+navigation and commerce, as well in the Northern, Deucalidonian,
+Western, and Britannic Sea, commonly called the Channel, the Baltic, the
+Sound; as also of the privileges and prerogatives of each of the Allies
+belonging to them, by virtue of treaties and agreements, as well as by
+received customs, the laws of nations, hereditary right, against any
+aggressors or invaders and molesters in Europe by sea or land, etc.'
+
+"_Query._ It being by the law of nations an indisputable right and
+prerogative of any king or people, in case of a great necessity or
+threatening ruin, to use all such means they themselves shall judge most
+necessary for their preservation; it having moreover been a constant
+prerogative and practice of the Swedes, for these several hundred years,
+in case of a war with their most dreadful enemies the Muscovites, to
+hinder all trade with them in the Baltic; and since it is also
+stipulated in this article that amongst other things, _one Ally ought to
+defend the prerogatives belonging to the other, even by received
+customs, and the law of nations_: how come we now, the King of Sweden
+stands more than ever in need of using that prerogative, not only to
+dispute it, but also to take thereof a pretence for an open hostility
+against him?
+
+"_Articles IV., V., VI., and VII._ fix the strength of the auxiliary
+forces England and Sweden are to send each other in case the territory
+of either of these powers should be invaded, or its navigation 'molested
+or hindered' in one of the seas enumerated in Article III. The invasion
+of the _German_ provinces of Sweden is expressly included as a _casus
+foederis_.
+
+"_Article VIII._ stipulates that that Ally who is not attacked shall
+first act the part of a pacific mediator; but, the mediation having
+proved a failure, 'the aforesaid forces shall be sent without delay; nor
+shall the confederates desist before the injured party shall be
+satisfied in all things.'
+
+"_Article IX._ That Ally that requires the stipulated 'help, has to
+choose whether he will have the above-named army either all or any,
+either in soldiers, ships, ammunition, or money.'
+
+"_Article X._ Ships and armies serve under 'the command of him that
+required them.'
+
+"_Article XI._ 'But if it should happen that the above-mentioned forces
+should not be proportionable to the danger, as supposing that perhaps
+the aggressor should be assisted by the forces of some other
+confederates of his, then one of the Allies, after previous request,
+shall be obliged to help the other that is injured, with greater forces,
+such as he shall be able to raise with safety and convenience, both by
+sea and land....'
+
+"_Article XII._ 'It shall be lawful for either of the Allies and their
+subjects to bring their men-of-war into one another's harbours, and to
+winter there.' Peculiar negotiations about this point shall take place
+at Stockholm, but 'in the meanwhile, the articles of treaty concluded at
+London, 1661, relating to the navigation and commerce shall remain, in
+their full force, as much as if they were inserted here word for word.'
+
+"_Article XIII._ ' ... The subjects of either of the Allies ... shall no
+way, either by sea or land, serve them (the enemies of either of the
+Allies), either as mariners or soldiers, and therefore it shall be
+forbid them upon severe penalty.'
+
+"_Article XIV._ 'If it happens that either of the confederate kings ...
+should be engaged in a war against a common enemy, or be molested by any
+other neighbouring king ... in his own kingdoms or provinces ... to the
+hindering of which, he that requires help may by the force of this
+treaty himself be obliged to send help: then that Ally so molested shall
+not be obliged to send the promised help....'
+
+"_Query I._ Whether in our conscience we don't think the King of Sweden
+most unjustly attacked by all his enemies; whether consequently we are
+not convinced that we owe him the assistance stipulated in these
+Articles; whether he has not demanded the same from us, and why it has
+hitherto been refused him?
+
+"_Query II._ These articles, setting forth in the most expressing terms,
+in what manner Great Britain and Sweden ought to assist one another, can
+either of these two Allies take upon him to prescribe to the other who
+requires his assistance a way of lending him it not expressed in the
+treaty; and if that other Ally does not think it for his interest to
+accept of the same, but still insists upon the performance of the
+treaty, can he from thence take a pretence, not only to withhold the
+stipulated assistance, but also to use his Ally in a hostile way, and to
+join with his enemies against him? If this is not justifiable, as even
+common sense tells us it is not, how can the reason stand good, which we
+allege amongst others, for using the King of Sweden as we do, _id est_,
+that demanding a literal performance of his alliance with us, _he would
+not accept the treaty of neutrality for his German provinces_, which we
+proposed to him some years ago, a treaty which, not to mention its
+partiality in favour of the enemies of Sweden, and that it was
+calculated only for our own interest, and for to prevent all disturbance
+in the empire, whilst we were engaged in a war against France, the King
+of Sweden had so much less reason to rely upon, as he was to conclude it
+with those very enemies, that had every one of them broken several
+treaties in beginning the present war against him, and as it was to be
+guaranteed by those powers, who were also every one of them guarantees
+of the broken treaties, without having performed their guarantee?
+
+"_Query III._ How can we make the words in the 7th Article, _that in
+assisting our injured Ally we shall not desist before he shall be
+satisfied in all things_, agree with our endeavouring, to the contrary,
+to help the enemies of that Prince, though all unjust aggressors, not
+only to take one province after the other from him, but also to remain
+undisturbed possessors thereof, blaming all along the King of Sweden for
+not tamely submitting thereunto?
+
+"_Query IV._ The treaty concluded in the year 1661, between Great
+Britain and Sweden, being in the 11th Article confirmed, and the said
+treaty forbidding expressly one of the confederates _either himself or
+his subjects to lend or to sell to the other's enemies, men-of-war or
+ships of defence_; the 13th Article of this present treaty forbidding
+also expressly the subjects of either of the Allies _to help anyways the
+enemies of the other, to the inconvenience and loss of such an Ally_;
+should we not have accused the Swedes of the most notorious breach of
+this treaty, had they, during our late war with the French, lent them
+their own fleet, the better to execute any design of theirs against us,
+or had they, notwithstanding our representations to the contrary,
+suffered their subjects to furnish the French with ships of 50, 60, and
+70 guns! Now, if we turn the tables, and remember upon how many
+occasions our fleet has of late been entirely subservient to the designs
+of the enemies of Sweden, even in most critical times, and that _the
+Czar of Muscovy has actually above a dozen English-built ships_ in his
+fleet, will it not be very difficult for us to excuse in ourselves what
+we should most certainly have blamed, if done by others?
+
+"_Article XVII._ The obligation shall not be so far extended as that all
+friendship and mutual commerce with the enemies of that Ally (that
+requires the help) shall be taken away; for supposing that one of the
+confederates should send his auxiliaries, and should not be engaged in
+the war himself, it shall then be lawful for the subjects to trade and
+commerce with that enemy of that Ally that is engaged in the war, also
+directly and safely to merchandise with such enemies, for all goods not
+expressly forbid and called contraband, as in a special treaty of
+commerce hereafter shall be appointed.
+
+"_Query I._ This Article being the only one out of twenty-two whose
+performance we have now occasion to insist upon from the Swedes, the
+question will be whether we ourselves, in regard to Sweden, have
+performed all the other articles as it was our part to do, and whether
+in demanding of the King of Sweden the executing of this Article, we
+have promised that we would also do our duty as to all the rest; if not,
+may not the Swedes say that we complain unjustly of the breach of one
+single Article, when we ourselves may perhaps be found guilty of having
+in the most material points either not executed or even acted against
+the whole treaty?
+
+"_Query II._ Whether the liberty of commerce one Ally is, by virtue of
+this Article, to enjoy with the other's enemies, ought to have no
+limitation at all, neither as to time nor place; in short, whether it
+ought even to be extended so far as to destroy the very end of this
+Treaty, which is the promoting the safety and security of one another's
+kingdoms?
+
+"_Query III._ Whether in case the French had in the late wars made
+themselves masters of Ireland or Scotland, and either in new-made
+seaports, or the old ones, endeavoured by trade still more firmly to
+establish themselves in their new conquest, we, in such a case, should
+have thought the Swedes our true allies and friends, had they insisted
+upon this Article to trade with the French in the said seaports taken
+from us, and to furnish them there with several necessaries of war, nay,
+even with armed ships, whereby the French might the easier have annoyed
+us here in England?
+
+"_Query IV._ Whether, if we had gone about to hinder a trade so
+prejudicial to us, and in order thereunto brought up all Swedish ships
+going to the said seaports, we should not highly have exclaimed against
+the Swedes, had they taken from thence a pretence to join their fleet
+with the French, to occasion the losing of any of our dominions, and
+even to encourage the invasion upon us, have their fleet at hand to
+promote the same?
+
+"_Query V._ Whether upon an impartial examination this would not have
+been a case exactly parallel to that we insist upon, as to a free Trade
+to the seaports the Czar has taken from Sweden, and to our present
+behaviour, upon the King of Sweden's hindering the same?
+
+"_Query VI._ Whether we have not ever since Oliver Cromwell's time till
+1710, in all our wars with France and Holland, without any urgent
+necessity at all, brought up and confiscated Swedish ships, though not
+going to any prohibited ports, and that to a far greater number and
+value, than all those the Swedes have now taken from us, and whether the
+Swedes have ever taken a pretence from thence to join with our enemies,
+and to send whole squadrons of ships to their assistance?
+
+"_Query VII._ Whether, if we inquire narrowly into the state of
+commerce, as it has been carried on for these many years, we shall not
+find that the trade of the above-mentioned places was not so very
+necessary to us, at least not so far as to be put into the balance with
+the preservation of a Protestant confederate nation, much less to give
+us a just reason _to make war against that nation, which, though not
+declared, has done it more harm than the united efforts of all its
+enemies_?
+
+"_Query VIII._ Whether, if it happened two years ago, that this trade
+became something more necessary to us than formerly, it is not easily
+proved, that it was occasioned only by the Czar's forcing us out of our
+old channel of trade to Archangel, and bringing us to Petersburg, and
+our complying therewith. So that all the inconveniences we laboured
+under upon that account ought to have been laid to the Czar's door, and
+not to the King of Sweden's?
+
+"_Query IX._ Whether the Czar did not in the very beginning of 1715
+again permit us to trade our old way to Archangel, and whether our
+Ministers had not notice thereof a great while before our fleet was sent
+that year to protect our _trade to Petersburg_, which by this alteration
+in the Czar's resolution was become as unnecessary for us as before?
+
+"_Query X._ Whether the King of Sweden had not declared, that if we
+would forbear trading to _Petersburg_, etc., which he looked upon as
+ruinous to his kingdom, he would in no manner disturb our trade, neither
+in the Baltic nor anywhere else; but that in case we would not give him
+this slight proof of our friendship, he should be excused if the
+innocent came to suffer with the guilty?
+
+"_Query XI._ Whether, by our insisting upon the trade to the ports
+prohibited by the King of Sweden, which besides it being unnecessary to
+us, hardly makes one part in ten of that we carry on in the Baltic, we
+have not drawn upon us the hazards that our trade has run all this
+while, been ourselves the occasion of our great expenses in fitting out
+fleets for its protection, and by our joining with the enemies of
+Sweden, fully justified his Swedish Majesty's resentment; had it ever
+gone so far as to seize and confiscate without distinction all our ships
+and effects, wheresoever he found them, either within or without his
+kingdoms?
+
+"_Query XII._ If we were so tender of our trade to the northern ports in
+general, ought we not in policy rather to have considered the hazard
+that trade runs by the approaching ruin of Sweden, and _by the Czar's
+becoming the whole and sole master of the Baltic, and all the naval
+stores we want from thence_? Have we not also suffered greater hardships
+and losses in the said trade from the Czar, than that amounting only to
+sixty odd thousand pounds (whereof, by the way, two parts in three may
+perhaps be disputable), which provoked us first to send twenty
+men-of-war in the Baltic with order to attack the Swedes wherever they
+met them? And yet, did not this very Czar, this very aspiring and
+dangerous prince, _last summer command the whole confederate fleet_, as
+it was called, _of which our men-of-war made the most considerable part?
+The first instance that ever was of a Foreign Potentate having the
+command given him of the English fleet, the bulwark of our nation_; and
+did not our said men-of-war afterwards convey his (the Czar's) transport
+ships and troops on board of them, in their return from Zealand,
+_protecting them from the Swedish fleet_, which else would have made a
+considerable havoc amongst them?
+
+"_Query XIII._ Suppose now, we had, on the contrary, taken hold of the
+great and many complaints our merchants have made of the ill-usage they
+meet from the Czar, to have sent our fleet to show our resentment
+against that prince, to prevent his great and pernicious designs even to
+us, _to assist Sweden pursuant to this Treaty_, and effectually to
+restore the peace in the North, would not that have been more for our
+interest, more necessary, more honourable and just, and more according
+to our Treaty; and would not the several 100,000 pounds these our
+Northern expeditions have cost the nation, have been thus better
+employed?
+
+"_Query XIV._ If the preserving and securing our trade against the
+Swedes has been the only and real object of all our measures, as to the
+Northern affairs, how came we the year before the last to leave eight
+men-of-war in the Baltic and at Copenhagen, when we had no more trade
+there to protect, and how came Admiral Norris last summer, although he
+and the Dutch together made up the number of twenty-six men-of-war, and
+consequently were too strong for the Swedes, to attempt anything against
+our trade under their convoy; yet to lay above two whole months of the
+best season in the Sound, without convoying our and the Dutch
+merchantmen to the several ports they were bound for, whereby they were
+kept in the Baltic so late that their return could not but be very
+hazardous, as it even proved, both to them and our men-of-war
+themselves? Will not the world be apt to think that the hopes of forcing
+the King of Sweden to an inglorious and disadvantageous peace, by which
+the Duchies of Bremen and Verden ought to be added to the Hanover
+dominions, or that some other such view, foreign, if not contrary, to
+the true and old interest of Great Britain, had then a greater influence
+upon all these our proceedings than _the pretended care of our trade_?
+
+"_Article XVIII._ For as much as it seems convenient for the
+preservation of the liberty of navigation and commerce in the Baltic
+Sea, that a firm and exact friendship should be kept between the Kings
+of Sweden and Denmark; and whereas the former Kings of Sweden and
+Denmark did oblige themselves mutually, not only by the public Articles
+of Peace made in the camp of Copenhagen, on the 27th of May, 1660, and
+by the ratifications of the agreement interchanged on both sides,
+sacredly and inviolably to observe all and every one of the clauses
+comprehended in the said agreement, but also declared together to ...
+Charles II., King of Great Britain ... a little before the treaty
+concluded between England and Sweden in the year 1665, that they would
+stand sincerely ... to all ... of the Articles of the said peace ...
+whereupon Charles II., with the approbation and consent of both the
+forementioned Kings of Sweden and Denmark, took upon himself a little
+after the Treaty concluded between England and Sweden, 1st March, 1665,
+to wit 9th October, 1665, guarantee of the same agreements.... Whereas
+an instrument of peace between ... the Kings of Sweden and Denmark
+happened to be soon after these concluded at Lunden in Schonen, in 1679,
+which contains an express transaction, and repetition and confirmation
+of the Treaties concluded at Roskild, Copenhagen, and Westphalia;
+therefore ... the King of Great Britain binds himself by the force of
+this Treaty ... that if either of the Kings of Sweden and Denmark shall
+consent to the violation, either of all the agreements, or of one or
+more articles comprehended in them, and consequently if either of the
+Kings shall to the prejudice of the person, provinces, territories,
+islands, goods, dominions and rights of the other, which by the force of
+the agreements so often repeated, and made in the camp of Copenhagen, on
+the 27th of May, 1660, as also of those made in the ... peace at Lunden
+in Schonen in 1679, were attributed to every one that was interested and
+comprehended in the words of the peace, should either by himself or by
+others, presume, or secretly design or attempt, or by open molestations,
+or by any injury, or by any violence of arms, attempt anything; that
+then the ... King of Great Britain ... shall first of all, by his
+interposition, perform all the offices of a friend and princely ally,
+which may serve towards the keeping inviolable all the frequently
+mentioned agreements, and of every article comprehended in them, and
+consequently towards the preservation of peace between both kings; that
+afterwards if the King, who is the beginner of such prejudice, or any
+molestation or injury, contrary to all agreements, and contrary to any
+articles comprehended in them, shall refuse after being admonished ...
+then the King of Great Britain ... shall ... assist him that is injured
+as by the present agreements between the Kings of Great Britain and
+Sweden in such cases is determined and agreed.
+
+"_Query._ Does not this article expressly tell us how to remedy the
+disturbances our trade in the Baltic might suffer, in case of a
+misunderstanding betwixt the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, by obliging
+both these Princes to keep all the Treaties of Peace that have been
+concluded between them from 1660-1670, and in case either of them should
+in an hostile manner act against the said Treaties, by assisting the
+other against the aggressor? How comes it then that we don't make use of
+so just a remedy against an evil we are so great sufferers by? Can
+anybody, though ever so partial, deny but the King of Denmark, though
+seemingly a sincere friend to the King of Sweden, from the peace of
+Travendahl till he went out of Saxony against the Muscovites, fell very
+unjustly upon him immediately after, taking ungenerously advantage of
+the fatal battle of Pultava? Is not then the King of Denmark the
+violator of all the above-mentioned Treaties, and consequently the true
+author of the disturbances our trade meets with in the Baltic? Why in
+God's name don't we, according to this article, assist Sweden against
+him, and why do we, on the contrary, declare openly against the injured
+King of Sweden, send hectoring and threatening memorials to him, upon
+the least advantage he has over his enemies, as we did last summer upon
+his entering Norway, and even order our fleets to act openly against him
+in conjunction with the Danes?
+
+"_Article XIX._ There shall be 'stricter confederacy and union between
+the above-mentioned Kings of Great Britain and Sweden, for the future,
+_for the defence and preservation of the Protestant, Evangelic, and
+reformed religion_.'
+
+"_Query I._ How do we, according to this article, join with Sweden to
+_assert, protect, and preserve the Protestant religion_? Don't we suffer
+that nation, which has always been a bulwark to the said religion, most
+unmercifully to be torn to pieces?... _Don't we ourselves give a helping
+hand towards its destruction?_ And why all this? Because our merchants
+have lost their ships to the value of sixty odd thousand pounds. _For
+this loss, and nothing else, was the pretended reason why, in the year
+1715, we sent our fleet in the Baltic, at the expense of L200,000_; and
+as to what our merchants have suffered since, suppose we attribute it to
+our threatening memorials as well as open hostilities against the King
+of Sweden, must we not even then own that that Prince's resentment has
+been very moderate?
+
+"_Query II._ How can other Princes, and especially our fellow
+Protestants, think us sincere in what we have made them believe as to
+our zeal in spending millions of lives and money for to secure the
+Protestant interest only in one single branch of it, _I mean the
+Protestant succession here_, when they see that that succession has
+hardly taken place, before we, only for sixty odd thousand pounds, (for
+let us always remember that this paltry sum was the first pretence for
+our quarrelling with Sweden) go about to undermine the very foundation
+of that interest in general, by helping, as we do, entirely to sacrifice
+Sweden, the old and sincere protector of the Protestants, to its
+neighbours, of which some are professed Papists, some worse, and some,
+at least, but lukewarm Protestants?
+
+"_Article XX._ Therefore, that a reciprocal faith of the Allies and
+their perseverance in this agreement may appear ... both the
+fore-mentioned kings mutually oblige themselves, and declare that ...
+they will not depart a tittle from the genuine and common sense of all
+and every article of this treaty under any pretences of friendship,
+profit, former treaty, agreement, and promise, or upon any colour
+whatsoever: but that they will most fully and readily, either by
+themselves, or ministers, or subjects, put in execution whatsoever they
+have promised in this treaty ... without any hesitation, exception, or
+excuse....
+
+"_Query I._ Inasmuch as this article sets forth that, at the time of
+concluding of the treaty, we were under no engagement contrary to it,
+and that it were highly unjust should we afterwards, and while this
+treaty is in force, which is eighteen years after the day it was signed,
+have entered into any such engagements, how can we justify to the world
+our late proceedings against the King of Sweden, which naturally seem
+the consequences of a treaty either of our own making with the enemies
+of that Prince, _or of some Court or other that at present influences
+our measures_?
+
+"_Query II._ The words in this article ... how in the name of honour,
+faith, and justice, do they agree with the _little and pitiful
+pretences_ we now make use of, not only for not assisting Sweden,
+pursuant to this treaty, _but even for going about so heartily as we do
+to destroy it_?
+
+"_Article XXI._ This defensive treaty shall last for eighteen years,
+before the end of which the confederate kings may ... again treat.
+
+"_Ratification of the abovesaid treaty._ We, having seen and considered
+this treaty, have approved and confirmed the same in all and every
+particular article and clause as by the present. We do approve the same
+for us, our heirs, and successors; assuring and promising our princely
+word that we shall perform and observe sincerely and in good earnest all
+those things that are therein contained, for the better confirmation
+whereof we have ordered our great seal of England to be put to these
+presents, which were given at our palace of Kensington, 25th of
+February, in the year of our Lord 1700, and in the 11th year of our
+reign (Gulielmus Rex).[22]
+
+"_Query._ How can any of us that declares himself for the late happy
+revolution, and that is a true and grateful lover of King William's for
+ever-glorious memory ... yet bear with the least patience, that the said
+treaty should (that I may again use the words of the 20th article) be
+_departed from, under any pretence of profit, or upon any colour
+whatsoever_, especially so insignificant and trifling a one as that
+which has been made use of for two years together to employ our ships,
+our men, and our money, _to accomplish the ruin of Sweden_, that same
+Sweden whose defence and preservation this great and wise monarch of
+ours has so solemnly promised, and which he always looked upon to be of
+the utmost necessity for to secure the Protestant interest in Europe?"
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[22] The treaty was concluded at the Hague on the 6th and 16th January,
+1700, and ratified by William III. on February 5th, 1700.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+Before entering upon an analysis of the pamphlet headed, "_Truth is but
+truth, as it is timed_," with which we shall conclude the _Introduction_
+to the Diplomatic Revelations, some preliminary remarks on the general
+history of Russian politics appear opportune.
+
+The overwhelming influence of Russia has taken Europe at different
+epochs by surprise, startled the peoples of the West, and been submitted
+to as a fatality, or resisted only by convulsions. But alongside the
+fascination exercised by Russia, there runs an ever-reviving scepticism,
+dogging her like a shadow, growing with her growth, mingling shrill
+notes of irony with the cries of agonising peoples, and mocking her very
+grandeur as a histrionic attitude taken up to dazzle and to cheat. Other
+empires have met with similar doubts in their infancy; Russia has become
+a colossus without outliving them. She affords the only instance in
+history of an immense empire, the very existence of whose power, even
+after world-wide achievements, has never ceased to be treated like a
+matter of faith rather than like a matter of fact. From the outset of
+the eighteenth century to our days, no author, whether he intended to
+exalt or to check Russia, thought it possible to dispense with first
+proving her existence.
+
+But whether we be spiritualists or materialists with respect to
+Russia--whether we consider her power as a palpable fact, or as the mere
+vision of the guilt-stricken consciences of the European peoples--the
+question remains the same: "How did this power, or this phantom of a
+power, contrive to assume such dimensions as to rouse on the one side
+the passionate assertion, and on the other the angry denial of its
+threatening the world with a rehearsal of Universal Monarchy?" At the
+beginning of the eighteenth century Russia was regarded as a mushroom
+creation extemporised by the genius of Peter the Great. Schloezer
+thought it a discovery to have found out that she possessed a past; and
+in modern times, writers, like Fallmerayer, unconsciously following in
+the track beaten by Russian historians, have deliberately asserted that
+the northern spectre which frightens the Europe of the nineteenth
+century already overshadowed the Europe of the ninth century. With them
+the policy of Russia begins with the first Ruriks, and has, with some
+interruptions indeed, been systematically continued to the present hour.
+
+Ancient maps of Russia are unfolded before us, displaying even larger
+European dimensions than she can boast of now: her perpetual movement of
+aggrandizement from the ninth to the eleventh century is anxiously
+pointed out; we are shown Oleg launching 88,000 men against Byzantium,
+fixing his shield as a trophy on the gate of that capital, and dictating
+an ignominious treaty to the Lower Empire; Igor making it tributary;
+Sviataslaff glorying, "the Greeks supply me with gold, costly stuffs,
+rice, fruits and wine; Hungary furnishes cattle and horses; from Russia
+I draw honey, wax, furs, and men"; Vladimir conquering the Crimea and
+Livonia, extorting a daughter from the Greek Emperor, as Napoleon did
+from the German Emperor, blending the military sway of a northern
+conqueror with the theocratic despotism of the Porphyro-geniti, and
+becoming at once the master of his subjects on earth, and their
+protector in heaven.
+
+Yet, in spite of the plausible parallelism suggested by these
+reminiscences, the policy of the first Ruriks differs fundamentally from
+that of modern Russia. It was nothing more nor less than the policy of
+the German barbarians inundating Europe--the history of the modern
+nations beginning only after the deluge has passed away. The Gothic
+period of Russia in particular forms but a chapter of the Norman
+conquests. As the empire of Charlemagne precedes the foundation of
+modern France, Germany, and Italy, so the empire of the Ruriks precedes
+the foundation of Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic Settlements, Turkey,
+and Muscovy itself. The rapid movement of aggrandizement was not the
+result of deep-laid schemes, but the natural offspring of the primitive
+organization of Norman conquest--vassalship without fiefs, or fiefs
+consisting only in tributes--the necessity of fresh conquests being kept
+alive by the uninterrupted influx of new Varangian adventurers, panting
+for glory and plunder. The chiefs, becoming anxious for repose, were
+compelled by the Faithful Band to move on, and in Russian, as in French
+Normandy, there arrived the moment when the chiefs despatched on new
+predatory excursions their uncontrollable and insatiable
+companions-in-arms with the single view to get rid of them. Warfare and
+organization of conquest on the part of the first Ruriks differ in no
+point from those of the Normans in the rest of Europe. If Slavonian
+tribes were subjected not only by the sword, but also by mutual
+convention, this singularity is due to the exceptional position of those
+tribes, placed between a northern and eastern invasion, and embracing
+the former as a protection from the latter. The same magic charm which
+attracted other northern barbarians to the Rome of the West attracted
+the Varangians to the Rome of the East. The very migration of the
+Russian capital--Rurik fixing it at Novgorod, Oleg removing it to Kiev,
+and Sviataslaff attempting to establish it in Bulgaria--proves beyond
+doubt that the invader was only feeling his way, and considered Russia
+as a mere halting-place from which to wander on in search of an empire
+in the South. If modern Russia covets the possession of Constantinople
+to establish her dominion over the world, the Ruriks were, on the
+contrary, forced by the resistance of Byzantium, under Zimiskes,
+definitively to establish their dominion in Russia.
+
+It may be objected that victors and vanquished amalgamated more quickly
+in Russia than in any other conquest of the northern barbarians, that
+the chiefs soon commingled themselves with the Slavonians--as shown by
+their marriages and their names. But then, it should be recollected that
+the Faithful Band, which formed at once their guard and their privy
+council, remained exclusively composed of Varangians; that Vladimir,
+who marks the summit, and Yaroslav, who marks the commencing decline of
+Gothic Russia, were seated on her throne by the arms of the Varangians.
+If any Slavonian influence is to be acknowledged in this epoch, it is
+that of Novgorod, a Slavonian State, the traditions, policy, and
+tendencies of which were so antagonistic to those of modern Russia that
+the one could found her existence only on the ruins of the other. Under
+Yaroslav the supremacy of the Varangians is broken, but simultaneously
+with it disappears the conquering tendency of the first period, and the
+decline of Gothic Russia begins. The history of that decline, more still
+than that of the conquest and formation, proves the exclusively Gothic
+character of the Empire of the Ruriks.
+
+The incongruous, unwieldy, and precocious Empire heaped together by the
+Ruriks, like the other empires of similar growth, is broken up into
+appanages, divided and subdivided among the descendants of the
+conquerors, dilacerated by feudal wars, rent to pieces by the
+intervention of foreign peoples. The paramount authority of the Grand
+Prince vanishes before the rival claims of seventy princes of the blood.
+The attempt of Andrew of Susdal at recomposing some large limbs of the
+empire by the removal of the capital from Kiev to Vladimir proves
+successful only in propagating the decomposition from the South to the
+centre. Andrew's third successor resigns even the last shadow of
+supremacy, the title of Grand Prince, and the merely nominal homage
+still offered him. The appanages to the South and to the West become by
+turns Lithuanian, Polish, Hungarian, Livonian, Swedish. Kiev itself, the
+ancient capital, follows destinies of its own, after having dwindled
+down from a seat of the Grand Princedom to the territory of a city.
+Thus, the Russia of the Normans completely disappears from the stage,
+and the few weak reminiscences in which it still outlived itself,
+dissolve before the terrible apparition of Genghis Khan. The bloody mire
+of Mongolian slavery, not the rude glory of the Norman epoch, forms the
+cradle of Muscovy, and modern Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy.
+
+The Tartar yoke lasted from 1237 to 1462--more than two centuries; a
+yoke not only crushing, but dishonouring and withering the very soul of
+the people that fell its prey. The Mongol Tartars established a rule of
+systematic terror, devastation and wholesale massacre forming its
+institutions. Their numbers being scanty in proportion to their enormous
+conquests, they wanted to magnify them by a halo of consternation, and
+to thin, by wholesale slaughter, the populations which might rise in
+their rear. In their creations of desert they were, besides, led by the
+same economical principle which has depopulated the Highlands of
+Scotland and the Campagna di Roma--the conversion of men into sheep, and
+of fertile lands and populous abodes into pasturage.
+
+The Tartar yoke had already lasted a hundred years before Muscovy
+emerged from its obscurity. To entertain discord among the Russian
+princes, and secure their servile submission, the Mongols had restored
+the dignity of the Grand Princedom. The strife among the Russian princes
+for this dignity was, as a modern author has it, "an abject strife--the
+strife of slaves, whose chief weapon was calumny, and who were always
+ready to denounce each other to their cruel rulers; wrangling for a
+degraded throne, whence they could not move but with plundering,
+parricidal hands--hands filled with gold and stained with gore; which
+they dared not ascend without grovelling, nor retain but on their knees,
+prostrate and trembling beneath the scimitar of a Tartar, always ready
+to roll under his feet those servile crowns, and the heads by which they
+were worn." It was in this infamous strife that the Moscow branch won at
+last the race. In 1328 the crown of the Grand Princedom, wrested from
+the branch of Tver by dint of denunciation and assassination, was picked
+up at the feet of Usbeck Khan by Yury, the elder brother of Ivan Kalita.
+Ivan I. Kalita, and Ivan III., surnamed the Great, personate Muscovy
+rising by means of the Tartar yoke, and Muscovy getting an independent
+power by the disappearance of the Tartar rule. The whole policy of
+Muscovy, from its first entrance into the historical arena, is resumed
+in the history of these two individuals.
+
+The policy of Ivan Kalita was simply this: to play the abject tool of
+the Khan, thus to borrow his power, and then to turn it round upon his
+princely rivals and his own subjects. To attain this end, he had to
+insinuate himself with the Tartars by dint of cynical adulation, by
+frequent journeys to the Golden Horde, by humble prayers for the hand of
+Mongol princesses, by a display of unbounded zeal for the Khan's
+interest, by the unscrupulous execution of his orders, by atrocious
+calumnies against his own kinsfolk, by blending in himself the
+characters of the Tartar's hangman, sycophant, and slave-in-chief. He
+perplexed the Khan by continuous revelations of secret plots. Whenever
+the branch of Tver betrayed a velleite of national independence, he
+hurried to the Horde to denounce it. Wherever he met with resistance, he
+introduced the Tartar to trample it down. But it was not sufficient to
+act a character; to make it acceptable, gold was required. Perpetual
+bribery of the Khan and his grandees was the only sure foundation upon
+which to raise his fabric of deception and usurpation. But how was the
+slave to get the money wherewith to bribe the master? He persuaded the
+Khan to instal him his tax-gatherer throughout all the Russian
+appanages. Once invested with this function, he extorted money under
+false pretences. The wealth accumulated by the dread held out of the
+Tartar name, he used to corrupt the Tartars themselves. By a bribe he
+induced the primate to transfer his episcopal seat from Vladimir to
+Moscow, thus making the latter the capital of the empire, because the
+religious capital, and coupling the power of the Church with that of his
+throne. By a bribe he allured the Boyards of the rival princes into
+treason against their chiefs, and attracted them to himself as their
+centre. By the joint influence of the Mahometan Tartar, the Greek
+Church, and the Boyards, he unites the princes holding appanages into a
+crusade against the most dangerous of them--the prince of Tver; and then
+having driven his recent allies by bold attempts at usurpation into
+resistance against himself, into a war for the public good, he draws not
+the sword but hurries to the Khan. By bribes and delusion again, he
+seduces him into assassinating his kindred rivals under the most cruel
+torments. It was the traditional policy of the Tartar to check the
+Russian princes the one by the other, to feed their dissensions, to
+cause their forces to equiponderate, and to allow none to consolidate
+himself. Ivan Kalita converts the Khan into the tool by which he rids
+himself of his most dangerous competitors, and weighs down every
+obstacle to his own usurping march. He does not conquer the appanages,
+but surreptitiously turns the rights of the Tartar conquest to his
+exclusive profit. He secures the succession of his son through the same
+means by which he had raised the Grand Princedom of Muscovy, that
+strange compound of princedom and serfdom. During his whole reign he
+swerves not once from the line of policy he had traced to himself;
+clinging to it with a tenacious firmness, and executing it with
+methodical boldness. Thus he becomes the founder of the Muscovite power,
+and characteristically his people call him Kalita--that is, the purse,
+because it was the purse and not the sword with which he cut his way.
+The very period of his reign witnesses the sudden growth of the
+Lithuanian power which dismembers the Russian appanages from the West,
+while the Tartar squeezes them into one mass from the East. Ivan, while
+he dared not repulse the one disgrace, seemed anxious to exaggerate the
+other. He was not to be seduced from following up his ends by the
+allurements of glory, the pangs of conscience, or the lassitude of
+humiliation. His whole system may be expressed in a few words: the
+machiavelism of the usurping slave. His own weakness--his slavery--he
+turned into the mainspring of his strength.
+
+The policy traced by Ivan I. Kalita is that of his successors; they had
+only to enlarge the circle of its application. They followed it up
+laboriously, gradually, inflexibly. From Ivan I. Kalita, we may,
+therefore, pass at once to Ivan III., surnamed the Great.
+
+At the commencement of his reign (1462-1505) Ivan III. was still a
+tributary to the Tartars; his authority was still contested by the
+princes holding appanages; Novgorod, the head of the Russian republics,
+reigned over the north of Russia; Poland-Lithuania was striving for the
+conquest of Muscovy; lastly, the Livonian knights were not yet disarmed.
+At the end of his reign we behold Ivan III. seated on an independent
+throne, at his side the daughter of the last emperor of Byzantium, at
+his feet Kasan, and the remnant of the Golden Horde flocking to his
+court; Novgorod and the other Russian republics enslaved--Lithuania
+diminished, and its king a tool in Ivan's hands--the Livonian knights
+vanquished. Astonished Europe, at the commencement of Ivan's reign,
+hardly aware of the existence of Muscovy, hemmed in between the Tartar
+and the Lithuanian, was dazzled by the sudden appearance of an immense
+empire on its eastern confines, and Sultan Bajazet himself, before whom
+Europe trembled, heard for the first time the haughty language of the
+Muscovite. How, then, did Ivan accomplish these high deeds? Was he a
+hero? The Russian historians themselves show him up a confessed coward.
+
+Let us shortly survey his principal contests, in the sequence in which
+he undertook and concluded them--his contests with the Tartars, with
+Novgorod, with the princes holding appanages, and lastly with
+Lithuania-Poland.
+
+Ivan rescued Muscovy from the Tartar yoke, not by one bold stroke, but
+by the patient labour of about twenty years. He did not break the yoke,
+but disengaged himself by stealth. Its overthrow, accordingly, has more
+the look of the work of nature than the deed of man. When the Tartar
+monster expired at last, Ivan appeared at its deathbed like a physician,
+who prognosticated and speculated on death rather than like a warrior
+who imparted it. The character of every people enlarges with its
+enfranchisement from a foreign yoke; that of Muscovy in the hands of
+Ivan seems to diminish. Compare only Spain in its struggles against the
+Arabs with Muscovy in its struggles against the Tartars.
+
+At the period of Ivan's accession to the throne, the Golden Horde had
+long since been weakened, internally by fierce feuds, externally by the
+separation from them of the Nogay Tartars, the eruption of Timour
+Tamerlane, the rise of the Cossacks, and the hostility of the Crimean
+Tartars. Muscovy, on the contrary, by steadily pursuing the policy
+traced by Ivan Kalita, had grown to a mighty mass, crushed, but at the
+same time compactly united by the Tartar chain. The Khans, as if struck
+by a charm, had continued to remain instruments of Muscovite
+aggrandizement and concentration. By calculation they had added to the
+power of the Greek Church, which, in the hand of the Muscovite grand
+princes, proved the deadliest weapon against them.
+
+In rising against the Horde, the Muscovite had not to invent but only to
+imitate the Tartars themselves. But Ivan did not rise. He humbly
+acknowledged himself a slave of the Golden Horde. By bribing a Tartar
+woman he seduced the Khan into commanding the withdrawal from Muscovy of
+the Mongol residents. By similar and imperceptible and surreptitious
+steps he duped the Khan into successive concessions, all ruinous to his
+sway. He thus did not conquer, but filch strength. He does not drive,
+but manoeuvre his enemy out of his strongholds. Still continuing to
+prostrate himself before the Khan's envoys, and to proclaim himself his
+tributary, he eludes the payment of the tribute under false pretences,
+employing all the stratagems of a fugitive slave who dare not front his
+owner, but only steal out of his reach. At last the Mongol awakes from
+his torpor, and the hour of battle sounds. Ivan, trembling at the mere
+semblance of an armed encounter, attempts to hide himself behind his own
+fear, and to disarm the fury of his enemy by withdrawing the object upon
+which to wreak his vengeance. He is only saved by the intervention of
+the Crimean Tartars, his allies. Against a second invasion of the Horde,
+he ostentatiously gathers together such disproportionate forces that the
+mere rumour of their number parries the attack. At the third invasion,
+from the midst of 200,000 men, he absconds a disgraced deserter.
+Reluctantly dragged back, he attempts to haggle for conditions of
+slavery, and at last, pouring into his army his own servile fear, he
+involves it in a general and disorderly flight. Muscovy was then
+anxiously awaiting its irretrievable doom, when it suddenly hears that
+by an attack on their capital made by the Crimean Khan, the Golden Horde
+has been forced to withdraw, and has, on its retreat, been destroyed by
+the Cossacks and Nogay Tartars. Thus defeat was turned into success, and
+Ivan had overthrown the Golden Horde, not by fighting it himself, but by
+challenging it through a feigned desire of combat into offensive
+movements, which exhausted its remnants of vitality and exposed it to
+the fatal blows of the tribes of its own race whom he had managed to
+turn into his allies. He caught one Tartar with another Tartar. As the
+immense danger he had himself summoned proved unable to betray him into
+one single trait of manhood, so his miraculous triumph did not infatuate
+him even for one moment. With cautious circumspection he dared not
+incorporate Kasan with Muscovy, but made it over to sovereigns belonging
+to the family of Menghi-Ghirei, his Crimean ally, to hold it, as it
+were, in trust for Muscovy. With the spoils of the vanquished Tartar, he
+enchained the victorious Tartar. But if too prudent to assume, with the
+eye-witnesses of his disgrace, the airs of a conqueror, this impostor
+did fully understand how the downfall of the Tartar empire must dazzle
+at a distance--with what halo of glory it would encircle him, and how it
+would facilitate a magnificent entry among the European Powers.
+Accordingly he assumed abroad the theatrical attitude of the conqueror,
+and, indeed, succeeded in hiding under a mask of proud susceptibility
+and irritable haughtiness the obtrusiveness of the Mongol serf, who
+still remembered kissing the stirrup of the Khan's meanest envoy. He
+aped in more subdued tone the voice of his old masters, which terrified
+his soul. Some standing phrases of modern Russian diplomacy, such as the
+magnanimity, the wounded dignity of the master, are borrowed from the
+diplomatic instructions of Ivan III.
+
+After the surrender of Kasan, he set out on a long-planned expedition
+against Novgorod, the head of the Russian republics. If the overthrow of
+the Tartar yoke was, in his eyes, the first condition of Muscovite
+greatness, the overthrow of Russian freedom was the second. As the
+republic of Viatka had declared itself neutral between Muscovy and the
+Horde, and the republic of Tskof, with its twelve cities, had shown
+symptoms of disaffection, Ivan flattered the latter and affected to
+forget the former, meanwhile concentrating all his forces against
+Novgorod the Great, with the doom of which he knew the fate of the rest
+of the Russian republics to be sealed. By the prospect of sharing in
+this rich booty, he drew after him the princes holding appanages, while
+he inveigled the boyards by working upon their blind hatred of
+Novgorodian democracy. Thus he contrived to march three armies upon
+Novgorod and to overwhelm it by disproportionate force. But then, in
+order not to keep his word to the princes, not to forfeit his immutable
+"Vos non vobis," at the same time apprehensive, lest Novgorod should not
+yet have become digestible from the want of preparatory treatment, he
+thought fit to exhibit a sudden moderation; to content himself with a
+ransom and the acknowledgment of his suzerainty; but into the act of
+submission of the republic he smuggled some ambiguous words which made
+him its supreme judge and legislator. Then he fomented the dissensions
+between the patricians and plebeians raging as well in Novgorod as at
+Florence. Of some complaints of the plebeians he took occasion to
+introduce himself again into the city, to have its nobles, whom he knew
+to be hostile to himself, sent to Moscow loaded with chains, and to
+break the ancient law of the republic that "none of its citizens should
+ever be tried or punished out of the limits of its own territory." From
+that moment he became supreme arbiter. "Never," say the annalists,
+"never since Rurik had such an event happened; never had the grand
+princes of Kiev and Vladimir seen the Novgorodians come and submit to
+them as their judges. Ivan alone could reduce Novgorod to that degree of
+humiliation." Seven years were employed by Ivan to corrupt the republic
+by the exercise of his judicial authority. Then, when he found its
+strength worn out, he thought the moment ripe for declaring himself. To
+doff his own mask of moderation, he wanted, on the part of Novgorod, a
+breach of the peace. As he had simulated calm endurance, so he
+simulated now a sudden burst of passion. Having bribed an envoy of the
+republic to address him during a public audience with the name of
+sovereign, he claimed, at once, all the rights of a despot--the
+self-annihilation of the republic.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+One feature characteristic of the Slavonic race must strike every
+observer. Almost everywhere it confined itself to an inland country,
+leaving the sea-borders to non-Slavonic tribes. Finno-Tartaric tribes
+held the shores of the Black Sea, Lithuanians and Fins those of the
+Baltic and White Sea. Wherever they touched the sea-board, as in the
+Adriatic and part of the Baltic, the Slavonians had soon to submit to
+foreign rule. The Russian people shared this common fate of the
+Slavonian race. Their home, at the time they first appear in history,
+was the country about the sources and upper course of the Volga and its
+tributaries, the Dnieper, Don, and Northern Dwina. Nowhere did their
+territory touch the sea except at the extremity of the Gulf of Finland.
+Nor had they before Peter the Great proved able to conquer any maritime
+outlet beside that of the White Sea, which, during three-fourths of the
+year, is itself enchained and immovable. The spot where Petersburg now
+stands had been for a thousand years past contested ground between Fins,
+Swedes, and Russians. All the remaining extent of coast from Polangen,
+near Memel, to Torrea, the whole coast of the Black Sea, from Akerman to
+Redut Kaleh, has been conquered later on. And, as if to witness the
+anti-maritime peculiarity of the Slavonic race, of all this line of
+coast, no portion of the Baltic coast has really adopted Russian
+nationality. Nor has the Circassian and Mingrelian east coast of the
+Black Sea. It is only the coast of the White Sea, as far as it was worth
+cultivating, some portion of the northern coast of the Black Sea, and
+part of the coast of the Sea of Azof, that have really been peopled with
+Russian inhabitants, who, however, despite the new circumstances in
+which they are placed, still refrain from taking to the sea, and
+obstinately stick to the land-lopers' traditions of their ancestors.
+
+From the very outset, Peter the Great broke through all the traditions
+of the Slavonic race. "It is water that Russia wants." These words he
+addressed as a rebuke to Prince Cantemir are inscribed on the title-page
+of his life. The conquest of the Sea of Azof was aimed at in his first
+war with Turkey, the conquest of the Baltic in his war against Sweden,
+the conquest of the Black Sea in his second war against the Porte, and
+the conquest of the Caspian Sea in his fraudulent intervention in
+Persia. For a system of local encroachment, land was sufficient; for a
+system of universal aggression, water had become indispensable. It was
+but by the conversion of Muscovy from a country wholly of land into a
+sea-bordering empire, that the traditional limits of the Muscovite
+policy could be superseded and merged into that bold synthesis which,
+blending the encroaching method of the Mongol slave with the
+world-conquering tendencies of the Mongol master, forms the life-spring
+of modern Russian diplomacy.
+
+It has been said that no great nation has ever existed, or been able to
+exist, in such an inland position as that of the original empire of
+Peter the Great; that none has ever submitted thus to see its coasts and
+the mouths of its rivers torn away from it; that Russia could no more
+leave the mouth of the Neva, the natural outlet for the produce of
+Northern Russia, in the hands of the Swedes, than the mouths of the Don,
+Dnieper, and Bug, and the Straits of Kertch, in the hands of nomadic and
+plundering Tartars; that the Baltic provinces, from their very
+geographical configuration, are naturally a corollary to whichever
+nation holds the country behind them; that, in one word, Peter, in this
+quarter, at least, but took hold of what was absolutely necessary for
+the natural development of his country. From this point of view, Peter
+the Great intended, by his war against Sweden, only rearing a Russian
+Liverpool, and endowing it with its indispensable strip of coast.
+
+But then, one great fact is slighted over, the _tour de force_ by which
+he transferred the capital of the Empire from the inland centre to the
+maritime extremity, the characteristic boldness with which he erected
+the new capital on the first strip of Baltic coast he conquered, almost
+within gunshot of the frontier, thus deliberately giving his dominions
+an _eccentric centre_. To transfer the throne of the Czars from Moscow
+to Petersburg was to place it in a position where it could not be safe,
+even from insult, until the whole coast from Libau to Tornea was
+subdued--a work not completed till 1809, by the conquest of Finland.
+"St. Petersburg is the window from which Russia can overlook Europe,"
+said Algarotti. It was from the first a defiance to the Europeans, an
+incentive to further conquest to the Russians. The fortifications in our
+own days of Russian Poland are only a further step in the execution of
+the same idea. Modlin, Warsaw, Ivangorod, are more than citadels to keep
+a rebellious country in check. They are the same menace to the west
+which Petersburg, in its immediate bearing, was a hundred years ago to
+the north. They are to transform Russia into Panslavonia, as the Baltic
+provinces were to transform Muscovy into Russia.
+
+Petersburg, the _eccentric centre_ of the empire, pointed at once to a
+periphery still to be drawn.
+
+It is, then, not the mere conquest of the Baltic provinces which
+separates the policy of Peter the Great from that of his ancestors, but
+it is the transfer of the capital which reveals the true meaning of his
+Baltic conquests. Petersburg was not like Muscovy, the centre of a race,
+but the seat of a government; not the slow work of a people, but the
+instantaneous creation of a man; not the medium from which the
+peculiarities of an inland people radiate, but the maritime extremity
+where they are lost; not the traditionary nucleus of a national
+development, but the deliberately chosen abode of a cosmopolitan
+intrigue. By the transfer of the capital, Peter cut off the natural
+ligaments which bound up the encroaching system of the old Muscovite
+Czars with the natural abilities and aspirations of the great Russian
+race. By planting his capital on the margin of a sea, he put to open
+defiance the anti-maritime instincts of that race, and degraded it to a
+mere weight in his political mechanism. Since the 16th century Muscovy
+had made no important acquisitions but on the side of Siberia, and to
+the 16th century the dubious conquests made towards the west and the
+south were only brought about by direct agency on the east. By the
+transfer of the capital, Peter proclaimed that he, on the contrary,
+intended working on the east and the immediately neighbouring countries
+through the agency of the west. If the agency through the east was
+narrowly circumscribed by the stationary character and the limited
+relations of Asiatic peoples, the agency through the west became at once
+illimited and universal from the movable character and the all-sided
+relations of Western Europe. The transfer of the capital denoted this
+intended change of agency, which the conquest of the Baltic provinces
+afforded the means of achieving, by securing at once to Russia the
+supremacy among the neighbouring Northern States; by putting it into
+immediate and constant contact with all points of Europe; by laying the
+basis of a material bond with the maritime Powers, which by this
+conquest became dependent on Russia for their naval stores; a dependence
+not existing as long as Muscovy, the country that produced the great
+bulk of the naval stores, had got no outlets of its own; while Sweden,
+the Power that held these outlets, had not got the country lying behind
+them.
+
+If the Muscovite Czars, who worked their encroachments by the agency
+principally of the Tartar Khans, were obliged to _tartarize_ Muscovy,
+Peter the Great, who resolved upon working through the agency of the
+west, was obliged to _civilize_ Russia. In grasping upon the Baltic
+provinces, he seized at once the tools necessary for this process. They
+afforded him not only the diplomatists and the generals, the brains with
+which to execute his system of political and military action on the
+west, they yielded him, at the same time, a crop of bureaucrats,
+schoolmasters, and drill-sergeants, who were to drill Russians into that
+varnish of civilization that adapts them to the technical appliances of
+the Western peoples, without imbuing them with their ideas.
+
+Neither the Sea of Azof, nor the Black Sea, nor the Caspian Sea, could
+open to Peter this direct passage to Europe. Besides, during his
+lifetime still Taganrog, Azof, the Black Sea, with its new-formed
+Russian fleets, ports, and dockyards, were again abandoned or given up
+to the Turk. The Persian conquest, too, proved a premature enterprise.
+Of the four wars which fill the military life of Peter the Great, his
+first war, that against Turkey, the fruits of which were lost in a
+second Turkish war, continued in one respect the traditionary struggle
+with the Tartars. In another respect, it was but the prelude to the war
+against Sweden, of which the second Turkish war forms an episode and the
+Persian war an epilogue. Thus the war against Sweden, lasting during
+twenty-one years, almost absorbs the military life of Peter the Great.
+Whether we consider its purpose, its results, or its endurance, we may
+justly call it _the_ war of Peter the Great. His whole creation hinges
+upon the conquest of the Baltic coast.
+
+Now, suppose we were altogether ignorant of the details of his
+operations, military and diplomatic. The mere fact that the conversion
+of Muscovy into Russia was brought about by its transformation from a
+half-Asiatic inland country into the paramount maritime Power of the
+Baltic, would it not enforce upon us the conclusion that England, the
+greatest maritime Power of that epoch--a maritime Power lying, too, at
+the very gates of the Baltic, where, since the middle of the 17th
+century, she had maintained the attitude of supreme arbiter--that
+England must have had her hand in this great change, that she must have
+proved the main prop or the main impediment of the plans of Peter the
+Great, that during the long protracted and deadly struggle between
+Sweden and Russia she must have turned the balance, that if we do not
+find her straining every nerve in order to save the Swede we may be sure
+of her having employed all the means at her disposal for furthering the
+Muscovite? And yet, in what is commonly called history, England does
+hardly appear on the plan of this grand drama, and is represented as a
+spectator rather than as an actor. Real history will show that the
+Khans of the Golden Horde were no more instrumental in realizing the
+plans of Ivan III. and his predecessors than the rulers of England were
+in realizing the plans of Peter I. and his successors.
+
+The pamphlets which we have reprinted, written as they were by English
+contemporaries of Peter the Great, are far from concurring in the common
+delusions of later historians. They emphatically denounce England as the
+mightiest tool of Russia. The same position is taken up by the pamphlet
+of which we shall now give a short analysis, and with which we shall
+conclude the introduction to the diplomatic revelations. It is entitled,
+"_Truth is but Truth as it is timed; or, our Ministry's present measures
+against the Muscovite vindicated_, etc., etc. Humbly dedicated to the
+House of C., London, 1719."
+
+The former pamphlets we have reprinted, were written at, or shortly
+after, the time when, to use the words of a modern admirer of Russia,
+"Peter traversed the Baltic Sea as master at the head of the combined
+squadrons of all the northern Powers, England included, which gloried in
+sailing under his orders." In 1719, however, when _Truth is but Truth_
+was published, the face of affairs seemed altogether changed. Charles
+XII. was dead, and the English Government now pretended to side with
+Sweden, and to wage war against Russia. There are other circumstances
+connected with this anonymous pamphlet which claim particular notice. It
+purports to be an extract from a relation, which, on his return from
+Muscovy, in August, 1715, its author, by order of George I., drew up and
+handed over to Viscount Townshend, then Secretary of State.
+
+
+     "It happens," says he, "to be an advantage that at present I may
+     own to have been the first so happy to foresee, or honest to
+     forewarn our Court here, of the absolute necessity of our then
+     breaking with the Czar, and shutting him out again of the Baltic."
+     "My relation discovered his aim as to other States, and even to the
+     German Empire, to which, although an inland Power, he had offered
+     to annex Livonia as an Electorate, so that he could but be admitted
+     as an elector. It drew attention to the Czar's then contemplated
+     assumption of the title of Autocrator. Being head of the Greek
+     Church he would be owned by the other potentates as head of the
+     Greek Empire. I am not to say how reluctant we would be to
+     acknowledge that title, since we have already made an ambassador
+     treat him with the title of Imperial Majesty, which the Swede has
+     never yet condescended to."
+
+
+For some time attached to the British Embassy in Muscovy, our author, as
+he states, was later on "_dismissed the service, because the Czar
+desired it_," having made sure that
+
+
+     "I had given our Court such light into his affairs as is contained
+     in this paper; for which I beg leave to appeal to the King, and to
+     vouch the Viscount Townshend, who heard his Majesty give that
+     vindication." "And yet, notwithstanding all this, I have been for
+     these five years past kept soliciting for a very long arrear still
+     due, and whereof I contracted the greatest part in executing a
+     commission for her late Majesty."
+
+
+The anti-Muscovite attitude, suddenly assumed by the Stanhope Cabinet,
+our author looks to in rather a sceptic mood.
+
+
+     "I do not pretend to foreclose, by this paper, the Ministry of that
+     applause due to them from the public, when they shall satisfy us as
+     to what the motives were which made them, till but yesterday,
+     straiten the Swede in everything, although then our ally as much as
+     now; or strengthen, by all the ways they could, the Czar, although
+     under no tie, but barely that of amity with Great Britain.... At
+     the minute I write this I learn that the gentleman who brought the
+     Muscovites, not yet three years ago, as a royal navy, not under our
+     protection, on their first appearance in the Baltic, is again
+     authorized by the persons now in power, to give the Czar a second
+     meeting in these seas. For what reason or to what good end?"
+
+
+The gentleman hinted at is Admiral Norris, whose Baltic campaign against
+Peter I. seems, indeed, to be the original pattern upon which the recent
+naval campaigns of Admirals Napier and Dundas were cut out.
+
+The restoration to Sweden of the Baltic provinces is required by the
+commercial as well as the political interest of Great Britain. Such is
+the pith of our author's argument:
+
+
+     "Trade is become the very life of our State; and what food is to
+     life, naval stores are to a fleet. The whole trade we drive with
+     all the other nations of the earth, at best, is but lucrative;
+     this, of the north, is indispensably needful, and may not be
+     improperly termed the _sacra embole_ of Great Britain, as being
+     its chiefest foreign vent, for the support of all our trade, and
+     our safety at home. As woollen manufactures and minerals are the
+     staple commodities of Great Britain, so are likewise naval stores
+     those of Muscovy, as also of all those very provinces in the Baltic
+     which the Czar has so lately wrested from the crown of Sweden.
+     Since those provinces have been in the Czar's possession, Pernan is
+     entirely waste. At Revel we have not one British merchant left, and
+     all the trade which was formerly at Narwa is now brought to
+     Petersburg.... The Swede could never possibly engross the trade of
+     our subjects, because those seaports in his hands were but so many
+     thoroughfares from whence these commodities were uttered, the
+     places of their produce or manufacture lying behind those ports, in
+     the dominions of the Czar. But, if left to the Czar, these Baltic
+     ports are no more thoroughfares, but peculiar magazines from the
+     inland countries of the Czar's own dominions. Having already
+     Archangel in the White Sea, to leave him but any seaport in the
+     Baltic were to put no less in his hands than the _two keys of the
+     general magazines of all the naval stores of Europe_; it being
+     known that Danes, Swedes, Poles, and Prussians have but single and
+     distinct branches of those commodities in their several dominions.
+     If the Czar should thus engross 'the supply of what we cannot do
+     without,' where then is our fleet? Or, indeed, where is the
+     security for all our trade to any part of the earth besides?"
+
+
+If, then, the interest of British commerce requires to exclude the Czar
+from the Baltic, the interest of our State ought to be no less a spur to
+quicken us to that attempt. By the interest of our State I would be
+understood to mean neither the party measures of a Ministry, nor any
+foreign motives of a Court, but precisely what is, and ever must be, the
+immediate concern, either for the safety, ease, dignity, or emolument of
+the Crown, as well as the common weal of Great Britain. With respect to
+the Baltic, it has "from the earliest period of our naval power" always
+been considered a fundamental interest of our State: first, to prevent
+the rise there of any new maritime Power; and, secondly, to maintain the
+balance of power between Denmark and Sweden.
+
+
+     "One instance of the wisdom and foresight of our _then truly
+     British statesmen_ is the peace at Stalboa, in the year 1617. James
+     the First was the mediator of that treaty, by which the Muscovite
+     was obliged to give up all the provinces which he then was
+     possessed of in the Baltic, and to be barely an inland Power on
+     this side of Europe."
+
+
+The same policy of preventing a new maritime Power from starting in the
+Baltic was acted upon by Sweden and Denmark.
+
+
+     "Who knows not that the Emperor's attempt to get a seaport in
+     Pomerania weighed no less with the great Gustavus than any other
+     motive for carrying his arms even into the bowels of the house of
+     Austria? What befel, at the times of Charles Gustavus, the crown of
+     Poland itself, who, besides it being in those days by far the
+     mightiest of any of the northern Powers, had then a long stretch of
+     coast on, and some ports in, the Baltic? The Danes, though then in
+     alliance with Poland, would never allow them, even for their
+     assistance against the Swedes, to have a fleet in the Baltic, but
+     destroyed the Polish ships wherever they could meet them."
+
+
+As to the maintenance of the balance of power between the established
+maritime States of the Baltic, the tradition of British policy is no
+less clear. "When the Swedish power gave us some uneasiness there by
+threatening to crush Denmark," the honour of our country was kept up by
+retrieving the then inequality of the balance of power.
+
+The Commonwealth of England sent in a squadron to the Baltic which
+brought on the treaty of Roskild (1658), afterwards confirmed at
+Copenhagen (1660). The fire of straw kindled by the Danes in the times
+of King William III. was as speedily quenched by George Rock in the
+treaty of Copenhagen.
+
+Such was the hereditary British policy.
+
+
+     "It never entered into the mind of the politicians of those times
+     in order to bring the scale again to rights, to find out the happy
+     _expedient of raising a third naval Power_ for framing a juster
+     balance in the Baltic.... Who has taken this counsel against Tyre,
+     the crowning city, whose merchants are princes, whose traffickers
+     are the honourables of the earth? _Ego autem neminem nomino, quare
+     irasci mihi nemo poterit, nisi qui ante de se noluerit confiteri._
+     Posterity will be under some difficulty to believe that this could
+     be the _work of any of the persons now in power_ ... that _we_ have
+     opened; _St. Petersburg to the Czar solely at our own expense, and
+     without any risk to him_...."
+
+
+The safest line of policy would be to return to the treaty of Itolbowa,
+and to suffer the Muscovite no longer "to nestle in the Baltic." Yet,
+it may be said, that in "the present state of affairs" it would be
+"difficult to retrieve the advantage we have lost by not curbing, when
+it was more easy, the growth of the Muscovite power." A middle course
+may be thought more convenient.
+
+
+     "If we should find it consistent with the welfare of our State that
+     the Muscovite have an inlet into the Baltic, as having, of all the
+     princes of Europe, a country that can be made most beneficial to
+     its prince, by uttering its produce to foreign markets. In this
+     case, it were but reasonable to expect, on the other hand, that in
+     return for our complying so far with his interest, for the
+     improvement of his country, his Czarish Majesty, on his part,
+     should demand nothing that may tend to the disturbance of another;
+     and, therefore, contenting himself with ships of trade, should
+     demand none of war."
+
+     "We should thus preclude his hopes of being ever more than an
+     inland Power," but "obviate every objection of using the Czar worse
+     than any Sovereign Prince may expect. I shall not for this give an
+     instance of a Republic of Genoa, or another in the Baltic itself,
+     of the Duke of Courland; but will assign Poland and Prussia, who,
+     though both now crowned heads, have ever contented themselves with
+     the freedom of an open traffic, without insisting on a fleet. Or
+     the treaty of Falczin, between the Turk and Muscovite, by which
+     Peter was forced not only to restore Asoph, and to part with all
+     his men-of-war in those parts, but also to content himself with the
+     bare freedom of traffic in the Black Sea. Even an inlet in the
+     Baltic for trade is much beyond what he could morally have promised
+     himself not yet so long ago on the issue of his war with Sweden."
+
+
+If the Czar refuse to agree to such "a healing temperament," we shall
+have "nothing to regret but the time we lost to exert all the means that
+Heaven has made us master of, to reduce him to a peace advantageous to
+Great Britain." War would become inevitable. In that case
+
+
+     "it ought no less to animate our Ministry to pursue their present
+     measures, than fire with indignation the breast of every honest
+     Briton that a Czar of Muscovy, who owes his naval skill to our
+     instructions, and his grandeur to our forbearance, should so soon
+     deny to Great Britain the terms which so few years ago he was fain
+     to take up with from the Sublime Porte."
+
+     "'Tis every way our interest to have the Swede restored to those
+     provinces which the Muscovite has wrested from that crown in the
+     Baltic. _Great Britain can no longer hold the balance in that
+     sea_," since she "_has raised the Muscovite to be a maritime Power
+     there_.... Had we performed the articles of our alliance made by
+     King William with the crown of Sweden, that gallant nation would
+     ever have been a bar strong enough against the Czar coming into the
+     Baltic.... Time must confirm us, that the Muscovite's _expulsion
+     from the Baltic_ is _now_ the principal end of our Ministry."
+
+
+Butler & Tanner. The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Secret Diplomatic History of The
+Eighteenth Century, by Karl Marx
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