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diff --git a/old/31891.txt b/old/31891.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce32bc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/31891.txt @@ -0,0 +1,13392 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Essays on the Constitution of the United +States by Paul Leicester Ford + + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no +restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under +the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or +online at http://www.gutenberg.org/license + + + +Title: Essays on the Constitution of the United States + +Author: Paul Leicester Ford + +Release Date: April 5, 2010 [Ebook #31891] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: US-ASCII + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES*** + + + + + + Essays on the Constitution of the United States + + Published During Its Discussion by the People + + 1787-1788 + + Edited by + + Paul Leicester Ford + + Brooklyn, N.Y. + + Historical Printing Club + + 1892 + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +Introduction. +The Letters Of Cassius, Written By James Sullivan. +The Letters Of Agrippa, Accredited To James Winthrop. +Replies To The Strictures Of A Landholder, By Elbridge Gerry. +The Letters Of A Landholder, Written By Oliver Ellsworth. +A Letter To The Landholder. By William Williams. +The Letters Of A Countryman. Written By Roger Sherman. +The Letters Of A Citizen Of New Haven, Written By Roger Sherman. +The Letters Of Cato, Written By George Clinton. +The Letters Of Caesar, Written By Alexander Hamilton. +The Letters Of Sydney. Written By Robert Yates. +Cursory Remarks By Hugh Henry Brackenridge. +Letter Of Caution, Written By Samuel Chase. +Letter Of A Friend To The Constitution, Written By Daniel Carroll. +The Letters Of Luther Martin. +Letter Of A Plain Dealer, Accredited To Spencer Roane. +Remarks On The New Plan Of Government, By Hugh Williamson. +Letter Of A Steady And Open Republican, Written By Charles Pinckney. +Bibliography. +Index. +Footnotes + + + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + +In 1888 the editor selected from the pamphlet arguments published during +the discussion of the Constitution of the United States, prior to its +ratification by the States, a collection of fourteen tracts, and printed +them in a volume under the title of _Pamphlets on the Constitution of the +United States_. The reception given that collection clearly proved that +these writings were only neglected because of their rarity and +inaccessibility, and has induced the editor to collect another, though +largely similar class of writings, which he believes of equal value and +equally unknown. + +In the great discussion which took place in the years 1787 and 1788 of the +adoption or rejection of the Constitution of the United States, one of the +important methods of influencing public opinion, resorted to by the +partisans and enemies of the proposed frame of government, was the +contribution of essays to the press of the period. The newspapers were +filled with anonymous articles on this question, usually the product of +the great statesmen and writers of that period. Often of marked ability, +and valuable as the personal views of the writers, the dispersion and +destruction of the papers that contained them have resulted in their +almost entire neglect as historical or legal writings, and the difficulty +of their proper use has been further increased by their anonymous +character, which largely destroyed the authority and weight they would +have carried, had their true writers been known. + +From an examination of over forty files of newspapers and many thousand +separate issues, scattered in various public and private libraries, from +Boston to Charleston, the editor has selected a series of these essays, +and reprinted them in this volume. From various sources he has obtained +the name of the writer of each. All here reprinted are the work of +well-known men. Five of the writers were Signers of the Declaration of +Independence; seven were members of the Federal Convention; many were +members of the State Conventions, and there discussed the Constitution. +All had had a wide experience in law and government. Their arguments are +valuable, not merely for their reasoning, but from their statement of +facts. New light is thrown upon the proceedings in the Federal Convention, +so large a part of which is yet veiled in mystery; and personal motives, +and state interests, are mercilessly laid bare, furnishing clues of both +the support of and opposition to the Constitution. Subsequently most of +the writers were prominent in administering this Constitution or opposing +its development, and were largely responsible for the resulting tendencies +of our government. + +PAUL LEICESTER FORD. +_Brooklyn, N. Y., April, 1892._ + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF CASSIUS, WRITTEN BY JAMES SULLIVAN. + + +Printed In The Massachusetts Gazette, +September-December, 1787. + + + + +Note. + + +The letters signed Cassius were, at the time of publication, generally +accredited to the pen of James Sullivan, and this opinion is adopted in +Amory's _Life of James Sullivan_. The letters themselves bear out this +opinion, being clearly written by a partisan of the Hancock faction, of +whom Sullivan was a warm adherent, and constant newspaper essayist. + +The first two letters were printed before the promulgation of the proposed +Constitution in Massachusetts, and chiefly relate to the differences +between the two parties headed by John Hancock and James Bowdoin; but are +included here to complete the series. The letters are of particular value +as giving the position of Hancock, of whom Sullivan was the particular +mouthpiece, proving him to be a supporter of the adoption of the +Constitution, though the contrary has often been asserted. The early +letters were commented upon by "Old Fog," in the _Massachusetts Centinel_ +of Sept. 22 and Oct. 6, 1787. + + + + +Cassius, I. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 367). + +TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +It is a great pity that such an able writer as Numa(1) should take up the +pen to distribute sentiments, which have a tendency to create uneasiness +in the minds of the misinformed and weak, (for none other will be +influenced by them) especially at this time when the state is hardly +recovered from those convulsions,(2) it has so recently experienced. + +The real well-wisher to peace and good government cannot but execrate many +of the ideas which that would be disturber of tranquillity has lately +proclaimed to the publick, through the channels of the Hampshire Gazette, +and Independent Chronicle.(3) The man of sense, the true lover of his +country, would, if a change of officers was to take place in the +government to which he was subject, and men be placed in power, whom he +thought not so capable of the task as those who preceded them, endeavour, +all in his power, to extenuate the evil, and none but the ruthless +incendiary, or the disappointed tool, would, at such a period, conduct in +a manner the reverse. + +It is well known, that there is a party in this state whose sentiments are +in favour of aristocracy; who wish to see the constitution dissolved, and +another, which shall be more arbitrary and tyrannical, established on its +ruins. Perhaps a few of this description were members of the last +administration.(4) If so, most happy for the commonwealth, they are now +hurled from seats of power, and unable to carry into effect plans laid for +subverting the liberties of the people.--Checked at once in their horrid +career--all those hopes blasted which they entertained of concerting +measures which would "afford them matter for derision at a future +day,"--they now put on the garb of hypocrisy, and seem to weep for the +terrible misfortunes which they pretend are hovering around us. Such +characters are, it is hoped, forever banished from places of trust. Some +of them pretend to be mighty politicians,--they display a vast knowledge of +ancient times--and by their harangues about the conduct of Greece, Rome and +Athens, show their acquaintance with the pages of antiquity. In some few +instances, however, perhaps they are a little mistaken. The learned Numa +says, "the degenerate Romans banished Cicero for saving the commonwealth." +Rome did not banish Cicero--a faction, who wished to triumph over the +liberties of Rome, exiled that immortal orator; and to that, or a similar +one, he at last fell a sacrifice. If a faction can be styled the people, +with great propriety do the disappointed aristocraticks, and their tools, +in our day, style themselves, the great majority of the people. + +If Numa, and others of the like stamp, are politicians, they are very +short-sighted ones. If our government is weak, is it policy to weaken it +still more by false suggestions, and by a scandalous abuse of our rulers? +by endeavouring to spread a spirit of discontent among the people, and +prejudicing their minds against those whom, by their suffrages, they have +chosen to take the helm of affairs? If this is policy, Numa is, indeed, an +accomplished politician. + +But the time of triumph for the aristocratick clan is now over. The people +have seen their folly in listening too much to them already. Their conduct +has involved the state in confusion; but it is hoped, a conduct the +reverse will place matters again upon a right footing. The secret +machinations, which were harboured in the breasts of those aristocratick +dupes, have been laid open to publick inspection--their plans thoroughly +investigated--and the horrid tendency of them, had they taken effect, been +fully manifested. + +They may weep, crocodile-like, till the source of their tears is dried up, +they never will get the prey into their jaws, which they hoped to devour. +The sting of remorse, it may be hoped, will bring them to a sense of their +guilt, and an upright conduct make some amends for their high-handed +offences. Should this take place, an injured people may forgive, though +they never can forget them. + +Let Numa reflect, that we now have, at the head of government, those men +who were the first to step forth in the great cause of liberty--who risked +their all to acquire the blessings of freedom; though that freedom, +through the influence of such characters as himself, has been often +abused. + +The people know their rulers, and have confidence in them: and can it be +supposed, that they would have confidence in those, whose dastardly souls, +in time of danger, shrunk back from the scene of action, and kept secure +in their strong holds? and when peace and independence had crowned the +exertions of far more noble souls, they groped out of darkness and +obscurity, and intruded themselves into places of power and trust? + +Can it be expected, that the people should have confidence in such men, or +feel themselves secure under their government? By no means. The bandage is +taken from their eyes--they see and detest them. They have displaced them, +that they may return to their former obscurity, and pass the remainder of +their days in philosophizing upon their conduct. Numa and his coadjutors +may exert themselves all in their power; but they cannot again stir up +sedition and rebellion. + +The people now have too much penetration to be led away by their +falsehoods and scandal: they will, it is hoped, ere long, reap the +blessings of good government, under the direction of a wise +administration, and treat in a manner they deserve, every incendiary +attempt against their peace and happiness. + +CASSIUS. + + + + +Cassius, II. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 371) + +TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +To Numa's long list of evils, which he says, in some of his productions, +are prevalent in the commonwealth, he might have added, that when priests +became Jesuits, the liberties of the people were in danger--in almost all +countries, we shall find, that when sedition and discontent were brewing, +Political Jesuits were often at the bottom of the affair. + +Unhappily for Numa, the citizens of Massachusetts are not so blinded by +ignorance, nor so devoted to prejudice and superstition, as the common +people in those arbitrary and despotick governments, where clerical +imposition reigns paramount almost to everything else; where the freedom +of speech is suppressed, and the liberty of the people, with regard to +examining for themselves, totally restrained. + +It is, however, the case that, even in this country, the weak and ignorant +are often led too implicitly to put their faith wholly upon what their +spiritual teachers think proper to inform them, and precipitately imbibe +sentiments from them, which, if their teacher is a designing knave, may +prove detrimental to society. The Jesuit will, however, find it very +difficult, notwithstanding many circumstances may seem to favor his views, +to carry the point of altering a free government to one more arbitrary, in +such a country as this. + +The cloak of religion too often answers to promote plans detrimental to +the peace and happiness of mankind. The priests, who accompanied the +Spaniards when they first invaded the kingdoms of Mexico and Peru, urged +on those blood-hounds to perpetrate scenes of cruelty and horror (at the +bare recital of which human nature shudders), with assurances that it +would tend to promote the cause of the Christian religion, if they +effected the conquest of those unhappy people, and that any conduct was +justifiable to bring infidels to a sense of their duty. + +The teacher of the benign and peaceable doctrine of the Saviour of +mankind, often thinks he can, with greater security, on account of his +profession, disseminate the seeds of sedition and discontent, without +being suspected. This thought no doubt occurred to Numa before he +exhibited his designing productions to the publick. Sheltered under the +sacred wing of religion, how many an impious wretch stalks secure from +publick justice, + + + "Whose mem'ries ought, and will perhaps yet live, + In all the glare which infamy can give." + + +Numa indicates that he means to prepare the minds of the people for the +reception of that government which the Federal Convention shall think most +proper for them to adopt. In the name of common sense, what can that +scribbler mean by this assertion? Is a scandalous abuse of our rulers--the +propagation of sentiments which are calculated to set the publick mind in +a ferment--if they are so far attended to as to have any influence among +the people--a fit preparation for such a measure? Surely, by no means, and +every thinking mind will discover that the productions of Numa are either +intended to effect secret purposes, or that they are merely effusions of +the fanatick brain of that Quixote of the day. + +Instead of vile insinuations and falsehoods being spread among the people, +in regard to their rulers, in order to prepare their minds for the +reception of that form of government which the Federal Convention may +propose, sentiments the very reverse ought to be propagated. The people +ought to be inspired with the highest confidence in those who preside over +the affairs of the state. It ought to be implanted in their minds, that +their rulers are men fit to conduct every plan which might be proposed, to +promote the general welfare of the people; and this with truth may be +asserted. But Numa has no more intention of preparing the minds of the +people for the government which the Federal Convention may propose, than +Queen Catharine has of abdicating the throne of Russia. + +The people of Massachusetts ought to be cautioned, above everything, to be +on their guard with respect to the conduct of Political Jesuits. They have +generally been the curse of almost every country that has cherished; they +have often been the promoters of revolution and bloodshed. A set of +infernal fiends, let loose from the dreary mansions of Beelzebub, cannot +be more detrimental to the place and happiness of society, than a band of +Political Jesuits. + +Citizens of Massachusetts! those men who now preside over you are, and +ever have been, the patrons of freedom and independence! men whose +exertions have been unceasing to promote and secure to you the blessings +of a free government; whose grand stimulus to act is the advancement of +your welfare and happiness!--men whose conduct is not stinted by the narrow +concerns of self, and who, "when their country calls, can yield their +treasure up, and know no wish beyond the publick good." Such are the men +who now wield the affairs of state, and whose deeds will, when those of +that vile clan of calumniators who exist in this state are rotting in the +tomb of oblivion, conspicuously adorn the brightest pages of the American +revolution. + +Numa(5) and his band, the calumniators of true worth, may bustle away for +a while; but they will ere long be obliged to retire from the bright +flashes of patriotism and merit; and, after finding their endeavours +fruitless, to sully The Character of the Brightest Luminary that ever +Adorned the Hemisphere of Massachusetts,(6) and many other illustrious +patriots, who compose the present administration, they will retire to +gnash their teeth in anguish and disappointment, in the caverns of +obscurity--a punishment their conduct most justly merits. + +CASSIUS. + + + + +Cassius, III. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 383) + +FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +It was the saying of an eminent legislator, that if we had angels to +govern us, we should quarrel with them. The conduct of some among us has +repeatedly evinced, beyond a doubt, that this would actually be the case; +we have proof of this in a more particular manner in the opposition now +made by some (but I sincerely hope the number is few) to the form of +government agreed upon by the late federal Convention. I firmly believe, +if a form of government was proposed to some of the inhabitants of the +United States by the great Author of Nature himself, founded on the basis +of eternal rectitude, and sanctioned in the courts above, that they would +object to it. + +It is a happy circumstance for the citizens of the United States that they +are acquainted with the motives which actuate the present opposers to the +plan of federal government; as they now, instead of listening with candour +to the dictates of mad frenzy and wild ambition, will treat with the +deserved contempt all their productions. + +The opposers to the plan of federal government, are composed of such as +are either deeply in debt and know not how to extricate themselves, should +a strict administration of law and justice take place, or those who are +determined not to be contented under any form of government, or of such as +mean to "owe their greatness to their country's ruin."--Are such fit men to +point out objections to a government, proposed by the first characters in +the universe, after a long and candid discussion of the subject?--Are such +fit characters to propose a government for ruling a free and enlightened +people?--Can those who are known to be divested of honour, justice and +integrity, expect to propagate sentiments that will outweigh those of men +whose character as true republicans and wise statesmen, are known from +pole to pole--men, whose wisdom and firmness have emancipated the United +States from the yoke of bondage, and laid the foundation of an empire, +which (if the people will still follow their precepts) will last till time +shall be swallowed up in the "wasteless ages of eternity?"--Can scribblers +whose fame is but of a day, think to influence the citizens of the United +States so far as to cause them to respect a form of government calculated +to diffuse the blessings of civil society far and wide?--If they can +harbour ideas of such a nature, I pity their weakness and despise their +villainy. + +Some writers in Pennsylvania, New York and Massachusetts, have displayed +their scribbling talents in opposition to the plan of federal government; +but it is easy to perceive by their arguments, that they are men who are +fearful of not being noticed in a federal government, or are some of the +stamp before mentioned. Their arguments are without weight, and their +assertions and insinuations as foreign to the real state of facts as +anything possibly can be: they anticipate evils, which, in the nature of +things, it is almost impossible should ever happen, and, for the most +part, their reasoning (if it is not a degradation to reason to call such +jargon by its name) is incoherent, nonsensical and absurd. + +Some writers in Massachusetts have discovered such weakness, inconsistency +and folly in their productions, that it discovers them to be entirely +ignorant of the subject they pretend to discuss, and totally unacquainted +with the plan of government proposed by the federal convention. Among this +number, is a scribbler under the signature of Vox Populi;(7) whose +signature, to have been consistent with his productions, should have been +Vox Insania. This pompous and very learned scribbler, goes on to harangue +the public about the danger, hazard, terror and destruction which will +attend the adoption of the federal Constitution. He pleads, in a mournful +strain, much about woful experience. From this circumstance, I am induced +to suppose Vox Populi was an adherent of the celebrated Shays, in his +unfortunate expedition the last winter, and wofully experienced the +misfortune attendant on the insurgents, through the energy of government. +However, the inhabitants of Massachusetts may be assured, that they will +have Woful Experience with a witness, if they suffer themselves to be led +away by such ignorant, knavish and designing numbheads as Vox Populi and +his clan, so far as to reject the plan of federal government proposed by +the Convention. Vox Populi complains that our source for taxes is +exhausted, and says we must have a new system for taxation: but he must +consider, that if the federal government is adopted, we shall not have +occasion to employ the legislature so great a part of the year as we are +now obliged to do; of consequence, government will be able to apply their +money to better uses than paying anti-federalists, while they are +spreading their poisonous vapours through the already too much infected +atmosphere. + +Mr. Vox Populi remarks, that some people are already taxed more than their +estates are worth; in this instance I sincerely believe he speaks the +truth. But what is the occasion of their being thus taxed?--It is because +they make a show as though they have property, though in fact it belongs +to another; they live sumptuously, and riot in the property of their +unfortunate creditors. Perhaps Mr. Vox Populi is one of this class, and +has wofully experienced a taxation more than his whole estate is worth: if +he is, I would advise him, instead of employing his time in belching out +his "de factos, plene proofs" and other chit-chat of the like kind, and +disseminating his execrable "ideas," to go about adjusting his affairs, as +it will tend more to his honour, and perhaps be the means of saving him +from the woful experience of confinement in a place much more fit for him +than that in which he now is. + +I pity Mr. Vox Populi's weakness and conceit, in thinking he and others of +his class have accents not less majestick than thunder, as I really think +he is very singular in his opinion. Instead of his "accents" being +majestick as thunder, they are as harmless and insignificant as the feeble +breeze. + +Citizens of Massachusetts, look well about you; you are beset by harpies, +knaves and blockheads, who are employing every artifice and falsehood to +effect your ruin. The plan of federal government is fraught with every +thing favourable to your happiness, your freedom and your future welfare: +if you reject it, posterity will execrate your memories, and ceaselessly +insult your ashes: if you adopt it, they will revere your departed shades, +and offer up libations of gratitude on your tombs. + +May that wisdom which is profitable to direct guide your judgments--and may +you, by adopting the federal government, secure to yourselves and your +posterity every social and religious advantage, and every national +blessing. + +CASSIUS. + + + + +Cassius, IV. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 385) + +FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +Anarchy, with her haggard cheeks and extended jaws, stands ready, and all +allow that unless some efficient form of government is adopted she will +soon swallow us. The opposers to the plan of government lately agreed upon +by the federal convention have not spared their censures upon it: they +have stigmatized it with every odious appellation that can be named; but +amidst all their railing, have not so much as hinted at a form of +government that would be proper for us to adopt: and even if they had, it +would have remained for us to examine, whether they were men of more +honesty, greater abilities, and firmer patriots and friends to their +country, than the members of the late convention; and whether the form of +government, which they might propose, was better adapted to our situation +and circumstances, and freer from imperfections, than the one which has +already been proposed to us. But it is not the intention of the opposers +to the plan of federal government, founded on firm and truly republican +principles; as, in that case, their aims would be entirely defeated, as it +would put it out of their power to stir up sedition and discontent; and +they would be lost in obscurity, or move in a most contemptible sphere. + +I have before hinted, that the opposers of the plan of federal government +are composed of knaves, harpies and debtors; and, I trust, it will soon +appear, what I have said is not a bare assertion only, but a matter of +fact. + +I shall now proceed to make a few remarks on the conclusion of "Vox +Populi's," or rather Vox Insania's, production which appeared in last +Friday's paper. + +Vox Populi requests the inhabitants of Massachusetts "to pay that +attention to the federal constitution which the importance of its nature +demands;" and informs them, that they "have hazarded their lives and +fortunes (by the way, a wonderful piece of news) to establish a government +founded on the principles of genuine civil liberty," &c. I join with him +in his request. And am confident if that attention which is requisite is +paid to the proposed plan of federal government, that it will meet with +the hearty approbation of every well wisher to the freedom and happiness +of his country. It is true, that the inhabitants of America have hazarded +their lives and fortunes to establish a free and efficient government; but +will Vox Populi, that moon-light prophet, pretend to say that such a +government is at present established? Vox Populi goes on to inform us, +that, by adopting the new plan of government, we shall make inroads on the +constitution of this State, which he seems to think will be sacrilegious. +His narrow and contracted ideas, his weak, absurd, and contemptible +arguments, discover him to be possessed of a mind clouded with the gloom +of ignorance, and thick with the grossest absurdity. Strange it is, that +that babbler should suppose it unjustifiable for the people to alter or +amend, or even entirely abolish, what they themselves have established. +But says Vox Populi, perhaps the new plan will not have the same number to +approbate it, that the constitution of this State had. Perhaps Vox Populi +will be hung for high treason. There is, in my opinion, as much +probability in the latter perhaps, as in the former. Pray, Mr. Vox Populi, +if I may be so bold, what reason have you to judge that there will not be +so many for adopting the constitution proposed by the convention, as there +were for adopting the constitution of this State some years ago? Do you +suppose the inhabitants of Massachusetts have depreciated in their +understanding? or do you suppose that the sublimity of your jargon has +blinded them with respect to their best interests? If you suppose the +former, I think you have not been much conversant with them of late, or +that your intellects are something defective. If you suppose the latter, +in my opinion, you are no better than a downright Fool. + +Vox Populi sets out to touch the consciences of men in office, in +representing the solemnity of an oath. It seems almost impossible that any +one should be so stupidly blinded to every dictate of reason and common +sense, as to start such things as have been mentioned by Vox Populi, to +deter men from using their influence to effect the adoption of the new +plan of government. + +Can that shallow-pated scribbler suppose that an oath taken by rulers to +stand by a form of government, adopted by the people, can be of any force +or consideration if the people choose to change that form of government +for another more agreeable to their wishes? + +But (in order without doubt to strike a greater dread upon their minds) +Vox Populi says, "the oath is registered in Heaven." Pray, Mr. Vox Populi, +when was you there? and did you really see the oath registered? The +constitution of this state was formed, and officers appointed under it, +long since the awful battle was fought in Heaven, between Michael and the +Prince of Darkness, and I cannot conceive of your admittance there in any +other way than under the banners of his Satanick Majesty, who might +suppose that such an unparalleled phenomenon would have an effect on the +archangel that would be favourable to his cause. + +Vox Populi asserts that the General Court(8) acted merely officially in +laying the proposed plan of government before the people. No man of +candour, sense and foresight, Mr. Vox Populi, will ask the reason of the +General Court's laying the plan of government proposed by the federal +constitution before the people, as their own minds will suggest to them +the true reason for it, and none but those who are as stupid and ignorant +as yourself, would suppose that the General Court acted merely officially +in doing as they did. The General Court were undoubtedly influenced by +motives of the best kind in what they did. + +They without doubt were anxious that the people should have the new plan +of government to consider of in due time, and, considering the importance +of it, and the tendency it had to promote their happiness, liberty and +security, took the first opportunity to present it to them. 'Tis true, Mr. +Vox Populi, that you are a member of the legislature; it is also true that +you are possessed of a mind as emaciated as the mass of corrupt matter +that encircles it. But although you belong to the house of +representatives, I trust you are not the mouth of that honourable body; +and, if not, pray who authorised you to inform the publick of the motives +for their conduct? Did they in an official manner make their motives known +to you, and request you to lay them before the publick? Indeed, Mr. Vox +Populi, you seem to put on very assuming airs, but I think you had better +humble yourself, as your station may, ere long, be lowered. + +A writer under the signature of Examiner,(9) has several times pointed out +the fallacy of the writings of Vox Populi, and requested that ghost-like +scribbler to lay a form of government before the publick in lieu of that +which he has taken upon him to condemn; and has informed him, that if he +does not, and still continues scribbling, his modesty will be called in +question. + +The Examiner is entirely unacquainted with the babbler he justly reproves, +or he would not have mentioned anything to him respecting modesty; as he +must be sensible that screech-owls are entirely divested of modesty, and +he may be assured that Vox Populi is one of those midnight squallers. + +Inhabitants of Massachusetts! be constantly on the watch--It requires +almost the eyes of an Argus to penetrate into all the schemes of those +designing wretches, who are waiting to see you reject the federal system +of government, and involve yourselves in all the horrours of anarchy, then +to riot with pleasure on your miseries. Disappoint their +expectations--adopt the proposed plan of federal government--it will secure +to you every blessing which a free and enlightened people can expect to +enjoy. + +Some, who are now in office, but expect soon to leave it, and bid adieu to +power, unless they can effect the establishment of a government which +shall + + + "Cause treason, rapine, sacrilege and crimes, + To blot the annals of these western climes," + + +are busy in spreading every false and malicious insinuation in their +power, to prejudice the people against the new plan of government; but it +is hoped they will see through their designs, and treat them with +contempt--and wisely agree to embrace the new plan of government, which is +favourable to every sentiment of republicanism, and replete with every +thing beneficial to their welfare. + +CASSIUS. + + + + +Cassius, V. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 386) + +TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +"Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves +before the Lord, and Satan came also among them. + +"And the Lord said unto Satan, Whence comest thou? Then Satan answered the +Lord, and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from walking up +and down in it. + +"And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my servant Job, that +there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one +that feareth God, and escheweth evil?" &c., &c. + +Citizens of Massachusetts! like the sons of God have the members of the +late federal convention assembled together; like them too, have they been +infested with the presence of Satan, or such as were influenced by +Satanick principles, and who wish to thwart every design that has a +tendency to promote the general good of the United States. + +Let us take a short view of the characters who composed the late federal +convention. Are they not men who, from their infancy, have been nurtured +in the principles of liberty, and taught to pay a sacred regard to the +rights of human nature? Are they not men who, when the poisonous breath of +tyranny would have blasted the flower of Independence in its bud, and +veiled every ray of freedom in the clouds of lawless despotism, nobly +stepped forth in defence of their injured country's rights, and through +the influence of whose exertions, favoured by the protection of an +over-ruling Power, the thick fog of despotism vanished like the early dew +before the powerful rays of the resplendent luminary of the universe? Are +they not honest, upright and just men, who fear God and eschew evil? + +With few exceptions, they are mostly men of this character; and, Citizens +of Massachusetts, they have formed a government adequate to the +maintaining and supporting the rank and dignity of America in the scale of +nations; a government which, if adopted, will protect your trade and +commerce, and cause business of every kind rapidly to increase and +flourish; it is a government which wants only a candid perusal and due +attention paid to it, to recommend it to every well-wisher to his country. + +Brethren and citizens, hearken to the voice of men who have dictated only +for your and posterity's good; men who ever + + + "Have made the publick good their only aim, + And on that basis mean to build their fame." + + +Listen not to the insinuations of those who will glory only in your +destruction, but wisely persevere in the paths of rectitude. + +CASSIUS. + + + + +Cassius, VI. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 387) + +FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +MR. ALLEN: + +Through the channel of your Paper, I beg leave to offer one or two short +remarks on a production which appeared in your last, under the signature +of Agrippa.(10) + +Without saying anything concerning the justness of the learned Agrippa's +observations on past events, I shall confine myself chiefly to a small +part of his uncommonly ingenious essay. + +Agrippa says, "the attempt has been made to deprive us," &c., "by exalting +characters on the one side, and vilifying them on the other." And goes on, +"I wish to say nothing of the merits or demerits of individuals, such +arguments always do hurt." Immediately after this he insinuates that the +members of the late federal convention have, "from their cradles, been +incapable of comprehending any other principles of government than those +of absolute power, and who have, in this instance (meaning the form of +government proposed by them) attempted to deprive the people of their +constitutional liberty by a pitiful trick." Thus the ignorant loggerhead +blunders directly into the very same thing which he himself, just before, +takes upon him to censure. Perhaps Agrippa thinks that excusable in +anti-federalists, which in a federalist he beholds as criminal; justly +thinking, without doubt, that as absurdity, knavery and falsehood, is the +general characteristick of anti-federalists, he might indulge himself in +either of them, without meriting censure. + +I apprehend, that Agrippa has a new budget of political ideas, centered in +his pericranium, which he will, in his own due time, lay before the +publick; for he insinuates, that the members of the late federal +convention are incapable of comprehending any other principles of +government than those of absolute power. Was it the dictates of absolute +power, that inspired the immortal Washington to lead forth a band of +freemen to oppose the inroads of despotism, and establish the independence +of his country? Was it the dictates of arbitrary power, that induced the +celebrated Franklin to cross the wide Atlantick to procure succours for +his injured countrymen and citizens? + +Blush and tremble, Agrippa! thou ungrateful monster!--Charon's boat now +waits on the borders of the Styx, to convey you to those mansions where +guilt of conscience will prey upon your intellects, at least for a season! + + + "Is there not some chosen curse, + Some hidden thunder in the stores of heaven, + Red with uncommon wrath, to blast the wretch, + Who dares pollute such names + So sacred, and so much belov'd?" + Methinks I hear each freeman cry, + Most certainly there is. + + +CASSIUS. + + + + +Cassius, VII. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 387) + +FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +I believe it may be asserted for fact, that since the foundations of the +universe were laid, there has no kind of government been formed, without +opposition being made to it, from one quarter or another. + +There always has been, and ever will be, in every country, men who have no +other aim in view than to be in direct opposition to every thing which +takes place, or which is proposed to be adopted.--This class of beings +always wish to make themselves important, and to incur notice; and, +conscious of their inability to obtain that notice which is bestowed on +the patriot and the just man, they put up (because they cannot help it) +with being noticed only for their absurdity and folly. When you hear this +class of Would Be's engaged in condemning any form of government, or any +thing else, ask them this simple question--What do you think would be +better than that which you condemn?--O! that is quite another matter, would +most probably be the answer; we are not adequate to the task of +fabricating a government, we leave that to wiser heads--but, they will +continue, it is easy for any one to discover the imperfections in this +form of government we are condemning. Strange absurdity!--inadequate to the +task of constructing, yet capable of criticizing upon, and pointing out +the defects of, anything which is constructed. Well may we say, in the +words of another-- + + + "Some are bewilder'd in the maze of schools, + And some made criticks Nature meant but fools: + In search of wit these lose their common sense, + And then turn critics in their own defence." + + +There is not, in the extensive circle of human nature, objects more +completely despicable than those who take upon them to censure and condemn +a work, without being able to substitute any thing preferable in lieu of +it. + +In those objects, last mentioned, this country considerably abounds, as +the newspaporial pages fully evince. They have been busily employed of +late, in finding fault with the plan of government proposed by the federal +convention; they have almost exhausted their folly, knavery, absurdity, +and ridiculous, inconclusive, non-applicable arguments on the subject; +and, in my opinion, was this question asked them, What do you mean by all +your learned farrago about this matter? they could not give any other +reasonable answer, than that their intent was, to exhibit specimens of +their scribbling talents.--But I will dismiss this subject for the present, +in order to make a few remarks on the conduct of some others, since the +proposed form of government made its appearance. + +In some assemblies, where the necessity of calling a state convention to +consider of the merits of the new constitution has been debated, some +gentlemen, who were opposed to the plan of federal government, while they +reprobated it, at the same time declared that none were more truly federal +than themselves.--What a pity it is, for these patriots in theory, that +actions speak louder than words--and that the people are so incredulous as +not to believe a thing which they know to be directly the reverse of +truth.-- + +It ever prejudices people against arguments, even if they should happen to +be just, if they are prefaced by a glaring falsehood--this, sharpers do not +always consider, when they are attempting to carry their favourite +points.--It is something to be wondered at, that a certain theoretical +patriot,(11) instead of saying he would sooner have lost his hand than +subscribed his name to the plan of federal government, had not have +declared, that he would sooner have lost his head, and the amazing fund of +federal wisdom it contains, before he would have been guilty of so horrid +an act. + +Look around you, inhabitants of America! and see of what characters the +anti-federal junto are composed.--Are any of them men of that class, who, +in the late war, made bare their arms and girded on the helmet in your +defence?--few, very few indeed, of the antifederalists, are men of this +character. But who are they that are supporters of that grand republican +fabrick, the Federal Constitution?--Are they not the men who were among the +first to assert the rights of freemen, and put a check to the invasions of +tyranny? Are they not, many of them, men who have fought and bled under +the banners of liberty?--Most certainly this is the case.--Will you then, +countrymen and fellow-citizens, give heed to these infamous, anti-federal +slanderers, who, in censuring the proposed plan of federal government, +have dared, basely dared to treat even the characters of a Washington and +a Franklin with reproach?--Surely you will not. Your good sense and +discernment will lead you to treat with abhorrence and contempt every +artifice which is put in practice to sap the confidence you have in men +who are the boast of their country, and an honour to human nature. You +certainly cannot harbour an idea so derogatory to reason and the nature of +things, as that men, who, for eight years, have fought and struggled, to +obtain and secure to you freedom and independence, should now be engaged +in a design to subvert your liberties and reduce you to a state of +servitude. Reason revolts at the thought, ... and none but the infamous +incendiary, or the unprincipled monster, would insinuate a thing so vile. + +CASSIUS. + + + + +Cassius, VIII. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 391) + +FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE INHABITANTS OF THIS STATE: + +In some former publications, I have confined myself chiefly to pointing +out the views of the opposers to the plan of federal government; the +reason why I did not enter particularly into the merits of the new +constitution is, that I conceived if it was candidly read, and properly +attended to, that alone would be sufficient to recommend it to the +acceptance of every rational and thinking mind that was interested in the +happiness of the United States of America. Some babblers of the opposition +junto have, however, complained that nothing has been said, except in +general terms, in favour of the federal constitution; in consequence of +this, incompetent as I am to the undertaking, I have been induced to lay +the following remarks before the publick. + +Sect. first, of the new constitution, says, + +"All legislative powers Herein Granted shall be vested in a congress of +the United States." + +I beg the reader to pay particular attention to the words herein granted, +as perhaps there may be occasion for me to recur to them more than once in +the course of my observations. + +The second section of the federal constitution says, that the members of +the house of representatives shall be chosen every second year, and the +electors shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most +numerous branch of the state legislature. Some have made objections to the +time for which the representatives are to be chosen; but it is to be +considered, that the convention, in this particular, meant to accommodate +the time for which the representatives should stand elected, to the +constitutions of the different states. If it had been provided, that the +time should have been of shorter duration, would not a citizen of Maryland +or South-Carolina had reason to murmur? + +The weakness the anti-federalists discover in insinuating that the federal +government will have it in their power to establish a despotick +government, must be obvious to every one; for the time for which they are +elected is so short, as almost to preclude the possibility of their +effecting plans for enslaving so vast an empire as the United States of +America, even if they were so base as to hope for anything of the kind. +The representatives of the people would also be conscious, that their good +conduct alone, would be the only thing which could influence a free people +to continue to bestow on them their suffrages: the representatives of the +people would not, moreover, dare to act contrary to the instructions of +their constituents; and if any one can suppose that they would, I would +ask them, why such clamour is made about a bill of rights, for securing +the liberties of the subject? for if the delegates dared to act contrary +to their instructions, would they be afraid to encroach upon a bill of +rights? If they determined among themselves to use their efforts to effect +the establishment of an aristocratical or despotick government, would a +bill of rights be any obstacle to their proceedings? If they were guilty +of a breach of trust in one instance, they would be so in another. + +The second section also says, no person shall be elected a representative +who shall not have been seven years an inhabitant of the United States. +This clause effectually confounds all the assertions of the +anti-federalists, respecting the representatives not being sufficiently +acquainted with the different local interests of their constituents; for a +representative, qualified as the constitution directs, must be a greater +numbskull than a Vox Populi or an Agrippa,(12) not to have a knowledge of +the different concerns of the Confederation. + +The objection that the representation will not be sufficient, is weak in +the highest degree. It is supposed, that there are sufficient inhabitants +in the state of Massachusetts to warrant the sending of six delegates, at +least, to the new Congress--To suppose that three gentlemen, of the first +characters and abilities, were inadequate to represent the concerns of +this state in a just manner, would be absurd in the highest degree, and +contradictory to reason and common sense. The weakness of the +anti-federalists, in regard to the point just mentioned, sufficiently +shews their delinquency with respect to rational argument. They have done +nothing more than barely to assert, that the representation would not be +sufficient: it is a true saying, that assertions are often the very +reverse of facts. + +Sect. third, of the new constitution, says, each state shall choose two +senators, &c. The liberalty of this clause is sufficient, any reasonable +person would suppose, to damp all opposition. + +Can any thing be more consistent with the strictest principles of +republicanism? + +Each state is here upon an equal footing; for the house of representatives +can of themselves do nothing without the concurrence of the senate. + +The third section further provides, that the senate shall choose their own +officers. This is so congenial with the constitution of our own state, +that I need not advance any argument to induce the free citizens of +Massachusetts to approbate it. And those who oppose this part of the +federal plan, act in direct opposition to what the anti-federalists often +profess, for the excellency of our constitution has been their favourite +theme. + +The third section also provides, that the senate shall have the sole power +to try all impeachments. This clause seems to be peculiarly obnoxious to +anti-federal sycophants. + +They have declared it to be arbitrary and tyrannical in the highest +degree. But, fellow-citizens, your own good sense will lead you to see the +folly and weakness contained in such assertions. You have experienced the +tyranny of such a government; that under which you now live is an exact +model of it. In Massachusetts, the house of representatives impeach, and +the senate try, the offender. + +That part of the proposed form of government, which is to be styled the +senate, will not have it in their power to try any person, without the +consent of two-thirds of the members. + +In this respect, therefore, the new constitution is not more arbitrary +than the constitution of this state. This clause does not, therefore, +savour in the least of any thing more arbitrary than what has already been +experienced: so that the horrours the anti-federal junto pretend to +anticipate on that head, must sink into nothing. Besides, when the house +of representatives have impeached, and the senate tried any one, and found +him guilty of the offence for which he is impeached, they can only +disqualify him from holding any office of power and trust in the United +States: and after that he comes within the jurisdiction of the law of the +land. + +How such a proceeding can be called arbitrary, or thought improper, I +cannot conceive. I leave it to the gentlemen in opposition to point out +the tyranny of such conduct, and explain the horrid tendency it will have, +for the government of the United States to determine whether any one or +more of their own body are worthy to continue in the station to which they +were elected. + +Another clause, which the anti-federal junto labour to prove to be +arbitrary and tyrannical, is contained in the fourth section, which +provides, that the time and place for electing senators and +representatives shall be appointed by the different state legislatures, +except Congress shall at any time make a law to alter such regulation in +regard to the place of choosing representatives. The former part of this +clause, gives not the least opportunity for a display of anti-federal +scandal, and the latter, only by misrepresentation, and false +construction, is by them made a handle of. What is intended, by saying +that Congress shall have power to appoint the place for electing +representatives, is, only to have a check upon the legislature of any +state, if they should happen to be composed of villains and knaves, as is +the case in a sister state;(13) and should take upon themselves to appoint +a place for choosing delegates to send to Congress; which place might be +the most inconvenient in the whole state; and for that reason be appointed +by the legislature, in order to create a disgust in the minds of the +people against the federal government, if they themselves should dislike +it. The weakness of their arguments on this head, must therefore be +obvious to every attentive mind. + +There is one thing, however, which I might mention, as a reason why the +opposition junto dread the clause aforementioned--they may suppose, that +Congress, when the people are assembled for the choice of their rulers, in +the place they have appointed, will send their terrible standing army +(which I shall speak of in its place) and, Cesar Borgia like, massacre the +whole, in order to render themselves absolute. This is so similar to many +of the apprehensions they have expressed, that I could not pass it by +unnoticed. Indeed the chief of their productions abound with +improbabilities and absurdities of the like kind; for having nothing +reasonable to alledge against a government founded on the principles of +staunch republicanism, and which, if well supported, will establish the +glory and happiness of our country. They resort to things the most strange +and fallacious, in order to blind the eyes of the unsuspecting and +misinformed. + +CASSIUS. + +(_To be continued._) + + + + +Cassius, IX. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 392) + +TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE INHABITANTS OF THIS STATE. + +(_Continued from our last._) + +Section 5, of the new constitution, says, Each house shall be a judge of +the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members--a majority +shall constitute a quorum, and be authorized to compel the attendance of +absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as the law may +provide. Each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings--punish +its members for disorderly behaviour--and with the consent of two-thirds, +expel a member. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and +from time to time publish the same, &c. No one, who professes to be +governed by reason, will dispute the propriety of any assembly's being the +judge of the qualifications requisite to constitute a member of their own +body. That part of the fifth section which says a majority shall +constitute a quorum, has been an object against which many anti-federal +shafts have been levelled. It has been asserted by some, that this clause +empowers a majority of members present, to transact any business relating +to the affairs of the United States, and that eight or ten members of the +house of representatives, and an equal number of the senate, might pass a +law which would benefit themselves, and injure the community at large. The +fallacy of such assertions is sufficiently conspicuous to render them +ridiculous and contemptible in the eyes of every unprejudiced mind--for the +section further expresses, That a smaller number than a quorum may adjourn +from day to day, and be authorised to compel attendance of absent members. +This is all the power that is vested in a smaller number than the +majority. It is therefore evident, that when it says a majority shall +constitute a quorum to do business, it means a majority of the whole +number of members that belong to either house. + +Sect. 5, further provides, That each house shall keep a journal of its +proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, &c. This clause is so +openly marked with every feature of republicanism, and expressed in such +liberal and comprehensive terms, that it needs no comment to render it +acceptable to the enlightened citizens of Massachusetts. + +Sect. 6, provides, That the senators and representatives shall receive a +compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law--they shall, +except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of peace, be privileged from +arrest during their session.--The necessity of such regulations must appear +plain to every one; the inhabitants of Massachusetts, fully convinced of +the justness of such provision, made it in the constitution of this state. +The 6th section further says, No member shall be called to account for +sentiments delivered in either house, at any other place. In this clause, +the freedom of debate, so essential to the preservation of liberty and the +support of a republican form of government, is amply provided for. Impeded +by no obstacle whatever, the patriot may here proclaim every sentiment +that glows within his breast. How far despotism can encroach upon such a +government I leave the antifederal junto to declare. + +The 6th section further provides, that no senator or representative shall, +during the time he is in office, be elected or appointed to any office +under the United States--nor shall any person, holding any office under the +government, be elected a member of either house during his continuance in +that station. + +This clause at once confutes every assertion of the antifederalists +respecting the new congress being able to secure to themselves all offices +of power, profit and trust. This section is even more rigidly republican +than the constitution of this commonwealth; for in the general assembly of +Massachusetts, a civil officer is not excluded a seat; whereas the new +constitution expressly asserts that no person in civil office under the +United States shall be eligible to a seat in either house. + +Sect. 7 provides that all bills for raising revenues shall originate in +the house of representatives. Here again must the anti-federalists appear +weak and contemptible in their assertions that the senate will have it in +their power to establish themselves a complete aristocratick body; for +this clause fully evinces that if their inclinations were ever so great to +effect such an establishment, it would answer no end, for being unable to +levy taxes, or collect a revenue, is a sufficient check upon every attempt +of such a nature. + +The 7th section further provides, That every bill which passes the house +of representatives and the senate, before it becomes a law, shall be +presented to the president of the United States; if he objects to it the +sense of both houses will be again taken on the subject, and if two-thirds +of the members are in favour of the bill, it passes into a law. + +Much clamour has been made about the power of the president; it has been +asserted that his influence would be such as to enable him to continue in +office during life. + +Such insinuations are founded on a very slender basis. If the president +opposes the sense of both houses, without sufficient reasons for his +conduct, he will soon become obnoxious, and his influence vanish like the +fleeting smoke; and his objection to anything which the house and senate +may think calculated for the promotion of the publick good, will be of no +effect. + +Sect. 8 provides, That Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, +duties, imposts, excises, &c.--to pay debts, to provide for the common +defence and general welfare of the United States--that all duties, imposts +and excises shall be uniform throughout the Union--they shall have power to +coin money, and to fix the value thereof, &c.--The impotency of the present +Congress sufficiently indicates the necessity of granting greater powers +to a federal head; and it is highly requisite such a head should be +enabled to establish a fund adequate to the exigencies of the Union. + +The propriety of all duties and imposts being uniform throughout the +states, cannot be disputed. It is also highly requisite that Congress +should be enabled to establish a coin which shall circulate the same +throughout all the states. The necessity of such arrangements is certainly +very obvious. For other particulars contained in the 8th section, I must +refer my readers to the Constitution, and am confident they will find it +replete with nothing more than what is absolutely necessary should be +vested in the guardians of a free country. + +Can, then, those murmuring sycophants, who oppose the plan of federal +government, wish for anything more liberal than what is contained in the +aforementioned section? If the powers of a federal head were to be +established on as weak a frame as that on which the present confederation +is founded, what effect would any constitution have in giving energy to +measures designed to promote the glory of the Union, and for establishing +its honour and credit? One great object of the federal Convention was, to +give more power to future Assemblies of the States. In this they have done +liberally, without partiallity to the interests of the states +individually; and their intentions were known before the honourable body +was dissolved. And now that a form of government, every way adequate to +the purposes of the Union, has been proposed by them, in which proper +powers are to be vested in the supreme head, a hue and cry is raised by +the sons of sedition and dishonesty, as though an army of uncircumcised +Philistines were upon us! + +They are bellowing about, that tyranny will inevitably follow the adoption +of the proposed constitution. It is, however, an old saying, that the +greatest rogue is apt to cry rogue first. This we may rely upon, that if +we follow perfidious counsels, as those are, I dare affirm, of the +anti-federalists, every evil which that sapp brood anticipates, will +befall us. Besides, foreign creditors will not be cheated out of their +property; nor will the creditors of our own country be tame spectators of +the sacrifice of their interest at the shrine of villainy. + +Section 9th says, The writ of habeus corpus shall not be suspended, unless +in case of rebellion, or the invasion of the publick safety may require +it. It has been asserted by some, that a person accused of a crime, would +be obliged to ruin himself, in order to prove his innocence; as he would +be obliged to repair to the seat of federal government, in order to have +his cause tried before a federal court, and be liable to pay all expenses +which might be incurred in the undertaking. But the section +beforementioned proves that assertion to be futile and false, as it +expressly provides for securing the right of the subjects, in regard to +his being tried in his own state. + +The 9th section further provides, that a regular statement and account of +the receipts and expenditures of all publick monies, shall be published +from time to time. Thus the people will have it in their power to examine +the appropriations made of the revenues and taxes collected by Congress; +and if they are not satisfied in regard to the conduct of their rulers in +this respect, they will be able to effect a change agreeable to their +wishes. + +The last section of this article provides, that no state shall enter into +any treaty, alliance, &c., coin money, emit bills of credit, make any +other but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts--all laws +respecting imposts, duties, and excises, shall be subject to the revision +and controul of Congress. + +The absolute necessity of powers of this nature being vested in a federal +head is indisputable. + +For want of such a power, what vile proceedings have of late disgraced +almost every legislative measure of Rhode Island! For want of such a +power, some honest creditors in Massachusetts have been paid in old horses +and enormous rocks, in return for money loaned upon interest. With respect +to the controul of Congress over laws of the afore-mentioned description, +it is highly requisite that it should take place: nor have the people any +thing to fear from such a proceeding; for their controul cannot be +extended farther than the powers granted in the new constitution; the +words of which are, "all powers Herein Granted." If any act originates +contrary to this, it will be of no effect, and a mere nullity. + +Section one, of article second, provides that the executive power shall be +vested in a president of the United States. The necessity of such a +provision must appear reasonable to any one; and further remarks, +therefore, on this head will be needless. + +In the same section it is provided, (among other things which to argue +upon would be unnecessary, as they are founded on the firmest principles +of republicanism) that Congress shall determine the time for choosing +electors, and the day of election shall be the same throughout the Union. +Can anything more strongly mark a liberal and free government than this +clause? No one state will in the least be influenced in their choice by +that of another; and Congress cannot have the least controul in regard to +the appointment of any particular men for electors. This, among other +things, proves that all requisite power will still remain in the hands of +the people, and any insinuation to the contrary, must be a mere chicane to +blind the judgments of the misinformed. + +CASSIUS. + +(_To be continued._) + + + + +Cassius, X. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 393) + +FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE INHABITANTS OF THIS STATE. + +(_Continued from our last._) + +Section I, of article II. further provides, That the president shall, +previous to his entering upon the duties of his office, take the following +oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will +faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will, +to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the constitution +of the United States. Thus we see that instead of the president's being +vested with all the powers of a monarch, as has been asserted, that he is +under the immediate controul of the constitution, which if he should +presume to deviate from, he would be immediately arrested in his career +and summoned to answer for his conduct before a federal court, where +strict justice and equity would undoubtedly preside. + +Section 3, of article II. provides, That the president of the United +States shall, from time to time, give Congress information of the state of +the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall +judge necessary and expedient--he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene +both houses or either of them, and adjourn them to such time as he may +think proper--he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and +shall commission all officers of the United States. + +Very little more power is granted to the president of the United States, +by the above section, than what is vested in the governours of the +different states. The propriety of vesting such powers in a supreme +executive cannot be doubted. What would it signify to appoint an executive +officer, and immediately after to make laws which would be a barrier to +the execution of his commission? + +It would answer the same end that the nominal power which is vested in the +different states answers, that is, it would answer the end of paying for +the support of a shaddow, without reaping the benefit of the substance. + +It is certainly requisite that proper powers should be vested in an +executive (and certainly no more than necessary powers are vested in the +executive of the United States by the new constitution) or else the +establishment of such a branch is needless. + +Section 4, of article II. says, The president, vice-president, and all +civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on +impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes +and misdemeanors.--Thus we see that no office, however exalted, can protect +the miscreant, who dares invade the liberties of his country, or +countenance in his crimes the impious villain who sacrilegiously attempts +to trample upon the rights of freemen. + +Who will be absurd enough to affirm, that the section alluded to, does not +sufficiently prove that the federal convention have formed a government +which provides that we shall be ruled by laws and not by men? None, +surely, but an anti-federalist--and from them falsehood receives constant +homage; for it is on the basis of falsehood and the summit of ignorance, +that all opposition to the federal government is founded. + +Section 1, of article III. provides, That the judicial power of the United +States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferiour courts +as Congress may from time to time appoint.--It has been asserted, that a +federal court would be an engine of partiality in the government, a source +of oppression and injustice to the poorer part of the community; but how +far consistency influenced the conduct of the authors of such assertions, +the publick must determine. The anti-federalists have said, that if a +cause should come before one of state judicial courts, and judgment be +given against the person who possessed most interest, that he would +immediately appeal to the federal court, whose residence would be at the +seat of government, and consequently at so great a distance that an +inhabitant of the state of Georgia or New-Hampshire, if he was in low +circumstances, would not be able to carry his cause before the federal +court, and would, therefore, be obliged to give it up to his wealthier +antagonist. The glaring improbability with which such insinuations abound, +must be obvious to every one. + +Can it be supposed, that any person would be so inconsistent, after a +cause was given against him, in a court where judges presided whose +characters, as honest and just men, were unrivalled, as to attempt to have +the cause re-heard before the federal court? + +Indeed if such a thing was to take place, the man in low circumstances +would have nothing to fear, as the payment of all charges would fall upon +the person who lost the cause, and there is not the shadow of a doubt, +with respect to the person's losing the cause, who had lost it before in a +court of justice in either of the states. + +In regard to the equal administration of justice in all the states, a +rattle brained anti-federalist, in the last Mass. Gazette, under the +signature of Agrippa,(14) has asserted, that the inequality of the +administration of justice throughout the states, was a favourite argument +in support of the new constitution--an assertion founded on as impudent and +barefaced a falsehood as ever was uttered, for the very reverse is the +case. The equality of the administration of justice in the different +states, has ever been dwelt upon as recommendatory of the new plan of +government. I am induced to think that Agrippa is non compos, and this +might proceed from his close application to study, while the library of a +celebrated university was under his care(15)--he seems to be one of those +whom Pope describes when he says, + + + "Some are bewilder'd in the maze of schools," &c. + + +I hope my readers will forgive this digression, when they consider that +such scandalous lies, absurdities, and misrepresentations as the +productions of Agrippa, that political Quixote, abound with, may have a +tendency to prejudice the minds of the misinformed against the new +constitution, unless they are properly noticed. + +Section 2, of Article III. provides, among other things, that the trial of +all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such +trial shall be held in the state where the crime shall have been +committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at +such place or places, as Congress may by law have directed. It has been +frequently asserted that the new constitution deprived the subject of the +right of trial by jury; on what grounds such an assertion could be +founded, is to me a mystery; for the constitution expressly says, that the +trial shall be by jury, except in cases of impeachment. In our own state, +if a civil officer is impeached he will not be tried by a jury, but by +that branch of our legislature styled the senate. Tired, no doubt, with a +repetition of arguments, upon parts of the constitution which did not +appear quite plain till investigated and rightly construed, the +anti-federalists have taken upon them to assert things which the proposed +system does not afford them the least grounds for. Presumptuous, indeed, +must they be in the highest degree, if they suppose any will be so blind +as to listen to the most palpable falsehoods, uttered by them. Their +conduct seems to evince, that they harbour sentiments similar to those of +the Romish priests, in countries where the common people have scarcely any +knowledge of things wherein their interests are insuperably connected, and +imbibe their principles wholly from what the priests think proper to +inform them. But such artifices will not avail to practice upon the +inhabitants of America; for here, almost all have some knowledge of +government, derived from their own study and experience; and very few are +so stupidly ignorant as to believe all that is circulated by minions and +miscreants. + +Section 3, of article III. provides, that Congress shall have power to +declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work +corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person +attainted.--This section is truly republican in every sense of the +expression, and is of itself fully adequate to proving that the members of +the federal convention were actuated by principles the most liberal and +free--this single section alone is sufficient to enroll their proceedings +on the records of immortal fame. + +Contrast this section with the laws of England, in regard to treason, and, +notwithstanding the boasted rights of the subject in that isle, we shall +find our own in this, as well as almost every other particular, far to +exceed them. + +Section 1, of article IV. says, full faith and credit shall be given in +each state, to the publick acts, records and judicial proceedings of every +other state. The benefit to be derived from such a regulation must be +great, especially to those who are sometimes obliged to have recourse to +law, for the settlement of their affairs. + +Section 2, of article IV. provides, that the citizens of each state shall +be intitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the +several states. This section must also be a source of much advantage to +the inhabitants of the different states, who may have business to transact +in various parts of the continent, as being equally intitled to the rights +of citizenship in one as well as another. + +They will find less difficulty in pursuing their various concerns than if +it were otherwise. + +In the same article, section 3, it is provided, That new states may be +admitted into the Union; but no new state shall be formed or erected +within the jurisdiction of any other state, nor any states be formed by +the sanction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the +consent of the legislatures of the states concerned, as well as of +Congress. This section can be opposed by none who have the peace and +happiness of the states at heart; for, by this section, the designs of +those who wish to effect the disunion of the states, in order to get +themselves established in posts of honour and profit, are entirely +defeated. The majority of the citizens of Massachusetts, in particular, +will see the good effects to be derived from such a regulation. + +CASSIUS. + +(_To be Continued._) + + + + +Cassius, XI. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 394) + +TUESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE INHABITANTS OF THIS STATE. + +(_Concluded from our last._) + +The 3d section, in article IV. also provides, that Congress shall have +power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting +the territory or other property of the United States; and nothing in this +constitution shall be construed as a prejudice to the claims of the United +States, or any particular state. + +There is not, certainly, anything contained in the aforementioned clause, +which can be opposed on reasonable grounds. It is certainly necessary that +Congress should have power to make all needful rules and regulations +respecting the concerns of the Union; and if they exceed what is +necessary, their regulations will be of no effect; for whatever is done by +them, which the constitution does not warrant, is null and void, and can +be no more binding on the inhabitants of America, than the edicts of the +grand signior of Turkey. + +You will remember, my countrymen, that the words of the constitution are, +"All Powers Herein Granted." + +Section 4, of article IV. says, The United States shall guarantee to every +state in the Union a Republican Form of Government; and shall protect each +of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the +executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic +violence.--At the perusal of this clause, anti-federalism must blush, and +opposition hide its head. Could anything have more openly, or more plainly +evinced to the world, the noble motives which influenced the conduct of +the delegates of America, than the clause aforementioned? it provides, +that a republican form of government shall be guaranteed to each state in +the Union. The inhabitants of America are surely acquainted with the +principles of republicanism, and will certainly demand the establishment +of them, in their fullest extent. + +The section just mentioned, secures to us the full enjoyment of every +thing which freemen hold dear, and provides for protecting us against +every thing which they can dread. + +This article, my countrymen, is sufficient to convince you of the +excellency of that constitution which the federal convention have formed; +a constitution founded on the broad basis of liberty, and, should the +citizens of America happily concur in adopting it, its pillars may be as +fixed as the foundations of created nature. + +Say, ye mighty cavillers, ye inconsistent opposers of the new plan of +government, of what avail, to the thinking part of the community, do you +suppose will be all your clamours about a bill of rights? Does not the +abovementioned section provide for the establishment of a free government +in all the states? and if that freedom is encroached upon, will not the +constitution be violated? It certainly will; and its violators be hurled +from the seat of power, and arraigned before a tribunal where impartial +justice will no doubt preside, to answer for their high-handed crime. + +Article V. of the new constitution, says, That Congress, whenever +two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose +amendments to this constitution; or on the application of the legislatures +of two-thirds of the states, shall call a convention for proposing +amendments, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and +purposes, as part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures +of three-fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths +thereof; as one or the other modes of ratification may be proposed by +Congress; provided that no amendments which may be made prior to the year +one thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first +and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no +state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the +senate.-- + +On what grounds can the opposers to the new plan found their assertions +that Congress will have it in their power to make what laws they please, +and what alterations they think proper in the constitution, after the +people have adopted it? The constitution expressly says, that any +alterations in the constitution must be ratified by three-fourths of the +states. The 5th article also provides, that the states may propose any +alterations which they see fit, and that Congress shall take measures for +having them carried into effect. + +If this article does not clearly demonstrate that all power is in the +hands of the people, then the language by which we convey our ideas, is +shockingly inadequate to its intended purposes, and as little to be +understood by us, as Hebrew to the most illiterate. + +The 6th section provides, that this constitution, and the laws which shall +be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be +made, in pursuance thereof, under the authority of the United States, +shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall +be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the +contrary notwithstanding. + +This is the article, my countrymen, which knaves and blockheads have so +often dressed up in false colours, and requested your attention to the +construction of it. Adopt not a constitution, say they, which stipulates +that the laws of Congress shall be the supreme law of the land--or, in +other words, they request of you not to obey laws of your own making. This +is the article which they say is so arbitrary and tyrannical, that unless +you have a bill of rights to secure you, you are ruined forever. + +But in the name of common sense I would ask, of what use would be a bill +of rights, in the present case?... It can only be to resort to when it is +supposed that Congress have infringed the unalienable rights of the +people: but would it not be much easier to resort to the federal +constitution, to see if therein power is given to Congress to make the law +in question? If such power is not given, the law is in fact a nullity, and +the people will not be bound thereby. For let it be remembered, that such +laws, and such only, as are founded on this constitution, are to be the +supreme law of the land;--and it would be absurd indeed, if the laws which +are granted in the constitution, were not to be, without reserve, the +supreme law of the land. To give Congress power to make laws for the +Union, and then to say they should not have force throughout the Union, +would be glaringly inconsistent:--Such an inconsistency, however, has +hitherto been the evil which the whole continent have complained of, and +which the new constitution is designed to remedy.--Let us reverse the +proposition, and see how it will then stand.--This constitution, and the +laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and +all treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority, shall not +be the supreme law of the land--and the judges in the several states shall +not be bound thereby.--This is exactly what the anti-federalists wish to be +the case; this, and in this alone would they glory.--But, fellow citizens, +you will discern the excellency of the aforementioned clause; you will +perceive that it is calculated, wisely calculated, to support the dignity +of this mighty empire, to restore publick and private credit, and national +confidence. + +Article IV. further provides, That the senators and representatives before +mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures and all +executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the +several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this +constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a +qualification to any office or publick trust under the United States. + +Thus, my fellow-citizens, we see that our rulers are to be bound by the +most sacred ties, to support our rights and liberties, to secure to us the +full enjoyment of every privilege which we can wish for; they are bound by +the constitution to guarantee to us a republican form of government in its +fullest extent; and what is there more that we can wish for? + +Thus the people of the United States, "in order to form a more perfect +Union, establish justice, insure domestick tranquillity, provide for the +common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of +liberty to ourselves and our posterity," have appointed a federal +convention to "ordain and establish," with the concurrence of the people, +a constitution for the United States of America. That federal convention +have assembled together, and after a full investigation of the different +concerns of the Union, have proposed a form of government, calculated to +support, and transmit, inviolate, to the latest posterity, all the +blessings of civil and religious liberty. + +Citizens of Massachusetts! consider, O consider well, these important +matters, and weigh them deliberately in the scale of reason! Consider at +what a vast expense of toil, difficulty, treasure and blood, you have +emancipated yourselves from the yoke of bondage, and established +yourselves an independent people! Consider that those immortal characters, +who first planned the event of the revolution, and with arms in their +hands stepped forth in the glorious cause of human nature, have now +devised a plan for supporting your freedom, and increasing your strength, +your power and happiness. + +Will you then, O my countrymen! listen to the mad dictates of men, who are +aiming, by every artifice and falsehood, which the emissaries of hell can +invent, to effect your total destruction and overthrow? who wish to ascend +the chariot of anarchy, and ride triumphant over your smoking ruins, which +they hope to effect, by their more than hellish arts: in your misery they +hope to glory, and establish their own greatness "on their country's +ruin." + +If they can effect this, they will laugh at your calamity, and mock your +misfortunes--the language of each brother in iniquity, when they meet, will +be, "hail damn'd associates," see our high success! + +Think, O my countrymen! think, before it is too late!--The important moment +approaches, when these states must, by the most wise of all conduct, +forever establish their glory and happiness, on the firmest basis, by +adopting the constitution, or by the most foolish and inconsistent of all +conduct, in rejecting it, entail on themselves and on their posterity, +endless infamy. + + + "There is a tide in the affairs of men, + Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; + Omitted, all the voyage of their life + Is bound in shallowness."---- + + +If you embrace not the golden moment now before you, and refuse to receive +that which only can establish the dignity of your towering Eagle, this and +generations yet unborn, will curse, with an anathema, your dying fame, and +breathe, with imprecations and just indignation, vengeance and insults on +your sleeping ashes! But should you, on the contrary, with energy and +vigour, push your fortune, and, with earnestness and gratitude, clasp to +your arms this great blessing which Heaven has pointed to your view, +posterity, made happy by your wisdom and exertions, will honour and revere +your memories. Secure in their prosperity, they will weep for joy, that +Heaven had given them--Fathers! + +CASSIUS. + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF AGRIPPA, ACCREDITED TO JAMES WINTHROP. + + +Printed In The Massachusetts Gazette, +November, 1787-January, 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +The letters of Agrippa were the ablest anti-federal publications printed +in Massachusetts, and showed especial ability in arguing the dangers and +defects of a plan of government which was both so peculiarly needed, and +so specially advantageous to the State of Massachusetts, that its adoption +was only endangered by certain questions of local politics, which could +not even enter into the discussion. They were noticed, or replied to, in +the Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 21, 1787, by "Charles James Fox;" Dec. 28, +1787, and Jan. 4, 1788, by "Kempis O'Flanagan," Jan. 22, and 25, 1788, by +"Junius," and in the letters of Cassius, printed in this volume. + +At the time of publication they were accredited to the pen of James +Winthrop, of Cambridge, and he was repeatedly attacked as the author, +without denying it; while his supposed authorship and general opposition +to the Constitution contributed to defeat his election by Cambridge to the +Massachusetts Convention for considering the proposed government, +receiving only one vote in the whole town. On the contrary, the writer, in +his tenth letter, states that the surmises as to the authorship are not +correct, and in the Massachusetts Gazette of Dec. 21, 1787, the following +appeared: + + + I feel myself _greatly hurt_ at the liberties lately taken by + certain _scribblers_ with the characters of the _hon._ E. Gerry + and James Winthrop, _esquire_, of Cambridge, two gentlemen, no + less distinguished for their _honesty_, _patriotism_, and + _extensive abilities_, than a Washington or a Franklin. + + ... In regard to J. Winthrop, _esquire_, (of said Cambridge) it + has been insinuated, that that gentleman is the author of the + pieces in the Massachusetts Gazette, signed Agrippa--but every one + who can _boast the pleasure of his acquaintance_, must _know that + insinuation_ is grounded on _falsehood_. + + The heterogenous compound of nonsense and absurdity with which the + compositions of _Agrippa_ are so replete, are certainly not the + productions of a man so celebrated for his superior knowledge and + _understanding_. + + In short, Mr. Printer, I hope you and your brother typographers + will be very careful how you are _guilty_ of _exposing_ such + _exalted characters_ in future. + + OCRICO. + + + + +Agrippa, I. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 385) + +FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +Many inconveniences and difficulties in the new plan of government have +been mentioned by different writers on that subject. Mr. Gerry has given +the publick his objections against it, with a manly freedom.(16) The +seceding members from the Pennsylvania Assembly also published theirs.(17) +Various anonymous writers have mentioned reasons of great weight. Among +the many objections have been stated the unlimited right of taxation--a +standing army--an inadequate representation of the people--a right to +destroy the constitution of the separate states, and all the barriers that +have been set up in defence of liberty--the right to try causes between +private persons in many cases without a jury; without trying in the +vicinity of either party; and without any limitation of the value which is +to be tried. To none of these or any other objections has any answer been +given, but such as have acknowledged the truth of the objection while they +insulted the objector. This conduct has much the appearance of trying to +force a general sentiment upon the people. + +The idea of promoting the happiness of the people by opposing all their +habits of business, and by subverting the laws to which they are +habituated, appears to me to be at least a mistaken proceeding. If to this +we add the limitations of trade, restraints on its freedom, and the +alteration of its course, and _transfer of the market_, all under the +pretence of regulation for _federal purposes_, we shall not find any +additional reason to be pleased with the plan. + +It is now conceded on all sides that the laws relating to civil causes +were never better executed than at present. It is confessed by a warm +federalist in answer to Mr. Gerry's sensible letter, that the courts are +so arranged at present that no inconvenience is found, and that if the new +plan takes place great difficulties may arise. With this confession before +him, can any reasonable man doubt whether he shall exchange a system, +found by experience to be convenient, for one that is in many respects +inconvenient and dangerous? The expense of the new plan is terrifying, if +there was no other objection. But they are multiplied. Let us consider +that of the representation. + +There is to be one representative for every thirty thousand people. Boston +would nearly send one, but with regard to another there is hardly a county +in the state which would have one. The representatives are to be chosen +for two years. In this space, when it is considered that their residence +is from two hundred to five hundred miles from their constituents, it is +difficult to suppose that they will retain any great affection for the +welfare of the people. They will have an army to support them, and may bid +defiance to the clamours of their subjects. Should the people cry aloud +the representative may avail himself of the right to alter the _time of +election_ and postpone it for another year. In truth, the question before +the people is, _whether they will have a limited government or an absolute +one_! + +It is a fact justified by the experience of all mankind from the earliest +antiquity down to the present time, that freedom is necessary to industry. +We accordingly find that in absolute governments, the people, be the +climate what it may, are general [sic] lazy, cowardly, turbulent, and +vicious to an extreme. On the other hand, in free countries are found in +general, activity, industry, arts, courage, generosity, and all the manly +virtues. + +Can there be any doubt which to choose? He that Hesitates must be base +indeed. + +A favourite objection against a free government is drawn from the +irregularities of the Greek and Roman republicks. But it is to be +considered that war was the employment which they considered as most +becoming freemen. Agriculture, arts, and most domestick employment were +committed chiefly to slaves. But Carthage, the great commercial republick +of antiquity, though resembling Rome in the form of its government, and +her rival for power, retained her freedom longer than Rome, and was never +disturbed by sedition during the long period of her duration. This is a +striking proof that the fault of the Greek and Roman republicks was not +owing to the form of their government, and that the spirit of commerce is +the great bond of union among citizens. This furnishes employment for +their activity, supplies their mutual wants, defends the rights of +property, and producing reciprocal dependencies, renders the whole system +harmonious and energetick. Our great object therefore ought to be to +encourage this spirit. If we examine the present state of the world we +shall find that most of the business is done in the freest states, and +that industry decreases in proportion to the rigour of government. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, II. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 386) + +TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS. + +In the Gazette of the 23d instant, I ascertained from the state of other +countries and the experience of mankind, that free countries are most +friendly to commerce and to the rights of property. This produces greater +internal tranquility. For every man, finding sufficient employment for his +active powers in the way of trade, agriculture and manufactures, feels no +disposition to quarrel with his neighbour, nor with the government which +protects him, and of which he is a constituent part. Of the truth of these +positions we have abundant evidence in the history of our own country. +Soon after the settlement of Massachusetts, and its formation into a +commonwealth, in the earlier part of the last century, there was a +sedition at Hingham and Weymouth. The governour passing by at that time +with his guard, seized some of the mutineers and imprisoned them. This was +complained of as a violation of their rights, and the governour lost his +election the next year; but the year afterwards was restored and continued +to be re-elected for several years. The government does not appear to have +been disturbed again till the revocation of the charter in 1686, being a +period of about half a century. + +Connecticut set out originally on the same principles, and has continued +uniformly to exercise the powers of government to this time. + +During the last year,(18) we had decisive evidences of the vigour of this +kind of government. In Connecticut, the treason was restrained while it +existed only in the form of conspiracy. In Vermont, the conspirators +assembled in arms, but were suppressed by the exertions of the militia, +under the direction of their sheriffs. In New-Hampshire, the attack was +made on the legislature, but the insurrection was in a very few hours +suppressed, and has never been renewed. In Massachusetts, the danger was +by delay suffered to increase. One judicial court after another was +stopped, and even the capital trembled. Still, however, when the supreme +executive gave the signal, a force of many thousands of active, resolute +men, took the field, during the severities of winter, and every difficulty +vanished before them. Since that time we have been continually coalescing. +The people have applied with diligence to their several occupations, and +the whole country wears one face of improvement. Agriculture has been +improved, manufactures multiplied, and trade prodigiously enlarged. These +are the advantages of freedom in a growing country. While our resources +have been thus rapidly increasing, the courts have set in every part of +the commonwealth, without any guard to defend them; have tried causes of +every kind, whether civil or criminal, and the sheriffs, have in no case +been interrupted in the execution of their office. In those cases indeed, +where the government was more particularly interested, mercy has been +extended; but in civil causes, and in the case of moral offences, the law +has been punctually executed. Damage done to individuals, during the +tumults, has been repaired, by judgment of the courts of law, and the +award has been carried into effect. This is the present state of affairs, +when we are asked to relinquish that freedom which produces such happy +effects. + +The attempt has been made to deprive us of such a beneficial system, and +to substitute a rigid one in its stead, by criminally alarming our fears, +exalting certain characters on one side, and vilifying them on the other. +I wish to say nothing of the merits or demerits of individuals; such +arguments always do hurt. But assuredly my countrymen cannot fail to +consider and determine who are the most worthy of confidence in a business +of this magnitude. + +Whether they will trust persons, who have from their cradles been +incapable of comprehending any other principles of government, than those +of absolute power, and who have, in this very affair, tried to deprive +them of their constitutional liberty, by a pitiful trick. They cannot +avoid prefering those who have uniformly exerted themselves to establish a +limited government, and to secure to individuals all the liberty that is +consistent with justice, between man and man, and whose efforts, by the +smiles of Providence, have hitherto been crowned with the most splendid +success. After the treatment we have received, we have a right to be +jealous, and to guard our present constitution with the strictest care. It +is the right of the people to judge, and they will do wisely to give an +explicit instruction to their delegates in the proposed convention, not to +agree to any proposition that will in any degree militate with that happy +system of government under which Heaven has placed them. + +AGRIPPA. + +_November 24, 1787._ + + + + +Agrippa, III. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 387) + +FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +It has been proved from the clearest evidence, in two former papers, that +a free government, I mean one in which the power frequently returns to the +body of the people, is in principle the most stable and efficient of any +kind; that such a government affords the most ready and effectual remedy +for all injuries done to persons and the rights of property. It is true we +have had a tender act.(19) But what government has not some law in favour +of debtors? The difficulty consists in finding one that is not more +unfriendly to the creditors than ours. I am far from justifying such +things. On the contrary, I believe that it is universally true, that acts +made to favour a part of the community are wrong in principle. All that is +now intended is, to remark that we are not worse than other people in that +respect which we most condemn. Probably the inquiry will be made, whence +the complaints arise. This is easily answered. Let any man look round his +own neighbourhood, and see if the people are not, with a very few +exceptions, peaceable and attached to the government; if the country had +ever within their knowledge more appearance of industry, improvement and +tranquillity; if there was ever more of the produce of all kinds together +for the market; if their stock does not rapidly increase; if there was +ever a more ready vent for their surplus; and if the average of prices is +not about as high as was usual in a plentiful year before the war. These +circumstances all denote a general prosperity. Some classes of citizens +indeed suffer greatly. Two descriptions I at present recollect. The +publick creditors form the first of these classes, and they ought to, and +will be provided for. + +Let us for a moment consider their situation and prospects. The +embarrassments consequent upon a war, and the usual reduction of prices +immediately after a war, necessarily occasioned a want of punctuality in +publick payments. Still, however, the publick debt has been very +considerably reduced, not by the dirty and delusive scheme of +depreciation, but the nominal sum. Applications are continually making for +purchases in our eastern and western lands. Great exertions are making for +clearing off the arrears of outstanding taxes, so that the +certificates(20) for interest on the state debt have considerably +increased in value. This is a certain indication of returning credit. +Congress this year disposed of a large tract of their lands towards paying +the principal of their debt.(21) Pennsylvania has discharged the whole of +their part of the continental debt. New York has nearly cleared its state +debt, and has located a large part of their new lands towards paying the +continental demands.(22) Other states have made considerable payments. +Every day from these considerations the publick ability and inclination to +satisfy their creditors increases. The exertions of last winter were as +much to support public as private credit. The prospect therefore of the +publick creditors is brightening under the present system. If the new +system should take effect without amendments, which however is hardly +probable, the increase of expense will be death to the hopes of all +creditors, both of the continental and of the state. With respect, +however, to our publick delays of payment we have the precedent of the +best established countries in Europe. + +The other class of citizens to which I alluded was the ship-carpenters. +All agree that their business is dull; but as nobody objects against a +system of commercial regulations for the whole continent, that business +may be relieved without subverting all the ancient foundations and laws +which have the respect of the people. It is a very serious question +whether giving to Congress the unlimited right to regulate trade would not +injure them still further. It is evidently for the interest of the state +to encourage our own trade as much as possible. But in a very large +empire, as the whole states consolidated must be, there will always be a +desire of the government to increase the trade of the capital, and to +weaken the extremes. We should in that case be one of the extremes, and +should feel all the impoverishment incident to that situation. Besides, a +jealousy of our enterprising spirit, would always be an inducement to +cramp our exertions. We must then be impoverished or we must rebel. The +alternative is dreadful. + +At present this state is one of the most respectable and one of the most +influential in the union. If we alone should object to receiving the +system without amendments, there is no doubt but it would be amended. But +the case is not quite so bad. New York appears to have no disposition even +to call a convention. If they should neglect, are we to lend our +assistance to compel them by arms, and thus to kindle a civil war without +any provocation on their part? Virginia has put off their convention till +May, and appears to have no disposition to receive the new plan without +amendments. Pennsylvania does not seem to be disposed to receive it as it +is. The same objections are made in all the states, that the civil +government which they have adopted and which secures their rights will be +subverted. All the defenders of this system undertake to prove that the +rights of the states and of the citizens are kept safe. The opposers of it +agree that they will receive the least burdensome system which shall +defend those rights. + +Both parties therefore found their arguments on the idea that these rights +ought to be held sacred. With this disposition is it not in every man's +mind better to recommit it to a new convention, or to Congress, which is a +regular convention for the purpose, and to instruct our delegates to +confine the system to the general purposes of the union, than the +endeavour to force it through in its present form, and with so many +opposers as it must have in every state on the continent? The case is not +of such pressing necessity as some have represented. Europe is engaged, +and we are tranquil. Never therefore was an happier time for deliberation. +The supporters of the measure are by no means afraid of insurrections +taking place, but they are afraid that the present government will prove +superiour to their assaults. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, IV. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 388) + +TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1787. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +Having considered some of the principal advantages of the happy form of +government under which it is our peculiar good fortune to live, we find by +experience, that it is the best calculated of any form hitherto invented, +to secure to us the rights of our persons and of our property, and that +the general circumstances of the people shew an advanced state of +improvement never before known. We have found the shock given by the war, +in a great measure obliterated, and the public debt contracted at that +time to be considerably reduced in the nominal sum. The Congress lands are +full adequate to the redemption of the principal of their debt, and are +selling and populating very fast. The lands of this state, at the west, +are, at the moderate price of eighteen pence an acre, worth near half a +million pounds in our money. They ought, therefore, to be sold as quick as +possible. An application was made lately for a large tract at that price, +and continual applications are made for other lands in the eastern part of +the state. Our resources are daily augmenting. + +We find, then, that after the experience of near two centuries our +separate governments are in full vigor. They discover, for all the +purposes of internal regulation, every symptom of strength, and none of +decay. The new system is, therefore, for such purposes, useless and +burdensome. + +Let us now consider how far it is practicable consistent with the +happiness of the people and their freedom. It is the opinion of the ablest +writers on the subject, that no extensive empire can be governed upon +republican principles, and that such a government will degenerate to a +despotism, unless it be made up of a confederacy of smaller states, each +having the full powers of internal regulation. This is precisely the +principle which has hitherto preserved our freedom. No instance can be +found of any free government of considerable extent which has been +supported upon any other plan. Large and consolidated empires may indeed +dazzle the eyes of a distant spectator with their splendour, but if +examined more nearly are always found to be full of misery. The reason is +obvious. In large states the same principles of legislation will not apply +to all the parts. The inhabitants of warmer climates are more dissolute in +their manners, and less industrious, than in colder countries. A degree of +severity is, therefore, necessary with one which would cramp the spirit of +the other. We accordingly find that the very great empires have always +been despotick. They have indeed tried to remedy the inconveniences to +which the people were exposed by local regulations; but these contrivances +have never answered the end. The laws not being made by the people, who +felt the inconveniences, did not suit their circumstances. It is under +such tyranny that the Spanish provinces languish, and such would be our +misfortune and degradation, if we should submit to have the concerns of +the whole empire managed by one legislature. To promote the happiness of +the people it is necessary that there should be local laws; and it is +necessary that those laws should be made by the representatives of those +who are immediately subject to the want of them. By endeavouring to suit +both extremes, both are injured. + +It is impossible for one code of laws to suit Georgia and Massachusetts. +They must, therefore, legislate for themselves. Yet there is, I believe, +not one point of legislation that is not surrendered in the proposed plan. +Questions of every kind respecting property are determinable in a +continental court, and so are all kinds of criminal causes. The +continental legislature has, therefore, a right to make rules in all cases +by which their judicial courts shall proceed and decide causes. No rights +are reserved to the citizens. The laws of Congress are in all cases to be +the supreme law of the land, and paramount to the constitutions of the +individual states. The Congress may institute what modes of trial they +please, and no plea drawn from the constitution of any state can avail. +This new system is, therefore, a consolidation of all the states into one +large mass, however diverse the parts may be of which it is to be +composed. The idea of an uncompounded republick, on an average one +thousand miles in length, and eight hundred in breadth, and containing six +millions of white inhabitants all reduced to the same standard of morals, +of habits, and of laws, is in itself an absurdity, and contrary to the +whole experience of mankind. The attempt made by Great Britain to +introduce such a system, struck us with horrour, and when it was proposed +by some theorist that we should be represented in parliament, we uniformly +declared that one legislature could not represent so many different +interests for the purposes of legislation and taxation. This was the +leading principle of the revolution, and makes an essential article in our +creed. All that part, therefore, of the new system, which relates to the +internal government of the states, ought at once to be rejected. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, V. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 390) + +TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +In the course of inquiry it has appeared, that for the purposes of +internal regulation and domestick tranquillity, our small and separate +governments are not only admirably suited in theory, but have been +remarkably successful in practice. It is also found, that the direct +tendency of the proposed system, is to consolidate the whole empire into +one mass, and, like the tyrant's bed, to reduce all to one standard. +Though this idea has been started in different parts of the continent, and +is the most important trait of this draft, the reasoning ought to be +extensively understood. I therefore hope to be indulged in a particular +statement of it. + +Causes of all kinds, between citizens of different states, are to be tried +before a continental court. This court is not bound to try it according to +the local laws where the controversies happen; for in that case it may as +well be tried in a state court. The rule which is to govern the new +courts, must, therefore, be made by the court itself, or by its employers, +the Congress. If by the former, the legislative and judicial departments +will be blended; and if by the Congress, though these departments will be +kept separate, still the power of legislation departs from the state in +all those cases. The Congress, therefore, have the right to make rules for +trying all kinds of questions relating to property between citizens of +different states. The sixth article of the new constitution provides, that +the continental laws shall be the supreme law of the land, and that all +judges in the separate states shall be bound thereby, anything in the +constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. All the +state officers are also bound by oath to support this constitution. These +provisions cannot be understood otherwise than as binding the state judges +and other officers, to execute the continental laws in their own proper +departments within the state. For all questions, other than those between +citizens of the same state, are at once put within the jurisdiction of the +continental courts. As no authority remains to the state judges, but to +decide questions between citizens of the same state, and those judges are +to be bound by the laws of Congress, it clearly follows, that all +questions between citizens of the same state are to be decided by the +general laws and not by the local ones. + +Authority is also given to the continental courts, to try all causes +between a state and its own citizens. A question of property between these +parties rarely occurs. But if such questions were more frequent than they +are, the proper process is not to sue the state before an higher +authority; but to apply to the supreme authority of the state, by way of +petition. This is the universal practice of all states, and any other mode +of redress destroys the sovereignty of the state over its own subjects. +The only case of the kind in which the state would probably be sued, would +be upon the state notes. The endless confusion that would arise from +making the estates of individuals answerable, must be obvious to every +one. + +There is another sense in which the clause relating to causes between the +state and individuals is to be understood, and it is more probable than +the other, as it will be eternal in its duration, and increasing in its +extent. This is the whole branch of the law relating to criminal +prosecutions. In all such cases, the state is plaintiff, and the person +accused is defendant. The process, therefore, will be, for the +attorney-general of the state to commence his suit before a continental +court. Considering the state as a party, the cause must be tried in +another, and all the expense of transporting witnesses incurred. The +individual is to take his trial among strangers, friendless and +unsupported, without its being known whether he is habitually a good or a +bad man; and consequently with one essential circumstance wanting by which +to determine whether the action was performed maliciously or accidentally. +All these inconveniences are avoided by the present important restriction, +that the cause shall be tried by a jury of the vicinity, and tried in the +county where the offence was committed. But by the proposed _derangement_, +I can call it by no softer name, a man must be ruined to prove his +innocence. This is far from being a forced construction of the proposed +form. The words appear to me not intelligible, upon the idea that it is to +be a _system_ of government, unless the construction now given, both for +civil and criminal processes, be admitted. I do not say that it is +intended that all these changes should take place within one year, but +they probably will in the course of half a dozen years, if this system is +adopted. In the meantime we shall be subject to all the horrors of a +divided sovereignty, not knowing whether to obey the Congress or the +State. We shall find it impossible to please two masters. In such a state +frequent broils will ensue. Advantage will be taken of a popular +commotion, and even the venerable forms of the state be done away, while +the new system will be enforced in its utmost rigour by an army.--I am the +more apprehensive of a standing army, on account of a clause in the new +constitution which empowers Congress to keep one at all times; but this +constitution is evidently such that it cannot stand any considerable time +without an army. Upon this principle one is very wisely provided. Our +present government knows of no such thing. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, VI. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 391) + +FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +To prevent any mistakes, or misapprehensions of the argument, stated in my +last paper, to prove that the proposed constitution is an actual +consolidation of the separate states into one extensive commonwealth, the +reader is desired to observe, that in the course of the argument, the new +plan is considered as an entire system. It is not dependent on any other +book for an explanation, and contains no references to any other book. All +the defences of it, therefore, so far as they are drawn from the state +constitutions, or from maxims of the common law, are foreign to the +purpose. It is only by comparing the different parts of it together, that +the meaning of the whole is to be understood. For instance-- + +We find in it, that there is to be a legislative assembly, with authority +to constitute courts for the trial of all kinds of civil causes, between +citizens of different states. The right to appoint such courts necessarily +involves in it the right of defining their powers, and determining the +rules by which their judgment shall be regulated; and the grant of the +former of those rights is nugatory without the latter. It is vain to tell +us, that a maxim of common law requires contracts to be determined by the +law existing where the contract was made: for it is also a maxim, that the +legislature has a right to alter the common law. Such a power forms an +essential part of legislation. Here, then, a declaration of rights is of +inestimable value. It contains those principles which the government never +can invade without an open violation of the compact between them and the +citizens. Such a declaration ought to have come to the new constitution in +favour of the legislative rights of the several states, by which their +sovereignty over their own citizens within the state should be secured. +Without such an express declaration the states are annihilated in reality +upon receiving this constitution--the forms will be preserved only during +the pleasure of Congress. + +The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right given to +regulate trade. Though this power under certain limitations would be a +proper one for the department of Congress; it is in this system carried +much too far, and much farther than is necessary. This is, without +exception, the most commercial state upon the continent. Our extensive +coasts, cold climate, small estates, and equality of rights, with a +variety of subordinate and concurring circumstances, place us in this +respect at the head of the Union. We must, therefore, be indulged if a +point which so nearly relates to our welfare be rigidly examined. The new +constitution not only prohibits vessels, bound from one state to another, +from paying any duties, but even from entering and clearing. The only use +of such a regulation is, to keep each state in complete ignorance of its +own resources. It certainly is no hardship to enter and clear at the +custom house, and the expense is too small to be an object. + +The unlimited right to regulate trade, includes the right of granting +exclusive charters. This, in all old countries, is considered as one +principal branch of prerogative. We find hardly a country in Europe which +has not felt the ill effects of such a power. Holland has carried the +exercise of it farther than any other state, and the reason why that +country has felt less evil from it is, that the territory is very small, +and they have drawn large revenues from their colonies in the East and +West Indies. In this respect, the whole country is to be considered as a +trading company, having exclusive privileges. The colonies are large in +proportion to the parent state; so that, upon the whole, the latter may +gain by such a system. We are also to take into consideration the industry +which the genius of a free government inspires. But in the British islands +all these circumstances together have not prevented them from being +injured by the monopolies created there. Individuals have been enriched, +but the country at large has been hurt. Some valuable branches of trade +being granted to companies, who transact their business in London, that +city is, perhaps, the place of the greatest trade in the world. But +Ireland, under such influence, suffers exceedingly, and is impoverished; +and Scotland is a mere bye-word. Bristol, the second city in England, +ranks not much above this town in population. These things must be +accounted for by the incorporation of trading companies; and if they are +felt so severely in countries of small extent, they will operate with +ten-fold severity upon us, who inhabit an immense tract; and living +towards one extreme of an extensive empire, shall feel the evil, without +retaining that influence in government, which may enable us to procure +redress. There ought, then, to have been inserted a restraining clause +which might prevent the Congress from making any such grant, because they +consequentially defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are also injurious +to the general commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying that rivalship +which is the great stimulus to industry. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, VII. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 392) + +TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +There cannot be a doubt, that, while the trade of this continent remains +free, the activity of our countrymen will secure their full share. All the +estimates for the present year, let them be made by what party they may, +suppose the balance of trade to be largely in our favour. The credit of +our merchants is, therefore, fully established in foreign countries. This +is a sufficient proof, that when business is unshackled, it will find out +that channel which is most friendly to its course. We ought, therefore, to +be exceedingly cautious about diverting or restraining it. Every day +produces fresh proofs, that people, under the immediate pressure of +difficulties, do not, at first glance, discover the proper relief. The +last year, a desire to get rid of embarrassments induced many honest +people to agree to a tender act, and many others, of a different +description, to obstruct the courts of justice. Both these methods only +increased the evil they were intended to cure. Experience has since shown +that, instead of trying to lessen an evil by altering the present course +of things, that every endeavor should have been applied to facilitate the +course of law, and thus to encourage a mutual confidence among the +citizens, which increases the resources of them all, and renders easy the +payment of debts. By this means one does not grow rich at the expense of +another, but all are benefited. The case is the same with the States. +Pennsylvania, with one port and a large territory, is less favourably +situated for trade than the Massachusetts, which has an extensive coast in +proportion to its limits of jurisdiction. Accordingly a much larger +proportion of our people are engaged in maritime affairs. We ought +therefore to be particularly attentive to securing so great an interest. +It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is +only by protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is +preserved. No man when he enters into society does it from a view to +promote the good of others, but he does it for his own good. All men +having the same view are bound equally to promote the welfare of the +whole. To recur then to such a principle as that local interests must be +disregarded, is requiring of one man to do more than another, and is +subverting the foundation of a free government. The Philadelphians would +be shocked with a proposition to place the seat of general government and +the unlimited right to regulate trade in the Massachusetts. There can be +no greater reason for our surrendering the preference to them. Such +sacrifices, however we may delude ourselves with the form of words, always +originate in folly, and not in generosity. + +Let me now request your attention a little while to the actual state of +publick credit, that we may see whether it has not been as much +misrepresented as the state of our trade. + +At the beginning of the present year, the whole continental debt was about +twelve millions of pounds in our money. About one-quarter part of this sum +was due to our foreign creditors. Of these France was the principal, and +called for the arrears of interest. A new loan of one hundred and twenty +thousand pounds was negotiated in Holland, at five per cent., to pay the +arrears due to France. At first sight this has the appearance of bad +economy, and has been used for the villainous purpose of disaffecting the +people. But in the course of this same year, Congress have negotiated the +sale of as much of their western lands on the Ohio and Mississippi, as +amount nearly to the whole sum of the foreign debt; and instead of a dead +loss by borrowing money at five per cent. to the amount of an hundred and +twenty thousand pounds in one sum, they make a saving of the interest at +six per cent. on three millions of their domestick debt, which is an +annual saving of an hundred and eighty thousand pounds. It is easy to see +how such an immense fund as the western territory may be applied to the +payment of the foreign debt. Purchasers of the land would as willingly +procure any kind of the produce of the United States as they would buy +loan office certificates to pay for the land. The produce thus procured +would easily be negotiated for the benefit of our foreign creditors. I do +not mean to insinuate that no other provision should be made for our +creditors, but only to shew that our credit is not so bad in other +countries as has been represented, and that our resources are fully equal +to the pressure. + +The perfection of government depends on the equality of its operation, as +far as human affairs will admit, upon all parts of the empire, and upon +all the citizens. Some inequalities indeed will necessarily take place. +One man will be obliged to travel a few miles further than another man to +procure justice. But when he has travelled, the poor man ought to have the +same measure of justice as the rich one. Small enqualities [sic] may be +easily compensated. There ought, however, to be no inequality in the law +itself, and the government ought to have the same authority in one place +as in another. Evident as this truth is, the most plausible argument in +favour of the new plan is drawn from the inequality of its operation in +different states. In Connecticut, they have been told that the bulk of the +revenue will be raised by impost and excise, and, therefore, they need not +be afraid to trust Congress with the power of levying a dry tax at +pleasure. New York and Massachusetts are both more commercial states than +Connecticut. The latter, therefore, hopes that the other two will pay the +bulk of the continental expense. The argument is, in itself, delusive. If +the trade is not over-taxed, the consumer pays it. If the trade is +over-taxed, it languishes, and by the ruin of trade the farmer loses his +market. The farmer has, in truth, no other advantage from imposts than +that they save him the trouble of collecting money for the government. He +neither gets nor loses money by changing the mode of taxation. The +government indeed finds it the easiest way to raise the revenue; and the +reason is that the tax is by this means collected where the money +circulates most freely. But if the argument was not delusive, it ought to +conclude against the plan, because it would prove the unequal operation of +it; and if any saving is to be made by the mode of taxing, the saving +should be applied towards our own debt, and not to the payment of that +part of the continental burden which Connecticut ought to discharge. It +would be impossible to refute in writing all the delusions made use of to +force this system through. Those respecting the publick debt, and the +benefit of imposts, are the most important, and these I have taken pains +to explain. In one instance, indeed, the impost does raise money at the +direct expense of the seaports. This is when goods are imported subject to +a duty, and re-exported without a drawback. Whatever benefit is derived +from this source, surely should not be transferred to another state, at +least till our own debts are cleared. + +Another instance of unequal operation is, that it establishes different +degrees of authority in different states, and thus creates different +interests. The lands in New Hampshire having been formerly granted by this +state, and afterwards by that state, to private persons, the whole +authority of trying titles becomes vested in a continental court, and that +state loses a branch of authority, which the others retain, over their own +citizens. + +I have now gone through two parts of my argument, and have proved the +efficiency of the state governments for internal regulation, and the +disadvantages of the new system, at least some of the principal. The +argument has been much longer than I at first apprehended, or possibly I +should have been deterred from it. The importance of the question has, +however, prevented me from relinquishing it. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, VIII. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 394) + +TUESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +It has been proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not the grand +principle of union among the parts of a very extensive empire; and that +when this principle is pushed beyond the degree necessary for rendering +justice between man and man, it debases the character of individuals, and +renders them less secure in their persons and property. Civil liberty +consists in the consciousness of that security, and is best guarded by +political liberty, which is the share that every citizen has in the +government. Accordingly all our accounts agree, that in those empires +which are commonly called despotick, and which comprehend by far the +greatest part of the world, the government is most fluctuating, and +property least secure. In those countries insults are borne by the +sovereign, which, if offered to one of our governours, would fill us with +horrour, and we should think the government dissolving. + +The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly unfair one, +that we must then separate, and form distinct confederacies. This would be +true if there was no principle to substitute in the room of power. +Fortunately there is one. This is commerce. All the states have local +advantages, and in a considerable degree separate interests. They are, +therefore, in a situation to supply each other's wants. Carolina, for +instance, is inhabited by planters, while the Massachusetts is more +engaged in commerce and manufactures. Congress has the power of deciding +their differences. The most friendly intercourse may therefore be +established between them. A diversity of produce, wants and interests, +produces commerce; and commerce, where there is a common, equal and +moderate authority to preside, produces friendship. + +The same principles apply to the connection with the new settlers in the +west. Many supplies they want for which they must look to the older +settlements, and the greatness of their crops enables them to make +payments. Here, then, we have a bond of union which applies to all parts +of the empire, and would continue to operate if the empire comprehended +all America. + +We are now, in the strictest sense of the terms, a federal republick. Each +part has within its own limits the sovereignty over its citizens, while +some of the general concerns are committed to Congress. The complaints of +the deficiency of the Congressional powers are confined to two articles. +They are not able to raise a revenue by taxation, and they have not a +complete regulation of the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each +of these complaints there is some foundation, but not enough to justify +the clamour which has been raised. Congress, it is true, owes a debt which +ought to be paid. A considerable part of it has been paid. Our share of +what remains would annually amount to about sixty or seventy thousand +pounds. If, therefore, Congress were put in possession of such branches of +the impost as would raise this sum in our state, we should fairly be +considered as having done our part towards their debt; and our remaining +resources, whether arising from impost, excise, or dry tax, might be +applied to the reduction of our own debt. The principal of this last +amounts to about thirteen hundred thousand pounds, and the interest to +between seventy or eighty thousand. This is, surely, too much property to +be sacrificed; and it is as reasonable that it should be paid as the +continental debt. But if the new system should be adopted, the whole +impost, with an unlimited claim to excise and dry tax, will be given to +Congress. There will remain no adequate found for the state debt, and the +state will still be subject to be sued on their notes. This is, then, an +article which ought to be limited. We can, without difficulty, pay as much +annually as shall clear the interest of our state debt, and our share of +the interest on the continental one. But if we surrender the impost, we +shall still, by this new constitution, be held to pay our full proportion +of the remaining debt, as if nothing had been done. The impost will not be +considered as being paid by this state, but by the continent. The +federalists, indeed, tell us that the state debts will all be incorporated +with the continental debt, and all paid out of one fund. In this as in all +other instances, they endeavour to support their scheme of consolidation +by delusion. Not one word is said in the book in favour of such a scheme, +and there is no reason to think it true. Assurances of that sort are +easily given, and as easily forgotten. There is an interest in forgetting +what is false. No man can expect town debts to be united with that of the +state; and there will be as little reason to expect that the state and +continental debts will be united together. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, IX. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 395) + +FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1787. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +We come now to the second and last article of complaint against the +present confederation, which is, that Congress has not the sole power to +regulate the intercourse between us and foreigners. Such a power extends +not only to war and peace, but to trade and naturalization. This last +article ought never to be given them; for though most of the states may be +willing for certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens, yet reasons +of equal weight may induce other states, differently circumstanced, to +keep their blood pure. Pennsylvania has chosen to receive all that would +come there. Let any indifferent person judge whether that state in point +of morals, education, energy is equal to any of the eastern states; the +small state of Rhode Island only excepted. Pennsylvania in the course of a +century has acquired her present extent and population at the expense of +religion and good morals. The eastern states have, by keeping separate +from the foreign mixtures, acquired their present greatness in the course +of a century and an half, and have preserved their religion and morals. +They have also preserved that manly virtue which is equally fitted for +rendering them respectable in war, and industrious in peace. + +The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be safely enough +lodged with Congress under some limitations. Three restrictions appear to +me to be essentially necessary to preserve that equality of rights to the +states, which it is the object of the state governments to secure to each +citizen. 1st. It ought not to be in the power of Congress, either by +treaty or otherwise, to alienate part of any state without the consent of +the legislature. 2d. They ought not to be able, by treaty or other law, to +give any legal preference to one part above another. 3d. They ought to be +restrained from creating any monopolies. Perhaps others may propose +different regulations and restrictions. One of these is to be found in the +old confederation, and another in the newly proposed plan. The third +scenes [sic] to be equally necessary. + +After all that has been said and written on this subject, and on the +difficulty of amending our old constitution so as to render it adequate to +national purposes, it does not appear that any thing more was necessary to +be done, than framing two new articles. By one a limited revenue would be +given to Congress with a right to collect it, and by the other a limited +right to regulate our intercourse with foreign nations. By such an +addition we should have preserved to each state its power to defend the +rights of the citizens, and the whole empire would be capable of expanding +and receiving additions without altering its former constitution. +Congress, at the same time, by the extent of their jurisdiction, and the +number of their officers, would have acquired more respectability at home, +and a sufficient influence abroad. If any state was in such a case to +invade the rights of the Union, the other states would join in defence of +those rights, and it would be in the power of Congress to direct the +national force to that object. But it is certain that the powers of +Congress over the citizens should be small in proportion as the empire is +extended; that, in order to preserve the balance, each state may supply by +energy what is wanting in numbers. Congress would be able by such a system +as we have proposed to regulate trade with foreigners by such duties as +should effectually give the preference to the produce and manufactures of +our own country. We should then have a friendly intercourse established +between the states, upon the principles of mutual interest. A moderate +duty upon foreign vessels would give an advantage to our own people, while +it would avoid all the disadvantages arising from a prohibition, and the +consequent deficiency of vessels to transport the produce of the southern +states. + +Our country is at present upon an average a thousand miles long from north +to south, and eight hundred broad from the Mississippi to the Ocean. We +have at least six millions of white inhabitants, and the annual increase +is about two hundred and fifty thousand souls, exclusive of emigrants from +Europe. The greater part of our increase is employed in settling the new +lands, while the older settlements are entering largely into manufactures +of various kinds. It is probable that the extraordinary exertions of this +state in the way of industry for the present year only, exceed in value +five hundred thousand pounds. The new settlements, if all made in the same +tract of country, would form a large state annually; and the time seems to +be literally accomplished when a nation shall be born in a day. Such an +immense country is not only capable of yielding all the produce of Europe, +but actually does produce by far the greater part of the raw materials. +The restrictions on our trade in Europe, necessarily oblige us to make use +of those materials, and the high price of labour operates as an +encouragement to mechanical improvements. In this way we daily make rapid +advancements towards independence in resources as well as in empire. If we +adopt the new system of government we shall, by one rash vote, lose the +fruit of the toil and expense of thirteen years, at the time when the +benefits of that toil and expense are rapidly increasing. Though the +imposts of Congress on foreign trade may tend to encourage manufactures, +the excise and dry tax will destroy all the beneficial effects of the +impost, at the same time that they diminish our capital. Be careful then +to give only a limited revenue, and the limited power of managing foreign +concerns. Once surrender the rights of internal legislation and taxation, +and instead of being respected abroad, foreigners will laugh at us, and +posterity will lament our folly. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, X. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 396) + +TUESDAY, JANUARY 1, 1788. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +_Friends and Brethren_, + +It is a duty incumbent on every man, who has had opportunities for +inquiry, to lay the result of his researches on any matter of publick +importance before the publick eye. No further apology will be necessary +with the generality of my readers, for having so often appeared before +them on the subject of the lately proposed form of government. It has been +treated with that freedom which is necessary for the investigation of +truth, and with no greater freedom. On such a subject, extensive in its +nature, and important in its consequences, the examination has necessarily +been long, and the topicks treated of have been various. We have been +obliged to take a cursory, but not inaccurate view of the circumstances of +mankind under the different forms of government to support the different +parts of our argument. Permit me now to bring into one view the principal +propositions on which the reasoning depends. + +It is shewn from the example of the most commercial republick of +antiquity, which was never disturbed by a sedition for above seven hundred +years, and at last yielded after a violent struggle to a foreign enemy, as +well as from the experience of our own country for a century and an half, +that the republican, more than any other form of government is made of +durable materials. It is shewn from a variety of proof, that one +consolidated government is inapplicable to a great extent of country; is +unfriendly to the rights both of persons and property, which rights always +adhere together; and that being contrary to the interest of the extreme of +an empire, such a government can be supported only by power, and that +commerce is the true bond of union for a free state. It is shewn from a +comparison of the different parts of the proposed plan, that it is such a +consolidated government. + +By article 3, section 2, Congress are empowered to appoint courts with +authority to try civil causes of every kind, and even offences against +particular states. By the last clause of Article 1, section 8, which +defines their legislative powers, they are authorised to make laws for +carrying into execution all the "powers vested by this constitution in the +government of the United States, or in _any department_ or officer +thereof;" and by article 6, the judges in every state are to be bound by +the laws of Congress. It is therefore a complete consolidation of all the +states into one, however diverse the parts of it may be. It is also shewn +that it will operate unequally in the different states, taking from some +of them a greater share of wealth; that in this last respect it will +operate more to the injury of this commonwealth than of any state in the +union; and that by reason of its inequality it is subversive of the +principles of a free government, which requires every part to contribute +an equal proportion. For all these reasons this system ought to be +rejected, even if no better plan was proposed in the room of it. In case +of a rejection we must remain as we are, with trade extending, resources +opening, settlements enlarging, manufactures increasing, and publick debts +diminishing by fair payment. These are mighty blessings, and not to be +lost by the hasty adoption of a new system. But great as these benefits +are, which we derive from our present system, it has been shewn, that they +may be increased by giving Congress a limited power to regulate trade, and +assigning to them those branches of the impost on our foreign trade only, +which shall be equal to our proportion of their present annual demands. +While the interest is thus provided for, the sale of our lands in a very +few years will pay the principal, and the other resources of the state +will pay our own debt. The present mode of assessing the continental tax +is regulated by the extent of landed property in each state. By this rule +the Massachusetts [sic] has to pay one eighth. If we adopt the new system, +we shall surrender the whole of our impost and excise, which probably +amount to a third of those duties of the whole continent, and must come in +for about a sixth part of the remaining debt. By this means we shall be +deprived of the benefit arising from the largeness of our loans to the +continent, shall lose our ability to satisfy the just demands on the +state. Under the limitations of revenue and commercial regulation +contained in these papers, the balance will be largely in our favour; the +importance of the great states will be preserved, and the publick +creditors both of the continent and state will be satisfied without +burdening the people. For a more concise view of my proposal, I have +thrown it into the form of a resolve, supposed to be passed by the +convention which is shortly to set in this town. + +"Commonwealth of Massachusetts. _Resolved_, That the form of government +lately proposed by a federal convention, held in the city of Philadelphia, +is so far injurious to the interests of this commonwealth, that we are +constrained by fidelity to our constituents to reject it; and we do hereby +reject the said proposed form and every part thereof. But in order that +the union of these states may, as far as possible, be promoted, and the +federal business as little obstructed as may be, we do agree on the part +of this commonwealth, that the following addition be made to the present +articles of confederation: + +"XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate the intercourse +between these states and foreign dominions, under the following +restrictions; viz.: 1st. No treaty, ordinance, or law shall alienate the +whole or part of any state, without the consent of the legislature of such +state. 2d. The United States shall not by treaty or otherwise give a +preference to the ports of one state over those of another; nor, 3d, +create any monopolies or exclusive companies; nor, 4th, extend the +privileges of citizenship to any foreigner. And for the more convenient +exercise of the powers hereby and by the former articles given, the United +States shall have authority to constitute judicatories, whether supreme or +subordinate, with power to try all piracies and felonies done on the high +seas, and also all civil causes in which a foreign state, or subject +thereof, actually resident in a foreign country and not being British +absentees, shall be one of the parties. They shall also have authority to +try all causes in which ambassadors shall be concerned. All these trials +shall be by jury and in some sea-port town. All imposts levied by Congress +on trade shall be confined to foreign produce or foreign manufactures +imported, and to foreign ships trading in our harbours, and all their +absolute prohibitions shall be confined to the same articles. All imposts +and confiscations shall be to the use of the state in which they shall +accrue, excepting in such branches as shall be assigned by any state as a +fund for defraying their proportion of the continental. And no powers +shall be exercised by Congress but such as are expressly given by this and +the former articles. And we hereby authorize our delegates in Congress to +sign and ratify an article in the foregoing form and words, without any +further act of this state for that purpose, provided the other states +shall accede to this proposition on their part on or before the first day +of January, which will be in the year of our Lord 1790. All matters of +revenue being under the controul of the legislature, we recommend to the +general court of this commonwealth, to devise, as early as may be, such +funds arising from such branches of foreign commerce, as shall be equal to +our part of the current charges of the continent, and to put Congress in +possession of the revenue arising therefrom, with a right to collect it, +during such term as shall appear to be necessary for the payment of the +principal of their debt, by the sale of the western lands."(23) + +By such an explicit declaration of the powers given to Congress, we shall +provide for all federal purposes, and shall at the same time secure our +rights. It is easier to amend the old confederation, defective as it has +been represented, than it is to correct the new form. For with whatever +view it was framed, truth constrains me to say, that it is insidious in +its form, and ruinous in its tendency. Under the pretence of different +branches of the legislature, the members will in fact be chosen from the +same general description of citizens. The advantages of a check will be +lost, while we shall be continually exposed to the cabals and corruption +of a British election. There cannot be a more eligible mode than the +present, for appointing members of Congress, nor more effectual checks +provided than our separate state governments, nor any system so little +expensive, in case of our adopting the resolve just stated, or even +continuing as we are. We shall in that case avoid all the inconvenience of +concurrent jurisdictions, we shall avoid the expensive and useless +establishments of the Philadelphia proposition, we shall preserve our +constitution and liberty, and we shall provide for all such institutions +as will be useful. Surely then you cannot hesitate, whether you will chuse +freedom or servitude. The object is now well defined. By adopting the form +proposed by the convention, you will have the derision of foreigners, +internal misery, and the anathemas of posterity. By amending the present +confederation, and granting limited powers to Congress, you secure the +admiration of strangers, internal happiness, and the blessings and +prosperity of all succeeding generations. Be wise, then, and by preserving +your freedom, prove, that Heaven bestowed it not in vain. Many will be the +efforts to delude the convention. The mode of judging is itself +suspicious, as being contrary to the antient and established usage of the +commonwealth. But since the mode is adopted, we trust, that the members of +that venerable assembly will not so much regard the greatness of their +power, as the sense and interest of their constituents. And they will do +well to remember that even a mistake in adopting it, will be destructive, +while no evils can arise from a total, and much less, probably, from such +a partial rejection as we have proposed. + +I have now gone through my reasonings on this momentous subject, and have +stated the facts and deductions from them, which you will verify for +yourselves. Personal interest was not my object, or I should have pursued +a different line of conduct. Though I conceived that a man who owes +allegiance to the state is bound, on all important occasions, to propose +such inquiries as tend to promote the publick good; yet I did not imagine +it to be any part of my duty to present myself to the fury of those who +appear to have other ends in view. For this cause, and for this only, I +have chosen a feigned signature. At present all the reports concerning the +writer of these papers are merely conjectural. I should have been ashamed +of my system if it had needed such feeble support as the character of +individuals. It stands on the firm ground of the experience of mankind. I +cannot conclude this long disquisition better than with a caution derived +from the words of inspiration--_Discern the things of your peace now in the +days thereof, before they be hidden from your eyes_. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, XI. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 398) + +TUESDAY, JANUARY 8, 1788. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE PEOPLE. + +My last address contained the outlines of a system fully adequate to all +the useful purposes of the union. Its object is to raise a sufficient +revenue from the foreign trade, and the sale of our publick lands, to +satisfy all the publick exigencies, and to encourage, at the same time, +our internal industry and manufactures. It also secures each state in its +own separate rights, while the continental concerns are thrown into the +general department. The only deficiencies that I have been able to +discover in the plan, and in the view of federalists they are very great +ones, are, that it does not allow the interference of Congress in the +domestick concerns of the state, and that it does not render our national +councils so liable to foreign influence. The first of these articles tends +to guard us from that infinite multiplication of officers which the report +of the Convention of Philadelphia proposes. With regard to the second, it +is evidently not of much importance to any foreign nation to purchase, at +a very high price, a majority of votes in an assembly, whose members are +continually exposed to a recall. But give those members a right to sit +six, or even two years, with such extensive powers as the new system +proposes, and their friendship will be well worth a purchase. This is the +only sense in which the Philadelphia system will render us more +respectable in the eyes of foreigners. In every other view they lose their +respect for us, as it will render us more like their own degraded models. +It is a maxim with them, that every man has his price. If, therefore, we +were to judge of what passes in the hearts of the federalists when they +urge us, as they continually do, _to be like other nations_, and when they +assign mercenary motives to the opposers of their plan, we should conclude +very fairly they themselves wish to be provided for at the publick +expense. However that may be, if we look upon the men we shall find some +of their leaders to have formed pretty strong attachments to foreign +nations. Whether those attachments arose from their being educated under a +royal government, from a former unfortunate mistake in politicks, or from +the agencies for foreigners, or any other cause, is not in my province to +determine. But certain it is that some of the principal fomenters of this +plan have never shown themselves capable of that generous system of policy +which is founded in the affections of freemen. Power and high life are +their idols, and national funds are necessary to support them. + +Some of the principal powers of Europe have already entered into treaties +with us, and that some of the rest have not done it, is not owing, as is +falsely pretended, to the want of power in Congress. Holland never found +any difficulty of this kind from the multitude of sovereignties in that +country, which must all be consulted on such an occasion. The resentment +of Great Britain for our victories in the late war has induced that power +to restrain our intercourse with their subjects. Probably an hope, the +only solace of the wretched, that their affairs would take a more +favourable turn on this continent, has had some influence on their +proceedings. All their restrictions have answered the end of securing our +independence, by driving us into many valuable manufactures. Their own +colonies in the mean time have languished for want of an intercourse with +these states. The new settlement in Nova Scotia has miserably decayed, and +the West India Islands have suffered for want of our supplies, and by the +loss of our market. This has affected the revenue; and, however +contemptuously some men may affect to speak of our trade, the supply of +six millions of people is an object worth the attention of any nation upon +earth. Interest in such a nation as Britain will surmount their +resentment. However their pride may be stung, they will pursue after +wealth. Increase of revenue to a nation overwhelmed with a debt of near +_two hundred and ninety millions_ sterling is an object to which little +piques must give way; and there is no doubt that their interest consists +in securing as much of our trade as they can. + +These are the topicks from which are drawn some of the most plausible +reasons that have been given by the federalists in favour of their plan, +as derived from the sentiments of foreigners. We have weighed them and +found them wanting. That they had not themselves full confidence in their +own reasons at Philadelphia is evident from the method they took to bias +the State Convention. Messrs. Wilson and M'Kean, two Scottish names, were +repeatedly worsted in the argument. To make amends for their own +incapacity, the gallery was filled with a rabble,(24) who shouted their +applause, and these heroes of aristocracy were not ashamed, though modesty +is their national virtue, to vindicate such a violation of decency. Means +not less criminal, but not so flagrantly indecent, have been frequently +mentioned among us to secure a majority. But those who vote for a price +can never sanctify wrong, and treason will still retain its deformity. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, XII. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 399) + +FRIDAY, JANUARY 11, 1788. + +For the Massachusetts Gazette. + +TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION. + +_Gentlemen_, + +Suffer an individual to lay before you his contemplations on the great +subject that now engages your attention. To you it belongs, and may Heaven +direct your judgment to decide on the happiness of all future generations, +as well as the present. + +It is universally agreed that the object of every just government is to +render the people happy, by securing their persons and possessions from +wrong. To this end it is necessary that there should be local laws and +institutions; for a people inhabiting various climates will unavoidably +have local habits and different modes of life, and these must be consulted +in making the laws. It is much easier to adapt the laws to the manners of +the people, than to make manners conform to laws. The idle and dissolute +inhabitants of the south require a different regimen from the sober and +active people of the north. Hence, among other reasons, is derived the +necessity of local governments, who may enact, repeal, or alter +regulations as the circumstances of each part of the empire may require. +This would be the case, even if a very great state was to be settled at +once. But it becomes still more needful when the local manners are formed, +and usages sanctified, by the practice of a century and a half. In such a +case, to attempt to reduce all to one standard is absurd in itself and +cannot be done but upon the principle of power, which debases the people +and renders them unhappy till all dignity of character is put away. Many +circumstances render us an essentially different people from the +inhabitants of the southern states. The unequal distribution of property, +the toleration of slavery, the ignorance and poverty of the lower classes, +the softness of the climate and dissoluteness of manners, mark their +character. Among us, the care that is taken of education, small and nearly +equal estates, equality of rights, and the severity of the climate, +renders the people active, industrious and sober. Attention to religion +and good morals is a distinguishing trait in our character. It is plain, +therefore, that we require for our regulation laws which will not suit the +circumstances of our southern brethren, and that laws made for them would +not apply to us. Unhappiness would be the uniform product of such laws; +for no state can be happy when the laws contradict the general habits of +the people, nor can any state retain its freedom while there is a power to +make and enforce such laws. We may go further, and say, that it is +impossible for any single legislature so fully to comprehend the +circumstances of the different parts of a very extensive dominion as to +make laws adapted to those circumstances. + +Hence arises in most nations of extensive territory, the necessity of +armies, to cure the defect of the laws. It is actually under the pressure +of such an absurd government, that the Spanish provinces have groaned for +near three centuries; and such will be our misfortune and degradation, if +we ever submit to have all the business of the empire done by one +legislature. The contrary principle of local legislation by the +representatives of the people, who alone are to be governed by the laws, +has raised us to our present greatness; and an attempt on the part of +Great Britain to invade this right, brought on the revolution, which gave +us a separate rank among the nations. We even declared, that we would not +be represented in the national legislature, because one assembly was not +adequate to the purposes of internal legislation and taxation. + +AGRIPPA. + +[_Remainder next Tuesday._] + + + + +Agrippa, XIII. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 400) + +TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1788. + +(_Concluded from our last._) + +TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION. + +_Gentlemen_, + +The question then arises, what is the kind of government best adapted to +the object of securing our persons and possessions from violence? I +answer, a _Federal Republick_. By this kind of government each state +reserves to itself the right of making and altering its laws for internal +regulation, and the right of executing those laws without any external +restraint, while the general concerns of the empire are committed to an +assembly of delegates, each accountable to his own constituents. This is +the happy form under which we live, and which seems to mark us out as a +people chosen of God. No instance can be produced of any other kind of +government so stable and energetick as the republican. The objection drawn +from the Greek and Roman states does not apply to the question. +Republicanism appears there in its most disadvantageous form. Arts and +domestic employments were generally committed to slaves, while war was +almost the only business worthy of a citizen. Hence arose their internal +dissensions. Still they exhibited proofs of legislative wisdom and +judicial integrity hardly to be found among their monarchick neighbors. On +the other hand we find Carthage cultivating commerce, and extending her +dominions for the long space of seven centuries, during which term the +internal tranquillity was never disturbed by her citizens. Her national +power was so respectable, that for a long time it was doubtful whether +Carthage or Rome should rule. In the form of their government they bore a +strong resemblance to each other. Rome might be reckoned a free state for +about four hundred and fifty years. We have then the true line of +distinction between those two nations, and a strong proof of the hardy +materials which compose a republican government. If there was no other +proof, we might with impartial judges risk the issue upon this alone. But +our proof rests not here. The present state of Europe, and the vigour and +tranquillity of our own governments, after experiencing this form for a +century and an half, are decided proofs in favour of those governments +which encourage commerce. A comparison of our own country, first with +Europe and then with the other parts of the world, will prove, beyond a +doubt, that the greatest share of freedom is enjoyed by the citizens, so +much more does commerce flourish. The reason is, that every citizen has an +influence in making the laws, and thus they are conformed to the general +interests of the state; but in every other kind of government they are +frequently made in favour of a part of the community at the expense of the +rest. + +The argument against republicks, as it is derived from the Greek and Roman +states, is unfair. It goes on the idea that no other government is subject +to be disturbed. As well might we conclude, that a limited monarchy is +unstable, because that under the feudal system the nobles frequently made +war upon their king, and disturbed the publick peace. We find, however, in +practice, that limited monarchy is more friendly to commerce, because more +friendly to the rights of the subject, than an absolute government; and +that it is more liable to be disturbed than a republick, because less +friendly to trade and the rights of individuals. There cannot, from the +history of mankind, be produced an instance of rapid growth in extent, in +numbers, in arts, and in trade, that will bear any comparison with our +country. This is owing to what the friends of the new system, and the +enemies of the revolution, for I take them to be nearly the same, would +term _our extreme liberty_. Already, have our ships visited every part of +the world, and brought us their commodities in greater perfection, and at +a more moderate price, than we ever before experienced. The ships of other +nations crowd to our ports, seeking an intercourse with us. All the +estimates of every party make the balance of trade for the present year to +be largely in our favour. Already have some very useful, and some elegant +manufactures got established among us, so that our country every day is +becoming independent in her resources. Two-thirds of the continental debt +has been paid since the war, and we are in alliance with some of the most +respectable powers of Europe. The western lands, won from Britain by the +sword, are an ample fund for the principal of all our public debts; and +every new sale excites that manly pride which is essential to national +virtue. All this happiness arises from the freedom of our institutions and +the limited nature of our government; a government that is respected from +principles of affection, and obeyed with alacrity. The sovereigns of the +old world are frequently, though surrounded with armies, treated with +insult; and the despotick monarchies of the east, are the most +fluctuating, oppressive and uncertain governments of any form hitherto +invented. These considerations are sufficient to establish the excellence +of our own form, and the goodness of our prospects. + +Let us now consider the probable effects of a consolidation of the +separate states into one mass; for the new system extends so far. Many +ingenious explanations have been given of it; but there is this defect, +that they are drawn from maxims of the common law, while the system itself +cannot be bound by any such maxims. A legislative assembly has an inherent +right to alter the common law, and to abolish any of its principles, which +are not particularly guarded in the constitution. Any system therefore +which appoints a legislature, without any reservation of the rights of +individuals, surrenders all power in every branch of legislation to the +government. The universal practice of every government proves the justness +of this remark; for in every doubtful case it is an established rule to +decide in favour of authority. The new system is, therefore, in one +respect at least, essentially inferior to our state constitutions. There +is no bill of rights, and consequently a continental law may controul any +of those principles, which we consider at present as sacred; while not one +of those points, in which it is said that the separate governments +misapply their power, is guarded. Tender acts and the coinage of money +stand on the same footing of a consolidation of power. It is a mere +fallacy, invented by the deceptive powers of Mr. Wilson, that what rights +are not given are reserved. The contrary has already been shewn. But to +put this matter of legislation out of all doubt, let us compare together +some parts of the book; for being an independent system, this is the only +way to ascertain its meaning. + +In article III, section 2, it is declared, that "the judicial power shall +extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the +laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under +their authority." Among the cases arising under this new constitution are +reckoned, "all controversies between citizens of different states," which +include all kinds of civil causes between those parties. The giving +Congress a power to appoint courts for such a purpose is as much, there +being no stipulation to the contrary, giving them power to legislate for +such causes, as giving them a right to raise an army, is giving them a +right to direct the operations of the army when raised. But it is not left +to implication. The last clause of article I, section 8, expressly gives +them power "to make all laws which shall be needful and proper for +carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested +by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any +department or officer thereof." It is, therefore, as plain as words can +make it, that they have a right by this proposed form to legislate for all +kinds of causes respecting property between citizens of different states. +That this power extends to all cases between citizens of the same state, +is evident from the sixth article, which declares all continental laws and +treaties to be the _supreme law_ of the land, and that all state judges +are bound thereby, "_anything in the constitution or laws of any state to +the contrary notwithstanding_." If this is not binding the judges of the +separate states in their own office, by continental rules, it is perfect +nonsense. + +There is then a complete consolidation of the legislative powers in all +cases respecting property. This power extends to all cases between a state +and citizens of another state. Hence a citizen, possessed of the notes of +another state, may bring his action, and there is no limitation that the +execution shall be levied on the publick property of the state; but the +property of individuals is liable. This is a foundation for endless +confusion and discord. This right to try causes between a state and +citizens of another state, involves in it all criminal causes; and a man +who has accidentally transgressed the laws of another state, must be +transported, with all his witnesses, to a third state, to be tried. He +must be ruined to prove his innocence. These are necessary parts of the +new system, and it will never be complete till they are reduced to +practice. They effectually prove a consolidation of the states, and we +have before shewn the ruinous tendency of such a measure. + +By sect. 8 of article I, Congress are to have the unlimited right to +regulate commerce, external and _internal_, and may therefore create +monopolies which have been universally injurious to all the subjects of +the countries that have adopted them, excepting the monopolists +themselves. They have also the unlimited right to imposts and all kinds of +taxes, as well to levy as to collect them. They have indeed very nearly +the same powers claimed formerly by the British parliament. Can we have so +soon forgot our glorious struggle with that power, as to think a moment of +surrendering it now? It makes no difference in principle whether the +national assembly was elected for seven years or for six. In both cases we +should vote to great disadvantage, and therefore ought never to agree to +such an article. Let us make provision for the payment of the interest of +our part of the debt, and we shall be fairly acquitted. Let the fund be an +impost on our foreign trade, and we shall encourage our manufactures. But +if we surrender the unlimited right to regulate trade, and levy taxes, +imposts will oppress our foreign trade for the benefit of other states, +while excises and taxes will discourage our internal industry. The right +to regulate trade, without any limitations, will, as certainly as it is +granted, transfer the trade of this state to Pennsylvania. That will be +the seat of business and of wealth, while the extremes of the empire will, +like Ireland and Scotland, be drained to fatten an overgrown capital. +Under our present equal advantages, the citizens of this state come in for +their full share of commercial profits. Surrender the rights of taxation +and commercial regulation, and the landed states at the southward will all +be interested in draining our resources; for whatever can be got by impost +on our trade and excises on our manufactures, will be considered as so +much saved to a state inhabited by planters. All savings of this sort +ought surely to be made in favour of our own state; and we ought never to +surrender the unlimited powers of revenue and trade to uncommercial +people. If we do, the glory of the state from that moment departs, never +to return. + +The safety of our constitutional rights consists in having the business of +governments lodged in different departments, and in having each part well +defined. By this means each branch is kept within the constitutional +limits. Never was a fairer line of distinction than what may be easily +drawn between the continental and state governments. The latter provide +for all cases, whether civil or criminal, that can happen ashore, because +all such causes must arise within the limits of some state. Transactions +between citizens may all be fairly included in this idea, even although +they should arise in passing by water from one state to another. But the +intercourse between us and foreign nations properly forms the department +of Congress. They should have the power of regulating trade under such +limitations as should render their laws equal. They should have the right +of war and peace, saving the equality of rights, and the territory of each +state. But the power of naturalization and internal regulation should not +be given them. To give my scheme a more systematick appearance, I have +thrown it into the form of a resolve, which is submitted to your wisdom +for amendment, but not as being perfect. + +"Resolved, that the form of government proposed by the federal convention, +lately held in Philadelphia, be rejected on the part of this commonwealth; +and that our delegates in Congress are hereby authorised to propose on the +part of this commonwealth, and, if the other states for themselves agree +thereto, to sign an article of confederation, as an addition to the +present articles, in the form following, provided such agreement be made +on or before the first day of January, which will be in the year of our +Lord 1790; the said article shall have the same force and effect as if it +had been inserted in the original confederation, and is to be construed +consistently with the clause in the former articles, which restrains the +United States from exercising such powers as are not expressly given. + +"XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate, whether by treaty, +ordinance or law, the intercourse between these states and foreign +dominions and countries, under the following restrictions. No treaty, +ordinance, or law shall give a preference to the ports of one state over +those of another; nor 2d. impair the territory or internal authority of +any state; nor 3d. create any monopolies or exclusive companies; nor 4th. +naturalize any foreigners. All their imposts and prohibitions shall be +confined to foreign produce and manufactures imported, and to foreign +ships trading in our harbours. All imposts and confiscations shall be to +the use of the state where they shall accrue, excepting only such branches +of impost as shall be assigned by the separate states to Congress for a +fund to defray the interest of their debt, and their current charges. In +order the more effectually to execute this and the former articles, +Congress shall have authority to appoint courts, supreme and subordinate, +with power to try all crimes, not relating to state securities, between +any foreign state, or subject of such state, actually residing in a +foreign country, and not being an absentee or person who has alienated +himself from these states on the one part, and any of the United States or +citizens thereof on the other part; also all causes in which foreign +ambassadours or other foreign ministers resident here shall be immediately +concerned, respecting the jurisdiction or immunities only. And the +Congress shall have authority to execute the judgment of such courts by +their own affairs. Piracies and felonies committed on the high seas shall +also belong to the department of Congress for them to define, try, and +punish, in the same manner as the other causes shall be defined, tried, +and determined. All the before-mentioned causes shall be tried by jury and +in some sea-port town. And it is recommended to the general court at their +next meeting to provide and put Congress in possession of funds arising +from foreign imports and ships sufficient to defray our share of the +present annual expenses of the continent."(25) + +Such a resolve, explicitly limiting the powers granted, is the farthest we +can proceed with safety. The scheme of accepting the report of the +Convention, and amending it afterwards, is merely delusive. There is no +intention among those who make the proposition to amend it at all. +Besides, if they have influence enough to get it accepted in its present +form, there is no probability that they will consent to an alteration when +possessed of an unlimited revenue. It is an excellence in our present +confederation, that it is extremely difficult to alter it. An unanimous +vote of the states is required. But this newly proposed form is founded in +injustice, as it proposes that a fictitious consent of only nine states +shall be sufficient to establish it. Nobody can suppose that the consent +of a state is any thing more than a fiction, in the view of the +federalists, after the mobbish influence used over the Pennsylvania +convention. The two great leaders of the plan, with a modesty of Scotsmen, +placed a rabble in the gallery to applaud their speeches, and thus +supplied their want of capacity in the argument. Repeatedly were Wilson +and M'Kean worsted in the argument by the plain good sense of Findly and +Smilie. But reasoning or knowledge had little to do with the federal +party. Votes were all they wanted, by whatever means obtained. Means not +less criminal have been mentioned among us. But votes that are bought can +never justify a treasonable conspiracy. Better, far better, would it be to +reject the whole, and remain in possession of present advantages. The +authority of Congress to decide disputes between states is sufficient to +prevent their recurring to hostility: and their different situation, wants +and produce is a sufficient foundation for the most friendly intercourse. +All the arts of delusion and legal chicanery will be used to elude your +vigilance, and obtain a majority. But keeping the constitution of the +state and the publick interest in view, will be your safety. + +[We are obliged, contrary to our intention, to postpone the remainder of +Agrippa till our next.] + + + + +Agrippa, XIV. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 401) + +FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1788. + +(_Concluded from our last._) + +TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION. + +_Gentlemen_, + +To tell us that we ought to look beyond local interests, and judge for the +good of the empire, is sapping the foundation of a free state. The first +principle of a just government is, that it shall operate equally. The +report of the convention is extremely unequal. It takes a larger share of +power from some, and from others, a larger share of wealth. The +Massachusetts will be obliged to pay near three times their present +proportion towards continental charges. The proportion is now ascertained +by the quantity of landed property, then it will be by the number of +persons. After taking the whole of our standing revenue, by impost and +excise, we must still be held to pay a sixth part of the remaining debt. +It is evidently a contrivance to help the other states at our expense. Let +us then be upon our guard, and do no more than the present confederation +obliges. While we make that our beacon we are safe. It was framed by men +of extensive knowledge and enlarged ability, at a time when some of the +framers of the new plan were hiding in the forests to secure their +precious persons. It was framed by men who were always in favor of a +limited government, and whose endeavours Heaven has crowned with success. +It was framed by men whose idols were not power and high life, but +industry and constitutional liberty, and who are now in opposition to this +new scheme of oppression. Let us then cherish the old confederation like +the apple of our eye. Let us confirm it by such limited powers to +Congress, and such an enlarged intercourse, founded on commercial and +mutual want, with the other states, that our union shall outlast time +itself. It is easier to prevent an evil than to cure it. We ought +therefore to be cautious of innovations. The intrigues of interested +politicians will be used to seduce even the elect. If the vote passes in +favour of the plan, the constitutional liberty of our country is gone +forever. If the plan should be rejected, we always have it in our power, +by a fair vote of the people at large, to extend the authority of +Congress. This ought to have been the mode pursued. But our antagonists +were afraid to risk it. They knew that the plan would not bear examining. +Hence we have seen them insulting all who were in opposition to it, and +answering arguments only with abuse. They have threatened and they have +insulted the body of the people. But I may venture to appeal to any man of +unbiassed judgment, whether his feelings tell him, that there is any +danger at all in rejecting the plan. I ask not the palsied or the +jaundiced, nor men troubled with bilious or nervous affections, for they +can see danger in every thing. But I apply to men who have no personal +expectations from a change, and to men in full health. The answer of all +such men will be, that never was a better time for deliberation. Let us +then, while we have it in our power, secure the happiness and freedom of +the present and future ages. To accept of the report of the convention, +under the idea that we can alter it when we please, will be sporting with +fire-brands, arrows and death. It is a system which must have an army to +support it, and there can be no redress but by a civil war. If, as the +federalists say, there is a necessity of our receiving it, for heaven's +sake let our liberties go without our making a formal surrender. Let us at +least have the satisfaction of protesting against it, that our own hearts +may not reproach us for the meanness of deserting our dearest interests. + +Our present system is attended with the inestimable advantage of +preventing unnecessary wars. Foreign influence is assuredly smaller in our +publick councils, in proportion as the members are subject to be recalled. +At present, their right to sit continues no longer than their endeavours +to secure the publick interest. It is therefore not an object for any +foreign power to give a large price for the friendship of a delegate in +Congress. If we adopt the new system, every member will depend upon thirty +thousand people, mostly scattered over a large extent of country, for his +election. Their distance from the seat of government will make it +extremely difficult for the electors to get information of his conduct. If +he is faithful to his constituents, his conduct will be misrepresented, in +order to defeat his influence at home. Of this we have a recent instance, +in the treatment of the dissenting members of the late federal +convention.(26) Their fidelity to their constituents was their whole +fault. We may reasonably expect similar conduct to be adopted, when we +shall have rendered the friendship of the members valuable to foreign +powers, by giving them a secure seat in Congress. We shall too have all +the intrigues, cabals and bribery practiced, which are usual at elections +in Great Britain. We shall see and lament the want of publick virtue; and +we shall see ourselves bought at a publick market, in order to be sold +again to the highest bidder. We must be involved in all the quarrels of +European powers, and oppressed with expense, merely for the sake of being +like the nations round about us. Let us then, with the spirit of freemen, +reject the offered system, and treat as it deserves the proposition of men +who have departed from their commission; and let us deliver to the rising +generation the liberty purchased with our blood. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, XV. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 402) + +TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1788. + +TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION. + +_Gentlemen_, + +Truly deplorable, in point of argument, must be that cause, in whose +defence persons of acknowledged learning and ability can say nothing +pertinent. When they undertake to prove that the person elected is the +safest person in the world to control the exercise of the elective powers +of his constituents, we know what dependence is to be had upon their +reasonings. Yet we have seen attempts to shew, that the fourth section of +the proposed constitution is an additional security to our rights. It may +be such in the view of a Rhode Island family (I think that state is +quoted) who have been of some time in the minority: but it is +extraordinary that an enlightened character(27) in the Massachusetts +[convention] should undertake to prove, that, from a single instance of +abuse in one state, another state ought to resign its liberty. Can an +[sic] man, in the free exercise of his reason, suppose, that he is +perfectly represented in the legislature, when that legislature may at +pleasure alter the time, manner and place of election? By altering the +time they may continue a representive during his whole life; by altering +the manner, they may fill up the vacancies by their own votes without the +consent of the people; and by altering the place, all the elections may be +made at the seat of the federal government. Of all the powers of +government perhaps this is the most improper to be surrendered. Such an +article at once destroys the whole check which the constituents have upon +their rulers. I should be less zealous upon this subject, if the power had +not been often abused. The senate of Venice, the regencies of Holland, and +the British Parliament have all abused it. The last have not yet +perpetuated themselves; but they have availed themselves repeatedly of +popular commotions to continue in power. Even at this day we find attempts +to vindicate the usurpation by which they continued themselves from three +to seven years. All the attempts, and many have been made, to return to +triennial elections, have proved abortive. These instances are abundantly +sufficient to shew with what jealousy this right ought to be guarded. No +sovereign on earth need be afraid to declare his crown elective, while the +possessor has the right to regulate the time, manner, and place of +election. + +It is vain to tell us, that the proposed government guarantees to each +state a republican form. Republicks are divided into democraticks, and +aristocraticks. The establishment of an order of nobles, in whom should +reside all the power of the state, would be an aristocratick republick. +Such has been for five centuries the government of Venice, in which all +the energies of government, as well as of individuals, have been cramped +by a distressing jealousy that the rulers have of each other. There is +nothing of that generous, manly confidence that we see in the democratick +republicks of our own country. It is a government of force, attended with +perpetual fear of that force. In Great Britain, since the lengthening of +parliaments, all our accounts agree, that their elections are a continued +scene of bribery, riot and tumult; often a scene of murder. These are the +consequences of choosing seldom, and or extensive districts. When the term +is short nobody will give an high price for a seat. It is an insufficient +answer to these objections to say, that there is no power of government +but may sometimes be applied to bad purposes. Such a power is of no value +unless it is applied to a bad purpose. It ought always to remain with the +people. The framers of our state constitution were so jealous of this +right, that they fixed the days for election, meeting and dissolving of +the legislature, and of the other officers of government. In the proposed +constitution not one of these points is guarded, though more numerous and +extensive powers are given them than to any state legislature upon the +continent. For Congress is at present possessed of the direction of the +national force, and most other national powers, and in addition to them +are to be vested with all the powers of the individual states, +unrestrained by any declarations of right. If these things are for the +security of our constitutional liberty, I trust we shall soon see an +attempt to prove that the government by an army will be more friendly to +liberty than a system founded in consent, and that five states will make a +majority of thirteen. The powers of controuling elections, of creating +exclusive companies in trade, of internal legislation and taxations ought, +upon no account, to be surrendered. I know it is a common complaint, that +Congress want more power. But where is the limited government that does +not want it? Ambition is in a governour what money is to a misar +[sic]--.... he can never accumulate enough. But it is as true in politicks +as in morals, he that is unfaithful in little, will be unfaithful also in +much. He who will not exercise the powers he has, will never properly use +more extensive powers. The framing entirely new systems, is a work that +requires vast attention; and it is much easier to guard an old one. It is +infinitely better to reject one that is unfriendly to liberty, and rest +for a while satisfied with a system that is in some measure defective, +than to set up a government unfriendly to the rights of states, and to the +rights of individuals--one that is undefined in its powers and operations. +Such is the government proposed by the federal convention, and such, we +trust, you will have the wisdom and firmness to reject. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, XV. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 403) + +FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1788. + +TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION. + +_Gentlemen_, + +That the new system, proposed for your adoption, is not founded in +argument, but in party spirit, is evident from the whole behaviour of that +party, who favour it. The following is a short, but genuine specimen of +their reasoning. The South Carolina legislature have established an +unequal representation, and will not alter it: therefore Congress should +be invested with an unrestrained power to alter the time, manner and place +of electing members into that body. Directly the contrary position should +have been inferred. An elected assembly made an improper use of their +right to controul elections, therefore such a right ought not to be lodged +with them. It will be abused in ten instances, for one in which it will +serve any valuable purpose. It is said also that the Rhode Island assembly +_intend_ to abuse their power in this respect, therefore we should put +Congress in a situation to abuse theirs. Surely this is not a kind of +reasoning that, in the opinion of any indifferent person, can vindicate +the fourth section. Yet we have heard it publickly advanced as being +conclusive. + +The unlimited power over trade, domestick as well as foreign, is another +power that will more probably be applied to a bad than to a good purpose. +That our trade was for the last year much in favour of the commonwealth is +agreed by all parties. The freedom that every man, whether his capital is +large or small, enjoys of entering into any branch that pleases him, +rouses a spirit of industry and exertion, that is friendly to commerce. It +prevents that stagnation of business which generally precedes publick +commotions. Nothing ought to be done to restrain this spirit. The +unlimited power over trade, however, is exceedingly apt to injure it. + +In most countries of Europe, trade has been more confined by exclusive +charters. Exclusive companies are, in trade, pretty much like an +aristocracy in government, and produce nearly as bad effects. An instance +of it we have ourselves experienced. Before the Revolution, we carried on +no direct trade to India. The goods imported from that country came to us +through the medium of an exclusive company. Our trade in that quarter is +now respectable, and we receive several kinds of their goods at about half +the former price. But the evil of such companies does not terminate there. +They always, by the greatness of their capital, have an undue influence on +the government. + +In a republick, we ought to guard, as much as possible, against the +predominance of any particular interest. It is the object of government to +protect them all. When commerce is left to take its own course, the +advantage of every class will be nearly equal. But when exclusive +privileges are given to any class, it will operate to the weakening of +some other class connected with them. + +AGRIPPA. + +(_Remainder next Tuesday._) + + + + +Agrippa, XVII. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 404) + +TUESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1788. + +TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION. + +_Gentlemen_, + +As it is essentially necessary to the happiness of a free people, that the +constitution of government should be established in principles of truth, I +have endeavoured, in a series of papers, to discuss the proposed form with +that degree of freedom which becomes a faithful citizen of the +commonwealth. It must be obvious to the most careless observer that the +friends of the new plan appear to have nothing more in view than to +establish it by a popular current, without any regard to the truth of its +principles. Propositions, novel, erroneous and dangerous, are boldly +advanced to support a system, which does not appear to be founded in, but +in every instance to contradict, the experience of mankind. We are told +that a constitution is in itself a bill of rights; that all power not +expressly given, is reserved; that no powers are given to the new +government which are not already vested in the state governments, and that +it is for the security of liberty that the persons elected should have the +absolute controul over the time, manner and place of election. These, and +an hundred other things of a like kind, though they have gained the hasty +assent of men, respectable for learning and ability, are false in +themselves and invented merely to serve a present purpose. This will, I +trust, clearly appear from the following considerations: + +It is common to consider man at first as in a state of nature, separate +from all society. The only historical evidence, that the human species +ever actually existed in this state, is derived from the book of Gen. +There it is said, that Adam remained a while alone. While the whole +species was comprehended in his person was the only instance in which this +supposed state of nature really existed. Ever since the completion of the +first pair, mankind appear as natural to associate with their own species, +as animals of any other kind herd together. Wherever we meet with their +settlements, they are found in clans. We are therefore justified in +saying, that a state of society is the natural state of man. Wherever we +find a settlement of men, we find also some appearance of government. The +state of government is therefore as natural to mankind as a state of +society. Government and society appear to be co-eval. The most rude and +artless form of government is probably the most ancient. This we find to +be practised among the Indian tribes in America. With them the whole +authority of government is vested in the whole tribe. Individuals depend +upon their reputation of valour and wisdom to give them influence. Their +government is genuinely democratical. This was probably the first kind of +government among mankind, as we meet with no mention of any other kind, +till royalty was introduced in the person of Nimrod. Immediately after +that time, the Asiatick nations seem to have departed from the simple +democracy, which is still retained by their American brethren, and +universally adopted the kingly form. We do indeed meet with some vague +rumors of an aristocracy in India so late as the time of Alexander the +Great. But such stories are altogether uncertain and improbable. For in +the time of Abraham, who lived about sixteen hundred years before +Alexander, all the little nations mentioned in the Mosaick history appear +to be governed by kings. It does not appear from any accounts of the +Asiatick kingdoms that they have practised at all upon the idea of a +limited monarchy. The whole power of society has been delegated to the +kings; and though they may be said to have constitutions of government, +because the succession to the crown is limited by certain rules, yet the +people are not benefitted by their constitutions, and enjoy no share of +civil liberty. The first attempt to reduce republicanism to a system, +appears to be made by Moses when he led the Israelites out of Egypt. This +government stood a considerable time, about five centuries, till in a +frenzy the people demanded a king, that they might resemble the nations +about them. They were dissatisfied with their judges, and instead of +changing the administration, they madly changed their constitution. +However they might flatter themselves with the idea, that an high-spirited +people could get the power back again when they pleased; they never did +get it back, and they fared like the nations about them. Their kings +tyrannized over them for some centuries, till they fell under a foreign +yoke. This is the history of that nation. With a change of names, it +describes the progress of political changes in other countries. The people +are dazzled with the splendour of distant monarchies, and a desire to +share their glory induces them to sacrifice their domestick happiness. + +From this general view of the state of mankind it appears that all the +powers of government originally reside in the body of the people; and that +when they appoint certain persons to administer the government, they +delegate all the powers of government not expressly reserved. Hence it +appears that a constitution does not in itself imply any more than a +declaration of the relation which the different parts of the government +bear to each other, but does not in any degree imply security to the +rights of individuals. This has been the uniform practice. In all doubtful +cases the decision is in favour of the government. It is therefore +impertinent to ask by what right government exercises powers not expressly +delegated. Mr. Wilson, the great oracle of federalism, acknowledges, in +his speech to the Philadelphians,(28) the truth of these remarks, as they +respect the state governments, but attempts to set up a distinction +between them and the continental government. To anybody who will be at the +trouble to read the new system, it is evidently in the same situation as +the state constitutions now possess. It is a compact among the _people_ +for the purposes of government, and not a compact between states. It +begins in the name of the people, and not of the states. + +It has been shown in the course of this paper, that when people institute +government, they of course delegate all rights not expressly reserved. In +our state constitution the bill of rights consists of thirty articles. It +is evident therefore that the new constitution proposes to delegate +greater powers than are granted to our own government, sanguine as the +person was who denied it. The complaints against the separate governments, +even by the friends of the new plan, are not that they have not power +enough, but that they are disposed to make a bad use of what power they +have. Surely then they reason badly, when they purpose to set up a +government possess'd of much more extensive powers than the present, and +subjected to much smaller checks. + +Bills of rights, reserved by authority of the people, are, I believe, +peculiar to America. A careful observance of the abuse practised in other +countries has had its just effect by inducing our people to guard against +them. We find the happiest consequences to flow from it. The separate +governments know their powers, their objects, and operations. We are +therefore not perpetually tormented with new experiments. For a single +instance of abuse among us there are thousands in other countries. On the +other hand, the people know their rights, and feel happy in the possession +of their freedom, both civil and political. Active industry is the +consequence of their security, and within one year the circumstances of +the state and of individuals have improved to a degree never before known +in this commonwealth. Though our bill of rights does not, perhaps, contain +all the cases in which power might be safely reserved, yet it affords a +protection to the persons and possessions of individuals not known in any +foreign country. In some respects the power of government is a little too +confined. In many other countries we find the people resisting their +governours for exercising their power in an unaccustomed mode. But for +want of a bill of rights the resistance is always, by the principles of +their government, a rebellion which nothing but success can justify. In +our constitution we have aimed at delegating the necessary powers of +government and confining their operation to beneficial purposes. At +present we appear to have come very near the truth. Let us therefore have +wisdom and virtue enough to preserve it inviolate. It is a stale +contrivance, to get the people into a passion, in order to make them +sacrifice their liberty. Repentance always comes, but it comes too late. +Let us not flatter ourselves that we shall always have good men to govern +us. If we endeavour to be like other nations we shall have more bad men +than good ones to exercise extensive powers. That circumstance alone will +corrupt them. While they fancy themselves the viceregents of God, they +will resemble him only in power, but will always depart from his wisdom +and goodness. + +AGRIPPA. + + + + +Agrippa, XVIII. + + +The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 406) + +TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1788. + +TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION. + +_Gentlemen_, + +In my last address I ascertained, from historical records, the following +principles: that, in the original state of government, the whole power +resides in the whole body of the nation, that when a people appoint +certain persons to govern them, they delegate their whole power; that a +constitution is not in itself a bill of rights; and that, whatever is the +form of government, a bill of rights is essential to the security of the +persons and property of the people. It is an idea favourable to the +interest of mankind at large, that government is founded in compact. +Several instances may be produced of it, but none is more remarkable than +our own. In general, I have chosen to apply to such facts as are in the +reach of my readers. For this purpose I have chiefly confined myself to +examples drawn from the history of our own country, and to the Old +Testament. It is in the power of every reader to verify examples thus +substantiated. Even in the remarkable arguments on the fourth section, +relative to the power over election I was far from stating the worst of +it, as it respects the adverse party. A gentleman, respectable in many +points, but more especially for his systematick and perspicuous reasoning +in his profession, has repeatedly stated to the Convention, among his +reasons in favour of that section, that _the Rhode Island assembly have +for a considerable time past had a bill lying on their __ table for +altering the manner of elections for representatives in that state_.(29) +He has stated it with all the zeal of a person who believed his argument +to be a good one. But surely a _bill lying on a table_ can never be +considered as any more than an _intention_ to pass it, and nobody pretends +that it ever actually did pass. It is in strictness only the intention of +a part of the assembly, for nobody can aver that it ever will pass. I +write not with an intention to deceive, but that the whole argument may be +stated fairly. Much eloquence and ingenuity have been employed in shewing +that side of the argument in favor of the proposed constitution, but it +ought to be considered that if we accept it upon mere verbal explanations, +we shall find ourselves deceived. I appeal to the knowledge of every one, +if it does not frequently happen, that a law is interpreted in practice +very differently from the intention of the legislature. Hence arises the +necessity of acts to amend and explain former acts. This is not an +inconvenience in the common and ordinary business of legislation, but is a +great one in a constitution. A constitution is a legislative act of the +whole people. It is an excellence that it should be permanent, otherwise +we are exposed to perpetual insecurity from the fluctuation of government. +We should be in the same situation as under absolute government, sometimes +exposed to the pressure of greater, and sometimes unprotected by the +weaker power in the sovereign. + +It is now generally understood that it is for the security of the people +that the powers of the government should be lodged in different branches. +By this means publick business will go on when they all agree, and stop +when they disagree. The advantage of checks in government is thus +manifested where the concurrence of different branches is necessary to the +same act, but the advantage of a division of business is advantageous in +other respects. As in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary to +suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to the +business. All human capacities are limited to a narrow space, and as no +individual is capable of practising a great variety of trades, no single +legislature is capable of managing all the variety of national and state +concerns. Even if a legislature was capable of it, the business of the +judicial department must, from the same cause, be slovenly done. Hence +arises the necessity of a division of the business into national and +local. Each department ought to have all the powers necessary for +executing its own business, under such limitations as tend to secure us +from any inequality in the operations of government. I know it is often +asked against whom in a government by representation is a bill of rights +to secure us? I answer, that such a government is indeed a government by +ourselves; but as a just government protects all alike, it is necessary +that the sober and industrious part of the community should be defended +from the rapacity and violence of the vicious and idle. A bill of rights, +therefore, ought to set forth the purposes for which the compact is made, +and serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of +the majority. It is a just observation of his excellency, doctor Adams, in +his learned defence of the American constitutions that unbridled passions +produce the same effect, whether in a king, nobility, or a mob. The +experience of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a disposition to +use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual +against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy. Our +state constitution has wisely guarded this point. The present +confederation has also done it. + +I confess that I have yet seen no sufficient reason for not amending the +confederation, though I have weighed the argument with candour; I think it +would be much easier to amend it than the new constitution. But this is a +point on which men of very respectable character differ. There is another +point in which nearly all agree, and that is, that the new constitution +would be better in many respects if it had been differently framed. Here +the question is not so much what the amendments ought to be, as in what +manner they shall be made; whether they shall be made as conditions of our +accepting the constitution, or whether we shall first accept it, and then +try to amend it. I can hardly conceive that it should seriously be made a +question. If the first question, whether we will receive it as it stands, +be negatived, as it undoubtedly ought to be, while the conviction remains +that amendments are necessary; the next question will be, what amendments +shall be made? Here permit an individual, who glories in being a citizen +of Massachusetts, and who is anxious that her character may remain +undiminished, to propose such articles as appear to him necessary for +preserving the rights of the state. He means not to retract anything with +regard to the expediency of amending the old confederation, and rejecting +the new one totally; but only to make a proposition which he thinks +comprehends the general idea of all parties. If the new constitution means +no more than the friends of it acknowledge, they certainly can have no +objection to affixing a declaration in favor of the rights of states and +of citizens, especially as a majority of the states have not yet voted +upon it. + +"Resolved, that the constitution lately proposed for the United States be +received only upon the following conditions: + +"1. Congress shall have no power to alter the time, place or manner of +elections, nor any authority over elections, otherwise than by fining such +state as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not +exceeding the expense of supporting its representatives or senators one +year. + +"2. Congress shall not have the power of regulating the intercourse +between the states, nor to levy any direct tax on polls or estates, or any +excise. + +"3. Congress shall not have power to try causes between a state and +citizens of another state, nor between citizens of different states; nor +to make any laws relative to the transfer of property between those +parties, nor any other matter which shall originate in the body of any +state. + +"4. It shall be left to every state to make and execute its own laws, +except laws impairing contracts, which shall not be made at all. + +"5. Congress shall not incorporate any trading companies, nor alienate the +territory of any state. And no treaty, ordinance or law of the United +States shall be valid for these purposes. + +"6. Each state shall have the command of its own militia. + +"7. No continental army shall come within the limits of any state, other +than garrison to guard the publick stores, without the consent of such +states in time of peace. + +"8. The president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but one year, +and shall be chosen successively from the different states, changing every +year. + +"9. The judicial department shall be confined to cases in which +ambassadours are concerned, to cases depending upon treaties, to offences +committed upon the high seas, to the capture of prizes, and to cases in +which a foreigner residing in some foreign country shall be a party, and +an American state or citizen shall be the other party, provided no suit +shall be brought upon a state note. + +"10. Every state may emit bills of credit without making them a tender, +and may coin money, of silver, gold or copper, according to the +continental standard. + +"11. No powers shall be exercised by Congress or the president but such as +are expressly given by this constitution and not excepted against by this +declaration. And any officer of the United States offending against an +individual state shall be held accountable to such state, as any other +citizen would be. + +"12. No officer of Congress shall be free from arrest for debt [but] by +authority of the state in which the debt shall be due. + +"13. Nothing in this constitution shall deprive a citizen of any state of +the benefit of the bill of rights established by the constitution of the +state in which he shall reside, and such bill of rights shall be +considered as valid in any court of the United States where they shall be +pleaded. + +"14. In all those causes which are triable before the continental courts, +the trial by jury shall be held sacred." + +These at present appear to me the most important points to be guarded. I +have mentioned a reservation of excise to the separate states, because it +is necessary, that they should have some way to discharge their own debts, +and because it is placing them in an humiliating & disgraceful situation +to depute them to transact the business of international government +without the means to carry it on. It is necessary also, as a check on the +national government, for it has hardly been known that any government +having the powers of war, peace, and revenue, has failed to engage in +needless and wanton expense. A reservation of this kind is therefore +necessary to preserve the importance of the state governments: without +this the extremes of the empire will in a very short time sink into the +same degradation and contempt with respect to the middle state as Ireland, +Scotland, & Wales, are in with regard to England. All the men of genius +and wealth will resort to the seat of government, that will be center of +revenue, and of business, which the extremes will be drained to supply. + +This is not mere vision, it is justified by the whole course of things. We +shall, therefore, if we neglect the present opportunity to secure +ourselves, only increase the number of proofs already too many, that +mankind are incapable of enjoying their liberty. I have been the more +particular in stating the amendments to be made, because many gentlemen +think it would be preferable to receive the new system with corrections. I +have by this means brought the corrections into one view, and shown +several of the principal points in which it is unguarded. As it is agreed, +at least professedly, on all sides, that those rights should be guarded, +it is among the inferior questions in what manner it is done, provided it +is absolutely and effectually done. For my own part, I am fully of opinion +that it would be best to reject this plan, and pass an explicit resolve, +defining the powers of Congress to regulate the intercourse between us and +foreign nations, under such restrictions as shall render their regulations +equal in all parts of the empire. The impost, if well collected, would be +fully equal to the interest of the foreign debt, and the current charges +of the national government. It is evidently for our interest that the +charges should be as small as possible. It is also for our interest that +the western lands should, as fast as possible, be applied to the purpose +of paying the home debt. Internal taxation and that fund have already paid +two-thirds of the whole debt, notwithstanding the embarrassments usual at +the end of a war. + +We are now rising fast above our difficulties; everything at home has the +appearance of improvement, government is well established, manufactures +increasing rapidly, and trade expanding. Till since the peace we never +sent a ship to India, and the present year, it is said, sends above a +dozen vessels from this state only, to the countries round the Indian +ocean. Vast quantities of our produce are exported to those countries. It +has been so much the practice of European nations to farm out this branch +of trade, that we ought to be exceedingly jealous of our right. The +manufactures of the state probably exceed in value one million pounds for +the last year. Most of the useful and some ornamental fabricks are +established. There is great danger of these improvements being injured +unless we practice extreme caution at setting out. It will always be for +the interest of the southern states to raise a revenue from the more +commercial ones. It is said that the consumer pays it. But does not a +commercial state consume more foreign goods than a landed one? The people +are more crowded, and of consequence the land is less able to support +them. We know it is to be a favourite system to raise the money where it +is. But the money is to be expended at another place, and is therefore so +much withdrawn annually from our stock. This is a single instance of the +difference of interest; it would be very easy to produce others. +Innumerable as the differences of manners, and these produce differences +in the laws. Uniformity in legislation is of no more importance than in +religion. Yet the framers of this new constitution did not even think it +necessary that the president should believe that there is a God, although +they require an oath of him. It would be easy to shew the propriety of a +general declaration upon that subject. But this paper is already extended +to so far [sic]. + +Another reason which I had in stating the amendments to be made, was to +shew how nearly those who are for admitting the system with the necessary +alterations, agree with those who are for rejecting this system and +amending the confederation. In point of convenience, the confederation +amended would be infinitely preferable to the proposed constitution. In +amending the former, we know the powers granted, and are subject to no +perplexity; but in reforming the latter, the business is excessively +intricate, and great part of the checks on Congress are lost. It is to be +remembered too, that if you are so far charmed with eloquence, and misled +by fair representations and charitable constructions, as to adopt an +undefined system, there will be no saying afterwards that you were +mistaken, and wish to correct it. _It will then be the constitution of our +country, and entitled to defence._ If Congress should chuse to avail +themselves of a popular commotion to continue in being, as the fourth +section justifies, and as the British parliament has repeatedly done, the +only answer will be, that it is the constitution of our country, and the +people chose it. It is therefore necessary to be exceedingly critical. +Whatsoever way shall be chosen to secure our rights, the same resolve +ought to contain the whole system of amendment. If it is rejected, the +resolve should contain the amendations of the old system; and if accepted, +it should contain the corrections of the new one. + +AGRIPPA. + + ------------------------------------- + +_A writer in the Gazette of 29th January, under the signature of Captain +M__c__Daniel, having with civility and apparent candour, called for an +explanation of what was said in one of my former papers, I have chosen to +mention him with respect, as the only one of my reviewers who deserves an +answer._ + + + + + +REPLIES TO THE STRICTURES OF A LANDHOLDER, BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. + + +Printed In The Massachusetts Centinel, +And +The American Herald, +January-April 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +The refusal of Gerry to sign or support the Constitution, being the only +northern member of the federal convention to do so, made him the general +target of attack by the federal writers of New England. To most of these +Gerry paid no attention, but the charges of "A Landholder" were so +positive, and so evidently written by a fellow member of the federal +convention, that an answer was necessary. + +To neither of the two pieces here printed did Gerry put his name, but the +subject and internal evidence are both conclusive that they were written +by him. Not being able to find a copy of the _American Herald_, I have +been compelled to reprint the second article from the _New York Journal_. +For more on this subject see the letters of A Landholder and of Luther +Martin in this collection. + + + + +Reply To A Landholder, I. + + +The Massachusetts Centinel, (Number 32 of Volume VIII) + +SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1788. + +MR. RUSSELL: + +You are desired to inform the publick from good authority, that Mr. GERRY, +by giving his dissent to the proposed Constitution, could have no motives +for preserving an office, for he holds none under the United States, or +any of them; that he has not, as has been asserted, exchanged Continental +for State Securities, and if he had, it would have been for his interest +to have supported the new system, because thereby the states are +restrained from impairing the obligation of contracts, and by a transfer +of such securities, they may be recovered in the new federal court; that +he never heard, in the Convention, a motion made, much less did make any, +"for the redemption of the old continental money;" but that he proposed +the public debt should be made neither better nor worse by the new system, +but stand precisely on the same ground by the Articles of Confederation; +that had there been such a motion, he was not interested in it, as he did +not then, neither does he now, own the value of ten pounds in continental +money; that he neither was called on for his reasons for not signing, but +stated them fully in the progress of the business. His objections are +chiefly contained in his letter to the Legislature; that he believes his +colleagues men of too much honour to assert what is not truth; that his +reasons in the Convention "were totally different from those which he +published," that his only motive for dissenting from the Constitution, was +a firm persuasion that it would endanger the liberties of America; that if +the people are of a different opinion, they have a right to adopt; but he +was not authorized to an act, which appeared to him was a surrender of +their liberties; that a representative of a free state, he was bound in +honour to vote according to his idea of her true interest, and that he +should do the same in similar circumstances. + +_Cambridge, January 3, 1788._ + + + + +Reply To A Landholder, II. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2282) + +WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1788. + +From the American Herald, printed at Boston. + +MR. GREENLEAF, + +As the Connecticut Landholder's publications are dispersed throughout the +state, it will be useful for the sake of truth to publish the following. + +TO THE PUBLIC. + +An elegant writer, under the signature of "A Landholder," having in a +series of publications, with a modesty and delicacy peculiar to himself, +undertaken to instruct members of legislatures, executives, and +conventions, in their duty respecting the new constitution, is, in stating +facts, unfortunate, in being repeatedly detected in errors; but his +perseverance therein does honor "to his magnanimity," and reminds me of +Dr. Sangerado (in Gil Blas) who being advised to alter his practice, as it +was founded on false principles and destructive to his patients, firmly +determined to pursue it, because he had written a book in support of it. +Had our learned author, the modern Sangerado, confined himself to facts +and to reasoning on the constitution, he might have continued to write +without interruption from its opposers, until by instructing others, he +had obtained that instruction which he seems to need, or a temporary +relief from the inenviable malady, the cacoethes scribendi; but his +frequent misrepresentations having exposed him to suspicions that as a +disciple of Mandeville he was an advocate for vice, or that to correct his +curiosity some humourist has palmed on him a spurious history of the +proceedings of the federal convention, and exhibited his credulity as a +subject of ridicule, it is proper to set him right in facts, which, in +almost every instance he has misstated. + +In a late address to the honorable Luther Martin, Esquire, the Landholder +has asserted, that Mr. Gerry "uniformly opposed Mr. Martin's principles," +but this is a circumstance wholly unknown to Mr. Gerry, until he was +informed of it by the Connecticut Landholder; indeed Mr. Gerry from the +first acquaintance with Mr. Martin, has "uniformly had a friendship for +him." + +This writer has also asserted, "that the day Mr. Martin took his seat in +convention, without requesting information, or to be let into the reasons +of the adoption of what he might not approve, he opened against them in a +speech which held during two days." But the facts are, that Mr. Martin had +been a considerable time in convention before he spoke; that when he +entered into the debates he appeared not to need "information," as he was +fully possessed of the subject; and that his speech, if published, would +do him great honor. + +Another assertion of this famous writer is, that Mr. Gerry in "a +sarcastical reply, admired the strength of Mr. Martin's lungs, and his +profound knowledge in the first principles of government;" that "this +reply" "left him a prey to the most humiliating reflections; but these did +not teach him to bound his future speeches by the lines of moderation; for +the very next day he exhibited, without a blush, another specimen of +eternal volubility." This is so remote from the truth, that no such reply +was made by Mr. Gerry to Mr. Martin, or to any member of the convention; +on the contrary, Mr. Martin, on the first day he spoke, about the time of +adjournment, signified to the convention that the heat of the season, and +his indisposition prevented his proceeding, and the house adjourned +without further debate, or a reply to Mr. Martin from any member whatever. + +Again, the Landholder has asserted that Mr. Martin voted "an appeal should +lay to the supreme judiciary of the United States for the correction of +all errors both in law and fact," and "agreed to the clause that declares +nine states to be sufficient to put the government in motion;" and in a +note says, "Mr. Gerry agreed with Mr. Martin on these questions." Whether +there is any truth in the assertions as they relate to Mr. Martin, he can +best determine; but as they respect Mr. Gerry, they reverse the facts; for +he not only voted against the first proposition (which is not stated by +the Landholder, with the accuracy requisite for a writer on government) +but contended for jury trials in civil cases, and declared his opinion, +that a federal judiciary with the powers above mentioned, would be as +oppressive and dangerous, as the establishment of a star-chamber, and as +to the clause that "declares nine states to be sufficient to put the +government in motion," Mr. Gerry was so much opposed to it, as to vote +against it in the first instance, and afterwards to move for a +reconsideration of it. + +The Landholder having in a former publication asserted "that Mr. Gerry +introduced a motion, respecting the redemption of old continental money" +and the public having been informed by a paragraph in the Massachusetts +Centinel, No. 32, of vol. 8, as well as by the honorable Mr. Martin, that +neither Mr. Gerry, or any other member, had introduced such a proposition, +the Landholder now says that "out of 126 days, Mr. Martin attended only +66," and then enquires "whether it is to be presumed that Mr. Martin could +have been minutely informed, of all that happened in convention, and +committees of convention, during the sixty days of absence?" and "Why is +it that we do not see Mr. McHenry's verification of his assertion, who was +of the committee for considering a provision for the debts of the union?" +But if these enquiries were intended for subterfuges, unfortunately for +the Landholder, they will not avail him: for, had Mr. Martin not been +present at the debates on this subject, the fact is, that Mr. Gerry was +not on a committee with Mr. McHenry, or with any other person, for +considering a provision for the debts of the union, or any provision that +related to the subject of old continental money; neither did he make any +proposition, in convention, committee, or on any occasion, to any member +of convention or other person, respecting the redemption of such money; +and the assertions of the Landholder to the contrary, are altogether +destitute of the shadow of truth. + +The Landholder addressing Mr. Martin, further says, "Your reply to my +second charge against Mr. Gerry, may be soon dismissed: compare his letter +to the legislature of his state, with your defence, and you will find, +that you have put into his mouth, objections different from anything it +contains, so that if your representation be true, his must be false." The +objections referred to, are those mentioned by Mr. Martin, as being made +by Mr. Gerry, against the supreme power of Congress over the militia. Mr. +Gerry, in his letter to the legislature, states as an objection, "That +some of the powers of the federal legislature are ambiguous, and others +(meaning the unlimited power of Congress, to keep up a standing army, in +time of peace, and their entire controul of the militia) are indefinite +and dangerous." Against both these did Mr. Gerry warmly contend, and why +his representations must be false, if Mr. Martin's are true, which +particularized what Mr. Gerry's stated generally, can only be discovered +by such a profound reasoner, as the Connecticut Landholder. + +The vanity of this writer, in supposing that his charges would be the +subject of constitutional investigation, can only be equalled by his +impertinence, in interfering with the politics of other states, or by his +ignorance, in supposing a state convention could take cognizance of such +matters as he calls charges, and that Mr. Gerry required a formal defence, +or the assistance of his colleagues, to defeat the unprovoked and +libellous attacks of the Landholder, or any other unprincipled reviler. + +The landholder says: "That Mr. Martin thought the deputy attorney-general +of the United States, for the state of Maryland, destined for a different +character, and that inspired him with the hope that he might derive from a +desperate opposition, what he saw no prospect of gaining by a contrary +conduct;" but the landholder ventures to predict, "that though Mr. Martin +was to double his efforts he would fail in his object." By this we may +form some estimate of the patriotism of the landholder, for, whilst he so +readily resolves Mr. Martin's conduct into a manoeuvre for office, he gives +too much reason to suppose, that he himself has no idea of any other +motive in conducting politicks. But how can the landholder ascertain, that +"Mr. Martin thought" the office mentioned "destined for a different +character?" Was the landholder present at the destination? If so, it was +natural for him, knowing there was a combination against Mr. Martin +(however remote this gentleman was from discovering it) to suppose his +accidental opposition to the complotters, proceeded from a discovery of +the plot. Surely the landholder must have some reason for his conjecture +respecting the motives of Mr. Martin's conduct, or to be subject to the +charge of publishing calumny, knowing it to be such. If then, this great +statesman was in a secret, which has been long impenetrable, he is now +entitled to the honor of giving the public the most important information +they have received, concerning the origin of the new constitution, and +having candidly informed them who is not, he ought to inform who is to +fill that office, and all others of the new federal government. It may +then, in some measure be ascertained, what individuals have supported the +constitution on principles of patriotism, and who under this guise have +been only squabbling for office. Perhaps we shall find that the landholder +is to have the contract for supplying the standing army under the new +government, and that many others, who have recurred to abuse on this +occasion, have some such happy prospects; indeed the landholder puts it +beyond a doubt, if we can believe him, that it was determined in the privy +council of this federal convention, that however Mr. Martin might advocate +the new constitution, he should not have the office mentioned; for if this +was not the case, how can the landholder so roundly assert that Mr. Martin +could have no prospect by a contrary conduct of gaining the office, and so +remarkably sanguine is the landholder, that the members of the privy +council would be senators of the new Congress, in which case the elections +would undoubtedly be made according to the conventional list of +nominations, as that he ventures to predict, though Mr. Martin was to +double his efforts, he would fail in his object. Thus whilst this blazing +star of federalism is taking great pains to hold up Mr. Gerry and Mr. +Mason, as having held private meetings "to aggrandize old Massachusetts +and the antient dominion" he has confessed enough to shew that his private +meetings were solely to aggrandize himself. + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF A LANDHOLDER, WRITTEN BY OLIVER ELLSWORTH. + + +Printed In +The Connecticut Courant +And +The American Mercury, +November, 1787-March, 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +The letters of a Landholder were so obviously written by a a member of the +federal convention, that their authorship could not long remain a secret. +They were published simultaneously in the _Connecticut Courant_ at +Hartford and the _American Mercury_ at Litchfield, and this so clearly +indicated Oliver Ellsworth as the writer that they were at once credited +to his pen. + +The letters had a very wide circulation, numbers being reprinted as far +north as New Hampshire, and as far south as Maryland. They called out +several replies, three of which, by Gerry, Williams and Martin, are +printed in this collection. + + + + +A Landholder, I. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1189) + +MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1787. + +TO THE HOLDERS AND TILLERS OF LAND. + +The writer of the following passed the first part of his life in +mercantile employments, and by industry and economy acquired a sufficient +sum on retiring from trade to purchase and stock a decent plantation, on +which he now lives in the state of a farmer. By his present employment he +is interested in the prosperity of agriculture, and those who derive a +support from cultivating the earth. An acquaintance with business has +freed him from many prejudices and jealousies, which he sees in his +neighbors, who have not intermingled with mankind, nor learned by +experience the method of managing an extensive circulating property. +Conscious of an honest intention he wishes to address his brethren on some +political subjects which now engage the public attention, and will in the +sequel greatly influence the value of landed property. The new +constitution for the United States is now before the public, the people +are to determine, and the people at large generally determine right, when +they have had means of information. + +It proves the honesty and patriotism of the gentlemen who composed the +general Convention, that they chose to submit their system to the people +rather than the legislatures, whose decisions are often influenced by men +in the higher departments of government, who have provided well for +themselves and dread any change least they should be injured by its +operation. I would not wish to exclude from a State Convention those +gentlemen who compose the higher branches of the assemblies in the several +states, but choose to see them stand on an even floor with their brethren, +where the artifice of a small number cannot negative a vast majority of +the people. + +This danger was foreseen by the Federal Convention, and they have wisely +avoided it by appealing directly to the people. The landholders and +farmers are more than any other men concerned in the present decision +whether the proposed alteration is best they are to determine; but that an +alteration is necessary an individual may assert. It may be assumed as a +fixed truth that the prosperity and riches of the farmer must depend on +the prosperity, and good national regulation of trade. Artful men may +insinuate the contrary--tell you let trade take care of itself, and excite +your jealousy against the merchant because his business leads him to wear +a gayer coat, than your economy directs. But let your own experience +refute such insinuations. Your property and riches depend on a ready +demand and generous price for the produce you can annually spare. When and +where do you find this? Is it not where trade flourishes, and when the +merchant can freely export the produce of the country to such parts of the +world as will bring the richest return? When the merchant doth not +purchase, your produce is low, finds a dull market--in vexation you call +the trader a jocky, and curse the men whom you ought to pity. A desire of +gain is common to mankind, and the general motive to business and +industry. You cannot expect many purchases when trade is restricted, and +your merchants are shut out from nine-tenths of the ports in the world. +While you depend on the mercy of foreign nations, you are the first +persons who will be humbled. Confined to a few foreign ports they must +sell low, or not at all; and can you expect they will greedily buy in at a +high price, the very articles which they must sell under every +restriction. + +Every foreign prohibition on American trade is aimed in the most deadly +manner against the holders and tillers of the land, and they are the men +made poor. Your only remedy is such a national government as will make the +country respectable; such a supreme government as can boldly meet the +supremacy of proud and self-interested nations. The regulation of trade +ever was and ever will be a national matter. A single state in the +American union cannot direct much less control it. This must be a work of +the whole, and requires all the wisdom and force of the continent, and +until it is effected our commerce may be insulted by every overgrown +merchant in Europe. Think not the evil will rest on your merchants alone; +it may distress them, but it will destroy those who cultivate the earth. +Their produce will bear a low price, and require bad pay; the laborer will +not find employment; the value of lands will fall, and the landholder +become poor. + +While our shipping rots at home by being prohibited from ports abroad, +foreigners will bring you such articles and at such price as they please. +Even the necessary article of salt has the present year, been chiefly +imported in foreign bottoms, and you already feel the consequence, your +flax-seed in barter has not returned you more than two-thirds of the usual +quantity. From this beginning learn what is to come. + +Blame not our merchants, the fault is not in them but in the public. A +Federal government of energy is the only means which will deliver us, and +now or never is your opportunity to establish it, on such a basis as will +preserve your liberty and riches. Think not that time without your own +exertions will remedy the disorder. Other nations will be pleased with +your poverty; they know the advantage of commanding trade, and carrying in +their own bottoms. By these means they can govern prices and breed up a +hardy race of seamen, to man their ships of war when they wish again to +conquer you by arms. It is strange the holders and tillers of the land +have had patience so long. They are men of resolution as well as patience, +and will I presume be no longer deluded by British emissaries, and those +men who think their own offices will be hazarded by any change in the +constitution. Having opportunity, they will coolly demand a government +which can protect what they have bravely defended in war. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +A Landholder, II. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1190) + +MONDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1787. + +TO THE HOLDER AND TILLERS OF LAND. + +_Gentlemen_, + +You were told in the late war that peace and Independence would reward +your toil, and that riches would accompany the establishment of your +liberties, by opening a wider market, and consequently raising the price +of such commodities as America produces for exportation. + +Such a conclusion appeared just and natural. We had been restrained by the +British to trade only with themselves, who often re-exported to other +nations, at a high advance, the raw materials they have procured from us. +This advance we designed to realize, but our expectation has been +disappointed. The produce of the country is in general down to the old +price, and bids fair to fall much lower. It is time for those who till the +earth in the sweat of their brow to enquire the cause. And we shall find +it neither in the merchant or farmer, but in a bad system of policy and +government, or rather in having no system at all. When we call ourselves +an independent nation it is false, we are neither a nation, nor are we +independent. Like thirteen contentious neighbors we devour and take every +advantage of each other, and are without that system of policy which gives +safety and strength, and constitutes a national structure. Once we were +dependent only on Great Britain, now we are dependent on every petty state +in the world and on every custom house officer of foreign ports. If the +injured apply for redress to the assemblies of the several states, it is +in vain, for they are not, and cannot be known abroad. If they apply to +Congress, it is also vain, for however wise and good that body may be, +they have not power to vindicate either themselves or their subjects. + +Do not my countrymen fall into a passion on hearing these truths, nor +think your treatment unexampled. From the beginning it hath been the case +that people without policy will find enough to take advantage of their +weakness, and you are not the first who have been devoured by their wiser +neighbours, but perhaps it is not too late for a remedy, we ought at least +to make a trial, and if we still die shall have this consolation in our +last hours, that we tried to live. + +I can foresee that several classes of men will try to alarm your fears, +and however selfish their motives, we may expect that liberty, the +encroachments of power, and the inestimable privileges of dear posterity +will with them be fruitful topicks of argument. As holy scripture is used +in the exorcisms of Romish priests to expel imaginary demons; so the most +sacred words will be conjured together to oppose evils which have no +existence in the new constitution, and which no man dare attempt to carry +into execution, among a people of so free a spirit as the Americans. The +first to oppose a federal government will be the old friends Great +Britain, who in their hearts cursed the prosperity of your arms, and have +ever since delighted in the perplexity of your councils. Many of these men +are still among us, and for several years their hopes of a reunion with +Britain have been high. They rightly judge that nothing will so soon +effect their wishes as the deranged state we are now in, if it should +continue. They see that the merchant is weary of a government which cannot +protect his property, and that the farmer finding no benefit from the +revolution, begins to dread much evil; and they hope the people will soon +supplicate the protection of their old masters. We may therefore expect +that all the policy of these men will center in defeating those measures +which will protect the people, and give system and force to American +councils. I was lately in a circle where the new constitution was +discussed. All but one man approved. He was full of trembling for the +liberties of poor America. It was strange! It was wondorous strange to see +his concern! After several of his arguments had been refuted by an +ingenious farmer in the company, but, says he, it is against the treaty of +peace, we received independence from Great Britain on condition of our +keeping the old constitution. Here the man came out! We had beat the +British with a bad frame of government, and with a good one he feared we +should eat them up. Debtors in desperate circumstances, who have not +resolution to be either honest or industrious, will be the next men to +take the alarm. They have long been upheld by the property of their +creditors and the mercy of the public, and daily destroy a thousand honest +men who are unsuspicious. Paper money and tender acts, is the only +atmosphere in which they can breathe, and live. This is now so generally +known that by being a friend to such measures a man effectually advertises +himself as a bankrupt. The opposition of these we expect, but for the sake +of all honest and industrious debtors, we most earnestly wish the proposed +constitution may pass, for whatever gives a new spring to business will +extricate them from their difficulties. + +There is another kind of people will be found in the opposition. Men of +much self importance and supposed skill in politics, who are not of +sufficient consequence to obtain public employment, but can spread +jealousies in the little districts of country where they are placed. These +are always jealous of men in place and of public measures, and aim at +making themselves consequential by distrusting every one in the higher +offices of society. + +It is a strange madness of some persons, immediately to distrust those who +are raised by the free suffrages of the people, to sustain powers which +are absolutely necessary for public safety. Why were they elevated but for +a general reputation of wisdom and integrity; and why should they be +distrusted, until by ignorance or some base action they have forfeited a +right to our confidence? + +To fear a general government or energetic principles least it should +create tyrants, when without such a government all have an opportunity to +become tyrants and avoid punishment, is fearing the possibility of one act +of oppression, more than the real exercise of a thousand. But in the +present case, men who have lucrative and influential state offices, if +they act from principles of self-interest, will be tempted to oppose an +alteration, which would doubtless be beneficial to the people. To sink +from a controlment of finance, or any other great department of the state, +thro' want of ability or opportunity to act a part in the federal system, +must be a terrifying consideration. Believe not those who insinuate that +this is a scheme of great men to grasp more power. The temptation is on +the other side. Those in great offices never wish to hazard their places +by such a change. This is the scheme of the people, and those high and +worthy characters who in obedience to the public voice offer the proposed +amendment of our federal constitution thus esteemed it, or they would have +determined state Conventions as the tribunal of ultimate decision. This is +the last opportunity you may have to adopt a government which gives all +protection to personal liberty, and at the same time promises fair to +afford you all the advantages of a sovereign empire. While you deliberate +with coolness, be not duped by the artful surmises of such as from their +own interest or prejudice are blind to the public good. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +A Landholder, III. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1191) + +MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1787. + +TO THE HOLDERS AND TILLERS OF LAND. + +_Gentlemen_, + +When we rushed to arms for preventing British usurpation, liberty was the +argument of every tongue. + +This word would open all the resources of the country and draw out a +brigade of militia rapidly as the most decisive orders of a despotic +government. Liberty is a word which, according as it is used, comprehends +the most good and the most evil of any in the world. Justly understood it +is sacred next to those which we appropriate in divine adoration; but in +the mouths of some it means anything, which enervate a necessary +government; excite a jealousy of the rulers who are our own choice, and +keep society in confusion for want of a power sufficiently concentered to +promote its good. It is not strange that the licentious should tell us a +government of energy is inconsistent with liberty, for being inconsistent +with their wishes and their vices, they would have us think it contrary to +human happiness. In the state this country was left by the war, with want +of experience in sovereignty, and the feelings which the people then had; +nothing but the scene we had passed thro' could give a general conviction +that an internal government of strength is the only means of repressing +external violence, and preserving the national rights of the people +against the injustice of their own brethren. Even the common duties of +humanity will gradually go out of use, when the constitution and laws of a +country do not insure justice from the public and between individuals. +American experience, in our present deranged state, hath again proved +these great truths, which have been verified in every age since men were +made and became sufficiently numerous to form into public bodies. A +government capable of controlling the whole, and bringing its force to a +point, is one of the prerequisites for national liberty. We combine in +society, with an expectation to have our persons and properties defended +against unreasonable exactions either at home or abroad. If the public are +unable to protest against the unjust impositions of foreigners, in this +case we do not enjoy our natural rights, and a weakness of government is +the cause. If we mean to have our natural rights and properties protected, +we must first create a power which is able to do it, and in our case there +is no want of resources, but a civil constitution which may draw them out +and point their force. + +The present question is, shall we have such a constitution or not? We +allow it to be a creation of power; but power when necessary for our good +is as much to be desired as the food we eat or the air we breathe. Some +men are mightily afraid of giving power lest it should be improved for +oppression; this is doubtless possible, but where is the probability? The +same objection may be made against the constitution of every state in the +union, and against every possible mode of government; because a power of +doing good always implies a power to do evil if the person or party be +disposed. + +The right of the legislature to ordain laws binding on the people, gives +them a power to make bad laws. + +The right of the judge to inflict punishment, gives him both power and +opportunity to oppress the innocent; yet none but crazy men will from +thence determine that it is best to have neither a legislature nor judges. + +If a power to promote the best interest of the people, necessarily implies +a power to do evil, we must never expect such a constitution in theory as +will not be open in some respects to the objections of carping and jealous +men. The new Constitution is perhaps more cautiously guarded than any +other in the world, and at the same time creates a power which will be +able to protect the subject; yet doubtless objections may be raised, and +so they may against the constitution of each state in the union. In +Connecticut the laws are the constitution by which the people are +governed, and it is generally allowed to be the most free and popular in +the thirteen states. As this is the state in which I live and write, I +will instance several things which with a proper coloring and a spice of +jealousy appear most dangerous to the natural rights of the people, yet +they have never been dangerous in practice, and are absolutely necessary +at some times to prevent much greater evil. + +The right of taxation or of assessing and collecting money out of the +people, is one of those powers which may prove dangerous in the exercise, +and which by the new constitution is vested solely in representatives +chosen for that purpose. But by the laws of Connecticut, this power called +so dangerous may be exercised by selectmen of each town, and this not only +without their consent but against their express will, where they have +considered the matter, and judge it improper. This power they may exercise +when and so often as they judge necessary! Three justices of the quorum +may tax a whole county in such sums as they think meet, against the +express will of all the inhabitants. Here we see the dangerous power of +taxation vested in the justices of the quorum and even in selectmen, men +whom we should suppose as likely to err and tyrannize as the +representatives of three millions of people in solemn deliberation, and +amenable to the vengeance of their constituents, for every act of +injustice. The same town officers have equal authority where personal +liberty is concerned, in a matter more sacred than all the property in the +world, the disposal of your children. When they judge fit, with the advice +of one justice of the peace, they may tear them from the parent's embrace, +and place them under the absolute control of such masters as they please; +and if the parent's reluctance excites their resentment, they may place +him and his property under overseers. Fifty other instances fearfull as +these might be collected from the laws of the state, but I will not repeat +them lest my readers should be alarmed where there is no danger. These +regulations are doubtless best; we have seen much good and no evil come +from them. I adduce these instances to shew, that the most free +constitution when made the subject of criticism may be exhibited in +frightful colors, and such attempts we must expect against that now +proposed. If, my countrymen, you wait for a constitution which absolutely +bars a power of doing evil, you must wait long, and when obtained it will +have no power of doing good. I allow you are oppressed, but not from the +quarter that jealous and wrongheaded men would insinuate. You are +oppressed by the men, who to serve their own purposes would prefer the +shadow of government to the reality. You are oppressed for the want of +power which can protect commerce, encourage business, and create a ready +demand for the productions of your farms. You are become poor; oppression +continued will make wise men mad. The landholders and farmers have long +borne this oppression, we have been patient and groaned in secret, but can +promise for ourselves no longer; unless relieved, madness may excite us to +actions we now dread. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, IV. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1192) + +MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1787. + +_Remarks on the objections made by the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, to the new +Constitution._(30) + +TO THE LANDHOLDERS AND FARMERS. + +To censure a man for an opinion in which he declares himself honest, and +in a matter of which all men have a right to judge, is highly injurious; +at the same time, when the opinions even of honorable men are submitted to +the people, a tribunal before which the meanest citizen hath a right to +speak, they must abide the consequence of public stricture. We are +ignorant whether the honorable gentlemen possesses state dignities or +emoluments which will be endangered by the new system, or hath motives of +personality to prejudice his mind and throw him into the opposition; or if +it be so, do not wish to evade the objections by such a charge. As a +member of the General Convention, and deputy from a great state, this +honorable person hath a right to speak and be heard. It gives pleasure to +know the extent of what may be objected or even surmised, by one whose +situation was the best to espy danger, and mark the defective parts of the +constitution if any such there be. Mr. Gerry, tho' in the character of an +objector, tells us "he was fully convinced that to preserve the union an +efficient government was indispensibly necessary, and that it would be +difficult to make proper amendments to the old articles of confederation," +therefore by his own confession there was an indispensible necessity of a +system, in many particulars entirely new. He tells us further "that if the +people reject this altogether, anarchy may ensue," and what situation can +be pictured more awful than a total dissolution of all government? Many +defects in the constitution had better be risked than to fall back into +that state of rude violence, in which every man's hand is against his +neighbor, and there is no judge to decide between them, or power of +justice to control. But we hope to shew that there are no alarming defects +in the proposed structure of government, and that while a public force is +created, the liberties of the people have every possible guard. + +Several of the honourable Gentlemen's objections are expressed in such +vague and indecisive terms, that they rather deserve the name of +insinuations, and we know not against what particular parts of the system +they are pointed. Others are explicit, and if real deserve serious +attention. His first objection is "that there is no adequate provision for +representation of the people." This must have respect either to the number +of representatives, or to the manner in which they are chosen. The proper +number to constitute a safe representation is a matter of judgment, in +which honest and wise men often disagree. Were it possible for all the +people to convene and give their personal assent, some would think this +the best mode of making laws, but in the present instance it is +impracticable. In towns and smaller districts where all the people may +meet conveniently and without expense this is doubtless preferable. The +state representation is composed of one or two from every town and +district, which composes an assembly not so large as to be unwieldy in +acting, nor so expensive as to burden the people. But if so numerous a +representation were made from every part of the United States, with our +present population, the new Congress would consist of three thousand men; +with the population of Great Britain, to which we may arrive in half a +century, of ten thousand; and with the population of France, which we +shall probably equal in a century and a half, of thirty thousand. + +Such a body of men might be an army to defend the country in case of +foreign invasion, but not a legislature, and the expense to support them +would equal the whole national revenue. By the proposed constitution the +new Congress will consist of nearly one hundred men; when our population +is equal to Great Britain of three hundred men, and when equal to France +of nine hundred. Plenty of Lawgivers! why any gentlemen should wish for +more is not conceivable. + +Considering the immense territory of America, the objection with many will +be on the other side; that when the whole is populated it will constitute +a legislature unmanageable by its numbers. Convention foreseeing this +danger, have so worded the article, that if the people should at any +future time judge necessary, they may diminish the representation. + +As the state legislatures have to regulate the internal policy of every +town and neighborhood, it is convenient enough to have one or two men, +particularly acquainted with every small district of country, its +interests, parties and passions. But the federal legislature can take +cognizance only of national questions and interests which in their very +nature are general, and for this purpose five or ten honest and wise men +chosen from each state; men who have had previous experience in state +legislation, will be more competent than an hundred. From an acquaintance +with their own state legislatures, they will always know the sense of the +people at large, and the expense of supporting such a number will be as +much as we ought to incur. + +If the Hon. gentleman, in saying "there is not adequate provision for the +representation of the people," refers to the manner of choosing them, a +reply to this is naturally blended with its second objection, that "they +would have no security for the right of election." It is impossible to +conceive what greater security can be given, by any form of words, than we +here find. + +The federal representatives are to be chosen by the votes of the people. +Every freeman is an elector. The same qualification which enables you to +vote for state representatives, gives you a federal voice. It is a right +you cannot lose, unless you first annihilate the state legislature, and +declare yourself incapable of electing, which is a degree of infatuation +improbable as a second deluge to drown the world. + +Your own assemblies are to regulate the formalities of this choice, and +unless they betray you, you cannot be betrayed. But perhaps it may be +said, Congress have a power to control this formality as to the time and +places of electing, and we allow they have: but this objection which at +first looks frightful was designed as a guard to the privileges of the +electors. Even state assemblies may have their fits of madness and +passion, this tho' not probable is possible. + +We have a recent instance in the state of Rhode Island, where a desperate +junto are governing contrary to the sense of a great majority of the +people. It may be the case in any other state, and should it happen, that +the ignorance or rashness of the state assemblies, in a fit of jealousy, +should deny you this sacred right, the deliberate justice of the continent +is enabled to interpose and restore you a federal voice. This right is +therefore more inviolably guarded than it can be by the government of your +state, for it is guaranteed by the whole empire. Tho' out of the order in +which the Hon. gentleman proposes his doubts, I wish here to notice some +questions which he makes. The proposed plan among others he tells us +involves these questions: "Whether the several state governments, shall be +so altered as in effect to be dissolved? Whether in lieu of the state +governments the national constitution now proposed shall be substituted?" +I wish for sagacity to see on what these questions are founded. No +alteration in the state governments is even now proposed, but they are to +remain identically the same that they are now. Some powers are to be given +into the hands of your federal representatives, but these powers are all +in their nature general, such as must be exercised by the whole or not at +all, and such as are absolutely necessary; or your commerce, the price of +your commodities, your riches and your safety, will be the sport of every +foreign adventurer. Why are we told of the dissolution of our state +governments, when by this plan they are indissolubly linked? They must +stand or fall, live or die together. The national legislature consists of +two houses, a senate and house of representatives. The senate is to be +chosen by the assemblies of the particular states; so that if the +assemblies are dissolved, the senate dissolves with them. The national +representatives are to be chosen by the same electors, and under the same +qualifications, as choose the state representatives; so that if the state +representation be dissolved, the national representation is gone of +course. + +State representation and government is the very basis of the congressional +power proposed. This is the most valuable link in the chain of connection, +and affords double security for the rights of the people. Your liberties +are pledged to you by your own state, and by the power of the whole +empire. You have a voice in the government of your own state, and in the +government of the whole. Were not the gentleman on whom the remarks are +made very honorable, and by the eminence of office raised above a +suspicion of cunning, we should think he had, in this instance, insinuated +merely to alarm the fears of the people. His other objections will be +mentioned in some future number of the: + +LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, V. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1193) + +MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1787. + +_Continuation of Remarks on the Hon. Elbridge Gerry's Objections to the +new Constitution._ + +TO THE LANDHOLDERS AND FARMERS. + +It is unhappy both for Mr. Gerry and the public, that he was not more +explicit in publishing his doubts. Certainly this must have been from +inattention, and not thro' any want of ability; as all his honorable +friends allow him to be a politician even of metaphysical nicety. + +In a question of such magnitude, every candid man will consent to discuss +objections, which are stated with perspicuity; but to follow the honorable +writer into the field of conjecture, and combat phantoms, uncertain +whether or not they are the same which terrified him, is a task too +laborious for patience itself. Such must be the writer's situation in +replying to the next objection, "that some of the powers of the +legislature are ambiguous, and others indefinite and dangerous." There are +many powers given to the legislature; if any of them are dangerous, the +people have a right to know which they are, and how they will operate, +that we may guard against the evil. The charge of being ambiguous and +indefinite may be brought against every human composition, and necessarily +arises from the imperfection of language. Perhaps no two men will express +the same sentiment in the same manner, and by the same words; neither do +they connect precisely the same ideas with the same words. From hence +arises an ambiguity in all language, with which the most perspicuous and +precise writers are in a degree chargeable. Some persons never attain to +the happy art of perspicuous expression, and it is equally true that some +persons thro' a mental defect of their own, will judge the most correct +and certain language of others to be indefinite and ambiguous. As Mr. +Gerry is the first and only man who has charged the new Constitution with +ambiguousness, is there not room to suspect that his understanding is +different from other men's, and whether it be better or worse, the +Landholder presumes not to decide. + +It is an excellency of this Constitution that it is expressed with +brevity, and in the plain, common language of mankind. + +Had it swelled into the magnitude of a volume, there would have been more +room to entrap the unwary, and the people who are to be its judges would +have had neither patience nor opportunity to understand it. Had it been +expressed in the scientific language of law, or those terms of art which +we often find in political compositions, to the honorable gentleman it +might have appeared more definite and less ambiguous; but to the great +body of the people altogether obscure, and to accept it they must leap +into the dark. + +The people to whom in this case the great appeal is made, best understand +those compositions which are concise and in their own language. Had the +powers given to the legislature been loaded with provisos, and such +qualifications as a lawyer who is so cunning as even to suspect himself, +would probably have intermingled; there would have been much more of a +deception in the case. It would not be difficult to shew that every power +given to the legislature is necessary for national defence and justice, +and to protect the rights of the people who create this authority for +their own advantage; but to consider each one particularly would exceed +the limits of my design. + +I shall, therefore, select two powers given them, which have been more +abused to oppress and enslave mankind, than all the others with which this +or any legislature on earth is cloathed--the right of taxation or of +collecting money from the people; and of raising and supporting armies. + +These are the powers which enable tyrants to scourge their subjects; and +they are also the very powers by which good rulers protect the people +against the violence of wicked and overgrown citizens, and invasion by the +rest of mankind. Judge candidly what a wretched figure the American empire +will exhibit in the eye of other nations, without a power to array and +support a military force for its own protection. Half a dozen regiments +from Canada or New-Spain, might lay whole provinces under contribution, +while we were disputing who has power to pay and raise an army. This power +is also necessary to restrain the violence of seditious citizens. A +concurrence of circumstances frequently enables a few disaffected persons +to make great revolutions, unless government is vested with the most +extensive powers of self-defence. Had Shays, the malcontent of +Massachusetts, been a man of genius, fortune and address, he might have +conquered that state, and by the aid of a little sedition in the other +states, and an army proud by victory, become the monarch and tyrant of +America. Fortunately he was checked; but should jealousy prevent vesting +these powers in the hands of men chosen by yourselves, and who are under +every constitutional restraint, accident or design will in all probability +raise up some future Shays to be the tyrant of your children. + +A people cannot long retain their freedom, whose government is incapable +of protecting them. + +The power of collecting money from the people, is not to be rejected +because it has sometimes been oppressive. + +Public credit is as necessary for the prosperity of a nation as private +credit is for the support and wealth of a family. + +We are this day many millions poorer than we should have been had a well +arranged government taken place at the conclusion of the war. All have +shared in this loss, but none in so great proportion as the landholders +and farmers. + +The public must be served in various departments. Who will serve them +without a meet recompense? Who will go to war and pay the charges of his +own warfare? What man will any longer take empty promises of reward from +those, who have no constitutional power to reward or means of fulfilling +them? Promises have done their utmost, more than they ever did in any +other age or country. The delusive bubble has broke, and in breaking has +beggared thousands, and left you an unprotected people; numerous without +force, and full of resources but unable to command one of them. For these +purposes there must be a general treasury, with a power to replenish it as +often as necessity requires. And where can this power be more safely +vested, than in the common legislature, men chosen by yourselves from +every part of the union, and who have the confidence of their several +states; men who must share in the burdens they impose on others; men who +by a seat in Congress are incapable of holding any office under the +states, which might prove a temptation to spoil the people for increasing +their own income? + +We find another objection to be "that the executive is blended with and +will have an undue influence over the legislature." On examination you +will find this objection unfounded. The supreme executive is vested in a +President of the United States; every bill that hath passed the senate and +representatives, must be presented to the president, and if he approve it +becomes law. If he disapproves, but makes no return within ten days, it +still becomes law. If he returns the bill with his objections, the senate +and representatives consider it a second time, and if two-thirds of them +adhere to the first resolution it becomes law notwithstanding the +president's dissent. We allow the president hath an influence, tho' +strictly speaking he hath not a legislative voice; and think such an +influence must be salutary. In the president all the executive departments +meet, and he will be a channel of communication between those who make and +those who execute the laws. Many things look fair in theory which in +practice are impossible. If lawmakers, in every instance, before their +final decree, had the opinion of those who are to execute them, it would +prevent a thousand absurd ordinances, which are solemnly made, only to be +repealed, and lessen the dignity of legislation in the eyes of mankind. + +The vice-president is not an executive officer while the president is in +discharge of his duty, and when he is called to preside his legislative +voice ceases. In no other instance is there even the shadow of blending or +influence between the two departments. + +We are further told "that the judicial departments, or those courts of +law, to be instituted by Congress, will be oppressive." We allow it to be +possible, but from whence arises the probability of this event? State +judges may be corrupt, and juries may be prejudiced and ignorant, but +these instances are not common; and why shall we suppose they will be more +frequent under a national appointment and influence, when the eyes of a +whole empire are watching for their detection? + +Their courts are not to intermeddle with your internal policy, and will +have cognizance only of those subjects which are placed under the control +of a national legislature. It is as necessary there should be courts of +law and executive officers, to carry into effect the laws of the nation, +as that there be courts and officers to execute the laws made by your +state assemblies. There are many reasons why their decisions ought not to +be left to courts instituted by particular states. + +A perfect uniformity must be observed thro' the whole union, or jealousy +and unrighteousness will take place; and for a uniformity one judiciary +must pervade the whole. The inhabitants of one state will not have +confidence in judges appointed by the legislature of another state, in +which they have no voice. Judges who owe their appointment and support to +one state, will be unduly influenced, and not reverence the laws of the +union. It will at any time be in the power of the smallest state, by +interdicting their own judiciary, to defeat the measures, defraud the +revenue, and annul the most sacred laws of the whole empire. A legislative +power, without a judicial and executive under their own control, is in the +nature of things a nullity. Congress under the old confederation had power +to ordain and resolve, but having no judicial or executive of their own, +their most solemn resolves were totally disregarded. The little state of +Rhode Island was purposely left by Heaven to its present madness, for a +general conviction in the other states, that such a system as is now +proposed is our only preservation from ruin. What respect can any one +think would be paid to national laws, by judicial and executive officers +who are amenable only to the present assembly of Rhode Island? The +rebellion of Shays and the present measures of Rhode Island ought to +convince us that a national legislature, judiciary and executive, must be +united, or the whole is but a name; and that we must have these, or soon +be hewers of wood and drawers of water for all other people. + +In all these matters and powers given to Congress, their ordinances must +be the supreme law of the land, or they are nothing. They must have +authority to enact any laws for executing their own powers, or those +powers will be evaded by the artful and unjust, and the dishonest trader +will defraud the public of its revenue. As we have every reason to think +this system was honestly planned, we ought to hope it may be honestly and +justly executed. I am sensible that speculation is always liable to error. +If there be any capital defects in this constitution, it is most probable +that experience alone will discover them. Provision is made for an +alteration if, on trial, it be found necessary. + +When your children see the candor and greatness of mind, with which you +lay the foundation, they will be inspired with equity to furnish and adorn +the superstructure. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, VI. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1194) + +MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1787. + + + He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but his neighbor + cometh and searcheth him. + + +TO THE LANDHOLDERS AND FARMERS: + +The publication of Col. Mason's(31) reasons for not signing the new +Constitution, has extorted some truths that would otherwise in all +probability have remained unknown to us all. His reasons, like Mr. +Gerry's, are most of them _ex post facto_, have been revised in New Y----k +by R. H. L.(32) and by him brought into their present artful and insidious +form. The factious spirit of R. H. L., his implacable hatred to General +Washington, his well-known intrigues against him in the late war, his +attempts to displace him and give the command of the American army to +General Lee, is so recent in your minds it is not necessary to repeat +them. He is supposed to be the author of most of the scurrility poured out +in the New-York papers against the new constitution. + +Just at the close of the Convention, whose proceedings in general were +zealously supported by Mr. Mason, he moved for a clause that no navigation +act should ever be passed but with the consent of two thirds of both +branches;(33) urging that a navigation act might otherwise be passed +excluding foreign bottoms from carrying American produce to market, and +throw a monopoly of the carrying business into the hands of the eastern +states who attend to navigation, and that such an exclusion of foreigners +would raise the freight of the produce of the southern states, and for +these reasons Mr. Mason would have it in the power of the southern states +to prevent any navigation act. This clause, as unequal and partial in the +extreme to the southern states, was rejected; because it ought to be left +on the same footing with other national concerns, and because no state +would have a right to complain of a navigation act which should leave the +carrying business equally open to them all. Those who preferred +cultivating their lands would do so; those who chose to navigate and +become carriers would do that. The loss of this question determined Mr. +Mason against the signing the doings of the convention, and is undoubtedly +among his reasons as drawn for the southern states; but for the eastern +states this reason would not do.(34) It would convince us that Mr. Mason +preferred the subjects of every foreign power to the subjects of the +United States who live in New-England; even the British who lately ravaged +Virginia--that Virginia, my countrymen, where your relations lavished their +blood--where your sons laid down their lives to secure to her and us the +freedom and independence in which we now rejoice, and which can only be +continued to us by a firm, equal and effective union. But do not believe +that the people of Virginia are all thus selfish: No, there is a +Washington, a Blair, a Madison and a Lee, (not R. H. L.) and I am +persuaded there is a majority of liberal, just and federal men in +Virginia, who, whatever their sentiments may be of the new constitution, +will despise the artful injustice contained in Col. Mason's reasons as +published in the Connecticut papers. + +_The President of the United States has no council, etc._, says Col. +Mason. His proposed council(35) would have been expensive--they must +constantly attend the president, because the president constantly acts. +This council must have been composed of great characters, who could not be +kept attending without great salaries, and if their opinions were binding +on the president his responsibility would be destroyed--if divided, prevent +vigor and dispatch--if not binding, they would be no security. The states +who have had such councils have found them useless, and complain of them +as a dead weight. In others, as in England, the supreme executive advises +when and with whom he pleases; if any information is wanted, the heads of +the departments who are always at hand can best give it, and from the +manner of their appointment will be trustworthy. Secrecy, vigor, dispatch +and responsibility, require that the supreme executive should be one +person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he is to execute. + +_There is no Declaration of Rights._ Bills of Rights were introduced in +England when its kings claimed all power and jurisdiction, and were +considered by them as grants to the people. They are insignificant since +government is considered as originating from the people, and all the power +government now has is a grant from the people. The constitution they +establish with powers limited and defined, becomes now to the legislator +and magistrate, what originally a bill of rights was to the people. To +have inserted in this constitution a bill of rights for the states, would +suppose them to derive and hold their rights from the federal government, +when the reverse is the case. + +_There is to be no ex post facto laws._ This was moved by Mr. Gerry and +supported by Mr. Mason,(36) and is exceptional only as being unnecessary; +for it ought not to be presumed that government will be so tyrannical, and +opposed to the sense of all modern civilians, as to pass such laws: if +they should, they would be void. + +_The general legislature is restrained from prohibiting the further +importation of slaves for twenty odd years._ But every state legislature +may restrain its own subjects; but if they should not, shall we refuse to +confederate with them? their consciences are their own, tho' their wealth +and strength are blended with ours. Mr. Mason has himself about three +hundred slaves, and lives in Virginia, where it is found by prudent +management they can breed and raise slaves faster than they want them for +their own use, and could supply the deficiency in Georgia and South +Carolina; and perhaps Col. Mason may suppose it more humane to breed than +import slaves--those imported having been bred and born free, may not so +tamely bear slavery as those born slaves, and from their infancy inured to +it; but his objections are not on the side of freedom, nor in compassion +to the human race who are slaves, but that such importations render the +United States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of defence. To +this I readily agree, and all good men wish the entire abolition of +slavery, as soon as it can take place with safety to the public, and for +the lasting good of the present wretched race of slaves. The only possible +step that could be taken towards it by the convention was to fix a period +after which they should not be imported. + +_There is no declaration of any kind to preserve the liberty of the press, +etc._ Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of burial of the +dead; it is enough that congress have no power to prohibit either, and can +have no temptation. This objection is answered in that the states have all +the power originally, and congress have only what the states grant them. + +_The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended as to +absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states; thereby +rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as +unattainable by a great part of the community, as in England; and enable +the rich to oppress and ruin the poor._ It extends only to objects and +cases specified, and wherein the national peace or rights, or the harmony +of the states is concerned, and not to controversies between citizens of +the same state (except where they claim under grants of different states); +and nothing hinders but the supreme federal court may be held in different +districts, or in all the states, and that all the cases, except the few in +which it has original and not appellate jurisdiction, may in the first +instance be had in the state courts and those trials be final except in +cases of great magnitude; and the trials be by jury also in most or all +the causes which were wont to be tried by them, as congress shall provide, +whose appointment is security enough for their attention to the wishes and +convenience of the people. In chancery courts juries are never used, nor +are they proper in admiralty courts, which proceed not by municipal laws, +which they may be supposed to understand, but by the civil law and law of +nations. + +Mr. Mason deems the president and senate's power to make treaties +dangerous, because they become laws of the land. If the president and his +proposed council had this power, or the president alone, as in England and +other nations is the case, could the danger be less?--or is the +representative branch suited to the making of treaties, which are often +intricate, and require much negotiation and secrecy? The senate is +objected to as having too much power, and bold unfounded assertions that +they will destroy any balance in the government, and accomplish what +usurpation they please upon the rights and liberties of the people; to +which it may be answered, they are elective and rotative, to the mass of +the people; the populace can as well balance the senatorial branch there +as in the states, and much better than in England, where the lords are +hereditary, and yet the commons preserve their weight; but the state +governments on which the constitution is built will forever be security +enough to the people against aristocratic usurpations:--The danger of the +constitution is not aristocracy or monarchy, but anarchy. + +I intreat you, my fellow citizens, to read and examine the new +constitution with candor--examine it for yourselves: you are, most of you, +as learned as the objector, and certainly as able to judge of its virtues +or vices as he is. To make the objections the more plausible, they are +called _The objections of the Hon. George Mason, etc._--They may possibly +be his, but be assured they were not those made in convention, and being +directly against what he there supported in one instance ought to caution +you against giving any credit to the rest; his violent opposition to the +powers given congress to regulate trade, was an open decided preference of +all the world to you. A man governed by such narrow views and local +prejudices, can never be trusted; and his pompous declaration in the House +of Delegates in Virginia that no man was more federal than himself, +amounts to no more than this, "Make a federal government that will secure +Virginia all her natural advantages, promote all her interests regardless +of every disadvantage to the other states, and I will subscribe to it." + +It may be asked how I came by my information respecting Col. Mason's +conduct in convention, as the doors were shut? To this I answer, no +delegate of the late convention will contradict my assertions, as I have +repeatedly heard them made by others in presence of several of them, who +could not deny their truth. Whether the constitution in question will be +adopted by the United States in our day is uncertain; but it is neither +aristocracy or monarchy can grow out of it, so long as the present descent +of landed estates last, and the mass of the people have, as at present, a +tolerable education; and were it ever so perfect a scheme of freedom, when +we become ignorant, vicious, idle, and regardless of the education of our +children, our liberties will be lost--we shall be fitted for slavery, and +it will be an easy business to reduce us to obey one or more tyrants. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, VII. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1195) + +MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1787. + +TO THE LANDHOLDERS AND FARMERS. + +I have often admired the spirit of candour, liberality, and justice, with +which the Convention began and completed the important object of their +mission. "In all our deliberation on this subject," say they, "we kept +steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of +every true American, the consolidation of our union, in which is involved +our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This +important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led +each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior +magnitude, than might otherwise have been expected; and thus the +Constitution which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and +of that mutual deference and concession, which the peculiarity of our +political situation rendered indispensible." + +Let us, my fellow citizens, take up this constitution with the same spirit +of candour and liberality; consider it in all its parts; consider the +important advantages which may be derived from it; let us obtain full +information on the subject, and then weigh these objections in the balance +of cool impartial reason. Let us see if they be not wholly groundless; but +if upon the whole they appear to have some weight, let us consider well, +whether they be so important, that we ought on account of them to reject +the whole constitution. Perfection is not the lot of human institutions; +that which has the most excellencies and fewest faults, is the best that +we can expect. + +Some very worthy persons, who have not had great advantages for +information, have objected against that clause in the constitution which +provides, that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification +to any office or public trust under the United States.(37) They have been +afraid that this clause is unfavorable to religion. But my countrymen, the +sole purpose and effect of it is to exclude persecution, and to secure to +you the important right of religious liberty. We are almost the only +people in the world, who have a full enjoyment of this important right of +human nature. In our country every man has a right to worship God in that +way which is most agreeable to his conscience. If he be a good and +peaceable person he is liable to no penalties or incapacities on account +of his religious sentiments; or in other words, he is not subject to +persecution. + +But in other parts of the world, it has been, and still is, far different. +Systems of religious error have been adopted, in times of ignorance. It +has been the interest of tyrannical kings, popes, and prelates, to +maintain these errors. When the clouds of ignorance began to vanish, and +the people grew more enlightened, there was no other way to keep them in +error, but to prohibit their altering their religious opinions by severe +persecuting laws. In this way persecution became general throughout +Europe. It was the universal opinion that one religion must be established +by law; and that all who differed in their religious opinions, must suffer +the vengeance of persecution. In pursuance of this opinion, when popery +was abolished in England, and the Church of England was established in its +stead, severe penalties were inflicted upon all who dissented from the +established church. In the time of the civil wars, in the reign of Charles +I., the presbyterians got the upper hand, and inflicted legal penalties +upon all who differed from them in their sentiments respecting religious +doctrines and discipline. When Charles II. was restored, the Church of +England was likewise restored, and the presbyterians and other dissenters +were laid under legal penalties and incapacities. It was in this reign, +that a religious test was established as a qualification for office; that +is, a law was made requiring all officers civil and military (among other +things) to receive the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, according to the +usage of the Church of England, written [within?] six months after their +admission to office under the penalty of 500L and disability to hold the +office. And by another statute of the same reign, no person was capable of +being elected to any office relating to the government of any city or +corporation, unless, within a twelvemonth before, he had received the +sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England. The pretence +for making these severe laws, by which all but churchmen were made +incapable of any office civil or military, was to exclude the papists; but +the real design was to exclude the protestant dissenters. From this +account of test-laws, there arises an unfavorable presumption against +them. But if we consider the nature of them and the effects which they are +calculated to produce, we shall find that they are useless, tyrannical, +and peculiarly unfit for the people of this country. + +A religious test is an act to be done, or profession to be made, relating +to religion (such as partaking of the sacrament according to certain rites +and forms, or declaring one's belief of certain doctrines,) for the +purpose of determining whether his religious opinions are such, that he is +admissable to a publick office. A test in favour of any one denomination +of Christians would be to the last degree absurd in the United States. If +it were in favour of either congregationalists, presbyterians, +episcopalians, baptists, or quakers, it would incapacitate more than +three-fourths of the American citizens for any publick office; and thus +degrade them from the rank of freemen. There need no argument to prove +that the majority of our citizens would never submit to this indignity. + +If any test-act were to be made, perhaps the least exceptionable would be +one, requiring all persons appointed to office to declare, at the time of +their admission, their belief in the being of a God, and in the divine +authority of the scriptures. In favour of such a test, it may be said, +that one who believes these great truths, will not be so likely to violate +his obligations to his country, as one who disbelieves them; we may have +greater confidence in his integrity. But I answer: His making a +declaration of such a belief is no security at all. For suppose him to be +an unprincipled man, who believes neither the word nor the being of God; +and to be governed merely by selfish motives; how easy is it for him to +dissemble! how easy is it for him to make a public declaration of his +belief in the creed which the law prescribes; and excuse himself by +calling it a mere formality. This is the case with the test-laws and +creeds in England. The most abandoned characters partake of the sacrament, +in order to qualify themselves for public employments. The clergy are +obliged by law to administer the ordinance unto them, and thus prostitute +the most sacred office of religion, for it is a civil right in the party +to receive the sacrament. In that country, subscribing to the thirty-nine +articles is a test for administration into holy orders. And it is a fact, +that many of the clergy do this, when at the same time they totally +disbelieve several of the doctrines contained in them. In short, test-laws +are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because men of loose +principles will, by an external compliance, evade them. If they exclude +any persons, it will be honest men, men of principle, who will rather +suffer an injury, than act contrary to the dictates of their consciences. +If we mean to have those appointed to public offices, who are sincere +friends to religion, we, the people who appoint them, must take care to +choose such characters; and not rely upon such cob-web barriers as +test-laws are. + +But to come to the true principle by which this question ought to be +determined: The business of a civil government is to protect the citizen +in his rights, to defend the community from hostile powers, and to promote +the general welfare. Civil government has no business to meddle with the +private opinions of the people. If I demean myself as a good citizen, I am +accountable, not to man, but to God, for the religious opinions which I +embrace, and the manner in which I worship the supreme being. If such had +been the universal sentiments of mankind, and they had acted accordingly, +persecution, the bane of truth and nurse of error, with her bloody axe and +flaming hand, would never have turned so great a part of the world into a +field of blood. + +But while I assert the rights of religious liberty, I would not deny that +the civil power has a right, in some cases, to interfere in matters of +religion. It has a right to prohibit and punish gross immoralities and +impieties; because the open practice of these is of evil example and +detriment. For this reason, I heartily approve of our laws against +drunkenness, profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed atheism. But in +this state, we have never thought it expedient to adopt a test-law; and +yet I sincerely believe we have as great a proportion of religion and +morality, as they have in England, where every person who holds a public +office, must either be a saint by law, or a hypocrite by practice. A +test-law is the parent of hypocrisy, and the offspring of error and the +spirit of persecution. Legislatures have no right to set up an +inquisition, and examine into the private opinions of men. Test-laws are +useless and ineffectual, unjust and tyrannical; therefore the Convention +have done wisely in excluding this engine of persecution, and providing +that no religious test shall ever be required. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, VIII. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1196) + +MONDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1787. + +TO THE HON. ELBRIDGE GERRY, ESQUIRE. + +_Sir_, + +When a man in public life first deviates from the line of truth and +rectitude, an uncommon degree of art and attention becomes necessary to +secure him from detection. Duplicity of conduct in him requires more than +double caution, a caution which his former habits of simplicity have never +furnished him the means of calculating; and his first leap into the region +of treachery and falsehood is often as fatal to himself as it was designed +to be to his country. Whether you and Mr. Mason may be ranked in this +class of transgressors I pretend not to determine. Certain it is, that +both your management and his for a short time before and after the rising +of the federal convention impress us with a favorable opinion, that you +are great novices in the arts of dissimulation. A small degree of +forethought would have taught you both a much more successful method of +directing the rage of resentment which you caught at the close of the +business at Philadelphia, than the one you took. You ought to have +considered that you reside in regions very distant from each other, where +different parts were to be acted, and then made your cast accordingly. + +Mr. Mason was certainly wrong in telling the world that he acted a double +part--he ought not to have published two setts of reasons for his dissent +to the constitution. His New England reasons would have come better from +you. He ought to have contented himself with haranguing in the southern +states, that it was too popular, and was calculated too much for the +advantage of the eastern states. At the same time you might have come on, +and in the Coffee-House at New York you might have found an excellent sett +of objections ready made to your hand, a sett that with very little +alteration would have exactly suited the latitude of New England, the +whole of which district ought most clearly to have been submitted to your +protection and patronage. A Lamb, a Willet, a Smith, a Clinton, a +Yates,(38) or any other gentleman whose salary is paid by the state +impost, as they had six months the start of you in considering the +subject, would have furnished you with a good discourse upon the "liberty +of the press," the "bill of rights," the "blending of the executive and +legislative," "internal taxation," or any other topic which you did not +happen to think of while in convention. + +It is evident that this mode of proceeding would have been well calculated +for the security of Mr. Mason; he there might have vented his antient +enmity against the independence of America, and his sore mortification for +the loss of his favorite motion respecting the navigation act, and all +under the mask of sentiments, which with a proper caution in expressing +them, might have gained many adherents in his own state. But, although Mr. +Mason's conduct might have been easily guarded in this particular, your +character would not have been entirely safe even with the precaution above +mentioned. Your policy, Sir, ought to have led you one step farther back. +You have been so precipitate and unwary in your proceedings, that it will +be impossible to set you right, even in idea, without recurring to +previous transactions and recalling to your view the whole history of your +conduct in the convention, as well as the subsequent display of patriotism +contained in your publication. I undertake this business, not that I think +it possible to help you out of your present embarrassments; but, as those +transactions have evidently slipt your memory, the recollection of the +blunder into which your inexperience has betrayed you, may be of eminent +service in forming future schemes of popularity, should the public ever +give you another opportunity to traduce and deceive them. + +You will doubtless recollect the following state of facts--if you do not, +every member of the convention will attest them--that almost the whole time +during the setting of the convention, and until the constitution had +received its present form, no man was more plausible and conciliating upon +every subject than Mr. Gerry--he was willing to sacrifice every private +feeling and opinion--to concede every state interest that should be in the +least incompatible with the most substantial and permanent system of +general government--that mutual concession and unanimity were the whole +burden of his song; and although he originated no idea himself, yet there +was nothing in the system as it now stands to which he had the least +objection--indeed, Mr. Gerry's conduct was agreeably surprising to all his +acquaintance, and very unlike that turbulent obstinacy of spirit which +they had formerly affixed to his character. Thus stood Mr. Gerry, till +toward the close of the business, he introduced a motion respecting the +redemption of the old Continental Money--that it should be placed upon a +footing with other liquidated securities of the United States.(39) As Mr. +Gerry was supposed to be possessed of large quantities of this species of +paper, his motion appeared to be founded in such barefaced selfishness and +injustice, that it at once accounted for all his former plausibility and +concession, while the rejection of it by the convention inspired its +author with the utmost rage and intemperate opposition to the whole system +he had formerly praised. His resentment could no more than embarrass and +delay the completion of the business for a few days; when he refused +signing the constitution and was called upon for his reasons. These +reasons were committed to writing by one of his colleagues and likewise by +the Secretary, as Mr. Gerry delivered them.(40) These reasons were totally +different from those which he has published, neither was a single +objection which is contained in his letter to the legislature of +Massachusetts ever offered by him in convention. + +Now, Mr. Gerry, as this is generally known to be the state of facts, and +as neither the reasons which you publish nor those retained on the +Secretary's files can be supposed to have the least affinity to truth, or +to contain the real motives which induced you to withhold your name from +the constitution, it appears to me that your plan was not judiciously +contrived. When we act without principle, we ought to be prepared against +embarrassments. You might have expected some difficulties in realizing +your continental money; indeed the chance was rather against your motion, +even in the most artful shape in which it could have been proposed. An +experienced hand would therefore have laid the whole plan beforehand, and +have guarded against a disappointment. You should have begun the business +with doubts, and expressed your sentiments with great ambiguity upon every +subject as it passed. This method would have secured you many advantages. +Your doubts and ambiguities, if artfully managed, might have passed, like +those of the Delphic Oracle, for wisdom and deliberation; and at the close +of the business you might have acted either for or against the +constitution, according to the success of your motion, without appearing +dishonest or inconsistent with yourself. One farther precaution would have +brought you off clear. + +Instead of waiting till the convention rose, before you consulted your +friends at New York, you ought to have applied to them at an earlier +period, to know what objections you should make. They could have +instructed you as well in August as October. + +With these advantages you might have past for a complete politician, and +your duplicity might never have been detected. + +The enemies of America have always been extremely unfortunate in +concerting their measures. They have generally betrayed great ignorance of +the true spirit and feeling of the country, and they have failed to act in +concert with each other. This is uniformly conspicuous, from the first +Bute Parliament in London to the last Shays Parliament at Pelham. + +The conduct of the enemies of the new constitution compares with that of +the other enemies above mentioned only in two particulars, its object and +its tendency. + +Its object was self interest built on the ruins of the country, and its +tendency is the disgrace of its authors and the final prosperity of the +same country they meant to depress. Whether the constitution will be +adopted at the first trial in the conventions of nine states is at present +doubtful. It is certain, however, that its enemies have great difficulties +to encounter arising from their disunion: in the different states where +the opposition rages the most, their principles are totally opposite to +each other, and their objections discordant and irreconcilable, so that no +regular system can be formed among you, and you will betray each other's +motives. + +In Massachusetts the opposition began with you, and from motives most +pitifully selfish and despicable, you addressed yourself to the feelings +of the Shays faction, and that faction will be your only support. In New +York the opposition is not to this constitution in particular, but to the +federal impost, it is confined wholly to salary-men and their connections, +men whose salary is paid by the state impost. This class of citizens are +endeavoring to convince the ignorant part of the community that an annual +income of fifty thousand pounds, extorted from the citizens of +Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey, is a great blessing to the +state of New York. And although the regulation of trade and other +advantages of a federal government would secure more than five times that +sum to the people of that state, yet, as this would not come through the +same hands, these men find fault with the constitution. In Pennsylvania +the old quarrel respecting their state constitution has thrown the state +into parties for a number of years. One of these parties happened to +declare for the new federal constitution, and this was a sufficient motive +for the other to oppose it; the dispute there is not upon the merits of +the subject, but it is their old warfare carried on with different +weapons, and it was an even chance that the parties had taken different +sides from what they have taken, for there is no doubt but either party +would sacrifice the whole country to the destruction of their enemies. In +Virginia the opposition wholly originated in two principles; the madness +of Mason, and the enemity of the Lee faction to General Washington. Had +the General not attended the convention nor given his sentiments +respecting the constitution, the Lee party would undoubtedly have +supported it, and Col. Mason would have vented his rage to his own negroes +and to the winds. In Connecticut, our wrongheads are few in number and +feeble in their influence. The opposition here is not one-half so great to +the federal government as it was three years ago to the federal impost, +and the faction, such as it is, is from the same blindfold party. + +I thought it my duty to give you these articles of information, for the +reasons above mentioned. Wishing you more caution and better success in +your future manoeuvers, I have the honor to be, Sir, with great respect, +your very humble servant. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, IX. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1197) + +MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1787. + +TO THE HON. GENTLEMEN CHOSEN TO SERVE IN THE STATE CONVENTION.(41) + +_Gentlemen_, + +When the deputies of a free people are met to deliberate on a constitution +for their country; they must find themselves in a solemn situation. Few +persons realize the greatness of this business, and none can certainly +determine how it will terminate. A love of liberty in which we have all +been educated, and which your country expects on you to preserve sacred, +will doubtless make you careful not to lay such foundations as will +terminate in despotism. Oppression and a loss of liberty arise from very +different causes, and which at first blush appear totally different from +another. + +If you had only to guard against vesting an undue power in certain great +officers of state your work would be comparatively easy. This some times +occasions a loss of liberty, but the history of nations teacheth us that +for one instance from this cause, there are ten from the contrary, a want +of necessary power in some public department to protect and to preserve +the true interests of the people. America is at this moment in ten-fold +greater danger of slavery than ever she was from the councils of a British +monarchy, or the triumph of British arms. She is in danger from herself +and her own citizens, not from giving too much, but from denying all power +to her rulers--not from a constitution on despotic principles, but from +having no constitution at all. Should this great effort to organize the +empire prove abortive, heaven only knows the situation in which we shall +find ourselves; but there is reason to fear it will be troublesome enough. +It is awful to meet the passions of a people who not only believe but feel +themselves uncontrouled--who not finding from government the expected +protection of their interests, tho' otherwise honest, become desperate, +each man determining to share by the spoils of anarchy, what he would wish +to acquire by industry under an efficient national protection. It becomes +the deputies of the people to consider what will be the consequence of a +miscarriage in this business. Ardent expectation is waiting for its +issue--all allow something is necessary--thousands of sufferers have stifled +their rights in reverence to the public effort--the industrious classes of +men are waiting with patience for better times, and should that be +rejected on which they make dependance, will not the public convulsion be +great? Or if the civil state should survive the first effects of +disappointment, what will be the consequences of slower operations? The +men who have done their best to give relief, will despair of success, and +gloomily determine that greater sufferings must open the eyes of the +deluded--the men who oppose, tho' they may claim a temporary triumph, will +find themselves totally unable to propose, and much less to adopt a better +system; the narrowness of policy that they have pursued will instantly +appear more ridiculous than at present, and the triumph will spoil that +importance, which nature designed them to receive not by succeeding, but +by impeding national councils. These men cannot, therefore, be the +saviours of their country. While those who have been foremost in the +political contention disappear either thro' despondence or neglect, every +man will do what is right in his own eyes and his hand will be against his +neighbor--industry will cease--the states will be filled with jealousy--some +opposing and others endeavoring to retaliate--a thousand existing factions, +and acts of public injustice, thro' the temporary influence of parties, +will prepare the way for chance to erect a government, which might now be +established by deliberate wisdom. When government thus arises, it carries +an iron hand. + +Should the states reject a union upon solid and efficient principles, +there needs but some daring genius to step forth, and impose an authority +which future deliberation never can correct. Anarchy, or a want of such +government as can protect the interests of the subjects against foreign +and domestic injustice, is the worst of all conditions. It is a condition +which mankind will not long endure. To avoid its distress they will resort +to any standard which is erected, and bless the ambitious usurper as a +messenger sent by heaven to save a miserable people. We must not depend +too much on the enlightened state of the country; in deliberation this may +preserve us, but when deliberation proves abortive, we are immediately to +calculate on other principles, and enquire to what may the passions of men +lead them, when they have deliberated to the utmost extent of patience, +and been foiled in every measure, by a set of men who think their +emoluments more safe upon a partial system, than upon one which regards +the national good. + +Politics ought to be free from passion--we ought to have patience for a +certain time with those who oppose a federal system. But have they not +been indulged until the state is on the brink of ruin, and they appear +stubborn in error? Have they not been our scourge and the perplexers of +our councils for many years? Is it not thro' their policy that the state +of New York draws an annual tribute of forty thousand pounds from the +citizens of Connecticut? Is it not by their means that our foreign trade +is ruined, and the farmer unable to command a just price for his +commodities? The enlightened part of the people have long seen their +measures to be destructive, and it is only the ignorant and jealous who +give them support. The men who oppose this constitution are the same who +have been unfederal from the beginning. They were as unfriendly to the old +confederation as to the system now proposed, but bore it with more +patience because it was wholly inefficacious. They talk of amendments--of +dangerous articles which must be corrected--that they will heartily join in +a safe plan of federal government; but when we look on their past conduct +can we think them sincere? Doubtless their design is to procrastinate, and +by this carry their own measures; but the artifice must not succeed. The +people are now ripe for a government which will do justice to their +interests, and if the honourable convention deny them, they will despair +of help. They have shewn a noble spirit in appointing their first citizens +for this business--when convened you will constitute the most august +assembly that were ever collected in the State, and your duty is the +greatest that can be expected from men, the salvation of your country. If +coolness and magnanimity of mind attend your deliberations, all little +objections will vanish, and the world will be more astonished by your +political wisdom than they were by the victory of your arms. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, X. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 1016) + +FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1788. + +For the Maryland Journal, etc. + +TO THE HONOURABLE LUTHER MARTIN, ESQ.(42) + +_Sir_, + +I have just met with your performance in favour of the Honourable Mr. +Gerry, published in the Maryland Journal of the 18th January, 1788. As the +Public may be ignorant of the Sacrifice you have made of your resentments +on this occasion, you will excuse me for communicating what your extreme +modesty must have induced you to conceal. You, no doubt, remember that you +and Mr. Gerry never voted alike in Convention, except in the instances I +shall hereafter enumerate. He uniformly opposed your principles, and so +far did you carry your abhorrence of his politics, as to inform certain +members to be on their guard against his wiles, so that, he and Mr. Mason +held private meetings, where plans were concerted "to aggrandise, at the +expence of the small States, Old Massachusetts and the Ancient Dominion." +After having thus opposed him and accused him, to appear his Champion and +intimate acquaintance, has placed you beyond the reach of ordinary +panegyric. Having done this justice to your magnanimity, I cannot resist +drawing the veil of the Convention a little farther aside; not, I assure +you, with any intention to give pain to your Constituents, but merely to +induce them to pity you for the many piercing mortifications you met with +in the discharge of your duty. The day you took your seat(43) must be long +remembered by those who were present; nor will it be possible for you to +forget the astonishment your behaviour almost instantaneously produced. +You had scarcely time to read the propositions which had been agreed to +after the fullest investigation, when, without requesting information, or +to be let into the reasons of the adoption of what you might not approve, +you opened against them in a speech which held during two days, and which +might have continued two months, but for those marks of fatigue and +disgust you saw strongly expressed on whichever side of the house you +turned your mortified eyes. There needed no other display to fix your +character and the rank of your abilities, which the Convention would have +confirmed by the most distinguished silence, had not a certain similarity +in genius provoked a sarcastic reply from the pleasant Mr. Gerry; in which +he admired the strength of your lungs and your profound knowledge in the +first principles of government; mixing and illustrating his little remarks +with a profusion of those hems, that never fail to lengthen out and +enliven his oratory. This reply (from your intimate acquaintance), the +match being so equal and the contrast so comic, had the happy effect to +put the house in good humor, and leave you a prey to the most humiliating +reflections. But this did not teach you to bound your future speeches by +the lines of moderation; for the very next day you exhibited without a +blush another specimen of eternal volubility. It was not, however, to the +duration of your speeches you owed the perfection of your reputation. You, +alone, advocated the political heresy, that the people ought not to be +trusted with the election of representatives.(44) You held the jargon, +that notwithstanding each state had an equal number of votes in the +Senate; yet the states were unequally represented in the Senate. You +espoused the tyrannic principle, that where a State refused to comply with +a requisition of Congress for money, that an army should be marched into +its bowels, to fall indiscriminately upon the property of the innocent and +the guilty, instead of having it collected as the Constitution proposed, +by the mild and equal operation of laws. One hour you sported the opinion +that Congress, afraid of the militia resisting their measures, would +neither arm nor organize them, and the next, as if men required no time to +breathe between such contradictions, that they would harass them by long +and unnecessary marches, till they wore down their spirit and rendered +them fit subjects for despotism. You, too, contended that the powers and +authorities of the new Constitution must destroy the liberties of the +people; but that the same powers and authorities might be safely trusted +with the Old Congress. You cannot have forgotten, that by such ignorance +in politics and contradictory opinions, you exhausted the politeness of +the Convention, which at length prepared to slumber when you rose to +speak; nor can you have forgotten, you were only twice appointed a member +of a Committee, or that these appointments were made merely to avoid your +endless garrulity, and if possible, lead you to reason, by the easy road +of familiar conversation. But lest you should say that I am a record only +of the bad, I shall faithfully recognize whatever occurred to your +advantage. You originated that clause in the Constitution which enacts, +that "This Constitution and the laws of the United States Which shall be +made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made, +under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the +land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in +the Constitution or the law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." +You voted that an appeal should lay to the Supreme Judiciary of the United +States, for the correction of all errors, both in law and fact. You also +agreed to the clause that declares nine States to be sufficient to put the +government in motion.(45) These are among the greater positive virtues you +exhibited in the Convention; but it would be doing you injustice were I to +omit those of a negative nature. Since the publication of the +Constitution, every topic of vulgar declamation has been employed to +persuade the people, that it will destroy the trial by jury, and is +defective for being without a bill of rights. You, sir, had more candour +in the Convention than we can allow to those declaimers out of it; there +you never signified by any motion or expression whatever, that it stood in +need of a bill of rights, or in any wise endangered the trial by jury. In +these respects the Constitution met your entire approbation; for had you +believed it defective in these essentials, you ought to have mentioned it +in Convention, or had you thought it wanted further guards, it was your +indispensable duty to have proposed them. I hope to hear that the same +candour that influenced you on this occasion, has induced you to obviate +any improper impressions such publications may have excited in your +constituents, when you had the honor to appear before the General +Assembly.(46) From such high instances of your approbation (for every +member, like you, had made objections to parts of the Constitution) the +Convention were led to conclude that you would have honored it with your +signature, had you not been called to Maryland upon some indispensable +business; nor ought it to be withheld from you, that your colleagues +informed many Gentlemen of the House, that you told them you intended to +return before its completion. Durst I proceed beyond these facts, to which +the whole Convention can witness, I would ask you why you changed your +opinion of the Constitution after leaving Philadelphia. I have it from +good authority that you complained to an intimate acquaintance, that +nothing grieved you so much as the apprehension of being detained in +Maryland longer than you could wish; for that you had rather lose one +hundred guineas, than not have your name appear to the Constitution. But +as this circumstance seems to have been overlooked when you composed your +defence of Mr. Gerry, you may have your recollection of it revived by +applying to Mr. Young, of Spruce street, Philadelphia, to whom you made +your complaint. But leaving this curious piece of human vanity to such +further investigation as you may think it deserves, let us come to those +matters more particularly between us. You have said, that you never heard +Mr. Gerry, or any other member, introduce a proposition for the redemption +of Continental money according to its nominal or any other value; nor did +you ever hear that such a proposition had been offered to the Convention, +or had been thought of. That the Public may clearly comprehend what degree +of credit ought to be given to this kind of evidence, they should know the +time you were absent from the Convention, as well as the time you +attended. If it should appear that you were only a few days absent, when +unimportant business was the object, they will conclude in your favour, +provided they entertain a good opinion of your veracity; on the other +hand, should it appear that you were absent nearly half the session, +however your veracity may be esteemed, they must reject your evidence. As +you have not stated this necessary information, I shall do it for you. The +Session of Convention commenced the 14th of May, and ended the 17th of +September, which makes 126 days. You took your seat the 10th of June,(47) +and left it the 4th of September, of which period you were absent at +Baltimore ten days, and as many at New York, so that you attended only 66 +days out of 126. Now, sir, is it to be presumed that you could have been +minutely informed of all that happened in Convention, and committees of +Convention, during the 60 days of your absence? or does it follow by any +rule of reasoning or logic, that because a thing did not happen in the 66 +days you were present, that it did not happen in the 60 days which you did +not attend? Is it anywise likely that you could have heard what passed, +especially during the last 13 days, within which period the Landholder has +fixed the apostacy of Mr. Gerry? or if it is likely that your particular +intimacy with Mr. Gerry would stimulate to inquiries respecting his +conduct, why is it that we do not see Mr. McHenry's verification of your +assertion, who was of the Committee for considering a proposition for the +debts of the union? Your reply to my second charge against this gentleman +may be soon dismissed. Compare his letter to the Legislature of his State +with your defence, and you will find that you have put into his mouth +objections different from anything it contains, so that if your +representation be true, his must be false. But there is another +circumstance which militates against your new friend. Though he was face +to face with his colleagues at the State Convention of Massachusetts,(48) +he has not ventured to call upon them to clear him either of this charge, +or that respecting the Continental money. But as the Public seemed to +require that something should be said on this occasion, an anonymous +writer denies that he made such a motion, and endeavours to abate the +force of my second allegation, merely by supposing that "his colleagues +were men of too much honor to assert that his reasons in Convention were +totally different from those which he has published." + +But alas, his colleagues would not acquit him in this way, and he was of +too proud a spirit to ask them to do it in person.(49) Hence the charge +remains on its original grounds, while you, for want of proper concert, +have joined his accusers and reduced him to the humiliating necessity of +endeavouring to stifle your justification. These points being dismissed, +it remains only to reconcile the contradictory parts you have acted on the +great political stage. You entered the convention without a sufficient +knowledge in the science of government, where you committed a succession +of memorable blunders, as the work advanced. Some rays of light penetrated +your understanding, and enabled you (as has been shown) to assist in +raising some of its pillars, when the desire of having your name enrolled +with the other laborers drew from you that remarkable complaint so +expressive of vanity and conviction. But self-interest soon gained the +ascendant, you quickly comprehended the delicacy of your situation, and +this restored your first impressions in all their original force. You +thought the Deputy Attorney General of the United States for the state of +Maryland, destined for a different character, and that inspired you with +the hope that you might derive from a desperate opposition what you saw no +prospect of gaining by a contrary conduct. But I will venture to predict, +that though you were to double your efforts, you would fail in your +object. I leave you now to your own reflections, under a promise, however, +to give my name to the public, should you be able to procure any +indifferent testimony to contradict a single fact I have stated. + +February, 1788. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, X. + + +[This number duplicates the preceding one, for an explanation of which see +the foot-note to the first Number X.--_Ed._] + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1206) + +MONDAY, MARCH 3, 1788. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.(50) + +The opposition in your state to the new federal constitution, is an event +surprising to your New England brethren, yet we are not disposed to +criminate a people, which made such gallant efforts in the establishment +of the American Empire. It is the prerogative of freemen to determine +their own form of government, and if this constitution is not addressed to +your interest, if it is not calculated to preserve your freedom and make +you glorious, we wish you not to accept it. We have fought by your side, +we have long been connected in interest, and with many of you by +consanguinity, and wish that you may share with us in all the benefits of +a great and free empire. Brethren who differ in their opinions how a +common interest may be best governed, ought to deliberate with coolness, +and not wantonly accuse each other, either of folly or design. +Massachusetts and Connecticut have decidedly judged the new government +well calculated not only for the whole but for the northern states. Either +you or these states have judged wrong. Your interests are similar to +theirs, and cannot be separated from them without counteracting nature. + +If there be any one state more interested than the others in the adoption +of this system, it is New Hampshire. Your local situation, which can never +be altered, is a solemn argument in its favor. Tho' separated from the +government of Britain at no less price than the blood of your bravest +sons, you border on her dominions. She is your enemy, and wishes nothing +more than your submission to her laws, and to the will of her proud +servants. + +Her force may easily be pointed thro' your whole territory and a few +regiments would effectually banish resistance. New Hampshire, tho' growing +in population, and amongst the first states in personal bravery, cannot +yet stand alone. Should a disunion of the states tempt Britain to make +another effort for recovering her former greatness, you will be the first +to fall under her sway. In such case you will have nothing to expect from +the other states. Dispirited with a fruitless attempt to unite in some +plan of general government and protection, they will say, let the +dissenting states abide the consequence of their own false opinions. +Though such a reply might not be wise, it would be exactly comfortable to +what we have ever found in human nature; and nature will have its course, +let policy be what it may. You are the northern barrier of the United +States, and by your situation, must first meet any hostile animosity from +that quarter designed against any part of them. It is certainly for the +interest of a barrier country, to have a general government on such +efficient principles, as can point the force of the whole for its relief +when attacked. The old constitution could not do this; that now under +consideration, if accepted, we trust will produce a circulation of riches +and the powers of protection to the most extreme parts of the body. On +these principles it has generally been said that New Hampshire and Georgia +would be amongst the first in adopting. Georgia has done it, not, perhaps, +because they were more wise than New Hampshire, but being pressed with a +dangerous war in the very moment of decision, they felt its necessity; and +feeling is an argument none can resist. Trust not to any complaisance of +those British provinces on your northern borders, or those artful men who +govern them, who were selected on purpose to beguile your politicks, and +divide and weaken the union. When the hour for a permanent connection +between the states is past, the teeth of the lion will be again made bare, +and you must be either devoured, or become its jackal to hunt for prey in +the other states. + +We believe those among you who are opposed to the system, as honest and +brave as any part of the community, and cannot suspect them of any design +against American Independence; but such persons ought to consider what +will be the probable consequence of their dissent; and whether this is not +the only hour in which this community can be saved from a condition, which +is, on all hands, allowed to be dangerous and unhappy. There are certain +critical periods in which nations, as well as individuals, who have fallen +into perplexity, by a wise exertion may save themselves and be glorious. +Such is the present era in American policy, but if we do not see the hour +of our salvation, there is no reason to expect that heaven will repeat it. +The unexpected harmony of the federal Convention--their mutual +condescension in the reconcilement of jarring interests and opposing +claims between the several States--the formation of a system so efficient +in appearance, at the same time so well guarded against an oppression of +the subject--the concurring sentiments of a vast majority thro' the United +States, of those persons who have been most experienced in policy, and +most eminent in wisdom and virtue; are events which must be attributed to +the special influence of heaven. + +To be jealous of our liberties is lawful, but jealously in excess is a +deliriam [sic] of the imagination, by no means favourable to liberty. If +you would be free and happy a power must be created to protect your +persons and properties; otherwise you are slaves to all mankind. Your +British neighbors have long known these truths, and will not fail by their +emissaries to seminate such jealousies as favor their own designs. + +To prophesy evil is ungrateful business; but forgive me when I predict, +that the adoption of this Constitution is the only probable means of +saving the greatest part of your State from becoming an appendage of +Canada or Nova Scotia. In some future paper I shall assign other reasons +why New Hampshire, more than any other State, is interested in this event. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, XI. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1207) + +MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1788. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. + +Those who wish to enjoy the blessings of society must be willing to suffer +some restraint of personal liberty, and devote some part of their property +to the public that the remainder may be secured and protected. The +cheapest form of government is not always best, for parsimony, though it +spends little, generally gains nothing. Neither is that the best +government which imposes the least restraint on its subjects; for the +benefit of having others restrained may be greater than the disadvantage +of being restrained ourselves. That is the best form of government which +returns the greatest number of advantages in proportion to the +disadvantages with which it is attended. + +Measured by this rule, the state of New Hampshire cannot expect a +Constitution preferable to that now proposed for the union. In point of +defence it gives you the whole force of the empire, so arranged as to act +speedily and in concert, which is an article of greatest importance to the +frontier states. With the present generation of men, national interest is +the measure by which war or peace are determined; and when we see the +British nation, by a late treaty, paying an enormous annual subsidy to the +little principality of Hesse-Cassel for the purpose of retaining her in +military alliance, it should teach us the necessity of those parts in the +Constitution which enable the efficient force of the whole to be opposed +to an invasion of any part. + +A national revenue and the manner of collecting it is another very +interesting matter, and here the citizens of New Hampshire have better +terms offered them, than their local situation can ever enable them to +demand or enforce. Impost and duties on trade, which must be collected in +the great importing towns, are the means by which an American revenue will +be principally, and perhaps wholly raised. But a point of your state comes +near the sea, and that point so situated that it never can collect +commerce, and become an emporium for the whole state. Nineteen parts in +twenty of New Hampshire are greatly inland, so that local situation +necessitates you to be an agricultural people; and this is not a hard +necessity, if you now form such a political connection with other states, +as will entitle you to a just share in that revenue they raise on +commerce. New York, the trading towns on Connecticut River, and Boston, +are the sources from which a great part of your foreign supplies will be +obtained, and where your produce will be exposed for market. + +In all these places an impost is collected, of which, as consumers, you +pay a share without deriving any public benefit. You cannot expect any +alteration in the private systems of these states, unless effected by the +proposed governments, neither to remedy the evil can you command trade +from the natural channels, but must sit down contented under the burden, +if the present hour of deliverance be not accepted. This argument alone, +if there were no other, ought to decide you in favour of adoption. + +It has been said that you object to the number of inhabitants being a +ratio to determine your proportion of the national expence--that your lands +are poor, but the climate favourable to population, which will draw a +share of expence beyond your ability to pay. I do not think this objection +well founded. Long experience hath taught that the number of industrious +inhabitants in any climate is not only the strength, but the wealth of a +state, and very justly measures their ability of defraying public +expences, without encroaching on the necessary support of life. + +If a great proportion of your lands are barren, you ought likewise to +remember another rule of nature; that the population and fertility in many +tracts of country will be proportioned to each other. Accidental causes +for a short time may interrupt the rule, but they cannot be of dangerous +continuance. Force may controul a despotic government, and commerce may +interrupt it in an advantageous situation for trade; but from the first of +these causes you have no reason to fear, and the last, should it happen, +will increase wealth with numbers. + +The fishery is a source of wealth and an object of immense consequence to +all the eastern coasts. The jealousy of European nations ought to teach us +its value. So far as you become a navigating people, the fishery should be +an object of your first attention. It cannot flourish until patronized and +protected by the general government. All the interests of navigation and +commerce must be protected by the union or come to ruin, and in our +present system where is the power to do it? + +When Americans are debarred the fishery, as will soon be the case unless a +remedy is provided, all the eastern shores will become miserably poor. + +Your forests embosom an immense quantity of timber for ship-building and +the lumber trade, but of how little value at present you cannot be +ignorant, and the value cannot increase until American navigation and +commerce are placed on a respectable footing, which no single state can do +for itself. The embarrassments of trade lower the price of your produce, +which with the distance of transportation almost absorbs the value; and +when by a long journey we have arrived at the place of market, even the +finest of your grain will not command cash, at that season of the year +most convenient for you to transport. Hence arises that scarcity of specie +of which you complain. Your interest is intimately connected with that of +the most commercial states, and you cannot separate it. When trade is +embarrassed the merchant is the first to complain, but the farmer in event +bears more than his share of the loss. + +Let the citizens of New Hampshire candidly consider these facts, and they +must be convinced that no other state is so much interested in adopting +that system of government now under consideration. + +A LANDHOLDER. + +The Landholder presents his most respectful compliments to Hon W. +Williams,(51) and begs leave to remind him that many dispensations in this +world, which have the appearance of judgment, are designed in goodness. +Such was the short address to you, and though at first it might excite an +exquisite sensibility of injury, will in its consequence prove to your +advantage, by giving you an honorable opportunity to come out and declare +your sentiments to the people. It had been represented in several parts of +the state, to the great surprise of your friends, that you wished some +religious test as an introduction to office, but as you have explained the +matter, it is only a religious preamble which you wish--against preambles +we have no animosity. Every man hath a sovereign right to use words in his +own sense, and when he hath explained himself, it ought to be believed +that he uses them conscientiously. The Landholder, for the sake of his +honourable friend, regrets that he denies his having used his name +publicly as a writer, for, though the honourable gentleman doubtless +asserts the truth, there are a great number of those odd people who really +think they were present on that occasion, and have such a strong habit of +believing their senses, that they will not be convinced even by evidence +which is superior to all sense. But it must be so in this imperfect world. + +P. S. The Landholder begs his honourable friend not to be surprised at his +former address, as he can assure him most seriously, that he does not even +conjecture by whom it was written. + + + + +The Landholder, XII. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1208) + +MONDAY, MARCH 17, 1788. + +TO THE RHODE ISLAND FRIENDS OF PAPER MONEY, TENDER ACTS AND +ANTI-FEDERALISM. + +The singular system of policy adopted by your state, no longer excites +either the surprise or indignation of mankind. There are certain extremes +of iniquity, which are beheld with patience, from a fixed conviction that +the transgressor is inveterate, and that his example from its great +injustice hath no longer a seducing influence. Milton's lapse of the +angels and their expulsion from Heaven, produces deeper regret in a +benevolent mind than all the evil tricks they have played or torments they +have suffered since the bottomless pit became their proper home. Something +similar to this is excited in beholding the progress of human depravity. +Our minds cannot bear to be always pained; the Creator hath, therefore +wisely provided that our tender sentiments should subside, in those +desperate cases where there is no longer a probability that any effort to +which we may be excited, will have a power to reclaim. But though our +benevolence is no longer distressed with the injustice of your measures, +as philosophers above the feelings of passion, we can speculate on them to +our advantage. The sentiment thrown out by some of our adventurous +divines, that the permission of sin is the highest display of supreme +wisdom, and the greatest blessing to the universe, is most successfully +illustrated by the effects of your general policy. + +In point of magnitude, your little state bears much the same proportion to +the united American empire, as the little world doth to the immense +intelligent universe; and if the apostacy of man hath conveyed such solemn +warning and instruction to the whole, as your councils have to every part +of the union, no one will doubt the usefulness of Adam's fall. At the +commencement of peace, America was placed in a singular situation. Fear of +a common danger could no longer bind us together; patriotism had done its +best and was wearied with exertion rewarded only by ingratitude--our +federal system was inadequate for national government and justice, and +from inexperience the great body of the people were ignorant what +consequences should flow from the want of them. Experiments in public +credit, though ruinous to thousands, and a disregard to the promises of +government had been pardoned in the moment of extreme necessity, and many +honest men did not realize that a repetition of them in an hour less +critical would shake the existence of society. Men full of evil and +desperate fortune were ready to propose every method of public fraud that +can be effected by a violation of public faith and depreciating promises. +This poison of the community was their only preservation from deferred +poverty, and from prisons appointed to be the reward of indolence and +knavery. An easement of the poor and necessitous was plead as a reason for +measures which have reduced them to more extreme necessity. Most of the +states have had their prejudices against an efficient and just government, +and have made their experiments in a false policy; but it was done with a +timorous mind, and seeing the evil they have receded. A sense of +subordination and moral right was their check. Most of the people were +convinced, and but few remained who wished to establish iniquity by law. +To silence such opposition as might be made to the new constitution, it +was fit that public injustice should be exhibited in its greatest degree +and most extreme effects. For this end Heaven permitted your apostacy from +all the principles of good and just government. By your system we see +unrighteousness in the essence, in effects, and in its native miseries. +The rogues of every other state blush at the exhibition, and say you have +betrayed them by carrying the matter too far. The very naming of your +measures is a complete refutation of anti-federalism, paper money and +tender acts, for no man chooses such company in argument. + +The distress to which many of your best citizens are reduced--the groans of +ruined creditors, of widows and orphans, demonstrates that unhappiness +follows vice by the unalterable laws of nature and society. I did not +mention the stings of conscience, but the authors of public distress ought +to remember that there is a world where conscience will not sleep. + +Is it now at length time to consider. The great end for which your +infatuation was permitted is now become complete. The whole union has seen +and fears, and while history gives true information, no other people will +ever repeat the studied process of fraud. You may again shew the distorted +features of injustice, but never in more lively colors, or by more able +hands than has been done already. As virtue and good government has +derived all possible advantage from your experiment, and every other state +thanks you for putting their own rogues and fools out of countenance, +begin to have mercy on yourselves. You may not expect to exist in this +course any longer than is necessary for public good; and there is no need +that such a kind of warning as you set before us should be eternal. Secure +as you may feel in prosecuting what all the rest of mankind condemn, the +hour of your political revolution is at hand. The cause is within to +yourselves, and needs but the permission of your neighbors to take its +full effect. Every moral and social law calls for a review, and a volume +of penal statutes cannot prevent it. They are in the first instance +nullified by injustice, and five years hence not a man in your territories +will presume their vindication. Passion and obstinacy, which were called +in to aid injustice, have had their reign, and can support you no longer. +By a change of policy give us evidence that you are returned to manhood +and honour. The inventors of such councils can never be forgiven in this +world, but the people at large who acted by their guidance may break from +the connection and restore themselves to virtue. + +There are among you legislators eminent, through the union for their +wisdom and integrity. Penetrated with grief and astonishment they stand in +silence, waiting the return of your reason. They are the only men who can +remove the impassable gulph that is between you and the rest of mankind. +In your situation there must be some sacrifice. It is required by the +necessity of the case, and for the dignity of government. You have guilty +victims enough for whom even benevolence will not plead; let them make the +atonement and save your state. The large body of a people are rarely +guilty of any crime greater than indiscretion, in following those who have +no qualification to lead but an unblushing assurance infraud. Acknowledge +the indiscretion, and leave those whom you have followed into the +quicksands of death to the infamy prepared for them, and from which they +cannot be reserved. Your situation admits no compounding of opposite +systems, or halving with justice, but to make the cure there must be an +entire change of measures. The Creator of nature and its laws made justice +as necessary for nations as for individuals, and this necessity hath been +sealed by the fate of all obstinate offenders. If you will not hear your +own groans, nor feel the pangs of your own torture, it must continue until +removed by a political annihilation. Such as do not pity themselves cannot +be long be pitied. + +Determined that our feelings shall be no longer wounded by any thing to +which despair may lead you, with philosophic coolness we wait to continue +our speculations on the event. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + +The Landholder, XIII. + + +The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1209) + +MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1788. + +The attempt to amend our federal Constitution, which for some time past +hath engrossed the public regard, is doubtless become an old and unwelcome +topic to many readers, whose opinions are fixed, or who are concerned for +the event. There are other subjects which claim a share of attention, both +from the public and from private citizens. It is good government which +secures the fruits of industry and virtue; but the best system of +government cannot produce general happiness unless the people are +virtuous, industrious and economical. + +The love of wealth is a passion common to men, and when justly regulated +it is conducive to human happiness. Industry may be encouraged by good +laws; wealth may be protected by civil regulations; but we are not to +depend on these to create it for us, while we are indolent and luxurious. +Industry is most favourable to the moral virtue of the world; it is +therefore wisely ordered by the Author of Nature, that the blessings of +this world should be acquired by our own application in some business +useful to society; so that we have no reason to expect any climate or soil +will be found, or any age take place, in which plenty and wealth will be +spontaneously produced. The industry and labour of a people furnish a +general rule to measure their wealth, and if we use the means we may +promise ourselves the reward. The present state of America will limit the +greatest part of its inhabitants to agriculture; for as the art of tilling +the earth is easily acquired, the price of land low, and the produce +immediately necessary for life, greater encouragement to this is offered +here than in any country on earth. But still suffer me to enquire whether +we are not happily circumstanced and actually able to manage some +principal manufactories with success, and increase our wealth by +increasing the labour of the people, and saving the surplus of our +earnings for a better purpose than to purchase the labour of the European +nations. It is a remark often made, and generally believed, that in a +country so new as this, where the price of land is low and the price of +labour high, manufactories cannot be conducted with profit. This may be +true of some manufactures, but of others it is grossly false. It is now in +the power of New England to make itself more formidable to Great Britain +by rivaling some of her principal manufactures, than ever it was by +separating from her government. Woolen cloaths, the principal English +manufacture, may more easily be rivaled than any other. Purchasing all the +materials and labour at the common price of the country, cloths of +three-quarters width, may be fabricated for six shillings per yard, of +fineness and beauty equal to English cloths of six quarters width, which +fell at twenty shillings. The cost of our own manufacture is little more +than half of the imported, and for service it is allowed to be much +preferable. It is found that our wool is of equal quality with the +English, and that what we once supposed the defect in our wool, is only a +deficiency in cleaning, sorting and dressing it. + +It gives me pleasure to hear that a number of gentlemen in Hartford and +the neighboring towns are forming a fund for the establishment of a great +woolen manufactory. The plan will doubtless succeed; and be more +profitable to the stockholders that money deposited in trade. As the +manufacture of cloths is introduced, the raising of wool and flax, the raw +materials, will become an object of the farmer's attention. + +Sheep are the most profitable part of our stock, and the breed is much +sooner multiplied than horses or cattle. Why do not our opulent farmers +avail themselves of the profit? An experience would soon convince them +there is no better method of advancing property, and their country would +thank them for the trial. Sheep are found to thrive and the wool to be of +good quality in every part of New England, but as this animal delights in +grazing, and is made healthy by coming often to the earth, our sea-coasts +with the adjacent country, where snow is of short continuance, are +particularly favourable to their propagation. Our hilly coasts were +designed by nature for this, and every part of the country that abounds in +hills ought to make an experiment by which they will be enriched. + +In Connecticut, the eastern and southern counties, with the highlands on +Connecticut river towards the sea, ought to produce more wool than would +cloath the inhabitants of the state. At present the quantity falls short +of what is needed by our own consumption; if a surplusage could be +produced, it would find a ready market and the best pay. + +The culture of flax, another principal material for manufacturing, affords +great profit to the farmer. The seed of this crop when it succeeds will +pay the husbandman for his labour, and return a better ground-rent than +many other crops which are cultivated. The seed is one of our best +articles for remittance and exportation abroad. Dressing and preparing the +flax for use is done in the most leisure part of the year, when labour is +cheap, and we had better work for sixpence a day and become wealthy, than +to be idle and poor. + +It is not probable the market can be overstocked, or if it should chance +for a single season to be the case, no article is more meliorated by time, +or will better pay for keeping by an increase of quality. A large flax +crop is one most certain sign of a thrifty husbandman. The present method +of agriculture in a course of different crops is well calculated to give +the husbandman a sufficiency of flax ground, as it is well known that this +vegetable will not thrive when sown successively in the same place. + +The nail manufacture might be another source of wealth to the northern +states. Why should we twice transport our own iron, and pay other nations +for labour which our boys might perform as well? The art of nail-making is +easily acquired. Remittances have actually been made from some parts of +the state in this article; the example is laudable, and ought to be +imitated. The sources of wealth are open to us, and there needs but +industry to become as rich as we are free. + +A LANDHOLDER. + + + + + +A LETTER TO THE LANDHOLDER. BY WILLIAM WILLIAMS. + + +Printed In +The American Mercury, +February 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +This letter was occasioned by the following communication, which was +printed in the _Connecticut Courant_ for Monday, February 4, 1788, (number +1202): + +TO THE HON. WILLIAM WILLIAMS, ESQ. + +_Sir_:--Whenever one man makes a charge against another, reason and justice +require that he should be able to support the charge. In some late +publications, I have offered my sentiments on the new constitution, have +adduced some arguments in favour of it, and answered objections to it. I +did not wish to enter into a controversy with any man. But I am unwilling +to have accusations publickly thrown out against me, without an +opportunity to answer them. In the late convention, when a _religious +test_ was the subject of debate, you took the liberty of saying _that the +Landholder_ (in treating of the same subject) _had missed the point; that +he had raised up a man of straw, and kicked it over again_. Now, Sir, I +wish this matter may be fairly cleared up. I wish to know, what is the +real point? Who and what the _real_ man is? Or in other words, what a +religious test is? I certainly have a right to expect that you will answer +these questions, and let me know wherein I am in the wrong. Perhaps you +may show that my ideas on the subject are erroneous. In order to do this, +it would not be amiss to offer a few reasons and arguments. You doubtless +had such as were convincing, at least to yourself, though you happen to +omit them at the time of the debate. If you will shew that I am in the +wrong, I will candidly acknowledge my mistake. If on the contrary you +should be unable to prove your assertions, the public will judge, whether +_you or I have missed the point_; and which of us has _committed the crime +of making a man of straw_. + +Not doubting but you will have the candour to come to an explanation on +this subject, + +I am, Sir, your humble servant, + +THE LANDHOLDER. + +From The Landholder's statement printed at page 195 of this volume, it +appears that this signature was employed by another man, in this instance. + + + + +Letter Of William Williams. + + +The American Mercury, (Number 88) + +MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11TH, 1788. + +MR. BABCOCK: + +Since the Federal Constitution has had so calm, dispassionate and so happy +an issue, in the late worthy Convention of this State; I did not expect +any members of that hon. body to be challenged in a News-paper, and +especially by name, and by anonymous writers, on account of their opinion, +or decently expressing their sentiments relative to the great subject then +under consideration, or any part of it. Nor do I yet see the propriety, or +happy issue of such a proceeding. However as a gentleman in your Paper +feels uneasy, that every sentiment contained in his publications, (tho' in +general they are well written) is not received with perfect acquiescence +and submission, I will endeavour to satisfy him, or the candid reader, by +the same channel, that I am not so reprehensible as he supposes, in the +matter refer'd to. When the clause in the 6th article, which provides that +"no religious test should ever be required as a qualification to any +office or trust, &c." came under consideration, I observed I should have +chose that sentence and anything relating to a religious test, had been +totally omitted rather than stand as it did, but still more wished +something of the kind should have been inserted, but with a reverse sense, +so far as to require an explicit acknowledgment of the being of a God, his +perfections and his providence, and to have been prefixed to, and stand +as, the first introductory words of the Constitution, in the following or +similar terms, viz. _We the people of the United States, in a firm belief +of the being and perfections of the one living and true God, the creator +and supreme Governour of the world, in his universal providence and the +authority of his laws; that he will require of all moral agents an account +of their conduct; that all rightful powers among men are ordained of, and +mediately derived from God; therefore in a dependence on his blessing and +acknowledgment of his efficient protection in establishing our +Independence, whereby it is become necessary to agree upon and settle a +Constitution of federal government for ourselves_, and in order to form a +more perfect union &c., as it is expressed in the present introduction, do +ordain &c., and instead of none, that no other religious test should ever +be required &c., and that supposing, but not granting, this would _be no +security at all_, that it would make hypocrites, &c. yet this would not be +a sufficient reason against it; as it would be a public declaration +against, and disapprobation of men, who did not, even with sincerity, make +such a profession, and they must be left to the searcher of hearts; that +it would however, be the voice of the great body of the people, and an +acknowledgment proper and highly becoming them to express on this great +and only occasion, and according to the course of Providence, one mean of +obtaining blessings from the most high. But that since it was not, and so +difficult and dubious to get inserted, I would not wish to make it a +capital objection; that I had no more idea of a religious test, which +should restrain offices to any particular sect, class, or denomination of +men or Christians in the long list of diversity, than to regulate their +bestowments by the stature or dress of the candidate, nor did I believe +one sensible catholic man in the state wished for such a limitation; and +that therefore the News-Paper observations, and reasonings (I named no +author) against a test, in favour of any one denomination of Christians, +and the sacrilegious injunctions of the test laws of England &c., +combatted objections which did not exist, and _was building up a man of +straw and knocking him down again_. These are the same and only ideas and +sentiments I endeavoured to communicate on that subject, tho' perhaps not +precisely in the same terms; as I had not written, nor preconceived them, +except the proposed test, and whether there is any reason in them or not, +I submit to the public. + +I freely confess such a test and acknowledgment would have given me great +additional satisfaction; and I conceive the arguments against it, on the +score of hypocrisy, would apply with equal force against requiring an oath +from any officer of the united or individual states; and with little +abatement, to any oath in any case whatever; but divine and human wisdom, +with universal experience, have approved and established them as useful, +and a security to mankind. + +I thought it was my duty to make the observations, in this behalf, which I +did, and to bear my testimony for God; and that it was also my duty to say +_the Constitution_, with this, and some other faults of another kind, was +yet too wise and too necessary to be rejected. + +W. WILLIAMS. + +P. S.--I could not have suspected the Landholder (if I know him) to be the +author of the piece referred to; but if he or any other is pleased to +reply, without the signature of his proper name, he will receive no +further answer or notice from me. + +Feb. 2d, 1788. + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF A COUNTRYMAN. WRITTEN BY ROGER SHERMAN. + + +Printed In +The New Haven Gazette, +November-December, 1787. + + + + +Note. + + +In the file of The New Haven Gazette formerly owned by Simeon Baldwin, an +intimate friend, and afterwards executor of Roger Sherman, it is noted by +the former that the essays of A Countryman were written by the latter. + +Following this series are two essays written by Sherman under a different +signature, after the adoption of the Constitution, which are an +interesting contrast to these. It will be noted in the first of these, +that Sherman alludes to what he "had endeavored to show in a former +piece." + + + + +A Countryman, I. + + +The New Haven Gazette, (Number 39) + +THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1787. + +TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT. + +You are now called on to make important alterations in your government, by +ratifying the new federal constitution. + +There are, undoubtedly, such advantages to be expected from this measure, +as will be sufficient inducement to adopt the proposal, provided it can be +done without sacrificing more important advantages, which we now do or may +possess. By a wise provision in the constitution of man, whenever a +proposal is made to change any present habit or practice, he much more +minutely considers what he is to _lose_ by the alterations, what effect it +is to have on what he at present possesses, than what is to be _hoped_ for +in the proposed expedient. + +Thus people are justly cautious how they exchange present advantages for +the hope of others in a system not yet experienced. + +Hence all large states have dreaded a division into smaller parts, as +being nearly the same thing as ruin; and all smaller states have predicted +endless embarrassment from every attempt to unite them into larger. It is +no more than probable that if any corner of this State of ten miles +square, was now, and long had been independent of the residue of the +State, that they would consider a proposal to unite them to the other +parts of the State, as a violent attempt to wrest from them the only +security for their persons or property. They would lament how little +security they should derive from sending one or two members to the +legislature at Hartford & New Haven, and all the evils that the Scots +predicted from the proposed union with England, in the beginning of the +present century, would be thundered with all the vehemence of American +politics, from the little ten miles district. But surely no man believes +that the inhabitants of this district would be less secure when united to +the residue of the State, than when independent. Does any person suppose +that the people would be more safe, more happy, or more respectable, if +every town in this State was independent, and had no State government? + +Is it not certain that government would be weak and irregular, and that +the people would be poor and contemptible? And still it must be allowed, +that each town would entirely surrender its boasted independence if they +should unite in State government, and would retain only about +one-eightieth part of the administration of their own affairs. + +Has it ever been found, that people's property or persons were less +regarded and less protected in large states than in small? + +Have not the Legislature in large states been as careful not to +over-burden the people with taxes as in small? But still it must be +admitted, that a single town in a small state holds a greater proportion +of the authority than in a large. + +If the United States were one single government, provided the constitution +of this extensive government was as good as the constitution of this State +now is, would this part of it be really in greater danger of oppression or +tyranny, than at present? It is true that many people who are _great men_ +because they go to Hartford to make laws for us once or twice in a year, +would then be no greater than their neighbours, as much fewer +representatives would be chosen. But would not the people be as safe, +governed by their representatives assembled in New York or Philadelphia, +as by their representatives assembled in Hartford or New Haven? Many +instances can be quoted, where people have been unsafe, poor and +contemptible, because they were governed only in small bodies; but can any +instance be found where they were less safe for uniting? Has not every +instance proved somewhat similar to the so much dreaded union between +England and Scotland, where the Scots, instead of becoming a poor, +despicable, dependent people, have become much more secure, happy, and +respectable? If then, the constitution is a good one, why should we be +afraid of uniting, even if the Union was to be much more complete and +entire than is proposed? + + + + +A Countryman, II. + + +The New Haven Gazette, (Number 40) + +THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1787. + +TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT. + +It is fortunate that you have been but little distressed with that torrent +of impertinence and folly, with which the newspaper politicians have over +whelmed many parts of our country. + +It is enough that you should have heard, that one party has seriously +urged, that we should adopt the _New Constitution_ because it has been +approved by _Washington_ and _Franklin_: and the other, with all the +solemnity of apostolic address to _Men_, _Brethren_, _Fathers_, _Friends +and Countryman_, have urged that we should reject, as dangerous, every +clause thereof, because that _Washington_ is more used to command as a +soldier, than to reason as a politician--_Franklin is old_, others are +_young_--and _Wilson_ is _haughty_.(52) You are too well informed to decide +by the opinion of others, and too independent to need a caution against +undue influence. + +Of a very different nature, tho' only one degree better than the other +reasoning, is all that sublimity of _nonsense_ and _alarm_, that has been +thundered against it in every shape of _metaphoric terror_, on the subject +of a _bill of rights_, the _liberty of the press_, _rights of conscience_, +_rights of taxation and election_, _trials in the vicinity_, _freedom of +speech_, _trial by jury_, and a _standing army_. These last are +undoubtedly important points, much too important to depend on mere paper +protection. For, guard such privileges by the strongest expressions, still +if you leave the legislative and executive power in the hands of those who +are or may be disposed to deprive you of them--you are but slaves. Make an +absolute monarch--give him the supreme authority, and guard as much as you +will by bills of rights, your liberty of the press, and trial by jury;--he +will find means either to take them from you, or to render them useless. + +The only real security that you can have for all your important rights +must be in the nature of your government. If you suffer any man to govern +you who is not strongly interested in supporting your privileges, you will +certainly lose them. If you are about to trust your liberties with people +whom it is necessary to bind by stipulation, that they shall not keep a +standing army, your stipulation is not worth even the trouble of writing. +No bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer than the +_honeymoon_ of a new married couple, unless the _rulers were interested_ +in preserving the rights; and in that case they have always been ready +enough to declare the rights, and to preserve them when they were +declared.--The famous English _Magna Charta_ is but an act of parliament, +which every subsequent parliament has had just as much constitutional +power to repeal and annul, as the parliament which made it had to pass it +at first. But the security of the nation has always been, that their +government was so formed, that at least _one branch_ of their legislature +must be strongly interested to preserve the rights of the nation. + +You have a bill of rights in Connecticut (i. e.) your legislature many +years since enacted that the subjects of this state should enjoy certain +privileges. Every assembly since that time, could, by the same authority, +enact that the subjects should enjoy none of those privileges; and the +only reason that it has not long since been so enacted, is that your +legislature were as strongly interested in preserving those rights as any +of the subjects; and this is your only security that it shall not be so +enacted at the next session of assembly: and it is security enough. + +Your General Assembly under your present constitution are supreme. They +may keep troops on foot in the most profound peace, if they think proper. +They have heretofore abridged the trial by jury in some cases, and they +can again in all. They can restrain the press, and may lay the most +burdensome taxes if they please, and who can forbid? But still the people +are perfectly safe that not one of these events shall take place so long +as the members of the General Assembly are as much interested, and +interested in the same manner, as the other subjects. + +On examining the new proposed constitution, there can be no question but +that there is authority enough lodged in the proposed Federal Congress, if +abused, to do the greatest injury. And it is perfectly idle to object to +it, that there is no bill of rights, or to propose to add to it a +provision that a trial by jury shall in no case be omitted, or to patch it +up by adding a stipulation in favor of the press, or to guard it by +removing the paltry objection to the right of Congress to regulate the +time and manner of elections. + +If you cannot prove by the best of all evidence, viz., by the _interest of +the rulers_, that this authority will not be abused, or at least that +those powers are not more likely to be abused by the Congress, than by +those who now have the same powers, you must by no means adopt the +constitution:--No, not with all the bills of rights and with all the +stipulations in favor of the people that can be made. + +But if the members of Congress are to be interested just as you and I are, +and just as the members of our present legislatures are interested, we +shall be just as safe, with even supreme power (if that were granted) in +Congress, as in the General Assembly. If the members of Congress can take +no improper step which will not affect them as much as it does us, we need +not apprehend that they will usurp authorities not given them to injure +that society of which they are a part. + +The sole question, (so far as any apprehension of tyranny and oppression +is concerned) ought to be, how are Congress formed? how far have you a +control over them? Decide this, and then all the questions about their +power may be dismissed for the amusement of those politicians whose +business it is to catch flies, or may occasionally furnish subjects for +_George Bryan's_ Pomposity, or the declamations of _Cato_--_An Old +Whig_--_Son of Liberty_--_Brutus_--_Brutus junior_--_An Officer of the +Continental Army_,--the more contemptible _Timoleon_, and the residue of +that rabble of writers. + + + + +A Countryman, III. + + +The New Haven Gazette, (Number 41) + +THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1787. + +TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT. + +The same thing once more--I am a plain man, of few words; for this reason +perhaps it is, that when I have said a thing I love to repeat it. Last +week I endeavored to evince, that the only surety you could have for your +liberties must be in the nature of your government; that you could derive +no security from bills of rights, or stipulations, on the subject of a +standing army, the liberty of the press, trial by jury, or on any other +subject. Did you ever hear of an absolute monarchy, where those rights +which are proposed by the pigmy politicians of this day, to be secured by +stipulation, were ever preserved? Would it not be mere trifling to make +any such stipulations, in any absolute monarchy? + +On the other hand, if your interest and that of your rulers are the same, +your liberties are abundantly secure. Perhaps the most secure when their +power is most complete. Perhaps a provision that they should never raise +troops in time of peace, might at some period embarrass the public +concerns and endanger the liberties of the people. It is possible that in +the infinite variety of events, it might become improper strictly to +adhere to any one provision that has ever been proposed to be stipulated. +At all events, the people have always been perfectly safe without any +stipulation of the kind, when the rulers were interested to make them +safe; and never otherwise. + +No people can be more secure against any oppression in their rulers than +you are at present; and no rulers can have more supreme and unlimited +authority than your general assembly have. + +When you consult on the subject of adopting the new constitution, you do +not enquire whether the powers therein contained can be safely lodged in +any hands whatever. For not only those very powers, but all other powers, +are already in the general assembly.--The enquiry is, whether Congress is +by this new constitution so formed that a part of the power now in the +general assembly would be as well lodged in Congress. Or, as was before +said, it depends on how far the members are under your control; and how +far their interest and yours are the same; to which careful attention must +be given. + + + + +A Countryman, IV. + + +The New Haven Gazette, (Number 42) + +THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1787. + +TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT. + +If the propriety of trusting your government in the hands of your +representatives was now a perfectly new question, the expediency of the +measure might be doubted. A very great portion of the objections which we +daily find made against adopting the new constitution (and which are just +as weighty objections against our present government, or against any +government in existence) would doubtless have their influence; and perhaps +would determine you against trusting the powers of sovereignty out of your +own hands. + +The best theory, the best philosophy on the subject, would be too +uncertain for you to hazard your freedom upon. + +But your freedom, in that sense of the expression (if it could be called +sense), is already totally gone. Your Legislature is not only supreme in +the usual sense of the word, but they have _literally, all the powers of +society_. Can you--can you _possibly_ grant anything new? Have you any +power which is not already granted to your General Assembly? You are +indeed called on to say whether a part of the powers now exercised by the +General Assembly, shall not, in future, be exercised by Congress. And it +is clearly much better for your interest, that Congress should experience +those powers than that they should continue in the General Assembly, +provided you can trust Congress as safely as the General Assembly. + +What forms your security under the General Assembly? Nothing save that the +interest of the members is the same as yours. Will it be the same with +Congress? There are essentially only two differences between the formation +of Congress and of your General Assembly. One is,--that Congress are to +govern a much larger tract of country, and a much greater number of +people, consequently your proportion of the government will be much +smaller than at present. The other difference is--that the members of +Congress when elected, hold their places for two, four and six years, and +the members of Assembly only six and twelve months. + +The first of these differences was discussed pretty fully in the first +number, (when there was no idea of proceeding thus far on the subject), +and has all the force as an objection against the powers of Congress, that +it would have if applied to a proposal to give up the sovereignty of the +several towns of the state, (if such sovereignty had existed,) and unite +in state government. + +It would be only a repetition to enter into a consideration of this +difference between Congress and your Assembly. + +It has been suggested that the six or eight members which we shall send to +Congress will be men of property, who can little feel any burthens they +may lay on society. How far is this idea supported by experience? As the +members are to pay their proportion, will they not be as careful of laying +too great burthens as poorer people? Are they less careful of their money +than the poor? This objection would be much stronger against trusting the +power out of your hands at all. If the several towns were now independent, +this objection would be much more forcible against uniting in state +government, and sending one or two of your most wealthy men to Hartford or +New Haven, to vote away your money. But this you have tried, and found +that assemblies of representatives are less willing to vote away money +than even their constituents. An individual of any tolerable economy, pays +all his debts, and perhaps has money beforehand. A small school district, +or a small parish, will see what sum they want, and usually provide +sufficiently for their wants, and often have a little money at interest. + +Town voters are partly representatives, i. e. many people pay town taxes +who have no right to vote, but the money they vote away is principally +their own. The towns in this state tax themselves less willingly than +smaller bodies. They generally however tax themselves sufficiently to +nearly pay the demands against them within the year, very seldom raise +money beforehand by taxes. The General Assembly of this state could never +be induced to _attempt_ to do more than pay the annual interest of what +they owe, and occasionally sink very small parts of the principal, and +they never in fact did thus much, and we are all witnesses that they are +full as careful of the public money as we can wish. It never was a +complaint that they were too ready to allow individuals large sums. A man +who has a claim against a town, and applies to a town-meeting, is very +likely to obtain justice: but he who has a claim against the state, and +applies to the General Assembly, stands but a poor chance to obtain +justice. Some rule will be found to exclude his claim,--or to lessen it,--or +he will be paid in a security--not worth half the money. + +You have uniformly experienced that your representatives are as careful, +if not more so, of your money, than you yourselves are in your +town-meetings; but still your representatives are generally men of +property, and those of them who are most independent, and those whom you +have sent to Congress, have not been by any means the least careful. + + + + +A Countryman, V. + + +The New Haven Gazette, (Number 44) + +TUESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1787. + +TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT. + +You do not hate to read Newspaper Essays on the new constitution, more +than I hate to write them. Then _we will be short_--which I have often +found the _best_ expression in a dull sermon, except the _last_. + +Whether the mode of election pointed out in the proposed constitution is +well calculated to support the principles which were designed to be +established in the different branches of the legislature, may perhaps be +justly doubted:--and may perhaps in some future day be discussed. + +The design undoubtedly was, that the house of representatives should be a +_popular_ assembly,--that the senate should, in its nature, be somewhat +more permanent, and that the two houses should be completely independent +of each other. These _principles_ are right--for the present we will +suppose they will be supported--there then remains to be considered no +considerable difference between the constitutional government which is +proposed, and your present government, except that the time for which you +choose your present rulers is only for six and twelve months, and the time +for which you are to choose your continental rulers is for two, four and +six years. + +The convention were mistaken if they supposed they should lessen the evils +of tumultuous elections by making elections less frequent. But are your +liberties endangered by this measure? Philosophy may mislead you. Ask +experience. Are not the liberties of the people of England as safe as +yours?--They are not as free as yours, because much of their government is +in the hands of _hereditary majesty_ and _nobility_. But is not that part +of the government which is under the control of the commons exceedingly +well guarded? But still the house of commons is only a third branch--the +_only_ branch who are appointed by the people--and they are chosen but once +in _seven years_. Is there then any danger to be apprehended from the +length of time that your rulers are to serve? when none are to serve more +than six years--one whole house but two years, and your President but four. + +The great power and influence of an hereditary monarch of Britain has +spread many alarms, from an apprehension that the commons would sacrifice +the liberties of the people to the money or influence of the crown: but +the influence of a powerful _hereditary_ monarch, with the national +Treasury--Army--and fleet at his command--and the whole executive +government--and one-third of the legislative in his hands constantly +operating on a house of commons, whose duration is never less than _seven +years_, unless this same monarch should _end_ it, (which he can do in an +hour,) has never yet been sufficient to obtain one vote of the house of +commons which has taken from the people the _liberty of the press_,--_trial +by jury_,--_the rights of conscience, or of private property_. + +Can you then apprehend danger of oppression and tyranny from the too great +duration of the power of _your_ rulers? + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN, WRITTEN BY ROGER SHERMAN. + + +Printed In +The New Haven Gazette, +December, 1789. + + + + +Note. + + +These letters are ascribed to Sherman on the authority mentioned at page +213. + +In a letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (_Correspondence_, 1, +63), he says: + +On the subject of amendments, nothing has been publickly, and very little +privately, said. Such as I am known to have espoused will, as far as I can +gather, be attainable from the federalists, who sufficiently predominate +in both branches, though with some the concurrence will proceed from a +spirit of conciliation rather than conviction. Connecticut is least +inclined, though I presume not inflexibly opposed, to a moderate revision. +A paper, which will probably be republished in the Virginia gazettes, +under the signature of a citizen of New Haven, unfolds Mr. Sherman's +opinions. + +In the _Writings of John Adams_, (VI, 427), is a correspondence between +Adams and Sherman, produced by these articles, which should be studied in +connection with them. + + + + +A Citizen Of New Haven, I. + + +The New Haven Gazette, (Number 48) + +THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1788. + +_Observations on the Alterations Proposed as Amendments to the new Federal +Constitution._ + +Six of the states have adopted the new constitution without proposing any +alteration, and the most of those proposed by the conventions of other +states may be provided for by congress in a code of laws without altering +the constitution. If congress may be safely trusted with the affairs of +the Union, and have sufficient powers for that purpose, and possess no +powers but such as respect the common interest of the states (as I have +endeavored to show in a former piece), then all the matters that can be +regulated by law may safely be left to their discretion, and those will +include all that I have noticed except the following, which I think on due +consideration will appear to be improper or unnecessary. + +1. It is proposed that the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the +members present in this branch of the congress shall be required for +passing certain acts. + +On which I would observe, that this would give a minority in congress +power to controul the majority, joined with the concurrent voice of the +president, for if the president dissents, no act can pass without the +consent of two-thirds of the members in each branch of congress; and would +not that be contrary to the general principles of republican government? + +2. That impeachments ought not to be tried by the senate, or not by the +senate alone. + +But what good reason can be assigned why the senate is not the most proper +tribunal for that purpose? The members are to be chosen by the +legislatures of the several states, who will doubtless appoint persons of +wisdom and probity, and from their office can have no interested motives +to partiality. The house of peers in Great Britain try impeachments and +are also a branch of the legislature. + +3. It is said that the president ought not to have power to grant pardons +in cases of high treason, but the congress. + +It does not appear that any great mischief can arise from the exercise of +this power by the president (though perhaps it might as well have been +lodged in congress). The president cannot pardon in case of impeachment, +so that such offenders may be excluded from office notwithstanding his +pardon. + +4. It is proposed that members of congress be rendered ineligible to any +other office during the time for which they are elected members of that +body. + +This is an objection that will admit of something plausible to be said on +both sides, and it was settled in convention on full discussion and +deliberation. There are some offices which a member of congress may be +best qualified to fill, from his knowledge of public affairs acquired by +being a member, such as minister to foreign courts, &c., and on accepting +any other office his seat in congress will be vacated, and no member is +eligible to any office that shall have been instituted or the emoluments +increased while he was a member. + +5. It is proposed to make the president and senators ineligible after +certain periods. + +But this would abridge the privilege of the people, and remove one great +motive to fidelity in office, and render persons incapable of serving in +offices, on account of their experience, which would best qualify them for +usefulness in office--but if their services are not acceptable they may be +left out at any new election. + +6. It is proposed that no commercial treaty should be made without the +consent of two-thirds of the senators, nor any cession of territory, right +of navigation or fishery, without the consent of three-fourths of the +members present in each branch of congress. + +It is provided by the constitution that no commercial treaty shall be made +by the president without the consent of two-thirds of the senators +present, and as each state has an equal representation and suffrage in the +senate, the rights of the state will be as well secured under the new +constitution as under the old; and it is not probable that they would ever +make a cession of territory or any important national right without the +consent of congress. The king of Great Britain has by the constitution a +power to make treaties, yet in matters of great importance he consults the +parliament. + +7. There is one amendment proposed by the convention of South Carolina +respecting religious tests, by inserting the word _other_, between the +words _no_ and _religious_ in that article, which is an ingenious thought, +and had that word been inserted, it would probably have prevented any +objection on that head. But it may be considered as a clerical omission +and be inserted without calling a convention; as it now stands the effect +will be the same. + +On the whole it is hoped that all the states will consent to make a fair +trial of the constitution before they attempt to alter it; experience will +best show whether it is deficient or not, on trial it may appear that the +alterations that have been proposed are not necessary, or that others not +yet thought of may be necessary; everything that tends to disunion ought +to be avoided. Instability in government and laws tends to weaken a state +and render the rights of the people precarious. + +If another convention should be called to revise the constitution, 'tis +not likely they would be more unanimous than the former; they might judge +differently in some things, but is it certain that they would judge +better? When experience has convinced the states and people in general +that alterations are necessary, they may be easily made, but attempting it +at present may be detrimental if not fatal to the union of the states. + +The judiciary department is perhaps the most difficult to be precisely +limited by the constitution, but congress have full power to regulate it +by law, and it may be found necessary to vary the regulations at different +times as circumstances may differ. + +Congress may make requisitions for supplies previous to direct taxation, +if it should be thought to be expedient, but if requisitions be made and +some states comply and others not, the non-complying states must be +considered and treated as delinquents, which will tend to excite +disaffection and disunion among the states, besides occasioning delay; but +if congress lay the taxes in the first instance these evils will be +prevented, and they will doubtless accommodate the taxes to the customs +and convenience of the several states. + +Some suppose that the representation will be too small, but I think it is +in the power of congress to make it too large, but I believe that it may +be safely trusted with them. Great Britain contains about three times the +number of the inhabitants in the United States, and according to Burgh's +account in his political disquisitions, the members of parliament in that +kingdom do not exceed 131, and if 69 more be added from the principal +cities and towns the number would be 200; and strike off those who are +elected by the small boroughs, which are called the rotten part of the +constitution by their best patriots and politicians, that nation would be +more equally and better represented than at present; and if that would be +a sufficient number for their national legislature, one-third of that +number will be more than sufficient for our federal legislature who will +have few general matters to transact. But these and other objections have +been considered in a former paper, before referred to. I shall therefore +conclude this with my best wishes for the continuance of the peace, +liberty and union of these states. + +A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. + + + + +A Citizen Of New Haven, II. + + +The New Haven Gazette, (Number 51) + +THURSDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1788. + +_Observations on the New Federal Constitution._ + +In order to form a good Constitution of Government, the legislature should +be properly organized, and be vested with plenary powers for all the +purposes for which the government was instituted, to be exercised for the +public good as occasion may require. + +The greatest security that a people can have for the enjoyment of their +rights and liberties, is that no laws can be made to bind them nor any +taxes imposed upon them, without their consent by representatives of their +own chusing, who will participate with them in the public burthens and +benefits; this was the great point contended for in our controversy with +Great Britain, and this will be fully secured to us by the new +constitution. The rights of the people will be secured by a representation +in proportion to their numbers in one branch of the legislature, and the +rights of the particular states by their equal representation in the other +branch. + +The President and Vice-President as well as the members of Congress will +be eligible for fixed periods, and may be re-elected as often as the +electors shall think fit, which will be a great security for their +fidelity in office, and give greater stability and energy to government +than an exclusion by rotation, and will be an operative and effectual +security against arbitrary government, either monarchical or aristocratic. + +The immediate security of the civil and domestic rights of the people will +be in the government of the particular states. And as the different states +have different local interests and customs which can be best regulated by +their own laws, it should not be expedient to admit the federal government +to interfere with them, any farther than may be necessary for the good of +the whole. The great end of the federal government is to protect the +several states in the enjoyment of those rights, against foreign invasion, +and to preserve peace and a beneficial intercourse among themselves; and +to regulate and protect our commerce with foreign nations. + +These were not sufficiently provided for by the former articles of +confederation, which was the occasion of calling the late Convention to +make amendments. This they have done by forming a new constitution +containing the powers vested in the federal government, under the former, +with such additional powers as they deemed necessary to attain the ends +the states had in view, in their appointment. And to carry those powers +into effect, they thought it necessary to make some alterations in the +organization of the government: this they supposed to be warranted by +their commission. + +The powers vested in the federal government are clearly defined, so that +each state still retain its sovereignty in what concerns its own internal +government, and a right to exercise every power of a sovereign state not +particularly delegated to the government of the United States. The new +powers vested in the United States, are, to regulate commerce; provide for +a uniform practice respecting naturalization, bankruptcies, and +organizing, arming and training the militia; and for the punishment of +certain crimes against the United States; and for promoting the progress +of science in the mode therein pointed out. There are some other matters +which Congress has power under the present confederation to require to be +done by the particular states, which they will be authorized to carry into +effect themselves under the new constitution; these powers appear to be +necessary for the common benefit of the states, and could not be +effectually provided for by the particular states. + +The objects of expenditure will be the same under the new constitution, as +under the old; nor need the administration of government be more +expensive; the number of members of Congress will be the same, nor will it +be necessary to increase the number of officers in the executive +department or their salaries; the supreme executive will be in a single +person, who must have an honourable support; which perhaps will not exceed +the present allowance to the President of Congress, and the expence of +supporting a committee of the states in the recess of Congress. + +It is not probable that Congress will have occasion to sit longer than two +or three months in a year, after the first session, which may perhaps be +something longer. Nor will it be necessary for the Senate to sit longer +than the other branch. The appointment of officers may be made during the +session of Congress, and trials on impeachment will not often occur, and +will require but little time to attend to them. The security against +keeping up armies in time of peace will be greater under the new +constitution than under the present, because it can't be done without the +concurrence of two branches of the legislature, nor can any appropriation +of money for that purpose be in force more than two years; whereas there +is no restriction under the present confederation. + +The liberty of the press can be in no danger, because that is not put +under the direction of the new government. + +If the federal government keeps within its proper jurisdiction, it will be +the interest of the state legislatures to support it, and they will be a +powerful and effectual check to its interfering with their jurisdiction. +But the objects of federal government will be so obvious that there will +be no great danger of any interference. + +The principal sources of revenue will be imposts on goods imported, and +sale of the western lands, which will probably be sufficient to pay the +debts and expences of the United States while peace continues; but if +there should be occasion to resort to direct taxation, each state's quota +will be ascertained according to a rule which has been approved by the +legislatures of eleven of the states, and should any state neglect to +furnish its quota, Congress may raise it in the same manner that the state +ought to have done; and what remedy more easy and equitable could be +devised, to obtain the supplies from a delinquent state? + +Some object, that the representation will be too small; but the states +have not thought fit to keep half the number of representatives in +Congress that they are entitled to under the present confederation; and of +what advantage can it be to have a large assembly to transact the few +general matters that will come under the direction of Congress.--The +regulating of time, place and manner of elections seems to be as well +secured as possible; the legislature of each state may do it, and if they +neglect to do it in the best manner, it may be done by Congress;--and what +motive can either have to injure the people in the exercise of that right? +The qualifications of the electors are to remain as fixed by the +constitutions and laws of the several states. + +It is by some objected, that the executive is blended with the +legislature, and that those powers ought to be entirely distinct and +unconnected, but is not this a gross error in politics? The united wisdom +and various interests of a nation should be combined in framing the laws. +But the execution of them should not be in the whole legislature; that +would be too troublesome and expensive; but it will not thence follow that +the executive should have no voice or influence in legislation. The +executive in Great Britain is one branch of the legislature, and has a +negative on all laws; perhaps that is an extreme not to be imitated by a +republic, but the partial negative vested in the President by the new +Constitution on the acts of Congress and the subsequent revision, may be +very useful to prevent laws being passed without mature deliberation. + +The Vice-President while he acts as President of the Senate will have +nothing to do in the executive department; his being elected by all the +states will incline him to regard the interests of the whole, and when the +members of the senate are equally divided on any question, who so proper +to give a casting vote as one who represents all the states? + +The power of the President to grant pardons extends only to offences +committed against the United States, which can't be productive of much +mischief, especially as those on Impeachment are excepted, which will +exclude offenders from office. + +It was thought necessary in order to carry into effect the laws of the +Union, to promote justice, and preserve harmony among the states, to +extend the judicial powers of the United States to the enumerated cases, +under such regulations and with such exceptions as shall be provided by +law, which will doubtless reduce them to cases of such magnitude and +importance as cannot safely be trusted to the final decision of the courts +of particular states; and the constitution does not make it necessary that +any inferior tribunals should be instituted, but it may be done if found +necessary; 'tis probable that the courts of particular states will be +authorized by the laws of the union, as has been heretofore done in cases +of piracy, &c., and the Supreme Court may have a circuit to make trials as +convenient, and as little expensive as possible to the parties; nor is +there anything in the constitution to deprive them of trial by jury in +cases where that mode of trial has been heretofore used. All cases in the +courts of common law between citizens of the same state, except those +claiming lands under grants of different states, must be finally decided +by courts of the state to which they belong, so that it is not probable +that more than one citizen to a thousand will ever have a cause that can +come before a federal court. + +Every department and officer of the federal government will be subject to +the regulation and control of the laws, and the people will have all +possible securities against oppression. Upon the whole, the constitution +appears to be well framed to secure the rights and liberties of the people +and for preserving the governments of the individual states, and if well +administered, to restore and secure public and private credit, and to give +respectability to the states both abroad and at home. Perhaps a more +perfect one could not be formed on mere speculation; and if upon +experience it shall be found deficient, it provides an easy and peaceable +mode to make amendments. Is it not much better to adopt it than to +continue in present circumstances? Its being agreed to by all the states +present in Convention, is a circumstance in its favour, so far as any +respect is due to their opinions. + +A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN. + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF CATO, WRITTEN BY GEORGE CLINTON. + + +Printed In +The New York Journal, +September-January, 1787-8. + + + + +Note. + + +These letters were commonly ascribed to the pen of George Clinton in the +press of the day, and that this ascription was right seems to be proved by +the following letter. Though signed by Hamilton, it is in the handwriting +of John Lamb, a leading anti-federalist of New York, and is in the George +Clinton MSS. in the New York State Library. It thus seems apparent that it +is a copy secured in some way by Hamilton's political opponents: + + + OCTOBER 18, 1787. + + _Dear Sir_: + + Since my last the chief of the state party has declared his + opposition to the government proposed, both in private + conversation and in print. That you may judge of the _reason_ and + _fairness_ of his views, I send you the two essays, with a reply + by Caesar. On further consideration it was concluded to abandon + this personal form, and to take up the principles of the whole + subject. These will be sent you as published, and might with + advantage be republished in your gazettes. + + A. HAMILTON. + + +This copy, so obtained, seems to have been the basis of the following note +in the _New York Journal_: + + + "A writer in the state of New-York, under the signature of + _Cesar_, came forward against the patriotic _Cato_ and endeavoured + to frighten him from starting any objections and threatened that + '_Cato_ would be followed by _Cesar_ in all his marches;' but we + find that as soon as ever _Cato_ came freely to discuss the merit + of the constitution _Cesar_ retreated and disappeared: and since + that a publication under the signature of Publius ... has appeared + in that state." + + +Another evidence in confirmation is, that the last of this series was +printed on January 3, 1788, and the New York Assembly met on the 9th of +the same month, after which Governor Clinton was probably too occupied to +write more, though no conclusion was announced in the last essay, and it +is probable no such termination was intended. Following these are the two +essays of _Caesar_ mentioned above. + + + + +Cato, I. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2134) + +THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1787. + +For the New York Journal. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: + +The Convention, who sat at Philadelphia, have at last delivered to +Congress that system of general government, which they have declared best +calculated to promote your safety and happiness as citizens of the United +States. This system, though not handed to you formally by the authority of +government, has obtained an introduction through divers channels; and the +minds of you all, to whose observation it has come, have no doubt been +contemplating it; and alternate joy, hope, or fear have preponderated, as +it conformed to, or differed from, your various ideas of just government. + +Government, to an American, is the science of his political safety; this +then is a moment to you the most important--and that in various points--to +your reputation as members of a great nation--to your immediate safety, and +to that of your posterity. In your private concerns and affairs of life +you deliberate with caution, and act with prudence; your public concerns +require a caution and prudence, in a ratio suited to the difference and +dignity of the subject. The disposal of your reputation, and of your lives +and property, is more momentous than a contract for a farm, or the sale of +a bale of goods; in the former, if you are negligent or inactive, the +ambitious and despotic will entrap you in their toils, and bind you with +the cord of power from which you, and your posterity may never be freed; +and if the possibility should exist, it carries along with it consequences +that will make your community totter to its center: in the latter, it is +the mere loss of a little property, which more circumspection or assiduity +may repair. + +Without directly engaging as an advocate for this new form of national +government, or as an opponent--let me conjure you to consider this a very +important crisis of your safety and character. You have already, in common +with the rest of your countrymen, the citizens of the other states, given +to the world astonishing evidence of your greatness--you have fought under +peculiar circumstances, and were successful against a powerful nation on a +speculative question, you have established an original compact between you +and your governors, a fact heretofore unknown in the formation of the +governments of the world; your experience has informed you, that there are +defects in the federal system, and, to the astonishment of mankind, your +legislatures have concerted measures for an alteration, with as much ease +as an individual would make a disposition of his ordinary domestic +affairs: this alteration now lies before you, for your consideration; but +beware how you determine--do not, because you admit that something must be +done, adopt anything--teach the members of that convention that ye are +capable of a supervision of their conduct. The same medium that gave you +this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is now open, can make +amendments, or give you another, if it is required. Your fate, and that of +your posterity, depends on your present conduct; do not give the latter +reason to curse you, nor yourselves cause of reprehension; as individuals +you are ambitious of leaving behind you a good name, and it is the +reflection that you have done right in this life, that blunts the +sharpness of death; the same principles would be a consolation to you, as +patriots, in the hour of dissolution, that you would leave to your +children a fair political inheritance, untouched by the vultures of power, +which you had acquired by an _unshaken perseverance_ in the cause of +liberty; but how miserable the alternative--you would deprecate the ruin +you had brought upon yourselves, be the curse of posterity, and the scorn +and scoff of nations. + +Deliberate, therefore, on this new national government with coolness; +analize it with criticism; and reflect on it with candor: if you find that +the influence of a powerful few, or the exercise of a standing army, will +always be directed and exerted for your welfare alone, and not to the +aggrandizement of themselves, and that it will secure to you and your +posterity happiness at home, and national dignity and respect from abroad, +adopt it; if it will not, reject it with indignation--better to be where +you are for the present, than insecure forever afterwards. Turn your eyes +to the United Netherlands, at this moment, and view their situation; +compare it with what yours may be, under a government substantially +similar to theirs. + +Beware of those who wish to influence your passions, and to make you dupes +to their resentments and little interests--personal invectives can never +persuade, but they always fix prejudices, which candor might have +removed--those who deal in them have not your happiness at heart. Attach +yourselves to measures, not to men. + +This form of government is handed to you by the recommendations of a man +who merits the confidence of the public; but you ought to recollect that +the wisest and best of men may err, and their errors, if adopted, may be +fatal to the community; therefore, in principles of _politics_, as well as +in religious faith, every man ought to think for himself. + +Hereafter, when it will be necessary, I shall make such observations on +this new constitution as will tend to promote your welfare and be +justified by reason and truth. + +CATO. + +_Sept. 26, 1787._ + + + + +Cato, II. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2136) + +THURSDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1787. + +For the New York Journal. + +_To the_ CITIZENS _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK: + + + "Remember, O my friends! the laws, the rights, + The generous plan of power deliver'd down, + By your renown'd Forefathers; + So dearly bought, the price of so much blood! + O let it never perish in your hands! + But piously transmit it to your children." + + +The object of my last address to you was to engage your dispassionate +consideration of the new Federal government; to caution you against +precipitancy in the adoption of it; to recommend a correction of its +errors, if it contained any; to hint to you the danger of an easy +perversion of some of its powers; to solicit you to separate yourselves +from party, and to be independent of and uninfluenced by any in your +principles of politics; and that address was closed with a promise of +future observations on the same subject, which should be justified by +reason and truth. Here I intended to have rested the introduction; but a +writer under the signature of CAESAR, in Mr. Child's paper of the 1st +instant, who treats you with passion, insult, and threat, has anticipated +those observations which would otherwise have remained in silence until a +future period. It would be criminal in me to hesitate a moment to appear +as your advocate in so interesting a cause, and to resist the influence of +such doctrines as this Caesar holds. I shall take no other cognizance of +his remarks on the _questionable_ shape of my future, or the _equivocal_ +appearance of my past reflections, than to declare, that in my past, I did +not mean to be misunderstood (for Caesar himself declares that it is +obviously the language of distrust), and that in my future there will not +be the semblance of doubt. But what is the language of Caesar--he ridicules +your prerogative, power, and majesty--he talks of this _proffered +constitution_ as the tender mercy of a benevolent sovereign to deluded +subjects, or, as his tyrant name-sake, of his proffered grace to the +virtuous Cato:--he shuts the door of free deliberation and discussion, and +declares that you must receive this government in manner and form as it is +_proffered_--that you cannot revise or amend it, and lastly, to close the +scene, he insinuates that it will be more healthy for you that the +American Fabius should be induced to accept of the presidency of this new +government than that, in case you do not acquiesce, he should be solicited +to command an army to impose it on you. Is not your indignation roused at +this absolute, imperious style? For what did you open the veins of your +citizens and expend their treasure? For what did you throw off the yoke of +Britain and call yourselves independent? Was it from a disposition fond of +change, or to procure new masters?--if those were your motives, you have +reward before you--go, retire into silent obscurity, and kiss the rod that +scourges you, bury the prospects you had in store, that you and your +posterity would participate in the blessings of freedom, and the +employments of your country--let the rich and insolent alone be your +rulers. Perhaps you are designed by providence as an emphatic evidence of +the mutability of human affairs, to have the show of happiness only, that +your misery may seem the sharper, and if so, you must submit. But if you +had nobler views, and you are not designed by heaven as an example--are you +now to be derided and insulted? Is the power of thinking, on the only +subject important to you, to be taken away? and if per chance you should +happen to differ from Caesar, are you to have Caesar's principles crammed +down your throats with an army? God forbid! + +In democratic republics the people collectively are considered as the +sovereign--all legislative, judicial, and executive power, is inherent in +and derived from them. As a people, your power and authority have +sanctioned and established the present government--your executive, +legislative, and judicial acknowledge it by their public acts--you are +again solicited to sanction and establish the future one--yet this Caesar +mocks your dignity and laughs at the majesty of the people. Caesar, with +his usual dogmatism, enquires, if I had talents to throw light on the +subject of legislation, why did I not offer them when the Convention was +in session? He is answered in a moment--I thought with him and you, that +the wisdom of America, in that Convention, was drawn as it were to a +Focus. I placed an unbounded confidence in some of the characters who were +members of it, from the services they had rendered their country, without +adverting to the ambitious and interested views of others. I was willingly +led to expect a model of perfection and security that would have +astonished the world. Therefore to have offered observation, on the +subject of legislation, under these impressions, would have discovered no +less arrogance than Caesar. The Convention, too, when in session, shut +their doors to the observations of the community, and their members were +under an obligation of secrecy. Nothing transpired. To have suggested +remarks on unknown and anticipated principles would have been like a man +groping in the dark, and folly in the extreme. I confess, however, I have +been disappointed, and Caesar is candid enough to make the same +declaration, for he thinks it _might_ have been more perfect. + +But to call in dispute, at this time, and in the manner Caesar does, the +right of free deliberation on this subject, is like a man's propounding a +question to another, and telling him at the same that if he does not +answer agreeable to the opinion of the propounder, he will exert force to +make him of the same sentiment: to exemplify this, it will be necessary to +give you a short history of the rise and progress of the Convention, and +the conduct of Congress thereon. The states in Congress suggested, that +the articles of confederation had provided for making alterations in the +confederation--that there were defects therein, and as a means to remedy +which, a Convention of delegates, appointed by the different states, was +resolved expedient to be held for the sole and express purpose of revising +it, and reporting to Congress and the different legislatures such +alterations and provisions therein as should (when agreed to in Congress +and confirmed by the several states) render the federal constitution +adequate to the exigencies of government. This resolution is sent to the +different states, and the legislature of this state, with others, appoint, +in conformity thereto, delegates for the purpose, and in the words +mentioned in that resolve, as by the resolution of Congress, and the +concurrent resolutions of the senate and assembly of this state, +subjoined, will appear. For the sole and express purpose aforesaid a +Convention of delegates is formed at Philadelphia: what have they done? +Have they revised the confederation, and has Congress agreed to their +report?--neither is the fact. This Convention have exceeded the authority +given to them, and have transmitted to Congress a new political fabric, +essentially and fundamentally distinct and different from it, in which the +different states do not retain separately their sovereignty and +independency, united by a confederate league--but one entire sovereignty, a +consolidation of them into one government--in which new provisions and +powers are not made and vested in Congress, but in an assembly, senate, +and president, who are not known in the articles of confederation. +Congress, without agreeing to, or approving of, this system _proffered_ by +the Convention, have sent it to the different legislatures, not for their +confirmation, but to submit it to the people; not in conformity to their +own resolution, but in conformity to the resolution of the Convention made +and provided in that case.(53) Was it, then, from the face of the +foregoing facts, the intention of Congress, and of this and the other +states, that the essence of our present national government should be +annihilated, or that it should be retained and only have an increase of +substantial necessary powers? Congress, sensible of this latter principle, +and that the Convention had taken on themselves a power which neither they +nor the other states had a right to delegate to them, and that they could +not agree to and approve of this consolidated system, nor the states +confirm it--have been silent on its character; and although many have dwelt +on their unanimity, it is no less than the unanimity of opinion that it +originated in an assumption of power, which your voice alone can sanctify. +This new government, therefore, founded in usurpation, is referred to your +opinion as the origin of power not heretofore delegated, and, to this end, +the exercise of the prerogative of free examination is essentially +necessary; and yet you are unhesitatingly to acquiesce, and if you do not, +the American Fabius, if we may believe Caesar is to command an army to +impose it. It is not my view to rouse your passions. I only wish to excite +you to, and assist you in, a cool and deliberate discussion of the +subject, to urge you to behave like sensible freemen. Think, speak, act, +and assert your opinions and rights--let the same good sense govern you +with respect to the adoption of a future system for the administration of +your public affairs that influenced you in the formation of the present. +Hereafter I do not intend to be diverted by Caesar, or any other. My object +is to take up this new form of national government--compare it with the +experience and opinions of the most sensible and approved political +authors--and to show that its principles, and the exercise of them, will be +dangerous to your liberty and happiness. + +CATO. + + + + +Cato, III. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2138) + +THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1787. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: + +In the close of my last introductory address, I told you that my object in +the future would be to take up this new form of national government, to +compare it with the experience and opinions of the most sensible and +approved political authors, and to show you that its principles, and the +exercise of them, will be dangerous to your liberty and happiness. + +Although I am conscious that this is an arduous undertaking, yet I will +perform it to the best of my ability. + +The freedom, equality and independence which you enjoyed by nature, +induced you to consent to a political power. The same principles led you +to examine the errors and vices of a British superintendence, to divest +yourselves of it, and to reassume a new political shape. It is +acknowledged that there are defects in this, and another is tendered to +you for acceptance; the great question then, that arises on this new +political principle, is, whether it will answer the ends for which it is +said to be offered to you, and for which all men engage in political +society, to wit, the preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates. + +The recital, or premises on which the new form of government is erected, +declares a consolidation or union of all the thirteen parts, or states, +into one great whole, under the firm of the United States, for all the +various and important purposes therein set forth. But whoever seriously +considers the immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits +of the United States, together with the variety of its climates, +productions, and commerce, the difference of extent, and number of +inhabitants in all; the dissimilitude of interest, morals, and politics, +in almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a +consolidated republican form of government therein, can never _form a +perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the +general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your +posterity_, for to these objects it must be directed: this unkindred +legislature therefore, composed of interests opposite and dissimilar in +their nature, will in its exercise, emphatically be like a house divided +against itself. + +The governments of Europe have taken their limits and form from +adventitious circumstances, and nothing can be argued on the motive of +agreement from them; but these adventitious political principles, have +nevertheless produced effects that have attracted the attention of +philosophy, which have established axioms in the science of politics +therefrom, as irrefragable as any in Euclid. It is natural, says +Montesquieu, _to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it +cannot long subsist: in a large one, there are men of large fortunes, and +consequently of less moderation; there are too great deposits to trust in +the hands of a single subject; an ambitious person soon becomes sensible +that he may be happy, great, and glorious by oppressing his fellow +citizens, and that he might raise himself to grandeur, on the ruins of his +country. In large republics, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand +views; in a small one, the interest of the public is easily perceived, +better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have +a less extent, and of course are less protected_--he also shows you, that +the duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to its having continued +with the same extent of territory after all its wars; and that the +ambition of Athens and Lacedemon to command and direct the union, lost +them their liberties, and gave them a monarchy. + +From this picture, what can you promise yourselves, on the score of +consolidation of the United States into one government? Impracticability +in the just exercise of it, your freedom insecure, even this form of +government limited in its continuance, the employments of your country +disposed of to the opulent, to whose contumely you will continually be an +object--you must risk much, by indispensably placing trusts of the greatest +magnitude, into the hands of individuals whose ambition for power, and +aggrandizement, will oppress and grind you--where from the vast extent of +your territory, and the complication of interests, the science of +government will become intricate and perplexed, and too mysterious for you +to understand and observe; and by which you are to be conducted into a +monarchy, either limited or despotic; the latter, Mr. Locke remarks, _is a +government derived from neither nature nor compact_. + +_Political liberty_, the great Montesquieu again observes, _consists in +security, or at least in the opinion we have of security_; and this +_security_, therefore, or the _opinion_, is best obtained in moderate +governments, where the mildness of the laws, and the equality of the +manners, beget a confidence in the people, which produces this security, +or the opinion. This moderation in governments depends in a great measure +on their limits, connected with their political distribution. + +The extent of many of the states of the Union, is at this time almost too +great for the superintendence of a republican form of government, and must +one day or other revolve into more vigorous ones, or by separation be +reduced into smaller and more useful, as well as moderate ones. You have +already observed the feeble efforts of Massachusetts against their +insurgents; with what difficulty did they quell that insurrection; and is +not the province of Maine at this moment on the eve of separation from +her? The reason of these things is, that for the security of the +_property_ of the community, in which expressive term Mr. Locke makes +life, liberty, and estate, to consist--the wheels of a republic are +necessarily slow in their operation; hence in large free republics, the +evil sometimes is not only begun, but almost completed, before they are in +a situation to turn the current into a contrary progression: the extremes +are also too remote from the usual seat of government, and the laws, +therefore, too feeble to afford protection to all its parts, and insure +_domestic tranquility_ without the aid of another principle. If, +therefore, this state, and that of North Carolina, had an army under their +control, they never would have lost Vermont, and Frankland, nor the state +of Massachusetts suffer an insurrection, or the dismemberment of her +fairest district, but the exercise of a principle which would have +prevented these things, if we may believe the experience of ages, would +have ended in the destruction of their liberties. + +Will this consolidated republic, if established, in its exercise beget +such confidence and compliance, among the citizens of these states, as to +do without the aid of a standing army? I deny that it will. The +malcontents in each state, who will not be a few, nor the least important, +will be exciting factions against it--the fear of a dismemberment of some +of its parts, and the necessity to enforce the execution of revenue laws +(a fruitful source of oppression) on the extremes and in the other +districts of the government, will incidentally and necessarily require a +permanent force, to be kept on foot: will not political security, and even +the opinion of it, be extinguished? Can mildness and moderation exist in a +government where the primary incident in its exercise must be force? Will +not violence destroy confidence, and can equality subsist where the +extent, policy, and practice of it will naturally lead to make odious +distinctions among citizens? + +The people who may compose this national legislature from the southern +states, in which, from the mildness of the climate, the fertility of the +soil, and the value of its productions, wealth is rapidly acquired, and +where the same causes naturally lead to luxury, dissipation, and a passion +for aristocratic distinction; where slavery is encouraged, and liberty of +course less respected and protected; who know not what it is to acquire +property by their own toil, nor to economize with the savings of +industry--will these men, therefore, be as tenacious of the liberties and +interests of the more northern states, where freedom, independence, +industry, equality and frugality are natural to the climate and soil, as +men who are your own citizens, legislating in your own state, under your +inspection, and whose manners and fortunes bear a more equal resemblance +to your own? + +It may be suggested, in answer to this, that whoever is a citizen of one +state is a citizen of each, and that therefore he will be as interested in +the happiness and interest of all, as the one he is delegated from; but +the argument is fallacious, and, whoever has attended to the history of +mankind, and the principles which bind them together as parents, citizens, +or men, will readily perceive it. These principles are, in their exercise, +like a pebble cast on the calm surface of a river--the circles begin in the +center, and are small, active, and forcible, but as they depart from that +point, they lose their force, and vanish into calmness. + +The strongest principle of union resides within our domestic walls. The +ties of the parent exceed that of any other; as we depart from home, the +next general principle of union is amongst citizens of the same state, +where acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, nourish affection, and +attachment; enlarge the circle still further, and, as citizens of +different states, though we acknowledge the same national denomination, we +lose in the ties of acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, and thus by +degrees we lessen in our attachments, till, at length, we no more than +acknowledge a sameness of species. Is it, therefore, from certainty like +this, reasonable to believe, that inhabitants of Georgia, or New +Hampshire, will have the same obligations towards you as your own, and +preside over your lives, liberties, and property, with the same care and +attachment? Intuitive reason answers in the negative. + +In the course of my examination of the principles of consolidation of the +states into one general government, many other reasons against it have +occurred, but I flatter myself, from those herein offered to your +consideration, I have convinced you that it is both presumptuous and +impracticable, consistent with your safety. To detain you with further +remarks would be useless. I shall, however, continue in my following +numbers to analyse this new government, pursuant to my promise. + +CATO. + + + + +Cato, IV. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2140) + +THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1787. + +For the New York Journal. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: + +Admitting, however, that the vast extent of America, together with the +various other reasons which I offered you in my last number, against the +practicability of the just exercise of the new government are insufficient +to convince; still it is an undesirable truth, that its several parts are +either possessed of principles, which you have heretofore considered as +ruinous and that others are omitted which you have established as +fundamental to your political security, and must in their operation, I +will venture to assert, fetter your tongues and minds, enchain your +bodies, and ultimately extinguish all that is great and noble in man. + +In pursuance of my plan I shall begin with observations on the executive +branch of this new system; and though it is not the first in order, as +arranged therein, yet being the _chief_, is perhaps entitled by the rules +of rank to the first consideration. The executive power as described in +the 2d article, consists of a president and vice-president, who are to +hold their offices during the term of four years; the same article has +marked the manner and time of their election, and established the +qualifications of the president; it also provides against the removal, +death, or inability of the president and vice-president--regulates the +salary of the president, delineates his duties and powers; and, lastly, +declares the causes for which the president and vice-president shall be +removed from office. + +Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the gentlemen who +composed the convention, it may be here remarked with deference, that the +construction of the first paragraph of the first section of the second +article is vague and inexplicit, and leaves the mind in doubt as to the +election of a president and vice-president, after the expiration of the +election for the first term of four years; in every other case, the +election of these great officers is expressly provided for; but there is +no explicit provision for their election in case of expiration of their +offices, subsequent to the election which is to set this political machine +in motion; no certain and express terms as in your state constitution, +that _statedly_ once in every four years, and as often as these offices +shall become vacant, by expiration or otherwise, as is therein expressed, +an election shall be held as follows, &c., this inexplicitness perhaps may +lead to an establishment for life. + +It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, that _in all +magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated by the +brevity of the duration, and that a longer time than a year would be +dangerous_. It is, therefore, obvious to the least intelligent mind to +account why great power in the hands of a magistrate, and that power +connected with considerable duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of +a republic, the deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single +magistrate, enables him in their exercise to create a numerous train of +dependents; this tempts his _ambition_, which in a republican magistrate +is also remarked, _to be pernicious_, and the duration of his office for +any considerable time favors his views, gives him the means and time to +perfect and execute his designs, _he therefore fancies that he may be +great and glorious by oppressing his fellow-citizens, and raising himself +to permanent grandeur on the ruins of his country_. And here it may be +necessary to compare the vast and important powers of the president, +together with his continuance in office, with the foregoing doctrine--his +eminent magisterial situation will attach many adherents to him, and he +will be surrounded by expectants and courtiers, his power of nomination +and influence on all appointments, the strong posts in each state +comprised within his superintendence, and garrisoned by troops under his +direction, his control over the army, militia, and navy, the unrestrained +power of granting pardons for treason, which may be used to screen from +punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and +thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt, his duration in office for +four years: these, and various other principles evidently prove the truth +of the position, that if the president is possessed of ambition, he has +power and time sufficient to ruin his country. + +Though the president, during the sitting of the legislature, is assisted +by the senate, yet he is without a constitutional council in their recess; +he will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and +will generally be directed by minions and favorites, or a council of state +will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments, the most +dangerous council in a free country. + +The ten miles square, which is to become the seat of government, will of +course be the place of residence for the president and the great officers +of state; the same observations of a great man will apply to the court of +a president possessing the powers of a monarch, that is observed of that +of a monarch--_ambition with idleness_--_baseness with pride_--_the thirst of +riches without labor_--_aversion to +truth_--_flattery_--_treason_--_perfidy_--_violation of engagements_--_contempt +of civil duties_--_hope from the magistrate's weakness_; _but above all, +the perpetual ridicule of virtue_--these, he remarks, are the +characteristics by which the courts in all ages have been distinguished. + +The language and the manners of this court will be what distinguishes them +from the rest of the community, not what assimilates them to it; and in +being remarked for a behavior that shows they are not _meanly born_, and +in adulation to people of fortune and power. + +The establishment of a vice-president is as unnecessary as it is +dangerous. This officer, for want of other employment, is made president +of the senate, thereby blending the executive and legislative powers, +besides always giving to some one state, from which he is to come, an +unjust pre-eminence. + +It is a maxim in republics that the representative of the people should be +of their immediate choice; but by the manner in which the president is +chosen, he arrives to this office at the fourth or fifth hand, nor does +the highest vote, in the way he is elected, determine the choice, for it +is only necessary that he should be taken from the highest of five, who +may have a plurality of votes. + +Compare your past opinions and sentiments with the present proposed +establishment, and you will find, that if you adopt it, that it will lead +you into a system which you heretofore reprobated as odious. Every +American Whig, not long since, bore his emphatic testimony against a +monarchical government, though limited, because of the dangerous +inequality that it created among citizens as relative to their rights and +property; and wherein does this president, invested with his powers and +prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great Britain (save as +to name, the creation of nobility, and some immaterial incidents, the +offspring of absurdity and locality). The direct prerogatives of the +president, as springing from his political character, are among the +following: It is necessary, in order to distinguish him from the rest of +the community, and enable him to keep, and maintain his court, that the +compensation for his services, or in other words, his revenue, should be +such as to enable him to appear with the splendor of a prince; he has the +power of receiving ambassadors from, and a great influence on their +appointments to foreign courts; as also to make treaties, leagues, and +alliances with foreign states, assisted by the Senate, which when made +become the supreme law of land: he is a constituent part of the +legislative power, for every bill which shall pass the House of +Representatives and Senate is to be presented to him for approbation; if +he approves of it he is to sign it, if he disapproves he is to return it +with objections, which in many cases will amount to a complete negative; +and in this view he will have a great share in the power of making peace, +coining money, etc., and all the various objects of legislation, expressed +or implied in this Constitution: for though it may be asserted that the +king of Great Britain has the express power of making peace or war, yet he +never thinks it prudent to do so without the advice of his Parliament, +from whom he is to derive his support, and therefore these powers, in both +president and king, are substantially the same: he is the generalissimo of +the nation, and of course has the command and control of the army, navy +and militia; he is the general conservator of the peace of the union--he +may pardon all offences, except in cases of impeachment, and the principal +fountain of all offices and employments. Will not the exercise of these +powers therefore tend either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary +aristocracy or monarchy? The safety of the people in a republic depends on +the share or proportion they have in the government; but experience ought +to teach you, that when a man is at the head of an elective government +invested with great powers, and interested in his re-election, in what +circle appointments will be made; by which means an _imperfect +aristocracy_ bordering on monarchy may be established. + +You must, however, my countrymen, beware that the advocates of this new +system do not deceive you by a fallacious resemblance between it and your +own state government which you so much prize; and, if you examine, you +will perceive that the chief magistrate of this state is your immediate +choice, controlled and checked by a just and full representation of the +people, divested of the prerogative of influencing war and peace, making +treaties, receiving and sending embassies, and commanding standing armies +and navies, which belong to the power of the confederation, and will be +convinced that this government is no more like a true picture of your own +than an Angel of Darkness resembles an Angel of Light. + +CATO. + + + + +Cato, V. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2145) + +THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1787. + +For the New York Journal, &c. + +_To the_ CITIZENS _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK. + +In my last number I endeavored to prove that the language of the article +relative to the establishment of the executive of this new government was +vague and inexplicit; that the great powers of the president, connected +with his duration in office, would lead to oppression and ruin; that he +would be governed by favorites and flatterers, or that a dangerous council +would be collected from the great officers of state; that the ten miles +square, if the remarks of one of the wisest men, drawn from the experience +of mankind, may be credited, would be the asylum of the base, idle, +avaricious and ambitious, and that the court would possess a language and +manners different from yours; that a vice-president is as unnecessary as +he is dangerous in his influence; that the president cannot represent you +because he is not of your own immediate choice; that if you adopt this +government you will incline to an arbitrary and odious aristocracy or +monarchy; that the president, possessed of the power given him by this +frame of government, differs but very immaterially from the establishment +of monarchy in Great Britain; and I warned you to beware of the fallacious +resemblance that is held out to you by the advocates of this new system +between it and your own state governments. + +And here I cannot help remarking that inexplicitness seems to pervade this +whole political fabric; certainly in political compacts, which Mr. Coke +calls _the mother and nurse of repose and quietness_ the want of which +induced men to engage in political society, has ever been held by a wise +and free people as essential to their security; as on the one hand it +fixes barriers which the ambitious and tyrannically disposed magistrate +dare not overleap, and on the other, becomes a wall of safety to the +community--otherwise stipulations between the governors and governed are +nugatory; and you might as well deposit the important powers of +legislation and execution in one or a few and permit them to govern +according to their disposition and will; but the world is too full of +examples, which prove that _to live by one man's will became the cause of +all men's misery_. Before the existence of express political compacts it +was reasonably implied that the magistrate should govern with wisdom and +justice; but mere implication was too feeble to restrain the unbridled +ambition of a bad man, or afford security against negligence, cruelty or +any other defect of mind. It is alleged that the opinions and manners of +the people of America are capable to resist and prevent an extension of +prerogative or oppression, but you must recollect that opinion and manners +are mutable, and may not always be a permanent obstruction against the +encroachments of government; that the progress of a commercial society +begets luxury, the parent of inequality, the foe to virtue, and the enemy +to restraint; and that ambition and voluptuousness, aided by flattery, +will teach magistrates where limits are not explicitly fixed to have +separate and distinct interests from the people; besides, it will not be +denied that government assimilates the manners and opinions of the +community to it. Therefore, a general presumption that rulers will govern +well is not a sufficient security. You are then under a sacred obligation +to provide for the safety of your posterity, and would you now basely +desert their interests, when by a small share of prudence you may transmit +to them a beautiful political patrimony, which will prevent the necessity +of their travelling through seas of blood to obtain that which your wisdom +might have secured? It is a duty you owe likewise to your own reputation, +for you have a great name to lose; you are characterized as cautious, +prudent and jealous in politics; whence is it therefore that you are about +to precipitate yourselves into a sea of uncertainty, and adopt a system so +vague, and which has discarded so many of your valuable rights? Is it +because you do not believe that an American can be a tyrant? If this be +the case, you rest on a weak basis: Americans are like other men in +similar situations, when the manners and opinions of the community are +changed by the causes I mentioned before; and your political compact +inexplicit, your posterity will find that great power connected with +ambition, luxury and flattery, will as readily produce a Caesar, Caligula, +Nero and Domitian in America, as the same causes did in the Roman Empire. + +But the next thing to be considered, in conformity to my plan, is the +first article of this new government, which comprises the erection of the +house of representatives and the senate, and prescribes their various +powers and objects of legislation. The most general objections to the +first article, that biennial elections for representatives are a departure +from the safe democratic principles of annual ones--that the number of +representatives are too few; that the apportionment and principles of +increase are unjust; that no attention has been paid to either the numbers +or property in each state in forming the senate; that the mode in which +they are appointed and their duration will lead to the establishment of an +aristocracy; that the senate and president are improperly connected, both +as to appointments and the making of treaties, which are to become the +supreme law of the land; that the judicial, in some measure, to wit, as to +the trial of impeachments, is placed in the senate, a branch of the +legislative, and sometimes a branch of the executive; that Congress have +the improper power of making or altering the regulations prescribed by the +different legislatures, respecting the time, place and manner of holding +elections for representatives, and the time and manner of choosing +senators; that standing armies may be established, and appropriation of +money made for their support for two years; that the militia of the most +remote state may be marched into those states situated at the opposite +extreme of this continent; that the slave trade is, to all intents and +purposes, permanently established, and a slavish capitation or poll-tax +may at any time be levied; these are some of the many evils that will +attend the adoption of this government. + +But, with respect to the first objection, it may be remarked that a +well-digested democracy has this advantage over all others, to wit: that +it affords to many the opportunity to be advanced to the supreme command, +and the honors they thereby enjoy fill them with a desire of rendering +themselves worthy of them; hence this desire becomes part of their +education, is matured in manhood, and produces an ardent affection for +their country, and it is the opinion of the great Sidney and Montesquieu +that this is, in a great measure, produced by annual election of +magistrates. + +If annual elections were to exist in this government, and learning and +information to become more prevalent, you never would want men to execute +whatever you could design. Sidney observes _that a well-governed state is +as fruitful to all good purposes as the seven-headed serpent is said to +have been in evil; when one head is cut off, many rise up in the place of +it_. He remarks further that _it was also thought that free cities, by +frequent election of magistrates, became nurseries of great and able men, +every man endeavoring to excel others, that he might be advanced to the +honor he had no other title to, than what might arise from his merit or +reputation_; but the framers of this _perfect government_, as it is +called, have departed from this democratical principle, and established +biennial elections for the house of representatives, who are to be chosen +by the people, and sextennial for the senate, who are to be chosen by the +legislatures of the different states, and have given to the executive the +unprecedented power of making temporary senators, in case of vacancies by +resignation or otherwise, and so far forth establishing a precedent for +virtual representation (though, in fact, their original appointment is +virtual), thereby influencing the choice of the legislatures, or if they +should not be so complaisant as to conform to his appointment, offence +will be given to the executive, and the temporary members will appear +ridiculous by rejection; this temporary member, during his time of +appointment, will of course act by a power derived from the executive, and +for, and under his immediate influence. + +It is a very important objection to this government, that the +representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of +corruption, and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments +ought to take precautions--how guarded you have been on this head, in your +own state constitution, and yet the number of senators and representatives +proposed for this vast continent does not equal those of your own state; +how great the disparity, if you compare them with the aggregate numbers in +the United States. The history of representation in England, from which we +have taken our model of legislation, is briefly this: before the +institution of legislating by deputies, the whole free part of the +community usually met for that purpose; when this became impossible, by +the increase of numbers, the community was divided into districts, from +each of which was sent such a number of deputies as was a complete +representation of the various numbers and orders of citizens within them; +but can it be asserted with truth, that six men can be a complete and full +representation of the numbers and various orders of the people in this +state? Another thing that may be suggested against the small number of +representatives is, that but few of you will have a chance of sharing even +in this branch of the legislature; and that the choice will be confined to +a very few. The more complete it is, the better will your interests be +preserved, and the greater the opportunity you will have to participate in +government, one of the principal securities of a free people; but this +subject has been so ably and fully treated by a writer under the signature +of Brutus,(54) that I shall content myself with referring you to him +thereon, reserving further observations on the other objections I have +mentioned, for my future numbers. + +CATO. + + + + +Cato, VI. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2163) + +THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1787. + +For the New York Journal, &c. + +_To the_ PEOPLE _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK. + +The next objection that arises against this proffered constitution is, +that the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes are unjust. The +words, as expressed in this article, are "representatives and direct taxes +shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included in +this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be +determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those +bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, +three-fifths of all other persons." In order to elucidate this, it will be +necessary to repeat the remark in my last number, that the mode of +legislation in the infancy of free communities was by the collective body, +and this consisted of free persons, or those whose age admitted them to +the right of mankind and citizenship, whose sex made them capable of +protecting the state, and whose birth may be denominated Free Born; and no +traces can be found that ever women, children, and slaves, or those who +were not sui juris, in the early days of legislation, meeting with the +free members of the community to deliberate on public measures; hence is +derived this maxim in free governments, that representation ought to bear +a proportion to the number of free inhabitants in a community; this +principle your own state constitution, and others, have observed in the +establishment of a future census, in order to apportion the +representatives, and to increase or diminish the representation to the +ratio of the increase or diminution of electors. But, what aid can the +community derive from the assistance of women, infants and slaves, in +their deliberation, or in their defence? and what motives, therefore, +could the convention have in departing from the just and rational +principle of representation, which is the governing principle of this +state and of all America? + +The doctrine of taxation is a very important one, and nothing requires +more wisdom and prudence than the regulation of that portion, which is +taken from, and of that which is left to the subject--and if you anticipate +what will be the enormous expense of this new government added also to +your own, little will that portion be which will be left to you. I know +there are politicians who believe that you should be loaded with taxes, in +order to make you industrious, and, perhaps, there are some of this +opinion in the convention, but it is an erroneous principle. For, what can +inspire you with industry, if the greatest measure of your labors are to +be swallowed up in taxes? The advocates for this new system hold out an +idea, that you will have but little to pay, for that the revenues will be +so managed as to be almost wholly drawn from the source of trade or duties +on imports, but this is delusive--for this government to discharge all its +incidental expenses, besides paying the interest on the home and foreign +debts, will require more money than its commerce can afford; and if you +reflect one moment, you will find, that if heavy duties are laid on +merchandise, as must be the case if government intends to make this the +prime medium to lighten the people of taxes, that the price of the +commodities, useful as well as luxurious, must be increased; the consumers +will be fewer; the merchants must import less; trade will languish, and +this source of revenue in a great measure be dried up; but if you examine +this a little further you will find that this revenue, managed in this +way, will come out of you, and be a very heavy and ruinous one, at least. +The merchant no more than advances the money for you to the public and +will not, nor cannot pay any part of it himself; and if he pays more +duties, he will sell his commodities at a price portionably raised. Thus +the laborer, mechanic, and farmer must feel it in the purchase of their +utensils and clothing--wages, etc., must rise with the price of things or +they must be ruined; and that must be the case with the farmer, whose +produce will not increase, in the ratio, with labor, utensils and +clothing; for that he must sell at the usual price or lower perhaps, +caused by the decrease of trade; the consequence will be that he must +mortgage his farm, and then comes inevitable bankruptcy. + +In what manner then will you be eased, if the expenses of government are +to be raised solely out of the commerce of this country; do you not +readily apprehend the fallacy of this argument? But government will find +that to press so heavily on commerce will not do, and therefore must have +recourse to other objects; these will be a capitation or poll-tax, window +lights, etc., etc., and a long train of impositions which their ingenuity +will suggest; but will you submit to be numbered like the slaves of an +arbitrary despot; and what will be your reflections when the tax-master +thunders at your door for the duty on that light which is the bounty of +heaven. It will be the policy of the great landholders who will chiefly +compose this senate, and perhaps a majority of this house of +representatives, to keep their lands free from taxes; and this is +confirmed by the failure of every attempt to lay a land-tax in this state; +hence recourse must and will be had to the sources I mentioned before. The +burdens on you will be insupportable--your complaints will be +inefficacious--this will beget public disturbances; and I will venture to +predict, without the spirit of prophecy, that you and the government, if +it is adopted, will one day be at issue on this point. The force of +government will be exerted, this will call for an increase of revenue, and +will add fuel to the fire. The result will be that either you will revolve +to some other form, or that government will give peace to the country by +destroying the opposition. If government therefore can, notwithstanding +every opposition, raise a revenue on such things as are odious and +burdensome to you, they can do anything. + +But why should the number of individuals be the principle to apportion the +taxes in each state, and to include in that number women, children and +slaves? The most natural and equitable principle of apportioning taxes +would be in a ratio to their property, and a reasonable impost in a ratio +to their trade; but you are told to look for the reason of these things in +accommodation; but this much-admired principle, when stripped of its +mystery, will in this case appear to be no less than a basis for an odious +poll-tax--the offspring of despotic governments, a thing so detestable that +the state of Maryland, in their bill of rights, declares "that the levying +taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be abolished." +A poll-tax is at all times oppressive to the poor, and their greatest +misfortune will consist in having more prolific wives than the rich. + +In every civilized community, even in those of the most democratic kind, +there are principles which lead to an aristocracy--these are superior +talents, fortunes and public employments. But in free governments the +influence of the two former is resisted by the equality of the laws, and +the latter by the frequency of elections, and the chance that every one +has in sharing in public business; but when this natural and artificial +eminence is assisted by principles interwoven in this government; when the +senate, so important a branch of the legislature, is so far removed from +the people as to have little or no connection with them; when their +duration in office is such as to have the resemblance to perpetuity; when +they are connected with the executive, by the appointment of all officers, +and also to become a judiciary for the trial of officers of their own +appointments; added to all this, when none but men of opulence will hold a +seat, what is there left to resist and repel this host of influence and +power? Will the feeble efforts of the house of representatives, in whom +your security ought to subsist, consisting of about seventy-three, be able +to hold the balance against them, when, from the fewness of members in +this house, the senate will have in their power to poison even a majority +of that body by douceurs of office for themselves or friends? From causes +like this both Montesquieu and Hume have predicted the decline of the +British government into that of an absolute one; but the liberties of this +country, it is probable, if this system is adopted, will be strangled in +their birth; for whenever the executive and senate can destroy the +independence of the majority in the house of representatives, then where +is your security? They are so intimately connected, that their interests +will be one and the same; and will the slow increase of numbers be able to +afford a repelling principle? But you are told to adopt this government +first, and you will always be able to alter it afterwards; this would +first be submitting to be slaves and then taking care of your liberty; and +when your chains are on, then to act like freemen. + +Complete acts of legislation, which are to become the supreme law of the +land, ought to be the united act of all the branches of government; but +there is one of the most important duties may be managed by the Senate and +executive alone, and to have all the force of the law paramount without +the aid or interference of the House of Representatives; that is the power +of making treaties. This power is a very important one, and may be +exercised in various ways, so as to affect your person and property, and +even the domain of the nation. By treaties you may defalcate part of the +empire; engagements may be made to raise an army, and you may be +transported to Europe, to fight the wars of ambitious princes; money may +be contracted for, and you must pay it; and a thousand other obligations +may be entered into; all which will become the supreme law of the land, +and you are bound by it. If treaties are erroneously or wickedly made who +is there to punish,--the executive can always cover himself with the plea +that he was advised by the senate, and the senate being a collective body +are not easily made accountable for mal-administration. On this account we +are in a worse situation than Great Britain, where they have secured by a +ridiculous fiction, the king from accountability, by declaring that he can +do no wrong, by which means the nation can have redress against his +minister; but with us infallibility pervades every part of the system, and +neither the executive nor his council, who are a collective body, and his +advisers, can be brought to punishment for mal-administration. + +CATO. + + + + +Cato, VII. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2181) + +THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 1788. + +For the New York Journal, &c. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. + +That the president and senate are further improperly connected will +appear, if it is considered that their dependence on each other will +prevent either from being a check upon the other; they must act in +concert, and whether the power and influence of the one or the other is to +prevail, will depend on the character and abilities of the men who hold +those offices at the time. The senate is vested with such a proportion of +the executive that it would be found necessary that they should be +constantly sitting. This circumstance did not escape the convention, and +they have provided for the event, in the 2d article, which declares that +the executive may, on extraordinary occasions, _convene both houses or +either of them_. No occasion can exist for calling the assembly without +the senate; the words _or either of them_ must have been intended to apply +only to the senate. Their wages are already provided for, and it will be +therefore readily observed that the partition between a perpetuation of +their sessions, and a perpetuation of offices in the progress of the +government, will be found to be but thin and feeble. Besides, the senate, +who have the sole power to try all impeachments, in case of the +impeachment of the president are to determine, as judges, the propriety of +the advice they gave him as senators. Can the senate in this, therefore, +be an impartial judicature? And will they not rather serve as a screen to +great public defaulters? + +Among the many evils that are incorporated in this new system of +government is that of congress having the power of making or altering the +regulations prescribed by the different legislatures respecting the time, +place and manner of holding elections for representatives, and the time +and manner of choosing senators. If it is enquired in what manner this +regulation may be exercised to your injury, the answer is easy. By the +first article the house of representatives shall consist of members, +chosen every second year by the people of the several states who are +qualified to vote for members of their several state assemblies; it can +therefore readily be believed, that the different state legislatures, +provided such can exist after the adoption of this government, will +continue those easy and convenient modes for the election of +representatives for the national legislature that are in use for the +election of members of assembly for their own states; but the congress +have, by the constitution, a power to make other regulations or alter +those in practice, prescribed by your own state legislatures; hence, +instead of having the places of elections in the precincts and brought +home almost to your own doors, congress may establish a place, or places, +at either the extremes, center or outer parts of the states; at a time and +season, too, when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these +means destroy the rights of election. But in opposition to this reasoning, +it is asserted, that it is a necessary power, because the states might +omit making rules for the purpose, and thereby defeat the existence of +that branch of the government; this is what logicians call _argumentum +absurdum_; for the different states, if they will have any security at all +in this government, will find it in the house of representatives, and +they, therefore, would be very ready to eradicate a principle in which it +dwells, or involve their country in an instantaneous revolution. Besides, +if this was the apprehension of the framers, and the ground of that +provision, why did not they extend this controlling power to the other +duties of the several state legislatures? To exemplify this, the states +are to appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president; but the +time is to be under the direction of congress. Now, suppose they were to +omit the appointment of senators and electors, though congress was to +appoint the time, which might well be apprehended, as the omission of +regulations for the election of members of the house of representatives, +provided they had that power; or suppose they were not to meet at all; of +course, the government cannot proceed in its exercise. And from this +motive or apprehension, congress ought to have taken these duties entirely +in their own hands, and, by a decisive declaration, annihilated them, +which they in fact have done by leaving them without the means of support, +or at least resting on their bounty. To this the advocates for this system +oppose the common, empty declamation, that there is no danger that +congress will abuse this power; but such language, as relative to so +important a subject, is mere vapor, and formed without sense. Is it not in +their power, however, to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to +you? It must be admitted, because the words are unlimited in their sense. +It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, to suppose that what +may be done will be; therefore, in considering this subject, you are to +suppose that in the exercise of this government, a regulation of congress +will be made for holding an election for the whole state at Poughkeepsie, +at New York, or, perhaps, at Fort Stanwix; who will then be the actual +electors for the house of representatives? You ought certainly to have as +much or more distrust with respect to the exercise of these powers by +congress, than congress ought to have with respect to the exercise of +those duties which ought to be entrusted to the several states, because +over them congress can have a legislative controlling power. + +Hitherto we have tied up our rulers in the exercise of their duties by +positive restrictions; if the cord has been drawn too tight, loosen it to +the necessary extent, but do not entirely unbind them. I am no enemy to +placing a reasonable confidence in them, but such an unbounded one as the +advocates and framers of this new system advise you to, would be dangerous +to your liberties; it has been the ruin of other governments, and will be +yours, if you adopt with all its latitudinal power. Unlimited power in +governors as well as individuals is frequently the parent of deception. +What facilitated the corrupt designs of Philip of Macedon and caused the +ruin of Athens, but the unbounded confidence in their statesmen and +rulers? Such improper confidence Demosthenes was so well convinced had +ruined his country, that in his second Philippic oration he remarks "that +there is one common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally +provided, the guard and security of all people, particularly of free +states, against the assaults of tyrants. What is this? Distrust. Of this +be mindful; to this adhere; preserve this carefully, and no calamity can +affect you." Montesquieu observes that "the course of government is +attended with an insensible descent to evil, and there is no reascending +to good without very great efforts." The plain influence from this +doctrine is, that rulers in all governments will erect an interest +separate from the ruled, which will have a tendency to enslave them. There +is, therefore, no other way of interrupting this insensible descent and +warding off the evil as long as possible, than by establishing principles +of distrust on your constituents, and cultivating the sentiment among +yourselves. But let me inquire of you, my countrymen, whether the freedom +and independence of elections is a point of magnitude? If it is, what kind +of a spirit of amity, deference and concession is that which has put in +the power of congress, at one stroke, to prevent your interference in +government, and do away your liberties forever? Does either the situation +or circumstances of things warrant it? + +CATO. + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF CAESAR, WRITTEN BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON. + + +Printed In +The Daily Advertiser, +October, 1787. + + + + +Note. + + +These letters, from what has already been quoted on page 245, were +evidently written by Alexander Hamilton. He had just finished a newspaper +controversy of a very acrimonious character with George Clinton, which +probably caused these letters to be an attack on the writer of _Cato_, +rather than a defense of the new government. They are further evidence of +the great want of political tact and sympathy with the masses, of which +Hamilton gave so many specimens in his short life, and which alone +prevented his political success. That he himself realized this mistake is +shown by his prompt abandonment of _Caesar_ and his beginning again anew in +_The Federalist_; the latter being a singular and interesting contrast in +both tone and argument to these earlier writings, which, it should be also +considered, were undoubtedly written in great haste. + + + + +Caesar, I. + + +The Daily Advertiser, (Number 812) + +MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1787. + +The citizens of the State of New York have received yesterday, from _Cato_ +(an ally of _Pompey_, no doubt), an introductory discourse on the +appearance of the new system for the government of the United States: +this, we are told, will be followed by such observations, on the +constitution proposed to the union, "as will promote our welfare and be +justified by reason and truth." There is, in this preparatory lecture, +little that is necessary to be dwelt on just now; and if Cato had not +possessed his future investigations in such terms as wore a _questionable +shape_, they should have passed unheeded. + +Cato tells us that he will not _directly engage as an advocate_ for this +new form of government, or as an _opponent_. Here Cato, without any +dispute, acts prudently. It will be wise in him to rest awhile; since he +has given a _preface_, which, with small address, can easily be made to +work on either side. When the sentiments of the confederate states come to +be generally known it will be time enough to proceed. Cato will then +_start fair_. A little caution, however, he thinks necessary to be given +the meantime. "Do not," says this prudent censor, in addressing the +citizens, "because you will admit that _something_ must be done, adopt +_anything_." What, in the name of common sense, does this injunction +import? I appeal to men of understanding, whether it is not obviously the +language of distrust, calculated, as far as such a thing can influence, to +prejudice the public opinion against the new constitution; and, in effect, +by a periphrastic mode of speech, recommending the rejection of it? +"_Teach_ the members of the Convention (Cato _very modestly_ goes on) that +you are capable of supervision of their conduct; the same medium that gave +you this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is now open, can make +amendments _or give you another_." O excellent thought, and happily +advised! Be clamorous, my friends--be discontented--assert your +prerogative--forever assert the power and _majesty of the people_. I am not +willing to suspect any man's intentions, when they aim at giving +information; but when they come abroad, couched in such _magisterial_ +terms, I own I feel some indignation. If this demagogue had talents to +throw light on the subject of legislation, why did he not offer them when +the Convention was in session? If they had been judged useful, no doubt +they would have been attended to. But is this _now a time_ for such +insinuations? Has not the wisdom of America been drawn, as it were, into a +focus, and the proffered constitution sent forth with a unanimity that is +unequalled in ancient or modern story? And shall we now wrangle and find +fault with the _excellent whole_, because, perhaps some of its parts +_might have been_ more perfect? There is neither virtue or patriotism in +such conduct. Besides, how can Cato say, "that the door is now open to +receive any amendments, or give us _another constitution_, if required?" I +believe he has advanced this without proper authority. I am inclined to +believe that the _door of recommendation is shut and cannot be opened by +the same men_; that the Convention, in one word, is dissolved; if so we +must reject IN TOTO, or _vice versa_; just take it as it is and be +thankful. I deny the similarity betwixt the present constitution and that +of the United Netherlands. Cato would have drawn a very melancholy +picture, but it won't apply. In my most humble opinion, it has a much +greater affinity with the government, which, in all human probability, +will remain when the history of the Seven Provinces shall be forgotten. +Cato tells us (what all America knows by this time) that the new +constitution comes sanctioned with the approbation of General Washington; +and, though he appears to have some reverence for that great patriot +chief, yet he very sagaciously observes, that the _best and wisest man may +err_; and thence asserts, that every man in _politics_, as well as in +religion, ought to judge for himself. This paragraph needs no comment, +and, for that reason, I shall not touch it; but with all deference to +Cato's penetration, I would recommend to him, instead of entering into +fruitless discussion of what has come from so many _clear heads_ and _good +hearts_, to join his fellow-citizens, and endeavor to reconcile this +_excellent constitution_ to the _weak_, the _suspicious_, and the +_interested_, who will be chiefly opposed to it, as soon as possible. I +would also advise him to give his vote (as he will probably be one of the +Electors) to the American Fabius; it will be more healthy for this +country, and _this state_, that he should be induced to accept of the +presidency of the new government, than that he should be solicited again +to accept of the command of _an army_. + +Cato, it appears, intends to adventure on perilous grounds; it will +therefore become him to be cautious on what terms he takes the field. "He +advises us to attach ourselves to measures, and not to men." In this +instance he advises well; and I heartily recommend it to _himself_, and +not to forget the force of that important admonition; for Cato, in his +future marches, will very probably be _followed_ by + +CAESAR. + +Friday. + + + + +Caesar, II. + + +The Daily Advertiser, (Number 826) + +WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1787. + +For the Daily Advertiser. + + + "The great source of all the evils which afflict Republics, is, + that the people are too apt to make choice of rulers, who are + either Politicians without being Patriots, or Patriots without + being Politicians." + + +MR. CHILDS: + +When I took notice of Cato's prefatory address to the Citizens of the +State of New York, in your paper of the first instant, I had no serious +intention of becoming a controversial defendant of the new constitution. +Indeed, if the system required defence, I was neither so weak nor so vain +as to suppose myself competent to the task. To obviate difficulties which +may arise, when such weighty affairs as the principles of legislation are +under discussion, I am sensible requires talents far beyond my limited +abilities. When I offered a few remarks on Cato's introduction, I was +strongly impressed with the idea that even the most substantial +criticisms, promulgated by the most influential _avowed Citizens_, could +have no good tendency at _this time_. I viewed the public mind as wound up +to a great pitch of dissatisfaction, by the inadequacy of the powers of +the present Congress to the general good and conversation of the union. I +believed then, as I do now, that the people were determined and prepared +for a _change_. I conceived, therefore, that the wish of every good man +would be, that _this change might be peaceably effected_. With this view I +opposed myself to Cato. I asserted, in my last, _that the __ door of +recommendation was shut, and cannot be opened by the same men--that the +Convention was dissolved._ If I am wrong, it will be of great importance +to Cato's future remarks that he make it appear. If he will declare from +sufficient authority, that the members of the late Convention have only +adjourned to give time to hear the sentiments of every political +disputant, that after the numerous presses of America have groaned with +the heavy productions of speculative politicians, they will _again meet_, +weigh their respective merits, and accommodate accordingly--I say, if Cato +can do this, I make no hesitation in acknowledging the utility of his +plan. In the mean time, I positively deny having any, the most distant +desire of shutting the door of free discussion, on any subject which may +benefit the people; but I maintain (until Cato's better information +refutes me) that the door, as far as relates to _this subject_, is already +shut, not by me, but by the highest possible authority which the case +admits, even by those great Patriots who were delegated by the people of +the United States to _open such a door_, as might enable them to escape +from impending calamities and political shipwreck. This distinction is +clear, I conceive, and ought to have some weight even with Cato, as well +as those for whom he writes. I am not one of those who gain an influence +by cajoling the unthinking mass (tho' I pity their delusions), and ringing +in their ears the gracious sound of their _absolute Sovereignty_. I +despise the trick of such dirty policy. I know there are Citizens, who, to +gain their own private ends, enflame the minds of the well-meaning, tho' +less intelligent parts of the community, by sating their vanity with that +cordial and unfailing specific, that _all power is seated in the people_. +For my part, I am not much attached to the _majesty of the multitude_, and +therefore waive all pretensions (founded on such conduct), to their +countenance. I consider them in general as very ill qualified to judge for +themselves what government will best suit their peculiar situations; nor +is this to be wondered at. The science of government is not easily +understood. Cato will admit, I presume, that men of good education and +deep reflection, only, are judges of the _form_ of a government; whether +it is constituted on such principles as will restrain arbitrary power, on +the one hand, and equal to the exclusion of corruption and the destruction +of licentiousness on the other; whether the New Constitution, if adopted, +will prove adequate to such desirable ends, time, the mother of events, +will show. For my own part, I sincerely esteem it a system, which, without +the finger of _God_, never could have been suggested and agreed upon by +such a diversity of interests. I will not presume to say that a more +perfect system might not have been fabricated; but who expects perfection +at once? And it may be asked, _who are judges of it_? Few, I believe, who +have leisure to study the nature of Government scientifically, but will +frequently disagree about the quantum of power to be delegated to Rulers, +and the different modifications of it. Ingenious men will give every +plausible, and, it may be, pretty substantial reasons, for the adoption of +two plans of Government, which shall be fundamentally different in their +construction, and not less so in their operation; yet both, if honestly +administered, might operate with safety and advantage. When a new form of +government is fabricated, it lies with the people at large to receive or +reject it--that is, their _inherent rights_. Now, I would ask (without +intending to triumph over the weaknesses or follies of any men), how are +the people to profit by this inherent right? By what conduct do they +discover that they are sensible of their own interests in this situation? +Is it by the exercise of a well-disciplined reason, and a correspondent +education? I believe not. How then? As I humbly conceive, by a tractable +and docile disposition, and by honest men endeavoring to keep their minds +easy, while others, of the same disposition, with the advantages of genius +and learning, are constructing the bark that may, by the blessing of +Heaven, carry them to the port of rest and happiness, if they will embark +without diffidence and proceed without mutiny. I know this is blunt and +ungracious reasoning; it is the best, however, which I am prepared to +offer on this momentous business; and, since my own heart does not +reproach me, I shall not be very solicitous about its reception. If truth, +then, is permitted to speak, the mass of the people of America (any more +than the mass of other countries) cannot judge with any degree of +precision concerning the fitness of this New Constitution to the peculiar +situation of America; they have, however, done wisely in delegating the +power of framing a government to those every way worthy and +well-qualified; and, if this Government is snatched, untasted, from them, +it may not be amiss to inquire into the causes which will probably +occasion their disappointment. Out of several, which present to my mind, I +shall venture to select _one_, baneful enough, in my opinion, to work this +dreadful evil. There are always men in society of some talents, but more +ambition, in quest of _that_ which it would be impossible for them to +obtain in any other way than by working on the passions and prejudices of +the less discerning classes of citizens and yeomanry. It is the plan of +men of this stamp to frighten the people with ideal bugbears, in order to +mould them to their own purposes. The unceasing cry of these designing +croakers is, My friends, your liberty is invaded! Have you thrown off the +yoke of one tyrant to invest yourselves with that of another? Have you +fought, bled and conquered for _such a change_? If you have--go--retire into +silent obscurity, and kiss the rod that scourges you. + +To be serious: These state empirics leave no species of deceit untried to +convince the unthinking people that they have power to do--what? Why truly +to do much mischief, and to occasion anarchy and wild uproar. And for what +reason do these political jugglers incite the peaceably disposed to such +extravagant commotions? Because until the people really discover that they +have _power_, by some outrageous act, they never can become of any +importance. The misguided people never reflect during this frenzy, that +the moment they become riotous, they renounce, from that moment, their +independence, and commence vassals to their ambitious leaders, who +instantly, and with a high hand, rob them of their consequence, and apply +it to their own present or future aggrandisement; nor will these tyrants +over the people stick at sacrificing _their_ good, if an advantageous +compromise can be effected for _themselves_. + +Before I conclude, I cannot refrain from observing that Cato states very +disingenuously the manner in which the Federal System came abroad. He +tells us, Congress were sensible that the late Convention exercised a +power which no authority could delegate to them. The Convention, says +Cato, have taken upon them to make a perfectly new system, which by its +operations will absorb the sovereignties of the individual States; this +new government founded on _usurpation_, (Cato, this expression is very +indecent--but I will rouse no passions against you) this consolidated +system Congress did not approve and _therefore_ have been _silent_ on its +character. That Congress was silent on its character is true, but could +Cato find no other reason for their silence than that of disapprobation? I +believe Congress were by no means dissatisfied with the freedom the +Convention took with the Articles of Confederation; I believe further that +with very few exceptions, that honorable body approves of the New +Constitution; and that they did not accompany it to the States with a +recommendatory capitation or circular letter, proceeded from a delicate +attention to the members of the late Convention, to a few of their own +body, and to the people of America at large. That the Convention went so +earnestly into the business committed to their care ought, instead of +being matter of chagrin, to occasion the liveliest expressions of +approbation and gratitude--as matters stand just now. I think it may be +fairly said, that no _generous plan of government_ for the _United States_ +has ever been constructed, (the plan only excepted which is under +consideration) so that it seems quite unnecessary in Cato to disturb the +peace of society by a bombast appeal to their feelings, on the _generous +plan of power delivered down by their renowned forefathers_. I venerate +the memory of the slaughtered patriots of America, and rejoice as much as +Cato that they did not bleed in vain, but I would have America profit by +their death in a different manner from him. I believe they sought to +obtain liberty for no particular State, but for the whole Union, +indissolubly connected under one controlling and supreme head. + +Cato complains of my anticipating parts of his subject which he intended +for future periods. I shall break in no more upon his _arrangements_. All +he can say against the New Constitution has been already disseminated in a +neighboring State by the glorious defenders of _Shayism_. I shall +therefore leave Cato to the wicked influences of his own heart, in the +fullest persuasion that all good citizens will combine their influence to +establish the fair fabric of American liberty beyond the reach of +suspicion, violence, anarchy, and tyranny. When this glorious work is +accomplished, what may America not hope to arrive at? I will venture to +prophesy that the day on which the Union under the new government shall be +ratified by the American States, that _that day_ will begin an era which +will be recorded and observed by future ages as a day which the Americans +had marked by their wisdom in circumscribing the _power_ and ascertaining +the _decline_ of the ancient nations in Christendom. + +CAESAR. + +October 15. + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF SYDNEY. WRITTEN BY ROBERT YATES. + + +Printed In +The New York Journal, +June, 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +_Sydney_ was a favorite pseudonym of Robert Yates, and was so well known +as his pen name by his contemporaries that it was hardly intended as a +mask. He had already contributed to the New York Journal a very able +series of papers on the Constitution over the signature of _Brutus_, +written to influence the people, but the elections had taken place before +the appearance of _Sydney_, which were therefore intended for the +delegates to the State Convention, soon to assemble. A year later, when +Yates was nominated for governor by the Federalists, quotation from these +articles was one of the favorite modes of attacking him used by the +anti-federalists. + + + + +Sydney, I. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2320) + +Friday, June 13, 1788. + +For the Daily Patriotic Register. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. + +Although a variety of objections to the proposed new constitution for the +government of the United States have been laid before the public by men of +the best abilities, I am led to believe that representing it in a point of +view which has escaped their observation may be of use, that is, by +comparing it with the constitution of the State of New York. + +The following contrast is therefore submitted to the public, to show in +what instances the powers of the state government will be either totally +or partially absorbed, and enable us to determine whether the remaining +powers will, from those kind of pillars, be capable of supporting the +mutilated fabric of a government, which even the advocates for the new +constitution admit excels "the boasted models of Greece or Rome, and those +of all other nations, in having precisely marked out the power of the +government and the rights of the people." + +It may be proper to premise that the pressure of necessity and distress +(and not corruption) had a principal tendency to induce the adoption of +the state constitutions and the existing confederation, that power was +even then vested in the rulers with the greatest caution, and that, as +from every circumstance we have reason to infer that the new constitution +does not originate from a pure source, we ought deliberately to trace the +extent and tendency of the trust we are about to repose, under the +conviction that a reassumption of that trust will at least be difficult, +if not impracticable. If we take a retrospective view of the measures of +Congress who have their secret journals, the conduct of their officers, at +home and abroad, acting under an oath of secrecy, as well as of +individuals who were intimately connected with them, from the year 1780 to +the last convention, who also acted under an injunction of secrecy (and +whose journals have not been published even to this day, but will no doubt +continue buried in the dark womb of suspicious secrecy), we can scarcely +entertain a doubt but that a plan has long since been framed to subvert +the confederation; that that plan has been matured with the most +persevering industry and unremitted attention, and that the objects +expressed in the preamble to the constitution, that is "to promote the +general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our +posterity," were merely the ostensible, and not the real reasons of its +framers. That necessity and danger have been the moving causes to the +establishment of the confederation will appear from the words of Congress +recommending its formation to the several legislatures which are "under a +conviction of the absolute necessity of uniting all our councils and all +our strength to maintain our common liberties. Let them be examined with +liberality becoming brethren and fellow-citizens, surrounded by the same +iminent dangers, contending for the same illustrious prize, and deeply +interested in being forever bound and connected together by the ties the +most intimate and indissoluble." + +That these principles equally applied to the formation of our state +constitution no person can seriously doubt who recollects the rapid +progress of the British troops in this state and in Jersey in the year +1776, and the despondence which prevailed among the people on that +occasion. The convention of this state, about that period, in explaining +to the people the justice of the American cause, addressed them as +follows: "You and all men were created free and authorised to establish +civil government for the preservation of our rights against civil +oppression, and the security of that freedom which God had given you, +against the rapacious hand of tyranny and lawless power. If then God hath +given us freedom, are we not responsible to him for that as well as other +talents? If it is our birth-right, let us not sell it for a mess of +pottage, nor suffer it to be torn from us by the hand of violence." + +The omission of a bill of rights in this State has given occasion to an +inference that the omission was equally warrantable in the constitution +for the United States. On this it may be necessary to observe that while +the constitution of this State was in agitation, there appeared doubts +upon the propriety of the measure, from the peculiar situation in which +the country then was; our connection with Britain dissolved, and her +government formally renounced--no substitute devised--all the powers of +government avowedly temporary, and solely calculated for defence; it was +urged by those in favor of a bill of rights that the power of the rulers +ought to be circumscribed, the better to protect the people at large from +the oppression and usurpation of their rulers. The English petition of +rights, in the reign of Charles the First, and the bill of rights in the +reign of king William, were mentioned as examples to support their +opinions. Those in opposition admitted that in established governments, +which had an implied constitution, a declaration of rights might be +necessary to prevent the usurpation of ambitious men, but that was not our +situation, for upon the declaration of independence it had become +necessary that the exercise of every kind of authority "under the former +government should be totally suppressed, and all the power of government +exerted under the authority of the people of the colonies;" that we could +not suppose that we had an existing constitution or form of government, +express or implied, and therefore our situation resembled a people in a +state of nature, who are preparing "to institute a government, laying its +foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as +to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness," and +as such, the constitution to be formed would operate as a bill of rights. + +These and the like considerations operated to induce the convention of New +York to dismiss the idea of a bill of rights, and the more especially as +the legislative state officers being elected by the people at short +periods, and thereby rendered from time to time liable to be displaced in +case of mal-conduct. But these reasons will not apply to the general +government, because it will appear in the sequel that the state +governments are considered in it as mere dependencies, existing solely by +its toleration, and possessing powers of which they may be deprived +whenever the general government is disposed so to do. If then the powers +of the state governments are to be totally absorbed, in which all agree, +and only differ as to the mode, whether it will be effected by a rapid +progression, or by as certain, but slower, operations: what is to limit +the oppression of the general government? Where are the rights, which are +declared to be incapable of violation? And what security have people +against the wanton oppression of unprincipled governors? No constitutional +redress is pointed out, and no express declaration is contained in it, to +limit the boundaries of their rulers; beside which the mode and period of +their being elected tends to take away their responsibility to the people +over whom they may, by the power of the purse and the sword, domineer at +discretion; nor is there a power on earth to tell them, What dost thou? +or, Why dost thou so? + +I shall now proceed to compare the constitution of the state of New York +with the proposed federal government, distinguishing the paragraphs in the +former, which are rendered nugatory by the latter; those which are in a +great measure enervated, and such as are in the discretion of the general +government to permit or not. + +The 1st and 37th paragraphs of the constitution of the state of New York. + +The 1st "Ordains, determines, and declares that no authority shall on any +pretence whatever be exercised over the people or members of this State, +but such as shall be derived from and granted by them." + +The 37th, "That no purchases or contracts for the sale of lands with or of +the Indians within the limits of this state, shall be binding on the +Indians, or deemed valid, unless made under the authority and with the +consent of the legislature of this state." + +I beg here to observe that the whole history of this spurious constitution +for the government of the United States, from its origin to the present +day, and the measures taken by Congress respecting the Indian affairs in +this state, are a series of violations of these paragraphs, and of the +13th article of the confederation. + +It was a violation of the state constitution for the senate and assembly, +on the 19th of February, 1787, to instruct their members to move in +Congress for an act recommending a convention; and it was also a violation +of the 13th article of the confederation for Congress, on the 21st day +February, to recommend a convention to the several legislatures. It was a +further violation of the constitution of this state, by the senate and +assembly, on the 27th day of March, to join and to appoint delegates to +meet in convention, and it being done in that hasty, if not surreptitious +manner, by joint resolutions, when acts of the least consequence, even for +the yoking of hogs, require to be passed under the formalities of a law, +makes it more glaringly so. + +It was an outrageous violation in the convention on the 17th of September, +1787, to attempt a consolidation of the union, and utterly destroy the +confederation and the sovereignty of particular states, when their powers +were restricted "to the sole and express purpose of revising and amending +the confederation." + +It was again an infringement of the 13th article in the confederation, for +Congress, on the 28th of September, not to arrest and prevent its being +transmitted to the several legislatures; nor was the legislature of this +state less culpable, in the beginning of February, 1788, who, in the +course of three hours, took up and concluded the measure of calling a +convention without apprising their constituents of the danger. + +It is notorious that the right of regulating Indian affairs, especially +with the five nations, has been in the colony of New York since the year +1664, and before that period, from the year 1614, whilst it was called New +Nederland under the Dutch. That by the confederation, although Congress +are invested with the power of regulating the trade and managing all +affairs with the Indians, that they are restricted to those Indians "not +members of any of the states, and a special proviso that the legislative +rights of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated." +It therefore was a violation of the confederation and of the rights of the +state for the congressional commissioners of Indian affairs to treat, at +fort Stanwix, with and thereat to make a purchase from the five nations +without the authority or consent of the legislature of this state. It was +an infraction of the rights of the citizens of this state, and an insult +on their government, for those commissioners to wrest private property +from individuals, imprison their persons, set at defiance the civil +authority of the county of Montgomery, and violently to resist the +execution of legal process. Nor was the ordinance of the 7th of August, +1786, for the regulation of Indian affairs, less so, namely, that "the +Indian department be divided into two districts, viz.: the southern, which +shall comprehend within its limits all the nations in the territory of the +United States, who reside to the southward of the Ohio; and the northern, +which shall comprehend all the nations within the said territory, and +westward, not of lake Ontario, but of Hudson's river; that a +superintendent for the northern districts shall have authority to appoint +two deputies to reside in such places as shall best facilitate the +regulation of the Indian trade; that no person, citizen or other, under +the penalty of five hundred dollars, shall reside among or trade with any +Indian or Indian nations within the territory of the United States, +without a licence for that purpose first obtained from the superintendent +of the district, or of one of the deputies, who is hereby directed to give +such licence to every person who shall produce from the supreme executive +of any state a certificate under the seal of the state, that he is of good +character and suitably qualified and provided for that employment, for +which licence he shall pay for one year the sum of fifty dollars to the +said superintendent for the use of the United States." If this was the +conduct of Congress and their officers, when possessed of powers which +were declared by them to be insufficient for the purposes of government, +what have we reasonably to expect will be their conduct when possessed of +the powers "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the +several states, and with the Indian tribes," when they are armed with +legislative, executive and judicial powers, and their laws the supreme +laws of the land--and when the states are prohibited, without the consent +of Congress, to lay any "imposts or duties on imports," and if they do +they shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States--and all +such laws subject to the revision and controul of Congress. + +It is therefore evident that this state, by adopting the new government, +will enervate their legislative rights, and totally surrender into the +hands of Congress the management and regulation of the Indian trade to an +improper government, and the traders to be fleeced by iniquitous +impositions, operating at one and the same time as a monopoly and a +poll-tax. The deputy by the above ordinance, has a right to exact yearly +fifty dollars from every trader, which Congress may increase to any +amount, and give it all the operation of a monopoly; fifty dollars on a +cargo of 10,000 dollars' value will be inconsiderable, on a cargo of 1000 +dollars burthensome, but on a cargo of 100 dollars will be intolerable, +and amount to a total prohibition, as to small adventurers. + +II, III, IX, XII, AND XXXI. + +The second paragraph provides "that the supreme legislative power within +this state shall be vested in two separate and distinct bodies of men, the +one to be called the assembly, and the other to be called the senate of +the state of New York, who together shall form the legislature." + +The ninth provides "that the assembly shall be the judge of their own +members, and enjoy the same privileges, and proceed in doing business in +like manner as the assembly of the colony of New York of right formerly +did." + +The twelfth paragraph provides "that the senate shall, in like manner, be +judges of their own members," etc. + +The 31st describes even the stile of laws--that the stile of all laws shall +be as follows: "Be it enacted by the people of the state of New York +represented in senate and assembly," and that all writs and proceedings +shall run in the name of the people of the state of New York, and tested +in the name of the chancellor or the chief judge from whence they shall +issue. + +The third provides against laws that may be hastily and inadvertently +passed, inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution and the public +good, and that "the governor, the chancellor and judges of the supreme +court, shall revise all bills about to be passed into laws, by the +legislature." + +The powers vested in the legislature of this state by these paragraphs +will be weakened, for the proposed new government declares that "all +legislative powers therein granted shall be vested in a congress of the +United States, which shall consist of a senate and a house of +representatives," and it further prescribes, that "this constitution and +the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof; +and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the +United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in +every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws +of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; and the members of the +several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both +of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or +affirmation to support this constitution." + +Those who are full of faith, suppose that the words in pursuance thereof +are restrictive, but if they reflect a moment and take into consideration +the comprehensive expressions of the instrument, they will find that their +restrictive construction is unavailing, and this is evinced by 1st art., 8 +sect., where this government has a power "to lay and collect all taxes, +duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common +defence and general welfare of the United States," and also "to make all +laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the +foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the government of the +United States, or in any department or office thereof." + +Art. 1st, sect. 7, provides a qualified negative, that is, that "every +bill which shall be passed [by] the house of representatives and the +senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of +the United States." + +To conclude my observations on this head, it appears to me as impossible +that these powers in the state constitution and those in the general +government can exist and operate together, as it would be for a man to +serve two masters whose interests clash, and secure the approbation of +both. Can there at the same time and place be and operate two supreme +legislatures, executives, and judicials? Will a "guarantee of a republican +form of government to every state in the union" be of any avail, or secure +the establishment and retention of state rights? + +If this guarantee had remained, as it was first reported by the committee +of the whole house, to wit, ... "that a republican constitution, and its +existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each state by the United States," +it would have been substantial; but the changing the word _constitution_ +into the word _form_ bears no favorable appearance. + +IV, V, XII, XVI. + +The fourth provides, "that the assembly of the state of New York shall +consist of at least seventy members, to be annually chosen in the several +counties in certain proportions." The 5th, 12th and 16th, declare that a +census shall be taken every seven years, to regulate the augmentation of +the number seventy, so as not to exceed three hundred. Here seventy +members are divided among the several counties, and consequently into at +least as many poles and sets of members to be annually chosen. If this is +contrasted with the constitution for the federal government--the +constitutional assembly or house of representatives will be found to +consist of sixty-five members divided among thirteen states, to be chosen +every second year. Six for the state of New York; not distributed among +the counties, but by all the counties. And, although "the times, places +and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be +prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof," yet, as it provides +that "Congress may at any time by law, make or alter those regulations, +except as to places of chusing senators"--the power in the state government +to prescribe rules in those cases will be superseded by the executive of +the general government, perhaps to the great inconvenience of the people. + +FROM THE VITH TO THE XIITH. + +The sixth paragraph recites that an opinion hath long prevailed among +divers of the good people of this state that the voting at the election by +ballot would tend more to preserve the liberty and equal freedom of the +people than voting viva voce; to the end, therefore, that a fair +experiment be made which of these two methods of voting is to be +preferred, it declares that after the war elections shall be by ballot. + +The seventh and eighth regulate the freeholds, and what property shall +entitle a man to vote; the ninth, the mode of conducting business in the +assembly, and their privileges; the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth, the +number of the senate, and how and by whom they shall be elected. + +As these clauses regulate the mode of elections and qualifications of the +voters of senate and assembly, a relation of what gave rise to the +provisions for voting by ballot and that of the value of the freehold, +will help to unravel what otherwise may appear mysterious. + +In respect to the first it may be necessary to observe that under the +colonial government there existed violent parties, not known by the name +of whig or tory--republicans and aristocrats. Those who were in the +employments of government, or the _ins_, were for extending the +prerogative of the crown, while the _outs_ were checks to it. Many of the +leaders on both sides were under strong expectations that sooner or later +that branch of colonial government called the king's council would be +erected into a hereditary house of lords. The _ins_ being nearest to the +disposition of the offices of honor and profit, and in the way of +obtaining patents for vacant lands, and being from time to time joined by +other crown officers and dependents, who flocked to and settled in this +colony since the year 1763, had the means of making use of undue influence +to retain their situations, which made the _outs_ at last dispair of ever +having a turn, unless the elections were by ballot. This opinion was +propagated in every part of the colony before and at the time of the +revolution, and so strongly did it operate upon the committee that were +ordered to consider of and report the constitution, that at one time they +had the whole system interwoven in the draft; but either because it would +have made it too lengthy, or that one of the parties were then reduced, +and not likely to rise again into importance, about the time the draft was +reported, it was struck out and was left by the constitution to the +legislature to decide, as experience on the exercise of both principles +should suggest. + +SYDNEY. + + + + +Sydney, II. + + +The New York Journal, (Number 2321) + +SATURDAY, JUNE 14, 1788. + +For the Daily Patriotic Register. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. + +(Concluded from yesterday's paper.) + +As to the value of the freeholds, there has been great diversity of +opinions, for notwithstanding all agreed that the rights and liberties of +a country were ever in danger from the rich and poor, and their safety in +the middle sort or yeomanry of the country, still the difficulty occurred +in establishing the mean. + +While the convention, in 1776, was setting at Harlem, the outlines of a +constitution were handed about, to try, it was supposed, the temper of the +members, in which it was proposed to have a governor, lieutenant governor, +senate, and assembly; the qualification of the governor, lieutenant +governor, and senate, to be that each should possess real estate to the +value of 10,000 pounds, and to be elected by freeholders possessing +freeholds to the value of 1,000 pounds. Although this was not attended +with bad effects, yet the qualifications of the electors gave rise to +various arguments, and, among others, that as taxation and representation +ought to go together, so the right of electing shall be in proportion to +the value of each man's estate. To exemplify this, a man of L100 estate +had one vote; a man of L1000 should have ten, and a man of ten thousand +pounds a hundred, and so on in the same ratio. Others on the contrary +supposed that there ought to be no other criterion than the age of +twenty-one, a citizen born and resident in this country; out of the two +extremes was produced the present system of election and qualification, +both admitted to be as secure and consistent rights as any that have been +contrived. + +It is apprehended, from the duplicity in the wording of 1st art., 4th +sec., that seemingly to leave in the power of the respective legislatures +to regulate the elections, and still, that Congress may at any time by law +make or alter such regulations; and the undesigned wording of the sixth +article, that the constitution and laws of the United States which shall +be made in pursuance thereof shall be the law of the land, anything in the +constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding, will +render the whole system ineffectual, if not nugatory, and a new system as +destructive to the liberties of the citizens as that of the ratio of +voices to the ratio of property introduced. Besides being liable to have +the whole State erected into one district, and consequently may give rise +to the inconveniences I mentioned before. + +VII, SEC. 6; VIII, SEC. 6; IX, SEC. 6; X, SECTION 6; XI, SEC. 6; XII, SEC. +2, 6; XVI, SEC. 6; XIII, XXXV, XLI. + +By the 13th paragraph "no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or +deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to the subjects of the +State by this constitution, unless by the law of the land, or judgment of +its peers." + +The 35th adopts, under certain exceptions and modifications, the common +law of England, the statute law of England and Great Britain, and the acts +of the legislature of the colony, which together formed the law on the +19th of April, 1775. + +The 41st provides that the trial by jury remain inviolate forever; that no +acts of attainder shall be passed by the legislature of this State for +crimes other than those committed before the termination of the present +war. And that the legislature shall at no time hereafter institute any new +courts but such as shall proceed according to the course of the common +law. + +There can be no doubt that if the new government be adopted in all its +latitude, every one of these paragraphs will become a dead letter: nor +will it solve any difficulties, if the United States guarantee "to every +state in the union a republican form of government;" we may be allowed the +form and not the substance, and that it was so intended will appear from +the changing the word _constitution_ to the word _form_ and the omission +of the words, _and its existing laws_. And I do not even think it +uncharitable to suppose that it was designedly done; but whether it was so +or not, by leaving out these words the jurisprudence of each state is left +to the mercy of the new government. By 1st art., 8th sec., 1st clause, +"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts +and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and +general welfare of the United States." + +By the 9th clause of the same section, "To constitute tribunals inferior +to the court." + +By the 18th clause, "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper +for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers +vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in +any department thereof." + +The 3d art., 1st sec., "The judicial power of the United States shall be +vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress +may from time to time ordain and establish." + +By sec. 2nd, "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and +equity." To have in various instances an original and exclusive, in others +a concurrent jurisdiction, and the supreme court in many cases an +appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact. It provides, indeed, that +the trial for crimes shall be by jury, but has left the trial in civil +matters to the mercy of construction and their own legislative sovereign +will and pleasure. + +By the 3d art., 3d sec., "The Congress shall have power to declare the +punishment of treason, but no attainder shall work a corruption of blood +or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." By 1st +art., 9th sec., 3d clause, "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law +shall be passed." + +XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXIII, XL. + +The 17th orders "That the supreme executive power and authority of this +State shall be vested in a governor." By the 18th he is commander-in-chief +of the militia and admiral of the navy of the State; may grant pardons to +all persons convicted of crimes; he may suspend the execution of the +sentence in treason or murder. + +By the 19th paragraph he is to see that the laws and resolutions of the +legislature be faithfully executed. + +By the 27th he is president of the council of appointment, and has a +casting vote and the commissioning of all officers. + +The 20th and 21st paragraphs give the lieutenant-governor, on the death, +resignation, removal from office, or impeachment of the governor, all the +powers of a governor. + +The 40th paragraph orders that the militia at all times, both in peace and +war, shall be armed and disciplined, and kept in readiness; in what manner +the Quakers shall be excused; and that a magazine of warlike stores be +forever kept at the expence of the State, and by act of the legislature, +established, maintained, and continued in every county in the State. + +Whoever considers the following powers vested in the government, and +compares them with the above, must readily perceive they are either all +enervated or annihilated. + +By the 1st art., 8th sec., 15th, 16th and 17th clauses, Congress will be +empowered to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, +suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, +arming and disciplining the militia, for the governing such part of them +as may be employed in the service of the United States, and for the +erection of forts, magazines, etc. + +And by the 2nd art., 2d sec., "The president shall be commander-in-chief +of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the +several States when called into actual service of the United States, +except in cases of impeachment." + +And by the 6th art., "The members of the several state legislatures, and +all the executive and judicial officers; both of the United States, and of +the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the +constitution." Can this oath be taken by those who have already taken one +under the constitution of this state? + +XVIII, SEC. 17; XIX, SEC. 17; XX SEC. 17; XXI, SEC. 17; XXIII, SEC. 17; +XXII TO XXX INCLUSIVE. + +These paragraphs regulate the election, appointment, construction and +duration of all the state, county and district officers, including the +delegates to Congress, and how they severally are to be created and +commissioned. + +The 22d directs that the treasurer shall be appointed by act of the +legislature to originate with the assembly. The 23d establishes a council +to appoint the officers. + +The 24th directs that the military officers shall be, during the pleasure +of the council, the chancellor, judges of the supreme court, the first +judge in every county until the age of 60. + +Twenty-five and 28, which offices are incompatible, and the tenure and +duration of such officers. + +Twenty-six, that sheriffs and coroners be annually appointed, and shall +not continue more than four years. + +Twenty-seven, that the officers of the court be appointed by the +respective courts, except the attorneys, by the first judge of every +court. + +Twenty-nine, provides that town clerks, supervisors, assessors, constables +and collectors, and all other officers heretofore elegible by the people, +shall always continue to be so elegible. + +Thirty, directs the mode how the delegates to represent this state in the +general Congress of the United States shall be elected. + +I apprehend that the paragraphs aforesaid will be compleatly rendered +unoperative by the following articles in the new constitution: + +Second article, second section, second clause, the president "shall have +power, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint +embassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme +court, and all officers of the United States where appointments are not +herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but +the Congress may by law vest the power of such inferior officers as they +think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the +heads of departments." By the 1st art., 8 section, 9, 18 clauses, Congress +have power "to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court, to make +all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution +the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in +the government of the United States, or in any department or officer +thereof." + +By the third article, 2d section, there is an extensive federal power as +above-mentioned. + +By the 2d article, 2d section, the president "shall take care that the +laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the +United States." + +From these powers lodged in Congress and the powers vested in the states, +it is clear that there must be a government within a government, two +legislative, executive and judicial powers. The power of raising an army +in time of peace, and to command the militia, will give the president +ample means to enforce the Supreme laws of the land. + +XXIII, SEC. 21; XXIV, SEC. 21; XXV, SEC. 21; XXVI, SEC. 21; XXVII, SEC. +21; XXVIII, SEC. 21; XXIX, SEC. 21; XXX, SEC. 21; XXXI, SEC. 2; XXXII, +XXXIII, XXXIV. + +The 32d paragraph orders, "That a court shall be instituted for the trial +of impeachments and the correction of errors under the regulations which +shall be established by the legislature, and to consist of the president +of the senate for the time being, and the senators, chancellors and judges +of the supreme court." + +The 33d vests the power of impeaching all officers of the state for mal +and corrupt practice in the representatives of the people in assembly. + +The 34th allows the parties impeached or indicted for crimes and +misdemeanors to have counsel. + +This system is undermined and rendered nugatory by 1st art., 6th and 7th +clauses, where the senate in the new constitution, have the trial and +judgment on all impeachments. + +By 3d art., 2d sec, 3d clause, the trial of all crimes is regulated. + +By the 3d art., 3d sec., it is defined what shall be treason, the proof +required, the punishment, and how the judgment in attainder shall operate. + +XXXIII, SEC. 32; XXXIV, SEC. 32; XXXV, SEC. 13; XXXVII, SEC. 1; XXXVIII, +XXXIX. + +The 38th paragraph provides "that the free exercise and enjoyment of +religious procession and worship, without discrimination or preference, +shall forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind, +provided that the liberty of conscience hereby granted shall not excuse +acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or +safety of the State." + +The 39th provides that "no minister of the gospel, or priest of any +denomination whatsoever, shall at any time hereafter, under any pretence +or description whatever, be eligible to or capable of holding any civil or +military office or place within this state." + +The first of those articles protects us from persecution in religious +matters. The other excludes the clergy from enjoying any office, civil or +military. Two provisions passed by in silence by the framers of the new +constitution; and although possibly the leaders in both have been equally +averse to a democratic system, and have had the same object, the ruin of +state government, in view. + +XLII. + +This paragraph provides "that it shall be in the discretion of the +legislature to naturalize all such persons and in such manner as they +shall think proper." + +The 1st art., 8 sec., 4th clause, give to the new government power to +establish a uniform rule of naturalization. + +And by the 4th art., 2d sec., "the citizens of each state shall be +entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several +states," whereby the clause is rendered entirely nugatory. + +From this contrast it appears that the general government, when compleatly +organized, will absorb all those powers of the state which the framers of +its constitution had declared should be only exercised by the +representatives of the people of the state; that the burthens and expence +of supporting a state establishment will be perpetuated; but its +operations to ensure or contribute to any essential measures promotive of +the happiness of the people may be totally prostrated, the general +government arrogating to itself the right of interfering in the most +minute objects of internal police, and the most trifling domestic concerns +of every state, by possessing a power of passing laws "to provide for the +general welfare of the United States," which may affect life, liberty and +property in every modification they may think expedient, unchecked by +cautionary reservations, and unrestrained by a declaration of any of those +rights which the wisdom and prudence of America in the year 1776 held +ought to be at all events protected from violation. + +In a word, the new constitution will prove finally to dissolve all the +power of the several state legislatures, and destroy the rights and +liberties of the people; for the power of the first will be all in all, +and of the latter a mere shadow and form without substance, and if adopted +we may (in imitation of the Carthagenians) say, Delenda vit Americae. + +SYDNEY. + + + + + +CURSORY REMARKS BY HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE. + + +Printed In +The American Museum, +April, 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +This article first appeared in _The Pittsburgh Gazette_, but as I have not +been able to find a file of that paper, I have been compelled to reprint +it from _The American Museum_. It was anonymous, but its authorship is +settled by its republication in Brackenridge's "_Gazette Publications_," +printed in book form in 1806. + + + + +Cursory Remarks. + + +The American Museum, (Number 4) + +APRIL, 1788. + +It is not my intention to enter largely into a consideration of this plan +of government, but to suggest some ideas in addition to, and of the same +nature with, those already made, showing the imperfections and the danger +of it. + +The first thing that strikes a diligent observer, is the want of +precaution with regard to the _sex_ of the president. Is it provided that +he shall be of the male gender? The Salii, a tribe of the Burgundians, in +the 11th century, excluded females from the sovereignty. Without a similar +exclusion, what shall we think, if, in progress of time, we should come to +have an _old woman_ at the head of our affairs? But what security have we +that he shall be a _white man_? What would be the national disgrace if he +should be elected from one of the southern states, and a _vile negro_ +should come to rule over us? Treaties would then be formed with the tribes +of Congo and Loango, instead of the civilized nations of Europe. But is +there any security that he shall be a _freeman_? Who knows but the +electors at a future period, in days of corruption, may pick up a +man-servant, a convict perhaps, and give him the dominion? Is any care +taken that he shall be of _perfect parts_? Shall we, in affairs of a civil +nature, leave a door open to lame men, bastards, eunuchs, and the devil +knows what? + +A senate is the next great constituent part of the government; and yet +there is not a word said with regard to the ancestry of any of them; +whether they should be altogether Irish, or only Scots Irish. If any of +them have been in the war of the White Boys, the Heart of Oak, or the +like, they may overturn all authority, and make Shilelah the supreme law +of the land. + +The house of representatives is to be so large, that it can never be +built. They may begin it, but it can never be finished. Ten miles square! +Babylon itself, unless the suburbs are taken into view, was not of greater +extent. + +But what avails it to dwell on these things? The want of a _bill of +rights_ is the great evil. There was no occasion for a bill of _wrongs_; +for there will be wrongs enough. But oh! a _bill of rights_! What is the +nature of a bill of rights? "It is a schedule or inventory of those powers +which Congress do not possess." But if it is clearly ascertained what +powers they have, what need of a catalogue of those powers they have not? +Ah! there is the mistake. A minister preaching, undertook, first, to show +what was in his text; second, what was not in it. When it is specified +what powers are given, why not also what powers are not given? A bill of +rights is wanting, and all those things which are usually secured under +it-- + +1. The _rights of conscience_ are swept away. The Confession of Faith, the +Prayer-Book, the Manual and Pilgrim's Progress are to go. The psalms of +Watts, I am told, are the only thing of the kind that is to have any +quarter at all. + +2. The _liberty of the press_--that is gone at the first stroke. Not so +much as an advertisement for a stray horse, or a runaway negro, can be put +in any of the gazettes. + +3. The _trial by jury_--that is knocked in the head, and all that worthy +class of men, the lawyers, who live by haranguing and bending the juries, +are demolished. + +I would submit it to any candid man, if in this constitution there is the +least provision for the privilege of shaving the beard? or is there any +mode laid down to take the measure of a pair of breeches? Whence is it +then, that men of learning seem so much to approve, while the ignorant are +against it? The cause is perfectly apparent, viz., that reason is an +erring guide, while instinct, which is the governing principle of the +untaught, is certain. Put a pig in a poke, carry it half a day's journey +through woods and by-ways, let it out, and it will run home without +deviation. Could Dr. Franklin do this? What reason have we then to suppose +that his judgment, or that of Washington, could be equal to that of Mr. +Smilie(55) in state affairs? + +Were it not on this principle that we are able to account for it, it might +be thought strange that old Livingston,(56) of the Jersies, could be so +hoodwinked as to give his sanction to such a diabolical scheme of tyranny +amongst men--a constitution which may well be called hell-born. For if all +the devils in Pandemonium had been employed about it, they could not have +made a worse. + +Neil MacLaughlin, a neighbor of mine, who has been talking with Mr. +Findley, says that under this constitution all weavers are to be put to +death. What have these innocent manufacturers done that they should be +proscribed? + +Let other states think what they will of it, there is one reason why every +Pennsylvanian should execrate this imposition upon mankind. It will make +his state most probably the seat of government, and bring all the +officers, and cause a great part of the revenue to be expended here. This +must make the people rich, enable them to pay their debts, and corrupt +their morals. Any citizen, therefore, on the Delaware and Susquehannah +waters, ought to be hanged and quartered, that would give it countenance. + +I shall content myself at present with these strictures, but shall +continue them from time to time as occasion may require. + + + + + +LETTER OF CAUTION, WRITTEN BY SAMUEL CHASE. + + +Printed In +THE MARYLAND JOURNAL, +October, 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +The authorship of this essay is fixed upon Chase by a letter of Daniel +Carroll, who in writing to Madison, alludes to both this, and his reply, +printed _post_. Chase was the leader of the Anti-Federalists in Maryland, +but was at first compelled by popular feeling to temporize, as is shown by +the following extracts, taken from the Maryland Journal for September 28, +1787: + + + The following is the conclusion of the speech of Samuel Chase, + Esq., delivered this day, at the Court House, before a numerous + and respectable body of citizens. + + (Published by request of many electors of Baltimore Town.) + + The Constitution proposed by the late Convention, for the United + States, will alter, and in some instances, abolish our Bill of + Rights and Form of Government. The Legislature of this State have + no right to alter our Form of Government, but in the mode + prescribed by the Constitution. The only question for the General + Assembly to determine is this, whether they will recommend to the + people to elect delegates to meet in convention, to consider and + decide on the plan proposed. I have always maintained the Union, + and the increase of powers in Congress. I think the Federal + Government must be greatly altered. I have not formed my opinion, + whether the plan proposed ought to be accepted as it stands, + without any amendment or alteration. The subject is very + momentous, and involves the greatest consequences. If elected, I + will vote for, and use my endeavours to procure a recommendation + by the Legislature to call a convention, as soon as it can + conveniently be done, unless otherways directed by this town. + + _September 26, 1787._ + + Having been informed that my engagements of yesterday, to the + meeting at the Court House, "to vote for, and use my endeavours to + procure a recommendation by the Legislature, to call a convention + as soon as it can conveniently be done," is not understood; from a + desire, if possible, to remove all misunderstanding, I take the + liberty to declare, that by the promise I meant to engage, and + therefore do promise, if elected, that I will use my endeavours to + procure, at the next session of Assembly, and as soon in the + session as the necessary business of the State will permit, a + recommendation by the General Assembly to call a convention, to + consider and decide on the Constitution proposed by the late + Convention for the United States, and to appoint the election of + delegates to the Convention as soon as the convenience of the + people will permit. I further beg leave to add as my opinion, that + the election of delegates to the Convention ought to be as early + in the spring as may be. + + SAMUEL CHASE. + + _Baltimore, September 27, 1787._ + + +There are attacks on Chase, by "Steady" in the _Maryland Journal_ of +September 28, 1787, and by "Spectator," in the _Maryland Journal_ of +October 9, 1787. + + + + +Caution. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 976) + +FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1787. + +TO THE INHABITANTS OF BALTIMORE TOWN, + +An attempt to _surprise_ you into any _public_ measure, ought to meet your +indignation and contempt. When violence or cunning is substituted for +argument and reason, suspicion should take the alarm, and prudence should +dictate the propriety of deliberation. Questions of consequence in private +life ought not to be _hastily_ decided, and with greater reason, +determinations that involve the future felicity of a whole people, ought +not to be taken before the most mature and deliberate consideration, and a +free and full examination of the subject and all its consequences. These +reflections occurred on being informed that some gentlemen of this Town +employ themselves in carrying about and soliciting subscribers to a +petition, addressed to the General Assembly, requesting them to call a +Convention to ratify the new system of government, proposed for the United +States by the late Convention at Philadelphia. If this petition contained +no more, it would not have been worthy of notice; but it publishes to the +world your entire approbation of the New Federal Government, and your +desire that it should be adopted and confirmed by this State, as it +stands, _without any amendment or alteration_. + +The ostensible cause for offering you the petition to sign is, that you +may express your sentiments to the legislature, that they ought to call a +Convention to ratify the new form of government for the United States; but +the real design of the promoters of the petition is to draw you into a +declaration in favour of the _whole_ system, and to bind you hereafter to +support it, which you must do, or allege deception and surprise, if, on +further reflection, you should discover that you rashly gave an opinion +against your real interests. If the _real_ intention of the promoters and +carriers of this petition was _only_ to obtain your opinion in favour of +calling a Convention, it might have been expressed in a _few_ lines; and +no one would oppose such a petition, although improper and unnecessary, +because your Delegates will certainly move for, and exert themselves to +procure, the calling a Convention; and no member of the General Assembly +will deny that, in so doing, your Delegates speak your sentiments. + +In my opinion, it is not necessary or proper for you, _at this time_, to +express your approbation, or disapprobation, of the new constitution for +the United States, for the following reasons: + +First--because the decision, _for_ or _against_ the plan, is of the +greatest consequence, as it involves no less than the happiness or misery +of you and all your posterity forever; and therefore, I think, requires +your dispassionate and most deliberate consideration. Secondly--because you +want information, and have not had time yourselves to examine the proposed +system, and to consider the consequences that may flow from rejecting or +adopting it. Thirdly--because time is not given for your countrymen in +this, and the other States, to consider the subject, and to lay their +sentiments and reasons for or against the measure before you. +Fourthly--because you ought to hear _both_ sides, as the man who determines +on hearing one part only, will almost always be mistaken in his judgment. +He may be in the right, but it will be by _chance_ and not by _reason_. +Fifthly--because you are not pressed in point of time to determine on the +subject; you have at least three months for deliberation; to decide, +therefore, in a few days will be rashness and folly. Sixthly--when men urge +you to determine in _haste_, on so momentous a subject, it is not +_unreasonable_ to require their motives; and it is not _uncharitable_ to +suspect that they are improper; and no possible mischief or inconvenience +can happen from delay. + +_October 11, 1787._ + +CAUTION. + + + + + +LETTER OF A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION, WRITTEN BY DANIEL CARROLL. + + +Printed In +The Maryland Journal, +October, 1787. + + + + +Note. + + +Daniel Carroll wrote Madison that he had replied to Chase's "Caution," and +as this is the only direct reply to that article I have been able to find, +I have ventured to ascribe this to him. The letter is in the Madison +Papers in the Department of State, which at present are restricted from +use, so I am unable to print it here. + + + + +A Friend To The Constitution. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 977) + +TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1787. + +TO THE INHABITANTS OF BALTIMORE TOWN. + +You have been addressed in the last Friday's paper, by a writer under the +signature of _Caution_, who would persuade you that you ought to withhold +your approbation, at this time, from the Federal Constitution recommended +by the Convention. + +This writer may have the best intentions in the world towards the _public +welfare_, and the _prosperity of Baltimore_; but every one must perceive +that he is an enemy to the proposed Constitution, and wishes to prevent +you from expressing yourselves in its favour, not only _at this time_, but +at any _future time_. + +Mr. C---- is said to be the author of this admonition; but that this is a +malicious insinuation, aimed at his sincerity, will appear by considering +his _recent promise_ on this subject, signed and published by himself, in +reference with the resolution of the Convention, upon which that promise +is founded. I shall state both the resolution and promise, that you may +judge for yourselves. + +The resolve of the Convention declares, that the Constitution should be +submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the +people, under the recommendation of its legislature, _for their assent and +ratification_. + +Mr. C---- being called upon, before his election, to declare himself on this +point, promises to the people, "that he will use his endeavours, if +elected, to call a Convention." + +I would just observe on this resolve and promise: First--that the resolve +makes it an _absolute condition_ that the legislature recommend a +Convention _to assent to, and ratify, the Constitution_. Secondly--that the +_promise_ made by Mr. C---- is obligatory upon him, to use his endeavors to +procure a Convention _for this purpose_. + +Another remark, which occurs on this occasion, is, that Mr. C---- could not +mean that a Convention ought to be called _for any other purpose_ than to +assent to, and ratify, the Constitution; for it is absurd to suppose he +meant the Convention should be authorized by the legislature to propose +amendments or alterations, that being _contrary_ to the declared intention +of the resolution, and the sense which his friends entertained of his +engagement at the time he entered into it. Mr. C----, therefore (without +presuming him capable of doing the greatest violence to his promise), +cannot be considered as the _author of Caution_, who argues strenuously, +though indirectly, _against adopting the Constitution_. + +From this brief view of the nature and intention of the resolve, I think +it is evident that the people ought, _without delay_, to signify their +approbation of the Constitution by _a petition to the legislature_, to the +end that the legislature, which is called upon by the Convention and +Congress to recommend to the people to choose Delegates to ratify it, may +have the _authority of the largest and most promising commercial and +manufacturing Town in the State_ to countenance so _important a +recommendation_. But _Caution_ thinks a petition _improper_ and +_unnecessary_; because, says he, "your Delegates will move for, and exert +themselves to procure, the calling a Convention." Admitting your Delegates +to move to have a Convention called, does it follow that they will add to +their motion these _essential words, to confirm and ratify the +Constitution_? Does it not rather appear, from the tenor of this writer's +remarks, that your Delegates ought to leave these words out of their +motion? But the _propriety_ and _necessity_ of a petition does not depend +on what your Delegates may, or may not do. It is _proper_ at this time, +because the Constitution meets your approbation. It is _necessary_ at this +time, because wanted as an inducement to the legislature to call upon the +people to appoint a Convention to carry into effect the object of the +resolution. In other words, as the recommendation for a Convention +_involves the legislature in a complete approbation of the Constitution_, +there is the greatest _propriety_ and _necessity_ for your telling the +legislature _that it meets your approbation_. + +I am sorry to find, by _Caution's_ publication and insinuations, which I +am told are circulated with great industry, that an opposition is opened +against the Constitution. I did not, I confess, expect to see it adopted +without some opposition; but I could not bring myself to believe, that +this opposition could have originated in Baltimore, which is _so +peculiarly interested in its speedy adoption_. But what I intended to say +on this point, is so well expressed in a late speech of Mr. Wilson, to the +people of Philadelphia, previous to their election for representatives, +that I shall take the liberty of closing with it. + +"After all, my fellow-citizens, (says this excellent politician) it is +neither extraordinary nor unexpected, that the Constitution offered to +your consideration should meet with opposition. It is the nature of man to +pursue his own interest in preference to the _public good_; and I do not +mean to make any personal reflection, when I add, that it is _the interest +of a very numerous, powerful and respectable body to counteract and +destroy the excellent work produced by the late Convention_. All the +offices of government, and all the appointments for the administration of +justice, and the collection of the public revenue, which are transferred +from the individual to the aggregate sovereignty of the States, will +necessarily turn the stream of influence and emolument into a new channel. +_Every person, therefore, who either enjoys, or expects to enjoy, a place +of profit under the present establishment, will object to the proposed +innovations, not, in truth, because it is injurious to the liberties of +his country; but because it affects his schemes of wealth and +consequence._ I will confess, indeed, that I am not a blind admirer of +this plan of government, and _that there are some parts of it_, which, if +my wish had prevailed, would certainly have been altered. But, when I +reflect how widely men differ in their opinions, and that every man (and +the observation applies likewise to every state) has an equal pretension +to assert his own, I am satisfied that anything _nearer to perfection_ +could not have been accomplished. If there are errors, _it should be +remembered_, that the seeds of reformation are sown in the work itself, +and the concurrence of two-thirds of the Congress may, at any time, +introduce _alterations and amendments_. Regarding it, then, in every point +of view, with a candid and disinterested mind, I am bold to assert, that +is the _best form of government which has ever been offered to the +world_." + +A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION. + +_Baltimore, October 13, 1787._ + + + + + +THE LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN. + + +Printed In +The Maryland Journal, +January-March, 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +Luther Martin, afterwards nick-named the "bull-dog of federalism," was at +this time the leading Anti-federalist in Maryland. From his pen came the +pamphlet entitled _Genuine Information ... Relative to the Proceedings of +the General Convention_; and when the "Landholder," (see _Ante_, page +135), attacked Elbridge Gerry, he began this series of articles in defense +of that gentleman, but eventually, by the replies, was compelled to +continue the series as a personal vindication. According to a letter of +Daniel Carrol, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer replied in the newspapers to +Martin, but I have not been able to identify this. + +In the _New York Journal_ for June 17, 1788, is a comparison of the +constitution as agreed upon early in the convention, with that finally +framed, which was probably written by Martin. + + + + +Luther Martin, I. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 1004) + +FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1788. + +MR. WILLIAM GODDARD: + +_Sir_, + +As the Publication under the Signature of the Connecticut Landholder is +circulating remote from the place of Mr. Gerry's residence, and is +calculated not only to injure the honourable gentleman in his private +character, but also to weaken the effect of his opposition to the +government proposed by the late convention, and thereby promote the +adoption of a System which I consider destructive of the rights and +liberties of the respective states and of their citizens, I beg leave, +through the channel of your Paper, to declare to the Public that from the +time I took my seat in convention, which was early in June, until the +fourth day of September, when I left Philadelphia, I am satisfied I was +not ten minutes absent from convention while sitting (excepting only five +days in the beginning of August, immediately after the committee of detail +had reported, during which but little business was done). That during my +attendance I never heard Mr. Gerry or any other member introduce a +proposition for the redemption of continental money according to its +nominal or any other value, nor did I ever hear that such a proposition +had been offered to consideration or had been thought of. I was intimate +with Mr. Gerry, and never heard him express, in private conversation or +otherwise, a wish for the redemption of continental money, or assign the +want of such a provision as a defect. Nor did I ever hear in Convention, +or anywhere else, such a motive of conduct attributed to Mr. Gerry. I also +declare to the Public that a considerable time before I left the +convention Mr. Gerry's opposition to the System was warm and decided; that +in a particular manner he strenuously opposed that provision by which the +power and authority over the militia is taken away from the States and +given to the general government; that in the debate he declared if that +measure was adopted it would be the most convincing proof that the +destruction of the State governments and the introduction of a king was +designed, and that no declarations to the contrary ought to be credited, +since it was giving the states the last coup de grace by taking from them +the only means of self preservation. The conduct of the advocates and +framers of this system towards the thirteen States, in pretending that it +was designed for their advantage, and gradually obtaining power after +power to the general government, which could not but end in their slavery, +he compared to the conduct of a number of jockeys who had thirteen young +colts to break; they begin with the appearance of kindness, giving them a +lock of hay, or a handful of oats, and stroaking them while they eat, +until being rendered sufficiently gentle they suffer a halter to be put +round their necks; obtaining a further degree of their confidence, the +jockeys slip a curb bridle on their heads and the bit into their mouths, +after which the saddle follows of course, and well booted and spurred, +with good whips in their hands, they mount and ride them at their +pleasure, and although they may kick and flounce a little at first, nor +being able to get rid of their riders, they soon become as tame and +passive as their masters could wish them. In the course of public debate +in the convention Mr. Gerry applied to the system of government, as then +under discussion, the words of Pope with respect to vice, "that it was a +monster of such horrid mien, as to be hated need but to be seen." And some +time before I left Philadelphia, he in the same public manner declared in +convention that he should consider himself a traitor to his country if he +did not oppose the system there, and also when he left the convention. +These, sir, are facts which I do not fear being contradicted by any member +of the convention, and will, I apprehend, satisfactorily shew that Mr. +Gerry's opposition proceeded from a conviction in his own mind that the +government, if adopted, would terminate in the destruction of the States +and in the introduction of a kingly government. + +I am, sir, your very obedient servant, + +LUTHER MARTIN. + +_Baltimore, January 13, 1788._ + + + + +Luther Martin, II. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 1018) + +FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1788. + +MR. GODDARD: + +_Sir_, + +In consequence of the justice I did Mr. Gerry, on a former occasion, I +find myself complimented with an Address in your last Paper. Whether the +Landholder of the Connecticut Courant, and of the Maryland Journal,(57) is +the same person, or different, is not very material; I however incline to +the former opinion, as I hope for the honour of human nature, it would be +difficult to find more than one individual who could be capable of so +total a disregard to the principles of truth and honour. After having made +the most unjust and illiberal attack on Mr. Gerry, and stigmatized him as +an enemy to his country, and the basest of mankind, for no other reason +than a firm and conscientious discharge of an important trust reposed in +that gentleman, had I not come in for a share of his censure, I confess I +should have been both disappointed and mortified. It would have had at +least the appearance, that the Landholder had discovered something in my +principles, which he considered congenial with his own. However great may +be my political sins, to be cursed with his approbation and applause, +would be a punishment much beyond their demerit. But, Sir, at present I +mean to confine myself to the original subject of controversy, the +injustice of the charges made against Mr. Gerry. That my veracity will not +be questioned when giving my negative to anonymous slander, I have the +fullest confidence. I have equal confidence that it will be as little +questioned by any who know me, even should the Landholder vouchsafe to +give the Public his name--a respectable name I am sure it cannot be. His +absolute want of truth and candour in assertions meant to injure the +reputation of individuals, whose names are given to the public, and to +hold them up to the indignation of their fellow citizens, will ever +justify this assertion, even should the name belong to one decorated with +wealth, or dignified by station. But the Landholder wishes it to be +supposed, that though my veracity should not be doubted, yet my evidence +ought to be rejected, and observes, that to comprehend what credit ought +to be given to it, by which I suppose he means its sufficiency if +credited, it ought to be known how long I was absent from Convention, as +well as the time I attended. I believe Sir, whoever will read my former +publication will in a moment perceive, that I there "stated" all the +"information" on this subject that was necessary or material, and that I +left no defect for the Landholder to supply. I there mentioned that "I +took my seat early in June, that I left Philadelphia on the fourth of +September, and during that period was not absent from the convention while +sitting, except only five days in the beginning of August, immediately +after the Committee of Detail had reported." I did not state the precise +day of June when I took my seat--it was the ninth, not the tenth--a very +inconsiderable mistake of the Landholder. But between that day and the +fourth of September he says that I was absent ten days at Baltimore, and +as many at New York, and thereby insinuates that an absence of twenty days +from the Convention intervened during that period, in which time Mr. Gerry +might have made and failed in his motion concerning continental money. A +short state of facts is all that is necessary to shew the disingenuity of +the Landholder, and that it is very possible to convey a falsehood, or +something very much like it, almost in the words of truth. On the +twenty-fifth of July the Convention adjourned, to meet again on the sixth +of August. I embraced that opportunity to come to Baltimore, and left +Philadelphia on the twenty-seventh; I returned on the fourth of August, +and on the sixth attended the Convention, with such members as were in +town, at which time the Committee of Detail made their report, and many of +the members being yet absent, we adjourned to the next day. Mr. Gerry left +Philadelphia to go to New York the day before I left there to come to +Baltimore; he had not returned on Tuesday, the seventh of August, when I +set out for New York, from whence I returned and took my seat in +Convention on Monday, the thirteenth. It is true that from the +twenty-fifth of July to the thirteenth of August eighteen (not twenty) +days had elapsed, but on one of those days I attended, and on twelve of +them the Convention did not meet. I was, therefore, perfectly correct in +my original statement that from early in June to the fourth of September I +was absent but five days from the Convention while sitting, and in that +statement omitted no "necessary information." It is also true that of +those eighteen days Mr. Gerry was absent twelve or thirteen, and that one +of those days when he was not absent was Sunday, on which day the +Convention did not meet. Thus, Sir, by relating facts as they really +occurred, we find the only time between early in June and the fourth of +September when such a motion could have been made by Mr. Gerry without my +being present is narrowed down to four, or at most five days, as I +originally stated it, although Landholder wishes it should be supposed +there were twenty days during that period when it might have taken place +without my knowledge, to wit, ten while I was at Baltimore, and as many +more while at New York. The Landholder also states that the Convention +commenced the fourteenth day of May, and that I did not take my seat till +the tenth day of June, by which, if he means anything, I presume he means +to insinuate that within that portion of time Mr. Gerry's motion might +have been made and rejected. He is here, Sir, equally unfortunate and +disingenuous. Though the Convention was to have met by appointment on the +fourteenth of May, yet no material business was entered upon till on or +about the thirtieth of that month. It was on that day that the Convention, +having had certain propositions laid before them by the Honourable +Governor of Virginia, resolved to go into a consideration of these +propositions. In this fact I am confident I am not mistaken, as I state +the day not merely from my own recollection but from minutes which I +believe to be very correct, in my possession, of the information given by +the Honourable Mr. McHenry to the assembly. The truth is, Sir, that very +little progress had been made by the Convention before I arrived, and that +they had not been more than ten days, or about that time, seriously +engaged in business. The first thing I did after I took my seat was +carefully to examine the journals for information of what had already been +done or proposed. I was also furnished with notes of the debates which had +taken place, and can with truth say that I made myself "minutely informed" +of what had happened before that period. In the same manner, after my +return from New York, I consulted the journals (for we were permitted to +read them, although we were not always permitted to take copies). If the +motion attributed to Mr. Gerry had been made and rejected, either before I +first took my seat or while at New York, it would have there appeared, and +that no such motion was made and rejected during either of these periods I +appeal to the highest possible authority. I appeal to those very journals, +which ought to have been published, and which we are informed are placed +in the possession of our late Honourable President. But why, Sir, should I +appeal to these journals, or to any other authority? Let the Landholder +turn to his eighth number, addressed to the Honourable Mr. Gerry; let him +blush, unless incapable of that sensation, while he reads the following +passage: "Almost the whole time during the sitting of the Convention, and +until the Constitution had received its present form, no man was more +plausible and conciliating on every subject than Mr. Gerry," &c. Thus +stood Mr. Gerry, till towards the close of the business he introduced a +motion respecting the redemption of paper money. The whole time of the +sitting of the Convention was not almost past. The Constitution had not +received its present form, nor was the business drawing towards a close, +until long after I took my seat in Convention. It is therefore proved by +the Landholder himself that Mr. Gerry did not make this motion at any time +before the ninth day of June. Nay more, in the paper now before me he +acknowledges that in his eighth number he meant (and surely no one ought +to know his meaning better than himself) to fix Mr. Gerry's apostacy to a +period within the last thirteen days. Why then all this misrepresentation +of my absence at Baltimore and New York? Why the attempt to induce a +belief that the Convention had been engaged in business from the +fourteenth of May, and the insinuation that it might have happened in +those periods? And why the charge that in not stating those facts I had +withheld from the public information necessary to its forming a right +judgment of the credit which ought to be given to my evidence. But, Sir, I +am really at a loss which most to admire--the depravity of this writer's +heart, or the weakness of his head. Is it possible he should not perceive +that the moment he fixes the time of Mr. Gerry's motion to the last +thirteen days of the Convention, he proves incontestably the falsehood and +malice of his charges against that gentleman--for he has expressly stated +that this motion and the rejection it received was the cause, and the sole +cause, of his apostacy; that "before, there was nothing in the system, as +it now stands, to which he had any objection, but that afterwards he was +inspired with the utmost rage and intemperate opposition to the whole +system he had formerly praised;" whereas I have shown to the clearest +demonstration, that a considerable time before the last thirteen days, Mr. +Gerry had given the most decided opposition to the system. I have shown +this by recital of facts, which if credited, incontestibly prove it--facts +which, I again repeat, will never be contradicted by any member of the +Convention. I ground this assertion upon the fullest conviction that it is +impossible to find a single person in that number so wicked, as publicly +and deliberately to prostitute his name in support of falsehood, and at +the same time so weak as to do this when he must be sure of detection. But +the Landholder is willing to have it supposed that Mr. Gerry might have +made the motion in a "committee," and that there it might have happened +without my knowledge; to such wretched subterfuges is he driven. This +evasion, however, will be equally unavailing. The business of the +committees were not of a secret nature, nor were they conducted in a +secret manner; I mean as to the members of the Convention. I am satisfied +that there was no committee while I was there, of whose proceedings I was +not at least "so minutely informed," that an attempt of so extraordinary a +nature as that attributed to Mr. Gerry, and attended with such an +immediate and remarkable revolution in his conduct, could not have taken +place without my having heard something concerning it. The non-adoption of +a measure by a committee did not preclude its being proposed to the +Convention, and being there adopted. Can it be presumed that a question in +which Mr. Gerry is represented to have been so deeply interested, and by +the fate of which his conduct was entirely influenced, would for want of +success in a committee have been totally relinquished by him, without a +single effort to carry it in Convention! If any other proof is wanting, I +appeal again to the Landholder himself. In his eighth number he states +that the motion was rejected "by the Convention." Let it be remembered +also, as I have before observed, in the paper now before me, he declares +it was his intention in that number to fix Mr. Gerry's apostacy to a +period within the last thirteen days; and in the same number he observes +that Mr. Gerry's resentment could only embarrass and delay the completion +of the business for a few days; all which equally militate against every +idea of the motion being made before he left Philadelphia, whether in +Committee or in Convention. The Landholder hath also asserted, that I have +"put into Mr. Gerry's mouth, objections different from any thing his +letter to the legislature of his State contains, so that if my +representation is true, his must be false." In this charge he is just as +well founded as in those I have already noticed. Mr. Gerry has more than +once published to the world, under the sanction of his name, that he +opposed the system from a firm persuasion that it would endanger the +liberties of America, and destroy the freedom of the States and their +citizens. Every word which I have stated as coming from his mouth, so far +from being inconsistent with those declarations, are perfectly +correspondent thereto and direct proofs of their truth. When the +Landholder informed us that Mr. Gerry was "face to face with his +colleagues in the Convention of Massachusetts," why did he not, unless he +wished to mislead the public, also inform us for what purpose he was +there? + +That it was only to answer questions; that might be proposed to him, not +himself to ask questions that he could not consistently interfere in any +manner in the debates, and that he was even prohibited an opportunity of +explaining such parts of his conduct as were censured in his presence? By +the anonymous publication alluded to by the Landholder, and inserted in +the note, Mr. Gerry's colleagues are not called upon to acquit him: it +only declares "that he believes them to be men of too much honour to +assert that his reasons in Convention were totally different from those he +published;" and in this I presume he was not disappointed for the +Landholder otherwise would have published it with triumph; but if Mr. +Gerry, as it is insinuated, was only prevented by pride, from, in person, +requesting them to acquit him, it amounts to a proof of his consciousness +that, as men of honour, they could not have refused it, had he made the +request. No person who views the absurdities and inconsistencies of the +Landholder, can I think, have a very respectable opinion of his +understanding, but I who am not much prejudiced in his favour, could +scarcely have conceived him so superlatively weak as to expect to deceive +the public and obtain credit to himself by asking "if charges against Mr. +Gerry are not true why do not his colleagues contradict them?" and "why is +it that we do not see Mr. McHenry's verification of your assertions?" If +these Gentlemen were to do Mr. Gerry that justice, he might as well +inquire "why is it we do not also see the verification of A, B, C and D +and so on to the last letter of the Conventional alphabet." When the +Landholder in his eighth number addressed himself to Mr. Gerry he +introduces his charges by saying "you doubtless will recollect the +following state of facts; if you do not every member of the Convention +will attest them." One member of the Convention has had firmness +sufficient to contradict them with his name, although he was well apprised +that he thereby exposed himself as a mark for the arrows of his political +adversaries, and as to some of them, he was not unacquainted with what +kind of men he had to deal. But of all the members who composed that body, +not one has yet stepped forward to make good the Landholder's prediction; +nor has one been found to "attest" his statement of facts. Many reasons +may be assigned why the members of the Convention should not think +themselves under a moral obligations of involving themselves in +controversy by giving their names in vindication of Mr. Gerry; and I do +not believe any of those who signed the proposed Constitution would +consider themselves bound to do this by any political obligation: But, +Sir, I can hardly suppose that Mr. Gerry is so perfectly esteemed and +respected by every person who had a seat in that body, that not a single +individual could possibly be procured to give his sanction to the +Landholder's charges, if it could be done with justice and as to myself, I +much question whether it would be easy to convince any person, who was +present at our information to the assembly,(58) that every one of my +honourable colleagues, (to each of whose merit I cordially subscribe, +though compelled to differ from them in political sentiments) would be +prevented by motives of personal delicacy to myself, from contradicting +the facts I have stated relative to Mr. Gerry, if it could be done +consistent with truth. If the Landholder was a member of the Convention, +to facilitate the adoption of a favourite system, or to gratify his +resentment against its opposers, he has originally invented and is now +labouring to support, charges the most unjust and ungenerous, contrary to +his own knowledge of facts. If he was not a member, he is acting the same +part, without any knowledge of the subject, and in this has the merit of +either following his own invention, of dealing out the information he +receives from some person of whom he is the wretched tool and dupe, at the +same time expressing himself with a decision, and making such professions +of being perfectly in every secret, as naturally tends, unless +contradicted, to deceive and delude the unsuspecting multitude. In one of +these predicaments the Landholder must stand, he is welcome to take his +choice, in either case he only wants to be known to be despised. Now sir, +let the Landholder come forward and give his name to the public. It is the +only thing necessary to finish his character, and to convince the world +that he is as dead to shame, as he is lost to truth and destitute of +honour. If I sir, can be instrumental in procuring him to disclose +himself; even in this I shall consider myself as rendering a service to my +country. I flatter myself for the dignity of human kind, there are few +such characters; but there is no situation in life, in which they may not +prove the bane and curse of society; they therefore ought to be known, +that they may be guarded against. + +I am, sir, your very humble servant, + +LUTHER MARTIN. + +_Baltimore, March 3, 1788._ + + + + +Luther Martin, III. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 1021) + +TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1788. + +Number I. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND. + +To you my fellow citizens, I hold myself in a particular manner +accountable for every part of my conduct in the exercise of a trust +reposed in me by you, and should consider myself highly culpable if I was +to withhold from you any information in my possession, the knowledge of +which may be material to enable you to form a right judgment on questions +wherein the happiness of yourselves and your posterity are involved. Nor +shall I ever consider it an act of condescention when impeached in my +public conduct, or character, to vindicate myself at your bar, and to +submit myself to your decision. In conformity to these sentiments, which +have regulated my conduct since my return from the Convention, and which +will be the rule of my actions in the sequel, I shall at this time beg +your indulgence, while I make some observations on a publication which the +Landholder has done me the honour to address to me, in the Maryland +Journal of the 29th of February last. In my controversy with that writer, +on the subject of Mr. Gerry, I have already enabled you to decide, without +difficulty, on the credit which ought to be given to his most positive +assertions and should scarce think it worth my time to notice his charges +against myself, was it not for the opportunity it affords me of stating +certain facts and transactions, of which you ought to be informed, some of +which were undesignedly omitted by me when I had the honour of being +called before the House of Delegates. No "extreme modesty" on my part was +requisite to induce me to conceal the "sacrifice of resentments" against +Mr. Gerry, since no such sacrifice had ever been made, nor had any such +resentments ever existed. The principal opposition in sentiment between +Mr. Gerry and myself, was on the subject of representation; but even on +that subject, he was much more conceding than his colleagues, two of whom +obstinately persisted in voting against the equality of representation in +the senate, when the question was taken in Convention upon the adoption of +the conciliatory propositions, on the fate of which depended, I believe, +the continuance of the Convention. In many important questions we +perfectly harmonized in opinion, and where we differed, it never was +attended with warmth or animosity, nor did it in any respect interfere +with a friendly intercourse and interchange of attention and civilities. +We both opposed the extraordinary powers over the militia, given to the +general government. We were both against the re-eligibility of the +president. We both concurred in the attempt to prevent members of each +branch of the legislature from being appointable to offices, and in many +other instances, although the Landholder, with his usual regard to truth +and his usual imposing effrontery, tells me, that I "doubtless must +remember Mr. Gerry and myself never voted alike, except in the instances" +he has mentioned. As little foundation is there in his assertion, that I +"cautioned certain members to be on their guard against his wiles, for +that he and Mr. Mason held private meetings, where the plans were +concerted to aggrandize, at the expence of the small States, old +Massachusetts and the ancient dominion." I need only state facts to refute +the assertion. Some time in the month of August, a number of members who +considered the system, as then under consideration and likely to be +adopted, extremely exceptionable, and of a tendency to destroy the rights +and liberties of the United States, thought it advisable to meet together +in the evenings, in order to have a communication of sentiments, and to +concert a plan of conventional opposition to, and amendment of that +system, so as, if possible, to render it less dangerous. Mr. Gerry was the +first who proposed this measure to me, and that before any meeting had +taken place, and wished we might assemble at my lodgings, but not having a +room convenient, we fixed upon another place. There Mr. Gerry and Mr. +Mason did hold meetings, but with them also met the Delegates from New +Jersey and Connecticut, a part of the Delegation from Delaware, an +honorable member from South Carolina, one other from Georgia, and myself. +These were the only "private meetings" that ever I knew or heard to be +held by Mr. Gerry and Mr. Mason, meetings at which I myself attended until +I left the Convention, and of which the sole object was not to aggrandize +the great at the expense of the small, but to protect and preserve, if +possible, the existence and essential rights of all the states, and the +liberty and freedom of their citizens. Thus, my fellow citizens, I am +obliged, unless I could accept the compliment at an expence of truth equal +to the Landholder's, to give up all claim to being "placed beyond the +reach of ordinary panegyrick," and to that "magnanimity" which he was so +solicitous to bestow upon me, that he has wandered [into] the regions of +falsehood to seek the occasion. When we find such disregard of truth, even +in the introduction, while only on the threshold, we may form judgment +what respect is to be paid to the information he shall give us of what +passed in the Convention when he "draws aside the veil," a veil which was +interposed between our proceedings and the Public, in my opinion, for the +most dangerous of purposes, and which was never designed by the advocates +of the system to be drawn aside, or if it was, not till it should be too +late for any beneficial purpose, which as far as it is done, or pretended +to be done, on the present occasion, is only for the purpose of deception +and misrepresentation. It was on Saturday that I first took my seat. I +obtained that day a copy of the propositions that had been laid before the +Convention, and which were then the subject of discussion in a committee +of the whole. The Secretary was so polite as, at my request, to wait upon +me at the State House the next day (being Sunday), and there gave me an +opportunity of examining the journals and making myself acquainted with +the little that had been done before my arrival. I was not a little +surprised at the system brought forward, and was solicitous to learn the +reasons which had been assigned in its support; for this purpose the +journals could be of no service; I therefore conversed on the subject with +different members of the Convention, and was favoured with minutes of the +debates which had taken place before my arrival. I applied to history for +what lights it could afford me, and I procured everything the most +valuable I could find in Philadelphia on the subject of governments in +general, and on the American revolution and governments in particular. I +devoted my whole time and attention to the business in which we were +engaged, and made use of all the opportunities I had, and abilities I +possessed, conscientiously to decide what part I ought to adopt in the +discharge of that sacred duty I owed to my country, in the exercise of the +trust you had reposed in me. I attended the Convention many days without +taking any share in the debates, listening in silence to the eloquence of +others, and offering no other proof that I possessed the powers of speech, +than giving my yea or nay when a question was taken, and notwithstanding +my propensity to "endless garrulity," should have been extremely happy if +I could have continued that line of conduct, without making a sacrifice of +your rights and political happiness. The committee of the whole house had +made but small progress, at the time I arrived, in the discussion of the +propositions which had been referred to them; they completed that +discussion, and made their report. The propositions of the minority were +then brought forward and rejected. The Convention had resumed the report +of the committee, and had employed some days in its consideration. Thirty +days, I believe, or more, had elapsed from my taking my seat before in the +language of the Landholder, I "opened in a speech which held during two +days." Such, my fellow citizens, is the true state of the conduct I +pursued when I took my seat in Convention, and which the Landholder, to +whom falsehood appears more familiar than truth, with his usual +effrontery, has misrepresented by a positive declaration, that without +obtaining or endeavouring to obtain any information on the subject, I +hastily and insolently obtruded my sentiments on the Convention, and to +the astonishment of every member present, on the very day I took my seat, +began a speech, which continued two days, in opposition to those measures +which, on mature deliberation, had been adopted by the Convention. But I +"alone advocated the political heresy, that the people ought not to be +trusted with the election of representatives." On this subject, as I would +wish to be on every other, my fellow citizens, I have been perfectly +explicit in the information I gave to the House of Delegates, and which +has since been published. In a state government, I consider all power +flowing immediately from the people in their individual capacity, and that +the people, in their individual capacity, have, and ever ought to have the +right of choosing delegates in a state legislature, the business of which +is to make laws, regulating their concerns, as individuals, and operating +upon them as such; but in a federal government, formed over free states, +the power flows from the people, and the right of choosing delegates +belongs to them only mediately through their respective state governments +which are the members composing the federal government, and from whom all +its power immediately proceeds; to which state governments, the choice of +the federal delegates immediately belongs. I should blush indeed for my +ignorance of the first elements of government, was I to entertain +different sentiments on the subject; and if this is "political heresy," I +have no ambition to be ranked with those who are orthodox. Let me here, my +fellow citizens, by way of caution, add an observation, which will prove +to be founded in truth: those who are the most liberal in complimenting +you with powers which do not belong to you, act commonly from improper and +interested motives, and most generally have in view thereby to prepare the +way for depriving you of those rights to which you are justly entitled. +Every thing that weakens and impairs the bands of legitimate authority +smooths the road of ambition; nor can there be a surer method of +supporting and preserving the just rights of the people, than by +supporting and protecting the just rights of government. As to the +"jargon" attributed to me of maintaining that "notwithstanding each state +had an equal number of votes in the senate, yet the states were unequally +represented in the senate," the Landholder has all the merit of its +absurdity; nor can I conceive what sentiment it is that I ever have +expressed, to which he, with his usual perversion and misrepresentation, +could give such a colouring. That I ever suggested the idea of letting +loose an army indiscriminately on the innocent and guilty, in a state +refusing to comply with the requisitions of Congress, or that such an idea +ever had place in my mind, is a falsehood so groundless, so base and +malignant, that it could only have originated or been devised by a heart +which would dishonour the midnight assassin. My sentiments on this subject +are well known; it was only in the case where a state refused to comply +with the requisitions of Congress, that I was willing to grant the general +government those powers which the proposed constitution gives it in every +case.(59) Had I been a greater friend to a standing army, and not quite so +averse to expose your liberties to a soldiery, I do not believe the +Landholder would have chose me for the object on whom to expend his +artillery of falsehood. + +That a system may enable government wantonly to exercise power over the +militia, to call out an unreasonable number from any particular state +without its permission, and to march them upon, and continue them in, +remote and improper services; that the same system should enable the +government totally to discard, render useless, and even disarm, the +militia, when it would remove them out of the way of opposing its +ambitious views, is by no means inconsistent, and is really the case in +the proposed constitution. In both these respects it is, in my opinion, +highly faulty, and ought to be amended. In the proposed system the general +government has a power not only without the consent, but contrary to the +will of the state government, to call out the whole of its militia, +without regard to religious scruples, or any other consideration, and to +continue them in service as long as it pleases, thereby subjecting the +freemen of a whole state to martial law and reducing them to the situation +of slaves. It has also, by another clause, the powers by which only the +militia can be organized and armed, and by the neglect of which they may +be rendered utterly useless and insignificant, when it suits the ambitious +purposes of government. Nor is the suggestion unreasonable, even if it had +been made, that the government might improperly oppress and harass the +militia, the better to reconcile them to the idea of regular troops, who +might relieve them from the burthen, and to render them less opposed to +the measures it might be disposed to adopt for the purpose of reducing +them to that state of insignificancy and uselessness. When the Landholder +declared that "I contended the powers and authorities of the new +constitution must destroy the liberties of the people," he for once +stumbled on the truth, but even this he could not avoid coupling with an +assertion utterly false. I never suggested that "the same powers could be +safely entrusted to the old Congress;" on the contrary, I opposed many of +the powers as being of that nature that, in my opinion, they could not be +entrusted to any government whatever consistent with the freedom of the +states and their citizens, and I earnestly recommended, what I wish my +fellow citizens deeply to impress on your minds, that in altering or +amending our federal government no greater powers ought to be given than +experience has shown to be necessary, since it will be easy to delegate +further power when time shall dictate the expediency or necessity, but +powers once bestowed upon a government, should they be found ever so +dangerous or destructive to freedom, cannot be resumed or wrested from +government but by another revolution. + +LUTHER MARTIN. + +_Baltimore, March 14, 1788._ + + + + +Luther Martin, IV. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 1022) + +FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1788. + +Number II. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND. + +In the recognition which the Landholder professes to make "of what +occurred to my advantage," he equally deals in the arts of +misrepresentation, as while he was "only the record of the bad," and I am +equally obliged from a regard to truth to disclaim his pretended +approbation as his avowed censure. He declares that I originated the +clause which enacts that "this Constitution and the laws of the United +States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, +or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be +the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound +thereby, any thing in the Constitution or the laws of any state to the +contrary notwithstanding." To place this matter in a proper point of view, +it will be necessary to state, that as the propositions were reported by +the committee of the whole house, a power was given to the general +government to negative the laws passed by the state legislatures, a power +which I considered as totally inadmissible; in substitution of this I +proposed the following clause, which you will find very materially +different from the clause adopted by the Constitution, "that the +legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of +the articles of the union, and all treaties made and ratified under the +authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective +states, so far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states +or their citizens, and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be +bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the +individual states to the contrary notwithstanding." When this clause was +introduced, it was not established that inferior continental courts should +be appointed for trial of all questions arising on treaties and on the +laws of the general government, and it was my wish and hope that every +question of that kind would have been determined in the first instance in +the courts of the respective states; had this been the case, the propriety +and the necessity that treaties duly made and ratified, and the laws of +the general government, should be binding on the state judiciaries which +were to decide upon them, must be evident to every capacity, while at the +same time, if such treaties or laws were inconsistent with our +constitution and bill of rights, the judiciaries of this state would be +bound to reject the first and abide by the last, since in the form I +introduced the clause, notwithstanding treaties and the laws of the +general government were intended to be superior to the laws of our state +government, where they should be opposed to each other, yet that they were +not proposed nor meant to be superior to our constitution and bill of +rights. It was afterwards altered and amended (if it can be called an +amendment) to the form in which it stands in the system now published, and +as inferior continental, and not state courts, are originally to decide on +those questions, it is now worse than useless, for being so altered as to +render the treaties and laws made under the general government superior to +our constitution, if the system is adopted it will amount to a total and +unconditional surrender to that government, by the citizens of this state, +of every right and privilege secured to them by our constitution, and an +express compact and stipulation with the general government that it may, +at its discretion, make laws in direct violation of those rights. But on +this subject I shall enlarge in a future number. + +That I "voted an appeal should lay to the supreme judiciary of the United +States, for the correction of all errors both in law and fact," in +rendering judgment is most true, and it is equally true that if it had +been so ordained by the Constitution, the supreme judiciary would only +have had an appellate jurisdiction, of the same nature with that possessed +by our high court of appeals, and could not in any respect intermeddle +with any fact decided by a jury; but as the clause now stands, an appeal +being given in general terms from the inferior courts, both as to law and +fact, it not only doth, but is avowedly intended, to give a power very +different from what our court of appeals, or any court of appeals in the +United States or in England enjoys, a power of the most dangerous and +alarming nature, that of setting at nought the verdict of a jury, and +having the same facts which they had determined, without any regard or +respect to their determination, examined and ultimately decided by the +judges themselves, and that by judges immediately appointed by the +government. But the Landholder also says that "I agreed to the clause that +declares nine states to be sufficient to put the government in motion." I +cannot take to myself the merit even of this without too great a sacrifice +of truth. It was proposed that if seven states agreed that should be +sufficient; by a rule of Convention in filling up blanks, if different +numbers were mentioned, the question was always to be taken on the +highest. It was my opinion, that to agree upon a ratification of the +constitution by any less number than the whole thirteen states, is so +directly repugnant to our present articles of confederation, and the mode +therein prescribed for their alteration, and such a violation of the +compact which the states, in the most solemn manner, have entered into +with each other, that those who could advocate a contrary proposition, +ought never to be confided in, and entrusted in public life. I availed +myself of this rule, and had the question taken on thirteen, which was +rejected. Twelve, eleven, ten and nine were proposed in succession; the +last was adopted by a majority of the members. I voted successively for +each of these members, to prevent a less number being agreed on. Had nine +not been adopted, I should on the same principle have voted for eight. But +so far was I from giving my approbation that the assent of a less number +of states than thirteen should be sufficient to put the government in +motion, that I most explicitly expressed my sentiments to the contrary, +and always intended, had I been present when the ultimate vote was taken +on the constitution, to have given it my decided negative, accompanied +with a solemn protest against it, assigning this reason among others for +my dissent. Thus, my fellow citizens, that candour with which I have +conducted myself through the whole of this business obliges me, however +reluctantly, and however "mortifying it may be to my vanity," to disavow +all "those greater positive virtues" which the Landholder has so +obligingly attributed to me in Convention, and which he was so desirous of +conferring upon me as to consider the guilt of misrepresentation and +falsehood but a trifling sacrifice for that purpose, and to increase my +mortification, you will find I am equally compelled to yield up every +pretence even to those of a negative nature, which a regard to justice +has, as he says, obliged him not to omit. These consist, as he tells us, +in giving my entire approbation to the system as to those parts which are +said to endanger a trial by jury, and as to its want of a bill of rights, +and in having too much candour there to signify that I thought it +deficient in either of these respects. But how, I pray, can the Landholder +be certain that I deserve this encomium? Is it not possible, as I so +frequently exhausted the politeness of the Convention, that some of those +marks of fatigue and disgust, with which he intimates I was mortified as +oft as I attempted to speak, might at that time have taken place, and have +been of such a nature as to attract his attention; or, perhaps, as the +Convention was prepared to slumber whenever I rose, the Landholder, among +others, might have sunk into sleep, and at that very moment might have +been feasting his imagination with the completion of his ambitious views, +and dreams of future greatness. But supposing I never did declare in +Convention that I thought the system defective in those essential points, +will it amount to a positive proof that I approved the system in those +respects, or that I culpably neglected an indispensable duty? Is it not +possible, whatever might have been my insolence and assurance when I first +took my seat, and however fond I might be at that time of obtruding my +sentiments, that the many rebuffs with which I met, the repeated +mortifications I experienced, the marks of fatigue and disgust with which +my eyes were sure to be assailed wherever I turned them--one gaping here, +another yawning there, a third slumbering in this place, and a fourth +snoring in that--might so effectually have put to flight all my original +arrogance, that, as we are apt to run into extremes, having at length +become convinced of my comparative nothingness, in so august an assembly +and one in which the science of government was so perfectly understood, I +might sink into such a state of modesty and diffidence as not to be able +to muster up resolution enough to break the seal of silence and open my +lips even after the rays of light had begun to penetrate my understanding, +and in some measure to chase away those clouds of error and ignorance in +which it was enveloped on my first arrival? Perhaps had I been treated +with a more forbearing indulgence while committing those memorable +blunders, for a want of a sufficient knowledge in the science of +government, I might, after the rays of light had illuminated my mind, have +rendered my country much more important services, and not only assisted in +raising some of the pillars, but have furnished the edifice with a new +roof of my own construction, rather better calculated for the convenience +and security of those who might wish to take shelter beneath it, than that +which it at present enjoys. Or even admitting I was not mortified, as I +certainly ought to have been, from the Landholder's account of the matter, +into a total loss of speech, was it in me, who considered the system, for +a variety of reasons, absolutely inconsistent with your political welfare +and happiness, a culpable neglect of duty in not endeavouring, and that +against every chance of success, to remove one or two defects, when I had +before ineffectually endeavoured to clear it of the others, which +therefore, I knew must remain? But to be serious, as to what relates to +the appellate jurisdiction in the extent given by the system proposed, I +am positive there were objections made to it, and as far as my memory will +serve me, I think I was in the number of those who actually objected; but +I am sure that the objections met with my approbation. With respect to a +bill of rights, had the government been formed upon principles truly +federal, as I wished it, legislating over and acting upon the states only +in their collective or political capacity, and not on individuals, there +would have been no need of a bill of rights, as far as related to the +rights of individuals, but only as to the rights of states. But the +proposed constitution being intended and empowered to act not only on +states, but also immediately on individuals, it renders a recognition and +a stipulation in favour of the rights both of states and of men, not only +proper, but in my opinion absolutely necessary. I endeavoured to obtain a +restraint on the powers of the general government, as to standing armies, +but it was rejected. It was my wish that the general government should not +have the power of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, +as it appears to me altogether unnecessary, and that the power given to it +may and will be used as a dangerous engine of oppression, but I could not +succeed. An honorable member from South Carolina most anxiously sought to +have a clause inserted securing the liberty of the Press, and repeatedly +brought this subject before the Convention, but could not obtain it. I am +almost positive he made the same attempt to have a stipulation in favour +of liberty of conscience, but in vain. The more the system advanced the +more was I impressed with the necessity of not merely attempting to secure +a few rights, but of digesting and forming a complete bill of rights, +including those of states and of individuals, which should be assented to, +and prefixed to the Constitution, to serve as a barrier between the +general government and the respective states and their citizens; because +the more the system advanced the more clearly it appeared to me that the +framers of it did not consider that either states or men had any rights at +all, or that they meant to secure the enjoyment of any to either the one +or the other; accordingly, I devoted a part of my time to the actually +preparing and draughting such a bill of rights, and had it in readiness +before I left the Convention, to have laid it before a committee. I +conversed with several members on the subject; they agreed with me on the +propriety of the measure, but at the same time expressed their sentiments +that it would be impossible to procure its adoption if attempted. A very +few days before I left the Convention, I shewed to an honorable member +sitting by me a proposition, which I then had in my hand, couched in the +following words: "Resolved that a committee be appointed to prepare and +report a bill of rights, to be prefixed to the proposed Constitution," and +I then would instantly have moved for the appointment of a committee for +that purpose, if he would have agreed to second the motion, to do which he +hesitated, not as I understand from any objection to the measure, but from +a conviction in his own mind that the motion would be in vain. + +Thus my fellow citizens, you see that so far from having no objections to +the system on this account, while I was at Convention, I not only then +thought a bill of rights necessary, but I took some pains to have the +subject brought forward, which would have been done, had it not been for +the difficulties I have stated. At the same time I declare that when I +drew up the motion, and was about to have proposed it to the Convention, I +had not the most distant hope it would meet with success. The rejection of +the clauses attempted in favour of particular rights, and to check and +restrain the dangerous and exorbitant powers of the general government +from being abused, had sufficiently taught me what to expect. And from the +best judgment I could form while in Convention, I then was, and yet +remained, decidedly of the opinion that ambition and interest had so far +blinded the understanding of some of the principal framers of the +Constitution, that while they were labouring to erect a fabrick by which +they themselves might be exalted and benefited, they were rendered +insensible to the sacrifice of the freedom and happiness of the states and +their citizens, which must, inevitably be the consequence. I most sacredly +believe their object is the total abolition and destruction of all state +governments, and the erection on their ruins of one great and extensive +empire, calculated to aggrandize and elevate its rulers and chief officers +far above the common herd of mankind, to enrich them with wealth, and to +encircle them with honours and glory, and which according to my judgment +on the maturest reflection, must inevitably be attended with the most +humiliating and abject slavery of their fellow citizens, by the sweat of +whose brows, and by the toil of whose bodies, it can only be effected. + +And so anxious were its zealous promoters to hasten to a birth this +misshapened heterogenous monster of ambition and interest, that, for some +time before the Convention rose, upon the least attempt to alter its form, +or modify its powers, the most fretful impatience was shown, such as would +not have done much honour to a State Assembly, had they been sitting as +long a time, and their treasury empty; while it was repeatedly urged on +the contrary, but urged in vain, that in so momentous an undertaking, in +forming a system for such an extensive continent, on which the political +happiness of so many millions, even to the latest ages, may depend, no +time could be too long--no thoughts and reflections too great--and that if +by continuing six months, or even as many years, we could free the system +from all its errors and defects, it would be the best use to which we +could possibly devote our time. Thus my fellow citizens am I under +necessity of resigning again into the hands of the Landholder, all those +virtues both of a positive and negative kind, which from an excess of +goodness he bestowed upon me, and give him my full permission to dispose +of them hereafter in favour of some other person, who may be more +deserving, and to whom they will be more acceptable: at the same time, I +must frankly acknowledge, however it may operate as a proof of my dullness +and stupidity, that the "ignorance in the science of government" under +which I laboured at first was not removed by more than two months close +application under those august and enlightened masters of the science with +which the Convention abounded, nor was I able to discover during that +time, either by my own researches, or by any light borrowed from those +luminaries, anything in the history of mankind or in the sentiments of +those who have favoured the world with their ideas on government, to +warrant or countenance the motley mixture of a system proposed: a system +which is an innovation in government of the most extraordinary kind; a +system neither wholly federal, nor wholly national--but a strange +hotch-potch of both--just so much federal in appearance as to give its +advocates in some measure, an opportunity of passing it as such upon the +unsuspecting multitude, before they had time and opportunity to examine +it, and yet so predominantly national as to put it in the power of its +movers, whenever the machine shall be set agoing, to strike out every part +that has the appearance of being federal, and to render it wholly and +entirely a national government: And if the framing and approving the +Constitution now offered to our acceptance, is a proof of knowledge in the +science of government, I not only admit, but I glory in my ignorance; and +if my rising to speak had such a somnific influence on the Convention as +the Landholder represents, I have no doubt the time will come, should this +system be adopted, when my countrymen will ardently wish I had never left +the Convention, but remained there to the last, daily administering to my +associates the salutary opiate. Happy, thrice happy, would it have been +for my country, if the whole of that time had been devoted to sleep, or +been a blank in our lives, rather than employed in forging its chains. As +I fully intended to have returned to the Convention before the completion +of its business, my colleagues very probably might, and were certainly +well warranted to, give that information the Landholder mentions; but +whether the Convention was led to conclude that I "would have honoured the +Constitution with my signature had not indispensable business called me +away," may be easily determined after stating a few facts. The Landholder +admits I was at first against the system--when the compromise took place on +the subject of representation, I in the most explicit manner declared in +Convention, that though I had concurred in the report, so far as to +consent to proceed upon it that we might see what kind of a system might +be formed, yet I disclaimed every idea of being bound to give it my +assent, but reserved to myself the full liberty of finally giving it my +negative, if it appeared to me inconsistent with the happiness of my +country. In a desultory conversation which long after took place in +Convention, one morning before our honourable president took the chair, he +was observing how unhappy it would be should there be such a diversity of +sentiment as to cause any of the members to oppose the system when they +returned to their states; on that occasion I replied that I was confident +no state in the union would more readily accede to a proper system of +government than Maryland, but that the system under consideration was of +such a nature, that I never could recommend it for acceptance; that I +thought the state never ought to adopt it, and expressed my firm belief +that it never would. + +An honourable member from Pennsylvania objected against that part of the +sixth article which requires an oath to be taken by the persons there +mentioned, in support of the constitution, observing (as he justly might +from the conduct the convention was then pursuing) how little such oaths +were regarded. I immediately joined in the objection, but declared my +reason to be, that I thought it such a constitution as no friend of his +country ought to bind himself to support. And not more than two days +before I left Philadelphia, another honourable member from the same state +urged most strenuously that the Convention ought to hasten their +deliberations to a conclusion, assigning as a reason that the Assembly of +Pennsylvania was just then about to meet, and that it would be of the +greatest importance to bring the system before that session of the +legislature, in order that a Convention of the State might be immediately +called to ratify it, before the enemies of the system should have an +opportunity of making the people acquainted with their objections, at the +same time declaring that if the matter should be delayed and the people +have time to hear the variety of objections which would be made to it by +its opposers, he thought it doubtful whether that state or any other state +in the union would adopt it.(60) As soon as the honourable member took his +seat, I rose and observed, that I was precisely of the same opinion, that +the people of America never would, nor did I think they ought to, adopt +the system, if they had time to consider and understand it; whereas a +proneness for novelty and change--a conviction that some alteration was +necessary, and a confidence in the members who composed the +Convention--might possibly procure its adoption, if brought hastily before +them, but that these sentiments induced me to wish that a very different +line of conduct should be pursued from that recommended by the honourable +member. I wished the people to have every opportunity of information, as I +thought it much preferable that a bad system should be rejected at first, +than hastily adopted and afterwards be unavailingly repented of. If these +were instances of my "high approbation," I gave them in abundance as all +the Convention can testify, and continued so to do till I left them. That +I expressed great regret at being obliged to leave Philadelphia, and a +fixed determination to return if possible before the Convention rose, is +certain. That I might declare that I had rather lose an hundred guineas +than not to be there at the close of the business is very probable--and it +is possible that some who heard me say this, not knowing my reasons, which +could not be expressed without a breach of that secrecy to which we were +enjoined, might erroneously have concluded that my motive was the +gratification of vanity, in having my name enrolled with those of a +Franklin and a Washington. As to the first, I cordially join in the +tribute of praise so justly paid to the enlightened philosopher and +statesman, while the polite, friendly and affectionate treatment myself +and my family received from that venerable sage and the worthy family in +which he is embosomed, will ever endear him to my heart. The name of +Washington is far above my praise. I would to Heaven that on this occasion +one more wreath had been added to the number of those which are twined +around his amiable brow--that those with which it is already surrounded may +flourish with immortal verdure, nor wither or fade till time shall be no +more, is my fervent prayer, and may that glory which encircles his head +ever shine with undiminished rays. To find myself under the necessity of +opposing such illustrious characters, whom I venerated and loved, filled +me with regret; but viewing the system in the light I then did, and yet do +view it, to have hesitated would have been criminal; complaisance would +have been guilt. If it was the idea of my state that whatever a Washington +or Franklin approved, was to be blindly adopted, she ought to have spared +herself the expence of sending any members to the Convention, or to have +instructed them implicitly to follow where they led the way. It was not to +have my "name enrolled with the other labourers," that I wished to return +to Philadelphia--that sacrifice which I must have made of my principles by +putting my name to the Constitution, could not have been effaced by any +derivative lustre it could possibly receive from the bright constellation +with which it would have been surrounded. My object was in truth the very +reverse; as I had uniformly opposed the system in its progress, I wished +to have been present at the conclusion, to have then given it my solemn +negative, which I certainly should have done, even had I stood single and +alone, being perfectly willing to leave it to the cool and impartial +investigation both of the present and of future ages to decide who best +understood the science of government--who best knew the rights of men and +of states, who best consulted the true interest of America, and who most +faithfully discharged the trust reposed in them, those who agreed to or +those who opposed the new Constitution--and so fully have I made up my own +mind on this subject, that as long as the history of mankind shall record +the appointment of the late Convention, and the system which has been +proposed by them, it is my highest ambition that my name may also be +recorded as one who considered the system injurious to my country, and as +such opposed it. Having shown that I did not "alter my opinion after I +left Philadelphia," and that I acted no "contradictory parts on the great +political stage," and therefore that there are none such to reconcile, the +reason assigned by the Landholder for that purpose doth not deserve my +notice, except only to observe that he shrewdly intimates there is already +a Junto established, who are to share in and deal out the offices of this +new government at their will and pleasure, and that they have already +fixed upon the character who is to be "Deputy Attorney General of the +United States for the State of Maryland." If this is true, it is worth +while to inquire of whom this Junto consists, as it might lead to a +discovery of the persons for the gratification of whose ambition and +interest this system is prepared, and is, if possible, to be enforced, and +from the disposition of offices already allotted in the various and +numerous departments, we possibly might discover whence proceeds the +conviction and zeal of some of its advocates. + +LUTHER MARTIN. + +_Baltimore, March 19, 1788._ + + + + +Luther Martin, V. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 1024) + +FRIDAY, MARCH 28, 1788. + +Number III. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND. + +There is, my fellow citizens, scarcely an individual of common +understanding, I believe, in this state, who is any ways acquainted with +the proposed Constitution, who doth not allow it to be, in many instances, +extremely censurable, and that a variety of alterations and amendments are +essentially requisite, to render it consistent with a reasonable security +for the liberty of the respective states, and their citizens. +Aristides,(61) it is true, is an exception from this observation; he +declares, that "if the whole matter was left to his discretion, he would +not change any part of the proposed Constitution," whether he meant this +declaration as a proof of his discretion, I will not say; it will however, +readily be admitted, by most, as a proof of his enthusiastic zeal in +favour of the system. But it would be injustice to that writer not to +observe, that if he is as much mistaken in the other parts of the +Constitution, as in that which relates to the judicial department, the +Constitution which he is so earnestly recommending to his countrymen, and +on which he is lavishing so liberally his commendations, is a thing of his +own creation and totally different from that which is offered for your +acceptance.--He has given us an explanation of the original and appellate +jurisdiction of the judiciary of the general government, and of the manner +in which he supposes it is to operate--an explanation so inconsistent with +the intention of its framers, and so different from its true construction +and from the effect which it will have, should the system be adopted, that +I could scarce restrain my astonishment at the error, although I was in +some measure prepared for it, by his previous acknowledgment that he did +not very well understand that part of the system; a circumstance I +apprehended he did not recollect at the time when he was bestowing upon it +his dying benediction. And if one of our judges, possessed of no common +share of understanding, and of extensive acquired knowledge, who, as he +informs us, has long made the science of government his peculiar study, so +little understands the true import and construction of this Constitution, +and that too in a part more particularly within his own province, can it +be wondered at that the people in general, whose knowledge in subjects of +this nature is much more limited and circumscribed, should but imperfectly +comprehend the extent, operation and consequences of so complex and +intricate a system; and is not this of itself a strong proof of the +necessity that it should be corrected and amended, at least so as to +render it more clear and comprehensible to those who are to decide upon +it, or to be affected by it. But although almost every one agrees the +Constitution, as it is, to be both defective and dangerous, we are not +wanting in characters who earnestly advise us to adopt it, in its present +form, with all its faults, and assure us we may safely rely on obtaining +hereafter the amendments that are necessary. But why, I pray you, my +fellow citizens, should we not insist upon the necessary amendments being +made now, while we have the liberty of acting for ourselves, before the +Constitution becomes binding upon us by our assent, as every principle of +reason, common sense and safety would dictate? Because, say they, the +sentiments of men are so different, and the interests of the different +states are so jarring and dissonant, that there is no probability they +would agree if alterations and amendments were attempted. Thus with one +breath they tell us that the obstacles to any alterations and amendments +being agreed to by the states are so insuperable, that it is vain to make +the experiment, while in the next they would persuade us it is so certain +the states will accede to those which shall be necessary, and that they +may be procured even after the system shall be ratified, that we need not +hesitate swallowing the poison, from the ease and security of instantly +obtaining the antidote--and they seem to think it astonishing that any +person should find a difficulty in reconciling the absurdity and +contradiction. If it is easy to obtain proper amendments, do not let us +sacrifice everything that ought to be dear to freemen, for want of +insisting upon its being done, while we have the power. If the obtaining +them will be difficult and improbable, for God's sake do not accept of +such a form of government as without amendments cannot fail of rendering +you mere beasts of burthen, and reducing you to a level with your own +slaves, with this aggravating distinction, that you once tasted the +blessings of freedom. Those who would wish you to believe that the faults +in the system proposed are wholly or principally owing to the difference +of state interests, and proceed from that cause, are either imposed upon +themselves, or mean to impose upon you. The principal questions, in which +the state interests had any material effect, were those which related to +representation, and the number in each branch of the legislature, whose +concurrence should be necessary for passing navigation acts, or making +commercial regulations. But what state is there in the union whose +interest would prompt it to give the general government the extensive and +unlimited powers it possesses in the executive, legislative and judicial +departments, together with the powers over the militia, and the liberty of +establishing a standing army without any restriction? What state in the +union considers it advantageous to its interest that the President should +be re-eligible--the members of both houses appointable to offices--the +judges capable of holding other offices at the will and pleasure of the +government, and that there should be no real responsibility either in the +President or in the members of either branch of the Legislature? Or what +state is there that would have been averse to a bill of rights, or that +would have wished for the destruction of jury trial in a great variety of +cases, and in a particular manner in every case without exception where +the government itself is interested? These parts of the system, so far +from promoting the interest of any state, or states, have an immediate +tendency to annihilate all the state governments indiscriminately, and to +subvert their rights and the rights of their citizens. To oppose these, +and to procure their alteration, is equally the interest of every state in +the union. The introduction of these parts of the system must not be +attributed to the jarring interests of states, but to a very different +source, the pride, the ambition and the interest of individuals. This +being the case, we may be enabled to form some judgment of the probability +of obtaining a safe and proper system, should we have firmness and wisdom +to reject that which is now offered; and also of the great improbability +of procuring any amendments to the present system, if we should weakly and +inconsiderately adopt it. The bold and daring attempt that has been made +to use, for the total annihilation of the states, that power that was +delegated for their preservation, will put the different states on their +guard. The votaries of ambition and interest being totally defeated in +their attempt to establish themselves on the ruins of the States, which +they will be if this Constitution is rejected, an attempt in which they +had more probability of success from the total want of suspicion in their +countrymen than they can have hereafter, they will not hazard a second +attempt of the same nature, in which they will have much less chance of +success; besides, being once discovered they will not be confided in. The +true interest and happiness of the states and their citizens will, +therefore, most probably be the object which will be principally sought +for by a second Convention, should a second be appointed, which if really +aimed at, I cannot think very difficult to accomplish, by giving to the +federal government sufficient power for every salutary purpose, while the +rights of the states and their citizens should be secure from any imminent +danger. But if the arts and influence of ambitious and interested men, +even in their present situation, while more on a level with yourselves, +and unarmed with any extraordinary powers, should procure you to adopt +this system, dangerous as it is admitted to be to your rights, I will +appeal to the understanding of every one of you, who will on this occasion +give his reason fair play, whether there is not every cause to believe +they will, should this government be adopted, with that additional power, +consequence and influence it will give them, most easily prevent the +necessary alterations which might be wished for, the purpose of which +would be directly opposite to their views, and defeat every attempt to +procure them. Be assured, whatever obstacles or difficulties may be at +this time in the way of obtaining a proper system of government, they will +be increased an hundred fold after this system is adopted. Reflect also, I +entreat you, my fellow citizens, that the alterations and amendments which +are wanted in the present system are of such a nature as to diminish and +lessen, to check and restrain the powers of the general government, not to +increase and enlarge those powers. If they were of the last kind, we might +safely adopt it, and trust to giving greater powers hereafter, like a +physician who administers an emetic ex re nata, giving a moderate dose at +first, and increasing it afterwards as the constitution of the patient may +require. But I appeal to the history of mankind for this truth, that when +once power and authority are delegated to a government, it knows how to +keep it, and is sufficiently and successfully fertile in expedients for +that purpose. Nay more, the whole history of mankind proves that so far +from parting with the powers actually delegated to it, government is +constantly encroaching on the small pittance of rights reserved by the +people to themselves, and gradually wresting them out of their hands until +it either terminates in their slavery or forces them to arms, and brings +about a revolution. From these observations it appears to me, my fellow +citizens, that nothing can be more weak and absurd than to accept of a +system that is admitted to stand in need of immediate amendments to render +your rights secure--for remember, if you fail in obtaining them, you cannot +free yourselves from the yoke you will have placed on your necks, and +servitude must, therefore, be your portion. Let me ask you my fellow +citizens what you would think of a physician who, because you were +slightly indisposed, should bring you a dose which properly corrected with +other ingredients might be a salutary remedy, but of itself was a deadly +poison, and with great appearance of friendship and zeal, should advise +you to swallow it immediately, and trust to accident for those requisites +necessary to qualify its malignity, and prevent its destructive effects? +Would not you reject the advice, in however friendly a manner it might +appear to be given, with indignation, and insist that he should first +procure, and properly attempt, the necessary ingredients, since after the +fatal draught was once received into your bowels, it would be too late +should the antidote prove unattainable, and death must ensue. With the +same indignation ought you, my fellow citizens, to reject the advice of +those political quacks, who under pretence of healing the disorders of our +present government, would urge you rashly to gulp down a constitution, +which in its present form, unaltered and unamended, would be as certain +death to your liberty, as arsenic could be to your bodies. + +LUTHER MARTIN. + +_Baltimore, March 25, 1788._ + + + + +Luther Martin, VI. + + +The Maryland Journal, (Number 1026) + +FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 1788. + +Number IV. + +TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND. + +If those, my fellow citizens, to whom the administration of our government +was about to be committed, had sufficient wisdom never to err, and +sufficient goodness always to consult the true interest of the governed, +and if we could have a proper security that their successors should to the +end of time be possessed of the same qualifications, it would be +impossible that power could be lavished upon them with too liberal a hand. +Power absolute and unlimited, united with unerring wisdom and unbounded +goodness, is the government of the Deity of the universe. But remember, my +fellow citizens, that the persons to whom you are about to delegate +authority are and will be weak, erring mortals, subject to the same +passions, prejudices and infirmities with yourselves; and let it be deeply +engraven on your hearts, that from the first history of government to the +present time, if we begin with Nimrod and trace down the rulers of nations +to those who are now invested with supreme power, we shall find few, very +few, who have made the beneficent Governor of the universe the model of +their conduct, while many are they who, on the contrary, have imitated the +demons of the darkness. We have no right to expect that our rulers will be +more wise, more virtuous, or more perfect than those of other nations have +been, or that they will not be equally under the influence of ambition, +avarice and all that train of baleful passions, which have so generally +proved the curse of our unhappy race. We must consider mankind such as +they really are,--such as experience has shown them to be heretofore, and +bids us expect to find them hereafter,--and not suffer ourselves to be +misled by interested deceivers or enthusiastick visionaries; and therefore +in forming a system of government, to delegate no greater power than is +clearly and certainly necessary, ought to be the first principle with +every people who are influenced by reason and a regard for their safety, +and in doing this, they ought most solicitously to endeavour so to qualify +even that power, by such checks and restraints, as to produce a perfect +responsibility in those who are to exercise it, and prevent them from its +abuse with a chance of impunity;--since such is the nature of man, that he +has a propensity to abuse authority and to tyrannize over the rights of +his fellowmen;--and to whomsoever power is given, not content with the +actual deposit, they will ever strive to obtain an increase. Those who +would wish to excite and keep awake your jealousy and distrust are your +truest friends; while they who speak peace to you when there is no +peace--who would lull you into security, and wish you to repose blind +confidence in your future governors--are your most dangerous enemies; +jealousy and distrust are the guardian angels who watch over +liberty--security and confidence are the forerunners of slavery. But the +advocates of the system tell you that we who oppose it, endeavour to +terrify you with mere possibilities which may never be realized, that all +our objections consist in saying government may do this, and government +may do that--I will for argument sake admit the justice of this remark, and +yet maintain that the objections are insurmountable. I consider it an +incontrovertible truth, that whatever by the constitution government even +may do, if it relates to the abuse of power by acts tyrannical and +oppressive, it some time or other will do. Such is the ambition of man, +and his lust for domination, that no power less than that which fixed its +bounds to the ocean can say to them, "Thus far shall ye go and no +farther." Ascertain the limits of the may with ever so much precision, and +let them be as extensive as you please, government will speedily reach +their utmost verge; nor will it stop there, but soon will overleap those +boundaries, and roam at large into the regions of the may not. Those who +tell you the government by this constitution may keep up a standing army, +abolish the trial by jury, oppress the citizens of the states by its +powers over the militia, destroy the freedom of the press, infringe the +liberty of conscience, and do a number of other acts injurious and +destructive of your rights, yet that it never will do so; and that you +safely may accept such a constitution and be perfectly at ease and secure +that your rulers will always be so good, so wise, and so virtuous--such +emanations of the Deity--that they will never use their power but for your +interest and your happiness, contradict the uniform experience of ages, +and betray a total ignorance of human nature, or a total want of +ingenuity. Look back, my fellow citizens, to your conduct but a few years +past, and let that instruct you what ought to be your conduct at this +time. Great Britain then claimed the right to pass laws to bind you in all +cases whatever. You were then told in all the soft insinuating language of +the present day, and with all the appearance of disinterested friendship +now used, that those who insisted this claim of power might be abused, +only wandered in the regions of fancy--that you need not be uneasy, but +might safely acquiesce in the claim--that you might have the utmost +possible confidence in your rulers, that they never would use that power +to your injury; but distrustful of government, and jealous of your +liberty, you rejected such counsel with disdain; the bare possibility that +Britain might abuse it, if once conceded, kindled a flame from one end of +this continent to the other, and roused you to arms. Weak and defenseless +as you were, unused to military exertions, and unsupplied with warlike +stores, you braved the strength of a nation the most powerful and best +provided--you chose to risk your lives and property rather than to risque +the possibility that the power claimed by the British government should be +exercised to your injury--a possibility which the minions of power at that +time, with as much confidence as those of the present day, declared to be +absolutely visionary. Heaven wrought a miracle in your favour, and your +efforts were crowned with success. You are not now called upon to make an +equal sacrifice, you are not now requested to beat your ploughshares into +swords, or your pruning hooks into spears, to leave your peaceful +habitations, and exchange domestic tranquillity for the horrors of war; +peaceably, quietly and orderly to give this system of slavery your +negative, is all that is asked by the advocates of freedom--to pronounce +the single monosyllable no, is all they entreat. Shall they entreat you in +vain? When by this it is to be determined, whether our independence, for +obtaining which we have been accustomed to bow the knee with reverential +gratitude to Heaven, shall be our greatest curse; and when on this it +depends whether we shall be subject to a government, of which the little +finger will be thicker than the loins of that of Great Britain. But there +are also persons who pretend that your situation is at present so bad that +it cannot be worse, and urge that as an argument why we should embrace any +remedy proposed, however desperate it may appear. Thus do the poor erring +children of mortality, suffering under the presence of real or imaginary +evils, have recourse to a pistol or halter for relief, and rashly launch +into the untried regions of eternity--nor wake from this delusion, until +they wake in endless woe. Should the citizens of America, in a fit +desperation, be induced to commit this fatal act of political suicide, to +which by such arguments they are stimulated, the day will come when +laboring under more than Egyptian bondage; compelled to finish their quota +of brick, though destitute of straw and of mortar; galled with your +chains, and worn down by oppression, you will, by sad experience, be +convinced (when that conviction shall be too late), that there is a +difference in evils, and that the buzzing of gnats is more supportable +than the sting of a serpent. From the wisdom of antiquity we might obtain +excellent instruction, if we were not too proud to profit by it. AEsop has +furnished us with a history of a nation of frogs, between which and our +own there is a striking resemblance--whether the catastrophe be the same, +rests with ourselves. Jupiter out of pure good nature, wishing to do them +as little injury as possible, on being asked for a king, had thrown down +into their pond a log to rule over them;--under whose government, had they +been wise enough to know their own interest and to pursue it, they might +to this day, have remained happy and prosperous. Terrified with the noise, +and affrighted by the violent undulations of the water, they for some time +kept an awful distance, and regarded their monarch with reverence; but the +first impression being in some measure worn off, and perceiving him to be +of a tame and peaceable disposition, they approached him with familiarity, +and soon entertained for him the utmost contempt. In a little time were +seen the leaders of the frogs croaking to their respective circles on the +weakness and feebleness of the government at home, and of its want of +dignity and respect abroad, till the sentiment being caught by their +auditors, the whole pond resounded with "Oh Jupiter, good Jupiter, hear +our prayers! Take away from us this vile log, and give us a ruler who +shall know how to support the dignity and splendor of government! Give us +any government you please, only let it be energetic and efficient." The +Thunderer, in his wrath, sent them a crane. With what delight did they +gaze on their monarch, as he came majestically floating on the wings of +the wind. They admired his uncommon shape--it was such as they had never +before seen--his deformities were, in their eyes, the greatest of beauties, +and they were heard like Aristides to declare that, were they on the verge +of eternity, they would not wish a single alteration in his form. His +monstrous beak, his long neck, and his enormous poke, even these, the +future means of their destruction, were subjects of their warm +approbation. He took possession of his new dominions, and instantly began +to swallow down his subjects, and it is said that those who had been the +warmest zealots for crane administration, fared no better than the rest. +The poor wretches were now much more dissatisfied than before, and with +all possible humility applied to Jupiter again for his aid, but in vain--he +dismissed them with this reproof, "that the evil of which they complained +they had foolishly brought upon themselves, and that they had no other +remedy now, but to submit with patience." Thus forsaken by the god, and +left to the mercy of the crane, they sought to escape his cruelty by +flight; but pursuing them to every place of retreat, and thrusting his +long neck through the water to the bottom, he drew them out with his beak +from their most secret hiding-places, and served them up as a regale for +his ravenous appetite. The present federal government is, my fellow +citizens, the log of the fable--the crane is the system now offered to your +acceptance--I wish you not to remain under the government of the one, nor +to become subjected to the tyranny of the other. If either of these events +take place, it must arise from your being greatly deficient to +yourselves--from your being, like the nation of Frogs, "a discontented, +variable race, weary of liberty and fond of change." At the same time I +have no hesitation in declaring, that if the one or the other must be our +fate, I think the harmless, inoffensive, though contemptible Log, +infinitely to be preferred to the powerful, the efficient, but +all-devouring Crane. + +LUTHER MARTIN. + +_Baltimore, March 29, 1788._ + + + + + +LETTER OF A PLAIN DEALER, ACCREDITED TO SPENCER ROANE. + + +Printed In +The Virginia Independent Chronicle, +February, 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +In October, 1787, Governor Edmund Randolph, delegate to the Federal +Convention from Virginia, addressed to the Speaker of the House of +Delegates a letter on the Federal Constitution. This was published in +December, 1787, in both _The Virginia Gazette_ and _The Virginia +Independent Chronicle_, as well as in pamphlet form at the time, and +recently in Ford's _Pamphlets on the Constitution_. Randolph had declined +to give his assent to the Constitution in the Convention, but had so far +altered his views in the intervening period as to make his letter on the +whole an argument in favor of rather than against its adoption. Uncertain +in exactly what light to regard his utterances, it was one of the few +writings of the time which did not receive replies from one party or the +other. + +The essay of "A Plain Dealer" is the only notice I have found of this +letter, and deals rather more with the inconsistencies of Randolph's +views, than with the arguments advanced in the letter. Of the author, +Randolph himself gives us a clue in his letter to Madison, of February 29, +1788, where he writes: + + + A writer calling himself Plain Dealer, who is bitter in principle + _vs._ the Constitution, has attacked me in the paper. I suspect + the author to be Mr. Spencer Roane; and the importunities of some + to me in public and private are designed to throw me unequivocally + and without condition into the opposition. + + + + +A Plain Dealer. + + +The Virginia Independent Chronicle, (Number 82) + +WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1788. + +_Mans parturiens et ecce nascitur mus._ + +After a long and general expectancy of some dissertation on the subject of +the proposed Federal Constitution, worthy the first magistrate of the +respectable state of Virginia, a letter of his Excellency Governor +Randolph, of Oct. 10, 1787, is at length presented to the public. Previous +to the appearance of this letter, various opinions were prevailing in +different parts of this country respecting that gentleman's _real_ opinion +on the subject of the said Constitution; and it became difficult for many +to conjecture how his Excellency would devise a middle course, so as to +catch the spirit of all his countrymen, and to reconcile himself to all +parties. It was not known to me, at least, that his Excellency felt an +"unwillingness to disturb the harmony of the legislature" on this +important subject; nor could I conceive that the sentiments of even the +ablest man among us could "excite a contest unfavorable" to the fairest +discussion of the question. On the other hand, I thought it right that the +adversaries of the Constitution, as well as its framers, should candidly +avow their real sentiments as early and decidedly as possible, for the +information of those who are to determine. It is true, his Excellency was +prevented declaring his opinion sooner, "by motives of delicacy arising +from two questions depending before the General Assembly, one respecting +the Constitution, the other respecting himself;" but I am of opinion that +during the pendency of a question concerning the Constitution, every +information on that subject is most properly to be adduced; and I did not +know that the being or not being Governor of Virginia, (an office in a +great degree nominal) was sufficient to deter a real patriot from speaking +the warning voice of opposition, in behalf of the liberties of his +country. + +The letter above-mentioned can derive no aid from panegyric, as to the +brilliancy and elegance of its stile, for unlike the threadbare discourses +of other statesmen on the dry subject of government, it amuses us with a +number of fine words. But how shall I express my dislike of the ultimatum +of his Excellency's letter, wherein he declares "that if after our best +efforts for amendments, they cannot be obtained, he will adopt the +Constitution as it is." How is this declaration reconcilable to a former +opinion of his Excellency's, expressed to the Honorable Richard Henry Lee, +and repeated by the latter gentleman in his letter,(62) as printed in the +public papers, "that either a monarchy or an aristocracy will be generated +from the proposed Constitution." Good God! how can the first Magistrate +and Father of a free republican government, after a feeble parade of +opposition, and before his desired plan of amendments has been determined +upon, declare that he will accept a Constitution which is to beget a +monarchy or an aristocracy? How can such a determination be reconcilable +to the feelings of Virginia, and to the principles which have prevailed in +almost every legislature of the union, who looked no farther than the +amendment of our present republican confederation? I have charity to +believe that the respectable characters who signed this Constitution did +so, thinking that neither a monarchy nor an aristocracy would ensue, but +that they should thereby preserve and ameliorate the republic of America; +but never until now, that his Excellency has let the cat out of the bag, +did I suppose that any member of the Convention, at least from the +republican state of Virginia, would accept a Constitution, whereby the +republic of his constituents is to be sacrificed in its infancy, and +before it has had a fair trial. But his Excellency will adopt this +Constitution, "BECAUSE HE WOULD REGULATE HIMSELF BY THE SPIRIT OF +AMERICA." But is his Excellency a prophet as well as a politician--can he +foretell future events? How else can he at this time discover what the +spirit of America is? But admitting his infallibility for a moment, how +far will his principle carry him?--why, that if the dominion of Shays, +instead of that of the new Constitution, should be generally accepted, and +become the spirit of America, his Excellency, too, would turn Shayite!--and +yet this question of the Constitution, is "ONE ON WHICH THE FATE OF +THOUSANDS YET UNBORN DEPENDS." It is his Excellency's opinion, as +expressed in the aforesaid letter, that the powers which are acknowledged +necessary for supporting the Union, cannot safely be entrusted to our +Congress as at present constituted; and his vain objection is "that the +representation of the states bears no proportion to their importance." +This is literally true; but is equally true of the Senate of the proposed +Constitution, which is to be an essential part of the legislature; and yet +his Excellency will accept the latter, and not agree to invest the +necessary powers in the former, although the above objection equally +applies to both. Nay, I am inclined to believe that the injurious +consequences of this unequal representation will operate more strongly +under the new government--for under the present confederation the members +of Congress are removable at the pleasure of their constituents;--whereas +under the proposed Constitution, the only method of removing a wicked, +unskilful or treacherous senator, will be by impeachment before the senate +itself, of which he is a member. + +These, Mr. Printer, are some of the inconsistencies which even a slight +observation of the above letter will suggest. It is not my purpose to +oppose now, or to investigate, the merits of the Constitution. This I +leave to abler pens, and to the common sense of my countrymen. The science +of government is _in itself_ simple and plain; and if in the history of +mankind no perfect government can be found, let it be attributed to the +chicane, perfidy and ambition of those who fabricate them; and who are +more or less, in common with all mankind, infected with a lust of power. +It is, however, certainly not consistent with sound sense to accept a +Constitution, knowing it to be imperfect; and his Excellency acknowledges +the proposed one to have radical objections. A Constitution ought to be +like Caesar's wife, not only good, but unsuspected, since it is the highest +compact which men are capable of forming, and involves the dearest rights +of life, liberty and property. I fear his Excellency has done no service +to his favorite scheme of amendments (and he too seems to be of the same +opinion) by his very candid declaration at the end of his letter. Subtlety +and chicane in politics, are equally odious and dishonorable; but when it +is considered that the present is not the golden age--the epoch of virtue, +candor and integrity--that the views of ambitious and designing men are +continually working to their own aggrandizement and to the overthrow of +liberty, and that the discordant interests of thirteen different +commonwealths are to be reconciled and promoted by one general government; +common reason will teach us that the utmost caution, secrecy, and +political sagacity is requisite to secure to each the important blessings +of a good government. + +I shall now take my leave of his Excellency and the above-mentioned +letter, declaring my highest veneration for his character and abilities; +and it can be no impeachment of the talents of any man who has not served +a regular apprenticeship to politics, to say, that his opinions on an +intricate political question are erroneous. For if, as the celebrated Dr. +Blackstone observes, "in every art, occupation, or science, commercial or +mechanical, some method of instruction or apprenticeship is held +necessary, how much more requisite will such apprenticeship be found to +be, in the science of government, the noblest and most difficult of any!" + +A PLAIN DEALER. + + + + + +REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT, BY HUGH WILLIAMSON. + + +Printed In +The State Gazette Of North Carolina. +1788. + + + + +Note. + + +No file of the _State Gazette of North Carolina_ is now known to exist, so +the date of publication of this essay is in doubt. It is printed from a +clipping from that paper, preserved by Williamson himself, which is in the +library of the New York Historical Society. A note states that: + + + "The following remarks on the new Plan of Government are handed us + as the substance of Dr. Williamson's Address to the freemen of + Edenton and the County of Chowan when assembled to instruct their + representatives." + + + + +Remarks. + + +State Gazette Of North Carolina. + +Though I am conscious that a subject of the greatest magnitude must suffer +in the hands of such an advocate, I cannot refuse, at the request of my +fellow-citizens, to make some observations on the new plan of government. + +It seems to be generally admitted, that the system of government which has +been proposed by the late convention, is well calculated to relieve us +from many of the grievances under which we have been laboring. If I might +express my particular sentiments on this subject, I should describe it as +more free and more perfect than any form of government that has ever been +adopted by any nation; but I would not say it has no faults. Imperfection +is inseparable from every device. Several objections were made to this +system by two or three very respectable characters in the convention, +which have been the subject of much conversation; and other objections, by +citizens of this state, have lately reached our ears. It is proper you +should consider of these objections. They are of two kinds; they respect +the things that are in the system, and the things that are not in it. We +are told that there should have been a section for securing the trial by +Jury in civil cases, and the liberty of the press: that there should also +have been a declaration of rights. In the new system, it is provided, that +"_the trial of all crimes_, except in cases of impeachment, _shall be by +jury_" but this provision could not possibly be extended to all _civil_ +cases. For it is well known that the trial by jury is not general and +uniform throughout the United States, either in cases of admiralty or of +chancery; hence it becomes necessary to submit the question to the general +Legislature, who might accommodate their laws on this occasion to the +desires and habits of the nation. Surely there is no prohibition in a case +that is untouched. + +We have been told that the liberty of the press is not secured by the new +Constitution. Be pleased to examine the Plan, and you will find that the +liberty of the press and the laws of Mahomet are equally affected by it. +The new government is to have the power of protecting literary property; +the very power which you have by a special act delegated to the present +congress. There was a time in England, when neither book, pamphlet, nor +paper could be published without a license from government. That restraint +was finally removed in the year 1694: and, by such removal, their press +became perfectly free, for it is not under the restraint of any license. +Certainly the new government can have no power to impose restraints. The +citizens of the United States have no more occasion for a second +declaration of rights, than they have for a section in favour of the +press. Their rights, in the several states, have long since been explained +and secured by particular declarations, which make a part of their several +constitutions. It is granted, and perfectly understood, that under the +government of the assemblies of the states, and under the government of +the congress, every right is reserved to the individual which he has not +expressly delegated to this, or that legislature. The other objections +that have been made to the new plan of government, are: That it absorbs +the powers of the several states; that the national judiciary is too +extensive; that a standing army is permitted; that congress is allowed to +regulate trade; that the several states are prevented from taxing exports +for their own benefit. + +When Gentlemen are pleased to complain, that little power is left in the +hands of the separate states, they should be advised to cast an eye upon +the large code of laws, which have passed in this state since the peace. +Let them consider how few of those laws have been framed for the general +benefit of the nation. Nine out of ten of them are domestic; calculated +for the sole use of this state or of particular citizens. There must still +be use for such laws, though you should enable the congress to collect a +revenue for national purposes; and the collection of that revenue includes +the chief of the new powers, which are now to be committed to the +congress. + +Hitherto you have delegated certain powers to the Congress, and other +powers to the Assemblies of the states. The portion that you have +delegated to Congress, is found to have been useless, because it is too +small: and the powers that are committed to the Assemblies of the several +states are also found to be absolutely ineffectual for national purposes, +because they can never be so managed as to operate in concert. Of what use +is that small portion of reserve powers? It neither makes you respectable +nor powerful. The consequence of such reservation is national contempt +abroad, and a state of dangerous weakness at home. What avails the claim +of power, which appears to be nothing better than the empty whistling of a +name? The Congress will be chosen by yourselves, as your members of +Assembly are. They will be creatures of your hands, and subject to your +advice. Protected and cherished by the small addition of power which you +shall put into their hands, you may become a great and respectable nation. + +It is complained that the powers of the national judiciary are too +extensive. This objection appears to have the greatest weight in the eyes +of gentlemen who have not carefully compared the powers which are to be +delegated, with those that had been formerly delegated to Congress. The +powers now to be committed to the national legislature, as they are +detailed in the 8th section of the first article, have already been +chiefly delegated to the Congress, under one form or another, except those +which are contained in the first paragraph of that section. And the +objects that are now to be submitted to the supreme judiciary, or to the +inferior courts, are those which naturally arise from the constitutional +laws of Congress. If there is a single new case that can be exceptional, +it is that between a Foreigner and a Citizen, or that between the Citizens +of different States. These cases may come up by appeal. It is provided in +this system, that there shall be no fraudulent tender in the payments of +debts. Foreigners with whom we have treaties will trust our citizens on +the faith of this engagement; and the citizens of different states will do +the same. If the Congress had a negative on the laws of the several +states, they would certainly prevent all such laws as might endanger the +honor or peace of the nation, by making a tender of base money; but they +have no such power, and it is at least possible that some state may be +found in this union, disposed to break the constitution, and abolish +private debts by such tenders. In these cases the courts of the offending +state would probably decide according to its own laws. The foreigner would +complain, and the nation might be involved in war for the support of such +dishonest measures. Is it not better to have a court of appeals in which +the judges can only be determined by the laws of the nation? This court is +equally to be desired by the citizens of different states. But we are told +that justice will be delayed, and the poor will be drawn away by the rich +to a distant court. The authors of this remark have not fully considered +the question, else they must have recollected that the poor of this +country have little to do with foreigners or with the citizens of distant +states. They do not consider that there may be an inferior court in every +state; nor have they recollected that the appeals being with such +exceptions, and under such regulations as Congress shall make, will never +be permitted for trifling sums or under trivial pretences, unless we can +suppose that the national legislature shall be composed of knaves and +fools. The line that separates the powers of the national legislature from +those of the several states is clearly drawn. The several states reserve +every power that can be exercised for the particular use and comfort of +the state. They do not yield a single power which is not absolutely +necessary to the safety and prosperity of the nation, nor one that could +be employed to any effect in the hands of particular states. The powers of +judiciary naturally arise from those of the legislature. Questions that +are of a national concern, and those cases which are determinable by the +general laws of the nation, are to be referred to the national judiciary; +but they have not anything to do with a single case either civil or +criminal which respects the private and particular concerns of a state or +its citizens. + +The possibility of keeping regular troops in the public service, has been +urged as another objection against the new constitution. It is very +remarkable that the same objection has not been made against the original +confederation, in which the same grievance obtains without the same +guards. It is now provided, that no appropriation of money for the use of +the army shall be for a longer time than two years. Provision is also made +for having a powerful militia, in which there never can be occasion for +many regular troops. + +It has been objected in some of the southern states, that the Congress, by +a majority of votes, is to have the power to regulate trade. It is +universally admitted that Congress ought to have this power, else our +commerce, which is nearly ruined, can never be restored; but some +gentlemen think that the concurrence of two-thirds of the votes in +Congress should have been required. By the sundry regulations of commerce, +it will be in the power of government not only to collect a vast revenue +for the general benefit of the nation, but to secure the carrying trade in +the hands of citizens in preference to strangers. It has been alleged that +there are few ships belonging to the southern states; and that the price +of freight must rise in consequence of our excluding many foreign vessels: +but when we have not vessels of our own, it is certainly proper that we +should hire those of citizens in preference to strangers; and though the +price of freight should rise for two or three years, this advantage is +fully due to our brethren in the eastern and middle states, who, with +great and exemplary candour, have given us equal advantages in return. A +small increase in the price of freight would operate greatly in favour of +the southern states: it would promote the spirit of ship-building; it +would promote a nursery for native seamen, and would afford support to the +poor who live near the sea coast; it would increase the value of their +lands, and, at the same time, it would reduce their taxes. + +It has finally been objected that the several states are not permitted to +tax their exports for the benefit of their particular treasuries. This +strange objection has been occasionally repeated by citizens of this +state. They must have transplanted it from another state, for it could not +have been the growth of North Carolina. + +Such have been the objections against the new constitution. + +Whilst the honest patriot who guards with jealous eye the liberties of his +country, and apprehends danger under every form--the placeman in every +state, who fears lest his office should pass into other hands--the idle, +the fractious, and the dishonest, who live by plunder or speculation on +the miseries of their country--while these, assisted by a numerous body of +secret enemies, who never have been reconciled to our independence, are +seeking for objections to this constitution--it is a remarkable +circumstance, and a very high encomium on the plan, that nothing more +plausible has been offered against it; for it is an easy matter to find +faults. + +Let us turn our eyes to a more fruitful subject; let us consider the +present condition of the United States, and the particular benefits that +North Carolina must reap by the proposed form of government. Without money +no government can be supported; and Congress can raise no money under the +present constitution. They have not the power to make commercial treaties, +because they cannot preserve them when made. Hence it is, that we are the +prey of every nation. We are indulged in such foreign commerce as must be +hurtful to us; we are prohibited from that which might be profitable; and +we are accordingly told, that in the last two years, the thirteen states +have hardly paid into the treasury as much as should have been paid by a +single state. Intestine commotions in some of the states--paper money in +others--a want of inclination in some, and a general suspicion throughout +the union that the burden is unequally laid--added to the general loss of +trade--have produced a general bankruptcy, and loss of honor. We have +borrowed money of Spain--she demands the principal, but we cannot pay the +interest. It is a circumstance perfectly humiliating, that we should +remain under obligations to that nation. We are considerably indebted to +France; but she is too generous to insist upon what she knows we cannot +pay, either the principal or interest. In the hour of distress, we +borrowed money in Holland; not from the government but from private +citizens. Those who were called the patriots, were our friends, and they +are oppressed in their turn by hosts of enemies. They will soon have need +of money. At this hour, we are not able to pay the interest of their loan. +What is to be done? Will you borrow money again from other citizens of +that oppressed republic, to pay the interest of what you borrowed from +their brethren? This would a painful expedient: but our want of government +may render it necessary. You have two or three ministers abroad; they must +soon return home, for they cannot be supported. You have four or five +hundred troops scattered along the Ohio to protect the frontier +inhabitants, and give some value to your lands; those troops are ill paid, +and in a fair way for being disbanded. There is hardly a circumstance +remaining--hardly one external mark--by which you can deserve to be called a +nation. You are not in a condition to resist the most contemptuous enemy. +What is there to prevent an Algerine pirate from landing on your coast, +and carrying your citizens into slavery? You have not a single sloop of +war. Does one of the states attempt to raise a little money by imposts or +other commercial regulations? A neighbouring state immediately alters her +laws, and defeats the revenue by throwing the trade into a different +channel. Instead of supporting or assisting, we are uniformly taking the +advantage of one another. Such an assemblage of people are not a nation. +Like a dark cloud, without cohesion or firmness, we are ready to be torn +asunder, and scattered abroad by every breeze of external violence, or +internal commotion. + +Is there a man in this state, who believes it possible for us to continue +under such a government? Let us suppose but for a minute, that such a +measure should be attempted. Let us suppose that the several states shall +be required and obliged to pay their several quotas according to the +original plan. You know that North Carolina, in the last four years, has +not paid one dollar into the treasury for eight dollars that she ought to +have paid. We must increase our taxes exceedingly, and those taxes must be +of the most grievous kind; they must be taxes on land and heads, taxes +that cannot fail to grind the face of the poor; for it is clear that we +can raise little by imports and exports. Some foreign goods are imported +by water from the northern states: such goods pay a duty for the benefit +of those states, which is seldom drawn back. This operates as a tax upon +our citizens. On this side, Virginia promotes her revenue to the amount of +twenty-five thousand dollars every year, by a tax on our tobacco that she +exports. South Carolina, on the other side, may avail herself of similar +opportunities. Two-thirds of foreign goods that are consumed in this +state, are imported by land from Virginia or South Carolina. Such goods +pay a certain impost for the benefit of the importing states, but our +treasury is not profited by this commerce. By such means our citizens are +taxed more than one hundred thousand dollars every year; but the state +does not receive credit for a shilling of that money. Like a patient that +is bleeding at both arms, North Carolina must soon expire under such +wasteful operations. Unless I am greatly mistaken, we have seen enough of +the state of the union, and of North Carolina in particular, to be assured +that another form of government is become necessary. Is the form of +government now proposed well calculated to give relief? To this we must +answer in the affirmative. All foreign goods that shall be imported into +these states, are to pay a duty for the use of the nation. All the states +will be on a footing, whether they have bad ports or good ones. No duties +will be laid on exports; hence the planter will receive the true value for +his produce, wherever it may be shipped. If excises are laid on wine, +spirits, or other luxuries, they must be uniform throughout the states. By +a careful management of imposts and excises, the national expenses may be +discharged without any other species of tax; but if a poll tax or land tax +shall ever become necessary, the weight must press equally on every part +of the union. For in all cases such taxes must be according to the number +of inhabitants. Is it not a pleasing consideration that North Carolina, +under all her natural disadvantages, must have the same facility of paying +her share of the public debt, as the most favoured, or the most fortunate +state? She gains no advantage by this plan, but she recovers from her +misfortunes. She stands on the same footing with her sisters, and they are +too generous to desire that she should stand on lower ground. When you +consider those parts of the new system which are of the greatest +import--those which respect the general question of liberty and safety--you +will recollect that the states in convention were unanimous; and you must +remember, that some of the members of that body have risqued their lives +in defence of liberty: but the system does not require the help of such +arguments; it will bear the most scrupulous examination. + +When you refer the proposed system to the particular circumstances of +North Carolina, and consider how she is to be affected by this plan, you +must find the utmost reason to rejoice in the prospect of better times. +This is a sentiment that I have ventured with the greater confidence, +because it is the general opinion of my late honourable colleagues,(63) +and I have the utmost reliance in their superior abilities. But if our +constituents shall discover faults where we could not see any--or if they +shall suppose that a plan is formed for abridging their liberties, when we +imagined that we had been securing both liberty and property on a more +stable foundation--if they perceive that they are to suffer a loss, where +we thought they must rise from a misfortune--they will, at least do us the +justice to charge those errors to the head, and not to the heart. + +The proposed system is now in your hands, and with it the fate of your +country. We have a common interest for we are embarked in the same vessel. +At present she is in a sea of trouble, without sails, oars, or pilot; +ready to be dashed to pieces by every flaw of wind. You may secure a port, +unless you think it better to remain at sea. If there is any man among you +that wishes for troubled times and fluctuating measures, that he may live +by speculations, and thrive by the calamities of the state, this +government is not for him. + +If there is any man who envies the prosperity of a native citizen--who +wishes that we should remain without native merchants or seamen, without +shipping, without manufactures, without commerce--poor and contemptible, +the tributaries of a sovereign country--this government is not for him. + +And if there is any man who has never been reconciled to our independence, +who wishes to see us degraded and insulted abroad, oppressed by anarchy at +home, and torn into pieces by factions--incapable of resistance, and ready +to become a prey to the first invader--this government is not for him. + +But it is a government, unless I am greatly mistaken, that gives the +fairest promise of being firm and honourable; safe from foreign invasion +or domestic sedition--a government by which our commerce must be protected +and enlarged; the value of our produce and of our lands must be increased; +the labourer and the mechanic must be encouraged and supported. It is a +form of government that is perfectly fitted for protecting liberty and +property, and for cherishing the good citizen and honest man. + + + + + +LETTER OF A STEADY AND OPEN REPUBLICAN, WRITTEN BY CHARLES PINCKNEY. + + +Printed In +The State Gazette Of South Carolina, +May, 1788. + + + + +Note. + + +In the file of the _State Gazette of South Carolina_ in the possession of +the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, a slip is inserted opposite this +essay, on which is writing contemporary with the paper, stating that it +was written by Charles Pinckney. It is almost the only essay on this +subject contained in the file, which is not merely extracted from some +northern paper; and Pinckney was, indeed, almost the only South Carolinian +who had given any attention to the subject involved, or who wrote for the +press. + + + + +A Republican. + + +The State Gazette Of South Carolina, (Number 3610) + +MONDAY, MAY 5, 1788. + +MRS. TIMOTHY: + +The enclosed,(64) copied from a paper sent me by a friend, seems so +peculiarly adapted to our present situation, that I cannot forbear +selecting it from the crowd of publications since the appearance of the +proposed Federal Constitution, and recommending it, thro' your paper, to +the most serious attention of all our fellow-citizens; but previously a +few HINTS, by way of introduction, will not, I hope, be impertinent. + +New Hampshire and Georgia are the two extreme barriers of the United +States, if the latter can with any propriety be called a barrier without +this state in conjunction; and both together, we know, are not, in point +of force, ready for any sudden emergency, to be compared to New Hampshire. + +It cannot be doubted that Great Britain has her busy emissaries throughout +the states, and not a few amongst us; and should the Constitution be +rejected, how long can we flatter ourselves to be free from Indian +cruelties and depredations, some time since begun in Georgia, and if at +this moment warded off from us, 'tis principally owing to the dread of an +efficacious union of the states by the adoption of the Federal +Constitution. The three southern states particularly, we have had for +several years past, good grounds to think Great Britain wishes to separate +from the rest, and to have reverted to her if possible. + +Mr. Martin's(65) long mischievous detail of the opinions and proceedings +of the late general convention, (already occupying a large space in six of +your Gazettes, and still unfinished,) with all his colourings and uncandid +insinuations, in regard to General Washington and Doct. Franklin, may suit +the short-sighted selfish wishes of _an individual_ of a state situated +almost in the centre of the rest, and much safer by that means from sudden +alarms. But the generous, manly _and truly federal sentiments of Maryland_ +are well known, and 'tis not doubted will be unequivocally shewn at her +convention very shortly to be held--and that New Hampshire, early in her +first meeting on that important subject, has only by consent taken farther +time to consider of it, and will at her next meeting adopt it, is the +general opinion. + +What pity the salutary caution of Doct. Franklin, just previous to his +signing the constitution recommended by the convention, had not been +strictly attended to! If we split, it will in all probability happen in +running headlong on the dangerous rock he so prophetically (as it were) +warned us from, "That the opinions of the errors of the constitution born +within the walls of the convention, should die there, and not a syllable +be whispered abroad." This Hint is full of that foresight and penetration +the Doctor has always been remarkable for. + +When the general convention met, no citizen of the United States could +expect less from it than I did, so many jarring interests and prejudices +to reconcile! The variety of pressing dangers at our doors, even during +the war, were barely sufficient to force us to act in concert, and +necessarily give way at times to each other. But when the great work was +done and published, I was not only most agreeably disappointed, but struck +with amazement. Nothing less than that superintending hand of Providence, +that so miraculously carried us through the war (in my humble opinion), +could have brought it about so complete, upon the whole. + +The constitution recommended, in all respects, takes its rise where it +ought, from the people; its President, Senate, and House of +Representatives, are sufficient and wholesome checks on each other, and at +proper periods are dissolved again into the common mass of the people: +longer periods would probably have produced danger; shorter, tumult, +instability and inefficacy. Every article of these and other essentials to +a republican government, are, in my opinion, well secured; were it +otherwise, not a citizen of the United States would have been more +alarmed, or more early in opposition to it, than + +A STEADY AND OPEN REPUBLICAN. + +_Charleston, May 2d, 1788._ + + + + + +BIBLIOGRAPHY. + + +[This list is only of those essays to which some clue of authorship has +been found. When written over a pen name the pseudonym is added.--_Ed._] + +Brackenridge, Hugh Henry. +Pittsburg Gazette. + +Bryan, Samuel. "Centinel." +Independent Gazetteer. + +Carroll, Daniel. "A Friend to the Constitution." +Maryland Journal. + +Chase, Samuel. "Caution." +Maryland Journal. + +Clinton, De Witt. "A Countryman." +New York Journal. + +Clinton, George. "Cato." +New York Journal. + +Coxe, Tench. "A Freeman." +Pennsylvania Gazette. + +Coxe, Tench. "An American." +Independent Gazetteer. + +Coxe, Tench. "A Pennsylvanian." +Pennsylvania Gazette. + +Duer, William. "Philo-Publius." +Daily Advertiser. + +Davie, William Richardson. "Publicola." +North Carolina State Gazette. + +Dickinson, John. "Fabius." +Humphrey's Mercury. + +Ellsworth, Oliver. "A Landholder." +Connecticut Courant. + +Findley, William. "An Officer of the Continental Army." +Independent Gazetteer. + +Gerry, Elbridge. +Massachusetts Centinel. + +Gerry, Elbridge. +American Herald. + +Hamilton, Alexander. "Publius." +Various papers. + +Hamilton, Alexander. "Caesar." +Daily Advertiser. + +Hanson, Alexander Contee. "Aristides." +Maryland Journal. + +Hopkinson, Francis. "A. B." +Independent Gazetteer. + +Iredell, James. "Marcus." +North Carolina State Gazette. + +Jay, John. "Publius." +Various papers. + +Lamb, John. "Conciliator." +New York Journal. + +McKnight, Dr. Charles. "The Examiner." +Daily Advertiser. + +Martin, Luther. +Maryland Journal. + +Madison, James. "Publius." +Various papers. + +Nicholas, John. "Decius." +Virginia Independent Chronicle. + +Pinckney, Charles. "A Steady and Open Republican." +State Gazette of South Carolina. + +Randolph, Thomas Mann. "A Republican Federalist." +Virginia Independent Chronicle. + +Roane, Spencer. "A Plain Dealer." +Virginia Independent Chronicle. + +Sherman, Roger. "A Countryman." +New Haven Gazette. + +Sherman, Roger. "A Citizen of New Haven." +New Haven Gazette. + +Sullivan, James. "Cassius." +Massachusetts Gazette. + +Tucker, St. George. "A State Soldier." +Virginia Independent Chronicle. + +Williams, William. +American Mercury. + +Williamson, Hugh. +North Carolina State Gazette. + +Winthrop, James. "Agrippa." +Massachusetts Gazette. + +Workman, Benjamin. "Philadelphiensis." +Independent Gazetteer. + +Yates, Robert. "Brutus." +New York Journal. + +Yates, Robert. "Sydney." +New York Journal. + + + + + +INDEX. + + +"A. B.," pseudonym of, 416. + +Adams, John, 117, 231. + +"Agrippa," pseudonym of, 22, 29, 49, 417. + +"American," pseudonym of, 415. + +American Herald, 123, 416. + +American Mercury, 417. + +American Museum, 315. + +Anarchy, danger of, 15, 165; + predicted, 18. + +Anti-Federalists, character of, 25. + +"Aristides," pseudonym of, 372, 416. + +Aristocracy, favorers of, 5; + small danger of, 165; + southern, 258; + causes of, 298; + tendencies to, 223. + +Articles of Confederation, 238; + advantages of, 77; + amendment of, 80, 98; + defects in, 255; + ease of amendment of, 117; + proposed amendment to, 84. + +Baldwin, Simeon, 213. + +Ballot, 305. + +Baltimore, 327, 333. + +Bill of rights, 28, 95, 113, 117, 119, 163, 219, 299, 320, 325, 364. + +Blair, John, 162. + +Bowdoin, James, 3, 6. + +Brackenridge, H. H., 315, 415. + +"Brutus," pseudonym of, 269, 295, 417. + +Bryan, George, 221. + +Bryan, Samuel, 415. + +"Caesar," pseudonym of, 245, 250, 279, 416. + +Canada, 191; + dangers from, 157. + +Capital, 262; + place for, 73, 321. + +Capitation tax, 272. + +"Capt. M'Daniel," pseudonym of, 122. + +Carroll, Daniel, 325, 329, 415. + +Carthage, 93. + +"Cassius," pseudonym of, 1, 51, 416. + +"Cato," pseudonym of, 243, 281, 415. + +"Caution," pseudonym of, 323, 415. + +"Centinel, The," pseudonym of, 218, 415. + +"Charles James Fox," pseudonym of, 51. + +Chase, Samuel, 323, 415; + promises of, 333; + speech of, 325. + +Childs, Francis, 250. + +"Citizen of New Haven," pseudonym of, 229, 416. + +Citizenship, 270; + rights of, 42. + +Clinton, De Witt, 415. + +Clinton, George, 173, 243, 281, 415. + +Coinage, uniformity of, 35. + +Coke, 266. + +Commerce of America, 95; + inter-state, congressional power over, 118; + regulation of, 97. + +Commercial treaties, power to make, 234. + +"Conciliator," pseudonym of, 416. + +Congress, Continental, action on the Constitution, 253, 289; + retrospective view of, 298; + inadequate powers of, 34. + +Congress, difference between state legislature and, 224; + length of session of, 239; + members of, 225; + character of, 227; + character from South, 258; + election of, 86; + privileges of, 33; + restriction on, 234; + interest of, 220; + journal of, 33; + nature of, 267; + powers of, 27, 32, 34, 41, 98; + to alienate territory, 80; + to coerce the states, 184; + over delinquent states, 358; + over citizens, 80; + over elections, 30, 37, 118, 276; + over inter-state commerce, 118; + over judiciary, 66; + over militia, 184; + law-making powers of, 45; + of taxation, 235; + over territories, 43; + over trade, 61; + representation in, 151. + +Connecticut, 183, 355; + address to, 215; + constitution of, 148; + Courant, 135, 415; + convention, 178, 207; + legislature of, 219; + manufactures of, 202; + taxation in, 74, 148; + tribute to New York from, 180. + +Constituents, instructions from, 28. + +Constitution, a creation of power, 145, 147; + adequacy of, 35; + adopting clause of, 131, 184, 362; + advantages of, 21; + amendment of, 44, 100, 118, 200, 233, 251, 284, 334; + attempts to surprise the people with, 327; + character of opposers of, 11, 143; + comparison of, 339; + with constitution of N. Y., 297; + with English, 381; + consolidating tendencies of, 65, 69, 70, 158, 258, 297; + construction of, 43; + objections to, 25, 53, 132, 151; + definition of, 116; + despotic power of, 28; + effect of, 95; + excellence of language of, 156; + expense of, 60; + general clauses of, 83, 96, 119; + importance of, 248; + judicial power under, 39; + laws made under, 360; + merits of, 27; + new powers granted by, 238; + powers under, 153, 156, 163, 220; + opposition to, 39; + preamble of, 208; + reasons for not submitting to state legislature, 139; + reception of, 9; + rejection of, 100; + remarks on, 237, 395; + supreme law of the land, 184; + want of explicitness in, 155, 260, 265; + should be tried before amending, 235; + writers against, 12. + +Convention, Federal, 238, 247, 284, 287; + appeals to the people, 140; + character of the members of, 20; + committees of, 348; + dissenting members of, 104; + harmony of, 191; + ignorance of the members of, 22; + illegal action of, 104; + irritated condition of, 367; + journals of, 347; + large vs. small states in, 355; + meetings of, 345; + meetings of members of, 355; + object of, 35; + powers of, 252, 290; + proceedings in, 130, 174, 183, 341; + secrecy of, 252, 298; + spirit of, 167; + wisdom of, 252. + +Convention, second, 62, 235, 375. + +Council, lack of, 162. + +"Countryman, A," pseudonym of, 211, 415, 416. + +Courts, Federal, 36, 40, 83. + +Courts, State, 54. + +Coxe, Tench, 415. + +Credit, public, 73, 197. + +Creditors, public, 60; + justice to, 35. + +Criminal prosecution, laws for, 67. + +Daily Advertiser, 250, 279, 415, 416. + +Davie, William Richardson, 415. + +Debt, Continental, 60, 73, 77, 95, 97, 127. + +Debtors, opposition of, to constitution, 144. + +"Decius," pseudonym of, 416. + +Delaware, 163, 355. + +Dickinson, John, 415. + +Duer, William, 415. + +Duties, 77; + Massachusetts' share of, 84; + paid by consumers, 271; + uniformity of, 35. + +Eastern states, carrying trade of, 162. + +Elections, 116; + frequency of, 227; + power of Congress over, 30, 118, 276; + provisions for, 37. + +Ellsworth, Oliver, 135, 415. + +England, laws of, against treason, 42; + religious freedom in, 168. + +Europe, governments of, 256; + treaties with, 89. + +"Examiner," pseudonym of, 18, 416. + +Excise forbidden, 118. + +Executive, 158, 260, 310; + advice of, 38; + blended with legislative, 240, 275; + council for, 163; + impeachment of, 39; + ineligible, after service, 234; + may be a woman, 319; + method of electing, 263; + not specified, 319; + objections to, 162; + powers of, 39, 261; + power over pardon, 234, 240; + power to convene Congress, 275; + re-eligibility of, 354, 374; + to be elected annually, 119; + under constitution, 37; + vote of, 38; + veto power of, 34. + +Ex post facto law, 163. + +"Fabius," pseudonym of, 415. + +Federal Government, necessity for, 141. + +Federalists, aristocratic tendencies of, 89. + +Findley, William, 100, 321, 415. + +Fisheries, 194; + power over, 234. + +Flax, 202. + +Foreign influence, 103. + +Foreign nations, intercourse with, 80. + +Forests, value of, 194. + +France, public debt to, 73. + +Franchise, 226. + +Frankland, 258. + +Franklin, Benjamin, 23, 26, 218, 321, 370. + +"Freeman," pseudonym of, 415. + +"Friend to the Constitution," 329, 415. + +Georgia, 164, 190, 259, 355. + +Gerry, Elbridge, 25, 51, 53, 104, 123, 127, 130, 137, 161, 172, 182, 186, + 339, 341, 350, 416; + conciliating conduct of, 174; + hypocrisy of, 174; + objections to constitutions, 132; + remarks on, 150. + +Goddard, William, 341. + +Government, divisions of, 116; + encroaching tendencies of, 376; + General and State linked, 153; + Greek and Roman, 55; + importance, 247; + necessity of, to society, 111; + opposition to, 24; + a strong one necessary for liberty, 147. + +Great Britain, dangers from, 190; + resentment of, 89. + +Habeas corpus, suspension of, 36. + +Hamilton, Alexander, 245, 279, 416. + +Hampshire Gazette, 5. + +Hancock, John, 3, 5, 10. + +Hanson, Alexander Contee, 372, 416. + +Hartford, 216. + +Harvard College Library, 40. + +Holland, public debt due, 73. + +Hopkinson, Francis, 416. + +Humphrey's Mercury, 415. + +Impeachment, 39, 233, 312, 391; + in Massachusetts, 41; + methods of, 30; + powers of Senate in, 29. + +Independent Chronicle, 5. + +Independent Gazetteer, 218, 415, 416, 417. + +India, trade with, 109. + +Indian affairs, 301; + lands, 300. + +Iredell, James, 416. + +Jay, John, 416. + +Judiciary, 54, 159, 235, 241; + appeals to, 130, 184, 361; + appointment of, 69; + dangers from, 66, 164; + federal, 83; + limits of 67, 118; + national, 309; + oppressiveness of, 159; + powers of, 96; + restrictions on federal, 119; + state, 241. + +"Junius," pseudonym of, 51. + +Jury, trial by, 41, 131, 308. + +"Kempis, O'Flanagan," pseudonym of, 51. + +Lamb, John, 173, 245, 416. + +"Landholder, A," 129, 135, 205, 339, 344, 415; + replies to, 123. + +Land grants, power of courts over, 75. + +Lands, western, 60, 63, 73. + +Lansing, John, Jr., 104. + +Lee, Gen. Charles, 161. + +Lee, Henry, 162. + +Lee, Richard Henry, 161, 177, 390. + +Liberty of the press, 365. + +Locke, 257. + +Loyalists, opposition of, to constitution, 143. + +M'Henry, James, 131, 187, 347, 350. + +McKean, Thomas, 90, 100. + +McKnight, Dr. Charles, 416. + +MacLaughlin, Neil, 321. + +Madison, 162, 231, 325, 387, 416. + +Magna Charta, 219. + +Maine, secession of, 257. + +Manufactures in America, 201. + +"Marcus," pseudonym of, 416. + +Martin, Luther, 104, 130, 137, 182, 185, 337, 416. + +Maryland, 188; + convention, 327; + Legislature, petition to, 334. + +Maryland Journal, 182, 323, 329, 337, 415, 416. + +Mason, George, 104, 161, 164, 165, 172, 355. + +Massachusetts, 258; + Constitution of, 16; + convention, 105, 187, 349; + proposed resolution for, 84; + debt of, 60; + delegates from, 29; + disadvantages of government for, 102; + early history of, 56; + feebleness of, 257; + impeachment in, 30, 41; + Legislature, action on constitution of, 17; + means of taxation of, 13; + origin of opposition in, 176; + plan to aggrandize, 182; + position of, 61; + public lands of, 63; + share of the Continental debt, 77; + taxation in, 74; + tender law of, 36, 59; + warning to, 10. + +Massachusetts Centinel, 3, 123, 416. + +Massachusetts Gazette, 1, 12, 18, 49, 51, 416, 417. + +Mercer, James Francis, 104. + +Militia, 358; + powers of Congress over, 184; + power over, 342, 354; + State control of, 118. + +Minority, powers of, 33. + +Monarchy, small danger of, 165. + +Money, receipts and expenditures of public, 36. + +Monopolies, power of Congress to create, 70; + prevention of, 80. + +Montesquieu, 256, 261. + +Nails, manufacture of, 202. + +Naturalization, 313; + powers of Congress over, 79. + +Navigation act, 161; + motion against, 173; + right to make, 234. + +Netherlands, condition of, 249. + +New England, manufactures of, 201. + +New Hampshire, 189, 259; + interest of, 190, 192; + lands in, 75. + +New Haven, 216. + +New Haven Gazette, 211, 229, 416. + +New Jersey, 183, 355. + +New Spain, dangers from, 157. + +Newspapers, scribblers in, 25. + +New York against constitution, 61; + Assembly, 245; + colonial parties, 306; + constitution of, 297, 299; + violation of, 301; + draft of a constitution for, 307; + impost of, 173; + opposition in, 176; + proposed property qualification in, 307; + State convention of 1776, 298; + State debt of, 60; + Executive, 310; + taxation in, 74; + tribute from Connecticut to, 180. + +New York Journal, 125, 243, 269, 293, 415, 416, 417. + +Nicholas, John, 416. + +North Carolina, 258. + +North Carolina, State Gazette of, 395, 415, 416, 417. + +Northern States, character of people of, 92. + +Nova Scotia, 191; + condition of, 89. + +"Numa," pseudonym of, 5, 10. + +Oath, 207, 369; + character of, 17, 168; + of President, 38. + +"Ocrico," pseudonym of, 52. + +Officers, federal, privileges of, 119. + +Office holders, 145; + multiplication of, 88. + +"Officer of the Continental Army," pseudonym of, 415. + +"Old Fog," pseudonym of, 3. + +Paper money, 127, 131, 196, 341, 348; + motion to redeem, 174, 186; + states to emit, 119. + +Parties, colonial, 306. + +People, dangers from, 179; + not to elect representatives, 183; + rights of, 115. + +Pennsylvania, 369; + Assembly, 53, 369; + Convention of, 90, 100; + future seat of government, 98; + naturalization in, 79; + opposition in, 176. + +Pennsylvania Gazette, 415. + +"Pennsylvanian," pseudonym of, 415. + +"Philadelphiensis," pseudonym of, 417. + +"Philo-Publius," pseudonym of, 415. + +Pinckney, C. C., 183. + +Pinckney, Charles, 416. + +Pittsburg Gazette, 317, 415. + +"Plain Dealer, A," pseudonym of, 385, 416. + +Poll tax, 272; + forbidden, 118. + +Population, destiny of, 193. + +Press, liberty of, 164, 239. + +Prices, depressed state of, 142. + +Private opinion, freedom of, 170. + +"Publicola," pseudonym of, 415. + +"Publius," pseudonym of, 145, 416. + +Quorum, dangers from, 32; + powers of, 33. + +Randolph, Edmund, 104, 231, 346, 387. + +Randolph, Thomas Mann, 416. + +Religion, freedom of, 168, 313; + misuse of, 8. + +Religious test, 207, 235; + nature of, 169; + necessity of, 168. + +Representation, 54, 269, 391; + best mode of, 151; + difference of opinion concerning, 354; + smallness of, 236, 240; + want of, 151. + +Representatives, House of, 54; + electors of, 28; + insufficiency of, 29; + length of residence necessary, 28; + method of choosing, 152; + method of electing, 27, 357; + people should not elect, 183; + term of, 28; + weakness of, 273. + +Republics, Greek and Roman, 94. + +"Republican Federalist," pseudonym of, 416. + +Republican government, guarantee of, 43, 106. + +Revenue bills, origination of, 34. + +Revenue, method of collecting, 193; + Massachusetts' share of, 102; + sources of, 239. + +Revolution, the American, 146. + +Rhode Island, 105, 108, 115, 159, 196; + junto in, 153; + legislature of, 31, 36. + +Rights, delegated, 113. + +Roane, Spencer, 385, 416. + +Russell, Benjamin, 127. + +Scotland, union with England, 216. + +Senate, 29, 273; + blended with Executive, 275; + method of choosing, 153; + officers of, 29; + powers of impeachment, 29; + treaty power of, 165, 274; + unspecified character of, 319. + +Shay's Rebellion, 5, 13, 57, 72, 157, 159, 257, 391. + +Sheep raising, 201. + +Sherman, Roger, 183, 211, 229, 416. + +Shipbuilding, 61, 194; + carpenters, 61. + +Slavery, 258; + responsibility for, 163. + +Slaves, importation of, 163. + +Smilie, John, 100, 321. + +Smith, Melancthon, 173. + +South Carolina, 164, 183, 265, 355; + amendment of, 235; + representation in, 108. + +Southern States, character of people of 92; + objections to commercial powers, 162. + +"Spectator," pseudonym of, 326. + +States, coercion of, 184; + influences, 297; + courts, 54, 159; + absorption of, 297; + dangers to, 153; + destruction of, 342; + powers of, 98; + negative on laws, 360; + legislatures, action of, on constitution, 25; + Congress a check on, 31; + differences between Congress and, 224; + powers of, 152; + power over elections, 31; + representation in, 152; + officers, dangers from, 289; + restrictions on, 36; + rights, 68, 113, 118, 147, 184; + admission of new, 42; + advantages of, 66; + bills of right valid in federal courts, 119; + consolidation of, 97, 255; + destruction of, 375; + disputes between, 64, 100; + equality of, in Senate, 29; + interest of, 215; + large vs. small, 216, 355; + number to organize government, 184; + rights to enforce laws of, 118. + +State Gazette of North Carolina, 395. + +State Gazette of South Carolina, 416. + +State house, 355. + +"State Soldier," pseudonym of, 417. + +"Steady and Open Republican," pseudonym of, 416. + +"Steady," pseudonym of, 326. + +Strong, Caleb, 105. + +Sullivan, James, 1, 416. + +"Sydney," pseudonym of, 269, 293, 417. + +Tax, poll, 273. + +Taxation, 156, 193; + dangers of, 81; + direct, 235, 270; + importance of, 271; + in Connecticut, 148, 226; + method of, 77, 358; + powers of Congress over, 97. + +Tender acts, 36, 59, 196. + +Territory, right to alienate, 80, 118, 234. + +Test law, 169, 171, 207, 235. + +Town meetings, 226. + +Trade, 61; + condition of, 140; + congressional control over, 161; + foreign, 95; + limitations of, 54; + Massachusetts' advantage for, 73; + powers of Congress over, 79; + regulation of, 70. + +Trading companies, 70, 109; + forbidden, 118. + +Treason, punishment of, 41. + +Treaty power, dangers from, 165. + +Treaties, law of the land, 24; + with Europe, 89. + +Tucker, St. George, 417. + +United States, an agricultural country, 200; + condition of, 81, 121, 158; + dangers to, 178; + differences between the inhabitants of, 91; + too large for government, 257; + tranquillity of, 59. + +Vermont, 258. + +Vice-president, 240, 263; + duties of, 158. + +Virginia, 162, 390; + house of delegates of, 166; + plan to aggrandize, 182; + qualifications of, 306; + method of, 305; + opposition in, 176. + +Virginia Gazette, 387. + +Virginia Independent Chronicle, 385, 416, 417. + +"Vox Populi," pseudonym of, 12, 16, 18. + +Washington, George, 23, 26, 161, 177, 218, 251, 254, 285, 321, 347, 370. + +West Indies, condition of, 89. + +Western territory, 239. + +Willetts, Marinus, 173. + +Williams, William, 137, 168, 195, 202, 417. + +Williamson, Hugh, 395, 417. + +Wilson, James, 90, 96, 100, 112, 218, 335. + +Winthrop, James, 40, 49, 417. + +Woolen manufactures, 201. + +Workman, Benjamin, 417. + +Yates, Robert, 104, 173, 269, 293, 417. + + + + + + +FOOTNOTES + + + 1 A writer then attacking the Hancock party. See _The Independent + Chronicle_ for Aug. 23, and Sept. 15, 20, 1787. _Ed._ + + 2 Shay's Rebellion. _Ed._ + + 3 Massachusetts newspapers published in Northampton and Boston. _Ed._ + + 4 The administration of Governor Bowdoin. _Ed._ + + 5 The author of the productions under the signature of Numa, it is + said, is a gentleman of the cloth, in one of the Western counties. + + 6 John Hancock. _Ed._ + + 7 A writer in the _Massachusetts Gazette_, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 13, 16, + and 23. _Ed._ + + 8 The Legislature of Massachusetts was then so styled. _Ed._ + + 9 In the _Massachusetts Gazette_, for Nov. 2, 9, and 20, 1787. _Ed._ + + 10 See the letters of Agrippa in this work. _Ed._ + + 11 Probably Elbridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts to the Federal + Convention. _Ed._ + + 12 Anti-federal scribblers in the Mass. Gazette. + + 13 Referring to Rhode Island. _Ed._ + + 14 Harvard University Library, of which James Winthrop was + librarian.--_Ed._ + + 15 Said to be by James Winthrop. See the letters, printed herein.--_Ed._ + + 16 Printed in _Elliot_, I, 492.--_Ed._ + + 17 "An Address of the subscribers, members of the late Houses of + Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to their + constituents," printed in the _Pennsylvania Packet_, Oct. 4, + 1787.--_Ed._ + + 18 Referring to Shay's rebellion.--_Ed._ + + 19 Act of 1786, providing that executions issued for private debt may + be satisfied by articles particularly enumerated, at an appraised + value from impartial men.--_Ed._ + + 20 No attempt had been made by Massachusetts for several years to pay + the interest on its debt, except by the State Treasurer's issuing + "consolidated notes" or "certificates" of indebtedness, bearing 6 + per cent. interest. Though these were by law receivable for taxes, + they had sold as low as 4/ in the pound.--_Ed._ + + 21 The sales to the Ohio Company.--_Ed._ + + 22 By Act of July 5, 1786.--_Ed._ + + 23 Probably an allusion to the Phelps and Gorham purchase.--_Ed._ + + 24 An allusion to the proceedings in the Convention of + Pennsylvania.--_Ed._ + + 25 Cf. with page 85.--_Ed._ + + 26 Robert Yates, John Lansing, Jr., Luther Martin, James Francis + Mercer, Edmund Randolph, George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry.--_Ed._ + + 27 The speech of Caleb Strong in the State Convention, Jan. 16, + 1788.--_Ed._ + + 28 Delivered Oct. 6, 1787. Printed in _Ford's Pamphlets on the + Constitution_, p. 155.--_Ed._ + + 29 No record of this is given in the _Debates in the Massachusetts + Convention_.--_Ed._ + + 30 Printed in _Elliot_, I, 492.--_Ed._ + + 31 Printed in Ford's _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, p. 327. + + 32 Richard Henry Lee. + + 33 Saturday, September 15. See _Papers of James Madison_, III., 1593. + + 34 The paragraph containing Mason's objection to the mere majority + power of Congress to regulate commerce, was included in all the + southern papers, but omitted in copies furnished to the papers north + of Maryland.--_Ed._ + + 35 Mason proposed in the convention that the President should have a + privy council of six.--_Ed._ + + 36 This is an error. It was moved by Mason and seconded by Gerry. Cf. + _Papers of James Madison, III._, 1578. + + 37 See letter of William Williams in this collection.--_Ed._ + + 38 John Lamb, Marinus Willetts, Melancthon Smith, George Clinton and + Robert or Abraham Yates, the principal anti-federalists of New + York.--_Ed._ + + 39 See counter-statements of Gerry and Martin in their answers.--_Ed._ + + 40 Cf. _Papers of James Madison_, III, 1595. + + 41 The Convention of Connecticut, which was to meet Jan. 4.--_Ed._ + + 42 The Landholder, IV-VIII, were reprinted in _The Maryland Journal_, + and the attack on Gerry in them, drew from Luther Martin a defence + of that gentleman, which is printed in this collection. To that the + Landholder replied as above, but this one of the series was not + printed in _The Connecticut Courant_, its place being taken by the + number X., printed immediately after this letter.--_Ed._ + + 43 June 9.--_Ed._ + + 44 This is a misstatement. The motion to elect representatives as the + state legislature should direct was made by C. C. Pinckney, was + seconded by Martin, and approved of by Sherman, and on being put to + a vote was favored by Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware and South + Carolina. Cf. _Papers of James Madison_, II., 925.--_Ed._ + + 45 Mr. Gerry agreed with Mr. Martin on these questions. + + 46 By direction of the General Assembly of Maryland, Martin reported + the proceedings of the federal Convention to them, and this was + afterwards printed in pamphlet form under the title of _Genuine + Information_.--_Ed._ + + 47 June 9, according to Madison, the _Journal_ and Martin's _Genuine + Information_.--_Ed._ + + 48 Gerry, though defeated in an election to the Massachusetts + Convention, was invited by them to attend, in order to furnish + information to the members.--_Ed._ + + 49 To prevent any misconstruction the following is the publication + entire: + + (This note is by the Landholder, and is followed by the article + already printed at p. 127. It therefore seems unnecessary to add it + here.--_Ed._) + + I will not say this writer makes a distinction between a thing done + in convention and a thing done in committee. Be this as it may, he + confesses more than Mr. Martin; for it seems that Mr. Gerry proposed + that "the public debt should stand on the same ground it now stands + on by the articles of confederation." He might have subjoined that + Mr. Gerry prefaced this motion by observing that it was the same in + substance as his first, in as much as it included his first. But + notwithstanding this motion was readily agreed to without his + explanation being contradicted, yet he never afterwards favoured the + convention with a look of peace, or a word of reconcilement. + + 50 The convention of New Hampshire had met on the 13 of June, and after + a discussion of seven days, had adjourned without voting upon the + constitution.--_Ed._ + + 51 See Letter of William Williams in this Collection.--_Ed._ + + 52 This is a paraphrase of the arguments of "The Centinel" in _The + Independent Gazetteer_.--ED. + + 53 An attempt had been made in Congress, by the friends of the new + government, for Congress to recommend its acceptance, but this + produced protest from those opposed to it, and threats of an appeal + to the people, so in order to prevent such action a compromise was + eventually made, by which it was merely unanimously "transmitted to + the several legislatures."--_Ed._ + + 54 A series of articles in the _New York Journal_, written by Robert + Yates.--_Ed._ + + 55 John Smilie, a prominent Anti-Federalist.--_Ed._ + + 56 William Livingston.--_Ed._ + + 57 See _Ante_, pages 182 and 189.--_Ed._ + + 58 The Maryland Delegates to the Federal Convention were required by + the legislature to report the proceedings of that body to them, and + it was in this connection that Martin's _Genuine Information_ was + prepared.--_Ed._ + + 59 According to this idea, I endeavored to obtain as an amendment to + the system the following clause: "And whenever the legislature of + the United States shall find it necessary that revenue shall be + raised by direct taxation, having apportioned the same by the above + rule, requisitions shall be made of the respective states to pay + into the continental treasury their respective quotas within a time + in the said requisition to be specified, and in case of any of the + states failing to comply with such requisition, then, and then only, + to have power to devise and pass acts directing the mode, and + authorizing the same in the state failing therein." This was + rejected, and that power, which I wished to have given the + government only in this particular instance, is given to it without + any restraint or limitation in every case. + + 60 How exactly agreeable to the sentiments of that honourable member + has been the conduct of the friends of the Constitution in + Pennsylvania and some other states, I need not mention. + + 61 A reference to Alexander Contee Hanson's pamphlet, written under the + pseudonym of Aristides. It is reprinted in Ford's _Pamphlets on the + Constitution_.--_Ed._ + + 62 Printed in _Elliot_, 1, 503.--_Ed._ + + 63 Williamson was a member of the Federal Convention.--_Ed._ + + 64 Following this article was an essay from a New York paper.--_Ed._ + + 65 See page 339.--_Ed._ + + + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES*** + + + +CREDITS + + +April 5, 2010 + + Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1 + Produced by Curtis Weyant, David King, and the Online + Distributed Proofreading Team at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. 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