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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Psychology, by Robert S. Woodworth
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Psychology
+ A Study Of Mental Life
+
+Author: Robert S. Woodworth
+
+Release Date: February 25, 2010 [EBook #31382]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PSYCHOLOGY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Don Kostuch
+
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's notes]
+ This text is derived from an unedited version in the Internet Archive.
+
+ Page numbers are indicated by numbers enclosed in curly braces,
+ e.g. {99}. They have been located where page breaks occurred in the
+ original book.
+
+ Labels and text in a figure that are not mentioned in the figure
+ description are included as a comma separated list, as in "(Figure
+ text: cochlea, vestibule, 3 Canals)".
+
+ Lengthy footnotes and quotations are indented.
+
+ Obvious misspellings and typos are corrected but inconsistent spelling
+ is not resolved, as in coordinate and cooerdinate.
+
+ Here are the definitions of some unfamiliar words (to me).
+
+ amour propre
+ self-esteem; self-respect.
+
+ esprit de corps
+ camaraderie, bonding, solidarity, fellowship.
+
+ motility (motile)
+ moving or capable of moving spontaneously.
+
+ unwonted
+ unusual.
+[End Transcribers's notes]
+
+
+
+PSYCHOLOGY
+A STUDY OF MENTAL LIFE
+
+BY
+ROBERT S. WOODWORTH, Ph. D.
+_Professor of Psychology in Columbia University_
+
+
+NEW YORK
+HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
+1921
+
+
+COPYRIGHT, 1921
+BY
+HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
+
+
+Printed in the U.S.A.
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+A few words to the reader are in order. In the first place, something
+like an apology is due for the free way in which the author has drawn
+upon the original work of many fellow-psychologists, without any
+mention of their names. This is practically unavoidable in a book
+intended for the beginner, but the reader may well be informed of the
+fact, and cautioned not to credit the content of the book to the
+writer of it. The author's task has been that of selecting from the
+large mass of psychological information now available, much of it new,
+whatever seemed most suitable for introducing the subject to the
+reader. The book aims to represent the present state of a very active
+science.
+
+Should the book appear unduly long in prospect, the longest and most
+detailed chapter, that on Sensation, might perfectly well be omitted,
+on the first reading, without appreciably disturbing the continuity of
+the rest.
+
+On the other hand should any reader desire to make this text the basis
+of a more extensive course of reading, the lists of references
+appended to the several chapters will prove of service. The books and
+articles there cited will be found interesting and not too technical
+in style.
+
+Much advantage can be derived from the use of the "Exercises". The
+text, at the best, but provides raw material. Each student's finished
+product must be of his own making. The exercises afford opportunity
+for the student to work over the material and make it his own.
+
+A first or preliminary edition of this book, in mimeographed sheets,
+was in use for two years in introductory classes conducted by the
+author and his colleagues, and was subjected to exceedingly helpful
+criticism from both teachers and students. The revision of that
+earlier edition into the present form has been very much of a
+cooeperative enterprise, and so many have cooeperated that room could
+scarcely be found for all their names. Professor A. T. Poffenberger,
+Dr. Clara F. Chassell, Dr. Georgina I. Gates, Mr. Gardner Murphy, Mr.
+Harold E. Jones and Mr. Paul S. Achilles have given me the advantage
+of their class-room experience with the mimeographed book. Dr.
+Christine Ladd-Franklin has very carefully gone over with me the
+passages dealing with color vision and with reasoning. Miss Elizabeth
+T. Sullivan, Miss Anna B. Copeland, Miss Helen Harper and Dr. A. H.
+Martin have been of great assistance in the final stages of the work.
+Important suggestions have come also from several other universities,
+where the mimeographed book was inspected.
+
+R. S. W.
+Columbia University
+August, 1921
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+ PAGE
+
+WHAT PSYCHOLOGY IS AND DOES 1
+
+Varieties of Psychology 2
+
+Psychology as Related to Other Sciences 5
+
+The Science of Consciousness 7
+
+The Science of Behavior 8
+
+Introspection 10
+
+Objective Observation 11
+
+General Lines of
+ Psychological Investigation 14
+
+Summary and Attempt at a Definition 17
+
+Exercises 19
+
+References 20
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+REACTIONS 21
+
+The Reaction Time Experiment 22
+
+Reflex Action 24
+
+The Nerves in Reflex Action 26
+
+Internal Construction of the
+ Nerves and Nerve Centers 31
+
+The Synapse 34
+
+Cooerdination 37
+
+Reactions in General 39
+
+Exercises 42
+
+References 44
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+REACTIONS OF DIFFERENT LEVELS 45
+
+Different Sorts of Stimuli 47
+
+The Motor Centers, Lower and Higher 49
+
+How the Brain Produces
+ Muscular Movements 53
+
+Facilitation and Inhibition 54
+
+Super-motor Centers in the Cortex 56
+
+Speech Centers 57
+
+The Auditory Centers 59
+
+The Visual Centers 62
+
+Cortical Centers for the Other Senses 68
+
+Lower Sensory Centers 64
+
+The Cerebellum 66
+
+Different Levels of Reaction 65
+
+Exercises 67
+
+References 67
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+TENDENCIES TO REACTION 68
+
+Purposive Behavior 70
+
+Organic States that Influence Behavior 72
+
+Preparation for Action 74
+
+Preparatory Reactions 77
+
+What the Preparatory
+ Reactions Accomplish 79
+
+What a Tendency Is,
+ in Terms of Nerve Action 82
+
+Motives 84
+
+Exercises 86
+
+References 88
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+NATIVE AND ACQUIRED TRAITS 89
+
+The Source of Native Traits 90
+
+Reactions Appearing at
+ Birth Must Be Native 91
+
+Reactions That Cannot Be
+ Learned Must Be Native 92
+
+Experimental Detection
+ of Native Reactions 93
+
+Is Walking Native or Acquired? 95
+
+Universality as a Criterion
+ of Native Reactions 97
+
+Some Native Traits Are
+ Far from Being Universal 98
+
+Why Acquired Traits Differ from
+ One Individual to Another 99
+
+What Mental Traits Are Native? 100
+
+Exercises 103
+
+References 104
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+INSTINCT 105
+
+The Difference Between
+ an Instinct and a Reflex 107
+
+An Instinct Is a Native
+ Reaction-Tendency 109
+
+Fully and Partially
+ Organized Instincts 111
+
+Instincts Are Not Ancestral Habits 113
+
+Instincts Not Necessarily Useful
+ in the Struggle for Existence 114
+
+The So-called Instincts of
+ Self-preservation and of Reproduction 115
+
+Exercises 117
+
+References 117
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+EMOTION 118
+
+Organic States That Are
+ Not Usually Classed as Emotions 119
+
+How These Organic States
+ Differ from Regular Emotions 120
+
+The Organic State in Anger 121
+
+Glandular Responses During Emotion 122
+
+The Nerves Concerned in
+ Internal Emotional Response 124
+
+The Emotional State as
+ a Preparatory Reaction 125
+
+"Expressive Movements," Another
+ Sort of Preparatory Reactions 126
+
+Do Sensations of These Various
+ Preparatory Reactions Constitute
+ the Conscious State of Emotion? 128
+
+The James-Lange Theory of the Emotions 129
+
+Emotion and Impulse 130
+
+Emotion Sometimes Generates Impulse 132
+
+Emotion and Instinct 134
+
+The Higher Emotions 136
+
+Exercises 136
+
+References 136
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+INVENTORY OF HUMAN INSTINCTS
+ AND PRIMARY EMOTIONS 137
+
+Classification 138
+
+Responses to Organic Needs 139
+
+Instinctive Responses to Other Persons 145
+
+The Play Instincts 151
+
+Exercises 170
+
+References 171
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE FEELINGS 172
+
+Pleasantness and Unpleasantness
+ Are Simple Feelings 173
+
+Felling-tone of Sensations 174
+
+Theories of Feeling 175
+
+Sources of Pleasantness
+ and Unpleasantness 178
+
+Primary Likes and Dislikes 180
+
+Other Proposed Elementary Feelings 184
+
+Exercises 186
+
+References 186
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+SENSATION 187
+
+The Sense Organs 188
+
+Analysis of Sensations 197
+
+The Skin Senses 197
+
+The Sense of Taste 201
+
+The Sense of Smell 203
+
+Organic Sensations 204
+
+The Sense of Sight 204
+
+Simpler Forms of the Color Sense 209
+
+Visual Sensations as
+ Related to the Stimulus 212
+
+Color Mixing 214
+
+What Are the Elementary
+ Visual Sensations? 216
+
+Theories of Color Vision 220
+
+Adaptation 224
+
+Rod and Cone Vision 226
+
+After-images 226
+
+Contrast 227
+
+The Sense of Hearing 228
+
+Comparison of Sight and Hearing 231
+
+Theory of Hearing 234
+
+Senses of Bodily Movement 236
+
+Exercises 241
+
+References 243
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+ATTENTION 244
+
+The Stimulus, or
+ What Attracts Attention 245
+
+The Motor Reaction in Attention 248
+
+The Shifting of Attention 251
+
+Laws of Attention and
+ Laws of Reaction in General 256
+
+Sustained Attention 257
+
+Distraction 259
+
+Doing Two Things at Once 260
+
+The Span of Attention 261
+
+Summary of the Laws of Attention 262
+
+Attention and Degree of Consciousness 265
+
+The Management of Attention 267
+
+Theory of Attention 268
+
+Exercises 270
+
+References 270
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+INTELLIGENCE 271
+
+Intelligence Tests 272
+
+Performance Tests 275
+
+Group Testing 276
+
+Some Results of the Intelligence Tests 278
+
+Limitations of the Intelligence Tests 281
+
+The Correlation of Abilities 288
+
+General Factors in Intelligence 285
+
+Special Aptitudes 288
+
+Heredity of Intelligence
+ and of Special Aptitudes 289
+
+Intelligence and the Brain 292
+
+Exercises 294
+
+References 295
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+LEARNING AND HABIT FORMATION 296
+
+Acquired Reactions Are
+ Modified Native Reactions 297
+
+Acquired Tendencies 299
+
+Animal Learning 302
+
+Summary of Animal Learning 310
+
+Human Learning 311
+
+Human Compared with Animal Learning 313
+
+Learning by Observation 317
+
+The Learning of Complex
+ Practical Performances 321
+
+Higher Units and Overlapping 323
+
+Moderate Skill Acquired in
+ the Ordinary Day's Work 326
+
+Habit 328
+
+Exercises 330
+
+References 331
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+MEMORY 332
+
+The Process of Memorizing 333
+
+Economy in Memorizing 333
+
+Unintentional Learning 346
+
+Retention 348
+
+Recall 364
+
+Recognition 357
+
+Memory Training 360
+
+Exercises 364
+
+References 365
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+ASSOCIATION AND MENTAL IMAGERY 366
+
+What Can Be Recalled 366
+
+Memory Images 368
+
+Limitations of Imagery 371
+
+The Question of Non-Sensory Recall 373
+
+Hallucinations 375
+
+Free Association 376
+
+Controlled Association 381
+
+Examples of Controlled Association 384
+
+Exercises 386
+
+References 388
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+THE LAWS OF ASSOCIATION 389
+
+The Law of Exercise 389
+
+The Law of Effect 391
+
+Limitations of the Law of Exercise 393
+
+Association by Similarity 395
+
+Association by Contiguity 396
+
+The Law of Combination 398
+
+The Law of Combination in Recall 413
+
+The Laws of Learning in
+ Terms of the Neurones 414
+
+Exercises 418
+
+References 418
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+PERCEPTION 418
+
+Some Definitions 421
+
+The Difference Between
+ Perception and Sensation 423
+
+Perception and Image 425
+
+Perception and Motor Reaction 427
+
+What Sort of Response,
+ Then, Is Perception? 431
+
+Practiced Perception 433
+
+Corrected Perception 435
+
+Sensory Data Serving as Signs
+ of Various Sorts of Fact 437
+
+The Perception of Space 439
+
+Esthetic Perception 443
+
+Social Perception 444
+
+Errors of Perception 446
+
+Illusions 450
+
+Exercises 460
+
+References 461
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII
+
+REASONING 462
+
+Animal and Human Exploration 463
+
+Reasoning Culminates in Inference 465
+
+Varieties of Reasoning 468
+
+Deductive and Inductive Reasoning 474
+
+Psychology and Logic 476
+
+Exercises 480
+
+References 480
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX
+
+IMAGINATION 481
+
+Beginnings of Imagination
+ in the Child 482
+
+Preliminary Definition of Imagination 483
+
+Play 485
+
+The Play Motives 488
+
+Empathy 491
+
+Worry 497
+
+Day Dreams 498
+
+Dreams 499
+
+Freud's Theory of Dreams 505
+
+Autistic Thinking 508
+
+Invention and Criticism 509
+
+The Enjoyment of Imaginative Art 512
+
+The Psychology of Inventive Production 517
+
+Imagination Considered in General 519
+
+Exercises 521
+
+References 522
+
+
+CHAPTER XX
+
+WILL 523
+
+Voluntary and Involuntary Action 524
+
+Development of Voluntary Control 526
+
+Ideomotor Action 527
+
+Conflict and Decision 528
+
+Obstruction and Effort 535
+
+Thought and Action 539
+
+Securing Action 541
+
+The Influence of Suggestion 546
+
+Exercises 551
+
+References 561
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI
+
+PERSONALITY 552
+
+Factors in Personality 553
+
+The Self 555
+
+Integration and Disintegration
+ of the Personality 558
+
+The Unconscious, or,
+ the Subconscious Mind 561
+
+Unconscious Wishes and Motives 565
+
+Exercises 571
+
+References 571
+
+INDEX 573
+
+
+{1}
+
+PSYCHOLOGY
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+WHAT PSYCHOLOGY IS AND DOES
+
+THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE SCIENCE, ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS METHODS
+
+
+Modern psychology is an attempt to bring the methods of scientific
+investigation, which have proved immensely fruitful in other fields,
+to bear upon mental life and its problems. The human individual, the
+main object of study, is so complex an object, that for a long time it
+seemed doubtful whether there ever could be real science here; but a
+beginning was made in the nineteenth century, following the lead of
+biology and physiology, and the work of the investigator has been so
+successful that to-day there is quite a respectable body of knowledge
+to assemble under the title of scientific psychology.
+
+Psychology, then, is a science. It is the science of--what shall we
+say? "The science of the soul"--that is what the name means by
+derivation and ancient usage. "The science of the mind" has a more
+modern sound. "The science of consciousness" is more modern still.
+"The science of behavior" is the most recent attempt at a concise
+formula.
+
+None of these formulas is wholly satisfactory. Psychology does not
+like to call itself the science of the soul, for that has a
+theological tang and suggests problems that have so far not seemed
+accessible to scientific investigation. Psychology does not like very
+well to call itself the science {2} of the mind, as _the_ mind seems to
+imply some thing or machine, and there is no such thing to be observed
+(unless it be the brain and body generally), and, anyway, psychology
+is distinctly a study of actions rather than of things. Psychology
+does not like to limit itself to the study of consciousness, but finds
+it necessary to study also unconscious actions. As to "behavior", it
+would be a very suitable term, if only it had not become so closely
+identified with the "behavioristic movement" in psychology, which
+urges that consciousness should be entirely left out of psychology, or
+at least disregarded. "Behavior psychology", as the term would be
+understood to-day, means a part of the subject and not the whole.
+
+[Footnote: A series of waggish critics has evolved the following:
+"First psychology lost its soul, then it lost its mind, then it lost
+consciousness; it still has behavior, of a kind."]
+
+The best way of getting a true picture of psychology, and of reaching
+an adequate definition of its subject-matter, would be to inspect the
+actual work of psychologists, so as to see what kind of knowledge they
+are seeking. Such a survey would reveal quite a variety of problems
+under process of investigation, some of them practical problems,
+others not directly practical.
+
+
+Varieties of Psychology
+
+
+Differential psychology.
+
+One line of question that always interests the beginner in psychology
+is as to how people differ--how different people act under the same
+circumstances--and why; and if we watch the professional
+psychologist, we often find him working at just this problem. He tests
+a great number of individuals to see how they differ, and tries to
+discover on what factors their differences depend, how far on
+heredity, how far on environment. The "psychologist" in such a place
+as the children's court {3} is a specialist whose duty it is to test
+the delinquent children that are brought before the court, with the
+special object of measuring the intelligence of each individual child
+and of helping in other ways to understand the child's peculiar
+conduct and attitude.
+
+The "psychological examiner" in the Army, during the Great War, had the
+same general object in view. It was desirable to measure the
+intelligence of each recruit as he entered the service, since military
+experience had shown that men of low intelligence made poor soldiers,
+while those of high intelligence made the best officers and
+non-commissioned officers, provided they also possessed good physique
+and certain less measureable mental qualifications, such as courage
+and leadership.
+
+
+Applied psychology.
+
+The Army psychologists, like the court psychologist, were engaged in
+applying scientific knowledge to the practical problems of life; and
+there are many other applications of psychology, to education, to
+medicine, to business and other occupations, as well as to the art of
+right living. Scientific knowledge enables you to _predict_ and
+_control_. Having devised scientific tests for intelligence, you can
+predict of a six-year-old boy who tests low, that he will not get much
+good from the regular classes in school; and thus you are in a
+position to control the education of this boy for his own best
+interests. In the Army, it happened during the earlier part of the war
+that some companies or regiments made much slower progress in training
+than others; and a whole Division was delayed for months because of
+the backwardness of a single regiment. When the psychological tests
+were introduced, these slow-learning units were found to contain a
+disproportionate number of men of low intelligence. From that time on,
+it was possible by aid of the tests to equalize the intelligence of
+different units when first formed, and thus insure equal {4} progress
+in training. This was a good example of "control".
+
+Most of us are attracted by the practical use of a science, and some
+have no patience with any study that does not seem immediately
+practical. But really any science, however much it is applied, must
+remain fundamentally a pure science; that is, it must seek most of all
+to know and understand. Practical scientific knowledge was usually
+first obtained without any inkling of how it might be used. The
+science of electricity is the most striking example of this. It began
+as an attempt to understand certain curious phenomena, which seemed to
+be nothing but curiosities; yet when the knowledge of these phenomena
+had progressed to a certain point, abundant use was found for it. Much
+the same is true of psychology, which began as a pure science and only
+recently has found ways of applying its discoveries to practical
+affairs. So the student beginning the science, though properly
+desirous of making practical use of what he learns, should let himself
+be governed for the present by the desire to know and understand,
+confident that the more scientific (which is to say, the more
+complete, systematic and reliable) his knowledge is, the more
+available it will be for practical application.
+
+
+General psychology.
+
+Our science is not concerned entirely with differences between people,
+but asks also in what ways people are alike, and this is indeed its
+central problem. How do "we" observe, learn, remember, imagine, think?
+What sensations and feelings do we have, what emotions, what
+instincts, what natural and acquired impulses to action? How are our
+natural powers and impulses developed and organized as we grow up?
+Psychology is concerned with the child as well as the adult, and it is
+even concerned with the animal. It is concerned with the abnormal as
+well as the normal human being. So you will find books and {5} courses
+on animal psychology, child psychology, abnormal psychology. Now
+general psychology--or just plain "psychology"--has to do with the
+main laws and principles that hold in all these special fields.
+
+
+Psychology as Related to Other Sciences
+
+A good definition of our science would distinguish it from other
+sciences, especially from those neighboring sciences with which it is
+in closest contact.
+
+
+Psychology and sociology.
+
+There is no difficulty in framing a good logical distinction here.
+Sociology studies the activities of a group of people taken as a
+whole, while psychology studies the activities of the individuals.
+Both might be interested in the same social act, such as an election,
+but sociology would consider this event as a unit, whereas psychology
+would break it up into the acts of the several voters. The distinction
+is clear enough theoretically, but breaks down often in practice, as
+sociology would like to know the motives that swayed individual
+voters, while psychology on its side is interested to know what
+decision was reached by the majority. All the social sciences,
+including economics and politics, have a psychological side, since
+they evidently are concerned to know the causes that govern human
+conduct. Social psychology studies the individual in his social
+relations.
+
+
+Psychology and biology.
+
+Biology, being the science of living creatures, includes psychology,
+which studies these creatures on the mental side. The science of life
+includes the science of mental life. We may call psychology a part of
+biology, or we may call it one of the biological sciences. It has very
+close contact with several other branches of biology. Animal
+psychology overlaps that part of zoology which studies the behavior of
+animals. Genetic psychology, as it is sometimes called, i.e., the
+study of mental heredity. {6} and development, dovetails with the
+general biological science of genetics, so that we find biologists
+gathering data on the heredity of feeble-mindedness or of musical
+ability, while psychologists discuss the general theory of heredity.
+
+
+Psychology and physiology.
+
+That one of all the sciences that has the closest contacts with
+psychology is human and animal physiology. Broadly defined, physiology
+is that part of biology that studies functions or activities; and, so
+defined, it includes psychology as part of itself. In practice,
+psychology devotes itself to desire, thought, memory, and such "mental
+functions", while physiology concentrates its effort upon "bodily
+functions" like digestion and circulation. But this is only a rough
+distinction, which breaks down at many points.
+
+Where shall we class sensation? Is it "mental" or "bodily"? Both
+sciences study it. Physiology is perhaps more apt to go into the
+detailed study of the action of the sense organs, and psychology to
+concern itself with the classification of sensations and the use made
+of them for recognizing objects or for esthetic purposes. But the line
+between the two sciences is far from sharp at this point.
+
+Speech, also, lies in both provinces. Physiology has studied the
+action of the vocal organs and the location of the brain centers
+concerned in speech, while psychology has studied the child's process
+of learning to speak and the relation of speech to thought, and is
+more apt to be interested in stuttering, slips of the tongue, and
+other speech disturbances which are said to be "mental rather than
+physical".
+
+It would be hard to mention any activity that is mental without being
+physical at the same time. Even thinking, which seems as purely mental
+as any, requires brain action; and the brain is just as truly a bodily
+organ as the heart or stomach. Its activity is bodily activity and
+lies properly within the field of physiology.
+
+{7}
+
+But it would be equally difficult to mention any function that is
+exclusively bodily, and not mental at the same time, in some degree.
+Take digestion for example: the pleasant anticipation of food will
+start the digestive juices flowing, before any food is physically in
+the stomach; while in anger or fear digestion comes to a sudden halt.
+Therefore we find physiologists interested in these emotions, and
+psychologists interested in digestion.
+
+We do not find any clean separation between our science and
+physiology; but we find, on the whole, that psychology examines what
+are called "mental" activities, and that it studies them as the
+performances of the whole individual rather than as executed by the
+several organs.
+
+
+The Science of Consciousness
+
+Typically, the activities that psychology studies are conscious
+performances, while many of those falling to physiology are
+unconscious. Thus digestion is mostly unconscious, the heart beat is
+unconscious except when disturbed, the action of the liver is entirely
+unconscious. Why not say, then, that psychology is the study of
+conscious activities?
+
+There might be some objection to this definition from the side of
+physiology, which studies certain conscious activities itself--speech,
+for example, and especially sensation.
+
+There would be objection also from the side of psychology, which does
+not wish to limit itself to conscious action. Take the case of any act
+that can at first be done only with close attention, but that becomes
+easy and automatic after practice; at first it is conscious, later
+unconscious, but psychology would certainly need to follow it from the
+initial to the final stage, in order to make a complete study of the
+practice effect. And then there is the "unconscious", or the
+"subconscious mind"--a matter on which psychologists {8} do not wholly
+agree among themselves; but all would agree that the problem of the
+unconscious was appropriate to psychology.
+
+For all the objections, it remains true that the _typical_ mental
+process, the typical matter for psychological study, is conscious.
+"Unconscious mental processes" are distinguished from the unconscious
+activity of such organs as the liver by being somehow _like_ the
+conscious mental processes.
+
+It would be correct, then, to limit psychology to the study of
+conscious activities and of activities akin to these.
+
+
+The Science of Behavior
+
+No one has objected so strenuously to defining psychology as the
+science of consciousness, and limiting it to consciousness, as the
+group of animal psychologists. By energetic work, they had proved that
+the animal was a very good subject for psychological study, and had
+discovered much that was important regarding instinct and learning in
+animals. But from the nature of the case, they could not observe the
+consciousness of animals; they could only observe their behavior, that
+is to say, the motor (and in some cases glandular) activities of the
+animals under known conditions. When then the animal psychologists
+were warned by the mighty ones in the science that they must interpret
+their results in terms of consciousness or not call themselves
+psychologists any longer, they rebelled; and some of the best fighters
+among them took the offensive, by insisting that human psychology, no
+less than animal, was properly a study of behavior, and that it had
+been a great mistake ever to define it as the science of
+consciousness.
+
+It is a natural assumption that animals are conscious, but after all
+you cannot directly observe their consciousness, and you cannot
+logically confute those philosophers {9} who have contended that the
+animal was an unconscious automaton. Still less can you be sure in
+detail what is the animal's sensation or state of mind at any time; to
+get at that, you would need a trustworthy report from the animal
+himself. Each individual must observe his own consciousness; no one
+can do it from outside. The objection of the behaviorist to
+"consciousness psychology" arises partly from distrust of this method
+of inner observation, even on the part of a human observer.
+
+Indeed, we can hardly define psychology without considering its
+_methods of observation_, since evidently the method of observation
+limits the facts observed and so determines the character of the
+science. Psychology has two methods of observation.
+
+When a person performs any act, there are, or may be, two sorts of
+facts to be observed, the "objective" and the "subjective". The
+objective facts consist of movements of the person's body or of any
+part of it, secretions of his glands (as flow of saliva or sweat), and
+external results produced by these bodily actions--results such as
+objects moved, path and distance traversed, hits on a target, marks
+made on paper, columns of figures added, vocal or other sounds
+produced, etc., etc. Such objective facts can be observed by another
+person.
+
+The subjective facts can be observed only by the person performing the
+act. While another person can observe, better indeed than he can
+himself, the motion of his legs in walking, he alone can observe the
+sensations in the joints and muscles produced by the leg movement. No
+one else can observe his pleased or displeased state of mind, nor
+whether he is thinking of his walking or of something quite different.
+To be sure, his facial expression, which is an objective fact, may
+give some clue to his thoughts and feelings, but "there's no art to
+read the mind's construction {10} in the face", or at least no sure
+art. One may feign sleep or absorption while really attending to what
+is going on around. A child may wear an angelic expression while
+meditating mischief. To get the subjective facts, we shall have to
+enlist the person himself as our observer.
+
+
+Introspection
+
+This is observation by an individual of his own conscious action. It
+is also called subjective observation. Notice that it is a form of
+observation, and not speculation or reasoning from probabilities or
+from past experience. It is a direct observation of fact.
+
+One very simple instance of introspection is afforded by the study of
+after-images. Look for an instant at the glowing electric bulb, and
+then turn your eyes upon a dark background, and observe whether the
+glowing filament appears there; this would be the "positive
+after-image". This simple type of introspection is used by physiology
+in its study of the senses, as well as by psychology; and it gives
+such precise and regular results that only the most confirmed
+behaviorists refuse to admit it as a good method of observation.
+
+But psychology would like to make introspective observations on the
+more complex mental processes as well; and it must be admitted that
+here introspection becomes difficult. You cannot hope to make minute
+observations on any process that lasts over a very few seconds, for
+you must let the process run its natural course unimpeded by your
+efforts at observing it, and then turn your "mental eye" instantly
+back to observe it _retrospectively_ before it disappears. As a matter
+of fact, a sensation or feeling or idea hangs on in consciousness for
+a few seconds, and can be observed in this retrospective way. There is
+no theoretical objection to this style of introspection, but it is
+practically difficult and {11} tricky. Try it on a column of figures:
+first add the column as usual, then immediately turn back and review
+exactly what went through your mind in the process of adding---what
+numbers you spoke internally, etc. Try again by introspecting the
+process of filling in the blanks in the sentence:
+
+"Botany could not make use of introspection because ______ have
+probably no ________ processes."
+
+At first, you may find it difficult to observe yourself in this way;
+for the natural tendency, when you are aiming at a certain result, is
+to reach the goal and then shift to something else, rather than to
+turn back and review the steps by which you reached the goal. But with
+practice, you acquire some skill in introspection.
+
+One difficulty with introspection of the more complex mental processes
+is that individuals vary more here than in the simpler processes, so
+that different observers, observing each his own processes, will not
+report the same facts, and one observer cannot serve as a check upon
+another so easily as in the simpler introspection of after-images and
+other sensations, or as in the observations made in other sciences.
+Even well trained introspectionists are quite at variance when they
+attempt a minute description of the thought processes, and it is
+probable that this is asking too much of introspection. We mustn't
+expect it to give microscopic details. Rough observations, however, it
+gives with considerable certainty. Who can doubt, for example, that a
+well-practised act goes on with very little consciousness, or that
+inner, silent speech often accompanies thinking? And yet we have only
+introspection to vouch for these facts.
+
+
+Objective Observation
+
+But to say, as used to be said, that psychology is purely an
+introspective science, making use of no other sort of observation, is
+absurd in the face of the facts.
+
+{12}
+
+We have animal psychology, where the observation is exclusively
+objective. In objective observation, the observer watches something
+else, and not himself. In animal psychology, the psychologist, as
+observer, watches the animal.
+
+The same is true of child psychology, at least for the first years of
+childhood. You could not depend on the introspections of a baby, but
+you can learn much by watching his behavior. Abnormal persons, also,
+are not often reliable introspectionists, and the study of abnormal
+psychology is mostly carried on by objective methods.
+
+Now how is it with the normal adult human being, the standard subject
+for psychology? Does he make all the observations on himself or may he
+be objectively observed by the psychologist? The latter, certainly. In
+fact, nearly all tests, such as those used in studying differential
+psychology, are objective. That is to say that the person tested is
+given a task to perform, and his performance is observed in one way or
+another by the examiner. The examiner may observe the _time_ occupied
+by the subject to complete the task, or the _quantity_ accomplished in
+a fixed time; or he may measure the correctness and _excellence_ of
+the work done, or the _difficulty_ of the task assigned. One test uses
+one of these measures, and another uses another; but they are all
+objective measures, not depending at all on the introspection of the
+subject.
+
+What is true of tests in differential psychology is true of the
+majority of experiments in general psychology: the performer is one
+person, the observer another, and the observation is objective in
+character. Suppose, for example, you are investigating a memory
+problem; your method may be to set your subject a lesson to memorize
+under certain defined conditions, and see how quickly and well he
+learns it; then you give him another, equally difficult lesson to be
+learned under altered conditions, and observe whether he {13} does
+better or worse than before. Thus you discover which set of conditions
+is more favorable for memorizing, and thence can infer something of
+the way in which memorizing is accomplished. In the whole experiment
+you need not have called on your subject for any introspections; and
+this is a type of many experiments in which the subject accomplishes a
+certain task under known conditions, and his success is objectively
+observed and measured.
+
+There is another type of objective psychological observation, directed
+not towards the success with which a task is accomplished, but towards
+the changes in breathing, heart beat, stomach movements, brain
+circulation, or involuntary movements of the hands, eyes, etc., which
+occur during the course of various mental processes, as in reading, in
+emotion, in dreaming or waking from sleep.
+
+Now it is not true as a matter of history that either of these types
+of objective observation was introduced into psychology by those who
+call themselves behaviorists. Not at all; experiments of both sorts
+have been common in psychology since it began to be an experimental
+science. The first type, the success-measuring experiment, has been
+much more used than introspection all along. What the behaviorists
+have accomplished is the definitive overthrow of the doctrine, once
+strongly insisted on by the "consciousness psychologists", that
+introspection is the only real method of observation in psychology;
+and this is no mean achievement. But we should be going too far if we
+followed the behaviorists to the extent of seeking to exclude
+introspection altogether, and on principle. There is no sense in such
+negative principles. Let us accumulate psychological facts by any
+method that will give the facts.
+
+{14}
+
+General Laws of Psychological Investigation.
+
+Either introspective or objective observation can be employed in the
+_experimental attack_ on a problem, which consists, as just
+illustrated in the case of memory, in controlling the conditions under
+which a mental performance occurs, varying the conditions
+systematically, and noting the resulting change in the subject's
+mental process or its outcome. Psychologists are inclined to regard
+this as the best line of attack, whenever the mental activity to be
+studied can be effectively subjected to control. Unfortunately,
+emotion and reasoning are not easily brought under control, and for
+this reason psychology has made slower progress in understanding them
+than it has made in the fields of sensation and memory, where good
+experimental procedure has been developed.
+
+Another general line of attack worthy to be mentioned alongside of the
+experimental is the _comparative method_. You compare the actions of
+individuals, classes or species, noting likenesses and differences.
+You see what behavior is typical and what exceptional. You establish
+norms and averages, and notice how closely people cluster about the
+norm and how far individuals differ from it. You introduce tests of
+various sorts, by which to get a more precise measure of the
+individual's performance. Further, by the use of what may be called
+double comparison, or "correlation", you work out the relationships of
+various mental (and physical) traits. For example, when many different
+species of animals are compared in intelligence and also in brain
+weight, the two are found to correspond fairly well, the more
+intelligent species having on the whole the heavier brains; from which
+we fairly conclude that the size of the brain has something to do with
+intelligence. But when we correlate brain weight and intelligence in
+human individuals. {15} we find so many exceptions to the rule (stupid
+men with large brains and gifted men with brains of only moderate
+size) that we are forced to recognize the importance of other factors,
+such as the perfection of the microscopic structure of the brain.
+
+Tests and correlations have become so prominent in recent
+psychological investigation that this form of the comparative method
+ranks on a par with the strict experimental method. A test is an
+experiment, in a way, and at least is often based upon an experiment;
+but the difference between the two lines of attack is that an
+experiment typically takes a few subjects into the laboratory and
+observes how their mental performances change with planfully changed
+conditions; whereas a test goes out and examines a large number of
+persons under one fixed set of conditions. An experiment belongs under
+what we called "general psychology", and a test under "differential
+psychology", since the first outcome of a test is to show how the
+individual differs from others in a certain respect. The results may,
+however, be utilized in various ways, either for such practical
+purposes as guiding the individual's choice of an occupation, or for
+primarily scientific purposes, such as examining whether intelligence
+goes with brain size, whether twins resemble each other as much
+mentally as they do physically, whether intellectual ability and moral
+goodness tend on the whole to go together, or not.
+
+The _genetic method_ is another of the general lines of attack on
+psychological problems. The object here is to trace the mental
+development of the individual, or of the race. It may be to trace the
+development either of mentality in general, or of some particular
+mental performance. It may be to trace the child's progress in
+learning to speak, or to follow the development of language in the
+human species, from the most primitive tongues up to those of the
+great {16} civilized peoples of to-day. It may be to trace the
+improvement of a performance with continued practice.
+
+The value of the genetic method is easily seen. Usually the beginnings
+of a function or performance are comparatively simple and easy to
+observe and analyze. Also, the process of mental growth is an
+important matter to study on its own account.
+
+The _pathological method_ is akin to the genetic, but traces the decay
+or demoralization of mental life instead of its growth. It traces the
+gradual decline of mental power with advancing age, the losses due to
+brain disease, and the maladaptations that appear in insanity and
+other disturbances. Here psychology makes close contact with
+_psychiatry_ which is the branch of medicine concerned with the
+insane, etc., and which in fact has contributed most of the
+psychological information derived from the pathological method.
+
+The object of the pathological method is, on the one side, to
+understand abnormal forms of mental life, with the practical object of
+preventing or curing them, and on the other side, to understand normal
+mental life the better. Just as the development of a performance
+throws light on the perfected act, so the decay or disturbance of a
+function often reveals its inner workings; for we all know that it is
+when a machine gets out of order that one begins to see how it ought
+to work. Failure sheds light on the conditions of success,
+maladaptation throws into relief the mental work that has to be done
+by the normal individual in order to secure and maintain his good
+adaptation. According to the psychiatrists, mental disturbance is
+primarily an affair of emotion and desire rather than of intellect;
+and consequently they believe that the pathological method is of
+special importance in the study of the emotional life.
+
+{17}
+
+Summary and Attempt at a Definition
+
+Having now made a rapid preliminary survey of the field of psychology,
+and of the aims and methods of the workers in this field, we ought to
+be in a position to give some sort of a definition.
+
+We conclude, then: psychology is a part of the scientific study of
+life, being the science of mental life. Life consisting in process or
+action, psychology is the scientific study of mental processes or
+activities. A mental activity is typically, though not universally,
+conscious; and we can roughly designate as mental those activities of
+a living creature that are either conscious themselves or closely akin
+to those that are conscious. Further, any mental activity can also be
+regarded as a physiological activity, in which case it is analyzed
+into the action of bodily organs, whereas as "mental" it simply comes
+from the organism or individual as a whole. Psychology, in a word, is
+the science of the conscious and near-conscious activities of living
+individuals.
+
+Psychology is not interested either in dead bodies or in disembodied
+spirits, but in living and acting individuals.
+
+One word more, on the _psychological point of view_. In everyday life
+we study our acquaintances and their actions from a personal
+standpoint. That is, we evaluate their behavior according as it
+affects ourselves, or, perhaps, according as it squares or not with
+our standards of right and wrong. We always find something to praise
+or blame. Now, the psychologist has no concern with praise and blame,
+but is a seeker after the facts. He would know and understand human
+actions, rather than pass judgment on them. When, for example, he is
+introduced into the school or children's court, for the purpose of
+examining children that are "problems", his attitude differs
+considerably from that of the {18} teacher or officer of the law; for
+while they almost inevitably pass judgment on the child in the way of
+praise or blame, the psychologist simply tries to understand the
+child. The young delinquent brought into the laboratory of the court
+psychologist quickly senses the unwonted atmosphere, where he is
+neither scolded nor exhorted, but asked to lend his cooeperation in an
+effort to discover the cause why his conduct is as it is. Now, this
+psychological attitude is not necessarily "better" than the other, but
+it is distinctly valuable in its place, as seen from the fact that the
+young delinquent often does cooeperate. He feels that if the
+psychologist can find out what is the trouble with him, this may help.
+Nothing, indeed, is more probable; it is when we have the facts and
+trace out cause and effect that we are in a fair way to do good.
+Nothing is more humane than psychology, in the long run, even though
+the psychologist may seem unfeeling in the course of his
+investigation.
+
+To the psychologist, conduct is a matter of cause and effect, of
+natural law. His business is to know the laws of that part of nature
+which we call human nature, and to use these laws, as fast as
+discovered, for solving the problems presented by the human individual
+or group. For him, even the most capricious conduct has its causes,
+even the most inexplicable has its explanation--if only the cause can
+be unearthed, which he does not pretend he can always actually
+accomplish, since causes in the mental realm are often very complex.
+No one can be a psychologist all of the time; no one can or should
+always maintain this matter-of-fact attitude towards self and
+neighbor. But some experience with the psychological attitude is of
+practical value to any one, in giving clearer insight, more
+toleration, better control, and even saner standards of living.
+
+{19}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter. A sample outline of the briefer sort is
+ here given:
+
+A. Subject-matter of psychology: mental activities.
+
+ (1) A sub-class under vital activities.
+
+ (2) Activities of individuals, as distinguished from
+
+ (a) Activities of social groups (sociology).
+
+ (b) Activities of single organs (physiology).
+
+ (3) Either conscious, or closely related to conscious activities.
+
+ (4) May be activities of human or animal, adult or child,
+ normal or abnormal individuals.
+
+B. Problems of psychology:
+
+ (1) How individuals differ in their mental activities.
+
+ (2) How individuals are alike in their mental activities.
+
+ (3) Practical applications of either (1) or (2).
+
+C. Methods of psychology:
+
+ (1) Methods of observing mental activities.
+
+ (a) Introspective, the observing by an individual of his own actions.
+
+ (b) Objective, the observation of the behavior of other individuals.
+
+ (2) General lines of attack upon psychological problems.
+
+ (a) Experimental: vary the conditions and see how the mental
+ activity changes.
+
+ (b) Comparative: test different individuals or
+ classes and see how mental activity differs, etc.
+
+ (c) Genetic: trace mental development.
+
+ (d) Pathological: examine mental decay or disturbance.
+
+2. Formulate a psychological question regarding each of the following:
+ hours of work, genius, crime, baseball.
+
+3. Distinguish introspection from theorizing.
+
+4. What different sorts of objective fact can be observed in psychology?
+
+5. What is the difference between the physiology of hearing and the
+ psychology of hearing?
+
+6. State two reasons why it would be undesirable to limit psychology
+ to the introspective study of consciousness.
+
+{20}
+
+7. What is the difference between an experiment and a test, (a) in
+ purpose, (b) in method?
+
+8. Compare the time it takes you to add twenty one-place numbers,
+ arranged in a vertical column, and arranged in a horizontal line,
+ (a) Is this introspective or objective observation? Why so? (b) Is
+ it a test or an experiment? Why?
+
+9. Write a psychological sketch of some one you know well, taking
+ care to avoid praise and blame, and to stick to the psychological
+ point of view.
+
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Some of the good books on the different branches of psychology are
+the following:
+
+On animal psychology:
+
+ Margaret F. Washburn, _The Animal Mind_, 2nd edition, 1917.
+
+ John B. Watson, _Behavior_, 1914.
+
+On child psychology:
+
+ Norsworthy and Whitley, _The Psychology of Childhood_, 1918.
+
+On abnormal psychology:
+
+ A. J. Rosanoff, _Manual of Psychiatry_, 5th edition, 1920.
+
+On applied psychology:
+
+ Hollingworth and Poffenberger, _Applied Psychology_, 1917.
+
+On individual psychology, parts of:
+
+ E. L. Thorndike, _Educational Psychology, Briefer Course_, 1914,
+
+ Daniel Starch, _Educational Psychology_, 1919.
+
+
+
+{21}
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+REACTIONS
+
+REFLEXES AND OTHER ELEMENTARY FORMS OF REACTION,
+AND HOW THE NERVES OPERATE IN CARRYING THEM OUT
+
+Having the field of psychology open before us, the next question is,
+where to commence operations. Shall we begin with memory, imagination
+and reasoning, or with will, character and personality, or with motor
+activity and skill, or with feelings and emotions, or with sensation
+and perceptions? Probably the higher forms of mental activity seem
+most attractive, but we may best leave complicated matters till later,
+and agree to start with the simplest sorts of mental performance. Thus
+we may hope to learn at the outset certain elementary facts which will
+later prove of much assistance in unraveling the more complex
+processes.
+
+Among the simplest processes are sensations and reflexes, and we might
+begin with either. The introspective psychologists usually start with
+sensations, because their great object is to describe consciousness,
+and they think of sensations as the chief elements of which
+consciousness is composed. The behaviorists would prefer to start with
+reflexes, because they conceive of behavior as composed of these
+simple motor reactions.
+
+Without caring to attach ourselves exclusively to either
+introspectionism or behaviorism, we may take our cue just here from
+the behaviorists, because we shall find the facts of motor reaction
+more widely useful in our further studies than the facts of sensation,
+and because the facts of {22} sensation fit better into the general
+scheme of reactions than the facts of reaction fit into any general
+scheme based on sensation.
+
+A reaction is a _response_ to a _stimulus_. The response, in the
+simplest cases, is a muscular movement, and is called a "motor
+response". The stimulus is any force or agent that, acting upon the
+individual, arouses a response.
+
+If I start at a sudden noise, the noise is the stimulus, and the
+forcible contraction of my muscles is the response. If my old friend's
+picture brings tears to my eyes, the picture (or the light reflected
+from it) is the stimulus, and the flow of tears is the response, here
+a "glandular" instead of a motor response.
+
+
+The Reaction Time Experiment
+
+One of the earliest experiments to be introduced into psychology was
+that on reaction time, conducted as follows: The experimenter tells
+his "subject" (the person whose reaction is to be observed) to be
+ready to make a certain movement as promptly as possible on receiving
+a certain stimulus. The response prescribed is usually a slight
+movement of the forefinger, and the stimulus may be a sound, a flash
+of light, a touch on the skin, etc. The subject knows in advance
+exactly what stimulus is to be given and what response he has to make,
+and is given a "Ready!" signal a few seconds before the stimulus. With
+so simple a performance, the reaction time is very short, and delicate
+apparatus must be employed to measure it. The "chronoscope" or clock
+used to measure the reaction time reads to the hundredth or thousandth
+of a second, and the time is found to be about .15 sec. in responding
+to sound or touch, about .18 sec. in responding to light.
+
+Even the simple reaction time varies, however, from one {23}
+individual to another, and from one trial to another. Some persons can
+never bring their record much below the figures stated, while a few
+can get the time down to .10 sec, which is about the limit of human
+ability. Every one is bound to vary from trial to trial, at first
+widely, after practice between narrow limits, but always by a few
+hundredths of a second at the least. It is curious to find the
+elementary fact of variability of reaction present in such a simple
+performance.
+
+What we have been describing is known as the "simple reaction", in
+distinction from other experiments that demand more of the subject. In
+the "choice reaction", there are two stimuli and the subject may be
+required to react to the one with the right hand and to the other with
+the left; for example, if a red light appears he must respond with the
+right hand, but if a green light appears, with the left. Here he
+cannot allow himself to become keyed up to as high a pitch as in the
+simple reaction, for if he does he will make many false reactions.
+Therefore, the choice reaction time is longer than the simple reaction
+time--about a tenth of a second longer.
+
+The "associative reaction" time is longer still. Here the subject must
+name any color that is shown, or read any letter that is shown, or
+respond to the sight of any number by calling out the next larger
+number, or respond to any suitable word by naming its opposite. He
+cannot be so well prepared as for the simple, or choice reaction,
+since he doesn't know exactly what the stimulus is going to be; also,
+the brain process is more complex here; so that the reaction time is
+longer, about a tenth of a second longer, at the best, than the choice
+reaction. It may run up to two or three seconds, even in fairly simple
+cases, while if any serious thinking or choosing has to be done, it
+runs into many seconds and even into minutes. Here the brain process
+is very {24} complex and involves a series of steps before the
+required motor response can be made.
+
+These laboratory experiments can be paralleled by many everyday
+performances. The runner starting at the pistol shot, after the
+preparatory "Ready! Set!", and the motorman applying the brakes at the
+expected sound of the bell, are making "simple" reactions. The boxer,
+dodging to the right or the left according to the blow aimed at him by
+his adversary, is making choice reactions, and this type is very
+common in all kinds of steering, handling tools and managing
+machinery. Reading words, adding numbers, and a large share of simple
+mental performances, are essentially associative reactions. In most
+cases from ordinary life, the _preparation_ is less complete than in
+the laboratory experiments, and the reaction time is accordingly
+longer.
+
+
+Reflex Action
+
+The simple reaction has some points of resemblance with the "reflex",
+which, also, is a prompt motor response to a sensory stimulus. A
+familiar example is the reflex wink of the eyes in response to
+anything touching the eyeball, or in response to an object suddenly
+approaching the eye. This "lid reflex" is quicker than the quickest
+simple reaction, taking about .05 second. The knee jerk or "patellar
+reflex", aroused by a blow on the patellar tendon just below the knee
+when the knee is bent and the lower leg hanging freely, is quicker
+still, taking about .03 second. The reason for this extreme quickness
+of the reflex will appear as we proceed. However, not every reflex is
+as quick as those mentioned, and some are slower than the quickest of
+the simple reactions.
+
+A few other examples of reflexes may be given. The "pupillary reflex"
+is the narrowing of the pupil of the eye {25} in response to a bright
+light suddenly shining into the eye. The "flexion reflex" is the
+pulling up of the leg in response to a pinch, prick or burn on the
+foot. Coughing and sneezing are like this in being protective
+reflexes, and the scratching of the dog belongs here also.
+
+There are many internal reflexes: movements of the stomach and
+intestines, swallowing and hiccoughing, widening and narrowing of the
+arteries resulting in flushing and paling of the skin. These are
+muscular responses; and there are also glandular reflexes, such as the
+discharge of saliva from the salivary glands into the mouth, in
+response to a tasting substance, the flow of the gastric juice when
+food reaches the stomach, the flow of tears when a cinder gets into
+the eye. There are also inhibitory reflexes, such as the momentary
+stoppage of breathing in response to a dash of cold water. All in all,
+a large number of reflexes are to be found.
+
+Most reflexes can be seen to be _useful_ to the organism. A large
+proportion of them are protective in one way or another, while others
+might be called regulative, in that they adjust the organism to the
+conditions affecting it.
+
+Now comparing the reflex with the simple reaction, we see first that
+the reflex is more deep-seated in the organism, and more essential to
+its welfare. The reflex is typically quicker than the simple reaction.
+The reflex machinery does not need a "Ready" signal, nor any
+preparation, but is always ready for business. (The subject in a
+simple reaction experiment would not make the particular finger
+movement that he makes unless he had made ready for that movement.)
+The attachment of a certain response to a certain stimulus, rather
+arbitrary and temporary in the simple reaction, is inherent and
+permanent in the reflex. Reflex action is involuntary and often
+entirely unconscious.
+
+Reflexes, we said, are permanent. That is because they {26} are native
+or inherent in the organism. You can observe them in the new-born
+child. The reflex connection between stimulus and response is
+something the child brings with him into the world, as distinguished
+from what he has to acquire through training and experience. He does
+acquire, as he grows up, a tremendous number of habitual responds that
+become automatic and almost unconscious, and these "secondary
+automatic" reactions resemble reflexes pretty closely. Grasping for
+your hat when you feel the wind taking it from your head is an
+example. These acquired reactions never reach the extreme speed of the
+quickest reflexes, but at best may have about the speed of the simple
+reaction. Though often useful enough, they are not so fundamentally
+necessary as the reflexes. The reflex connection of stimulus and
+response is something essential, native, closely knit, and always
+ready for action.
+
+
+The Nerves in Reflex Action
+
+Seeing that the response, in reflex action, is usually made by a
+muscle or gland lying at some distance from the sense organ that
+receives the stimulus--as, in the case of the flexion reflex, the
+stimulus is applied to the skin of the hand (or foot), while the
+response is made by muscles of the limb generally--we have to ask what
+sort of connection exists between the stimulated organ and the
+responding organ, and we turn to physiology and anatomy for our
+answer. The answer is that the _nerves_ provide the connection. Strands
+of nerve extend from the sense organ to the muscle.
+
+But the surprising fact is that the nerves do not run directly from
+the one to the other. There is no instance in the human body of a
+direct connection between any sense organ and any muscle or gland. The
+nerve path from sense organ to muscle always leads through a _nerve
+center_. One {27} nerve, called the sensory nerve, runs from the sense
+organ to the nerve center, and another, the motor nerve, runs from the
+center to the muscle; and the only connection between the sense organ
+and the muscle is this roundabout path through the nerve center. The
+path consists of three parts, sensory nerve, center, and motor nerve,
+but, taken as a whole, it is called the _reflex arc_, both the words,
+"reflex" and "arc", being suggested by the indirectness of the
+connection.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 1.--The connection from the back of the hand,
+which is receiving a stimulus, and the arm muscle which makes the
+response. The nerve center is indicated by the dotted lines.]
+
+
+The _nervous system_ resembles a city telephone system. What passes
+along the nerve is akin to the electricity that {28} passes along the
+telephone wire; it is called the "nerve current", and is electrical
+and chemical in nature.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 2.--(From Martin's "Human Body.") General view of
+the nervous system, showing brain, cord, and nerves.]
+
+
+All nerve connections, like the great majority of telephone
+connections, are effected through the centers, called "centrals" in
+{29} the case of the telephone. Telephone A is connected directly with
+the central, telephone B likewise, and A and B are indirectly
+connected, through the central switchboard. That is the way it is in
+the nervous system, with "nerve center" substituted for "central", and
+"sense organ" and "muscle or gland" for "telephones A and B."
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 3.--Location of the cord, cerebrum and cerebellum.
+The brain stem continues the cord upward into the skull cavity.
+(Figure text: cerebrum, cerebellum, cord, tongue)]
+
+
+The advantage of the centralized system is that it is a _system_,
+affording connections between any part and any other, and unifying the
+whole complex organism.
+
+The _nerve centers_ are located in the brain and spinal cord. The
+brain lies in the skull and the cord extends from the brain down
+through a tube in the middle of the {30} backbone. Of the brain many
+parts can be named, but for the present it is enough to divide it into
+the "brain stem", a continuation of the spinal cord up along the base
+of the skull cavity, and the two great outgrowths of the brain stem,
+called "cerebrum" and "cerebellum". The spinal cord and brain stem
+contain the lower or reflex centers, while the cerebellum, and
+especially the cerebrum, contain the "higher centers". The lower
+centers are directly connected by nerves with the sense organs, glands
+and muscles, while the higher centers have direct connections with the
+lower and only through them with the sense organs, glands and muscles.
+In other words, the sensory nerves run into the cord or brain stem,
+and the motor nerves run out of these same, while interconnecting
+nerve strands extend between the lower centers in the cord and brain
+stem and the higher centers in the cerebrum and cerebellum.
+
+The spinal cord contains the reflex centers for the limbs and part of
+the trunk, and is connected by sensory and motor nerves with the limbs
+and trunk. The brain stem contains the reflex centers for the head and
+also for part of the interior of the trunk, including the heart and
+lungs, and is connected with them by sensory and motor nerves. The
+nerve center that takes part in the flexion reflex of the foot is
+situated in the lower part of the cord, that for the similar reflex of
+the hand lies in the upper part of the cord, that for breathing lies
+in the lower or rear part of the brain stem, and that for winking lies
+further forward in the brain stem.
+
+Big movements, such as the combined action of all four legs of an
+animal in walking, require cord and brain stem to work together, and
+throw into relief what is really true even of simpler reflexes, namely
+that a reflex is a _coordinated_ movement, in the sense that different
+muscles cooperate in its execution.
+
+{31}
+
+Internal Construction of the Nerves and Nerve Centers
+
+We shall understand nerve action better if we know something of the
+way in which the nervous system is built. A nerve is not to be thought
+of as a unit, nor are the brain and cord to be thought of as mere
+masses of some peculiar substance.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 4.--A motor nerve cell from the spinal cord,
+highly magnified. (Figure text: dendrites, cell body, axon,
+termination of axon in muscle)]
+
+
+A nerve is a bundle of many slender insulated threads, just as a
+telephone cable, running along the street, {32} is a bundle of many
+separate wires which are the real units of telephonic communication. A
+nerve center, like the switchboard in a telephone central, consists of
+many parts and connections.
+
+The whole nervous system is essentially composed of _neurones_. A
+neurone is a nerve cell with its branches. Most nerve cells have two
+kinds of branches, called the _axon_ and the _dendrites_.
+
+The nerve cell is a microscopic speck of living matter. Its dendrites
+are short tree-like branches, while its axon is often several inches
+or even feet in length. The axon is the "slender thread", just spoken
+of as analogous to the single telephone wire. A nerve is composed of
+axons. [Footnote: The axon is always protected or insulated by a
+sheath, and axon and sheath, taken together, are often called a "nerve
+fiber".] The "white matter" of the brain and cord is composed of
+axons. Axons afford the means of communication between the nerve
+centers and the muscles and sense organs, and between one nerve center
+and another.
+
+The axons which make up the motor nerves are branches of nerve cells
+situated in the cord and brain stem; they extend from the reflex
+center for any muscle out to and into that muscle and make very close
+connection with the muscle substance. A nerve current, starting from
+the nerve cells in the reflex center, runs rapidly along the axons to
+the muscle and arouses it to activity.
+
+The axons which make up the optic nerve, or nerve of sight, are
+branches of nerve cells in the eye, and extend into the brain stem.
+Light striking the eye starts nerve currents, which run along these
+axons into the brain stem. Similarly, the axons of the nerve of smell
+are branches of cells in the nose.
+
+The remainder of the sensory axons are branches of nerve cells that
+lie in little bunches close alongside the cord or {33} brain stem.
+These cells have no dendrites, but their axon, dividing, reaches in
+one direction out to a sense organ and in the other direction into the
+cord or brain stem, and thus connects the sense organ with its "lower
+center".
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 5.--Sensory and motor axons, and their nerve
+cells. The arrows indicate the direction of conduction. (Figure text:
+eye, brain stem, skin, cord, muscle)]
+
+
+Where an axon terminates, it broadens out into a thin plate, or breaks
+up into a tuft of very fine branches ( the "end-brush"), and by this
+means makes close contact with the muscle, the sense organ, or the
+neurone with which it connects.
+
+{34}
+
+The Synapse
+
+Now let us consider the mode of connection between one neurone and
+another in a nerve center. The axon of one neurone, through its
+end-brush, is in close contact with the dendrites of another neurone.
+There is contact, but no actual growing-together; the two neurones
+remain distinct, and this contact or junction of two neurones is
+called a "synapse". The synapse, then, is not a thing, but simply a
+junction between two neurones.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 6.--The synapse between the two neurones lies just
+above the arrow.]
+
+The junction is good enough so that one of the two neurones, if itself
+active, can arouse the other to activity. The end-brush, when a nerve
+current reaches it from its own nerve cell, arouses the dendrites of
+the other neurone, and thus starts a nerve current running along those
+dendrites to their nerve cell and thence out along its axon.
+
+Now here is a curious and significant fact: the dendrites are
+receiving organs, not transmitting; they pick up messages from the
+end-brushes across the synapse, but send out no messages to those
+end-brushes. Communication across a synapse is always in one
+direction, from end-brush to dendrites.
+
+This, then, is the way in which a reflex is carried out, the pupillary
+reflex, for example. Light entering the eye starts a nerve current in
+the axons of the optic nerve; these axons terminate in the brain stem,
+where their end-brushes arouse the dendrites of motor nerve cells, and
+the axons of these {35} cells, extending out to the muscle of the
+pupil, cause it to contract, and narrow the pupil.
+
+Or again, this is the way in which one nerve center arouses another to
+activity. The axons of the cells in the first center (or some of them)
+extend out of this center and through the white matter to the second
+center, where they terminate, their end-brushes forming synapses with
+the cells of the second center. Let the first center be thrown into
+activity, and immediately, through this connection, it arouses the
+second.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 7.--Different forms of synapse found in the
+cerebellum, "a" is one of the large motor cells of the cerebellum (a
+"Purkinje cell"), with its dendrites above and its axon below; and
+"b," "c" and "d" show three forms of synapse made by other neurones
+with this Purkinje cell. In "b," the arrow indicates a "climbing
+axon," winding about the main limbs of the Purkinje cell. In "c," the
+arrow points to a "basket"--an end-brush enveloping the cell body;
+while "d" shows what might be called a "telegraph-wire synapse."
+Imagine "d" superimposed upon "a": the axon of "d" rises among the
+fine dendrites of "a," and then runs horizontally through them; and
+there are many, many such axons strung among the dendrites. Thus the
+Purkinje cell is stimulated at three points: cell body, trunks of the
+dendrites, and twigs of the dendrites.]
+
+
+The "gray matter" comprises the nerve centers, lower and higher. It is
+made up of nerve cells and their dendrites, of the beginnings of axons
+issuing from these cells and of the terminations of incoming axons.
+The white matter, as was said before, consists of axons. An axon
+issues from the {36} gray matter at one point, traverses the white
+matter for a longer or shorter distance, and finally turns into the
+gray matter at another point, and thus nerve connection is maintained
+between these two points.
+
+There are lots of nerve cells, billions of them. That ought to be
+plenty, and yet--well, perhaps sometimes they are not well developed,
+or their synapses are not close enough to make good connections.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 8.--A two-neurone reflex arc. (Figure text:
+stimulus, skin, sensory axon, bit of the spinal cord, motor axon,
+muscle)]
+
+
+Examined under the microscope, the nerve cell is seen to contain,
+besides the "nucleus" which is present in every living cell and is
+essential for maintaining its vitality and special characteristics,
+certain peculiar granules which appear to be stores of fuel to be
+consumed in the activity of the cell, and numerous very fine fibrils
+coursing through the cell and out into the axon and dendrites.
+
+The _reflex arc can now be described_ more precisely than before.
+Beginning in a sense organ, it extends along a sensory axon (really
+along a team of axons acting side by side) to its end-brush in a lower
+center, where it crosses a synapse and enters the dendrites of a motor
+neurone and so {37} reaches the cell body and axon of this neurone,
+which last extends out to the muscle (or gland). The simplest reflex
+arc consists then of a sensory neurone and a motor neurone, meeting at
+a synapse in a lower or reflex center. This would be a two-neurone
+arc.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 9.--A three-neurone arc, concerned in respiration.
+This also illustrates how one nerve center influences another.
+(Figure text: white matter, gray matter, lung, respiratory center in
+the brain stem, diaphragm, motor center in cord for the diaphragm)]
+
+
+Very often, and possibly always, the reflex arc really consists of
+three neurones, a "central" neurone intervening between the sensory
+and motor neurones and being connected through synapses with each. The
+central neurone plays an important role in cooerdination.
+
+
+COOeRDINATION
+
+The internal structure of nerve centers helps us see how cooerdinated
+movement is produced. The question is, how {38} several muscles are
+made to work together harmoniously, and also how it is possible that a
+pin prick, directly affecting just a few sensory axons, causes a big
+movement of many muscles. Well, we find the sensory axon, as it enters
+the cord, sending off a number of side branches, each of which
+terminates in an end-brush in synaptic connection with the dendrites
+of a motor nerve cell.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 10.--Cooerdination brought about by the branching
+of a sensory axon. (Figure text: cord, sensory neurone, motor neurone)]
+
+
+Thus the nerve current from a single sensory neurone is distributed to
+quite a number of motor neurones. Where there are central neurones in
+the arc, their branching axons aid in distributing the excitation; and
+so we get a big movement in response to a minute, though intense
+stimulus.
+
+But the response is not simply big; it is definite, coordinated,
+representing team work on the part of the muscles as distinguished
+from indiscriminate mass action. That means selective distribution of
+the nerve current. The axons of the sensory and central neurones do
+not connect with any and every motor neurone indiscriminately, but
+link up with selected groups of motor neurones, and thus harness
+together teams that will work in definite ways, producing {39} flexion
+of a limb in the case of one such team, and extension in the case of
+another. Every reflex has its own team of motor neurones, harnessed
+together by its outfit of sensory and central neurones. The same motor
+neurone may however be harnessed into two or more such teams, as is
+seen from the fact that the same muscle may participate in different
+reflex movements; and for a similar reason we believe that the same
+sensory neurone may be utilized in more than one reflex arc.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 11.--Cooerdination brought about by the branching
+of the axon of a central neurone. (Figure text: sensory, central,
+motor)]
+
+
+The most distinctive part of any reflex arc is likely to be its
+central neurones, which are believed to play the chief part in
+cooerdination, and in determining the peculiarities of any given
+reflex, such as its speed and rhythm of action.
+
+
+Reactions in General
+
+Though the reflex is simple by comparison with voluntary movements, it
+is not the simplest animal reaction, for it is cooerdinated and depends
+on the nervous system, while the simplest animals, one-celled animals,
+have no nervous system, any more than they have muscles or organs of
+any {40} kind. Without possessing separate organs for the different
+vital functions, these little creatures do nevertheless take in and
+digest food, reproduce their kind, and move. Every animal shows at
+least two different motor reactions, a positive or approaching
+reaction, and a negative or avoiding reaction.
+
+The general notion of a reaction is that of a _response_ to a
+_stimulus_. The stimulus acts on the organism and the organism acts
+back. If I am struck by a wave and rolled over on the beach, that is
+passive motion and not my reaction; but if the wave stimulates me to
+maintain my footing, then I am active, I respond or react.
+
+Now there is no such thing as wholly passive motion. Did not Newton
+teach that "action and reaction are equal"?--and he was thinking of
+stones and other inanimate objects. The motion of a stone or ball
+depends on its own weight and shape and elasticity as much as on the
+blow it receives. Even the stone counts for something in determining
+its own behavior.
+
+A loaded gun counts for more than a stone, because of the stored
+energy of the powder that is set free by the blow of the hammer. The
+"reaction" of the gun is greater than the force acting on it, because
+of this stored energy that is discharged.
+
+An animal reaction resembles the discharge of the gun, since there is
+stored energy in the animal, consisting in the chemical attraction
+between food absorbed and oxygen inspired, and some of this energy is
+utilized and converted into motion when the animal reacts. The
+stimulus, like the trigger of the gun, simply releases this stored
+energy.
+
+The organism, animal or human, fully obeys the law of conservation of
+energy, all the energy it puts out being accounted for by stored
+energy it has taken in in food and oxygen. But at any one time, when
+the organism receives {41} a stimulus, the energy that it puts forth
+in reaction comes from inside itself.
+
+There is another way in which the organism counts in determining its
+reaction. Not only does it supply the energy of the response, but its
+own internal arrangements determine how that energy shall be directed.
+That is to say, the organism does not blow up indiscriminately, like a
+charge of dynamite, but makes some definite movement. This is true
+even of the simplest animals, and the more elaborate the internal
+mechanism of the animal, the more the animal itself has to do with the
+kind of response it shall make to a stimulus. The nervous system of
+the higher animals, by the connections it provides between the
+stimulus and the stores of energy in the muscles, is of especial
+importance in determining the nature of the response.
+
+Stimuli are necessary to arouse the activity of the organism. Without
+any stimulus whatever, it seems likely that the animal would relapse
+into total inactivity. It should be said, however, that stimuli, such
+as that of hunger, may arise within the organism itself. The stimulus
+may be external or internal, but some stimulus is necessary in order
+to release the stored energy.
+
+In general, then, a reaction consists in the release by a stimulus of
+some of the stored energy of an animal, and the direction of that
+energy by the animal's own internal mechanism of nerves and muscles
+(and, we may add, bones and sinews) into the form of some definite
+response.
+
+{42}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline of the chapter, being at the same time a "completion
+ test". Complete the following outline by filling in the blank
+ spaces (usually a single word will fill the blank, but sometimes two
+ words will be better):
+
+ A. Definition: A reaction is a response to a ___________.
+ The stimulus energy stored in the organism, and the __________
+ has a definite form determined by the organism's own machinery
+ of ________ and ______.
+
+
+
+ B. Among very prompt reactions are the reflex and the "simple
+ reaction". The reflex differs from the "simple reaction" in that:
+
+ (1) It usually takes less________.
+
+ (2) It requires no___________,
+
+ (3) The machinery for it is ________in the organism.
+
+ C. The machinery for a reflex consists of:
+
+ (1) a________ organ.
+
+ (2) a ________nerve.
+
+ (3) a nerve ________,
+
+ (4) a _________nerve.
+
+ (5) a muscle or _________.
+
+ D. The sensory and motor nerves consist of ________ which are
+ branches of ______. The cells for the motor nerves lie in the
+ ________, and those for the sensory nerves lie in two cases in
+ the _________, and in all other cases in bunches located close
+ beside the _________or ________,
+
+ E. The neurone is the _______ of which the nervous ______ is
+ composed. It consists of a ________ and of two sorts of
+ branches, the ________ and the ________. Internally, the neurone
+ shows a peculiar structure of ________ and ________.
+
+ F. Communication from one neurone to another occurs across
+ a _____ called the synapse. The _________of an axon here comes
+ into close contact with the ______or with the _________of
+ another neurone. The communication takes place from the
+ ________of the first neurone to the ___________ of the second.
+
+ G. The "nerve current" in a reflex therefore runs the following
+ course: from the sense organ into a ________ axon, along this to
+ its _________ in a nerve, and across a _________ there into the
+ _________ of a neurone, and thence {43} out along the _______of
+ this neurone to the ________or _________ that executes the
+ reflex. This is a two-neurone _________, but often there is a
+ third, ________neurone between the _________ and the
+ _____________.
+
+ H. Cooerdination is effected by the ________ of the axons of the
+ sensory and ________ neurones, by which means the nerve current
+ is ______ to a team of ________ and so to a team of _________.
+
+2. Is the reaction time experiment, as described in the text, an
+ introspective or an objective experiment?
+
+3. Mention two cases from common life that belong under the
+ "simple reaction", two that belong under "choice reaction", and two
+ that belong under the "associative reaction".
+
+4. Arrange the reflexes mentioned in the text under the two heads
+ of "protective" and "regulative".
+
+5. Draw diagrams of (a) the neurone, (b) a synapse, (c) a reflex
+ arc, and (d) a cooerdinated movement. Reduce each drawing to the
+ simplest possible form, and still retain everything that is
+ essential.
+
+6. What part of the nervous system lies (a) in the forehead and
+ top of the head, (b) in the very back of the head, (c) along the
+ base of the skull, (d) within the backbone, (e) in the arm?
+
+7. Using a watch to take the time, see how long it takes you to
+ name the letters in a line of print, reading them in reverse order
+ from the end of the line to the beginning. Compare with this time
+ the time required to respond to each letter by the letter following
+ it in the alphabet (saying "n" when you see m, and "t" when you see
+ s, etc.). Which of these two "stunts" is more like reflex action,
+ and how, nevertheless, does it differ from true reflex action?
+
+8. The pupillary reflex. Describe the reaction of the pupil of the
+ eye to light suddenly shining into the eye. This response can best
+ be observed in another person, but you can observe it in yourself
+ by aid of a hand mirror. On another person you can also observe the
+ "crossed" pupillary reflex, by throwing the light into one eye only
+ while you watch the other eye. What sort of connection do you
+ suppose to exist between the two eyes, making this crossed reflex
+ possible?
+
+9. The lid reflex, or wink reflex, (a) Bring your hand suddenly
+ close to another person's eye, and notice the response of the
+ eyelid, (b) See whether you can get a crossed reflex here, (c) See
+ whether your subject can voluntarily prevent (inhibit) the lid
+ reflex, (d) See whether the reflex occurs when he gives the
+ stimulus himself, by moving his own hand suddenly up to his eye.
+ (e) What other stimulus, besides the visual one that you have been
+ using, will arouse the same response?
+
+{44}
+
+REFERENCES
+
+C. Judson Herrick, in his _Introduction to Neurology_, 2nd edition,
+1918, gives a fuller and yet not too detailed account of the neurone
+in Chapter III, and of reflex action in Chapter IV.
+
+Percy G. Stiles, in his _Nervous System and Its Conservation_, 1915,
+discusses these matters in Chapters II, III and IV.
+
+Ladd and Woodworth's _Elements of Physiological Psychology_, 1911, has
+chapters on these topics.
+
+{45}
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+REACTIONS OF DIFFERENT LEVELS
+
+HOW SENSATIONS, PERCEPTIONS AND THOUGHTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS FORMS OF
+INNER RESPONSE, AND HOW THESE HIGHER REACTIONS ARE RELATED IN THE
+NERVOUS SYSTEM TO THE SIMPLER RESPONSES OF THE REFLEX LEVEL.
+
+Having defined a reaction as an act of the individual aroused by a
+stimulus, there is no reason why we should not include a great variety
+of mental processes under the general head of reactions. Any mental
+process is an activity of the organism, and it is aroused by some
+stimulus, external or internal; therefore, it is a reaction.
+
+I hear a noise--now, while the noise, as a physical stimulus, comes to
+me, my hearing it is my own act, my sensory reaction to the stimulus.
+I recognize the noise as the whistle of a steamboat--this recognition
+is clearly my own doing, dependent on my own past experience, and may
+be called a perception or perceptive response. The boat's whistle
+reminds me of a vacation spent on an island--clearly a memory
+response. The memory arouses an agreeable feeling--an affective
+response, this may be called. In its turn, this may lead me to imagine
+how pleasant it would be to spend another vacation on that island, and
+to cast about for ways and means to accomplish this result--here we
+have imagination and reasoning, aroused by what preceded just as the
+sensation was aroused by the physical stimulus.
+
+In speaking of any mental process as an act of the individual, we do
+not mean to imply that he is always _conscious_ {46} of his activity.
+Sometimes he feels active, sometimes passive. He feels active in hard
+muscular work or hard thinking, while he feels passive in reflex
+action, in sensation, and in simply "being reminded" of anything
+without any effort on his own part. But he is active in everything he
+does, and he does everything that depends on his being alive. Life is
+activity, and every manifestation of life, such as reflex action or
+sensation, is a form of vital activity. The only way to be inactive is
+to be dead.
+
+But vital activity is not "self-activity" in any absolute sense, for
+it is _aroused_ by some stimulus. It does not issue from the
+individual as an isolated unit, but is his _response_ to a stimulus.
+That is the sense of calling any mental process a reaction; it is
+something the individual does in response to a stimulus.
+
+To call a sensation a form of reaction means, then, that the sensation
+is not something done to the person, nor passively received by him
+from outside, but something that he himself does when aroused to this
+particular form of activity. What comes from outside and is received
+by the individual is the stimulus, and the sensation is what he does
+in response to the stimulus. It represents the discharge of internal
+stored energy in a direction determined by his own inner mechanism.
+The sensation depends on his own make-up as well as on the nature of
+the stimulus, as is especially obvious when the sensation is abnormal
+or peculiar. Take the case of color blindness. The same stimulus that
+arouses in most people the sensation of red arouses in the color-blind
+individual the sensation of brown. Now what the color-blind individual
+_receives_, the light stimulus, is the same as what others receive,
+but he responds differently, _i.e._, with a different sensation,
+because his own sensory apparatus is peculiar.
+
+The main point of this discussion is that all mental {47} phenomena,
+whether movements, sensations, emotions, impulses or thoughts, are a
+person's acts, but that every act is a response to some present
+stimulus. This rather obvious truth has not always seemed obvious.
+Some theorists, in emphasizing the spontaneity and "self-activity" of
+the individual, have pushed the stimulus away into the background;
+while others, fixing their attention on the stimulus, have treated the
+individual as the passive recipient of sensation and "experience"
+generally. Experience, however, is not received; it is lived, and that
+means done; only, it is done in response to stimuli. The concept of
+reaction covers the ground.
+
+While speaking of sensations and thoughts as belonging under the
+general head of reactions, it is well, however, to bear in mind that
+all mental action tends to arouse and terminate in muscular and
+glandular activity. A thought or a feeling tends to "express itself"
+in words or (other) deeds. The motor response may be delayed, or
+inhibited altogether, but the tendency is always in that direction.
+
+
+Different Sorts of Stimuli
+
+To call all mental processes reactions means that it is always in
+order to ask for the stimulus. Typically, the stimulus is an external
+force or motion, such as light or sound, striking on a sense organ.
+There are also the internal stimuli, consisting of changes occurring
+within the body and acting on the sensory nerves that are distributed
+to the muscles, bones, lungs, stomach and most of the organs. The
+sensations of muscular strain and fatigue, and of hunger and thirst,
+are aroused by internal stimuli, and many reflexes are aroused in the
+same way.
+
+Such internal stimuli as these are like the better known external
+stimuli in that they act upon sense organs; but it {48} seems
+necessary to recognize another sort of stimuli which act directly on
+the nerve centers in the brain. These may be called "central stimuli"
+and so contrasted with the "peripheral stimuli" that act on any sense
+organ, external or internal. To do this is to take considerable
+liberty with the plain meaning of "stimulus", and calls for
+justification. What is the excuse for thus expanding the notion of a
+stimulus?
+
+The excuse is found in the frequent occurrence of mental processes
+that are not directly aroused by any peripheral stimulus, though they
+are plainly aroused by something else. Anything that arouses a thought
+or feeling can properly be called its stimulus. Now it often happens
+that a thought is aroused by another, just preceding thought; and it
+seems quite in order to call the first thought the stimulus and the
+second the response. A thought may arouse an emotion, as when the
+thought of my enemy, suddenly occurring to mind, makes me angry; the
+thought is then the stimulus arousing this emotional response.
+
+If hearing you speak of Calcutta makes me think of India, your words
+are the stimulus and my thought the response. Well, then, if I _think_
+of Calcutta in the course of a train of thought, and next think of
+India, what else can we say than that the thought of Calcutta acts as
+a stimulus to arouse the thought of India as the response? In a long
+train of thought, where A reminds you of B and B of C and C of D, each
+of these items is, first, a response to the preceding, and, second, a
+stimulus to the one following.
+
+There is no special difficulty with the notion of "central stimuli"
+from the physiological side. We have simply to think of one nerve
+center arousing another by means of the tract of axons connecting the
+two. Say the auditory center is aroused by hearing some one mention
+your friend's name, {49} and this promptly calls up a mental picture
+of your friend; here the auditory center has aroused the visual. What
+happens in a train of thought is that first one group of neurones is
+aroused to activity, and then this activity, spreading along the axons
+that extend from this group of neurones to another, arouses the second
+group to activity; and so on. The brain process may often be
+exceedingly complex, but this simple scheme gives the gist of it.
+
+The way nerve currents must go shooting around the brain from one
+center or group of neurones to another, keeping it up for a long time
+without requiring any fresh peripheral stimulus, is remarkable. We
+have evidence of this sort of thing in a dream or fit of abstraction.
+Likely enough, the series of brain responses would peter out after
+awhile, in the absence of any fresh peripheral stimulus, and total
+inactivity ensue. But response of one brain center to nerve currents
+coming from another brain center, and not directly from any sense
+organ, must be the rule rather than the exception, since most of the
+brain neurones are not directly connected with any sense organ, but
+only with other parts of the brain itself. All the evidence we have
+would indicate that the brain is not "self-active", but only
+responsive; but, once thrown into activity at one point, it may
+successively become active at many other points, so that a long series
+of mental operations may follow upon a single sensory stimulus.
+
+
+The Motor Centers, Lower and Higher
+
+A "center" is a collection of nerve cells, located somewhere in the
+brain or cord, which gives off axons running to some other center or
+out to muscles or glands, while it also receives axons coming from
+other centers, or from sense organs. These incoming axons terminate in
+end-brushes and so form synapses with the dendrites of the local {50}
+nerve cells. The axons entering any center and terminating there
+arouse that center to activity, and this activity, when aroused, is
+transmitted out along the axons issuing from that center, and produces
+results where those axons terminate in their turn.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 12.--Side view of the left hemisphere of the
+brain, showing the motor and sensory areas (for the olfactory area,
+see Fig. 18). The visual area proper, or "visuo-sensory area," lies
+just around the corner from the spot marked "Visual," on the middle
+surface of the hemisphere, where it adjoins the other hemisphere.
+(Figure text: frontal lobe, parietal lobe, central fissure, occipital
+lobe, motor area, somesthetic area, auditory area, fissure of Sylvius,
+temporal lobe, brain stem, cerebellum)]
+
+
+The _lower_ motor centers, called also reflex centers, are located in
+the cord or brain stem, and their nerve cells give rise to the axons
+that form the motor nerves and connect with the muscles and glands. A
+muscle is thrown into action by nerve currents from its lower motor
+center.
+
+The principal _higher_ motor center is the "motor area" of the brain,
+located in the cortex or external layer of gray matter, in the
+cerebrum. More precisely, the motor area is a long, narrow strip of
+cortex, lying just forward of what is called the "central fissure" or
+"fissure of Rolando".
+
+{51}
+
+If you run your finger over the top of the head from one side to the
+other, about halfway back from the forehead, the motor areas of the
+two cerebral hemispheres will lie close under the path traced by your
+finger.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 13.--(After Cajal.) Type of the brain cells that
+most directly control muscular movement. (Figure text: Axon. Giant
+pyramid cell from the motor area of the cerebral cortex, magnified 35
+diameters. Cell body of same farther magnified)]
+
+
+The motor area in the right hemisphere is connected with the left half
+of the cord and so with the muscles of the left half of the body; the
+motor area of the left hemisphere similarly affects {52} the right
+half of the body. Within the motor area are centers for the several
+limbs and other motor organs. Thus, at the top, near the middle line
+of the head (and just about where the phrenologists located their
+"bump of veneration"!), is the center for the legs; next below and to
+the side is the center for the trunk, next that for the arm, next that
+for head movements, and at the bottom, not far from the ears, is the
+center for tongue and mouth.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 14.--The nerve path by which the motor area of the
+cortex influences the muscles. The upper part of this path, consisting
+of axons issuing from the giant pyramids of the motor area and
+extending down into the spinal cord, is the pyramidal tract. The lower
+part of the path consists of axons issuing from the motor cells of the
+cord and extending out to the muscles. The top of the figure
+represents a vertical cross-section of the brain, such as is given, on
+a larger scale, in Fig. 18. (Figure text: cortex, cord, muscles)]
+
+
+The largest nerve cells of all are found in the motor area, and are
+called, from their shape, the "giant pyramids". They have large
+dendrites and very long axons, which latter, {53} running in a thick
+bundle down from the cortex through the brain stem and cord,
+constitute the "pyramidal tract", the principal path of communication
+from the cerebrum to the lower centers. The motor area of the brain
+has no direct connection with any muscle, but acts through the
+pyramidal tract on the lower centers, which in turn act on the
+muscles.
+
+
+How The Brain Produces Muscular Movements
+
+The motor area is itself aroused to action by nerve currents entering
+it through axons coming from other parts of the cortex; and it is by
+way of the motor area that any other part of the cortex produces
+bodily movement. There are a few exceptions, as, for example, the
+movements of the eyes are produced generally by the "visual area"
+acting directly on the lower motor centers for the eye in the brain
+stem; but, in the main, any motor effect of brain action is exerted
+through the motor area. The motor area, as already mentioned, acts on
+the lower motor centers in the cord and brain stem, and these in turn
+on the muscles; but we must look into this matter a little more
+closely.
+
+A lower motor center is a group of motor and central neurones, lying
+anywhere in the cord or brain stem, and capable of directly arousing a
+certain cooerdinated muscular movement. One such unit gives flexion of
+the leg, another gives extension of the leg, a third gives the rapid
+alternation of flexion and extension that we see in the scratching
+movement of the dog. Such a motor center can be aroused to activity by
+a sensory stimulus, and the resulting movement is then called a
+reflex.
+
+The lower center can be aroused in quite another way, and that is by
+nerve currents coming from the brain, by way of the motor area and the
+pyramidal tract. Thus flexion of the leg can occur voluntarily as well
+as reflexly. The same {54} muscles, and the same motor neurones, do
+the job in either case. In the reflex, the lower center is aroused by
+a sensory nerve, and in the voluntary movement by the pyramidal tract.
+
+The story is told of a stranger who was once dangling his legs over
+the edge of the station platform at a small backwoods town, when a
+native called out to him "Hist!" (hoist), pointing to the ground under
+the stranger's feet. He "histed" obediently, which is to say that he
+voluntarily threw into play the spinal center for leg flexion; and
+then, looking down, saw a rattler coiled just beneath where his feet
+had been hanging. Now even if he had spied the rattler first, the
+resulting flexion, though impulsive and involuntary, would still have
+been aroused by way of the motor area and the pyramidal tract, since
+the movement would have been a response to _knowledge_ of what that
+object was and signified, and knowledge means action by the cerebral
+cortex, which we have seen to affect movement through the medium of
+the motor area. But if the snake had made the first move, the same leg
+movement on the man's part, made now in response to the painful
+sensory stimulus, would have been the flexion reflex.
+
+
+Facilitation and Inhibition
+
+Not only can the motor area call out essentially the same movements
+that are also produced reflexly, but it can prevent or _inhibit_ the
+execution of a reflex in spite of the sensory stimulus for the reflex
+being present, and it can reinforce or _facilitate_ the action of the
+sensory stimulus so as to assist in the production of the reflex. We
+see excellent examples of cerebral facilitation and inhibition in the
+case of the knee jerk. This sharp forward kick of the foot and lower
+leg is aroused by a tap on the tendon running in front {55} of the
+knee. Cross the knee to be stimulated over the other leg, and tap the
+tendon just below the knee cap, and the knee jerk appears. So purely
+reflex is this movement that it cannot be duplicated voluntarily; for,
+though the foot can of course be voluntarily kicked forward, this
+voluntary movement does not have the suddenness and quickness of the
+true reflex. For all that, the cerebrum can exert an influence on the
+knee jerk. Anxious attention to the knee jerk inhibits it; gritting
+the teeth or clenching the fist reinforces it. These are cerebral
+influences acting by way of the pyramidal tract upon the spinal center
+for the reflex.
+
+Thus the cortex controls the reflexes. Other examples of such control
+are seen when you prevent for a time the natural regular winking of
+the eyes by voluntarily holding them wide open, or when, carrying a
+hot dish which you know you must not drop, you check the flexion
+reflex which would naturally pull the hand away from the painful
+stimulus. The young child learns to control the reflexes of
+evacuation, and gradually comes to have control over the breathing
+movements, so as to hold his breath or breathe rapidly or deeply at
+will, and to expire vigorously in order to blow out a match.
+
+The coughing, sneezing and swallowing reflexes likewise come under
+voluntary control. In all such cases, the motor area facilitates or
+inhibits the action of the lower centers.
+
+
+Super-motor Centers in the Cortex
+
+Another important effect of the motor area upon the lower centers
+consists in combining their action so as to produce what we know as
+skilled movements. It will be remembered that the lower centers
+themselves give cooerdinated movements, such as flexion or extension of
+the whole limb; but still higher cooerdinations result from cerebral
+control. {56} When the two hands, though executing different
+movements, work together to produce a definite result, we have
+cooerdination controlled by the cortex. Examples of this are seen in
+handling an ax or bat, or in playing the piano or violin. A movement
+of a single hand, as in writing or buttoning a coat, may also
+represent a higher or cortical cooerdination.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 15.--(From Starr.) Axons connecting one part of
+the cortex with another. The brain is seen from the side, as if in
+section. At "A" are shown bundles of comparatively short axons,
+connecting near-by portions of the cortex; while "B," "C," and "D"
+show bundles of longer axons, connecting distant parts of the cortex
+with one another. The "Corpus Callosum" is a great mass of axons
+extending across from each cerebral hemisphere to the other, and
+enabling both hemispheres to work together. "O. T." and "C. N." are
+interior masses of gray matter, which can be seen also in Fig. 18. "O.
+T." is the thalamus, about which more later.]
+
+
+Now it appears that the essential work in producing these higher
+cooerdinations of skilled movement is performed not by the motor area,
+but by neighboring parts of the cortex, which act on the motor area in
+much the same way as the motor area acts on the lower centers. Some of
+these {57} skilled-movement centers, or super-motor centers, are
+located in the cortex just forward of the motor area, in the adjacent
+parts of the frontal lobe. Destruction of the cortex there, through
+injury or disease, deprives the individual of some of his skilled
+movements, though not really paralyzing him. He can still make simple
+movements, but not the complex movements of writing or handling an
+instrument.
+
+It is a curious fact that the left hemisphere, which exerts control
+over the movements of the right hand and right side of the body
+generally, also plays the leading part in skilled movements of either
+hand. This is true, at least, of right-handed persons; probably in the
+left-handed the right hemisphere dominates.
+
+Motor power may be lost through injury at various points in the
+nervous system. Injury to the spinal cord, destroying the lower motor
+center for the legs, brings complete paralysis. Injury to the motor
+area or to the pyramidal tract does not destroy reflex movement, but
+cuts off all voluntary movement and cerebral control. Injury to the
+"super-motor centers" causes loss of skilled movement, and produces the
+condition of "apraxia", in which the subject, though knowing what he
+wants to do, and though still able to move his limbs, simply cannot
+get the combination for the skilled act that he has in mind.
+
+
+Speech Centers
+
+Similar to apraxia is "aphasia" or loss of ability to speak. It bears
+the same relation to true paralysis of the speech organs that hand
+apraxia bears to paralysis of the hand. Through brain injury it
+sometimes happens that a person loses his ability to speak words,
+though he can still make vocal sounds. The cases differ in severity,
+some retaining the ability to speak only one or two words which {58}
+from frequent use have become almost reflex (swear words, sometimes,
+or "yes" and "no"), while others are able to pronounce single words,
+but can no longer put them together fluently into the customary form
+of phrases and sentences, and still others can utter simple sentences,
+but not any connected speech.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 16.--Side view of the left hemisphere, showing the
+location of the "speech centers." The region marked "Motor" is the
+motor speech center, that marked "Auditory" the auditory speech
+center, and that marked "Visual" the visual speech center. (Figure text:
+central fissure, motor area, auditory area, visual area, fissure of
+Sylvius, brain stem, cerebellum)]
+
+
+In pure cases of _motor aphasia_, the subject knows the words he
+wishes to say, but cannot get them out. The brain injury here lies in
+the frontal lobe in the left hemisphere, in right-handed people, just
+forward of the motor area for the mouth, tongue and larynx. This
+"motor speech center" is the best-known instance of a super-motor
+center. It cooerdinates the elementary speech movements into the
+combinations called words; and perhaps there is no other motor
+performance so highly skilled as this of speaking. It is acquired so
+early in life, and practised so constantly, that {59} we take it quite
+as a matter of course, and think of a word as a simple and single
+movement, while in fact even a short word, as spoken, is a complex
+movement requiring great motor skill.
+
+There is some evidence that the motor speech center extends well
+forward into the frontal lobe, and that the front part of it is
+related to the part further back as this is to the motor area back of
+it. That is to say, the back of the speech center combines the motor
+units of the motor area into the skilled movements of speaking a word,
+while the more forward part of the speech center combines the word
+movements into the still more complex movement of speaking a sentence.
+It is even possible that the very front part of the speech center has
+to do with those still higher combinations of speech movements that
+give fluency and real excellence of speaking.
+
+
+The Auditory Centers
+
+Besides the motor aphasia, just mentioned, there is another type,
+called _sensory aphasia_, or, more precisely, auditory aphasia. In
+pure auditory aphasia there is no inability to pronounce words or even
+to speak fluently, but there is, first, an inability to "hear words",
+sometimes called word deafness, and there is often also an inability
+to find the right words to speak, so that the individual so afflicted,
+while speaking fluently enough and having sense in mind, misuses his
+words and utters a perfect jargon. One old gentleman mystified his
+friends one morning by declaring that he must go and "have his
+umbrella washed", till it was finally discovered that what he wanted
+was to have his hair cut.
+
+The cortical area affected in this form of aphasia is located a little
+further back on the surface of the brain than {60} the motor speech
+center, being close to the auditory area proper. The latter is a small
+cortical region in the temporal lobe, connected (through lower
+centers) with the ear, and is the only part of the cortex to receive
+nerve currents from the organ of hearing. The auditory area is,
+indeed, the organ of hearing, or an organ of hearing, for without it
+the individual is deaf. He may make a few reflex responses to loud
+noises, but, consciously, he does not hear at all; he has no auditory
+sensations.
+
+In the immediate neighborhood of the auditory area proper (or of the
+"auditory-sensory area", as it may well be called), are portions of
+the cortex intimately connected by axons with it, and concerned in
+what may be called auditory perceptions, i.e., with recognizing and
+understanding sounds. Probably different portions of the cortex near
+the auditory-sensory center have to do with different sorts of
+auditory perception. At least, we sometimes find individuals who, as a
+result of injury or disease affecting this general region, are unable
+any longer to follow and appreciate music. They cannot "catch the
+tune" any longer, though they may have been fine musicians before this
+portion of their cortex was destroyed. In other cases, we find,
+instead of this music deafness, the word deafness mentioned just
+above.
+
+The jargon talk that so often accompanies word deafness reminds us of
+the fact that speech is first of all auditory to the child. He
+understands what is said to him before he talks himself, and his
+vocabulary for purposes of understanding always remains ahead of his
+speaking vocabulary. It appears that this precedence of auditory
+speech over motor remains the fact throughout life, in most persons,
+and that the auditory speech center is the most fundamental of all the
+speech centers, of which there is one more not yet mentioned, used in
+reading.
+
+{61}
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 17.--(From Cajal.) Magnified sections through the
+cortex, to show the complexity of its inner structure. One view shows
+nerve cells and their dendrites, with only a few axons, while the
+other shows axons, outgoing and incoming, and some of their fine
+branches. Imagine one view superimposed upon the other, and you get
+some idea of the intricate interweaving of axons and dendrites that
+occurs in the cortex.]
+
+{62}
+
+The Visual Centers
+
+There is a visual-sensory area in the occipital lobe, at the back of
+the brain, that is connected with the eye in the same way as the
+auditory center is connected with the ear. Without it, the individual
+still shows the pupillary reflex to light, but has no sensations of
+sight. He is blind.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 18.--Vertical cross-section through the brain,
+showing the cortex on the outside, the thalamus and other interior
+masses of gray matter, some of the paths to and from the cortex, and
+the callosum or bridge of axons connecting the two cerebral
+hemispheres. The "Motor path" is the pyramidal tract, only the
+beginning of which is shown here, its further course being indicated
+in Fig. 14. (Figure text: tactile path, motor path, auditory path,
+callosum, thalamus, olfactory area)]
+
+
+This visual-sensory area occupies only a small portion of the
+occipital lobe, and yet practically the whole lobe is concerned with
+vision. Some portions of the lobe are concerned in perceiving words in
+reading, and without them the individual is "word blind". Other
+portions are concerned in perceiving (recognizing, understanding) seen
+objects, and without them the individual is "object blind". Other {63}
+portions are concerned in perceiving color relations, and still other
+portions in perceiving spatial relations through the sense of sight
+and so knowing where seen objects are and being able to guide one's
+movements by sight.
+
+
+Cortical Centers for the Other Senses
+
+There is an olfactory area in a rather secluded part of the cortex,
+and this is related to the sense of smell in the same general way.
+Probably there is a similar taste center, but it has not been
+definitely located. Then there is a large and important area called
+the "somesthetic", connected with the body senses generally, i.e.,
+chiefly with the skin and muscle senses. This area is located in a
+narrow strip just back of the central fissure, extending parallel to
+the motor area which lies just in front of the fissure, and
+corresponding part for part with it, so that the sensory area for the
+legs lies just behind the motor area for the legs, and so on.
+Destruction of any part of this somesthetic area brings loss of the
+sensations from the corresponding part of the body.
+
+Just behind this direct sensory center for the body, in the parietal
+lobe, are portions of the cortex concerned in perceiving facts by aid
+of the body senses. Perception of size and shape by the sense of
+touch, perception of weight by the muscle sense, perception of degrees
+of warmth and cold by the temperature sense, are dependent on the
+parietal lobe and disappear when the cortex of this region is
+destroyed. It appears that there is a sort of hierarchy of centers
+here, as in the motor region and probably also in the visual and
+auditory regions. Skill in handling objects is partly dependent on the
+"feel" of the objects and so is impaired by injuries to the parietal
+lobe, as well as by injury to the frontal lobe; and knowing how to
+manage a fairly complex situation, as in lighting a fire when you have
+the various {64} materials assembled before you, seems also to depend
+largely on this part of the cortex.
+
+
+Lower Sensory Centers
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 19.--Sensory path from the skin of any portion of
+the trunk or limbs. The path consists of three neurones, the cell body
+of the first lying just outside the spinal cord, that of the second
+lying in the cord, and that of the third lying in the thalamus. The
+last part of this path is the "Tactile path," shown in Fig. 18.
+(Figure text: cortex, thalamus, cord, skin)]
+
+
+As already indicated, no portion of the cortex, not even the sensory
+areas, is directly connected with any sense organ. The sensory axons
+from the skin, for example, terminate in the spinal cord, in what may
+be called the lowest sensory centers. Here are nerve cells whose axons
+pass up through the cord and brain stem to the thalamus or interbrain,
+where they terminate in a second sensory center. And cells here send
+their axons up to the somesthetic area of the cortex.
+
+{65}
+
+The thalamus is remarkable as an intermediate center for all the
+senses, except smell; but exactly what is accomplished by this big
+intermediate sensory center remains rather a mystery, though it
+certainly appears that the thalamus has something to do with feeling
+and emotion.
+
+
+The Cerebellum
+
+Regarding the cerebellum, there is much knowledge at hand, but it is
+difficult to give the gist of it in a few words. On the one hand, the
+cerebellum receives a vast number of axons from the lower sensory
+centers; while, on the other hand, it certainly has nothing to do with
+conscious sensation or perception. Its use seems to be motor. It has
+much to do with maintaining the equilibrium of the body, and probably
+also with maintaining the steadiness and general efficiency of
+muscular contraction. Though it has no known sensory or intellectual
+functions, it is very closely connected with the cerebrum, receiving a
+tremendous bundle of axons from different parts of the cerebrum, by
+way of the brain stem. Possibly these are related to motor activity.
+The phrenologists taught that the cerebellum was the center for the
+sexual instinct, but there is no evidence in favor of this guess.
+
+
+Different Levels of Reaction
+
+Let a noise strike the ear and start nerve currents in along the
+auditory nerve, passing through the lowest and intermediate centers
+and reaching the auditory-sensory area of the cortex. When this last
+is aroused to activity, we have a sensation of sound, which is the
+first conscious reaction to the external stimulus. Axons running from
+the auditory-sensory to the near-by cortex give a perception of some
+fact indicated by the external stimulus, and this perception is a {66}
+second and higher conscious reaction, which, to be sure, ordinarily
+occurs so quickly after the first that introspection cannot
+distinguish one as first and the other as second; but the facts of
+brain injury, already mentioned, enable us to draw the distinction.
+The perceived fact may call up a mental image, or a recognition of
+some further fact less directly signified by the noise; these would be
+reactions of still higher order. Much of the cortex is apparently not
+very directly connected with either the sensory or the motor areas,
+and probably is concerned somehow in the recognition of facts that are
+only very indirectly indicated by any single sensory stimulus, or with
+the planning of actions that only indirectly issue in muscular
+movement.
+
+On the sensory and intellectual side, the higher reactions follow the
+lower: sensation arouses perception and perception thought. On the
+motor side, the lower reactions are aroused by the higher. Thus the
+speech center arouses the motor centers for the speech organs,
+combining the action of these into the speaking of a word; and in a
+similar way, it seems, the intention to speak a sentence expressing a
+certain meaning acts as a stimulus to call up in order the separate
+words that make the sentence. A general plan of action precedes and
+arouses the particular acts and muscular movements that execute the
+plan.
+
+{67}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline of the chapter. Fill in sub-topics under each of the
+ following heads:
+
+ A. Mental processes of all kinds are reactions.
+
+ B. The stimulus that directly arouses a mental process is often
+ "central".
+
+ C. Brain activities of all sorts influence the muscles by way
+ of the motor area and the lower motor centers.
+
+ D. Brain action in skilled movement.
+
+ E. Brain action in speech.
+
+ F. Brain action in sensation.
+
+ G. Brain action in recognizing seen or heard objects.
+
+ H. Relations of reactions of different levels.
+
+2. Define and illustrate these classes of stimuli:
+
+ A. Peripheral:
+
+ (1) External.
+
+ (2) Internal.
+
+ B. Central.
+
+3. Show by a diagram how one cortical center arouses another.
+ Compare the diagram in Fig. 9, p. 37.
+
+4. Facilitation of the patellar reflex or "knee jerk". Let your
+ subject sit with one leg hanging freely from the knee down. With
+ the edge of your hand strike the patellar tendon just below the
+ knee cap. (a) Compare the reflex movement so obtained with a
+ voluntary imitation by the subject. Which is the quicker and
+ briefer? (b) Apply a fairly strong auditory stimulus (a sudden
+ noise) a fraction of a second before the tap on the tendon, and see
+ whether the reflex response is reinforced, (c) Ask the subject to
+ clench his fists or grit his teeth, and tap the tendon as he does
+ so. Reinforcement? (d) Where is the reflex center for the patellar
+ reflex, and whence comes the reinforcing influence?
+
+5. Construct a diagram showing the different centers and connections
+ involved in making the skilled movement of writing; and consider
+ what loss of function would result from destruction of each of the
+ centers.
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Herrick's _Introduction to Neurology_, 1918, Chapter XX, on the
+"Functions of the Cerebrum".
+
+Stile's _Nervous System and Its Conservation_, Chapters X, XI
+and XII.
+
+
+{68}
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+TENDENCIES TO REACTION
+
+HOW MOTIVES INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR, AND HOW THEY FIT INTO A PSYCHOLOGY
+WHICH SEEKS TO ANALYZE BEHAVIOR INTO REACTIONS.
+
+One advantage of basing our psychology on _reactions_ is that it keeps
+us "close to the ground", and prevents our discussions from sailing
+off into the clouds of picturesque but fanciful interpretation.
+Psychology is very apt to degenerate into a game of blowing bubbles,
+unless we pin ourselves down to hard-headed ways of thinking. The
+notion of a reaction is of great value here, just because it is so
+hard-headed and concrete. Whenever we have any human action before us
+for explanation, we have to ask what the stimulus is that arouses the
+individual to activity, and how he responds. Stimulus-response
+psychology is solid, and practical as well; for if it can establish
+the laws of reaction, so as to predict what response will be made to a
+given stimulus, and what stimulus can be depended on to arouse a
+desired response, it furnishes the "knowledge that is power". Perhaps
+no more suitable motto could be inscribed over the door of a
+psychological laboratory than these two words, "Stimulus-Response."
+
+Such a motto would not frighten away the modern introspectionists, for
+they, no less than the behaviorists, could find a congenial home in a
+stimulus-response laboratory. They would begin by studying sensations,
+and, advancing to more complex responses, would observe the conscious
+processes entering into the response.
+
+{69}
+
+But, however useful the reaction may be as affording a sound basis for
+psychological study, we must not allow it to blind our eyes to any of
+the real facts of mental life; and, at first thought, it seems as if
+_motives, interests_ and _purposes_ did not fit into the
+stimulus-response program. Many hard-headed psychologists have fought
+shy of such matters, and some have flatly denied them any place in
+scientific psychology. But let us see.
+
+
+ _S ---> R_
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 20.--The symbol of stimulus-response psychology.
+_S_ means the stimulus, and _R_ the response. The line between is the
+connection from stimulus to response.]
+
+
+Suppose we are looking out on a city street during the noon hour. We
+see numbers of people who--lunch over, nothing to do till one
+o'clock!--are standing or walking about, looking at anything that
+chances to catch their eye, waving their hands to friends across the
+street, whistling to a stray dog that comes past, or congregating
+about an automobile that has broken down in the crowded thoroughfare.
+These people are responding to stimuli, obviously enough, and there is
+no difficulty in fitting their behavior into the stimulus-response
+scheme.
+
+But here comes some one who pays little attention to the sights and
+sounds of the street, simply keeping his eyes open enough to avoid
+colliding with any one else. He seems in a hurry, and we say of him,
+"He must have business on hand; he has to keep an appointment or catch
+a train". He is not simply responding to the stimuli that come to him,
+but has some purpose of his own that directs his movements.
+
+Here is another who, while not in such a hurry, is not idling by any
+means, since he peers closely at the faces of the men, neglecting the
+women, and seems to be looking for some one in particular; or,
+perhaps, he neglects men and {70} women alike, and looks anxiously at
+the ground, as if he had lost something. Some inner motive shuts him
+off from most of the stimuli of the street, while making him extra
+responsive to certain sorts of stimuli.
+
+
+Purposive Behavior
+
+Now it would be a great mistake to rule these purposeful individuals
+out of our psychology. We wish to understand busy people as well as
+idlers. What makes a man busy is some inner purpose or motive. He
+still responds to present stimuli--otherwise he would be in a dream or
+trance and out of all touch with what was going on about him--but his
+actions are in part controlled by an inner motive.
+
+To complete the foundations of our psychology, then, we need to fit
+purpose into the general plan of stimulus and response. At first
+thought, purpose seems a misfit here, since--
+
+First, a purpose is an inner force, whereas what arouses a response
+should be a stimulus, and typically an external stimulus. We do not
+wish to drop back into the old "self-activity" psychology, which
+thought of the individual as originating his acts from within himself.
+But if we could show that a purpose is itself an inner response to
+some external stimulus, and acts in its turn as a "central stimulus"
+to further reactions, this difficulty would disappear.
+
+Second, while a typical reaction, like the reflex or the simple
+reaction of the experiment, is prompt and over with at once, a purpose
+persists. It keeps the busy man, in our illustration, hurrying all the
+way down the street and around the corner and how much farther we
+cannot say. It is very different from a momentary response, or from a
+stimulus that arouses a momentary response and nothing more.
+
+Third, what persists, in purposive behavior, is the tendency {71}
+towards some end or goal. The purposeful person wants something he has
+not yet got, and is striving towards some future result. Whereas a
+stimulus pushes him from behind, a goal beckons to him from ahead.
+This element of action directed towards some end is absent from the
+simple response to a stimulus.
+
+In short, we have to find room in our stimulus-response psychology for
+action persistently steered in a certain direction by some cause
+acting from within the individual. We must find room for _internal_
+states that _last_ for a time and _direct_ action. In addition, we
+sometimes, though not always, need to find room for conscious
+foreknowledge of the goal towards which the action is directed.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 21.--The stimulus-response scheme complicated to
+allow for the existence of T, an inner motive or tendency, which,
+aroused by an external stimulus, itself arouses a motor response. If
+the reaction-tendency were linked so firmly to a single response as to
+arouse that response with infallible certainty and promptness, then it
+would be superfluous for psychology to speak of a tendency at all. But
+often quite a series of responses, R1, R2, etc., follows upon a single
+stimulus, all tending towards the same end-result, such as escape; and
+then the notion of a "tendency" is by no means superfluous.]
+
+
+"Purpose" is not the best general term to cover all the internal
+factors that direct activity, since this word rather implies foresight
+of the goal, which demands the intellectual ability to imagine a
+result not present to the senses. This highest level of inner control
+over one's behavior had best be left for consideration in later
+chapters on imagination and will. There are two levels below this. In
+the middle level, the individual has an inner steer towards a certain
+result, though without conscious foresight of that result. At the
+lowest level, we can scarcely speak of the individual as being
+directed towards any precise goal, but still his {72} internal state
+is such as to predispose him for certain reactions and against other
+reactions.
+
+The lowest level, that of organic states, is typified by fatigue. The
+middle level, that of internal steer, is typified by the hunting dog,
+striving towards his prey, though not, as far as we know, having any
+clear idea of the result at which his actions are aimed. The highest
+level, that of conscious purpose, is represented by any one who knows
+exactly what he wants and means to get.
+
+No single word in the language stands out clearly as the proper term
+to cover all three levels. "Motives" would serve, if we agree at the
+outset that a motive is not always clearly conscious or definite, but
+may be any inner state or force that drives the individual in a given
+direction. "Wants" or "needs" might be substituted for "motives", and
+would apply better than "motives" to the lowest of our three levels.
+"Tendencies", or "tendencies to reaction", carries about the right
+meaning, namely that the individual, because of his internal state,
+tends towards a certain action. "Determining tendencies" (perhaps
+better, "directive tendencies") is a term that has been much used in
+psychology, with the meaning that the inner tendency determines or
+directs behavior. Much used also are "adjustment" and "mental set",
+the idea here being to liken the individual to an adjustable machine
+which can be set for one or another sort of work. Often "preparation"
+or "readiness for action" is the best expression.
+
+
+Organic States that Influence Behavior
+
+Beginning at the lowest of our three levels, let us observe not even
+the simplest animal, but a single muscle. If we give a muscle electric
+shocks as stimuli, it responds to each shock by contracting. To a weak
+stimulus, the response is weak; {73} to a strong stimulus, strong. But
+now let us apply a long series of equal shocks of moderate intensity,
+one shock every two seconds. Then we shall get from the muscle what is
+called a "fatigue curve", the response growing weaker and weaker, in
+spite of the continued equality of the stimuli. How is such a thing
+possible? Evidently because the inner condition of the muscle has been
+altered by its long-continued activity. The muscle has become
+fatigued, and physiologists, examining into the nature of this
+fatigue, have found the muscle to be poisoned by "fatigue substances"
+produced by its own activity. Muscular contraction depends on the
+oxidation of fuel, and produces oxidized wastes, of which carbon
+dioxide is the best known; and these waste products, being produced in
+continued strong activity faster than the blood can carry them away,
+accumulate in the muscle and partially poison it. The "organic state"
+is here definitely chemical.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 22.--Fatigue curve of a muscle. The vertical lines
+record a series of successive contractions of the muscle, and the
+height of each line indicates the force of the contraction. Read from
+left to right.]
+
+
+This simple experiment is worth thinking over. Each muscular
+contraction is a response to an electric stimulus, but the force of
+the contraction is determined in part by the internal state of the
+muscle. Fatigue is an _inner_ state of the muscle that _persists_ for
+a time (till the blood carries away the wastes), and that
+_predisposes_ the muscle _towards_ a certain kind of response, namely,
+weak response. Thus the three characteristics of purposive behavior
+that seemed so {74} difficult to fit into the scheme of stimulus and
+response are all here in a rudimentary form.
+
+But notice this fact also: the inner condition of _muscular fatigue is
+itself a response_ to external stimuli. It is part and parcel of the
+total muscular response to a stimulus. The total response includes an
+internal change of condition, which, persisting for a time, is a
+factor in determining how the muscle shall respond to later stimuli.
+These facts afford, in a simple form, the solution of our problem.
+
+Before leaving the muscle, let us take note of one further fact. If
+you examine the "fatigue curve" closely, you will see that a perfectly
+fresh muscle _gains_ in strength from its first few responses. It is
+said to "warm up" through exercise; and the inner nature of this
+warming up has been found to consist in a moderate accumulation of the
+same products which, in greater accumulation, produce fatigue. The
+warmed-up condition is then another instance of an "organic state".
+
+There will be more to say of "organic states" when we come to the
+emotions. For the present, do not the facts already cited compel us to
+enlarge somewhat the conception of a reaction as we left it in the
+preceding chapters? Besides the external response, there is often an
+internal response to a stimulus, a changed organic state that persists
+for a time and has an influence on behavior. The motor response to a
+given stimulus is determined partly by that stimulus, and partly by
+the organic state left behind by just preceding stimuli. You cannot
+predict what response will be made to a given stimulus, unless you
+know the organic state present when the stimulus arrives.
+
+
+Preparation for Action
+
+At the second level, the inner state that partly governs the response
+is more neural than chemical, and is directed {75} specifically
+towards a certain end-result. As good an instance as any is afforded
+by the "simple reaction", described in an earlier chapter. If the
+subject in that experiment is to raise his finger promptly from the
+telegraph key on hearing a given sound, he must be _prepared_, for there
+is no permanent reflex connection between this particular stimulus and
+this particular response. You tell your subject to be ready, whereupon
+he places his finger on the key, and gets all ready for this
+particular stimulus and response. The response is determined as much
+by his inner state of readiness as by the stimulus. Indeed, he
+sometimes gets too ready, and makes the response before he receives
+the stimulus.
+
+The preparation in such a case is more specific, less a general
+organic state, than in the previous cases of fatigue, etc. It is
+confined for the most part to the nervous system and the sense organ
+and muscles that are to be used. In an untrained subject, it includes
+a conscious purpose to make the finger movement quickly when the sound
+is heard; but as he becomes used to the experiment he loses clear
+consciousness of what he is to do. He is, as a matter of fact, ready
+for a specific reaction, but all he is conscious of is a general
+readiness. He feels ready for what is coming, but does not have to
+keep his mind on it, since the specific neural adjustment has become
+automatic with continued use.
+
+Examples of internal states of preparedness might be multiplied
+indefinitely, and it may be worth while to consider a few more, and
+try out on them the formula that has already been suggested, to the
+effect that preparation is an inner adjustment for a specific
+reaction, set up in response to some stimulus (like the "Ready!"
+signal), persisting for a time, and predisposing the individual to
+make the specified reaction whenever a suitable stimulus for it
+arrives. The preparation may or may not be conscious. It might be
+named "orientation" or "steer", with the meaning that {76} the
+individual is headed or directed towards a certain end-result. It is
+like so setting the rudder of a sailboat that, when a puff of wind
+arrives, the boat will respond by turning to the one side.
+
+The runner on the mark, "set" for a quick start, is a perfect picture
+of preparedness. Here the onlookers can see the preparation, since the
+ready signal has aroused visible muscular response in the shape of a
+crouching position. It is not simple crouching, but "crouching to
+spring." But if the onlookers imagine themselves to be seeing the
+whole preparation--if they suppose the preparation to be simply an
+affair of the muscles--they overlook the established fact that the
+muscles are held in action by the nerve centers, and would relax
+instantly if the nerve centers should stop acting. The preparation is
+neural more than muscular. The neural apparatus is set to respond to
+the pistol shot by strong discharge into the leg muscles.
+
+What the animal psychologists have called the _delayed reaction_ is a
+very instructive example of preparation. An animal is placed before a
+row of three food boxes, all looking just alike, two of them, however,
+being locked while the third is unlocked. Sometimes one is unlocked
+and sometimes another, and the one which at any time is unlocked is
+designated by an electric bulb lighted above the door. The animal is
+first trained to go to whichever box shows the light; he always gets
+food from the lighted box. When he has thoroughly learned to respond
+in this way, the "delayed reaction" experiment begins. Now the animal
+is held while the light is burning, and only released a certain time
+after the light is out, and the question is whether, after this delay,
+he will still follow the signal and go straight to the right door. It
+is found that he will do so, provided the delay is not too long--how
+long depends on the animal. With rats the delay cannot exceed 5
+seconds, with cats it can reach 18 {77} seconds, with dogs 1 to 3
+minutes, with children (in a similar test) it increased from 20
+seconds at the age of fifteen months to 50 seconds at two and a half
+years, and to 20 minutes or more at the age of five years.
+
+Rats and cats, in this experiment, need to keep their heads or bodies
+turned towards the designated box during the interval between the
+signal and the release; or else lose their orientation. Some dogs,
+however, and children generally, can shift their position and still,
+through some inner orientation, react correctly when released. The
+point of the experiment is that the light signal puts the animal or
+child into a state tending towards a certain result, and that, when
+that result is not immediately attainable, the state persists for a
+time and produces results a little later.
+
+
+Preparatory Reactions
+
+In the delayed reaction, the inner orientation does little during the
+interval before the final reaction, except to maintain a readiness for
+making that reaction; but often "preparatory reactions" occur before
+the final reaction can take place. Suppose you whistle for your dog
+when he is some distance off and out of sight. You give one loud
+whistle and wait. Presently the dog swings around the corner and
+dashes up to you. Now, what kept the dog running towards you after
+your whistle had ceased and before he caught sight of you? Evidently
+he was directed towards the end-result of reaching you, and this
+directing tendency governed his movements during the process. He made
+many preparatory reactions on the way to his final reaction of jumping
+up on you; and these preparatory reactions were, of course, responses
+to the particular trees he had to dodge, and the ditches he had to
+jump; but they were at the same time governed by the inner state set
+up in him by your {78 } whistle. This inner state favored certain
+reactions and excluded others that would have occurred if the dog had
+not been in a hurry. He passed another dog on the way without so much
+as saying, "How d'ye do?" And he responded to a fence by leaping over
+it, instead of trotting around through the gate. That is to say, the
+inner state set up in him by your whistle _facilitated_ reactions that
+were preparatory to the final reaction, and _inhibited_ reactions that
+were not in that line.
+
+A hunting dog following the trail furnishes another good example of a
+directive tendency. Give a bloodhound the scent of a particular man
+and he will follow that scent persistently, not turning aside to
+respond to stimuli that would otherwise influence him, nor even to
+follow the scent of another man. Evidently an inner neural adjustment
+has been set up in him predisposing him to respond to a certain
+stimulus and not to others.
+
+The homing of the carrier pigeon is a good instance of activity
+directed in part by an inner adjustment, since, when released at a
+distance from home, he is evidently "set" to get back home, and often
+persists and reaches home after a very long flight. Or, take the
+parallel case of the terns, birds which nest on a little island not
+far from Key West. Of ten birds taken from their nests and transported
+on shipboard out into the middle of the Gulf of Mexico and released
+500 miles from home, eight reappeared at their nests after intervals
+varying from four to eight days. How they found their way over the
+open sea remains a mystery, but one thing is clear: they persisted in
+a certain line of activity until a certain end-result was reached, on
+which this line of activity ceased.
+
+One characteristic of tendencies that has not previously been
+mentioned comes out in this example. When a tendency has been aroused,
+the animal (or man) is tense and {79} restless till the goal has been
+reached, and then quiets down. The animal may or may not be clearly
+conscious of the goal, but he is restless till the goal has been
+attained, and his restlessness then ceases. In terms of behavior, what
+we see is a series of actions which continues till a certain result
+has been reached and then gives way to rest. Introspectively, what we
+feel (apart from any clear mental picture of the goal) is a
+restlessness and tenseness during a series of acts, giving way to
+relief and satisfaction when a certain result has been reached.
+
+A hungry or thirsty animal is restless; he _seeks_ food or drink,
+which means that he is making a series of preparatory reactions, which
+continues till food or drink has been found, and terminates in the
+end-reaction of eating or drinking.
+
+
+What the Preparatory Reactions Accomplish
+
+The behavior of a hungry or thirsty individual is worth some further
+attention--for it is the business of psychology to interest itself in
+the most commonplace happenings, to wonder about things that usually
+pass for matters of course, and, if not to find "sermons in stones",
+to derive high instruction from very lowly forms of animal behavior.
+Now, what is hunger? Fundamentally an organic state; next, a sensation
+produced by this organic state acting on the internal sensory nerves,
+and through them arousing in the nerve centers an adjustment or
+tendency towards a certain end-reaction, namely, eating. Now, I ask
+you, if hunger is a stimulus to the eating movements, why does not the
+hungry individual eat at once? Why, at least, does he not go through
+the motions of eating? You say, because he has nothing to eat. But he
+could still make the movements; there is no physical impossibility in
+his making chewing and swallowing movements without the presence of
+food. {80} Speaking rationally, you perhaps say that he does not make
+these movements because he sees they would be of no use without food
+to chew; but this explanation would scarcely apply to the lower sorts
+of animal, and besides, you do not have to check your jaws by any such
+rational considerations. They simply do not start to chew except when
+food is in the mouth. Well, then, you say, chewing is a response to
+the presence of food in the mouth; and taking food into the mouth is a
+response to the stimulus of actually present food. The response does
+not occur unless the stimulus is present; that is simple.
+
+Not quite so simple, either. Unless one is hungry, the presence of
+food does not arouse the feeding reaction; and even food actually
+present in the mouth will be spewed out instead of chewed and
+swallowed, if one is already satiated. Try to get a baby to take more
+from his bottle than he wants! Eating only occurs when one is _both_
+hungry and in the presence of food. Two conditions must be met: the
+internal state of hunger and the external stimulus of food; then, and
+then only, will the eating reaction take place.
+
+Hunger, though a tendency to eat, does not arouse the eating movements
+while the stimulus of present food is lacking; but, for all that,
+hunger does arouse immediate action. It typically arouses the
+preparatory reactions of seeking food. Any such reaction is at the
+same time a response to some actually present stimulus. Just as the
+dog coming at your whistle was responding every instant of his
+progress to some particular object--leaping fences, dodging trees--so
+the dog aroused to action by the pangs of hunger begins at once to
+respond to present objects. He does not start to eat them, because
+they are not the sort of stimuli that produce this response, but he
+responds by dodging them or finding his way by them in his quest for
+food. The responses that the hungry dog makes to other objects than
+{81} food are preparatory reactions, and these, if successful, put the
+dog in the presence of food. That is to say, the _preparatory
+reactions provide the stimulus that is necessary to arouse the
+end-reaction_. They bring the individual to the stimulus, or the
+stimulus to the individual.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 23.--A stimulus arouses the tendency towards the
+end-reaction, R, but (as indicated by the dotted line), T is not by
+itself sufficient to arouse R; but T can and does arouse P, a
+preparatory reaction, and P (or some external result directly produced
+by P), cooeperating with T, gives rise to R.]
+
+
+What we can say about the modus operandi of hunger, then, amounts to
+this: Hunger is an inner state and adjustment predisposing the
+individual to make eating movements in response to the stimulus of
+present food; in the absence of food, hunger predisposes to such other
+responses to various stimuli as will bring the food stimulus into
+play, and thus complete the conditions necessary for the eating
+reaction. In general, _an aroused reaction-tendency predisposes the
+individual to make a certain end-reaction when the proper stimulus for
+that reaction is present; otherwise, it predisposes him to respond to
+other stimuli, which are present, by preparatory reactions that
+eventually bring to bear on the individual the stimulus required to
+arouse the end-reaction_.
+
+Let us apply our formula to one more simple case. While reading in the
+late afternoon, I find the daylight growing dim, rise and turn on the
+electric light. The stimulus that sets this series of acts going is
+the dim light; the first, inner response is a _need_ for light. This
+need tends, by force of habit, to make me turn the button, but it does
+not make me execute this movement in the air. I only make this
+movement when the button is in reaching distance. My first {82}
+reaction, rising from my chair, is preparatory and brings the button
+close enough to act as a stimulus for the hand reaction. The button
+within reach is not by itself sufficient to arouse the turning
+reaction, nor is the need for light alone sufficient. The two
+conditions must be present together, and the preparatory reaction is
+such that, given the need, the other condition will be met and the
+reaction then aroused.
+
+
+What a Tendency Is, in Terms of Nerve Action
+
+Very little need be added to our neural conception of a reaction in
+order to get a satisfactory conception of a tendency to reaction.
+Principally, we must add this fact, that a nerve center aroused to
+activity does not always discharge instantly and completely into the
+muscles, or into some other center, and come to rest itself. It does
+so, usually, in the case of a reflex, and in other momentary
+reactions; as when A makes you think of B, and B at once of C, and so
+on, each thought occupying you but a moment. But a tendency means the
+arousing of a nerve center under conditions which do not allow that
+center to discharge at once. The center remains in a condition of
+tension; energy is dammed up there, unable to find an outlet.
+
+We have already seen what the conditions are that cause this damming
+up of energy. The center that is aroused tends to arouse in turn some
+lower motor center, but by itself does not have complete control over
+that lower center, since the lower center also requires a certain
+external stimulus in order to arouse it to the discharging point.
+Until the proper external stimulus arrives to complete the arousal of
+the lower center, the higher center cannot discharge its energy.
+
+When there is an "organic state" present, such as hunger or thirst,
+this may act as a persistent stimulus to the sensory nerves and
+through them to the higher center in {83} question; and then we can
+readily understand how it is that the center remains active until the
+organic state is relieved. But where there is no such persistent
+organic stimulus, as there can scarcely be in the case of the
+bloodhound or of the man hurrying to a train or seeking in the crowd
+for a friend, there we have to suppose that a center, once aroused to
+activity and prevented from complete discharge, remains active by
+virtue of energy dammed up in itself. There is pretty good
+physiological evidence that this sort of thing is a fundamental fact;
+for there are certain rhythmical reflexes, like scratching or
+stepping, that, when started going by a momentary sensory stimulus,
+keep it up for a time after the stimulus has ceased. There seems to be
+no doubt that a nerve center, once aroused, may stay aroused for a
+time.
+
+The "dammed-up energy" here is not to be confused with the "stored
+energy" spoken of under the head of reactions. We said, in that
+connection, that a stimulus released energy stored in the organism.
+That, however, was _potential_ energy, dormant within the organism
+till aroused; but what we have here in mind is active or _kinetic_
+energy. Stored energy is like that of coal in the bin; dammed-up
+energy is like that of steam in the boiler.
+
+Dammed-up energy in the nerve centers accounts for the persistence of
+a tendency to reaction after the stimulus has ceased. It accounts for
+the "delayed reaction" and similar cases. But how shall we account for
+preparatory reactions? We have a nerve center in an active state,
+tending to discharge into a certain lower motor center, but unable to
+do so because a peripheral stimulus is necessary, in addition, in
+order to arouse this lower center. Then we find the higher center
+discharging into _other_ lower centers, and so giving rise to
+preparatory reactions. More precisely, what we find is that the higher
+center facilitates the response {84} of certain lower centers to their
+proper peripheral stimuli, while inhibiting the response of other
+lower centers to their appropriate stimuli. This is the same sort of
+thing that we observe in all control exerted by a higher center over a
+lower. It means that the higher center, besides its main line of
+connection with the lower center that will give the end-reaction, has
+minor lines of connection with certain other lower centers; some of
+these centers it facilitates and others it inhibits. These connections
+between the main and the subordinate centers may have been established
+by inborn nature, or by previous training, as will be explained in
+later chapters.
+
+The action of the main center on the subordinate centers concerned in
+executing preparatory reactions does not relieve the tension in the
+main center. The dammed-up energy stays there till the proper stimulus
+is procured for arousing the end-reaction, and then escapes through
+its main channel of discharge, and the main center then finally comes
+to rest.
+
+It may fairly be urged that no violence has been done to the general
+conception of a reaction by these additions, and also that with the
+additions the notion of a reaction has room for tendencies or inner
+adjustments. So that we conclude that stimulus-response psychology is
+adequate to the job, and will do justice to all forms of human
+behavior. It has a place for sensations, perceptions and thoughts, as
+we saw in the preceding chapter, and it has a place also for purposes,
+desires and motives generally.
+
+
+Motives
+
+In the present chapter, desirous of "keeping close to the ground", we
+have said little of distinctively human motives. That will come later.
+In general, a motive is a tendency towards a certain end-result or
+end-reaction, a tendency which is itself aroused by some stimulus, and
+which {85} persists for a time because its end-reaction is not at once
+made. The end-reaction is not made at once because it can only be
+aroused by an appropriate stimulus, acting in conjunction with the
+motive. But the motive, persisting in its inner activity, facilitates
+reactions to certain stimuli and inhibits others. The reactions it
+facilitates are preparatory to the end-reaction, in that they provide
+the necessary conditions for that reaction to occur, which means that
+they bring to bear on the individual the necessary stimulus which can
+arouse the end-reaction. The restlessness that characterizes an
+individual driven by an inner motive gives way to rest and
+satisfaction when the end-result is reached.
+
+Motives range from the primitive or primal, like hunger, to the very
+advanced, such as zeal for a cause. They range from the momentary,
+illustrated by the need for more light in reading, to the great
+permanent forces of life, like _amour propre_ and _esprit de corps_.
+But the permanent motives are not always active; they sleep and are
+awakened again by appropriate stimuli.
+
+In everyday speech we are apt to use the words "motive" and "reason"
+interchangeably, as in asking some one what his "motive", or what his
+"reason" is for doing so and so. A motive, however, is not necessarily
+a reason, nor a reason a motive. A reason is thought-out and
+conscious, which a motive need not be. On the other hand, a reason
+does not become a motive unless it takes hold of us and arouses a
+genuine tendency towards the planned result. You may prove to me,
+logically, the desirability of a course of action, but your reasons do
+not necessarily make me desire it. You can give a child excellent
+reasons for studying his lessons, but you have to stir some real
+motive of child life in order to get action. In the highest type of
+conduct, to be sure, motive and reason pull together, reason showing
+the way to the goal at which motive is aimed.
+
+{86}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Complete the following outline of the chapter, by filling in
+ main headings to fit the subordinate headings that are given below:
+
+ A. _________
+
+ (1) It keeps close to the facts.
+
+ (2) It has room for introspective as well as behavior study.
+
+ (3) It can be applied practically.
+
+ B. _________
+
+ (1) A stimulus is typically external, a purpose internal.
+
+ (2) A stimulus typically acts for a moment, a purpose persists
+ for some time.
+
+ (3) A stimulus is not directed towards a result, a purpose is
+ so directed.
+
+
+ C. _________
+
+ (1) Organic or physiological states that predispose towards
+ certain forms of behavior.
+
+ (2) Inner adjustments towards certain results, without
+ foresight of the results.
+
+ (3) Conscious purpose.
+
+ D. _________
+
+ (1) They are aroused by stimuli.
+
+ (2) They persist for a time.
+
+ (3) They influence the response to other stimuli.
+
+
+ E. _________
+
+ (1) They are neural rather than chemical.
+
+ (2) They amount to a preparation or readiness for a certain
+ response.
+
+ (3) They persist sometimes for only a few seconds, sometimes
+ for many minutes at least.
+
+ F. _________
+
+ (1) A whole series of acts may be set going by a single stimulus.
+
+ (2) The series comes to an end when a certain result has been
+ reached.
+
+ (3) Each act in the series is a response to some particular
+ stimulus, and yet would not be aroused by that stimulus
+ except for the active adjustment towards the end-result.
+{87}
+ (4) The end-result cannot be reached until a particular
+ stimulus helps the adjustment to arouse the end-reaction.
+
+ (5) The preliminary acts in the series bring the required
+ stimulus that can give the end-reaction.
+
+ G. _______
+
+ (1) It may be kept active by a continuing peripheral stimulus.
+
+ (2) It may be unable to discharge fully because its main path of
+ discharge is blocked.
+
+ H. _______
+
+ (1) The main center has minor connections with other
+ centers, in addition to its main path of discharge.
+
+ (2) The persisting activity of the main center influences
+ other centers by way of facilitation and inhibition.
+
+2. Fill in the blanks in the following paragraph:
+
+ "A motive or (1) is a reaction that has not yet come off. It has
+ been (2) by some stimulus, and it tends towards a certain (3),
+ which however it is unable of itself to produce, but requires the
+ assistance of another (4) which is not yet present. The motive
+ gives rise to (5) responses, which, if (6), finally bring the
+ required (7), and this, combined with the (8) arouses the (9), and
+ so brings the whole (10) of acts to a close."
+
+3. Cite cases illustrating the importance of preparatory adjustment
+ (a) for securing prompt reaction, and
+ (b) for securing keen observation.
+
+4. Cite a case where some need or desire gives rise to a series of
+ preparatory reactions.
+
+5. Cite a case where a need or desire leads to the omission
+ (inhibition) of acts that would otherwise have occurred.
+
+6. What is meant by the last sentence in the chapter?
+
+7. An experiment on the "delayed reaction". Take two sheets of
+ paper, and on each write the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F,
+ scattering them irregularly over the sheet. The task, in general,
+ is now to take aim at one of the letters, while your hand, holding
+ a pencil, is raised to the side of your head, and then to close the
+ eyes and strike at the letter aimed for. First aim at A, and mark
+ the point hit with an a, then the same with B, and so on. With the
+ first sheet, strike as soon as you have got your aim and closed
+ your eyes; but with the second sheet, aim, close your eyes, and
+ count ten slowly before striking, keeping the eyes closed till the
+ stroke has been made. Two sorts of observation should now be made:
+ first, introspective--record at once what you can of the way you
+ kept your aim during the delay. Second, objective--measure the
+ errors, and determine how much the delay affected your aim. What
+ conclusions can you draw from the experiment?
+
+{88}
+
+REFERENCES
+
+On the "delayed reaction", see Walter S. Hunter, "The Delayed Reaction
+in Animals and Children", _Behavior Monographs_, No. 6, 1913. A brief
+summary of this work can also be found in Hunter's _General
+Psychology_, 1919, pp. 31-33.
+
+On the homing of pigeons and terns, see Watson and Lashley, _An
+Historical and Experimental Study of Homing_, published by the
+Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1915.
+
+Interesting examples of changed organic states affecting the behavior
+of unicellular animals are given by Jennings in his _Behavior of the
+Lower Organisms_, 1906, and by Margaret F. Washburn in _The Animal
+Mind_, 2nd edition, 1917, pp. 246-257.
+
+
+{89}
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+NATIVE AND ACQUIRED TRAITS
+
+SOME RESPONSES ARE PROVIDED BY NATURE, WHILE
+OTHERS HAVE TO BE LEARNED BY EXPERIENCE
+
+John Doe is a strongly built man, over six feet high, with big bones
+and muscles, erect, vigorous, with plenty of color in his face,
+dark-haired, blue-eyed, clean-shaven, with a scar on his cheek, broad
+face and large ears. He is easy-going, even-tempered, fond of children
+and also of women, rather slangy and even profane in his talk, has a
+deep, sonorous voice and can carry the bass in a chorus. He is handy
+with tools, can drive or repair an automobile, is a fairly good carpet
+salesman, but much prefers out-of-door work. Rather free in spending
+his money, he has never run into debt except on one occasion, which
+turned out badly for him. Which of these traits of John Doe are native
+and which are acquired? How far are his physical, mental and moral
+characteristics the result of his "original nature" and how far have
+they been ingrained in him or imposed upon him by his training and
+environment?
+
+The distinction between native and acquired is clearest in the field
+of anatomy. Hair color and eye color are evidently native, and so, in
+the main, is the size of the body, though undoubtedly growth may be
+stunted by poor nutrition, and the individual fail to reach his
+"natural" height and weight. On the other hand, scars, tan, and the
+after-effects of disease or injury, are evidently acquired. Of
+movements, the native character of the reflexes has already been
+noted, and it is clear that skill in handling tools or {90} managing
+the voice is learned, though the individual may have a natural
+aptitude for these performances. Temperament and emotional traits we
+usually think of as belonging to a man's "nature", though we have to
+admit that a naturally cheerful disposition may be soured by ill
+treatment. On the other hand, while we reckon habits, such as
+profanity, or free spending, or an erect carriage, as belonging with
+the acquired traits, we know that some natures are prone to certain
+habits, and other natures to other habits. Thus the effects of
+"nature" and "experience" are almost inextricably interwoven in the
+behavior of an adult person.
+
+Difficult as it certainly is to separate the native from the acquired
+in human action, the attempt must be made. We cannot dodge so
+fundamental a problem. Scientifically it is important as the
+starting-point of a genetic study; we must know where the individual
+starts in order to understand the course of his development.
+Practically it is important because there is reason to believe that
+native traits are deeply seated and not easily eradicated, even though
+they can be modified and specialized in different ways. If a habit is
+not simply a habit, but at the same time a means of gratifying some
+natural tendency, then it is almost imperative to find a substitute
+gratification in order to eliminate the habit. The individual's nature
+also sets limits beyond which he cannot be brought by no matter how
+much training and effort; and this is true of mental development as
+well as of physical.
+
+
+The Source of Native Traits
+
+"Native" means a little more than "congenital." A child may be born
+blind, having been infected by disease germs shortly before birth; he
+may be congenitally an idiot because of head injury during a difficult
+birth; or his mentality may have been impaired, during his uterine
+life, by {91} alcohol reaching his brain from a drunken mother. Such
+traits are congenital, but acquired. Native traits date back to the
+original constitution of the child, which was fully determined at the
+time when his individual life began, nine months before birth. The
+"fertilized ovum", formed by the combination of two cells, one from
+each of the parents, though microscopic in size and a simple sphere in
+shape, somehow contains the determiners for all the native or
+inherited traits of the new individual.
+
+It is very mysterious, certainly. This microscopic, featureless
+creature is already a human individual, with certain of its future
+traits--those that we call "native"--already settled. It is a human
+being as distinguished from any other species, it is a white or
+colored individual, male or female, blonde or brunette, short or tall,
+stocky or slender, mentally gifted or deficient, perhaps a "born"
+musician or adventurer or leader of men. These and all other native
+traits are already determined and latent within it; and the only
+question, regarding such traits, is whether the environment is going
+to be such as to enable this young individual to live and mature and
+unfold what is latent within it.
+
+
+Reactions Appearing at Birth Must Be Native
+
+For the first few months of the individual's existence, sheltered as
+it is within the mother's body, there is no chance for any
+acquisition, except of certain abnormalities such as were alluded to
+above. What occurs during this prenatal period is natural development,
+not learning or any effect of experience. The traits displayed by the
+new-born child are, accordingly, native traits. His breathing, crying,
+starting at a noise, squirming, stretching, grasping, sucking and
+swallowing, and other movements made from birth on, are to be counted
+as native reactions, that is to say, as {92} reactions executed by
+sensory, muscular and nervous machinery that have become ready for use
+by the mere process of natural growth. This is the first and clearest
+sign of a native trait, that it shall appear at birth.
+
+
+Reactions That Cannot Be Learned Must Be Native
+
+But native traits continue to make their appearance as the child's
+development proceeds after birth. Inherited anatomical traits, like
+stature and build, hair color, beard, and shape of nose, though
+certainly determined by native constitution, do not fully make their
+appearance till maturity. In fact, what does maturity mean, except
+that the natural characteristics have finally reached their complete
+development? And it is as true of internal structure as of external,
+that natural development, far from being complete at birth, keeps on
+till maturity. The neurones continue to grow, and their synapses in
+the nerve centers to become closer knit, just by virtue of natural
+growth; and thus reflex arcs, and other reaction machinery, one by one
+reach the ready-to-use stage during the individual's growing-up,
+especially during the first few years. With the growth to a functional
+condition of their sensori-neuro-muscular mechanisms, mental and motor
+reactions that are native, though not present at birth, make their
+appearance. The native intelligence of the child gradually unfolds,
+likewise his special native "gifts" and his inherited emotional and
+impulsive traits.
+
+Of course it is more difficult to make sure that a trait is native
+when it does not appear till some time after birth, for the chance of
+acquiring it by a process of learning has to be taken into account. If
+you can so control the conditions under which the young individual
+grows as to eliminate the possibility of learning a certain act, then
+you can {93} make sure whether the act is acquired or provided by the
+native constitution.
+
+
+Experimental Detection of Native Reactions
+
+Take the question whether birds learn to fly or simply come to fly
+when their natural development has gone far enough. The newly hatched
+bird cannot fly; its muscles are not strong enough, its wings are not
+feathered, and its nerve mechanism for cooerdinating the wing movements
+has still some growth to make before being ready for use. But, under
+ordinary conditions, the young bird has some chance to _learn_ flying,
+by watching the old birds fly and by trying and gradually getting the
+motion. The old birds, after a time, push the young ones from the nest
+and seem, to our eyes, to be teaching them to fly. Experiment enables
+us to decide the question. One of the earliest experiments in animal
+psychology was made by Spalding in 1873. He took newly hatched birds
+from the nest and shut each one separately in a little box that gave
+it no chance to stretch its wings or to see other birds fly. Here he
+fed and cared for them till the age at which flying usually begins,
+and then released them. Off they flew, skilfully managing wings and
+tail, swooping around the trees and soon disappearing from sight. A
+very successful experiment!--and conclusive. The little birds had had
+no chance to learn to fly, yet they flew. Flying must have come to
+them in the natural course of growth.
+
+Compare with this experiment another one no less successful, though it
+turned out differently. To discover whether the song of the oriole is
+fixed by nature or learned by imitation, Scott took some little ones,
+just hatched, and brought them up away from older birds. After a time,
+when growth had advanced to a certain stage, the birds began {94} to
+sing. The elementary notes and rattles characteristic of the oriole
+made their appearance, but were combined in unusual ways, so that the
+characteristic song of the oriole did not appear, but a new song. When
+these birds had grown up in the laboratory, other new-hatched orioles
+were brought up with them, and adopted this new song; so that the
+laboratory became the center for a new school of oriole music. The
+experiment showed that the elements of the oriole's song were provided
+by nature, while the combination of these elements was acquired by
+imitation.
+
+Probably this last is about the result one would get in the analogous
+case of human speech, if a similar experiment should be tried on
+children. Without an experiment, we have certain facts that point to a
+conclusion. The child uses his vocal organs from birth on; and before
+he reaches the age when he imitates the speech of others, he produces
+various vowels and consonants, and even puts them together into simple
+compounds, as "da-da" and "goo-goo." So far, deaf children do about
+the same as others, affording additional evidence that so much of
+speech is native. To get real speech, however, further combinations of
+the speech movements must be made, and the combinations (words) must
+have meaning attached to them. These higher achievements are evidently
+the result of learning, since the child uses the words that it hears
+spoken, and attaches the same meanings to them as people do about it.
+The child comes to speak the language of those about it, without
+regard to the speech of its ancestors. His "native language" is
+therefore acquired, though the elements of vocal utterance are truly
+native, and apparently are alike all over the world without regard to
+the various languages spoken.
+
+{95}
+
+Is Walking Native or Acquired?
+
+As another example of this same general problem of distinguishing
+native from acquired reactions, and of the kind of evidence that
+throws light on the problem in the absence of direct experiment, let
+us consider the child's walking. Does the child learn to walk, or does
+it simply _come_ to walk when its natural development has gone far
+enough? We think the child learns to walk because it begins very
+imperfectly and usually takes several weeks before it can be described
+as really walking of itself. We even think we teach it to walk, though
+when we examine our teaching we soon convince ourselves that we do not
+know _how_ we walk, and that what we are doing with the baby is to
+stimulate and encourage him to walk, protect him from hurting himself,
+etc., rather than teaching him as we later teach the child to write.
+An experiment to settle the matter might be conducted along the lines
+of Spalding's experiment on the young birds. We might prevent the baby
+from making any attempt to walk till it had fully reached the normal
+age for walking, and then turn it loose and see whether it walked of
+itself.
+
+Such an experiment has never been made under strict laboratory
+conditions; but here is a well-attested case that approximates to an
+experiment. A little girl of seven months, a very active child, seemed
+to want to get on her feet; but the doctor decided that her feet were
+too small to use, and directed that she be put back in long dresses.
+For four months she was kept in long dresses, and great care was
+exercised never to place her on the floor without them. Then, one day,
+she was set down without her dress, and immediately up she got and
+walked; and from that moment she was very agile on her feet.
+
+Another rather different case, but tending towards the {96} same
+conclusion, is that of a little girl who, in contrast to the
+preceding, gave her parents some anxiety because, up to the age of
+seventeen months, she wouldn't walk. She would stand holding on, but
+not trust herself to her feet alone. One noon her father came in from
+his work and, removing his cuffs, laid them on the table. The little
+girl crept to the table, and raised herself to a standing position,
+holding on to the table. She then took a cuff in one hand, and
+inserted the other hand into it, thus, for the first time, standing
+unsupported. She put on the other cuff in like manner, and then
+marched across the room, as proud as you please. For a few days she
+could walk only with cuffs, but after that was able to dispense with
+them. There are a few other cases, differing in details, but agreeing
+on the main point, that the baby walked well on its first trial and
+went through nothing that could properly be interpreted as a process
+of learning.
+
+It would really be very surprising if the human infant were left to
+learn locomotion for himself, while all other animals have this power
+by nature. Just because the human infant matures slowly, and learns a
+vast deal while maturing, is no reason for overlooking the fact that
+it does mature, i.e., that its native powers are gradually growing and
+reaching the condition of being ready for use. The most probable
+conception of "learning to walk," in the light of the evidence, is
+about as follows. At the age when the child's bones and muscles have
+become strong enough for walking, the nerve connections for
+cooerdinating this complex movement have also just about reached the
+stage of development when they are ready for business. The numerous
+synapses in the nerve centers that must be traversed by nerve currents
+in order to arouse the muscles to this particular act are not, we may
+suppose, all ready at the same instant, and it takes some little time
+for them to pass from {97} the stage when they will first conduct to
+the stage when, having grown more, they conduct perfectly. In other
+words, the neural mechanism for walking can function imperfectly
+before it can function perfectly. It takes several weeks of growth to
+pass from the barely functional condition to the fully functional
+condition; and it is during these weeks that the child seems to be
+learning to walk, while really his exercise of the partially developed
+neural mechanisms has no effect except to hasten their growth to some
+extent.
+
+
+Universality as a Criterion of Native Reactions
+
+The fundamental sign or criterion of a native trait, in accordance
+with what we have been saying, is that it shall make its appearance
+when there has been no chance to acquire it through experience. This
+is the one perfect criterion; but unfortunately it cannot always be
+applied, especially with a slowly maturing and much-learning species
+such as the human. We need other criteria, and one of some value is
+the criterion of _universality_.
+
+Consider, for example, the attraction between the sexes, and ask
+whether this represents a native tendency, or whether each individual
+acquires it, as he does his "native language", by learning from his
+elders. Before the body reaches sexual maturity, there has been
+abundant opportunity for the quick-learning child to observe sex
+attraction in older people. Yet it is highly improbable that the
+liking for the other sex which he begins to show strongly in youth is
+simply an acquired taste. It is improbable because the attraction
+between the sexes is so universal not only among mankind but among
+birds and mammals and, indeed, practically throughout the animal
+kingdom.
+
+Fighting is a similar case. Not so universal as the sex instinct, it
+still appears almost universally among birds and mammals.
+
+{98}
+
+The human individual is an animal, and some of his native traits are
+universal among animals. He is a vertebrate, and some of his traits,
+though not present in all animals, are universal among vertebrates. He
+is a mammal, with mammalian traits; a primate, with primate traits; a
+man with human traits; a Chinaman or Indian or European with racial
+traits; belongs to a more or less definite stock or breed within the
+race, and possesses the traits that are common to members of that
+stock; and the same with family traits. The criterion of universality,
+in the light of these facts, comes down to this: that _when all
+individuals having the same descent show a trait in common, that
+trait is to be regarded as belonging to their native
+constitution--unless evidence can be brought forward to the contrary_.
+
+Smoking is universal among many Malay peoples, but we know, as a
+historical fact, that it was introduced among them after the discovery
+of America, not very many generations ago. Superstition is universal
+among some peoples, but we see the superstitious beliefs and practices
+taught by the older to the younger generation. Similarly with any
+specific language. It may very well be true in such cases that the
+universal practice appeals to some native tendency of the people; but
+the specific practice is handed down by tradition and not by
+inheritance.
+
+
+Some Native Traits Are Far from Being Universal
+
+Though the universality of a trait creates a certain presumption in
+favor of its being native, the opposite is not always true, for a
+trait may be native and yet appear in only a fraction of those who
+have a common descent. Eye color is certainly native, and yet one of
+two brothers may have blue eyes and the other brown. Mental deficiency
+runs in families, but usually some members of such families have {99}
+normal mentality. Genius is almost certainly a native trait, but it is
+the reverse of universal. The fact is that, along with certain traits
+that appear in all, the native constitution of a stock provides also
+for traits that appear only sporadically. Enough has been said to show
+that the criterion of universality is one that needs to be applied
+with judgment.
+
+
+Why Acquired Traits Differ from One Individual to Another
+
+Acquired traits are on the whole much less universal, much more
+individual, than native traits. They are readjustments of the
+individual to environmental conditions; and, as the environment
+varies, so the adjustments vary, even when native traits are the same.
+Acquired traits are often specializations of the native traits, as any
+specific language is a specialization of the vocal utterances that are
+native and common to all men, and as the peculiar gait of an
+individual is a specialization of the universal walking movement. The
+gait differs with the environmental differences to which the
+individual has adapted himself, and will be different in one who has
+been accustomed to walk over rough ground and in one whose walking has
+been done on the city streets.
+
+_Acquired traits are not independent of native, but are developed on
+the basis of the native traits_. They are acquired not by laying aside
+native tendencies and working out something entirely new, but by
+acting in accordance with the native tendencies and making such
+readjustments as the environment demands. The acquisition of mental
+traits is accomplished by the process of _learning_, and we shall
+later have abundant occasion to examine it in more detail.
+
+{100}
+
+What Mental Traits Are Native?
+
+For the present, let us simply take a brief survey of the mental
+field, and notice what types of reactions are native and what
+acquired. On the motor side, the reflexes are native, while habitual
+and skilled movements are acquired. On the sensory side, nature
+provides the use of the sense organs and the sensations immediately
+resulting from their stimulation. The baby responds to touch, warmth,
+cold, sound and light as soon as it is born, or practically so, and
+undoubtedly has the corresponding sensations. In other words, the
+rudiments of seeing, hearing, etc., are provided by nature. But when
+we say, "I see a dog" we mean more than that we are getting certain
+visual sensations; we mean that we see a known object or known sort of
+object. This implies recognition of the object, either as an
+individual thing or as one of a class; and this the baby can scarcely
+be supposed to do at first. He sees the dog to the extent that he
+responds by visual sensations to the light coming from the dog, but
+not to the extent that he recognizes the dog as a dog. In short, the
+_meanings_ of sensations are acquired, though the sensations
+themselves are native.
+
+Things come to be known by use of the senses, and when thus known are
+not only recognized when present, but also remembered and thought of
+when they are not present to the senses. Such memories and items of
+knowledge, dependent as they are on experience, are to be reckoned
+among the acquired reactions. Ideas or conceptions of things also
+belong here.
+
+Of the emotions, some are called "primary" or native--anger and fear
+are examples--while others result from the compounding of these
+primary emotions and are therefore acquired. As people and things come
+to be known, emotional reactions become attached to them, and give
+what {101} are often named "sentiments", such as love for this person,
+contempt for that one, family pride, patriotism. These sentiments,
+bound up as they are with knowledge and ideas, are certainly acquired.
+
+Closely akin to the primary emotions are the native impulses, as the
+impulse to eat, to cry, to laugh, to escape from danger, to resist
+external compulsion and to overcome obstacles. The native impulses are
+the raw material out of which the numerous acquired desires of child
+and adult are formed. One sort of native impulse is the impulse to
+notice or pay attention to certain sorts of stimuli. These native
+interests of the child give birth to the various specialized interests
+of the adult. The baby's attention to a bright light represents a
+native interest; the older child's fixing his eyes on a dark brown
+piece of chocolate represents an acquired interest which has developed
+in a way that is easy to understand.
+
+Finally, we must count among the native traits of the individual his
+inherited aptitudes for certain kinds of work. One child shows a
+natural aptitude for music, another for acting, another for
+mathematics, another for mechanical things, another for language, and
+so on. As any of these "natural gifts" is present in some degree in
+nearly all members of the human family, and not to anything like the
+same degree in animals, they are the characteristically human traits.
+It is on the basis of such native aptitudes that each individual
+proceeds, through the processes of learning, to build up his various
+acquired abilities, such as the ability to sing, to speak a certain
+language, to add, to work with tools, to perform athletic feats, and
+to take part in social activities of various sorts.
+
+Our next task will be to examine more closely the native equipment of
+man, and after that to take up the process of learning, which is the
+way reactions are acquired. First the native, then the acquired. The
+acquired is based upon {102} the native. Acquired reactions are indeed
+so numerous that we cannot attempt even to list them all, let alone
+examine each one separately; but we can at least study the _way_ in
+which they are acquired. Native reactions are much less numerous, so
+that the student may hope to obtain a fairly comprehensive survey of
+this field, though, of course, without much detail.
+
+The general plan of this book, then, is as follows. Up to this point,
+it has been providing a stock of methods and general conceptions to
+serve as tools in psychological study: consciousness and behavior, the
+introspective and objective methods, reactions and tendencies to
+reaction, native and acquired, and the part played by the nervous
+system. Next comes a survey of reactions provided by the native
+constitution, and after that a study of the process of learning or
+acquiring reactions. Finally, there are several chapters devoted to
+such topics as imagination, reasoning and will, which are ways in
+which the individual utilizes his whole equipment, native and
+acquired, in meeting the exigencies of life.
+
+{103}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. When does the individual come into existence as an individual?
+ When does he begin to acquire traits? How long does he continue to
+ unfold his native traits, and how long does he continue to acquire
+ traits?
+
+3. Which of the following elements of spoken language are native,
+ and which acquired?
+
+ (a) Production of voice by the vocal cords and air blast from the lungs.
+
+ (b) Varying the voice in loudness.
+
+ (c) Varying the voice in pitch.
+
+ (d) Production of vowels by different positions of the mouth.
+
+ (e) Production of consonants by lip and tongue movements.
+
+ (f) Combination of vowels and consonants into words.
+
+ (g) Combination of words into idioms and grammatical sentences,
+
+ (h) Attachment of meanings to words.
+
+ (i) Sweet-toned voice.
+
+ (j) Nasal twang.
+
+ (k) Fluency in speaking.
+
+
+4. In each of the following reactions, decide whether the connection
+ of stimulus and response is probably native or acquired:
+
+ Stimulus Response
+
+ (a) a sudden noise starting
+
+ (b) a bright light blinking
+
+ (c) a bright light shading your eyes
+
+ (d) cold putting on coat
+
+ (e) cold shivering
+
+ (f) sight of a ball reaching for it
+
+ (g) ball in the hand throwing it
+
+ (h) slipping righting yourself
+
+ (i) row of objects counting them
+
+ (j) insulting language anger
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Edward L. Thorndike, in Chapter I of his _Educational Psychology,
+Briefer Course_, 1914, gives a general survey of the native factors in
+mental life and behavior.
+
+{104}
+
+Hollingworth and Poffenberger, in their _Applied Psychology_, 1917,
+devote Chapters II and III to the matter of mental heredity.
+
+Norsworthy and Whitley, in their _Psychology of Childhood_, devote
+Chapters I and II to "original nature".
+
+C. B. Davenport, in his _Heredity and Eugenics_, presents evidence of
+the importance of heredity in determining mental and moral traits.
+
+Yerkes and Bloomfleld, in a short article in the _Psychological
+Bulletin_ for 1910, Vol. 7, pp. 253-263, under the title, "_Do Kittens
+Instinctively Kill Mice?_", furnish a good illustration of the method
+employed in distinguishing native from acquired reactions.
+
+{105}
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+INSTINCT
+
+
+CONDUCT AS DETERMINED BY NATIVE REACTION-TENDENCIES
+
+Instinct is native behavior. It is contrasted with habit, knowledge,
+or anything in the way of learned reactions. When the mother wasp
+gathers a store of food suitable for young wasps, lays eggs beside the
+food and covers the whole with a wall of mud, we know that her
+behavior is instinctive because she has had no possible chance to
+learn from older wasps. She has never seen a wasp's nest made, for
+when the last preceding crop of nests was being made she was herself
+an unhatched egg. Therefore, she cannot possibly know the use of the
+nest with its eggs and store of food. She has no "reason" for building
+the nest, no ulterior purpose, but is impelled to build the nest,
+simply and solely for the sake of doing just that thing. Thus instinct
+is contrasted with calculated or reasoned action as well as with
+learned action. Calculated action is based on knowledge of cause and
+effect, and this knowledge is acquired by the individual in the course
+of his experience; but instinct is not based on the individual's
+experience, but only on his native constitution.
+
+The case of the baby eating is exactly the same as that of the wasp.
+The baby has not learned to eat, he knows nothing of the use of food
+and therefore has no ulterior purpose in eating, he does not reason
+about the matter, but eats simply because hunger is a native impulse
+to eat. {106} Eating is an end in itself to a hungry baby, and not a
+means to some further end; and that is what eating continues to be
+even to the hungry adult, however much he may learn about the use of
+food in maintaining life. From a broad philosophical point of view,
+instinct may be seen to work towards some great end, such as the
+preservation of the individual or the propagation of the race, but
+from the individual's own point of view, it is directed simply towards
+the performance of some particular act, or the accomplishment of some
+particular result.
+
+If instinct, as a collective term, means native behavior, "an
+instinct" is a unit of such behavior. Or, it is some unit of native
+organization that equips the individual to behave in a certain way.
+Different species of animals have different instincts, i.e., they are
+differently organized by nature. The differences of organization lie
+partly in the equipment of sense organs, partly in the equipment of
+motor organs, and partly in the nerves and nerve centers that, being
+themselves aroused by way of the sense organs, in turn arouse the
+motor organs.
+
+The dependence of instinct on sensory equipment becomes clear when we
+think of animals possessing senses that human beings lack. The
+instinct of dogs to follow the scent depends on their keen sense of
+smell. Bees have something akin to a sense of taste in their feet, and
+follow their own trails by tasting them. Fishes have special sense
+organs along their sides that are stimulated by water currents, and it
+is in response to this stimulus that the fish instinctively keeps his
+head turned upstream.
+
+The dependence of instinct on motor equipment is still more obvious.
+The flying instinct of birds depends on the possession of wings, and
+the swimming instinct of the seal depends on the fact that his limbs
+have the peculiar form of flippers. The firefly instinctively makes
+flashes of light, {107} and the electric eel instinctively discharges
+his electric organ and gives his enemy a shock.
+
+But the core of an instinct is to be sought in the nerve centers,
+since it is there that the cooerdination of the muscles is
+accomplished. A wing or flipper would be of no use unless its muscles
+were excited to action by the nerve centers, and it would be of very
+little use unless the nerve centers were so organized as to arouse the
+muscles in a certain combination, and with a certain force and rhythm.
+In terms of the nervous system, an instinct is the activity of a team
+of neurones so organized, and so connected with muscles and sense
+organs, as to arouse certain motor reactions in response to certain
+sensory stimuli.
+
+
+The Difference Between an Instinct and a Reflex
+
+What we have said regarding instinct thus far could equally well be
+said of reflex action. A reflex is a native reaction, and it is taken
+care of by a team of neurones in the way just stated. We might speak
+of a reflex as "instinctive", using this adjective as equivalent to
+"native"; but we should shrink for some reason from speaking of the
+pupillary reflex to light as an instinct, or of the "knee jerk
+instinct", or the "swallowing instinct", or the "flexion instinct".
+There is some difference between the typical reflex and the typical
+instinct, though it is not very obvious what the difference is.
+
+The typical reflex is a much simpler act than the typical instinct,
+but it is impossible to separate the two classes on this basis. At the
+best, this would be a difference of degree and not of kind. Among
+reflexes, some are simpler than others, but even the simplest is
+compound in the sense of being a cooerdinated movement. The knee jerk
+is simpler than the flexion reflex, and this is simpler than the
+scratch {108} reflex, which consists of a rapid alternation of flexion
+and extension by one leg, while the other is stiffly extended and
+supports the trunk. Coughing, which would be called a reflex rather
+than an instinct, consists of a similar alternation of inspiration and
+forced expiration, and swallowing consists of a series of tongue,
+throat and gullet movements. These compound reflexes show that we
+cannot accept the simple definition that is sometimes given for an
+instinct, that it is a compound of reflexes. Such a definition would
+place coughing and swallowing among the instincts, and so do violence
+to the ordinary use of the word. In point of complexity, we find a
+graded series ranging from the pupillary reflex at one extreme to the
+nesting or mating instinct at the other, and no sharp line can be
+drawn on this score between the reflexes and the instincts.
+
+Another distinction has been attempted on the basis of consciousness.
+Typically, it may be said, a reflex works automatically and
+unconsciously, while an instinct is consciously impulsive. The reflex,
+accordingly, would be an unconscious reaction, the instinct a
+conscious reaction. But this distinction also breaks down on
+examination of cases. The pupillary reflex, to be sure, is entirely
+unconscious. But the flexion reflex is a little different. When
+unimpeded, it occurs so promptly that we are scarcely aware of the
+painful stimulus before the reaction has occurred. But let the
+reaction be hindered--either voluntarily or, for instance, by the foot
+being seized and held--and a strong conscious impulse is felt to pull
+the leg away; so that here the flexion reflex would belong among the
+instincts, according to the proposed distinction.
+
+Similar remarks would apply equally well to coughing, since a strong
+impulse to cough is felt if the coughing movement is checked.
+Sneezing, a protective reflex, is usually a slow reaction, giving time
+for a conscious impulse to {109} sneeze before the reaction takes
+place. The same is true of scratching and of swallowing, and of a
+number of other reflexes. In short, it is impossible to draw a
+satisfactory line between reflexes and instincts on the basis of
+conscious impulse.
+
+These cases point the way, however, to what is probably the best
+distinction. It was when the flexion reflex was _delayed_ that it
+began to look like an instinct, and it was because sneezing was a
+_slow_ response that it had something of the character of an instinct.
+Typically, a reflex is a prompt reaction. It occurs at once, on the
+occurrence of its stimulus, and is done with. What is characteristic
+of the instinct, on the contrary, is the persisting "tendency", set up
+by a given stimulus, and directed towards a result which cannot be
+instantly accomplished.
+
+
+An Instinct Is a Native Reaction-Tendency
+
+We would propose, then, to consider an instinct as an inner
+adjustment, or tendency to reaction. It is this, rather than just a
+reaction. When a stimulus promptly arouses a reaction, and that ends
+the matter, we speak of reflex action--provided, of course, the
+connection between stimulus and response is native. But when a
+stimulus sets up a tendency to a reaction that cannot be immediately
+executed, or towards an end-result which cannot immediately be
+reached, and when the tendency so aroused persists for a time in
+activity, and gives rise to preparatory reactions, then we speak of
+instinct.
+
+The "broody" hen makes a good picture of instinct. When in this
+condition she responds to a nestful of eggs, as she does not at other
+times, by sitting persistently on them and keeping them covered. She
+is in a certain "organic state" that facilitates this response. In the
+absence {110} of any nestful of eggs, she shows a peculiar restless
+behavior that indicates to one who knows hens that this one "wants to
+set." The tendency that has been awakened in her cannot be satisfied
+by any momentary act, but persists and governs her actions for a
+considerable period.
+
+The nesting instinct of birds affords a still more complete example.
+The end-result here, the finished nest, cannot be instantly had, and
+the pair of birds keep on gathering materials and putting them
+together until this end-result is present before their eyes. It is not
+necessary to suppose that the birds have any plan or mental image of
+what the nest is to be like; probably not. But their state, in the
+nest-building season, is such that they are impelled to build, and the
+tendency is not quieted till the completed nest is there.
+
+The mating instinct, in unsophisticated members of the human species,
+is another perfect example. So is the hunting instinct in a dog; when
+this instinct is aroused, the animal makes a lot of movements of
+various sorts, responses to various particular stimuli, but evidently
+these movements are not sufficient to quiet the tendency, for they
+continue till the prey is captured. The behavior of a gregarious
+animal when separated from his fellows shows the same sort of thing.
+Take a young chick out of the brood and fence it away from the rest.
+It "peeps" and runs about, attacking the fence at different points;
+but such reactions evidently do not bring satisfaction, for it varies
+them until, if a way out of the inclosure has been left, it reaches
+the other chicks, when this series of acts terminates, and gives way
+to something quite different, such as pecking for food.
+
+The persisting tendency does not produce the series of movements all
+by itself, but, as was explained in speaking of tendencies in general,
+cooeperates with sensory stimuli in producing them. Clearly enough, the
+nest-building bird, {111} picking up a twig, is reacting to that twig.
+He does not peck at random, as if driven by a mere blind impulsion to
+peck. He reacts to twigs, to the crotch in the tree, to the half-built
+nest. Only, he would not react to these stimuli unless the nesting fit
+were on him. The nest-building tendency favors response to certain
+stimuli, and not to others; it facilitates certain reactions and
+inhibits others. It facilitates reactions that are _preparatory_ to
+the end-result, and inhibits others.
+
+
+Fully and Partially Organized Instincts
+
+Insects afford the best examples of very highly organized instincts.
+Their behavior is extremely regular and predictable, their progress
+towards the end-result of an instinct remarkably straightforward and
+sure. They make few mistakes, and do not have to potter around. By
+contrast, the instincts of mammals are rather loosely organized.
+Mammals are more plastic, more adaptable, and at the same time less
+sure; and this is notably true of man. It would be a mistake to
+suppose that man has few instinctive tendencies; perhaps he has more
+than any other creature. But his instinctive behavior has not the
+hard-and-fast, ready-made character that we see in the insects. Man is
+by all odds the most pottering, hem-and-hawing of animals. Instinct
+does not lead him straight to his goal, but makes him seek this way
+and that till he finds it. His powers of observation, memory and
+thought are drawn into the game, and thus instinct in man is
+complicated and partly concealed by learning and reasoning.
+
+For example, when an insect needs a nest, it proceeds in orderly
+fashion to construct a nest of the pattern instinctive to that species
+of insect; but when a man needs a home, he goes about it in a
+variable, try-and-try-again {112} manner, scheming, experimenting,
+getting suggestions from other people, and finally producing--a
+dugout, a tree house; a wigwam, a cliff dwelling--something that
+differs altogether from many other human habitations, except in the
+fact that it is a habitation and thus satisfies a need which is
+undoubtedly as instinctive in man as in the insect.
+
+A fully organized instinct is one where the necessary preparatory
+reactions are linked up closely with the main reaction-tendency, so
+that, once the main tendency is aroused to activity, the preparatory
+reactions follow with great sureness. The main team of neurones is
+closely connected with the subordinate teams that give the preparatory
+reactions; and these connections do not have to be acquired by
+experience and training, but are well formed by native growth. Just
+the right preparatory reactions are linked to the main tendency, so
+that the whole series of acts is run off with great regularity.
+
+In a loosely organized instinct, the main tendency is not firmly
+linked with any specific preparatory reactions, but is loosely linked
+with a great many preparatory reactions, and so gives quite variable
+behavior, which, however, leads on the whole towards the main goal.
+
+While a creature under the spell of a fully organized instinct is
+busy, one driven by a loosely organized instinct may be better
+described as restless. He tries this thing and that, and goes through
+the kind of behavior that is called "trial and error". A closely knit
+instinct, then, gives a perfectly definite series of preparatory
+reactions, while a loosely organized instinct gives trial and error
+behavior. We shall see later how trial and error furnishes a starting
+point for learning, and how, in an animal that can learn, those among
+the trial-and-error reactions that are actually preparatory to the
+end-result become firmly attached to the main tendency, so that what
+was by native constitution a loosely {113} organized instinct may
+become, through the individual's experience, a closely organized
+habit. If a man has occasion to build himself many homes, he comes,
+after a while, to build almost as uniformly and surely as an insect.
+
+
+Instincts Are Not Ancestral Habits
+
+The theory of inheritance of acquired traits has gone by the board;
+biologists no longer accept it. Such traits as an individual's tanned
+skin acquired by living in the tropics, horny hands acquired by hard
+labor, immunity to measles acquired by having measles, big muscular
+development acquired by gymnastics, are not transmitted by heredity to
+the children of the individual who acquired these traits.
+
+Nor are acquired behavior traits transmitted by heredity. Learned
+reactions are not so transmitted, knowledge is not, acquired skill is
+not. Learn to cook, to typewrite, or pilot an airplane as perfectly as
+possible, and your child will still have to learn all over again. You
+may make your experience valuable to him by _teaching_ him, but not in
+the way of heredity.
+
+Language affords a good test of this matter. A child's parents, and
+all his ancestors for many generations, may have spoken the same
+language, but that does not relieve the child of the necessity of
+_learning_ that language. He does not inherit the language habits of
+his ancestors. He has no native tendency to say "dog", or "chien", or
+"hund", on sight of this animal. Here in America we have children born
+of stocks that have spoken foreign languages for many generations; but
+English becomes their "native tongue" after a generation or two here,
+that is to say, as soon as the child hears English from infancy.
+
+In short, there is no likelihood whatever that any instinct {114} ever
+originated out of a habit or learned reaction. If we could believe it
+had so originated, that would furnish an easy explanation of the
+origin of an instinct; but it is contrary to all the known facts.
+
+
+Instincts Not Necessarily Useful in the Struggle for Existence
+
+Some of the best-known instincts, such as feeding or mating--or
+hunting, or flight from danger, or the hibernation of frogs--are so
+essential for the survival of the individual or the propagation of the
+next generation that we tend to assume that all instinctive behavior
+has "survival value", value, that is, towards the survival of the
+individual or of the race. But this is an assumption, and it seems not
+to be borne out by actual observations of instinctive behavior, since,
+along with the definitely useful reactions, others occur that would
+seem to have no survival value. Perhaps the crowing of the rooster at
+dawn would be a case in point; or the elaborate bowing that is
+observed in some kinds of birds. And there are the less definite,
+rather random movements of squirming, kicking, running about,
+wrinkling up the face, etc., that appear in young animals. We may well
+hesitate before definitely asserting that these movements are of no
+use for survival, but at least their use is not obvious, and there is
+no reason for assuming that all instinctive behavior must necessarily
+be useful.
+
+To be sure, the "struggle for existence" would eliminate individuals
+who behaved in ways that seriously handicapped them in procuring food
+or escaping from enemies; and therefore we should not expect to find
+really harmful instincts preserved in the race. But a mode of behavior
+might be neutral in this respect, or even slightly disadvantageous,
+and yet not be weeded out unless the struggle for existence were very
+keen.
+
+{115}
+
+The main point is that the psychologist should take instinctive
+behavior as he finds it, and not allow himself to be prejudiced by the
+assumption that instinct must necessarily be useful. That has to be
+shown in each case, not assumed at the outset.
+
+
+The So-called Instincts of Self-preservation and of Reproduction
+
+You will hear it stated, by some, that there are just two instincts,
+and that all instinctive behavior belongs under the head of one or the
+other of these two. The one is the instinct to preserve one's
+individual life, and the other is the instinct to propagate the
+species. Mating, nesting and care of the young come under the
+reproductive instinct, while feeding, flight from danger, and shunning
+extreme heat or cold are modes of self-preservation. This seems
+logical enough, but it is very bad psychology. It amounts to a
+classification of native reactions from an external point of view,
+without any consideration of the way the individual is organized.
+
+Perhaps the most obvious objection to these two supposedly
+all-inclusive instincts is found in what has just been said, to the
+effect that some instinctive behavior has no known survival value.
+This amounts to saying that some instincts do not serve either the
+preservation of the individual or the propagation of the species; and
+such a statement is probably true, especially of human instincts.
+
+But even if this objection should not hold, there is another, more
+radical one. Neither of these two big "instincts" is a behavior unit
+in any sense. Take the "instinct of self-preservation", for example.
+It would certainly have to include both feeding and escape from
+danger. But feeding and flight from danger do not belong in a single
+series {116} of acts; they are two distinct series, and represent two
+distinct tendencies. So distinct are they that, as we shall see in the
+next chapter, they are antagonistic. If the danger-avoiding tendency
+is aroused, the whole feeding and digestive activity is checked for
+the time being. The two instincts are antagonistic, in their actual
+operation; throw one into action, and you throw the other out. It is
+only from an external point of view that the two can be classed
+together; in the organization of the individual they are entirely
+separate.
+
+Not much different is the "instinct of reproduction". In birds, to be
+sure, there is a fairly continuous series of reactions, that begins
+with mating, continues with nesting, laying eggs and incubating them,
+and ends in the care of the young birds. But in mammals there is no
+such continuous series of reproductive acts, but mating comes to a
+close and an interval elapses in which there is no behavior going on
+that has anything to do with reproduction.
+
+Before giving a detailed list of the various human instincts, we shall
+do well to consider emotion, which is closely bound up with instinct.
+
+
+{117}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Explain the differences between these three;
+
+ Action governed by instinct.
+
+ Action governed by habit.
+
+ Action governed by deliberation.
+
+3. What is the objection to each of the following expressions?
+
+ (a) "The ex-soldier instinctively saluted when he met an officer
+ in the street."
+
+ (b) "The bee knows by instinct how to construct the honeycomb."
+
+4. Why is it so difficult to find a valid distinction between instinct
+ and reflex action?
+
+5. Why are instincts more universal and uniform than habits?
+
+6. How is instinct an important matter to consider in a study of
+ human motives?
+
+7. Show how the behavior of a hungry child of six or eight years
+ fits the picture of a "loosely organized instinct".
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+William James in his _Principles of Psychology_, 1890, has a very
+stimulating chapter on instinct, in Vol. II, pp. 383-441.
+
+John B. Watson, in Chapters IV and V of his _Behavior_, 1914, gives a
+good account of the instincts of animals.
+
+{118}
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+EMOTION
+
+VARIOUS ORGANIC STATES, AND THE CONSCIOUS STATES THAT GO WITH THEM
+
+Joy, sorrow, fear, anger, amusement, disgust and curiosity illustrate
+the meaning of the term "emotion". An emotion is a "moved" or
+stirred-up state of mind. Or, since almost any such state of mind
+includes also elements that are cognitive, like recognition of present
+objects or memories of the past, we might better speak of emotion as
+the stirred-up-ness present in a state of mind. The emotional part of
+the total state may be so strong as to overshadow all other
+components, or it may have less intensity down to zero.
+
+Such is emotion from the introspective point of view; but it can also
+be observed objectively, and in fact there is more to say about it
+objectively than introspectively. What appears to introspection as the
+scarcely analyzable state of anger appears to the external observer as
+clenched fists, flushed face, labored breathing, tense muscles, loud
+voice, and many other describable details. Anger is a state of the
+organism, or state of the individual, rather than simply a state of
+mind.
+
+We shall have a more comprehensive definition, then, if we substitute
+"state of the individual" for "state of mind", and say that emotion is
+a stirred-up state of the individual. It is a conscious state,
+however; an "unconscious emotion" would be practically a contradiction
+in terms. Not but that a person may be angry without knowing it. He
+may be {119} "unconscious of the fact" that he is angry; which simply
+means that he is not introspectively observing himself and analyzing
+his mental state. But it is impossible that his organic state shall be
+all stirred up and his mental state meanwhile perfectly calm and
+intellectual. In short, an emotion is a conscious stirred-up state of
+the organism.
+
+
+Organic States That Are Not Usually Classed as Emotions
+
+Something was said before about "organic states", under the general
+head of tendencies to reaction. Fatigue was an example. Now we could
+include fatigue under the term, "stirred-up state of the organism"; at
+least, if not precisely "stirred-up", it is uneasy. It is a deviation
+from the normal or neutral state. Also, it is often a conscious state,
+as when we speak of the "tired feeling"; not a purely cognitive state,
+either--not simply a recognition of the _fact_ that we are
+fatigued--but a state of disinclination to work any longer. Though
+fatigue is thus so much like an emotion that it fits under our
+definition, it is not called an emotion, but a sensation or complex of
+sensations. After hard muscular work, the state of the muscles makes
+itself felt by "fatigue sensations", and the sum total of these,
+coming from many different muscles, makes up the complex sensation of
+fatigue. After prolonged mental work, there may be fatigue sensations
+from the eyes and perhaps from the neck, which is often fixed rigidly
+during strenuous mental activity; and there are perhaps other obscure
+fatigue sensations originating in other organs and contributing to the
+total sensation which we know as mental fatigue, or as general
+fatigue.
+
+Many other organic states are akin to emotion in the same way. The
+opposite of fatigue, the "warmed-up" condition, brought on by a
+certain amount of activity after {120} rest, is a case in point. It is
+a deviation from the average or neutral condition, in the direction of
+greater readiness for activity. The warmed-up person _feels_ ready for
+business, full of "ginger" or "pep"--in short, full of life. The name
+"euphoria" which means about the same as "feeling good", is given to
+this condition. Drowsiness is another of these emotion-like states;
+but hunger and thirst are as typical examples as any.
+
+
+How These Organic States Differ from Regular Emotions
+
+Now why do we hesitate to call hunger, fatigue and the rest by the
+name of emotions? For two reasons, apparently. There are two salient
+differences between an organic state such as hunger, and an emotion
+such as anger.
+
+Hunger we call a sensation because it is _localized_; we feel it in
+the region of the stomach. Thirst we localize in the throat, muscular
+fatigue in the fatigued muscles, and there are several other organic
+states that come to us as sensations from particular organs. This is
+not entirely true of drowsiness or euphoria, but it is still less true
+of the emotions, which we feel as in _us_, rather than in any _part_
+of us. We "feel mad all over", and we feel glad or sorry all over. It
+is true that, traditionally, the heart is the seat of the emotions,
+which means, no doubt, that they are felt in the region of the heart
+more than elsewhere; and other ancient "seats", in the bowels or
+diaphragm, agree to this extent that they point to the interior of the
+trunk as the general location where the emotions are felt. But at best
+the location of emotions is much less definite than that of the
+sensations of fatigue or hunger.
+
+The second difference between the emotions and the other organic
+states comes to light when we notice their causes. Thirst, as an
+organic state, is a lack of water resulting {121} from perspiration,
+etc.; hunger as an organic state results from using up the food
+previously eaten; fatigue results from prolonged muscular activity.
+Each of these organic states results naturally from some internal
+bodily process; while, on the contrary, the exciting cause of an
+emotion is usually something _external_ which has nothing directly to
+do with the internal state of the body. Here I am, perfectly calm and
+normal, my organic state neutral, when some one insults me and throws
+me into a state of rage; this queer state seems to be inside me,
+specially in the trunk. Now how can the sound of the insulting
+person's voice produce any change in my insides? Evidently, by way of
+the auditory nerve, the brain and lower centers, and the motor nerves
+to the interior. While, then, organic states of the hunger class
+result directly from internal physiological processes, the organic
+state in an emotion is aroused by the brain, the brain itself being
+aroused by some stimulus, usually external.
+
+
+The Organic State in Anger
+
+But perhaps we are going too fast in assuming that there is any
+peculiar internal state in emotion. Possibly our subjective
+localization of anger in the trunk is all wrong, and everything there
+is going on as usual. At least, the question is squarely before us
+whether or not there is any internal bodily response in emotion.
+
+Suppose we have a tame cat, that knows us well, and, after feeding her
+a good meal containing some substance that is opaque to the X-rays,
+suppose we place her on a table and pass X-rays through her body, so
+as to get a visible shadow of the stomach upon the plate of the X-ray
+machine. Well and good; the cat is contentedly digesting her meal, and
+the X-ray picture shows her stomach to be making rhythmical churning
+movements. In comes a fox {122} terrier and barks fiercely at the cat,
+who shows the usual feline signs of anger; but she is held in position
+and her stomach kept under observation--when, to our surprise, the
+stomach movements abruptly cease, not to begin again till the dog has
+been gone for perhaps fifteen minutes. The churning movements of the
+intestine cease along with those of the stomach, and, as other
+experiments show, even the gastric juice stops flowing into the
+stomach. The whole business of digestion halts during the state of
+anger. So anger is an organic state, without doubt. At least in
+cats--but the same is found to be true of man, and hence the excellent
+rule not to get angry on a full stomach.
+
+Stomach-inhibition is not the only internal response during anger. The
+heart, so long regarded as the seat of the emotions, does beat more
+forcibly than usual; and the diaphragm, where the old Greeks located
+the emotions, does make extra-strong breathing movements. There are
+yet other and more curious changes that have recently been discovered
+by the physiologists.
+
+
+Glandular Responses During Emotion
+
+Thus far, we have been considering muscular responses, but now we must
+turn our attention to the glands. The glands are often affected during
+emotion, as witness the shedding of tears in grief, sweating in anger,
+the dry mouth during fear due to inhibition of the salivary glands,
+and the stoppage of the gastric juice during anger, as just noted.
+These particular glands all pour out their secretions either upon the
+skin or upon the mucous membrane of the mouth, stomach, etc.; and such
+secretion is called "external" in distinction from the "internal
+secretion" of certain other glands which may be called the glands of
+internal secretion or the "endocrine glands". Internal secretions are
+{123} discharged into the blood vessels, and carried by the blood to
+all parts of the body, and they have important effects on the activity
+of various organs.
+
+Of the endocrine glands, we will mention only two, which are known to
+play an important part in mental life.
+
+The thyroid gland, situated in the lower part of the neck, is
+necessary for normal brain activity. Without its internal secretion,
+brain activity is very sluggish.
+
+The adrenals, two little glands located near the kidneys (whence their
+name, though they have nothing to do with the kidney in function),
+have a close connection with such emotions as anger. In the normal or
+neutral state of the organism, the adrenal secretion oozes slowly into
+the blood, and has a tonic influence on the heart and muscles. But let
+an anger stimulus occur, and within a few seconds the adrenals are
+secreting rapidly; all the organs soon get a big dose of the adrenal
+secretion, and some of them are strongly affected by it. It hastens
+and strengthens the action of the heart, it causes the large veins
+inside the trunk to squeeze the blood lagging there back to the heart;
+and by these two means greatly quickens the circulation. It also
+affects the liver, causing it to discharge large quantities of stored
+sugar into the blood. Thus the muscles of the limbs get an unusual
+quantity of their favorite fuel supplied them, and also, by the
+increased circulation, an unusual quantity of oxygen; and they are
+enabled to work with unusual energy. The adrenal secretion also
+protects them in some way against fatigue.
+
+While the adrenal secretion is thus exerting a very stimulating
+influence on the limb muscles, it is having just the opposite effect
+on the digestive organs; in fact it is having the effects described
+above as occurring there during anger. These inhibitory effects are
+started by the stomach nerves, but are continued by the action of the
+adrenal juice {124} on the stomach walls. The rapid secretion of the
+adrenal glands during anger is itself aroused by the nerve running to
+this gland.
+
+
+The Nerves Concerned in Internal Emotional Response
+
+There is a part of the nervous system called the "autonomic system",
+so called because the organs it supplies--heart, blood vessels,
+stomach, intestines and other internal organs, possess a large degree
+of "autonomy" or independence. The heart, it will be remembered, beats
+of itself, even when cut off altogether from any influence of the
+nerve centers; and the same is true in some measure of the other
+internal organs. Yet they are subject to the influence of the nerve
+centers, which reinforce and inhibit their activity. Each internal
+organ has a double supply of nerves, one nerve acting to reinforce the
+activity of the organ and the other to inhibit it; and both the
+reinforcing and the inhibiting nerves belong to the autonomic system.
+
+The autonomic is not separate from the main nervous system, but
+consists of outgoing axons from centers in the cord and "medulla"
+(part of the brain stem). It has three divisions, one from the
+medulla, one from the middle reach of the cord, and one from the lower
+part of the cord; and these three divisions are related to three
+different emotional states. The upper division, from the medulla,
+favors digestion by promoting the flow of gastric juice and the
+churning movements of the stomach; and at the same time it seems to
+favor the comfortable, rather lazy state that is appropriate for
+digestion. The middle division (often called the "sympathetic", though
+the name is rather misleading to a student of psychology, as it has
+nothing to do with "sympathy") checks digestion, hastens the heart
+beat, and stimulates the adrenal glands to rapid secretion, thus
+giving {125} rise to the organic condition of anger. The lower
+division has to do with the bladder, rectum and sex organs, and is
+active during sex excitement, for one thing.
+
+The lower centers in the medulla and cord that give rise to the
+autonomic nerves are themselves much under the influence of the
+higher, cerebral centers. Thus appetite for food, and the flow of
+gastric juice, can be aroused by the sight of good food, or by hearing
+or reading about food, or even by merely thinking of food; and both
+anger and sex appetite can be aroused in corresponding ways.
+
+We should notice right here the antagonism that exists between the
+middle division of the autonomic and the other two. Suppose the upper
+division is active, as in comfortable digestion, when an angering
+stimulus supervenes; then, as we have seen, digestion halts, the upper
+autonomic is shunted out of action by the middle division. In the same
+way, sex appetite is shunted out by anger.
+
+
+The Emotional State as a Preparatory Reaction
+
+An emotion is often spoken of as a disturbance of the normal quiet
+state, and as if it represented a breakdown of the organism's
+machinery. Anger or fear is often a nuisance in civilized life, and
+any strong emotion is apt to disturb mental work or skilled manual
+work. But if we think ourselves back into a primitive condition of
+life, when anger means a fight, we see that the organic response in
+anger makes a first-class preparation for the fight. Rapid
+circulation, abundant muscular fuel, protection from fatigue--these
+are all positively useful; and the halting of digestion is useful also
+in relieving the circulation from taking care of an activity that can
+afford to wait.
+
+What we have been calling the "organic state in anger" occurs also in
+_fear_ of the strong type (as distinguished from {126} fear
+paralysis), and in certain other states that are not exactly either
+fear or anger, such as the state of a football player before the game,
+or the state of a student about to take an examination. It is the
+state of _excitement_ or of being "all keyed up". So far as known, the
+organic response (including the adrenal secretion) is the same in
+these various instances of excitement: anger, fear, zeal and so on.
+When an individual is in this organic state, his muscles will work
+harder and longer than is otherwise possible; and thus are explained
+those remarkable cases of extraordinary strength and endurance in
+great emergencies, as in escaping from a fire or from a bombarded
+city.
+
+The fear-anger state of the organism, being certainly a state of
+preparedness for attack or defense, suggests the following
+generalization: "Any emotion represents internal preparation for some
+type of overt action." This holds good, at least, for food appetite
+and sex appetite. Regarding the other emotions, we know too little of
+the internal responses that may occur, to judge whether or not they
+have any utility as preparatory reactions.
+
+
+"Expressive Movements," Another Sort of Preparatory Reactions
+
+Though we know little of any internal response in many of the
+emotions, we almost always find some characteristic external movement,
+such as smiling, scowling, pouting, sneering, sobbing, screaming,
+shouting or dancing. By aid of such "expressive movements" we are
+sometimes able to judge the emotional state of another person. But
+what is the sense of these movements? At first thought, the question
+itself is senseless, the movements are so much a matter of course,
+while on second thought they certainly do seem odd. What sense is
+there is protruding the lips when sulky, {127} or in drawing up the
+corners of the mouth and showing the canine teeth in contempt? Perhaps
+they are just odd tricks of instinct--for we agreed in the preceding
+chapter not to assume all instinctive responses to be useful. Darwin,
+however, after studying a great many of these expressive movements,
+both in men and in animals, reached the conclusion that, if not of
+present utility, they were survivals of acts that had been useful
+earlier in the life of the individual or of the race.
+
+Shaking the head from side to side, in negation or unwillingness,
+dates back to the nursing period of the individual's life, when this
+movement was made in rejecting undesired food. Directly useful in this
+case, it was carried over to analogous situations that aroused the
+child's reluctance.
+
+Showing the teeth in scorn dates back, according to Darwin, to a
+prehuman stage of development, and is seen in its useful form in
+animals like the dog or gorilla that have large canine teeth. Baring
+the teeth in these animals is a preparation for using the teeth; and
+often, also, it frightens the enemy away and saves the bother of
+actually attacking "small fry". The movement, Darwin urges, has
+survived in the race, even after fighting with the teeth has largely
+disappeared.
+
+Many other expressive movements are traced back in a similar way,
+though it must be admitted that the racial survivals are usually less
+convincing than those from the infancy of the individual. The nasal
+expression in disgust was originally a defensive movement against bad
+odors; and the set lips of determination went primarily with the set
+glottis and rigid chest that are useful in lifting heavy weights or in
+other severe muscular efforts. Such movements, directly useful in
+certain simple situations, become linked up with analogous situations
+in the course of the {128} individual's experience. Many of them,
+certainly, we can regard as preparatory reactions.
+
+
+Do Sensations of These Various Preparatory Reactions
+Constitute the Conscious State of Emotion?
+
+No one can doubt that some of the bodily changes that occur during an
+emotion make themselves felt as sensations. Try this experiment:
+pretend to be angry--it is not hard!--go through the motions of being
+angry, and notice what sensations you get. Some from the clenched
+fist, no doubt; some from the contorted face; some from the neck,
+which is stiff and quivering. In genuine anger, you could sense also
+the disturbed breathing, violent heart beat, hot face. The internal
+responses of the adrenal glands and liver you could not expect to
+sense directly; but the resulting readiness of the limb muscles for
+extreme activity is sometimes sensed as a feeling of tremendous
+muscular power.
+
+Now lump together all these sensations of bodily changes, and ask
+yourself whether this mass of sensations is not identical with the
+angry state of mind. Think all these sensations away, and ask yourself
+whether any angry feeling remains. What else, if anything, can you
+detect in the conscious emotional state besides these blended
+sensations produced by internal and external muscular and glandular
+responses?
+
+If you conclude that the conscious emotion consists wholly of these
+sensations, then you are an adherent of the famous James-Lange theory
+of the emotions; if you find any other component present in the
+emotion, you will find this theory unacceptable.
+
+{129}
+
+The James-Lange Theory of the Emotions
+
+The American psychologist James, and the Danish psychologist Lange,
+independently of each other, put forward this theory in the early
+eighties of the last century, and it has ever since remained a great
+topic for discussion. According to the theory, the emotion is the _way
+the body feels_ while executing the various internal and expressive
+movements that occur on such occasions. The "stirred-up state of mind"
+is the complex sensation of the stirred-up state of the body. Just as
+fatigue or hunger is a complex of bodily sensations, so is anger, fear
+or grief, according to the theory.
+
+James says, we do not tremble because we are afraid, but are afraid
+because we tremble. By that he means that the conscious state of being
+afraid is composed of the sensations of trembling (along with the
+sensations of other muscular and glandular responses). He means that
+the mental state of recognizing the presence of danger is not the
+stirred-up state of fear, until it has produced the trembling and
+other similar responses and got back the sensations of them. "Without
+the bodily states following on the perception"--i.e., perception of
+the external fact that arouses the whole emotional reaction--"the
+latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute
+of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to
+run, receive the insult, and deem it right to strike, but we should
+not actually _feel_ afraid or angry."
+
+It has proved very difficult to submit this theory to a satisfactory
+test. The only real test would be to cut off sensations from the
+interior of the trunk entirely; in which case, if the theory is right,
+the conscious emotion should fail to appear, or at least lack much of
+its "emotional warmth". Evidence of this sort has been slow in coming
+in. One or {130} two persons have turned up at nerve clinics,
+complaining that they no longer had any emotions, and were found to
+have lost internal bodily sensation. These cases strongly support the
+theory, but others have tended in the opposite direction. The fact
+that the internal response is the same in anger, and in fear of the
+energetic type, shows that the difference between these emotions must
+be sought elsewhere. Possibly sufficient difference could be found in
+the expressive movements, or in minor internal responses not yet
+discovered. If not, the theory would certainly seem to have broken
+down at this point.
+
+In any case, there is no denying the service done by the James-Lange
+theory in calling attention to bodily sensations as real components of
+the conscious emotional state.
+
+
+Emotion and Impulse
+
+Most people are rather impatient with the James-Lange theory, finding
+it wholly unsatisfactory, though unable to locate the trouble
+precisely. They know the theory does not ring true to them, that is
+all. Now the trouble lies just here: what they mean by "being afraid"
+is "wanting to get away from the danger", what they mean by "being
+angry" is "wanting to strike the offending person", and in general
+what they mean by any of the named "emotions" is not a particular sort
+of "stirred-up conscious state", but an _impulse_ towards a certain
+action or a certain result. Evidently it would be absurd to say we
+want to get away from the bear because we tremble, or that until we
+started to tremble we should be perfectly indifferent whether the bear
+got us or not.
+
+The tendency to escape is aroused directly by the perception of
+danger; of that there can be no doubt. It does not depend on
+trembling, but for that matter neither does it depend on _feeling_
+afraid. Sometimes we recoil from a {131} sudden danger before
+experiencing any thrill of fear, and are frightened and tremble the
+next moment, after we have escaped. The stirred-up state develops more
+slowly than the tendency to escape. The seen danger directly arouses
+an adjustment towards the end-result of escape, and both the
+preparatory bodily responses and the feeling of fear develop after
+this adjustment has been set up. If the end-result is reached
+instantly, the preparatory reactions and the feeling may not develop
+at all, or they may put in an appearance after the main act is all
+over. There is nothing in all this that speaks either for or against
+the James-Lange theory.
+
+These statements need further elucidation, however. Notice, first,
+that psychology makes a perfectly proper and important distinction
+between emotion and impulse. In terms of consciousness, emotion is
+"feeling somehow", and impulse is "wanting to do something". In
+behavior terms, emotion is an organic state, and impulse an adjustment
+of the nerve centers towards a certain reaction. An impulse is a
+conscious tendency.
+
+Since emotion and impulse so often go together, common sense does not
+bother to distinguish them, and the common names for the "emotions"
+are more properly names of impulses. Fear means the impulse to escape,
+rather than any specific stirred-up state. Psychology has, indeed,
+made a mistake in taking over these names from common speech and
+trying to use them as names of specific emotional states. We were
+having some difficulty, a few moments ago, in finding any great
+distinction between fear and anger, considered as emotional
+states--just because we were overlooking the obvious fact that "fear"
+is an impulse to escape from something, while "anger" is an impulse to
+get at something and attack it. The adjustments are very different,
+but the organic states are much alike.
+
+{132}
+
+The organic state in fear or anger cannot generate the escape or
+fighting tendency, since the two tendencies are so different in spite
+of the likeness of the organic state. The tendencies are aroused
+directly by the perception of the dangerous or offensive object. The
+order of events is as follows. The stimulus that sets the whole
+process going is, let us say, a bear in the woods. First response:
+seeing the bear. Second response: recognizing the dangerous situation.
+Third response: adjustment towards escape. Fourth response (unless
+escape is immediate): internal preparatory reactions, adrenal, etc.;
+also, probably, external expressive movements and movements steered in
+the general direction of escape. Fifth response: conscious stirred-up
+state consisting of blended sensations of all these preparatory
+reactions. Sixth response (by good luck): definitive escape reaction.
+Seventh response: satisfaction and quiescence.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 24.--Here the stimulus-response diagram is
+complicated to take account of the emotional state. The ellipse here
+stands for the brain. S arouses T, a tendency towards the response R.
+But T also arouses P, a bodily state of preparedness, and sensations
+(E) of this bodily state, together with T, constitute the conscious
+state of the individual while he is tending towards the response, or
+end-result, R.]
+
+
+Emotion Sometimes Generates Impulse
+
+Typically, impulse generates emotion. The reaction tendency is primary
+and the emotion secondary.
+
+But suppose the organic state of fear to be {133} present--never mind
+how it got there--might it not act like hunger or fatigue, and
+generate a fear impulse? Could it not be that a person should first be
+fearful, without knowing what he was afraid of and without really
+having anything to be afraid of; and then, as it were, _find_
+something to be afraid of, something to justify his frightened state?
+This may be the way in which abnormal fears sometimes arise: a
+naturally timid individual is thrown by some obscure stimulus into the
+state of fear, and then attaches this fear to anything that suggests
+itself, and so comes to be afraid of something that is really not very
+terrific, such as the number two, "I mustn't do anything twice, that
+would be dangerous; if I do happen to do it twice, I have to do it
+once more to avoid the danger; and for fear of inadvertently stopping
+with twice, it is best always to do everything three times and be
+safe." That is the report of a naturally timorous young man. We all
+know the somewhat similar experience of being "nervous" or "jumpy"
+after escaping from some danger; the organic fear state, once aroused,
+stays awhile, and predisposes us to make avoiding reactions. In the
+same way, let a man be "all riled up" by something that has happened
+at the office, and he is likely to take it out on his wife or
+children. Slightly irritating performances of the children, that would
+usually not arouse an angry reaction, do so this evening, because that
+thing at the office has "made him so cross."
+
+In the same way, let a group of people get into a very mirthful state
+from hearing a string of good jokes, and a hearty laugh may be aroused
+by a feeble effort that at other times would have fallen flat.
+
+In such cases, the organic state, once set up in response to a certain
+stimulus, persists after the reaction to that stimulus is finished and
+predisposes the individual to make the same sort of reaction to other
+stimuli.
+
+{134}
+
+Emotion and Instinct
+
+Anger, fear, lust, the comfortable state appropriate to digestion,
+grief (the state of the weeping child), mirth or amusement, disgust,
+curiosity, the "tender emotion" (felt most strongly by a mother
+towards her baby), and probably a few others, are "primary emotions".
+They occur, that is to say, by virtue of the native constitution, and
+do not have to be learned or acquired through experience. They are
+native states of mind; or, as modes of behavior, they are like
+instincts in being native behavior.
+
+One distinction between emotional and instinctive behavior is that the
+emotion consists of internal responses, while the instinct is directed
+outwards or at least involves action on external objects. Another
+distinction is that the emotional response is something in the nature
+of a preparatory reaction, while the instinct is directed towards the
+end-reaction.
+
+The close connection of emotion and instinct is fully as important to
+notice as the distinction between them. Several of the primary
+emotions are attached to specific instincts: thus, the emotion of fear
+goes with the instinct to escape from danger, the emotion of anger
+goes with the fighting instinct, the emotion of lust with the mating
+instinct, tender emotion with the maternal instinct, curiosity with
+the exploring instinct. Where we find emotion, we find also a tendency
+to action that leads to some end-result.
+
+It has been suggested, accordingly, that each primary emotion is
+simply the "affective" phase of an instinct, and that every instinct
+has its own peculiar emotion. This is a very attractive idea, but up
+to the present it has not been worked out very satisfactorily. Some
+instincts, such as that for walking, seem to have no specific emotion
+attached to them. Others, like anger and fear, resemble each other
+very {135} closely as organic states, though differing as impulses.
+The really distinct emotions (not impulses) are much fewer than the
+instincts.
+
+The most important relationship between instinct and emotion is what
+we have seen in the cases of anger and a few others, where the emotion
+represents bodily readiness for the instinctive action.
+
+
+The Higher Emotions
+
+We have been confining our attention in this chapter to the primary
+emotions. The probability is that the higher emotions, esthetic,
+social, religious, are derived from the primary in the course of the
+individual's experience.
+
+Primary emotions become refined, first by modifications of the motor
+response, by which socially acceptable reactions are substituted for
+the primitive crying, screaming, biting and scratching, guffawing,
+dancing up and down in excitement, etc.; second by new attachments on
+the side of the stimulus, such that the emotion is no longer called
+out by the original simple type of situation (it takes a more serious
+danger, a subtler bit of humor, to arouse the emotional response); and
+third by combination of one emotion with another. An example of
+compound emotion is the blend of tenderness and amusement awakened in
+the friendly adult by the actions of a little child. Hate is perhaps a
+compound of anger and fear, and pity a compound of grief and
+tenderness. There are dozens of names of emotions in the
+language--resentment, reverence, gratitude, disappointment,
+etc.--which probably stand for compound emotions rather than for
+primary emotions, but the derivation of each one of them from the
+primary emotions is a difficult task. The emotional life cannot be
+kept apart from the life of ideas, for the individual is a good deal
+of a unit.
+
+{136}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Make a list of 20 words denoting various emotional states.
+
+3. Trace the expressive facial movement of pouting back to its
+ probable origin in the history of the individual.
+
+4. What internal nerves are concerned with digestion? With fear?
+
+5. Show by diagrams the differences between (a) the common-sense
+ theory of the emotions, (b) the James-Lange theory, (c) the
+ James-Lange theory modified to take full account of the
+ reaction-tendency.
+
+6. Make a list of objections to the James-Lange theory, and
+ scrutinize each objection carefully, to see
+
+ (a) whether it really attacks the theory, or misconceives it.
+
+ (b) whether it carries much or little weight.
+
+7. Act out several emotions, (a) by facial expression alone, and
+ (b) by facial expression plus gestures, and let another person
+ guess what emotion you are trying to express. How many times does
+ he guess right under (a), and under (b)?
+
+8. Discuss the relative practical importance of emotion and impulse.
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+For the James-Lange theory, see the chapter on the emotions by William
+James, in his _Principles of Psychology_, 1890, Vol. II, pp. 442-485.
+
+For Darwin's views on expressive movements, see his _Expression of the
+Emotions in Man and Animals_, first published in 1872.
+
+For pictures of facial expression in various emotions, see Antoinette
+Feleky, in the _Psychological Review_ for 1914, Vol. 21, pp. 33-41.
+
+For the internal physiological changes, see Walter B. Cannon's _Bodily
+Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage_, 1915.
+
+For an interesting and important view of the close connection between
+emotion and instinct, see William McDougall's _Introduction to Social
+Psychology_, Chapter II.
+
+{137}
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+INVENTORY OF HUMAN INSTINCTS AND PRIMARY EMOTIONS
+
+A LIST OF THE NATIVE STOCK OF TENDENCIES AND OF
+THE EMOTIONS THAT SOMETIMES GO WITH THEM.
+
+It would be a great mistake to suppose that instinct was important
+only in animal or child psychology, because the human adult governed
+his conduct entirely by reason and calculation of consequences. Man
+does not outgrow instinct, any more than he outgrows emotion. He does
+not outgrow the native reaction-tendencies. These primitive motives
+remain in force, modified and combined in various ways, but not
+eliminated nor even relegated to an unimportant place. Even in his
+most intelligent actions, the adult is animated by motives that are
+either plain instincts or else derivatives of the instincts. According
+to some of the leaders in psychology, he has no other motives than
+these; according to this book, as will be set forth later, there are
+"native likes and dislikes" (for color, tone, number, persons, etc.)
+to be placed beside the instincts as primary motives; but, according
+to either view, the instincts are extraordinarily important in the
+study of motivation, and a complete and accurate list of them is very
+much to be desired. Life is a great masquerade of the instincts, and
+it is not only entertaining to unmask them, but illuminating as well.
+
+A complete account of an instinct would cover the following points:
+the stimulus that naturally arouses it, the end-result at which it is
+aimed, the preparatory reactions that occur, external and internal;
+and also, from the {138} introspective side, the conscious impulse,
+the peculiar emotional state (if any), and the special sort of
+satisfaction that comes when the end-result is reached. Further, we
+should know what modifications or disguises the instinct takes on in
+the course of experience--what new stimuli acquire the power of
+arousing it, what learned reactions are substituted for the native
+preparatory and final reactions, and what combinations occur between
+the instinct in question and other reaction-tendencies.
+
+Besides all this, it would be very desirable to present convincing
+evidence that each instinct listed is a genuine instinct, a part of
+the native equipment, and not something built up by experience and
+training. It is rather absurd, the free and easy way in which an
+instinct is often assumed, simply to fit behavior which needs to be
+explained--a money getting instinct, for example, or a teacher-hating
+instinct. Since money and teachers do not exist in a state of nature,
+there can be no instincts specifically related to them; and it is
+incumbent on the psychologist to show how such acquired tendencies are
+derived from the native tendencies.
+
+The full program outlined above being much too extensive to follow out
+completely in this chapter, we shall only mention a few salient points
+under each instinct. We shall try to point out the primitive behavior
+of the child, that reveals the instinct at its lowest terms, and give
+some hint also of its importance in adult behavior.
+
+
+Classification
+
+Of all the instincts, two groups or classes stand out from the rest:
+the responses to organic needs, and the responses to other persons.
+The first class includes eating, avoiding injury, and many others; the
+second class includes the herd instinct, the mating instinct and the
+parental instinct, these three and perhaps no others.
+
+{139}
+
+These two groups out, the rest are rather a miscellaneous collection,
+including the "random" or playful activity of young children,
+locomotion, vocalization, laughter, curiosity, rivalry and fighting.
+They might be named the "non-specific instincts", because the stimulus
+for each is not easy to specify, being sometimes another person, so
+that this group has great social importance, but sometimes being
+impersonal. This third class might also be called the "play
+instincts", since they are less essential than the other classes for
+maintaining the individual life or for propagating the species; and
+are, we may say, less concerned with the struggle for existence than
+with the joy of living.
+
+Our classification then has three heads:
+
+ (1) Responses to organic needs,
+ (2) Responses to other persons,
+ (3) Play responses.
+
+
+Responses to Organic Needs
+
+Something has already been said [Footnote: See above, pp. 79-81, 112.]
+of the manner in which an organic state, such as lack of water, acting
+on internal sensory nerves, arouses in the nerve centers an adjustment
+towards an end-result, and how, if the end-result cannot immediately
+be attained, preparatory reactions occur, the preparatory reactions
+being in some cases closely attached, by nature, to the main tendency,
+and in other cases only loosely attached so that the tendency leads to
+trial and error behavior. The reactions that are nearest to the
+end-result are likely to be closely attached to the main tendency,
+while those that are farther from the end-result are loosely attached.
+Thus, in the case of _thirst_, the drinking movement itself is about
+all, in man, that is purely instinctive, {140} and the way of getting
+water to the mouth, or the mouth to the water, is a matter for trial
+and error, and only becomes fixed as the result of a process of
+learning. Still less can we mention any specific water-seeking
+reactions, in the human being, that are provided by the native
+constitution. Yet the whole business of relieving thirst is directed
+by the native thirst-impulse, and to that extent is an instinctive
+activity. And shall we say that so simple a matter as meeting this
+organic need is below the dignity of psychology, and can have little
+influence on the behavior of mankind? Hardly, when we think of the
+role played by springs, wells and drinking places of all kinds in the
+life of the race, of aqueducts and reservoirs, of all the beverages
+that have been invented, and of all the people whose job it has been
+to provide and dispense them. To be sure, any beverage with a taste,
+or a "kick", is not simply a thirst-reliever, but makes some
+additional appeal, good or bad; but all this simply illustrates the
+way instincts become modified, by combination with other instincts,
+and by the learning and fixing of various preparatory reactions that
+were not provided, ready-made, in the native constitution. The
+drinking instinct, or thirst impulse, is a very good example of this
+whole class of organic instincts.
+
+
+Instincts connected with hunger.
+
+Here again, the reactions nearest to the end-result (food in the
+stomach) are provided by nature. Sucking and swallowing appear at
+birth, chewing with the appearance of the teeth; and the infant also
+makes what seem to be instinctive movements of seeking the breast, as
+well as movements of rejecting it when satiated and of spitting out
+bad-tasting food. Putting food (and other things) into the mouth by
+the hands seems almost instinctive, and yet it has to be fixed by
+trial and error. Anything like definite food-seeking behavior,
+amounting to a _hunting_ instinct, scarcely gets a chance to show
+itself in {141} the human child, because his food is provided for him.
+In many animals, hunting is a highly organized instinct; thus,
+crouching, stalking, springing and teasing the mouse when caught, have
+been proved to be instinctive in young cats. Some animals have
+definite food-storing instincts also, and possibly food-storing shows
+the acquisitive or collecting tendency in its lowest terms. Possibly,
+that is to say, hunting and collecting, as well as disgust (primarily
+of bad-tasting or bad-smelling food), are originally parts of the
+food-getting behavior, having the general character of reactions
+preparatory to eating. However this may be, we can easily see the
+great importance of the hunger motive in human life; we have only to
+consider the matter in the same way as we considered thirst just
+above.
+
+Breathing and air-getting.
+
+Breathing, obviously a native reaction, is ordinarily automatic and
+needs no preparatory reactions, simply because air is so easy to get.
+But let breathing be difficult, for any reason, and the stifling
+sensation is as impulsive as hunger or thirst. The stuffy air in a
+cave or in a hole under a haymow will lead a child to frantic escape.
+Possibly the delight in being out of doors which shows itself in young
+children, and is not lost in adults, represents a sort of air-hunting
+instinct, parallel to food-hunting. Closely connected with breathing
+is the function of circulation, automatic for the most part; and we
+should mention also the organic needs of waste-elimination, which give
+impulsive sensations akin to hunger and thirst, and lead to more or
+less organized instinctive reactions.
+
+
+Responses to heat and cold.
+
+The warm-blooded animals, birds and mammals, have the remarkable power
+of keeping the body temperature constant (at 98-99 degrees Fahrenheit,
+in man, somewhat higher in birds), in spite of great variations in the
+external temperature to which the body is exposed, and in spite of
+great variations in the {142} amount of heat generated in the body by
+muscular exercise. Sweating and flushing of the skin are reactions to
+heat, and prevent the body temperature from rising; paling of the
+skin, shivering and general muscular activity are responses to cold
+and prevent the body temperature from falling. Shrinking from great
+heat or cold are also instinctive, while seeking shelter from the heat
+or cold is a preparatory reaction that is not definitely organized in
+the native constitution of man, but gives rise to a great variety of
+learned reactions, and plays a considerable part in life.
+
+
+Shrinking from injury.
+
+The "flexion reflex" of the arm or leg, which pulls it away from a
+pinch, prick or burn, is the type of a host of defensive
+reactions--winking, scratching, rubbing the skin, coughing, sneezing,
+clearing the throat, wincing, limping, squirming, changing from an
+uncomfortable position--most or all of them instinctive reactions.
+With each goes some sort of irritating sensation, as pain, itching,
+tickling, discomfort; and a conscious impulse to get rid of the
+irritation is often present. When the simpler avoiding reactions do
+not remove the irritating stimulus, they are repeated more vigorously
+or give way to some bigger reaction tending towards the same result.
+The climax of the avoiding reactions is flight or running away. Akin
+to flight are cowering, shrinking, dodging or warding off a blow,
+huddling into the smallest possible space, getting under cover,
+clinging to another person; and most or all of these, too, are
+instinctive reactions. With flight and the other larger
+danger-avoiding reactions there is often present, along with the
+impulse to escape, the stirred up organic and conscious state of
+_fear_.
+
+The stimuli that arouse movements of escape are of two sorts: those
+that directly cause some irritating sensation, and those that are
+simply signs of danger. The smaller avoiding reactions--flexion
+reflex, coughing, etc.--are {143} aroused by stimuli that are directly
+painful or irritating; whereas flight, cowering, etc., are mostly
+responses to mere signs of danger. A "sign of danger" is usually seen
+or heard at some distance, not felt directly on or in the body. Now,
+while avoiding reactions are attached by nature to the irritating
+stimuli, it is not at all clear whether escape movements are
+_natively_ attached to any signs of danger, or, if they are, to what
+particular signs of danger they are attached. What visual or auditory
+stimuli, that are not directly irritating, will arouse escape
+movements in a young child? For the youngest children, no such stimuli
+have been found. You can easily get avoiding reactions from a little
+baby by producing pain or discomfort; you can get the clinging
+response by letting the child slip when he is being held in your arms;
+and you get crying and shrinking on application of a loud, grating
+noise, such a noise as is irritating in itself without regard to what
+it may signify. But you cannot get any shrinking from stimuli that are
+not directly irritating.
+
+For example, you get no sign of fear from a little child on suddenly
+confronting him with a furry animal. With older children, you do get
+shrinking from animals, but it is impossible to be sure that the older
+child has not _learned_ to be afraid of them. I have seen a child of
+two years simply laugh when a large, strange dog came bounding towards
+him in the park; but a year later he would shrink from a strange dog.
+Whence the change? There are two possibilities: either a native
+connection between this stimulus and the shrinking response only
+reached its maturity when the child was about three years old--and
+there is nothing improbable in this--or else the child, though
+actually never bitten by a dog, had been warned against dogs by his
+elders or had observed his elders shrinking from dogs. Children do
+pick up fears in this way; for example, children who are {144}
+naturally not the least bit afraid of thunder and lightning may
+acquire a fear of them from adults who show fear during a
+thunderstorm.
+
+On the whole, the danger-avoiding reactions are probably not linked by
+nature to any special signs of danger. While the emotion of fear, the
+escape impulse, and many of the escape movements are native, the
+attachment of these responses to specific stimuli--aside from directly
+irritating stimuli--is acquired. Fear we do not learn, but we learn
+what to fear.
+
+
+Crying.
+
+We have the best of evidence that this is a native reaction, since the
+baby cries from birth on. He cries from hunger, from cold, from
+discomfort, from pain, and, perhaps most of all, as he gets a little
+older, from being thwarted in anything he has set out to do. This last
+stimulus gives the "cry of anger", which baby specialists tell us
+sounds differently from the cries of pain and of hunger. Still, there
+is so much in common to the different ways of crying that we may
+reasonably suppose there is some impulse, and perhaps some emotional
+state, common to all of them. The common emotion cannot be anger, or
+hunger, or discomfort or pain. To name it grief or sorrow would fit
+the crying of adults better than that of little children. The best
+guess is that the emotional state in crying is the feeling of
+_helplessness_. The cry of anger is the cry of helpless anger; anger
+that is not helpless expresses itself in some other way than crying;
+and the same is true of hunger, pain and discomfort. Crying is the
+reaction appropriate to a condition where the individual cannot help
+himself--where he wants something but is powerless to get it. The
+helpless baby sets up a wail that brings some one to his assistance;
+that is the utility of crying, though the baby, at first, does not
+have this result in view, but simply cries because he is hungry and
+helpless, uncomfortable and {145} helpless, thwarted and helpless. The
+child cries less as he grows older, because he learns more and more to
+help himself.
+
+With the vocal element of crying goes movement of the arms and legs,
+which also has utility in attracting attention; but what may be the
+utility of shedding copious tears remains a mystery, in spite of
+several ingenious hypotheses that have been advanced to explain it.
+
+
+Fatigue, rest and sleep.
+
+That fatigue, primarily an organic state, gives rise to fatigue
+sensations and to a neural adjustment for rest--a disinclination to
+work any longer--and that drowsiness is a somewhat different organic
+state that gives an inclination to sleep--all this has been
+sufficiently set forth in earlier chapters. Going to sleep is a
+definite act, an instinctive response to the drowsy state. In the way
+of preparatory reactions, we find many interesting performances in
+birds and mammals, such as the curling up of the dog or cat to sleep,
+the roosting of hens, the standing on one leg of some birds; and we
+see characteristic positions adopted by human beings, but do not know
+how far these are instinctive and how far acquired. Closing the eyes
+is undoubtedly a native preparatory reaction for sleep.
+
+Like the other responses to organic needs, rest and sleep figure
+pretty largely in the behavior of the adult, as in finding or
+providing a good place to sleep. Certainly if fatigue and sleep could
+be eliminated, as some over-enthusiastic workers have pretended to
+hope, life would be radically changed.
+
+
+Instinctive Responses to Other Persons
+
+We are next to look for action and emotion aroused by persons,
+specifically--not by persons and things alike. Fear can be aroused by
+persons, but also by things. In a social animal, such as man, almost
+any instinct comes to have {146} social bearings. Eating and drinking
+become social matters, and all the organic instincts figure in the
+placing and making of a home. Home is a place of shelter against heat
+and cold, it is a refuge from danger, it is where you eat and where
+you sleep. It meets all these organic needs but--it is specially where
+"your people" are.
+
+Home is a place where _unlike_ persons foregather, male with female,
+adults with children, and thus it symbolizes the "family instincts",
+mating and child-care, which are responses to persons unlike in sex or
+age. But home also illustrates very well the herd instinct, which is a
+response to like persons, "birds of a feather flocking together". It
+is not the single home that illustrates this, but the almost universal
+grouping of homes into villages or cities.
+
+
+The herd instinct or gregarious instinct.
+
+It might be argued that a city or village was the result of economic
+causes, or, in the olden days, a means of protection against enemies,
+and not a direct satisfaction of any instinct in man to flock
+together. But often a family who know perfectly well that their
+economic advantage demands their remaining where they are, in some
+isolated country spot, will pull up stakes and accept an inferior
+economic status in the city, just because the country is too lonely
+for them. One woman, typical of a great many, declined to work in a
+comfortable and beautiful place in the country, because "she didn't
+want to see trees and rocks, she wanted to see people". There is no
+doubt that man belongs by nature with the deer or wolf rather than
+with solitary animals such as the lion. He is a gregarious creature.
+
+The gregarious instinct does not by any manner of means account for
+all of man's social behavior. It brings men together and so gives a
+chance for social doings, but these doings are learned, not provided
+ready-made by the instinct. About all we can lay to the herd instinct
+is uneasiness when {147} alone, seeking company, remaining in company,
+and following the rest as they move from place to place. The feeling
+of loneliness or lonesomeness goes with being alone, and a feeling of
+satisfaction goes with being in company.
+
+Probably there is one more fact that belongs under the herd instinct.
+A child is lonely even in company, unless he is allowed to
+_participate_ in what the others are doing. Sometimes you see an adult
+who is gregarious but not sociable, who insists on living in the city
+and wishes to see the people, but has little desire to talk to any one
+or to take part in any social activities; but he is the exception. As
+a rule, people wish not only to be together but to do something
+together. So much as this may be ascribed to the instinct, but no
+more. "Let's get together and _do something_"--that is as far as the
+gregarious instinct goes. _What_ we shall do depends on other motives,
+and on learning as well as instinct.
+
+
+The mating instinct.
+
+Attraction towards the opposite sex is felt by a small number of
+children, by most young people beginning from 15 to 20 years of age,
+by a minority not till a few years later, and, by a small number,
+never at all. On account of the late maturing of this instinct, in
+man, instinctive behavior is here inextricably interwoven with what
+has been learned. A definite organic and emotional state, lust, goes
+with this instinct. Preparatory reactions, called "courtship", are
+very definitely organized in many animals, and often quite elaborate.
+In man, courtship is elaborate enough, but not definitely organized as
+an instinct; and yet it follows much the same line as we observe in
+animal courtship. It begins with admiring attention to one of the
+opposite sex, followed by efforts to attract that one's attention by
+"display" (strutting, decoration of the person, demonstrating one's
+prowess, especially in opposition to rivals). Then the male takes an
+aggressive attitude, the {148} female a coy attitude; the male woos,
+the female hangs back, and something analogous to pursuit and capture
+takes place, except that the capture may be heartily accepted by both
+parties.
+
+The "survival value" of this instinct is absolute; without it the race
+would not long survive. But it has "play value" also, it contributes
+to the joy of living as well as to the struggle for survival. There is
+much in social intercourse, and in literature and art, that is
+motivated by the sex impulse. Some would-be psychologists have been so
+much impressed by the wide ramifications of the sex motive in human
+conduct that they have attributed to it all play, all enjoyment, all
+the softer and lighter side of life, even all the spiritual side of
+life. One need only run over the long list of instincts, especially
+those that still remain to be mentioned, in order to be convinced of
+the one-sidedness of such a view. On the other hand, some moralists
+have been so deeply impressed by the difficulties that arise out of
+the sex motive, as to consider it essentially gross and bad; but this
+is as false as the other view. The sex impulse is like a strong but
+skittish horse that is capable of doing excellent work but requires a
+strong hand at the reins and a clear head behind. It is a horse that
+does not always pull well in a team; yet it is capable of fine
+teamwork. It can be harnessed up with other tendencies, and when so
+combined contribute some of its motive force to quite a variety of
+human activities.
+
+
+The parental or mothering instinct.
+
+In many species of animals, though not by any means in all, one or
+both of the parents stays by the young till some degree of maturity is
+reached. In some kinds of fish, it is the male that cares for the
+young; in birds it is often both parents. In mammals it is always the
+mother. Instinctively, the mammalian mother feeds, warms and defends
+her young. Just as {149} instinctively, the human mother does the
+same. This instinctive reaction to the little baby is attended by a
+strong emotion, called, for want of a better name, the "tender
+emotion".
+
+The strongest stimulus to arouse this instinct is the little, helpless
+baby. The older child has to take second place with the mother, so
+soon as there is a little baby there. After a child is weaned, and
+after he is able to get about and do for himself to quite an extent,
+he has less hold on the maternal instinct. The love and care that he
+may still get is less a simple matter of instinct.
+
+Though the little baby is the strongest stimulus to this instinct,
+older children and even adults, provided they are like the baby in
+being winsome and helpless in some way, may arouse the same sort of
+feeling and behavior, tender feeling and protective behavior. A pet
+animal may arouse the same tendency, and a "darling little calf" or a
+"cute little baby elephant" may awaken something of the same thrill.
+Even a young plant may be tended with a devotion akin to the maternal.
+The fact seems to be here, as with other instincts, that objects
+similar to the natural stimulus may arouse the same impulse and
+emotion. Love between the sexes is often a compound of sex attraction
+and the mothering instinct; and it is interesting to watch a happily
+mated couple each mothering the other.
+
+But is it allowable to speak of this instinct as present in the male
+human being, or in any one not a mother? Undoubtedly the woman who has
+recently become a mother is most susceptible to the appeal of a little
+baby, but the response of other women and of girls to a baby is so
+spontaneous that we cannot but call it instinctive. Men and boys have
+no special desire to feed or cuddle a little baby, and are quite
+contented to leave the care of the baby mostly to the "women folks".
+But they do object strongly to seeing the {150} baby hurt or
+ill-treated, and will respond by protecting it. Also, they like to
+watch the baby act, and like to help it along in its efforts to do
+things. This may be instinctive in the man; at least it reminds us of
+the behavior of a mother cat or dog or horse, when she plays with her
+young and stimulates them to action. When the mother cat brings a live
+mouse for her half-grown kittens to practise on, she is acting
+instinctively, and probably a man is obeying the same instinct when he
+brings the baby a toy and derives pleasure from watching the baby's
+attempts to use it.
+
+The parental instinct would thus seem to lie at the root of education,
+considered as an enterprise of adults directed towards getting the
+young to acquire the behavior of the race; and it also lies at the
+root of charity, the desire to protect the helpless.
+
+Is there any instinct in the child answering to the parental, any
+"filial" instinct, as it were? Psychologists have usually answered no,
+but possibly they have been misled by the word "filial" and looked in
+the wrong direction. The parental instinct is an instinct to give, and
+the answering instinct would be one to take--not to give in return. It
+is probably not instinctive for the child to do for the parent, but is
+it not instinctive for the child to take from the parent, and to look
+to the parent for what he wants? It is not exactly "unnatural conduct"
+in a child to impose on his mother, as it would be in the mother to
+impose on the child; but would it not be unnatural in a child to take
+an unreceptive and distrustful attitude towards his mother?
+
+Filial love is different. It is not purely instinctive, but depends on
+intelligence. It is only possible if the child has the intelligence to
+see the parent as something besides a parent--as some one needing care
+and protection--and if the child himself takes a parental attitude
+towards the parent. But that is a grown-up attitude, seldom taken by
+{151} young children. It is not the infantile instinct, which, if
+there is such an instinct, is the spring of trustful, docile,
+dependent, childlike and childish behavior.
+
+
+The Play Instincts
+
+Any instinct has "play value", but some have also "survival value" and
+so are serious affairs. Survival value characterizes the instincts we
+have already listed, both the responses to organic needs and the
+responses to other people. But there are other instincts with less of
+survival value, but no less of play value, and these we call the play
+instincts, without attaching any great importance to the name or even
+to the classification.
+
+
+Playful activity.
+
+The kicking and throwing the arms about that we see in a well-rested
+baby is evidently satisfying on its own account. It leads to no result
+of consequence, except indeed that the exercise is good for the
+child's muscles and nerves. The movements, taken singly, are not
+uncoordinated by any means, but they accomplish no definite result,
+produce no definite change in external objects, and so seem random and
+aimless to adult eyes. It is impossible to specify the stimulus for
+any given movement, though probably stimuli from the interior of the
+body first arouse these responses. They are most apt to occur during
+the organic state of "euphoria", and tend to disappear during fatigue.
+
+There is a counter-tendency to this tendency towards general activity,
+and that is _inertia_, the tendency towards inactivity or _economy of
+effort_. Most pronounced in fatigue, this also appears in lassitude
+and inert states that cannot be called fatigue because not brought on
+by excessive activity. After sleep, many people are inert, and require
+a certain amount of activity to "warm up" to the active condition. As
+the child grows older, the {152} "economy of effort" motive becomes
+stronger, and the random activity motive weaker, so that the adult is
+less playful and less responsive to slight stimuli. He has to have
+some definite goal to get up his energy, whereas the child is active
+by preference and just for the sake of activity.
+
+During the first year or so of the child's life, his playful activity
+takes shape in several ways. First, out of the great variety of the
+random movements certain ones are picked out and fixed. This is the
+way with putting the hand into the mouth or drumming on the floor with
+the heels, and these instances illustrate the important fact that many
+learned acts develop out of the child's random activity. Without play
+activity there would be little work or accomplishment of the
+distinctively human type. Second, certain specific movements, those of
+locomotion and vocalization, appear with the ripening of the child's
+native equipment, and take an important place in his play. Third, his
+play comes to consist more and more of responses to external objects,
+instead of to internal stimuli as at first. The playful responses to
+external objects fall into two classes, according as they manipulate
+objects or simply examine them.
+
+We have, then, a small group of instincts that is very closely related
+to the fundamental instinct of random activity.
+
+
+Locomotion.
+
+Evidence has already been presented [Footnote: See p. 95.] indicating
+that walking is instinctive and not learned, so that the human species
+is no exception to the rule that every species has its instinctive
+mode of locomotion. Simpler performances which enter into the very
+complex movement of walking make their appearance separately in the
+infant before being combined into walking proper. Holding up the head,
+sitting up, kicking with an alternate motion of the {153} two legs,
+and creeping, ordinarily precede walking and lead up to it.
+
+What is the natural stimulus to locomotion? It is as difficult to say
+as it is to specify the stimulus in other forms of playful activity.
+From the fact that blind children are usually delayed in beginning to
+walk, we judge that the sense of sight furnishes some of the most
+effective stimuli to this response. Often the impulse attending
+locomotion is the impulse to approach some seen object, but probably
+some satisfaction is derived simply from the free movement itself.
+There certainly is no special emotion going with locomotion.
+Locomotion has, of course, plenty of "survival value", and might have
+been included among the organic instincts.
+
+Some of the other varieties of human locomotion, such as running and
+jumping, are probably native. Others, like hopping and skipping, are
+probably learned. As to climbing, there is some evolutionary reason
+for suspecting that an instinctive tendency in this direction might
+persist in the human species, and certainly children show a great
+propensity for it; while the acrobatic ability displayed by those
+adults whose business leads them to continue climbing is so great as
+to raise the question whether the ordinary citizen is right when he
+thinks of man as essentially a land-living or surface-living animal.
+As to swimming, the theory is sometimes advanced that this too is a
+natural form of locomotion for man, and that, consequently, any one
+thrown into deep water will swim by instinct. Experiments of this sort
+result badly, the victim clutching frantically at any support, and
+sometimes dragging down with him the theorist who is administering
+this drastic sort of education. In short, the instinctive response of
+a man to being in deep water is the same as in other cases of sudden
+withdrawal of solid support; it consists in clinging and is attended
+by the emotion of fear.
+
+{154}
+
+Vocalization.
+
+Crying at birth proves voice-production to be a native response, but
+we are more interested just here in the playful cooing and babbling
+that appear when the child is a few weeks or months old. This cheerful
+vocalization is also instinctive, in all probability, since the baby
+makes it before he shows any signs of responding imitatively to the
+voices of other people. It seems to be one form of the random activity
+that goes with euphoria. The child derives satisfaction not so much
+from the muscular activity of vocalization as from the sounds that he
+produces, so that deaf children, who begin to babble much like other
+children, lag behind them as the months go by, from not deriving this
+auditory satisfaction from the vocal activity. Though whistling,
+blowing a horn, shaking a rattle and beating a drum are not native
+responses, it is clear that the child naturally enjoys producing
+sounds of various sorts.
+
+The baby's cheerful babbling is the instinctive basis on which his
+speech later develops through a process of learning.
+
+
+Manipulation.
+
+While the first random activity of the baby has nothing to do with
+external objects, but simply consists of free movements of the arms
+and legs, after a time these give place to manipulation of objects.
+The baby turns things about, pulls and pushes them, drops them, throws
+them, pounds with them. Thus he acquires skill in handling things and
+also learns how things behave. This form of playful activity contains
+the germ of constructiveness and of inventiveness, and will come into
+view again under the head of "imagination."
+
+
+Exploration or curiosity.
+
+Along with manipulation goes the examination of objects by the hand,
+the mouth, the eyes and ears, and all the senses. Listening to a
+sudden noise is one of the first exploratory reactions. Following a
+moving light with the eyes, fixing the eyes upon a {155} bright
+object, and exploring an object visually by looking successively at
+different parts of it, appear in the first few months of the baby's
+life. Exploration by the hands and by the mouth appear early. Sniffing
+an odor is a similar exploratory response. When the child is able to
+walk, his walking is dominated largely by the exploring tendency; he
+approaches what arouses his curiosity, and embarks on little
+expeditions of exploration. Similar behavior is seen in animals and is
+without doubt instinctive. With the acquisition of language, the
+child's exploration largely takes the form of asking questions.
+
+The stimulus that arouses this sort of behavior is something new and
+unfamiliar, or at least relatively so. When an object has been
+thoroughly examined, it is dropped for something else. It is when the
+cat has just been brought into a strange house that she rummages all
+over it from garret to cellar. A familiar object is "taken for
+granted", and arouses little exploratory response.
+
+Quite a group of conscious impulses and emotions goes with exploratory
+behavior. The feeling or impulse of curiosity is something that
+everybody knows; like other impulses, it is most strongly felt when
+the end in view cannot be immediately reached. When you are prevented
+by considerations of propriety or politeness from satisfying your
+curiosity, then it is that curiosity is most "gnawing". A very
+definite emotion that occurs on encountering something extremely novel
+and strange is what we know as "surprise", and somewhat akin to this
+is "wonder".
+
+Exploration, though fundamentally a form of playful activity, has
+great practical value in making the child acquainted with the world.
+It contains the germ of seeking for knowledge. We shall have to recur
+to this instinct more than once, under the head of "attention" and
+again under "reasoning".
+
+{156}
+
+Manipulation and exploration go hand in hand and might be considered
+as one tendency rather than two. The child wishes to get hold of an
+object, that arouses his curiosity, and he examines it while handling
+it. You cannot properly get acquainted with an object by simply
+looking at it, you need to manipulate it and make it perform; and you
+get little satisfaction from manipulating an object unless you can
+watch how it behaves.
+
+
+Tendencies running counter to exploration and manipulation.
+
+Just as playful activity in general is limited by the counter
+tendencies of fatigue and inertia, so the tendency to explore and
+handle the unfamiliar is held in check by counter tendencies which we
+may call "caution" and "contentment".
+
+Watch an animal in the presence of a strange object. He looks at it,
+sniffs, and approaches it in a hesitating manner; suddenly he runs
+away for a short distance, then faces about and approaches again. You
+can see that he is almost evenly balanced between two contrary
+tendencies, one of which is curiosity, while the other is much like
+fear. It is not full-fledged fear, not so much a tendency to escape as
+an alertness to be ready to escape.
+
+Watch a child just introduced to a strange person or an odd-looking
+toy. The child seems fascinated, and can scarcely take his eyes from
+the novel object, but at the same time he "feels strange", and cannot
+commit himself heartily to getting acquainted. There is quite a dose
+of caution in the child's make-up--more in some children than in
+others, to be sure--with the result that the child's curiosity gets
+him into much less trouble than might be expected. Whether caution is
+simply to be identified with fear or is a somewhat different native
+tendency, it is certainly a check upon curiosity.
+
+By "contentment" we mean here a liking for the familiar, {157} which
+offsets to some extent the fascination of the novel. If you are
+perfectly contented, you are not inclined to go out exploring; and
+when you have had your fill of the new and strange, you like to get
+back to familiar surroundings, where you can rest in content. Just as
+playful behavior of all sorts decreases with increasing age, so the
+love for exploring decreases, and the elderly person clings to the
+familiar. But even children may insist in occupying their own
+particular chair, on eating from a particular plate, and on being sung
+to sleep always with the same old song. They are "little creatures of
+habit", not only in the sense that they readily form habits, but in
+the sense that they find satisfaction in familiar ways and things.
+Here we see the germ of a "conservative" tendency in human nature,
+which balances, to a greater or less extent, and may decidedly
+overbalance, the "radical" tendency of exploration.
+
+
+Laughter.
+
+We certainly must not omit this from our list of instincts, for,
+though it does not appear till some time after birth, it has all the
+earmarks of an instinctive response. If it were a learned movement, it
+could be made at will, whereas, as a matter of fact, few people are
+able to produce a convincing laugh except when genuinely amused, which
+means when the instinctive tendency to laugh is aroused by some
+appropriate stimulus. The emotion that goes with laughing may be
+called mirth or amusement, and it is a strongly impulsive state of
+mind, the impulse being simply to laugh, with no further end in view.
+
+The most difficult question about laughter is to tell in general
+psychological terms what is the stimulus that arouses it. We have
+several ingenious theories of humor, which purport to tell; but they
+are based on adult humor, and we have as yet no comprehensive genetic
+study of laughter, tracing it up from its beginnings in the child.
+Laughing certainly belongs with the play instincts, and possibly the
+{158} stimulus is no more definite, at first, than that which arouses
+other playful activity. The baby seems to smile, at first, just from
+good spirits (euphoria). The stimuli that, a little later, arouse a
+burst of laughter have an element of what we may call "expected
+surprise" (as dropping a rattle and exploding with laughter when it
+bangs on the floor, and keeping this up time after time), and this
+element can still be detected in various forms of joke that are
+effective mirth-provokers in the adult. But why the child should laugh
+when tickled, at the same time trying to escape, is a poser. Many
+students of humor have subscribed to the theory that what makes us
+laugh is a sudden sense of our own superiority, thus attaching
+laughter to the self-assertive instinct, soon to be discussed. The
+laugh of victory, the laugh of defiance, the laugh of mockery, the sly
+or malicious laugh, support this theory, but can it be stretched to
+cover the laugh of good humor, the tickle laugh, or the baby's laugh
+in general? That seems very doubtful, and we must admit that we do not
+know the essential element in a laughter stimulus. One thing is fairly
+certain: that, while laughing is a native response, we learn what to
+laugh at, for the most part, just as we learn what to fear.
+
+
+Fighting.
+
+Hold the new-born infant's arms tightly against its sides, and you
+witness a very peculiar reaction: the body stiffens, the breath may be
+held till the face is "red with anger"; the child begins to cry and
+then to scream; the legs are moved up and down, and the arms, if they
+can be got free, make striking or slashing movements. In somewhat
+older children, any sort of restraint or interference with free
+movement may give a similar picture, except that the motor response is
+more efficient, consisting in struggling, striking, kicking, and
+biting. It is not so much pain as interference that gives this
+reaction. You get it if you take away a toy the child is playing with,
+or if you forbid {159} the child to do something he is bent on doing.
+In animals, the fighting response is made to restraint, to being
+attacked, or to being interfered with in the course of feeding, or
+mating, or in the instinctive care of the young. The mother lioness,
+or dog or cat or hen, is proverbially dangerous; any interference with
+the young leads to an attack by the mother. The human mother is no
+exception to this rule. In human adults, the tendency to fight is
+awakened by any interference with one's enterprises, by being insulted
+or got the better of or in any way set down in one's self-esteem.
+
+In general, the stimulus to fighting is restraint or interference. Let
+any reaction-tendency be first aroused and then interfered with, and
+pugnacious behavior is the instinctive result.
+
+The stimulus may be an inanimate object. You may see a child kick the
+door viciously when unable to open it; and grown-ups will sometimes
+tear, break or throw down angrily any article which they cannot make
+do as they wish. A bad workman quarrels with his tools. Undoubtedly,
+however, interference from other persons is the most effective
+stimulus.
+
+The impulse so aroused is directed primarily towards getting rid of
+the restraint or interference, but also towards inflicting damage on
+the opponent; and with this impulse often goes the stirred-up organic
+and emotional state of anger. As brought out in the chapter on
+emotion, the organic state in anger is nearly or quite identical with
+that in fear of the active type; and the two states of the individual
+differ in respect to impulse rather than in respect to emotion. In
+fear, the impulse is to get away from the adversary, in anger to get
+at him. The emotion of anger is not always aroused in fighting, for
+sometimes there is a cold-blooded desire to damage the adversary.
+
+The motor response, instinctively consisting of struggling, kicking,
+etc., as already described, becomes modified {160} by learning, and
+may take the form of scientific fistwork, or the form of angry talk,
+favored by adults. Or, the adversary may be damaged in his business,
+in his possessions, in his reputation, or in other indirect ways. The
+fighting spirit, the most stimulating of the emotions, gives energy to
+many human enterprises, good as well as bad. The successful reformer
+must needs be something of a fighter.
+
+Thus far we have said nothing to justify our placing fighting here
+among the play instincts. Fighting against attack has survival value,
+fighting to protect the young has survival value, and, in general, the
+defensive sort of fighting has survival value, even though
+interference with play activity is just as apt to give this response
+as interference with more serious activities.
+
+But there is more than this to the fighting instinct. The stimulus of
+interference is not always required. Consider dogs. The mere presence
+of another dog is often enough to start a scrap, and a good fighting
+dog will sally forth in search of a fight, and return considerably
+mauled up, which does not improve his chances for survival, to say the
+least. Fighting of this aggressive sort is a luxury rather than a
+necessity. It has play value rather than survival value. There can be
+no manner of doubt that pugnacious individuals, dogs or men, get more
+solid satisfaction from a good fight than from any other amusement.
+You see people "itching for a fight", and actually "trying to pick a
+quarrel", by provoking some other person who is strictly minding his
+own business and not interfering in the least. A battle of words
+usually starts in some such way, with no real reason, and a battle of
+words often develops into a battle of tooth and nail. Two women were
+brought before the judge for fighting, and the judge asked Mrs. Smith
+to tell how it started. "Well, it was this way, your honor. I met Mrs.
+Brown carrying a basket on her arm, and I says {161} to her, 'What
+have ye got in that basket?' says I. 'Eggs', says she. 'No!' says I.
+'Yes!' says she. 'Ye lie!' says I. 'Ye lie!' says she. And a 'Whoop!'
+says I, and a 'Whoop!' says she; and that's the way it began, sir."
+
+We have, then, to recognize aggressive fighting, in addition to
+defensive, and the aggressive sort certainly belongs among the play
+instincts.
+
+The instincts that by acting counter to fighting hold it in check are
+several: laughter--a good laugh together allays hostility; or the
+parental instinct--a parent will stand treatment from his child that
+he would quickly resent from any one else; or self-assertion--"Too
+proud to fight!" But the most direct checks are afforded by
+inertia--"What's the use?"--and especially by fear and caution.
+
+Fighting, both defensive and aggressive, has so close a connection
+with the more generalized self-assertive tendency that it might be
+included under that instinct. It may be regarded as a special form of
+self-assertive behavior, often complicated with the emotion of anger.
+
+
+Self-assertion.
+
+What then is this wonderful instinct of self-assertion, to which
+fighting and much of laughing are subordinate? "Assertiveness",
+"masterfulness", and the "mastery impulse" are alternative names. Of
+all the native tendencies, this is the one most frequently aroused,
+since there is scarcely a moment of waking (or dreaming) life when it
+is not more or less in action. It is so much a matter of course that
+we do not notice it in ourselves, and often not in other persons; and
+even clever psychological observers have seemed entirely blind to it,
+and given it no place in their list of instincts.
+
+Self-assertion, like fighting, has two forms, the defensive and the
+aggressive, and in either case it may be a response to either people
+or things. That gives four varieties of self-assertive behavior, which
+may be labeled as follows:
+
+{162}
+
+1. Defensive reaction to things, overcoming obstruction, putting
+through what has been undertaken--the success motive.
+
+2. Defensive reaction to persons, resisting domination by them--the
+independence motive.
+
+3. Aggressive reaction to things--seeking for power.
+
+4. Aggressive reaction to persons--seeking to dominate. We will take
+these up in order, beginning with the most elemental.
+
+1. Overcoming obstruction. The stimulus here is much the same as that
+which induces fighting, but the response is simpler, without anger and
+without the impulse to do damage. Take hold of a baby's foot and move
+it this way or that, and you will find that the muscles of the leg are
+offering resistance to this extraneous movement. Obstruct a movement
+that the baby is making, and additional force is put into the movement
+to overcome the obstruction. An adult behaves in a similar way. Let
+him be pushing a lawn-mower and encounter unexpected resistance from a
+stretch of tough grass; involuntarily he pushes harder and keeps on
+going--unless the obstruction is too great. Let him start to lift
+something that is heavier than he thinks; involuntarily he "strains"
+at the weight, which means that a complex instinctive response occurs,
+involving a rigid setting of the chest with holding of the breath, and
+increased muscular effort. This instinctive reaction may be powerful
+enough to cause rupture.
+
+Other than purely physical resistance is overcome by other
+self-assertive responses. When the child's toy will not do what he
+wants it to do, he does not give up at once, but tries again and puts
+more effort into his manipulation. When, in school, he is learning to
+write, and finds difficulty in producing the desired marks, he bends
+over the desk, twists his foot round the leg of his chair, screws up
+his face, {163} and in other ways reveals the great effort he is
+making. An adult, engaged in some piece of mental work, and
+encountering a distraction, such as the sound of the phonograph
+downstairs, may, of course, give up and listen to the music, but, if
+he is very intent on what he is doing, he puts more energy into his
+work and overcomes the distraction. When he encounters a baffling
+problem of any sort, he does not like to give it up, even if it is as
+unimportant as a conundrum, but cudgels his brains for the solution.
+As a general proposition, and one of the most general propositions
+that psychology has to present, we may say that obstruction of any
+sort, encountered in carrying out any intention whatever, acts as a
+stimulus to the putting of additional energy into the action.
+
+Anger is often aroused by obstruction, but anger does not develop a
+tenth as often, in the course of the day, as the plain overcoming
+reaction. The impulse is not to do damage, but to overcome the
+obstruction and do what we have set out to do. The emotional state
+might sometimes be called "determination", sometimes "zeal"; but the
+most elementary state belonging here is _effort_. The feeling of
+effort is, partly at least, a sensation complex resulting from
+stiffening the trunk and neck, knitting the brows, and other muscular
+strains that have practical utility in overcoming physical resistance
+and that are carried over to the overcoming of other sorts of
+resistance, where they have no obvious utility. Effort is a simpler
+emotion than anger, and occurs much more frequently.
+
+2. Resisting domination by other persons. The child shows from an
+early age that he "has a will of his own", and "wants his own way" in
+opposition to the commands of other persons. There is an independent
+spirit in man that is native rather than acquired. The strength of
+this impulse differs, to be sure, in different individuals, some {164}
+children being more "contrary" and others more docile; but there
+probably never was a child without a good dose of disobedience in his
+make-up. In order to have a nice, obedient child, you have to "break"
+him like a colt, though you can use reason as well as force in
+breaking a child. This process of "breaking" gives a habit of
+obedience to certain persons and along certain lines; but, outside of
+these limits, the child's independence is still there and ready to be
+awakened by any attempt to dominate him. In youth, with the sense of
+power that comes from attaining adult stature and muscular strength,
+the independent spirit is strengthened, with the result that you
+seldom see a youth, or an adult, who can take orders without at least
+some inner opposition and resentment.
+
+3. Seeking for power over things. The self-assertive response to
+things is not limited to overcoming the obstructions offered by things
+to the accomplishment of our purposes; but we derive so much positive
+satisfaction from overcoming obstruction and mastering things that we
+go out in search of things to master. The child's manipulation has an
+element of masterfulness in it, for he not only likes to see things
+perform, but he likes to be the one that makes them perform. If he has
+a horn, he is not satisfied till he can sound it himself. The man with
+his automobile is in the same case. When it balks, he is stimulated to
+overcome it; but when it runs smoothly for him, he has a sense of
+mastery and power that is highly gratifying. Chopping down a big tree,
+or moving a big rock with a crowbar, affords the same kind of
+gratification; and so does cutting with a sharp knife, or shooting
+with a good bow or gun, or operating any tool or machine that
+increases one's power. Quite apart from the utility of the result
+accomplished, any big achievement is a source of satisfaction to the
+one who has done it, because it gives play to aggressive
+self-assertion. Many {165} great achievements are motived as much by
+the zest for achievement as by calculation of the advantages to be
+secured.
+
+4. Seeking to dominate other people. The individual not simply resists
+domination by other people, but he seeks to dominate them himself.
+Even the baby gives orders and demands obedience. Get a number of
+children together, and you will see more than one of them attempt to
+be the leader in their play. Some must necessarily be followers just
+now, but they will attempt to take the lead on another occasion. The
+"born leader" is perhaps one who has an exceptionally strong dose of
+masterfulness in his make-up, but he is, still more, one who has
+abilities, physical or mental, that give him the advantage in the
+universal struggle for leadership.
+
+Besides giving orders and taking the lead, there are other ways in
+which the child finds satisfaction for his instinct to dominate.
+Showing off is one, bragging is one, doing all the talking is one;
+and, though in growing older and mixing with people the child becomes
+less naive in his manner of bragging and showing off, he continues
+even as an adult to reach the same end in more subtle ways. Going
+about to win applause or social recognition is a seeking for
+domination. Anything in which one can surpass another becomes a means
+of self-assertion. One may demonstrate his superiority in size,
+strength, beauty, skill, cleverness, virtue, good humor,
+cooeperativeness, or even humility, and derive satisfaction from any
+such demonstration. The impulse to dominate assumes literally a
+thousand disguises, more rather than less.
+
+_Rivalry_ and _emulation_, sometimes accorded a separate place in a
+list of the instincts, seem well enough provided for under the general
+head of self-assertion. They belong on the social side of assertive
+behavior, i.e., they are responses to other people and aim at the
+domination of other {166} people or against being dominated by them.
+But the struggle for mastery, in rivalry, does not take the form of a
+direct personal encounter. Compare wrestling with a contest in
+throwing the hammer. In wrestling the mastery impulse finds a direct
+outlet in subduing the opponent, while in throwing the hammer each
+contestant tries to beat the other indirectly, by surpassing him in a
+certain performance. This you would call rivalry, but wrestling is
+scarcely rivalry, because the struggle for mastery is so direct.
+Rivalry may seek to demonstrate superiority in some performance, or to
+win the favor of some person or social group, as in the case of rivals
+in love.
+
+When we speak of "emulation", we have in mind the sort of behavior
+observed when one child says, "See what I can do!" and the other
+counters with, "Pooh! I can do that, too". Or, the first child wins
+applause by some performance, and we then notice the second child
+attempting the same. It is a case of resisting the indirect domination
+of another, by not letting him surpass us in performance or in social
+recognition.
+
+_Thwarted self-assertion_ deserves special mention, as the basis for
+quite a number of queer emotional states. Shame, sulkiness,
+sullenness, peevishness, stubbornness, defiance, all go with wounded
+self-assertion under different conditions. Envy and jealousy belong
+here, too. Shyness and embarrassment go with self-assertion that is
+doubtful of winning recognition. Opposed to all these are
+self-confidence, the cheerful state of mind of one who seeks to master
+some person or thing and fully expects to do so, and elation, the
+joyful state of one who has mastered.
+
+
+Submission.
+
+Is there any counter-tendency that limits self-assertion and holds it
+in check? Inertia and fear of course have this effect, but is there
+any specific instinct precisely opposite to self-assertion? A
+difficult question, not {167} yet to be answered with any assurance;
+but there is some evidence of a native submissive or yielding
+tendency. Two forms may be distinguished: yielding to obstruction, and
+yielding to the domination of other persons.
+
+Giving up, in the face of obstacles, is certainly common enough, but
+at first thought we should say that the individual was passive in the
+matter, and simply forced to yield, as a stone is brought to a stop
+when it strikes a wall. In reality, giving up is not quite so passive
+as this. There is no external force that can absolutely force us to
+give up, unless by clubbing us on the head or somehow putting our
+reactive mechanism out of commission. As long as our brain, nerves and
+muscles are able to act, no external force can absolutely compel us to
+cease struggling. Since, then, we do cease struggling before we are
+absolutely out of commission, our giving up is not a purely passive
+affair, but our own act, a kind of reaction; and no doubt a native
+reaction. Further, when struggling against a stubborn obstacle, we
+sometimes feel an _impulse to give up_, and giving up brings relief.
+
+The ability to give up is not a mere element of weakness in our
+nature, but is a valuable asset in adapting ourselves to the
+environment. Adaptation is called for when the reaction first and most
+naturally made to a given situation does not meet the requirements of
+the situation. A too stubborn assertiveness means persistence in this
+unsuitable reaction, and no progress towards a successful issue;
+whereas giving up the first plan of attack, and trying something else
+instead, is the way towards success. Some people are too stubborn to
+be adaptable.
+
+The docility of the child, who believes whatever is told him, has in
+it an element of submissiveness. There is submissiveness also in the
+receptive attitude appropriate in observation and forming
+opinions--the attitude of looking for the facts and accepting them as
+they are rather than seeking {168} to confirm one's own
+prepossessions. Bias is self-assertive, impartiality is submissive to
+some degree.
+
+Yielding to the domination of other persons often occurs unwillingly,
+and then comes under the head of "thwarted self-assertion"; but the
+question is whether it ever occurs willingly and affords satisfaction
+to the individual who yields. We certainly yield with good grace to
+one who so far outclasses us that competition with him is unthinkable.
+An adult may arouse the submissive response in a child; and the social
+group, by virtue of its superior power and permanence, may arouse it
+in the individual adult. Hero worship seems a good example of willing
+submission, agreeable to the one who submits. There are persons who
+are "lost" without a hero, without some one to lean on, some one to
+tell them what to do and even what to believe. This looks much like
+the "filial" or "infantile" instinct that was mentioned before as a
+possibility, and the dependent spirit in an adult possibly represents
+a continuation of the infantile attitude into adult life.
+
+Some behavior that looks submissive is really self-assertion in
+disguise. There are two forms of self-assertion that are specially
+likely to be taken for submission. Wounded or thwarted self-assertion
+is one. Shame and envy are like submission in this respect, that they
+involve an absence of self-confidence or self-assurance, but they do
+not afford the satisfaction of willing submission, nor the relief of
+giving up the struggle against obstacles. So far from being genuinely
+submissive, they are states in which the self is making a violent and
+insistent demand for justification or social recognition. The other
+form of self-assertion which looks like submission occurs when a
+person identifies himself with a superior individual or with a social
+group. He will then boast of the prowess of his hero or of the
+prestige of his group, whether it be his family, his school, {169} his
+town or his country. Now, boasting cannot by any stretch of the
+imagination be regarded as a sign of submissiveness; it is a sign of
+assertiveness, and nothing else. What has happened here is that the
+individual, having identified himself with his hero or his group,
+finds in their greatness a means of asserting himself as against other
+individuals who have not the good fortune to be so identified. This
+transferred self-assertion is a strong element in loyalty and public
+spirit, and plays a large and useful part in public affairs.
+
+{170}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Make an outline of the chapter, in the form of a table, which
+ shall show for each instinct: (a) the natural stimulus, (b) the
+ native motor response, (c) the end-result that the instinct tends
+ towards, in its adult as well as its native condition, and (d) the
+ emotion, if any, that goes with the activity of the instinct.
+
+2. An adult tendency or propensity may be simply an unmodified
+ instinct, or it may be derived from instincts by combination, etc.
+ Try to identify each of the following as an instinct, or to analyze
+ it into two or more instincts:
+
+ (a) Love for adventure.
+ (b) Patriotism.
+ (c) A father's pride in his children.
+ (d) Love for travel.
+ (e) Insubordination.
+ (f) Love for dancing.
+
+3. Which of the instincts are most concerned in making people work?
+
+4. Show how self-assertion finds gratification in the life-work of
+
+ an actor.
+ a physician.
+ a housekeeper.
+ a teacher.
+ a railroad engineer.
+
+5. Arrange the following impulses and emotions in the order of the
+ frequency of their occurrence in your ordinary day's work and play:
+
+ (a) Fear.
+ (b) Anger.
+ (c) Disgust
+ (d) Curiosity.
+ (e) Self-assertion.
+ (f) Submission.
+ (g) The tendency to protect or "mother" another.
+
+6. How do "practical jokes" lend support to the view that laughter
+ is primarily aroused by a sense of one's own superiority?
+
+7. Get together a dozen jokes or funny stories, and see how many
+ of them can be placed with the practical jokes in this respect.
+
+8. Mention some laughter-stimuli that do not lend support to the
+ theory mentioned in Exercise 6.
+
+9. What instincts find outlet in (a) dress, (b) automobiling, (c)
+ athletics, (d) social conversation?
+
+
+
+{171}
+
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+McDougall's _Social Psychology_ gives, in Chapters III and IV, an
+inventory of the instinctive equipment of mankind, and in Chapter V
+attempts to analyze many complex human emotions and propensities into
+their native elements.
+
+Thorndike, in his _Educational Psychology, Briefer Course_, 1914,
+Chapters, II-V, attempts a more precise analysis of stimulus and
+response.
+
+Watson's _Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist_, 1919,
+attempts in Chapter VI to show that there are only three primary
+emotions, fear, rage and love; and in Chapter VII gives a critical
+review of the work on human instincts.
+
+H. C. Warren, in Chapter VI of his _Human Psychology_, 1919, gives a
+brief survey of the reflexes and instincts.
+
+
+{172}
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE FEELINGS
+
+
+PLEASANTNESS AND UNPLEASANTNESS, AND OTHER
+STATES OF FEELINGS AND THEIR INFLUENCE UPON
+BEHAVIOR
+
+Feeling is subjective and unanalyzed. It is conscious, and an
+"unconscious feeling" would be a contradiction in terms. But, while
+conscious, it is not cognitive; it is not "knowing something", even
+about your subjective condition; it is simply "the way you feel". As
+soon as you begin to analyze it, and say, "I feel badly here or there,
+in this way or in that", you _know_ something about your subjective
+condition, but the feeling has evaporated for the instant. In passing
+over into definite knowledge of facts, it has ceased to be feeling.
+
+Feeling is an undercurrent of consciousness, or we might call it a
+background. The foreground consists of what you are taking notice of
+or thinking about, or of what you are intending to do; that is to say,
+the foreground is cognitive or impulsive, or it may be both at once,
+as when we are intent on throwing this stone and hitting that tree. In
+the background lies the conscious subjective condition. Behind facts
+observed and acts intended lies the state of the individual's feeling,
+sometimes calm, sometimes excited, sometimes expectant, sometimes
+gloomy, sometimes buoyant.
+
+The number of different ways of feeling must be very great, and it
+would be no great task to find a hundred different words, some of them
+no doubt partly synonymous, to complete the sentence, "I feel
+_______". All the {173} emotions, as "stirred-up states of mind",
+belong under the general head of the feelings.
+
+But when the psychologist speaks of _the feelings_, he usually means
+the _elementary_ feelings. An emotion is far from elementary. If you
+accept the James-Lange theory, you think of an emotion as a blend of
+organic sensations; and if you reject that theory, you would still
+probably agree that such an emotion as anger or fear seems a big,
+complex state of feeling. It seems more complex than such a sensation
+as red, warm, or bitter, which are called elementary sensations
+because no one has ever succeeded in decomposing them into simpler
+sensations. Now, the question is whether any feelings can be indicated
+that are as elementary as these simple sensations.
+
+
+Pleasantness and Unpleasantness Are Simple Feelings
+
+No one has ever been able to break up the feelings of pleasantness and
+unpleasantness into anything simpler. "Pleasure" and "displeasure" are
+not always so simple; they are names for whole states of mind which
+may be very complex, including sensations and thoughts in addition to
+the feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness. "Pain" does not make
+a satisfactory substitute for the long word "unpleasantness", because
+"pain", as we shall see in the next chapter, is properly the name of a
+certain sensation, and feelings are to be distinguished from
+sensations. Red, warm and bitter, along with many others, are
+sensations, but pleasantness and unpleasantness are not sensations.
+
+How, then, do the elementary feelings differ from sensations? In the
+first place, sensations submit readily to being picked out and
+observed, and in fact become more vivid when they are brought into the
+"foreground", while feelings grow vague and lose their character when
+thus singled {174} out for examination. Attend to the noises in the
+street and they stand out clearly, attend to the internal sensation of
+breathing and it stands out clearly, but attend to your pleasant state
+of feeling and it retreats out of sight.
+
+In the second place, sensations are "localized"; you can tell pretty
+well where they seem to come from. Sensations of light, sound and
+smell are localized outside the body, sensations of touch are
+localized on the skin (or sometimes outside), taste sensations are
+localized in the mouth, organic and muscular sensations in some part
+of the body. On the other hand, pleasantness and unpleasantness are
+much less definitely localized; they seem to be "in us", without being
+in any special part of us.
+
+In the third place, feelings differ from sensations in having no known
+sense organs. There is no special sense organ or set of sense organs
+for the feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness, as there is for
+warmth or cold. Some sensations are pleasant, to be sure, and some
+unpleasant; but there is no one kind of sense organ that has the
+monopoly of either sort of feeling.
+
+
+Feeling-Tone of Sensations
+
+The pleasantness or unpleasantness characteristic of many sensations
+is called their "feeling-tone", and sensations that are markedly
+pleasant or unpleasant are said to have a strong or pronounced
+feeling-tone. Bitter is intrinsically unpleasant, sweet pleasant, the
+salty taste, when not too strong, neither one nor the other, so that
+it has no definite feeling-tone. Odors, as well as tastes, usually
+have a rather definite feeling-tone. Of sounds, smooth tones are
+pleasant, grating noises unpleasant. Bright colors are pleasant, while
+dull shades are sometimes unpleasant, sometimes merely indifferent or
+lacking in feeling-tone. Pain is usually unpleasant, moderate warmth
+and cold pleasant, simple touch {175} indifferent. Very intense
+sensations of any kind are likely to be unpleasant.
+
+The statements made above as to the subjectivity and non-localization
+of feeling do not apply altogether to the feeling-tone of sensations.
+The pleasantness or unpleasantness of a sensation is localized with
+the sensation and seems to belong to the object rather than to
+ourselves. The unpleasantness of a toothache seems to be in the tooth
+rather than simply "in us". The pleasantness of a sweet taste is
+localized in the mouth, and we even think of the sweet substance as
+being objectively pleasant. We say that it is a "pleasant day", and
+that there is a "pleasant tang in the air", as if the pleasantness
+were an objective fact.
+
+By arguing with a person, however, you can get him to admit that,
+while the day is pleasant _to him_, and the tang in the air pleasant
+to him, they may be unpleasant to another person; and he will admit
+that a sweet substance, ordinarily pleasant, is unpleasant when he has
+had too much of sweet things to eat. So you can make him realize that
+pleasantness and unpleasantness depend on the individual and his
+condition, and are subjective rather than objective. Show a group of
+people a bit of color, and you will find them agreeing much better as
+to what color that is than as to how pleasant it is. Feeling-tone is
+subjective in the sense that people disagree about it.
+
+
+Theories of Feelings
+
+1. Pleasantness might represent a general _organic state_, and
+unpleasantness the contrary state, each state being an internal bodily
+response to pleasant or unpleasant stimuli, and making itself felt as
+an unanalyzable compound of vague internal sensations.
+
+This theory of feeling is certainly attractive, and it would {176}
+account very well for all the facts so far stated, for the
+subjectivity of feeling, for its lack of localization, and for the
+absence of specific sense organs for the feelings. It would bring the
+feelings into line with the emotions. But the real test of the theory
+lies just here: can we discover radically different organic states for
+the two opposite feelings?
+
+Numerous experiments have been conducted in the search for such
+radically different organic states, but thus far the search has been
+rather disappointing. Arrange to record the subject's breathing and
+heart beat, apply pleasant and unpleasant stimuli to him, and see
+whether there is any characteristic organic change that goes with
+pleasant stimuli, and an opposite change with unpleasant stimuli. You
+should also obtain an introspective report from your subject, so as to
+be sure that the "pleasant stimuli" actually gave a feeling of
+pleasantness, etc. Certain experiments of this sort have indicated
+that with pleasantness goes slower heart beat and quicker breathing,
+with unpleasantness quicker heart beat and slower breathing. But not
+all investigators have got these results; and, anyway, it would be
+impossible to generalize to the extent of asserting that slow heart
+beat always gave a pleasant state of feeling, and rapid heart beat an
+unpleasant; for there is slow heart beat during a "morning grouch",
+and rapid during joyful expectation. Or, in regard to breathing, try
+this experiment: hasten your breathing and see whether a feeling of
+pleasantness results; slacken it and see whether unpleasantness
+results. The fact is that pleasantness can go with a wide range of
+organic states, so far as these are revealed by heart beat and
+breathing; and the same with unpleasantness. If there is any organic
+fact definitely characteristic of either state of feeling, it is a
+subtle fact that has hitherto eluded observation.
+
+{177}
+
+2. Pleasantness might represent smooth and easy brain action,
+unpleasantness slow and impeded brain action. According to this
+theory, unimpeded progress of nerve currents through the brain is
+pleasant, while resistance encountered at the brain synapses is
+unpleasant. A stimulus is pleasant, then, because the nerve currents
+started by it find smooth going through the brain centers, and another
+stimulus is unpleasant because it finds the going poor.
+
+While this theory looks good in some ways, and fits some cases very
+well--as the great unpleasantness of blocked reaction, where you
+cannot make up your mind what to do--there are two big objections to
+it. The first objection is found in the facts of practice. Practising
+any reaction makes it more and more smooth-running and free from inner
+obstruction, and should therefore make it more and more pleasant; but,
+as a matter of fact, practising an unfamiliar act of any sort makes it
+more pleasant for a time only, after which continued practice makes it
+automatic and neither pleasant nor unpleasant. The smoothest
+reactions, which should give the highest degree of pleasant feeling
+according to the theory, are simply devoid of all feeling.
+
+The second objection lies in the difficulty of believing unpleasant
+stimuli to give slow, impeded reactions. On the contrary, the
+instinctive defensive reactions to unpleasant stimuli are very quick,
+and give no sign of impeded progress of nerve currents through the
+brain centers.
+
+3. There is one fact, not yet taken into account, that may point the
+way to a better theory. Feeling is impulsive. In pleasantness, the
+impulse is to "stand pat" and let the pleasant state continue; in
+unpleasantness, the impulse is to end the state. The impulse of
+pleasantness is directed towards keeping what is pleasant, and the
+impulse of unpleasantness is directed towards getting rid of the
+unpleasant. In indifference there is no tendency either to keep or to
+be {178} rid of. These facts are so obvious as scarcely to need
+mention, yet they may be the core of this whole matter of feeling.
+Certainly they are the most important facts yet brought out as
+relating feeling to conduct.
+
+Putting this fact into neural terms, we say that pleasantness goes
+with a neural adjustment directed towards keeping, towards letting
+things stay as they are; while unpleasantness goes with an adjustment
+towards riddance. Bitter is unpleasant because we are so organized, by
+native constitution, as to make the riddance adjustment on receiving
+this particular stimulus. In plain language, we seek, to be rid of it,
+and that is the same as saying it is unpleasant. Sweet is pleasant for
+a similar reason.
+
+There is some evidence that these adjustments occur in that part of
+the brain called the thalamus. [Footnote: See p. 65.]
+
+
+Sources of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness
+
+Laying aside now the difficult question of the organic and cerebral
+nature of the feelings, we turn to the simpler question of the stimuli
+that arouse them. A very important fact immediately arrests our
+attention. There are two different kinds of stimuli for pleasantness,
+and two corresponding kinds for unpleasantness. The one kind is
+typified by sweet and bitter, the other by success and failure. Some
+things are pleasant (or unpleasant) without regard to any already
+awakened desire, while other things are pleasant (or unpleasant) only
+because of such a desire. A sweet taste is pleasant even though we
+were not desiring it at the moment, and a bitter taste is unpleasant
+though we had no expectation of getting it and no desire awakened to
+avoid it. On the other hand, the sight of our stone hitting the tree
+is pleasant only because we were aiming at the tree, and {179} the
+sight of the stone going to one side of the tree is unpleasant just
+for the same reason.
+
+ Some things we want.
+ Because we like them;
+ Some things we like.
+ Because we want them.
+
+We want candy, because we like the sweet taste; but we like a cold
+drink because and when we are thirsty and not otherwise. Thirst is a
+want for water, a state of the organism that impels us to drink; and
+when we are in this state, we like a drink, a drink is pleasant then.
+How absurd it would be to say that we were thirsty because we liked to
+drink! when the fact is that we like to drink because we are thirsty.
+The desire to drink must first be aroused, and then drinking is
+pleasant.
+
+What is true of thirst is true of hunger, or of any organic need. The
+need must first be aroused, and then its satisfaction is pleasant.
+This applies just as well to fighting, laughing, fondling a baby, and
+to all the instincts. It gives you no pleasure to strike or kick a
+person, or to swear at him, unless you are first angry with him. It
+gives you no pleasure to go through the motions of laughing unless you
+"want to laugh", i.e., unless you are amused. It gives you no pleasure
+to fondle the baby unless you love the baby. Let any instinct be first
+aroused, and then the result at which the instinct is aimed causes
+pleasure, but the same result will cause no pleasure unless the
+instinct has been aroused.
+
+The same can be said of desires that are not exactly instinctive. At a
+football game, for example, when one of the players kicks the ball and
+it sails between the goal posts, half of the spectators yell with joy,
+while the other half {180} groan in agony. Why should the appearance
+of a ball sailing between two posts be so pleasant to some, and
+unpleasant to others? This particular appearance is by itself neither
+pleasant nor unpleasant, but because the desire to see this happen has
+been previously aroused in the partisans of one team, and the desire
+that it should not happen in the partisans of the other, therefore it
+is that the pleasantness or unpleasantness occurs. First arouse any
+desire, and then you can give pleasure by gratifying it, displeasure
+by thwarting it. This is the pleasure of success, and the
+unpleasantness of failure.
+
+Pleasures of this class may be named secondary, because they depend
+upon pre-aroused desires.
+
+
+Primary Likes and Dislikes
+
+Though many of the most intense pleasures and displeasures of life are
+of the secondary type, this fact must not blind us to the existence of
+the primary pleasures and displeasures, typified by sweet and bitter.
+Any sensation with a pronounced feeling-tone is a primary pleasure or
+displeasure. We like or dislike it just for itself, and without regard
+to the gratification of any pre-aroused instinct or desire.
+
+There are natural likes and dislikes--apart from the satisfaction of
+instincts--and there are others that are acquired. In other words,
+there are native tastes and acquired tastes. Individuals differ
+considerably in their native tastes, and still more in their acquired
+tastes. Liking for sweets is native, liking for fragrant odors is
+native, but liking for lemonade, or black coffee, or olives, or
+cheese, is acquired, and not acquired by everybody. Liking for bright
+colors is native, but liking for subdued colors, and the special
+pleasure in color harmonies, are acquired. So we might {181} run
+through the list of the senses, finding under each some sensations
+with native feeling-tone, and other sensations that acquire
+feeling-tone through experience.
+
+Some people have a native liking for numbers and other facts of a
+mathematical nature. We say of such a one that he has a natural taste
+for mathematics. Another has a natural dislike for the same. Some have
+a taste for things of the mechanical sort, others fight shy of such
+things. Some have a natural taste for people, being sociable
+creatures--which means more than being gregarious--while others are
+little interested in mixing with people, observing their ways, and the
+give and take of friendly intercourse.
+
+Now the question arises whether these native likes and dislikes, for
+odors, colors, tones, numbers, machinery, and people, are really
+independent of the instincts. Some psychologists have insisted that
+all the interest and satisfaction of life were derived from the
+instincts, laying special stress on the instincts of curiosity and
+self-assertion.
+
+With respect to our "natural liking for mathematics", these
+psychologists would argue as follows: "First off, curiosity is aroused
+by numbers, as it may be by any novel fact; then the child, finding he
+can do things with numbers, gratifies his mastery impulse by playing
+with them. He encounters number problems, and his mastery impulse is
+again aroused in the effort to solve the problems. Later, he is able
+to 'show off' and win applause by his mathematical feats, and thus the
+social form of self-assertion is brought into play. This particular
+child may have good native ability for mathematics, and consequently
+his mastery impulse is specially gratified by this kind of activity;
+but he has no real direct liking for mathematics, and all his industry
+in this field is motivated by curiosity and especially by
+self-assertion."
+
+The instinct psychologists have a strong case here, as {182} they
+would have also in regard to the liking for machinery. Still, the
+mathematical individual would not be convinced, for he would testify
+that numbers, etc., made a direct appeal to him. Numbers, geometric
+forms, and algebraic transformations are fascinating to him, and there
+is something beautiful, to his mind, in the relationships that are
+discovered. The same could be said of the liking for plant or animal
+life that appears in the "born biologist". If the objects of the world
+make a direct appeal to the man whose mind is attuned to them, then
+his interest and zeal in studying them are not wholly derived from the
+instincts. The instincts come into play, truly enough, in all
+scientific work, and add impetus to it, but the primary motive is a
+direct liking for the kind of facts studied.
+
+"Primary likes and dislikes" are still more clearly in evidence in the
+arts than in the sciences. Take the color art, for example. There can
+be no manner of doubt that bright colors are natively pleasant. Can we
+explain the liking for color as derived from satisfaction of the
+instincts? Is it due simply to curiosity? No, for then the color would
+no longer be attractive after it had ceased to be a novelty. Is color
+liked simply for purposes of self-display? No, this would not explain
+our delight in the colors of nature. Or do color effects constitute
+problems that challenge the mastery impulse? This might fit the case
+of intricate color designs, but not the strong, simple color effects
+that appeal to most people. There is no escape from the conclusion
+that color is liked for its own sake, and that this primary liking is
+the foundation of color art.
+
+Music, in the same way, is certainly based on a primary liking for
+tones and their combinations, as well as for rhythm. Novel effects
+also appeal to curiosity, musical performance is a means of display to
+the performer, and the problem set by a piece of music to the
+performer in the {183} way of execution, and to the listener in the
+way of understanding and appreciation, gives plenty of play to the
+mastery impulse. Besides, music gets associated with love, tenderness,
+war and religion; but none of the impulses thus gratified by music is
+the fundamental reason for music, since without the primary taste for
+tone and rhythm there would be no music to start with, and therefore
+no chance for these various impulses to find an outlet in this
+direction.
+
+Still another field of human activity, in which native likes and
+dislikes play their part alongside of the instincts, is the field of
+social life. The gregarious instinct brings individuals together into
+social groups, and probably also makes the individual crave
+participation in the doings of the group. The sex instinct lends a
+special interest to those members of the group who are of the opposite
+sex, and the parental instinct leads the adults to take a protective
+attitude towards the little children. Also, it is probably due to the
+parental instinct that any one spontaneously seeks to help the
+helpless. Self-assertion has plenty of play in a group, both in the
+way of seeking to dominate and in the way of resisting domination; and
+the submissive tendency finds an outlet in admiring and following
+those who far surpass us. Thwarted self-assertion accounts for many of
+the dislikes that develop between the members of a group. But none of
+these instincts accounts for the interest in personality, or for the
+genuine liking that people may have for one another.
+
+Let a group of persons of the same age and sex get together, all
+equals for the time being, no one seeking to dominate the rest, no one
+bowing to another as his superior nor chafing against an assumed
+superiority which he does not admit, no one in a helpless or
+unfortunate condition that arouses the pity of the rest. What an
+uninteresting affair! No instincts called into play except bare
+gregariousness! {184} On the contrary, such a group affords almost or
+quite the maximum of social pleasure. It affords scope for comradeship
+and good fellowship, which are based on a native liking for people,
+and not on the instincts.
+
+Enough has perhaps been said to convince the reader that, besides the
+things we like for satisfaction of our instinctive needs and cravings,
+there are other things that we "just naturally like"--and the same
+with dislikes--and that these primary likes and dislikes have
+considerable importance in life.
+
+
+Other Proposed Elementary Feelings
+
+Pleasantness and unpleasantness are the only feelings generally
+accepted as elementary, though several others have been suggested.
+
+
+Wundt's tri-dimensional theory of feeling.
+
+This author suggested that there were three pairs of feelings:
+pleasantness and unpleasantness; tension and its opposite, release or
+relief; and excitement and its opposite, which may be called numbness
+or subdued feeling. Thus there would be three dimensions of feeling,
+which could be represented by the three dimensions of space, and any
+given state of feeling could be described by locating it along each of
+the three dimensions. Thus, one moment, we may be in a pleasant,
+tense, excited state; another moment in a pleasant, relieved and
+subdued state; and another moment in an unpleasant, tense and subdued
+state, etc. As each feeling can also exist in various degrees, the
+total number of shades of feeling thus provided for would be very
+great, indeed.
+
+Though this theory has awakened great interest, it has not won
+unqualified approval. Excitement and the rest are real enough states
+of feeling--no one doubts that--but the question is whether they are
+fit to be placed alongside of pleasantness and unpleasantness as
+elementary feelings. It {185} appears rather more likely that they are
+blends of sensations. In the excited states that have been most
+carefully studied, that is to say, in fear and anger, there is that
+big organic upstir, making itself felt as a blend of many internal
+sensations. Tension may very probably be the feeling of tense muscles,
+for tension occurs specially in expectancy, and the muscles are tense
+then.
+
+Whether elementary or not, these feelings are worthy of note. It is
+interesting to examine the striving for a goal and the attainment of
+the goal with respect to each "dimension" of feeling. Striving is
+tense, attainment brings the feeling of release. Striving is often
+excited, but fatigue and drowsiness (seeking for rest) are numb, and
+self-assertion may be neutral in this respect, as in "cool
+assumption". Reaching the goal may be excited or not; all depends on
+the goal, whether it be striking your opponent or going to sleep. On
+the other hand, reaching the goal is practically always pleasant
+(weeping seems an exception here), while striving for a goal is
+pleasant or unpleasant according as progress is being made towards the
+goal, or stiff obstruction encountered.
+
+The _feeling of familiarity_, and its opposite, the feeling of
+strangeness or newness, also have some claim to be considered here.
+The first time you see a person, he seems strange, the next few times
+he awakens in you the feeling of familiarity, after which he becomes
+so much a matter of course as to arouse no definite feeling of this
+sort, unless, indeed, a long time has elapsed since you saw him last;
+in this case the feeling of familiarity is particularly strong.
+
+The feelings of doubt or hesitation, and of certainty or assurance,
+also deserve mention as possibly elementary.
+
+{186}
+
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Complete the sentence, "I feel_____" in 20 different ways
+ (not using synonyms), and measure the time required to do this.
+
+3. What can be meant by speaking in psychology of only two feelings,
+ when common speech recognizes so many?
+
+4. If the states of mind designated by the words, "feeling sure",
+ or "feeling bored", are compound states, what elements besides the
+ feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness may enter into the
+ compounds?
+
+5. Attempt an analysis of the "worried feeling", by your own
+ introspection, i.e., try to discover elementary feelings and
+ sensations in this complex state of mind.
+
+6. Following Wundt's three-dimensional scheme of feeling, analyze
+ each of the following states of mind (for example, a child just
+ admitted to the presence of the Christmas tree would be in a state
+ of mind that is pleasant, tense, and excited):
+
+ (a) Watching a rocket go up and waiting for it to burst.
+
+ (b) Just after the rocket has burst.
+
+ (c) Waiting for the dentist to pull.
+
+ (d) Just after he has pulled.
+
+ (e) Enjoying a warm bed.
+
+ (f) Lying abed after waking, not quite able as yet to decide
+ to get up.
+
+ (g) Seeing an automobile about to run down a child.
+
+7. Make a list of six primary dislikes, and a list of six dislikes that
+ are dependent on the instincts.
+
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+For a much fuller treatment of the subject, see E. B. Titchener,
+_Textbook of Psychology_, 1909, pp. 225-264.
+
+
+{187}
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+SENSATION
+
+AN INVENTORY OF THE ELEMENTARY SENSATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT SENSES
+
+With reflex action, instinct, emotion and feeling, the list of native
+mental activities is still incomplete. The senses are provided by
+nature, and the fundamental use of the senses goes with them. The
+child does not learn to see or hear, though he learns the meaning of
+what he sees and hears. He gets sensation as soon as his senses are
+stimulated, but recognition of objects and facts comes with
+experience. Hold an orange before his open eyes, and he sees, but the
+first time he doesn't see _an orange_. The adult sees an object, where
+the baby gets only sensation. "Pure sensation", free from all
+recognition, can scarcely occur except in the very young baby, for
+recognition is about the easiest of the learned accomplishments, and
+traces of it can be seen in the behavior of babies only a few days
+old.
+
+Sensation is a response; it does not come to us, but is aroused in us
+by the stimulus. It is the stimulus that comes to us, and the
+sensation is our own act, aroused by the stimulus. Sensation means the
+activity of the receiving organ (or sense organ), of the sensory
+nerves, and of certain parts of the brain, called the sensory centers.
+Without the brain response, there is apparently no conscious
+sensation, so that the activity of the sense organ and sensory nerve
+is preliminary to the sensation proper. Sensation may be called the
+first response of the brain to the external stimulus. It is usually
+only the first in a series of brain {188} responses, the others
+consisting in the recognition of the object and the utilization of the
+information so acquired.
+
+Sensation, as we know it in our experience, goes back in the history
+of the race to the primitive sensitivity (or irritability) of living
+matter, seen in the protozoa. These minute unicellular creatures,
+though having no sense organs--any more than they have muscles or
+digestive organs--respond to a variety of stimuli. They react to
+mechanical stimuli, as a touch or jar, to chemical stimuli of certain
+kinds, to thermal stimuli (heat or cold), to electrical stimuli, and
+to light. There are some forces to which they do not respond:
+magnetism, X-rays, ultraviolet light; and we ourselves are insensitive
+to these agents, which are not to be called stimuli, since they arouse
+no response.
+
+
+The Sense Organs
+
+In the development of the metazoa, or multicellular animals,
+specialization has occurred, some parts of the body becoming muscles
+with the primitive motility much developed, some parts becoming
+digestive organs, some parts conductors (the nerves) and some parts
+becoming specialized receptors or sense organs. A sense organ is a
+portion of the body that has very high sensitivity to some particular
+kind of stimulus. One sense organ is highly sensitive to one stimulus,
+and another to another stimulus. The eye responds to very minute
+amounts of energy in the form of light, but not in other forms; the
+ear responds to very minute amounts of energy in the form of sound
+vibrations, the nose to very minute quantities of energy in certain
+chemical forms.
+
+There is only one thing that a sense organ always and necessarily
+contains, and that is the _termination of a sensory nerve_. Without
+that, the sense organ, being isolated, would have no effect on the
+brain or muscles or any other {189} part of the body, and would be
+entirely useless. The axons of the sensory nerve divide into fine
+branches in the sense organ, and thus are more easily aroused by the
+stimulus.
+
+Besides the sensory axons, two other things are often found in a sense
+organ--sometimes one of the two, sometimes the other and sometimes
+both. First, there are special sense cells in a few sense organs; and
+second, in most sense organs there is accessory apparatus which,
+without being itself sensitive, assists in bringing the stimulus to
+the sense cells or sensory nerve ends.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 25.--Diagram of the taste end-organ. Within the
+"Taste bud" are seen two sense cells, and around the base of these
+cells are seen the terminations of two axons of the nerve of taste.
+(Figure text: surface of tongue, taste bud, pit)]
+
+
+_Sense cells_ are present only in the eye, ear, nose and mouth--always
+in very sheltered situations. The taste cells are located in little
+pits opening upon the surface of the tongue. In the sides of these
+pits can be found little flask-shaped chambers, each containing a
+number of taste cells. The taste cell has a slender prolongation that
+protrudes from the chamber into the pit; and it is this slender tip of
+the cell that is exposed to the chemical stimulus of the {190} tasting
+substance. The stimulus arouses the taste cell, and this in turn
+arouses the ending of the sensory axon that twines about the base of
+the cell at the back of the chamber. The taste cell, or its tip, is
+extra sensitive to chemical stimuli, and its activity, aroused by the
+chemical stimulus, in turn arouses the axon and so starts a nerve
+current to the brain stem and eventually to the cortex.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 26.--The olfactory sense cells and their brain
+connections. (Figure text: axon to brain cortex, dendrites, synapses in
+brain stem, axons of sense cells sense cells in nose.)]
+
+
+The olfactory cells, located in a little recess in the upper and back
+part of the nose, out of the direct air currents going toward the
+lungs, are rather similar to the taste cells. They have fine tips
+reaching to the surface of the mucous membrane lining the nasal cavity
+and exposed to the chemical stimuli of odors. The olfactory cell has
+also a long slender branch extending from its base through the bone
+into the skull cavity and connecting there with dendrites of nerve
+cells. This central branch of the olfactory cell is, in fact, an axon;
+and it is peculiar in being an axon growing from a sense cell. This is
+the rule in invertebrates, but in vertebrates the sensory axon is
+regularly an outgrowth of a {191} nerve cell, and only in the nose do
+we find sense cells providing their own sensory nerve.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 27.--Sense cells and nerve cells of the retina.
+Light, reaching the retina from the interior of the eyeball (as shown
+in Fig. 28), passes through the nearly transparent retina till stopped
+by the pigment layer, and then and there arouses to activity the tips
+of the rods and cones. The rods and cones pass the impulse along to
+the bipolar cells and these in turn to the optic nerve cells, the
+axons of which extend by way of the optic nerve to the thalamus in the
+brain. (Figure text: pigment layer, rods, cones, light, bipolar Cells,
+optic Nerve Cells)]
+
+
+In the eye, the sense cells are the rods and cones of the retina.
+These are highly sensitive to light, or, it may be, to chemical or
+electrical stimuli generated in the pigment of the retina by the
+action of light. The rods are less highly developed than the cones.
+Both rods and cones connect at their base with neurones that pass the
+activity along through the optic nerve to the brain.
+
+The internal ear contains sense cells of three rather similar kinds,
+all being "hair cells", Instead of a single {192} sensitive tip, each
+cell has a number of fine hair-tips, and it is these that first
+respond to the physical stimulus. In the cochlea, the part of the
+inner ear concerned with hearing, the hairs are shaken by sound
+vibrations that have reached the liquid in which the whole end-organ
+is immersed. In the "semicircular canals", a part of the inner ear
+that is concerned not with sound but with rotary movements of the
+head, we find hair cells again, their hair-tips being matted together
+and so located as to be bent, like reeds growing on the bottom of a
+brook, by currents of the liquid filling the canals. In the
+"vestibule", the central part of the inner ear, the hair-tips of the
+sense cells are matted together, and in the mat are imbedded little
+particles of stony matter, called the "otoliths". When the head is
+inclined in any direction, these heavy particles sag and bend the
+hairs, so stimulating them; and the same result occurs when a sudden
+motion up or down or in any direction is given to the head. Around the
+base of the sense cells, in any of these parts of the internal ear,
+are twined the fine endings of sensory axons, which are excited by the
+activity of the sense cells, and pass the activity on to the brain.
+
+
+Accessory sense-apparatus.
+
+Every sense except the "pain sense" has more or less of this. The
+hairs of the skin are accessory to the sense of touch. A touch on a
+hair is so easily felt that we often think of the hairs as sensitive;
+but really it is the skin that is sensitive, or, rather, it is the
+sensory axon terminating around the root of the hair in the skin. The
+tongue can be thought of as accessory apparatus serving the sense of
+taste, and the breathing apparatus as accessory to the sense of smell,
+"tasting" being largely a tongue movement that brings the substance to
+the taste cells, and "smelling" of anything being largely a series of
+little inspiratory movements that carry the odor-laden air to the
+olfactory part of the nasal cavity.
+
+{193}
+
+But it is in the eye and the ear that the highest development of
+accessory sense apparatus has taken place. All of the eye except the
+retina, and all of the ear except the sense cells and the sensory
+axons, are accessory.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 28.--Horizontal cross section through the right
+eyeball. (Figure text: cornea, ciliary muscle, retina, choroid.
+sclerotic, Optic Nerve)]
+
+
+The eye is an optical instrument, like the camera. In fact, it is a
+camera, the sensitive plate being the retina, which differs indeed
+from the ordinary photographic plate in recovering after an exposure
+so as to be ready for another. Comparing the eye with the camera, we
+see that the eyeball corresponds to the box, the outer tough coat
+{194} of the eyeball (the "sclerotic" coat) taking the place of the
+wood or metal of which the box is built, and the deeply pigmented
+"choroid" coat, that lines the sclerotic, corresponding to the coating
+of paint used to blacken the inside of the camera box and prevent
+stray light from getting in and blurring the picture. At the front of
+the eye, where light is admitted, the sclerotic is transformed into
+the transparent "cornea", and the choroid into the contractile "iris",
+with the hole in its center that we call "the pupil of the eye".
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 29.--Diagram to show the course of the sound waves
+through the outer and middle ear and into the inner ear. The arrow is
+placed within the "meatus," and points in the direction taken by the
+sound waves. See text for their further course. (Figure text: cochlea,
+vestibule, semicircular canal, ossicles, Eustachian, ear drum)]
+
+
+The iris corresponds to the adjustable diaphragm of the camera. Just
+behind the pupil is the lens of the eye, which also is adjustable by
+the action of a little muscle, called the "ciliary muscle". This
+muscle corresponds to the focussing mechanism of the camera; by it the
+eye is focussed on near or far objects. The eye really {195} has two
+lenses, for the cornea acts as a lens, but is not adjustable. The
+"aqueous and vitreous humors" fill the eyeball and keep it in shape,
+while still, being transparent, they allow the light to pass through
+them on the way to the retina. The retina is a thin coat, lying inside
+the choroid at the back of the eyeball, and having the form of a
+hollow hemisphere. The light, coming through the pupil and traversing
+the vitreous humor, strikes the retina from the inside of the eyeball.
+Other accessory apparatus of the eye includes the lids, the tear
+glands, and the muscles that turn the eyeball in any direction.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 30.--Two views of the internal ear. These views
+show the shape of the internal ear cavity. The sense organs lie inside
+this cavity. Notice how the three semi-circular canals lie in three
+perpendicular planes. (Figure text: cochlea, vestibule, 3 Canals)]
+
+
+The ear is about as complex a piece of mechanism as the eye. We speak
+of the "outer", "middle" and "inner" ear. The outer, in such an animal
+as the horse, serves as a movable ear trumpet, catching the sound
+waves and concentrating them upon the ear drum, or middle ear. The
+human external ear seems to accomplish little; it can be cut off
+without noticeably affecting hearing. The most essential part of the
+external ear is the "meatus" or hole that allows the sound waves to
+pass through the skin to the tympanic membrane or drum head. The sound
+waves throw this membrane into vibration, and the vibration is
+transmitted, by an assembly of three little bones, across the
+air-filled cavity {196} of the middle ear to an opening leading to the
+water-filled cavity of the inner ear. This opening from the middle to
+the inner ear is closed by a membrane in which one end of the assembly
+of little bones is imbedded, as the other end is imbedded in the
+tympanic membrane; and thus the vibrations are transmitted from the
+tympanic membrane to the liquid of the inner ear. Once started in this
+liquid, the vibrations are propagated through it to the sense cells of
+the cochlea and stimulate them in the way already suggested.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 31.--A small sample of the sense cells of the
+cochlea. The hairs of the sense cells are shaken by the vibration of
+the water, and pass the impulse back to the end-brushes of the
+auditory axons, The tectorial membrane looks as if it might act as a
+damper, but may be concerned, as "accessory apparatus," in the
+stimulation of the hair cells. The basilar membrane consists in part
+of fibers extending across between the ledges of bone; these fibers
+are arranged somewhat after the manner of piano strings, and have
+suggested the "piano theory" of hearing, to be mentioned later in the
+chapter. (Figure text: water space, membrane, Tectorial membrane, bone,
+soft tissue, basilar membrane, auditory axons to brain stem, nerve
+cells of auditory nerves, auditory hair cells with end brushes of
+auditory axons)]
+
+
+Further study of the accessory apparatus of the eye and ear can be
+recommended as very interesting, but the little that has been said
+will serve as an introduction to the study of sensation.
+
+
+{197}
+
+Analysis of Sensations
+
+Prominent among the psychological problems regarding sensation is that
+of analysis. Probably each sense gives comparatively few elementary
+sensations, and many blends or compounds of these elements. To
+identify the elements is by no means a simple task, for under ordinary
+circumstances what we get is a compound, and it is only by carefully
+controlling the stimulus that we are able to get the elements before
+us; and even then the question whether these are really elementary
+sensations can scarcely be settled by direct observation.
+
+Along with the search for elementary sensations goes identification of
+the stimuli that arouse them, and also a study of the sensations
+aroused by any combination of stimuli. Our task now will be to ask
+these questions regarding each of the senses.
+
+
+The Skin Senses
+
+Rough and smooth, hard and soft, moist and dry, hot and cold, itching,
+tickling, pricking, stinging, aching are skin sensations; but some of
+these are almost certainly compounds. The most successful way of
+isolating the elements out of these compounds is to explore the skin,
+point by point, with weak stimuli of different kinds. If a blunt metal
+point, or the point of a lead pencil, a few degrees cooler than the
+skin, is passed slowly over the skin, at most points no sensation
+except that of contact arises, but at certain points there is a clear
+sensation of cold. Within an area an inch square on the back of the
+hand, several of these _cold spots_ can be found; and when the
+exploration is carefully made, and the cold spots marked, they will be
+found to give the same sensation every time. Substitute a metal point
+a few {198} degrees warmer than the skin, and a few spots will be
+found that give the sensation of warmth, these being the _warmth
+spots_. Use a sharp point, like that of a needle or of a sharp
+bristle, pressing it moderately against the skin, and you get at most
+points simply the sensation of contact, but at quite a number of
+points a small, sharp pain sensation arises. These are the _pain
+spots_. Finally, if the skin is explored with a hair of proper length
+and thickness, no sensation at all will be felt at most points,
+because the hair bends so readily when one end of it is pressed
+against the skin as not to exert sufficient force to arouse a
+sensation; but a number of points are found where a definite sensation
+of touch or contact is felt; these are the _touch spots_.
+
+No other varieties of "spots" are found, and the four sensations of
+touch, warmth, cold and pain are believed to be the only elementary
+skin sensations. Itch, stinging and aching seem to be the same as
+pain. Tickle is touch, usually light touch or a succession of light
+touches. Smooth and rough are successions of touch sensations. Moist
+is usually a compound of smooth and cold. Hard and soft combine touch
+and the muscular sensation of resistance.
+
+Hot and cold require more discussion. The elementary sensations are
+warmth and coolness, rather than hot and cold. Hot and cold are
+painful, and the fact is that strong temperature stimuli arouse the
+pain spots as well as the warmth or cold spots. Hot, accordingly, is a
+sensation compounded of warmth and pain, and cold a sensation composed
+of coolness and pain. More than this, when a cold spot is touched with
+a point heated well above the skin temperature (best to a little over
+100 Fahrenheit), the curious fact is noted that the cold spot responds
+with its normal sensation of cold. This is called the "paradoxical
+cold sensation". From this fact it is probable that a hot object
+excites the cold sensation, along with those of warmth and {199} pain;
+so that the sensation of heat is a blend of the three. Another curious
+fact is that a very cold object produces a burning sensation
+indistinguishable from that of a hot object; so that the sensation of
+great cold, like that of heat, is probably a blend of the three
+elementary sensations of warmth, cold and pain.
+
+
+ [Illustration: Fig. 32.--Diagram of various sorts of sensory
+ end-organ found in the skin.
+
+ A is a hair end-organ; the sensory axons can be seen coiling around
+ the root of the hair; evidently a touch on the hair, outside, would
+ squeeze the coiled axon and stimulate it. The hair is a bit of
+ "accessory apparatus."
+
+ B is a touch corpuscle, consisting of a coiled axon-end surrounded
+ by a little cone of other tissue.
+
+ C is an end-bulb, presumably belonging to the temperature sense. It
+ has, again, a coiled axon-end surrounded by other tissue. The
+ "coils" are really much more finely branched than the diagram shows.
+
+ D is a free-branched nerve end, consisting simply of a branched
+ axon, with no accessory apparatus. It is the pain-sense organ.
+
+ E is a corpuscle of a type found in the subcutaneous tissue, as well
+ as in more interior parts of the body. It contains an axon-end
+ surrounded by a layered capsule.]
+
+
+The stimulus that arouses the touch sensation is a bending of the
+skin. That which arouses warmth or cold is of {200} course a
+temperature stimulus, but, strange as it may seem, the exact nature of
+the effective stimulus has not been agreed upon. Either it is a
+warming or cooling of the skin, or it is the existence of a higher or
+lower temperature in the skin than that to which the skin is at the
+moment "adapted". This matter will become clearer when we later
+discuss adaptation. The stimulus that arouses the pain sensation may
+be mechanical (as a needle prick), or thermal (heat or cold), or
+chemical (as the drop of acid), or electrical; but in any case it must
+be strong enough to injure or nearly to injure the skin. In other
+words, the pain sense organ is not highly sensitive, but requires a
+fairly strong stimulus; and thus it is fitted to give warning of
+stimuli that threaten injury.
+
+Several kinds of sensory end-organ are found in the skin. There is the
+"spherical end-bulb", into which a sensory axon penetrates; it is
+believed to be the sense organ for cold. There is the rather similar
+"cylindrical end-bulb" believed to be the sense organ for warmth.
+There is the "touch corpuscle", found in the skin of the palms and
+soles, and consisting, like the end-bulbs, of a mass of accessory
+cells with a sensory axon ramifying inside it; this is an end-organ
+for the sense of touch. There is the hair end-organ, consisting of a
+sensory axon coiled about the root of the hair; this, also, is a touch
+receptor. Finally, there is the "free-branched nerve end", consisting
+simply of the branching of a sensory axon, with no accessory apparatus
+whatever; and this is the pain receptor. Perhaps the pain receptor
+requires no accessory apparatus because it does not need to be
+extremely sensitive.
+
+Now since we find, in the skin, "spots" responsive to four quite
+different stimuli, giving four quite different sensations, and
+apparently provided with different types of end-organs, it has become
+customary to speak of four skin senses in place of the traditional
+"sense of touch". We {201} speak of the pain sense, the warmth sense,
+the cold sense, and the pressure sense, which last is the sense of
+touch proper.
+
+
+The Sense of Taste
+
+Analysis has been as successful in the sense of taste as in cutaneous
+sensation. Ordinarily we speak of an unlimited number of tastes, every
+article of food having its own characteristic taste. Now the interior
+of the mouth possesses the four skin senses in addition to taste, and
+many tastes are in part composed of touch, warmth, cold or pain. A
+"biting taste" is a compound of pain with taste proper, and a "smooth
+taste" is partly touch. The consistency of the food, soft, tough,
+brittle, gummy, also contributes, by way of the muscle sense, to the
+total "taste". But in addition to all these sensations from the mouth,
+the flavor of the food consists largely of odor. Food in the mouth
+stimulates the sense of smell along with that of taste, the odor of
+the food reaching the olfactory organ by way of the throat and the
+rear passage to the nose. If the nose is held tightly so as to prevent
+all circulation of air through it, most of the "tastes" of foods
+vanish; coffee and quinine then taste alike, the only _taste_ of each
+being bitter, and apple juice cannot be distinguished from onion
+juice.
+
+But when the nose is excluded, and when cutaneous and muscular
+sensations are deducted, there still remain a few genuine tastes.
+These are sweet, sour, bitter and salty--and apparently no more. These
+four are the elementary taste sensations, all others being compounds.
+The papillae of the tongue, with their little "pits" already spoken
+of, correspond to the "spots" of the skin, with this difference,
+however, that the papillae do not each give a single sensation. Some
+of them give only two, some only three of the four tastes; and the
+bitter taste is aroused principally from {202} the back of the tongue,
+the sweet from the tip, the sour from the sides, the salty from both
+tip and sides.
+
+The stimulus to the sense of taste is something of a chemical nature.
+The tasteable substances must be in solution in order to penetrate the
+pits and get to the sensitive tips of the taste cells. If the upper
+surface of the tongue is first dried, a dry lump of sugar or salt laid
+on it gives no sensation of taste until a little saliva has
+accumulated and dissolved some of the substance.
+
+Exactly what is the chemical agent that produces a given taste
+sensation is a problem of some difficulty. Many different substances
+give the sensation of bitter, and the question is, what there is
+common to all these substances. The sweet taste is aroused not only by
+sugar, but by glycerine, saccharine, and even "sugar of lead" (lead
+acetate). The sour taste is aroused by most acids, but not by all, and
+also by some substances that are not chemically acids. Thus the
+chemistry of taste stimuli involves something not as yet understood.
+
+Though there is this uncertainty regarding the stimulus, on the whole
+the sense of taste affords a fine example of success achieved by
+experimental methods in the analysis of complex sensations. At the
+same time it affords a fine example of the fusion of different
+sensations into characteristic _blends_. The numerous "tastes" of
+every-day life, though found on analysis to be compounded of taste,
+smell, touch, pain, temperature and muscle sensations, have the effect
+of units. The taste of lemonade, for example, compounded of sweet,
+sour, cold and lemon odor, has the effect of a single characteristic
+sensation. It can be analyzed, but it ordinarily appears as a unit.
+This is true generally of blends; indeed, what we mean by blending is
+that, while the component sensations are still present and can be
+found by careful attention, they are not simply present together {203}
+but are compounded into a characteristic total. Each elementary
+sensation entering into the blend gives up some of its own quality,
+as, in the case of lemonade, neither the sweet nor the sour is quite
+so distinct and obtrusive as either would be if present alone. The
+same is true of the lemon odor, and it is true generally of the odor
+components that enter into the "tastes" of food. Were the odor
+components in these tastes as clear and distinct as they are when the
+same substance is smelled outside the mouth, we could not fail to
+notice that the "tastes" were largely composed of odor. The obtrusive
+thing about a blend is the total effect, not the elementary sensations
+that are blended.
+
+
+The Sense of Smell
+
+The great variety of odors long resisted every attempt at
+psychological analysis, largely because the olfactory end-organ is so
+secluded in position. You cannot apply stimuli to separate parts of
+it, as you can to the skin or tongue. But, recently, good progress has
+been made, [Footnote: By Henning.] by assembling almost all possible
+odors, and becoming thoroughly acquainted with them, not as
+substances, but simply as odors, and noting their likenesses and
+differences. It seems possible now to state that there are _six
+elementary odors_, as follows:
+
+1. Spicy, found in pepper, cloves, nutmeg, etc.
+
+2. Flowery, found in heliotrope, etc.
+
+3. Fruity, found in apple, orange oil, vinegar, etc.
+
+4. Resinous, found in turpentine, pine needles, etc.
+
+5. Foul, found in hydrogen sulphide, etc.
+
+6. Scorched, found in tarry substances.
+
+These being the elements, there are many compound odors. The odor of
+roasted coffee is a compound of resinous and scorched, peppermint a
+compound of fruity and spicy.
+
+{204}
+
+Each elementary odor corresponds to a certain characteristic in the
+chemical constitution of the stimulus.
+
+The sense of smell is extremely delicate, responding to very minute
+quantities of certain substances diffused in the air. It is extremely
+useful in warning us against bad air and bad food. It has also
+considerable esthetic value.
+
+
+Organic Sensation
+
+The term "organic sensation" is used to cover a variety of sensations
+from the internal organs, such as hunger, thirst, nausea, suffocation
+and less definite bodily sensations that color the emotional tone of
+any moment, contributing to "euphoria" and also to disagreeable states
+of mind. Hunger is a sensation aroused by the rubbing together of the
+stomach walls when the stomach, being ready for food, begins its
+churning movements. Careful studies of sensations from the internal
+organs reveal astonishingly little of sensation arising there, but
+there can be little doubt that the sensations just listed really arise
+where they seem to arise, in the interior of the trunk.
+
+Little has been done to determine the elementary sensations in this
+field; probably the organic sensations that every one is familiar with
+are blends rather than elements.
+
+
+The Sense of Sight
+
+Of the tremendous number and variety of visual sensations, the great
+majority are certainly compounds. Two sorts of compound sensation can
+be distinguished here: _blends_ similar to those of taste or smell,
+and _patterns_ which scarcely occur among sensations of taste and
+smell, though they are found, along with blends, in cutaneous
+sensation. Heat, compounded of warmth, cold and pain sensations, is an
+{205} excellent example of a blend, while the compound sensation
+aroused by touching the skin simultaneously with two points--or three
+points, or a ring or square--is to be classed as a pattern. In a
+pattern, the component parts are spread out in space or time (or in
+both at once), and for that reason are more easily attended to
+separately than the elements in a blend. Yet the pattern, like the
+blend, has the effect of a unit. A spatial pattern has a
+characteristic shape, and a temporal pattern a characteristic course
+or movement. A rhythm or a tune is a good example of a temporal
+pattern.
+
+Visual sensations are spread out spatially, and thus fall into spatial
+patterns. They also are in constant change and motion, and so fall
+into temporal patterns, many of which are spatial as well. The visual
+sensation aroused, let us say in a young baby, by the light entering
+his eye from a human face, is a spatial pattern; the visual sensation
+aroused by some one's turning down the light is a pure temporal
+pattern; while the sensation from a person seen moving across the room
+is a pattern both spatial and temporal. Finding the elements of a
+visual pattern would mean finding the smallest possible bits of it,
+which would probably be the sensations due to the action of single
+rods and cones, just as the smallest bit of a cutaneous sensation
+would be due to the exciting of a single touch spot, warmth spot, cold
+spot or pain spot.
+
+Analyzing a visual blend is quite a different job. Given the color
+pink, for example, let it be required to discover whether this is a
+simple sensation or a blend of two or more elementary sensations.
+Studying it intently, we see that it can be described as a whitish
+red, and if we are willing to accept this analysis as final, we
+conclude that pink is a blend of the elementary sensations of white
+and red. Of the thousands and thousands of distinguishable hues,
+shades {206} and tints, only a few are elements and the rest are color
+blends; and our main problem now is to identify the elements. Notice
+that we are not seeking for the physical elements of light, nor for
+the primary pigments of the painter's art, but for the elementary
+_sensations_. Our knowledge of physics and painting, indeed, is likely
+to lead us astray. Sensations are our responses to the physical
+stimulus, and the psychological question is, what fundamental
+responses we make to this class of stimuli.
+
+Suppose, without knowing anything of pigments or of the physics of
+light, we got together a collection of bits of color of every shade
+and tint, in order to see what we could discover about visual
+sensations. Leaving aside the question of elements for the moment, we
+might first try to _classify_ the bits of color. We could sort out a
+pile of reds, a pile of blues, a pile of browns, a pile of grays,
+etc., but the piles would shade off one into another. The salient fact
+about colors is the gradual transition from one to another. We can
+arrange them in _series_ better than we can classify them. They can be
+serially arranged in three different ways, according to brightness or
+intensity, according to color-tone, and according to saturation.
+
+The _intensity series runs from light to dark_. We can arrange such a
+series composed entirely of reds or blues or any other one color; or
+we can arrange the whole collection of bits of color into a single
+light-dark series. It is not always easy to decide whether a given
+shade of one color is lighter or darker than a given shade of a
+different color; but in a rough way, at least, every bit of whatever
+color would have its place in the single intensity series. An
+intensity series can, of course, be arranged in any other sense as
+well as in sight.
+
+The _color-tone series_ is best arranged from a collection consisting
+entirely of full or saturated colors. Start the {207} series with any
+color and put next to this the color that most resembles it in
+color-tone, i.e., in specific color quality; and so continue, adding
+always the color that most resembles the one preceding. If we started
+with red, the next in order might be either a yellowish red or a
+bluish red. If we took the yellowish red and placed it beside the red,
+then the next in order would be a still more yellowish red, and the
+series would run on to yellow and then to greenish yellow, green,
+bluish green, blue, violet, purple, purplish red, and so back to red.
+The color-tone series returns upon itself. It is a circular series.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 33.--The color circle. R, Y, G and B, stand for
+the colors red, yellow, green and blue. The shaded portion corresponds
+to the spectrum or rainbow. Complementary colors (see later) lie
+diametrically opposite to each other on the circumference.]
+
+
+A _saturation series_ runs from full-toned or saturated colors to pale
+or dull. Since we can certainly say of a pale blue that it is less
+saturated than a vivid red, etc., we could, theoretically, arrange our
+whole collection of bits of color in a single saturation series, but
+our judgment would be very uncertain at many points. The most
+significant saturation series confine themselves to a single
+color-tone, {208} and also, as far as possible, to a constant
+brightness, and extend from the most vivid color sensation obtainable
+with this color-tone and brightness, through a succession of less and
+less strongly colored sensations of the same tone and brightness, to a
+dead gray of the same brightness. Any such saturation series
+terminates in a neutral gray, which is light or dark to match the rest
+of the particular saturation series.
+
+White, black and gray, which find no place in the color-tone series,
+give an intensity series of their own, running from white through
+light gray and darker and darker gray to black, and any gray in this
+series may be the zero point in a saturation series of any color-tone.
+
+A three-dimensional diagram of the whole system of visual sensations
+can be built up in the following way. Taking all the colors of the
+same degree of brightness, we can arrange the most saturated, in the
+order of their color-tone, around the circumference of a circle, put a
+gray of the same brightness at the center of this circle, and then
+arrange a saturation series for each color-tone extending from the
+most saturated at the circumference to gray at the center. This would
+be a two-dimensional diagram for colors having the same brightness.
+For a greater brightness, we could arrange a similar circle and place
+it above the first, and for a smaller brightness, a similar circle and
+place it below the first, and we could thus build up a pile of
+circles, ranging from the greatest brightness at the top to the least
+at the bottom. But, as the colors all lose saturation when their
+brightness is much increased, and also when it is much decreased, we
+should make the circles smaller and smaller toward either the top or
+the bottom of the pile, so that our three-dimensional diagram would
+finally take the form of a double cone, with the most intense white,
+like that of sunlight, at the upper point, with dead black at the
+lower point, {209} and with the greatest diameter near the middle
+brightness, where the greatest saturations can be obtained. The axis
+of the double cone, extending from brightest white to dead black,
+would give the series of neutral grays. All the thousands of
+distinguishable colors, shades and tints, would find places in this
+scheme.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 34.--The color cone, described in the text.
+Instead of a cone, a four-sided pyramid is often used, so as to
+emphasize the four main colors, red, yellow, green and blue, which are
+then located at the corners of the base of the pyramid. (Figure text:
+white, black, R, B, G, Y)]
+
+
+Simpler Forms of the Color Sense
+
+Not every one gets all these sensations. In _color-blindness_, the
+system is reduced to one or two dimensions, instead of three. There
+are two principal forms of color-blindness: total, very uncommon; and
+red-green blindness, fairly {210} common. The totally color-blind
+individual sees only white, black, and the various shades of gray. His
+system of visual sensations is reduced to one dimension, corresponding
+to the axis of our double cone.
+
+_Red-green blindness_, very uncommon in women, is present in three or
+four percent of men. It is not a disease, not curable, not corrected
+by training, and not associated with any other defect of the eye, or
+of the brain. It is simply a native peculiarity of the color sense.
+Careful study shows that the only color sensations of the red-green
+blind person are blue and yellow, along with white, black and the
+grays. His color circle reduces to a straight line with yellow at one
+end and blue at the other. Instead of the color circle, he has a
+double saturation series, reaching from saturated yellow through
+duller yellows to gray and thence through dull blues to saturated
+blue. What appears to the normal eye as red, orange or grass green
+appears to him as more or less unsaturated yellow; and what appears to
+the normal eye as greenish blue, violet and purple appears to him as
+more or less unsaturated blue. His color system can be represented in
+two dimensions, one for the double saturation series,
+yellow-gray-blue, and the other for the intensity series,
+white-gray-black.
+
+Color-blindness, always interesting and not without some practical
+importance (since the confusions of the color-blind eye might lead to
+mistaking signals in navigation or railroading), takes on additional
+significance when we discover the curious fact that _every one is
+color-blind_--in certain parts of the retina. The outermost zone of
+the retina, corresponding to the margin of the field of view, is
+totally color-blind (or very nearly so), and an intermediate zone,
+between this and the central area of the retina that sees all the
+colors, is red-green blind, and delivers only blue and yellow
+sensations, along with white, black and gray. Take {211} a spot of
+yellow or blue and move it in from the side of the head into the
+margin of the field of view and then on towards the center. When it
+first appears in the margin, it simply appears gray, but when it has
+come inwards for a certain distance it changes to yellow. If a red or
+green spot is moved in similarly, it first appears gray, then takes on
+a faint tinge of yellow, and finally, as it approaches the center of
+the field of view, appears in its true color. The outer zone gets only
+black and white, the intermediate zone gets, in addition to these,
+yellow and blue, and the central area adds red and green (and with
+them all the colors).
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 35.--Color cones of the retina. F is the fovea, or
+central area of clearest vision. (Figure text: all colors, white-black &
+yellow-blue, white-black)]
+
+
+Now as to the question of elements, let us see how far we can go,
+keeping still to the sensations, without any reference to the
+stimulus. If a collection of bits of color is presented to a class of
+students who have not previously studied this matter, with the request
+that each select those colors that seem to him elementary and not
+blends, there is practically unanimous agreement on three colors, red,
+yellow and blue; and there are some votes for green also, but almost
+none for orange, violet, purple, brown or any other colors. {212}
+except white and black. That white and black are elementary sensations
+is made clear by the case of total color-blindness, since in this
+condition there are no other visual sensations from which white and
+black could be compounded, and these two differ so completely from
+each other that it would be impossible to think of white as made up of
+black, or black of white. Gray, on the other hand, appears like a
+blend of black and white. In the same way, red-green blindness
+demonstrates the reality of yellow and blue as elementary sensations,
+since neither of them could be reduced to a blend of the other with
+white or black; and there are no other colors present in this form of
+color vision to serve as possible elements out of which yellow and
+blue might be compounded. That white, black, yellow and blue are
+elementary sensations is therefore clear from the study of visual
+sensations alone; and there are indications that red and green are
+also elements.
+
+
+Visual Sensations as Related to the Stimulus
+
+Thus far, we have said nothing of the stimulus that arouses visual
+sensations. Light, the stimulus, is physically a wave motion, its
+vibrations succeeding each other at the rate of 500,000000,000000
+vibrations, more or less, per second, and moving through space with a
+speed of 186,000 miles per second. The "wave-length", or distance from
+the crest of one wave to the crest of the next following, is measured
+in millionths of a millimeter.
+
+The most important single step ever taken towards a knowledge of the
+physics of light, and incidentally towards a knowledge of visual
+sensations, was Newton's analysis of white light into the spectrum. He
+found that when white light is passed through a prism, it is broken up
+into all the colors of the rainbow or spectrum. Sunlight consists of a
+{213} mixture of waves of various lengths. At one end of the spectrum
+are the long waves (wave-length 760 millionths of a millimeter), at
+the other end are the short waves (wavelength 390), and in between are
+waves of every intermediate length, arranged in order from the longest
+to the shortest. The longest waves give the sensation of red, and the
+shortest that of violet, a slightly reddish blue.
+
+Outside the limits of the visible spectrum, however, there are waves
+still longer and shorter, incapable of arousing the retina, though the
+very long waves, beyond the red, arouse the sensation of warmth from
+the skin, and the very short waves, beyond the violet, though arousing
+none of the senses, do effect the photographic plate. Newton
+distinguished seven colors in the visible spectrum, red, orange,
+yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet; but there is nothing specially
+scientific about this list, since physically there are not seven but
+an unlimited number of wave-lengths included in the spectrum, varying
+continuously from the longest at the red end to the shortest at the
+violet; while psychologically the number of distinguishable colors in
+the spectrum, though not unlimited, is at least much larger than
+seven. Between red and orange, for instance, there are quite a number
+of distinguishable orange-reds and reddish oranges.
+
+If now we ask what differences in the stimulus give rise to the three
+kinds of difference in visual sensation that were spoken of
+previously, we find that color-tone depends on the wave-length of the
+light, brightness on the energy of the stimulus, i.e., on the
+amplitude of the vibration, and saturation on the mixture of long and
+short wave-lengths in a complex light-stimulus--the more mixture, the
+less saturation.
+
+These are the general correspondences between the light stimulus and
+the visual sensation; but the whole relationship is much more complex.
+Brightness depends, not only on the energy of the stimulus, but also
+on wave-length. The {214} retina is tuned to waves of medium length,
+corresponding to the yellow, which arouse much brighter sensation than
+long or short waves of the same physical energy. Otherwise put, the
+sensitivity of the retina is greatest for medium wavelengths, and
+decreases gradually towards the ends of the spectrum, ceasing
+altogether, as has been said, at wavelengths of 760 at the red end and
+of 390 at the violet end.
+
+Saturation, depending primarily on amount of mixture of different
+wave-lengths, depends also on the particular wavelengths acting, and
+also on their amplitude. So, the red and blue of the spectrum are more
+saturated than the yellow and green; and very bright or very dim
+light, however homogeneous, gives a less saturated sensation than a
+stimulus of medium strength.
+
+
+Color Mixing
+
+Color-tone depends on the wave-length, as has been said, but this is
+far from the whole truth; the whole truth, indeed, is one of the most
+curious and significant facts about color vision. We have said that
+each color-tone is the response to a particular wave-length. But any
+color-tone can be got without its particular wave-length being present
+at all; all that is necessary is that wave-lengths centering about
+this particular one shall be present. A mixed light, consisting of two
+wave-lengths, the one longer and the other shorter than the particular
+wave which when acting alone gives a certain color-tone, will give
+that same color-tone. For example, the orange color resulting from the
+isolated action of a wave-length of 650 is given also by the combined
+action of wave-lengths of 600 and 700, in amounts suitably
+proportioned to each other.
+
+A point of experimental technique: in _mixing colored lights_ for the
+purpose of studying the resulting sensations, we do not mix painter's
+pigments, since the physical {215} conditions then would be far from
+simple, but we mix the lights themselves by throwing them together
+either into the eye, or upon a white screen. We can also, on account
+of a certain lag or hang-over in the response of the retina, mix
+lights by rapidly alternating them, and get the same effect as if we
+had made them strike the retina simultaneously.
+
+By mixing a red light with a yellow, in varying proportions, all the
+color-tones between red and yellow can be got--reddish orange, orange
+and yellowish orange. By mixing yellow and green lights, we get all
+the greenish yellow and yellowish green color-tones; and by mixing
+green and blue lights we get the bluish greens and greenish blues.
+Finally, by mixing blue and red lights, in varying proportions, we get
+violet, purple and purplish red. Purple has no place in the spectrum,
+since it is a sensation which cannot be aroused by the action of any
+single wave-length, but only by the mixture of long and short waves.
+
+To get all the color-tones, then, we need not employ all the
+wave-lengths, but can get along with only four. In fact, we can get
+along with three. Red, green and blue will do the trick. Red and green
+lights, combined, would give the yellows; green and blue would give
+the greenish blues; and red and blue would give purple and violet.
+
+The sensation of white results--to go back to Newton--from the
+combined action of all the wave-lengths. But the stimulus _need_ not
+contain _all_ the wave-lengths. Four are enough; the three just
+mentioned would be enough. More surprising still, two are enough, if
+chosen just right. Mix a pure yellow light with a pure blue, and you
+will find that you get the sensation of white--or gray, if the lights
+used are not strong.
+
+[Footnote: When you mix blue and yellow _pigments_, each absorbs part
+of the wave-lengths of white light, and what is left after this double
+absorption may be predominantly green. This is absolutely different
+from the addition of blue to yellow light; addition gives white, not
+green.]
+
+{216}
+
+Lights, or wave-lengths, which when acting together on the retina give
+the sensation of white or gray, are said to be _complementary_.
+Speaking somewhat loosely, we sometimes say that two _colors_ are
+complementary when they mix to produce white. Strictly, the colors--or
+at least the color sensations--are not mixed; for when yellow and blue
+lights are mixed, the resulting sensation is by no means a mixture of
+blue and yellow sensations, but the sensation of white in which there
+is no trace of either blue or yellow. Mixing the stimuli which, acting
+separately, give two complementary colors, arouses the colorless
+sensation of white.
+
+Blue and yellow, then, are complementary. Suppose we set out to find
+the complementary of red. Mixing red and yellow lights gives the
+color-tones intermediate between these two; mixing red and green still
+gives the intermediate color-tones, but the orange and yellow and
+yellowish green so got lack saturation, being whitish or grayish. Now
+mix red with bluish green, and this grayishness is accentuated, and if
+just the right wave-length of bluish green is used, no trace of orange
+or yellow or grass green is obtained, but white or gray. Red and
+bluish green are thus complementary. The complement of orange light is
+a greenish blue, and that of greenish yellow is violet. The typical
+green (grass green) has no single wave-length complementary to it, but
+it does give white when mixed with a compound of long and short waves,
+which compound by itself gives the sensation of purple; so that we may
+speak of green and purple as complementary.
+
+
+What Are the Elementary Visual Sensations?
+
+Returning now to the question of elementary sensations, which we laid
+aside till we had examined the relationship of the sensations to the
+stimulus, we need to be on our guard against physics, or at least
+against being so much impressed with the physics of light as to forget
+that we are concerned with the _response_ of the organism to physical
+light--a matter on which physics cannot speak the final word.
+
+{217}
+
+ Fig. 36.--(After Koenig.) The color triangle, a map of the laws of
+ color mixture. The spectral colors are arranged in order along the
+ heavy solid line, and the purples along the heavy dotted line. The
+ numbers give the wave-lengths of different parts of the spectrum.
+ Inside the heavy line are located the pale tints of each color,
+ merging from every side into white, which is located at the point W.
+
+ Suppose equal amounts of two spectral colors are mixed: to find from
+ the diagram the color of the mixture. Locate the two colors on the
+ heavy line, draw a straight line between these two points, and the
+ middle of this line gives the color-tone and saturation of the
+ mixture. For example, mix red and yellow: then the resulting color
+ is a saturated reddish yellow. Mix red (760) and green (505): the
+ resulting yellow is non-saturated, since the straight line between
+ these two points lies inside the figure. If the straight line
+ joining two points passes through W, the colors located at the two
+ points are complementary.
+
+ Spectral colors are themselves not completely saturated. The way to
+ get color sensations of maximum saturation is first to stare at one
+ color, so as to fatigue or adapt the eye for that color, and then to
+ turn the eye upon the complementary color, which, under these
+ conditions, appears fuller and richer than anything otherwise
+ obtainable. The corners, R, G, and B, denote colors of maximum
+ saturation, and the whole of the triangle outside of the heavy line
+ is reserved for super-saturated color sensations.
+
+
+{end 217; text continues from 216}
+{218}
+
+Physics tells us of the stimulus, but we are concerned with the
+response. The facts of color-blindness and color mixing show very
+clearly that the response does not tally in all respects with the
+stimulus. Physics, then, is apt to confuse the student at this point
+and lead him astray. Much impressed with the physical discovery that
+_white_ light is a mixture of all wave-lengths, he is ready to believe
+the sensation of white a mixed sensation. He says, "White is the sum
+of all the colors", meaning that the sensation of white is compounded
+of the sensations of red, orange, yellow, green, blue and
+violet--which is simply not true. No one can pretend to get the
+sensations of red or blue in the sensation of white, and the fact of
+complementary colors shows that you cannot tell, from the sensation of
+white, whether the stimulus consists of yellow and blue, or red and
+bluish green, or red, green and blue, or all the wave-lengths, the
+response being the same to all these various combinations. Total
+color-blindness showed us, when we were discussing this matter before,
+that white was an elementary sensation, and nothing that has been said
+since changes that conclusion.
+
+Consider _black_, too. Physics says, black is the absence of light;
+but this must not be twisted to mean that black is the absence of all
+visual sensation. Absence of visual sensation is simply nothing, and
+black is far from that. It is a sensation, as positive as any, and
+undoubtedly elementary.
+
+From the point of view of physics, there is no reason for considering
+any one color more elementary than any other. Every wave-length is
+elementary; and if sensation tallied precisely with the stimulus,
+every spectral color-tone would be an element. But there are obvious
+objections to such a view, such as: (1) there are not nearly as many
+{219} distinguishable color-tones as there are wave-lengths; (2)
+orange, having a single wave-length, certainly appears to be a blend
+as truly as purple, which has no single wave-length; and (3) we cannot
+get away from the fact of red-green blindness, in which there are only
+two color-tones, _yellow_ and _blue_. In this form of color vision
+(which, we must remember, is normal in the intermediate zone of the
+retina), there are certainly not as many elementary responses as there
+are wave-lengths, but only one response to all the longer waves (the
+sensation of yellow), one response to all the shorter waves (the
+sensation of blue), one response to the combination of long and short
+waves (the sensation of white), and one response to the cessation of
+light (the sensation of black). These four are certainly elementary
+sensations, and there are probably only a few more.
+
+There must be at least two more, because of the fact that two of the
+sure elements, yellow and blue, are complementary. For suppose we try
+to get along with one more, as _red_. Then red, blended with yellow,
+would give the intervening color-tones, namely, orange with reddish
+and yellowish orange; and red blended with blue would give violet and
+purple; but yellow and blue would only give white or gray, and there
+would be no way of getting green. We must admit _green_ as another
+element. The particular red selected would be that of the red end of
+the spectrum, if we follow the general vote; and the green would
+probably be something very near grass green. We thus arrive at the
+conclusion that there are six elementary visual responses or
+sensations: white and black, yellow and blue, red and green.
+
+It is a curious fact that some of these elementary sensations blend
+with each other, while some refuse to blend. White and black blend to
+gray, and either white or black or both together will blend with any
+of the four elementary colors or with any possible blend of these
+four. Brown, for {220} example, is a grayish orange, that is, a blend
+of white, black, red and yellow. Red blends with yellow, yellow with
+green, green with blue, and blue with red. But we cannot get yellow
+and blue to blend, nor red and green. When we try to get yellow and
+blue to blend, by combining their appropriate stimuli, both colors
+disappear, and we get simply the colorless sensation of white or gray.
+When we try to get red and green to blend, both of them disappear and
+we get the sensation of yellow.
+
+
+Theories of Color Vision
+
+Of the most celebrated theories of color vision, the oldest,
+propounded by the physicists Young and Helmholtz, recognized only
+three elements, red, green and blue. Yellow they regarded as a blend
+of red and green, and white as a blend of all three elements. The
+unsatisfactory nature of this theory is obvious. White as a sensation
+is certainly not a blend of these three color sensations, but is,
+precisely, colorless; and no more is the yellow sensation a blend of
+red and green. Moreover, the theory cannot do justice either to total
+color-blindness, with its white and black but no colors, or to
+red-green blindness, with its yellow but no red or green.
+
+The next prominent theory was that of the physiologist Hering. He did
+justice to white and black by accepting them as elements; and to
+yellow and blue likewise. The fact that yellow and blue would not
+blend he accounted for by supposing them to be antagonistic responses
+of the retina; when, therefore, the stimuli for both acted together on
+the retina, neither of the two antagonistic responses could occur, and
+what did occur was simply the more generic response of white.
+Proceeding along this line, he concluded that red and green were also
+antagonistic responses; but just here {221} he committed a wholly
+unnecessary error, in assuming that if red and green were antagonistic
+responses, the combination of their stimuli must give white, just as
+with yellow and blue. Accordingly, he was forced to select as his red
+and green elementary color-tones two that would be complementary; and
+this meant a purplish (i.e., bluish) red, and a bluish green, with the
+result that his "elementary" red and green appear to nearly every one
+as compounds and not elements. It would really have been just as easy
+for Hering to suppose that the red and green responses, antagonizing
+each other, left the sensation yellow; and then he could have selected
+that red and green which we have concluded above to have the best
+claim.
+
+A third theory, propounded by the psychologist, Dr. Christine
+Ladd-Franklin, is based on keen criticism of the previous two, and
+seems to be harmonious with all the facts. She supposes that the color
+sense is now in the third stage of its evolution. In the first stage
+the only elements were white and black; the second stage added yellow
+and blue; and the third stage red and green. The outer zone of the
+retina is still in the first stage, and the intermediate zone in the
+second, only the central area having reached the third. In red-green
+blind individuals, the central area remains in the second stage, and
+in the totally color-blind the whole retina is still in the first
+stage.
+
+In the first stage, one response, white, was made to light of whatever
+wave-length. In the second stage, this single response divided into
+two, one aroused by the long waves and the other by the short. The
+response to the long waves was the sensation of yellow, and that to
+the short waves the sensation of blue. In the third stage, the yellow
+response divided into one for the longest waves, corresponding to the
+red, and one for somewhat shorter waves, corresponding to the green.
+Now, when we try to get a blend of red and green {222} by combining
+red and green lights, we fail because the two responses simply unite
+and revert to the more primitive yellow response; and similarly when
+we try to get the yellow and blue responses together, they revert to
+the more primitive white response out of which they developed.
+
+But, since no one can pretend to _see_ yellow as a reddish green, nor
+white as a bluish yellow, it is clear that the just-spoken-of union of
+the red and green responses, and of the yellow and blue responses,
+must take place _below the level of conscious sensation_. These unions
+probably take place within the retina itself. Probably they are purely
+chemical unions.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 37--The Ladd-Franklin theory of the evolution of
+the color sense. (Figure text: Stage 1--white, Stage 2--yellow blue,
+Stage 3--red green blue)]
+
+
+The _very first_ response of a rod or cone to light is probably a
+purely chemical reaction. Dr. Ladd-Franklin, carrying out her theory,
+supposes that a light-sensitive "mother substance" in the rods and
+cones is decomposed by the action of light, and gives off cleavage
+products which arouse the vital activity of the rods and cones, and
+thus start nerve currents coursing towards the brain.
+
+In the "first stage", she supposes, a _single_ big cleavage product,
+which we may call W, is split off by the action of {223} light upon
+the mother substance, and the vital response to W is the sensation of
+white.
+
+In the second stage, the mother substance is capable of giving off two
+smaller cleavage products, Y and B. Y is split off by the long waves
+of light, and B by the short waves, and the vital response to Y is the
+sensation of yellow, that to B the sensation of blue. But suppose
+that, chemically, Y + B = W: then, if Y and B are both split off at
+the same time in the same cone, they immediately unite into W, and the
+resulting sensation is white, and neither yellow nor blue.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 38.--The cleavage products, in the three stages of
+the color sense. The "mother substance" is not represented in the
+diagram, but only the cleavage products which, according to the
+Ladd-Franklin theory, are the direct stimuli for the color sensations.
+(Figure text: 1--white, 2--yellow blue, 3--red green blue)]
+
+
+Similarly, in the third stage, the mother substance is capable of
+giving off _three_ cleavage products, R, G and B; and there are three
+corresponding vital responses, the sensations of red, green and blue.
+But, chemically, R + G = Y; and therefore, if R and G are split off at
+the same time, they unite chemically into Y and give the sensation of
+yellow. If R, G and B are all split off at the same time, they unite
+chemically as follows: R + G = Y, and Y + B = W; and therefore the
+resulting sensation is that of white.
+
+This theory of cleavage products is in good general agreement with
+chemical principles, and it does justice to all the facts of color
+vision, as detailed in the preceding pages. It should be added that
+"for black, the theory supposes that, {224} in the interest of a
+continuous field of view, objects which reflect no light at all upon
+the retina have correlated with them a definite non-light
+sensation--that of black." [Footnote: Quotation from Dr.
+Ladd-Franklin.]
+
+
+Adaptation
+
+Sensory adaptation is a change that occurs in other senses also, but
+it is so much more important in the sense of sight than elsewhere that
+it may best be considered here. The stimulus continues, the sensation
+ceases or diminishes--that is the most striking form of sensory
+adaptation. Continued action of the same stimulus puts the sense into
+such a condition that it responds differently from at first, and
+usually more weakly. It is much like fatigue, but it often is more
+positive and beneficial than fatigue.
+
+The sense of smell is very subject to adaptation. On first entering a
+room you clearly sense an odor that you can no longer get after
+staying there for some time. This adaptation to one odor does not
+prevent your sensing quite different odors. Taste shows less
+adaptation than smell, but all are familiar with the decline in sweet
+sensation that comes with continued eating of sweets.
+
+All of the cutaneous senses except that for pain are much subject to
+adaptation. Continued steady pressure gives a sensation that declines
+rapidly and after a time ceases altogether. The temperature sense is
+usually adapted to the temperature of the skin, which therefore feels
+neither warm nor cool. If the temperature of the skin is raised from
+its usual level of about 70 degrees Fahrenheit to 80 or 86, this
+temperature at first gives the sensation of warmth, but after a time
+it gives no temperature sensation at all; the warmth sense has become
+adapted to the temperature of 80 degrees; and now a temperature of 70
+will give the sensation of cool. {225} Hold one hand in water at 80
+and the other in water at 66, and when both have become adapted to
+these respective temperatures, plunge them together into water at 70;
+and you will find this last to feel cool to the warm-adapted hand and
+warm to the cool-adapted. There are limits to this power of
+adaptation.
+
+The muscle sense seems to become adapted to any fixed position of a
+limb, so that, after the limb has remained motionless for some time,
+you cannot tell in what position it is; to find out, you have only to
+move it the least bit, which will excite both the muscle sense and the
+cutaneous pressure sense. The sense of head rotation is adaptable, in
+that a rotation which is keenly sensed at the start ceases to be felt
+as it continues; but here it is not the sense cells that become
+adapted, but the back flow that ceases, as will soon be explained.
+
+To come now to the sense of sight, we have _light adaptation, dark
+adaptation_, and _color adaptation_. Go into a dark room, and at first
+all seems black, but by degrees--provided there is a little light
+filtering into the room--you begin to see, for your retina is becoming
+dark-adapted. Now go out into a bright place, and at first you are
+"blinded", but you quickly "get used" to the bright illumination and
+see objects much more distinctly than at first; for your eye has now
+become light-adapted. Remain for some time in a room illuminated by a
+colored light (as the yellowish light of most artificial illuminants),
+and by degrees the color sensation bleaches out so that the light
+appears nearly white.
+
+Dark adaptation is equivalent to sensitizing the retina for faint
+light. Photographic plates can be made of more or less sensitiveness
+for use with different illuminations; but the retina automatically
+alters its sensitivity to fit the illumination to which it is exposed.
+
+
+{226}
+
+Rod and Cone Vision
+
+You will notice, in the dark room, that while you see light and shade
+and the forms of objects, you do not see colors. The same is true out
+of doors at night. In other words, the kind of vision that we have
+when the eye is dark-adapted is totally color-blind. Another
+significant fact is that the fovea is of little use in very dim light.
+These facts are taken to mean that dim-light vision, or _twilight
+vision_ as it is sometimes called, is _rod vision_ and not cone
+vision; or, in other words, that the rods and not the cones have the
+great sensitiveness to faint light in the dark-adapted eye. The cones
+perhaps become somewhat dark-adapted, but the rods far outstrip them
+in this direction. The fovea has no rods and hence is of little use in
+very faint light. The rods have no differential responsiveness to
+different wave-lengths, remaining still in the "first stage" in the
+development of color vision, and consequently no colors are seen in
+faint light.
+
+Rod vision differs then from cone vision in having only one response
+to every wave-length, and in adapting itself to much fainter light. No
+doubt, also, it is the rods that give to peripheral vision its great
+sensitivity to moving objects.
+
+
+
+After-Images
+
+After-images, which might better be called after-sensations, occur in
+other senses than sight, but nowhere else with such definiteness. The
+main fact here is that the response outlasts the stimulus. This is
+true of a muscle, and it is true of a sense organ. It takes a little
+time to get the muscle, or the sense organ, started, and, once it is
+in action, it takes a little time for it to stop. If you direct your
+eyes towards the lamp, holding your hand or a book in front of them as
+a screen, remove the screen for an {227} instant and then replace it,
+you will continue for a short time to see the light after the external
+stimulus has been cut off. This "positive after-image" is like the
+main sensation, only weaker. There is also a "negative after-image",
+best got by looking steadily at a black-and-white or colored figure
+for as long as fifteen or twenty seconds, and then directing the eyes
+upon a medium gray background. After a moment a sensation develops in
+which black takes the place of white and white of black, while for
+each color in the original sensation the complementary color now
+appears.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 39.--The visual response outlasts the stimulus.
+The progress of time is supposed to be from left to right in the
+diagram. After the stimulus ceases, the sensation persists for a time,
+at first as a positive after-image, and then as a negative
+after-image, a sort of back swing. (Figure text: stimulus, sensory
+response)]
+
+
+This phenomenon of the negative after-image is the same as that of
+color adaptation. Exposing the retina for some time to light of a
+certain color adapts the retina to that color, bleaches that color
+sensation, and, as it were, subtracts that color (or some of it) from
+the gray at which the eyes are then directed; and gray (or white)
+minus a color gives the complementary color.
+
+
+Contrast
+
+Contrast is still another effect that occurs in other senses, but most
+strikingly in vision. There is considerable in common between the
+negative after-image and contrast; indeed, {228} the negative
+after-image effect is also called "successive contrast". After looking
+at a bright surface, one of medium brightness appears dark, while this
+same medium brightness would seem bright after looking at a dark
+surface. This is evidently adaptation again, and is exactly parallel
+to what was found in regard to the temperature sense. After looking at
+any color steadily, the complementary color appears more saturated
+than usual; in fact, this is the way to secure the maximum of
+saturation in color sensation. These are examples of "successive
+contrast".
+
+"Simultaneous contrast" is something new, not covered by adaptation,
+but gives the same effects as successive contrast. If you take two
+pieces of the same gray paper, and place one on a black background and
+the other on white, you will find the piece on the black ground to
+look much brighter than the piece on the white ground. Spots of gray
+on colored backgrounds are tinged with the complementary colors. The
+contrast effect is most marked at the margin adjoining the background,
+and grows less away from this margin. Any two adjacent surfaces
+produce contrast effects in each other, though we usually do not
+notice them any more than we usually notice the after-images that
+occur many times in the course of the day.
+
+
+The Sense of Hearing
+
+Sound, like light, is physically a wave motion, though the sound
+vibrations are very different from those of light. They travel 1,100
+feet a second, instead of 186,000 miles a second. Their wave-length is
+measured in feet instead of in millionths of a millimeter, and their
+vibration frequencies are counted in tens, hundreds and thousands per
+second, instead of in millions of millions. But sound waves vary among
+themselves in the same three ways that we {229} noticed in light
+waves: in amplitude, in wave-length (or vibration rate), and in degree
+of mixture of different wave-lengths.
+
+Difference of amplitude (or energy) of sound waves produces difference
+of loudness in auditory sensation, which thus corresponds to
+brightness in visual sensation. Sounds can be arranged in order of
+loudness, as visual sensations can be arranged in order of brightness,
+both being examples of intensity series such as can be arranged in any
+kind of sensation.
+
+Difference of wave-length of sound waves produces difference in the
+_pitch_ of auditory sensation, which thus corresponds to color in
+visual sensation. Pitch ranges from the lowest notes, produced by the
+longest audible waves, to the highest, produced by the shortest
+audible waves. It is customary, in the case of sound waves, to speak
+of vibration rate instead of wave-length, the two quantities being
+inversely proportional to each other (in the same conducting medium).
+The lowest audible sound is one of about sixteen vibrations per
+second, and the highest one of about 30,000 per second, while the
+waves to which the ear is most sensitive have a vibration rate of
+about 1,000 to 4,000 per second. The ear begins to lose sensitiveness
+as early as the age of thirty, and this loss is most noticeable at the
+upper limit, which declines slowly from this age on.
+
+Middle C of the piano (or any instrument) has a vibration rate of
+about 260. Go up an octave from this and you double the number of
+vibrations per second; go down an octave and you halve the number of
+vibrations. Of any two notes that are an octave apart, the upper has
+twice the vibration rate of the lower. The whole range of audible
+notes, from 16 to 30,000 vibrations, thus amounts to about eleven
+octaves, of which music employs about eight octaves, finding little
+use for the upper and lower extremes of the {230} pitch series. The
+smallest step on the piano, called the "semitone", is one-twelfth of
+an octave; but it must not be supposed that this is the smallest
+difference that can be perceived. A large proportion of people can
+observe a difference of four vibrations, and keen ears a difference of
+less than one vibration; whereas the semitone, at middle C, is a step
+of about sixteen vibrations.
+
+_Mixture of different wave-lengths_, which in light causes difference
+of saturation, may be said in sound to cause difference of purity. A
+"pure tone" is the sensation aroused by a stimulus consisting wholly
+of waves of the same length. Such a stimulus is almost unobtainable,
+because every sounding body gives off, along with its fundamental
+waves, other waves shorter than the fundamental and arousing tone
+sensations of higher pitch, called "overtones". A piano string which,
+vibrating as a whole, gives 260 vibrations per second (middle C), also
+vibrates at the same time in halves, thus giving 520 vibrations per
+second; in thirds, giving 780 per second; and in other smaller
+segments. The whole stimulus given off by middle C of the piano is
+thus a compound of fundamental and overtones; and the sensation
+aroused by this complex stimulus is not a "pure tone" but a blend of
+fundamental tone and overtones. By careful attention and training, we
+can "hear out" the separate overtones from the total blend; but
+ordinarily we take the blend as a unit (just as we take the taste of
+lemonade as a unit), and hear it simply as middle C of a particular
+quality, namely the piano quality. Another instrument will give a
+somewhat different combination of overtones in the stimulus, and that
+means a different quality of tone in our sensation. We do not
+ordinarily analyze these complex blends, but we distinguish one from
+another perfectly well, and thus can tell whether a piano or a cornet
+is playing. The difference between different instruments, which we
+have spoken of as a {231} difference in quality or purity of tone, is
+technically known as _timbre_; and the timbre of an instrument depends
+on the admixture of shorter waves with the fundamental vibration which
+gives the main pitch of a note.
+
+Akin to the timbre of an instrument is the _vowel_ produced by the
+human mouth in any particular position. Each vowel appears to consist,
+physically, of certain high notes produced by the resonance of the
+mouth cavity. In the position for "ah", the cavity gives a certain
+tone; in the position for "ee" it gives a higher tone. Meanwhile, the
+pitch of the voice, determined by the vibration of the vocal cords,
+may remain the same or vary in any way. The vowel tones differ from
+overtones in remaining the same without regard to the pitch of the
+fundamental tone that is being sung or spoken, whereas overtones move
+up or down along with their fundamental. The vowels, as auditory
+sensations, are excellent examples of blends, in that, though
+compounds, they usually remain unanalyzed and are taken simply as
+units. What has been said of the vowels applies also to the
+semi-vowels and continuing consonants, such as l, m, n, r, f, th, s
+and sh.
+
+Other consonants are to be classed with the noises. Like a vowel, and
+like the timbre of an instrument, a noise is a blend of simple tones;
+but the fundamental tone in a noise-blend is not so preponderant as to
+give a clear pitch to the total sound, while the other tones present
+are often too brief or too unsteady to give a tonal effect.
+
+
+Comparison of Sight and Hearing
+
+The two senses of sight and hearing have many curious differences, and
+one of the most curious appears in mixing different wave-lengths.
+Compare the effect of throwing two colored lights together into the
+eye with the effect of {232} throwing two notes together into the ear.
+Two notes sounded together may give either a harmonious blend or a
+discord; now the discord is peculiar to the auditory realm; mixed
+colors never clash, though colors seen side by side may do so to a
+certain extent. A discord of tones is characterized by imperfect
+blending (something unknown in color mixing), and by roughness due to
+the presence of "beats" (another thing unknown in the sense of sight).
+Beats are caused by the interference between sound waves of slightly
+different vibration rate. If you tune two whistles one vibration apart
+and sound them together, you get a tone that swells once a second;
+tune them ten vibrations apart and you get ten swellings or beats per
+second, and the effect is rough and disagreeable.
+
+Aside from discord, a tone blend is really not such a different sort
+of thing from a color blend. A chord, in which the component notes
+blend while they can still, by attention and training, be "heard out
+of the chord", is quite analogous with such color blends as orange,
+purple or bluish green. At the same time, there is a curious
+difference here. By analogy with color mixing, you would expect two
+notes, as C and E, when combined, to give the same sensation as the
+single intermediate note D. Nothing of the kind! Were it so, music
+would be very different from what it is, if indeed it were possible at
+all. But the real difference between the two senses at this point is
+better expressed by saying that D does not give the effect of a
+combination of C and E, or, in general, that no one note ever gives
+the effect of a combination or blend of notes higher and lower than
+itself. Homogeneous orange light gives the sensation of a blend of red
+and yellow; but there is nothing like this in the auditory sphere. In
+light, some wave-lengths give the effect of simple colors, as red and
+yellow; and other wave-lengths the effect of blends, as greenish
+yellow or bluish {233} green; but in sound, every wave-length gives a
+tone which seems just as elementary as any other.
+
+There is nothing in auditory sensation to correspond to white, no
+simple sensation resulting from the combined action of all
+wave-lengths. Such a combination gives noise, but nothing that seems
+particularly simple. There is nothing auditory to correspond with
+black, for silence seems to be a genuine absence of sensation. There
+are no complementary tones like the complementary colors, no tones
+that destroy each other instead of blending. In a word, auditory
+sensation tallies with its stimulus much more closely than visual
+sensation does with its; and the main secret of this advantage of the
+sense of hearing is that it has a much larger number of elementary
+responses. Against the six elementary visual sensations are to be set
+auditory elements to the number of hundreds or thousands. From the
+fact that every distinguishable pitch gives a tone which seems as
+simple and unblended as any other, the conclusion would seem to be
+that each was an element; and this would mean thousands of elements.
+On the other hand, the fact that tones close together in pitch sound
+almost alike may mean that they have elements in common and are thus
+themselves compounds; but still there would undoubtedly be hundreds of
+elements.
+
+Both sight and hearing are served by great armies of sense cells, but
+the two armies are organized on very different principles. In the
+retina, the sense cells are spread out in such a way that each is
+affected by light from one particular direction; and thus the retina
+gives excellent space information. But each retinal cell is affected
+by any light that happens to come from its particular direction. Every
+cone, in the central area of the retina, makes all the elementary
+visual responses and gives all the possible color sensations; so it is
+not strange that the number of visual {234} elements is small. On the
+other hand, the ear, having no sound lens, has no way of keeping
+separate the sounds from different directions (and accordingly gives
+only meager indications of the direction of sound); but its sense
+cells are so spread out as to be affected, some by sound of one
+wavelength, others by other wave-lengths. The different tones do not
+all come from the same sense cells. Some of the auditory cells give
+the low tones, others the medium tones, still others the high tones;
+and since there are thousands of cells, there may be thousands of
+elementary responses.
+
+
+Theory of Hearing
+
+The most famous theory of the action of the inner ear is the "piano
+theory" of Helmholtz. The foundation of the theory is the fact that
+the sense cells of the cochlea stand on the "basilar membrane", a
+long, narrow membrane, stretched between bony attachments at either
+side, and composed partly of fibers running crosswise, very much as
+the strings of a piano or harp are stretched between two side bars. If
+you imagine the strings of a piano to be the warp of a fabric and
+interwoven with crossing fibers, you have a fair idea of the structure
+of the basilar membrane, except for the fact that the "strings" of the
+basilar membrane do not differ in length anywhere like as much as the
+strings of the piano must differ in order to produce the whole range
+of notes. Now, a piano string can be thrown into "sympathetic
+vibration", as when you put on the "loud pedal" (remove the dampers
+from the strings) and then sing a note into the piano. You will find
+that the string of the pitch sung has been thrown into vibration by
+the action of the sound waves sung against it.
+
+Now suppose the strings of the basilar membrane to be tuned to notes
+of all different pitches, within the range of {235} audible
+vibrations: then each string would be thrown into sympathetic
+vibration whenever waves of its own vibration rate reached it by way
+of the outer and middle ear; and the sense cells standing over the
+vibrating fibers would be shaken and excited. The theory is very
+attractive because it would account so nicely for the great number of
+elementary tone sensations (there are over 20,000 fibers or strings in
+the basilar membrane), as well as for various other facts of
+hearing--if we could only believe that the basilar membrane did
+vibrate in this simple manner, fiber by fiber. But (1) the fabric into
+which the strings of the membrane are woven would prevent their
+vibrating as freely and independently as the theory requires; (2) the
+strings do not differ in length a hundredth part of what they would
+need to differ in order to be tuned to all notes from the lowest to
+the highest, and there is no sign of differences in stretch or in
+loading of the strings to make up for their lack of difference in
+length; and (3) a little model of the basilar membrane, exposed to
+sound waves, is seen to be thrown into vibration, indeed, and into
+different forms of vibration for waves of different length, but not by
+any means into the simple sort of vibration demanded by the piano
+theory. This theory is accordingly too simple, but it probably points
+the way towards some truer, more complex, conception.
+
+The fact that there are many elementary sensations of hearing is the
+chief reason why the art of tones is so much more elaborate than the
+art of color; for while painting might dispute with music as to which
+were the more highly developed art, painting depends on form as well
+as color, and there is no art of pure color at all comparable with
+music, which makes use simply of tones (and noises) with their
+combinations and sequences.
+
+{236}
+
+Senses of Bodily Movement
+
+It is a remarkable fact that some parts of the inner ear are not
+connected with hearing at all, but with quite another sense, the
+existence of which was formerly unsuspected. The two groups of sense
+cells in the vestibule--the otolith organs--were formerly supposed to
+be the sense organ for noise; but noise now appears to be a compound
+of tones, and its organ, therefore, the cochlea. The _semicircular
+canals_, from their arrangement in three planes at right angles to
+each other, were once supposed to analyze the sound according to the
+direction from which it came; but no one could give anything but the
+vaguest idea of how they might do this, and besides the ear is now
+known to give practically no information regarding the direction of
+sound, except the one fact whether it comes from the right or left,
+which is given by the difference in the stimulation received by the
+two ears, and not by anything that exists in either ear taken alone.
+
+The semicircular canals have been much studied by the physiologists.
+They found that injury to these structures brought lack of equilibrium
+and inability to walk, swim or fly in a straight course. If, for
+example, the horizontal canal in the left ear is destroyed, the animal
+continually deviates to the left as he advances, and so is forced into
+a "circus movement". They found that the compensatory movements
+normally made in reaction to a movement impressed on the animal from
+without were no longer made when the canals were destroyed. They found
+that something very much like these compensatory movements could be
+elicited by direct stimulation of the end-organs in the canals or of
+the sensory nerves leading from them. And they found that little
+currents of the liquid filling the canals acted as a stimulus to these
+end-organs and so aroused the {237} compensatory movements. They were
+thus led to accept a view that was originally suggested by the
+position of the canals in space.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 40.--How the sense cells in a semicircular canal
+are stimulated by a water current. This current is itself an inertia
+back-flow, resulting from a turning of the head in the opposite
+direction. (Figure text: water current, nerve to brain)]
+
+
+Each "semicircular" canal, itself considerably more than a
+semicircular tube, opens into the vestibule at each end and thus
+amounts to a complete circle. Therefore rotating the head must, by
+inertia, produce a back flow of the fluid contents of the canal, and
+this current, by bending the hairs of the sense cells in the canal,
+would stimulate them and give a sensation of rotation, or at least a
+sensory nerve impulse excited by the head rotation.
+
+When a human subject is placed, blindfolded, in a chair that can be
+rotated without sound or jar, it is found that he can easily tell
+whenever you start to turn him in either direction. If you keep on
+turning him at a constant speed, he soon ceases to sense the movement,
+but if then you stop him, he says you are starting to turn him in the
+opposite {238} direction. He senses the beginning of the rotary
+movement because this causes the back flow through his canals; he
+ceases to sense the uniform movement because friction of the liquid in
+the slender canal soon abolishes the back flow by causing the liquid
+to move with the canal; and he senses the stopping of this movement
+because the liquid, again by inertia, continues to move in the
+direction it had been moving just before when it was keeping pace with
+the canal. Thus we see that there are conscious sensations of rotation
+from the canals, and that these give information of the starting or
+stopping of a rotation, though not of its steady continuance.
+Excessive stimulation of the canals gives the sensation of dizziness.
+
+The otolith organs in the vestibule are probably excited, not by
+rotary movements, but by sudden startings and stoppings of rectilinear
+motion, as in an elevator; and also by the pull of gravity when the
+head is held in any position. They give information regarding the
+position and rectilinear movements of the head, as the canals do of
+rotary head movements. Both are important in maintaining equilibrium
+and motor efficiency.
+
+The muscle sense is another sense of bodily movement; it was the
+"sixth sense", so bitterly fought in the middle of the last century by
+those who maintained that the five senses that were enough for our
+fathers ought to be enough for us, too. The question was whether the
+sense of touch did not account for all sensations of bodily movement.
+It was shown that there must be something besides the skin sense,
+because weights were better distinguished when "hefted" in the hand
+than when simply laid in the motionless palm; and it was shown that
+loss of skin sensation in an arm or leg interfered much less with the
+cooerdinated movements of the limb than did the loss of all the sensory
+nerves to the limb.
+
+
+ [Illustration: Fig. 41.--(From Cajal.) A "tendon spindle," very
+ similar to the muscle spindle spoken of in the text, but found at
+ the tendinous end of a muscle instead of embedded in the muscle
+ substance itself, "a" indicates the tendon, and "e" the muscle
+ fibers; "b" is a sensory axon, and "c" its end-brush about the
+ spindle. Let the tendon become taut in muscular contraction, and the
+ fine branches of the sensory axon will be squeezed and so
+ stimulated.]
+
+
+Later, the crucial fact was established {239} that sense organs (the
+"muscle spindles") existed in the muscles and were connected with
+sensory nerve fibers; and that other sense organs existed in the
+tendons and about {240} the joints. This sense accordingly might
+better be called the "muscle, tendon and joint sense", but the shorter
+term, "muscle sense", bids fair to stick. The Greek derivative,
+"kinesthesis", meaning "sense of movement", is sometimes used as an
+equivalent; and the corresponding adjective, "kinesthetic", is common.
+
+The muscle sense informs us of movements of the joints and of
+positions of the limbs, as well as of resistance encountered by any
+movement. Muscular fatigue and soreness are sensed through the same
+general system of sense organs. This sense is very important in the
+control of movement, both reflex and voluntary movement. Without it, a
+person lacks information of where a limb is to start with, and
+naturally cannot know what movement to make; or, if a movement is in
+process of being executed, he has no information as to how far the
+movement has progressed and cannot tell when to stop it. Thus it is
+less strange than it first appears to learn that "locomotor ataxia", a
+disease which shows itself in poor control of movement, is primarily a
+disease affecting not the motor nerves but the sensory nerves that
+take care of the muscle sense.
+
+{241}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter, rearranging the material somewhat, so as to
+ state, under each sense, (a) what sense cells, if any, are present
+ in the sense organ, (b) what accessory apparatus is present in the
+ sense organ, (c) what stimuli arouse the sense, (d) what are the
+ elementary responses of the sense, (e) peculiar blends occurring
+ within the sense or between this sense and another, (f) what can be
+ said regarding adaptation of the sense, and (g) what can be said
+ regarding after-images of the sense.
+
+2. Classify the senses according as they respond to stimuli
+ (a) internal to the body, (b) directly affecting the surface of the
+ body, (c) coming from a distance.
+
+3. What distinctive _uses_ are made of each sense?
+
+4. Explore a small portion of the skin, as on the back of the hand,
+ for cold spots, and for pain spots.
+
+5. Try to analyze the smooth sensation obtained by laying the
+ finger tip on a sheet of paper, and the rough sensation obtained by
+ laying the finger tip on the surface of a brush, and to describe
+ the difference in terms of the elementary skin sensations.
+
+6. Is the pain sense a highly developed sense, to judge from its
+ sense organ? Is it highly specialized? highly sensitive? How does
+ its peculiarity in these respects fit it for its use?
+
+7. Separation of taste and smell. Compare the taste of foods when
+ the nostrils are held closed with the taste of the same food when
+ the nostrils are opened.
+
+8. Make a complete analysis of the sensations obtained from chocolate
+ ice cream in the mouth.
+
+9. Peripheral vision. (a) Color sense. While your eyes are looking
+ rigidly straight ahead, take a bit of color in the hand and bring
+ it slowly in from the side, noticing what color sensation you get
+ from it when it can first be seen at all, and what changes in color
+ appear as it moves from the extreme periphery to the center of the
+ field of view, (b) Form sense. Use printed letters in the same way,
+ noticing how far out they can be read, (c) Sense of motion. Notice
+ how far out a little movement of the finger can be seen. Sum up
+ what you have learned of the differences between central and
+ peripheral vision. What is the use of peripheral vision?
+
+10. Light and dark adaptation. Go from a dimly lighted place
+ into bright sunlight, and immediately try for an instant to read
+ with the sun shining directly upon the page. Remaining in the
+ sunlight, {242} repeat the attempt every 10 seconds, and notice
+ how long it takes for the eye to become adapted to the bright
+ light. Having become light-adapted, go back into a dimly lighted
+ room, and see whether dark-adaptation takes more or less time than
+ light-adaptation.
+
+11. Color adaptation. Look steadily at a colored surface, and notice
+ whether the color fades as the exposure continues. Try looking at
+ the color with one eye only, and after a minute look at the color
+ with each eye separately, and notice whether the saturation
+ appears the same to the eye that has been exposed to the color,
+ and to the eye that has been shielded.
+
+12. Negative after-images. Look steadily for half a minute at a
+ black cross upon a white surface, and then turn the eyes upon a
+ plain gray surface, and describe what you see. (b) Look steadily
+ for half a minute at a colored spot upon a white or gray
+ background, and then turn the eyes upon a gray background, and
+ note the color of the after-image of the spot. Repeat with a
+ different color, and try to reach a general statement as to the
+ color of the negative after-image.
+
+13. Positive visual after-images. Look in the direction of a bright
+ light, such as an electric light, holding the hand as a screen
+ before the eyes, so that you do not see the light. Withdraw the
+ hand for a second, exposing the eyes to the light, and immediately
+ screen the eyes again, and notice whether the sensation of the
+ light outlasts the stimulus.
+
+14. Tactile after-images. Touch the skin lightly for an instant,
+ and notice whether the sensation ends as soon as the stimulus is
+ removed. If there is any after-image, is it positive or negative?
+
+15. Tactile adaptation. Support two fingers on the edge of a table,
+ and lay on them a match or some other light object. Let this
+ stimulus remain there, motionless, and notice whether the tactile
+ sensation remains steady or dies out. What is the effect of making
+ slight movements of the fingers, and so causing the stimulus to
+ affect fresh parts of the skin?
+
+16. Temperature sense adaptation. Have three bowls of water, one
+ quite warm, one cold, one medium. After holding one hand in the
+ warm water and the other in the cold, transfer both simultaneously
+ to the medium water and compare the temperature sensations got by
+ each hand from this water. State the result in terms of
+ adaptation.
+
+17. Overtones. These can be quite easily heard in the sound of a
+ large bell. What use does the sense of hearing make of overtones?
+
+
+
+REFERENCES
+For a somewhat fuller discussion of the topic of sensation, see
+Warren's _Human Psychology_, 1919, pp. 151-214; and for a much fuller
+discussion, see Titchener's _Textbook of Psychology_, 1909, pp.
+46-224.
+
+{243}
+
+For a really thorough consideration of the facts and theories of color
+vision, see J. Herbert Parsons, _An Introduction to the Study of
+Colour Vision_, 1915.
+
+For a more complete statement of the Ladd-Franklin theory, see the
+article on "Vision", in Baldwin's _Dictionary of Philosophy and
+Psychology_, 1902.
+
+For a recent study that has revolutionized the psychology of the sense
+of smell, see _Der Geruch_, by Hans Henning, 1916, or a review of the
+same by Professor Gamble in the _American Journal of Psychology_,
+1921, Vol. 32, pp. 290-296.
+
+For an extensive discussion of the "Psychology of Sound", sec the book
+with this title by Henry J. Watt, 1917.
+
+For a full account of taste, see Hollingworth and Poffenberger's
+_Sense of Taste_, 1917.
+
+
+{244}
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+ATTENTION
+
+HOW WE ATTEND, TO WHAT, AND WITH WHAT RESULTS
+
+"Attention!" shouts the officer as a preliminary to some more specific
+command, and the athletic starter calls out "Ready!" for the same
+purpose. Both commands are designed to put the hearer in an attitude
+of readiness for what is coming next. They put a stop to miscellaneous
+doings and clear the way for the specific reaction that is next to be
+called for. They nullify the effect of miscellaneous stimuli that are
+always competing for the hearer's attention, and make him responsive
+only to stimuli coming from the officer. They make the hearer clearly
+conscious of the officer. They arouse in the hearer a condition of
+keen alertness that cannot be maintained for more than a few seconds
+unless some further command comes from the officer. In all these ways
+"attention" in the military sense, or "readiness" in the athletic
+sense, affords a good picture of the psychology of attention.
+Attention is preparatory, selective, mobile, highly conscious. To
+attend to a thing is to be keenly conscious of that thing, it is to
+respond to that thing and disregard other things, and it is to expect
+something more from that thing.
+
+Attention is, in a word, exploratory. To attend is to explore, or to
+start to explore. Primitive attention amounts to the same as the
+instinct of exploration. Its natural stimulus is anything novel or
+sudden, its "emotional state" is curiosity or expectancy, and its
+instinctive reaction consists {245} of exploratory movements. Its
+inherent impulse is to explore, examine, or await.
+
+Attention belongs fundamentally among the native forms of behavior.
+The child does not have to learn to attend, though he must learn to
+attend to many things that do not naturally get his attention. Some
+stimuli naturally attract attention, and others attract attention only
+because of previous experience and training. In considering the whole
+subject of attention, then, we shall in part be dealing with native
+responses, and in part with responses that are acquired. But the great
+laws of attention, which will come to light in the course of the
+chapter, are at the same time general laws of reaction, and belong
+under the head of native characteristics.
+
+
+The Stimulus, or What Attracts Attention
+
+We can attend to anything whatever, but are more likely to attend to
+some things than to others. As stimuli for attention, some objects are
+much more effective than others, and the question is, in what way one
+object has the advantage over another. There are several ways, several
+"factors of advantage", we may call them.
+
+_Change_ is the greatest factor of advantage. A steady noise ceases
+after a while to be noticed, but let it change in any respect and
+immediately it arrests attention. The ticking of the clock is a good
+example: as long as it keeps uniformly on, it is unnoticed, but if it
+should suddenly beat faster or louder or in a different key, or even
+if it should stop altogether, it would "wake us up" with a start. The
+change in the stimulus must not be too gradual if it is to be
+effective, it must have a certain degree of suddenness. It may be a
+change in intensity, a becoming suddenly stronger or weaker; or it may
+be change in quality, as in tone, or {246} color, or odor; or it may
+be a change in position, a movement in space. When one who is holding
+our arm gives it a sudden squeeze to attract our attention, that is a
+change of intensity; when we step from the bank into the water, the
+sudden change from warmth to cold, that gets our attention without
+fail, is a change of quality; and something crawling on the skin
+attracts attention by virtue of its motion. Anything moving in the
+field of view is also an unfailing stimulus to attention.
+
+_Strength_, or high intensity of a stimulus, is another important
+factor of advantage. Other things being equal, a strong stimulus will
+attract attention before a weak one. A loud noise has the advantage
+over a low murmur, and a bright flash of light over a faint twinkle.
+
+In the case of visible objects, size has about the same effect as
+intensity. The large features of the landscape are noticed before the
+little details. The advertiser uses large type, and pays for big space
+in the newspaper, in the effort to attract the attention of the
+reader.
+
+ [Footnote: Often he pays more than the space is worth; at least
+ doubling the size of his "ad" will not, on the whole, double the
+ amount of attention he gets, or the number of readers whose
+ attention he will catch. The "attention value" of an advertisement
+ has been found by Strong to increase, not as fast as the increase in
+ space, but about as the square root of the space occupied.]
+
+Another similar factor is _repetition_. Cover a billboard with several
+copies of the same picture, and it attracts more attention than a
+single one of the pictures would. Repeat a "motive" in the decoration
+of a building, and it is more likely to be noticed. Repeat a cry or
+call several times, and after a while it may be noticed, though not at
+first. The "summation of stimuli" has much the same effect as
+increasing the intensity of a single stimulus.
+
+If, however, a stimulus is repeated or continued for a long time, it
+will probably cease to hold attention, because of its {247} monotony,
+or, in other words, because it lacks the element of change.
+
+_Striking quality_ is an advantage, quite apart from the matter of
+intensity. Saturated colors, though no stronger in intensity of light
+than pale colors, are stronger stimuli for attention. High notes are
+more striking than low. Itch, tickle and pain get attention in
+preference to smooth touch. "Striking" cannot be defined in physical
+terms, but simply refers to the fact that some kinds of stimulus get
+attention better than others.
+
+_Definite form_ has the advantage over what is vague. A small, sharply
+defined object, that stands out from its background, attracts the eye
+more than a broad, indefinite expanse of light such as the sky. In the
+realm of sound, "form" is represented by rhythm or tune, and by other
+definite sequences of sound, such as occur in the jingles that catch
+the little child's ear.
+
+The factors of advantage so far mentioned are native, and a stimulus
+possessing one or more of them is a natural attention-stimulus. But
+the individual also learns what is worth noticing, and what is not,
+and thus forms _habits of attention_, as well as habits of
+inattention. The automobile driver forms the habit of attending to the
+sound of his motor, the botanist forms the habit of noticing such
+inconspicuous objects as the lichens on the tree trunks. On the other
+hand, any one forms the habit of not noticing repeated stimuli that
+have no importance for him. Move into a house next the railroad, and
+at first you notice every train that passes; even at night you awake
+with a start, dreaming that some monster is pursuing you; but after a
+few days the trains disturb you very little, night or day. The general
+rule covering attention habits is this: anything that you have to work
+with, or like to play with, acquires the power to attract your
+attention, while anything that you do nothing {248} with loses
+whatever hold on your attention it may have possessed by virtue of its
+intensity, quality, etc.
+
+Besides these permanent habits of attention, there are temporary
+adjustments determined by the _momentary interest_ or desire. Stimuli
+relevant to the momentary interest have an unwonted hold upon
+attention, while things out of line with this interest may escape
+attention altogether, even though the same things would ordinarily be
+noticed. What you shall notice in the store window is governed by what
+you are looking for as much as by the prominence of the object in the
+total display. When you are angry with a person, you notice bad points
+about him that you usually overlook, and any aroused desire adjusts or
+"sets" attention in a similar way. The desire or interest of the
+moment _facilitates_ attention to certain stimuli and _inhibits_
+attention to others, and is thus an important factor of advantage.
+
+The interest of the moment is often represented by a question. Ask
+yourself what spots of red there are in the field of view, and
+immediately various red spots jump out and strike the eye; ask
+yourself what pressure sensations you are getting from the skin, and
+immediately several obtrude themselves. A question sets attention
+towards whatever may furnish an answer.
+
+To sum up, we may say that three general factors of advantage
+determine the power of any stimulus to attract attention. There is the
+native factor, consisting of change, intensity, striking quality, and
+definite form; there is the factor of habit, dependent on past
+experience; and there is the factor of present interest and desire.
+
+
+The Motor Reaction in Attention
+
+Attention is obviously a reaction of the individual to the stimulus
+that gets his attention; and it is in part a motor {249} reaction. The
+movements that occur in attending to an object are such as to afford a
+better view of it, or a better hearing of it, or, in general, such as
+to bring the sense organs to bear on it as efficiently as possible.
+
+We may distinguish two sorts of motor reaction that occur in
+attention: the general attentive attitude, and the special adjustments
+of the sense organs. An audience absorbed in a speech or musical
+performance gives a good picture of the general _attentive attitude_.
+You notice that most people look fixedly towards the speaker, as if
+listening with their eyes, and that many of them lean forward as if it
+were important to get just as close as possible. All the little
+restless movements cease, so that you could "hear a pin drop", and at
+the tensest moments even the breath is checked. The attitude of
+attention is one of tense immobility, with the whole body oriented
+towards the object of attention. When the object of attention is
+something not present but thought of, a somewhat similar rigid
+attitude is assumed; the body is apt to lean forward, the neck to be
+held stiff, and the eyes to "stare at vacancy", i.e., to be fixed on
+some convenient object as a mere resting place, while attention is
+fixed outside the visual field altogether.
+
+But we spoke of attention as mobile, and it would be strange if its
+mobility did not show itself in the motor reaction. It does in fact
+show itself in the _sense organ adjustments_ which amount to
+exploratory reactions. Attention to an object in the hand is shown by
+"feeling of it", to a substance in the mouth by tasting movements, to
+an odor by sniffing movements, to a sound by cocking the head and
+turning the eyes towards the source of sound. The most instructive of
+this type of attention-reactions are those of the eyes. The eye is
+focused on the object that arouses attention, the lens being
+accommodated for its distance by the action of the little ciliary
+muscle inside the {250} eyeball; the two eyes are converged upon the
+object, so that the light from it strikes the fovea or best part of
+each retina; and the eyes are also turned up, down or sidewise, so as,
+again, to receive the light from the object upon the fovea.
+
+This last class of eye movements is specially instructive and shows
+specially well the mobility of attention. Let a bright or moving
+object appear somewhere in the field of view--immediately the eyes
+turn towards it with a quick jump, fixate it for a few seconds and
+then jump elsewhere unless the object is found to be specially
+significant. Watch the eyes of one who is looking at a picture or
+scene of any sort, and you will see his eyes jumping hither and
+thither, as his attention shifts from one part of the scene to
+another. Ask him to abstain from this jumpy movement and let his eyes
+"sweep over" the scene, and he will confidently try to follow your
+instructions, but if you watch his eyes you will find them still
+jumping. In fact, "sweeping the glance" is a myth. It cannot be done.
+At least, there is only one case in which it can be done, and that is
+when there is a moving object to look at. Given an object moving at a
+moderate speed across the field of view, and the eyes can follow it
+and keep pace with it pretty accurately. But without the moving object
+as stimulus, the eyes can only execute the jump movement. There are
+thus two types of exploratory eye movement: the "jump" in passing from
+one object to another, and the "pursuit movement" in examining a
+moving object.
+
+In reading, the eye moves by a series of short jumps from left to
+right along the first line of print, makes a long jump back to the
+beginning of the second line and another series of short jumps along
+that line, and so on. To appreciate the value of this jerky movement,
+we need to understand that each short jump occupies but a thirtieth to
+a fiftieth {251} of a second, while the "fixation pauses" between
+jumps last much longer, with the result that over ninety per cent. of
+the time spent on a line of print is fixation time, and less than ten
+per cent, is occupied in jumping from one fixation to the next. Now,
+it has been found that nothing of any consequence is seen during the
+eye jumps, and that the real seeing takes place only during the
+fixations. The jump movement, therefore, is simply a means of passing
+from one fixation to another with the least possible loss of time.
+
+The eye sees an object distinctly only when at rest with respect to
+the object. If the object is still, the eye must be still to see it
+distinctly, and to see its different parts must fixate one after the
+other, jumping from one part to another. But if the object is in
+motion, the eye may still be able to see it distinctly by means of the
+pursuit movement, which is a sort of moving fixation.
+
+
+The Shifting of Attention
+
+Eye movement affords a good picture of the mobility of attention.
+Ordinarily the eye shifts frequently from one part of the field of
+view to another. When simply exploring a scene, it shifts about in
+what seems an indiscriminate way, though really following the
+principle of deserting each object as soon as it has been examined,
+and jumping to that other object which next has the advantage on
+account of movement, brightness, color, definite form, or habit of
+attention. In reading, however, the eye is governed by a definite
+interest, and moves consecutively along the series of words, instead
+of shifting irregularly about the page.
+
+A moving object, or an object that is doing something, or even a
+complex object that presents a number of parts to be examined in turn,
+can hold the eye for some time. But it is almost impossible to hold
+the eye fixed for any length of time on a simple, motionless,
+unchanging object.
+
+{252}
+
+Attention is mobile because it is exploratory; it continually seeks
+something fresh for examination. In the presence of a complex of
+sights and sounds and touch stimuli, it tends to shift every second or
+two from one part of the situation to another. Even if you are lying
+in bed with your eyes closed, the movement of attention still appears
+in the rapid succession of thoughts and images, and some shift usually
+occurs as often as once a second.
+
+A few simple experiments will serve to throw the shifting of attention
+into clearer relief. Look fixedly at a single letter written on a
+blank sheet of paper, and notice how one part after another of the
+letter stands out; notice also that attention does not stick
+absolutely to the letter, since thoughts obtrude themselves at
+intervals.
+
+ [Illustration:
+
+ O O O
+ O O
+ O O O
+ O O
+ O O O
+
+ Fig. 42.--A dot figure, from Sanford. Look steadily at it.]
+
+
+Or, make a "dot figure", composed of six or eight or more dots
+arranged either regularly or irregularly, and look steadily at the
+collection. Probably you will find that the dots seem to fall into
+figures and groups, and that the grouping changes frequently.
+Objectively, of course, the dots are grouped in one way as much as
+another, so that any particular grouping is your own doing. The
+objective stimulus, in other words, is capable of arousing several
+grouping reactions on your part, and does arouse different reactions
+one after another
+
+Shifting also appears in looking at an {253} "ambiguous figure", drawn
+so as to represent equally well a solid object in either of two
+different positions. The transparent cube, showing near and far edges
+alike, is a good example. Look steadily at such a drawing, and the
+cube will appear to shift its position from time to time. Numerous
+such figures can be constructed; the most celebrated is the ambiguous
+staircase. Look steadily at it, and suddenly you see the under side of
+a flight of stairs, instead of the upper; and if you keep on looking
+steadily, it shifts back and forth between these two positions.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 43.--The ambiguous cube figure.]
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 44.--The ambiguous staircase figure.]
+
+
+A still more striking case of shifting goes by the name of "binocular
+rivalry", and occurs when colors or figures that we cannot combine
+into a single picture are presented, {254} one to one eye, and the
+other to the corresponding part of the other retina. Hold red glass
+close in front of one eye and blue before the other, and look through
+both at once towards a bright background, and you will see red part of
+the time and blue part of the time, the two alternating as in the case
+of ambiguous figures.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 45.--Another ambiguous figure, which can be seen
+in three ways.]
+
+
+The stereoscope is a great convenience in applying inconsistent
+stimuli to the two eyes, and by aid of this instrument a great variety
+of experiments can be made. It is thus found that, if the field before
+one eye is a plain color, while the other, of a different color, has
+any little figure on it, this figure has a great advantage over the
+rival plain color and stays in sight most of the time. Anything moving
+in one field has a similar advantage, and a bright field has the
+advantage over a darker one. Thus the same factors of advantage hold
+good in binocular rivalry as in native attention generally.
+
+A different kind of shifting appears in what is called "fluctuation of
+attention". Make a light gray smudge on a white sheet of paper, and
+place this at such a distance that the gray will be barely
+distinguishable from the white {255} background. Looking steadily at
+the smudge, you will find it to disappear and reappear periodically.
+Or, place your watch at such a distance that its ticking is barely
+audible, and you will find the sound to go out and come back at
+intervals. The fluctuation probably represents periodic fatigue and
+recovery at the brain synapses concerned in observing the faint
+stimulus.
+
+Shiftings of the fluctuation type, or of the rivalry type either, are
+not to be regarded as quite the same sort of thing as the ordinary
+shiftings of attention. The more typical movement of attention is
+illustrated by the eye movements in examining a scene, or by the
+sequence of ideas and images in thinking or dreaming. Rivalry and
+fluctuation differ from this typical shifting of attention in several
+ways:
+
+(1) The typical movement of attention is quicker than the oscillation
+in rivalry or fluctuation. In rivalry, each appearance may last for
+many seconds before giving way to the other, whereas the more typical
+shift of attention occurs every second or so. In fact, during a
+rivalry or fluctuation experiment, you may observe thoughts coming and
+going at the same time, and at a more rapid rate than the changes in
+the object looked at. Attention does not really hold steady during the
+whole time that a single appearance of an ambiguous figure persists.
+
+(2) Rivalry shifts are influenced very little, if at all, by the
+factor of momentary desire or interest, and are very little subject to
+control.
+
+(3) In rivalry, the color that disappears goes out entirely, and in
+looking at a dot figure or ambiguous figure you get the same effect,
+since the grouping or appearance that gives way to another vanishes
+itself for the time being. But when, in exploring a scene with the
+eyes, you turn from one object to another, the object left behind
+simply retires to the background, without disappearing altogether;
+and, {256} in the same way, when attention shifts from one noise to
+another, the first noise does not lapse altogether but remains vaguely
+heard. Or when, in thinking of a number of people, one after another
+comes to mind, the first one does not go out of mind altogether when
+attention moves to the next, but remains still vaguely present for a
+few moments.
+
+
+Laws of Attention and Laws of Reaction in General
+
+Shifting occurs also in reflex action. Let two stimuli be acting at
+once, the one calling for one reflex and the other for the opposed
+reflex (as flexion and extension of the same limb), and the result is
+that only one of these reactions will occur at the same time, the
+other being completely inhibited; but the inhibited reflex gets its
+turn shortly, provided the two stimuli continue to act, and, in fact,
+the two reactions may alternate in a way that reminds us of binocular
+rivalry or ambiguous figures. Three fundamental laws of reaction here
+come to light.
+
+(1) The _law of selection_: of two or more inconsistent responses to
+the same situation (or complex of stimuli), only one is made at the
+same time.
+
+(2) The _law of advantage_: one of the alternative responses has an
+initial advantage over the others, due to such factors as intensity
+and change in the stimulus, or to habits of reaction.
+
+(3) The _law of shifting_: the response that has the initial advantage
+loses its advantage shortly, and an alternative response is made,
+provided the situation remains the same.
+
+These three laws hold good of reactions at all levels, from reflex
+action to rational thinking.
+
+The mobility of attention obeys these same laws; only, attention is
+livelier and freer in its movements than reflex action or than the
+shifting in rivalry. Attention is more mobile and less bound to rigid
+rules.
+
+
+{257}
+
+Sustained Attention
+
+The mobility of attention is only half the story. When we speak, for
+instance, of a student as having good powers of attention, we are not
+thinking of mobility but rather of the opposite.
+
+Eye movement, which we employed before as a picture of the movement of
+attention, affords also a picture of sustained attention. Remember how
+the eye moves in reading. Every second it shifts, but still it keeps
+to the line of print. Just so, attention keeps moving forward in the
+story we are reading, but sticks to the story. The more absorbed we
+are in the story, the more rapidly we read. Attention is sustained
+here, and still it moves. Sustained attention is not glued to one
+point, by any means, but is simply confined to a given object or
+theme, within which its motion may be as lively as ever.
+
+What is it, then, that sustains attention? Evidently it is the factor
+of present desire or interest, already mentioned. It is a
+reaction-tendency, aroused to activity by some stimulus or other,
+unable to reach its goal instantly, but persisting in activity for a
+while and facilitating responses that are in its line, while
+inhibiting others. Such a tendency facilitates response, i.e.,
+attention, to certain stimuli, and inhibits attention to others, thus
+causing them to be overlooked and neglected.
+
+For the student, the ideal attention-sustainer is an interest in the
+matter presented. If, however, he cannot get up any absorbing interest
+in the subject-matter at once, he may generate the necessary motive
+force by taking the lesson as a "stunt", as something to be mastered,
+a spur to his self-assertion. In the old days, fear was often the
+motive force relied upon in the schoolroom, and the switch hanging
+{258} behind the efficient teacher's desk was the stimulus to
+sustained attention. There must be _some_ tendency aroused if
+attention is to be sustained. The mastery impulse is certainly
+superior to fear for the purpose, but better than either is a genuine
+interest in the subject studied.
+
+In order to get up a genuine interest in a subject--an objective or
+inherent interest--it is usually necessary to penetrate into the
+subject for some little distance. The subject may not appeal to any of
+our native impulses, or to any interest that has been previously
+acquired, and how then are we to hold attention to it long enough to
+discover its inherent interest? Curiosity will give us a start, but is
+too easily satisfied to carry us far. Fear of punishment or
+disapproval, hope of reward or praise, being put on our mettle, or
+realizing the necessity of this subject for our future success, may
+keep us going till we find the subject attractive in itself.
+
+So, when the little child is learning to read, the printed characters
+have so little attractiveness in themselves that he naturally turns
+away from them after a brief exploration. But, because he is scolded
+when his mind wanders from those marks, because other children make
+fun of his blunders, because, when he reads correctly, he feels the
+glow of success and of applause, he does hold himself to the printed
+page till he is able to read a little, after which his interest in
+what he is reading is sufficient, without extraneous motives, to keep
+his nose between the covers of the story book more, perhaps, than is
+good for him. The little child, here, is the type of the successful
+student.
+
+Attention to a subject thus passes through three stages in its
+development. First comes the instinctive exploratory sort of
+attention, favored by the native factors of advantage. Next comes the
+stage of forced attention, driven by {259} extraneous motives, such as
+fear or self-assertion. Finally arrives the stage of objective
+interest. In the first and last stages attention is spontaneous, in
+the middle stage forced. The middle stage is often called that of
+voluntary attention, since effort has to be exerted to sustain
+attention, while the first and last stages, being free from effort,
+may be called involuntary.
+
+
+Distraction
+
+Distraction is an important topic for consideration in connection with
+sustained attention. A distraction is a stimulus that attracts
+attention away from the thing to which we mean to attend. There are
+always competing stimuli, and the various factors of advantage,
+especially desire or interest, determine which stimulus shall get
+attention at any moment.
+
+In the excited insane condition known as "mania" or the "manic state",
+the patient is excessively distractible. He commences to tell you
+something, all interest in what he has to say, but, if you pull out
+your watch while he is talking, he drops his story in the middle of a
+sentence and shifts to some remark about the watch. He seems to have
+no impulse persistent enough to hold his thoughts steady. There are
+contrary insane conditions in which it is almost impossible to
+distract the patient from his own inner broodings, so much is he
+absorbed in his own troubles.
+
+Distraction is a favorite topic for experiment in the laboratory. The
+subject is put to work adding or typewriting, and works for a time in
+quiet, after which disturbances are introduced. A bell rings, a
+phonograph record is played, perhaps a perfect bedlam of noise is let
+loose; with the curious result that the subject, only momentarily
+distracted, accomplishes more work rather than less. The distraction
+has acted as a stimulus to greater effort, and by this effort {260} is
+overcame. This does not always happen so in real life, but it shows
+the possibilities of sustained attention.
+
+There are several ways of overcoming a distraction. First, greater
+energy may be thrown into the task one is trying to perform. The extra
+effort is apt to show itself in gritting the teeth, reading or
+speaking aloud, and similar muscular activity which, while entirely
+unnecessary for executing the task in hand, helps by keeping the main
+stream of energy directed into the task instead of toward the
+distracting stimuli. Effort is necessary when the main task is
+uninteresting, or when the distraction is specially attractive, or
+even when the distraction is something new and strange and likely to
+arouse curiosity. But one may grow accustomed or "adapted" to an
+oft-recurring distraction, so as to sidetrack it without effort; in
+other words, a habit of inattention to the distracting stimulus may be
+formed. There is another, quite different way of overcoming a
+distraction, which works very well where it can be employed, and that
+is to couple the distraction to the main task, so as to deal with both
+together. An example is seen in piano playing. The beginner at the
+piano likes to play with the right band alone, because striking a note
+with the left hand distracts him from striking the proper note with
+the right. But, after practice, he couples the two hands, strikes the
+bass note of a chord with the left hand while his right strikes the
+other notes of the same chord, and much prefers two-handed to
+one-handed playing. In short, to overcome a distraction, you either
+sidetrack it or else couple it to your main task.
+
+
+Doing Two Things at Once
+
+The subject of distraction brings to mind the question that is often
+asked, "Can any one do two things at once?" In this form, the question
+admits of but one answer, for we {261} are always doing at least two
+things at once, provided we are doing anything else besides breathing.
+We have no trouble in breathing and walking at the same time, nor in
+seeing while breathing and walking, nor even in thinking at the same
+time. But breathing, walking, and seeing are so automatic as to
+require no attention. The more important question then, is whether we
+can do two things at once, when each demands careful attention.
+
+The redoubtable Julius Caesar, of happy memory, is said to have been
+able to dictate at once to several copyists. Now, Caesar's copyists
+were not stenographers, but wrote in long-hand, so that he could speak
+much faster than they could write. What he did, accordingly, was
+undoubtedly to give the first copyist a start on the first letter he
+wished to send, then turn to the second and give him a start on the
+second letter, and so on, getting back to the first in time to keep
+him busy. Quite an intellectual feat, certainly! But not a feat
+requiring absolutely simultaneous attention to several different
+matters. In a small way, any one can do something of the same kind. It
+is not impossible to add columns of numbers while reciting a familiar
+poem; you get the poem started and then let it run on automatically
+for a few words while you add a few numbers, switch back to the poem
+and then back to the adding, and so on. But in all this there is no
+doing of two things, attentively, at the same instant of time.
+
+You may be able, however, to combine two acts into a single
+cooerdinated act, in the way just described under the head of
+distraction, and give undivided attention to this compound act.
+
+
+The Span of Attention
+
+Similar to the question whether we can attentively perform more than a
+single act at a time is the question of {262} how many different
+objects we can attend to at once. The "span of attention" for objects
+of any given kind is measured by discovering how many such objects can
+be clearly seen, or heard, or felt, in a single instant of time.
+Measurement of this "span" is one of the oldest experiments in
+psychology. Place a number of marbles in a little box, take a single
+peek into the box and see if you know how many marbles are there. Four
+or five you can get in a single glance, but with more there you become
+uncertain.
+
+In the laboratory we have "exposure apparatus" for displaying a card
+for a fifth of a second or less, just enough time for a single glance.
+Make a number of dots or strokes on the card and see whether the
+subject knows the number on sight. He can tell four or five, and
+beyond that makes many mistakes.
+
+Expose letters not making any word and he can read about four at a
+glance. But if the letters make familiar words, he can read three or
+four words at a glance. If the words make a familiar phrase, he gets a
+phrase of several words, containing as many as twenty letters, at a
+single glance.
+
+Expose a number of little squares of different colors, and a
+well-trained subject will report correctly as many as five colors,
+though he cannot reach this number every time.
+
+
+Summary of the Laws of Attention
+
+Bringing together now what we have learned regarding the higher and
+more difficult forms of attention, as revealed by sustained attention
+and work under distraction, by the span of attention and by trying to
+do two things at once, we find the previously stated three laws of
+attention further illustrated, and a couple of new laws making their
+appearance.
+
+(1) The _law of selection_ still holds good in these more {263}
+difficult performances, since only one attentive response is made at
+the same instant of time. Automatic activities may be simultaneously
+going on, but any two attentive responses seem to be inconsistent with
+each other, so that the making of one excludes the other, in
+accordance with the general law of selection.
+
+What shall we say, however, of reading four disconnected letters at
+the same time, or of seeing clearly four colors at the same time?
+Here, it would seem, several things are separately attended to at
+once. The several things are similar, and close together, and the
+responses required are all simple and much alike. Such responses,
+under such very favorable conditions, are perhaps, then, not
+inconsistent with each other, so that two, three, or even four such
+attentive responses may be made at the same time.
+
+(2) The _law of advantage_ holds good, as illustrated by the fact that
+some distractions are harder to resist than others.
+
+(3) The _law of shifting_ holds good, as illustrated by the constant
+movement of attention, even when it is "sustained", and by the
+alternation between two activities when we are trying to carry them
+both along simultaneously.
+
+(4) The _law of sustained attention_, or of _tendency_ in attention,
+is the same old law of tendency that has shown itself repeatedly in
+earlier chapters. A tendency, when aroused to activity, facilitates
+responses that are in its line and inhibits others. A tendency is thus
+a strong factor of advantage, and it limits the shifting of attention.
+
+(5) A new law has come to light, the _law of combination_, which reads
+as follows: _a single response may be made to two or more stimuli_;
+or, _two or more stimuli may arouse a single joint response_.
+
+Even though, in accordance with the law of selection, only one
+attentive response is made at the same time, more than {264} one
+stimulus may be dealt with by this single attentive response. Groups
+of four dots are grasped as units, familiar words are grasped as
+units. Notice that these units are our own units, not external units.
+Physically, a row of six dots is as much a unit as a row of four, but
+we grasp the four as a unit in a way that we cannot apply to the six.
+Physically, six letters are as much a unit when they do not form a
+word as when they do; but we can make a unitary response to the six in
+the one case and not in the other. The response is a unit, though
+aroused by a number of separate stimuli.
+
+The law of combination, from its name, is open to a possible
+misconception, as if we reached out and grasped and combined the
+stimuli, whereas ordinarily we do nothing to the stimuli, except to
+see them and recognize them, or in some such way respond to them. The
+combination is something that happens _in us_; it is our response. If
+the expression were not so cumbersome, we might more accurately name
+this law that of "unitary response to a plurality of stimuli".
+
+Sometimes, indeed, we do make an actual motor response to two or more
+stimuli, as when we strike a chord of several notes on the piano. The
+law of combination still holds good here, since the movements of the
+two hands are cooerdinated into a single act, which is thought of as a
+unit ("striking a chord"), attended to as a unit, and executed as a
+unit. Such cooerdinated movements may be called "higher motor units",
+and we shall find much to say regarding them when we come to the
+subject of learned reactions. The law of combination, all in all, will
+be found later to have extreme importance in learned reactions.
+
+Passing now to another side of the study of attention, we shall
+immediately come across a sixth law to add to our list.
+
+{265}
+
+Attention and Degree of Consciousness
+
+Up to this point, the introspective side of the psychology of
+attention has not been considered. One of the surest of all
+introspective observations belongs right here, to the effect that we
+are more conscious of that to which we are attending than of anything
+else. Of two stimuli acting at once upon us, we are the more conscious
+of that one which catches our attention; of two acts that we perform
+simultaneously, that one is more conscious that is performed
+attentively.
+
+We need not be entirely unconscious of the act or the stimulus to
+which we are not attending. We may be dimly conscious of it. There are
+degrees of consciousness. Suppose, for example, you are looking out of
+the window while "lost in thought". You are most conscious of the
+matter of your thoughts, but conscious to a degree of what you see out
+of the window. Your eyes are focused on some particular object
+outside, and you are more conscious of this than of other objects seen
+in indirect vision, though even of these last you are not altogether
+unconscious. Consciousness shades off from high light to dim
+background.
+
+The "field of attention" is the maximum or high light of
+consciousness; it comprises the object under attentive observation,
+the reaction attentively performed. The "field of consciousness"
+includes the field of attention and much besides. It includes objects
+of which we are vaguely aware, desires active but not clearly
+formulated, feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness, of tension,
+excitement, confidence, etc.
+
+Apparently the field of consciousness shades off gradually into the
+field of unconscious activity. Some physiological processes go on
+unconsciously, and very habitual movements may be almost or entirely
+unconscious. The boundary {266} between what is vaguely conscious and
+what is entirely unconscious is necessarily very vague itself, but the
+probability is that the field of consciousness is broader than we
+usually suspect, and that many activities that we ordinarily think of
+as unconscious, because we do not observe them at the time nor
+remember them later, lie really near the margin of the field of
+consciousness, but inside that field. "Unconscious motives", such as
+spite or pride often seem to be, are probably vaguely conscious rather
+than unconscious. We shall return to the fascinating topic of the
+unconscious at the close of the book.
+
+Degree of consciousness does not always tally with intensity of
+sensation or energy of muscular action. You may be more conscious of a
+slight but significant sound than of much louder noises occurring at
+the same time. You may be more conscious of a delicate finger movement
+than of a strong contraction of big muscles occurring at the same
+time. Degree of consciousness goes with degree of mental activity. Of
+all the reactions we are making at the same time--and usually there
+are several--the most active in a mental way is the most conscious.
+The slight sound arouses intense mental response because it means
+something of importance--like the faint cry of the baby upstairs,
+noticed instead of the loud noises of the street. The delicate finger
+movement aims at some difficult result, while the big muscles may be
+doing their accustomed work automatically.
+
+It is not always the most efficient mental process that is most
+conscious; indeed, practising an act makes it both more efficient and
+less conscious. It is, rather, the less efficient processes that
+require attention, because they require mental work to keep them going
+straight.
+
+Our sixth law of attention, emerging from this introspective study, is
+naturally of a different style from the remainder of the list, which
+were objectively observed; yet it {267} is no less certain and perhaps
+no less significant. It may be called:
+
+(6) The _law of degrees of consciousness_, and thus stated: _An
+attentive response is conscious to a higher degree than any
+inattentive response made at the same time_. An inattentive response
+may be dimly conscious or, perhaps, altogether unconscious. The less
+familiar the response, and the higher it stands in the scale of mental
+performances, the more attentive it is, and the more conscious.
+
+
+The Management of Attention
+
+Attentive observation is more trustworthy than inattentive, and also
+gives more facts. Attentive movement is more accurate than
+inattentive, and may be quicker as well. Attentive study gives quicker
+learning than inattentive, and at the same time fixes the facts more
+durably.
+
+Shall we say, then, "Do everything attentively"? But that is
+impossible. We sense so many stimuli at once that we could not
+possibly attend to all of them. We do several things at once, and
+cannot give attention to them all. A skilful performance consists of
+many parts, and we cannot possibly give careful attention to all the
+parts. Attention is necessarily selective, and the best advice is, not
+simply to "be attentive", but to attend to the right things.
+
+In observation, the best plan is obviously to decide beforehand
+exactly what needs to be observed, and then to focus attention on this
+precise point. That is the principle underlying the remarkably sure
+and keen observation of the scientist. Reading may be called a kind of
+observation, since the reader is looking for what the author has to
+tell; and the rule that holds for other observation holds also for
+reading. That is to say that the reader finds the most when he knows
+just what he is looking for. We can learn {268} something here from
+story-reading, which is the most efficient sort of reading, in the
+sense that you get the point of the story better than that of more
+serious reading matter, the reason being that attention is always
+pressing forward in the story, looking for something very definite.
+You want to know how the hero gets out of the fix he is in, and you
+press forward and find out with great certainty and little loss of
+time. The best readers of serious matter have a similar eagerness to
+discover what the author has to say; they get the author's question,
+and press on to find his answer. Such readers are both quick and
+retentive. The dawdling reader, who simply spends so much time and
+covers so many pages, in the vague hope that something will stick,
+does not remember the point because he never got the point, and never
+got it because he wasn't looking for it.
+
+In skilled movement, or skilled action of any sort, the best rule is
+to fix attention on the end-result or, if the process is long, on the
+result that immediately needs to be accomplished. "Keep your eye on
+the ball" when the end just now to be achieved is hitting the ball.
+Attention to the details of the process, though necessary in learning
+a skilled movement, is distracting and confusing after skill has been
+acquired. The runner does not attend to his legs, but to the goal or,
+if that is still distant, to the runner just ahead of him.
+
+
+Theory of Attention
+
+The chief facts to take account of in attempting to form a conception
+of the brain action in attention are mobility, persistence in spite of
+mobility, and focusing.
+
+The mobility of attention must mean that brain activities are in
+constant flux, with nerve currents continually shooting hither and
+thither and arousing ever fresh groups of neurones; but sustained
+attention means that a brain {269} activity (representing the desire
+or interest or reaction-tendency dominant at the time) may persist and
+limit the range of the mobile activities, by facilitating some of
+these and inhibiting others.
+
+The "focusing" of mental activity is more difficult to translate into
+neural terms. The fact to be translated is that, while several mental
+activities may go on at once, only one occupies the focus of
+attention. This must mean that, while several brain activities go on
+at once, one is superior in some way to the rest. The superiority
+might lie in greater intensity of neurone action, or in greater
+extent; that is, one brain activity is bigger in some way than any
+other occurring at the same time--bigger either because the neurones
+in it are working more energetically or because it includes a larger
+number of active neurones.
+
+But why should not two equally big brain activities sometimes occur at
+the same moment, and attention thus be divided? The only promising
+hypothesis that has been offered to explain the absence of divided
+attention is that of "neurone drainage", according to which one or the
+other of two neurone groups, simultaneously aroused to activity,
+drains off the energy from the other, so putting a quietus on it.
+Unfortunately, this hypothesis explains too much, for it would make it
+impossible for minor brain activities to go on at the same time as the
+major one, and that would mean that only one thing could be done at a
+time, and that the field of consciousness was no broader than the
+field of attention. On the whole, we must admit that we do not know
+exactly what the focusing of attention can mean in brain terms.
+
+{270}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter, in the form of a number of "laws", putting
+ under each law the chief facts that belong there.
+
+2. See if you can verify, by watching another person's eyes, the
+ statements made on page 250 regarding eye movements.
+
+3. Choose a spot where there is a good deal going on, stay there
+ for five minutes and jot down the things that attract your
+ attention. Classify the stimuli under the several "factors of
+ advantage".
+
+4. Mention some stimulus to which you have a habit of attention,
+ and one to which you have a habit of inattention.
+
+5. Close the eyes, and direct attention to the field of cutaneous
+ and kinesthetic sensations. Do sensations emerge of which you are
+ ordinarily only dimly conscious? Does shifting occur?
+
+6. Of the several factors of advantage, which would be most effective
+ in catching another person's attention, and which in holding his
+ attention?
+
+7. How does attention, in a blind person, probably differ from that
+ of a seeing person?
+
+8. Doing two things at once. Prepare several columns of one-place
+ numbers, ten digits in a column. Try to add these columns, at the
+ same time reciting a familiar poem, and notice how you manage it,
+ and how accurate your work is.
+
+9. Consider what would be the best way to secure sustained
+ attention to some sort of work from which your mind is apt to wander.
+
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Walter B. Pillsbury gives a full treatment of the subject in his book
+on _Attention_, 1908, and a condensed account of the matter in Chapter
+V of his _Essentials of Psychology_, 2nd edition, 1920.
+
+Another full treatment is that of Titchener, in his _Textbook of
+Psychology_, 1909, pp. 265-302.
+
+On the topic of distraction, see John J. B. Morgan's _Overcoming of
+Distraction and Other Resistances_, 1916.
+
+{271}
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+INTELLIGENCE
+
+HOW INTELLIGENCE IS MEASURED, WHAT IT CONSISTS IN AND EVIDENCE OF ITS
+BEING LARGELY A MATTER OF HEREDITY
+
+Before leaving the general topic of native traits and passing to the
+process of learning or acquiring traits, we need to complete our
+picture of the native mental constitution by adding intelligence to
+reflex action, instinct, emotion, feeling, sensation and attention.
+Man is an intelligent animal by nature. The fact that he is the most
+intelligent of animals is due to his native constitution, as the fact
+that, among the lower animals, some species are more intelligent than
+others is due to the native constitution of each species. A rat has
+more intelligence than a frog, a dog than a rat, a monkey than a dog,
+and a man than a monkey, because of their native constitutions as
+members of their respective species.
+
+But the different individuals belonging to the same species are not
+all equal in intelligence, any more than in size or strength or
+vitality. Some dogs are more intelligent than others, and the same is
+notably true of men. Now, are these differences between members of the
+same species due to heredity or environment? This question we can
+better approach after considering the methods by which psychologists
+undertake to measure intelligence; and an analysis of these methods
+may also serve to indicate what is included under the term
+"intelligence".
+
+{272}
+
+Intelligence Tests
+
+Not far from the year 1900 the school authorities of the city of
+Paris, desiring to know whether the backwardness of many children in
+school resulted from inattention, mischievousness and similar
+difficulties of a moral nature, or from genuine inability to learn,
+put the problem into the hands of Alfred Binet, a leading psychologist
+of the day; and within a few years thereafter he and a collaborator
+brought out the now famous Binet-Simon tests for intelligence. In
+devising these tests, Binet's plan was to leave school knowledge to
+one side, and look for information and skill picked up by the child
+from his elders and playmates in the ordinary experience of life.
+Further, Binet wisely decided not to seek for any _single_ test for so
+broad a matter as intelligence, but rather to employ many brief tests
+and give the child plenty of chances to demonstrate what he had
+learned and what he could do. These little tests were graded in
+difficulty from the level of the three-year-old to that of the
+twelve-year-old, and the general plan was to determine how far up the
+scale the child could successfully pass the tests.
+
+These were not the first tests in existence by any means, but they
+were the first attempt at a measure of general intelligence, and they
+proved extraordinarily useful. They have been added to and revised by
+other psychologists, notably by Terman in America, who has extended
+the scale of tests up to the adult level. A few samples from Terman's
+revision will give an idea of the character of the Binet tests.
+
+ From the tests for three-year-olds: Naming familiar objects--the
+ child must name correctly at least three of five common objects that
+ are shown him.
+
+ Six-year test: Finding omissions in pictures of faces, from which
+ the nose, or one eye, etc., is left out. Four such pictures are
+ shown, and three correct responses are required to pass the test.
+
+ Eight-year test: Tell how wood and coal are alike; and so with three
+ other pairs of familiar things; two out of four correct responses
+ are required to pass the test.
+
+{273}
+
+ Twelve-year test: Vocabulary test--rough definitions showing the
+ child's understanding of forty words out of a standard list of one
+ hundred.
+
+The question may be raised, "Why such arbitrary standards-three out of
+five required here, two out of four there, forty out of a hundred the
+next time?" The answer is that the tests have been standardized by
+actual trial on large numbers of children, and so standardized that
+the average child of a given age can just barely pass the tests of
+that age.
+
+Intelligence is measured by Binet on a scale of _mental age_. The
+average child of, let us say, eight years and six months is said to
+have a mental age of eight years and six months; and any individual
+who does just as well as this is said to have this mental age, no
+matter what his chronological age may be. The average child of this
+age passes all the tests for eight years and below, and three of the
+six tests for age nine; or passes an equivalent number of tests from
+the total series. Usually there is some "scatter" in the child's
+successes, as he fails in a test here and there below his mental age,
+and succeeds here and there above his mental age, but the failures
+below and the successes above balance each other in the average child,
+so that he comes out with a mental age equal to his chronological age.
+
+ [Footnote: The Binet scale, it must be understood, is an instrument
+ of precision, not to be handled except by one who has been
+ thoroughly trained in its use. It looks so simple that any student
+ is apt to say, "Why, I could give those tests!" The point is that he
+ couldn't--not until he knew the tests practically by heart, not till
+ he had standardized his manner of conducting them to agree perfectly
+ with the prescribed manner and till he knew how to score the varying
+ answers given by different children according to the scoring system
+ that goes with the tests, and not till, by experience in handling
+ children in the tests, he was able to secure the child's confidence
+ and get him to do his best, without, however, giving the child any
+ assistance beyond what is prescribed. Many superior persons have
+ looked down on the psychological examiner with his (or her)
+ assortment of little tests, and have said, "Certainly no special
+ training is necessary to give these tests. You simply want to find
+ out whether the child can do these stunts. I can find out as well as
+ you." They miss the point altogether. The question is not whether
+ the child can do these stunts (with an undefined amount of
+ assistance), but whether he _does_ them under carefully prescribed
+ conditions. The child is given two, three or four dozen chances to
+ see how many of them he will accept; and the whole scale has been
+ standardized by try-out on many children of each age, and so adapted
+ that when given according to instructions, it will give a correct
+ measure of the child's mental age. But when given by superior
+ persons in ignorance of its true character, it gives results very
+ wide of the mark. So much by way of caution.]
+
+{274}
+
+If a child's mental age is the same as his chronological age, he is
+just average, neither bright nor dull. If his mental age is much above
+his chronological, he is bright; if much below, dull. His degree of
+brightness or dullness can be measured by the number of years his
+mental age is above or below his chronological age. He is, mentally,
+so many years advanced or retarded.
+
+Brightness or dullness can also be measured by the _intelligence
+quotient_, which is employed so frequently that it is customarily
+abbreviated to "IQ". This is the mental age divided by the
+chronological, and is usually expressed in per cent. The IQ of the
+exactly average child, of any age, is 1, or 100 per cent. The IQ of
+the bright child is above 100 and of the dull child below 100. About
+sixty per cent. of all children have an IQ between 90 and 110, twenty
+per cent, are below 90 and twenty per cent, above 110. The following
+table gives the distribution in somewhat greater detail:
+
+IQ below 70, 1%
+IQ 70-79, 5%
+IQ 80-89, 14%
+IQ 90-99, 30%
+IQ 100-109, 30%
+IQ 110-119, 14%
+IQ 120-129, 5%
+IQ over 129, 1%
+ ---
+ 100
+
+{275}
+
+For convenience, those with IQ under 70 are sometimes labeled
+"feeble-minded", and the others, in order, "borderline", "low normal",
+"average" (from 90 to 110), "superior", "very superior", "exceedingly
+superior"; but this is arbitrary and really unscientific, for what the
+facts show is not a separation into classes, but a continuous
+gradation from one extreme to the other. The lower extreme is near
+zero, and the upper extreme thus far found is about 180.
+
+While the mental age tells an individual's intellectual level at a
+given time, the IQ tells how fast he has progressed. An IQ of 125
+means that he has picked up knowledge and skill 25 per cent. faster
+than the average individual--that he has progressed as far in four
+years as the average child does in five, or as far in eight as the
+average does in ten, or as far in twelve as the average does in
+fifteen. The IQ usually remains fairly constant as the child grows
+older, and thus represents his rate of mental growth. It furnishes a
+pretty good measure of the individual's intelligence.
+
+
+Performance Tests
+
+Since, however, the Binet tests depend greatly on the use of language,
+they are not fair to the deaf child, nor to the child with a speech
+defect, nor to the foreign child. Also, some persons who are clumsy in
+managing the rather abstract ideas dealt with in the Binet tests show
+up better in managing concrete objects. For all such cases,
+_performance tests are useful. Language plays little part in a
+performance test_, and concrete objects are used. The "form board" is
+a good example. Blocks of various simple shapes are to be fitted into
+corresponding holes in a board; the time of performance is measured,
+and the errors (consisting in trying to put a block into a differently
+shaped hole) are also counted. To the normal adult, this task seems
+too simple {276} to serve as a test for intelligence, but the young
+child finds it difficult, and the mentally deficient adult goes at it
+in the same haphazard way as a young child, trying to force the square
+block into the round hole. He does not pin himself down to the one
+essential thing, which is to match blocks and holes according to
+shape.
+
+Another good performance test is the "picture completion". A picture
+is placed before the child, out of which several square holes have
+been cut. These cut-out pieces are mounted on little blocks, and there
+are other similar blocks with more or less irrelevant objects pictured
+on them. The child must select from the whole collection of little
+blocks the one that belongs in each hole in the picture. The better
+his understanding of the picture, the better his selection.
+
+
+Group Testing
+
+The tests so far described, because they have to be given to each
+subject individually, require a great deal of time from the trained
+examiner, and tests are also needed which can be given to a whole
+group of people at once. For persons who can read printed directions,
+a group test can easily be conducted, though much preliminary labor is
+necessary in selecting and standardizing the questions used. Group
+testing of foreigners, illiterates, and young children is more
+difficult, but has been accomplished, the directions being conveyed
+orally or by means of pantomime.
+
+The first extensive use of group intelligence tests was made in the
+American Army during the Great War. A committee of the American
+Psychological Association prepared and standardized the tests, and
+persuaded the Army authorities to let them try them out in the camps.
+So successful were these tests--when supplemented, in doubtful cases,
+by individual tests--that they were adopted in the receiving {277}
+camps; and they proved very useful both in detecting those individuals
+whose intelligence was too low to enable them to learn the duties of a
+soldier, and those who, from high intelligence, could profitably be
+trained for officers.
+
+The "Alpha test", used on recruits who could read, consisted of eight
+pages of questions, each page presenting a different type of problem
+for solution. On the first page were rows of circles, squares, etc.,
+to which certain things were to be done in accordance with spoken
+commands. The subject had to attend carefully to what he was told to
+do, since he was given each command only once, and some of the
+commands called for rather complicated reactions. The second page
+consisted of arithmetical problems, ranging from very simple at the
+top of the page to more difficult ones below, though none of them went
+into the more technical parts of arithmetic. One page tested the
+subject's information on matters of common knowledge; and another
+called for the selection of the best of three reasons offered for a
+given fact, as, for example, "Why is copper used for electric wires?
+Because--it is mined in Montana--it is a good conductor--it is the
+cheapest metal." Another page presented disarranged sentences (as,
+"wet rain always is", or "school horses all to go"), to be put
+straight mentally, and indicated on the paper as true or false.
+
+Many group tests are now in use, and among them some performance
+tests. In the latter, pictures are often employed; sometimes the
+subject has to complete the picture by drawing in a missing part,
+sometimes he has to cancel from the picture a part that is
+superfluous. He may have to draw a pencil line indicating the shortest
+path through a maze, or he may have to continue a series of marks
+which starts off according to a definite plan. The problems set him
+under each class range from very easy to fairly difficult.
+
+{278}
+
+Some Results of the Intelligence Tests
+
+The principal fact discovered by use of standardized intelligence
+tests is that the tests serve very well the purpose for which they
+were intended. In expert hands they actually give a fairly reliable
+measure of the individual's intelligence. They have located the
+trouble in the case of many a backward school child, whose
+intelligence was too low to enable him to derive much benefit from the
+regular school curriculum. His schooling needed to be adjusted to his
+intelligence so as to prepare him to do what he was constitutionally
+able to do.
+
+On the other hand, it sometimes happens that a child who is
+mischievous and inattentive in school, and whose school work is rather
+poor, tests high in intelligence, the trouble with him being that the
+work set him is below his mental level and therefore unstimulating.
+Such children do better when given more advanced work. The
+intelligence tests are proving of great service in detecting boys and
+girls of superior intelligence who have been dragging along, forming
+lazy habits of work, and not preparing for the kind of service that
+their intelligence should enable them to give.
+
+Some results obtained by the "Alpha test" are given in the following
+table, and in the diagram which restates the facts of the table in
+graphic form. The Alpha test included 212 questions in all, and a
+correct answer to any question netted the subject one point. The
+maximum score was thus 212 points, a mark which could only be obtained
+by a combination of perfect accuracy and very rapid work (since only a
+limited time was allowed for each page of the test). Very seldom does
+even a very bright individual score over 200 points. The table shows
+the approximate per cent, of individuals scoring between certain
+limits; thus, {279} of men drafted into the Army, approximately 8 per
+cent. scored below 15 points, 12 per cent. scored from 16 to 29
+points, etc. Of college freshmen, practically none score below 76
+points, 1 per cent. score from 76 to 89 points, etc.
+
+
+ Per cent. of Per cent. of
+ drafted men college freshmen
+ making these making these
+ Scores Scores
+Scores
+0-14 points 3 0
+
+15-29 12 0
+
+30-44 15 0
+
+45-59 16 0
+
+60-74 13 0
+
+75-89 11 1
+
+90-104 9 4
+
+105-119 7 8
+
+120-134 6 14
+
+135-149 4 23
+
+150-164 2 24
+
+165-179 1.3 13
+
+180-194 0.5 7
+
+195-212 0.2 1
+ ----- ---
+ 100 100
+
+
+The "drafted men", consisting of men between the ages of twenty-one
+and thirty-one, fairly represent the adult male white population of
+the country, except in two respects. Many able young men were not
+included in the draft, having previously volunteered for officers'
+training camps or for special services. Had they been included, the
+percentages making the higher scores would have gone up slightly. On
+the other hand, many men of very low intelligence never reached the
+receiving camps at all, being inmates of institutions for the
+feebleminded or excluded from the draft because of known mental
+deficiency; and, of those who reached {280} the camps, many, being
+illiterate, did not take the Alpha test. It is for this reason that
+the graph for drafted men stops rather short at the lower end; to
+picture fairly the distribution of intelligence, it should taper off
+to the left, beyond the zero of the Alpha test.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 46.--Distribution of the scores of drafted men,
+and also of college freshmen, in the Alpha test. The height of the
+broken line above the base line is made proportional to the percent of
+the group that made the score indicated just below along the base
+line. (Figure text: army median--65, freshman median--150)]
+
+
+College freshmen evidently are, as they should be, a highly selected
+group in regard to intelligence. The results obtained at different
+colleges differ somewhat, and the figures here given represent an
+approximate average of results obtained at several colleges of high
+standing. The median {281} score for freshmen has varied, at different
+colleges, from 140 to 160 points.
+
+ [Footnote: The "median" is a statistical measure very similar to the
+ average; but, while the average score would be obtained by adding
+ together the scores of all the individuals and dividing the sum by
+ the number of individuals tested, the median is obtained by
+ arranging all the individual scores in order, from the lowest to the
+ highest, and then counting off from either end till the middle
+ individual is reached; his score is the median. (If the number of
+ individuals tested is an even number, there are two middle
+ individuals, and the point midway between them is taken as the
+ median.) Just as many individuals are below the median as above it.
+ The median is often preferred to the average in psychological work,
+ not only because it is more easily computed, but because it is less
+ affected by the eccentric or unusual performances of a few
+ individuals, and therefore more fairly represents the whole
+ population.]
+
+It will be noticed in the graph that none of the freshmen score as low
+as the median of the drafted men. All of the freshmen, in fact, lie
+well above the median for the general population. A freshman who
+scores below 100 points finds it very difficult to keep up in his
+college work. Sometimes, it must be said, a freshman who scores not
+much over 100 in the test does very well in his studies, and sometimes
+one who scores very high in the test has to be dropped for poor
+scholarship, but this last is probably due to distracting interests.
+
+No such sampling of the adult female population has ever been made as
+was afforded by the draft, and we are not in a position to compare the
+average adult man and woman in regard to intelligence. Boys and girls
+under twelve average almost the same, year by year, according to the
+Binet tests. In various other tests, calling for quick, accurate work,
+girls have on the average slightly surpassed boys of the same age, but
+this may result from the fact that girls mature earlier than boys;
+they reach adult height earlier, and perhaps also adult intelligence.
+College women, in the Alpha test, score on the average a few points
+below college men, but this, on the other hand, may be due to the fact
+that the Alpha test, being prepared for men, includes a few questions
+that lie rather outside the usual range of women's interests. On the
+whole, tests have given very little evidence of any significant
+difference between the general run of intelligence in the two sexes.
+
+
+Limitations of the Intelligence Tests
+
+Tests of the Binet or Alpha variety evidently do not cover the whole
+range of intelligent behavior. They do not test {282} the ability to
+manage carpenter's or plumber's tools or other concrete things, they
+do not test the ability to manage people, and they do not reach high
+enough to test the ability to solve really big problems.
+
+Regarding the ability to manage concrete things, we have already
+mentioned the performance tests, which provide a necessary supplement
+to the tests that deal in ideas expressed in words. It is an
+interesting fact that some men whose mental age is below ten,
+according to the Binet tests, nevertheless have steady jobs, earn good
+wages, and get on all right in a simple environment. There are many
+others, with a mental age of ten or eleven, who cannot master the
+school work of the upper grades, and yet become skilled workmen or
+even real artists. Now, it takes mentality to perform skilled or
+artistic work; only, the mentality is different from that demanded by
+what we call "intellectual work".
+
+Managing people requires tact and leadership, which are obviously
+mental traits, though not easily tested. It is seldom that a real
+leader of men scores anything but high in the intelligence tests, but
+it more often happens that an individual who scores very high in the
+tests has little power of leadership. In part this is a matter of
+physique, or of temperament, rather than of intelligence, but in part
+it is a matter of _understanding_ people and seeing how they can be
+influenced and led.
+
+Though the intelligence tests deal with "ideas", they do not, as so
+far devised, reach up to the great ideas nor make much demand on the
+superior powers of the great thinker. If we could assemble a group of
+the world's great authors, scientists and inventors, and put them
+through the Alpha test, it is probable that they would all score high,
+but not higher than the upper ten per cent, of college freshmen. Had
+their IQ's been determined when they were children, {283} probably all
+would have measured over 180 and some as high as 200, but the tests
+would not have distinguished these great geniuses from the gifted
+child who is simply one of a hundred or one of a thousand.
+
+
+The Correlation of Abilities
+
+There is no opposition between "general intelligence", as measured by
+the tests, and the abilities to deal with concrete things, with
+people, or with big ideas. Rather, there is a considerable degree of
+correspondence. The individual who scores high in the intelligence
+tests is likely, but not certain, to surpass in these respects the
+individual who scores low in the tests. In technical language, there
+is a "positive correlation" between general intelligence and ability
+to deal with concrete things, people and big ideas, but the
+correlation is not perfect.
+
+_Correlation_ is a statistical measure of the degree of
+correspondence. Suppose, for an example, we wish to find out how
+closely people's weights correspond to their heights. Stand fifty
+young men up in single file in order of height, the tallest in front,
+the shortest behind. Then weigh each man, and shift them into the
+order of their weights. If no shifting whatever were needed, the
+correlation between height and weight would be perfect. Suppose the
+impossible, that the shortest man was the heaviest, the tallest the
+lightest, and that the whole order needed to be exactly reversed; then
+we should say that the correlation was perfectly inverse or negative.
+Suppose the shift from height order to weight order mixed the men
+indiscriminately, so that you could not tell _anything_ from a man's
+position in the height order as to what his position would be in the
+weight order; then we should have "zero correlation". The actual
+result, however, would be that, while the height order would be {284}
+somewhat disturbed in shifting to the weight order, it would not be
+entirely lost, much less reversed. That is, the correlation between
+height and weight is positive but not perfect.
+
+Statistics furnishes a number of formulae for measuring correlations,
+formulae which agree in this, that perfect positive correlation is
+indicated by the number + 1, perfect negative correlation by the
+number - 1, and zero correlation by 0. A correlation of +.8 indicates
+close positive correspondence, though not perfect correspondence; a
+correlation of +.3 means a rather low, but still positive,
+correspondence; a correlation of -.6 means a moderate tendency towards
+inverse relationship.
+
+The correlation between two good intelligence tests, such as the Binet
+and the Alpha, comes out at about +.8, which means that if a fair
+sample of the general population, ranging from low to high
+intelligence, is given both tests, the order of the individuals as
+measured by the one test will agree pretty closely with the order
+obtained with the other test. The correlation between a general
+intelligence test and a test for mechanical ability is considerably
+lower but still positive, coming to about +.4. Few if any real
+negative correlations are found between different abilities, but low
+positive or approximately zero correlations are frequent between
+different, rather special abilities.
+
+In other words, there is no evidence of any antagonism between
+different sorts of ability, but there is plenty of evidence that
+different special abilities may have little or nothing in common.
+
+ [Footnote]
+ Possibly some readers would like to see a sample of the
+ statistical formulae by which correlation is measured. Here is one
+ of the simplest. Number the individuals tested in their order as
+ given by the first test, and again in their order as given by the
+ second test, and find the difference between each individual's two
+ rank numbers. If an individual who ranks no. 5 in one test ranks no.
+ 12 in the other, the difference in his rank numbers is 7. Designate
+ this difference by the letter D. and the whole number of individuals
+ tested by n. Square each D, and get the sum of all the squares,
+ calling this sum "sum of D2[squared]". Then the correlation is given
+ by the formula,
+
+ 1 - ( ( 6 X sum of D[squared] ) / (n x ( n[squared] - 1)) )
+
+ As an example in the use of this formula, take the following:
+
+
+
+ Individuals Rank of each Rank of each D D[squared]
+ tested individual in individual in
+ first test second test
+
+ Albert 3 5 2 4
+
+ George 7 6 1 1
+
+ Henry 5 3 2 4
+
+ James 2 1 1 1
+
+ Stephen 1 4 3 9
+
+ Thomas 4 2 2 4
+
+ William 6 7 1 1
+
+
+ n = 7
+
+ sum of D[squared] = 24
+
+ n[squared] - 1 = 48
+
+ 6 x sum of D[squared] = 144
+
+ 6 x sum of D[squared] / n ( n[squared] - 1 )
+
+ = 1 - 144/(7 x 48)
+
+ = +.57
+
+ In order to get a full and true measure of the correlation between
+ two tests, the following precautions are necessary:
+
+ (1) The _same individuals_ must be given both tests.
+
+ (2) The number of individuals tested must be as great as 15 or 20,
+ preferably more.
+
+ (3) The individuals should be a fair sample of the population in
+ regard to the abilities tested; they should not be so selected as to
+ represent only a small part of the total range of ability.
+
+ (4) The tests should be thorough enough to determine each
+ individual's rank in each test, with a high degree of certainty.
+ Sloppy testing gives a correlation nearer zero than it should be,
+ because it "pies" the true orders to some extent.
+ [End footnote]
+
+{285}
+
+General Factors in Intelligence
+
+If now we try to analyze intelligence and see in what it consists, we
+can best proceed by reviewing the intelligence tests, and asking how
+it is that an individual succeeds in them. Passing the tests is a very
+specific instance of {286} intelligent behavior, and an analysis of
+the content of the tests should throw some light on the nature of
+intelligence.
+
+The first thing that strikes the eye in looking over the tests is that
+they call for so many different reactions. They call on you to name
+objects, to copy a square, to tell whether a given statement is true
+or false, to tell wherein two objects are alike or different. The
+first impression, then, is that intelligence consists simply in doing
+a miscellaneous lot of things and doing them right.
+
+But can we not state in more general terms how the individual who
+scores high in the tests differs from one who scores low? If you
+survey the test questions carefully, you begin to see that the person
+who passes them must possess certain general characteristics, and that
+lack of these characteristics will lead to a low score. We may speak
+of these characteristics as "general factors" in intelligent behavior.
+
+First, the tests evidently require the use of past experience. They
+call, not for instinctive reactions, but for previously learned
+reactions. Though the Binet tests attempt to steer clear of specific
+school knowledge, they do depend upon knowledge and skill picked up by
+the child in the course of his ordinary experience. They depend on the
+ability to learn and remember. One general factor in intelligence is
+therefore _retentiveness_.
+
+But the tests do not usually call for simple memory of something
+previously learned. Rather, what has been previously learned must be
+applied, in the test, to a more or less novel problem. The subject is
+asked to do something a little different from anything he has
+previously done, but similar enough so that he can make use of what he
+has learned. He has to _see the point_ of the problem now set him, and
+to _adapt_ what he has learned to this novel situation. Perhaps
+"seeing the point" and "adapting oneself to {287} a novel situation"
+are to be held apart as two separate general factors in intelligence,
+but on the whole it seems possible to include both under the general
+head, _responsiveness to relationships_, and to set up this
+characteristic as a second general factor in intelligence.
+
+In the form board and picture completion tests, this responsiveness to
+relationships comes out clearly. To succeed in the form board, the
+subject must respond to the likeness of shape between the blocks and
+their corresponding holes. In picture completion, he must see what
+addition stands in the most significant relationship to the total
+picture situation. In telling how certain things are alike or
+different, he obviously responds to relationships; and so also in
+distinguishing between good and poor reasons for a certain fact. This
+element of response to relationships occurs again and again in the
+tests, though perhaps not in the simplest, such as naming familiar
+objects.
+
+Besides these two intellectual factors in intelligent behavior, there
+are certain moral or impulsive factors. One is _persistence_, which is
+probably the same thing as the mastery or self-assertive instinct. The
+individual who gives up easily, or succumbs easily to distraction or
+timidity, is at a disadvantage in the tests or in any situation
+calling for intelligent behavior.
+
+But, as we said before, in discussing the instincts, excessive
+stubbornness is a handicap in meeting a novel situation, which often
+cannot be mastered by the first mode of response that one makes to it.
+Some giving up, some _submissiveness_ in detail along with persistence
+in the main effort, is needed. The too stubborn young child may waste
+a lot of time trying with all his might to force the square block into
+the round hole, and so make a poorer score in the test, than if he had
+given up his first line of attack and tried something else.
+Intelligent behavior must perforce {288} often have something of the
+character of "trial and error", and trial and error requires both
+persistence in the main enterprise and a giving up here in order to
+try again there.
+
+Finally, the instinct of _curiosity_ or exploration is evidently a
+factor in intelligence. The individual who is stimulated by novel
+things to explore and manipulate them will amass knowledge and skill
+that can later be utilized in the tests, or in intelligent behavior
+generally.
+
+
+Special Aptitudes
+
+We distinguish between the general factors in intelligence, just
+mentioned, and special aptitudes for dealing with colors, forms,
+numbers, weights etc. A special aptitude is a specific responsiveness
+to a certain kind of stimulus or object. The special aptitudes are
+factors in intelligent behavior--as we may judge from the content of
+the intelligence tests--only, the tests are so contrived as not to
+depend too much on any one or any few of the special aptitudes.
+Arithmetical problems alone would not make a fair test for
+intelligence, since they would lay undue stress on the special
+aptitude for number; but it is fair enough to include them along with
+color naming, weight judging, form copying, and word remembering, and
+so to give many special aptitudes a chance to figure in the final
+score.
+
+There are tests in existence for some special aptitudes: tests for
+color sense and color matching, for musical ability, for ability in
+drawing, etc.; but as yet we have no satisfactory list of the special
+aptitudes. They come to light when we compare one individual with
+another, or one species with another. Thus, while man is far superior
+to the dog in dealing with colors, the dog is superior in dealing with
+odors. Man has more aptitude for form, but some animals are fully his
+equal in sense of location and ability to find {289} their way. Man is
+far superior in dealing with numbers and also with tools and
+mechanical things. He is superior in speech, in sense of rhythm, in
+sense of humor, in sense of pathos. Individual human beings also
+differ markedly in each of these respects. They differ in these
+special directions as well as in the "general factors" of
+intelligence.
+
+
+Heredity of Intelligence and of Special Aptitudes
+
+Let us now return to the question raised at the very outset of the
+chapter, whether or not intelligence is a native trait. We then said
+that the differing intelligence of different species of animals must
+be laid to their native constitutions, but left the question open
+whether the differing intelligence of human individuals was a matter
+of heredity or of environment.
+
+Intelligence is of course quite different from instinct, in that it
+does not consist in ready-made native reactions. The intelligence of
+an individual at any age depends on what he has learned previously.
+But the factors in intelligent behavior--retentiveness, responsiveness
+to relationships, persistence, etc.--may very well be native traits.
+
+But what _evidence_ is there that the individual's degree of
+intelligence is a native characteristic, like his height or color of
+hair? The evidence is pretty convincing to most psychologists.
+
+First, we have the fact that an individual's degree of intelligence is
+an inherent characteristic, in the sense that it remains with him from
+childhood to old age. Bright child, bright adult; dull child, dull
+adult. That is the rule, and the exceptions are not numerous enough to
+shake it. Many a dull child of well-to-do parents, in spite of great
+pains taken with his education, is unable to escape from his inherent
+limitations. The intelligence quotient remains fairly {290} constant
+for the same child as he grows up, and stands for an inherent
+characteristic of the individual, namely, the rate at which he
+acquires knowledge and skill. Give two children the same environment,
+physical and social, and you will see one child progress faster than
+the other. Thus, among children who grow up in the same community,
+playing together and going to the same schools, the more rapid mental
+advance of some than of others is due to differences in native
+constitution, and the IQ gives a measure of the native constitution in
+this respect. There are exceptions, to be sure, depending on physical
+handicaps such as deafness or disease, or on very bad treatment at
+home, but in general the IQ can be accepted as representing a fact of
+native constitution.
+
+Another line of evidence for the importance of native constitution in
+determining degrees of intelligence comes from the study of mental
+resemblance among members of the same family. Brothers or sisters test
+more alike than children taken at random from a community, and twins
+test more alike than ordinary brothers and sisters. Now, as the
+physical resemblance of brothers or sisters, and specially of twins,
+is accepted as due to native constitution, we must logically draw the
+same conclusion from their mental resemblance.
+
+The way feeble-mindedness runs in families is a case in point. Though,
+in exceptional instances, mental defect arises from brain injury at
+the time of birth, or from disease (such as cerebrospinal meningitis)
+during early childhood, in general it cannot be traced to such
+accidents, but is inherent in the individual. Usually mental defect or
+some similar condition can be found elsewhere in the family of the
+mentally defective child; it is in the family stock. When both parents
+are of normal intelligence and come from families with no mental
+abnormality in any ancestral line, it is practically unknown that they
+should have a feeble-minded {291} child; but if mental deficiency has
+occurred in some of the ancestral lines, an occasional feeble-minded
+child may be born even of parents who are themselves both normal. If
+one parent is normal and the other feeble-minded, some of the children
+are likely to be normal and others feeble-minded; but if both parents
+are feeble-minded, it is said that all the children are sure to be
+feeble-minded or at least dull.
+
+These facts regarding the occurrence of feeble-mindedness cannot be
+accounted for by environmental influences, especially the fact that
+some children of the same family may be definitely feeble-minded and
+others normal. We must remember that children of the same parents need
+not have precisely similar native constitutions; they are not always
+alike in physical traits such as hair color or eye color that are
+certainly determined by native constitution.
+
+The special aptitudes also run in families. You find musical families
+where most of the children take readily to music, and other families
+where the children respond scarcely at all to music, though their
+general intelligence is good enough. You find a special liking and
+gift for mathematics cropping out here and there in different
+generations of the same family. No less significant is the fact that
+children of the same family show ineradicable differences from one
+another in such abilities. In one family were two brothers, the older
+of whom showed much musical ability and came early to be an organist
+and composer of church music; while the younger, possessing
+considerable ability in scholarship and literature, was never able to
+learn to sing or tell one tune from another. Being a clergyman, he
+desired very much to be able to lead in singing, but he simply could
+not learn. Such obstinate differences, persisting in spite of the same
+home environment, must depend on native constitution.
+
+Native constitution determines mental ability in two respects. It
+fixes certain limits which the individual cannot {292} pass, no matter
+how good his environment, and no matter how hard he trains himself;
+and, on the positive side, it makes the individual responsive to
+certain stimuli, and so gives him a start towards the development of
+intelligence and of special aptitudes.
+
+
+Intelligence and the Brain
+
+There is certainly some connection between the brain and intelligent
+behavior. While the spinal cord and brain stem vary according to the
+size of the body, and the cerebellum with the motility of the species
+of animal, the size of the cerebrum varies more or less closely with
+the intelligence of the species. It does vary also with bodily size,
+as illustrated by the whale and elephant, which have the largest
+cerebrum of all animals, including man. But the monkey, which shows
+more intelligence than most animals, has also a very large cerebrum
+for his size of body; and the chimpanzee and gorilla, considerably
+surpassing the ordinary monkeys in intelligence, have also a much
+larger cerebrum. The cerebrum of man, in proportion to the size of his
+body, far surpasses that of the chimpanzee or gorilla.
+
+The cerebrum varies considerably in size from one human individual to
+another. In some adults it is twice as large as in others, and the
+question arises whether greater intelligence goes with a larger brain.
+Now, it appears that an extremely small cerebrum spells idiocy; not
+all idiots have small brains, but all men with extremely small brains
+are idiots. The brain weight of quite a number of highly gifted men
+has been measured in post-mortem examination, and many of these gifted
+men have had a very large cerebrum. On the whole, the gifted
+individual seems to have a large brain, but there are exceptions, and
+the relationship between brain size and intelligence cannot be very
+close. Other factors must enter, one factor being undoubtedly the
+fineness {293} of the internal structure of the cortex. Brain function
+depends on dendrites and end-brushes, forming synapses in the cortex,
+and such minute structures make little impression on the total brain
+weight.
+
+While intelligence is related to the cerebrum as a whole, rather than
+to any particular "intelligence center", there is some likelihood that
+the special aptitudes are related to special parts of the cortex,
+though it must be admitted that few aptitudes have as yet been
+localized. The pretended localizations of phrenology are all wrong.
+But we do know that each sense has its special cortical area, and that
+adjacent to these sensory areas are portions of the cortex intimately
+concerned in response to different classes of complex stimuli. Near
+the auditory center the cortex is concerned in recognizing spoken
+words, and in following music; near the visual center it is concerned
+in recognizing printed words, in recognizing seen objects, in finding
+one's way by the sense of sight, etc. These special aptitudes thus
+have a fairly definite cortical localization, and possibly others have
+also.
+
+Examined microscopically, the cortex shows differences of structure in
+different parts, and to the structural differences probably correspond
+differences of function. Now it is practically impossible that such a
+function as attention or memory should have any localized cortical
+center, for these are general functions. The instincts are specialized
+enough to have local centers, but none have so far been localized.
+What has been localized is of the nature of special aptitudes.
+
+{294}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Pick out the true statements from the following list:
+
+ (a) Man is the most intelligent of animals.
+
+ (b) Intelligence depends on the development of the cerebellum.
+
+ (c) It has not been found possible to use any single
+ performance as a reliable index of intelligence.
+
+ (d) Children of different mental ages may have the same IQ.
+
+ (e) A child with a mental age of 10 years can do all the tests
+ for 10 years and below, but none of those for the higher ages.
+
+ (f) The intelligence tests depend wholly on accurate response
+ and not at all on speed of reaction.
+
+ (g) If intelligence tests depended upon previous training, they
+ could not be measures of native intelligence.
+
+ (h) High correlation between the test scores of brothers and
+ sisters is a fact that tends to indicate the importance of
+ heredity in determining intelligence.
+
+ (i) The "general factors" in intelligence are the same as the
+ instincts.
+
+ (j) Feeble-minded individuals include all those who are below
+ the average intelligence.
+
+3. It is found that eminent men very often have eminent brothers,
+ uncles and cousins. How would this fact be explained?
+
+4. It is also found that the wives of eminent men often have eminent
+ relatives. How would this fact be explained?
+
+5. How could it happen that a boy of 9, in the third school grade,
+ with an IQ of 140, should be mischievous and inattentive? What
+ should be done with him?
+
+6. If a boy of 12, by industrious work, does pretty well in the
+ fourth grade, why should we not accept the teacher's estimate of
+ him as a "fairly bright boy"?
+
+7. How might the brain of an idiot be underdeveloped, aside from
+ the matter of the number of nerve cells in the cortex?
+
+8. Can it be that high intelligence is a disadvantage in any form
+ of industrial work, and, if so, how?
+
+9. Show how "general intelligence" and "special aptitudes" may
+ work together to give success in some special line of work.
+
+{295}
+
+REFERENCES
+
+For the Binet tests and some results obtained by their use, see Louis
+M. Terman, _The Measurement of Intelligence_, 1916.
+
+The group tests used in the American Army during the War are described
+in detail In Vol. 15 of the _Memoirs of the National Academy of
+Sciences_, 1921, edited by Robert M. Yerkes. This large book describes
+the work of preparing and standardizing the tests, and also gives some
+results bearing on the Intelligence of different sections of the
+population. Some of the interesting results appear on pp. 507, 522,
+528, 537, 693, 697, 705, 732, 743, 799, 815, 819, 829, 856 and 869.
+
+For briefer treatments of the subject, see Walter S. Hunter's _General
+Psychology_, 1919, pp. 36-58, and W. B. Pillsbury's _Essentials of
+Psychology_, 2nd edition, 1920, pp. 388-407.
+
+For the poor results obtained in attempting to judge intelligence from
+photographs, see an illustrated article by Rudolph Pintner, in the
+_Psychological Review_ for 1918, Vol. 25, pp. 286-296.
+
+For a study of one of the special aptitudes, see C. E. Seashore's
+_Psychology of Musical Talent_, 1919.
+
+For a comprehensive survey of test methods and results, see the two
+volumes of Whipple's _Manual of Mental and Physical Tests_, 2nd
+edition, 1914, 1915.
+
+{296}
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+LEARNING AND HABIT FORMATION
+
+THE DEPENDENCE OF ACQUIRED REACTIONS UPON INSTINCT AND REFLEX ACTION,
+AND THE MODIFICATION OF NATIVE REACTIONS BY EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING.
+
+
+Already, in considering intelligence, we have partially rounded the
+corner from native to acquired traits, and now, fairly around the
+corner, we see ahead of us a long straight stretch of road. For there
+is much to say regarding acquired traits and regarding the process of
+acquisition. All knowledge is acquired, the whole stock of ideas, as
+well as motor skill, and there are acquired motives in addition to the
+native motive forces that we called instincts, and acquired likes and
+dislikes in addition to those that are native; so that, all in all,
+there are thousands on thousands of acquired reactions, and the daily
+life of the adult is made up of these much more than of strictly
+native reactions.
+
+It will take us several chapters to explore this new territory that
+now lies before us, a chapter on acquiring motor habits and skill, a
+chapter on memory, a chapter on acquired mental reactions, and a
+chapter devoted to the general laws that hold good in this whole
+field. Our general plan is to proceed from the simple to the complex,
+generalizing to some extent as we go, but leaving the big
+generalizations to the close of the discussion, where we shall see
+whether the whole process of acquiring reactions of all sorts cannot
+be summed up in a few general laws of acquisition, or "laws of
+association" as they are traditionally called. On reaching that {297}
+goal, the reader may well come back, with the general laws in mind,
+and see how well they fit in detail all the instances of acquired
+responses that we are about to describe. We might have begun by
+stating the general laws, but on the whole it will be better to
+proceed "inductively", beginning with the observed facts and working
+up to the general laws.
+
+
+Acquired Reactions Are Modified Native Reactions
+
+Though we have "turned a corner" in passing from native traits to
+acquired, it would be a mistake to suppose we had left what is native
+altogether behind. It would be a mistake to suppose that the
+individual outgrew and left behind his native reactions and acquired
+an entirely new outfit. The reactions that he acquires--or _learns_,
+as we speak of acquisition in the sphere of reactions--develop out of
+his native reactions. Consider this: how is the individual ever going
+to learn a reaction? Only by reacting. Without native reactions, he
+would be entirely inactive at the outset, and would never make a start
+towards any acquisition. His acquired reactions, then, are his native
+reactions modified by use.
+
+The vast number of motor acts that the individual acquires are based
+upon the reflexes. They are modified reflexes. The simplest kind of
+modification is the mere _strengthening_ of an act by exercise. By his
+reflex breathing and crying, the new-born baby exercises his lungs and
+breathing muscles and the nerve centers that control them, with the
+result that his breathing becomes more vigorous, his crying louder.
+The strengthening of a reaction through exercise is a fundamental
+fact.
+
+But we should scarcely speak of "learning" if the only modification
+consisted in the simple strengthening of native reactions, and at
+first thought it is difficult to see how the {298} exercise of any
+reaction could modify it in any other respect. But many reflexes are
+not perfectly fixed and invariable, but allow of some free play, and
+then exercise may fix or stabilize them, as is well illustrated in the
+case of the pecking response of the newly hatched chick. If grains are
+strewn before a chick one day old, it instinctively strikes at them,
+seizes them in its bill and swallows them; but, its aim being poor and
+uncertain, it actually gets, at first, only a fifth of the grains
+pecked at; by exercise it improves so as to get over half on the next
+day, over three-fourths after another day or two, and about 86 percent
+(which seems to be its limit) after about ten days of practice.
+Exercise has here modified a native reaction in the way of making it
+more definite and precise, by strengthening the accurate movement as
+against all the variations of the pecking movement that were made at
+the start. Where a native response is variable, exercise tends towards
+constancy, and so towards the _fixation_ of definite habits.
+
+A reflex may come to be _attached_ to a new stimulus, that does not
+naturally arouse it. A child who has accidentally been pricked with a
+pin, and of course made the flexion reflex in response to this natural
+stimulus, will make this same reaction to the sight of a pin
+approaching his skin. The seen pin is a _substitute stimulus_ that
+calls out the same response as the pin prick. This type of
+modification gives a measure of control over the reflexes; for when we
+pull the hand back voluntarily, or wink at will, or breathe deeply at
+will, we are executing these movements without the natural stimulus
+being present.
+
+Voluntary control includes also the ability to omit a response even if
+the natural stimulus is present. Holding the breath, keeping the eyes
+wide open in spite of the tendency to wink, not swallowing though the
+mouth is full of saliva, holding the hand steady when it is being
+pricked, and many {299} similar instances of control over reflexes are
+cases of _detachment_ of a native reaction from its natural stimulus.
+Not "starting" at a sudden sound to which we have grown used and not
+turning the eyes to look at a very familiar object, are other
+instances of this detachment.
+
+The _substitute response_ is another modification to be placed
+alongside of the substitute stimulus. Here a natural stimulus calls
+out a motor response different from its natural response. The muttered
+imprecation of the adult takes the place of the child's scream of
+pain. The loose holding of the pen between the thumb and the first two
+fingers takes the place of the child's full-fisted grasp.
+
+Finally, an important type of modification consists in the
+_combination_ of reflex movements into larger cooerdinations. One hand
+grasps an object, while the other hand pulls, pushes or strikes it.
+Or, both hands grasp the object but in different ways, as in handling
+an ax or shovel. These cases illustrate simultaneous cooerdination, and
+there is also a serial cooerdination, in which a number of simple
+instinctive movements become hitched together in a fixed order.
+Examples of this are seen in dancing, writing a word, and, most
+notably, in speaking a word or familiar phrase.
+
+In these ways, by strengthening, fixing and combining movements, and
+by new attachments and detachments between stimulus and response, the
+instinctive motor activity of the baby passes over into the skilled
+and habitual movement of the adult.
+
+
+Acquired Tendencies
+
+In the sphere of _impulse_ and _emotion_ the same kinds of
+modification occur. Detachment of an impulse or emotion from its
+natural stimulus is very much in evidence, since {300} what frightens
+or angers or amuses the little child may have no such power with the
+adult. One little boy of two could be thrown into gales of laughter by
+letting a spoon drop with a bang to the floor; and you could repeat
+this a dozen times in quick succession and get the response every
+time. But this stimulus no longer worked when he had advanced to the
+age of four.
+
+The emotions get attached to substitute stimuli. Amusement can be
+aroused in an older child by situations that were not at all amusing
+to the baby. New objects arouse fear, anger, rivalry or curiosity. The
+emotions of the adult--with the exception of sex attraction, which is
+usually very weak in the child--are the emotions of the child, but
+they are aroused by different stimuli.
+
+Not only so, but the emotions express themselves differently in the
+child and the adult. Angry behavior is one thing in the child, and
+another thing in the adult, so far as concerns external motor action.
+The child kicks and screams, where the adult strikes with his fist, or
+vituperates, or plots revenge. The internal bodily changes in emotion
+are little modified as the individual grows up--except that different
+stimuli arouse them--but the overt behavior is greatly modified;
+instead of the native reactions we find substitute reactions.
+
+A little girl of three years, while out walking in the woods with her
+family, was piqued by some correction from her mother, but, instead of
+showing the instinctive signs of temper, she picked up a red autumn
+leaf and offered it to her mother, with the words, very sweetly
+spoken, "Isn't that a pretty leaf?" "Yes," said her mother,
+acquiescently. "Wouldn't you like to have that leaf?" "Yes, indeed."
+"I'll throw it away!" (in a savage tone of voice, and with a gesture
+throwing the leaf away). Here we have an early form of substitute
+reaction, and can glimpse how such {301} reactions become attached to
+the emotions. The natural outlet for the child's anger was blocked,
+probably because previous outbursts of rage had not had satisfactory
+consequences, so that the anger was dammed up, or "bottled up", for
+the instant, till the child found some act that would give it vent.
+Now supposing that the substitute reaction gave satisfaction to the
+child, we can well imagine that it would become attached to the angry
+state and be used again in a similar case. Thus, without outgrowing
+the emotions, we may outgrow emotional behavior that is socially
+unacceptable.
+
+Emotions are also combined, much as reflexes are combined. The same
+object which on one occasion arouses in us one emotion may arouse
+another emotion on another occasion, so that eventually, whenever we
+see that object, we respond by a blend of the two emotions. Your chief
+may terrify you on some occasions, at other times amaze you by his
+masterly grasp on affairs, and again win your affection by his care
+for your own welfare; so that your attitude toward "the boss" comes to
+be a blend of fear, admiration and gratitude. Religion and patriotism
+furnish good examples of compound emotions.
+
+Well, then, adult behavior compared with the instinctive behavior of
+the little child shows these several types of modification. This is
+interesting, but it is not all we wish to know. We want to know how
+the modification comes about; that is, we want to get an insight into
+the process of learning. Scientifically, this is one of the most
+fascinating topics in psychology--how we learn, how we are molded or
+modified by experience--and practically, it is just as important,
+since if we wish to educate, train, mold, improve ourselves or others,
+it is the _process_ of modification that we must control; and to
+control it we must understand it.
+
+To understand it we must watch the process itself; and {302} therefore
+we turn to studies that trace the course of events in human and animal
+learning.
+
+
+Animal Learning
+
+Animals do learn, all the vertebrates, at least, and many of the
+invertebrates. They often learn more slowly than men, but this is an
+advantage for our present purpose, since it makes the learning process
+easier to follow. Mere anecdotes of intelligent behavior in animals
+are of little value, but experimental studies, in which the animal's
+progress is followed, step by step, from the time when he is
+confronted with a perfectly novel situation till he has mastered the
+trick, have now been made in great numbers, and a few typical
+experiments will serve as a good introduction to the whole subject of
+learning.
+
+
+The negative adaptation experiment.
+
+Apply a harmless and meaningless stimulus time after time; at first
+the animal makes some instinctive exploring or defensive reaction; but
+with continued repetition of the stimulus, he ceases after a while to
+respond. The instinctive reaction has been detached from one of its
+natural stimuli.
+
+Even in unicellular animals, negative adaptation can be observed, but
+in them is only temporary, like the "sensory adaptation" described in
+the chapter on sensation. Stop the stimulus and the original
+responsiveness returns after a short time. Nothing has been learned,
+for what is learned remains after an interval of rest.
+
+In higher animals, permanent adaptation is common, as illustrated by a
+famous experiment on a spider. While the spider was in its web, a
+tuning fork was sounded, and the spider made the defensive reaction of
+dropping to the ground. It climbed back to its web, the fork was
+sounded again, the spider dropped again; but after several {303}
+repetitions in quick succession, the spider ceased to respond. Next
+day, to be sure, it responded as at first; but after the same
+performance had been repeated on several days, it ceased permanently
+to respond to this stimulus.
+
+Negative adaptation is common in domestic animals, as well as in men.
+The horse "gets used" to the harness, and the dog to the presence of a
+cat in the house. Man grows accustomed to his surroundings, and to
+numerous unimportant sights and sounds.
+
+
+The conditioned reflex experiment.
+
+Put into a dog's mouth a tasting substance that arouses the flow of
+saliva, and at the same instant ring a bell; and repeat this
+combination of stimuli many times. Then ring the bell alone, and the
+saliva flows in response to the bell. The bell is a _substitute
+stimulus_, which has become attached to the salivary response by dint
+of having been often given along with the natural stimulus that
+arouses this response. At first thought, this is very weird, but do we
+not know of similar facts in every-day experience? The dinner bell
+makes the mouth water; the sight of food does the same, even the name
+of a savory dish will do the same.
+
+Quite possibly, the learning process by which the substitute stimulus
+becomes attached to the salivary reaction is more complex in man's
+case. He may _observe_ that the dinner bell means dinner, whereas the
+dog, we suppose, does not definitely observe the connection of the
+bell and the tasting substance. What the experiment shows is that a
+substitute stimulus can become attached to a reaction under very
+simple conditions.
+
+A conditioned reflex experiment on a child deserves mention. A young
+child, confronted with a rabbit, showed no fear, but on the contrary
+reached out his hand to take the rabbit. At this instant a loud
+rasping noise was produced just behind the child, who quickly withdrew
+his hand with {304} signs of fear. After this had been repeated a few
+times, the child shrank from the rabbit and was evidently afraid of
+it. Probably it is in this way that many fears, likes and dislikes of
+children originate.
+
+
+The signal experiment.
+
+Place a white rat before two little doors, both just alike except that
+one has on it a yellow circle. The rat begins to explore. If he enters
+the door with the yellow sign, he finds himself in a passage which
+leads to a box of food; if he enters the other door he gets into a
+blind alley, which he explores, and then, coming out, continues his
+explorations till he reaches the food box and is rewarded. After this
+first trial is thus completed, place him back at the starting point,
+and he is very apt to go straight to the door that previously led to
+the food, for he learns simple locations very quickly. But meanwhile
+the experimenter may have shifted the yellow sign to the other door,
+connected the passage behind the marked door with the food box, and
+closed off the other passage; for the yellow disc in this experiment
+always marks the way to the food, and the other door always leads to a
+blind alley. The sign is shifted irregularly from one door to the
+other. Whenever the rat finds himself in a blind alley, he comes out
+and enters the other door, so finally getting his reward on every
+trial. But for a long time he seems incapable of responding to the
+yellow signal. However, the experimenter is patient; he gives the rat
+twenty trials a day, keeping count of the number of correct responses,
+and finds the number to increase little by little, till after some
+thirty days every response is correct and unhesitating. The rat has
+learned the trick.
+
+He learns the trick somewhat more rapidly if punishment for incorrect
+responses is added to reward for correct responses. Place wires along
+the floor of the two passages, and switch an electric current into the
+blind alley, behind {305} the door that has no yellow circle on it.
+When the rat enters the blind alley and gets a shock, he makes a
+prompt avoiding reaction, scampering back to the starting point and
+cowering there for some time; eventually he makes a fresh start,
+avoids the door that led to the shock and therefore enters the other
+door, though apparently without paying any attention to the yellow
+sign, since when, on the next trial, the sign is moved, he avoids the
+_place_ where he got the shock, without reference to the sign. But in
+a series of trials he learns to follow the sign.
+
+Learning to respond to a signal might be classified under the head of
+substitute stimulus, since the rat learns to respond to a stimulus,
+the yellow disk, that at first left him unmoved. But more careful
+consideration shows this to be, rather, a case of substitute response.
+The natural reaction of a rat to a door is to enter it, not to look at
+its surface, but the experiment forces him to make the preliminary
+response of attending to the appearance of the door before entering
+it. The response of attending to the surface of the door is
+substituted for the instinctive response of entering. Otherwise put:
+the response of finding the marked door and entering that is
+substituted for the response of entering any door at random.
+
+
+The maze experiment.
+
+An animal is placed in an enclosure from which it can reach food by
+following a more or less complicated path. The rat is the favorite
+subject for this experiment, but it is a very adaptable type of
+experiment and can be tried on any animal. Fishes and even crabs have
+mastered simple mazes, and in fact to learn the way to a goal is
+probably possible for any species that has any power of learning
+whatever. The rat, placed in a maze, explores. He sniffs about, goes
+back and forth, enters every passage, and actually covers every square
+inch of the maze at least once; and in the course of these
+explorations {306} hits upon the food box. Replaced at the starting
+point, he proceeds as before, though with more speed and less dallying
+in the blind alleys. On successive trials he goes less and less deeply
+into a blind alley, till finally he passes the entrance to it without
+even turning his head. Thus eliminating the blind alleys one after
+another, he comes at length to run by a fixed route from start to
+finish.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 47.--(From Hicks.) Ground plan of a maze used in
+experiments on the rat. The central square enclosure is the food box.
+The dotted line shows the path taken by a rat on Its fourth trial,
+which occupied 4 minutes and 2 seconds.]
+
+
+At first thought, the elimination of useless moves seems to tell the
+whole story of the rat's learning process; but careful study of his
+behavior reveals another factor. When the rat approaches a turning
+point in the maze, his course bends so as to prepare for the turn; he
+does not simply advance to the turning point and then make the turn,
+but several steps before he reaches that point are organized or
+cooerdinated into a sort of unit.
+
+{307}
+
+ [Illustration: Fig. 48.--(From Watson.) Learning curve for the rat
+ in the maze. This is a composite or average, derived from the
+ records of four animals. The height of the heavy line above the base
+ line, for any trial, indicates the number of minutes consumed in
+ that trial in passing through the maze and reaching the food box.
+ The gradual descent of the curve indicates the gradual decrease in
+ time required, and thus pictures the progress of the animals in
+ learning the maze.]
+
+
+The combination of steps into larger units is shown also by certain
+variations of the experiment. It is known that the rat makes little
+use of the sense of sight in learning the maze, guiding himself mostly
+by the muscle sense. Now if the maze, after being well learned, is
+altered by shortening one of the straight passages, the rat runs full
+tilt against the new end of the passage, showing clearly that he was
+proceeding, not step by step, but by _runs_ of some length. Another
+variation of the experiment is to place a rat that has learned a maze
+down in the midst of it, instead of at {308} the usual starting point.
+At first he is lost, and begins exploring, but, hitting on a section
+of the right path, he gets his cue from the "feel" of it, and races
+off at full speed to the food box. Now his cue could not have been any
+single step or turn, for these would all be too much alike; his cue
+must have been a familiar _sequence_ of movements, and that sequence
+functions as a unit in calling out the rest of the habitual movement.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 49.--(From Watson.) A puzzle box. The animal must
+here reach his paw out between the bars and raise the latch, _L_. A
+spring then gently opens the door.]
+
+
+In short, the rat learns the path by _elimination_ of false reactions
+and by _combination_ of single steps and turns into larger
+reaction-units.
+
+
+The puzzle-box experiment.
+
+Place a hungry young cat in a strange cage, with a bit of fish lying
+just outside, and you are sure to get action. The cat extends his paw
+between the slats but cannot reach the fish; he pushes his nose
+between the slats but cannot get through; he bites the slats, claws at
+anything small, shakes anything loose, and tries every part of the
+cage. Coming to the button that fastens {309} the door, he attacks
+that also, and sooner or later turns the button, gets out, and eats
+the fish. The experimenter, having noted the time occupied in this
+first trial, replaces the cat, still hungry, in the cage, and another
+bit of fish outside. Same business, but perhaps somewhat quicker
+escape. More trials, perhaps on a series of days, give gradually
+decreasing times of escape. The useless reactions are gradually
+eliminated, till finally the cat, on being placed in the cage, goes
+instantly to the door, turns the button, goes out and starts to eat,
+requiring but a second or two for the whole complex reaction. Perhaps
+15 or 20 trials have been required to reach this stage of prompt,
+unerring response. The course of improvement is rather irregular, with
+ups and downs, but with no sudden shift from the varied reaction of
+the first trial to the fixed reaction of the last. The learning
+process has been gradual.
+
+This is the typical instance of learning by "trial and error", which
+can be defined as varied reaction with gradual elimination of the
+unsuccessful responses and fixation of the successful one. It is also
+a case of the substitute response. At first, the cat responds to the
+situation by reaching or pushing straight towards the food, but it
+learns to substitute for this most instinctive response the less
+direct response of going to another part of the cage and turning a
+button.
+
+The cat in this experiment is evidently trying to get out of the cage
+and reach the food. The situation of being confined in a cage while
+hungry arouses an impulse or tendency to get out; but this tendency,
+unable at once to reach its goal, is dammed up, and remains as an
+inner directive force, facilitating reactions that are in the line of
+escape and inhibiting other reactions. When the successful response is
+hit upon, and the door opened, the dammed-up energy is discharged into
+this response; and, by repetition, {310} the successful response
+becomes closely attached to the escape-tendency, so as to occur
+promptly whenever the tendency is aroused.
+
+There is no evidence that the cat reasons his way out of the cage. His
+behavior is impulsive, not deliberative. There is not even any
+evidence that the cat clearly observes how he gets out. If he made a
+clean-cut observation of the manner of escape, his time for escaping
+should thereupon take a sudden drop, instead of falling off gradually
+and irregularly from trial to trial, as it does fall off. Trial and
+error learning is learning by doing, and not by reasoning or
+observing. The cat learns to get out by getting out, not by seeing how
+to get out.
+
+
+Summary of Animal Learning
+
+Let us take account of stock at this point, before passing to human
+learning, and attempt to generalize what we have observed in animals
+of the process of learning.
+
+(1) _Elimination_ of a response, which means _detachment_ of a
+response from the stimulus that originally aroused it, occurs in three
+main cases:
+
+ (a) Elimination occurs most quickly when the response brings actual
+ _pain_; the animal makes the avoiding reaction to the pain and
+ quickly comes to make this response to the place where the pain
+ occurred; and thus the positive reaction to this place is
+ eliminated.
+
+ (b) Elimination occurs more gradually when the response, without
+ resulting in actual pain, brings _failure_ or delay in reaching a
+ goal towards which the animal is tending. The positive response of
+ entering and exploring a blind alley grows weaker and weaker, till
+ the blind alley is neglected altogether.
+
+ (c) Elimination of a response also occurs, slowly, through _negative
+ adaptation_ to a stimulus that is harmless and also useless.
+
+{311}
+
+(2) New _attachments_ or _linkages_ of stimulus and response occur in
+two forms, which are called "substitute stimulus" and "substitute
+response".
+
+ [Footnote: The writer hopes that no confusion will be caused by
+ his use of several words to express this same meaning.
+ "Attachment of stimulus and response", "linkage of stimulus and
+ response", "connection between stimulus and response", and "bond
+ between stimulus and response", all mean exactly the same; but
+ sometimes one and sometimes another seems to bring the meaning
+ more vividly to mind.]
+
+ (a) _Substitute stimulus_ refers to the case where the natural
+ response is not itself modified, but becomes attached to another
+ stimulus than the one that originally aroused it. This new linkage
+ can sometimes be established by simply giving the original stimulus
+ and the substitute stimulus at the same time, and doing so
+ repeatedly, as in the conditioned reflex experiment.
+
+ (b) _Substitute response_ refers to the case where the stimulus
+ remaining as it originally was, a new reaction is attached to it in
+ place of the original response. The conditions under which this
+ takes place are more complex than those that give the substitute
+ stimulus. A tendency towards some goal must first be aroused, and
+ then blocked by the failure of the original response to lead to the
+ goal. The dammed-up tendency then facilitates other responses, and
+ gives trial and error behavior, till some one of the trial responses
+ leads to the goal; and this successful response is gradually
+ substituted for the original response, and becomes firmly attached
+ to the situation and tendency.
+
+(3) New _combinations of responses_ occur, giving higher motor units.
+
+
+Human Learning
+
+To compare human and animal learning, and notice in what ways the
+human is superior, cannot but throw light on the whole problem of the
+process of learning. It is obvious {312} that man learns more quickly
+than the animals, that he acquires more numerous reactions, and a much
+greater variety of reactions; but the important question is how he
+does this, and how his learning process is superior.
+
+We must first notice that all the forms of learning displayed by the
+animal are present also in the human being. Negative adaptation is
+important in human life, and the conditioned reflex is important, as
+has already been suggested. Without negative adaptation, the adult
+would be compelled to attend to everything that aroused the child's
+curiosity, to shrink from everything that frightened the child, to
+laugh at everything that amused the child. The conditioned reflex type
+of learning accounts for a host of acquired likes and dislikes. Why
+does the adult feel disgust at the mere sight of the garbage pail or
+the mere name of cod liver oil? Because these inoffensive visual and
+auditory stimuli have been associated, or paired, with odors and
+tastes that naturally aroused disgust.
+
+The signal experiment is duplicated thousands of times in the
+education of every human being. He learns the meaning of signs and
+slight indications; that is, he learns to recognize important facts by
+aid of signs that are of themselves unimportant. We shall have much to
+say on this matter in a later chapter on perception. Man learns signs
+more readily than such an animal as the rat, in part because the human
+being is naturally more responsive to visual and auditory stimuli. Yet
+the human being often has trouble in learning to read the signs
+aright. He assumes that a bright morning means good weather all day,
+till, often disappointed, he learns to take account of less obvious
+signs of the weather. Corrected for saying, "You and me did it", he
+adopts the plan of always saying "you and I", but finds that this
+quite unaccountably brings ridicule on him at times, so that gradually
+he _may_ come to say the one or the {313} other according to obscure
+signs furnished by the structure of the particular sentence. The
+process of learning to respond to obscure signs seems to be about as
+follows: something goes wrong, the individual is brought to a halt by
+the bad results of his action, he then sees some element in the
+situation that he had previously overlooked, responds to this element,
+gets good results, and so--perhaps after a long series of
+trials--comes finally to govern his action by what seemed at first
+utterly insignificant.
+
+Trial and error learning, though often spoken of as characteristically
+"animal", is common enough in human beings. Man learns by impulsively
+doing in some instances, by rational analysis in others. He would be
+at a decided disadvantage if he could not learn by trial and error,
+since often the thing he has to manage is very difficult of rational
+analysis. Much motor skill, as in driving a nail, is acquired by
+"doing the best you can", getting into trouble, varying your
+procedure, and gradually "getting the hang of the thing", without ever
+clearly seeing what are the conditions of success.
+
+
+Human Compared With Animal Learning
+
+Fairly direct comparisons have been made between human and animal
+learning of mazes and puzzles. In the maze, the human subject has an
+initial advantage from knowing he is in a maze and has to master it,
+while the rat knows no more than that he is in a strange place, to be
+explored with caution on the odd chance that it may contain something
+eatable, or something dangerous. But, after once reaching the food
+box, the rat begins to put on speed in his movements, and within a few
+trials is racing through the maze faster than the adult man, though
+not so fast as a child. Adults are more circumspect and dignified,
+they make less speed, cover less distance, but also make fewer false
+moves {314} and finish in less time. That is in the early trials;
+adults do not hold their advantage long, since children and even rats
+also reach complete mastery of a simple maze in ten or fifteen trials.
+
+The chief point of superiority of adults to human children, and of
+these to animals, can be seen in the adjacent table. It is in the
+_first trial_ that the superiority of the adults shows most clearly.
+They get a better start, and adapt themselves to the situation more
+promptly. Their better start is due to (1) better understanding of the
+situation at the outset, (2) more plan, (3) less tendency to "go off
+on a tangent", i.e., to respond impulsively to every opening, without
+considering or looking ahead. The adult has more inhibition, the child
+more activity and responsiveness; the adult's inhibition stands him in
+good stead at the outset, but the child's activity enables him to
+catch up shortly in so simple a problem as this little maze.
+
+ AVERAGE NUMBER OF ERRORS MADE, IN EACH TRIAL IN
+ LEARNING A MAZE, BY RATS, CHILDREN AND ADULT MEN
+
+ (From Hicks and Carr)
+
+
+ Trial
+ No. Rats Children Adults
+
+ 1 53 35 10
+ 2 45 9 15
+ 3 30 18 5
+ 4 22 11 2
+ 5 11 9 6
+ 6 8 13 4
+ 7 9 6 2
+ 8 4 6 2
+ 9 9 5 1
+ 10 3 5 1
+ 11 4 1 0
+ 12 5 0 1
+ 13 4 1 1
+ 14 4 0 1
+ 15 4 1 1
+ 16 2 0 1
+ 17 1 0 1
+
+
+ The table reads that, on the first trial in the maze, the rats
+ averaged 53 errors, the children 35 errors, and the adults 10
+ errors, and so on. An "error" consisted in entering a blind alley or
+ in turning back on {315} the course. The subjects tested consisted
+ of 23 rats, five children varying in age from 8 to 18 years, and
+ four graduate students of psychology. The human maze was much larger
+ than those used for the rats, but roughly about the same in
+ complexity. Since rats are known to make little use of their eyes in
+ learning a maze, the human subjects were blindfolded. The rats were
+ rewarded by food, the others simply by the satisfaction of success.
+
+
+The puzzle boxes used in experiments on animal learning are too simple
+for human adults, but mechanical puzzles present problems of
+sufficient difficulty. The experimenter hands the subject a totally
+unfamiliar puzzle, and notes the time required by the subject to take
+it apart; and this is repeated in a series of trials till mastery is
+complete. In addition to taking the time, the experimenter observes
+the subject's way of reacting, and the subject endeavors at the end of
+each trial to record what he has himself observed of the course of
+events.
+
+The human subject's behavior in his first trial with a puzzle is often
+quite of the trial and error sort. He manipulates impulsively; seeing
+a possible opening he responds to it, and meeting a check he backs off
+and tries something else. Often he tries the same line of attack time
+and time again, always failing; and his final success, in the first
+trial, is often accidental and mystifying to himself.
+
+On the second trial, he may still be at a loss, and proceed as before;
+but usually he has noticed one or two facts that help him. He is most
+likely to have noticed _where_ he was in the puzzle when his
+accidental success occurred; for it appears that _locations_ are about
+the easiest facts to learn for men as well as animals. In the course
+of a few trials, also, the human subject notices that some lines of
+attack are useless, and therefore eliminates them. After a time he may
+"see into" the puzzle more or less clearly, though sometimes he gets a
+practical mastery of the handling of the puzzle, while still obliged
+to confess that he does not understand it at all.
+
+{316}
+
+Insight, when it does occur, is of great value. Insight into the
+general principle of the puzzle leads to a better general plan of
+attack, and insight into the detailed difficulties of manipulation
+leads to smoother and defter handling. The human "learning curve" (see
+Figure 50) often shows a prolonged stretch of no improvement, followed
+by an abrupt change to quicker work; and the subject's introspections
+show that 76 per cent, or more of these sudden improvements followed
+immediately after some fresh insight into the puzzle.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 50.--(From Ruger.) Curve for human learning of a
+mechanical puzzle. Distance above the base line represents the time
+occupied in each trial, the successive trials being arranged in order
+from left to right. A drop in the curve denotes a decrease in time,
+and thus an improvement. At _X_, the subject saw something about the
+puzzle that he had not noticed before and studied it out with some
+care, so increasing his time for this one trial, but bringing the time
+down thereafter to a new and steady level.]
+
+
+The value of insight appears in another way when the subject, after
+mastering one puzzle, is handed another involving the same principle
+in a changed form. If he has seen the principle of the first puzzle,
+he is likely to carry over this knowledge to the second, and master
+this readily; {317} but if he has simply acquired motor skill with the
+first puzzle, without any insight into its principle, he may have as
+hard a time with the second as if he had never seen the first.
+
+
+Learning by Observation
+
+"We learn by doing" is a true proverb, in the sense that we acquire a
+reaction by making just that reaction. We must make a reaction in
+order to get it really in hand, so that the proverb might be
+strengthened to read, "To learn, we must do". But we should make it
+false if we strengthened it still further and said "We learn _only_ by
+doing". For human beings, at least, learn also by observing.
+
+The "insight" just spoken of consists in observing some fact--often
+some relationship--and the value of insight in hastening the process
+of learning is a proof that we learn by observation as well as by
+actual manipulation. To be sure, observation needs to be followed by
+manipulation in order to give practical mastery of a thing, but
+manipulation without observation means slow learning and often yields
+nothing that can be carried over to a different situation.
+
+Learning by observation is typically human. The adult's superiority in
+tackling a maze may be summed up by saying that he observes more than
+the child--much more than the animal--and governs his behavior by his
+observations. The enormous human superiority in learning a simple
+puzzle, of the sort used in experiments on animals, arises from seeing
+at once the key to the situation.
+
+A chimpanzee--one of the most intelligent of animals--was tested with
+a simple puzzle box, to be opened from outside by turning a button
+that prevented the door from opening. The device was so simple that
+you would expect the animal to see into it at once. A banana was put
+into the box and the door fastened with the button. The {318}
+chimpanzee quickly found the door, and quickly found the button, which
+he proceeded to pull about with one hand while pulling the door with
+the other. Without much delay, he had the button turned and the door
+open. After about three trials, he had a practical mastery of the
+puzzle, showing thus considerable superiority over the cat, who would
+more likely have required twelve or fifteen trials to learn the trick.
+But now a second button was put on a few inches from the first, both
+being just alike and operating in the same way. The chimpanzee paid no
+attention to this second button, but turned the first one as before,
+and when the door failed to open, kept on turning the first button,
+opening it and closing it and always tugging at the door. After a
+time, he did shift to the second button, but as he had left the first
+one closed, his manipulation of the second was futile. It was a long,
+hard job for him to learn to operate both buttons correctly; and the
+experiment proved that he did not observe how the button kept the door
+from opening, but only that the button was the thing to work with in
+opening the door. At one time, indeed, in order to force him to deal
+with the second button, the first one was removed, but he still went
+to the place where it had been and fingered about there. What he had
+observed was chiefly the place to work at in order to open the door.
+We must grant that animals observe locations, but most of their
+learning is by doing and not by observing.
+
+Here is another experiment designed to test the ability of animals to
+learn by observation. The experimenter takes two cats, one having
+mastered a certain puzzle box, the other not, and places the untrained
+cat where it can watch the trained one do its trick. The trained cat
+performs repeatedly for the other's benefit, and is then taken away
+and the untrained cat put into the puzzle box. But he has derived no
+benefit from what has gone on before his eyes, and must learn by trial
+{319} and error, the same as any other cat; he does not even learn any
+more quickly than he otherwise would have done.
+
+The same negative results are obtained even with monkeys, but the
+chimpanzee shows some signs of learning by observation. One chimpanzee
+having learned to extract a banana from a long tube by pushing it out
+of the further end with a stick which the experimenter had kindly left
+close by, another chimpanzee was placed where he could watch the first
+one's performance and did watch it closely. Then the first animal was
+taken away and the second given a chance. He promptly took the stick
+and got the banana, without, however, imitating the action of the
+first animal exactly, but pulling the banana towards him till he could
+reach it. This has been called learning by imitation, but might better
+be described as learning by observation.
+
+Such behavior, quite rare among animals, is common in human children,
+who are very observant of what older people do, and imitate them on
+the first opportunity, though often this comes after an interval. The
+first time a child speaks a new word is usually not right after he has
+heard it. When, on previous occasions, he has heard this word, he has
+not attempted to copy it, but now he brings it out of himself. He has
+not acquired the word by direct imitation, evidently, but by what has
+been called "delayed imitation", which consists in observation at the
+time followed later by attempts to do what has been observed.
+Observation does not altogether relieve the child of the necessity of
+learning by trial and error, for often his first imitations are pretty
+poor attempts; but observation gives him a good start and hastens the
+learning process considerably. "Learning by imitation", then, is, more
+properly, "learning by observation followed by trial and error" and
+the reason so little of it appears in animals is their lack of
+observation.
+
+_Learning by thinking_ depends on observation, since in {320} thought
+we make use of facts previously observed. Seldom, unless in the
+chimpanzee and other manlike apes, do we see an animal that appears to
+be thinking. The animal is always doing, or waiting, or sleeping. He
+seems too impulsive to stop and think. But a man may observe something
+in the present problem that calls previous observations to mind, and
+by mentally combining observations made at different times may figure
+out the solution before beginning motor manipulation. Usually,
+however, some manipulation of the trial and error sort is needed
+before the thought-out solution will work perfectly.
+
+Sometimes mental rehearsal of a performance assists in learning it, as
+we see in the beginner at automobile driving, who, while lying in bed
+after his first day's experience, mentally goes through the motions of
+starting the engine and then the car, and finds that this "absent
+treatment" makes the car easier to manage the next day.
+
+In summing up the points of superiority of human over animal learning,
+we may note that--
+
+1. Man is perhaps a quicker learner, anyway, without regard to his
+better methods of learning. This, however, is open to doubt, in view
+of the very rapid learning by animals of such reactions as the
+avoidance of a place where they have been hurt.
+
+2. Man is a better observer, and this is the great secret of his quick
+learning. He is especially strong in observing relationships, or
+"principles" as we often call them.
+
+3. He has more control over his impulses, and so finds time and energy
+for observing and thinking.
+
+4. He is able to work mentally with things that are not present; he
+remembers things he has seen, puts together facts observed at
+different times, thinks over problems that are not actually
+confronting him at the moment, and maps out plans of action.
+
+{321}
+
+
+The Learning of Complex Practical Performances
+
+A great deal of light has been thrown on the learning process by
+psychological studies of the course of improvement in mastering such
+trades as telegraphy and typewriting.
+
+A student of telegraphy was tested once a week to see how rapidly he
+could send a message, and also how rapidly he could "receive a message
+off the wire", by listening to the clicking of the sounder. The number
+of letters sent or received per minute was taken as the measure of his
+proficiency. This number increased rapidly in the first few weeks, and
+then more and more slowly, giving a typical learning curve, or
+"practice curve", as it is also called.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 51.--(From Bryan and Harter.) Practice curve of
+student W. J. R. in learning telegraphy. The height of the curve
+indicates the number of letters sent or received per minute. Therefore
+a rise of the curve here indicates improvement.]
+
+
+The curve for sending, aside from minor irregularities, rose with a
+fairly smooth sweep, tapering off finally towards the "physiological
+limit", the limit of what the nerves and muscles of this individual
+could perform.
+
+ [Footnote: A good example of the physiological limit is seen in the
+ hundred yard dash, since apparently no one, with the best of
+ training, can lower the record much below ten seconds; and any given
+ individual's limit may be considerably worse than this, according to
+ his build, muscular strength and quickness of nerve centers. The
+ simple reaction gives another good example; every one has his limit,
+ beyond which no amount of training will lower his reaction time; the
+ neuromuscular system simply will not work any faster.]
+
+
+The receiving {322} curve rose more slowly than the sending curve, and
+flattened out after about four months of practice, showing little
+further improvement for the next two months. This was a discouraging
+time for the student, for it seemed as if he could never come up to
+the commercial standard. In fact, many learners drop out at this
+stage. But this student persisted, and, after the long period of
+little improvement, was gratified to find his curve going up rapidly
+again. It went up rapidly for several months, and when it once more
+tapered off into a level, he was well above the minimum standard for
+regular employment.
+
+Such a flat stretch in a practice curve, followed by a second
+rise--such a period of little or no improvement, followed by rapid
+improvement--is called a "plateau". Sometimes due to mere
+discouragement, or to the inattention that naturally supervenes when
+an act becomes easy to perform, it often has a different cause. It
+may, in fact, represent a true physiological limit for the act as it
+is being performed, and the subsequent rise to a higher level may
+result from _improved methods_ of work. That was probably the case
+with the telegrapher.
+
+ [Footnote: A plateau of this sort is present in the learning curve
+ for mastery of a puzzle, given on p. 316.]
+
+The telegrapher acquires skill by improving his methods, rather than
+by simply speeding up. He acquires methods that he didn't dream of at
+first. At the start, he must learn the alphabet of dots and dashes.
+This means, for purposes of sending, that he must learn the little
+rhythmical pattern of finger movements that stands for each letter;
+and, for purposes of receiving, that he must learn the rhythmical
+{323} pattern of clicks from the sounder that stands for a letter.
+When he has learned the alphabet, he is able to send and receive
+slowly. In sending, he spells out the words, writing each letter as a
+separate act. In receiving, at this early stage, he must pick out each
+separate letter from the continuous series of clicks that he hears
+from the sounder. By degrees, the letters become so familiar that he
+goes through this spelling process easily; and, doing now so much
+better than at the outset, he supposes he has learned the trade, in
+its elements, and needs only to put on more speed.
+
+But not at all! He has acquired but a small part of the necessary
+stock-in-trade of the telegrapher. He has his "letter habits", but
+knows nothing as yet of "word habits". These gradually come to him as
+he continues his practice. He comes to know words as units, motor
+units for sending purposes, auditory units for receiving. The
+rhythmical pattern of the whole word becomes a familiar unit. Short,
+much used words are first dealt with as units, then more and more
+words, till he has a large vocabulary of word habits. A word that has
+become a habit need not be spelled out in sending, nor laboriously dug
+out letter by letter in receiving; you simply think the word "train",
+and your finger taps it out as a connected unit; or, in receiving, you
+recognize the characteristic pattern of this whole series of clicks.
+When the telegrapher has reached this word habit stage, he finds the
+new method far superior, in both speed and sureness, to the letter
+habit method which he formerly assumed to be the whole art of
+telegraphy. He does not even stop with word habits, but acquires a
+similar control over familiar phrases.
+
+
+Higher Units and Overlapping
+
+The acquisition of skill in telegraphy consists mostly in learning
+these _higher units_ of reactions. It is the same in {324} learning to
+typewrite. First you must learn your alphabet of letter-striking
+movements; by degrees you reduce these finger movements to firm
+habits, and are then in the letter-habit stage, in which you spell out
+each word as you write it. After a time, you write a familiar word
+without spelling it, by a cooerdinated series of finger movements; you
+write by word units, and later, in part, by phrase units; and these
+higher units give you speed and accuracy.
+
+Along with this increase in the size of the reaction-units employed
+goes another factor of skill that is really very remarkable. This is
+the "overlapping" of different reactions, a species of doing two or
+more things at once, only that the two or more reactions are really
+parts of the same total activity. The simplest sort of overlap can be
+illustrated at an early stage in learning to typewrite. The absolute
+beginner at the typewriter, in writing "and", pauses after each letter
+to get his bearings before starting on the next; but after a small
+amount of practice he will locate the second letter on the keyboard
+while his finger is still in the act of striking the first letter.
+Thus the sensory part of the reaction to the second letter commences
+before the motor part of reacting to the first letter is finished; and
+this overlap does away with pauses between letters and makes the
+writing smoother and more rapid.
+
+With further practice in typewriting, when word habits and phrase
+habits are acquired, overlap goes to much greater lengths. One expert
+kept her eyes on the copy about four words ahead of her fingers on the
+keyboard, and thus was reacting to about four words at the same time:
+one word was just being read from the copy, one word was being
+written, and the two words between were being organized and prepared
+for actual writing. The human typewriting mechanism, consisting of
+eye, optic nerve, parts of the brain and cord, motor nerves and
+muscles, works somewhat like one of {325} those elaborate machines
+which receive raw material steadily at one end perform a series of
+operations upon it, and keep turning out finished product at the other
+end.
+
+All this is very remarkable, but the same sort of overlapping and
+working with large units can be duplicated in many linguistic
+performances that every one makes. In reading aloud, the eyes keep
+well ahead of the voice, and seeing, understanding and pronouncing are
+all applied simultaneously to different words of the passage read. In
+talking, the ideas keep developing and the spoken words tag along
+behind.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 52.--(From Book.) Practice curve of a young man
+learning to typewrite. Each point on the "curve" represents a daily
+record in number of strokes per minute. With improvement, the curve
+rises.]
+
+
+In telegraphy and typewriting, it is almost inevitable that the
+learner should start with the alphabet and proceed to gradually larger
+units. But in learning to talk, or to read, the process goes the other
+way. The child understands spoken words and phrases before breaking
+them up into their elementary vocal sounds; and he can better be
+taught to read by beginning with whole words, or even with whole {326}
+sentences, than by first learning the alphabet and laboriously
+spelling out the words. In short, the learning process often takes its
+start with the higher units, and reaches the smaller elements only for
+the purpose of more precise control.
+
+
+Moderate Skill Acquired in the Ordinary Day's Work
+
+Merely repeating a performance many times does not give the high
+degree of skill that we see in the expert telegrapher or typist.
+Ordinarily, we practise much less assiduously, are much less zealous,
+and have no such perfect measure of the success of our work. For
+"practice to make perfect", it must be strongly motivated, and it must
+be sharply checked up by some index or measure of success or failure.
+If the success of a performance can be measured, and chalked up before
+the learner's eyes in the form of a practice curve, so that he can see
+his progress, this acts as a strong incentive to rapid improvement.
+
+Ordinarily, we have no clear indication of exactly how well we are
+doing, and are satisfied if we get through our job easily and without
+too much criticism and ridicule from people around. Consequently we
+reach only a moderate degree of skill, nowhere near the physiological
+limit, and do not acquire the methods of the real expert.
+
+This is very true of the manual worker. Typesetters of ten or more
+years' experience were once selected as subjects for an experiment on
+the effects of alcohol, because it was assumed that they must have
+already reached their maximum skill. In regard to alcohol, the result
+was that this drug caused a falling off in speed and accuracy of
+work--but that is another story. What we are interested in here is the
+fact that, as soon as these long-practised operators found themselves
+under observation, and their work measured, they all began to improve
+and in the course of a couple of weeks {327} reached quite a new level
+of performance. Their former level had been reasonably satisfactory
+under workaday conditions, and special incentive was needed to make
+them approach their limit.
+
+A similar condition of affairs has been disclosed by "motion studies"
+in many kinds of manual work; the movements of the operative have been
+photographed or closely examined by the efficiency expert, and
+analyzed to determine whether there are any superfluous movements that
+could be eliminated, and whether a different method of work would be
+economical of time and effort. Usually, superfluous motion has been
+found and considerable economy seen to be possible. There is evidently
+no law of learning to the effect that continued repetition of a
+performance necessarily makes it perfect in speed, ease, or adaptation
+to the task in hand. What the manual worker attains as the result of
+prolonged experience is a passable performance, but not at all the
+maximum of skill.
+
+The brain worker has little to brag of as against the manual worker.
+He, too, is only moderately efficient in doing his particular job.
+There are brilliant exceptions--bookkeepers who add columns of figures
+with great speed and precision, students who know just how to put in
+two hours of study on a lesson with the maximum of effect, writers who
+always say just what they wish to say and hit the nail on the head
+every time--but the great majority of us are only passable. We need
+strong incentive, we need a clear and visible measure of success or
+failure, we need, if such a thing were possible, a practice curve
+before us to indicate where we stand at the present moment with
+respect to our past and our possible future.
+
+{328}
+
+Habit
+
+A habit is contrasted with a reflex, in that the reflex is native, the
+habit acquired; but both are alike in being prompt and automatic
+reactions. The best antithesis to a habit is the response of a person
+to a novel situation, where neither nature nor previous experience
+gives him a ready response. The new response is exploratory and
+tentative, while habit is fixed and definite. The new response is
+variable, the habit regular. The new response is slow and uncertain,
+the habit fairly quick and accurate. The new response is attended by
+effort and strained attention, the habit is easy and often only
+half-conscious. The new response is apt to be unsatisfying to the one
+who makes it, while habit is comfortable and a source of satisfaction.
+
+To break a habit is most uncomfortable. Nature--at least that "second
+nature" which is habit--calls aloud for the customary performance.
+Strenuous effort is required to get out of the rut, and the slipping
+back into the rut which is almost sure to occur in moments of
+inadvertence is humiliating. Result--usually the habit sticks.
+
+But if the habit simply must be broken? Breaking a habit is forming a
+counter-habit, and the more positive the counter-habit the better for
+us. This counter-habit must not be left to form itself, but must be
+practised diligently. Strong motivation is necessary, no half-hearted
+acquiescence in somebody else's injunction to get rid of the habit. We
+must adopt the counter-habit as ours, and work for a high standard of
+skill in it. For example, if we come to realize that we have a bad
+habit of grouchiness with our best friends, it is of little use merely
+to attempt to deaden this habit; we need to aim at being a positive
+addition to the company whenever we are present, and to practise the
+art of being good company, checking up our efforts to be sure we are
+hitting {329} the right vein, and persisting in our self-training till
+we become real artists. It takes some determination for a grouchy
+individual to make such a revolution in his conduct; his
+self-assertion resists violently, for the grouchiness is part and
+parcel of himself and he hates to be anything but himself. He must
+conceive a new and inspiring ideal of himself, and start climbing up
+the practice curve towards the new ideal.
+
+{330}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Which of the acts performed in eating breakfast are instinctive,
+ which are matters of habit, and which are partly the one and partly
+ the other?
+
+3. Compare your mental attitude in approaching an unfamiliar and
+ a familiar task.
+
+4. How does the performance of the expert in swimming or dancing, etc.,
+ differ from the performance of the beginner? Analyze out the points
+ of superiority.
+
+5. Show that the element of trial and error is present in (a) the
+ child's learning to pronounce a word, and (b) learning "how to
+ take" a person so as to get on well with him.
+
+6. Why is it that our handwriting, though exercised so much, is apt
+ to grow worse rather than better, while on the contrary our
+ spelling is apt to improve?
+
+7. How would you rate your efficiency in study? Is it near your
+ physiological limit, on a plateau, or in a stage of rapid
+ improvement?
+
+8. A practice experiment. Take several pages of uniform printed
+ matter, and mark it off into sections of 15 lines. Take your time
+ for marking every word in one section that contains both e and r.
+ The two letters need not be adjacent, but must both be present
+ somewhere In the word. Having recorded your time for this first
+ section, do the same thing with the next section, and so on for 12
+ sections. What were you able to observe, introspectively, of your
+ method of work and changes with practice. From the objective
+ observations, construct a practice curve.
+
+9. Write brief explanations of the following terms:
+ practice
+ habit
+ higher unit
+ overlapping
+ plateau
+ physiological limit
+ insight
+ trial and error
+ negative adaptation
+ substitute stimulus
+ substitute response
+ conditioned reflex
+
+{331}
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Thorndike's _Animal Intelligence, Experimental Studies,_ 1911, reports
+his own pioneer work in this field. See also Chapter X in the same
+author's _Educational Psychology, Briefer Course_, 1914.
+
+For other reviews of the work on animal learning, see Watson's
+_Behavior_, 1914, pp. 184-250; also Washburn's _Animal Mind_, 2nd
+edition, 1917, pp. 257-312.
+
+For human learning and practice, see Thorndike's _Educational
+Psychology, Briefer Course_, 1914, Chapters XIV and XV; also Starch's
+_Educational Psychology_, 1919, Chapter XI.
+
+For an experiment showing the acquisition of fears by a child, see
+Watson and Raynor, "Conditioned Emotional Reactions", in the _Journal
+of Experimental Psychology_, 1920, Vol. 3, pp. 1-14.
+
+James's chapter on "Habit", in his _Principles of Psychology_, 1890,
+Vol. I, is a classic which every one should read.
+
+
+{332}
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+MEMORY
+
+HOW WE MEMORIZE AND REMEMBER, AND IN WHAT
+RESPECTS MEMORY CAN BE MANAGED AND IMPROVED
+
+So much depends on a good memory in all walks of life, and especially
+in brain work of any sort, that perhaps it is no wonder that many
+students and business and professional men become worried about their
+memories and resort to "memory training courses" in the hope of
+improvement. The scientific approach to this very practical problem
+evidently lies through a careful study of the way in which memory
+works, and the general problem may be expressed in the question, how
+we learn and remember. This large problem breaks up, on analysis, into
+four subordinate questions: how we commit to memory, how we retain
+what has been committed to memory, how we get it back when we want it,
+and how we know that what we now get back is really what we formerly
+committed to memory. In the case of a person's name which we wish to
+remember, how do we "fix it in mind", how do we carry it around with
+us when we are not thinking of it, how do we call it up when needed,
+and what assures us that we have called up the right name? The four
+problems may be named those of
+
+ (1) Memorizing, or learning,
+ (2) Retention
+ (3) Recall
+ (4) Recognition
+
+{333}
+
+The Process of Memorizing
+
+As memorizing is one sort of learning, what we have found in the
+preceding chapter regarding the learning process should throw light on
+our present problem. We found animals to learn by doing, and man by
+doing and also by observation or observation combined with doing.
+Observation is itself a form of doing, a mental reaction as
+distinguished from a purely passive or receptive state; so that
+learning is always active. Observation we found to be of great
+assistance, both by way of hastening the learning process, and by way
+of making what is learned more available for future use. Our previous
+studies of learning thus lead us to inquire whether committing to
+memory may not consist partly in rehearsing what we wish to learn, and
+partly in observing it. Learning by rote, or by merely repeating a
+performance over and over again, is, indeed, a fact; and observant
+study is also a fact.
+
+Let us see how learning is actually done, as indicated by laboratory
+experiments. The psychologist experiments a great deal with the
+_memorizing of nonsense material_, because the process can be better
+observed here, from the beginning, than when sensible material is
+learned. Suppose a list of twenty one-place numbers is to be studied
+till it can be recited straight through. The learner may go at it
+simply by "doing", which means here by reading the list again and
+again, in the hope that it will finally stick. This pure rote learning
+will perhaps do the job, but it is slow and inefficient. Usually the
+learner goes to work in quite a different way. He observes various
+facts about the list. He notices what numbers occur at the beginning
+and end, and perhaps in other definite positions. He may group the
+digits into two-place or three-place numbers, and notice the
+characteristics of these. Any familiar combinations that {334} may
+occur, such as 1492, he is likely to spy and remember. Lacking these,
+he can at least find similar and contrasting number-groups.
+
+For example, the list
+
+ 5 7 4 0 6 2 7 3 5 1 4 0 9 2 8 6 3 8 0 1,
+
+which at first sight seemed rather bare of anything characteristic,
+was analyzed in a way partly indicated by the commas and semicolons,
+
+ 5, 74, 0; 62, 73; 5140; 9, 286; 380, 1,
+
+and memorized easily. These observed facts transformed the list from a
+shapeless mass into something having definite characteristics, and the
+observed characteristics stuck in mind and held the rest together.
+
+Lists of nonsense syllables, such as
+
+ wok pam zut bip seg ron taz vis lab mer koj yad
+
+are apt to be learned largely by observation of similarities and
+contrasts, by reading meanings into the syllables, and by grouping
+into pairs and reading rhythmically. Grouping reduces the twelve
+syllables to six two-syllabled nonsense words, some of which may
+suggest meaningful words or at least have a swing that makes them easy
+to remember. Perhaps the first syllable of every pair is accented, and
+a pause introduced after each pair; such devices assist memorizing.
+
+The rhythmical and other _groups_ that are found or made by the
+learner in memorizing nonsense lists are, in effect, "higher units",
+and have much the same value as the higher units of telegraphy or
+typewriting. One who learns many lists in the course of a laboratory
+experiment develops a {335} regular system of grouping. First he reads
+the list through, in groups of two, three or four items, noticing each
+group as a whole; later, he notices the items in each group and how
+they are related to each other. He also notices the interrelations of
+different groups, and the position of each group in the total series.
+All this is quite different from a mere droning along through the
+items of the list; it is much more active, and much more observant.
+
+Very interesting are the various ways in which the learner attacks a
+list of nonsense syllables, numbers, or disconnected words. He goes to
+work something like the cat trying to escape from a strange cage. He
+proceeds by a sort of trial and error observation; he keeps looking
+for something about the list that will help to fix it. He sees
+something that promises well for a moment, then gives it up because he
+sees something better. He notices positions, i.e., connects items with
+their position in the list. He finds syllables that stand out as
+peculiar in some way, being "odd", "fuzzy", smooth, agreeable,
+disagreeable, or resembling some word, abbreviation or nickname. He
+notes resemblances and contrasts between different syllables. He also
+finds groups that resemble each other, or that resemble words.
+
+Besides what he actually finds in the list, he imports _meanings_,
+more or less far-fetched, into the list. He may make a rhythmical line
+of verse out of it; he may make a story out of it. In short, he both
+explores the list as it stands and manipulates it into some shape that
+promises to be rememberable.
+
+His line of attack differs according to the particular test that is
+later to be made of his memory. Suppose he is shown a number of
+pictures, with the understanding that later those now shown are to be
+mixed with others, and that he must then pick out those now
+shown--then he simply examines each picture for something
+characteristic. But {336} suppose each picture is given a name, and he
+must later tell the name of each--then he seeks for something in the
+picture that can be made to suggest its name. Or suppose, once more,
+that the pictures are spread out before him in a row, and he is told
+that they will later be mixed and he be required to rearrange them in
+the same order in which they are now shown--then he seeks for
+relationships between the several pictures. His process of memorizing,
+always observant, exploratory and manipulatory, differs in detail
+according to the memory task that he expects later to perform.
+
+For another example, suppose an experiment is conducted by the method
+of "paired associates". The subject is handed a list of pairs of
+words, such as
+
+ soprano emblem
+ grassy concise
+ nothing ginger
+ faraway kettle
+ shadow next
+ mercy scrub
+ hilltop internal
+ recite shoestring
+ narrative thunder
+ seldom harbor
+ jury eagle
+ windy occupy
+ squirm hobby
+ balloon multiply
+ necktie unlikely
+ supple westbound
+ obey inch
+ broken relish
+ spellbound ferment
+ desert expect
+
+He must learn to respond with the second word of each pair when the
+first word of the pair is given. What he does, in learning this
+lesson, is to take each pair of words as a unit, and try to find
+something in the pair that shall make it a firm unit. It may be simply
+the peculiar sound or look of a pair that he notes, or it may be some
+connection {337} of meaning. Perhaps the pair suggests an image or a
+little story. After a few readings, he has the pairs so well in hand
+that he can score almost one hundred per cent., if tested immediately.
+
+But now suppose the experimenter springs a surprise, by asking the
+subject, as far as possible, to recite the pairs in order, or to tell,
+after completing one pair, what was the first word of the next pair.
+The subject can do very little at this, and protests that the test is
+not fair, since he "paid no attention to the order of the pairs, but
+concentrated wholly on each pair separately". Had he expected to
+recite the whole list of pairs in order, he would have noticed the
+relationship of successive pairs, and perhaps woven them into a sort
+of continued story.
+
+In memorizing _connected passages_ of prose or poetry, the "facts
+observed" are the general sense and drift of the passage, the meanings
+of the parts and their places in the general scheme, the grammatical
+structure of the sentences and phrases, and the author's choice of
+particular words. Memorizing here is the same general sort of
+observant procedure as with nonsense material, greatly assisted by the
+familiar sequences of words and by the connected meaning of the
+passage, so that a connected passage can be learned in a fraction of
+the time needed to memorize an equally long list of unrelated words.
+No one in his senses would undertake to memorize an intelligible
+passage by the pure rote method, for this would be throwing away the
+best possible aid in memorizing; but you will find students who fail
+to take full advantage of the sense, because, reading along passively,
+they are not on the alert for general trends and outlines. For fixing
+in mind the sense of a passage, the essential thing is to see the
+sense. If the student gets the point with absolute clearness, he has
+pretty well committed it to memory.
+
+{338}
+
+Short-circuiting.
+
+The peculiarities of words or syllables in a list or passage that is
+being memorized, the relationships observed among the parts, and the
+meanings suggested or imported into the material, though very useful
+in the early stages of memorizing, tend to drop out of mind as the
+material becomes familiar. A pair of syllables, "lub--mer", may have
+first been associated by turning them into "love mother", but later
+this meaning fades out, and the two syllables seem simply to belong
+together in their own right. A pair of words, like "seldom--harbor",
+that were first linked together by the intermediary thought of a boat
+that seldom came into the harbor, become directly bound together as
+mere words. A short-circuiting occurs, indirect attachments giving way
+to direct. Even the outline and general purpose of a connected passage
+may fade out of mind, when the passage becomes well learned, so that
+it may be almost impossible for a schoolboy, who has learned his
+little speech by heart, to deliver it with any consciousness of its
+real meaning. A familiar act flattens out and tends to become
+automatic and mechanical.
+
+
+Economy in Memorizing
+
+Memorizing is a form of mental work that is susceptible of management,
+and several principles of scientific management have been worked out
+that may greatly assist in the learning of a long and difficult
+lesson. The problem has been approached from the angle of economy or
+efficiency. Suppose a certain amount of time is allowed for the study
+of a lesson, how can this time be best utilized?
+
+The first principle of economy has already been sufficiently
+emphasized: observant study, directed towards the finding of
+relationships and significant facts, is much more efficient than mere
+dull repetition.
+
+{339}
+
+The value of recitation in memorizing.
+
+"Recitation" here means reciting to oneself. After the learner has
+read his lesson once or twice, he may, instead of continuing simply to
+read it, attempt to recite it, prompting himself without much delay
+when he is stuck, and verifying his recitation by reference to the
+paper. The question is whether this active reciting method of study is
+or is not economical of time in memorizing, and whether or not it
+fixes the lesson durably in memory. The matter has been thoroughly
+tested, and the answer is unequivocally in favor of recitation. The
+only outstanding question is as to how soon to start attempting to
+recite, and probably no single answer can be given to this question,
+so much depends on the kind of material studied, and on peculiarities
+of the individual learner. Where the sense rather than the exact
+wording of a lesson has to be learned, it is probably best to recite,
+in outline, after the first reading, and to utilize the next reading
+for filling in the outline.
+
+The results of one series of experiments on this matter are summarized
+in the adjoining table.
+
+
+THE VALUE OF RECITATION IN MEMORIZING (from Gates)
+
+Material studied 16 nonsense syllables 5 short biographies,
+ totalling about 170 words
+
+ Per cent, remembered Per cent. remembered
+
+ immediately after 4 hours immediately after 4 hours
+
+
+All time devoted
+to reading 35 15 35 16
+
+1/5 of time devoted
+to recitation 50 26 37 19
+
+2/5 of time devoted
+to recitation 54 28 41 25
+
+3/5 of time devoted
+to recitation 57 37 42 26
+
+4/5 of time devoted
+to recitation 74 48 42 26
+
+
+ The time devoted to study was in all cases 9 minutes, and this time
+ was divided between reading and recitation in different proportions
+ as stated in the first column at the left. Reading down the next
+ column, {340} we find that when nonsense syllables were studied and
+ the test was conducted immediately after the close of the study
+ period, 35 per cent. were remembered when all the study time had
+ been devoted to reading, 50 per cent, when the last 1/5 of the study
+ time had been devoted to recitation, 54 per cent when the last 2/5
+ of the time had been devoted to recitation; and so on. The next
+ column shows the per cents. remembered four hours after the study
+ period. Each subject in these experiments had before him a sheet of
+ paper containing the lesson to be studied, and he simply read it
+ till the experimenter gave a signal to recite, after which the
+ subject recited the lesson to himself as well as he could, prompting
+ himself from the paper as often as necessary, and proceeded, thus
+ till the end of the study period. The subjects in these particular
+ experiments were eighth grade children; adult subjects gave the same
+ general results.
+
+
+Three facts stand out from the table: (1) Reading down the columns, we
+see that recitation was always an advantage. (2) The advantage was
+more marked in the test conducted four hours after study than in the
+test immediately following the study. To be sure, there is always a
+falling off from the immediate to the later test; there is bound to be
+some forgetting when the lesson has been studied for so short a time
+as here; but the forgetting proceeds more slowly after recitation than
+after all reading. Recitation fixes the matter more durably. (3) The
+advantage of recitation is less marked in the meaningful material than
+in case of nonsense syllables, though it is marked in both cases. The
+reason is that meaningful material can better be read observantly,
+time after time, than is possible with nonsense material. Continued
+reading of nonsense material degenerates into a mere droning, while in
+repeatedly reading meaningful material the learner who is keenly
+interested in mastering the passage is sure to keep his mind ahead of
+his eyes to some extent, so that his reading becomes half recitation,
+after all.
+
+Whence comes the advantage of recitation? It has a twofold advantage:
+it is more stimulating, and it is more satisfying. When you know you
+are going to attempt recitation at once, you are stimulated to observe
+positions, peculiarities, relationships, and meanings, and thus your
+study {341} goes on at a higher level than when the test of your
+knowledge is still far away, with many readings still to come. You are
+also stimulated to manipulate the material, by way of grouping and
+rhythm.
+
+On the side of satisfaction, recitation shows you what parts of the
+lesson you have mastered and gives you the glow of increasing success.
+It shows you exactly where you are failing and so stimulates to extra
+attention to those parts of the lesson. It taps the instincts of
+exploration, manipulation, and mastery much more effectively than
+continued re-reading of the same lesson can do. The latter becomes
+very uninteresting, monotonous and fatiguing.
+
+Perhaps, after all, the greatest advantage of reciting is that it
+makes you do, in learning, the very act that you have later to perform
+in the test; for what you have finally to do is to recite the lesson
+without the book. When reading, you are doing something different; and
+if it were altogether different, it probably would not help you at all
+towards success in the test. But since intelligent reading consists
+partly in anticipating and outlining as you go, it is a sort of half
+recitation, it is halfway doing what you are trying to learn to do.
+Memorizing consists in performing an act, now, with assistance, that
+you later wish to perform without assistance; and recitation first
+stimulates you to fashion the act conformably to the object in view,
+and then exercises you in performing that act.
+
+
+Spaced and unspaced repetition.
+
+Another question on the economical management of memorizing: Is it
+better to keep steadily going through the lesson till you have it, or
+to go through it at intervals? If you were allowed a certain time, and
+no more, in which to prepare for examination on a certain memory
+lesson, how could the study time be best distributed? This question
+also has received a very definite answer.
+
+{342}
+
+Spaced repetitions are more effective than unspaced. In an experiment
+of Pieron, a practised subject went through a list of twenty numbers
+with an interval of only thirty seconds between readings, and needed
+eleven readings to master the list. But a similar list, with
+five-minute intervals, was mastered in six readings; and the number of
+readings went down to five with an interval of ten minutes, and
+remained the same for longer intervals up to two days. With this
+particular sort of lesson, then, ten minutes was a long enough
+interval, and two days not too long, to give the greatest economy of
+time spent in actual study.
+
+In a somewhat different experiment in another laboratory, lists of
+nonsense syllables were studied either two, four, or eight times in
+immediate succession, and this was repeated each day till a total of
+twenty-four readings had been given to each list; then, one day after
+the last reading of each list, the subjects were tested as to their
+memory of it. The result appears in the adjoining table.
+
+
+EFFECT OF SPACED STUDY ON ECONOMY OF MEMORIZING (From Jost)
+
+ Distribution of
+ the 24 readings Total score Total score
+ of Mr. B. of Mr. M.
+ 8 readings a day for 3 days 18 7
+
+ 6 readings a day for 4 days 39 31
+
+ 2 readings a day for 12 days 58 55
+
+
+
+The widest distribution gave the best score. Undoubtedly, then, if you
+had to memorize a poem or speech, you would get better value for time
+spent if you read it once or twice at a time, with intervals of
+perhaps a day, than if you attempted to learn it at one continuous
+sitting. What exact spacing would give the very greatest economy would
+depend on the length and character of the lesson.
+
+Spaced study also fixes the matter more durably. Every student knows
+that continuous "cramming" just before an {343} examination, while it
+may accomplish its immediate purpose, accomplishes little for
+permanent knowledge.
+
+When we say that spaced repetitions give best results in memorizing,
+that does not mean that study generally should be in short periods
+with intervals of rest; it says nothing one way or the other on that
+question. The probability is, since most students take a certain time
+to get well "warmed up" to study, that fairly long periods of
+consecutive study would yield larger returns than the same amount of
+time divided into many short periods. What we have been saying here is
+simply that repetition of the _same material_ fixes it better in
+memory, when an interval (not necessarily an empty interval) elapses
+between the repetitions.
+
+
+Whole versus part learning.
+
+In memorizing a long lesson, is it more economical to divide it into
+parts, and study each part by itself till mastered, or to keep the
+lesson entire and always go through the whole thing? Most of us would
+probably guess that study part by part would be better, but
+experimental results have usually been in favor of study of the whole.
+
+If you had to memorize 240 lines of a poem, you would certainly be
+inclined to learn a part at a time; but notice the following
+experiment. A young man took two passages of this length, both from
+the same poem, and studied one by the whole method, the other by the
+part method, in sittings of about thirty-five minutes each day. His
+results appear in the table.
+
+LEARNING PASSAGES OF 240 LINES, BY WHOLE AND PART METHODS
+(Pyle and Snyder)
+
+ Method of study Number of days Total number of
+ required minutes required
+
+ 30 lines memorized per day,
+ then whole reviewed till it
+ could be recited 12 431
+
+ 3 readings of whole per day
+ till it could be recited 10 348
+
+
+{344}
+
+Here there was an economy of eighty-three minutes, or nearly twenty
+per cent., by using the whole method as against the part method.
+Similar experiments have regularly given the same general result.
+
+However, the matter is not quite so simple, as, under certain
+conditions, the results tend the other way. Let us consider a very
+different type of learning test. A "pencil maze", consisting of
+passages or grooves to be traced out with a pencil, while the whole
+thing was concealed from the subject by a screen, was so arranged that
+it could be divided into four parts and each part learned separately.
+Four squads of learners were used. Squads A and B learned the maze as
+a whole, squads C and D part by part. Squads A and C learned by spaced
+trials, two trials per day. Squad B learned the whole thing at one
+sitting; while squad D, which came off best of all, learned one part a
+day for four days, and on the fifth day learned to put the parts
+together. The results appear in the adjoining table, which shows the
+average time required to master the maze by each of the four methods.
+
+
+PART AND WHOLE LEARNING, SPACED AND UNSPACED,
+IN THE PENCIL MAZE (From Pechstein)
+
+ Spaced trials Unspaced trials
+
+Whole learning A 641 seconds B 1250 seconds
+
+Part learning C 1220 seconds D 538 seconds
+
+
+When the trials were spaced, the whole method was much the better; but
+when the trials were bunched, the part method was much the better;
+and, on the whole, the unspaced part learning was the best of all.
+Thus the result stands in apparent contradiction with two accepted
+laws: that of the advantage of spaced learning, and that of the
+advantage of whole learning.
+
+This contradiction warns us not to accept the "laws" {345} too
+blindly, but rather to analyze out the factors of advantage in each
+method, and govern ourselves accordingly. Among the factors involved
+are the following four:
+
+(1) The factor of interest, confidence and visible accomplishment--the
+emotional factor, we might call it. This is on the side of part
+learning, especially with beginners, who soon feel out of their depth
+when wading into a long lesson, and lose hope of ever learning it in
+this way. This factor is also largely on the side of unspaced as
+against spaced learning, when the part studied is of moderate length
+and when there are recitations to keep up the interest; for when the
+learner sees he is getting ahead, he would rather keep right on than
+wait for another day to finish. To have a task that you can hope to
+accomplish at once, and to attack it with the intention of mastering
+it at once, is very stimulating.
+
+(2) The factor of recency, of "striking while the iron is hot". When
+an act has just been successfully performed it can easily be repeated,
+and when a fact has just been observed it can readily be put to use.
+This factor is clearly on the side of unspaced learning; and it is
+also on the side of part learning, since by the time you have gone
+through the whole long lesson and got back to where you are now, the
+recency value of what you have just now accomplished will have
+evaporated.
+
+(3) The factor of meaning, outlining and broad relationships. This is
+on the side of whole learning, for it is when you are going through
+the whole that you catch its general drift, and see the connections of
+the several parts and their places in the whole. This factor is so
+important as to outweigh the preceding two in many cases, especially
+with experienced learners dealing with meaningful material. Even if
+you should prefer the part method, you would be wise to begin by a
+careful survey of the whole.
+
+{346}
+
+(4) The factor of permanency. This is something "physiological", and
+it is on the side of spaced learning. The muscles profit more by
+exercise with intervals of rest than by a large amount of continuous
+exercise, and no athlete would think for a moment of training for a
+contest of strength by "cramming" for it. Apparently the neurones obey
+the same law as the muscles, and for that reason spaced learning gives
+more durable results than unspaced.
+
+
+Unintentional Learning
+
+What we have been examining is intentional memorizing, with the "will
+to learn" strongly in the game. The assertion has sometimes been made
+that the will to learn is necessary if any learning is to be
+accomplished. We must look into this matter, for it has an important
+bearing on the whole question of the process of learning.
+
+There is a famous incident that occurred in a Swiss psychological
+laboratory, when a foreign student was supposed to be memorizing a
+list of nonsense syllables. After the list had been passed before him
+many times without his giving the expected signal that he was ready to
+recite, the experimenter remarked that he seemed to be having trouble
+in memorizing the syllables. "Oh! I didn't understand that I was to
+learn them", he said, and it was found that, in fact, he had made
+almost no progress towards learning the list. He had been observing
+the separate syllables, with no effort to connect them into a series.
+
+Another incident: subjects were put repeatedly through a "color naming
+test", which consisted of five colors repeated in irregular order, the
+object being to name the one hundred bits of color as rapidly as
+possible. After the subjects had been through this test over two
+hundred times, you would think they could recite it from memory; but
+not {347} at all! They had very little memory of the order of the bits
+of color. Their efforts had been wholly concentrated upon naming the
+bits as seen, and not in connecting them into a series that could be
+remembered.
+
+The experiment described a few pages back on "paired associates" is
+another case in point. The subjects memorized the pairs, but made no
+effort to connect the pairs in order, and consequently were not able
+later to remember the order of the pairs.
+
+Many somewhat similar experiments have been performed, with the object
+of measuring the reliability of the testimony of eye-witnesses; and it
+has been found that testimony is very unreliable except for facts that
+were specifically noted at the time. Enact a little scene before a
+class of students who do not suspect that their memory of the affair
+is later to be tested, and you will find that their memory for many
+facts that were before their eyes is hazy, absent, or positively
+false.
+
+These facts all emphasize the importance of the will to learn. But let
+us consider another line of facts. An event occurs before our eyes,
+and we do notice certain facts about it, not with any intention of
+remembering them later, but simply because they arouse our interest;
+later, we recall such facts with great clearness and certainty. Or, we
+hear a tune time after time, and gradually come to be able to sing it
+ourselves, without ever having attempted to memorize it. Practically
+all that the child learns in the first few years of his life, he
+learns without any "will to learn".
+
+What is the difference between the case where the will to learn is
+necessary, and the case where it is unnecessary? The difference is
+that in the one case we observe facts for the purpose of committing
+them to memory, and in the other case we observe the facts without any
+such intention. In both cases we remember what we have definitely
+observed, {348} and fail to remember what we have not observed.
+Sometimes, to be sure, it is not so much observation as doing that is
+operative. We may make a certain reaction with the object of learning
+it so as to make it later, or we may make the reaction for some other
+reason; but in either case we learn it.
+
+What is essential, then, is not the will to learn, but the doing and
+observing. The will to learn is sometimes important, as a directive
+tendency, to steer doing and observing into channels relevant to the
+particular memory task that we need to perform. But committing to
+memory seems not to be any special form of activity; rather, it
+consists of reactions that also occur without any view to future
+remembering. Not only do we learn _by_ doing and observing, but doing
+and observing _are_ learning.
+
+
+Retention
+
+We come now to the second of our four main problems, and ask how we
+retain, or carry around inside of us, what we have learned. The answer
+is, not by any process or activity. Retention is a resting state, in
+which a learned reaction remains until the stimulus arrives that can
+arouse it again. We carry around with us, not the reaction, but the
+machinery for making the reaction.
+
+Consider, for example, the retention of motor skill. A boy who has
+learned to turn a handspring does not have to keep doing it all the
+time in order to retain it. He may keep himself in better form by
+reviewing the performance occasionally, but he retains the skill even
+while eating and sleeping. The same can be said of the retention of
+the multiplication table, or of a poem, or of knowledge of any kind.
+The machinery that is retained consists very largely in brain
+connections. Connections formed in the process of {349} learning
+remain behind in a resting condition till again aroused to activity by
+some appropriate stimulus.
+
+But the machinery developed in the process of learning is subject to
+the wasting effects of time. It is subject to the law of "atrophy
+through disuse". Just as a muscle, brought by exercise into the pink
+of condition, and then left long inactive, grows weak and small, so it
+is with the brain connections formed in learning. With prolongation of
+the condition of rest, the machinery is less and less able to
+function, till finally all retention of a once-learned reaction may be
+lost.
+
+But _is_ anything once learned ever completely forgotten and lost?
+Some say no, being strongly impressed by cases of recovery of memories
+that were thought to be altogether gone. Childhood experiences that
+were supposed to be completely forgotten, and that could not at first
+be recalled at all, have sometimes been recovered after a long and
+devious search. Sometimes a hypnotized person remembers facts that he
+could not get at in the waking state. Persons in a fever have been
+known to speak a language heard in childhood, but so long disused as
+to be completely inaccessible in the normal state. Such facts have
+been generalized into the extravagant statement that nothing once
+known is ever forgotten. For it is an extravagant statement. It would
+mean that all the lessons you had ever learned could still be recited,
+if only the right stimulus could be found to arouse them; it would
+mean that all the lectures you ever heard (and attended to) are still
+retained, that all the stories you ever read are still retained, that
+all the faces you ever noticed are still retained, that all the scenes
+and happenings that ever got your attention could still be revived if
+only the right means were taken to revive them. There is no evidence
+for any such extreme view.
+
+The modern, scientific study of this matter began with {350}
+recognizing the fact that there are _degrees of retention_, ranging
+all the way from one hundred per cent, to zero, and with the invention
+of methods of measuring retention. Suppose you have memorized a list
+of twenty numbers some time ago, and kept a record of the time you
+then took to learn it; since when you have not thought of it again.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 53.--(From Ebbinghaus.) The curve of forgetting.
+The curve sinks at first rapidly, and then slowly, from the 100 per
+cent line towards the zero line, 100 per cent. here meaning perfect
+retention, and 0 no retention.]
+
+
+On attempting now to recite it, you make no headway and are inclined
+to think you have entirely forgotten it. But, finding the list again,
+you _relearn_ it, and probably find that your time for relearning is
+less than the original learning time--unless the lapse of time has run
+into months. Now consider--if no time at all were needed for
+relearning, because the list could be recited easily without, your
+retention would be one hundred per cent. If, on the contrary, it took
+you just as long now to relearn as it did originally to learn, the
+retention would be zero. If it takes you now two-thirds as long to
+relearn as it originally took to learn, then {351} one-third of the
+work originally done on the list does not have to be done over, and
+_this saving is the measure of retention_.
+
+By the use of this method, the curve of retention, or curve of
+forgetting, as it is also called, has been determined. It is a curve
+that first goes down steeply, and then more and more gradually, till
+it approximates to zero; which means that the loss of what has been
+learned proceeds rapidly at first and then more and more slowly.
+
+The curve of forgetting can be determined by other methods besides the
+saving method--by the recall method or by the recognition method; and
+data obtained by these methods are given in the adjoining tables. It
+will be seen that the different methods agree in showing a curve that
+falls off more rapidly at first than later. More is lost in the first
+hour than in the second hour, and more in the first week than in the
+second week. Few of the experiments have been continued long enough to
+bring the curve actually to the zero line, but it has come very close
+to that line in tests conducted after an interval of two to four
+months.
+
+
+PER CENT. OF WORDS RECOGNIZED AT DIFFERENT INTERVALS AFTER BEING SEEN
+(From Strong)
+
+ Interval between Per cent. recognized with
+ exposure and test certainty and correctness
+
+ 15 secs. 84
+
+ 5 min. 73
+
+ 15 min. 62
+
+ 30 min. 58
+
+ 1 hour 56
+
+ 2 hours 50
+
+ 4 hours 47
+
+ 8 hours 40
+
+ 12 hours 38
+
+ 1 day 29
+
+ 2 days 24
+
+ 4 days 19
+
+ 7 days 10
+
+
+ The subject read a list of 20 disconnected words once through,
+ giving careful attention to each word. Immediately at the close of
+ the reading he performed an example in mental arithmetic, to prevent
+ his reviewing the list of words mentally. After an interval, he was
+ shown these {352} twenty words mixed with twenty others, and had to
+ pick out those he surely recognized as having been shown before.
+ Many lists were used, for testing after the different intervals.
+ Five adult subjects took part in the experiment, and in all 15 lists
+ were used with each interval; the per cents. given in the table are
+ the averages for the 15 lists.
+
+
+ THE PER CENT. OF ERROR IN RECALLING DETAILS OF A
+ PICTURE AFTER DIFFERENT INTERVALS OF TIME
+ (From Dallenbach)
+
+ Time of test Per cent, of error Per cent of error
+ in spontaneous in answering
+ recall questions regarding
+ the picture
+
+ Immediately after exposure 10 14
+
+ After 5 days 14 18
+
+ After 15 days 18 20
+
+ After 46 days 22 22
+
+
+ The picture was placed in the subject's hands, and he examined it
+ for one minute, at the end of which time he wrote down as complete a
+ description of the picture as possible, and then answered a set of
+ sixty questions covering all the features of the picture. After five
+ days he was retested in the same way, and again after fifteen days,
+ etc. In one respect this is not a typical memory experiment, since
+ the test after five days would revive the subject's memory of the
+ picture and slacken the progress of forgetting. The experiment
+ corresponds more closely to the conditions of ordinary life, when we
+ do recall a scene at intervals; or it corresponds to the conditions
+ surrounding the eye-witness of a crime, who must testify regarding
+ it, time after time, before police, lawyers and juries. However, the
+ subjects in this experiment realized at the time that they were to
+ be examined later, and studied the picture more carefully than the
+ eye-witness of a crime would study the event occurring before his
+ eyes; so that the per cent. of error was smaller here than can be
+ expected in the courtroom.
+
+
+It must be understood that this classical curve of forgetting only
+holds good, strictly, for material that has _barely_ been learned.
+Reactions that have been drilled in thoroughly and repeatedly fall off
+very slowly at first, and the further course of the curve of
+forgetting has not been accurately followed in their case. A typist
+who had spent perhaps two hundred hours in drill, and then dropped
+typewriting for a year, recovered the lost ground in less than an hour
+of fresh practice, so that the retention, as measured by the saving
+method, was over ninety-nine per cent.
+
+Somewhat different from the matter of the curve of forgetting is the
+question of the _rate of forgetting_, as {353} dependent on various
+conditions. The rate of forgetting depends, first, on the thoroughness
+of the learning, as we have just seen. It depends on the kind of
+material learned, being very much slower for meaningful than for
+nonsense material, though both have been learned equally well. Barely
+learned nonsense material is almost entirely gone by the end of four
+months, but stanzas of poetry, just barely learned, have shown a
+perceptible retention after twenty years.
+
+Very fortunately, the principles of economy of memorizing hold good
+also for retention. Forgetting is slower when relationships and
+connections have been found in the material than when the learning has
+been by rote. Forgetting is slower after active recitation than when
+the more passive, receptive method of study has been employed.
+Forgetting is slower after spaced than after unspaced study, and
+slower after whole learning than after part learning.
+
+An old saying has it that quick learning means quick forgetting, and
+that quick learners are quick forgetters. Experiment does not wholly
+bear this out. A lesson that is learned quickly because it is clearly
+understood is better retained than one which is imperfectly understood
+and therefore slowly learned; and a learner who learns quickly because
+he is on the alert for significant facts and connections retains
+better than a learner who is slow from lack of such alertness. The
+wider awake the learner, the quicker will be his learning and the
+slower his subsequent forgetting; so that one is often tempted to
+admonish a certain type of studious but easy-going person, "for
+goodness' sake not to dawdle over his lessons", with any idea that the
+more time he spends with them the longer he will remember them. More
+gas! High pressure gives the biggest results, provided only it is
+directed into high-level observation, and does not simply generate
+fear and worry and a rattle-brained frenzy of rote learning.
+
+{354}
+
+Recall
+
+Having committed something to memory, how do we get it back when we
+want it? To judge from such simple cases as the animal's performance
+of a previously learned reaction, all that is necessary is a
+_stimulus_ previously linked with the response. How, for example,
+shall we get the cat to turn the door-button, this being an act that
+the cat has previously learned? Why, we put the cat into the same
+cage, i.e., we supply the stimulus that has previously given the
+reaction, and trust to it to give the same reaction again. The
+learning process has attached this reaction to this stimulus. Now can
+we say the same regarding material committed to memory by the human
+subject? Is recall a species of learned reaction that needs only the
+linked stimulus to arouse it?
+
+If you have learned and still retain a list of numbers or syllables,
+you can recite it on thinking of it, on hearing words that identify it
+in your mind, or on being given the first few items in the list as a
+start. The act of reciting the list became linked, during the
+learning, with the thought of the list, with words signifying this
+particular list, and with the first items of the list; therefore,
+these stimuli can now arouse the reaction of reciting the list. As you
+advance into the list, reciting it, the parts already recited act as
+stimuli to keep you going forward. In the same way, if you have
+memorized Hamlet's soliloquy, this title serves as the stimulus to
+make you recall the beginning of the speech and that in turn calls up
+the next part and so on; or, if you have analyzed the speech into an
+outline, the title calls up the outline and the outline acts as the
+stimulus to call up the several parts that were attached to the
+outline in the process of memorization. When one idea calls up
+another, the first acts as a stimulus and the second is a {355}
+response previously attached to this stimulus. In general, then,
+recall is a learned response to a stimulus.
+
+There is an exceptional case, where recall seems to occur without any
+stimulus. This form of recall goes by the name of _perseveration_, and
+a good instance of it is the "running of a tune in the head", shortly
+after it has been heard. Another instance is the vivid flashing of
+scenes of the day before the "mind's eye" as one lies in bed before
+going to sleep. It appears as if the sights or sounds came up of
+themselves and without any stimulus. Possibly there is some vague
+stimulus which cannot itself be detected. Only a slight stimulus would
+be needed, because these recent and vivid experiences are so easily
+aroused.
+
+
+Difficulties in recall.
+
+Sometimes recall fails to materialize when we wish it and have good
+reason for expecting it. We know this person's name, as is proved by
+the fact that we later recall it, but at the moment we cannot bring it
+up. We know the answer to this examination question, but in the heat
+of the examination we give the wrong answer, though afterwards the
+right answer comes to mind. This seldom happens with thoroughly
+learned facts, but frequently with facts that are moderately well
+known. Some sort of inhibition or interference blocks recall.
+
+One type of interference is emotional. Fear may paralyze recall.
+Anxious self-consciousness, or stage fright, has prevented the recall
+of many a well-learned speech, and interfered with the skilful
+performance of many a well-trained act.
+
+Distraction is an interference, since it keeps the stimulus from
+exerting its full effect. Sometimes the stimulus that is present has
+been linked with two or more responses, and these get in each other's
+way; as you will sometimes hear a speaker hesitate and become confused
+from having two ways {356} of expressing the same thought occur to him
+at almost the same instant.
+
+
+Helps in recall.
+
+There are no sure rules for avoiding these intricate interferences;
+and, in general, recall being a much less manageable process than
+memorizing, we do not have anything like the same mass of practical
+information regarding it. One or two suggestions have some value,
+however.
+
+(1) Give the stimulus a good chance. Look squarely at the person whose
+name you wish to recall, avoiding doubt as to your ability to recall
+it; for doubt is itself a distraction. Put yourself back into the time
+when you formerly used this person's name. In extemporaneous speaking,
+go ahead confidently, avoid worry and self-consciousness, and, full of
+your subject, trust to your ideas to recall the words as needed. Once
+carried away with his subject, a speaker may surprise himself by his
+own fluency.
+
+(2) Drop the matter for a while, and come back to it afresh.
+Sometimes, when you cannot at once recall a name, it does no good to
+keep doggedly hunting, while half an hour later you get it without the
+least trouble. The explanation of this curious phenomenon is found in
+interference and the dying out of interference. At your first attempt
+to recall the name, you simply got on the wrong track, and thus gave
+this wrong track the "recency" advantage over the right track; but
+this temporary advantage fades out rapidly with rest and leaves the
+advantage with the track most used in the past.
+
+The rule to drop a matter when baffled and confused, and take it up
+again when fresh, can be used in more complex cases than hunting for a
+name. When, in trying to solve any sort of problem, you find yourself
+in a rut, about the only escape is to back off, rest up, and make an
+entirely fresh start.
+
+{357}
+
+Recognition
+
+The fourth question propounded at the beginning of the chapter, as to
+how we can know that the fact now recalled is what we formerly
+committed to memory and now wish to recall, is part of the larger
+question of how we recognize. What we recognize includes not only
+facts recalled, but also facts not recalled but presented a second
+time to the senses. Recognition of objects seen, heard, touched, etc.,
+is the most rudimentary form of memory. The baby shows signs of
+recognizing persons and things before he shows signs of recall. A
+little later, he recognizes and understands words before he begins to
+speak (recall) them; and everybody's vocabulary of recognized words
+remains much greater than his speaking vocabulary. We recognize faces
+that we could not recall, and names that we could not recall. In
+short, recognition is easier than recall.
+
+Consequently any theory of recognition that makes it depend on recall
+can scarcely be correct. One such theory held that an object is
+recognized by recalling its original setting in past experience; an
+odor would be recognized by virtue of recalling the circumstances
+under which it was formerly experienced. Now sometimes it does happen
+that an odor which seems familiar, but cannot be identified, calls up
+a past experience and thus is fully recognized; but such "indirect
+recognition" is not the usual thing, for direct recognition commonly
+takes place before recall of the past experience has time to occur.
+You see a person, and know him at once, though it may require some
+moments before you can recall where and when you have seen him before.
+
+Recognition may be more or less complete. At its minimum, it is simply
+a "feeling of familiarity" with the object; at its maximum it is
+locating the object precisely in your autobiography. You see a man,
+and say, "He looks {358} familiar, I must have seen him somewhere",
+and then it dawns on you, "Oh! yes, now I know exactly who he is; he
+is the man who . . ." Between these extremes lie various degrees of
+recognition. This man seems to be some one seen recently, or a long,
+long time ago, or at the seashore, or as a salesman in a store; or as
+some one you looked up to, or felt hostility towards, or were amused
+at; and often these impressions turn out to be correct, when you
+succeed in fully recognizing the person. These impressions resemble
+the first signs of recognition in the baby's behavior; you say that
+the baby remembers people because he smiles at one who has pleased him
+before, and shrinks from one who has displeased him.
+
+
+Recognition described in terms of stimulus and response.
+
+Recognition is a form of learned response, depending on previous
+reaction to the object recognized. To recognize an object is to
+respond to it as we responded before--except for the feeling of
+familiarity, which could not occur the first time we saw the object.
+But notice this: though the object is the same identical object it was
+before, it may have changed somewhat. At least, its setting is
+different; this is a different time and perhaps a different place, and
+the circumstances are bound to be more or less different. In spite of
+this difference in the situation, we make the same response as before.
+
+Now, the response we made to the object in its original setting was a
+response to the whole situation, object _plus_ setting; our response
+to the object was colored by its setting. When we now recognize the
+object, we make the same response to the object in a different
+setting; the response originally called out by the object _plus_ its
+setting is now aroused by the object alone. Consequently we have an
+uneasy feeling of responding to a situation that is not present. {359}
+This uneasy feeling is the feeling of familiarity in its more haunting
+and "intriguing" form.
+
+We see some one who seems familiar and who arouses a hostile attitude
+in us that is not accounted for in the least by his present actions.
+We have this uneasy feeling of responding to a situation that is not
+present, and cannot rest till we have identified the person and
+justified our hostile attitude.
+
+Or, we see some one who makes us feel as if we had had dealings with
+him before in a store or postoffice where he must have served us; we
+find ourselves taking the attitude towards him that is appropriate
+towards such a functionary, though there is nothing in his present
+setting to arouse such an attitude. Or, we see some one in the city
+streets who seems to put us back into the atmosphere of a vacation at
+the seashore, and by searching our memory we finally locate him as an
+individual we saw at such and such a resort. At other times, the
+feeling of familiarity is rather colorless, because the original
+situation in which the person was encountered was colorless; but we
+still have the feeling of responding to something that is not present.
+We make, or start to make, the same response to the person that we
+originally made to him _plus_ his setting, and this response to
+something that is not there gives the feeling of familiarity.
+
+When we see the same person time after time in the same setting, as
+when we go into the same store every morning and buy a paper from the
+same man, we cease to have any strong feeling of familiarity at sight
+of him, the reason being that we are always responding to him in the
+same setting, and consequently have no feeling of responding to
+something that is not there. But if we see this same individual in a
+totally different place, he may give us a queer feeling of
+familiarity. When we see the same person time after time {360} in
+various settings, we end by separating him from his surroundings and
+responding to him alone, and therefore the familiarity feeling
+disappears.
+
+Complete recognition, or "placing" the object, involves something more
+than these feelings and rudimentary reactions. It involves the recall
+of a context or scheme of events, and a fitting of the object into the
+scheme.
+
+
+Memory Training
+
+The important question whether memory can be improved by any form of
+training breaks up, in the light of our previous analysis, into the
+four questions, whether memorizing can be improved, whether the power
+of retention can be improved, whether recall can be improved, and
+whether recognition can be improved. As to recognition, it is
+difficult to imagine how to train it; the process is so elusive and so
+direct. It has been found, however, that practice in recognizing a
+certain class of objects improves one's standards of judgment as to
+whether a feeling of familiarity is reliable or not; it enables one to
+distinguish between feelings that have given correct recognitions and
+the vaguer feelings that often lead one astray.
+
+As to recall, certain hints were given above as to the efficient
+management of this process, and probably practice in recalling a
+certain sort of facts, checked up by results, would lead to
+improvement.
+
+As to retention, since this is not a performance but a resting state,
+how could we possibly go about to effect an improvement? One
+individual's brain is, to be sure, more retentive than another's; but
+that seems a native trait, not to be altered by training.
+
+On the other hand, the process of committing to memory, being a
+straightforward and controllable activity, is {361} exceedingly
+susceptible to training, and it is there, for the most part, that
+memory training should be concentrated in order to yield results. It
+does yield marked results. In the laboratory, the beginner in learning
+lists of nonsense syllables makes poor work of it. He is emotionally
+wrought up and uncertain of himself, goes to work in a random way
+(like any beginner), perhaps tries to learn by pure rote or else
+attempts to use devices that are ill-adapted to the material, and has
+a slow and tedious job of it. With practice in learning this sort of
+material, he learns to observe suitable groupings and relationships,
+becomes sure of himself and free from the distraction of emotional
+disturbance, and may even come to enjoy the work. Certainly he
+improves greatly in speed of memorizing nonsense syllables. If,
+instead, he practises on Spenser's "Faery Queen", he improves in that,
+and may cut down his time for memorizing a twelve-line stanza from
+fifteen minutes to five. This improvement is due to the subject's
+finding out ways of tackling this particular sort of material. He gets
+used to Spenser's style and range of ideas. And so it is with any kind
+of material; practice in memorizing it brings great improvement in
+memorizing that particular material.
+
+Whether practice with one sort of material brings skill that can be
+"transferred", or carried over to a second kind of material, is quite
+another question. Usually the amount of _transfer_ is small compared
+with the improvement gained in handling the first material, or
+compared with the improvement that will result from specific training
+with the second kind. What skill is transferred consists partly of the
+habit of looking for groupings and relationships, and partly in the
+confidence in one's own ability as a memorizer. It is really worth
+while taking part in a memory experiment, just to know what you can
+accomplish after a little training. Most persons who complain of poor
+memory would be {362} convinced by such an experiment that their
+memory was fundamentally sound. But these laboratory exercises do not
+pretend to develop any general "power of memory", and the much
+advertised systems of memory training are no more justified in such a
+claim. What is developed, in both cases, is skill in memorizing
+certain kinds of material so as to pass certain forms of memory test.
+
+One who suffers from poor memory for any special material, as names,
+errands, or engagements, probably is not going to work right in
+committing the facts to memory; and if he gives special attention to
+this particular matter, keeping tab on himself to see whether he
+improves, he is likely to find better ways of fixing the facts and to
+make great improvement. It was said of a certain college president of
+the older day that he never failed to call a student or alumnus by
+name, after he had once met the man. How did he do it? He had the
+custom of calling each man in the freshman class into his office for a
+private interview, during which, besides fatherly advice, he asked the
+man personal questions and studied him intently. He was interested in
+the man, he formed a clear impression of his personality, and to that
+personality he carefully attached the name. Undoubtedly this able
+scholar was possessed of an unusually retentive memory; but his memory
+for names depended largely on his method of committing them to memory.
+
+Contrast this with the casual procedure of most of us on being
+introduced to a person. Perhaps we scarcely notice the name, and make
+no effort to attach the name to the personality. To have a good memory
+for names, one needs to give attention and practice to this specific
+matter. It is the same with memory for errands; it can be specifically
+trained. Perhaps the best general hint here is to connect the errand
+beforehand in your mind with the {363} place where you should think,
+during the day, to do the errand.
+
+Often some little _mnemonic system_ will help in remembering
+disconnected facts, but such devices have only a limited field of
+application and do not in the least improve the general power of
+memory. Some speakers, in planning out a speech, locate each
+successive "point" in a corner of the hall, or in a room of their own
+house; and when they have finished one point, look into the next
+corner, or think of the next room, and find the following point there.
+It would seem that a well-ordered discourse should supply its own
+logical cues so that such artificial aids would be unnecessary.
+
+In training the memory for the significant facts that constitute the
+individual's knowledge of his business in life, the best rule is to
+systematize and interrelate the facts into a coherent whole. Thus, a
+bigger and stronger stimulus is provided for the recall of any item.
+This, along with the principles of "economy" in memorizing, is the
+best suggestion that psychology has to make towards memory
+improvement.
+
+{364}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. In outlining the chapter, regroup the material so as to separate
+ the practical applications from the description of memory
+ processes. This gives you two main heads: A. Memory processes, and
+ B. The training and management of memory. Each of these main heads
+ should be divided into four sub-heads: Memorizing, retention, etc.,
+ and the information contained in the chapter grouped under these
+ sub-heads.
+
+2. Disorders of memory can be classified under the four heads of
+ disorders of learning, of retention, of recall and of recognition.
+ Where would you place each of the following?
+
+ (a) Aphasia, where, through brain injury, the subject's
+ vocabulary is very much reduced.
+
+ (b) The condition of the very old person, who cannot remember
+ what has happened during the day, though he still remembers
+ experiences of his youth.
+
+ (c) The "feeling of having been there before", in which you have
+ a weird impression that what is happening now has happened in
+ just the same way before, as if events were simply repeating
+ themselves.
+
+ (d) The loss of memory which sometimes occurs after a physical
+ or emotional shock, or after a fever, and which passes away
+ after a time.
+
+3. How fully can you recall what happened on some interesting
+ occasion when you were a child of 5-8 years? Dwell on the
+ experience, and see whether you get back more than at first seemed
+ possible. Try the same with an experience of five years ago.
+
+4. If a student came to you for advice, complaining of poor memory,
+ and said that though he put hours and hours on a lesson and read it
+ over many times, still he failed on it, what questions would you
+ ask regarding his method of study, and what suggestions would you
+ offer?
+
+5. An experiment on memorising lists of numbers. Prepare several
+ lists of 20 digits, and shuffle them; draw out one and take your
+ time for learning it to the point of perfect recitation. Write an
+ introspective account of the process. Repeat with a second list
+
+6. An experiment in memorizing word-pairs. Prepare 20 pairs of
+ words as follows: take 20 cards or slips of paper, and write a
+ different word on each. Then turn them over, shuffle, and write
+ another word on the back of each. Thus, though you may know what
+ words you have written, you do not how how they are paired; and now
+ your job is to learn the pairs. Note starting time, take the first
+ card and look at both {365} sides, and study the pair of words on
+ this card for about 5 seconds, passing then to the second card, and
+ so on through the pack. Shuffle the pack, take the top card and
+ give yourself about 5 seconds to recall the word on the reverse,
+ then turning the card over and reading it. Proceed in this way
+ through the pack, shuffle again, and repeat. Continue thus till you
+ score 100 per cent. Note total time required, and report on process
+ of memorizing.
+
+7. Memorizing a series of related words. Prepare a list of 40
+ words, as follows: first write the numbers 1 to 40 in a column;
+ then write any word for No. 1; for No. 2, write some word closely
+ related to No. 1; for No. 3 some word closely related to No. 2; and
+ so on. Your list, for example, might begin like this: house, roof,
+ chimney, soot, fire, coal, mine, miner, strike, arbitration, etc.
+ Having finished writing your list, cover it and see how much of it
+ you can recite without further study, and how long it takes you to
+ complete the memorizing. Explain the results obtained.
+
+8. Plot the curve of forgetting from the following data, which give
+ the per cent, of retention of stanzas of a poem at different
+ intervals after the end of memorizing.
+
+ after 1 day 79%
+ after 2 days 67%
+ after 6 days 42%
+ after 14 days 30%
+ after 30 days 24%
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Ebbinghaus, _On Memory_, 1885, translated by Ruger and Bussenius,
+1918. This is the pioneer experimental study of memory, and is still
+worth reading, and is not specially hard reading.
+
+James's chapter on Memory, in Vol. I of his _Principles of
+Psychology_, 1890, is still one of the best references, and contains
+some important remarks on the improvement of memory.
+
+Of the numerous special studies on memory, mention may be made of that
+by Arthur I. Gates, _Recitation as a Factor in Memorizing_, 1917,
+which, on pp. 65-104, gives a valuable account of the various devices
+used by one who is memorizing.
+
+For the psychology of testimony, see G. M. Whipple's article on "The
+Obtaining of Information: Psychology of Observation and Report", in
+the _Psychological Bulletin_ for 1918, Vol. 15, pp. 217-248,
+especially pp. 233-248. See also a popularly written account of the
+matter by Muensterberg, in _On the Witness Stand_, 1908, pp. 15-69.
+
+{366}
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+ASSOCIATION AND MENTAL IMAGERY
+
+SOMETHING ABOUT THINKING AS RELATED TO MEMORY
+
+Memory plays a part, not only in "memory work", and not only in
+remembering particular past experiences, but in all sorts of thinking.
+Recall furnishes the raw material for thought. A large share of any
+one's daily work, whether it be manual or mental, depends on the
+recall of previously learned reactions. Most of the time, though we
+are not exactly trying to remember facts committed to memory, we are
+recalling what we have previously learned, and utilizing the recalled
+material for our present purposes. For example, in conversation we
+recall words to express our meaning, and we recall the meanings of the
+words we hear. In adding a column of figures, we recall the sums of
+the numbers. In cooking a meal, we recall the ingredients of the dish
+we wish to prepare, and the location of the various materials and
+utensils required for our purpose. In planning a trip, we recall
+places and routes. Any sort of problem is solved by means of recalled
+facts put together in a new way. A writer in constructing a story puts
+together facts that he has previously noted, and any work of the
+imagination consists of materials recalled from past experience and
+now built into a new composition.
+
+
+What Can Be Recalled
+
+If recall is so important in thinking and acting, it is worth while to
+make a survey of the materials that recall {367} furnishes. In
+general, using the term "recall" rather broadly, we say that any
+previously learned reaction may be recalled. Writing _movements_ may
+be said to be recalled when we write, and speech movements when we
+speak. "Higher units", like the word habits and phrase habits of the
+telegrapher and typist, are in a broad sense recalled whenever they
+are used. The typist does not by any means recall the experience of
+learning a higher unit, but he calls into action again the response
+that he has learned to make. In the same way, the word habits and
+phrase habits of vocal speech are called into action, i.e., recalled,
+whenever we speak.
+
+Besides these motor reactions, _tendencies_ to reaction can be
+recalled. The attitude of hostility that may have become habitual in
+us towards a certain person, or towards a certain task, is called into
+activity at the mention of that person or task. The acquired interest
+in architecture that we may have formed by reading or travel is
+revived by the sight of an ambitious group of buildings. A slumbering
+purpose may be recalled into activity by some relevant stimulus.
+
+Observed _facts_ can be recalled, and this is the typically human form
+of recall. In animals, we see the recall of tendencies and of learned
+movements, but no clear evidence of the recall of observed facts. To
+be recalled with certainty, a fact must have been definitely noted
+when it was before us. If we have definitely noted the color of a
+person's eyes, we are in a position to testify that his eyes are
+brown, for example; otherwise, we may say that we think probably his
+eyes are brown; because we have certainly noticed that he is dark, and
+the dark eyes fit best into this total impression.
+
+We say that a fact is recalled when we think of it without its being
+present to the senses. While the original {368} observation of the
+fact was a response to a sensory stimulus, the recall of it is a
+response to some other stimulus, some "substitute stimulus". When John
+is before me, I observe that his eyes are brown in response to a
+visual stimulus; but I later recall this fact in response simply to
+the name "John", or in response to the question as to what is the
+color of John's eyes. I see what a square is by seeing squares and
+handling them, and later I get this idea simply in response to the
+word "square" in conversation or reading.
+
+
+Memory Images
+
+Now, can _sensations_ be recalled, can they be aroused except by their
+natural sensory stimuli? Can you recall the color blue, or the sound
+of a bugle, or the odor of camphor, or the feel of a lump of ice held
+in the hand? Almost every one will reply "Yes" to some at least of
+these questions. One may have a vivid picture of a scene before the
+"mind's eye", and another a realistic sound in the "mind's ear", and
+they may report that the recalled experience seems essentially the
+same as the original sensation. Therefore, sensory reactions are no
+exception to the rule of recall by a substitute stimulus.
+
+A sensation or complex of sensations recalled by a substitute stimulus
+is called a "mental image" or a "memory image".
+
+Individuals seem to differ in the vividness or realism of their memory
+images--the likeness of the image to an actual sensation--more than in
+any other respect. Galton, in taking a sort of census of mental
+imagery, asked many persons to call up the appearance of their
+breakfast table as they had sat down to it that morning, and to
+observe how lifelike the image was, how complete, how adequate in
+respect to color, how steady and lasting, and to compare {369} the
+image in these respects with the sensory experience aroused by the
+actual presence of the scene. Some individuals reported that the image
+was "in all respects the same as an original sensation", while others
+denied that they got anything at all in the way of recalled sensation,
+though they could perfectly well recall definite facts that they had
+observed regarding the breakfast table. The majority of people gave
+testimony intermediate between these extremes.
+
+Individuals differ so much in this respect that they scarcely credit
+each other's testimony. Some who had practically zero imagery held
+that the "picture before the mind's eye" spoken of by the poets was a
+myth or mere figure of speech; while those who were accustomed to
+vivid images could not understand what the others could possibly mean
+by "remembering facts about the breakfast table without having any
+image of it", and were strongly tempted to accuse them of poor
+introspection, if not worse. It is true that in attempting to study
+images, we have to depend altogether on introspection, since no one
+can objectively observe another person's memory image, and therefore
+we are exposed to all the unreliability of the unchecked introspective
+method. But at the same time, when you cross-question an individual
+whose testimony regarding his imagery is very different from yours,
+you find him so consistent in his testimony and so sure he is right,
+that you are forced to conclude to a very real difference between him
+and yourself. You are forced to conclude that the power of recalling
+sensations varies from something like one hundred per cent, down to
+practically zero.
+
+Individuals may also differ in the _kind_ of sensation that they can
+vividly recall. Some who are poor at recalling visual sensations do
+have vivid auditory images, and others who have little of either
+visual or auditory imagery call up {370} kinesthetic sensations
+without difficulty. When this was first discovered, a very pretty
+theory of "imagery types" was built upon it. Any individual, so it was
+held, belonged to one or another type: either he was a "visualist",
+thinking of everything as it appears to the eyes, or he was an
+"audile", thinking of everything according to its sound, or he was a
+"motor type", dealing wholly in kinesthetic imagery, or he might, in
+rare cases, belong to the olfactory or gustatory or tactile type.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 54.--Individual differences in mental imagery.
+According to the type theory, every individual has a place in one or
+another of the distinct groups, visual, auditory, tactile,
+kinesthetic, or olfactory. According to the facts, the majority, of
+individuals cluster in the middle space, and form a single large
+group, though some few are extremely visual, or auditory, etc., in
+their imagery. (Figure text: according to the type theory, according to
+the facts)]
+
+
+But the progress of investigation showed, first, that a "mixed type"
+must also be admitted, to provide for individuals who easily called up
+images of two or more different senses; and, later on, that the mixed
+type was the most common. In fact, it is now known to be very unusual
+for an individual to be confined to images of a single sense. Nearly
+every one gets visual images more easily and frequently than those of
+any other sense, but nearly every one has, from time to time,
+auditory, kinesthetic, tactile and olfactory images. So that the
+"mixed type" is the only real type, the extreme visualist or audile,
+etc., being exceptional and not typical.
+
+{371}
+
+Limitations of Imagery
+
+Recalled sensations are commonly inferior to their originals, both in
+the enjoyment they afford and in the use that can be made of them.
+They are likely to be inferior in several respects.
+
+(1) An image has usually less color, or tone--less body, realism and
+full sensory quality--than a sensation aroused by its appropriate
+peripheral stimulus. While you may be able to call up a fairly good
+image of your absent friend's face, the actual presence of your friend
+would be more satisfactory, just as a sensory experience. You may be
+able to run over a piece of music "in your head", and if your auditory
+imagery is strong you may even run over an orchestral piece, and get
+the tone quality of the various instruments; but, after all, such a
+mental concert is an imperfect substitute for a real orchestra. You
+enjoy a real whiff of the sea more than the best olfactory image you
+can summon. There is something lacking in these recalled sensations,
+and the trouble seems to be that they are not sensations enough; they
+lack sensory body.
+
+(2) Images are apt to be sketchy and lacking in detail, and also
+narrow and lacking in background.
+
+(3) Images are apt to be unsteady and fleeting, as compared with
+actual sensations. Where the peripheral stimulus, continuing, keeps
+the sensation going, the substitute stimulus that recalls a sensation
+is not so effective in this respect, any more than in giving body and
+detail. In all these respects, an image is less enjoyable and
+satisfying than an actual sensation.
+
+(4) On the more practical side, images are inferior to the actual
+presence of an object, in that we cannot utilize the image as a source
+of new information. {372} We _cannot observe facts_ in the image of a
+thing that we have not observed in the actual presence of the thing.
+
+At one of the universities, there is a beautiful library building,
+with a row of fine pillars across the front, and the students pass
+this building every day and enjoy looking at it. It has long been a
+favorite experiment in the psychology classes at that university to
+have the students call up an image of the library, and to have them
+state how clear their image is, how complete and how vivid. Then they
+are asked to count the pillars from their image, and to tell what kind
+of capitals the pillars have, and whether the shafts are plain or
+fluted. But at this point the students begin to object. "We have never
+counted those pillars, and cannot be expected to know the number now."
+In fact, few of them give the correct number, and those who have
+reported clear and vivid images are little better off in this respect
+than those whose images are dim and vague.
+
+The image, then, does not give you facts that you did not observe in
+the presence of the object. The substitute stimulus, which now recalls
+the image, only recalls responses which you made when the real object
+was the stimulus. If you looked at the object simply to get its
+general appearance, the general appearance is all you can recall. If
+you noted the color of the object, you can probably recall the color.
+If you noted such details as the number of pillars, you can recall
+these details. But the substitute stimulus that now arouses the image
+is by no means the equivalent of the original peripheral stimulus in
+making possible a variety of new reactions. Its only linkage is with
+reactions actually made by you in response to the real object. The
+substitute stimulus, such as the name of a building, became linked
+with responses actually made by you, not with responses that you
+simply might have made, when the object was present. This important
+fact is closely related to the {373} unreliability of testimony that
+was mentioned before under the head of "unintentional memory".
+[Footnote: See pp. 346-348.] Facts recalled are facts previously
+observed.
+
+It is true, of course, that recalled facts can be compared and new
+facts be observed by the comparison. We may recall how John looks, and
+how James looks, and note the fact, not previously observed, that they
+look alike. A great deal can be inferred in this way by a person who
+is sitting in his room far from the objects thought about. But this
+noting of the relationships of different objects is a very different
+matter from observing what is there, in a single object or scene. What
+is there can only be observed when you are there.
+
+
+The Question of Non-Sensory Recall
+
+Many observed facts are not strictly facts of sensation, though
+observed by means of the senses. Let us suppose, for an example, that
+your attention is caught by the bright green new leaves at the tips of
+the branches of an evergreen tree in summer, and that you notice also
+the darker green of the older leaves further back along the branches,
+and, exploring deeper, find leaves that are dead and brown, while
+still further in they have all fallen off, leaving bare branches
+reaching back to the trunk; so that you finally "see" how the tree is
+constructed, as a hollow cone of foliage supported by an interior
+framework of branches. All this has meant a lot of different reactions
+on your part, and the final "seeing" of how the tree is constructed
+would scarcely be called a sensation, since it has required mental
+work beyond that of simply seeing the tree. It is a response
+additional to the strictly sensory response of seeing the tree.
+
+Now the question is whether this additional response can be recalled,
+without recalling at the same time the primary {374} response of
+seeing the tree. Can we recall the fact observed about the tree
+without at the same time seeing the tree "in the mind's eye"? Must we
+necessarily have an image of the tree when we recall the way the tree
+is constructed?
+
+Since getting the general sensory appearance of the tree, and
+observing the way it is constructed, are two different responses, it
+seems quite conceivable that either fact should be recalled without
+the other; and no one doubts that the sensory appearance of the tree
+can be recalled without the other observed fact coming up along with
+it. But many authorities have held that the non-sensory fact could not
+be recalled alone; in other words, they have held that every recalled
+fact comes as a sensory image, or with a sensory image. Persons with
+ready visual imagery are of course likely to get a visual image with
+any fact they may recall. But persons whose visual imagery is hard to
+arouse say that they recall facts without any visual image. I who
+write these words, being such a person, testify that while I have been
+writing and thinking about that tree I have not seen it before my
+mind's eye.
+
+It is true, however, that I have had images during this time--auditory
+images of words expressing the facts mentioned. Another individual
+might have had kinesthetic images instead of either visual or
+auditory. But can there be a recall of fact without _any_ sensory
+image?
+
+On this question, which has been called the question of "imageless
+thought", though it might better be called that of "imageless recall",
+controversy has raged and is not yet at rest, so that a generally
+accepted conclusion cannot be stated. But the best indications are to
+the effect, first, that vague and fleeting images, especially of the
+kinesthetic sort, are often present without being detected except by
+very fine introspection, some image being pretty sure to come up every
+few seconds when we are engaged in silent thought or {375} recall;
+but, second, that images are not present every second of the time, and
+that at the instant when a non-sensory fact is recalled it is apt to
+be alone.
+
+
+Hallucinations
+
+Since a vivid mental image may be "in all respects the same as an
+actual sensation", according to the testimony of some people, the
+question arises how, then, an image is distinguished from a sensation.
+Well, the image does not usually fit into the objective situation
+present to the senses. But if it does fit, or if the objective
+situation is lost track of, then, as a matter of fact, the image may
+be taken for a sensation.
+
+You see some beautiful roses in the florist's window, and you _smell_
+them; the odor fits into the objective situation very well, till you
+notice that the shop door is shut and the window glass impervious to
+odors, from which you conclude that the odor must have been your
+image.
+
+You are lost in thought of an absent person, till, forgetting where
+you are, you seem to see him entering the door; he "fits" well enough
+for an instant, but then the present situation forces itself upon you
+and the image takes its proper place.
+
+You are half asleep, almost lost to the world, and some scene comes
+before you so vividly as to seem real till its oddity wakens you to
+the reality of your bedroom. Or you are fully asleep, and then the
+images that come are dreams and seem entirely real, since contact with
+the objective situation has been broken.
+
+Images taken for real things are common in some forms of mental
+disorder. Here the subject's hold on objective fact is weakened by his
+absorption in his own desires and fears, and he hears reviling voices
+and smells suspicious {376} odors or sees visions that are in line
+with his desires and fears.
+
+Such false sensations are called "hallucinations". An hallucination is
+an image taken for a sensation, a recalled fact taken for a present
+objective fact. It is a sensory response, aroused by a substitute
+stimulus, without the subject's noticing that it is thus aroused
+instead of by its regular peripheral stimulus.
+
+
+Synesthesia.
+
+Quite a large number of people are so constituted as to hear sounds as
+if colored, a deep tone perhaps seeming dark blue, the sound of a
+trumpet a vivid red, etc. Each vowel and even each consonant may have
+its own special color, which combine to give a complex color scheme
+for a word. Numbers also may be colored. This colored hearing is the
+commonest form of "synesthesia", which consists in responding to a
+stimulus acting on one sense, by sensations belonging to a different
+sense. Whether the persons so constituted as to respond in this way
+are constituted thus by nature or by experience is uncertain, though
+the best guess is that the extra sensations are images that have
+become firmly attached to their substitute stimuli during early
+childhood.
+
+
+Free Association
+
+Mental processes that depend on recall are called "associative
+processes", since they make use of associations or linkages previously
+formed. When some definite interest or purpose steers the associative
+processes, we speak of "controlled association", contrasting this with
+the "free association" that occurs in an idle mood, when one thought
+simply calls up another with no object in view and no more than
+fleeting desires to give direction to the sequence of thoughts.
+
+_Revery_ affords the best example of free association. I {377} see my
+neighbor's dog out of my window, and am reminded of one time when I
+took charge of that dog while my neighbor was away, and then of my
+neighbor's coming back and taking the dog from the cellar where I had
+shut him up; next of my neighbor's advice with respect to an
+automobile collision in which I was concerned; next of the stranger
+with whom I had collided, and of the stranger's business address on
+the card which he gave me; next comes a query as to this stranger's
+line of business and whether he was well-to-do; and from there my
+thoughts switch naturally to the high cost of living.
+
+This is rather a drab, middle-aged type of revery, and youth might
+show more life and color; but the linkages between one thought and the
+next are typical of any revery. The linkages belong in the category of
+"facts previously observed". I had previously observed the ownership
+of this dog by my neighbor, and this observation linked the dog and
+the neighbor and enabled the dog to recall the neighbor to my mind.
+Most of the linkages in this revery are quite concrete, but some are
+rather abstract, such as the connection between being well-to-do (or
+not) and the high cost of living; but, concrete or abstract, they are
+connections previously observed by the subject. Sometimes the linkage
+keeps the thoughts within the sphere of the same original experience,
+and sometimes switches them from one past experience to another, or
+even away from any specific past experience to general considerations;
+yet always the linkage has this character, that the item that now acts
+as stimulus has been formerly combined in observation with the other
+item that now follows as the response. One fact recalls another when
+the two have been previously observed as belonging together.
+
+But suppose, as is commonly the case, that the fact now present in my
+mind has been linked, in different past {378} experiences, with
+several different facts. Then two questions demand our attention:
+whether all these facts are recalled; and, if not, what gives the
+advantage to the fact actually recalled over the others that are not
+recalled.
+
+The answer to the first question is plain. The fact first present in
+mind does not call up all the associated facts, but usually only one
+of them, or at least only one at a time. My neighbor, in the example
+given, though previously associated with a dozen other facts, now
+calls up but two of these facts, and those two not simultaneously but
+one after the other. We see a law here that is very similar to a law
+stated under the head of attention. There, we said that of all the
+objects before us that might be noticed only one was noticed at a
+time; and here we say that of all the objects that might be recalled
+to mind by association only one is recalled at a time. Both statements
+can be combined into the one general "law of reaction" which was
+mentioned before, that of all the responses linked to a given stimulus
+(or complex of stimuli) only one is actually aroused at the same
+instant, though several may be aroused in succession, provided the
+stimulus continues.
+
+In revery, the stimulus usually does not continue. The first fact
+thought of gives way to the fact that it recalls, and that to one that
+it recalls in turn, and so on, without much dwelling on any fact. But
+if we do dwell on any fact--as upon the thought of a certain
+person--then this stimulus, continuing to act, calls up in succession
+quite a number of associated facts.
+
+If, then, only one of the several facts associated with the stimulus
+is recalled at once, our second question presents itself, as to what
+are the factors of advantage that cause one rather than another of the
+possible responses to occur. The fact first in mind might have called
+up any one of several facts, having been linked with each of them in
+past {379} experience; and we want to know why it recalls one of these
+facts rather than the rest.
+
+The factors of advantage in recall are the factors that determine the
+strength of linkage between two facts; and they are:
+
+ the _frequency_ with which the linkage has occurred;
+ the _recency_ with which it has occurred; and
+ the _intensity_ with which it has occurred.
+
+If I have frequently observed the connection of two facts, the linkage
+between them is strong; if I have recently observed their connection,
+the linkage between them is strong till the "recency value" dies away;
+and if my observation of the connection of the two facts was a vivid
+experience, or intense reaction, then, also, the linkage between them
+is strong. If these three factors of advantage work together in favor
+of the same response, then that response is sure to occur; but if the
+three factors pull different ways, we should have to figure out the
+balance of advantage before we could predict which of the possible
+responses would actually be made. Naturally enough, even the skilful
+psychologist is often unable to strike the balance between the three
+factors. He does know, however, and all of us know in a practical way,
+that strong recency value offsets a lot of frequency; so that a mere
+vague allusion to a very recent topic of conversation can be depended
+on to recall the right facts to the hearer's mind, even though they
+lie outside of his habitual line of interest. "James", by virtue of
+frequency, means your brother or friend; but after the lecturer has
+been talking about the psychologist James, repetition of this name
+infallibly recalls the psychologist to mind.
+
+Besides frequency, recency and intensity, there is, indeed, another
+factor to be taken into account; and that is the {380} present state
+of the subject's mind. If he is unhappy, unpleasant associations have
+the advantage; if happy, pleasant. If he is absorbed in a given
+matter, facts related to that matter have the advantage. Frequency,
+recency and intensity summarize the _history_ of associations, and
+measure their strength as dependent on their history; but the present
+state of mind is an additional directive factor, and when it has much
+to do with recall, we speak of directed or controlled association.
+
+Before we pass to the topic of controlled association, however, there
+is another form of free association, quite different from revery, to
+be examined. There is an experiment, called the _free association
+test_, in which the subject is given a series of words as stimuli, and
+is asked to respond to each word by speaking some other word, the
+first that is recalled by the stimulus. No special kind of word need
+be given in response, but simply the _first word recalled_. Though
+this is called free association, it is controlled to the extent that
+the response must be a word, and the result is very different from
+revery. Instead of the recall of concrete facts from past experience,
+there is recall of words. If you give the subject the stimulus word,
+"table", his response is "chair" or "dinner", etc., and often he does
+not think of any particular table, but simply of the word. Words are
+so often linked one with another that it is no wonder that one recalls
+another automatically. What particular word shall be recalled depends
+on the frequency, recency and intensity of past linkage.
+
+Though this form of test seems so simple as almost to be silly, it is
+of use in several ways. When a large number of stimulus words are
+used, and the responses classified, some persons are found to favor
+linkages that have a personal significance--"egocentric responses",
+these are called--while other persons run to connections that are
+{381} impersonal and objective. Thus the test throws some light on the
+individual's _habits_ of attention. The test has also a "detective"
+use, based upon the great efficacy of the factor of _recency_; you may
+be able by it to tell whether an individual has recently had a certain
+matter in mind. If he happens to be an individual who has recently
+committed some crime, properly selected stimulus words will lead him
+to recall the scene of the crime, and thus to make responses that
+betray him, unless he checks them and so arouses suspicion by his
+hesitation. Another use of the test is for unearthing a person's
+emotional "complexes", which of course possess a high _intensity_
+value. If the subject shows hesitation and embarrassment in responding
+to words referring to money, the indication is that he is emotionally
+disturbed over the state of his finances. One person who consulted a
+doctor for nervousness made peculiar responses to stimulus words
+relating to the family, and was discovered to be much disturbed over
+his family's opposition to his projected marriage. The free
+association test is useful rather as giving the experienced
+psychologist hints to be followed up than as furnishing sure proof of
+the contents of the subject's mind.
+
+
+Controlled Association
+
+There is a controlled association test conducted like this one in free
+association, except that the subject is required to respond to each
+stimulus word by a word standing in a specified relation to it. To one
+series of words he must respond by saying their opposites; to another,
+by mentioning a part of each object named; to another series,
+consisting of names of countries, he must respond by naming as quickly
+as possible the capital of each country named; and there are many
+tests of this sort, each dealing with some class of relationships
+which, being often observed, are easily handled {382} by a person of
+normal intelligence. The intelligent subject makes few errors in such
+a test, and responds in very quick time. Indeed, the remarkable fact
+is that he takes less time to respond in an easy controlled
+association test than in the free association test; which shows that
+the "control" acts not simply to limit the response, but also to
+_facilitate_ it.
+
+The "control" here is often called by the name of "mental set". It is
+a good example of a "reaction tendency". On being told you are to give
+opposites, you somehow set or adjust your mental machinery for making
+this type of response. The mental set thus thrown into action
+facilitates responses of the required type, while inhibiting other
+responses that would readily occur in the absence of any directive
+tendency. If the word "good" came as a stimulus word in a free
+association test, it might easily arouse the responses, "good day",
+"good night", "good boy", "good better", and many besides, since all
+of these combinations have been frequently used in the past; and the
+balance of frequency, recency and intensity might favor any one of
+these responses. But when the subject is set for opposites, the
+balance of these factors has little force as against the mental set.
+The mental set for opposites favors the revival of such combinations
+as "new--old", "good--bad", and such others of this class as have been
+noted and used in the subject's past experience.
+
+Mental set is a selective factor, a factor of advantage. It does not
+supersede the previously formed associations, or work independently of
+them, but selects from among them the one which fits the present task.
+Does it get in its work after recall has done its part, or before?
+Does it wait till recall has brought up a number of responses, and
+then pick out the one that fills the bill? No, it often works much too
+quickly for that, giving the right response instantly; and
+introspection is often perfectly clear that none but the right {383}
+response is recalled at all. The selective influence of the mental set
+is exerted _before recall_; it facilitates the right recall and
+inhibits recall of any but the right response.
+
+In controlled association, as in free association, only one of the
+facts previously linked with the stimulus is recalled at a time; but
+while in free association the factors of frequency, recency and
+intensity of past linkage determine which of the many possible facts
+shall be recalled, in controlled association the additional factor of
+mental set is present and has a controlling influence in determining
+which fact shall be recalled. Thus, in an opposites test, the stimulus
+word "good" promptly calls up the pair "good--bad", because the mental
+set for opposites gives this response a great advantage over "good
+night" and other responses which may have a very strong linkage with
+the stimulus word.
+
+The mental set is itself a response to a stimulus. It is an inner
+response thrown into activity by some stimulus, such as the stimulus
+of being asked to give the opposites of a series of words that are
+presently to be shown or spoken. This inner response of getting ready
+for the task can be introspectively observed by a person who is new to
+this type of test. It may take the form of mentally running over
+examples of opposites--or whatever kind of responses are to be called
+for--or it may take the form of calling up some image or diagram or
+gesture that symbolizes the task. A visual image of the nose on the
+face may serve as a symbol of the part-whole relationship, a small
+circle inside a larger one may symbolize the relation of an object to
+a class of objects, and gesturing first to the right and then to the
+left may symbolize the relationship of opposites. But as the subject
+grows accustomed to a given task, these conscious symbols fade away,
+and nothing remains except a general "feeling of readiness" or of
+"knowing what you are {384} about". The mental set remains in force,
+however, and is no less efficient for becoming almost unconscious.
+
+
+Examples of Controlled Association
+
+Dwelling so long on the test for controlled association may have
+created the impression that this is a rather artificial and unusual
+type of mental performance; but in reality controlled association is a
+very representative mental process, and enters very largely into all
+forms of mental work. This is true in arithmetical work, for example.
+A pair of numbers, such as 8 and 3, has been linked in past experience
+with several responses; it means 83, it means 11, it means 5, and it
+means 24. But if you are adding, it means 11, and no other response
+occurs; if you are multiplying, it means 24, and only that response
+occurs. The mental set for multiplying facilitates the responses of
+the multiplication table and inhibits those of the addition table,
+while the mental set for adding does the reverse. Rapid adding or
+multiplying would be impossible without an efficient mental set. Thus
+in arithmetic, as in the tests, the mental set is an inner response to
+the _task_.
+
+In reading, there is a mental set which is an inner response to the
+_context_, and which determines which of the several well-known
+meanings of a word shall actually be called to mind when the word is
+read. Presented alone, a word may call up any of its meanings,
+according to frequency, etc.; but in context it usually brings to mind
+just the one meaning that fits the context. The same is true of
+conversation.
+
+The objective _situation_ arouses a mental set that controls both
+thought and action. The situation of being in church, for example,
+determines the meanings that are got from the words heard, and
+controls the motor behavior to {385} fit the occasion. The subject,
+observing the situation, adjusts himself to it, perhaps without any
+conscious effort, and his adjustment facilitates appropriate mental
+and motor reactions, while inhibiting others.
+
+A _problem_ arouses a mental set directed towards solution of the
+problem. A difficult problem, however, differs from a context or
+familiar task or situation in this important respect, that the
+appropriate response has not been previously linked with the present
+stimulus, so that, in spite of ever so good a mental set, the right
+response cannot immediately be recalled. One must _search_ for the
+right response. Still, the mental set is useful here, in directing the
+search, and keeping it from degenerating into an aimless running
+hither and thither. Problem solution is so different a process from
+smooth-running controlled association that it deserves separate
+treatment, which will be given it a few chapters further on, under the
+caption of reasoning.
+
+{386}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. The rating of images belonging under different senses. Try to
+ call up the images prescribed below, and rate each image according
+ to the following scale:
+
+ _3. . . . The image is practically the same as a sensation, as bright,
+ full, incisive, and, in short, possessed of genuine
+ sensory quality_.
+
+ _2. . . . The image has a moderate degree of sensory quality_.
+
+ _1. . . . The image has only faint traces of sensory quality_.
+
+ _0. . . . No sensory image is called up, though there was a
+ recall of the fact mentioned_.
+
+ Call up visual images of: a friend's face, a sun flower, a white
+ house among trees, your own signature written in ink.
+
+ Call up auditory images of: the sound of your friend's voice, a
+ familiar song, an automobile horn, the mewing of a cat.
+
+ Call up olfactory images of: the odor of coffee, of new-mown hay, of
+ tar, of cheese.
+
+ Call up gustatory images of: sugar, salt, bitter, acid.
+
+ Call up cutaneous images of: the feel of velvet, a lump of ice, a
+ pencil held against the tip of your nose, a pin pricking your
+ finger.
+
+ Call up kinesthetic imagery of: lifting a heavy weight, reaching up
+ to a high shelf, opening your mouth wide, kicking a ball.
+
+ Call up organic imagery of: feeling hungry, feeling thirsty, feeling
+ nausea, feeling buoyant.
+
+ In case of which sense do you get the most lifelike imagery, and in
+ case of which sense the least. By finding the average rating given
+ to the images of each sense, you can arrange the senses in order,
+ from the one in which your imagery rates highest to the one in which
+ it rates lowest. It may be best to try more cases before reaching a
+ final decision on this matter.
+
+3. Verbal imagery. When you think of a word, do you have a visual,
+ auditory, or kinesthetic image of it--or how does it come?
+
+4. In reading, notice how much imagery of objects, persons, scenes,
+ sounds, etc., occurs spontaneously.
+
+5. Analysis of a revery. Take any object as your starting point,
+ and let your mind wander from that wherever it will for a minute.
+ {387} Then review and record the series of thoughts, and try to
+ discover the linkages between them.
+
+6. Free association experiment. Respond to each one of a list of
+ disconnected words by saying the first word suggested by it. Use
+ the following list: city, war, bird, potato, day, ocean, insect,
+ mountain, tree, roof.
+
+7. Controlled association, (a) Use the same list of stimulus words
+ as above, but respond to each by a word meaning the _opposite_ or
+ at least something contrasting, (b) Repeat, naming a _part_ of the
+ object designated by each of these same words, (c) Repeat again,
+ naming an _instance_ or variety of each of the objects named. Did
+ you find wrong responses coming up, or did the mental set exclude
+ them altogether?
+
+8. Write on a sheet of paper ten pairs of one-place numbers, each
+ pair in a little column with a line drawn below, as in addition or
+ multiplication examples. See how long it takes you to _add_, and
+ again how long it takes to _multiply_ all ten. Which task took the
+ longer, and why? Did you notice any interference, such as thinking
+ of a sum when you were "set" for products?
+
+9. Free association test for students of psychology. Respond to
+ each of the following stimulus words by the first word suggested by
+ it of a psychological character:
+
+ conditioned
+ objective
+ gregarious
+ delayed
+ correlation
+ fear
+ negative
+ end-brush
+ mastery
+ rat
+ pyramidal
+ submission
+ stimulus
+ semicircular
+ feeling-tone
+ substitute
+ kinesthetic
+ primary
+ axon
+ advantage
+ tension
+ synapse
+ field
+ blend
+ autonomic
+ quotient
+ rod
+ retention
+ limit
+ fovea
+ nonsense
+ apraxia
+ saturated
+ higher
+ thalamus
+ red-green
+ paired
+ organic
+ complementary
+ economy
+ tendency
+ after
+ exploration
+ preparatory
+ basilar
+ recency
+ native
+ fluctuation
+ curve
+ endocrine
+ dot
+ perseveration
+ expressive
+ Binet
+ synesthesia
+ James-Lange
+ frontal
+ facilitation
+ flexion
+ overlapping
+
+{388}
+
+REFERENCES
+
+On imagery, synesthesia, etc., see Gallon's _Inquiries into Human
+Faculty and Its Development_, 1883, pp. 57-112; and for more recent
+studies of imagery see G. H. Betts on _The Distribution and Function
+of Mental Imagery_, 1909, and Mabel R. Fernald on _The Diagnosis of
+Mental Imagery_, 1912.
+
+On the diagnostic use of the association test, an extensive work is
+that of C. G. Jung, _Studies in Word-Association_, translated by Eder,
+1919.
+
+
+{389}
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+THE LAWS OF ASSOCIATION
+
+AN ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE LEARNING PROCESS TO ITS ELEMENTS
+
+
+This is a very serious occasion. What we now have before us is one of
+the great outstanding problems of psychology, a problem that has come
+down through the ages, with succeeding generations of psychological
+thinkers contributing of their best to its solution; and our task is
+to attack this problem afresh in the light of modern knowledge of the
+facts of learning and memory. We wish to gather up the threads from
+the three preceding chapters, which have detailed many facts regarding
+learned reactions of all sorts, and see whether we cannot summarize
+our accumulated knowledge in the form of a few great laws. We wish
+also to relate our laws to what is known of the brain machinery.
+
+
+The Law of Exercise
+
+Of one law of learning, we are perfectly sure. There is no doubt that
+the exercise of a reaction strengthens it, makes it more precise and
+more smooth-running, and gives it an advantage over alternative
+reactions which have not been exercised. Evidence for these statements
+began to appear as soon as we turned the corner into this part of our
+subject, and has accumulated ever since. This law is sometimes called
+the "law of habit", but might better be called the "law of improvement
+of a reaction through exercise", or, more briefly, the "law of
+exercise".
+
+{390}
+
+The law of exercise is very broad in its scope, holding good of life
+generally and not alone of mental life. Exercise of a muscle develops
+the muscle, exercise of a gland develops the gland; and, in the same
+way, exercise of a mental reaction strengthens the machinery used in
+making that reaction.
+
+Let us restate the law in terms of stimulus and response. _When a
+given stimulus arouses a certain response, the linkage between that
+stimulus and that response is improved by the exercise so obtained_,
+and thereafter the stimulus arouses the response more surely, more
+promptly, more strongly than before.
+
+Under the law of exercise belong several _sub-laws_ already familiar
+to us.
+
+1. The law of _frequency_ refers to the cumulative effect of repeated
+exercise. The practice curve gives a picture of this sub-law, showing
+how improvement with repeated exercise of a performance is rapid at
+first and tapers off into the physiological limit, beyond which level
+more repetition cannot further improve the performance. The
+superiority of "spaced study" over unspaced means that exercise is
+more effective when rest periods intervene between the periods of
+exercise; as this is notoriously true of muscular exercise, it is not
+surprising to find it true of mental performances as well.
+
+2. The law of _recency_ refers to the gradual weakening of the
+machinery for executing a reaction when no longer exercised; it is the
+general biological law of "atrophy through disuse" applied to the
+special case of learned reactions. As exercise improves the linkage
+between stimulus and response, so disuse allows the linkage to
+deteriorate. This law is pictured more completely and quantitatively
+in the curve of forgetting.
+
+Really, there are two laws of recency, the one being a {391} law of
+retention, the other a law of momentary warming up through exercise.
+The law of retention, or of forgetting, is the same as atrophy through
+disuse. The warming-up effect, well seen in the muscle which is
+sluggish after a long rest but becomes lively and responsive after a
+bit of exercise, [Footnote: See p. 73.] appears also in the fact that
+a skilled act needs to be done a few times in quick succession before
+it reaches its highest efficiency, and in the fact of "primary
+memory", the lingering of a sensation or thought for a few moments
+after the stimulus that aroused it has ceased. Primary memory is not
+strictly memory, since it does not involve the recall of facts that
+have dropped out of mind, but just a new emphasis on facts that have
+not yet completely dropped out. Warming up is not a phenomenon of
+learning, but it is a form of recency, and is responsible for the very
+strong "recency value" that is sometimes a help in learning,
+[Footnote: See p. 345.] and sometimes a hindrance in recall.
+[Footnote: See p. 356.]
+
+3. The law of _intensity_ simply means that vigorous exercise
+strengthens a reaction more than weak exercise. This is to be
+expected, but the question is, in the case of mental performances, how
+to secure vigorous exercise. Well, by active recitation as compared
+with passive reception, by close attention, by high level observation.
+In active recitation, the memorizer strongly exercises the performance
+that he is trying to master, while in reading the lesson over and over
+he is giving less intense exercise to the same performance.
+
+
+The Law of Effect
+
+We come now to a law which has not so accepted a standing as the law
+of exercise, and which may perhaps be another sub-law under that
+general law. The "law of effect" may, however, be regarded simply as a
+generalized statement of {392} the facts of learning by trial and
+error. The cat, in learning the trick of escaping from a cage by
+turning the door-button, makes and therefore exercises a variety of
+reactions; and you might expect, then, in accordance with the law of
+exercise, that all of these reactions would be more and more firmly
+linked to the cage-situation, instead of the successful reaction
+gradually getting the advantage and the unsuccessful being eliminated.
+The law of effect, stated as objectively as possible, is simply that
+the successful or unsuccessful outcome or _effect_ of a reaction
+determines whether it shall become firmly linked with the stimulus, or
+detached from the stimulus and thus eliminated. _The linkage of a
+response to a stimulus is strengthened when the response is a success,
+and weakened when the response is a failure_.
+
+Success here means reaching the goal of an awakened desire or
+_reaction-tendency_, and failure means being stopped or hindered from
+reaching the goal. Since success is satisfying and failure unpleasant,
+the law of effect is often stated in another form: a response that
+brings satisfaction is more and more firmly attached to the situation
+and reaction-tendency, while a response that brings pain or
+dissatisfaction is detached.
+
+The law of effect is a statement of fact, but the question is whether
+it is an ultimate fact, or whether it can be explained as a special
+case of the law of exercise. Some have suggested that it is but a
+special case of the sub-law of frequency; they call attention to the
+fact that the successful response must be made at every trial, since
+the trial continues till success is attained, whereas no one
+unsuccessful response need be made at every trial; therefore in the
+long run the successful response must gain the frequency advantage.
+But there is a very ready and serious objection to this argument; for
+it may and does happen that an unsuccessful response is repeated
+several times during a single {393} trial, while the successful
+response is never made more than once in a single trial, since success
+brings the trial to a close; and thus, as a matter of fact, frequency
+often favors the unsuccessful response--which, nevertheless, loses out
+in competition with the successful response.
+
+Can the law of effect be interpreted as an instance of the sub-law of
+recency? The successful reaction always occurs at the end of a trial,
+and is the most recent reaction at the beginning of the next trial.
+This recency might have considerable importance if the next trial
+began instantly (as in unspaced learning), but can have no importance
+when so long as interval as a day is left between trials; for
+evidently the recency of twenty-four hours plus ten seconds is not
+effectively different from that of an even twenty-four hours. Recency,
+then, does not explain the law of effect.
+
+Can it be explained as an instance of the sub-law of intensity? An
+animal, or man, who sees success coming as he is making the reaction
+that leads directly to success, throws himself unreservedly into this
+reaction, in contrast with his somewhat hesitant and exploratory
+behavior up to that time. The dammed-up energy of the
+reaction-tendency finds a complete outlet into the successful
+reaction, and therefore the successful reaction is more intensely
+exercised than the unsuccessful. This seems like a pretty good
+explanation, though perhaps not a complete explanation.
+
+
+Limitations of the Law of Exercise
+
+The law of exercise, with all its sub-laws, is certainly fundamental
+and universal; it is always in operation whenever anything is learned;
+and yet, just by itself, it goes only halfway towards accounting for
+learned reactions. For a reaction to be exercised, it must be _made_,
+and the law of exercise presupposes that it is made, and does not
+attempt to account for its being made in the first place.
+
+{394}
+
+The law of exercise does not cover the formation of new linkages, but
+only the strengthening of linkages that are already working. It does
+not explain the attachment of a response to some other than its
+natural stimulus, nor the combination, of responses into a higher
+unit, nor the association of two facts so that one later recalls the
+other. We learn by doing, but how can we do anything new so as to
+start to learn? We learn by observing combinations of facts, but how
+in the first place do we combine the facts in our minds?
+
+How, for example, can we learn to respond to the sight of the person
+by saying his name? Evidently, by exercising this linkage of stimulus
+and response. But how did we ever make a start in responding thus,
+since there is nothing about the person's looks to suggest his name?
+The name came to us through the ear, and the face by way of the eye;
+and if we repeated the name, that was a response to the auditory
+stimulus and not to the visual. How has it come about, then, that we
+later respond to the visual stimulus by saying the name?
+
+In short, the more seriously we take the law of exercise, the more we
+feel the need of a supplementary law to provide for the first making
+of a reaction that then, by virtue of exercise, is strengthened.
+
+This is the problem that occupied the older writers on psychology when
+they dealt with "association"; and their solution of the problem was
+formulated in the famous "laws of association". The laws of
+association were attempts to explain how facts got associated, so that
+later one could recall another.
+
+These laws have a long history. From Aristotle, the ancient Greek who
+first wrote books on psychology, there came down to modern times four
+laws of association. Facts become associated, according to Aristotle,
+when they are {395} contiguous (or close together) in space, or when
+they are contiguous in time, or when they resemble each other, or when
+they contrast with each other. The psychologists of the earlier modern
+period, in the eighteenth and first part of the nineteenth centuries,
+labored with very good success to reduce these four laws to one
+comprehensive law of association. Contiguity in space and in time were
+combined into a law of association by _contiguity in experience_,
+since evidently mere physical contiguity between two objects could
+establish no association between them in any one's mind except as he
+experienced them together.
+
+
+Association by Similarity
+
+Continuing their simplification of the laws of association, these
+older psychologists showed that resemblance and contrast belonged
+together, since to be similar things must have something in common,
+and to be contrasted also two things must have something in common.
+You contrast north with south, a circle and a square, an automobile
+and a wheelbarrow; but no one thinks of contrasting north with a
+circle, south with an automobile, or a square and a wheelbarrow,
+though these pairs are more incongruous than the others. Things that
+are actually associated as contrasting with each other have something
+in common; and therefore association by contrast could be included
+under association by similarity. Thus the four laws had been reduced
+to two, association by contiguity and association by similarity.
+
+The final step in this reduction was to show that association by
+similarity was a special case of association by contiguity. To be
+similar, two things must have something in common, and this common
+part, being contiguous with the remainder of each of the two things,
+establishes an indirect contiguity between the two things, a {396}
+sort of contiguity bridge between them. One thing has the parts or
+characteristics, A B X Y, and the similar thing has the parts or
+characteristics, C D X Y; and thus X Y, when seen in the second thing,
+call up A B, with which they are contiguous in the first thing.
+
+A stranger reminds me of my friend because something in the stranger's
+face or manner has been met with before in my friend; it has been
+contiguous with my friend, and recalls him by virtue of this
+contiguity. The stranger, as a whole individual, has never been
+contiguous with my friend, but some characteristic of the stranger has
+been thus contiguous. In association by similarity, it is not the
+whole present object that arouses recall of the similar object, but
+some _part_ of the present object. This kind of association is
+important in thinking, since it brings together facts from different
+past experiences, and thus assembles data that may be applied to a new
+problem. If every new object or situation could only be taken as a
+whole, it could not remind me of anything previously met; and I should
+be like an inexperienced child in the presence of each new problem;
+but, taken part by part, the novel situation has been met with before,
+and can be handled in the light of past experience.
+
+Exactly what there is in common between two similar faces or other
+objects cannot always be clearly made out; but the common
+characteristic is there, even if not consciously isolated, and acts as
+an effective stimulus to recall.
+
+
+Association by Contiguity
+
+This reduction of all the laws of association to one great law was no
+mean achievement; and the law of association by contiguity in
+experience holds good. If one thing recalls another to your mind, you
+can be sure that the two {397} have been contiguous in your
+experience, either as wholes or piecemeal. For two things to become
+associated, they must be experienced together.
+
+Yes, the law holds good, when thus stated--but notice that the
+statement is virtually negative. It says, in effect, that two things
+do _not_ become associated _unless_ they are contiguous in experience.
+If it were turned about to read that two things do become associated
+if they are contiguous in experience, it would no longer be a true
+law, for the exceptions would then be extremely numerous.
+
+The memory and testimony experiments have brought many exceptions to
+light. Show a person twenty pictures in a row, and let him examine
+each one in turn so closely that he can later recognize every one of
+them; and still he will not have the adjacent pictures so associated
+that each one can call up the next in order. To accomplish his last
+task, he has to observe the order specifically; it is not enough that
+he simply experiences pictures together. Or, again, read to a person
+twenty pairs of words, asking him to notice the pairs so that later he
+can respond by the second word of any pair when the first word is
+given him; and read the list through three or four times, so that he
+shall be able to make almost a perfect score in the expected test;
+still he will have formed few associations between the contiguous
+pairs, and will make a very low score if you ask him to recite the
+pairs in order. Many similar experiments have yielded the same general
+result--contiguity in experience and still no association.
+
+The law of association by contiguity is unsatisfactory from a modern
+standpoint because it treats only of the stimulus, and says nothing
+about the response. It states, quite truly, that stimuli must be
+contiguous in order that an association between them may be formed,
+but it neglects to state that the association, being something in us,
+must {398} be formed by our reaction to the stimuli. It is especially
+necessary to consider the response because, as we have just seen, the
+response is not always made and the association, therefore, not always
+formed. Only if the stimuli are contiguous, can the associating
+response be aroused, but they do not infallibly arouse it even if they
+are contiguous.
+
+The law of contiguity is incomplete, also, because it is not
+applicable to the association of two motor acts into a cooerdinated
+higher unit, or of the combination of two primary emotions into a
+higher emotional unit.
+
+In a word, the time-honored law of association is no longer
+satisfactory because it does not fit into a stimulus-response
+psychology. It comes down from a time when the motor side of mental
+performances was largely overlooked by psychology, and when the
+individual was pictured as being passively "impressed" with the
+combinations of facts that were presented to his senses.
+
+
+The Law of Combination
+
+What we need, then, as an improvement on the old law of association by
+contiguity, and as a supplement to the law of exercise, is some law
+governing the response to two or more contiguous stimuli. Now we
+already have such a law, which we put to some use in studying
+attention, [Footnote: See pp. 268-264.] and called the law of
+"combination", or of "unitary response to a plurality of stimuli". We
+had better fetch that law out again and put it in good repair, and see
+whether it is adequate for the job that we now have on hand. In a very
+general, abstract form, the law of combination read that "two or more
+stimuli may arouse a single joint response". Let us add a single word,
+which had not risen above the horizon when we formulated the law
+before, and say that {399} _two or more contiguous stimuli may arouse
+a single joint response_.
+
+That seems very little to say; can we possibly go far with so simple a
+statement? Well, let us see. In saying that two or more stimuli arouse
+a single response, we imply that _there is already some rudimentary
+linkage between each stimulus and their common response, and that this
+linkage is used in arousing the response_. Now bring in our trusty law
+of exercise, and we see that the use, or exercise, of such a linkage
+may strengthen it to such an extent that, _later, a single one of the
+stimuli may arouse the response which was originally aroused by the
+whole collection of stimuli_.
+
+Does that promise any better? Probably it requires further discussion
+and exemplification before its value can be appreciated. Let us, then,
+first discuss it a bit, and then apply it to the explanation of the
+chief varieties of learned reaction that have come to our attention.
+
+The law of combination attempts to show how it comes about that a
+stimulus, originally unable to arouse a certain response, acquires the
+power of arousing it; and the law states that this occurs only when
+the originally ineffective stimulus is combined with others which can
+and do arouse the response. The ineffective stimulus, being one of a
+combination of stimuli which collectively arouse the response,
+participates to some slight degree in arousing that response and may
+thus become effectively linked with the response.
+
+Notice an assumption underlying the law of combination. Evidently a
+stimulus could not take part in arousing a response unless there were
+some pre-existing linkage between it and the response. This linkage
+may however be extremely loose and feeble, and wholly incapable by
+itself of arousing the response. The assumption of pre-existing loose
+linkage between almost any stimulus and almost any response is
+justified by the facts of playful behavior and trial and error {400}
+behavior. In addition to the close reflex connections provided in the
+native constitution, and in addition also to the close connections
+formed in previous training, there are at any time, and especially in
+childhood and youth, a vast number of loose connections. These are too
+weak to operate singly, until they have cooeperated in producing a
+response, and thus been individually strengthened, after which they
+may be able singly to produce the response.
+
+The law of combination, then, as applied to learning, includes four points:
+
+ (a) A collection of stimuli may work together and arouse a single
+ response.
+
+ (b) This is possible because of pre-existing loose linkage between
+ the separate stimuli and the response.
+
+ (c) When any stimulus, working together with others, helps to arouse
+ a response, its linkage with that response is strengthened by
+ exercise.
+
+ (d) The linkage may be sufficiently strengthened so that a single
+ stimulus can arouse the response without help from the other
+ stimuli that were originally necessary.
+
+Having now abundantly stated and reiterated the law of combination in
+the abstract, let us turn to concrete instances of learned reactions,
+and see how the law takes care of them. We have already classified a
+large share of all the concrete instances under a few main heads, as
+substitute stimulus, substitute response, combination (or association)
+of stimuli, and combination of responses. We shall presently find it
+possible to reduce these four classes to two, since the association of
+two objects, by virtue of which one of them later recalls the other,
+is a rather complicated case of substitute stimulus, while the
+combination of movements into a higher unit is a complicated case of
+substitute response.
+
+ [Footnote: To distinguish between "substitute stimulus" and
+ "substitute response" is, in strict logic, like distinguishing
+ between "inside out" and "outside in." Whenever there is a
+ substitute stimulus there is also a substitute response, of course,
+ since this stimulus, in being substituted for another, gets that
+ other's response in place of its own original response; and in the
+ same way, you can always find substitute stimulus in any instance of
+ substitute response; for, in being substituted for another, a
+ response gets that other's stimulus in place of its own original
+ stimulus. For all that, the distinction between the two main cases
+ of learning is of some importance, since sometimes the changed
+ stimulus, and sometimes the changed response, is the interesting
+ fact.]
+
+{401}
+
+I. SUBSTITUTE STIMULUS EXPLAINED BY THE LAW OF COMBINATION
+
+Here the response, without being itself essentially changed, becomes
+attached to a new stimulus. We distinguish two cases under the general
+head of substitute stimulus. In the one case, the substitute stimulus
+was originally extraneous, and unnecessary for arousing the response,
+while in the other case it was originally necessary as part of a team
+of stimuli that aroused the response.
+
+
+A. Substitute Stimulus Originally Unnecessary for Arousing the
+Response
+
+1. Conditioned reflex.
+
+This is the very simplest case belonging under the law of combination.
+The dog that responded to the bell by a flow of saliva, after the bell
+plus a tasting substance had acted together on him time after time, is
+the typical instance; and another good instance is that of the little
+child who was "taught" to shrink from a rabbit by the sounding of a
+harsh noise along with the showing of the rabbit. [Footnote: See p.
+303.] The explanation of all instances of conditioned reflex is the
+same. We have an effective stimulus acting, i.e., a stimulus strongly
+linked with the response; and we also have acting an ineffective
+stimulus, which gets drawn into the same reaction. The effective
+stimulus determines what response shall be made, and the other
+stimulus finds an outlet {402} into that response, being, as it seems,
+attracted towards the activated response, sucked into it. The weak
+linkage from the ineffective stimulus to the response, being thus used
+and strengthened, later enables this stimulus to arouse the response
+single-handed.
+
+This sort of thing is best presented in a diagram. A full line in the
+diagram denotes a linkage strong enough to work alone, while a dotted
+line denotes a weak linkage. Letters stand for stimuli and responses.
+In the diagram for conditioned reflex, A is the original effective
+stimulus (the rasping noise in the instance of the child and the
+rabbit), and B is the ineffective stimulus (the sight of the rabbit).
+R is the shrinking response, linked strongly to the stimulus A and
+only weakly to the stimulus B, which has several other linkages fully
+as good as the linkage B-R. But A arouses the response R; and R, being
+thus activated, draws on B and brings the linkage B-R into use. After
+this has occurred a number of times, the linkage B-R has been so
+strengthened by repeated exercise that it can operate alone, so that
+the rabbit brings the shrinking response even in the absence of A, the
+noise.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 55.--Attachment of the substitute stimulus in the
+case of the conditioned reflex.]
+
+
+At first, the child shrinks from the noise, but, the rabbit being
+before his eyes, he incidentally shrinks from the rabbit as well. He
+really shrinks in response to all the stimuli acting on him at that
+moment. He shrinks from the whole situation. He makes a unitary
+response to the whole collection of contiguous stimuli, and thus
+exercises the linkage between each stimulus and their joint response.
+The {403} linkage between rabbit and shrinking is later strong enough
+to work alone. It is a clear case of the law of combination.
+
+
+2. Learning the names of things.
+
+A child who can imitate simple words that he hears is shown a penny
+and the word "penny" is spoken to him. To this combination of stimuli
+he responds by saying the word. This is primarily a response to the
+auditory stimulus, since the sight of the penny, though it might
+probably have aroused some response, and even some vocal response from
+the child, had no strong linkage with this particular vocal response.
+But the auditory stimulus determined the response, and attracted the
+visual stimulus into this particular channel of saying "penny". The
+linkage from the sight of the penny to the saying of this word being
+thus strengthened by exercise, the seen penny later gives the right
+vocal response, without any auditory stimulus to assist.
+
+
+ [Illustration: Fig. 56.--Linkage of a name to an object. The diagram
+ is arranged to illustrate the formation of a linkage from the sight
+ of the object to saying its name. A very similar diagram would
+ illustrate the linkage from the name to the thought or image of the
+ object. The acquiring of mental images seems to be essentially the
+ same process as the acquiring of conditioned reflexes, and of names.
+ (Figure text: object seen, various possible responses, name heard,
+ name spoken)]
+
+
+{404}
+
+B. Substitute Stimulus Originally an Essential Member Of A Team of
+Stimuli That Aroused the Response
+
+1. Observed grouping or relationship.
+
+"Learning by observation" is a very important human accomplishment,
+and we found many evidences of its importance in our study of the
+process of memorizing. The facts observed, which assist memory so
+greatly, are usually relations or groups.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 57.--The formation of an association between two
+objects by observing their grouping or relationship. (Figure text:
+response of observing the Group A B, thought of Group A B)]
+
+
+Evidently the observation of a group of things is a response to a
+collection of stimuli, and could not originally be aroused by any one
+of the stimuli alone. The same is true of observing a relationship;
+the observation is a response to two things taken together, and not,
+originally, to either of the two things taken alone. In spite of this,
+a single one of the things may later call to mind the relationship, or
+the group; that is, it arouses the response originally made to the
+pair or group of stimuli. The single stimulus has been substituted for
+the team that originally aroused the response. Its linkage with the
+response has been so strengthened by exercise as to operate
+effectively without assistance.
+
+For example, in learning pairs of words in a "paired {405} associates
+experiment", [Footnote: See p. 336.] the subject is apt to find some
+relation between the words forming a pair, even though they are
+supposed to be "unrelated words". When he has thus learned the pair,
+either of the words in it will recall the observed relation and the
+other word of the pair. Sometimes, after a long interval especially,
+the relation is recalled without the other word. One subject fixed the
+pair, "windy--occupy", by thinking of a sailor occupying a windy perch
+up in the ropes. Some weeks later, on being given the word "windy", he
+recalled the sailor on the perch, but could not get the word "occupy".
+That is, he made the same response to "windy" that he had originally
+made to "windy--occupy", but did not get the response completely
+enough to give the second word.
+
+In the typical cases of _association by contiguity_ when one object
+reminds us of another that was formerly experienced together with it,
+the law of combination comes in as just described. The two objects
+were observed to be grouped or related in some way, or some such
+unitary response was made to the two objects taken together, and this
+response became so linked to each of the objects that later a single
+one of them arouses this unitary response and recalls the other
+object. In the free association test, [Footnote: See p. 380.] the
+stimulus word "dimple" calls up the previously made response of seeing
+a dimple in a cheek, and so leads to the word "cheek". In a controlled
+association test, where opposites are required, the stimulus word
+"mythical" arouses the previously made observation of the antithesis
+of mythical and historical, and so leads to the motor response of
+saying the latter word.
+
+ [Footnote: When, however, this indirect linkage between stimulus and
+ motor response is frequently exercised, short-circuiting takes place
+ (see p. 338), and the stimulus word arouses the motor response
+ directly. Short-circuiting follows the law of combination very
+ nicely. Let a stimulus S arouse an idea I and this in turn a motor
+ act M. S--I--M represents the linkages used. But undoubtedly there
+ is a weak pre-existing linkage directly across from S to M, and this
+ gets used to a slight degree, strictly according to the conditioned
+ reflex diagram, with I playing the part of the effective stimulus in
+ arousing M, and S the part of the originally ineffective stimulus.
+ By dint of being exercised in this way, the linkage S--M becomes
+ strong enough to arouse the motor response directly, and I is then
+ very likely to be left out altogether.]
+
+
+{406}
+
+2. Response by analogy and association by similarity.
+
+When an object reminds me of a similar object, that is association by
+similarity. But suppose I actually take the object to be the similar
+object, and behave towards it accordingly; then my reaction is called
+"response by analogy". Once, when far from home, I saw a man whom I
+took to be an acquaintance from my home town, and stepped up to him,
+extending my hand. He did not appear very enthusiastic, and informed
+me that, in his opinion, I had made a mistake. This was response by
+analogy, but if I had simply said to myself that that man looked like
+my acquaintance, that would have been association by similarity.
+Really, association by similarity is the more complex response, for it
+involves response to the points of newness in the present object, as
+well as to the points of resemblance to the familiar object, whereas
+response by analogy consists simply in responding to the points of
+resemblance.
+
+Response by analogy often appears in little children, as when they
+call all men "papa"' or as when they call the squirrel a "kitty" when
+first seen. If they call it a "funny kitty", that is practically
+association by similarity, since the word "funny" is a response to the
+points in which a squirrel is different from a cat, while the word
+"kitty" is a response to the points of resemblance.
+
+But response by analogy is not always so childish or comic as the
+above examples might seem to imply. When we respond to a picture by
+recognizing the objects depicted, that is response by analogy, since
+the pictured object is only {407} partially like the real object; a
+bare outline drawing may be enough to arouse the response of "seeing"
+the object. Other instances of response by analogy will come to light
+when, in the next chapter, we come to the study of perception.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 58.--Response by analogy. The letters, A, B, X,
+Y, represent the several stimuli that make up the original object, and
+each of them becomes well linked with their common response (seeing
+the object, and perhaps naming it). When the linkage between X and Y
+and the response has become strong, a similar object, presenting X and
+Y along with other new stimuli, C and D, appears, and arouses the old
+response, by virtue of the now-effective linkage from X and Y to this
+response.]
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 59.--Association by similarity. Everything here as
+in the previous diagram, except that C and D get a response in
+addition to that aroused by X and Y, and so the new object is seen to
+be new, while at the same time it recalls the old object to mind.]
+
+
+The machinery of response by analogy is easily understood by aid of
+the law of combination. A complex object, presenting a number of parts
+and characteristics, arouses the response of seeing and perhaps naming
+the object. This is a unitary response to a collection of stimuli, and
+each of the parts or characteristics of the object participates in
+arousing the response, and the linkage of each part with the response
+is thus strengthened. Later, therefore, the whole identical object is
+not required to arouse this same {408} response, but some of its parts
+or characteristics will give the response, and they may do this even
+when they are present in an object that has other and unfamiliar parts
+and characteristics.
+
+The machinery of association by similarity is the same, with the
+addition of a second response, called out by the new characteristics
+of the present object.
+
+
+II. SUBSTITUTE RESPONSE EXPLAINED BY THE LAW OF COMBINATION
+
+The substitute response machinery is more complicated than that of the
+substitute stimulus, as it includes the latter and something more.
+What that something more is will be clear if we ask ourselves why a
+substitute response should ever be made. Evidently because there is
+something wrong with the original response; if that were entirely
+satisfactory, it would continue to be made, and there would be no room
+for a substitute. The original response being unsatisfactory to the
+individual, how is he to find a substitute? Only by finding some
+stimulus that will arouse it. This is where trial and error come in,
+consisting in a search for some extra stimulus that shall give a
+satisfactory response.
+
+Suppose now that the extra stimulus has been found which arouses a
+satisfactory substitute response. The original stimulus, or the
+reaction-tendency aroused by it, still continuing, participates in
+arousing the substitute response, playing the part of the originally
+ineffective stimulus in the conditioned reflex. Thus the original
+stimulus becomes strongly linked with the substitute response.
+
+The process of reaching a substitute response thus includes three
+stages: (a) original response found unsatisfactory, (b) new stimulus
+found which gives a satisfactory substitute response, (c) attachment
+of the substitute response to the original stimulus.
+
+{409}
+
+There are two main cases under the general head of substitute
+response. In one case, the substitute response is essentially an old
+response, not acquired during the process of substitution, but simply
+substituted, as indicated just above, for the original response to the
+situation. This represents the common trial and error learning of
+animals. The second case is that where the substitute response has to
+be built up by combination of old responses into a higher unit.
+
+
+C. Substitute Response, but not in Itself a New Response
+
+I. Trial and error.
+
+Our much-discussed instance of the _cat in the cage_ need not be
+described again, but may simply be illustrated by a diagram.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 60.--How the cat learns the trick of escaping from
+the cage by unlatching the door. S is the situation of being shut up
+in a cage, and T is the tendency to get out. R1 is the primary
+response aroused by this tendency, which response meets with failure,
+not leading to the end-result of the tendency. Responses are then made
+to various particular stimuli about the cage, and one of these
+stimuli, the door-latch, X, gives the response R2 which leads to the
+end-result. Now the response R2 was in part aroused by T, and its
+pre-existing weak linkage with T is so strengthened by exercise that
+T, or we may say S, comes to give the correct response without
+hesitation.]
+
+{410}
+
+2. Learning to balance on a bicycle.
+
+When the beginner feels the bicycle tipping to the left, he naturally
+responds by leaning to the right, and even by turning the wheel to the
+right. Result unsatisfactory--strained position and further tipping to
+the left. As the bicyclist is about to fall, he saves himself by a
+response which he has previously learned in balancing on his feet; he
+extends his foot to the left, which amounts to a response to the
+ground on the left as a good base of support. Now let him sometime
+respond to the ground on his left by turning his wheel that way, and,
+to his surprise and gratification, he finds the tipping overcome, and
+his balance well maintained. The response of turning to the left,
+originally made to the ground on the left (but in part to the
+tipping), becomes so linked with the tipping as to be the prompt
+reaction whenever tipping is felt. The diagram of this process would
+be the same as for the preceding instance.
+
+
+D. Substitute Response, the Response Being a Higher Motor Unit
+
+1. The brake and clutch combination in driving an automobile.
+
+This may serve as an instance of _simultaneous cooerdination_, since
+the two movements which are combined into a higher unit are executed
+simultaneously. The beginner in driving an automobile often has
+considerable trouble in learning to release the "clutch", which,
+operated by the left foot, ungears the car from the engine, and so
+permits the car to be stopped without stopping the engine. The foot
+brake, operated by the right foot, is comparatively easy to master,
+because the necessity for stopping the car is a perfectly clear and
+definite stimulus. Now, when the beginner gets a brake-stimulus, he
+responds promptly with his right foot, but neglects to employ his left
+foot on the clutch, because he has no effective clutch-stimulus; there
+is nothing {411} in the situation that reminds him of the clutch.
+Result, engine stalled, ridicule for the driver. Next time, perhaps,
+he _thinks_ "clutch" when he gets the brake-stimulus, and this
+thought, being itself a clutch-stimulus, arouses the clutch-response
+simultaneously with the brake-response. After doing this a number of
+times, the driver no longer needs the thought of the clutch as a
+stimulus, for the left foot movement on the clutch has become
+effectively linked with the brake-stimulus, so that any occasion that
+arouses the brake-response simultaneously arouses the clutch response.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 61.--Combining clutch-response with
+brake-response. At first, the brake-stimulus has only a weak linkage
+with the clutch-response, and an extra stimulus has to be found to
+secure the clutch-response. But whenever the clutch-response is made
+while the brake-stimulus is acting, the weak linkage between these two
+is exercised, till finally the brake-stimulus is sufficient to give
+the clutch-response, along with the brake-response.]
+
+
+The combination of two responses is effected by linking both to the
+same stimulus; thus the two become united into a cooerdinated higher
+motor unit.
+
+
+2. The word-habit in typewriting furnishes an example of _successive
+cooerdination_, the uniting of a sequence of movements into a higher
+unit. [Footnote: See p. 324.] The beginner has to spell out {412} the
+word he is writing, and make a separate response to each letter; but
+when he has well mastered the letter-habits, and, still unsatisfied,
+is trying for more speed, it happens that he thinks ahead while
+writing the first letter of a word, and _prepares_ for the second
+letter. In effect, he commences reacting to the second letter while
+still writing the first. This goes further, till he anticipates the
+series of letters forming a short word while still at the beginning of
+the word. The letter movements are thus linked to the thought of the
+word as a whole, and the word becomes an effective stimulus for
+arousing the series of letter movements.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 62.--Learning a word-habit in typewriting. At
+first, besides the stimulus of the word, "_and_" it is necessary also
+to have the stimulus "_a_" in order to arouse the response of writing
+a, the stimulus "_n_" in order to arouse the writing of n, and the
+stimulus "_d_" in order to arouse the writing of d. Yet the stimulus
+"_and_" is present all this time, and its weak linkages with the
+writing movements are used and strengthened, so that finally it is
+sufficient, by itself, to arouse the whole series of writing
+movements.]
+
+
+Many other instances of learning can be worked out in the same way,
+and there seems to be no difficulty in {413} interpreting any of them
+by the law of combination. Even "negative adaptation" can possibly be
+interpreted as an instance of substitute response; some slight and
+easy response may be substituted for the avoiding reaction or the
+attentive reaction that an unimportant stimulus at first arouses,
+these reactions being rather a nuisance when they are unnecessary. On
+the whole, the law of combination seems to fill the bill very well. It
+explains what the law of exercise left unexplained. It always brings
+in the law of exercise as an ally, and, in explaining substitute
+response, it brings in the law of effect, which however, as we saw
+before, may be a sub-law under the law of exercise. These two, or
+three laws, taken together, give an adequate analysis of the whole
+process of learning.
+
+
+The Law of Combination in Recall
+
+Unitary response to multiple stimuli is important in recall as well as
+in learning. The clearest case of this is afforded by "controlled
+association". [Footnote: See p. 381.]
+
+In an opposites test, the response to the stimulus word "long" is
+aroused partly by this stimulus word, and partly by the "mental set"
+for opposites. There are two lines of influence, converging upon the
+response, "long--short" (of which only the word "short" may be
+spoken): one line from the stimulus word "long", and the other from
+the mental set for pairs of opposite words. The mental set for
+opposites tends to arouse any pair of opposites; the word "long" tends
+to arouse any previously observed group of words of which "long" is a
+part. The mental set, an internal stimulus, and the stimulus word
+coming from outside, converge or combine to arouse one particular
+response.
+
+The mental set for adding has previously exercised {414} linkages with
+the responses composing the addition table, while the mental set for
+multiplication has linkages with the responses composing the
+multiplication table. When the set for adding is active, a pair of
+numbers, seen or heard, together with this internal stimulus of the
+mental set, arouses the response that gives the sum; but when the
+multiplying set is active, the same pair of numbers gives the product
+as the response. All thinking towards any goal is a similar instance
+of the law of combination.
+
+
+The Laws of Learning in Terms of the Neurone
+
+We have good evidence that the brain is concerned in learning and
+retention. Loss of some of the cortex through injury often brings loss
+of learned reactions, and the kind of reactions lost differs with the
+part of the cortex affected. Injury in the occipital lobe brings loss
+of visual knowledge, and injury in the neighborhood of the auditory
+sense-center brings loss of auditory knowledge.
+
+Injury to the retina or optic nerve, occurring early in life, results
+in an under-development of the cortex in the occipital lobe. The nerve
+cells remain small and their dendrites few and meager, because they
+have not received their normal amount of exercise through stimulation
+from the eye.
+
+Exercise, then, has the same general effect on neurones that it has on
+muscles; it causes them to grow and it probably also improves their
+internal condition so that they act more readily and more strongly.
+The growth, in the cortex, of dendrites and of the end-brushes of
+axons that interlace with the dendrites, must improve the synapses
+between one neurone and another, and thus make better conduction paths
+between one part of the cortex and another, and also between the
+cortex and the lower sensory and motor centers.
+
+The law of exercise has thus a very definite meaning when {415}
+translated into neural terms. It means that the synapses between
+stimulus and response are so improved, when traversed by nerve
+currents in the making of a reaction, that nerve currents can get
+across them more easily the next time.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 63.--The law of exercise in terms of synapse. A
+nerve current is supposed to pass along this pair of neurones in the
+direction of the arrow. Every time it passes, it exercises the
+end-brush and dendrites at the synapse (for the "passage of a nerve
+current" really means activity on the part of the neurones through
+which it passes), and the after-effect of this exercise is growth of
+the exercised parts, and consequent improvement of the synapse as a
+linkage between one neurone and the other. Repeated exercise may
+probably bring a synapse from a very loose condition to a state of
+close interweaving and excellent power of transmitting the nerve
+current.]
+
+
+The more a synapse is used, the better synapse it becomes, and the
+better linkage it provides between some stimulus and some response.
+The cortex is the place where linkages are made in the process of
+learning, and it is there also that forgetting, or atrophy, takes
+place through disuse. Exercise makes a synapse closer, disuse lets it
+relapse into a loose and poorly conducting state.
+
+The law of combination, also, is readily translated into {416} neural
+terms. The "pre-existing loose linkages" which it assumed to exist
+undoubtedly do exist in the form of "association fibers" extending in
+vast numbers from any one part of the cortex to many other parts.
+These fibers are provided by native constitution, but probably
+terminate rather loosely in the cortex until exercise has developed
+them. They may be compared to telephone wires laid down in the cables
+through the streets and extending into the houses, but still requiring
+a little fine work to attach them properly to the telephone
+instruments.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 64.--Diagram for the learning of the name of an
+object, transformed into a neural diagram. The vocal movement of
+saying the name is made in response to the auditory stimulus of
+hearing the name, but when the neurone in the "speech center" is thus
+made active, it takes up current also from the axon that reaches it
+from the visual center, even though the synapse between this axon and
+the speech neurone is far from close. This particular synapse between
+the visual and the speech centers, being thus exercised, is left in an
+improved condition. Each neurone in the diagram represents hundreds in
+the brain, for brain activities are carried on by companies and
+regiments of neurones. (Figure text: object seen, visual center name
+heard, auditory center, speech center, name spoken)]
+
+
+The diagrams illustrating different cases under the law of combination
+can easily be perfected into neural diagrams, though, to be sure, any
+diagram is ultra-simple as compared with the great number of neurones
+that take part in even a simple reaction.
+
+The reader will be curious to know now much of this neural
+interpretation of our psychological laws is observed fact, and how
+much speculation. Well, we cannot as yet {417} observe the brain
+mechanism in actual operation--not in any detail. We have good
+evidence, as already outlined, for growth of the neurones and their
+branches through exercise.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 65.--Control, in multiplying. The visual stimulus
+of two numbers in a little column, has preformed linkages both with
+the adding response and with that of multiplying. But the mental set
+for adding being inactive at the moment, and that for multiplying
+active (because the subject means to multiply), the multiplying
+response is facilitated.]
+
+
+We have perfectly good evidence of the law of "unitary response to
+multiple stimuli" from the physiological study of reflex action; and
+we have perfectly good anatomical evidence of the convergence and
+divergence of neural paths of connection, as required by the law of
+combination. The association fibers extending from one part to another
+of the cortex are an anatomical fact. [Footnote: See p. 56.]
+Facilitation is a fact, and that means that a stimulus which could not
+of itself arouse a response can cooeperate with another stimulus that
+has a direct connection with that response, and reinforce its effect.
+In short, all the elements required for a neural law of combination
+are known facts, and the only matter of doubt is whether we have built
+these elements together aright in our interpretation. It is not pure
+speculation, by any means.
+
+{418}
+
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter, in the form of a list of laws and sub-laws.
+
+2. Review the instances of learning cited in Chapters XIII-XV,
+ and examine whether they are covered and sufficiently accounted for
+ by the general laws given in the present chapter.
+
+3. Draw diagrams, like those given in this chapter, for the simpler
+ cases, at least, that you have considered in question 2.
+
+4. Show that response by analogy is important in the development
+ of language. Consider metaphor, for example, and slang, and the
+ using of an old word in a new sense (as in the case of
+ 'rail-road').
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+William James devoted much thought to the problem of the mechanism of
+learning, habit, association, etc., and his conclusions are set forth
+in several passages in his _Principles of Psychology_, 1890, Vol. I,
+pp. 104-112, 554-594, and Vol. II, pp. 578-592.
+
+Another serious consideration of the matter is given by William
+McDougall in his _Physiological Psychology_, 1905, Chapters VII and
+VIII.
+
+See also Thorndike's _Educational Psychology, Briefer Course_, 1914,
+Chapter VI.
+
+On the whole subject of association, see Howard C. Warren, _A History
+of the Association Psychology_, 1921.
+
+
+{419}
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+PERCEPTION
+
+MENTAL LIFE CONSISTS LARGELY IN THE DISCOVERY OF FACTS NEW TO THE
+INDIVIDUAL, AND IN THE RE-DISCOVERY OF FACTS PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED
+
+
+You will remember the case of John Doe, who was brought before us for
+judgment on his behavior, as to how far it was native and how far
+acquired. We have since that time been occupied in hearing evidence on
+the case, and after mature consideration have reached a decision which
+we may formulate as follows: that this man's behavior is primarily
+instinctive or native, but that new attachments of stimulus and
+response, and new combinations of responses, acquired in the process
+of learning, have furnished him with such an assortment of habits and
+skilled acts of all sorts that we can scarcely identify any longer the
+native reactions out of which his whole behavior is built. That
+decision being reached, we are still not ready to turn the prisoner
+loose, but wish to keep him under observation for a while longer, in
+order to see what use he makes of this vast stock of native and
+acquired reactions. We wish to know how an individual, so equipped,
+behaves from day to day, and meets the exigencies of life. Such, in
+brief, is the task we have still before us.
+
+Accordingly, one fine morning we enter our prisoner's sleeping
+quarters, and find him, for once, making no use of his acquired
+reactions, as far as we can see, and utilizing but a small fraction of
+his native reactions. He is, in short, asleep. We ring a bell, and he
+stirs uneasily. We {420} ring again, and he opens his eyes sleepily
+upon the bell, then spies us and sits bolt upright in bed. "Well, what
+. . ." He throws into action a part of his rather colorful vocabulary.
+He evidently sees our intrusion in an unfavorable light at first, but
+soon relaxes a little and "supposes he must be late for breakfast".
+Seeing our stenographer taking down his remarks, he is puzzled for a
+moment, then breaks into a loud laugh, and cries out, "Oh! This is
+some more psychology. Well, go as far as you like. It must have been
+your bell I heard in my dream just now, when I thought I saw a lot of
+cannibals beating the tom-tom". Having now obtained sufficient data
+for quite a lengthy discussion, we retire to our staff room and
+deliberate upon these manifestations.
+
+"The man perceives", we agree. "By the use of his eyes and ears he
+discovered facts, and interpreted them in the light of his previous
+experience. In knowing the facts, he also got adjusted to them and
+governed his actions by them. But notice--a curious thing--how his
+perception of the facts progressed by stages from the vague and
+erroneous to the correct and precise. Before he was fully awake, he
+mistook the bell for a tom-tom; then, more fully aroused, he knew the
+bell. Ourselves he first saw as mere wanton intruders, then as
+cheerful friends who wished him no ill; finally he saw us in our true
+character as investigators of his behavior."
+
+Following our man through the day's work and recreation, we find a
+large share of his mental activity to consist in the perception of
+facts. We find that he makes use of the facts, adjusting himself to
+them and also shaping them to suit himself. His actions are governed
+by the facts perceived, at the same time that they are governed by his
+own desires. Ascertaining how the facts stand, he takes a hand and
+manipulates them. He is constantly coming to know {421} fresh facts,
+and constantly doing something new with them. His life is a voyage of
+discovery, and at the same time a career of invention.
+
+Discovery and invention!--high-sounding words, still they are
+applicable to everyday life. The facts observed may not be absolutely
+new, but at least they have always to be verified afresh, since action
+needs always to take account of present reality. The invention may be
+very limited in scope, but seldom does an hour pass that does not call
+for doing something a little out of the ordinary, so as to escape from
+a fresh trap or pluck fruit from a newly discovered bough. All of our
+remaining chapters might, with a little forcing, be pigeonholed under
+these two great heads. Discovery takes its start with the child's
+instinctive exploratory activity, and invention with his manipulation,
+and these two tendencies, perhaps at bottom one, remain closely
+interlinked throughout.
+
+
+Some Definitions
+
+_Perception_ is the culmination of the process of discovery. Discovery
+usually requires exploration, a search for facts; and it requires
+attention, which amounts to finding the facts or getting them
+effectively presented; and perception then consists in knowing the
+presented facts.
+
+When the facts are presented to the senses, we speak of "sense
+perception". If they are presented to the eye, we speak of visual
+perception; if to the ear, of auditory perception, etc. But when we
+speak of a fact as being "presented" to the eye or ear, we do not
+necessarily mean that it is directly and completely presented; it may
+only be indicated. We may have before the eyes simply a _sign_ of some
+fact, but perceive the fact which is the _meaning_ of the sign. We
+look out of the window and "see it is wet to-day", though wetness is
+something to be felt rather than seen; {422} having previously
+observed how wet ground looks, we now respond promptly to the visual
+appearance by knowing the indicated state of affairs. In the same way,
+we say that we "hear the street car", though a street car, we must
+admit, is not essentially a noise. What we hear, in strictness, is a
+noise, but we respond to the noise by perceiving the presence of the
+car. Responding to a stimulus presented to one sense by perceiving a
+fact which could only be directly presented to another sense is
+exemplified also by such common expressions as that the stone "looks
+heavy", or that the bell "sounds cracked". or that the jar of fruit
+"smells sour". Sense perception, then, is responding to a stimulus by
+knowing some fact indicated by it either directly or indirectly.
+Perception that is not sense perception occurs when the fact perceived
+is not even indirectly presented to the senses at the moment. The fact
+is then presented by recall; yet the fact in question is not recalled.
+Recall not only gives you facts previously perceived, but may provide
+the data, the stimulus, for fresh perception. Putting together two
+recalled facts, you may perceive a further fact not previously known.
+Remembering that you took your umbrella to the office this morning in
+the rain, that it was fine when you left the office, and that you
+certainly did not have the umbrella when you reached home, you
+perceive that you must have left it at the office. Reading in the
+paper of preparations for another polar expedition, and remembering
+that both poles have already been discovered, you perceive that there
+is something more in polar exploration than the mere race for the
+pole. Perception of this sort amounts to "reasoning", and will be
+fully considered in another chapter, while here we shall focus our
+attention on sense perception.
+
+{423}
+
+The Difference Between Perception and Sensation
+
+If sense perception is a response to a sensory stimulus, so is
+sensation, and the question arises whether there is any genuine
+difference between these two. In the instance of "hearing the street
+car", the difference is fairly obvious; hearing the noise is
+sensation, while knowing the street car to be there is perception.
+
+Sensation is the first response aroused by a stimulus, or at least the
+first response that is conscious. Perception is a second response,
+following the sensation, and being properly a direct response to the
+sensation, and only an indirect response to the physical stimulus. The
+chain of events is: stimulus, response of the sense organ and sensory
+nerve, first cortical response which is sensation, second cortical
+response which is perception.
+
+Conscious sensation is the response of the part of the cortex that
+first receives the nerve current from the sense organ stimulated, the
+response of the "sensory area" for the particular sense stimulated.
+When the eye is stimulated, the nerve current first reaches a small
+portion of the occipital lobe, called the visual sensory area. Without
+that area there is no visual sensation. When the ear is stimulated,
+the conscious sensation is the response of a small portion of the
+temporal lobe called the auditory sensory area, and without this area
+there is no auditory sensation. But the presence of the visual sensory
+area is not enough to give the visual perception of facts, nor is the
+presence of the auditory sensory area enough to give auditory
+perception. The cortical regions _adjacent_ to the sensory areas are
+necessary for perception; if they are destroyed, the individual may
+still see, but not know the objects seen; or may still hear, but not
+recognize the words or tunes that he hears. If the cortical area
+destroyed is in the parietal {424} lobe, adjacent to the sensory area
+for the cutaneous and kinesthetic senses, he may still "feel" objects,
+but without being able to distinguish an apple from a lump of coal, or
+a folded newspaper from a tin pail.
+
+Sense perception, then, is a response of areas adjacent to the sensory
+areas, and this response is aroused by nerve currents coming along
+"association fibers" from the sensory areas which are first aroused
+from the sense organs.
+
+The whole chain of events, from the time the stimulus reaches the
+sense organ to the time the fact is perceived, occupies only a fifth
+or even a tenth of a second in simple cases, and the interval between
+the beginning of the sensation to the beginning of the perception is
+not over a twentieth when the fact is easily perceived. Since the
+sensation usually lasts for longer than this, it overlaps the
+perception in time, and the two conscious responses are so _blended_
+that it is difficult or impossible for introspection to separate them.
+
+But when an unusual fact is presented, perception may lag, though
+sensation occurs promptly. We may be baffled and confused for an
+instant, and have sensation without any definite perception; or, more
+often, we make a rapid series of _trial and error perceptions_. In one
+instance, a noise was first heard as distant thunder, and then,
+correctly, as somebody walking on the floor above. In another case, a
+faint sound was first taken for a bird singing, then for a distant
+locomotive whistle, and finally for what it was, the tinny noise of a
+piece of metal carried in the hand and brushing against the overcoat
+as the person walked; this series occupied not over five seconds. On
+touching an object in the dark, you may feel it as one thing and
+another till some response is aroused that fits the known situation
+and so satisfies you. Such trial and error perception can be observed
+very frequently if one is on the watch for {425} psychological
+curiosities; and it justifies the distinction between sensation and
+perception, since the sensation remains virtually unchanged while
+perception changes.
+
+Another sort of shifting perception is seen in looking steadily at the
+"ambiguous figures" which were considered in the chapter on attention,
+the cube, staircase, and others; and the "dot figures" belong here as
+well. [Footnote: See p. 252.] In these cases the stimulus arouses two
+or more different perceptions, alternately, while the sensation
+remains almost or quite unchanged.
+
+
+Perception and Image
+
+The experiment with ambiguous figures also gives an answer to the
+question whether perception consists in the addition of recalled
+memory images to the sensations aroused by the present stimulus. If
+that were so, you should, when you see the upper side of the flight of
+stairs, see them as wooden stairs or stone stairs, as carpeted or
+varnished, with shadows on them such as appear on a real flight of
+stairs, with a railing, or with some other addition of a similar
+nature; and, when the appearance changes to that of the under side of
+a flight of stairs, the colors, shadows, etc., should change as well.
+The usual report is that no such addition can be detected, and that
+the subject sees no filling-in of the picture, but simply the bare
+lines--only that they seem at one moment to be the bare outline of the
+upper side, and at another moment an equally bare outline of the lower
+side, of a flight of stairs.
+
+So again, when you "hear the street car", you do not ordinarily, to
+judge from the reports of people who have been asked, get any visual
+or kinesthetic image of the car, but you simply know the car is there.
+You will quite {426} possibly get some such image, if you _dwell_ on
+the fact of the car's being there, just as some persons, in talking to
+a friend over the telephone, have a visual image of the friend. There
+is no reason why such images should not be aroused, but the question
+is whether they are essential to perception of the fact, and whether
+they occur before or after the fact is perceived. Often they do not
+occur, and often, when they do occur, they follow the perception of
+the fact, being aroused by that perception and not constituting it.
+
+Sometimes images are certainly aroused during the perception of a
+fact, and, blending with the present rather vague sensation, add color
+and filling to the picture.
+
+Here is an instance of this which I once observed in myself, in spite
+of the infrequency of my visual images. Approaching a house through a
+wide field one winter night, and seeing a lamp shining out of a window
+towards me, I seemed to see the yellowish light touching the high
+spots in the grass around. I was surprised that the lamp should carry
+so far, and the next instant saw that the light spots on the ground
+were small patches of snow, lighted only from the clouded sky; and at
+this the yellow tinge of the spots vanished. I must have read the
+yellow color into them to fit the lamplight. The yellow was an image
+blending with the actual sensation. Colors tacked on to a seen object
+in this way are sometimes called "memory colors".
+
+When this instance is considered carefully, however, it does not by
+any means indicate that the image produced the perception. I responded
+to the pair of stimuli--lamp shining towards me and light spots around
+me--by perceiving the spots as lighted by the lamp; and the color
+followed suit. I next saw the spots as snow, and the color vanished.
+It was a case of trial and error perception, with color images
+conforming to the perception.
+
+Perception does not essentially consist in the recall of {427} images,
+but is a different sort of response--what sort, we have still to
+consider.
+
+
+Perception and Motor Reaction
+
+Possibly, we may surmise, perception is a motor response, completely
+executed or perhaps merely incipient, or at least a readiness for a
+certain motor response. This guess is not quite so wild as our
+customary sharp distinction between knowing and doing might lead us to
+think. When we say that reacting to a thing in a motor way is quite
+different from merely seeing the thing, we forget how likely the child
+is to do something with any object as soon as he sees what it is. We
+forget also how common it is for a person, in silently reading a
+word--which is perceiving the word--to whisper it or at least move his
+lips. To be sure, persons who read a great deal usually get over this
+habit, as the child more and more inhibits his motor response to many
+seen objects. But may it not be that the motor response is simply
+reduced to a minimum? Or, still better, may it not be that perceiving
+an object amounts to _getting ready_ to do something with it? May not
+seeing a word always be a getting ready to say it, even if no actual
+movement of the vocal organs occurs? May not seeing an orange consist
+in getting ready to take it, peel it, and eat it? May not perceiving
+our friend amount to the same thing as getting ready to behave in a
+friendly manner, and perceiving our enemy amount to the same thing as
+getting on our guard against him? According to this view, perception
+would be a response that adjusted the perceiver to the fact perceived,
+and made him ready to do something appropriate.
+
+In spite of the attractiveness of this theory of perception, it is
+probably not the real essence of the matter. Just as perception may
+change while sensation remains the same, so there may be a hesitation
+between two motor responses {428} to an object, without any change in
+the way it is perceived; and just as a block may occur between
+sensation and perception, so also may one occur between perception of
+a fact and the motor response. In other words, perception of a fact
+may not spell complete readiness to act upon it. The best example of
+this is afforded again by cases of localized brain injuries.
+
+It happens, in motor aphasia, that the subject hears and understands a
+spoken word--fully perceives it--and yet cannot pronounce it himself.
+And at that, there need be no paralysis of the speech organs. The
+brain injury has affected the motor speech-cooerdinating machinery, and
+deprived the individual of the power to get ready for speaking a word,
+even though he perceives it.
+
+Analogous disabilities occur in respect to other movements. It may
+happen, through injury somewhere near the motor area, though not
+precisely in that area, that one who clearly perceives a seen object
+is still quite incapable of handling it. He knows the object, and he
+knows in an abstract way what to do with it, but how to go about it he
+cannot remember. This type of disturbance is called "motor apraxia",
+and, like motor aphasia, it proves that there is a preparation that
+follows perception and still precedes actual movement. Paralysis of
+the motor area is different; then, the subject both perceives the
+object, and gets all ready to act upon it; only, the movement does not
+occur.
+
+The truth seems to be that a series of four responses occurs in the
+brain, in the process of making a skilled movement dealing with a
+perceived object. First, sensation; second, perception of the object;
+third, cooerdinating preparation for the act; and fourth, execution of
+the act by the motor area arousing the lower motor centers and through
+them the muscles. The first response is like receiving signals {429}
+or code messages; the second deciphers the messages and knows the
+state of affairs; the third plans action; and the fourth sends out
+orders to the agents that perform the action.
+
+The distinction between perception and preparation for action is
+sometimes rather difficult to draw. The twelve o'clock whistle means
+time to drop your tools, and it is hard to draw a line between knowing
+the fact and beginning the act. On the other hand, when my watch tells
+me the noon hour is almost over, some little time may be required
+before I get into motion. Where there is no block or inhibition, the
+chain of responses runs off with such speed as to seem a single
+response. But a block may occur at any one of several places. It may
+check the actual movement, as in the "delayed reaction", [Footnote:
+See p. 76.] and in cases where we itch to do something yet check
+ourselves. Here the preparation occurs, but the execution is checked.
+Sometimes the block occurs between perception and preparation, when we
+know a fact but find nothing to do about it or hesitate between two
+ways of acting. Sometimes, also, the block occurs between sensation
+and perception; a sudden loud noise will sometimes throw a person into
+a momentary state of confusion during which he is unable to recognize
+the noise.
+
+Blocking of response at different stages can be illustrated very well
+in the case of anger. The irritating stimulus gives a prompt fighting
+reaction, unless checked at some stage. When the check prevents me
+from actually striking the offending person, but leaves me clenching
+my fist and gnashing my teeth, the chain of responses has evidently
+gone as far as readiness for action, and been blocked between that
+stage and the stage of execution. Probably the inhibitory influence
+here is anticipation of bad consequences. The block may occur one
+stage further back, when I say to myself that {430} I mustn't let
+myself get "all riled up" since it will spoil my morning's work; here,
+instead of substituting the clenched fist for actual fighting, I
+substitute a bored or contemptuous attitude for the pugnacious
+attitude. All this time I still am conscious of the offense done me.
+But suppose something leads me to try to look at the other person's
+behavior from his own point of view--then I perceive it in a different
+light, and it may no longer appear a personal offense to myself. I
+here get a substitute perception.
+
+The process of blocking and substituting is the same process that we
+have seen in trial and error.[Footnote: See p. 408.] The response
+proving unsatisfactory, or promising to be unsatisfactory, is checked
+and a substitute response found. Other elements in the situation get a
+chance to exert their influence on the reaction. If perception of a
+fact were absolutely the same as preparing a motor act, we could not
+look over the situation, perceiving one fact after another, and
+letting our adjustment for action depend on the total situation
+instead of on the separate facts successively observed; nor could we
+perceive one fact while preparing the motor response to another fact,
+as is actually done in telegraphy, typewriting, reading aloud, and
+many other sorts of skilled action. In reading aloud, the eyes on the
+page keep well ahead of the voice; while one word is being pronounced,
+the next word is being prepared for pronouncing, and words still
+further ahead are in process of being perceived.
+
+We conclude, accordingly, that perception of an object is not
+absolutely the same thing as motor response to the object, nor even as
+motor readiness to respond, although the transition from perception to
+motor readiness may be so quick that the whole reaction seems a unit.
+In reality, perception of the object precedes the motor adjustment,
+and is one factor in determining that adjustment.
+
+{431}
+
+What Sort of Response, Then, Is Perception?
+
+We can say this, that perception is knowing the fact, as distinguished
+from readiness to act. We can say that perception is an adjustment to
+facts as they are, while motor adjustment is a preparation for
+changing the facts. Perception does not alter the facts, but takes
+them as they are; movement alters the facts or produces new facts. We
+can say that perception comes in between sensation and motor
+preparation. But none of these statements is quite enough to satisfy
+us, if we wish to know something of the machinery of perception. What
+is the stimulus in perception, and what is the nature of the response?
+
+It takes a collection of stimuli to arouse a perception. This
+collection is at the same time a selection from among the whole mass
+of sensory stimuli acting at any moment on the individual. Perception
+is thus a fine example both of the "law of selection" and of the "law
+of combination". [Footnote: See pp. 256, 263.] Perception is at once a
+_combining_ response and an _isolating_ response.
+
+We perceive a face--that means that we take the face as a unit, or
+make a unitary response to the multiple stimuli coming from the face.
+At the same time, in perceiving the face, we isolate it from its
+background, or disregard the numerous other stimuli that are
+simultaneously acting upon us. If we proceed to examine the face in
+detail, we may isolate the nose and perceive that as a whole. We might
+isolate still further and perceive a freckle on the nose, taking that
+as a whole, or even observing separately its location, diameter, depth
+of pigmentation, etc. Even if we went so far as to observe a single
+speck of dust on the skin, in which case isolation would about reach
+its maximum, combination would still stay in the game, for we should
+either note {432} the location of the speck--which would involve
+relating it to some part of the face--or we should contrast it with
+the color of the skin, or in some similar way take the single stimulus
+in relation with other present stimuli. Perception is always a unitary
+response to an isolated assemblage of stimuli.
+
+Consider these two opposite extremes: taking in the general effect of
+the view from a mountain top, and perceiving the prick of a pin. In
+the first case, combination is very much in evidence, but where is the
+isolation? There is isolation, since internal bodily sensations, and
+very likely auditory and olfactory sensations as well, are present but
+do not enter into the view. In the case of the pin prick, isolation is
+evident, but where does combination come in? It would not come into
+the mere reflex of pulling the hand away, but perceiving the pin means
+something more than reflex action. It means locating the sensation, or
+noticing its quality or duration or something of that sort, and so
+contrasting it with other sensations or relating it to them in some
+way. To perceive one stimulus as related to another is to respond to
+both together.
+
+But in describing perception as a unitary response to an isolated
+assemblage of stimuli, we have not differentiated it from a motor
+response, for that, too, is often aroused by a few (or many) stimuli
+acting together. What more can we say? In neural terms, we can only
+repeat what was said before, that perception is the next response
+after sensation, being a direct response to a certain combination of
+sensations, and being in its turn the stimulus, or part of the
+stimulus, that arouses a motor adjustment, as it may also be the
+stimulus to recall of previously observed facts. In more psychological
+terms, we can say that sense perception is closely bound up with
+sensation, so that we seem to see the fact, or hear it, etc.; we
+perceive it as present to the {433} senses, rather than as thought of
+or as anticipated. Motor readiness is anticipatory, perception
+definitely objective. Motor readiness is an adjustment for something
+yet to be, while perception is an adjustment to something already
+present.
+
+
+Practised Perception
+
+A fact perceived for the first time must needs be attended to, in
+order that it may be perceived. That is, the first and original
+perception of a fact is a highly conscious response. But the
+perception of a fact, like any other form of response, becomes easy
+with practice; the linkage of stimulus and response becomes stronger
+and stronger, till finally the stimulus arouses the perceptive
+response almost automatically. The familiar fact is perceived without
+receiving close attention, or even without receiving any attention.
+While your attention is absorbed in reading or thinking, you may
+respond to the sight of the flower in a vase on your table by knowing
+it to be there, you may respond to the noise of the passing street car
+by knowing what that is, and you may respond to the contact of your
+foot with the leg of the chair by dimly knowing what that object is. A
+great deal of this inattentive perception of familiar facts is always
+going on. Aside from sensation and from some of the reflexes, the
+perception of familiar facts is the most practised and the easiest of
+all responses.
+
+The laws and sub-laws of learning apply perfectly to practised
+perception. The more frequently, the more recently, and the more
+intensely a given fact has been perceived, the more readily is it
+perceived again. The more a given fact is in line with the mental set
+of the moment, the more readily is it perceived. Sometimes it is so
+readily perceived that we think we see it when it isn't there. If you
+are hunting for a lost knife, anything remotely resembling {434} a
+knife will catch your eye and for an instant be perceived as the
+missing object.
+
+The principle of _substitute stimulus_ applies remarkably well to
+practised perception. The first time you perceive an object, you
+observe it attentively, and expose your perceptive apparatus to the
+whole collection of stimuli that the object sends your way. The next
+time you need not observe it so attentively, for you make the same
+perceptive response to a _part_ of the original collection of stimuli.
+The response originally aroused by the whole collection of stimuli is
+later aroused by a fraction of this collection. The stimulus may be
+_reduced_ considerably, and still arouse the perception of the same
+fact. A child is making the acquaintance of the dog. The dog barks,
+and the child watches the performance. He not only sees the dog, and
+hears the noise, but he _sees_ the dog _bark_, and _hears_ the dog
+_bark_. This original perception is a unitary response to the
+combination of sight and sound. Thereafter he does not require both
+stimuli at once, but, when he hears this noise, he perceives the dog
+barking, and when he sees the dog he sees an object that can bark. In
+the same way, a thousand objects which furnish stimuli to more than
+one of the senses are perceived as units, and, later, need only act on
+a single sense to be known.
+
+The stimulus, instead of being reduced, may be _modified_, and still
+arouse the same perception as before. A face appears in the baby's
+field of view, but away across the room so that it is a very small
+object, visually. The face approaches and gradually becomes a larger
+visual object, and the light and shadow upon it change from moment to
+moment, but it remains nearly enough the same to arouse essentially
+the same perception in the child. He comes to know the face at various
+distances and angles and under various lights.
+
+{435}
+
+Again, the child holds a block in his hands, and looks at it square
+on, so that it is really a rectangle in his field of view. He turns it
+slightly, and now it is no longer visually a rectangle, but an oblique
+parallelogram. But the change is not enough to abolish the first
+perception; he sees it as the same object as before. By dint of many
+such experiences, we see a book cover or a door as a rectangle, no
+matter at what angle we may view it, and we know a circle for a circle
+even though at most angles it is really an ellipse in the field of
+view. A large share of practised perceptions belong under the head of
+"response by analogy",[Footnote: See p. 406.] since they consist in
+making the same response to the present stimulus that has previously
+been made to a similar but not identical stimulus. If every modified
+stimulus gave a new and different perception, it would be a slow job
+getting acquainted with the world. A thing is never twice the same, as
+a collection of stimuli, and yet, within wide limits, it is always
+perceived as the same thing.
+
+
+Corrected Perception
+
+Response by analogy, however, often leads us astray, in making us
+perceive a new object as essentially the same as something already
+familiar. First impressions of a new object or acquaintance often need
+revision, because they do not work well. They do not work well because
+they are rough and ready, taking the object in the lump, with scant
+attention to details which may prove to be important. It is easy to
+follow the law of combination and respond to a whole collection of
+stimuli, but to break up the collection and isolate out of it a
+smaller collection to respond to--that is something we will not do
+unless forced to it. Isolation and discrimination are uphill work.
+When they occur, it is {436} because the rough and ready response has
+proved unsatisfactory,
+
+_Substitute response_ is the big factor in corrected perception, as
+substitute stimulus is in practised perception. When our first
+perception of an object gets us into difficulties, then we are forced
+to attend more closely and find something in the object that can serve
+as the stimulus to a better response. This is the process by which we
+isolate, analyze, discriminate.
+
+Our old friend, the white rat, learned to enter a door only if it bore
+a yellow sign. [Footnote: See p. 304.] It was uphill work for him,
+hundreds of trials being required before the discriminating response
+was established; but he learned it finally. At the outset, a door was
+a door to the rat, and responded to as such, without regard to the
+sign. Whenever he entered a door without the sign, he got a shock, and
+scurried back; and before venturing again he looked all around,
+seeking, we may say, a stimulus to guide him; incidentally, he looked
+at the yellow disk, and this stimulus, though inconspicuous and feeble
+to a rat, finally got linked up with the entering response. The
+response of first finding and then following the sign had been
+substituted for the original response of simply entering.
+
+In the same way the newly hatched chick, which at first pecks at all
+small objects, caterpillars included, learns to discriminate against
+caterpillars. In a practical sense, the chick, like the rat, learns to
+distinguish between stimuli that at first aroused the same response.
+It is in the same way that the human being is driven to discriminate
+and attend to details. He is brought to a halt by the poor results of
+his first rough and ready perception, scans the situation, isolates
+some detail and, finding response to this detail to bring satisfactory
+results, substitutes response to this {437} detail for his first
+undiscriminating response to the whole object.
+
+The child at first treats gloves as alike, whether rights or lefts,
+but thus gets into trouble, and is driven to look at them more sharply
+till he perceives the special characteristics of rights and lefts. He
+could not describe the difference, to be sure, but he sees it well
+enough for his purposes. If you ask an older person to describe this
+difference, and rally him on his inability to do so, he is thus driven
+to lay them side by side and study out the difference still more
+precisely.
+
+The average non-mechanical person, on acquiring an automobile, takes
+it as a gift of the gods, a big total thing, simply to sit in and go.
+He soon learns certain parts that he must deal with, but most of the
+works remain a mystery to him. Then something goes wrong, and he gets
+out to look. "What do you suppose this thing is here? I never noticed
+it before". Tire trouble teaches him about wheels, engine trouble
+leads him to know the engine, ignition trouble may lead him to notice
+certain wires and binding-posts that were too inconspicuous at first
+to attract his attention. A car becomes to him a thing with a hundred
+well-known parts, instead of just one big totality.
+
+Blocked response, closer examination, new stimulus isolated that gives
+satisfactory response--such is, typically, the process of analytic
+perception.
+
+
+Sensory Data Serving as Signs of Various Sorts of Fact
+
+Among facts perceived, we may list things and events, and their
+qualities and relations. Under "things" we here include persons and
+animals and everything that would ordinarily be called an "object".
+Under "events", we include movement, change and happenings of all
+sorts. Under {438} "qualities" we may include everything that can be
+discovered in a thing or event taken by itself, and under "relations"
+anything that can be discovered by comparing or contrasting two things
+or events. The "groups" that we have several times spoken of as being
+observed would here be included under "things"; but the strict logic
+of the whole classification is not a matter of importance, as the only
+object in view is to call attention to the great variety of facts that
+are perceived.
+
+Now the question arises, by what signs or indications these various
+facts are perceived. Often, as we have seen, the fact is by no means
+fully presented to the senses, and often it is far from easy for the
+perceiver to tell on what signs the perception depends. He knows the
+fact, but how he knows it he cannot tell. A large part of the very
+extensive experimental investigation of perception has been concerned
+with this problem of ferreting out the signs on which the various
+perceptions are based, the precise stimuli to which the perceptions
+respond.
+
+For example, we can examine objects by feeling of them with a stick
+held in the hand, and thus perceive their roughness or smoothness; but
+how do we sense these facts? It seems to us as if we felt them with
+the end of the stick, but that is absurd, since there are no sense
+organs in the stick. It must be that we perceive the roughness by
+means of sensations arising in the hand and arm, but to identify these
+sensations is a much harder task than to discover the objective fact
+of roughness.
+
+Again, we distinguish the tones of two musical instruments by aid of
+their overtones, but elaborate experiments were required to prove
+this, since ordinarily we do not distinguish the overtones, and could
+simply say that the instruments sounded differently, and let it go at
+that.
+
+Once more, consider our ability to perceive time intervals; {439} and
+to distinguish an interval of a second from one of a second and a
+quarter. How in the world can any one perceive time? Time is no force
+that could conceivably act as a stimulus to a sense organ. It must be
+some change or process that is the stimulus and that serves as the
+indication of duration. Most likely, it is some muscular or internal
+bodily change, but none of the more precise suggestions that have been
+offered square with all the facts. It cannot be the movements of
+breathing that give us our perception of time, for we can hold our
+breath and still distinguish one short interval from another. It
+cannot be the heart beat, for we can beat time in a rhythm that cuts
+across the rate of the heart beat. When a singer is accompanying
+himself on the piano, keeping good time in spite of the fact that the
+notes are uneven in length, and meanwhile using his feet on the
+pedals, what has he got left to beat time with? No one has located the
+stimulus to which accurate time perception responds, though, in a
+general way, we are pretty sure that change of one sort or another is
+the datum. With longer intervals, from a minute to several hours, the
+sign of duration is probably the amount happening in the interval, or
+else such progressive bodily changes as hunger and fatigue.
+
+
+The Perception of Space
+
+Stimuli for the perception of location are provided by all the senses.
+We perceive a taste as in the mouth, thirst as in the throat, hunger
+pangs as in the stomach. To a familiar odor we may respond by knowing
+the odorous substance to be close at hand. To stimulation of the
+semi-circular canals we respond by knowing the direction in which we
+are being turned.
+
+We respond to sounds by knowing the direction from which they come,
+and the distance from which they come; {440} but it must be confessed
+that we are liable to gross errors here. To perceive the distance of
+the sounding body we have to be familiar with the sound at various
+distances, and our perception of distance is based on this knowledge.
+As to the direction of sound, experiment has proved that we do little
+more than distinguish between right and left; we are all at sea in
+attempting to distinguish front from back or up from down. Apparently
+the only datum we have to go by is the different stimulation given the
+two ears according as the sound comes from the right or left.
+
+The remaining senses, the cutaneous, the kinesthetic and the visual,
+afford much fuller data for the perception of spatial facts. Movements
+of the limbs are perceived quite accurately as to direction and
+extent.
+
+A cutaneous stimulus is located with fair exactness, though much less
+exactly on such regions as the back than on the hands or lips. If you
+were asked how you distinguished one point from another on the back of
+the hand, you could only answer that they felt different; and if you
+were further asked whether a pencil point applied to the two points of
+the skin did not feel the same, you would have to acknowledge that it
+did feel the same, except that it was felt in a different place. In
+other words, you would not be able to identify the exact data on which
+your perception of cutaneous position is based. Science has done no
+better, but has simply given the name of "local sign" to the
+unanalyzed sensory datum that gives a knowledge of the point
+stimulated.
+
+In handling an object, as also in walking and many other movements,
+the cutaneous and kinesthetic senses are stimulated together, and
+between them furnish data for the perception of many spatial facts,
+such as the shape of an object examined by the hand. The spherical
+shape is certainly better perceived by this combination of tactile and
+kinesthetic {441} sensations than by vision, and the same is probably
+true of many similar spatial facts. That is, when we see a round ball,
+the visual stimulus is a substitute for the tactile and cutaneous
+stimuli that originally had most to do with arousing this perception.
+
+In part by this route of the substitute stimulus, the sense of vision
+comes to arouse almost all sorts of spatial perceptions. Of itself,
+the retina has "local sign" since we can tell where in the field of
+view a seen object is, i.e., in what direction it is from us. This
+visual perception of location is so much more exact than the cutaneous
+or kinesthetic that it cannot possibly be derived from them; and the
+same is true of the visual perception of difference in length, which
+is one of the most accurate forms of perception. The retina must of
+itself afford very complete stimuli for the perception of location and
+size, as far as these are confined to the two dimensions, up-down and
+right-left. But, when you stop to think, it seems impossible that the
+retina should afford any data for perceiving distance in the
+front-back dimension.
+
+The retina is a screen, and the stimulus that it gets from the world
+outside is like a picture cast upon a screen. The picture has the
+right-left and up-down dimensions, but no front-back dimension. How,
+then, does it come about, as it certainly does, that we perceive by
+aid of the eye the distance of objects from us, and the solidity and
+relief of objects? This problem in visual perception has received much
+attention and been carried to a satisfactory solution.
+
+Consider, first, what stimuli indicative of distance and relief could
+affect a single motionless eye. The picture on the retina could then
+be duplicated by a painter on canvas, and the signs of distance
+available would be the same in the two cases. The painter uses
+foreshortening, making a man in the picture small in proportion to his
+distance away; {442} and in the same way, when any familiar object
+casts a small picture on the retina, we perceive the object, not as
+diminished in size, but as far away. The painter colors his near hills
+green, his distant ones blue, and washes out all detail in the
+latter--"aerial perspective", he calls this. His distant hill peeks
+from behind his nearer one, being partially covered by it. His shadows
+fall in a way to indicate the relief of the landscape. These signs of
+distance also affect the single resting eye and are responded to by
+appropriate spatial perceptions.
+
+Now let the single eye move, with the head, from side to side: an
+index of the distance of objects is thus obtained, additional to all
+the painter has at his disposal, for the distant objects in the field
+of view now seem to move with the eye, while the nearer objects slide
+in the opposite direction. How much this sign is ordinarily made use
+of in perceiving distance is not known; it is believed not to be used
+very much, and yet it is the most delicate of all the signs of
+distance. The reason why it may not be much used by two-eyed people is
+that another index almost as delicate and handier to use is afforded
+by binocular vision.
+
+When both eyes are open, we have a sign of distance that the painter
+does not use, though it is used in stereoscope slides. The right and
+left eyes get somewhat different views of the same solid object, the
+right eye seeing a little further around the object to the right, and
+the left eye to the left. The disparity between the two retinal
+images, due to the different angles at which they view the object, is
+greatest when the object is close at hand, and diminishes to
+practically zero when it is a few hundred feet away. This disparity
+between the two retinal images is responded to by perception of the
+distance and relief of the object.
+
+It will be recalled [Footnote: See pp. 253-254.] that when two utterly
+inconsistent {443} views are presented to the two eyes, as a red field
+to one and a green field to the other, the visual apparatus balks and
+refuses to see more than one at a time--the binocular rivalry
+phenomenon. But when the disparate views are such as are presented to
+the two eyes by the same solid object, the visual apparatus (following
+the law of combination) responds to the double stimulation by getting
+a single view of an object in three dimensions.
+
+
+Esthetic Perception
+
+Beauty, humor, pathos and sublimity can be perceived by the senses,
+though we might debate a long time over the question whether these
+characteristics are really objective, or merely our own feelings
+aroused by the objects, and then projected into them. However that may
+be, there is no doubt that the ability to make these responses is
+something that can be trained, and that some people are blind and deaf
+to beauty and humor that other people clearly perceive. Many a one
+fails to see the point of a joke, or is unable to find any humor in
+the situation, which are clearly perceived by another. Many a one sees
+only a sign of rain in a great bank of clouds, only a weary climb in
+the looming mountain.
+
+ "A primrose by the river's brim
+ A yellow primrose was to him.
+ And it was nothing more."
+
+It would not be quite fair to describe such a one as lacking in
+feeling; he probably has, on sufficient stimulus, the same feelings as
+another man, and it would be more exact to say that he is lacking in
+perception of certain qualities and relations. He probably tends, by
+nature and training, to practical rather than esthetic perception. To
+see any {444} beauty in a new style of music or painting, or to sense
+the humor in a new form of humorous writing, you need to be initiated,
+to be trained in observing the precise qualities and relations that
+are depended on for the esthetic effect. A complex situation presents
+almost an unlimited range of facts that may be perceived; no one
+perceives them all, and which he shall perceive depends on his nature
+and training, as well as on his attitude or mental set at the moment
+when the situation is presented.
+
+Psychology has not by any means been idle in this field of esthetics;
+it has developed experimental methods for determining the preferences
+of individuals and of social groups. But it must be confessed that the
+results offer little that can be succinctly summarized.
+
+One curious result is that even the very simplest objects can produce
+an esthetic effect. You would scarcely suppose, for example, that a
+mere rectangle could produce any esthetic effect, or that it would
+make any difference what exact proportions the rectangle possessed;
+and yet it is found that some rectangles are preferred to others, and
+that the popular choice falls upon what the art theorists have long
+known as the "golden section", a rectangle with a width about
+sixty-two per cent, of its length. Also, however much you may like
+symmetry, you would scarcely suppose that it could make much
+difference where, on a horizontal line, a little cross line should be
+erected; and yet nearly every one, on being tested, will agree that
+the middle is the best point. These are merely a couple of sample
+results from the numerous studies in this field.
+
+
+Social Perception
+
+By the senses we perceive the motives and intentions of other people,
+their sincerity, goodness, intelligence, and {445} many other traits.
+We see them angry or bored, amused, full of energy. To be sure, none
+of these human characteristics is directly and fully sensed, but that
+is the case also with many characteristics of inanimate objects which,
+nevertheless, we perceive by aid of the senses. We perceive anger or
+sincerity in much the same way that we perceive moisture or smoothness
+by the eye. To experience the anger of another person is a complex
+experience, but a single element from this experience may come to
+serve as the sign of the whole condition. A good share of the child's
+undirected education consists in learning to perceive the intentions
+and characteristics of other people by aid of little signs. He learns
+to read the signs of the weather in the family circle, and he learns
+in some measure to be a judge of men.
+
+I once saw an instructive little incident, in which an older boy
+suddenly grabbed the cap from a little boy's head, and held it out to
+the driver of a passing automobile, as if giving it to him. The man
+saw the joke, and drove on laughing, but the little boy took it
+seriously and was quite worried for fear the man would carry off his
+cap. An older child would have "seen into" the situation readily; he
+could not have been teased in that way. Many social situations which
+are "all Greek" to a little child are understood readily by an older
+person.
+
+It would be very valuable if psychology could succeed in analyzing out
+the signs by which such a trait as intelligence or "will power" is
+perceived, so as to reduce such perception to a science; but it is
+very doubtful if this can be done. Some persons who probably have
+themselves a keen perception of such traits have put forward systems,
+based upon the shape of the face, etc. They probably think they
+perceive human traits according to their systems, but the systems fail
+in other hands, and are undoubtedly {446} fallacious. No good judge of
+character really goes by the shape of the face; he goes by little
+behavior signs which he has not analyzed out, and therefore cannot
+explain to another person.
+
+You can tell very little regarding a person's intelligence from his
+photograph. This has now been pretty well established. Photographs of
+persons of various degrees of intelligence are placed before those who
+are reputed to be good judges, and their estimates compared with the
+test ratings, and there is no correspondence. You might just as well
+look at the back of the photograph as at the front.
+
+Even with the person before you, you are likely to commit great
+errors. This sort of incident has happened. A young woman is brought
+before the court for delinquency, and the psychologist who has tested
+her testifies that she is of low intelligence. But the young woman is
+good-looking and graceful in her speech and manners, and so impresses
+the judge that he dismisses as "absurd" the notion of her being
+feeble-minded. He sets her free, on which she promptly gets into
+trouble again. Apparently the only way to perceive intelligence is to
+see a person in action, preferably under standard conditions, where
+his performance can be measured; that is to say, in an intelligence
+test.
+
+
+Errors of Perception
+
+The grocer needs to be assured of the accuracy of his scales, and the
+chemist of the high accuracy of his chemical balance; the surveyor
+needs to know about the errors that may creep into the process of
+measuring the length of a line or angle. All of them, using
+instruments to assist in accurate perception of facts, are concerned
+about the accuracy of their instruments. Now, we all use the senses in
+perceiving facts, and "errors of sense" therefore concern us {447}
+all. Some of the errors committed in sense perception can be laid at
+the door of the senses, and some rather belong in the sphere of
+perception proper.
+
+If you come out of a cold room into a warm room, the latter seems
+warmer than it is; and if you come out of a dark room into a light
+room, the latter seems brighter than it is. These errors, due to
+adaptation of the temperature sense and of the retina, are properly
+classed as errors of sense.
+
+If you are taking a child's temperature with a "minute thermometer",
+it is best to use your watch to tell you when the minute is up, for
+the minute, when you are simply waiting for it to pass, seems very
+long. But if you are "working against time", a minute seems short. The
+professor is shocked when the closing bell rings, and thinks that
+certainly the hour cannot be up; but some of the students have been
+consulting their watches for quite a long while, being sure the hour
+must be nearly over. These are scarcely errors of sense, but they are
+errors of perception.
+
+Where we tend to err in one certain direction from the truth, as in
+the examples just cited, psychology speaks of a "constant error", and
+evidently the knowledge of such constant errors is of importance
+wherever the facts are of importance. In a court of law, a witness
+often has to testify regarding the length of time occupied by some
+event, and a knowledge of the constant errors in time perception would
+therefore be of considerable legal importance. They would need to be
+worked out in considerable detail, since they differ according to the
+desires and attitude of the witness at the time of the event.
+
+Besides constant errors, there are accidental or variable errors, due
+to slight momentary causes. Both constant and variable errors can be
+illustrated by a series of shots at a target. The variable error is
+illustrated by the scatter of {448} the hits, and the constant error
+by the excess of hits above the bull's-eye, or below, or to the right
+or left. The constant error can be corrected, once you know what it
+is; if results show that you tend to shoot too high, you can
+deliberately aim lower. But the variability of any performance cannot
+be eliminated except by long practice, and not altogether even then.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 66.--Constant error and scatter in hitting at a
+target. The little circle was the target, but the center of the actual
+distribution of the attempts lies at the cross, which was drawn in
+afterwards. The constant error could be stated by saying that the
+center of distribution was so far from the target, and in such and
+such a direction. The scattering of the attempts can be measured
+also.]
+
+
+Experimental psychology has taken great pains in measuring the
+accuracy of different sorts of perception. How small a difference in
+length can be perceived by the eye, how small a difference of weight
+by the hand--these are sample problems in this line.
+
+For example, to measure the fineness with which weights can be
+perceived when "hefted" in the hand, you take two objects that are
+alike in size and appearance but differing slightly in weight, and
+endeavor to decide which is the heavier just by lifting them. You try
+repeatedly and keep track of the number of errors, using this number
+as a measure of the accuracy of perception. Now, if one weight were
+twice as heavy as the other (one, for example, weighing 100 grams
+{449} and the other 200), you would never make an error except through
+carelessness; but if one were 100 and the other 120 grams, you would
+make an occasional error, and the number of errors would increase as
+the difference was decreased; finally, comparing 100 and 101 grams,
+you would get almost as many wrong as right, so that your perception
+of that small difference would be extremely unreliable.
+
+
+ ERRORS IN PERCEIVING SMALL DIFFERENCES
+ OF WEIGHT (From Warner Brown)
+
+ Difference 20 16 12 8 4 8 2 1 grams
+
+ Errors 1 2 5 18 28 81 89 44 per hundred trials
+
+ The weights were in the neighborhood of 100 grams; each weight was
+ compared with the 100-gram weight, and each such pair was lifted and
+ judged 1400 times. Notice that the per cent of errors gradually
+ increases as the difference becomes smaller.
+
+
+The smaller the difference between two stimuli, the more numerous the
+errors in perceiving it, or, the less perceptible it is, and there is
+no sharp line between a difference that can be perceived and one that
+is too small to be perceived. That is the first great result from the
+study of the perception of small differences.
+
+The second great result is called _Weber's law_, which can be stated
+as follows: In the same sort of perception, equal relative (not
+absolute) differences are equally perceptible. For example, from the
+preceding table we see that 28 per cent. of errors are made in
+comparing weights of 100 and 104 grams; then, according to Weber's
+law, 28 per cent, of errors would also be made in comparing 200 grams
+with 208, or 500 with 520, or 1000 with 1040 grams, or any pair of
+weights that stood to each other in the ratio of 100 to 104. Weber's
+law is only approximately true for the perception of weights, since
+actually fewer errors are committed in comparing 500 and 520 than in
+comparing 100 and 104 grams; but the discrepancy is not extremely
+great here, and in {450} some other kinds of perception, as especially
+in comparing the brightness of lights or the length of seen lines, the
+law holds good over a wide range of stimuli and only breaks down near
+the upper and lower extremes. We are familiar, in ordinary life, with
+the general truth of Weber's law, since we know that an inch would
+make a much more perceptible addition to the length of a man's nose
+than to his height, and we know that turning on a second light when
+only one is already lit gives a much more noticeable increase in the
+light than if we add one more light when twenty are already burning.
+
+A third great result of this line of study is that different sorts of
+perception are very unequal in their fineness and reliability.
+Perception of brightness is about the keenest, as under favorable
+conditions a difference of one part in one hundred can here be
+perceived with very few errors. Visual perception of length of line is
+good for about one part in fifty, perception of lifted weight for
+about one part in ten, perception of loudness of sound for about one
+part in three. But the perception of small differences in the pitch of
+musical tones is keener still, only that, not following Weber's law in
+the least, it cannot be expressed in the same way. A person with a
+good ear for pitch can distinguish with very few errors between two
+tones that differ by only one vibration per second, and can perceive
+this same absolute difference equally well, whether the total
+vibration rate is 200, 400, or 800 vibrations per second.
+
+
+Illusions
+
+An error of perception is often called an "illusion", though this term
+is commonly reserved for errors that are large and curious. When one
+who is being awakened by a bell perceives it as a tom-tom, that is an
+illusion. An {451} illusion consists in responding to a sensory
+stimulus by perceiving something that is not really there. The
+stimulus is there, but not the fact which it is taken to indicate.
+Illusion is false perception.
+
+The study of illusions is of value, not only as showing how far a
+given kind of perception can be trusted, but also as throwing light on
+the process of perception. When a process goes wrong, it sometimes
+reveals its inner mechanism more clearly than when everything is
+running smoothly. Errors of any kind are meat to the psychologist.
+
+Illusions may be classified under several headings according to the
+factors that are operative in causing the deception.
+
+1. Illusions due to peculiarities of the sense organs.
+
+Here the stimulus is distorted by the sense organ and so may easily be
+taken as the sign of an unreal fact.
+
+Separate the points of a pair of compasses by about three-quarters of
+an inch, and draw them across the mouth, one point above it and the
+other below; you will get the illusion of the points separating as
+they approach the middle of the mouth (where the sensory nerve supply
+is greatest), and coming together again as they are drawn to the cheek
+at the other side.
+
+Under this same general head belong also after-images and contrast
+colors, and also double vision whenever for any reason the two eyes
+are not accurately converged upon an object. The fact that a vertical
+line appears longer than an equal horizontal is supposed to depend
+upon some peculiarity of the retina. Aside from the use of this class
+of illusions in the detailed study of the different senses, the chief
+thing to learn from them is they so seldom are full-fledged illusions,
+because they are ignored or allowed for, and not taken as the signs of
+facts. An after-image would constitute a genuine illusion if it were
+taken for some real {452} thing out there; but as a matter of fact,
+though after-images occur very frequently--slight ones practically
+every time the eyes are turned--they are ignored to such an extent
+that the student of psychology, when he reads about them, often thinks
+them to be something unusual and lying outside of his own experience.
+The same is true of double images. This all goes to show how strong is
+the tendency to disregard mere sensation in the interest of getting
+objective facts.
+
+2. Illusions due to preoccupation or mental set.
+
+When an insane person hears the creaking of a rocking-chair as the
+voice of some one calling him bad names, it is because he is
+preoccupied with suspicion. We might almost call this an
+hallucination,[Footnote: See p. 375.] since he is projecting his own
+auditory images and taking them for real sensations; it is, at any
+rate, an extreme instance of illusion. In a milder form, similar
+illusions are often momentarily present in a perfectly normal person,
+as when he is searching for a lost object and thinks he sees it
+whenever anything remotely similar to the desired object meets his
+eyes; or as when the mother, with the baby upstairs very much on her
+mind, imagines she hears him crying when the cat yowls or the
+next-door neighbors start their phonograph. The ghost-seeing and
+burglar-hearing illusions belong here as well. The mental set
+facilitates responses that are congruous with itself.
+
+3. Illusions of the response-by-analogy type.
+
+This is probably the commonest source of everyday illusions, and the
+same principle, as we have seen, is operative in a host of correct
+perceptions. Perceiving the obliquely presented rectangle as a
+rectangle is an example of correct perception of this type. Perceiving
+the buzzing of a fly as an aeroplane is the same sort of response only
+that it happens to be incorrect. If the present stimulus has something
+in {453} common with the stimulus which has in the past aroused a
+certain perception, we may make the same response now as we did
+before--especially, of course, if the present mantel set favors this
+response.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 67.--The Ladd-Franklin illusion of monocular
+perspective. Close one eye, and hold the book so that the other eye is
+at the common center from which the lines radiate; this center is
+about 5 inches from the figure. Hold the book horizontally, and just a
+little below the eye.]
+
+
+A good instance of this type is the "proofreader's illusion", so
+called, perhaps, because the professional proofreader is less subjcet
+to it than any one else. The one most subject to it is the author of a
+book, for whom it is almost impossible to find every misspelled word
+and other typographical error in reading the proof. Almost every book
+comes out with a few such errors, in spite of having been scanned
+repeatedly by several people. A couple of misprints have purposely
+been left in the last few lines for the reader's benefit. If the word
+as printed has enough resemblance to the right word, it arouses the
+same percept and enables the reader to get the sense and pass on
+satisfied. {454} Before we began to pore over books and pictures, the
+lines that we saw usually were the outlines of solid objects, and now
+it requires only a bare diagram of lines to arouse in us the
+perception of a solid object seen in perspective. An outline drawing,
+like those of the cube and staircase used to illustrate ambiguous
+perspective, is more readily seen as a solid object than as a flat
+figure.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 68.--Aristotle's illusion.]
+
+
+Another illusion of this general type dates away back to Aristotle.
+Cross two fingers, perhaps best the second and third, and touch a
+marble with the crossed part of both fingers, and it seems to be two
+marbles; or, you can use the side of your pencil as the stimulus. In
+the customary position of the fingers, the stimuli thus received would
+mean two objects.
+
+A much more modern illusion of the same general type is afforded by
+the moving pictures. The pictures do not actually show an object in
+motion; they simply show the object in a series of motionless
+positions, caught by instantaneous photography. The projector shows
+the series of snap-shots in rapid succession, and conceals them by a
+shutter while they are shifted, so as to avoid the blur that would
+occur if the picture were itself moved before the eyes. But the series
+of snap-shots has so much in common with the visual stimulus got from
+an actually present moving object that we make the same perceptive
+response. {455} The same illusion in a rudimentary form can be
+produced by holding the forefinger upright three or four inches in
+front of the nose, and looking at it while winking first the one eye
+and then the other. Looked at with the right eye alone it appears to
+be more to one side and looked at with the left eye alone it appears
+to be more to the other side; and when the one eye is closed and the
+other simultaneously opened, the finger seems actually to move from
+one position to the other.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 69.--The pan illusion. The two pan-shaped outlines
+are practically identical, but it is hard to compare the corresponding
+sides--hard to isolate from the total figure just the elements that
+you need to compare.]
+
+
+4. Illusions due to imperfect isolation of the fact to be perceived.
+
+Here belong, probably, most of the illusions produced in the
+psychological laboratory by odd combinations of lines, etc. A figure
+is so drawn as to make it difficult to isolate the fact to be
+observed, and when the observer attempts to perceive it, he falls into
+error. He thinks he is perceiving one fact, when he is perceiving
+another. The best example is the Mueller-Lyer figure, in which two
+equal lines are embellished with extra lines at their ends; you are
+supposed to perceive the lengths of the two main lines, but you are
+very apt to take the whole figure in the rough and perceive the
+distances between its chief parts. You do not succeed in isolating the
+precise fact you wish to observe.
+
+{456}
+
+The Mueller-Lyer Illusion
+
+The most familiar form of this striking illusion is made with arrow
+heads, thus
+
+
+[Illustration: Inward and outward arrowheads on two equal length lines.]
+
+
+In attempting to compare the two horizontal lines one is confused so
+as to regard the line with outward-extending obliques longer than that
+with inward-extending obliques, though, measured from point to point,
+they are equal. The same illusion occurs in a variety of similar
+figures, such as
+
+
+[Illustration: Inward and outward arrowheads.]
+
+
+where the main lines are not drawn, but the distances from point to
+point are to be compared; or such as
+
+
+[Illustration: Inward and outward solid arrowheads.]
+
+
+where the two distances between points are again to be compared.
+Angles, however, are not necessary to give the illusion, as can be
+seen in this figure
+
+
+[Illustration: Half circles with similar spacing.]
+
+
+or in this
+
+
+[Illustration: Full circles with similar spacing.]
+
+
+In the last the lengths to be compared extend (_a_) from the
+right-hand rim of circle 1 to the left-hand rim of circle 2, and (_b_)
+from this last to the right-hand rim of circle 3. The same illusion
+can be got with squares, or even with capital letters as
+
+[Illustration: Upper case E with similar spacing and the center letter
+reversed.]
+
+
+or
+
+
+[Illustration: Upper case R with similar spacing and the center letter
+reversed.]
+
+
+or
+
+
+[Illustration: Upper case L E D with similar spacing and the center
+letter reversed.]
+
+
+where the distances between the main vertical lines are to be
+compared.
+
+Here is an another form of the same illusion
+
+
+[Illustration: Two sets of three parallel horizontal lines. In the first
+set the center line is longest. In the second set the center line is
+shortest, but the same length as the first center line.]
+
+
+the middle lines being affected by those above and below.
+
+{457}
+
+Though these illusions seem like curiosities, and far from every-day
+experience, they really do enter in some degree into almost every
+figure that is not perfectly square and simple.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 70.--The Poggendorf illusion. Are the two obliques
+parts of the same straight line?]
+
+
+Any oblique line, any complication of any sort, is pretty sure to
+alter the apparent proportions and directions of the figure. A broad
+effect, a long effect, a skewed effect, may easily be produced by
+extra lines suitably introduced into a dress, into the front of a
+building, or into a design of any sort; so that the designer needs to
+have a practical knowledge of this type of illusion.
+
+Extra lines have an influence also upon esthetic perception. The
+esthetic effect of a given form may be quite altered by the
+introduction of apparently insignificant extra lines.
+
+{458}
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 71.--The barber-pole illusion. The rectangle
+represents a round column, around which runs a spiral, starting at
+_a_. Which of the lines, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, comes closest to being a
+continuation of _a?_]
+
+
+Esthetic perception is very much subject to the law of combination,
+and to the resulting difficulty of isolation.
+
+One of the most interesting illusions, not being visual, can {459}
+only be described and not demonstrated here.
+
+
+ [Illustration: Fig. 72.--By aid of this simple figure, the
+ Poggendorf and barber-pole illusions can be seen to be instances of
+ the Mueller-Lyer illusion, Try to bisect the horizontal line in this
+ figure. The oblique line at the right tends to displace the
+ right-hand end of the horizontal to the right, while the oblique at
+ the left tends to displace the left-hand end of the horizontal also
+ to the right. Similar displacements account for the Poggendorf and
+ barber-pole illusions.]
+
+
+ [Illustration: Fig. 73.--The Zoellner illusion. The long lines are
+ really parallel. The illusion is increased by holding the figure so
+ that these main lines shall be neither vertical nor horizontal. It
+ is more difficult to "deceive the eye" in regard to the direction of
+ vertical and horizontal lines, than in regard to the direction of
+ oblique lines. This illusion must be related in some way to the
+ Mueller-Lyer and Poggendorf illusions, since the elements employed in
+ constructing the three figures are so much the same.
+
+ If you treat this figure according to the directions given for Fig.
+ 67, and sight along the obliques, you get an illusion of
+ perspective.]
+
+
+It is called the "size-weight illusion", and may be said to be based
+on the old catch, "Which is heavier, a pound of lead or a pound of
+feathers?" Of course, we shrewdly answer, a pound's {460} a pound. But
+lift them and notice how they feel! The pound of lead feels very much
+heavier. To reduce this illusion to a laboratory experiment, you take
+two round wooden pill-boxes, one several times as large as the other,
+and load them so that they both weigh the same; then ask some one to
+lift them and tell which is the heavier. He will have no doubt at all
+that the smaller box is the heavier; it may seem two or three times as
+heavy. Young children, however, get the opposite illusion,
+assimilating the weight to the visual appearance; but older persons
+switch over to the contrast effect, and perceive in opposition to the
+visual appearance. What seems to happen in the older person is a motor
+adjustment for the apparent weights, as indicated by their visual
+appearance, with the result that the weight of larger size is lifted
+more strongly than the weight of smaller size; so that the big one
+comes up easily and seems light, the little one slowly and seems
+heavy.
+
+
+{461}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Show that the law of combination accounts both for many
+ correct perceptions, and for many illusions.
+
+3. Through which of the senses are spatial facts best perceived?
+
+4. "At first, the baby very likely perceives a ball simply as something
+ for him to handle and throw; but, through the medium of blocked
+ response, he comes to perceive it more objectively, i.e., as an
+ object related to other objects, and not simply related to
+ himself." Explain and illustrate this statement.
+
+5. Give an example from the field of auditory perceptions where
+ "isolation" is very much in evidence.
+
+6. Can you see any law analogous to Weber's law in the field of
+ financial profit and loss? Does a dollar gained or lost _seem_ the
+ same amount, without regard to the total amount possessed?
+
+7. Trial and error perception. Go about the room with closed eyes,
+ and identify objects by touching them with the hands. Notice
+ whether your first impression gives place to corrected impressions.
+
+8. Perception of form by "active" and "passive" touch. With
+ the eyes closed, try to distinguish objects of different shapes (a)
+ by letting them simply rest upon the skin, and (b) by handling
+ them. What senses cooeperate in furnishing data for "active touch"?
+
+9. Binocular parallax, or the differing views of the same solid object
+ obtained by the two eyes. Hold a small, three-dimensional object a
+ foot in front of the face, and notice carefully the view of it
+ obtained by each eye separately. A pencil, pointing towards the
+ face, gives very different views. What becomes of the two monocular
+ views when both eyes are open at once?
+
+10. Binocular compared with monocular perception of "depth"
+ or distance away. Take a pencil in each hand, and bring the points
+ together a foot in front of the face, while only one eye is open.
+ When the points seem to be nearly touching, open the other eye,
+ and see whether the two points still seem to be close together.
+ Repeat.
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Discussions of perception that are in some respects fuller than the
+present chapter can be found in C. H. Judd's _Psychology, General
+Introduction_, 2nd edition, 1917, pp. 162-194; in Titchener's
+_Textbook of Psychology_, 1909, pp. 303-373; and in Warren's _Human
+Psychology_, 1919, pp. 232-269.
+
+
+{462}
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII
+
+REASONING
+
+THE PROCESS OF MENTAL, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM MOTOR EXPLORATION
+
+We are still on the general topic of "discovery". Indeed, we are still
+on the topic of perception; we come now to that form of perception
+which is different from sense perception. The reasoner is an explorer,
+and the culmination of his explorations is the perception of some fact
+previously unknown to him.
+
+Reasoning might be described as mental exploration, and distinguished
+from purely motor exploration of the trial and error variety. Suppose
+you need the hammer, and go to the place where it is kept, only to
+find it gone. Now if you simply proceed to look here and there,
+ransacking the house without any plan, that would be motor
+exploration. But if, finding this trial and error procedure to be
+laborious and almost hopeless, you sit down and think, "Where can that
+hammer be? Probably where I used it last!" you may recall using it
+for a certain purpose, in a certain place, go there and find it. You
+have substituted mental exploration of the situation for purely motor
+exploration, and saved time and effort. Such instances show the use of
+reasoning, and the part it plays in behavior.
+
+The _process_ of reasoning is also illustrated very well in these
+simple cases. It is an exploratory process, a searching for facts. In
+a way, it is a trial and error process. If you don't ransack the
+house, at least you ransack your memory, in search for facts that will
+assist you. You recall this fact {463} and that, you turn this way and
+that, mentally, till some fact is recalled that serves your need. No
+more in reasoning than in motor exploration can you hope to go
+straight to the desired goal.
+
+
+Animal and Human Exploration
+
+Is man the only reasoning animal? The experimental work on animal
+learning, reviewed in one of our earlier chapters, was begun with this
+question in mind. Previous evidence on this point had been limited to
+anecdotes, such as that of the dog that was found opening a gate by
+lifting the latch with his nose, and was supposed to have seen men
+open the gate in this way, and to have _reasoned_ that if a man could
+do that, why not a dog? The objection to this sort of evidence is that
+the dog's manner of acquiring the trick was not observed. Perhaps he
+reasoned it out, and perhaps he got it by accident--you cannot tell
+without watching the process of learning. You must experiment, by
+taking a dog that does not know the trick, and perhaps first "showing
+him" how to open the gate by lifting the latch; but it was found that
+dogs and cats, and even monkeys, could not learn the trick in this
+way. If, however, you placed a dog in a cage, the door of which could
+be opened by lifting a latch, and motivated the dog strongly by having
+him hungry and placing food just outside, then the dog went to work by
+trial and error, and lifted the latch in the course of his varied
+reactions; and if he were placed back in the cage time after time, his
+unsuccessful reactions were gradually eliminated and the successful
+reaction was firmly attached to the situation of being in that cage,
+so that he would finally lift the latch without any hesitation.
+
+The behavior of the animal does not look like reasoning. For one
+thing, it is too impulsive and motor. The typical {464} attitudes of
+the reasoner, whether "lost in thought" or "studying over things", do
+not appear in the dog, or even in the monkey, though traces of them
+may perhaps be seen in the chimpanzee and other manlike apes. Further,
+the animal's learning curve fails to show sudden improvements such as
+in human learning curves follow "seeing into" the problem. In short,
+there is nothing to indicate that the animal recalls facts previously
+observed or sees their bearing on the problem in hand. He works by
+motor exploration, instead of mental. He does not search for
+"considerations" that may furnish a clue.
+
+The behavior of human beings, placed figuratively in a cage, sometimes
+differs very little from that of an animal. Certainly it shows plenty
+of trial and error and random motor exploration; and often the puzzle
+is so blind that nothing but motor exploration will bring the
+solution. What the human behavior does show that is mostly absent from
+the animal is (1) attentive studying over the problem, scrutinizing it
+on various sides, in the effort to find a clue; (2) thinking,
+typically with closed eyes or abstracted gaze, in the effort to recall
+something that may bear on the problem; and (3) sudden "insights" when
+the present problem is seen in the light of past experience.
+
+Though reason differs from animal trial and error in these respects,
+it still is a tentative, try-and-try-again process. The right clue is
+not necessarily hit upon at the first try; usually the reasoner finds
+one clue after another, and follows each one up by recall, only to get
+nowhere, till finally he notices a sign that recalls a pertinent
+meaning. His exploration of the situation, though carried on by aid of
+recalled experience instead of by locomotion, still resembles finding
+the way out of a maze with many blind alleys. In short, reasoning may
+be called a trial and error process in the sphere of mental reactions.
+
+{465}
+
+The reader familiar with geometry, which is distinctly a reasoning
+science, can readily verify this description. It is true that the
+demonstrations are set down in the book in a thoroughly orderly
+manner, proceeding straight from the given assumption to the final
+conclusion; but such a demonstration is only a dried specimen and does
+not by any means picture the living mental process of reasoning out a
+proposition. Solving an "original" is far from a straight-forward
+process. You begin with a situation (what is "given") involving a
+problem (what is to be proved), and, studying over this lay-out you
+notice a certain fact which looks like a clue; this recalls some
+previous proposition which gives the significance of the clue, but
+often turns out to have no bearing on the problem, so that you shift
+to another clue; and so on, by what is certainly a trial and error
+process, till some fact noted in the situation plus some knowledge
+recalled by this fact, taken together, reveal the truth of the
+proposition.
+
+
+Reasoning Culminates in Inference
+
+When you have described reasoning as a process of mental exploration,
+you have told only half the story. The successful reasoner not only
+seeks, but finds. He not only ransacks his memory for data bearing on
+his problem, but he finally "sees" the solution clearly. The whole
+exploratory process culminates in a perceptive reaction. What he
+"sees" is not presented to his senses at the moment, but he "sees that
+something _must_ be so". This kind of perception may be called
+_inference_.
+
+To bring out distinctly the perceptive reaction in reasoning, let us
+cite a few very simple cases. Two freshmen in college, getting
+acquainted, ask about each other's fathers and find that both are
+alumni of this same college. "What class was your father in?" "In the
+class of 1900. And {466} yours?" "Why, he was in 1900, too. Our
+fathers were in the same class; they must know each other!" Here two
+facts, one contributed by one person and the other by another person,
+enable both to perceive a third fact which neither of them knew
+before. Inference, typically, is a response to two facts, and the
+response consists in perceiving a third fact that is bound up in the
+other two.
+
+You do not infer what you can perceive directly by the senses. If Mary
+and Kate are standing side by side, you can _see_ which is the taller.
+But if they are not side by side, but Mary's height is given as so
+much and Kate's as an inch more, then from these two facts you know,
+by inference, that Kate is taller than Mary.
+
+"Have we set the table for the right number of people?" "Well, we can
+see when the party comes to the table." "Oh! but we can tell now by
+counting. How many are there to be seated? One, two, three--fifteen in
+all. Now count the places at table--only fourteen. You will have to
+make room for one more." This reducing of the problem to numbers and
+then seeing how the numbers compare is one very simple and useful kind
+of inference.
+
+Indirect comparison may be accomplished by other similar devices. I
+can reach around this tree trunk, but not around that, and thus I
+perceive that the second tree is thicker than the first, even though
+it may not look so. If two things are each found to be equal to a
+third thing, then I see they must be equal to each other; if one is
+larger than my yardstick and the other smaller, then I see they must
+be unequal.
+
+Of the two facts which, taken together, yield an inferred fact, one is
+often a general rule or principle, and the inference then consists in
+seeing how the general rule applies to a special case. A dealer offers
+you a fine-looking diamond ring for five dollars, but you recall the
+rule that "all genuine diamonds are expensive", and perceive that this
+{467} diamond must be an imitation. This also is an instance of
+indirect comparison, the yardstick being the sum of five dollars; this
+ring measures five dollars, but any genuine diamond measures more than
+five dollars, and therefore a discrepancy is visible between this
+diamond and a genuine diamond. You can't see the discrepancy by the
+eye, but you see it by way of indirect comparison, just as you
+discover the difference between the heights of Mary and Kate by aid of
+the yardstick.
+
+If all French writers are clear, then Binet, a French writer, must be
+clear. Here "French writers" furnish your yardstick. Perhaps it would
+suit this case a little better if, instead of speaking of indirect
+comparison by aid of a mental yardstick, we spoke in terms of
+"relations". When you have before your mind the relation of A to M,
+and also the relation of B to M, you may be able to see, or infer, a
+relation between A and B. M is the common point of reference to which
+A and B are related. Binet stands in a certain relation to "French
+writers", who furnish the point of reference; that is, he is one of
+them. Clear writing stands in a certain relation to French writers,
+being one of their qualities; from which combination of relations we
+perceive clear writing as a quality of Binet.
+
+Just as an illusion is a false sense perception, so a false inference
+is called a "fallacy". One great cause of fallacies consists in the
+confused way in which facts are sometimes presented, resulting in
+failure to see the relationships clearly. If you read that
+
+ "Smith is taller than Brown; and
+ Jones is shorter than Smith; and therefore
+ Jones is shorter than Brown,"
+
+the mix-up of "taller" and "shorter" makes it difficult to get the
+relationships clearly before you, and you are likely {468} to make a
+mistake. Or again, if Mary and Jane both resemble Winifred, can you
+infer that they resemble each other? You are likely to think so at
+first, till you notice that resemblance is not a precise enough
+relation to serve for purposes of indirect comparison. Mary may
+resemble Winifred in one respect, and Jane may resemble her in another
+respect, and there may be no resemblance between Mary and Jane.
+
+Or, again,
+
+ "All French writers are clear; but
+ James was not a French writer; and therefore
+ James was not a clear writer,"
+
+may cause some confusion from failure to notice that the relation
+between French writers and clear writing is not reversible so that we
+could turn about and assert that all clear writers were French.
+
+The reasoner needs a clear head and a steady mental eye; he needs to
+look squarely and steadily at his two given statements in order to
+perceive their exact relationship. Diagrams and symbols often assist
+in keeping the essential facts clear of extraneous matter, and so
+facilitate the right response.
+
+To sum up: the process of reasoning culminates in two facts being
+present as stimuli, and the response, called "inference", consists in
+perceiving a third fact that is implicated in the two stimulus-facts.
+It is a good case of the law of combination, and at the same time it
+is a case where "isolation" is needed, otherwise the response will be
+partly aroused by irrelevant stimuli, and thus be liable to error.
+
+
+Varieties of Reasoning
+
+Reasoning as a whole is a process of mental exploration culminating in
+inference. Now, without regard to possible {469} variations of the
+perceptive response of inference, there are at least different
+varieties of the exploratory process leading up to inference. The
+situation that arouses reasoning differs from one case to another, the
+motive for engaging in this rather laborious mental process differs,
+and the order of events in the process differs. There are several main
+types of reasoning, considered as a process of mental exploration.
+
+
+1. Reasoning out the solution of a practical problem.
+
+A "problem" is a situation for which we have no ready and successful
+response. We cannot successfully respond by instinct or by previously
+acquired habit. We must _find out_ what to do. We explore the
+situation, partly by the senses and actual movement, partly by the use
+of our wits. We observe facts in the situation that recall previous
+experiences or previously learned rules and principles, and apply
+these to the present case. Many of these clues we reject at once as of
+no use; others we may try out and find useless; some we may think
+through and thus find useless; but finally, if our exploration is
+successful, we observe a real clue, recall a pertinent guiding
+principle, and see the way out of our problem.
+
+Two boys went into the woods for a day's outing. They climbed about
+all the morning, and ate their lunch in a little clearing by the side
+of a brook. Then they started for home, striking straight through the
+woods, as they thought, in the direction of home. After quite a long
+tramp, when they thought they should be about out of the woods, they
+saw clear space ahead, and, pushing forward eagerly, found themselves
+in the same little clearing where they had eaten their lunch!
+Reasoning process No. 1 now occurred: one of the boys _recalled_ that
+when traversing the woods without any compass or landmark, the
+traveller is very likely to go in a circle; inference, "That is what
+we have done and {470} we probably shall do the same thing again if we
+go ahead. We may as well sit down and think it over."
+
+Mental exploration ensued. "How about following the brook?" "That
+won't do, for it flows down into a big swamp that we couldn't get
+through". "How about telling directions by the sun?" "But it has so
+clouded over that you can't tell east from west, or north from south."
+"Yes, those old clouds! How fast they are going! They seem to go
+straight enough." "Well, say! How about following the clouds? If we
+keep on going straight, in any direction, for a couple of hours, we
+shall surely get out of the woods somewhere." This seems worth trying
+and actually brings the boys out to a road where they can inquire the
+way home.
+
+What we find in this case is typical of problem solution. First, a
+desire is aroused, and it facilitates the observation and recall of
+facts relevant to itself. One pertinent fact is observed, another
+pertinent fact, or rule, is recalled; and in these two taken together
+the key to the problem is found.
+
+
+2. Rationalization or self-justification.
+
+While in the preceding case reasoning showed what to do, here it is
+called upon to justify what has been done, or what is going to be done
+anyway. The question is, what reason to assign for the act; we feel
+the need of meeting criticism, either from other people or from
+ourselves. The real motive for the act may be unknown to ourselves, as
+it often is unless we have made a careful study of motives; or, if
+known, it may not be such as we care to confess. We require a
+_reasonable_ motive, some acceptable general principle that explains
+our action.
+
+A child is unaccountably polite and helpful to his mother some day,
+and when asked about it replies that he simply wants to help--while
+his real motive may have been to score against his brother or sister,
+who is to some extent his rival.
+
+{471}
+
+If I have work requiring attention but want to go to the game, I
+should certainly be lacking in reasoning ability if I could not find
+something in the situation that made my attendance at the game
+imperative. I am stale, and the game will freshen me up and make me
+work better afterward. Or, I am in serious danger of degenerating into
+a mere "grind", and must fight against this evil tendency. Or, my
+presence at the game is necessary in order to encourage the team.
+
+Thus, aspects of the situation that are in line with our desire bob to
+the surface and suggest acceptable general principles that make the
+intended action seem good and even necessary. Finding excuses for acts
+already performed is a reasoning exercise of the same sort. Man is a
+rationalizing animal as well as a rational animal, and his
+self-justifications and excuses, ludicrous though they often are, are
+still a tribute to his very laudable appreciation of rationality.
+
+
+3. Explanation.
+
+This form of reasoning, like the preceding, takes its start with
+something that raises the question, "Why?" Only, our interest in the
+question is objective rather than subjective. It is not our own
+actions that call for explanation, but some fact of nature or of human
+behavior. Why--with apologies to the Southern Hemisphere!--is it so
+cold in January? The fact arouses our curiosity. We search the
+situation for clues, and recall past information, just as in the
+attempt to solve a practical problem. "Is it because there is so much
+snow in January?" "But what, then, makes it snow? This clue leads us
+in a circle." "Perhaps, then, it is because the sun shines so little
+of the time, and never gets high in the sky, even at noon." That is a
+pretty good clue; it recalls the general principle that, without a
+continued supply of heat, cold is inevitable. To explain a phenomenon
+is to deduce it from {472} an accepted general principle; to
+understand it is to see it as an instance of the general principle.
+Such understanding is very satisfactory, since it rids you of
+uncertainty and sometimes from fear, and gives you a sense of power
+and mastery.
+
+
+4. Application.
+
+The reasoning processes discussed up to this point have taken their
+start with the particular, and have been concerned in a search for the
+general principle that holds good of the given particular case.
+Reasoning may also take its start at the other end, in a general
+statement, and seek for particular cases belonging under this general
+rule. But what can be the motive for this sort of reasoning? What is
+there about a general proposition to stimulate exploration?
+
+Several motives may be in play. First, there may be a need for
+application of the general principle. Somebody whose authority you
+fully accept enunciates a general proposition, and you wish to apply
+it to special cases, either for seeing what practical use you can make
+of it, or simply to make its meaning more real and concrete to
+yourself. Your exploration here takes a different form from that thus
+far described. Instead of searching a concrete situation for clues,
+and your memory for general principles, you search your memory for
+particular cases where the general law should apply. If all animals
+are cold-blooded, excepting only birds and mammals, then fish and
+frogs and lizards are cold-blooded, spiders, insects, lobsters and
+worms; having drawn these inferences, your understanding of the
+general proposition becomes more complete.
+
+
+5. Doubt.
+
+A general proposition may stimulate reasoning because you doubt it,
+and wish to find cases where it breaks down. Perhaps somebody makes
+the general statement whose authority you do not accept; perhaps he
+says it in an assertive way that makes you want to take him down {473}
+a peg. Perhaps you are in the heat of an argument with him, so that
+every assertion he may make is a challenge. You search your memory for
+instances belonging under the doubted general statement, in the hope
+of finding one where the general statement leads to a result that is
+contrary to fact. "You say that all politicians are grafters. Theodore
+Roosevelt was a politician, therefore, according to you, he must have
+been a grafter. But he was not a grafter, and you will have to take
+back that sweeping assertion."
+
+
+6. Verification.
+
+This same general type of reasoning, which takes its start with a
+general proposition, and explores particular instances in order to see
+whether the proposition, when applied to them, gives a result in
+accordance with the facts, has much more serious uses; for this is the
+method by which a _hypothesis_ is tested in science. A hypothesis is a
+general proposition put forward as a guess, subject to verification.
+If it is thoroughly verified, it will be accepted as a true statement,
+a "law of nature", but at the outset it is only a guess that may turn
+out to be either true or false. How shall its truth or falsity be
+demonstrated? By deducing its consequences, and testing these out in
+the realm of observed fact.
+
+An example from the history of science is afforded by Harvey's
+discovery of the circulation of the blood, which was at first only a
+hypothesis, and a much-doubted one at that. If the blood is driven by
+the heart through the arteries, and returns to the heart by way of the
+veins, then the flow of blood in any particular artery must be away
+from the heart, and in any particular vein towards the heart. This
+deduction was readily verified. Further, there should be little tubes
+leading from the smallest arteries over into the smallest veins, and
+this discovery also was later verified, when the invention of the
+microscope made observation of the capillaries possible. Other
+deductions also were verified, {474} and in short all deductions from
+the hypothesis were verified, and the circulation of the blood became
+an accepted law.
+
+Most hypotheses are not so fortunate as this one; most of them die by
+the wayside, since it is much easier to make a guess that shall fit
+the few facts we already know than to make one that will apply
+perfectly to many other facts at present unknown. A hypothesis is a
+great stimulus to the discovery of fresh facts. Science does not like
+to have unverified hypotheses lying around loose, where they may trip
+up the unwary. It is incumbent on any one who puts forward a
+hypothesis to apply it to as many special cases as possible, in order
+to see whether it works or not; and if the propounder of the
+hypothesis is so much in love with it that he fails to give it a
+thorough test, his scientific colleagues are sure to come to the
+rescue, for they, on the whole, would be rather pleased to see the
+other fellow's hypothesis come to grief. In this way, the rivalry
+motive plays a useful part in the progress and stabilizing of science.
+
+
+Deductive and Inductive Reasoning
+
+When you are sure at the outset of your general proposition, and need
+only to see its application to special cases, your reasoning is said
+to be "deductive". Such reasoning is specially used in mathematics.
+But in natural science you are said to employ "inductive reasoning".
+The process has already been described. You start with particular
+facts demanding explanation or generalization, and try to find some
+accepted law that explains them. Failing in that, you are driven to
+guess at a general law, i.e., to formulate a hypothesis that will fit
+the known facts. Then, having found such a conjectural general law,
+you proceed to deduce its consequences; you see that, _if_ the
+hypothesis is true, such and such facts must be true. Next you go out
+and see whether these facts are true, and if they are, your hypothesis
+{475} is verified to that extent, though it may be upset later. If the
+deduced facts are not true, the hypothesis is false, and you have to
+begin all over again.
+
+The would-be natural scientist may fail at any one of several points.
+First, he may see no question that calls for investigation. Everything
+seems a matter-of-course, and he concludes that science is complete,
+with nothing left for him to discover. Second, seeing something that
+still requires explanation, he may lack fertility in guessing, or may
+be a poor guesser and set off on a wild-goose chase. Helmholtz, an
+extremely fertile inventor of high-grade hypotheses, describes how he
+went about it. He would load up in the morning with all the knowledge
+he could assemble on the given question, and go out in the afternoon
+for a leisurely ramble; when, without any strenuous effort on his
+part, the various facts would get together in new combinations and
+suggest explanations that neither he nor any one else had ever thought
+of before. Third, our would-be scientific investigator may lack the
+clear, steady vision to see the consequences of his hypothesis; and,
+fourth, he may lack the enterprise to go out and look for the facts
+that his hypothesis tells him should be found.
+
+
+Psychology and Logic
+
+Psychology is not the only science that studies reasoning; that is the
+subject-matter of logic as well, and logic was in the field long
+before psychology. Psychology studies the _process_ of reasoning,
+while logic checks up the result and shows whether it is valid or not.
+Logic cares nothing about the exploratory process that culminates in
+inference, but limits itself to inference alone.
+
+Inference, in logical terminology, consists in drawing a conclusion
+from two given premises. The two premises are the "two facts" which,
+acting together, arouse the {476} perceptive response called
+inference, and the "third fact" thus perceived is the conclusion.
+[Footnote: The "two facts" or premises need not be true; either or
+both may be assumed or hypothetical, and still they may lead to a
+valid conclusion, i.e., a conclusion implicated in the assumed
+premises.] Logic cares nothing as to how the premises were found, nor
+as to the motive that led to the search for them, nor as to the time
+and effort required, nor the difficulty encountered; these matters all
+pertain to psychology.
+
+Logic sets forth the premises and conclusion in the form of the
+"syllogism", as in the old stand-by:
+
+ Major premise: All men are mortal
+ Minor premise: Socrates is a man
+ Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal
+
+The syllogism includes three "terms", which in the above instance are
+"Socrates", "mortal", and "man" or "men". Logic employs the letters,
+S, P, and M to symbolize these three terms in general. S is the
+"subject" (or, we might say, the "object" or the "situation") about
+which something is inferred. P is the "predicate", or what is inferred
+about S; and M is the "middle term" which corresponds to our
+"yardstick" or "point of reference", as we used those words at the
+beginning of the chapter. S is compared with P through the medium of
+M; or, S and P are both known to be related to M, and therefore (when
+the relations are of the right sort) they are related to each other.
+It is part of the business of logic to examine what relations are, and
+what are not, suitable for yielding a valid inference.
+
+In symbols, then, the syllogism becomes:
+
+ Major premise: M is P
+ Minor premise: S is M
+ Conclusion: Therefore, S is P
+
+{477}
+
+Without confounding logic and psychology in the least, we may take
+this symbolic syllogism as a sort of map, on which to trace out the
+different exploratory processes that we have already described under
+the head of "varieties of reasoning". To do so may make these
+different processes stand out more distinctly.
+
+In problem-solution, we start with S, a situation unsolved, i.e.,
+without any P. P, when found, will be the solution. We explore the
+situation, and find in it M; i.e., we observe that S is M. Now M
+recalls our previously acquired knowledge that M is P. Having then
+before us the two premises, we perceive that S is P, and are saved.
+
+In rationalization or explanation, we know, to start with, that S is
+P, and wish to know _why_ this is so. As before, we explore S, find M,
+recall that M is P, and see that S, therefore, is P. Our final
+conclusion is, really, that S is P because it is M; that January is
+cold because it gets little sunlight.
+
+In application, doubt or verification, we start with the major
+premise, M is P, and explore our memories for an S which, being M,
+should therefore be P according to our hypothesis. If we find an S
+which is _not_ P, then our final conclusion is that the major premise
+is false.
+
+Reference to our "map" indicates that there might be several other
+varieties of reasoning, and there are, indeed, though they are
+scarcely as important as those already mentioned. Reasoning sometimes
+starts with the observation of P, which means something that might
+prove useful on some future occasion. Your attention is caught by
+these prominent words in an advertisement, "$100 a week!" That might
+come in handy on some future occasion, and you look further to see how
+all that money can be attached to S, yourself on some future occasion.
+You soon learn that you have only to secure subscriptions for a
+certain magazine, {478} and that income may be yours. P is the money,
+and M is the occupation that gives the money, while S is yourself
+supposedly entering on this occupation and earning the money. This
+type of reasoning is really quite common. If we see a person making a
+great success of anything, we try to discover how he does it,
+reasoning that if we do the same, we shall also be successful; or, if
+we see some one come to grief, we try to see how it happened, so as to
+avoid his mistake and so the bad consequences of that mistake. We plan
+to perform M so as to secure P, or to avoid M in the hope of avoiding
+P.
+
+Sometimes, not so rarely, we have both premises handed out to us and
+have only to draw the conclusion. More often, we hear a person drawing
+a conclusion from only one expressed premise, and try to make out what
+the missing premise can be. Sometimes this is easy, as when one says,
+"I like him because he is always cheerful", from which you see that
+the person speaking must like cheerful persons. But if you hear it
+said that such a one "cannot be a real thinker, he is so positive in
+his opinions" or that another "is unfeeling and unsympathetic from
+lack of a touch of cruelty in his nature", you may have to explore
+about considerably before finding acceptable major premises from which
+such conclusions can be deduced.
+
+Finally, in asking what are the _qualifications of a good reasoner_ we
+can help ourselves once more by reference to the syllogistic map. To
+reason successfully on a given topic, you need good major premises,
+good minor premises, and valid conclusions therefrom.
+
+(a) A good stock of major premises is necessary, a good stock of rules
+and principles acquired in previous experience. Without some knowledge
+of a subject, you have only vague generalities to draw upon, and your
+reasoning process will be slow and probably lead only to indefinite
+conclusions. {479} Experience, knowledge, memory are important in
+reasoning, though they do not by any means guarantee success.
+
+(b) The "detective instinct" for finding the right clues, and
+rejecting false leads, amounts to the same as sagacity in picking out
+the useful minor premises. In problem solution, you have to find both
+of your premises, and often the minor premise is the first to be found
+and in turn recalls the appropriate major premise. Finding the minor
+premise is a matter of observation, and if you fail to observe the
+significant fact about the problem, the really useful major premise
+may lie dormant, known and retained but not recalled, while false
+clues suggest inapplicable major premises and give birth to plenty of
+reasoning but all to no purpose. Some persons with abundant knowledge
+are ineffective reasoners from lack of a sense for probability. The
+efficient reasoner must be a good guesser.
+
+(c) The reasoner needs a clear and steady mental eye, in order to see
+the conclusion that is implicated in the premises. Without this, he
+falls into confusion and fallacy, or fails, with the premises both
+before him, to get the conclusion. The "clear and steady mental eye",
+in less figurative language, means the ability to check hasty
+responses to either premise alone, or to extraneous features of the
+situation, so as to insure that "unitary response" to the combination
+of premises which constitutes the perceptive act of inference.
+
+
+{480}
+
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. In what respects does the animal's solution of a problem fall
+ short of reasoning?
+
+3. Give a concrete instance of reasoning belonging under each of
+ the types mentioned in the text.
+
+4. How is it that superstitions such as that of Friday being an
+ unlucky day persist? What would be the scientific way of testing
+ such a belief?
+
+5. What causes tend to arouse belief, and what to arouse doubt?
+
+6. Introspective study of the process of thinking. Attempt to
+ solve some of the following problems, and write down what you can
+ observe of the process.
+
+ (a) What is it that has four fingers and a thumb, but no flesh
+ or bone?
+
+ (b) Why does the full moon rise about sunset?
+
+ (c) If a book and a postage stamp together cost $1.02, and
+ the book costs $1.00 more than the stamp, how much does the
+ stamp cost?
+
+ (d) A riddle: "Sisters and brothers have I none, yet this
+ man's father is my father's son."
+
+ (e) Prove that a ball thrown horizontally over level ground will
+ strike the ground at the same time, no matter how hard it is
+ thrown.
+
+ (f) If no prunes are atherogenous, but some bivalves are
+ atherogenous, can you conclude that some prunes are not
+ bivalves?
+
+ (g) Deduce, as impersonally as possible, the opinion of you
+ held by some other person.
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+William James, _Principles of Psychology_, 1890, Vol. II, pp. 325-371.
+John Dewey, _How We Think_, 1910.
+
+
+{481}
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX
+
+IMAGINATION
+
+MENTAL AS DISTINGUISHED FROM MOTOR MANIPULATION
+
+
+From discovery we now turn to invention, from exploration to manipulation.
+
+The human enterprise of exploration, which we have examined under the
+headings of perception and reasoning, as well as earlier under
+attention, runs the gamut from simple exploratory movements of the
+sense organs in looking and listening, to the elaborate scientific
+procedure followed in testing hypotheses and discovering the laws of
+nature. Inventive or manipulative activity runs a similar gamut from
+the child's play with his toys to the creation of a work of art, the
+designing of a work of engineering, the invention of a new machine, or
+the organization of a new government. The distinction between the two
+lines of activity is that exploration seeks what is there, and
+manipulation changes it to something else. Exploration seeks the facts
+as they exist, while invention modifies or rearranges the facts. The
+two enterprises go hand in hand, however, since facts must be known to
+be manipulated, while on the other hand manipulation of an object
+brings to light facts about it that could never be discovered by
+simple examination. Invention is based on science and also contributes
+to the advance of science.
+
+Manipulation and exploration certainly go hand in hand in the little
+child's behavior. The baby picks up his new toy, turns it about and
+examines it on all sides, shakes it and is pleased if it makes a
+noise, drops it and is pleased {482} with its bang on the floor. This
+is manipulation, certainly; but it is also a way of exploring the
+properties of the toy.
+
+
+Beginnings of Imagination in the Child
+
+Beginning with grasping, turning, pushing, pulling, shaking and
+dropping of objects, the child's manipulation develops in several
+directions. One line of development leads to _manual skill_. The child
+learns to manage his toys better.
+
+A second line of development is in the direction of
+_constructiveness_. Taking things apart and putting them together,
+building blocks, assembling dolls and toy animals into "families" or
+"parties" setting table or arranging toy chairs in a room, are
+examples of this style of manipulation, which calls less for manual
+dexterity than for seeing ways in which objects can be rearranged.
+
+_Make-believe_ is a third direction followed in the development of
+manipulation. The little boy puts together a row of blocks and pushes
+it along the floor, asserting that it is a train of cars. The little
+girl lays her doll carefully in its bed, saying "My baby's sick; that
+big dog did bite him". This might be spoken of as "manipulating things
+according to the meanings attached to them", the blocks being treated
+as cars, and the doll as a sick baby.
+
+Perhaps a little later than make-believe to make its appearance in the
+child is _story-telling_ the fourth type of manipulation. Where in
+make-believe he has an actual object to manipulate according to the
+meaning attached to it, in story-telling he simply talks about persons
+and things and makes them perform in his story. He comes breathless
+into the house with a harrowing tale of being pursued by a
+hippopotamus in the woods; or he gives a fantastic account of the
+doings of his acquaintances. For this he is sometimes accused of being
+a "little liar"--as indeed he {483} probably is when circumstances
+demand--and sometimes, more charitably, he is described as being still
+unable to distinguish observation from imagination; but really what he
+has not yet grasped is the _social_ difference between his
+make-believe, which no one objects to, and his story-telling, which
+may lead people astray.
+
+Both make-believe and story-telling are a great convenience to the
+child, since he is able by their means to manipulate big and important
+objects that he could not manage in sober reality. He thus finds an
+outlet for tendencies that are blocked in sober reality--blocked by
+the limitations of his environment, blocked by the opposition of other
+people, blocked by his own weakness and lack of knowledge and skill.
+Unable to go hunting in the woods, he can play hunt in the yard;
+unable to go to war with the real soldiers, he can shoulder his toy
+gun and campaign all about the neighborhood. The little girl of four
+years, hearing her older brothers and sisters talk of their school,
+has her own "home work" in "joggity", and her own graduation
+exercises.
+
+
+Preliminary Definition of Imagination
+
+In such ways as we have been describing, the little child shows
+"imagination", or mental manipulation. In story-telling the objects
+manipulated are simply _thought of_; in make-believe, though there is
+actual motor manipulation of present objects, the attached _meanings_
+are the important matter; and in construction there is apt to be a
+_plan_ in mind in advance of the motor manipulation, as when you look
+at the furniture in a room and consider possible rearrangements.
+
+The materials manipulated in imagination are usually facts previously
+perceived, and to be available for mental {484} manipulation they must
+now be recalled; but they are not merely recalled--they are rearranged
+and give a new result that may never have been perceived. A typical
+product of imagination is composed of parts perceived at different
+times and later recalled and combined, as a centaur is composed of man
+and horse, or a mermaid of woman and fish. Imagination is like
+reasoning in being a mental reaction; but it differs from reasoning in
+being manipulation rather than exploration; reasoning consists in
+seeing relationships that exist between facts, and imagination in
+putting facts into new relationships. These are but rough distinctions
+and definitions; we shall try to do a little better after we have
+examined a variety of imaginative performances.
+
+"Imagination" and "invention" mean very much the same mental process,
+though "imagination" looks rather to the mental process itself, and
+"invention" more to the outcome of the process, which is a product
+having some degree of novelty and originality.
+
+Imagination, like association and like attention, is sometimes free,
+and sometimes controlled. Controlled imagination is directed towards
+the accomplishment of some desired result, while free imagination
+wanders this way and that, with no fixed aim. Controlled imagination
+is seen in planning and designing; free imagination occurs in moments
+of relaxation, and may be called "play of the imagination". The free
+variety, as the simpler, will be considered first.
+
+
+Our study will have more point if we first remind ourselves what are
+the psychological _problems to be attacked_ in studying any mental
+activity. What is the _stimulus_ and what the _response?_ These are
+the fundamental questions. But the study of response breaks up into
+three subordinate questions, regarding the _tendency_ that is
+awakened, regarding the {485} _end-result_ obtained, and regarding the
+often complex _process_ or series of responses, that leads to the
+end-result.
+
+The response in imagination we have already defined, in a general way,
+as mental manipulation, and the end-result as the placing of facts
+into new combinations or relationships. The stimulus consists of the
+facts, either perceived at the moment or recalled from past
+perception, that are now freshly related or combined. The more precise
+question regarding the stimulus is, then, as to what sort of facts
+make us respond in an inventive or imaginative way; and the more
+precise question regarding the end-result is as to what kind of
+combinations or new relationships are given to the facts--both pretty
+difficult questions. In regard to process, the great question is as to
+how any one can possibly escape from the beaten track of instinct and
+habit, and do anything new; and in regard to tendency the question is
+as to what motives are awakened in inventive activity and what
+satisfaction there is in the end-result. This last question, as to
+_why_ we imagine, is about the easiest to answer.
+
+
+Play
+
+Free imagination was spoken of a moment ago as a kind of play; and we
+might turn this about and say that play, usually if not always,
+contains an element of imagination or invention. Sometimes the child
+makes up new games, very simple ones of course, to fit the materials
+he has to play with; but even when he is playing a regular game, he
+has constantly to adapt himself to new conditions as the
+game-situation changes. We may take the child's play as the first and
+simplest case of free invention and ask our questions regarding it.
+What are the child's play-stimuli (toys), how does he manipulate them,
+what end-results does he reach, and what satisfaction does he derive
+from {486} playing? We can ask these questions, but it is not so sure
+that we can answer them.
+
+_What is a toy?_ Anything to play with. But what characteristics of an
+object make it a real toy, which shall actually arouse the play
+response? First, it must be such that the child can move it; and
+almost anything that he can move serves, one time or another, for a
+plaything. But the surest stimulus is a _new_ toy, the element of
+novelty and variety being important in arousing manipulation as it is
+in arousing exploration. However, to define a toy simply as something
+moveable, and also new if possible, fails to satisfy the spirit of
+inquiry, and about the only way to progress further is to make a long
+list of toys, and classify them from the psychological point of view.
+Thus we get the following classes of play-stimuli:
+
+Little models of articles used by adults, such as tools, furniture,
+dishes; and we might include here dolls and toy animals. The child's
+response to this class of toys is imitative. Some psychologists have
+been so much impressed with the imitative play of children and animals
+(as illustrated by puppies playing fight), that they have conceived of
+all play as a sort of rehearsal for the serious business of life; but
+this conception does not apply very well to some of the other sorts of
+toy.
+
+Noise-makers: rattle, drum, bell, horn, whistle, fire-cracker.
+
+Things that increase your speed of locomotion, or that move you in
+unusual ways, as bicycle, skate, sled, rocking-horse, swing, seesaw,
+merry-go-round. Here belong also such sports as hopping, skipping,
+jumping, dancing, skipping rope, vaulting, leapfrog, whirling,
+somersault. The dizzy sensation resulting from stimulation of the
+semicircular canals is evidently pleasant to young children, and some
+of their sports seem aimed at securing a good measure of it.
+
+{487}
+
+Things that increase your radius of action; balls to throw or bat, bow
+and arrow, sling, mirror used to throw sunlight into a distant
+person's eyes; and we might include the bicycle here as well as in the
+preceding class.
+
+Things that resist the force of gravity, floating, soaring, balancing,
+ascending, instead of falling; or that can be made to behave in this
+way. Here we have a host of toys and sports: balloons, soap bubbles,
+kites, rockets, boats, balls that bounce, tops that balance while they
+spin, hoops that balance while they roll, arrows shot high into the
+sky; climbing, walking on the fence, swimming, swinging, seesaw again.
+
+Things that move in surprising ways or that are automatic: toy
+windmills, mechanical toys.
+
+Things that can be opened and shut or readjusted in some similar way:
+a book to turn the leaves of, a door to swing or to hook and unhook, a
+bag or box to pack or unpack, water taps to turn on or off (specially
+on).
+
+Plastic materials, damp sand, mud, snow; and other materials that can
+be worked in some way, as paper to tear or fold, stones or blocks to
+pile, load or build, water to splash or pour; and we might add here
+fire, which nearly every one, child or adult, likes to manage.
+
+Finally, playmates should really be included in a list of playthings,
+since the presence of a playmate is often the strongest stimulus to
+arouse play.
+
+_Such being the stimulus, what is the play response?_ It consists in
+manipulating or managing the plaything so as to produce some
+interesting result. The hoop is made to roll, the kite to fly, the
+arrow to hit something at a distance, the blocks are built into a
+tower or knocked down with a crash, the mud is made into a "pie", the
+horn is sounded. Many games are variations on pursuit and capture (or
+escape): tag, hide-and-seek, prisoner's base, blind {488} man's buff,
+football, and we might include chess and checkers here. Wrestling,
+boxing, snowballing are variations on attack and defense. A great many
+are variations on action at a distance, of which instances have
+already been cited from children's toys; in adult games we find here
+golf, croquet, bowling, quoits, billiards, shooting. Many games
+emphasize motor skill, as skipping ropes, knife, cat's cradle, usually
+however with competition in skill between the different players. This
+element of manual skill enters of course into nearly all games. Mental
+acuteness appears in the guessing games, as well as in chess and many
+games of cards. Many games combine several of the elements mentioned,
+as in baseball we have action at a distance, pursuit and escape, motor
+skill and activity, and a chance for "head work".
+
+
+The Play Motives
+
+Now, what is the sense of games and toys, what satisfactions do they
+provide? What instincts or interests are thrown into activity? There
+is no one single "play instinct" that furnishes all the satisfaction,
+but conceivably every natural and acquired source of satisfaction is
+tapped in one play or another. In the games that imitate fighting,
+some of the joy of fighting is experienced, even though no real anger
+develops. In the games that imitate pursuit and escape, some of the
+joy of hunting and some of the joy of escape are awakened. In the
+"kissing games" that used to be common in young people's parties when
+dancing was frowned upon, and in dancing itself, some gratification of
+the sex instinct is undoubtedly present; but dancing also gives a
+chance for muscular activity which is obviously one source of
+satisfaction in the more active games. In fact, joy in motor activity
+must be counted as one of the most general sources of
+play-satisfaction. Another {489} general element is the love of social
+activity, which we see in dancing as well as in nearly all games and
+sports. Another, akin to the mere joy in motor activity, is the love
+of manipulation, with which we began this whole discussion.
+
+The "escape motive" deserves a little more notice. Though you would
+say at first thought that no one could seek fear, and that this
+instinct could not possibly be utilized in play, yet a great many
+amusements are based on fear. The "chutes", "scenic railways", "roller
+coasters", etc., of the amusement parks would have no attraction if
+they had no thrill; and the thrill means fear. You get some of the
+thrill of danger, though you know that the danger is not very real.
+Probably the thrill itself would not be worth much, but being quickly
+followed by _escape_, it is highly satisfactory. The joy of escape
+more than pays for the momentary unpleasantness of fear. The fear
+instinct is utilized also in coasting on the snow, climbing, swimming,
+or any adventurous sport; in all of which there is danger, but the
+skilful player escapes by his own efforts. If he lost control he would
+get a tumble; and that is why the sport is exciting and worth while.
+He has his fear in check, to be sure, but it is awakened enough to
+make the escape from danger interesting. Nothing could be much further
+from the truth than to consider fear as a purely negative thing,
+having no positive contribution to make to human satisfaction. Though
+we try to arrange the serious affairs of life so as to avoid danger as
+much as possible, in play we seek such dangers as we can escape by
+skilful work. The fascination of gambling and of taking various risks
+probably comes from the satisfaction of the fear and escape motive.
+
+But of all the "instincts", it is the self-assertive or masterful
+tendency that comes in oftenest in play. Competition, one form of
+self-assertion, is utilized in a tremendous number of games and
+sports. Either the players compete {490} as individuals, or they
+"choose sides" and compete as teams. No one can deny that the joy of
+winning is the high light in the satisfaction of play. Yet it is not
+the whole thing, for the game may have been worth while, even if you
+lose. Provided you can say, "Though I did not win, I played a good
+game", you have the satisfaction of having done well, which is the
+mastery satisfaction in its non-competitive form.
+
+When the baby gets a horn, he is not contented to have somebody else
+blow it for him, but wants to blow it himself; and very pleased he is
+with himself when he can make it speak. "See what _I_ can do!" is the
+child's way of expressing his feelings after each fresh advance in the
+mastery of his playthings. Great is the joy of the boy when he,
+himself, can make his top spin or his kite fly; and great is the
+girl's joy when she gets the knack of skipping a rope. Great is any
+one's joy when, after his first floundering, he comes to ride a
+bicycle, and the sense of power is enhanced in this case by covering
+distance easily, and so being master of a larger environment. As boys,
+I remember, we used to take great delight in the "apple thrower",
+which was simply a flexible stick, sharpened at one end to hold a
+green apple. With one's arm thus lengthened, the apple could be thrown
+to extraordinary distances, and to see our apple go sailing over a
+tall tree or striking the ground in the distance, gave a very
+satisfying sense of power. All of those toys that enable you to act at
+a distance, or to move rapidly, minister to the mastery impulse.
+Imitative play does the same, in that it enables the child to perform,
+in make-believe, the important deeds of adults. Children like to play
+at being grown-up, whether by wearing long dresses or by smoking, and
+it makes them feel important to do what the grown-ups do; you can
+observe how important they feel by the way they strut and swagger.
+
+{491}
+
+All in all, there are several different ways of gratifying the
+self-assertive or mastery impulse in play: always there is the toy or
+game-situation to master and manage; often self-importance is
+gratified by doing something big, either really or in make-believe;
+and usually there is a competitor to beat.
+
+
+Empathy
+
+There is still another possible way in which play may gratify the
+mastery impulse. Why do we like to see a kite flying? Of course, if it
+is _our_ kite and we are flying it, the mastery impulse is directly
+aroused and gratified; but we also like to watch a kite flown by some
+one else, and similarly we like to watch a hawk, a balloon or
+aeroplane, a rocket. We like also to watch things that balance or
+float or in other ways seem to be superior to the force of gravity.
+Why should such things fascinate us? Perhaps because of _empathy_, the
+"feeling oneself into" the object contemplated. As "sympathy" means
+"feeling with", "empathy" means "feeling into", and the idea is that
+the observer projects himself into the object observed, and gets some
+of the satisfaction from watching an object that he would get from
+_being_ that object. Would it not be grand to be a kite, would it not
+be masterful? Here we stand, slaves of the force of gravity, sometimes
+toying with it for a moment when we take a dive or a coast, at other
+times having to struggle against it for our very lives, and all the
+time bound and limited by it--while the kite soars aloft in apparent
+defiance of all such laws and limitations. Of course it fascinates us,
+since watching it gives us, by empathy, some of the sense of power and
+freedom that seems appropriate to the behavior of a kite. Perhaps the
+fascination of fire is empathy of a similar sort; for fire is power.
+
+Having thus found the mastery impulse here, there, and {492} almost
+everywhere in the realm of play, we are tempted to assume a masterful
+attitude ourselves and say, "Look you! We have discovered the one and
+only play motive, which is none other than the instinct of
+self-assertion". Thus we should be forgetting the importance in play
+of danger and the escape motive, the importance of manipulation for
+its own sake, and the importance of the mere joy in muscular and
+mental activity. Also, we should be overlooking the occasional
+presence of laughter, the occasional presence of sex attraction, and
+the almost universal presence of the gregarious and other social
+motives. Play gratifies many instincts, not merely a single one.
+
+Further, it is very doubtful whether the whole satisfaction of play
+activity can be traced to the instincts, anyway, for play may bring in
+the native "likes and dislikes", which we saw [Footnote: See p. 180.]
+to be irreducible to instinctive tendencies; and it may bring in
+acquired likes and interests developed out of these native likes. Play
+gives rise to situations that are interesting and attractive to the
+players, though the attraction cannot be traced to any of the
+instincts. The rhythm of dancing, marching, and of children's
+sing-song games can scarcely be traced to any of the instincts.
+
+The sociability of games goes beyond mere gregariousness, since it
+calls for acting together and not simply for being together; and at
+the same time it goes beyond competition and self-assertion, as is
+seen in the satisfaction the players derive from good team work. It is
+true that the individual player does not lay aside his self-assertion
+in becoming a loyal member of a team; rather, he identifies himself
+with the team, and finds in competition with the opposing team an
+outlet for his mastery impulse. But at the same time it is obvious
+that self-assertion would be still more fully gratified by man-to-man
+contests; and therefore the {493} usual preference of a group of
+people for "choosing sides" shows the workings of some other motive
+than self-assertion. The fact seems to be that cooerdinated group
+activity is an independent source of satisfaction.
+
+If the self-assertive impulse of an individual player is too strongly
+aroused, he spoils the game, just as an angry player spoils a friendly
+wrestling match or snowball fight, and just as a thoroughly frightened
+passenger spoils a trip down the rapids, which was meant to be simply
+thrilling. The instincts are active in play, but they must not be too
+active, for human play is an activity carried on well above the
+instinctive level, and dependent on motives that cannot wholly be
+analyzed in terms of the instincts.
+
+
+Day Dreams
+
+Daydreaming is a sort of play, more distinctly imaginative than most
+other play. Simply letting the mind run, as in the instances cited
+under free association, where A makes you think of B and B of C, and
+so on--this is not exactly daydreaming, since there is no "dream", no
+castle in the air nor other construction, but simply a passing from
+one recalled fact to another. In imaginative daydreaming, facts are
+not simply recalled but are rearranged or built together into a story
+or "castle" or scheme. A daydream typically looks toward the future,
+as a plan for possible doing; only, it is not a serious plan for the
+future--which would be controlled imagination--nor necessarily a plan
+which could work in real life, but merely play of imagination. If we
+ask the same questions here as we did regarding child's play, we find
+again that it is easier to define the end-result and the source of
+satisfaction in daydreaming than it is to define the stimulus or the
+exact nature of the imaginative process.
+
+{494}
+
+Daydreams have some motive force behind them, as can be judged from
+the absorption of the dreamer in his dream, and also from an
+examination of the end-results of this kind of imagination. Daydreams
+usually have a _hero_ and that hero is usually the dreamer's self.
+Sometimes one is the conquering hero, and sometimes the suffering
+hero, but in both cases the recognized or unrecognized merit of
+oneself is the big fact in the story, so that the mastery motive is
+evidently finding satisfaction here as well as in other forms of play.
+Probably the conquering hero dream is the commoner and healthier
+variety. A classical example is that of the milkmaid who was carrying
+on her head a pail of milk she had been given. "I'll sell this milk
+for so much, and with the money buy a hen. The hen will lay so many
+eggs, worth so much, for which I will buy me a dress and cap. Then the
+young men will wish to dance with me, but I shall spurn them all with
+a toss of the head." Her dream at this point became so absorbing as to
+get hold of the motor system and call out the actual toss of the
+head--but we are not after the moral just now; we care simply for the
+dream as a very true sample of many, many daydreams. Such dreams are a
+means of getting for the moment the satisfaction of some desire,
+without the trouble of real execution; and the desire gratified is
+very often some variety of self-assertion. Sometimes the hero is not
+the dreamer's self, but some one closely identified with himself. The
+mother is prone to make her son the hero of daydreams and so to
+gratify her pride in him.
+
+The "suffering hero" daydream seems at first thought inexplicable, for
+why should any one picture himself as having a bad time, as
+misunderstood by his best friends, ill-treated by his family, jilted
+by his best girl, unsuccessful in his pet schemes? Why should any one
+make believe to be worse off than he is; what satisfaction can that
+{495} be to him? Certainly, one would say, the mastery motive could
+not be active here. And yet--do we not hear children _boasting_ of
+their misfortunes? "Pooh! That's only a little scratch; I've got a
+real deep cut." My cut being more important than your scratch makes
+me, for the moment, more important than you, and gives me a chance to
+boast over you. Older people are known sometimes to magnify their own
+ailments, with the apparent aim of enhancing their own importance.
+Perhaps the same sort of motive underlies the suffering hero daydream.
+
+I am smarting, let us suppose, from a slight administered by my
+friend; my wounded self-assertion demands satisfaction. It was a very
+little slight, and I should make myself ridiculous if I showed my
+resentment. But in imagination I magnify the injury done me, and go on
+to picture a dreadful state of affairs, in which my friend has treated
+me very badly indeed, and perhaps deserted me. Then I should not be
+ridiculous, but so deeply wronged as to be an important person, one to
+be talked about; and thus my demand for importance and recognition is
+gratified by my daydream.
+
+Usually the suffering hero pictures himself as in the right, and
+animated by the noblest intentions, though misunderstood, and thus
+further enhances his self-esteem; but sometimes he takes the other
+tack and pictures himself as wicked--but as very, very wicked, a
+veritable desperado. It may be his self-esteem has been wounded by
+blame for some little meanness or disobedience, and he restores it by
+imagining himself a great, big, important sinner instead of a small
+and ridiculous one. In adolescence, the individual's growing demand
+for independence is often balked by the continued domination of his
+elders, and he rebelliously plans quite a career of crime for himself.
+He'll show them! They won't be so pig-headedly complacent when they
+know they have driven him to the bad. You can tell by the looks of
+{496} a person whose feelings are hurt that he is imagining something;
+usually he is imagining himself either a martyr or a desperado, or
+some other kind of suffering hero, often working up into a conquering
+hero in the end, when, his self-esteem restored, he is ready to be
+friends again. The suffering hero daydream is a "substitute reaction",
+taking the place of a fight or some other active self-assertion. The
+conquering hero daydream is often motivated in the same way; for
+example, our friend the milkmaid would not have been so ready to scorn
+the young men with a toss of the head if she had not been feeling her
+own actual inferiority and lack of fine clothes. The daydream makes
+good, in one way or another, for actual inability to get what we
+desire. The desire which is gratified in the play of imagination
+belongs very often indeed under the general head of self-assertion;
+but when one is in love it is apt to belong under that head. Love
+dreams of the agreeable sort need no further motivation; but the
+unpleasant, jealous type of love dream is at the same time a suffering
+hero dream, and certainly involves wounded self-assertion along with
+the sexual impulse. Probably the self-asserting daydream is the
+commonest variety, take mankind as a whole, with the love dream next
+in order of frequency. But there are many other sorts. There is the
+humor daydream, illustrated by the young person who suddenly breaks
+into a laugh and when you ask why replies that she was thinking how
+funny it would be if, etc., etc. She is very fond of a good laugh, and
+not having anything laughable actually at hand proceeds to imagine
+something. So, a music lover may mentally rehearse a piece when he has
+no actual music to enjoy; and if he has some power of musical
+invention, he may amuse himself, in idle moments, by making up music
+in his head; just as one who has some ability in decorative design may
+fill his idle moments by concocting new designs on paper. {497} When
+vacation time approaches, it is hard for any one, student or
+professor, to keep the thoughts from dwelling on the good times ahead,
+and getting some advance satisfaction. Thus all kinds of desires are
+gratified in imagination.
+
+
+
+Worry
+
+Do we have fear daydreams, as we have amusements utilizing the fear
+and escape motive? Yes, sometimes we imagine ourselves in danger and
+plan out an escape. One individual often amuses himself by imagining
+he is arrested and accused of some crime, and figuring out how he
+could establish an alibi or otherwise prove his innocence. But fear
+daydreams also include _worry_, which seems at first to be an
+altogether unpleasant state of mind, forced upon us and not indulged
+in as most daydreams are. Yet, as the worry is often entirely
+needless, it cannot be said to be forced upon a person, but must have
+some motive. There must be some satisfaction in it, in spite of all
+appearance.
+
+Some abnormal cases of worry suggest the theory that the fear is but a
+cloak for unacknowledged desire. Take this extreme case. A young man,
+"tied to the apron-strings" of a too affectionate and too domineering
+mother, has a strong desire to break loose and be an independent unit
+in the world; but at the same time, being much attached to his mother,
+he is horrified by this desire. She goes on a railroad journey without
+him--just an ordinary journey with no special danger--but all the time
+she is away he is in an agony of suspense lest the train may be
+wrecked. Such an abnormal degree of worry calls for explanation.
+Well--did not the worry perhaps conceal a wish, a wish that the train
+_might_ be wrecked? So he would be set free without any painful effort
+on his part; and he {498} was a young man who shrank from all effort.
+The psychopathologist who studied the case concluded that this was
+really the explanation of the worry.
+
+If, however, we take such extreme cases as typical and cynically apply
+this conception to all worries, we shall make many mistakes. A student
+worries unnecessarily about an examination; therefore, he desires to
+fail. A mother worries because her child is late in getting home;
+therefore, she wants to be rid of that child. Thus, by being too
+psychopathological, we reach many absurd conclusions in everyday life;
+for it is the child that is loved that is worried over, and it is the
+examination that the student specially wishes to pass that he fears he
+has flunked.
+
+Worry is a sort of substitute reaction, taking the place of real
+action when no real action is possible. The student has done all he
+can do; he has prepared for the examination, and he has taken the
+examination; now there is nothing to do except wait; so that the
+rational course would be to dismiss the matter from his mind; if he
+cannot accomplish that, but must do something, then the only thing he
+can do is to speculate and worry. So also the mother, in her
+uncertainty regarding her child, is impelled to action, and if she
+knew of any real thing to do she would do it and not worry; but there
+is nothing to do, except in imagination. Worry is fundamentally due to
+the necessity of doing something with any matter that occupies our
+mind; it is an imaginative substitute for real action.
+
+But worry may be something of an indoor sport as well. Consider
+this--if the mother really believed her child had fallen into the
+pond, she would rush to pull him out; but while she is worrying for
+fear he may have fallen in, she remains at home. Really she expects to
+see him come home any minute, but by conjuring up imaginary dangers
+she is getting ready to make his home-coming a great relief instead
+{499} of a mere humdrum matter. She is "shooting the chutes", getting
+the thrill of danger with escape fully expected.
+
+The normal time for a daydream is the time when there is no real act
+to be performed. A strong man uses it as the amusement of an idle
+moment and promptly forgets it. But one who is lacking in force,
+especially the personal force needed in dealing with other people, may
+take refuge in daydreams as a substitute for real doing. Instead of
+hustling for the money he needs he may, like Micawber, charm himself
+with imagining the good opportunities that may turn up. Instead of
+going and making love to the lady of his choice, he shyly keeps away
+from her and merely dreams of winning her. He substitutes imaginary
+situations for the real facts of his life, and gratifies his mastery
+motive by imaginary exploits. He invents imaginary ailments to excuse
+his lack of real deeds. He conjures up imaginary dangers to worry
+over. All this is abuse of imagination.
+
+
+Dreams
+
+Let us turn now from daydreams to dreams of the night. These also are
+play of imagination, even freer from control and criticism than the
+daydream. In sleep the cortical brain functions sink to a low level,
+and perhaps cease altogether in the deepest sleep. Most of the dreams
+that are coherent enough to be recalled probably occur just after we
+have gone to sleep or just before we wake up, or at other times when
+sleep is light. At such times the simpler and more practised
+functions, such as recall of images, can go on, though criticism, good
+judgment, reasoning, and all that sort of delicate and complex
+activity, do not occur. Daytime standards of probability, decorum,
+beauty, wit, and excellence of any sort are in abeyance; consistency
+is thrown to the winds, the scenes being shifted in the middle of a
+{500} speech, and a character who starts in as one person merging
+presently into somebody else. Dreams follow the definition of
+imagination or invention, in that materials recalled from different
+contexts are put together into combinations and rearrangements never
+before experienced. The combinations are often bizarre and
+incongruous.
+
+Perhaps the most striking characteristic of dreams is their seeming
+reality while they last. They seem real in spite of their incongruity,
+because of the absence of critical ability during sleep. In waking
+life, when the sight of one object reminds me of another and calls up
+an image of that other, I know that the image is an image, and I know
+I have thought of two different things. In sleep the same recall by
+association occurs, but the image is forthwith accepted as real; and
+thus things from different sources get together in the same dream
+scene, and a character who reminds us of another person forthwith
+becomes that other person. We are not mentally active enough in sleep
+to hold our images apart. Associative recall, with blending of the
+recalled material, and with entire absence of criticism, describes the
+process of dreaming.
+
+What is the _stimulus_, to which the dream responds? Sometimes there
+is an actual sensory stimulus, like the alarm clock or a stomach ache;
+and in this case the dream comes under the definition of an illusion;
+it is a false perception, more grotesquely false than most illusions
+of the day. A boy wakes up one June morning from a dream of the Day of
+Judgement, with the last trump pealing forth and blinding radiance all
+about--only to find, when fully awake, that the sun is shining in his
+face and the brickyard whistle blowing the hour of four-thirty a.m.
+This was a false perception. More often, a dream resembles a daydream
+in being a _train of thoughts and images_ without much relation to
+present sensory stimuli; and then the dream {501} would come under the
+definition of hallucination instead of illusion.
+
+Sometimes a sensory stimulus breaks in upon a dream that is in
+progress, and is interpreted in the light of this dream. In one
+experiment, the dreamer, who was an authoress, was in the midst of a
+dream in which she was discussing vacation plans with a party of
+friends, when the experimenter disturbed her by declaiming a poem; in
+her dream this took the form of a messenger from her publisher,
+reciting something about a contract which seemed a little disturbing
+but which she hoped (in the dream) would not interfere with her
+vacation. Maury, an early student of this topic, was awakened from a
+feverish dream of the French Revolution by something falling on his
+neck; this, under the circumstances, he took to be the guillotine.
+
+Now, _why_ is a dream? What satisfaction does it bring to the dreamer?
+Or shall we say that it is merely a mechanical play of association,
+with no motivation behind it? Dreams are interesting while they last,
+sometimes fearful, sometimes angry, sometimes amorous, otherwise not
+very emotional but distinctly interesting, so that many people hate to
+have a dream broken up by awaking. It seems likely, then, that dreams
+are like daydreams in affording gratification to desires. They are
+"wish-fulfilling", to borrow a term from Freud's theory of dreams,
+soon to be considered.
+
+A boy dreams repeatedly of finding whole barrels of assorted
+jackknives, and is bitterly disappointed every time to awake and find
+the knives gone; so that finally he questions the reality of the
+dream, but pinching himself (in the dream) concludes he must be awake
+this time. An adult frequently dreams of finding money, first a nickel
+in the dust, and then a quarter close by, and then more and more, till
+he wakes up and spoils it all. Such dreams are {502} obviously
+wish-fulfilling, as are also the sex dreams of sexually abstinent
+persons, or the feasting dreams of starving persons, or the polar
+explorer's recurring dream of warm, green fields. An eminent
+psychologist has given a good account of a dream which he had while
+riding in an overcrowded compartment of a European train, with the
+window closed and himself wedged in tightly far from the window. In
+this uncomfortable situation he dropped asleep and dreamed that he had
+the seat next to the window, had the window open and was looking out
+at a beautiful landscape. In all these cases _the wish gratified in
+the dream is one that has been left unsatisfied in the daytime_, and
+this is according to the famous passage, slightly paraphrased, "What a
+man hath, why doth he yet dream about?" The newly married couple do
+not dream of each other. We seldom dream of our regular work, unless
+for some reason we are disturbed over it. The tendencies that are
+satisfied during the day do not demand satisfaction in dreams; but any
+tendency that is aroused during the day without being able to reach
+its conclusion is likely to come to the surface in a dream.
+
+Any sort of desire or need, left unsatisfied in the day, may motivate
+a dream. Desire for food, warmth, sex gratification, air, money, etc.,
+have been exemplified in dreams already cited. Curiosity may be the
+motive, as in the case of an individual, who, having just come to live
+in Boston, was much interested in its topography, and who saw one day
+a street car making off in what seemed to him a queer direction, so
+that he wondered where it could be going and tried unsuccessfully to
+read its sign. The next night he dreamed of seeing the car near at
+hand and reading the sign, which, though really consisting of nonsense
+names, satisfied his curiosity during the dream.
+
+The mastery motive, so prominent in daydreams, can be detected also in
+many sleep dreams. There are dreams in {503} which we do big
+things--tell excruciatingly funny jokes, which turn out when recalled
+next day to be utterly flat; or improvise the most beautiful music,
+which we never can recall with any precision, but which probably
+amounted to nothing; or play the best sort of baseball. The gliding or
+flying dream, which many people have had, reminds one of the numerous
+toys and sports in which defiance of gravity is the motive; and
+certainly it gives you a sense of power and freedom to be able, in a
+dream, to glide gracefully up a flight of stairs, or step with ease
+from the street upon the second-story balcony. One dream which at
+first thought cannot be wish-fulfilling perhaps belongs under the
+mastery motive: The dreamer sees people scurrying to cover, looks up
+and sees a thunderstorm impending; immediately he is struck by
+lightning and knocked down in the street; but he finds he can rise and
+walk home, and seems to have suffered no harm except for a black
+blotch around one eye. Now, any man who could take lightning that way
+would be proud to wear the scar. So the dream was wish-fulfilling, and
+the wish involved was, as often, the self-assertive impulse.
+
+This last dream is a good one, however, for pointing another moral. We
+need not suppose that the dreamer was aiming at the denouement from
+the beginning of the dream. Dreams have no plot in most instances;
+they just drift along, as one thing suggests another. The sight of
+people running to cover suggested a thunderstorm, and that suggested
+that "I might get struck", as it would in the daytime. Now, the dream
+mentality, being short on criticism, has no firm hold on "may be" and
+"might be", but slides directly into the present indicative. The
+thought of being struck is _being_ struck, in a dream. So we do not
+need to suppose that the dreamer pictured himself as struck by
+lightning in order to have the satisfaction of coming off {504} whole
+and bragging of the exploit. In large measure the course of a dream is
+determined by free association; but the mastery motive and other
+easily awakened desires act as a sort of bias, facilitating certain
+outcomes and inhibiting others.
+
+But there are unpleasant dreams, as well as pleasant. There are fear
+dreams, as well as wish dreams. A child who is afraid of snakes and
+constantly on the alert against them when out in the fields during the
+day, dreams repeatedly of encountering a mass of snakes and is very
+much frightened in his sleep. Another child dreams of wolves or
+tigers. A person who has been guilty of an act from which bad
+consequences are possible dreams that those consequences are realized.
+The officer suffering from nervous war strain, or "shell shock", often
+had nightmares in which he was attacked and worsted by the enemy.
+Since Freud has never admitted that dreams could be fear-motived,
+holding that here, as in worry, the fear is but a cloak for a positive
+desire, some of his followers have endeavored to interpret these
+shell-shock nightmares as meaning a desire to be killed and so escape
+from the strain. To be consistent, they would have also to hold that
+the child, who of all people is the most subject to terrifying dreams,
+secretly desires death, though not avowing this wish even to himself.
+This would be pushing consistency rather far, and it is better to
+admit that there are real fear dreams, favored by indigestion or
+nervous strain, but sometimes occurring simply by the recall of a
+fear-stimulus in the same way that anything is recalled, i.e., through
+association.
+
+A large share of dreams does not fit easily into any of the classes
+already described. They seem too fantastic to have any personal
+meaning. Yet they are interesting to the dreamer, and they would be
+worth going to see if they could be reproduced and put on the stage.
+Isn't that sufficient {505} excuse for them? May they not be simply a
+free play of imagination that gives interesting results because of its
+very freedom from any control or tendency, and because of the
+vividness of dream imagery?
+
+
+Freud's Theory of Dreams
+
+Just at this point we part company with Freud, whose ideas on dreams
+as wish-fulfilments we have been following, in the main. Not that
+Freud would OK our account of dreams up to this point. Far from it. It
+would seem to him on too superficial a level altogether, dealing as it
+does with conscious wishes and with straightforward fulfilments. It
+has left out of account the "Unconscious" and its symbolisms. The
+Freudian would shake his head at our interpretation of the lightning
+dream, and say, "Oh, there is a good deal more in that dream. We
+should have to analyze that dream, by letting the dreamer dwell on
+each item of it and asking himself what of real personal significance
+the stroke of lightning or the scar around the eye suggested to him.
+He would never be able by his unaided efforts to find the unconscious
+wishes fulfilled in the dream, but under the guidance of the
+psychoanalyst, who is a specialist in all matters pertaining to the
+Unconscious, he may be brought to realize that his dream is the
+symbolic expression of wishes that are unconscious because they have
+been suppressed".
+
+The Unconscious, according to Freud, consists of forbidden
+wishes--wishes forbidden by the "Censor", which represents the moral
+and social standards of the individual and his critical judgment
+generally. When the Censor suppresses a wish, it does not peaceably
+leave the system but sinks to an unconscious state in which it is
+still active and liable to make itself felt in ways that get by the
+Censor because they are disguised and symbolic. An abnormal worry
+{506} is such a disguise, a queer idea that haunts the nervous person
+is another, "hysterical" paralysis or blindness is another.
+
+In normal individuals the dream life is held by Freud to be the chief
+outlet for the suppressed wishes; for then the Censor sleeps and "the
+mice can play". Even so, they dare not show themselves in their true
+shape and color, but disguise themselves in innocent-appearing
+symbolism. That lightning may stand for something much more personal.
+Let your mind play about that "being knocked down by lightning and
+getting up again", and ask yourself what experience of childhood it
+calls up.--Well, I remember the last time my father whipped me and I
+came through defiant, without breaking down as I always had before on
+similar occasions.--Yes, now we are on the track of something. The
+lightning symbolizes your father and his authority over you, which as
+a child you resented. You were specially resentful at your father's
+hold on your mother, whom you regarded as yours, your father being a
+rival with an unfair advantage. Your sex impulse was directed towards
+your mother, when you were a mere baby, but you soon came to see (how,
+Freud has never clearly explained) that this was forbidden, and that
+your father stood in the way. You resented this, you hated your
+father, while at the same time you may have loved him, too; so this
+whole complex and troublesome business was suppressed to the
+Unconscious, whence it bobs up every night in disguise. You may dream
+of the death of some one, and on analysis that some one is found to
+represent your father, whom as a child you secretly wished out of the
+way; or that some one may stand for your younger brother, against whom
+you, had a standing grudge because he had usurped your place as the
+pet of the family. These childish wishes are the core of the
+Unconscious and help to motivate all dreams, but more recently
+suppressed {507} wishes may also be gratified in dream symbolism. A
+man may "covet his neighbor's wife", but this is forbidden, unworthy,
+and false to the neighbor who is also his friend. The wish is
+disavowed, suppressed, not allowed in the waking consciousness; but it
+gratifies itself symbolically in a dream; the neighbor's wife not
+appearing at all in the dream, but the neighbor's automobile instead,
+which the neighbor cannot run properly, while the dreamer manages it
+beautifully.
+
+Freud has claimed the dream as his special booty, and insists that all
+dreams are wish-fulfilments, even those that seem mere fantastic play
+of imagination, since, as he sees it, no mental activity could occur
+except to gratify some wish. Further, he holds, most if not all dreams
+are fulfilments of suppressed wishes, and these are either sex or
+spite wishes, the spite wishes growing out of the interference of
+other people with our sex wishes.
+
+The objection to Freud's theory of dreams is, first, that he fails to
+see how easy-running the association or recall mechanism is. It isn't
+necessary to look for big, mysterious driving forces, when we know
+that A makes you think of B, and B of C, with the greatest ease. The
+dreamer isn't laboring, he is idly playing, and his images come
+largely by free association, with personal desires giving some steer.
+
+Another objection is that Freud overdoes the Unconscious; suppressed
+wishes are usually not so unconscious as he describes them; they are
+unavowed, unnamed, unanalyzed, but conscious for all that. It is not
+so much the unconscious wish that finds outlet in dreams and
+daydreams, as the unsatisfied wish, which may be perfectly conscious.
+
+Another very serious objection to Freud is that he overdoes the sex
+motive or "libido". He says there are two main tendencies, that of
+self-preservation and that of reproduction, but that the former is
+ordinarily not much subject to suppression, while the latter is very
+much under the {508} social ban. Consequently the Unconscious consists
+mostly of suppressed sex wishes. Evidently, however, Freud's analysis
+of human motives is very incomplete. He does not clearly recognize the
+self-assertive tendency, which, as a matter of fact, is subjected to
+much suppression from early childhood all through life, and which
+undoubtedly has as much to do with dreams, as it has with daydreams.
+Freud has given an "impressionistic" picture, very stimulating and
+provocative of further exploration, but by no means to be accepted as
+a true and complete map of the region.
+
+
+Autistic Thinking
+
+Dreaming, whether awake or asleep, is free imagination. It does not
+have to check up with any standard. So long as it is interesting at
+the moment and gratifies the dreamer in any way, it serves its
+purpose. Sometimes the daydreamer exercises some control, breaking off
+a spiteful or amorous dream because he thinks it had better not be
+indulged; but in this he ceases to be simply a daydreamer.
+Daydreaming, by itself, is an example of what is called "autistic
+thinking", which means thinking that is sufficient unto itself, and
+not subjected to any criticism. Autistic thinking gratifies some
+desire and that is enough for it. It does not submit to criticism from
+other persons nor from other tendencies of the individual, nor does it
+seek to square itself with the real world.
+
+Autistic thinking, indulged in by every imaginative person in moments
+of relaxation, is carried to an absurd extreme by some types of insane
+individuals. One type withdraws so completely from reality as to be
+inaccessible in the way of conversation, unresponsive to anything that
+happens, entirely immersed in inner imaginings. Others, while living
+in the world about them, transform it into a make-believe {509} world
+by attaching meanings to things and persons as suits themselves. This
+institution, in which the subject is confined, is his royal palace,
+the doctors are his officials, the nurses his wives, "thousands of
+them, the most beautiful women in creation". Or the delusion may take
+the line of the "suffering hero", the subject imagining himself a
+great man shut up in this place by the machinations of his enemies;
+the doctors are spies and enemy agents, and the nurses also act
+suspiciously; his food is poisoned, and he is kept in a weak and
+helpless condition, all out of fear of him. It is impossible to argue
+the patient out of his delusions by pointing out to him how clearly
+they conflict with reality; he evades any such test by some
+counter-argument, no matter how flimsy, and sticks to his dream or
+make-believe.
+
+Autistic thinking is contrasted with realistic thinking, which seeks
+to check up with real facts; it may be contrasted also with socialized
+thinking, which submits to the criticism of other people; and it may
+even be contrasted with self-criticized thinking, in which the
+individual scrutinizes what he has imagined, to see whether it is on
+the whole satisfactory to himself, or whether it simply gratified a
+single or momentary impulse that should be balanced off by other
+tendencies.
+
+
+Invention and Criticism
+
+"Criticism"--the word has been used repeatedly, and it is time it gave
+an account of itself. Criticism evidently demands balancing off one
+desire by another. One tendency gets criticized by running afoul of
+another tendency, one idea by conflicting with another idea. We
+concoct a fine joke to play on our friend; but then the thought comes
+to us that he may not take it kindly; we don't want to break with our
+friend, and so we regretfully throw our promising invention on the
+scrap heap. That is self-criticism, the {510} balancing off of one
+impulse by another. Self-criticism is obnoxious to the natural man,
+who prefers to follow out any tendency that has been aroused till it
+reaches its goal; but he learns self-criticism in the hard school of
+experience. For plenty of criticism is directed upon the individual
+from without.
+
+Criticism is directed upon him by the facts of the real world, so soon
+as he tries to act out what he has imagined. Often his invention will
+not work, his plan does not succeed, and he is involved in chagrin and
+even pain. He must perforce cast away his plan and think up a new one.
+At this point the "weak brother" is tempted to give up trying, and
+take refuge in autistic thinking, but the stronger individual accepts
+the challenge of reality. He sees that an invention is not
+satisfactory unless it will really work, and sets about learning what
+will work and what not, so accumulating observations that later enable
+him to criticize his own ideas, to some extent, before trying them out
+on real things.
+
+Criticism is directed upon the individual from the side of other
+people, who from the day he first begins to tell his childish
+imaginings, are quite free with their objections. Humiliated by this
+critical reception of his ideas, the individual may resolve to keep
+them to himself for the future, and draw away, again, towards autistic
+thinking; or, more forcefully, he may exert himself to find some idea
+that will command the approval of other people. If he can take rebuffs
+goodnaturedly, he soon finds that social criticism can be a great
+help, that two heads are better than one in planning any invention
+that needs to work. He accumulates knowledge of what will pass muster
+when presented to other people, and thus again learns self-criticism.
+
+Self-criticism is helped by such rules as to "think twice", to "sleep
+on it before deciding", to "drop the matter for a time and come back
+to it and see whether it still looks {511} the same". When you are all
+warmed up over an idea, its recency value gives it such an advantage
+over opposing ideas that they have no chance, for the moment, of
+making themselves felt in the line of criticism.
+
+I once heard the great psychologist, and great writer, William James,
+make a remark that threw some light on his mode of writing. In the
+evening, he said, after warming up to his subject, he would write on
+and on till he had exhausted the lead he was following, and lay the
+paper aside with the feeling, "Good! Good! That's good". The next
+morning, he said, it might not seem good at all. This calls to mind
+the old advice to writers about its being "better to compose with fury
+and correct with phlegm than to compose with phlegm and correct with
+fury". The phlegmatic critical attitude interferes considerably with
+the enthusiastic inventive activity. Give invention free rein for the
+time being, and come around with criticism later.
+
+Some over-cautious and too self-critical persons, though rather
+fertile in ideas, never accomplish much in the way of invention
+because they cannot let themselves go. Criticism is always at their
+elbow, suggesting doubts and alternatives and preventing progress in
+the creative activity, instead of biding its time and coming in to
+inspect the completed result. For a similar reason, much of the best
+inventive work--writing, for example, or painting--is done in
+prolonged periods of intense activity, which allow time for invention
+to get warmed to its task, when it takes the bit in its teeth and
+dashes off at a furious speed, leaving criticism to trail along
+behind.
+
+Invention in the service of art or of economic and social needs is
+controlled imagination, realistic, socialized, subjected to criticism.
+It cannot afford to be autistic, but must meet objective or social
+standards. Mechanical inventions must work when translated into
+matter-of-fact wood and iron, and {512} must also pass the social test
+of being of some use. Social inventions of the order of institutions,
+laws, political platforms and slogans, plans of campaign, must "work"
+in the sense of bringing the desired response from the public. Social
+imagination of the very important sort suggested by the proverbs,
+"Seeing ourselves as others see us", or "Putting ourselves in the
+other fellow's place"--for it is only by imagination that we can thus
+get outside of our own experience and assume another point of
+view--must check up with the real sentiments of other people.
+
+
+The Enjoyment of Imaginative Art
+
+It requires imagination to enjoy art as well as to produce it. The
+producer of the work of art puts the stimuli before you, but you must
+make the response yourself, and it is an inventive response, not a
+mere repetition of some response you have often made. The novelist
+describes a character for you, and you must respond by putting
+together the items in the description so as to conceive of a character
+you have never met. The painter groups his figures before you, but you
+must get the point of the picture for yourself. The musical composer
+provides a series of chords, but you must get the "hang" of the
+passage for yourself, and if he has introduced a novel effect, it may
+not be easy to find any beauty in it, at least on the first hearing.
+
+Art, from the consumer's side, is play. It is play of the imagination,
+with the materials conveniently presented by the artist. Now, as art
+is intended to appeal to a consumer (or enjoyer), the question as to
+sources of satisfaction in the enjoyment of art is fundamental in the
+whole psychology of art, production as well as consumption.
+
+We have the same questions to ask regarding the enjoyment of a _novel_
+as regarding a daydream. Novel-reading is daydreaming with the
+materials provided by the {513} author, and gratifies the same
+motives. A novel to be really popular must have a genuine hero or
+heroine--some one with whom the reader can identify himself. The
+frequency of novels in which the hero or heroine is a person of high
+rank, or wins rank or wealth in the course of the story, is a sign of
+appeal to the mastery motive. The humble reader is tickled in his own
+self-esteem by identifying himself for the time with the highborn or
+noble or beautiful character in the story. The escape motive also is
+relied upon to furnish the excitement of the story, which always
+brings the hero into danger or difficulty and finally rescues him,
+much to the reader's relief. Love stories appeal, of course, to the
+sex impulse, humorous stories to laughter, and mystery stories to
+curiosity. Cynical stories, showing the "pillars of society" in an
+ignoble light, appeal to the self-assertive impulse of the reader, in
+that he is led to apply their teaching to pretentious people whom he
+knows about, and set them down a peg, to his own relative advancement.
+But here again we have to insist, as under the head of sports and
+daydreams, that interests of a more objective kind are also gratified
+by a good work of fiction. A story that runs its logical course to a
+tragic end is interesting as a good piece of workmanship, and as an
+insight into the world. We cannot heartily identify ourselves with
+Hamlet or Othello, yet we should be sorry to have those figures erased
+from our memories; they mean something, they epitomize world-facts
+that compel our attention.
+
+
+The appeal of art is partly emotional.
+
+A very great work of art, the Apollo Belvedere or the Sistine Madonna,
+when you suddenly come upon it in walking through a gallery, may move
+you almost or quite to tears. Beautiful music, and not necessarily sad
+music either, has the same effect. Why this particular emotion should
+be aroused is certainly an enigma. "Crying because you are so happy"
+is similar {514} but itself rather inexplicable. In many other cases,
+the emotional appeal of art is easily analyzed. The pathetic appeals
+straightforwardly to the grief impulse, the humorous to the laughter
+impulse, the tragic to fear and escape. The sex motive is frequently
+utilized in painting and sculpture as well as in literature.
+
+
+Art makes also an intellectual appeal.
+
+It is satisfying partly because of this appeal, as is clear when we
+remember that many great works of art require mental effort in order
+to grasp and appreciate them. You must be wide-awake to follow a play
+of Shakespeare; you must puzzle out the meaning of a group painting
+before fully enjoying it; you must study some of the detail of a
+Gothic cathedral before getting the full effect; music may be too
+"classical" for many to grasp and follow. Unless, then, the artist has
+made a great mistake, the mental activity which he demands from his
+public must contribute to the satisfaction they derive from his works.
+If his appeal were simply to their emotions, any intellectual labor
+would be a disturbing element. The intellectual appeal is partly to
+objective interests in the thing presented, partly to interest in the
+workmanship, and partly to the mastery motive in the form of problem
+solution.
+
+Perhaps we do not often think of a fine painting or piece of music as
+a problem set us for solution, but it is that, and owes part of its
+appeal to its being a problem. To "get the hang of" a work of art
+requires some effort and attention; if the problem presented is too
+difficult for us, the work of art is dry; if too easy, it is tame.
+
+The mastery motive is probably as important in the enjoyment of art as
+it is in play and dreaming. It comes in once in the joy of mastering
+the significance of the work of art, and again in self-identification
+with the fine characters portrayed.
+
+{515}
+
+Empathy in art enjoyment.
+
+At first thought, some forms of art, as architecture, seem incapable
+of making the just-mentioned double appeal to the mastery motive.
+Architecture can certainly present problems for the beholder to solve,
+but how can the beholder possibly identify himself with a tower or
+arch? If, however, we remember the "empathy" that we spoke of under
+the head of play, we see that the beholder may project himself into
+the object, unintentionally of course, and thus perhaps get
+satisfaction of his mastery impulse.
+
+Look at a pillar, for example. If the pillar is too massive for the
+load supported, it gives you the unsatisfactory impression of doing
+something absurdly small for your powers. If on the contrary the
+pillar is too slender for the load that seems to rest upon it, you get
+the feeling of strain and insecurity; but if it is rightly
+proportioned, you get the feeling of a worthy task successfully
+accomplished. The pillar, according to empathy, pleases you by
+arousing and gratifying your mastery impulse; and many other
+architectural effects can be interpreted in the same way.
+
+Empathy can perhaps explain the appeal of the _big_ in art and nature.
+In spite of the warnings put forth against thinking of mere bigness as
+great or fine, we must admit that size makes a very strong appeal to
+something in human nature. The most perfect miniature model of a
+cathedral, however interesting and attractive as it rests on the table
+before you, fails to make anything like the impression that is made by
+the giant building towering above you. Big trees, lofty cliffs, grand
+canyons, tremendous waterfalls, huge banks of clouds, the illimitable
+expanse of the sea, demonstrate cogently the strong appeal of the big.
+Perhaps the big is not necessarily grand, but the grand or sublime
+must be big or somehow suggest bigness. The question is, then, what it
+is in us that responds to the appeal of the big.
+
+{516}
+
+Perhaps it is the submissive tendency that is aroused. This great
+mountain, so far outclassing me that I am not tempted in the least to
+compete with it, affords me the joy of willing submission. The escape
+motive may come in along with submissiveness--at the first sight of
+the mountain a thrill of fear passes over me, but I soon realize that
+the mountain will not hurt me in spite of its awe-inspiring vastness;
+so that my emotion is blended of the thrill of fear, the relief of
+escape, and the humble joy of submission. That is one analysis of the
+esthetic effect of bigness.
+
+Empathy suggests a very different analysis. According to this,
+projecting myself into the mountain, identifying myself with it, I
+experience the sensation of how it feels to be a mountain. It feels
+big--I feel big. My mastery impulse is gratified. To decide between
+these two opposing interpretations ought to be possible from the
+behavior or introspection of a person in the presence of some big
+object. If he feels insignificant and humble and bows reverently
+before the object, we may conclude that the submissive tendency is in
+action; but if the sight of the grand object makes him feel strong and
+fine, if he throws out his chest and a gleam comes into his eye, then
+everything looks like the mastery motive. Quite possibly, the effect
+varies with the person and the occasion.
+
+We have to think of art as a great system or collection of inventions
+that owes its existence to its appeal to human nature, and that has
+found ways, as its history has progressed, of making its appeal more
+and more varied. Art is a type in these respects of many social
+enterprises, such as sport, amusement, and even such serious matters
+as politics and industry. Each of these is a collection of inventions
+that persists because it appeals to human impulses, and each one
+appeals to a variety of different impulses.
+
+
+{517}
+
+The Psychology of Inventive Production
+
+To the consumer, art is play, but to the producer it is work, in the
+sense that it is directed towards definite ends and has to stand
+criticism according as it does or does not reach those ends. What is
+true of the producer of art works is true also of other inventors, and
+we may as well consider all sorts of controlled imagination together.
+
+In spite of the element of control that is present in productive
+invention, the really gifted inventor seems to make play of his work
+to a large extent. Certainly the inventive genius does not always have
+his eyes fixed on the financial goal, nor on the appeal which his
+inventions are to make to the public. It is astonishing to read in the
+lives of inventors what a lot of comparatively useless contrivances
+they busied themselves with, apparently from the pure joy of
+inventing. One prolific writer said that he "never worked in his life,
+only played". The inventor likes to manipulate his materials, and this
+playfulness has something to do with his originality, by helping to
+keep him out of the rut.
+
+That "necessity is the mother of invention" is only half of the truth;
+it points to the importance of a directive tendency, but fails to show
+how the inventor manages to leave the beaten path and really invent.
+Necessity, or some desire, puts a question, without which the inventor
+would not be likely to find the answer; but he needs a kind of
+flexibility or playfulness, just because his job is that of seeing
+things in a new light. We must allow him to toy with his materials a
+bit, and even to be a bit "temperamental", and not expect him to grind
+out works of art or other inventions as columns of figures are added.
+
+When inventive geniuses have been requested to indicate their method,
+they have been able to give only vague hints. How does the musical
+composer, for example, free himself of {518} all the familiar pieces
+and bring the notes into a fresh arrangement? All that he can tell
+about it is usually that he had an "inspiration"; the new air simply
+came to him. Now, of course the air did not really come to him from
+outside; he made it, it was his reaction, but it was a quick, free
+reaction, of which he could observe little introspectively.
+
+Perhaps the best-studied case of invention is that of the learner in
+typewriting, who, after laboriously perfecting his "letter habits" or
+responses to single letters by appropriate finger movements on the
+keyboard, may suddenly find himself writing in a new way, the word no
+longer being spelled out, but being written as a unit by a cooerdinated
+series of finger movements. The amazing thing is that, without trying
+for anything of the kind, he has been able to break away from his
+habit of spelling out the word, and shift suddenly to a new manner of
+writing. He testifies that he did not plan out this change, but was
+surprised to find himself writing in the new way. He was feeling well
+that day, hopeful and ambitious, he was striving for greater speed,
+and, while he was completely absorbed in his writing, this new mode of
+reaction originated.
+
+We see in this experimentally studied case some of the conditions that
+favor invention. Good physical condition, freshness, mastery of the
+subject, striving for some result, and "hopefulness". Now, what is
+that last? Confidence, enterprise, willingness to "take a chance",
+eagerness for action and readiness to break away from routine? Some of
+this independent, manipulating spirit was probably there.
+
+A soldier, so wounded as to paralyze his legs but capable of recovery
+by training, had advanced far enough to hobble about with a cane and
+by holding to the walls. One morning, feeling pretty chipper, he took
+a chance and left the wall, cutting straight across the room; and
+getting through without a fall, was naturally much encouraged and
+{519} maintained this advance. This might be called invention; it was
+breaking away from what had become routine, and that is the essential
+fact about the inventive reaction. This playful spirit of cutting
+loose, manipulating, and rearranging things to suit yourself is
+certainly a condition favorable to invention. It does not guarantee a
+valuable invention, but it at least helps towards whatever invention
+the individual's other qualifications make possible.
+
+Another condition favorable to invention is youth. Seldom does a very
+old person get outside the limits of his previous habits. Few great
+inventions, artistic or practical, have emanated from really old
+persons, and comparatively few even from the middle-aged. On the other
+hand, boys and girls under eighteen seldom produce anything of great
+value, not having as yet acquired the necessary mastery of the
+materials with which they have to deal. The period from twenty years
+up to forty seems to be the most favorable for inventiveness.
+
+
+Imagination Considered in General
+
+Finally, we must return to the question of definition or general
+description that was left open near the beginning of the chapter.
+There seem to be two steps in the inventive response, one preliminary,
+the other strictly inventive. The preliminary step brings the stimuli
+to bear, and invention is the response that follows.
+
+Typically, the preliminary stage consists in recall; and association
+by similarity, bringing together materials from different past
+experiences, is very important as a preliminary to invention. Facts
+recalled from different contexts are thus brought together, and
+invention consists in a response to such novel combinations of facts.
+The two steps in invention are, first, getting a combination of
+stimuli, and second, responding to the combination.
+
+{520}
+
+Sometimes it has been said that imagination consists in putting
+together material from different sources, but this leaves the matter
+in mid-air; recall can bring together facts from different sources and
+so afford the stimulus for an imaginative response, but the response
+goes beyond the mere togetherness of the stimuli. Thinking of a man
+and also of a horse is not inventing a centaur; there is a big jump
+from the juxtaposition of the data to the specific arrangement that
+imagination gives them. The man plus the horse may give no response at
+all, or may give many other responses besides that of a centaur; for
+example, a picture of the man and the horse politely bowing to each
+other. The particular manipulation, or imaginative response, that is
+made varies widely; sometimes it consists in taking things apart
+rather than putting them together, as when you imagine how a house
+would look with the evergreen tree beside it cut down; always it
+consists in putting the data into new relationships.
+
+Imagination thus presents a close parallel to reasoning, where, also,
+there are two stages, the preliminary consisting in getting the
+premises together and the final consisting in perceiving the
+conclusion. The final response in imagination is in general like that
+in reasoning; both are _perceptive reactions_; but imagination is
+freer and more variable. Reasoning is governed by a very precise aim,
+to see the actual meaning of the combined premises; that is, it is
+exploratory; while imagination, though it is usually more or less
+steered either by a definite aim or by some bias in the direction of
+agreeable results, has after all much more latitude. It is seeking,
+not a relationship that is there, but one that can be put there.
+
+{521}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Make a list of hobbies and amusements that you specially enjoy,
+ and try to discover the sources of satisfaction in each.
+
+3. Recall two stories that you specially enjoyed, and try to
+ discover the sources of satisfaction in each.
+
+4. How far does the account of daydreams given in the text square
+ with your own daydreams, and how far does it seem inadequate?
+
+5. An experiment on the speed of revery or of daydreaming.
+ Beginning at a recorded time, by your watch, let your mind wander
+ freely for a few moments, stopping as soon as your stream of
+ thoughts runs dry. Note the time at the close. Now review your
+ daydream (or revery), and tally off the several scenes or
+ happenings that you thought of, so as to count up and see how many
+ distinct thoughts passed through your mind. How many seconds, on
+ the average, were occupied by each successive item?
+
+6. Why do dreams seem real at the time?
+
+7. Analysis of a dream. Take some dream that you recall well, and let
+ your thoughts play about it, and about the separate items of
+ it--about each object, person, speech, and happening in the
+ dream--with the object of seeing whether they remind you of
+ anything personally significant. Push the analysis back to your
+ childhood, by asking whether anything about the dream symbolizes
+ your childish experiences or wishes. To be sure, the psychoanalyst
+ would object that the individual cannot be trusted to make a
+ complete analysis of his own dream--just as the psychologist would
+ object to your accepting the recalled experiences and wishes as
+ necessarily standing in any causal relation to your dream--but, at
+ any rate, the exercise is interesting.
+
+8. Problems in invention. Solve some of these, and compare the
+ mental process with that of reasoning.
+
+ (a) Devise a game to be played by children and adults together,
+ to everybody's satisfaction.
+
+ (b) Imagine a weird animal, after the analogy of the centaur.
+
+ (c) Imagine an interesting incident, bringing in an old man,
+ a little girl, and a waterfall.
+
+ (d) Design the street plan for an ideal small town, built on
+ both sides of a small river.
+
+9. Show how empathy might make us prefer a symmetrical building to
+ one that is lop-sided.
+
+
+{522}
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+
+On the imagination and play of children, see Norsworthy and Whitley's
+_Psychology of Childhood_, 1918, Chapters IX and XII.
+
+For Freud's views regarding dreams, see his _Interpretation of
+Dreams_, translated by Brill, 1913.
+
+For a view which, though psychoanalytical, diverges somewhat from that
+of Freud, see Maurice Nicoll, _Dream Psychology_, 1917; also C. W.
+Kimmins, _Children's Dreams_, 1920.
+
+For studies of play, see Edward S. Robinson, "The Compensatory
+Function of Make-Believe Play", in the _Psychological Review_ for
+1920, Vol. 27, pp. 429-439; also M. J. Reaney, _The Psychology of the
+Organized Group Game_, 1916.
+
+On invention, see Josiah Royce, "The Psychology of Invention", in the
+_Psychological Review_ for 1898, Vol. 5, pp. 113-144; also F. W.
+Taussig's _Inventors and Money-Makers_, 1915.
+
+
+{523}
+
+CHAPTER XX
+
+WILL
+
+PLANNED ACTION, ACTION IN SPITE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT,
+AND ACTION AGAINST EXTERNAL OBSTRUCTION
+
+
+If the psychologist were required to begin his chapter on the will
+with a clean-cut definition, he would be puzzled what to say. He might
+refer to the old division of the mind into the "three great faculties"
+of intellect, feeling, and will, but would be in duty bound to add at
+once that this "tripartite division" is now regarded as rather
+useless, if not misleading. It is misleading if it leads us to
+associate will exclusively with motor action, for we also have
+voluntary attention and voluntary control in reasoning and inventing,
+and we have involuntary motor reactions. "Will" seems not to be any
+special kind of response, but rather to refer to certain relationships
+in which a response may stand to other responses--but this is
+certainly too vague a definition to be of use.
+
+"Will" is not precisely a psychological term, anyway, but is a term of
+common speech which need not refer to any psychological unit. In
+common speech it has various and conflicting meanings. "Since you urge
+me", one may say, "I _will_ do this, though much against my _will_."
+Let the dictionary define such words. What psychology should do with
+them is simply to take them as a mining prospector takes an
+outcropping of ore: as an indication that it may pay to dig in the
+neighborhood.
+
+{524}
+
+Voluntary and Involuntary Action
+
+About the first thing we strike when we start digging is the
+distinction between voluntary and involuntary. A man has committed
+homicide, and the question in court is whether he did it "with malice
+aforethought", i.e., with full will and intention, whether he did it
+in a sudden fit of anger, i.e., impulsively rather than quite
+voluntarily, or whether it was an accident and so wholly unintentional
+or involuntary. The court wishes to know, since a man who has
+committed one sort of homicide is a very different character from one
+who has committed another sort; different acts can be expected from
+him in the future and different precautions need to be taken
+accordingly.
+
+It is a fact, then, that an act may be performed either with or
+without foreknowledge--a remarkable fact both ways! An intentional act
+is remarkable from the side of physics or chemistry or botany--which
+is to say that it is very exceptional in nature at large. On the other
+hand, a completely involuntary act is rather exceptional in human
+behavior and perhaps in animal behavior as well, for almost always
+there is some striving towards an end, some impulse. The simplest
+reflexes, to be sure, are completely involuntary. The pupillary
+reaction to light is not done with malice aforethought, cannot be so
+done. The lid reflex, or wink of the eye, occurs many times in the
+course of an hour, without foreknowledge, or after-knowledge for that
+matter, though the same movement can be made voluntarily. Sneezing and
+coughing are not voluntary in the full sense, but they are distinctly
+impulsive, they strive towards desired relief. To sneeze voluntarily
+is to sneeze when you don't want to, and to sneeze involuntarily is to
+sneeze when you want to--which seems queer, since we usually think of
+a voluntary act as one done to further our wishes. The solution of
+this puzzle is, {525} of course, that a voluntary sneeze is desired
+not because of a direct impulse but to gain some ulterior end, such as
+to prove we can do it, or for histrionic purposes--in short, for some
+purpose beyond the immediate satisfaction of an impulse.
+
+Thus we may classify acts as wholly involuntary or mechanical, as
+impulsive, and as distinctly voluntary or purposive. Or, we may
+arrange acts in a scale from those that have no conscious end, through
+those aimed directly at an immediate end, up to those done to
+accomplish an ulterior end which is imagined beforehand. The last
+class of fully voluntary acts belongs under the general head of
+manipulation, just as imagination does. We _imagine some change_ to be
+produced in the existing situation and then proceed to put our
+imagination into effect; and this is a typical voluntary act.
+
+We seldom, however, picture a _complete_ act in imagination before
+executing it. Even so simple an act as closing the fist cannot be
+completely pictured beforehand; for if you try to imagine how the
+closed fist is going to feel and then close it, you will find that you
+left out of your image many details of the actual kinesthetic
+sensations. What we imagine and intend is _some_ change in the
+situation, and we then proceed to execute that change and other
+changes incidentally.
+
+Besides the simple reflexes, there is another sort of involuntary and
+mechanical action. Through practice and repetition, an act may become
+so habitual as to be done automatically, that is, without being
+imagined beforehand, and even without conscious impulse. The practised
+typist responds in this way to the words he is copying. We should
+notice, however, that this does not mean that the total behavior and
+state of mind of the typist is mechanical and devoid of impulse. The
+typist may write the letters {526} mechanically, and if expert may
+write even words in this way, but all the time he is consciously
+aiming to copy the passage. His attention and impulse have deserted
+the fully mastered details and attach themselves to the larger units.
+In the same way, in signing your name you have no conscious intention
+or impulse to write each successive letter; but you fully intend to
+sign your name.
+
+
+Development of Voluntary Control
+
+The child's actions are at first impulsive but not voluntary in the
+full sense, since obviously he cannot imagine and intend an act till
+he has had experience of that act, and he must usually have
+experienced doing the act himself before he can effectively imagine
+it. At least, this is true of the simpler movements; compound
+movements, made up of familiar elements, may be first observed in
+other persons and then voluntarily imitated. The child's process of
+acquiring voluntary control over a movement is illustrated by the
+story of how the baby learned to put his hand in his mouth. He first
+made this movement in the course of "aimless" throwing of his arms
+about, liked the sensation of the hand in the mouth, tried apparently
+to get it there again, and in the course of a few days was able to put
+it there at will. The child's "aimless" movements at the start were
+probably impulsive, but they were not directed towards any
+preconceived end. Then, having observed a desirable result of one
+movement, he worked towards that result by trial and error, till
+finally he had the necessary movement so closely linked to the thought
+of the result as to follow directly upon the thought.
+
+Once brought under voluntary control, a movement becomes with further
+repetition habitual and mechanical, and no longer voluntary or even
+impulsive. Thus the voluntary {527} performance of an act intervenes
+between the native or instinctive doing of it and the later habitual
+doing of it. Blowing out a match affords another example of this
+course of events. A child can of course blow out, instinctively, when
+he has the natural stimulus for strong expiration, but he cannot at
+will blow at the lighted match. Being prompted and shown, he comes by
+degrees to be able to blow out the match; during the learning stage he
+has to try, and the act is voluntary; but with further practice it
+becomes involuntary, though it may still be executed as part of a
+larger voluntary act, such as preventing a burning match from setting
+fire to something on which it has fallen.
+
+A complex act, or series of movements, may be voluntary as a whole,
+being directed towards some preconceived result, while the single
+movements that constitute the series are mechanical, their particular
+results no longer being thought of separately. This is well
+illustrated by the instances of typewriting, speaking, and signing the
+name, mentioned a moment ago. With practice, the interest in a
+performance goes more and more to the final result and deserts the
+elements of the act.
+
+It is during the organization of reactions that they require attention
+and must be thought of before being executed. Organization goes on and
+on, a thoroughly organized reaction being later combined with others
+into a still bigger act. New demands constantly made upon the
+individual prevent him, however well organized, from ever reaching the
+condition of a wholly automatic machine. Will, in the sense of action
+aimed at the accomplishment of foreseen results, stays with him to the
+end.
+
+
+Ideomotor Action
+
+Involuntary movement is not always "sensorimotor", which means
+directly aroused by a sensory stimulus; oftener {528} it is
+"ideomotor", or directly aroused by an idea or thought. It may be so
+aroused and still be involuntary. We think of a certain result and our
+muscles produce this result, though we did not really mean to do this
+act ourselves. The thought arouses the movement because it has
+previously been linked with the movement. A thought which has
+previously served as the stimulus to an act will tend to have this
+effect again, unless inhibited by some contrary stimulus. There is no
+need of a definite _consent_ to the act, provided there is nothing
+present to inhibit it.
+
+Good examples of ideomotor action can be observed among the audience
+at an athletic contest. You are watching one of your team do the pole
+vault, for instance, and are so much absorbed in his performance and
+so desirous for him to succeed that you identify yourself with him to
+a degree. He is rising to clear the high bar, and the thought of his
+clearing it, monopolizing your mind and leaving no room for the
+inhibitory thought that the performer is down there in the field and
+you up here in the stand, causes you to make an incipient leg movement
+as if you yourself were vaulting.
+
+Voluntary action, in the fullest sense, occurs when you realize the
+situation and are definitely conscious of yourself, that is to say,
+when you differentiate yourself clearly out of the total situation,
+and not only imagine some change to be made, but think of that change
+as to be produced _by you_, without at the same time having any
+contrary thought to inhibit actual execution.
+
+
+Conflict and Decision
+
+It appears that in our "digging" we have now struck another vein, for
+here we have the fact of one tendency running contrary to another and
+inhibiting it. Conflict of desires and the consequent necessity of
+_choosing_ between {529} them, is thus brought vividly to our
+attention. Every one would at once agree that "will" and "choice"
+belong closely together. The most distinctly voluntary acts occur when
+two alternatives are thought of, and one of them is chosen.
+
+Organized as we are by nature, that is to say, on a large scale, but
+incompletely--environed as we are, with multitudinous stimuli
+constantly playing on us and arousing contrary tendencies--we cannot
+hope to escape conflict of motives and the necessity of making
+decisions. Every decision made, every conflict resolved, is a step in
+the further organization of the individual. It may be a step in a good
+direction, or in a bad direction, but it is a step in organizing the
+individual's reaction-tendencies into what we call his
+_character_--the more or less organized sum total of his native and
+acquired tendencies to reaction, with emphasis on those reactions that
+affect his life and social relations in a broad way.
+
+The lowest animals, having few reaction tendencies, and being
+responsive to only a narrow environment, show little sign of internal
+conflict, and when it does occur it is resolved very simply by the
+advantage going to one of the opposing tendencies, with perhaps a
+shift later to the other, in the way described in our earlier
+consideration of attention. [Footnote: See p. 251.] This type of
+decision is fundamental. In the behavior of higher animals, we
+sometimes detect signs of a longer-persisting conflict, as between
+curiosity and fear, when a wild creature seems poised between his
+inclination to approach and examine a strange object and his
+inclination to run away, veering now towards the one and now towards
+the other alternative, and unable, as it seems, to reach a decision.
+
+Conflict between the enterprising tendency to explore, manipulate or
+somehow launch forth into the new, and the negative tendencies of
+fear, inertia, shyness, etc., is {530} something that recurs again and
+again in human experience, as illustrated by making up your mind to
+get up in the morning, or to plunge into the cold water, or to speak
+up and have your say in a general conversation. There is a _hesitancy_
+in such cases, due to a positive and a negative tendency. The conflict
+may be resolved in favor of the negative tendency by simple
+prolongation of the hesitation till the occasion for action has
+passed, or it may be resolved in favor of the positive tendency when
+this is strong enough for an instant to enable the individual to
+commit himself to the enterprise, after which he usually stays
+committed. The positive motive must for an instant be stronger than
+the negative, in order to get action.
+
+A somewhat different type of conflict, which may be called
+_vacillation_, occurs when two positive tendencies are aroused that
+are inconsistent with each other, so that gratification of the one
+entails renunciation of the other. Old Buridan's celebrated problem of
+the ass, placed equally distant from two equally attractive bundles of
+hay, and whether he would starve to death from the exact balance of
+the two opposing tendencies, is a sort of parable to fit this case.
+Probably the poor ass did not starve--unless he richly deserved his
+name--but he may conceivably have ended the very uncomfortable state
+of vacillation by running away altogether, as a human being, who is
+really more subject to vacillation than any other creature, is
+sometimes so much disturbed at having to decide between two
+invitations for the same day as to decline both, and go fishing.
+Vacillation is certainly a very unpleasant state of mind. We want
+action, or else we want peace, but vacillation gives us neither. In
+spite of its irksomeness, we seem sometimes almost powerless to end
+it, because as soon as we have about decided on the one alternative,
+what we shall miss by not choosing the other comes vividly to mind,
+and swings the pendulum its way.
+
+{531}
+
+However it comes about that a decision is reached, it usually is
+reached, and the curious fact then is that it usually sticks. A
+student may vacillate long between the apparently equal attractions of
+two colleges, but when he finally decides on one, the advantages of
+the other lose their hold on him. Now he is all for one and not at all
+for the other. Having identified himself with one college, he has
+completely altered the balance of attractions, his self-assertion now
+going wholly on the side of the chosen college, and even leading him
+to pick flaws in the other as if to reinforce his decision. In other
+words, he "rationalizes", justifies, and fortifies his decision, once
+he has reached it. Some people, indeed, are abnormally subject to
+vacillation and seem never to accept their own decisions as final, but
+normally there are strong influences tending to maintain a decision,
+once it is made: the unpleasantness of the state of vacillation and
+relief at having escaped from it; the satisfaction of having a
+definite course of action; and self-assertion, because we have
+decided, and now this course of action is _ours_. During vacillation,
+neither of the alternatives was identified with ourselves, but now we
+have decided and are not going to be so weak as to change. X is our
+college now and anything you say against it you say against us. Thus
+the person who has decided defends himself energetically against
+reopening the question.
+
+The state of indecision and the state of decision seem thus fairly
+well understood, but the process of passing from the one to the other
+is often obscure. It differs from one case to another. In one case we
+find the rational process of deliberation, in which each alternative
+is weighed and the decision awarded to the one that promises best.
+This is essentially a work of imagination: you imagine that you have
+adopted the one alternative, and see how it suits you, then you do the
+same with the other alternative. You think each {532} alternative
+through to see how satisfactory it will be, balance one against the
+other, and choose accordingly. This is ideal, but often impracticable,
+since we have not the time for full deliberation, or since we cannot
+trust imagination to give us a correct picture, or since we have no
+common measure by aid of which to balance off different sorts of
+satisfaction. Even when practicable, the deliberate way of reaching a
+decision is likely to seem irksome, because of the delay involved and
+the natural propensity for impulsive action. Perhaps the most common
+process is a sort of partial deliberation, the two alternatives
+appealing to us by turns till at some moment one makes a strong enough
+appeal to secure action.
+
+Sometimes there is a deadlock, and then we either give up deciding for
+the moment, and, sleeping over the matter, find when we next take it
+up that one alternative has lost its momentary attractiveness and the
+other has the field; or else, feeling the irksomeness and humiliation,
+almost, of being unable to make up our mind, we say, "Any decision is
+better than none; here goes, then; _this_ is what I will do", so
+breaking the deadlock by what seems like an arbitrary toss-up.
+
+At other times, without such a distinct "act of will", and without any
+observable change in the attractiveness of either alternative, we
+simply find, after awhile, that a decision has emerged, and that we
+now know what we are going to do. What has happened in us to bring
+about the decision we cannot see, but here we are with a decision made
+and perhaps with the act already performed. The two alternatives
+remain theoretically equal, but one has somehow got hold of us, while
+the other has lapsed.
+
+Then there is the case where we "see the better, but follow the
+worse", or are in great danger of so doing. The "worse" is usually
+something that appeals to the {533} "old Adam" in us, something that
+strongly arouses a primitive instinctive response; while the "better"
+is a nobler, more dutiful, or more prudent course. The lower motive
+being the stronger, how can it ever be that the higher motive gets the
+decision? Well, the fight is not just a contest between these two.
+Other motives are drawn into the fray, the whole man is drawn in, and
+it is a question which side is the stronger. Fear of ridicule or
+criticism, sense of duty, self-respect, ambition, ideals of oneself,
+concern for the welfare of another person, loyalty to a social group,
+may be ranged on the side of the "weaker" motive and give it the
+advantage over the stronger.
+
+_What becomes of the rejected motives?_ If unimportant and s
+superficial, they simply lapse into an inactive state and are gradually
+forgotten, perhaps recurring to mind once in a while with a faint
+tinge of regret, since after all we should have liked to gratify them.
+"As a boy, I wanted to be a sailor; well, I would rather like to try
+it for once." When a motive is deeply rooted in our nature, it cannot
+be so easily eliminated. Sometimes it is simply _deferred_ and remains
+dormant, content to bide its time; "there will be time enough for that
+later on". Sometimes it is _disguised_ and then gratified, as when an
+apparently courteous deed contains an element of spite. Sometimes it
+is afforded a _substitute gratification_, as when the boastful boy,
+after having his "conceit taken out of him" by his mates, boasts of
+his school, profession, town or country. This is often called
+"sublimation". Sometimes, though denied, it remains insistent, and
+"_defense mechanisms_" have to be devised to keep it down; the "sour
+grapes" mechanism is an example, which may be used not only when the
+"grapes" are physically out of reach but also when for any reason we
+decide to leave them alone.
+
+The psychoanalytic school lays great stress on {534} "suppressed"
+desires, holding that they become _unconscious while still remaining
+active_, and that they find gratification symbolically in dreams, and
+at times break into waking life in a disturbing way.
+
+The most adequate way of handling rejected motives is to _cooerdinate_
+them with other, accepted motives--to harness them into teams and put
+them to work. This cannot always be done; for example, if a young
+woman has two attractive suitors, she might find difficulty in
+harnessing them together, and will have to say good-by to one, at
+least. But when the boastful boy becomes a loyal and enthusiastic
+member of a school, his self-assertive motive is harnessed up with
+social motives into a very effective team. Probably a tendency can
+only be "sublimated" by being thus combined and cooerdinated with other
+strong tendencies.
+
+These various ways of handling a rejected motive could be nicely
+illustrated from the case of the sex instinct. It so happens, partly
+because modern economic and educational conditions enforce a delay in
+marriage--and in part simply because there are so many attractive
+people in the world--that the cravings of sex must often be denied.
+What becomes of them? Of course the sex instinct is too deep-seated to
+be eradicated or permanently to lapse into a dormant state. But the
+fascination for particular individuals may so lapse or be forgotten.
+Certain people we remember, once in a while, with half-humorous and
+certainly not very poignant regret. Deferring the whole matter till
+the time is ripe works well with many a youth or maiden. Combined with
+social interests, the sex motive finds sublimated satisfaction in a
+great variety of amusements, as well as in business associations
+between the sexes. Introduce a nice young lady into an officeful of
+men, and the atmosphere changes, often for the better,--which means,
+certainly, that the sex motive of these men, combined with ordinary
+business {535} motives, is finding a sublimated satisfaction. The sex
+motive thus enters into a great variety of human affairs. "Defense
+mechanisms" are common in combating unacceptable erotic impulses; the
+sour grapes mechanism sometimes takes the extreme form of a hatred of
+the other sex; but a very good and useful device of this general sort
+is to throw oneself into some quite different type of activity, as the
+young man may successfully work off his steam in athletics. This is
+not sublimation, in any proper use of that term, for athletic sport
+does not gratify the sex tendency in the least, but it gratifies other
+tendencies and so gratifies the individual. It is the individual that
+must be satisfied, rather than any specified one of his tendencies. As
+regards cooerdination, the fact was illustrated just above that this
+method would not always work; but sometimes it works immensely well.
+Here is a young person (either sex), in the twenties, with insistent
+sex impulses, tempted to yield to the fascination of some mediocre
+representative of the other sex. Such a low-level attachment, however,
+militates against self-respect, work, ambition, social sense. Where is
+the "cooerdination"? It has to be found; some worthy mate will harness
+all these tendencies, stimulating and gratifying sex attraction,
+self-respect, ambition, and others besides, and cooerdinating them all
+into the complex and decidedly high-grade sentiment of love.
+
+
+Obstruction and Effort
+
+The term "will" is used to designate the response to external
+obstruction as well as the response to internal conflict. In fact,
+nothing is so characteristically "will" as the overcoming of
+resistance that checks progress towards a desired result. As
+"decision" is the response to internal conflict of tendencies, so
+"effort" is the response to external {536} resistance encountered in
+executing a desire that has been adopted. The obstruction may be
+purely physical, as the underbrush that impedes your progress through
+the woods; or it may be another person's will running counter to
+yours; or it may be of the nature of distraction of attention from the
+end in view.
+
+The resistance may also be internal, and consist in your own lack of
+skill in executing your intentions, or in the disturbing effect of
+some desire which, though rejected, has not gone to sleep but still
+pulls you another way than the way you have decided to go.
+
+In all these cases, the individual is moving towards a certain goal,
+but encounters obstruction; and his response is effort, or increased
+energy put into his movement towards the goal. So long as the tendency
+towards a goal finds smooth going, there is not the same determination
+that appears as soon as an obstruction is encountered. The "will", in
+common usage, will not brook resistance--the "indomitable will".
+
+Now effort and determination, in our chapter on the native impulses,
+were put under the head of the assertive or masterful tendency; and it
+does seem that "will", in this sense, is almost the same thing as the
+instinct of self-assertion. Certainly, in the case of adults, an
+obstruction puts the individual "on his mettle", and superimposes the
+mastery motive upon whatever motive it may have been that originally
+prompted the action.
+
+The mastery motive came clearly to light in an experiment designed to
+investigate "will action". The subject of the experiment was first
+given a long course of training in responding to certain stimulus
+words by other certain words that were constantly paired with them;
+and when his habits of response were thus well fixed, his task was
+changed so that now he must respond to any word or syllable by any
+{537} other that _rhymed_ with it. A series of stimuli now began with
+words for which no specific response habit had been formed, and to
+these the subject reacted with no great difficulty. But then,
+unexpectedly, he got a stimulus word to which he had a fixed habit of
+response, and before he could catch himself he had made the habitual
+response, and so failed to give a rhyme as he had intended. This check
+sometimes made him really angry, and at least it brought him up to
+attention with a feeling which he expressed in the words, "I can and
+will do this thing". He was thus put on his guard, gave closer
+attention to what he was doing, and was usually able to overcome the
+counter tendency of habit and do what he meant to do. Some subjects,
+who adapted themselves readily and fully to the rhyming task, i.e.,
+who got up a good "mental set" for this sort of reaction, made few
+errors and did not experience this feeling of effort and
+determination; for them the effort was unnecessary; but the average
+person needed the extra energy in order to overcome the resistances
+and accomplish his intentions.
+
+Other good instances of effort are found in the overcoming of
+distraction, described under the head of attention, [Footnote: See p.
+259.] and in the work of the beginner at any job. When the beginner
+has passed the first cautious, exploratory stage of learning, he
+begins to "put on steam". He pounds the typewriter, if that is what he
+is learning, spells the words aloud, and in other ways betrays the
+great effort he is making.
+
+Ask a child just learning to write why he grasps the pencil so
+tightly, why he bends so closely over the desk, why he purses his
+lips, knits his brow, and twists his foot around the leg of his chair,
+and he might answer, very truly, that it is because he cannot do this
+job easily and has to _try hard_. All these unnecessary muscular
+movements and tensions {538} show the _access of energy_ that has been
+liberated in his brain by the obstruction encountered.
+
+Any learner, once he has mastered the difficulties of the task,
+reaches an easy-running stage in which effort is no longer required,
+unless for making a record or in some way surpassing himself. With
+reference to effort, then, we may speak of three stages of practice:
+the initial, exploratory stage, the awkward and effortful stage, and
+the skilled and free-running stage. These are identical with the three
+stages in the development of attention to a subject, which were
+described [Footnote: See p.258] as the stage of spontaneous attention
+or curiosity; the stage of forced attention, or effortful attention,
+controlled by such motives as fear or self-assertion; and the final
+stage of objective interest and absorption in the subject, which is
+evidently the same as the free-running condition.
+
+Effort is not a good in itself; it is an unpleasant condition; but it
+is a natural response to difficulty and is often necessary in order to
+get the individual into the free-running condition which is both
+efficient and pleasant. It is often required to get the individual out
+of the easy-going condition into the free-running condition, which is
+something entirely different. In free-running action there may be even
+more energy expended than in effortful action, but it is better
+directed and produces no strains and jolts.
+
+Intelligence, in the sense of adaptability and "seeing the point", may
+often take the place of effort. Consider the way two different people
+react to a sticking door: the one puts in more strength and forces it,
+the other by a deft thrust to the side opens it without much extra
+force. You can't say absolutely which mode of attack is better, for
+your stubborn one may waste his strength on an obstruction that really
+cannot be forced, while your clever one may waste his {539} time on a
+door that needs only a bit of a push. Persistence _plus_ adaptability
+is what efficient activity demands.
+
+
+Thought and Action
+
+"Men of thought" and "men of action" are sometimes contrasted--which
+is hardly fair to either, since the great man of action must have the
+imagination to conceive a plan, and must know exactly what he is
+aiming to accomplish, while the great thinker must be persistent in
+thinking and must get into action by way of writing or somehow making
+his thoughts count in the world. But we do find men who are impatient
+of thought and want to get into action at once, even without knowing
+just what they are about, and other men who seem quite contented to
+think and plan, without any definite intention of ever putting their
+plans into execution. The former type, the impulsive individual, is
+not difficult to understand, his behavior fits in so well with the
+primitive trial-and-error sort of activity; but the mere thinker seems
+an anomaly, in view of the general psychological principle that
+thought tends toward motor action.
+
+In accounting for the inactive thinker, we have to remember, first,
+that some inhibition of immediate action is often necessary, in order
+to have time to think the matter over; this prudent attitude becomes a
+habit with some individuals. Besides, there are the negative motives
+of fear, shyness and laziness that tend to deter from the actual
+execution of a plan. Hamlet's "conscience" that makes "cowards of us
+all", so that "the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the
+pale cast of thought, and enterprises of great pith and moment . . .
+lose the name of action" turns out, if we look a few lines further
+back, to be the "dread of something" unknown, that "puzzles the will,
+and makes us rather bear those ills we have than fly to others that we
+know not of". {540} Fear--fear of unforeseen consequences, fear of
+committing ourselves, fear of ridicule--is one great inhibiter of
+action, and inertia is another, since it is much less strenuous to sit
+in the armchair and plan than to get out and put the plan into effect.
+Besides this, some people who are good at planning come to take so
+much pride and satisfaction in the thinking part of an enterprise that
+they do not feel the need for action. Moreover, you can "plan" in a
+large way, without bothering about details, but once you start to
+execute your plan you encounter details and preliminaries which are
+apt to rob the enterprise of its zest. Here is where persistence and
+effort are needed.
+
+_Abulia_--"no will"--is an abnormal degree of lack of zest for action.
+Along with it go timidity and lack of social force, proneness to
+rumination and daydreaming, and often a feeling of being compelled to
+perform useless acts, such as doing everything three times or
+continual washing of the hands. Abulia is not just a comfortable
+laziness, but is attended by a sense of humiliation and inferiority.
+It shows itself in excessive hesitation and vacillation and in failure
+to accomplish anything of consequence. Sometimes the subject expends
+much effort, but fails to direct the effort towards the execution of
+his purposes. Some authorities have ascribed abulia to inertia or "low
+mental tension", some to an overdose of fear and caution, some to the
+paralyzing effect of suppressed desires still living in the
+"unconscious". Mild degrees of it, such as are not uncommon, seem
+sometimes to be due to the hiatus that is bound to exist between the
+end one has in view and the means one must take to start towards that
+end. One has zest for reaching the goal, but not for the
+preliminaries.
+
+An author, whose case was studied because he was accomplishing so
+little, was found to follow a daily program about as follows. He would
+get up in the morning full of {541} confidence that this was going to
+be a good day, with much progress made in his book. Before starting to
+write, however, he must first have his breakfast, and then a little
+fresh air, just to prepare himself for energetic work. On returning
+from his walk, he thought it best to rest for a few moments, and then
+one or two other little matters seemed to demand attention; by the
+time these were done, the morning was so far gone that there was no
+time for a really good effort, so he optimistically postponed the
+writing till the afternoon, when the same sort of thing happened, and
+the great performance had to be put over till the next day. This man
+did better under a regime prescribed by his medical adviser, who
+commanded him to write for two hours immediately after rising, and
+make this his day's work--no more and no less than two hours. The
+definiteness of this task prevented dawdling.
+
+Other writers have noted a curious tendency to "fight shy" of the
+passage actually being written and let the thoughts move ahead and
+plan out the later passages. Sometimes it is necessary to trick
+yourself if you are to get anything done; you say, "I can't write this
+properly just now; I'll just sketch out a preliminary draft"--on which
+understanding you may be able to write, whereas you could not if you
+thought you were writing "for keeps"; but when you have got well
+started and warmed to the task, you may find your work good enough to
+keep, after all. Judging by these mild cases, abulia may be due partly
+to distaste for the details of actual performance, and partly to a
+dread of committing oneself to anything that has the stamp of
+finality.
+
+
+Securing Action
+
+No chapter in psychology offers more in the way of practical
+applications than this chapter on the will--if we only {542} knew more
+on the subject! How to get action, either from yourself, or from
+others if you are responsible for their action, is a big practical
+problem. A few hints on the matter are suggested by what precedes.
+
+How to get action from yourself--how to liberate your latent energies
+and accomplish what you are capable of accomplishing. A definite
+purpose is the first requirement; without that one merely drifts, with
+no persistency and no great energy. The goal should be something that
+appeals vitally to you, and something which you can attain; not too
+distant a goal; or, if the ultimate goal is distant, there must be
+mileposts along the way which you can take as more immediate goals;
+for a goal that can be reached by immediate action enlists more
+present effort. The student puts more energy into his study when the
+examination is close at hand; and, although this is regrettable, it
+reveals a fact in human nature that can be utilized in the management
+of yourself or others. A well defined and clearly visible goal is a
+much better energy-releaser than vague "good intentions".
+
+The more clearly you can see and measure your approach towards the
+goal, the more action; thus it has been found in many different lines
+that the "practice curve method" of training gives quicker and better
+results than ordinary drill. In the practice curve [Footnote: See p.
+321.] you have a picture of your progress; you are encouraged by
+seeing how far you have advanced, and stimulated to surpass your past
+record, and thus your immediate goal is made very definite. You cannot
+do so well when you simply "do your best" as when you set out to reach
+a certain level, high enough to tax your powers without being quite
+out of reach. You cannot jump so high in the empty air as you can to
+clear a bar; and, to secure your very best endeavor, the bar must not
+be so low {543} that you can clear it easily, nor so high that you
+cannot clear it at all.
+
+The goal should be heartily adopted as _your_ goal, which is to say
+that the self-assertive motive should be harnessed into service. The
+importance of this motive in securing action is seen in the strong
+effect of competition to arouse great activity. The runner cannot make
+as good speed when running "against time" as when competing directly,
+neck to neck, with other runners. Hence, to get full action from
+yourself, find worthy competitors. And for the same reason, accept
+responsibility. This puts you on your mettle. To shun competition and
+responsibility is characteristic of abulia. Other strong motives, such
+as the economic motive or the sex motive (seen in the energetic work
+of a young man whose goal is marriage to a certain young woman) can
+also be enlisted in many cases. But, for the best results, there
+should be, in addition to these extraneous motives, a genuine interest
+in the work itself.
+
+Do not say, "I will try". Say, "I will do it". The time for trying, or
+effort, is when obstruction is actually encountered. You cannot really
+try then, unless you are already fully determined to reach the goal.
+
+Getting action from other people is the business of parents, teachers,
+bosses, officers, and to some extent of every one who wishes to
+influence another. In war, the problem of "morale" is as important as
+the problem of equipment, and it was so recognized by all the armies
+engaged in the Great War. Each side sought to keep the morale of its
+own soldiers at a high level, and to depress the morale of the enemy.
+Good morale means more than willingness for duty; it means "pep", or
+positive zest for action. Some of the means used to promote morale
+were the following. The soldier must believe in the justness of his
+cause; that is, he must make victory his own goal, and be {544}
+whole-hearted in this resolve. He must believe in the coming success
+of his side. He must be brought to attach himself firmly to the social
+group of which he forms a part. He must be so absorbed in the
+activities of this group as to forget, in large measure, his own
+private concerns. Not only must he be enthusiastic for cause and
+country, but he must be strong for his division, regiment and company.
+Much depends on the officers that directly command him. He must have
+confidence in them, see that they know their business, and that they
+are looking out for the welfare of their men as well as expecting much
+from them. Competition between companies, regiments, and arms of the
+service was a strong force tending towards rapid progress in training
+and good service in the field. Interest in the actual technical work
+that was being done, and seeing that one's immediate group was
+accomplishing something towards the winning of the war was a powerful
+spur, while a sense of the uselessness of the work in hand strongly
+depressed the morale of a group. "Nothing succeeds like success";
+morale was at its best when the army was advancing and seemingly
+nearing the goal. Morale was also wonderfully good when the enemy was
+advancing, provided your side was holding well with a good prospect of
+bringing the enemy to a halt and baffling his offensive. On the other
+hand, nothing was so hard on morale as the failure of an ambitious
+offensive of one's own side; the sense of futility and hopelessness
+then reached its maximum--except, of course, for the case of obviously
+approaching defeat. The conditions of trench warfare imposed a strain
+on morale: no progress, in spite of the danger and hardship, no chance
+to get at the enemy or do anything positive.
+
+The manager of an industrial enterprise has the same problem of morale
+to meet. It is his business to get action from people who come into
+the enterprise as servants. The {545} main difficulty with the
+master-servant relation is that the servant has so little play for his
+own self-assertion. The master sets the goal, and the servant has
+submissively to accept it. This is not his enterprise, and therefore
+he is likely to show little "pep" in his work. He can be driven to a
+certain extent by fear and economic want; but better results, and the
+best social condition generally, can be expected from such management
+as enlists the individual's own will. He must be made to feel that the
+enterprise is his, after all. He must feel that he is fairly treated,
+and that he receives a just share of the proceeds. He must be
+interested in the purposes of the concern and in the operations on
+which he is engaged. Best of all, perhaps, some responsibility and
+initiative must be delegated to him. When the master, not contented
+with setting the main goal, insists on bossing every detail,
+continually interfering in the servant's work, the servant has the
+least possible chance of adopting the job as _his own_. But where the
+master is able, in the first place, to show the servant the objective
+need and value of the goal, and to leave the initiative in respect to
+ways and means to the servant, looking to him for results, the servant
+often responds by throwing himself into the enterprise as if it were
+his own--as, indeed, it properly is in such a case.
+
+"Initiative"--that high-grade trait that is so much in demand--seems
+to be partly a matter of imagination and partly of will. It demands
+inventiveness in seeing what can be done, zest for action, and an
+independent and masterful spirit.
+
+The physician who treats "nervous" or neurotic cases has this problem
+of getting action from his patients. Strange as it may seem, these
+cases, while bemoaning their unfortunate condition, cling to it as if
+it had its compensations, and do not wholeheartedly _will to get
+well_. They have {546} slumped into the attitude of invalidism, and
+need reorientation towards the goal of health and accomplishment. How
+to bring this about is the great problem. Much depends here on the
+personality of the physician, and different physicians (as well as
+mental healers outside the medical profession) employ different
+technique with more or less of success. The first necessity is to win
+the patient's confidence; after that, some use persuasion, some
+suggestion, some psychoanalysis, some (non-medical practitioners) use
+metaphysical doctrines designed to lead the patient to "hitch his
+wagon to a star". On the intellectual side, these methods agree in
+giving the patient a new perspective, in which weakness, ill health
+and maladaptation are seen to be small, insignificant and unnecessary,
+and health and achievement desirable and according to the nature of
+things; while on the side of impulse they probably come together in
+appealing to the masterful and self-assertive tendency, either by
+putting the subject on his mettle, or by leading him to partake of the
+determined, masterful attitude of the physician, or by making him feel
+that he is one with the great forces of the universe. Methods that
+psychologically are very similar to these are employed by the
+clergyman in dealing with morally flabby or maladjusted individuals;
+and the courts are beginning to approach the delinquent from the same
+angle. All the facts seem to indicate that the way to get action is to
+have a goal that "fires the imagination" and enlists the masterful
+tendencies of human nature.
+
+
+The Influence of Suggestion
+
+Can the will of one person be controlled by that of another, through
+hypnotism or any similar practice? This question is often asked
+anxiously by those who fear that crime or misconduct willed by one
+person may be passively executed by another.
+
+{547}
+
+Hypnosis is a sleeplike and passive state that is nevertheless
+attentive and concentrated. It appears as if the subject were awake at
+just one point, namely at the point of relation with the hypnotizer.
+To stimuli from other sources, external or internal, he is
+inaccessible. His field of activity is narrowed down to a point,
+though at that point he may be intensely active.
+
+The depth of the hypnotic state varies from shallow to profound.
+Comparatively few individuals can be deeply hypnotized, but many can
+be got into a mild receptive state, in which they accept the
+suggestions of the hypnotizer more readily than in the fully awaking
+state. The waking person is alert, suspicious, assertive, while the
+hypnotized subject is passive and submissive. The subject's
+cooeperation is necessary, in general, in order to bring on the
+hypnotic state, whether shallow or deep.
+
+The means of inducing hypnosis are many and varied, but they all
+consist in shoving aside extraneous thoughts and stimuli, and getting
+the subject into a quiet, receptive attitude, with attention sharply
+focussed upon the operator.
+
+When the subject is in this state, the "suggestions" of the operator
+are accepted with less criticism and resistance than in the fully
+waking state. In deep hypnosis, gross illusions and even
+hallucinations can be produced. The operator hands the subject a
+bottle of ammonia, with the assurance that it is the perfume of roses,
+and the subject smells of it with every appearance of enjoyment. The
+operator points to what he says is a statue of Apollo in the corner,
+and the subject apparently sees one there.
+
+Loss of sensation can also be suggested and accepted. Being assured
+that his hand has lost its sensation and cannot feel a pin prick, the
+subject allows his hand to be pricked with no sign of pain. Paralysis
+of the arm or leg can be similarly suggested and accepted.
+
+{548}
+
+Acts may be suggested and performed. The subject is handed a cardboard
+sword with the assurance that that is a sword, and directed to attack
+some person present, which he does with the appearance of serious
+intent.
+
+Now, however, let the subject be given a real sword with the same
+command as before. Result--the subject wakes up! This suggestion was
+too much; it aroused dormant tendencies, broadened out the field of
+activity, and so produced the waking condition. A suggestion that runs
+counter to the subject's organized character and tendencies cannot get
+by without arousing them and so awakening the subject. Consequently,
+there does not seem to be much real danger of crimes being performed
+by innocent persons under hypnosis.
+
+In mild hypnosis, the above striking phenomena are not produced, but
+suggestions of curative value may be conveyed, and so taken to heart
+that they produce real results. The drowsy state of a child just
+falling to sleep can be similarly utilized for implanting suggestions
+of value. One little boy had a nervous twitching of the face that was
+very annoying. His father, just as the child was dropping off to
+sleep, conveyed the suggestion that the child didn't like this
+twitching; and this suggestion, repeated night after night, in a few
+days caused the twitching almost wholly to disappear.
+
+Suggestion often succeeds in a waking state. In a certain test for
+"suggestibility", the task is set of copying a series of lines. The
+first line is short, the second longer, the third longer still, the
+rest all of the same length, but the more suggestible individual keeps
+on making each succeeding line longer. There are, however, various
+tests for suggestibility, and an individual who succumbs to one does
+not necessarily succumb to another, so that it may be doubted whether
+we should baldly speak of one individual as more suggestible than
+another.
+
+{549}
+
+Suggestion may be exerted by a person, or by the circumstances. If by
+a person, the more "prestige" he enjoys in the estimation of the
+subject, the greater his power of suggestion. A prestige person is one
+to whom you are submissive. A child is so dependent on older people,
+and so much accustomed to "being told", that he is specially
+susceptible to prestige suggestion.
+
+Suggestion exerted by the circumstances is about the same as what is
+often called "auto-suggestion" or "self-suggestion". A man falls and
+hurts his hip, and, finding his leg difficult to move, conceives that
+it is paralyzed, and may continue paralyzed for some time.
+
+"Counter-suggestion" applies to cases where a suggestion produces the
+result contrary to what is suggested. You suggest to a person that he
+should do a certain thing, and immediately he is set against that act,
+though, left to himself, he would have performed it. Or, you advance a
+certain opinion and at once your hearer takes the other side of the
+question. Quite often skilful counter-suggestion can secure action,
+from children or adults, which could not be had by positive suggestion
+or direct command.
+
+If suggestion succeeds by arousing the submissive tendency,
+counter-suggestion succeeds by arousing the assertive tendency.
+Suggestion works when it gets response without awakening the
+resistance which might be expected, and counter-suggestion when it
+arouses so much resistance that the suggestion itself does not have
+the influence which might be expected. In terms of stimulus and
+response, suggestion works when a particular stimulus (what is
+suggested) arouses response without other stimuli being able to
+contribute to the response; and counter-suggestion works when a
+stimulus (what is suggested, again) is itself prevented from
+contributing to the response. In counter-suggestion, response to the
+suggestion itself is inhibited, and in positive {550} suggestion
+response to other stimuli is inhibited. Both involve narrowness of
+response, and are opposed to what we commonly speak of as "good
+judgment", the taking of all relevant stimuli into account, and
+letting the response be aroused by the combination.
+
+{551}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Which of the previous chapters have the closest contacts with
+ the present chapter?
+
+3. How does the popular conception of hypnotism differ from the
+ scientific?
+
+4. List 8 acts performed during the day, and arrange them in order
+ from the most involuntary to the most voluntary.
+
+5. Analyze a complex performance so as to show what in it is voluntary
+ and what involuntary.
+
+6. Mention an instance of practice changing a voluntary performance
+ into an involuntary, and one of practice changing an involuntary
+ performance into a voluntary.
+
+7. If an individual is influenced by two opposing motives, must he
+ act according to the stronger of the two?
+
+8. Illustrate, in the case of anger, several ways of dealing with a
+ rejected motive. i.e., in what different ways can anger be
+ controlled?
+
+9. How would you represent purpose in neural terms? How does
+ it compare with "mental set"?
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+On the importance of self-assertion (and of submission) in will, and
+on the relation of conduct to impulse and to reasoning, see
+McDougall's _Social Psychology_, Chapter IX, on "Volition", and
+Supplementary Chapter I, on "Theories of Action".
+
+For a practical study of the question, how to secure action, see
+Walter Dill Scott's _Increasing Human Efficiency in Business_, 1911.
+
+On hypnotism, see Albert Moll's _Hypnotism_, translated by A. F.
+Hopkirk; or James's Chapter XXVII in his _Principles of Psychology_,
+1890.
+
+{552}
+
+CHAPTER XXI
+
+PERSONALITY
+
+THE INDIVIDUAL AS A WHOLE, INTEGRATED OR PARTIALLY DISSOCIATED
+
+People differ not only in intelligence and efficiency, but in an
+intangible something referred to as "personality". If your
+acquaintance is applying for a certain position, and has named you as
+one of his references, you will be asked by the appointing officer to
+tell what you know of the candidate's experience, his knowledge and
+skill in the field where he desires a position, his character and
+habits, and his _personality_; and in replying you state, if you
+conscientiously can, that the candidate has a pleasing and forceful
+personality, that he gets on well with superiors, equals and
+inferiors, is cooeperative, energetic, ambitious without being selfish,
+clean, modest, brave, self-reliant, cheerful, optimistic,
+equal-tempered; and you perhaps include here traits that might also be
+classed under the head of "character", as honesty, truthfulness,
+industry, reliability, and traits that might be classed under
+physique, as good appearance and carriage, commanding presence, a
+"strong face", and even neatness and good taste in dress. Here we have
+an array of traits that are of great importance to the individual's
+success in his work, in his social relationships and in his family
+life; and it is a proof of how much remains to be accomplished in
+psychology that we cannot as yet present anything like a real
+scientific analysis of personality, nor show on what elementary
+factors it depends.
+
+{553}
+
+Factors in Personality
+
+If we do attempt some sort of analysis, we have first to notice that
+personality depends in part on _physique_. In ordinary life, mental
+and physical traits are not sharply distinguished, and probably they
+cannot be distinguished except in the abstract. The mere size of a
+person affects his attitude towards other people and their attitude
+towards him--and it is in such social relations that personality most
+clearly stands out. His size affects the individual's behavior in
+subtle ways, since the big fellow dominates others easily just by
+virtue of his size, and so tends to be good-humored, while the little
+fellow is apt to be strenuous and self-assertive. Muscular development
+and "looks" also have their effect on personality.
+
+Another factor might, by a sort of play on words, be called
+_chemique_. This corresponds to what is often called _temperament_, a
+very obscure matter psychologically. We speak of one as having an
+excitable temperament, a jovial or a sour temperament. "Disposition"
+is another word used in connection with such traits. The ancients
+attempted to relate the "four temperaments" to the four great "humors"
+or fluids of the body. Thus the "sanguine" individual was one with a
+surplus of blood, the "choleric" had a surplus of bile, the
+"phlegmatic" a surplus of phlegm, and the "melancholic" a surplus of
+black bile or spleen; and any individual's temperament resulted from
+the balance of these four. Sometimes a fifth temperament, the nervous,
+was admitted, dependent on the "nerve fluid".
+
+This particular chemical derivation of temperament is, of course, out
+of date, being based on very imperfect knowledge of physiology; but it
+still remains possible that chemical substances carried around in the
+body fluids have much to do with the sort of trait that we think of
+under {554} the head of temperament. Only that to-day, with some
+knowledge regarding the internal secretions of the "endocrine glands",
+we should be inclined to connect temperament with them, rather than
+with blood, bile, etc. Take, for example, the secretion of the adrenal
+glands, that we found to be poured out during fear and anger and to
+have so much to do with the bodily condition of readiness for violent
+action and probably also with the "stirred-up" emotional state. What
+is more likely than that individuals differ in the strength of their
+adrenal secretion or in the readiness with which the glands are
+aroused to pour it out into the circulation? The excitable individual
+might be one with over-active adrenals. And in the same way the
+strenuous individual might be one with an unusually active thyroid
+gland, since there certainly seems to be some connection between this
+gland and the tendency to great activity. There are several other
+glands that possibly affect behavior in somewhat similar ways, so that
+it is not improbable, though still rather hypothetical, that chemical
+substances, produced in these glands, and carried by the blood to the
+brain and muscles, have much to do with the elusive traits that we
+class under temperament and personality.
+
+Once more, consider the instincts in relation to personality.
+Undoubtedly these instinctive tendencies differ in strength in
+different individuals. One is more gregarious than another, and this
+is an important element in his personality. One is more assertive and
+masterful than another, one is more "motherly" than another, more
+responsive by tender and protective behavior to the presence of
+children or others who need help. One is more prone to laugh than
+another, and the "sense of humor" is admitted to be an important
+element in personality. And so on through the list; so that
+personality can be partially analyzed in terms of instinct.
+
+{555}
+
+Has _intelligence_ anything to do with personality? It certainly has,
+in many ways. One who is slow in learning adapts himself poorly to
+other persons and remains out of touch with his social environment.
+"Tact" depends partly on instinctive liking for society, no doubt, but
+partly on the ability to perceive what others want, and on the
+imagination to put yourself in their place. High principles require
+the ability to reason things out and see them in perspective.
+Statistical studies of the rulers of Europe, for a period of several
+centuries, show that on the whole those with higher intelligence were
+also of better character and personality. Criminals, taken as a whole,
+average rather low in intelligence; and it may even be doubted whether
+the clever, scheming rascal, who defrauds widows of their money, or
+trains feeble-minded boys to pick pockets for him, has, after all, the
+brains of the man who can easily see how such schemes could be worked
+but decides against them himself because he sees something better
+worth doing.
+
+A sense of inferiority, either physical or mental, is apt to affect
+the personality unfavorably. It does not necessarily produce humble
+behavior; far from that, it often leads to a nervous assertiveness. An
+apparently disdainful individual is often really shy and unsure of
+himself. Put a man where he can see he is equal to his job and at the
+same time is accomplishing something worth while, and you often see
+considerable improvement in his personality.
+
+
+The Self
+
+In a broad, objective sense, the self is the individual, but in a more
+subjective sense the self is what the individual knows about himself,
+how he conceives himself, how he feels about himself, what he plans
+and wishes for himself. It is reasonable to suppose that the newly
+born infant does not {556} distinguish himself from other objects.
+Perhaps his foot, as he sees it, seems simply an object among others,
+like a toy; but he soon learns to connect the visual appearance with
+the cutaneous and kinesthetic sensations from the foot, and these
+sensations, along with the organic, always retain in large measure the
+subjective quality of belonging to the self, whereas sights, sounds,
+odors and tastes seem to belong to objects distinct from the self.
+
+If we ask how the child comes to make the distinction between the self
+and the not-self, we have to call to mind the assertiveness that
+manifests itself very early in the child's behavior--how he resists
+being pushed and pulled about, struggles against being held, and in
+many ways, more and more complex as he develops, shows that he has a
+"will of his own". It is in resisting and overcoming external things
+that he comes to distinguish himself from them.
+
+Not only external things, but other _persons_ particularly, have to be
+encountered and resisted by the child; and often, too, he has to
+submit to them, after a struggle. Probably he distinguishes between
+himself and other people even more sharply than between himself and
+inanimate things. Ask any one to tell you what he knows about himself,
+and he will begin to tell you how he differs from others. Thus the
+individual's conception of himself is largely a product of his social
+experience.
+
+The self is first known as wish or will, and probably that always
+remains the core of any one's conception of himself. That is to say, I
+think of myself first of all as wishing, aiming, purposing, resisting,
+striving, competing. But I may come to know myself more objectively.
+By dint of experience I know something of my limitations. I know I am
+not muscular enough to do this, nor mathematical enough to do that,
+nor artistic enough to do the other. In this progressive age, some
+children even know their own IQ. We {557} have frequent occasion to
+measure ourselves against others, or against tasks, and lay some of
+the lessons to heart. Though most of us are probably inclined to
+overrate ourselves, many will be found to give a pretty exact estimate
+of themselves. It is surprising that this should be so, in view of the
+tendency to believe what one wishes, and of the deep-seated desire for
+superiority or at least against inferiority. It shows that, after all,
+there is a good deal of fidelity to fact in our make-up.
+
+The word "self-assertion", which has been used more or less throughout
+the book as a name for the native tendency to resist, persist, master,
+dominate, display oneself and seek social recognition, can now be seen
+to be not entirely a good word for the purpose. It seems to imply that
+the self-assertive individual is necessarily conscious of the self.
+From what has just been said, it can be seen that this would be
+putting the cart before the horse. The self-assertive impulse
+precedes, consciousness of self follows and depends on self-assertion.
+A true estimate of oneself and one's limitations arises from
+self-assertion plus experience of failure and the necessity of giving
+up and submitting.
+
+Self-assertion is not identical with selfishness. Selfishness aims to
+get, self-assertion to do. Selfish behavior is, however, often
+dictated by self-assertion, as when a person wishes to get and have,
+in order to be able to show by his possessions what a great man he is.
+But sometimes self-assertion squelches selfishness, leading a person
+to renounce present gain without hope of later gain in compensation,
+just because he sees in such renunciation the best chance for mastery
+and proving himself "the captain of his soul".
+
+The "expansion of the self" is an interesting and significant
+phenomenon. The individual comes to call things, persons, social
+groups, ideas and principles by the name {558} "mine". Now what is
+mine is part of me. My self-feeling attaches to my dog; I am proud of
+that dog, brag of his exploits, am cast down if I see him outclassed;
+and it is the same way with my house, my son, my town, my country. We
+spoke of this sort of thing before, under the name of "sublimation of
+the self-assertive impulse", and we said then that the sublimation was
+made possible by the combination of this impulse with some other
+interest. My dog is not entirely myself; he is a dog, and I am
+interested in him as a dog; I am interested in other dogs, and like to
+watch their antics. But this particular dog means more than another to
+me because he is mine; I have expanded myself to include him. In
+general, the self is expanded to take in objects that are interesting
+in themselves, but which become doubly interesting by being
+appropriated and identified in some measure with oneself.
+
+
+Integration and Disintegration of the Personality
+
+Though the individual is always in one sense a unit, there is a sense
+in which he needs to achieve unity. His various native tendencies and
+interests do not always pull together, and in fact some necessarily
+pull against others. So that we sometimes say of a person that he is
+behaving so differently from usual that we should not know he was the
+same person. We may speak of one person as being well integrated,
+meaning that he is always himself, his various tendencies being so
+cooerdinated as to work reasonably well together; whereas of another we
+speak as poorly integrated, unstable, an uncertain quantity.
+Integration is achieved partly by selection from among conflicting
+impulses, partly by cooerdination, partly by judicious treatment of
+those impulses that are denied; as was partly explained in the last
+chapter.
+
+{559}
+
+The self, expanding socially, may expand in more than one direction,
+with the result that the individual has in a sense two or more selves,
+one for his business, one for his home; and it may happen that the
+instincts and interests dominating the individual in these two
+relations are quite different, so that a man who is hard and grasping
+in business is kind and generous to his wife and children. "Dr. Jekyll
+and Mr. Hyde" gives an extreme picture of such lack of integration, a
+picture rather fanciful than drawn from real life.
+
+But we do find in real life cases of _dissociation_ of the
+personality, also called cases of double or multiple personality. The
+individual passes from one state to another, behaving very differently
+in the two states, and usually unable to remember in the primary or
+more lasting state what he has done in the secondary state. In the
+secondary state he remembers what he did in the primary state, but is
+apt to speak of it as if done by another person. In many cases, the
+primary state seems limited and hampered, as if the individual were
+not his complete self, while the secondary state is a sort of
+complement to the first, but decidedly imperfect in itself. Thus in
+the primary state the individual may be excessively quiet, while in
+the secondary state he is excessively mischievous. It is much as if
+some of his reaction-tendencies were forcibly kept apart from the
+rest, so that when they did become aroused to activity, the remainder
+of the individual went to sleep. The individual seems to function in
+fractions, and never as a whole.
+
+Often the secondary state likes to have a name for itself and to be
+considered as a secondary personality, as if two persons were
+inhabiting the same body--a very forced conception. The secondary
+personality will even assert that it stays awake in the background and
+watches the primary personality when the latter is active, spying on
+it without {560} that personality being aware of it. Thus two
+fractions of the individual would be functioning at the same time, but
+still not working together as a unit.
+
+This claim of the secondary personality has been experimentally
+checked up by Dr. Morton Prince, in the following way. He was able to
+cause his subject, a young woman, to pass from the primary to the
+secondary state and back again, by a procedure resembling hypnotism.
+While she was in the secondary state, he told her that she (the
+secondary personality) was to solve an arithmetical problem, the
+general nature of which he described to her then and there, while the
+actual numbers were not shown till she was put back in the primary
+state. He then put her into the primary state for a few moments, and
+placed the numbers unobtrusively before her, without the primary
+personality seeming to notice them. Put back now into the secondary
+state, she instantly shouted out the answer to the problem, and
+asserted that she (the secondary personality) had had the answer ready
+for some time, and had been impatiently waiting to be brought back and
+announce it. This is at least prima facie evidence in favor of Dr.
+Prince's view, that two separate fractions of the individual were both
+functioning consciously at the same time.
+
+It is weird business, however interpreted, and raises the question
+whether anything of the same sort, only milder in degree, occurs in
+ordinary experience. Here is one somewhat similar fact that we are all
+familiar with: we have two matters in hand at the same time, very
+different in their emotional tone, one perhaps a worrisome matter of
+business, the other an interesting personal matter; and the shift from
+one to the other feels almost like changing personalities. Also, while
+busy with one, we may sometimes feel the other stirring, just barely
+awake and dimly conscious.
+
+Also, is not something like this true?--A person, very {561}
+conscientious in the performance of his duties, always doing what he
+is told, feels stirrings of a carefree, independent spirit, as if some
+sides of his nature were not finding expression, and in little ways he
+gives it expression, not exactly by taking a "moral holiday"
+[Footnote: This is one of William James's expressive phrases.] or
+going on a spree of some sort, but by venting his impulses just an
+instant at a time, so that he scarcely remembers it later, and in such
+little ways that other people, also, are scarcely aware of It. He has
+a "secondary personality", only it is little developed, and it has its
+little place in the conscious life, instead of being dissociated.
+
+In the cases of true dissociation, there was often a violent emotional
+shock that started the cleavage. One celebrated case started at 8
+years of age, when the subject, a little girl, was thrown to the floor
+by a drunken father angered by finding the child asleep in his bed.
+From that moment, it would seem that the frolicsome side of childish
+behavior was banished from the main personality, and could get into
+action only when the main personality relaxed its control and became
+dormant; so that thereafter the child alternated between two states,
+one very quiet, industrious and conscientious, the other vivacious and
+mischievous; and the main personality never remembered what was done
+in this secondary, mischievous state. In such cases, it would appear
+that the cleavage resulted from a violent thrusting out from the main
+personality of tendencies inconsistent with the dominant (here
+serious) attitude of that personality.
+
+
+The Unconscious, or, the Subconscious Mind
+
+Here at last, it may strike the reader, we have come to the core of
+the whole subject of psychology; for many readers will undoubtedly
+have been attracted by the statements {562} sometimes made, to the
+effect that the "unconscious" represents the deeper and more
+significant part of mental life, and that psychologists who confine
+their attention mostly to the conscious activities are treating their
+subject in a very partial and superficial manner. There is a sort of
+fascination about the notion of a subconscious mind, and yet it will
+be noticed that psychologists, as a rule, are inclined to be wary and
+critical in dealing with it. Let as take up in order the various sorts
+of unconscious mental processes.
+
+In the first place, _retention is unconscious_. The host of memories
+that a person possesses and can recall under suitable conditions is
+carried about with him in an unconscious condition. But there need be
+no special mystery about this, nor is it just to speak about memories
+being "preserved in the unconscious". The fact simply is that
+retention is a resting condition, whereas consciousness is an active
+condition. Retention is a matter of brain structure, neurone
+connections, neural mechanisms ready for action when the proper
+stimulus reaches them but remaining inactive till the stimulus comes.
+An idea is like a motor reaction, to the extent that it is a reaction;
+and we retain ideas in the same way that we retain learned motor
+reactions. Now no one would think of saying that a learned motor
+reaction was retained in the unconscious. The motor reaction is not
+present at all, until it is aroused; the neuro-muscular mechanism for
+executing the reaction is present, but needs a stimulus to make it
+active and give the reaction. In the same way, an idea is not present
+in the individual except when it is activated, but its neural
+mechanism is present, and unconscious just because it is inactive.
+
+Unconscious inactivity is therefore no great problem. But there is
+such a thing as _unconscious activity_. Two sorts of such activity are
+well known. First, there are the {563} purely "physiological"
+processes of digestion, liver and kidney secretion, etc. We are quite
+reconciled to these being unconscious, and this is not the sort of
+unconscious activity that gives us that fascinatingly uncanny feeling.
+Second, there are the "secondarily automatic" processes, once
+conscious, now almost or quite unconscious through the effect of
+frequent repetition.
+
+Such unconscious activities occur as _side-activities_, carried on
+while something else occupies attention, or as _part-activities_ that
+go on while attention is directed to the total performance of which
+they are parts. In either case, the automatism may be motor or
+perceptive, and the degree of consciousness may range from moderate
+down to zero. [Footnote: See pp. 265-267.]
+
+For example, the letters of your name you write almost unconsciously,
+while fully conscious of writing your name. When you are reading, the
+letters are only dimly conscious, and even the words are only
+moderately conscious, while the whole performance of reading is highly
+conscious. These are instances of unconscious (or dimly conscious)
+part-activities. Unconscious side-activities are illustrated by
+holding your books firmly but unconsciously under your arm, while
+absorbed in conversation, by drumming with your fingers while puzzling
+over a problem, and by looking at your watch and reading the time, but
+so nearly unconsciously that the next instant you have to look again.
+In all such cases, the unconscious or barely conscious activity has
+been made easy by previous practice, and there is no special
+fascination about it, except such as comes through the use of that
+awesome word, "unconscious".
+
+But now for the real "subconscious mind". You try to recall a familiar
+name, but are stuck; you drop the matter, and "let your subconscious
+mind work"; and, sure enough, after a few minutes you have the name.
+Or, you are all {564} tangled up in a difficult problem; you let the
+subconscious mind work on it overnight, and next morning it is
+perfectly clear. Just here it is that psychology begins to take issue
+with the popular idea. The popular interpretation is that work has
+been done on the problem during the interval when it was out of
+consciousness--unconscious mental work of a high order. But is it
+necessary to suppose that any work has been done on the problem during
+the interval?
+
+The difficulty, when you first attacked the problem, arose from false
+clues which, once they got you, held you by virtue of their "recency
+value". [Footnote: See pp. 390-391.] The matter laid aside, these
+false clues lost their recency value with lapse of time, so that when
+you took the matter up again you were free from their interference and
+had a good chance to go straight towards the goal.
+
+It is the same with motor acts. On a certain day, a baseball pitcher
+falls into an inefficient way of handling the ball, and, try as he
+may, cannot recover his usual form. He has to give up for that day,
+but after a rest is as good as ever. Shall we say that his
+subconscious mind has been practising pitching during the rest
+interval? It is much more likely that here, as in the preceding case,
+the value of a fresh start lies in freshness, in rest and the
+consequent disappearance of interferences, rather than in any work
+that has been done during the interval of rest.
+
+Next, consider the "co-conscious" as Morton Prince has well named
+the presence and activity of the secondary personality along with the
+primary, as in his experiment described above. Here it seems that two
+streams of consciousness were flowing along side by side within the
+same individual. There is the activity of the main personality, and
+there is the activity of the secondary personality, going on at the
+same time without the knowledge of the main {565} personality. This is
+a way of reading the facts, rather than a simple statement of fact,
+but at least it is a reasonable interpretation, and worthy of
+consideration.
+
+
+Unconscious Wishes and Motives
+
+Schopenhauer wrote much of the "will to live", which was, in his view,
+as unconscious as it was fundamental, and only secondarily gave rise
+to the conscious life of sensations and ideas. Bergson's "elan vital"
+has much the same meaning. In a sense, the will to live is the
+fountain of all our wishes; in another sense, it is the sum total of
+them all; and in another sense, it is an abstraction, the concrete
+facts consisting in the various particular wishes and tendencies of
+living creatures. The will to live is not simply the will to stay
+alive; it is the will to _live_ with all that that includes. Life is
+activity, and to live means, for any species, to engage in the full
+activity possible for that species.
+
+The will to live is in a sense unconscious, since it is seldom present
+simply in that bald, abstract form. But since life is activity, any
+will to act is the will to live in a special form, so that we may
+perfectly well say that the will to live is always conscious whenever
+there is any conscious impulse or purpose.
+
+In this simple statement we may find the key to all unconscious
+motives, disregarding the case of dissociation and split personality.
+If you analyze your motives for doing a certain act and formulate them
+in good set terms, then you have to admit that this motive was
+unconscious before, or only dimly conscious, since it was not
+formulated, it was not isolated, it was not present in the precise
+form you have now given it. Yet it was there, implicated in the total
+conscious activity. It was not unconscious in the sense of being
+active in a different, unconscious realm. The realm in which it was
+active was that of conscious activity, and it formed an {566}
+unanalyzed part of that activity. It was there in the same way that
+overtones are present in perceiving the tone quality of a particular
+instrument; the overtones are not _separately_ heard and may be very
+difficult to analyze, yet all the time they are playing an important
+part in the conscious perception.
+
+In the same way, we may not "realize" that we are helping our friend
+as a way of dominating over him, but think, so far as we stop to
+think, that our motive is pure helpfulness. Later, analyzing our
+motives, we may separate out the masterful tendency, which was present
+all the time and consciously present, but so bound up with the other
+motive of helpfulness that it did not attract attention to itself. Now
+if our psychology makes us cynics, and leads us to ascribe the whole
+motivation of the helpful act to the mastery impulse, and therefore to
+regard this as working in the unconscious, we are fully as far from
+the truth as when we uncritically assumed that helpfulness was the
+only motive operating.
+
+For man, to live means a vast range of activity--more than can
+possibly be performed by any single individual. We wish to do a
+thousand things that we never can do. We are constantly forced to
+limit the field of our activity. Physical incapacity, mental
+incapacity, limitations of our environment, conflict between one wish
+and another of our own, opposition from other people, and mere lack of
+time, compel us to give up many of our wishes. Innumerable wishes must
+be laid aside, and some, resisting, have to be forcibly suppressed.
+Renunciation is the order of the day, from childhood up to the age
+when weakness and weariness supervene upon the zest for action, and
+the will to live fades out into readiness to die.
+
+What becomes of the suppressed wishes, we have already briefly
+considered. [Footnote: See p. 533.] We have noticed Freud's conception
+{567} that they live on "in the unconscious". Nothing ever learned, he
+would say, can ever be forgotten, and no wish ever aroused can ever be
+quieted, except by being gratified either directly or through some
+substitute response. Each one of us, according to this view, carries
+around inside of him enough explosive material to blow to bits the
+whole social structure in which he lives. It is the suppressed sex
+wishes, and spite wishes growing out of thwarted sex wishes, that
+mostly constitute the unconscious.
+
+These unconscious wishes, according to Freud, motivate our dreams, our
+queer and apparently accidental actions, such as slips of the tongue
+and other "mistakes", the yet queerer and much more serious "neurotic
+symptoms" that appear in some people, and even a vast deal of our
+serious endeavor in life. All the great springs of action are sought
+in the unconscious. The biologist, consciously, is driven by his
+desire to know the world of plants and animals, but what really
+motivates him, on this view, is his childish sex curiosity, thwarted,
+driven back upon itself, and finding a substitute outlet in biological
+study. And so, in one way or another, with every one of us.
+
+All this seems to depart pretty far from sober reality, and especially
+from proved fact. It involves a very forced interpretation of child
+life, an interpretation that could never have arisen from a direct
+study of children, but which has seemed useful in the psychoanalysis
+of maladjusted adults. It is a far cry from the facts that Freud seeks
+to explain, to the conception of the infantile unconscious with which
+he endeavors to explain them.
+
+Freud's conception of life and its tendencies is much too narrow.
+There is not half enough room in his scheme of things for life as it
+is willed and lived. There is not room in it even for all the
+instincts, nor for the "native likes and dislikes"; and there is still
+less room for the will to live, in {568} the sense of the zest for all
+forms of activity, each for its own sake as a form of vital activity.
+Any scheme of motivation, which traces all behavior back to a few
+formulated wishes, is much too abstract, as was illustrated just above
+in the case of the helpful act.
+
+Freud is apparently guilty of yet another error, in supposing that any
+specific wish, ungratified, lives on as the same, identical, precise
+wish. A very simple instance will make clear the point of this
+criticism. Suppose that the first time you definitely mastered the
+fact that "3 times 7 are 21", it was in a certain schoolroom, with a
+certain teacher and a certain group of schoolfellows. You were perhaps
+animated at that moment by the desire to secure the approval of that
+teacher and to shine before those schoolfellows. Does it follow, then,
+that every time you now make use of that bit of the multiplication
+table, you are "unconsciously" gratifying that wish of long ago? To
+believe that would be to neglect all that we have learned of
+"shortcircuiting" and of the "substitute stimulus" generally.
+[Footnote: See p. 338.] That wish of long ago played its part in
+linking the response to the stimulus, but the linkage became so close
+that that precise wish was no longer required. The same response has
+been made a thousand times since, with other wishes in the game, and
+when the response is made to-day, a new wish is in the game. It is the
+same with the biologist. Suppose, for the sake of argument, what
+probably is true in only a fraction of the cases, that the biologist's
+first interest in making any minute study of animals arose from sex
+curiosity. As soon, however, as he engaged in any real study of
+animals, substitute stimuli entered and got attached to his exploring
+responses; and to suppose that that identical wish of long ago is
+still subconsciously active, whenever the biologist takes his
+microscope in hand, is to throw out all {569} these substitute stimuli
+and their attachments to many new responses, and to see in a very
+complex activity only one little element.
+
+In making use of the conception of the unconscious to assist us in
+interpreting human conduct, we are thus exposed to two errors. First,
+finding a motive which was not analyzed out by the individual, and
+which was only vaguely and implicitly conscious, and formulating that
+motive in an explicit way, we are then liable to the error of
+supposing that the motive must have been explicitly present, not
+indeed in consciousness but in the unconscious; whereas the whole
+truth is exhausted when we say that it was consciously but only
+implicitly present--active, but not active all alone. Second, having
+traced out how a certain act was learned, we are apt to suppose that
+its history is repeated whenever it is performed afresh--that the
+wishes and ideas that were essential to its original performance must
+be unconsciously present whenever it is once more
+performed--neglecting thus the fact that what is retained and renewed
+consists of responses, rather than experiences. What is renewed when a
+learned act is performed is not the history of the act, but the act
+itself. In a new situation, the act is part of a new performance, and
+its motivation is to some degree new.
+
+Though his theories are open to criticism, Freud has made important
+contributions to the study of personality. The same can be said of
+other schools of psycho-pathology. Jung and Adler deserve mention as
+representing varieties of psychoanalysis that differ more or less
+radically from that of Freud. Outside of the psychoanalytic school
+altogether, Janet and Morton Prince have added much to psychological
+knowledge from their studies of dissociated and maladjusted
+personalities. In endeavoring to assist the maladjusted individual,
+all these schools have much in common, since they all seek to bring to
+his attention elements in his personality {570} of which he is not
+clearly aware. Clear consciousness of implicit or dissociated elements
+in one's personality often proves to be a step towards a firmer
+organization of the personality and towards a better adjustment to the
+conditions of life.
+
+
+{571}
+
+EXERCISES
+
+1. Outline the chapter.
+
+2. Mention some personal traits that appear when the individual
+ is dealing with inanimate things, and some that only appear in
+ dealing with other persons.
+
+3. Construct a "rating scale" for the trait of independence, as
+ follows. Think of some one who is extremely independent, and call
+ him A; of some one who is at the opposite extreme and call him E;
+ of some one standing halfway, and call him C; and fill in the
+ positions B and D with other persons standing between A and C and
+ between C and E, in this matter of independence. You now have a
+ sort of measuring rod, with the five persons A, B, C, D and E
+ marking degrees of the trait. To rate any other individual,
+ consider where he belongs on this scale--whether even with A, with
+ B, etc.
+
+4. How does the embarrassing "self-consciousness" of one who is
+ speaking in public differ from simple consciousness of self?
+
+5. Consider what was conscious and what unconscious in the following
+ case of "shell shock": A sharpshooter had a certain peekhole in the
+ front of the trench through which he was accustomed to take aim at
+ the enemy. The enemy evidently spotted him, for bullets began to
+ strike close by as soon as ever he got up to shoot. He stood this
+ for a time, and then suddenly lost the sight of his right eye,
+ which he used in aiming.
+
+6. Explain the difference between unconscious action of the
+ dissociated type and of the implicit type.
+
+
+REFERENCES
+
+For attempts to utilize psychological methods in the study of
+personality, see F. L. Wells, _Mental Adjustments_, 1917; also Chapter
+11 in Watson's _Psychology_, 1919.
+
+Much interesting psychological material, along with a good deal of
+philosophical discussion, is contained in James's chapter on the
+"Consciousness of Self" in Vol. I of his _Principles of Psychology_,
+1890.
+
+For a discussion of the unconscious, see the symposium on
+_Subconscious Phenomena_, 1910, participated in by Muensterberg, Ribot,
+Janet, Jastrow, Hart and Prince.
+
+On dissociation, see Morton Prince's _Dissociation of a Personality_.
+
+For Freud's doctrine of the unconscious, see his _Psychopathology of
+Everyday Life_, translated by Brill.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+Abulia, 499, 539-541, 545-546
+
+Accessory sense-apparatus, 192-196, 200
+
+Acquired reactions, 89-90, 94, 99-102, 112-114, 144, 247, 296-829, 399
+
+Adaptation,
+ of attention, 247, 260;
+ negative, 302-303, 310, 312;
+ sensory, 224-225, 447
+
+Adjustment, 72, 78-79, 131, 178, 382, 385, 420, 430, 431, 433
+
+Adler, 569
+
+Adrenal glands, 123-124, 554
+
+Advantage,
+ factors of, 245-248, 259, 382;
+ law of, 256
+
+Aggressive behavior, 160-161, 164-165
+
+After-images, 226-227, 451-452
+
+Ambiguous figures, 253-254, 425
+
+Analysis,
+ of motives, 565-566, 569;
+ of sensations, 197, 201, 203, 205-206, 211-212, 230, 233
+
+Anger, 118, 122-123, 125-126, 131-132, 158-159, 163, 300-301, 429-430
+
+Animal behavior, 8-9, 14, 39-40, 76-79, 93-94, 97, 105-107, 109-111,
+ 116, 121-122, 141, 145, 147, 148, 156, 159, 160, 298, 302-311,
+ 313-314, 317-320, 436, 463-464
+
+Aphasia, 57-60, 62, 428
+
+Appetite, 125, 126
+
+Applied psychology, 3-4
+
+Apraxia, 57, 63-64, 428
+
+Aptitudes, 101, 288-289, 291, 293
+
+Area,
+ auditory, 50, 59-60, 62;
+ motor, 50-57;
+ olfactory, 62-63;
+ somesthetic, 50, 62-63;
+ speech, 58-60, 62;
+ visual, 50, 53, 62-63
+
+Aristotle, 394, 454
+
+Art, 182-183, 512-516
+
+Assertiveness, _see_ Self-assertion
+
+Association, 366;
+ by contiguity, 395-398, 405;
+ free, 376-381;
+ by similarity, 395-396, 405-408, 519;
+ laws of, 389-417;
+ controlled, 381-385, 413-414, 417
+
+Association fibers, 56, 416-417, 424
+
+Atrophy through disuse, 349, 390, 415
+
+Attachment of stimulus and response, 25, 34-35, 53-54, 84, 92,
+ 112, 135, 139, 298-301, 303, 311, 338, 372, 377-379, 390, 392, 394,
+ 399-412, 414-417, 433
+
+Attention, 244-269, 381, 421, 433
+
+Attitude of attention, 249;
+ of thought, 249, 464
+
+Autistic thinking, 508-510
+
+Automatism, 26, 328, 338, 383-384, 433, 525, 563
+
+Autonomic nerves, 124-125
+
+Auto-suggestion, 549
+
+Avoiding reaction, 24-25, 142-144, 305, 310
+
+Axon, 31-38, 51-52, 56, 61, 64, 189-192
+
+
+
+Baldwin, 243
+
+Basilar membrane, 196, 234-235
+
+Behavior psychology, 1, 8-9, 18, 21
+
+Bergson, 565
+
+Betts, 388
+
+Big, appeal of the, 515-516
+
+Binet, 272-273
+
+Binet tests, 272-275
+
+Binocular,
+ rivalry, 253-254;
+ vision, 442-443
+
+Biology, 5;
+ liking for, 182
+
+Black, a sensation, 218, 223-224
+
+Blends, 197-199, 202-203, 205-206, 219-220, 232, 301, 424, 500
+
+Bloomfield, 104
+
+Boasting, 169, 495
+
+Book, W. F., 325
+
+Brain, 14-15, 28-30, 49-66, 292-293;
+ stem, 29-330, 32, 33, 50
+
+Brown, Warner, 449
+
+Bryan, 321
+
+
+
+Cajal, 51, 61, 239
+
+Callosum, 56, 62
+
+Cannon, 136
+
+Carr, 314
+
+Caution, 156, 511
+
+"Censor," 505-506
+
+Central neurone, 37-39
+
+Cerebellum, 29-30, 35, 50, 65
+
+Cerebrum, 29-30, 50-64, 292-293
+
+Character, 529, 555
+
+Child, behavior, 91-92, 94-97, 100-101, 138, 141, 143-144, 147,
+ 150-159, 162-168, 297-298, 300-301, 303-304, 313-314, 319, 357-358,
+ 434-435, 437, 445, 481-483, 485-487, 490, 501, 504, 506, 526-527
+
+Choice, 528-535
+
+Cochlea, 192, 195-196, 234-235
+
+Co-conscious, 564
+
+Collecting instinct, 141
+
+Color,
+ liking for, 183;
+ circle, 207;
+ cone, 209;
+ pyramid, 209;
+ sense, 204-228;
+ theories, 220-224;
+ tone, 206-207, 213-215;
+ triangle, 217;
+ zones, 211-212;
+ mixing, 214-217
+
+Color-blindness, 209-211
+
+Colored hearing, 376
+
+Combination,
+ 80, 135, 140, 148, 260-261, 299, 301, 306-308, 311, 323-326, 334,
+ 479, 519;
+ law of, 263-264, 398-417, 431-432, 468
+
+Comparative method, 14-15
+
+Comparison, 466-467
+
+Compensatory movements, 236-238
+
+Complementary colors, 216-217, 227-228
+
+"Complexes," 381
+
+Conditioned reflex, 303-304, 312, 401-402
+
+Cones, 191, 226
+
+Consciousness, 7-8;
+ of animals, 8-9;
+ degrees of, 172, 265-267, 338, 383-384
+
+Constant error, 447-448
+
+Constitution, native, 91, 92, 98, 271, 289-292
+
+Constructiveness, 154, 482
+
+Contentment, 156-157
+
+Contiguity, association by, 395-398, 405
+
+Contrast, visual, 227-228
+
+Control, 55, 257, 298, 320, 335-336,
+ 348, 381-385, 413-414, 417, 484, 511
+
+Cooerdination, 30, 37-39, 41, 55-59, 66, 260-261, 299, 410-412, 534-535
+
+Correlation method, 14-16, 283-285
+
+Cortex, 50, 52, 56-63, 293, 414, 423
+
+Counter-suggestion, 549
+
+Cramming, 342, 346
+
+Criteria of instinct, 92, 97, 138
+
+Criticism, 499-500, 503, 505, 508-512, 547
+
+Crying, 144
+
+Curiosity, 154-157, 181, 244, 258
+
+Curve,
+ of distribution, 280;
+ of forgetting, 350, 390;
+ of learning or practice, 307, 316, 321, 325, 390
+
+Cutaneous senses, 197-201, 224, 440, 451
+
+
+
+Dallenbach, 362
+
+Daring, 489, 518-519
+
+Darwin, 127, 136
+
+Davenport, 104
+
+Day dreams, 493-499
+
+Decision, 528-535
+
+Defense mechanisms, 533, 535
+
+Defensive reactions, 24-26, 142-144, 159-160, 162-164, 310
+
+Delayed reaction, 76-77, 429
+
+Delusion, 509
+
+Dendrites, 31-32, 34-35, 51, 61, 190, 414
+
+Detachment of response from stimulus, 299, 302, 310, 328
+
+Determining tendency, 72, 380-385
+
+Dewey, 480
+
+Differential psychology, 3, 12, 180, 210, 271, 272, 274, 279-280,
+ 286, 291-292, 368-370, 374, 548
+
+Digestion, 121-123, 125
+
+Discord, 232
+
+Discovery, 421, 462
+
+Discrimination, 435-437
+
+Disgust, 127, 312
+
+Dissociation, 559-561
+
+Distraction, 259-260, 356-356
+
+Distribution of intelligence, 274-275, 279-281
+
+Dizziness, 238
+
+Domination, 165
+
+Dot figure, 252
+
+Doubt, 472-473
+
+Drainage, 269
+
+Dreams, 499-508
+
+
+
+Ear, 191-192, 195-196, 236-238
+
+Ebbinghaus, 350, 365
+
+Economy of effort, 151;
+ in memorizing, 338-346, 353
+
+Effect, law of, 391-393, 413
+
+Effort, 127, 162, 259-260, 534, 539
+
+Egocentric response, 380
+
+Elementary,
+ feelings, 173, 184-185;
+ sensations, 197-198, 201, 203, 211-212, 216-220, 233-234
+
+Elimination in learning, 306, 308-309, 310, 314, 327
+
+Emotion, 118-136, 137-169, 173, 299-301, 345, 355, 361, 381, 513-514,
+ 554, 661
+
+Empathy, 491, 516-516
+
+Emulation, 165-166
+
+End-brush of an axon, 33-36, 38, 61
+
+Endocrine glands, 122-123, 554
+
+Energy,
+ conservation of, 40;
+ dammed-up, 82-84, 301, 309, 393;
+ released, 535-546;
+ stored, 40-41, 46
+
+Envy, 166, 168
+
+Equilibrium, 65
+
+Errors, 446-459, 467
+
+Escape tendency, 142-144, 489, 498-499
+
+Esthetics, 443-444, 457-458
+
+Euphoria, 120, 151
+
+Excitement, 126
+
+Exercise,
+ effect of, 297-298;
+ law of, 389-391, 393-394, 413-415
+
+Experiment in psychology, 12-15, 93, 302, 333
+
+Explanation, 471-472
+
+Exploration, 154-157, 244, 249-252, 258, 288, 305, 421, 462-465, 470
+
+Expressive movements, 126-128
+
+Eye, 32, 34-35, 62, 191, 198-196;
+ movements of, 249-251
+
+
+
+Facilitation, 54-55, 78, 83-85, 248, 257, 263, 382-385, 413-414, 417
+
+Factors,
+ in attention, 245-248, 259;
+ in intelligence, 285-288;
+ in memorizing, 345-346;
+ in personality, 553-555;
+ in recall, 379, 382
+
+Faculties, 523
+
+Fallacy, 467-468, 479
+
+Father complex, 606
+
+Fatigue, 73-74, 119, 123, 145, 151
+
+Fear, 125-126, 129-133, 142-144, 153, 303-304, 489, 497-498, 504,
+ 513, 516, 539-540;
+ abnormal, 133, 497-498
+
+Feeble-mindedness, 275, 290-292, 446
+
+Feeling, 172-185;
+ of activity, 45-46;
+ of excitement, 126, 184-185;
+ of familiarity, 185, 357-360;
+ of readiness, 75, 383;
+ of tension, 78-79, 184-185
+
+Feeling-tone, 174-176, 178, 180-181
+
+Feleky, 136
+
+Fernald, 388
+
+Fiction, 512-513
+
+Fighting, 158-161
+
+Fissures of the brain, 50
+
+Fixation, 298
+
+Fluctuation of attention, 254-255
+
+Flying, 93
+
+Forgetting, 349-353, 415
+
+Forgotten name, 356, 563-564
+
+Fovea, 193, 211, 226
+
+Free association, 376, 504, 507;
+ test, 380
+
+Frequency, 379, 390, 433
+
+Freshmen, intelligence of, 279-281
+
+Freud, 505-508, 522, 566-569, 571
+
+
+
+Galton, 368, 388
+
+Gamble, 243
+
+Games, 487
+
+Gates, 339, 365
+
+General psychology, 4-5
+
+Genetic method, 15-16, 90
+
+Genius, 99
+
+Glands, 25, 122-124, 303
+
+Gliding dream, 503
+
+Golden section, 444
+
+Gray matter, 35-36, 50-52, 56, 61-62
+
+Gregariousness, 110, 146-147
+
+Group tests, 276-277
+
+
+
+Habit, 89, 112-114, 157, 247-248, 260, 328-329, 381
+
+Hallucination, 375-376, 501, 547
+
+Hart, 571
+
+Harter, 321
+
+Hearing, 50, 59-60, 62, 228-235, 439-440
+
+Helmholtz, 220, 234, 475
+
+Helplessness, 144, 149
+
+Henning, 203, 243
+
+Herd instinct, 110, 146-147
+
+Heredity, 91, 98, 100-101, 118, 289-292
+
+Hering, 220-221
+
+Hero,
+ worship, 168;
+ conquering and suffering, 494-496, 509
+
+Herrick, 44, 67
+
+Hesitancy, 530
+
+Hicks, 306, 314
+
+Higher units, 323-326, 334, 410-412
+
+Hollingworth, 20, 104, 243
+
+Homing, 78, 146
+
+Humor, theories of, 157-168
+
+Hunger, 79-81, 120, 140-141, 204
+
+Hunter, 88, 295
+
+Hunting instinct, 72, 78, 140-141
+
+Hypnosis, 349, 547-548
+
+Hypothesis, 473-475
+
+
+
+Ideomotor action, 527-528
+
+Illusion, 424, 450-459, 500, 547
+
+Imageless thought, 374
+
+Imagery,
+ mental, 368-376, 499-500;
+ in perception, 425-427;
+ types, 370
+
+Imagination, 481-520, 525
+
+Imitation, 319, 486
+
+Impulse, 132-135, 155, 167, 177, 299, 524-525, 539
+
+Incentives, 541-546
+
+Incidental memory, 346-348, 397
+
+Independence, 163-164
+
+Individual, 91
+
+Individual psychology, _see_ Differential psychology
+
+Induction, 374-375
+
+Inference, 465-468, 475-476, 479
+
+Inferiority, sense of, 166, 168, 496, 510, 555
+
+Inheritance of acquired traits, 113-114
+
+Inhibition, 25, 54-55, 78, 83-84, 122-125, 248, 257, 263, 314, 382,
+ 384, 429-430, 528, 540
+
+Initiative, 545
+
+Insane, 269, 508-609
+
+Insight in learning, 316-320
+
+Instinct, 105-116, 137-169, 179, 181, 488-489, 492, 513, 554;
+ criteria of, 92, 97, 138;
+ and emotion, 134-135;
+ modification of, 299-301
+
+Integration, 558-561
+
+Intelligence, 90-91, 271-293, 538, 555;
+ tests of, 3, 272-277, 281-283
+
+Intelligence quotient, 274-275, 289-290
+
+Intensity of sensation, 206;
+ of reaction, 379, 391, 433
+
+Interest, 181-184, 248, 257-259
+
+Interference, 355-356
+
+Internal secretions, 122-123, 554
+
+Intra-uterine life, 90-92
+
+Introspection, 10-11, 19
+
+Invalidism, 546
+
+Invention, 421, 475, 484, 485, 509-512, 517, 619
+
+"IQ," 274-275
+
+Isolation, 431-432, 435-437, 455-459, 468,479
+
+
+
+James, 117, 129, 136, 331, 365, 418, 480, 511, 551, 561, 571
+
+James-Lange theory, 128-130
+
+Janet, 569, 571
+
+Jastrow, 571
+
+Jennings, 88
+
+Jost, 342
+
+Judd, 461
+
+Judgment, 550
+
+Jung, 388, 569
+
+
+
+Kimmins, 522
+
+Kinesthesis, 240
+
+Koenig, 217
+
+
+
+Ladd, 44
+
+Ladd-Franklin, 221-224, 243, 453
+
+Lange, 129
+
+Lashley, 88
+
+Laughter, 157-168, 161
+
+Law,
+ of advantage, 256;
+ of association, 394-398;
+ of attention, 256, 262-263, 267;
+ of combination, 263-264, 398-417;
+ of effect, 391-393;
+ of exercise, 389-391, 393-394;
+ of habit, 389;
+ of reaction, 256, 262-263, 267;
+ of selection, 256, 262, 378, 382;
+ of shifting, 256, 263;
+ of tendency, 81, 263
+
+Learning, 93-94, 96, 99, 112, 113, 143-144, 296-329;
+ laws of, 389-417, 433
+
+Libido, 507
+
+Light, 212-213
+
+Likes and dislikes, 178-184, 291, 492-493, 513
+
+Linkage, _see_ Attachment
+
+Lobes of the brain, 50
+
+Local sign, 440-441
+
+Locomotion, 93-97, 99, 152-153, 486
+
+Logic, 475-476
+
+Love, 535
+
+Loyalty, 169, 531
+
+
+
+Make-believe, 482-483, 508
+
+Management,
+ of action, 541-546;
+ of attention, 267-268;
+ of memory, 338-346, 353, 356, 360-363;
+ of reasoning, 478-479
+
+Manipulation, 154, 315, 481-483
+
+Massed learning, 341-343, 345
+
+Mastery impulse, _see_ Self-assertion
+
+Martin, 28
+
+Mathematics, liking for, 181-182
+
+Mating instinct, 97, 116, 147-148
+
+Maturing, 92, 96
+
+Maury, 501
+
+Maze learning, 305-308, 318-314
+
+McDougall, 136, 171, 418, 551
+
+Meaning, 421, 482-483
+
+Median, 280
+
+Memorizing, 333-346, 360-363
+
+Memory, 332-363
+
+Memory colors, 426
+
+Mental action, 6-7, 45-47
+
+Mental age, 273-274
+
+Mental set, 72, 382-385, 413-414, 417, 433, 452
+
+Mental work, 384
+
+Methods of psychology, 9-16
+
+Mnemonic systems, 363
+
+Modification of reactions, 297-299
+
+Moll, 551
+
+Morale, 543-545
+
+Morgan, 270
+
+Mother complex, 506
+
+Mother instinct, 148-150, 159, 161
+
+Motive, 69, 72, 84-85, 137, 257-258, 469-473, 487-499, 501-510,
+ 513-517, 528-546, 565-570
+
+Motor,
+ area, 50-54;
+ centers, 50-59, 65, 66;
+ nerve, 27, 30-33, 36-37, 39, 50, 52-53
+
+Movement,
+ expressive, 126-128;
+ reflex, 24-26;
+ skilled, 55-59, 268, 321-326, 410-412;
+ voluntary, 53-55, 298
+
+Moving pictures, 454
+
+Mueller-Lyer illusion, 455-456, 459
+
+Muensterberg, 265, 571
+
+Muscle sense, 225, 238-240
+
+Music, 235;
+ liking for, 182-183, 291
+
+Music deafness, 60
+
+
+Native traits, 89-102, 297
+
+Negative adaptation, 302-303, 310, 312, 413
+
+Nerve, 26, 30, 32;
+ autonomic, 124-125;
+ cell, 31-36, 51, 414;
+ center, 26, 29-30, 49-66, 76, 82-84, 96, 107, 125, 293;
+ fiber, 32
+
+Nervous system, 27-29, 32, 41, 124
+
+Nesting, 105, 110-112
+
+Neurone, 32-36, 51, 61, 346, 414-417
+
+Newton, 212
+
+Nicoll, 522
+
+Nightmare, 504
+
+Noise, 231, 236
+
+Nonsense syllables, 334
+
+Non-sensory recall, 373-375
+
+Norsworthy, 20, 104, 522
+
+
+
+Object blindness, 62
+
+Objective observation in psychology, 9, 11-13
+
+Observation, 267;
+ learning by, 317-320, 333-337, 348, 367-375
+
+Obstruction, 162-163, 177, 534-559
+
+Organic needs, responses to, 139-145
+
+Organic sensations, 119-120, 128, 204
+
+Organic state, 72-74, 79, 82, 119-126, 132-133, 175-176
+
+Original nature, 91, 92, 98
+
+Organization of the individual, 527, 529, 532, 558
+
+Otolith, 192, 238
+
+Overlapping, 324-325, 412
+
+Overtones, 230, 438
+
+
+
+Pain, 173, 198-201
+
+Paired associates, 336, 347, 404
+
+Paralysis, 57, 547
+
+Parental instinct, 148-150
+
+Parsons, 243
+
+Path,
+ auditory, 62;
+ motor, 51-53, 62;
+ tactile, 62, 64
+
+Pathological method, 16
+
+Patterns, 204-205
+
+Pechstein, 344
+
+Perception, 45, 60, 62-63, 65-66, 419-459, 462, 465, 468, 475-476,
+ 479, 520
+
+Performance tests, 275-276
+
+Perseveration, 355
+
+Personality, 552-570
+
+Perspective, 435, 441-442, 453-454
+
+Phrenology, 52, 65, 293
+
+Physiognomy, 445-446
+
+Physiological limit, 321
+
+Physiology, 6-7
+
+Physique, 553
+
+Piano theory of hearing, 234-235
+
+Pieron, 342
+
+Pillsbury, 270, 295
+
+Pintner, 295
+
+Pitch, 229-230, 450
+
+Place associations, 304, 305, 315, 333
+
+Plan, 483, 493, 539-540
+
+Plateau, 322
+
+Play, 139, 148, 151-152, 160, 485-499, 504-505, 517
+
+Pleasantness and unpleasantness, 173-180, 184-185
+
+Poffenberger, 20, 104, 243
+
+Poggendorf illusion, 457, 459
+
+Practice, 177, 298, 304-310, 314-317, 321-327, 360-363, 433, 538;
+ curve, 307, 316, 321, 325, 390, 542
+
+Preparation for action, 22-25, 72, 74-77, 427-430
+
+Preparatory reactions, 77-84, 111-112, 125-128, 132, 139-140, 145, 147
+
+Prestige, 549
+
+Prince, 559, 564, 569, 571
+
+Problem solution, 385, 465, 469-470, 477, 514
+
+Proofreader's illusion, 453
+
+Protozoa, 39-40, 188, 302
+
+Psychiatry, 16
+
+Psychoanalysis, 505-508, 521, 533, 567-669
+
+Psychology,
+ definition of, 1-2, 5-8, 17-18;
+ methods of, 9-16;
+ varieties, 2-6
+
+Psychopathology, 16, 498, 540-541, 545-550, 567, 569
+
+Punishment, 304-305
+
+Purpose, 69-71, 75, 78, 524-527, 542
+
+Puzzle experiment, 308-310, 315-319, 463-464
+
+Pyle, 343
+
+Pyramid cells, 51, 52, 61
+
+Pyramidal tract, 52-55, 57, 62
+
+
+
+Random activity, 151-152
+
+Rationalization, 470-471, 531
+
+Raynor, 331
+
+Reaction, 22-26, 39-41, 45-49, 65-66, 68, 75, 84, 256, 262-263, 266,
+ 423, 428;
+ acquired, 89-90, 94, 99-102;
+ delayed, 76-77, 429;
+ native, 89-102;
+ preparatory, 77-84, 111-112, 125-128, 132;
+ time, 22-24, 75, 424
+
+Reading, 250-251, 258, 262, 267-268, 384, 427, 453, 512-513
+
+Reaney, 522
+
+Reasoning, 320, 422, 462-479, 520;
+ in animals, 310, 317-318, 463-464
+
+Recall, 354-356, 366-385, 413, 422, 469-471, 500, 519, 563
+
+Recency, 345, 356, 379, 390, 433, 511, 563
+
+Recitation in memorizing, 339-341
+
+Recognition, 187, 357-360
+
+Red-green blindness, 210
+
+Reflex, 24-26, 53, 107-109, 256, 297;
+ conditioned, 303-304;
+ control of, 54-55;
+ arc, 26-30, 34, 36-37;
+ centers, 30, 53
+
+Relationships, response to, 286-287, 317, 320, 333-336, 345, 404-405,
+432, 467-468, 520
+
+Relief, 79, 84
+
+Reproduction, instinct of, 116
+
+Respiration, 37, 55, 141, 176, 527
+
+Response by analogy, 405-406, 435, 452-455
+
+Restlessness, 78-79, 112
+
+Retention, 286, 302, 349-353, 360, 562
+
+Retina, 191, 193, 195, 210-211, 233, 441-442
+
+Revery, 376-380
+
+Ribot, 571
+
+Rivalry, 165-166, 474, 489, 543;
+ binocular, 253-254
+
+Robinson, 522
+
+Rods, 191, 226
+
+Rotation, sense of, 236-238
+
+Rosanoff, 20
+
+Rote learning, 333, 337
+
+Royce, 522
+
+Ruger, 316
+
+
+Sanford, 252
+
+Satisfaction, 79, 84, 109-110, 132, 472, 487-499, 501-510, 513-517,
+ 533-535, 540
+
+Saturation of colors, 207-208, 213-214, 217
+
+Scatter, 23, 273, 298, 448
+
+Schopenhauer, 565
+
+Science, 3-4, 473-475;
+ liking for, 181-182
+
+Scott, 93, 551
+
+Seashore, 295
+
+Secondary personality, 559-561, 564
+
+Selection, 256, 262. 378, 382
+
+Self, 428, 555-558
+
+Self-activity, 46-47
+
+Self-assertion, 158, 161-169, 181, 183, 258-259, 287, 472-478,
+ 489-496, 502-503, 508, 513, 515-516, 531, 536-537, 545-546, 549,
+ 556-558
+
+Self-criticism, 509-511
+
+Selfishness, 557
+
+Self-preservation, 115-116, 507
+
+Semicircular canal, 192, 194, 195, 225, 236-238, 486
+
+Sensation, 6, 19, 46, 60, 62-64, 120, 187-240;
+ and feeling, 173-174;
+ feeling-tone of, 174-175;
+ and perception, 423-425;
+ recall of, 368-376
+
+Sense, cells, 189-192;
+ organs, 188-196, 199-200, 236-239, 249;
+ perception, 421-422
+
+Sensory,
+ nerve, 27, 30, 32-34, 36-38, 188-189, 191, 193, 196, 239-240;
+ areas, 50, 59-66, 423
+
+Setting of an object, 358
+
+Sex,
+ attraction, 97, 116, 125, 147-148, 488, 507-508, 534-535;
+ differences, 281
+
+Sex differences, 281
+
+Shame, 166, 168
+
+Shell shock, 504
+
+Shifting of attention, 251-256
+
+Short-circuiting in the process of learning, 338, 405, 568
+
+Shyness, 166
+
+Sight, 32, 34-35, 62, 191, 193-195, 204-228, 231-234, 441-443
+
+Sign and meaning, 421, 437-446
+
+Signal experiment, 304-305, 312
+
+Similarity, association by, 395-396, 405-408
+
+Size-weight illusion, 459-460
+
+Skill, 55-59, 268, 282, 348, 352, 410-412, 428, 482, 488
+
+Skin senses, 197-201, 224, 440, 451
+
+Sleep, 145, 499-500
+
+Smell, 29, 32, 62, 63, 190, 201, 203-204, 224
+
+Snyder, 343
+
+Sociability, 181, 183-184, 489, 492
+
+Social, behavior, 145-151, 510. 552, 558-559;
+ perception, 444-446, 512, 555
+
+Sociology, 5
+
+Song of birds, 98-94
+
+Sound, 228-231
+
+Space, 439-443
+
+Spaced repetition In learning, 341-343, 345, 390
+
+Spaulding, 93
+
+Span of attention, 261-262
+
+Speech, 6, 60, 94, 98, 113, 154, 325, 402-403, 416;
+ centers, 57-62
+
+Spinal cord, 29-33, 50, 52, 55, 64
+
+Spite, 507
+
+Staircase figure, 253
+
+Starch, Daniel, 20, 331
+
+Starr, 56
+
+Statistical measures, 14-15, 280, 283-285
+
+Stereoscope, 254, 442
+
+Stiles, 44, 67
+
+Stimulus, 22, 24, 26-27, 34, 40-41, 46-49, 188, 484-486, 500-501;
+ central, 48-49, 368, 371, 422, 468, 500, 528;
+ internal, 41, 47, 79, 119, 128, 132
+
+Story-telling, 482-483
+
+Straining, 162-163
+
+Strong, 246, 351
+
+Struggle for existence, 114
+
+Subconscious minds, 563-564
+
+Sublimation, 533-535
+
+Submissive tendency, 166-169, 287, 516, 549
+
+Substitute, response, 299-301, 305, 311, 328, 400, 409-413, 430,
+ 436-437, 498-499, 533;
+ stimulus, 298, 300, 303, 311, 368, 371-372, 376, 400-409, 416, 434, 568
+
+Suggestion, 546-650
+
+Suppression, 505-508, 533, 566-567
+
+Surprise, 155
+
+Survival value, 114, 139, 148, 151, 160
+
+Survivals, 127
+
+Sustained attention, 257-260
+
+Syllogism, 476-479
+
+Symbols, 383, 468, 505-507
+
+Symmetry, 444
+
+Synapse, 34-35, 96, 414-416
+
+Synesthesia, 376
+
+
+
+Tact, 555
+
+Taste, 189-190, 201-208, 224
+
+Taussig, 522
+
+Telegraphy, learning of, 321-323
+
+Temperament, 553-554
+
+Temperature, responses, 141-142;
+ sense, 197-201, 224-225
+
+Tendency, 68-85, 109-112, 116, 130-135, 137-169, 177, 257, 263,
+ 299-301, 309, 348, 367, 382, 392-393, 408-409, 417, 483-499,
+ 501-510, 512-516, 528-546, 561
+
+Terman, 272, 296
+
+Testimony, 347, 352, 397
+
+Tests, 3, 12, 14, 272-277, 281-283, 548
+
+Thalamus, 56, 62, 64-65, 178
+
+Thinking, 48-49, 319-320
+
+Third dimension, 441-443
+
+Thirst, 79-81, 120-121, 139-140, 179
+
+Thorndike, 20, 104, 171, 331, 418
+
+Thought and action, 539-541
+
+Thrill, 489, 498-499
+
+Thyroid gland, 123, 554
+
+Timbre, 231
+
+Time, 438-439, 447
+
+Titchener, 186, 242, 270, 461
+
+Touch, 50, 62, 63, 197-201;
+ spots, 198
+
+Toys, 486-497
+
+Training of memory, 360-363
+
+Traits, native and acquired, 89-102
+
+Transfer, 316-317, 361-362
+
+Trial and error, 112, 305, 309, 311, 313, 315, 335, 392, 409, 424, 426,
+ 430, 462-465, 526
+
+Typewriting, learning of, 324-325, 411-412, 518, 525-526, 537
+
+
+
+Unconscious, activity, 265-266, 383-384, 506-508, 525-526, 562-565;
+ emotion, 118-119;
+ feeling, 172;
+ motive, 565-569;
+ retention, 348-349, 562
+
+Unintentional learning, 346-348
+
+Utility,
+ of emotion, 125-127;
+ of instinct, 114, 144-145;
+ of reflexes, 125
+
+
+Vacillation, 530
+
+Variability, 23, 273, 298, 369, 447-448
+
+Verification of hypotheses, 473-475
+
+Visual,
+ area, 62;
+ images, 370;
+ perception, 441-443, 450;
+ sensations, 204-228, 231-234
+
+Visualist, 370
+
+Vocalization, 93-94, 154
+
+Voluntary action, 298, 524-528
+
+Vowels, 231
+
+
+Walking, 95-97, 99, 153
+
+Warming-up, 74, 119-120, 343, 391
+
+Warren, 171, 242, 418, 461
+
+Washburn, 19, 88, 331
+
+Watson, 20, 88, 117, 171, 307, 308, 331, 571
+
+Watt, 243
+
+Weber's law, 449-450
+
+Weight, perception of, 448-450, 459-460
+
+Wells, 571
+
+Whipple, 295, 365
+
+White matter, 32, 35-36, 56, 62
+
+Whitley, 20, 104, 522
+
+Whole and part study, 343-346
+
+Will, 523-550;
+ to learn, 346-348;
+ to live, 565
+
+Wish, 496-497, 501-509, 565
+
+Word
+ blindness, 62;
+ deafness, 59
+
+Worry, 497-499
+
+Wundt, 184
+
+
+Yerkes, 104, 295
+
+
+Young, 220
+
+Youth, 147, 164, 495, 519
+
+
+Zoellner illusion, 459
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Psychology, by Robert S. Woodworth
+
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