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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre> +<p>Title: My Three Years in America</p> +<p>Author: Johann Heinrich Andreas Hermann Albrecht Graf von Bernstorff</p> +<p>Release Date: January 6, 2010 [eBook #30865]</p> +<p>Language: English</p> +<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> +<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA***</p> +<p> </p> +<h3>E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall</h3> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full"> +<p> </p> + +<h1>MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA</h1> + +<p class="center">BY</p> + +<p class="author"> +COUNT BERNSTORFF +</p> + +<p class="center"> +1920 +</p> + +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> + +<table class="contents"> +<tr><td class="contents" colspan="2"> + <a href="#page_1">Introduction</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="small">CHAPTER</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">I.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_13"> + Germany and the United States Before the War</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">II.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_35"> + The German Propaganda in the United States</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">III.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_58"> + Political Events Preceding the "Lusitania" Incident</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">IV.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_80"> + Economic Questions</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">V.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_101"> + The So-called German Conspiracies</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">VI.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_127"> + The "Lusitania" Incident</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">VII.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_166"> + The "Arabic" Incident</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">VIII.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_212"> + The Second "Lusitania" Incident</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">IX.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_241"> + The "Sussex" Incident</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">X.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_270"> + American Mediation</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">XI.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_353"> + The Rupture of Diplomatic Relations</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">XII.</td> + <td class="contents"><a href="#page_393"> + The Return Home</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2"><a href="#page_417">INDEX</a></td></tr> +</table> + + +<p class="title">MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA</p> + +<h2><a name="page_1"><span class="page">Page 1</span></a> +INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +MY FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL VIEWS BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It was in my own home, the German Embassy in London, where the +atmosphere was entirely political, that I learned my first steps +in politics. My father did not belong to that class of diplomats, +so prevalent to-day, who treat politics as an occupation to be +pursued only in their spare time. His whole life was consecrated +to the cause of the German nation, and from my earliest childhood +my mind was filled with the same idea, to the exclusion of all +others. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Owing to my father's share in the negotiations which brought about +the marriage of the Emperor Frederick with the Princess Royal of +England, the Imperial couple became closely connected with my parents, +and, as Crown Prince and Princess, frequently resided at the Embassy +in London. It was the entourage of the Emperor Frederick that first +inspired in me those political views, which, during a long diplomatic +career, gradually crystallized into the deep-rooted convictions +of my political outlook. I believed Germany's salvation to lie +in the direction of a liberal development of Unification and +Parliamentary Government, as also in an attitude of consistent +friendliness towards England and the United States of America. Thus, +to use a modern phrase, I <a name="page_2"><span class="page">Page +2</span></a> was an avowed supporter of the Western Policy. At the +present moment, while we are standing as mourners at the grave +of our national hopes, I am more than ever convinced, that had +this policy been steadily pursued, we should have been spared the +catastrophe that has overtaken us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the other hand, I will not deny, that even the Oriental Policy +would have proved a feasible political scheme, if only we had decided +to pursue it in good time. Albeit, I am of opinion that even Bismarck +had already started us in the direction of the Western Policy, when +in 1879 he decided in favor of Austria-Hungary and not Russia. +Despite all that the careworn recluse of Friedrichsruhe may have +written against Caprivi's policy, which was decidedly Western in +tendency, he was himself the founder of the Triple Alliance, which, +without the good-will of England, could not have come into existence. +Had we pursued an Eastern Policy, though it would ultimately have +led to the sacrifice and partition of Austria-Hungary, it would not +have secured us those advantages in the Orient of which Marschall +speaks. Nevertheless, I have always regretted that we sent such a +first-rate man to Constantinople, for him ultimately to become the +able director of the false policy which we pursued there. There +is an Oriental proverb which says: "Never lay your load on a dead +camel's back." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +If, as I always used to hope, we had resolved to adopt the Western +Policy, we should in any case have had to be prepared, in certain +circumstances, to venture with England's help upon a war against +Russia. And the experiences of the Five-Years War have taught us +that we should have won such a conflict with ease. I never wanted +a war with Russia, and was never an enemy of that country; but I +believed that our position among the nations of the world would +compel us to decide one way <a name="page_3"><span class="page">Page +3</span></a> or the other, and I felt, just as Caprivi did, that we +should not very well be able to avoid war. Even if, in the event +of a war between the Triple Alliance and Russia and France, England +had only maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality, this would +have proved very much more favorable for us than the situation which +developed out of the Encirclement Policy (<i>Einkreisungspolitik</i>). +Furthermore, had we pursued the Western Policy, we should have had +to reckon with the possibility of England's wishing to moderate, +even in a perfectly friendly manner, our somewhat explosive economic +development. I should not, however, have regarded this altogether as +a disadvantage. For, truth to tell, we grew a little too rapidly. +We ought, as "junior partners" in Britain's world-empire, to have +gathered our strength more slowly. As an example of what I mean, take +the policy which France and Japan have pursued since the beginning +of the present century. If we had done the same, we should, at all +events, have been saved from so seriously overheating the boilers +of our industrial development, we should not have outstripped England +as quickly as we undoubtedly could have done if we had been left to +develop freely, but we should also have escaped the mortal danger +which we drew upon ourselves by provoking universal hostility. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is impossible now for me to demonstrate retrospectively that we +should have been able to conclude an alliance with England. Prince +Bülow denies that this was ever the case. Maybe that during +his tenure of office this possibility did not offer a sufficient +guarantee of future security to warrant our incurring the hostility +of Russia. I am convinced, however, that an alliance with England +would have been within our power, if we had pursued Caprivi's policy +consistently, and the Kruger telegram had never been dispatched. +Unfortunately <a name="page_4"><span class="page">Page 4</span></a> +we have always had statesmen at the helm in Germany,—Bismarck +not excepted,—the bulk of whose views and knowledge were +essentially continental, and who never felt quite at home with +English ways of thinking. I feel perfectly satisfied on this point, +however, that English commercial jealousy, with which we naturally +had to reckon, would not have proved an insuperable obstacle to +a good understanding with England, provided that we had declared +ourselves ready, if necessary, to fight Russia. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The policy of the free hand, which we pursued until the outbreak +of war, aimed at the highest possible results. Prince Bülow, +who was the inaugurator of this policy, might possibly have known +how to steer us through the "Danger-Zone" without provoking war. +And then in a few years to come, we should have become so strong +and should have left the Danger-Zone so very far behind us, that, +as far as human judgment could tell, we should no longer have had +any need to fear war. German naval construction from the beginning +of the present century certainly made our relationship to England +very much worse, while it also materially increased the danger +of our position from the standpoint of world-politics. The +Bülow-Tirpitz notion of a <i>Risikoflotte,</i>[*] may, however, +only have been practicable on condition that our diplomacy were +sufficiently skilful to avoid war, as long as the "risk" idea in +England was not able, of itself, to maintain peace. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote *: Literally: a fleet for risks or for taking risks; a +fleet to be used at a venture.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +German foreign policy had been ably conducted by Bismarck; but, in +keeping with the times, it had been almost exclusively Continental +and European. At the very moment when Bismarck withdrew from the +arena, Germany's era of world-politics began. It was not the <a +name="page_5"><span class="page">Page 5</span></a> free bloom of +our statesmen's own creative powers; but a bitter necessity, born +of the imperative need of providing Germany's increasing population +with sufficient foodstuffs. But it was not our world-politics, as +such, that brought about our downfall; but the way we set to work +in prosecuting our policy. The Triple Alliance, with its excellent +Reinsurance Treaty, did not constitute a sufficiently powerful +springboard from which to take our plunge into world-politics. The +Reinsurance contract could not be anything but a makeshift, which +merely deferred the inevitable choice which had to be made between +Russia and Austria-Hungary. In the course of time, we should either +have had to decide entirely in favor of Russia, in the manner outlined +above, or we should have had to try to come to an understanding +with England, upon terms which, at all events, we should not have +been at liberty to choose for ourselves. Unfortunately, however, +it was an axiom of post-Bismarckian German politics, that the +differences between Russia and England were irreconcilable, and +that the Triple Alliance would have to constitute the needle-index +of the scales between these two hostile Powers. This proposition +was incessantly contested both verbally and in writing by Herr von +Holstein, who was then the leading spirit at the Foreign Office. +He perceived that its chief flaw was the weak point in the Triple +Alliance itself,—that is to say, the differences between +Austria-Hungary and Italy on the one hand, and Italy's dependence +upon England's superior power in the Mediterranean on the other. +Furthermore, he recognized the prodigious possibility, which was +not beyond the art of English statesmanship, of a compromise between +England and Russia. He did not see, however, how the hostility of +the French to ourselves would serve as a medium for this universal +coalition against us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_6"><span class="page">Page 6</span></a> In the last +Entente Note of the Five-Years War there is the following passage: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition, +strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They required that they +should be able to dictate and tyrannize to a subservient Europe, +as they dictated and tyrannized over subservient Germany." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +We Germans know that this indictment is a lie; but unfortunately +all unprejudiced Germans must acknowledge that for years this lie +has been believed outside Germany. We, for our part, cherished +similar views about our enemies, nor did we make a sufficient effort +to dissipate their prejudices. On the contrary we constantly lent +color to them by means of the extravagant and high-flown speeches, +which formed the accompaniment to our world and naval policy, and +by means of our opposition to pacifism, disarmament, and arbitration +schemes, etc., etc. The extent to which our attitude at the Hague +Conference damaged us in the eyes of the whole world is no longer +a secret to anybody. As Heinrich Friedjung rightly observes: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"At the Hague Conference German diplomacy delivered itself up to +the vengeance of the pacifists, like a culprit." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +During my tenure of office in Washington I succeeded on three occasions +in coming to an agreement with the Government there regarding the +terms of an arbitration treaty. All three treaties were, however, +rejected in Berlin, and consequently in America I never ceased from +being questioned reproachfully as to the reason why the United +States had been able to conclude arbitration <a name="page_7"><span +class="page">Page 7</span></a> treaties with every other State in +the world, but not with Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Entente Note, already quoted above, contained this further +statement: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"As soon as their preparations were complete, they encouraged a +subservient ally to declare war against Serbia at forty-eight hours' +notice, knowing full well that a conflict involving the control +of the Balkans could not be localized and almost certainly meant +a general war. In order to make doubly sure, they refused every +attempt at conciliation and conference until it was too late, and +the world war was inevitable for which they had plotted, and for +which alone among the nations they were fully equipped and prepared." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The leaders of the Entente Powers would like to exalt this distortion +of history into a dogma, in order that their various peoples may not +bring any unpleasant charges against them. And yet the historical +truth is already pretty clear to all who look for it honestly and +without prejudice. The German Government believed that the Serbian +propaganda would annihilate Austria-Hungary, and hoped, moreover, +that her last faithful ally would experience a political renaissance +as the result of her chastisement of Serbia. That is why they gave +Count Berchtold a free hand, in the belief that Count Bülow's +success over the Bosnian crisis could be repeated. Meanwhile, however, +the situation had changed. Russia and France, relying upon England's +help, wanted to risk a war. When the German Government saw this +they tried, like a driver of a car about to collide with another +vehicle, to jam on all breaks, and to drive backwards. But it was +then too late. The mistake our Government made was to consent to +Austria-Hungary's <a name="page_8"><span class="page">Page 8</span></a> +making so daring an experiment, at a moment of such critical tension. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is not true either that we were thoroughly equipped and prepared +for war. We had neither sufficient supplies of munitions, foodstuffs +and raw materials, nor any plan of campaign for a war with England. +Be this as it may, we should not have been defeated if we had abided +firmly by our defensive policy. The heroic spirit displayed by +the German people surpassed all bounds, and they believed quite +honestly that they were fighting a war of defence. If our policy +had been conducted with corresponding consistency we should have +saved our position in the world. We ought always to have borne in +mind the analogy of the Seven Years War, in order to have been +ready at any moment to extricate ourselves from the hopeless business +with the least possible amount of loss. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the first battle of the Marne, President Wilson consistently +maintained that a decision was no longer possible by force of arms. +This view, which I also shared, gave us some common ground, upon +which, despite our other differences, we were able to some extent +to work together. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Regarding Dr. Wilson's personality certain doubts have been and +are still entertained by many people. He is the most brilliant +and most eloquent exponent of the American point of view. But he +does not devote the same energy and consistency to the execution +of his various programmes as he does to their formation. There +can be no question that, as a result both of his origin and his +training, the President is very much under the sway of English +thought and ideals. Nevertheless, his ambition to be a Peacemaker +and an <i>Arbiter Mundi</i> certainly suggested the chance of our +winning him over to our side, in the event of our being unable to +achieve a <a name="page_9"><span class="page">Page 9</span></a> +decisive victory with the forces at our disposal. In this case, +Wilson, as the democratic leader of the strongest neutral Power, +was the most suitable person to propose and to bring about a Peace +by arrangement. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the opening of the U-boat campaign, two alternatives remained +open to us, one of which we were compelled to choose. If the prospects +of a U-boat war promised to secure a victory, it was naturally +incumbent upon us to prosecute it with all possible speed and energy. +If, as I personally believed, the U-boat war did not guarantee a +victory, it ought, owing to the enormous amount of friction to +which it could not help giving rise, under all circumstances to +have been abandoned; for, by creating American hostility, it did +us more harm than good. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I, as the German Ambassador, in the greatest neutral State, with +the evidences of American power all about me, could not help feeling +it my duty to maintain our diplomatic relations with the United +States. I was convinced that we should most certainly lose the +war if America stepped in against us. And thus I realized ever +more and more the supreme importance of preventing this from taking +place. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +My communications to the Central Government were framed with a +view to inducing them also to adopt this attitude; but they, of +course, had to form their conclusions, not from one source, but +from all the sources of information they possessed. At all events, +isolated as I was at Washington, I could not confine myself merely +to the task of furnishing my Government with information; but was +compelled on occasion to act on my own initiative, in order to +prevent any premature development in the diplomatic situation from +becoming utterly hopeless. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The policy for which I stood not only promised the negative success +of keeping America out of the war, but <a name="page_10"><span +class="page">Page 10</span></a> it also offered the only prospect +there was of obtaining, with neutral help, a Peace by arrangement. +My belief that such a peace could have been obtained through Dr. +Wilson is, of course, no longer susceptible of proof to-day. It +may perhaps sound improbable in view of the President's behavior at +Versailles. It is my opinion, however, that, previous to the 31st +of January, 1917, Dr. Wilson's attitude towards us was radically +different. I base my assumption that Wilson might in those days have +assisted us in obtaining a Peace by negotiation upon the following +points: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +(1) A Peace by mediation was the only way in which the United States +could avoid becoming involved in the war, and this is what the +American public opinion of the day wished above all to prevent. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(2) It is true that even if he had wished to do so, Wilson could +not have declared war on England, neither could he by any exercise +of force have prevented the delivery of munitions to the Allies, or +have compelled England to observe the rights of nations. He could, +however, have obliged England to conclude a Peace by arrangement +with us; not only because in so doing he would have had the support +of American public opinion, but also because such a policy was in +keeping with the best political interests of the United States. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I therefore pursued the policy of Peace with undeviating consistency, +and to this day I still believe it to have been the only right +policy. A thorough prosecution of the U-boat campaign was also a +feasible scheme. But the worst thing that we could possibly do, +was, to steer the zigzag course; for by so doing we were certain +not only to cause constant vexations to America, but, by our half +measures and partial pliancy, also to drive Mr. <a name="page_11"><span +class="page">Page 11</span></a> Wilson even further and further into +the inflexible attitude of a policy of prestige. Unfortunately, +however, it was precisely this zigzag course that we adopted; and +thus, in addition to destroying the prospects which my policy had +offered, according to the view of the Naval people, we also crippled +the effects of the U-boat campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +My policy might best be described as that of "a silent resolve to +obtain Peace." It was utterly wrong to publish our readiness for +Peace broadcast. We should have presented a strong front to the +outside world, and we should have increased the powers of resistance +which we actually possessed by emphasizing our strength both to +our people at home and to other States. According to my view, we +ought, after the first battle of the Marne, to have recognized +in our heart of hearts that victory was out of the question, and +consequently we should have striven to conclude a Peace, the relatively +unfavorable terms of which might perhaps have temporarily staggered +public opinion in Germany and created some indignation. It was not +right, however, to allow deference to public opinion to outweigh +other considerations, as it did in our case. The political leaders +of the Empire ought to have kept the High Military Command, which +from its point of view naturally demanded firmer "assurances" than +the general situation warranted, more thoroughly within bounds, +just as Bismarck did. Presumably the High Military Command would +have been able to perform its duties quite as efficiently if it +had been prevented from exercising too much influence on the policy +which aimed at a conclusion of peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a politician I consider that the ultimate cause of our misfortune +was our lack of a uniform policy both before and during the war. If, +at the time of Bismarck's retirement, we had made a timely and resolute +decision <a name="page_12"><span class="page">Page 12</span></a> +either in favor of the Western Policy that he advocated, or in favor +of the Eastern Policy, we should have prevented the development +of a situation in the politics of the world which ultimately led +to our own undoing. If, during the war, however, we had completely +abandoned the U-boat campaign, and had made every possible effort +to come to an understanding with America, we should, in my opinion, +have been able to extricate ourselves from it satisfactorily. Be +this as it may, it is also possible that if the U-boat campaign had +been prosecuted resolutely, and without any shilly-shallying—a +thing I never wished—we should not have suffered so complete +a collapse from the military, economic, political and moral point +of view, as we must otherwise have done. According to my view it +is the hesitating zigzag course that we pursued which is chiefly +to blame for the fact that of all possible results of the epoch +of German world-politics, the unhappiest for ourselves has come +to pass. The Wilhelminian Age perished owing to the fact that no +definite objects were either selected or pursued in good time, +and, above all, because both before and during the war, two systems +in the Government of the country were constantly at variance with +each other and mutually corroding. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_13"><span class="page">Page 13</span></a> +CHAPTER I</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE WAR +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Anyone who has lived some time in the United States will feel with +Goethe that "America is better off than our own Continent." Owing to +the almost perfect autarchy existing there, grave economic problems +never really arise. Nowhere else, during the whole course of my +various diplomatic wanderings, have I ever seen a happier people, who +looked more cheerfully into the future. In view of the comparatively +sparse population of the country, intensive agricultural production +has only become necessary in a few isolated districts; there are +always purchasers in plenty for the rich surplus of raw materials +available, and industry has not yet been directed solely towards +export. As a result of these happy conditions, the American citizen +feels but little interest for what goes on in other countries. In +the period preceding the Five-Years War, if the political interests +of the United States ever happened to cross those of Europe, it was +almost exclusively in regard to American questions. As a proof +of this we have only to think of the Spanish-American War, and of +the various incidents relating to Venezuela; whereas it was only +with difficulty that the German Government succeeded in inducing +President Roosevelt's Administration to take part in the Algeciras +Conference, at which the presence of the United States representative +in no way alleviated our task. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_14"><span class="page">Page 14</span></a> Up to the time +of the Five-Years War, the Foreign Policy conducted from Washington +was almost entirely Pan-American, and the Monroe Doctrine was the +beginning and end of it; for even if that versatile man, President +Roosevelt, was fond of extending his activities to other spheres, +as, for instance, when he brought the Russo-Japanese War to an +end by the Peace of Portsmouth, the Panama Canal scheme remained +his favorite child. But in the case of the Russo-Japanese War, +it was home politics, which in America are chiefly responsible +for turning the scales in regard to Foreign Policy, that again +played the principal part. Mr. Roosevelt wished to win over to +his side the very strong pacifist element in America; whereas the +Imperialists—particularly later on—deprecated these +successful attempts at mediation, because they prevented a further +weakening of both of the belligerent parties. Even Roosevelt's +Secretary of State, John Hay, concerned himself actively with the +Far East, and was known in America as the spiritual founder of the +policy of the "Open Door." In this particular matter, the German +Government frequently acted hand in hand with the American, and it +was owing to this circumstance that the Foreign Office at Berlin +very much wished to have the United States represented at the Algeciras +Conference. The German Government believed that the Americans would +also declare themselves in favor of the "Open Door" even in Morocco. +This assumption, however, turned out to be a false one, owing to +the fact that the political and economic interest shown by the +United States for countries on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean +was not sufficiently keen. The Algeciras Conference was a fairly +trustworthy forecast of all that subsequently happened at the Peace +Conference at Versailles. Equally lacking in foundation was also +the assumption, so prevalent in Germany, <a name="page_15"><span +class="page">Page 15</span></a> that, as the result of their energetic +Far-Eastern policy, the Americans would plunge themselves into a +serious conflict with Japan. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The question of the Philippines, which arose out of the Spanish-American +War and the Cuban affair, constitutes a certain contrast to the +customary Pan-American Foreign Policy of the United States. A large +number of Americans—possibly the majority—would like +to relinquish the Philippines as soon as the inhabitants of these +islands are in a position to rule themselves. At its inception, +the question of the Philippines brought us into a conflict with +the United States, which was remembered by Americans for years. +Heinrich Friedjung, referring to this incident, says: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"Quite superfluously it occurred to the German Government to make +our East-Asiatic Squadron, under Admiral Diederichs, appear before +Manila precisely at the moment when, in 1898, the decision was made +regarding the Philippines. This was done simply out of a pointless +consciousness of power, without any intention to cause offence." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This criticism is partly justified. And yet the affair was somewhat +different from the version of it which the American Ambassador, +Andrew White, allowed to filter through; for, seeing that, as the +United States did not intend to retain the Philippines, they could +raise no objection to Germany's wishing to acquire them. Thanks to +his friendly attitude towards Germany, Andrew White had, on his +own initiative, exceeded his instructions and was duly censured +by his Government for his zeal. Nevertheless, a misunderstanding +had occurred, as the result of which the Berlin Foreign Office had +acted in perfect good faith. In the public mind in the United States, +however, <a name="page_16"><span class="page">Page 16</span></a> the +feeling still rankled that Germany had wished to make a demonstration +against their Government; and the English Press, which at that +time was hostile to us, applied the bellows enthusiastically to +the glowing embers of American ill-humor. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Venezuela affair, in the year 1902, which was a matter of lodging +certain complaints against the Venezuelan Government, ended in a +similar manner. Germany and England together sent their ultimatum +to Venezuela, and when no heed was paid to it, they instituted +a blockade of a number of Venezuelan ports. It was at this time +that I was appointed Secretary to the Embassy in London, where +I had to conduct a good deal of the negotiations regarding the +Venezuela question, with the Foreign Office. The whole affair, as +initiated by ourselves, was, in proportion to the German claims, +much too elaborate. The first suggestion which led to the common +action on the part of the British and ourselves, came from the +English side; but we should have been wiser, from the point of view +of our own advantage, if we had not listened to the suggestion. +It was absolutely clear from the start that the American Government +would raise objections to this sort of procedure, on the part of +European powers, in South America, and that England, true to her +usual custom, would climb down before the United States the moment she +recognized plainly the latter's displeasure. And when public opinion +in America raised a violent protest, and, incidentally, resolutely +assumed that Germany wished to obtain a footing in Venezuela, the +English Press attacked us in the rear by asserting that the whole +affair had been engineered by Germany, in order to embroil England +with the United States. At President Roosevelt's wish the matter was +finally settled with America's help; but in the United States it +left behind the widely <a name="page_17"><span class="page">Page +17</span></a> prevalent impression that Germany would infringe +the Monroe Doctrine the moment she had the power to do so. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +President Taft, who in the year 1909 took President Roosevelt's +place, endeavored, with his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, to +develop still further the policy of the "Open Door," inaugurated +by John Hay. Both gentlemen felt the keenest interest in the Far +East. The former had been Governor of the Philippines, the latter had +been closely connected with the Pittsburgh iron industry, and knew +the need of extending its sphere of activities. Mr. Knox suggested +the proposal of internationalizing the railways of Manchuria. When, +however, this American notion met with response in Germany, and +apart from its general rejection elsewhere, had the further effect +of drawing Japan and Russia together again, Mr. Knox abandoned his +active Far-Eastern policy, and confined himself to stimulating the +large banks of America into becoming interested in the building of +railways and other economic means of development in China. This policy +was described as "Dollar Diplomacy" by the Democratic Opposition, +and violently opposed. When, therefore, the votes went against the +Republican Party, and President Wilson came to the helm, he let +the Far-Eastern policy drop. High Finance immediately seized this +opportunity in order to extricate itself from Chinese undertakings. +It had only embarked upon "Dollar Diplomacy" at the request of the +Government, and the venture had yielded but little profit, owing +to the fact that Americans are not inclined to invest in foreign +securities. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Secretary of State Knox's policy, which was always supported by +us, accounted for the fact that the official relations between +the German and American Governments were never more cordial than +during the years 1909-13, <a name="page_18"><span class="page">Page +18</span></a> in spite of a short disturbance resulting from a +dispute over our potash exports to the United States. The best +proof of how friendly the official relations of the two Governments +were is shown by the ease with which this quarrel was settled. We +were also successful in concluding a commercial agreement which +was satisfactory to both sides, and overcame the danger of a customs +war as the result of America's new customs tariffs; whereas Taft's +economic plans, which aimed at reciprocity and union with Canada, +came to grief for political reasons, as the result of Canadian +Opposition, and left behind a bitter after-taste both in the United +States, Canada and England. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Official diplomatic communications excepted, however, it must +unfortunately be admitted, that mutual misunderstanding has been +the principal feature of German-American relations. In Germany +there was no understanding for the curious mixture of political +sagacity, commercial acumen, tenacity and sentimentality, which +goes to make up the character of the American people. The power of +the Union was therefore underestimated by us, and the high-spirited +utterances of American youthful strength were more disapproved of +than was necessary, because they were interpreted as mere "bluff" +and arrogance. We never sufficiently allowed for the fact that the +Americans are very "emotional"—that is to say, that they are +easily carried away by their feelings and then become uncertain. +Political surprises in the United States are almost the rule. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the other hand, Americans never give themselves time to learn +to understand a foreign nation. A knowledge of foreign languages is +by no means general in the United States. The Americans unconsciously +borrow their thoughts and ideas from England, because it is the +only nation whose literature and Press are accessible <a +name="page_19"><span class="page">Page 19</span></a> to them in the +original tongue. Naturally this fact contributed very considerably, +before the Five-Years War, towards making the comprehension of +Germany difficult; because in those days German-English relations +were growing more and more unfavorable every day, and this decline +in friendliness found a powerful echo in the English Press and +other literature. The English language exercises more absolute +power in the United States than even in England itself. For example, +it would never occur to any diplomat in Washington to transact his +business in any other language than English. Whereas, in London, +I never once heard the French Ambassador pronounce one word of +English—even in an after-dinner speech—M. Jusserand +in Washington always spoke English. But, in spite of the claim +that the French make, that their language prevails in diplomatic +circles, he could not have done otherwise; because I have never, +during the whole of the eight years of my official activities in +Washington, met one Secretary of State who had mastered any other +language than English. It is obvious that this state of affairs +opens all doors and avenues to English political and cultural +influences. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus, before the outbreak of the Five-Years War, the majority of +Americans already looked upon the Germans, however unconsciously, +through the optics of the English Press and English literary +publications. A large number of people in the United States honestly +believed, moreover, in the rumored German scheme to seize the empire +of the world. Our enormous successes in the economic field provoked +unbounded admiration and led, on the one hand, to an over-estimation +of our power, which did not prove favorable to us politically, +while, on the other hand, the Americans who frequently indulged in +generalizations about Germany were prone to judge us according to +the German-American Beer-Philistine, whom they <a name="page_20"><span +class="page">Page 20</span></a> disdainfully called a "Dutchman." +The Americans' view of the German people wavered between these two +extremes; but every year opinion tended to incline more and more in +the direction of the former. The phantom of a German world-empire, +extending from Hamburg to Bagdad, had already taken possession of +the American mind long before the war; and in the United States it +was feared that the next step would be that this world-empire would +infringe the Monroe Doctrine and found colonies in South America. +Professor Baumgarten, in an entertaining book, has pointed out to +what extent the publications of the Pan-German party contributed +towards promoting such conceptions in America. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Our Press was a little too fond of making attacks on the Monroe +Doctrine in particular. I was always of the opinion that we ought, +openly and officially, to have recognized this American article of +faith. As regards the Monroe Doctrine, the question is not one of +Right, but one of Power. We certainly had not the power to infringe +the Monroe Doctrine, even if we had had the intention, which was never +the case. It would, therefore, have been more wise to acknowledge +it, and thus to improve the political attitude, towards ourselves, +of a country on which we were so very much dependent for a number +of our raw-material supplies. I have often wondered whether the +Imperial Government would not have regarded it as its duty to avoid +war at all costs, if our economic dependence upon foreign countries +had been more clearly recognized. German prosperity was based to +a great extent on the Germans overseas, who had settled down in +every corner of the earth, just as in former days the Greeks had +settled all over the Roman Empire. The Germans overseas constituted +a colonial empire, which was a far more precious source of wealth +than many a foreign possession belonging to other Powers. <a +name="page_21"><span class="page">Page 21</span></a> In my opinion +not sufficient allowance was made for this state of affairs. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Finally, a further cause of misunderstandings, as I have already +mentioned in the Introduction, was to be found in the general disfavor +with which American pacifist tendencies were regarded in Germany. +Nine-tenths of the American nation are pacifists, either through their +education and sentimental prepossession in favor of the principle, +or out of a sense of commercial expediency. People in the United +States did not understand that the German people, owing to their +tragic history, are compelled to cultivate and to uphold the martial +spirit of their ancestors. The types of the German officer of the +reserve and of the members of the student corps are particularly +unsympathetic to the American, and, for certain German foibles, +all sign of that understanding that readily forgives, is entirely +absent in the United States, owing to the fact that our historical +development is not realized over there. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although the Americans are largely and unconsciously swayed by the +influence of English ideas, we must be careful to avoid falling into +the error, so common in Germany, of regarding them as Anglo-Saxons. +The Americans themselves, in their own country, scarcely ever call +themselves Anglo-Saxons. This term is used by the English when +they are anxious to claim their American cousins as their own. +Occasionally, too, an American may use the expression when making +an after-dinner speech at some fraternizing function. As a rule, +however, the Americans insist on being Americans, and nothing else. +On the 11th May, 1914, at a memorial service for the men who fell +at Vera Cruz, President Wilson, in one of his finest speeches, +said: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Notice how truly these men were of our blood. I mean of our American +blood, which is not drawn from <a name="page_22"><span class="page">Page +22</span></a> any one country, which is not drawn from any one +stock, which is not drawn from any one language of the modern world; +but free men everywhere have sent their sons and their brothers +and their daughters to this country in order to make that great +compounded nation which consists of all the sturdy elements and +of all the best elements of the whole globe. I listened again to +this list of the dead with a profound interest, because of the +mixture of the names, for the names bear the marks of the several +national stocks from which these men came. But they are not Irishmen +or Germans or Frenchmen or Hebrews or Italians any more. They were +not when they went to Vera Cruz; they were Americans; every one +of them, with no difference in their Americanism because of the +stock from which they came. They were in a peculiar sense of our +blood, and they proved it by showing that they were of our spirit, +that no matter what their derivation, no matter where their people +came from, they thought and wished and did the things that were +American; and the flag under which they served was a flag in which +all the blood of mankind is united to make a free nation." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The above words of President Wilson are the key to the attitude of +the Americans who are of German origin. True, these people, almost +without exception, still cling to their old home with heartfelt +affection; but they are Americans, like the rest of the nation. +"Germania is our mother, and Columbia is our bride," said Carl +Schurz, and with these words he described the situation in a nutshell. +Just as a man shall "leave his father and his mother, and shall +cleave unto his wife," so the man who is generally styled the +German-American decides in favor of his new home-land, when a conflict +arises between America and Germany. He will, however, do anything +<a name="page_23"><span class="page">Page 23</span></a> in his +power to avoid such a conflict. Even before the war, we in Germany +entirely failed to understand the difficult and delicate position +of the American of German origin. And during the war this was more +than ever the case. The question of the "German-Americans" has +never been dealt with tactfully in Germany. Our greatest mistake +was to expect too much from them. The Americans of German origin +have retained in their new home all the failings and virtues of the +German people. <i>We</i> could not, therefore, blame them if they +showed less interest and less understanding in regard to political +questions than the rest of America; for did they not, on the other +hand, distinguish themselves by their respect for the established +order of things, and by the fidelity and industry with which they +pursued their various callings? The inevitable consequence of these +national qualities was that they did not exercise the political +influence which would have been only in keeping with their numerical +superiority. For instance, I might mention that, on the occasion +when I first visited Milwaukee, I was welcomed by an Irish mayor, +a circumstance which somewhat surprised me, seeing that at the +time the town contained from 300,000 to 400,000 Germans. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In consequence of the state of affairs described above, the principal +object of German policy in the United States before the war was +to try to bring about a more satisfactory understanding between +the two peoples. Prince Henry's journey to America, the exchange +of University professors and school teachers, which took place on +this occasion, the visits of the two fleets, the American Institute +in Berlin, and similar more or less successful undertakings served +the same purpose. German diplomatic representatives were instructed +to promote this policy with all their power. When I was appointed +Ambassador in Washington, the Kaiser's and <a name="page_24"><span +class="page">Page 24</span></a> the Chancellor's principal injunction, +in taking leave of me, was that I should enlighten public opinion +in the United States regarding the peaceful and friendly intentions +of German policy. Prince Bülow also said to me that I must +without fail bring the negotiations about an Arbitration Treaty +with the United States, which had been left unfinished owing to +the death of my predecessor, to a satisfactory conclusion. Despite +these definite instructions, the German Government, as I have already +pointed out, ultimately blundered and stumbled over legal quibbles. +In any case, however, Prince Bülow had meanwhile vacated his +office. The effect upon the American mind of our obstruction of +this matter should not be under-estimated. It helped not a little +to convince public opinion in the United States of the alleged +warlike intentions of the German people. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In accordance with American custom, the semi-official and semi-private +activities concerned with fostering a better understanding between +the two States had to be published to the whole world, and this +had the inevitable disadvantage of provoking opposition, both in +Germany and in the United States, among all those who had reasons +for being hostile. Unfortunately, the official representatives of +Germany in Washington were always a thorn in the side of a certain +section of the German Press, whenever they tried, in consideration +of the American attitude of mind and social customs, to introduce +a warmer feeling into the relations between the two sides. Even +in the time of my predecessor, Speck von Sternburg, the German +Embassy was on such occasions charged with softness and an excessive +desire to become adapted to American ways; and this remained the +case during my tenure of office. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Our Press in general, moreover, never revealed a sufficient amount +of interest or understanding in regard to <a name="page_25"><span +class="page">Page 25</span></a> American affairs. There were only +a very few German newspaper correspondents in the United States, +and those that did happen to be there were too poorly paid to be +able to keep properly in touch with American social life. About +twelve months before the war, the well-known wealthy German-American, +Hermann Sielcken, offered to help me out of this difficulty by +undertaking to pay the salary of a first-rate American journalist, +of German origin, who was to reside in Washington, and act as the +representative there of Wolff's telegraphic bureau. I immediately +took steps to organize this telegraphic service. Very shortly +afterwards, however, I was informed by Berlin, that the telegrams +would be too expensive, as the subject was not of enough interest, +and in this case the Wolff Bureau would only have had to defray +the cost of the actual telegrams. This was the way the supply of +news was organized in a country that imagined it was practising +world-politics. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mr. Wilson took up his quarters in the White House, Washington, +about a year before the war, and opened his period of office with +several internal reforms. Then came the American-Mexican crisis, +and relations with Europe in general, and Germany in particular, +therefore, fell somewhat into the background. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Woodrow Wilson was a University don and an historian. His works +are distinguished by their brilliant style and the masterly manner +in which he wields the English language—a power which was +also manifested in his political speeches and proclamations. Mr. +Wilson sprang into political and general fame when he was President +of the University of Princeton, and was elected as Governor of +the State of New Jersey. Even in those days he displayed, side by +side, on the one hand, his democratic bias which led him violently +to oppose the aristocratic student-clubs, and on the other, his +egocentric and autocratic <a name="page_26"><span class="page">Page +26</span></a> leanings which made him inaccessible to any advice from +outside, and constantly embroiled him with the governing council +of the University. As Governor of New Jersey, The Holy Land of +"Trusts," Mr. Wilson opened an extraordinarily sharp campaign against +their dominion. Mr. Roosevelt, it is true, had spoken a good deal +against the trusts, but he had done little. He could not, however, +have achieved much real success, because the Republican Party was +too much bound up with the trusts, and dependent on them. At the +time when Mr. Roosevelt wanted to take action, he also succeeded in +splitting up his party, so that real reform could only be expected +from the Democratic side. The conviction that this was so was the +cause of Mr. Wilson's success in the Presidential election of 1912. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In regard to external politics, Mr. Wilson was pacifistic, as was +also his party; whereas the Imperialists belonged almost without +exception to the Republican Party. In spite of "Wall Street," and +the influence of English ideas and opinions upon American society, +Pacifist tendencies largely prevailed in the United States before +the outbreak of the Five-Years War; how much more was this the case, +therefore, when Mr. Wilson, in accordance with American custom, +gave the post of Secretary of State to the politician to whose +influence he owed his nomination as candidate for the Presidency +by the Democratic Party. Thus did Mr. William Jennings Bryan attain +to the dignity of Secretary of State after he had thrice stood as +a candidate for the Presidency without success. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In all political questions, Mr. Bryan followed a much more radical +tendency than Mr. Wilson. His opponents call him a dishonest demagogue. +I, on the contrary, would prefer to call Mr. Bryan an honest visionary +and fanatic, whose passionate enthusiasm may go to make <a +name="page_27"><span class="page">Page 27</span></a> an exemplary +speechmaker at large meetings, but not a statesman whose concern is +the world of realities. He who in his enthusiasm believes he will +be able to see his ideal realized in this world next Thursday week +is not necessarily dishonest on that account, even if he overlooks +the fact that things are going very badly indeed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It was believed in a large number of circles that Mr. Bryan would +not accept the post of Secretary of State, for even at that time +everybody who was in the know was already aware that Mr. Wilson could +only tolerate subordinates and not men with opinions of their own. +Mr. Bryan, however, felt the moral obligation, at least to attempt to +give his radical views a chance of succeeding, and declared, as he +took over the post, that so long as he was Secretary of State the +United States would never go to war. He even wanted this principle +to be generally accepted by the rest of the world, and with this +end in view, submitted to all foreign Governments the draft of +an Arbitration and Peace-Treaty, which was to make war utterly +impossible in the future. As is well known, the German Government, +unlike all the others, refused to fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes. +The Secretary of State was a little mortified by this, even though +he still hoped that we should ultimately follow the example of +the other Powers. Every time we met, he used to remind me of his +draft Arbitration Treaty, which I had forwarded to Berlin. Later on +I often regretted that we did not fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes; +who, by the by, during the war, again returned to the question, but +in vain. If the treaty had been signed by us, it would most probably +have facilitated the negotiations about the U-boat campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The diplomatic corps in Washington thus found itself confronted +by an entirely new situation. The Republican Party had been at the +helm for sixteen years, and <a name="page_28"><span class="page">Page +28</span></a> had now to vacate every one of the administrative +posts. Even our personal intercourse with the President was governed +by different formalities from those which existed in the days of his +predecessors. Mr. Roosevelt liked to maintain friendly relations +with those diplomats whose company pleased him. He disregarded the +old traditional etiquette, according to which the President was not +allowed to visit the Ambassadors or any private houses in Washington. +The friendly relations that existed between Mr. Roosevelt and Baron +Speck von Sternburg are well known. When in the year 1908, after +this gentleman's decease, I assumed his post at Washington, Mr. +Roosevelt invited me to the White House on the evening after my +first audience, to a private interview, in which every topic of +the day was discussed. Invitations of this kind were of frequent +occurrence during the last two months of Roosevelt's administration, +which, at the time of my entering office, was already drawing to +its close. For instance, Mr. Roosevelt showed me the draft of the +speech which after his retirement he delivered at the University +of Berlin. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +My dealings with President Taft were on the same footing; for he +also was in favor of an amicable and unconventional relationship. +On one occasion he invited me to join him in his private Pullman on +a journey to his home in Cincinnati, where we attended the musical +festival together. On another occasion, he suddenly appeared, without +formal notice, at the Embassy, while we were holding a ball in +honor of his daughter, and later on he accepted an invitation to +my daughter's wedding. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +President Wilson, who by inclination and habit is a recluse and +a lonely worker, does not like company. He re-introduced the old +etiquette and confined himself only to visiting the houses of Cabinet +members, which had been the customary tradition. He also kept himself +aloof <a name="page_29"><span class="page">Page 29</span></a> from +the banquets, which are such a favorite feature of social life in +America, and severely limited the company at the White House. Thus +the New Year Reception was discontinued entirely. This attitude +on the part of the President was the outcome of his tastes and +inclinations. But I certainly do not believe that he simply developed +a theory out of his own peculiar tastes, as so often happens in +life. I am more inclined to believe that Mr. Wilson regarded the +old American tradition as more expedient, on the grounds that it +enabled the President to remain free from all intimacy, and thus to +safeguard the complete impartiality which his high office demanded. +The peculiar friendship which unites Mr. Wilson with Mr. House is +no objection to this theory, for the latter has to some extent +always been in the position of a minister without portfolio. An +adviser of this sort, who incurs no responsibility by the advice +he gives, is more readily accepted by American opinion than by +any other, because the President of the United States is known to +be alone and exclusively responsible, whereas his ministers are +only looked upon as his assistants. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Generally speaking, the political situation in the United States +before the Five-Years War was as follows: On the one hand, owing +to the influence of English ideas, which I have already mentioned, +it was to be expected that a feeling of sympathy with the Entente +would probably preponderate in the public mind; while on the other +hand, owing to the general indifference that prevailed with regard to +all that happened in Europe, and to the strong pacifist tendencies, +no interference in the war was to be expected from America, unless +unforeseen circumstances provoked it. At all events it was to be +feared that the inflammability of the Americans' feelings would +once again be under-estimated in Germany, as it had been already. +It has never been properly <a name="page_30"><span class="page">Page +30</span></a> understood in our country, despite the fact that +the Manila and Venezuela affairs might have taught us a lesson in +this respect. The juxtaposition in the American people's character +of Pacifism and an impulsive lust of war should have been known to +us, if more sedulous attention had been paid in Germany to American +conditions and characteristics. The American judges affairs in +Europe, partly from the standpoint of his own private sentiment of +justice, and partly under the guidance of merely emotional values; +but not, as was generally supposed in Germany, simply from a cold and +business-like point of view. If this had been reckoned with in Germany, +the terrible effect upon public opinion in America of the invasion of +Belgium and of the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i>—particularly +in view of the influence of English propaganda—would have +been adequately valued from the start. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On May 17th, 1915, in a report addressed to the Imperial Chancellor, +I wrote as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"It is not a bit of good glossing over things. Our best plan, therefore, +is frankly to acknowledge that our propaganda in this country has, as +the result of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, completely collapsed. +To everyone who is familiar with the American character this could +have been foreseen. I therefore beg leave to point out in time, +that another event like the present one would certainly mean war +with the United States. Side by side in the American character +there lie two apparently completely contradictory traits. The cool, +calculating man of business is not recognizable when he is deeply +moved and excited—that is to say, when he is actuated by +what is here called 'emotion.' At such moments he can be compared +only to an hysterical woman, to whom talking is of no avail. The +only hope is to gain time while the attack <a name="page_31"><span +class="page">Page 31</span></a> passes over. At present it is impossible +to foresee what will be the outcome of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident. +I can only hope that we shall survive it without war. Be this as +it may, however, we can only resume our propaganda when the storm +has subsided." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Here I should like to intrude a few of my own views regarding the +importance of public opinion in the United States. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In Europe, where people are constantly hearing about the truly +extraordinary and far-reaching authority of the American +President—the London <i>Times</i> once said that, after the +overthrow of the Russian Czar, the President of the United States +was the last remaining autocrat—it is difficult to form a +correct estimate of the power of public opinion in the Union. In +America, just as no mayor can with impunity ignore the public opinion +of his city, and no governor the public opinion of his state, so +the President of the Republic, despite his far-reaching authority, +cannot for long run counter to the public opinion of his country. +The fact has often been emphasized by Mr. Wilson himself, among +others, that the American President must "keep his ear to the +ground"—that is to say, must pay strict attention to public +opinion and act in harmony with it. For the American statesman, +whose highest ambition consists either in being re-elected, or +at least in seeing his party returned to power, any other course +would amount to political suicide; for any attempt at swimming +against the tide will certainly be avenged at the next elections. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It must be remembered that public opinion in the United States +is seldom so homogeneous and unanimous a thing as, for example, +in England. Particularly in questions of foreign politics, public +opinion in the Union, stretching, as it does, over a whole continent, +reacts in <a name="page_32"><span class="page">Page 32</span></a> +widely varying ways in different localities, and to a very different +degree. Thus, in the States bordering on the Atlantic coast, which +are more closely in touch with the Old World, there is, as a rule, +a very definite public opinion on European questions, while the +West remains more or less indifferent. On the other hand, in the +Gulf States a very lively interest is taken by the public in the +Mexican problem, and the Pacific States are closely concerned with +the Japanese question, matters which arouse hardly more than academic +interest in other localities. This is also reflected in the American +Daily Press, which does not produce papers exerting equal influence +over the whole nation, but rather, in accordance with the customary +geographical division of the Union into seven economic spheres +of interest—namely, New York, New England, Middle Atlantic +States, Southern States, Middle West, Western and Pacific States, +comprises seven different daily presses, each of which gives first +place to quite a different problem from the rest. It is true that +the New York Press is certainly the most important mirror of American +public opinion on European questions. Nevertheless, this importance +should not lead to the erroneous assumption that the American Press +and the New York Press are synonymous terms. The perusal of the +latter does not suffice for the formation of a reliable judgment +of American public opinion, with regard to certain questions which +concern the whole nation; rather it is necessary also to study +the leading papers of New England, the Middle Atlantic States, +and particularly the West. The reports of German and English +correspondents on feeling in America, which, as so often happens, +are based purely on the New York Press, frequently play one false, if +one relies on them for an estimate of the public opinion of the whole +nation. The "Associated Press," therefore, <a name="page_33"><span +class="page">Page 33</span></a> makes it a rule with all questions +of national importance, not only to reproduce extracts from the +New York Press, but also to publish précis of the opinions +of at least fifty leading journals from all parts of the Union. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The American daily papers are more important as a medium for influencing +public opinion than as a mirror for reflecting it. The United States +is the land of propaganda <i>par excellence!</i> Every important +enterprise, of no matter what nature, has its Press agent; the +greatest of all is the propaganda lasting for months, which is +carried on before the biennial elections, and of the magnitude of +which it is difficult for the average European to gain any conception. +It is therefore not surprising that the political leaders of the +country make very wide use of the Press in important questions +of foreign politics, to influence public opinion in favor of the +Government policy. Not only the great news agencies, but also all +leading newspapers of the Union maintain their permanent special +correspondents in Washington, and these are received almost daily by +the Secretary of State, and as a rule once a week by the President. +The information that they receive at these interviews they communicate +to their papers in the greatest detail, without naming the high +officials from whom it has emanated, and in this way they naturally +act as megaphones through which the views of the Government are +spread throughout the whole country. In foreign questions it was +often striking how newspapers would hold back their comments until +they had received in this way a <i>mot d'ordre</i> from Washington. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of course this possibility for the Government to create opinion on +concrete questions only applies so long as a firm public opinion has +not already set in. As soon as the process of "crystallization," as +it is called, is complete, there is nothing left for the Government +but to <a name="page_34"><span class="page">Page 34</span></a> follow +the preponderating public opinion. Even a man like Mr. Wilson, who +possesses an unusually high degree of self-will, has always followed +public opinion, for the correct interpretation of which—apart +from his own proverbial instinct—he commands the services +of his secretary, Mr. Tumulty, and a large staff, as well as the +organization of the Democratic party, which spreads through the +length and breadth of the country. If, in a few exceptional cases, +the President has set himself in opposition to public opinion, +we might be sure that it would not be long before he again set his +course on theirs. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_35"><span class="page">Page 35</span></a> +CHAPTER II</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When I received the news of the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, +I was dining with the Spanish Ambassador at the Metropolitan Club +in Washington. Signor Riano and I were not for a moment in doubt as +to the very serious, peace-menacing character of the incident, but +we found little interest in the matter among the Americans in the +club, who, as always, regarded European affairs with indifference. +As to the results of the murder, I received in Washington no +information, either officially or through the Press. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I therefore, on the 7th July, began my usual summer leave, which +had been granted a few weeks before. For the last time I crossed +the ocean on one of the proud German liners, and, indeed, on the +finest of our whole merchant fleet, the <i>Vaterland</i>. For the +last time I saw, on my arrival, the port of Hamburg and the lower +Elbe in all their glory. Germans who live at home can hardly imagine +with what love and what pride we foreign ambassadors and exiled +Germans regarded the German shipping-lines. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A few days after I had arrived in my home at Starnberg there began +strong public excitement and uneasiness over the political situation. +However, of late years so many crises had been successfully averted +at the eleventh hour, that this time, too, I hoped up to the last +minute that a change for the better would set in. It seemed as +though the responsibility for a war was too great to be <a +name="page_36"><span class="page">Page 36</span></a> borne by anyone +man—whoever he might be—who would have to make the +final decision. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the wonderful, still summer evening of the 1st August, we heard +across the Starnberger Lake, in all the surrounding villages, the +muffled beat of drums announcing mobilization. The dark forebodings +with which the sound of the drums filled me have fixed that hour +indelibly in my memory. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following day was devoted to preparations for the journey to +Berlin, where I had to receive instructions before returning with +all possible speed to Washington. The journey from Munich to Berlin, +which could only be made in military trains, occupied forty-eight +hours. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the Wilhelmstrasse I had interviews with the authorities, the +substance of which was instructions to enlighten the Government +and people of the United States on the German standpoint. In doing +so I was to avoid any appearance of aggression towards England, +because an understanding with Great Britain had to be concluded +as soon as possible. The Berlin view on the question of guilt was +even then very much the same as has been set down in the memorandum +of the commission of four of the 27th May, 1919, at Versailles, +namely, that Russia was the originator of the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Further, I was informed at the Foreign Office, that in addition +to some other additions to the staff of the Washington Embassy, +the former Secretary of State of the Colonial Office, Dr. Dernburg, +and Privy Councillor Albert, of the Ministry of the Interior, were +to accompany me; the former as representative of the German Red +Cross, the latter as agent of the "Central Purchasing Company." Dr. +Dernburg's chief task, however, was to raise a loan in the United +States, the proceeds of which were to pay for Herr Albert's purchases +for the aforesaid company. For this purpose the Imperial Treasury +<a name="page_37"><span class="page">Page 37</span></a> supplied +us with Treasury notes, which could only be made negotiable by my +signature. This gave rise later to the legend that Dr. Dernburg +was armed with millions for propaganda purposes. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Our journey was wearisome but passed off without incident. In +forty-eight hours we reached Rotterdam, where we boarded the Dutch +steamer <i>Noordam</i>. As we went aboard we were all in high spirits, +for we had seen everywhere in Germany a wonderful, self-sacrificing +and noble enthusiasm. On the steamer, however, which incidentally was +badly overloaded, the picture changed. We suddenly found ourselves +surrounded by hostile feeling, and among our fellow-passengers +there were only a few friendly to the German cause. The bitter +daily struggle toward which we were travelling was to begin on the +ship. We plunged straight into it, and tried as far as possible +to influence our fellow passengers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At Dover the ship was inspected by a British officer; the inspection, +however, passed off without any inconvenience to us, as in those +first days of the war the regulations of international law were +still to some extent respected. We had already made all preparations +to throw the Treasury notes overboard, in case we were searched. +As a curiosity I mention a comic interlude that occurred after we +had left Dover Harbor. A friendly German-American from a Western +State, who did not know who I was, but had recognized me as a German, +accosted me with the remark: "Take care that you don't expose yourself +to annoyance; the people on board think you are the German Ambassador +in Washington." The excellent man was overcome with amazement when +I admitted my identity. We had not had our names entered on the +passengers' list, but apart from this made no secret of our journey, +as it was already known in Rotterdam. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After an eleven days' voyage, we landed in New York <a +name="page_38"><span class="page">Page 38</span></a> on the 23rd +August. Our arrival was a relief, as during the journey we had +been overwhelmed exclusively with enemy wireless reports of French +victories. Every day we had received news of the annihilation of a +fresh German Army Corps. In comparison with this mental torture, +the cross-fire of questions from countless American Pressmen, not +altogether friendly towards Germany, was comparatively easy to +bear. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As is known, American public opinion at that time had been given a +one-sided view of the causes and course of the war, for England, who, +immediately after the declaration of war, had cut our Transatlantic +cable, held the whole of the Transatlantic news apparatus in her +hands. Apart from this, however, our enemies found from the beginning +very important Allies in a number of leading American newspapers, +which, in their daily issue of from three to six editions, did all +they could to spread anti-German feeling. In New York the bitterest +attacks on Germany were made by the <i>Herald</i> and the <i>Evening +Telegram</i>, which were in close touch with France, as well as the +<i>Tribune</i> and <i>Times</i>, which followed in England's wake; +somewhat more moderate were the <i>Sun</i> and the <i>Globe</i>; the +only neutrals were the <i>Evening Post</i> and the <i>American</i>. +Outside New York the Press raged against us, particularly in New +England and the Middle-Atlantic States. In the South and West we +were also baited by the Press, but with considerably less intensity. +The only papers which could be called neutral were those of the Hearst +Press, which took up an outspoken National-American standpoint, +and, in addition, the <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, the <i>Washington +Post</i>, and a few minor newspapers. It was already very significant +that papers like the <i>Boston Transcript</i>, the <i>Brooklyn +Eagle</i>, the <i>Baltimore Sun</i>, and a few others opened their +letter-boxes to anti-German articles, which, it is true, they condemned +with fair <a name="page_39"><span class="page">Page 39</span></a> +regularity in their leading articles or editorial notes. Against +this campaign, fed systematically and daily with British propaganda +information—especially on the subject of German atrocities in +Belgium—the small number of papers in the German language, +which, moreover, were little heeded by public opinion, and at the +head of which stood the old <i>New Yorker Staatszeitung</i> and +the courageous weekly <i>Fatherland</i>, founded shortly after +the outbreak of war by the young German-American, G. S. Vierick, +could make but little headway. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On my arrival in New York, and during the next few weeks, I made +an honest effort by daily interviews of the representatives of +the leading daily newspapers to explain the German standpoint to +the American public. I soon noticed, however, that these efforts +were not only practically fruitless but that they were even fraught +with certain dangers for me. The daily struggle with the Press was +threatening to undermine my official position and to compromise +my relations with the Washington Government so seriously that I +should not have been in a position to carry through with success +the diplomatic negotiations which were likely to be called for. +I therefore considered it as my duty to the German people to give +up, as far as I personally was concerned, all propaganda in favor +of the German cause. Certainly I have had a good deal further to +do with American journalists until the final rupture; but I +categorically refused to grant interviews or to receive newspaper +correspondents who were not prepared to treat my statements purely +as confidential, private information. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I should like to take this opportunity to remark that the American +journalist is far better than the reputation he enjoys in Europe. +In spite of the hostile atmosphere which surrounded me in America +I have never had to complain of an indiscretion. True, many minor +New <a name="page_40"><span class="page">Page 40</span></a> York +reporters whom I did not receive invented statements which I had +never made; but such experiences are common to all politicians in +America. Moreover, the results of these journalistic tricks were +almost always local and were easily contradicted. In Washington +such things never occurred. The journalists there were quite +extraordinarily capable and trustworthy men, who always behaved +like "gentlemen." My relations with them remained very friendly +to the last. In so far as I was not forced to keep silence for +political reasons I have always told them the real truth. Of course, +I was as little capable as the American journalists of foreseeing +that the policy I was representing was doomed to ultimate failure. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Just at the time when I gave up personal propaganda in order to +devote myself to my political and diplomatic activities in Washington, +the financial mission of Secretary of State Dr. Dernburg had failed. +President Wilson had stated clearly that it would be an unneutral +act for loans to be raised in the Union by the combatant States. +Our friends in high financial circles in New York regarded this +decision as favorable to Germany, for they foresaw—what actually +happened—that for every million received by us, our enemies +would raise a hundred millions. As a result of this decision of +the President, Privy Councillor Albert had to finance his purchases +as far as possible privately, while Dr. Dernburg, whose time was +not fully occupied by his duties as delegate of the Red Cross, +which had meanwhile been organized by Geheim Oberregierungrat Meyer +Gerhardt and Rittmeister Hecker, would have left America if there +had remained any possibility of doing so. There was not, however, as +the English inspected all neutral ships shortly after they left the +American ports and—in flagrant contravention of international +law, which only allows the <a name="page_41"><span class="page">Page +41</span></a> arrest of persons who are already enrolled in the +fighting forces—summarily arrested and interned every German +capable of bearing arms. As Dr. Dernburg was thus an unwilling +prisoner in New York he began to write articles on the world-war +for the daily Press. He had a gift for explaining the causes of the +war in a quiet, interesting manner, and particularly for setting +out the German standpoint in a conciliatory form. His propaganda work +therefore met with extraordinary success. The editors of newspapers +and periodicals pressed him to contribute to their columns, and the +whole New York Press readily printed all the articles he sent in +to contradict the statements of the anti-Germans. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Out of this activity developed, in co-operation with the Foreign +Office, Dr. Dernburg's New York Press Bureau, a solution of the +propaganda question which was exceedingly welcome to me. As a private +person Dr. Dernburg could say and write much that could not be said +officially and therefore could not come from me. Consequently I +took it for granted that—in spite of certain suggestions +to the contrary—Dr. Dernburg would not be attached to the +Embassy, which would only hamper his work, and also that the Press +Bureau would retain its independent and unofficial character. I +may take it as a well-known fact that Washington is the political, +and New York the economic, capital of the United States, which +has always resulted in a certain geographical division of the +corresponding diplomatic duties. It naturally had its disadvantages +that there should be, apart from the Consulate-General, four other +independent German establishments in New York, namely, the offices +of Dr. Dernburg, Privy Councillor Albert, the military attaché +Captain von Papen and the naval attaché Commander Boy-Ed. +In order to keep, to some extent, in touch with these gentlemen, +I occasionally travelled to New York and <a name="page_42"><span +class="page">Page 42</span></a> interviewed them together in the +Ritz-Carlton Hotel, where I usually stayed and in which Dr. Dernburg +lived; for their offices, scattered as they were over the lower +town, and which, moreover, I never entered, were unsuitable for the +purpose. Our mutual personal relations were always of the best. On +the other hand, it was naturally difficult to make any headway with +our official business, since each received independent instructions +from Berlin. This was least the case with Dr. Dernburg, because his +responsible authority as far as propaganda was concerned was partly +the Foreign Office itself and partly the semi-official "Central +Office for Foreign Service." The other three gentlemen, however, +were all responsible to home departments other than mine. Captain +von Papen and Commander Boy-Ed frequently held back from me the +instructions they had received from Berlin in order not to embarrass +the Embassy by passing on military or naval information. Financially, +too, the four officials were completely independent and had their +own banking accounts, for which they had to account individually +to their respective departments at home. Only Privy Councillor +Albert had, for the purchase on a large scale of raw material, +definite funds which were in any event under my control. Concerning +the activities of these four gentlemen, countless legends have been +spread in America and in part have found their way to Germany. In +spite of all the reproaches levelled against them, and indirectly +against myself, with regard to propaganda—I shall speak of the +so-called conspiracies in Chapter V.—nothing has reached my +ears of which these gentlemen need in any way be ashamed. Individual +mistakes we have, of course, all made; in view of the ferocity and +protraction of the struggle they were inevitable. But in general the +German propaganda in America in no way deserves the abuse with which +it has been covered, in <a name="page_43"><span class="page">Page +43</span></a> part, too, at home. If it had really been so clumsy +or ineffective as the enemy Press afterwards claimed, the Entente +and their American partisans would not have set in motion such +gigantic machinery to combat it. One need only read G. Lechartier's +book, "Intrigues et Diplomaties à Washington," to see what +importance was attached to our propaganda by the enemy. In spite +of all the bitterness which the author infuses into his fictitious +narration, admiration for the German activity in the United States +shines through the whole book. Further, at the end of 1918 a Commission +of the Senate appointed to investigate German propaganda, as a +result of the publication of protocols on this subject, repeatedly +stated that its work had in no way been in vain, but rather its +after effects had made themselves strongly felt "like poison gas" +long after America's entry into the war. One may well venture to +say that, had it not been for the serious crisis caused by the +submarine war, it would probably in time have succeeded in completely +neutralizing the anti-German campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As regards our justification for openly championing the German cause +before the people of the United States by written and spoken word, +this is self-evident in a country which recognizes the principles of +freedom of the Press and free speech. Apart from this, however, +the American Government have themselves provided a precedent in +this connection during the civil war, when President Lincoln in +1863 sent to England the famous preacher, Henry Ward Beecher, whose +sympathies were strongly on the side of the Federals. Through his +speeches, afterwards published as "Patriotic Addresses," he did +much towards swaying public opinion in favor of the Northern States. +In this war, too, America, after abandoning her neutrality, has +carried out vigorous propaganda in neutral countries, as is shown +<a name="page_44"><span class="page">Page 44</span></a> by the +mission of the well-known New York supporter of woman suffrage, +Mrs. Norman Whitehouse, under the auspices of the official Press +Bureau and with the special approval of Secretary of State Lansing. +Moreover our justification has been expressly upheld by a statement +of Commissioner Bruce Bielaski of the American Law Department, who +appeared as chief witness against us before the above mentioned +Commission of Inquiry. He declared that there was no law in the United +States which, before her entry into the war, rendered illegal German +or any other foreign propaganda. Why all this noise then?—it +is reasonable to ask. Why, then, has the suggestion persisted at +home and abroad, almost from the appearance of Dr. Dernburg until +the present day, that we had, with our propaganda campaign, made +ourselves guilty of treachery to the United States? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From the moral point of view, too, no exception can be taken to +the German propaganda. The United States was neutral and wished to +remain so. The German propaganda was working for the same end. I +have never heard of a single case of bribery by our representatives. +If money was spent on our side, it was purely for the purpose of +spreading articles and pamphlets pleading United States neutrality. +Applications were frequently made to us by writers and editors who +from inner conviction were ready to write and circulate articles +of this kind, but were not financially in a position to do so. The +leaders of German propaganda would surely have been neglectful +of their duty if in such cases they had not provided the necessary +funds. All Governments in the world have always proceeded in a +similar way, and in particular that of the United States since +their entry into the war, as is shown by the case of the <i>Freie +Zeitung</i> of Bern—therefore equally in a neutral country. +These facts must throw a strange light on the inquiry of the <a +name="page_45"><span class="page">Page 45</span></a> American Senate +into German propaganda, delayed as it was until last winter and +carried through with such elaborate machinery. It is obvious that +beneath it all there lay—what irony!—a purely propagandist +purpose, namely, that of humiliating Germany in the person of her +late official representative accredited to the United States, and to +make her appear contemptible in the eyes of the uncritical public! +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Whereas in the first months of the war no one in America had thought +of connecting "German Propaganda" with anything shocking, our opponents +afterwards succeeded in disseminating the idea that a few offences +against the law committed by Imperial and American Germans represented +an important, even the most important, part of the German propaganda +work. So it was brought about that even in the time before America's +entry into the war, everyone who openly stood up for Germany's +cause was stamped by the expression "German Propagandist" as a +person of doubtful integrity. The gradual official perpetuation +of this admittedly misleading identification of our absolutely +unexceptionable propaganda with a few regrettable offences against +the American penal code—this and no other was the object +of that inquiry by the Senate. The prejudicial headlines under +which the published articles were printed, such as "Brewery and +Brandy Interests" and "German-Bolshevist Propaganda," themselves +sufficed to indicate that our propaganda was to be crucified between +two "malefactors"; for to the average American citizen there is +nothing more horrifying than the distillery on the one hand and +Bolshevism on the other. In this connection I must not omit to +mention that the great majority of the documents laid before the +Commission had been secured by means of bribery or theft. It is +also worth while to remind the reader of the significant words <a +name="page_46"><span class="page">Page 46</span></a> of Senator +Reed, a member of the Commission, who said at one point in the +examination: "I am interested in trying to distil some truth from +a mass of statements which are so manifestly unfair and distorted +that it is hard to characterize them in parliamentary language." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As for the fantastic figures with which the Americans have undertaken +to estimate the cost of our propaganda, they rest—in so far as +they are not simply the fruit of a malicious imagination—on +the, to say the least of it, superficial hypothesis that all the +money paid out by the different German offices from the outbreak of +war until the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Germany +and America, the amount of which has been arrived at on the strength +of a minute scrutiny of the books of all the banks with which these +offices have done business, were used for purposes of propaganda. +As a matter of fact, of course, far the greater part of this outlay +went to finance the very extensive purchases of Privy Councillor +Albert as well as certain business transactions concluded by Captain +von Papen, which will be discussed later. In comparison with this +the sum we devoted to propaganda work was quite small. The Press +Bureau was frequently very appreciably hampered by the fact that +even for quite minor expenditure outside the fixed budget, previous +sanction had to be obtained from Berlin. Consequently much useful +work would have had to remain undone if, particularly in the first +months of the war, self-sacrificing German-Americans to whom it +was only of the slightest interest that the German point of view +should be accurately and emphatically explained, had not placed +small sums at the disposal of the leaders of our propaganda. In the +two and a half years between the outbreak of war and the rupture +between Germany and America the sums paid out from official funds +for propaganda work in the Union—including minor contributions +<a name="page_47"><span class="page">Page 47</span></a> for other +countries, as, for example, the pictures distributed from New York +over South America and Eastern Asia—do not, all told, exceed +a million dollars. That is surely only a small fraction of what +England and France have expended during the war in order, in spite +of very thorough preparation in peace time, to win over American +public opinion to their cause. It is actually only a sixth of what, +according to the <i>Chicago Tribune</i> on the 1st November, 1919, +the official American Press Bureau of Mr. George Creel has spent +in order to "cement enthusiasm for the war" during the eighteen +months between America's entry into the war and the conclusion +of the Armistice. The thirty-five to fifty million dollars which, +according to the statements of our enemies, were swallowed up by +German propaganda in the United States belong, therefore, to the +realms of fable. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this connection I must mention yet another, far more malicious +legend, namely, the slander widely spread in America last year, +that the funds collected in America for the German Red Cross were +used to finance German propaganda. It is a fact that every dollar +that went to the German Red Cross Delegation in New York was remitted +to the home organization for which it was intended. Of course these +funds were in the first place paid into the various New York banking +accounts from which Dr. Dernburg drew the funds for the Press Bureau. +But, as Captain Hecker has most definitely stated, their equivalent +was remitted to Germany through the bank, regardless of the changes +in the exchange. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Dr. Dernburg, in organizing the Press Bureau, availed himself of +the assistance he found in New York. The suggestion, widely current +in America and repeated by a member of the American Secret Service +before the Senatorial inquiry, that this Press Bureau had formed, +<a name="page_48"><span class="page">Page 48</span></a> as it were, +a part of the German mobilization, and that, therefore, the most +skilled propaganda experts from Europe and the Far East had been +gathered together in New York in order that, after a preliminary run +there, they might be let loose on the American world, is a ridiculous +invention. Just as Dr. Dernburg himself became a propagandist without +any premeditation, so it was also the case with his colleagues. At +first his only assistants were the New York Press Agent of the +Hamburg-Amerika line, Herr M. B. Claussen, and after the entry of +Japan into the war a Government official from that country who was +unable to continue his journey to Germany, because the passport across +the Atlantic granted him through the instrumentality of the State +Department was rejected by the British authorities. This official, +Dr. Alexander Fuehr, the interpreter of the Consulate-General in +Yokohama, who had great experience in Press matters and possessed +an intimate knowledge of American affairs, assisted by quite a +small staff of assistants engaged in New York, issued the daily +bulletins of the "German Information Service," which appeared for +a year and consisted of translations of the substance of the German +newspapers, comments on daily events and occasional interviews +with people who had returned from Europe. It was Herr Claussens's +duty to circulate the bulletins, the arrival of which was in no +way kept secret, among the American Press, and to see to it that +they should be reproduced as fully as possible, which was done, +especially in the provincial Press. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Later, when the propaganda movement had developed to the extent of +publishing and circulating leaflets, brochures and longer pamphlets, +Dr. Dernburg decided to employ in the Press Bureau a well-known +American publicist in the person of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who +<a name="page_49"><span class="page">Page 49</span></a> had already +done good work, by speaking and writing, towards an unbiassed +appreciation of the German point of view, and he was assisted by +two younger New York journalists. Later, when the bureau took up +war-picture and war-film propaganda, these were joined by two more +young German Government officials, Dr. Mechlenburg and Herr Plage, +who also were held up in America on their way from Japan. More than +a dozen persons, including messengers, have never been employed by +the Press Bureau at a time. Of the thirty-one trained propagandists +imported from Germany who, according to Captain Lester's evidence +before the Senatorial Commission, were supposed to have worked +in the Press Bureau, in so far as their names were given in the +protocols of the inquiry, we are assured by Herr Fuehr that not +one was employed there! +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In addition to his direction of the Press Bureau Dr. Dernburg, +who continued with inexhaustible energy to write articles for the +periodicals and instructive letters for the daily Press, was responsible +for keeping in touch with the directors of the American Press. +He also availed himself of invitations to speak in American and +German circles, and sometimes in other places than New York. As far +as I know he never founded any societies for propaganda purposes. +On the other hand, when such societies which had arisen, without +his influence turned to him, he of course supported them by word +and deed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For all questions of propaganda Dr. Dernburg had the assistance of +a small committee nominated by himself and consisting, in addition +to Herren Albert, Meyer Gerhardt and Fuehr, of a few American +journalists and business men. It was his custom to confer with this +committee once or twice a month, when the general situation, the +prevailing fluctuations of public opinion and <a name="page_50"><span +class="page">Page 50</span></a> the probable influence of the propaganda +material about to be published, were discussed in detail. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With this entirely improvised and, as will be seen, very modest +machinery, Dr. Dernburg began his campaign. The enemy statement +that the German propaganda in the United States had been actually +organized many years before the war, so that in 1914 we might have +ready at our disposal an organization with branches in every part +of the country, is unfortunately devoid of any foundation. It is +a regrettable fact that, in spite of my repeated warnings to the +authorities, nothing was ever done on the German side before the +war. It is well known that at that time the power of public opinion +in democratic countries was very little understood in Germany. +It was thought at home—which is typical of the objective, +matter-of-fact German national character—that it was much +more important that the right should be done than that it should +be recognized as right by the public. Added to this was the +under-estimation of the influence of the United States on the +development of world politics. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Before the war no one in Germany had thought it possible that the +Union would have to be reckoned with as a factor, much less a decisive +factor, in a European war. This was a mistake, the effect of which +unfortunately was felt until well into 1917—the result was +that there was never enough money available to keep in touch and +co-operate with the American Press. As a matter of fact I had, +in the course of my activities in Washington, personally entered +into certain social relations with the proprietors of a few great +American newspapers. But from Berlin no advances were made. Even +with the German-American papers there was no organized connection, +and they themselves did not work together in any way. It is true that +for years there had been <a name="page_51"><span class="page">Page +51</span></a> a business connection between the greatest American +news-agency, the Associated Press, and the Wolff Telegraphic Bureau; +as, however, the agency was not served direct with Berlin +Wolff-telegrams, but by its own representatives there, this did not +amount to much. England, on the other hand—quite apart from +the close relationship resulting from a common language—had +for years maintained and systematically cultivated the closest +contact with the American Press. It followed, then, that on the +outbreak of war the English influence on the American daily Press +was enormous. It did not rest as exclusively as has been assumed +in Germany on direct proprietary rights. I do not think that, with +the exception of a single newspaper in one of the smaller cities +any great American paper was directly bought by England. Here and +there considerable blocks of American newspaper shares may have been +in English hands and influenced the tendency of certain papers. If, +however, it is true—as was credibly stated in Irish-American +quarters during the first year of the war—that Lord Northcliffe +boasted a year or two before the war of "controlling" seventeen +American papers, it is difficult to believe that this influence +of the English press-magnates was based on hard cash. Rather is +it the case that certain newspapers received their otherwise very +costly private news-service from England on very advantageous terms. +To others, English writers of leading articles are said to have +been attached, without cost to the newspaper—a scheme of +which I have often heard in America, but which is difficult to +prove, as all American newspapers maintain the strictest secrecy +as to the origin of their leading articles. It is, however, common +knowledge that with regard to European affairs the American news +service was swayed by this entirely English organization. Until the +outbreak of the war the American news agencies drew exclusively <a +name="page_52"><span class="page">Page 52</span></a> from English +sources. Moreover, those newspapers which in the United States play +a very important part, inasmuch as they are the fount of most of +the new ideas by which the tone of the Press in influenced, were in +a very considerable degree served from England. On the other hand, +the wide field of cinematographic production was strongly influenced +by the French film. In this way our enemies in the United States +had, at the outbreak of war, a boundless and excellently prepared +field for the propagation of their news, and the representation of +their point of view, but more particularly for their attack on the +German cause. In spite of this, however, they immediately inundated +the Union with propagandist literature, particularly through the +agents of the English shipping lines, who were scattered all over +the country, and the well-known author and politician, Sir Gilbert +Parker, sent from London tons of this matter to well-known American +business men, professors and politicians. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On our side, it is true, and I should like to emphasize this to their +credit, that on the outbreak of war the German-American newspapers +took up our cause unhesitatingly and as one man. Further, they have, +until America's entry into the war, honestly striven to win full +justice for the American point of view, and to combat the unneutral +leanings of the majority of the Americans and the slanderous attacks +of our enemies. As, however, they are not accessible to the general +public, who do not know German, and in particular scarcely ever +come into the hands of the authoritative American political circles, +their support remained more or less academic. Very valuable services +were rendered to the German cause by the already-mentioned weekly +paper <i>Fatherland</i>, which was printed in English; in view, +however, of its reputation as a partisan journal, it naturally <a +name="page_53"><span class="page">Page 53</span></a> could not exert +so deep an influence as the local daily papers, which carried on the +English propaganda without allowing it to become too conspicuous. +For telegraphic communication from Germany to America we had to +rely solely on the two German wireless stations at Sayville and +Tuckerton, erected shortly before the outbreak of war, and we soon +succeeded, subject to American censorship, in getting a regular +Press-service, which was spread, not only over the whole of the +United States, but was also passed on to South America and East +Asia. But in the first place, in spite of repeated extension and +strengthening, these two stations were quite inadequate; in the +second place, the Press-service never succeeded in adapting itself +thoroughly to American requirements. The same may be said of most +of the German propaganda literature which reached America in fairly +large quantities since the third month of the war, partly in German +and partly in not always irreproachable English. This, like the +Press telegrams, showed a complete lack of understanding of American +national psychology. The American character, I should like to repeat +here, is by no means so dry and calculating as the German picture +of an American business man usually represents. The outstanding +characteristic of the average American is rather a great, even +though superficial, sentimentality. There is no news for which a +way cannot be guaranteed through the whole country, if clothed in +a sentimental form. Our enemies have exploited this circumstance +with the greatest refinement in the case of the German invasion of +"poor little Belgium," the shooting of the "heroic nurse," Edith +Cavell, and other incidents. Those who had charge of the Berlin +propaganda, on the other hand, made very little of such occurrences +on the enemy side, e.g., the violation of Greece, the bombing of the +Corpus Christi procession <a name="page_54"><span class="page">Page +54</span></a> in Karlsruhe, etc. One thing that would have exerted a +tremendous influence in America, if its publicity had been handled +with only average skill, was the sufferings of our children, women +and old people as a result of the British hunger blockade—that +they have made no attempt to bring to the notice of the world. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the other hand they put themselves to the greatest possible +trouble to lay "The Truth About the War" before American public +opinion. This, however, fell on unfavorable ground, for the American +does not care to be instructed. He had no interest in learning +the "truth" which the German Press communications and explanatory +pamphlets were so anxious to impress upon him. The American likes +to form his own opinions and so only requires facts. The possibility +of exerting influence therefore lies rather in the choice of the +facts and the way in which they are presented, than in logical +and convincing argument. It is all the easier to influence him by +the well-timed transmission of skilfully disposed facts, since his +usually very limited general knowledge and his complete ignorance of +European affairs deprive him of the simplest premises for a critical +judgment of the facts presented to him from the enemy side. It is +quite incredible what the American public will swallow in the way +of lies if they are only repeated often enough and properly served +up. It all turns on which side gets the news in first; for the first +impression sticks. Corrections are generally vain, especially as +they appear as a rule in small print and in inconspicuous places. +When, for example, the American Press got the first news of the +"destruction" of Rheims cathedral from London and in the English +version, no German correction, however well-founded, would succeed +in removing the first impression. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Particularly ineffective in their influence on American <a +name="page_55"><span class="page">Page 55</span></a> public +opinion—as may be said here in anticipation—have been +the majority of our official Notes. In view of the subsequent +ever-increasing interruption of the news service from Germany, +they were the last and only means by which the German standpoint +could be brought before the American people. Their effectiveness +depended entirely on the impression that they made on American public +opinion and not on the Washington Government; yet they were nearly +always drawn up in Berlin in the form of juristic précis, +propagandist but quite futile. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +All these factors must be taken into consideration in attempting +to estimate the success of our propaganda in the United States. +They show that on the one hand the prevailing conditions of American +public opinion were extraordinarily unfavorable to our propaganda, +and that the support it received from home, with a few exceptions, +was misguided. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Dr. Dernburg, then, had not a chance during the eight months of his +activity in America of transforming her into a pro-German country, +and it is certain that no one else could have done it in his place. +But he succeeded to a great extent, and within a comparatively short +time, in more or less crippling the enemy propaganda, and at least in +gradually rendering ineffective the grossest misrepresentations of +our enemies. By his own writings and other methods of spreading the +truth, and particularly by the numerous brochures and books, which +at his suggestion were written by American supporters of the German +cause and distributed in thousands directly or indirectly by the +Press Bureau with the help of a skilfully compiled address-book, he +succeeded in exerting very considerable influence. By keeping in touch +with American journalists and other influential persons he did much +good work, particularly in the first months <a name="page_56"><span +class="page">Page 56</span></a> of the war. His connection with +Irish leaders laid the foundation for a co-operation which in the +following year was of great importance to our position in the United +States, and which, with a somewhat more intelligent backing by +our Government departments at home, might have been more fruitful +still. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +One branch of our propaganda which was also initiated under Dr. +Dernburg, but was chiefly developed after his departure, was the +moving-picture propaganda, for which a very efficient company was +floated by Privy Councillor Albert. At first it was intended to be +an agency for the circulation of films from Germany. As, however, +suitable material for the American market could not be obtained +there, the "American Correspondent Film Co." decided to send its +own agents to Germany and Austria with a view to making suitable +films for their purpose. In this way several important film-dramas +were produced which have had great success in hundreds of American +cinemas. In spite of this the company had finally to be liquidated, +chiefly owing to lack of support from the military authorities at +home. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i> our propaganda of enlightenment +in the United States substantially came to an end. Henceforward +the principal aim of its activity, which, after Dr. Dernburg's +departure, came under the direction of Privy Councillor Albert, +was to keep the United States out of the war. Side by side with +this, an attempt was made to influence public feeling against the +export of arms and ammunition and against the Anglo-French loan, +and to demonstrate the increasingly prejudiced effect wrought by +England on American economic interests. In November, 1915, I urged, +as I cabled at the time to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, the complete +suppression of propaganda. The Press Bureau in New York continued +under the direction <a name="page_57"><span class="page">Page +57</span></a> of Dr. Fuehr, until the breaking off of relations +between America and Germany. It concerned itself, however, apart +from certain regular literary contributions to certain journals, +less with propaganda work than with keeping an eye on the American +Press and the development of the news service to and from Germany +as well as to South America and Eastern Asia. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_58"><span class="page">Page 58</span></a> +CHAPTER III</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +POLITICAL EVENTS PRECEDING THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As I mentioned in the first chapter, it was to be expected that +public opinion in America would range itself overwhelmingly on +the side of the Entente. As a result of the violation of Belgian +neutrality, this happened far in excess of expectation. The violence +of the statements of the anti-German party called forth strong +replies from those who desired a strict neutrality on the part of +the United States. The adherents of the latter party were always +stigmatized as pro-Germans, although even the German-Americans never +called for anything more than an unconditional neutrality. This also +was the aim for which the German policy was working through its +representatives in America. We never hoped for anything further. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The waves of excitement ran so high that even the private relations +of the adherents of both parties contending suffered. President +Wilson, therefore, on the 18th August, 1914, issued a proclamation +to the American people which is of special interest because it +lays down in a definite form the policy to which he logically and +unwaveringly adhered until the rupture. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this proclamation the following sentences occur: "Every man +who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit +of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness +and friendliness to all concerned." And further: "The people of +the United <a name="page_59"><span class="page">Page 59</span></a> +States ... may be divided in camps of hostile opinion.... Such +divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might +seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty +as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself +ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels +of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The policy outlined in these quotations from Mr. Wilson's proclamation +won the approval of an overwhelming majority of the American people, +for even among the supporters of the Entente there was only a small +minority who desired an active participation in the war by the +United States. Apart from the fact that the traditional American +policy seemed to preclude any such intervention in European affairs, +it was to the interest of the United States to play with unimpaired +power the rôle of <i>Arbiter mundi</i>, when the States of +ancient Europe, tired of tearing one another to pieces, at last +longed for peace again. America could not but hope that neither of +the two warring parties would come out of the war in a dominating +position. There is, therefore, a certain modicum of truth in the +view frequently expressed in Germany that the United States would +in any case finally have entered the war to prevent the so-called +"German Peace." But the question is whether such a peace was possible +in face of the superior strength of our enemies. If we had won the +first battle of the Marne and had then been prepared to restore +Belgium and conclude a moderate peace, it is conceivable that we +might have come to terms with England on the basis of a kind of +Treaty of Amiens. After the loss of the battle of the Marne a "German +Peace" was out of the question. The possibility of such a peace +has never recurred. It was therefore necessary for the German <a +name="page_60"><span class="page">Page 60</span></a> policy to +strive for a peace by understanding on the basis of the <i>status +quo</i>. Just as Frederick the Great defended Prussia's newly won +position as a great Power against overwhelming odds, so we were +fighting under similar conditions for the maintenance of Germany's +position in the world. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Our Government had declared <i>urbi et orbi</i> that they were +waging a defensive war, and were therefore obliged to regulate +their policy accordingly. If we had desired a peace like that of +Hubertusburg we should have won. It is often contended in Germany +to-day that it would still have been possible to attain this end. +I have struggled for it in America for two and a half years and +am as convinced to-day as I was then, that by acquiescing in the +policy of the United States we should have obtained a peace which +would have met the needs of the German people, if only those who +desired the same thing at home had been in a position to carry +their wishes through. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In Germany it is also alleged, contrary to my own opinion, that the +German people could not have held out if they had not been driven +on by the "Will to conquer." I regard this view as an injustice to +the German nation. If our home propaganda, instead of continually +awakening vain hopes, had insisted on telling the real truth, the +German people would have faced danger to the last. We ought to +have repeated constantly that our situation was very serious, but +that we must clench our teeth, and our Government must be ready +to seize the first opportunity to end the defensive war by a +corresponding peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The controversy about the "German peace" or "peace by negotiation" +must be touched on here because it formed the nucleus of the diplomatic +struggle in Washington. At the beginning of the war these catchwords +<a name="page_61"><span class="page">Page 61</span></a> had not +yet been invented, but their substance even then controlled the +situation. The attitude of the American Government and public opinion +towards us depended in the first place on whether they thought that +we were striving for world-mastery or were waging a defensive war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Immediately after my return from Europe I called on President Wilson, +who had taken the opportunity of the war and the death of his first +wife, to withdraw even more than ever from the outer world. He was +generally known as the recluse of the White House. He only received +people with whom he had political business to settle. Particularly +from diplomats and other foreigners Mr. Wilson kept very aloof, +because he was anxious to avoid the appearance of preference or +partiality. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the disillusionment of Versailles it is difficult for a German +to form an unbiassed judgment of Mr. Wilson. We must not forget, +however, that no serious attempt has ever been made in Germany +to get an unprejudiced estimate of Mr. Wilson's personality. In +the course of the war he has come to be regarded more and more +as unneutral and anti-German, whereas, to the average American +public opinion, he appeared in quite a different light. Later, +after the defeat of our arms, we hailed Mr. Wilson as the Messiah +who was to save Germany and the whole world from dire distress. +When, therefore, at Versailles, the President, instead of unfolding +and carrying through a far-reaching programme for the general +reconstruction of the world, approved all the ultra-chauvinistic +and nationalistic mistakes of the European statesmen and proclaimed +as the aim of the peace the punishment of Germany, Mr. Wilson was +set down in Germany without more ado as a hypocrite. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I think that through all the phases of the war the German <a +name="page_62"><span class="page">Page 62</span></a> opinion of Mr. +Wilson has suffered from sheer exaggeration. The chief mistake lay +in separating Wilson's personality from public opinion in the United +States. In spite of his strong will and his autocratic leanings, Mr. +Wilson is still, in the first place, a perfect type of the American +politician. In his speeches he always tries to voice public opinion, +and in his policy to follow its wishes. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +He certainly tries to direct and influence public opinion. But +he changes his front at once if he notices that he has strayed +from the way that the <i>aura popularis</i> would have him follow. +In order to form a correct judgment of Mr. Wilson's actions and +speeches it is always necessary to ask oneself, in the first place, +what end he has in view for his own political position and that +of his party in America. He proclaims in a most dazzling way the +ideals of the American people. But their realization always depends +on his own actual political interests and those of the Democratic +party. Mr. Wilson's attitude has always been synonymous with that +of his party, because the latter can produce no other personality +capable of competing with the President. Therefore, Mr. Wilson +always met with little or no opposition within the Democratic party, +and he was able to follow for a long time his own inclination to +adopt a quite independent policy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Socially the President is very congenial when once he has made up +his mind to emerge from his narrow circle. He has not the reputation +of being a loyal friend, and is accused of ingratitude by many of +his former colleagues and enthusiastic adherents. In any case, +however, Mr. Wilson is an implacable enemy when once he feels himself +personally attacked or slighted. As a result of his sensitiveness +he has a strong tendency to make the mistake of regarding political +differences of <a name="page_63"><span class="page">Page 63</span></a> +opinion as personal antipathy. The President has never forgiven the +German Government for having caused the failure of his peace-policy +of 1916-17, which was supported by public opinion in America. In +Germany his later speeches, in which he drew a distinction between +the German people and the Imperial Government, were regarded as +hypocrisy. Such a differentiation was at that time based on American +public feeling, which held autocracy and militarism responsible for +the disasters which had been brought upon the world. The question +has, however, never been answered why this distinction was abandoned +by Mr. Wilson at Versailles. Without wishing in any way either to +accuse or defend him I consider the answer to this riddle to be +that the President allowed himself to be convinced of the complicity +of the German people by the statesmen of the Entente. He was at the +time in a mood with regard to us which predisposed him to such +influences. Mr. Wilson was by origin, up-bringing and training a +pacifist. When it is remembered that with us and in neutral countries +it was the pacifists themselves who were the most indignant at +the Peace of Versailles, that they were the very people who for +the most part advised against the signature of this peace, one +can imagine the feelings aroused in a disillusioned pacifist like +Wilson by those whom he regards as responsible for having thwarted +the possibility of an ideal pacifist peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Apart from this, Mr. Wilson at Versailles no longer dominated American +public opinion, and his political power consequently collapsed. In +the United States the old indifference to European affairs regained +the upper hand. Men were satisfied with having brought about a +victory over autocracy and militarism. They wanted nothing further. +The American troops were crowding home, and, finally, feeling in the +United States was still <a name="page_64"><span class="page">Page +64</span></a> so strongly against us that no one would have understood +the President if he had caused a rupture with his Allies on our +behalf. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At Versailles, too, an outstanding peculiarity of Mr. Wilson's may +have played a part which even during the earlier negotiations had +been of great importance. He is a man who is slow to make up his +mind, and likes to postpone decisions until they are inevitable. He +is always ready to wait and see whether the situation may not improve +or some unexpected event occur. How often during the Washington +negotiations did, first I and then our enemies, believe that we had +set President Wilson on a definite course. But again and again +the requisite decision would be postponed. In Washington it was +generally taken under the strong pressure of public opinion. In +Versailles the Entente statesmen may well have forced a decision +by displaying a stronger will and a wider knowledge of European +affairs. Mr. Wilson was at Versailles in the position of the giant +Antæus, who drew his strength from his native soil. Once +away from American ground Hercules (Clemenceau) was able to crush +him. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the time I am now describing the circumstances were quite different, +because at that time Mr. Wilson had a reliable support for his +policy in American public opinion. In Germany, at the very beginning +of the war, great resentment was felt against Mr. Wilson for the +cold negative in his reply to the Emperor's telegram in which Mr. +Wilson was asked to condemn the atrocities perpetrated by the Belgian +population and <i>francs-tireurs</i>. It was not, however, noticed +in Germany that the President at the same time likewise refused +to receive a Belgian deputation which came to America to beg for +his help. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During my conversation with the President already <a +name="page_65"><span class="page">Page 65</span></a> mentioned, +he made a statement on the lines of his proclamation of neutrality +of which I have already given the substance. My reply that the +American neutrality seemed to us to be tinged with sympathy for +our enemies Mr. Wilson contradicted emphatically. He thought that +this appearance was the result of England's naval power, which +he could do nothing to alter. In this connection the President +made the following remark, which struck me very forcibly at the +time: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The United States must remain neutral, because otherwise the fact +that her population is drawn from so many European countries would +give rise to serious domestic difficulties." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +My remark about the benevolence of the United States' neutrality +towards our enemies was at the time chiefly prompted by the differences +that had arisen with regard to the wireless stations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The fact that this question arose gives yet another proof of how +little we were prepared for war. By German enterprise two wireless +stations had been erected on the east coast of the United States +as a means of direct communication with Europe, one at Sayville +(Long Island), the other at Tuckerton (New Jersey). Both were partly +financed by American and French capital. As at the beginning of the +war the cable fell entirely into English hands and was destroyed by +them, we had no telegraphic communication with home at our disposal. +We had to fall back exclusively on the wireless stations, when, as +frequently happened, we were unable to make use of the circuitous +routes via neutral countries. Unfortunately it appeared that the legal +position with regard to the proprietorship of the two stations was +not clear. Actions were immediately brought on the French side, and +the closing of the stations by decree of the <a name="page_66"><span +class="page">Page 66</span></a> courts demanded. Under these +circumstances it was fortunate for us that the American Government, +after tedious negotiations with me, took over possession of both +stations. Otherwise they would have been closed and we should have +been unable to use them. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Our satisfaction at this decision was modified by the establishment +of a censorship of radio-telegrams on the part of the American +Government on the strength of the Hague Convention, which prohibits +the communication by wireless from a neutral country with the military +or naval forces of a combatant. If the stations had been publicly +used before the war we should have stood on firm legal ground, for +such cases are excepted by the Hague Convention. Unfortunately the +stations were in 1914 only partially completed, and the application +of the clauses in question was therefore doubtful. It is true that +the stations were ready for immediate use, but as a result of the +French protest the American Government held strictly to the legal +standpoint. In these negotiations we had to content ourselves with +pointing out that whereas our enemies could pass on military information +to their Governments by means of coded cablegrams, we should be +confined to the use of the wireless stations. Finally we came to +an agreement with the American Government that they should have +a copy of the code which we used for the wireless telegrams. In +this way their contents were kept secret from the enemy, but not +from the Washington Government. This course we only agreed to as +a last resource as it was not suitable for handling negotiations +in which the American Government was concerned. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The course of this controversy was typical of the fate of German +interests in America throughout the whole period of American neutrality. +Unfortunately we had absolutely no means at hand for putting any +pressure on <a name="page_67"><span class="page">Page 67</span></a> +America in our own favor. In comparison with the public opinion in +the Eastern States, which followed in the wake of the Entente, and +with the authoritative circles of New York, Wilson's Administration +without question strove for an honorable neutrality. In spite of +this most of their decisions were materially unfavorable to us, so +that a German observer from a distance might, not without reason, +obtain the impression that the neutrality of the American Government +was mere hypocrisy and that all kinds of pretexts were found for +helping England. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This was not the chief impression made on a near observer. In politics +the Americans are first and foremost jurists, and indeed in a narrower +and more literal sense than the English Imperialists, with whom, +according to their old traditions, justice only serves as a cloak +for their political ambitions. I cannot judge how far the Americans +have become full-blooded Imperialists since their entry into the +war, i.e., since about 1917. At the time of which I speak this was +far from being the case. If, moreover, it is a fact that the majority +of the decisions of the United States turned out unfavorably to us, +the question of the American motives should have been carefully +differentiated from the other question as to what inferences may be +drawn from the state of affairs. Even if we had had just reason +to complain of unfair treatment it was for us to be as indulgent +towards America as was compatible with our final aim not to lose +the war. The question is not whether we had cause for resentment +and retaliation, but simply what benefit could be extracted for +Germany out of the existing situation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this visit to the White House, the only question that was acute +was that of the wireless stations. This and the negotiations which +I shall mention later, dealing with the coaling of our ships of war +and the American export of arms and ammunition, I discussed with +Secretary of <a name="page_68"><span class="page">Page 68</span></a> +State Bryan. The first time I visited this gentleman he exclaimed +with great warmth: "Now you see I was right when I kept repeating +that preparation for war was the best way of bringing war about. All +the European Powers were armed to the teeth and always maintained +that this heavy armament was necessary to protect them from war. +Now the fallacy is obvious. We alone live in peace because we are +unarmed." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mr. Bryan has always been a genuine pacifist, and later sacrificed +his Ministerial appointment to his convictions. So long as he remained +in office he continued to influence the American Government to +maintain neutrality and constantly strove to bring about peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A first attempt in this direction was made from Washington immediately +after the outbreak of the war, but met with no response from the +combatant Powers. At the beginning of September, Mr. Bryan repeated +the offer of American mediation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At that time a vigorous agitation had begun in New York for the +restoration of peace. Mr. William Randolph Hearst, the well-known +editor of widely circulated newspapers, and other well-known +personalities, called together great meetings at which America's +historical mission was said to be the stopping of the wholesale +murder that was going on in Europe. At this time I was, together +with several other gentlemen, staying with James Speyer, the banker, +at his country house. The host and the majority of the guests, +among whom was the late ambassador in Constantinople, Oscar Straus, +were supporters of the prevailing pacific movement. The question +of American mediation was eagerly discussed at the dinner table. +Mr. Straus was an extremely warm adherent of this idea. He turned +particularly to me because the German Government were regarded +as opponents of the pacifist ideas. I said that we had not <a +name="page_69"><span class="page">Page 69</span></a> desired the +war and would certainly be ready at the first suitable opportunity +for a peace by understanding. Thereupon Mr. Straus declared that +he would at once travel to Washington and repeat my words to Mr. +Bryan. Immediately after dinner he went to the station and on the +following day I received a wire from the Secretary of State, asking +me to return to Washington as soon as I could to discuss the matter +with him. There we had a long interview in his private residence, +with the result that an American offer of mediation was sent to +the Imperial Chancellor. Meanwhile Mr. Straus had gone to the +ambassadors of the other combatant Powers, who all more or less +rejected the proposal. The friendly reply of the German Government +coincided in principle with what I had said, but added that Mr. +Bryan should first address himself to the enemy, as the further +course of the negotiations depended on their attitude, which was not +yet known. The American Government never returned to the question +and I had no reason to urge them to do so. Any importunity on our +side would have given an impression of weakness. Nevertheless this +interlude was so far favorable to us that it contrasted our readiness +for negotiation with the enemy's refusal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In consequence of the failure of their first attempt to intervene the +American Government thought it necessary to exercise more restraint. +In spite of this, however, President Wilson, before the end of +the winter of 1914-15, sent his intimate friend, Colonel Edward +M. House, to London, Paris and Berlin, in order to ascertain +semi-officially whether there were any possibilities of peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mr. House, who lived in an unpretentious abode in New York, occupied +a peculiar and very influential position at the White House. Bound +to the President by intimate friendship, he has always refused to +accept any <a name="page_70"><span class="page">Page 70</span></a> +Ministerial appointment, either at home or abroad, although he was +only possessed of modest means and could certainly have had any +post in the Cabinet or as an ambassador that he had liked to choose. +In this way he remained entirely independent, and since President +Wilson's entry into office, was his confidential adviser in domestic, +and particularly in foreign politics. As such Colonel House had a +position that is without precedent in American history. During his +stay in London, at this time, he is said to have described himself +to the wife of an English Cabinet Minister, herself not favorably +disposed towards America, as the "eyes and ears of the President." +I know from my own experience how thoroughly and effectively he +was able to inform his friend on the European situation, and how +perfectly correctly, on the other hand, he interpreted Mr. Wilson's +views. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It was not easy to become more closely acquainted with Colonel +House, whose almost proverbial economy of speech might be compared +with the taciturnity of old Moltke. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Unlike the majority of his fellow-nationals, and particularly his +immediate fellow-countrymen of the Southern States, Colonel House, +while possessing great personal charm and the courtesy that is +characteristic of the Southern States, is reserved and retiring. +It took a considerable time before I got to know this able and +interesting man at all intimately. I did not become intimate with +him until the time of the journey to Berlin already mentioned. +Even then it was the earnest wish of Colonel House to obtain for +his great friend the chief credit of being the founder of peace. +Colonel House was particularly well fitted to be the champion of the +President's ideas. I have never known a more upright and honorable +pacifist than he. He had a horror of war because he regarded it +as the contradiction of his ideals <a name="page_71"><span +class="page">Page 71</span></a> of the nobility of the human race. +He often spoke with indignation of the people who were enriching +themselves out of the war, and added that he would never touch +the profits of war industry. He afterwards repeatedly told me that +he had spoken as energetically in London against the blockade, +which was a breach of international law, as against the submarine +war in Berlin. Both these types of warfare were repugnant to the +warm, sympathetic heart of Colonel House. He could not understand +why women and children should die of hunger or drowning in order +that the aims of an imperialist policy, which he condemned, might +be attained. At the same time he was convinced that neither of +these types could decide the war, but would only serve to rouse +in both the combatant countries a boundless hatred which would +certainly stand in the way of future co-operation in the work of +restoring peace. In many of his remarks at that time, Colonel House +proved to be right, since the war was decided mainly by the entry +of America and the consequent overwhelming superiority in men, +money and material. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile, as a result of the traffic in munitions, feeling in +Germany had turned sharply against the United States. Our position +with regard to this question was very unfavorable as we had no legal +basis for complaint. The clause of the Hague Convention which permitted +such traffic had been included in the second Hague Convention at our +own suggestion. Nevertheless it was natural that the one-sided support +of our enemies by the rapidly growing American war industry roused +strong feeling in Germany. As a result there began a controversy +with the American Government similar to that with England during the +war of 1870-71. Even in the United States there was a considerable +minority which disapproved of the munitions traffic, though on moral +<a name="page_72"><span class="page">Page 72</span></a> rather than +political or international grounds. It goes without saying that +the agitation of this minority was supported in every way by the +German representatives. There was no law in America to prohibit +such support, which could not, moreover, be regarded as a breach +of American neutrality. It is true that in this way a few Germans +got themselves into an awkward position because they were suspected +of stirring up the German-Americans, who together with the Irish +played a leading part in the agitation against the Government. In +particular, Dr. Dernburg became unpopular in America, since he +began to address meetings in addition to his journalistic work. The +Washington Government regarded him as the leader of the "hyphenated +Americans" who were opposing the policy of the President's +Administration, because the latter took up the strict legal standpoint +that the traffic in munitions was permissible, and that it would +therefore be a breach of neutrality in our favor if such traffic +were forbidden after the outbreak of hostilities. President Wilson +himself even had an idea of nationalizing the munition factories, +which would have rendered traffic with the combatant Powers a breach +of international law. When, however, he sounded Congress on this +matter, it became evident that a majority could not be obtained +for such a step. The United States had already brought forward +a similar proposal at the Hague Conference with the intention of +conceding one of the chief demands of the pacifists. It was in +wide circles in America an axiom that the munitions factories were +the chief incentives to war. As during the first winter of the +war there were very few such factories in America the President's +plan was not merely Utopian but meant in all seriousness, in which +connection it should be noted that American industrial circles +were among Mr. Wilson's bitterest opponents. If Mr. Wilson's <a +name="page_73"><span class="page">Page 73</span></a> proposal had +been known to German public opinion he would have been more favorably +judged. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The negotiations which I had to carry out on this question of the +munitions traffic concerned themselves also with the question of +the coaling of our ships of war. This was based on an agreement +between the American Government and the Hamburg-Amerika line. The +port authorities had at first shown themselves agreeable. As a +result of the English protest the attitude of the American Government +became increasingly strict. With the actual coaling I had nothing +to do. That came within the sphere of the Naval Attaché, +who, for obvious reasons connected with the conduct of the war at +sea, kept his actions strictly secret. My first connection with +this question was when I was instructed to hand over to the American +Government the following memorandum, dated 15th December, 1914: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"According to the provisions of general international law, there is +nothing to prevent neutral States from allowing contraband of war +to reach the enemies of Germany through or out of their territory. +This is also permitted by Article VII. of the Hague Convention of the +19th October, 1907, dealing with the rights and duties of neutrals +in the case of land or sea war. If a State uses this freedom to the +advantage of our enemies, that State, according to a generally +recognized provision of international law, which is confirmed in +Article IX. of the two aforesaid Conventions, may not hamper Germany's +military power with regard to contraband through or out of its +territory. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The declaration of neutrality of the United States takes this +view fully into account since the furnishing of contraband of war +to all combatants is likewise permitted: 'All persons may lawfully +and without restriction <a name="page_74"><span class="page">Page +74</span></a> by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture +and sell within the United States, arms and ammunitions of war +and other articles ordinarily known as contraband of war.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"This principle has been accepted in the widest sense by the public +declaration of the American State Department of the 15th October, +1914, with regard to neutrality and contraband. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Nevertheless different port authorities in the United States have +refused to supply the necessary fuel to merchant vessels in which +it might be carried to German ships of war on the high seas or in +other neutral ports. According to the principles of international +law already mentioned, there is no need for a neutral State to +prevent the transport of fuel in this way; such a State then ought +not to hold up merchant ships loaded in this way nor interfere with +their freedom of movement, once it has countenanced the supply +of contraband to the enemy. The only case in which it would be the +duty of such a nation to hamper the movements of these ships in +this one-sided fashion would be one in which such traffic might +be turning the ports into German naval bases. This might perhaps +have been the case if German coal depots had been situated at these +ports, or if the ships used them for a regular calling port on +their way to the German naval forces. It is, however, unnecessary +to urge that the occasional sailing of a merchant ship with coal +for German ships of war does not make a port into a base for German +naval enterprises out of keeping with neutrality. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Our enemies are obtaining contraband of war from the United States, +in particular rifles, to the value of many milliards of marks; this +is within their rights. But toleration becomes serious injustice +if the United States refuses to allow the occasional provisioning of +our <a name="page_75"><span class="page">Page 75</span></a> ships +of war from her ports. This would mean unequal treatment of the +combatants and a recognized rule of neutrality would be infringed +to our disadvantages." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This memorandum played an important part in the subsequent negotiations, +because Mr. Flood, the president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs +of the American House of Representatives, interpreted it as amounting +to a German agreement to the supply of arms and ammunition to her +enemies. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In view of the situation in the United States, it was to our interest +to leave the struggle for a prohibition of the munitions traffic to +our American friends. The efforts of Senator Stone in this direction +are well known, and have been recently quoted before the Commission of +the German National Assembly. If a considerable number of influential +Americans took up the case for the prohibition there was far more +hope of bringing it about than if it was apparent that the American +Government were surrendering to German pressure. The pacifist Mr. +Bryan was very sensitive on this point and visited me frequently +to assert his neutrality. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I therefore advised the Imperial Government in this matter not to +send an official Note for the moment, so that the American agitation +in favor of the prohibition of munition traffic might have full freedom +for development. As, however, our enemies continually harked back +to the idea that the Imperial Government did not take exception +to the supply of munitions, I was forced, as the result of continual +pressure from our American friends, to alter my attitude, and, +after receiving permission from Berlin, to hand to the Washington +Government on 4th April, 1915, a memorandum, of which I give the +most important part here. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Further I should like to refer to the attitude of the <a +name="page_76"><span class="page">Page 76</span></a> United States +towards the question of the export of arms. The Imperial Government +is convinced that the Government of the United States agree with +them on this point, that questions of neutrality should be dealt +with not merely with regard to the strict letter, but the spirit +also must be taken into consideration, in which neutrality is carried +through. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The situation arising out of the present war cannot be compared +with that in any previous war. For this reason no reference to +supplies of arms from Germany in such wars is justified; for then +the question was not whether the combatants should be supplied +with material but which of the competing States should secure the +contract. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In the present war all the nations which possess a war-industry of +any importance are either themselves involved in the war, or occupied +with completing their own armament, and therefore have prohibited +the export of war material. The United States are accordingly the +only neutral State in a position to supply war-material. The idea +of neutrality has, therefore, assumed a new significance, which +is quite independent of the strict letter of the laws that have +hitherto prevailed. On the other hand the United States are founding +a gigantic war industry in the broadest sense, and they are not +only working the existing plant but are straining every nerve to +develop it and to erect new factories. The international agreement +for the protection of the rights of neutrals certainly arose from +the necessity of protecting the existing branches of industry in +neutral countries as far as possible against an encroachment upon +their prerogatives. But it can in no way accord with the spirit of +honorable neutrality, if advantage is taken of such international +agreements to found a new industry in a neutral State, such as appears +in the development in the <a name="page_77"><span class="page">Page +77</span></a> United States of an arms-industry, the output of which +can, in view of the existing situation, be solely to the advantage +of the combatant powers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"This industry is at present only delivering its wares to the enemies +of Germany. The readiness, in theory, to do the same for Germany, +even if the transport were possible, does not alter the case. If +it is the desire of the American people to maintain an honorable +neutrality, the United States will find the means to stop this +one-sided traffic in arms, or at least to use it for the purpose +of protecting legitimate commerce with Germany, particularly in +respect of foodstuffs. This conception of neutrality should appeal +all the more to the United States in view of the fact that they +have allowed themselves to be influenced by the same standpoint +in their policy in regard to Mexico. On the 4th February, 1914, +President Wilson, according to a statement of a member of Congress +on 30th December, 1914, before the commission for foreign affairs +with regard to the withdrawal of the prohibition of the export of +arms to Mexico, said: 'We shall be observing true neutrality by +taking into consideration the accompanying circumstances of the +case.... He then took up the following point of view: 'Carranza, in +contrast to Huerta, has no ports at his disposal for the importation +of war-material, so in his case we are bound, as a State, to treat +Carranza and Huerta alike, if we are to be true to the real spirit +of neutrality and not mere paper neutrality.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"This point of view, applied to the present case, indicates prohibition +of the export of arms." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although during the war all Notes were at once made public, the +American Government were very annoyed at my publishing this memorandum, +which in any case would have met with no success. The agitation +for the prohibition of the export of arms and munitions was <a +name="page_78"><span class="page">Page 78</span></a> vigorously +pressed, and in spite of the "<i>Lusitania</i> incident" never +completely subsided. But the American Government held to their +point of view, which they explained to me on the 21st April, as +follows: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In the third place, I note with sincere regret that, in discussing +the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of the United States +to the enemies of Germany, Your Excellency seems to be under the +impression that it was within the choice of the Government of the +United States, notwithstanding its professed neutrality and its +diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit +this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair +attitude toward Germany. This Government holds, as I believe Your +Excellency is aware, and as it is constrained to hold in view of +the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law, +that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress +of a war which would affect unequally the relations of the United +States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure +from the principle of strict neutrality by which it has consistently +sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none +of the circumstances urged in Your Excellency's memorandum alters +the principle involved. The placing of an embargo on the trade +in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and +be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It +will, I feel assured, be clear to Your Excellency that, holding +this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out +of the question for this Government to consider such a course." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the meantime, Colonel House returned from Europe without having +met with any success, but he had opened useful personal relations. +The Governments of all the combatant Powers then held the opinion +that the time had not yet come when they could welcome the mediation +<a name="page_79"><span class="page">Page 79</span></a> of President +Wilson. Colonel House, however, did not allow the lack of success of +his first mission to deter him from further efforts, and remained +to the last the keenest supporter of American mediation. Since this +journey Colonel House and I became on very friendly and intimate +terms, which should have helped to bring about such a peace. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_80"><span class="page">Page 80</span></a> +CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +ECONOMIC QUESTIONS +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the preceding chapter I mentioned that Dr. Dernburg's plan for +raising a loan in the United States had failed. Later the direction +of all our economic and financial affairs passed into the hands of +Geheimrat Albert. His original task was to organize in New York +extensive shipments of foodstuffs, particular wheat and fats, which +were to be exported through the New York office of the Hamburg-Amerika +line. This depended, in the first place, on the possibility of +raising the necessary funds, and in the second, on the possibility +that England, out of regard for the neutrals, and particularly the +United States, would be compelled to abide by the codified principles +of international law. Neither of these premises materialized. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As the necessary means for carrying through the scheme could not be +raised it might have been possible to finance it if the Government +had taken over the not inconsiderable funds of the German banks and +the great industrial enterprises, e.g., the chemical factories in +the United States, and used them for the shipments. The suggestions +we made to this effect were not answered until the end of August, +when we arrived in New York and had already lost many weeks in +trying to negotiate the loan. One organ, which immediately after +the war had taken up these questions on its own initiative, failed, +and so nothing was done in the whole wide sphere of credit, supply of +raw materials and foodstuffs and shipping until my arrival with the +other gentlemen, so that <a name="page_81"><span class="page">Page +81</span></a> the most favorable opportunity was lost. Remittances +from Germany did not arrive until long afterwards, and then only +to a very modest extent. Consequently the whole economic scheme +was considerably narrowed and hampered from the beginning. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The second assumption, that the United States, in consideration +of her great commercial connections with Germany, would maintain +her rights as a neutral State to unrestricted sea trade within the +provisions of international law, proved to be unfounded. The United +States, at any rate according to the view of some very distinguished +Americans, as, for example, in the journal <i>New Republic</i>, +violated the spirit of neutrality when she allowed commerce of +the neutrals one with another to be strangled by England. To the +interest in traffic with the neutral States, and indirectly with +Germany, was opposed the interest in the still greater trade with +our enemies, to which was added, and indeed to a rapidly increasing +extent, the supply of war material. The United States did not realize +the extent of their economic power in respect of England, as the +inexperienced, newly-appointed Democratic Government had no statistics +to which to refer, and from a military point of view were defenceless +for want of an army or fleet. So England was able, slowly and +cautiously, but surely, to cut off the Central Powers from the +American market. In view of this state of things the important +thing was to pass all shipments off as neutral. The exporter had +to be an American or a subject of neutral Europe. The financing +had also to be European, at any rate outwardly. The destination +could only be a port in Holland, Scandinavia, Spain or—at that +time—Italy. Consequently it was not long before the consignments +could no longer be made through the New York representative of +the Hamburg-Amerika line, but were taken in hand by Herr Albert +<a name="page_82"><span class="page">Page 82</span></a> himself, +who merely availed himself of the professional advice of the +Hamburg-Amerika line. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +All decisions therefore could emanate from the same source, which +prevented loss of time, especially as the financial responsibility +also rested with Herr Albert. The most important thing, however, +was that attention was distracted from the shipping, as for a long +time Herr Albert remained unknown, whereas the Hamburg-Amerika line +from the first was kept under the closest observation by England. On +the other hand, this arrangement exposed the cargoes to condemnation +by the English prize courts as they were now State-owned. But Herr +Albert could assume—and, as it turned out, rightly—that +so long as the English respected neutral property, it would be +difficult as a rule to trace the shipments back to him. Otherwise +there would have been no security for a German private undertaking. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +In carrying out his task, Herr Albert at first shipped the purchased +goods by the usual lines (Scandinavia-American line). Soon, however, +difficulties arose, because these lines, in order to avoid being +held up in English ports, would no longer accept cargoes which +were intended, if possible, for Germany, so a special line was +formed sailing under the American flag. The direction of this line +was in the hands of an American firm who represented themselves +as the owners, whereas, in reality, the ships were chartered by +Herr Albert. As, at the beginning of the war, the American flag +was more respected by the English than those of the other neutrals, +a number of these ships got through without much delay. Later this +method of shipping also became impossible. Then single ships were +chartered—mostly under the American flag—and when the +owners, from fear of loss, refused the charter, or when outrageous +conditions <a name="page_83"><span class="page">Page 83</span></a> +made chartering impossible, they were bought outright. The ships +were consigned as blockade runners to a neutral port, and later +either made direct for Germany or were taken in by a German ship +of war. As the most important examples I may mention the <i>Eir, +Maumee, Winneconne, Duneyre, Andrew, Welch</i> and <i>Prince +Waldemar</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +With the tightening up of the English measures and blockade these +undertakings became increasingly difficult, and finally had to be +abandoned. Moreover the cost and the trouble of preparation grew +out of all proportion to the results. Every individual shipment +had to be prepared long beforehand. Out of ten attempts often only +one would succeed. Very often an attempt which had cost weeks of +work would fall through at the last moment owing to the refusal +of credit by the banks, particularly when the political position +was strained, or to an indiscretion, or English watchfulness, or +difficulties with the American port authorities. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The English surveillance had assumed dimensions that would not +have been possible without the tacit connivance, which at times +became active support, of the American authorities. Not only did +the English consuls demand that in each individual case the bills +of lading should be submitted to them, but in addition to this an +efficient surveillance and spy service was organized, partly by +American detective bureaus and partly by a separate and wide-reaching +service. The English had confidential agents in all the shipping +offices, whose services had for the most part been acquired by +bribery. At various times attempts were made to break into Herr +Albert's office, to learn the combination for opening his safe, to +get hold of papers through the charwomen and other employees, and +even to rob him personally of papers. The control of the American +port authorities was within the letter of the law, but in practice +it worked <a name="page_84"><span class="page">Page 84</span></a> +very unfavorably to us. The regulation was that ship and cargo +must be consigned to a definite port. This regulation was drawn up +purely for purposes of statistics, and consequently no importance +was attached to it before the war. As a rule the bills of lading +were filled in by subordinate employees of the exporter. Soon after +the outbreak of the war a special "neutrality squad" was attached +to the "Collector of the Port of New York" whose duty it was to +maintain strict neutrality by seeing that the said laws were properly +observed. This led, in cases where there was a suspicion that the +cargo was not intended for the given port of destination, but for +Germany, to an exhaustive inquiry. This measure could not fail to +act as a deterrent, and even Herr Albert was seriously hampered +in his enterprises. The whole system amounted to a complement of +the English blockade. When Herr Albert finally succeeded in coming +to an agreement with the Customs authorities in this matter a great +number of opportunities had been missed and the shipments had been +made practically impossible by the tightening of the English blockade. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +There was no question of entrusting the shipping to American exporters +who had had long experience of German trade. Herr Albert from the +first considered it advisable to interfere as little as possible +with the existing business relations between the two countries, +and he left it to the firms trading with Germany to carry through +their commissions as best they could. This method of supplying +Germany with food, however, completely failed. The fault also lies +partly with the importers in Germany. In these circles it was for a +long time hoped, but in vain, to obtain consignments from American +firms. Further, they clung too long to the business methods of peace, +demanded estimates, bargained about prices, and, most important of +all, did not realize <a name="page_85"><span class="page">Page +85</span></a> that the risk to the exporter as a result of the +English blockade made special compensation or payment necessary. +In consequence the valuable time at the beginning of the war was +lost. Very soon, however, the American exporters withdrew completely, +because those who had had previous business relations with Germany +were known to the English, and so were suspected and finally placed +on the black list. A shipment by one of these firms would then at +once have been marked down as destined for Germany, and would have +run risk of capture. Herr Albert, therefore, made use of special +agencies. At first, in addition to employing Danish firms, he founded +several new American export companies. These new organizations +were of course only available for a short time, and, as soon as +they came under English suspicion and were consequently rendered +useless, had to be replaced by others. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The reproach that has been made from time to time that these enterprises +were confined to a small clique of confidential persons and firms +seems to be unjustified by the facts. The circumstances demanded the +closest possible secrecy, for otherwise the origin and destination +of the cargoes would have been discovered by the English secret +service before they left New York. This would have involved the +complete loss of the cargo as a result of the English embargo. +That firms already engaged, even though for a short time, in +German-American commerce could not be considered is obvious. Not only +were they known to the English, but in some cases their German names +already laid them open to suspicion. Accordingly, their occasional +requests that they should carry through enterprises of this nature +were consistently refused. This criticism is only made by a small +circle of German-American firms grouped round the German Union and +the so-called German-American Chamber of <a name="page_86"><span +class="page">Page 86</span></a> Commerce, and originated in an +anxiety, understandable but based on an inadequate knowledge of +the facts, to participate in the undertakings. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although the export of raw material did not actually come within +the scope of Herr Albert's original commission, it often became +necessary, at special request or from the nature of the case, to +lend a helping hand in the export of raw material, particularly +wool and cotton. In this way, in the autumn of 1914, the American +steamer <i>Luckenbach</i> was successfully run through direct to +Germany with several million pounds of wool on board. With regard +to cotton, Herr Albert, also in the autumn of 1914, by negotiations +which he carried on through me with the State Department and the +Foreign Trade Adviser, succeeded in obtaining English recognition +that cotton should not be regarded as contraband of war. Even after +this recognition, England made the export of cotton practically +impossible by intimidating the cotton exporters in every possible +way, among others by spreading the rumor that the ships would be +captured nevertheless, and by prohibiting English insurance companies +from underwriting such cargoes. Here Herr Albert intervened by +effecting the insurance through German insurance companies, and +proved by the loading and arming of cotton ships, e.g., the American +ship <i>Carolyn</i>, that the threat of capture was not to be taken +seriously but was simply an attempt at intimidation on the part +of the English. In this way, confidence was so far restored that +in the autumn of 1914 and the beginning of 1915 a large number +of other firms joined in the business. When, later, cotton was +made unconditional contraband of war, Herr Albert made attempts +to fit out blockade runners—which ended with the arrival +at a German port of the <i>Eir</i> with 10,000 bales of cotton. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The various attempts to export copper, rubber and <a +name="page_87"><span class="page">Page 87</span></a> other raw +materials which were unconditional contraband, apart from the cases +already mentioned of wool and cotton, proved impossible, in spite of +repeated, extensive and very cautious preparation. A very ambitious +scheme of this kind with the S.S. <i>Atlantic</i> had to be abandoned +at the last moment owing to difficulties with the port authorities. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +All these enterprises, the purchase, sale and shipment of foodstuffs +and raw material, the chartering, buying and selling of ships, the +founding of shipping lines, new companies, etc., as well as the +financial business had their political as well as their purely +business side. They were either intended to serve as precedents in +the definite phases of development of international maritime law +or to exert influence on American public opinion from an economic +point of view. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When the result of these shipping enterprises is weighed after +the event, it will be seen that they did not play a decisive part +in the supply of Germany with foodstuffs and raw material. Germany +would during the first year of war have managed to get along even +without the few hundred thousand tons which in this way were brought +in via neutral countries. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the +imports from neutral countries, they several times served to relieve +the situation. Very important in this respect was the successful +struggle for the free import of cotton at the end of 1914 and the +beginning of 1915, quite apart from our own shipments. Without +this we should have come to an end of our supplies considerably +earlier. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The question of war and marine insurance very soon called for particular +attention to the interests of our own shipping. The American insurance +market was dominated by the English companies. The latter not only +conducted about two-thirds of the whole insurance business <a +name="page_88"><span class="page">Page 88</span></a> of the country, +but also exerted a decisive influence on the American companies. In +addition to this, they held an authoritative position as holding +a share of the capital. England very soon gave instructions that +English insurance companies should not participate in any business +in which German interests were in any way involved. Consequently +in making shipments to neutral countries, we were faced with great +difficulties, for the power of the German insurance companies and +the few American companies that were independent of England did +not suffice. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The two most important German companies with branches in New York, +the <i>Norddeutsche Versicherungsgesellschaft</i> and the <i>Mannheimer +Versicherungsgesellschaft</i>, which was excellently, actively, and +very loyally represented in New York by the firm F. Hermann & +Co., at first offered an insurance limit of about 75,000 dollars, +that is 150,000 dollars together, which in any case was insufficient. +At first they had no authority to undertake war insurance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The economic importance of the insurance question is obvious on the +face of it. No marine insurance was possible without war insurance. +In particular the American Government bureau for war insurance +made the covering of the marine insurance an essential condition. +This example was followed by all the American insurance companies. +A satisfactory settlement of the insurance—both war and +marine—on the other hand was a necessary condition for the +financing of the shipments. The shippers only obtained credit from +the bank on handing over the insurance policies. In addition to this +it came about later that the few American shipping lines which remained +independent of England, and so were on the black list, were no longer +in a position to cover the "Hull Insurance," i.e., the insurance of +the ship herself, and <a name="page_89"><span class="page">Page +89</span></a> therefore the solution of the insurance question +became a necessary condition for obtaining freight space. Here +too, then, it was to our interest to come to the rescue, because +otherwise the lines in question would have been forced to come to +an understanding with the English firms, which would have placed +their tonnage at the service of our enemies. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To begin with, Herr Albert himself undertook the insurance in cases +of exceptional importance. It was at most a question of a small +balance, by the furnishing of which an immediate risk or a dangerous +delay in shipment was avoided. Our chief efforts were directed +towards raising the insurance limit of the German companies. As +a result a pool of German insurance companies was formed whose +limit for marine and war insurance was gradually raised more and +more. In this way it was possible to carry through a number of +shipments to European countries, to keep a not inconsiderable +tonnage—about 30,000 tons—out of the hands of the Allies, +as well as to enable a number of important German firms in South +America to carry on extensive trade between North and South America, +and so to maintain their business activity in spite of the measures +adopted by the English. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +About our propaganda I have already spoken in detail in the second +chapter. It may be mentioned again here that the centre of gravity +of our active propaganda lay in the economic question, which was +to a certain extent the key to the understanding of our American +policy during the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Though the vast and rapid development of American export trade +through the trade in war material, and the change in position from +debtor to creditor, was only effected gradually, and the loss of the +German market at first made itself adversely felt both actively and +passively, <a name="page_90"><span class="page">Page 90</span></a> +the size of the contracts from the Allies and the consequent profits +at once acted like a narcotic on public opinion. This was all the +more the case as a result of the extraordinarily skilful way in which +the English handled the question. They always proceeded cautiously +and gradually. For instance, they at first accepted the Declaration +of London in principle, but made several alterations which to the +public, who did not realize the extent of their effect, seemed +unimportant and which yet formed the basis for the gradual throwing +overboard of the Declaration of London. After public opinion had +grown accustomed to the English encroachments and the interests +affected had been pacified by the Allied contracts, the blockade +was introduced after careful preparation in the Press; it was not at +first described as a blockade, but was gradually and systematically +tightened. Among other things, the export of cotton to Germany was +expressly agreed to at the end of 1914, but was afterwards hampered +in practice by various measures, as, for example, the holding up of +individual ships, and the refusal of marine insurance, and finally +brought to an end by the declaration of cotton as unconditional +contraband. It is characteristic that the declaration of cotton as +unconditional contraband was made public on the very day on which +the whole American Press was in a state of great excitement over the +<i>Arabic</i> case, so that this comparatively unimportant incident +filled the front pages and leading articles of the newspapers, while +the extremely important economic measure was published in a place +where it would hardly be noticed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +We made vigorous efforts to oppose this English step. We got into +touch with the importers of German goods, who formed an association +and forwarded a protest to Washington. Without attracting attention, +we gave the association the assistance of a firm of solicitors, whose +<a name="page_91"><span class="page">Page 91</span></a> services +were at our disposal, as legal advisers. Relations were entered into +with the cotton interest, which, through the political pressure of +the Southern States, exerted great influence on public opinion and +in Congress. Various projects for buying cotton on a large scale +for Germany were considered, discussed with the cotton interest +and tested by small purchases. In the same way negotiations were +entered upon with the great meat companies, the copper interest +and others by systematic explanation and emphasis of the interests +with regard to the German market. The result, partly for the reasons +given, partly owing to the political development of the general +relations between Germany and the United States, was small. This, +however, can hardly be taken as an argument against the expediency +of the steps taken as at that time. No one could foresee the later +development of the war and particularly the length of time it was +going to last; whereas had the war been shorter there is no doubt +that these measures would have attained their object. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +An important part of the economic propaganda was the institution of +the so-called "Issues," i.e., the attempt by carefully construing +individual incidents to make clear to public opinion the fundamental +injustice of the English encroachments and their far-reaching +consequences in practice. The most important case in this direction is +that of the <i>Wilhelmina</i>. According to the prevailing principles +of international law, foodstuffs were only conditional contraband. +They might be imported into Germany if they were intended for the +exclusive use of the civil population. As, however, England succeeded +in restraining the exporters from any attempt to consign foodstuffs +to Germany, especially as in view of the enormous supplies that were +being forwarded to our enemies they had little interest in such +shipment, the question <a name="page_92"><span class="page">Page +92</span></a> never reached a clear issue. Herr Albert therefore +induced an American firm to ship foodstuffs for the civil population +of Germany on the American steamer <i>Wilhelmina</i>, bound for +Hamburg, by himself undertaking the whole risk from behind the +scenes. This was arranged in such a way as to preserve in appearance +the good faith of the American firm, and to make the shipment seem +purely American in the eyes of the American Government and the +English. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The <i>Wilhelmina</i> was taken by the English into Falmouth and +detained on the grounds that Hamburg was a fortified town, and +that, according to the measures adopted by Germany for supplying +the civil population with food—requisitioning, centralization +of distribution, etc.—there was no longer any distinction +between the supply of the military and the civil population. While +the negotiations on this question were still in the air, and seemed +to be progressing favorably for us, England resorted to a general +blockade. Consequently the case lost its interest, both practical +and as a question of principle, especially as England declared +her readiness to pay for the goods at Hamburg prices. As, on the +other hand, insistence on the purely theoretical claims would give +rise to the danger that the English or American secret service +might in the end succeed in proving the German origin of the +undertaking, Herr Albert accepted the proffered payment of the +English Government, and received as compensation a sum which covered +all the expenses. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Such incidents could have been construed in several ways. One of the +most important, and also the most popular, was the shipment of cotton +to Germany for the civilian population between the autumn of 1915 and +the middle of 1916. The declaration of cotton as absolute contraband +was at first only on paper, as no American <a name="page_93"><span +class="page">Page 93</span></a> exporters had hitherto ventured +to ship cotton. Consequently, detailed discussions took place as +to whether such an undertaking should be entered upon in the full +light of publicity. Great excitement among the cotton growers proved +the extremely keen and widespread interest. England would have +been forced to act on her declaration at a time when the American +Government could not afford to ignore the interests of the cotton +industry, with its influence on domestic politics. The full effect +of the meagreness of the crops, and on the other hand the increase +of consumption in the United States, and consequent rise in price, +was not yet realized by the public, nor even in cotton circles. +The cotton industry viewed with anxiety the increased difficulty +of finding a market, and were anxious for a reopening of that of +the Central Powers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Certainly a shipment of cotton to Germany would only have been +justified in conjunction with comprehensive other measures, particularly +purchases on the American cotton market on German account. As a +result of detailed discussion with American interested parties, +who repeatedly urged us to such a step, we forwarded proposals +to Berlin on these lines. Their general purport was that about +a million bales of cotton should be bought outright on behalf of +Germany, and that in addition options should be secured on a further +million or two million bales on the understanding that the taking up +of the options should be dependent on the possibility of shipment +to Germany. On the strength of these measures the shipment of one +big consignment should have been undertaken. The plan had sound +prospects of success. In any case there would have been no risk +worth mentioning, as, to the initiated, there was no doubt as to +the rise of prices. In view of the new bank legislation (Federal +Reserve Act), no insuperable difficulties would have stood in the +way of <a name="page_94"><span class="page">Page 94</span></a> +financing the shipment. The indirect political pressure on the +American Government and public opinion, with its reaction on England, +would have been considerable. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Unfortunately the plan was frustrated by the taking up of the matter +in America direct from Germany, without regard to the shipment +difficulty, without going into the question of the options and +without knowledge of the political or economic situation. Bremen +actually placed a contract in New York for one million bales to be +delivered in Bremen at a fixed price. It was, however, clear from +the first to anyone acquainted with the circumstances that such a +step was bound to be futile. The whole thing turned on the question +of shipping. The American Press, again under English influence, at +once pointed the finger of scorn, saying that the contract was +not meant seriously, but was merely a piece of bluff for purposes +of German propaganda. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After this had brought about the collapse of the more ambitious +plan, the shipment of a single cargo still continued to be discussed +and detailed preparations were made. The idea had, however, to be +abandoned, because the difficulties of passing off the shipment as +a purely American enterprise were practically insuperable without +the background of great economic measures, which placed the cost +out of all proportion to the chances of success. The whole cost, +as in the "<i>Wilhelmina</i> case" would have to be guaranteed +from Germany, and would of course have been lost if the English +secret service succeeded in establishing the German connection. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The propaganda for preventing and hampering the supply of war material +to our enemies turned at first on the question of principle whether +such supplies were reconcilable with neutrality. The attempt was +made—as has been briefly mentioned already—with the +special support of the German-American circles, to impress upon the +<a name="page_95"><span class="page">Page 95</span></a> American +people the immorality and essentially unneutral nature of the supplies, +especially in view of the vast scale they were assuming. It is +well known that these attempts, which extended to a strictly legal +exertion of influence on Congress, failed. The lack of unity and +limited political experience of the German-Americans contributed +to this result, but the economic interest of the nation in the +supplies, in which the whole American Administration and industry +were finally concerned, formed the decisive factor. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Attempts too were very soon made to hamper the supplies in a practical +way. In August, 1914, it might perhaps have been possible to buy up +the Bethlehem Steel Works, if the outlay of the necessary capital +had been promptly decided upon. At that time the Americans themselves +did not foresee what a gigantic proportion these supplies were +to assume. The purchase of these works would have deprived the +whole munition industry of its main support. Similar proposals have +repeatedly been worked out by us, as, for example, the proposal +to amalgamate the whole shrapnel industry of the United States. +The fear, well grounded in itself, that such an arrangement was +scarcely within the bounds of practical politics and could have +been got round, could be ignored. In case of disputes as to the +validity of such a step we should have gained more by the publicity +than we stood to lose. At that time, however, the Berlin Government +took up a negative attitude, and did not interest itself in the +question until the beginning of 1915, when the vast supplies of +material from America began to make themselves felt and the +concentration of German industry on the production of munitions was +not yet complete. The Military Attaché received instructions +to do everything possible to hamper the fulfilment of the great +outstanding French and Russian contracts for shrapnel, which <a +name="page_96"><span class="page">Page 96</span></a> was at that +time still the chief shell used by the Allies. This was done +successfully, if on a small scale, by founding an undertaking of +our own, called the Bridgeport Projectile Company, and entering +into contracts to establish the most important machinery for the +manufacture of powder and shrapnel. Through this company, which +originally passed as entirely American, the special machinery required +for the manufacture of shrapnel was bought on a scale which seriously +affected the American output, and in particular hindered the acceptance +and carrying through of further contracts from the Allies for a +considerable time. Herr Albert assisted and advised the Military +Attaché in making these contracts, arranged the financing +of the enterprise later on, and worked at its development after +Herr von Papen's departure. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Still more successful were the efforts to remove from the market +the surplus benzol, which is the raw product for the production +of picric acid. The benzol was bought up by a company specially +formed for the purpose, who sent it to a chemical works under German +management to be manufactured into salicylic preparations. These +products were sold for the most part for the American market, and +also, with the approval of the Ministry for War, exported to neutral +countries. The undertaking was eventually closed down after making +considerable profits for the Imperial Treasury. In the same way, +for some time, all the bromine coming on to the market, the products +of which were used to manufacture and increase the density of gas, +were bought up. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To these efforts to hamper and delay the supply of war material +belonged also the much-discussed agreement with the Bosch Magneto +Company, the American branch of the Stuttgart firm. The substance +of the arrangement was that this company, which was under <a +name="page_97"><span class="page">Page 97</span></a> German direction, +should not immediately refuse Allied contracts for fuses, but should +appear to accept them and delay their fulfilment, and, to complete +the deception, even occasionally deliver small quantities, and +finally, at the last moment, refuse to complete the contract. This +procedure was attacked at the time by a German-American journalist, +von Skal. On the strength of short notices which Herr von Skal +published in the German Press, in ignorance of the real state of +the case, public opinion in Germany turned against the parent firm, +the Bosch works in Stuttgart. The question then became the subject of +my reports, and was submitted to an inquiry by the home authorities +and the courts. I still hold to my opinion that the whole affair was +unnecessarily exaggerated by German public opinion, and that the +detailed investigation into its legality by the home authorities +and courts was unnecessary, as the managing director of the American +branch and the directors of the German company had acted in perfect +good faith in an attempt to advance the interests of the German +cause. It was merely a question of the result. If their policy +of procrastination had succeeded in delaying the contracts and +had kept our enemies for a considerable time from building their +own factory for fuses and aeroplane magnetoes, their action would +have been justified; in the contrary event it would have been vain, +but blameless from a moral and legal point of view. The fact that at +the beginning the English relied on the possibility of the production +and supply of such fuses from America, and only later gradually +came to a decision to build and fit out their own factories, +consequently under much more difficult circumstances, offered an +opening for this procedure. That difficulties were caused to the +enemy in this respect until quite recently is unmistakably shown +by the messages that reached America from England. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_98"><span class="page">Page 98</span></a> As a result +of the extensive purchases of the Allies, there came about a gradual +change in the attitude of the American Government to the question +of issuing loans. At the end of March, 1915, we succeeded, acting +on instructions from Berlin, in raising a small loan. It involved +an unusual amount of trouble. The American financial world was +already completely dominated by the Morgan trust. This domination +resulted from the fact that the Allied commissions were concentrated +in English hands and were placed by England in the hands of J. P. +Morgan & Co., who acted as the agents of the English Government. +As these commissions finally included every sphere of economic +life, all the great American banks and bankers were called upon, +and so drawn into the Morgan circle. The result was that no big +firm could be induced to undertake a German loan. However, several +trust companies of repute, who already had or wished to have business +relations with Germany, declared their readiness to become partners +in a syndicate if we succeeded in finding a "Syndicate Manager." +A certain New York firm which afterwards made a name for itself, +but at that time was comparatively unknown, seemed suited for this +position. When all the preparations and preliminary agreements +had been carried through, the trust companies, under the pressure +of the Morgan influence, declared that their names must not be +associated with the syndicate. Meanwhile the matter had gone so +far that withdrawal would have meant a moral surrender which would +have been dangerous for our credit. Consequently, we had to make +up our minds to negotiate the loan under the signature of this one +firm, which was naturally undesirable for the general interest. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Looking back, I am of the opinion that we should have done better not +to consider a loan in the United States, but to remit the necessary +funds from Berlin. This had <a name="page_99"><span class="page">Page +99</span></a> to be done later to redeem the loan, and at a time when +the rate of exchange was much more unfavorable. When the loan was +raised we had certainly no idea that it would have to be redeemed during +the war, as we had reckoned on a shorter duration of hostilities. On +the other hand there is no truth in the statement that this loan +in some way cleared the way for further Allied loans. These loans, +which were the natural result of the great supplies of material to +the Allies, would have come in any case. We did, however, deprive +ourselves by this loan of an argument to prove the defective neutrality +of the United States. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +In 1916 we succeeded in getting hold of some five millions in Treasury +notes without formal loan negotiations. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Another economic question which occupied my attention was connected +with the export of German dye-stuffs to the United States. In Berlin +it was held that German dye-stuffs should be withheld from the +United States as a lever for inducing them to protest against the +English blockade, and possibly have it raised. The same point of +view was adopted with regard to other goods which were necessities +for the United States, as, for example, potassic salt, sugar beetroot +seed and other commodities. A change of view did not occur until +the spring of 1916 at my suggestion. It is my belief that the +withholding of these goods proved a serious mistake. The political +aim of bringing pressure to bear on England with a view to the +raising of the blockade was not realized. The American industry +partly got over the difficulty by obtaining dye-stuffs in other +ways—importation of German dyes from China, where they had +been systematically bought, smuggling of German dyes via neutral +countries, importation of Swiss dyes, introduction of natural <a +name="page_100"><span class="page">Page 100</span></a> dyes and +dye-substitutes—but more especially by the foundation of a +dye industry of their own. In the case of potash, they had simply +to do with what little they could get; which was all the easier +as the American manure manufacturers and dealers had already in +their own interests begun a systematic propaganda to prove that +potash was not indispensable, but could be replaced by their own +products. It might be observed as a generalization that ultimately +no individual product has proved to be really indispensable. The +result of holding back our exports was therefore simply—apart +from a quite unnecessary straining of political relations, since +England succeeded in diverting all the odium on to us—a scarcity +of important German commodities in the United States and the +substitution of their own production. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In negotiating the German loan, the chief difficulty was that grasping +speculators got hold of the market, discredited the war loan by +underbidding one another and in part by direct dishonorable dealing, +and also that owing to the impossibility of producing ready money, +interest in the war loan flagged. Early on I suggested the issue +of bills <i>ad interim</i>. The scheme, however, failed, because +the representative of the Deutsche Bank opposed it, and because +the natural opposition of two great institutions, who were making a +profitable business out of the sale of war loans and the speculations +on the value of the mark, which were closely connected with it, could +not be overcome. I am still of the opinion that with well-timed +organization the sum raised by the war loan could have been increased +by several millions. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_101"><span class="page">Page 101</span></a> +CHAPTER V</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE SO-CALLED GERMAN CONSPIRACIES +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Immediately after the outbreak of war, our cruisers in foreign +waters were cut off from their base of operations, and the German +Reservists in North and South America were prevented from returning +home owing to the British Command of the Sea. Measures to assist them +were therefore taken by the German Nationals and German Americans +in the United States, which although not in themselves aimed at the +Union, certainly transgressed its laws. Moreover during the year +1915 and succeeding years, several deeds of violence against the +enemies of Germany, or preparations for such deeds, were discovered, +involving more or less serious offences against the laws of America. +Both kinds of activity, comprised under the suggestive term "German +Conspiracies" or "German Plots against American Neutrality," were +skilfully used by our enemies to discredit us, and these agitations +did considerable harm to the German cause, besides being a serious +obstacle in the way of my policy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Among the measures for assisting the German fleet may be mentioned, +in the first place, the case of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, which has +already been noticed. The New York branch, acting in accordance +with the instructions of their head offices in Hamburg, dispatched +about a dozen chartered vessels, laden with coal and provisions, +to the squadron of German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers then on +the high seas. This cargo was declared in <a name="page_102"><span +class="page">Page 102</span></a> the ships' clearing papers to be +consigned to ports beyond the area of open sea where the German +cruisers were known to be. When it came out later that the New York +branch of the Hamburg-Amerika Line had made use of this device +for coaling German men-of-war the chief officials were brought up +on the charge of deliberately making false declarations in their +clearing papers, and their chief, Dr. Bünz, a man of the highest +character, with three of his subordinates, was condemned, in December, +1915, to eighteen months' imprisonment in the first instance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The severity of the penalty thus inflicted on a man so universally +respected, who had, during his long tenure of the office of +Consul-General in Chicago and New York, gained the warm affection +of many Americans, was regarded merely as a manifestation for the +benefit of the outside world of the American Government's intention +to preserve a strict neutrality. No one supposed that the aged +Dr. Bünz would really have to undergo his sentence, and as +a matter of fact he remained at liberty for some time even after +America's declaration of war. In the summer of 1917 a violent +press-campaign broke out against him, whereupon, despite his ill +health he offered of his own accord to serve his sentence and was +removed to the State prison at Atlanta, where he died in 1918. +All honor to his memory! +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Considering that his offence was nothing more than a technical +violation of the letter of the American Customs regulations and +was actuated by no base motive, nor by hostility to the United +States, the punishment inflicted was excessively harsh. It was +pleaded on his behalf in the speech for the defence that America +during the war against Spain had acted in exactly the same way, +when ships were dispatched from the neutral harbor of Hong Kong to +coal Admiral Dewey's fleet before Manila <a name="page_103"><span +class="page">Page 103</span></a> and their cargo was declared as +being scrap-iron consigned to Macao. An indication of the state of +public opinion in the Eastern States of America at the end of 1915 +may be found in the fact that the heavy sentence on this "German +Conspirator" met with general approval apart from a few emphatic +protests on the part of the German-American papers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A number of German Reserve officers domiciled in America succeeded, +despite the close watch maintained by England on the seas, in effecting +their return to the Fatherland, thanks to a secret bureau in New +York, organized by German-Americans, which provided them with false +or forged American passports. This bureau was closed by the American +police consequent on the discovery in January, 1915, of four German +Reservists, with such papers in their possession, on board a Norwegian +ship in New York harbor. The organizer had apparently fled from +New York some time before, but finally fell into the hands of the +British, and was drowned in a torpedoed transport. The Reservists +were discharged on payment of heavy fines. One, however, was sentenced +to three years' penal servitude. In estimating this affair, it +must be remembered that according to the recognized conventions +of international law, British men-of-war were not justified in +making prisoners of individual unarmed Germans returning to their +homes in neutral vessels. The American Government itself explicitly +affirmed as much when a ship flying the Stars and Stripes was held +up in mid-ocean for examination. As a rule, however, neutral Powers +were too weak to stand up for their rights against British violations +of international law, and so all Germans who were discovered by the +British on their homeward voyage were made prisoners of war. Our +countrymen, therefore, if they wished to do their duty by going to the +defence of their Fatherland, <a name="page_104"><span class="page">Page +104</span></a> were compelled, in face of this flagrant violation +of the Law of Nations, to provide themselves with false passports. +They had thus to choose between two conflicting duties, a dilemma +all too common in life and one which the individual must solve +according to his lights. The bearers of such false passports certainly +risked heavy penalties, but shrank still more from incurring any +suspicion of skulking or cowardice. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It would seem, moreover, that there is little to choose, from the +moral point of view, between their "sailing under false flags," +for the purpose of evading the British guardians of the sea, and +the hoisting of neutral ensigns by British ships to escape from +German submarines. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +There can, at all events, be no question of a "German conspiracy" +in these cases of forged passports as I had officially announced on +behalf of the German Government, that under the circumstances no one +who remained in America would, on his arrival in Germany, be punished +for not answering the call to the Colors. I can repudiate in the +most express terms any personal responsibility for the activities +of the above-mentioned secret bureau in New York, although attempts +have been made to connect my name with it on the sole ground of a +letter, said to have been written to me by von Wedell before his +departure, which was, as a matter of fact, first made known to me +by its publication in the Press. It is true that this gentleman, +a New York barrister before the war, was a personal acquaintance of +mine; he had, however, immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, +hastened back to Germany to join his own regiment, and later returned +secretly to America, presumably under orders from his superiors, +only to disappear again with equal secrecy after a short stay. I +had never even heard the name of Rueroede before his arrest, but +in view of <a name="page_105"><span class="page">Page 105</span></a> +his denial that any personal profit accrued to him from his services +in providing his fellow-countrymen with documents for the purpose +of facilitating their escape from British vigilance, I much regret +the severity of the penalty inflicted on him. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +If the cases of the Hamburg-Amerika Line and the falsification +of the passports damaged the German cause in America, this was +still more true of the acts of violence planned or carried out +by Germans or German-Americans against individuals known to be +hostile to our cause. The few authentic cases of this sort of thing +were, as every impartial person must recognize, engineered by a +few patriotic but foolish hotheads; the more sober and responsible +German elements in the United States were certainly no party to +them. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To the list of these outrages, the enemies of Germany deliberately +added others which probably had no foundation in fact. Thus, for every +accident which occurred in any American munition factory—and +many accidents were bound to happen in the new works which had +sprung up like mushrooms all over the land, and were staffed with +absolutely untrained personnel—"German agents" were regularly +held responsible, and the anti-German Press, particularly the +<i>Providence Journal</i>, announced these accidents as "a clear +manifestation of the notorious German system of frightfulness." +Worse still, these papers instilled into their readers the firm +conviction that these crimes were an essential part of German +propaganda, and in their cartoons represented the German, more +particularly the German-American, as a bearded anarchist with a +bomb ready in his hand. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I myself was frequently libelled in this manner by the "Yellow +Press," and represented both by pen and pencil as the ringleader +and instigator of the so-called "conspiracies"; this accusation, at +first tentative, later grew <a name="page_106"><span class="page">Page +106</span></a> increasingly clear and unmistakable. The campaign of +calumny in which even the more respectable Press took its share, +was, however, directed more particularly against the Military +Attaché, Captain von Papen, and the Naval Attaché, +Captain Boy-Ed, whose names were openly coupled with some of the +crimes which came before the American Courts of Justice. Both these +officers finally fell victims to this agitation, and had to be +recalled from America in December, 1915, in accordance with a request +from the United States Government. At the same time, in the annual +Presidential message to Congress, statutory measures were laid +down against Americans implicated in these conspiracies, or, as +the phrase ran, against all those "contriving schemes for the +destruction of the independence, and implicated in plots against +the neutrality, of the Government." Not until the declaration of war +against Germany, on April 2nd, 1917, did President Wilson venture +openly to accuse the official German representatives in America +of complicity in these designs, in the following words: "It is +unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts +of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously +near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the +country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, +and even under the personal direction of official agents of the +Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United +States." Since then my own name has been mentioned as the supreme +head of the German "Conspiracy" in America, in the innumerable +propaganda pamphlets with which the official "Committee of Public +Information" has flooded America and Europe. And I have been openly +accused of having instigated and furthered, or at the very least +been privy to, all manner of criminal activities. In interviews with +American journalists I <a name="page_107"><span class="page">Page +107</span></a> have more than once refuted these calumnies, which +can be supported by no evidence, and were solely intended to arouse +popular feeling against Germany; but I must now refer again to +the more definite of these accusations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It must be left to the impartial historian of the future to establish +the full truth concerning the German conspiracies in the United +States; any evidence given under the influence of the passions +arising out of the war can, of course, possess only a limited value. +It is obvious from the proceedings concerning the constitution of +the Senate Committee that much of the evidence was prejudiced and +unreliable, probably because it was based solely on information +given by Germans or former Germans, whose identities were kept +strictly secret, and who told deliberate lies, either because, +like Judas, they had received a reward for their treachery, or +because, having severed all ties with their old country, they wished +to secure their footing in the new. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In any case I myself was never a partner to any proceedings which +contravened the laws of the United States. I never instigated such +proceedings, nor did I consciously afford their authors assistance, +whether financially or otherwise. I was in no single instance privy +to any illegal acts, or to any preparations for such acts. Indeed, +as a rule I heard of them first through the papers, and even then +scarcely believed in the very existence of most of the conspiracies +for which I was afterwards held accountable. I shall hardly be +blamed for this by anyone who remembered the number of projects +which we were all duly accused of entertaining, such as the various +alleged plans for the invasion of Canada with a force recruited +from the German-American rifle clubs, and many another wild-cat +scheme attributed to us in the first months of the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Such offences against the laws of America as were <a +name="page_108"><span class="page">Page 108</span></a> actually +committed were certainly reprobated by none more sincerely than +by myself, if only because nothing could be imagined more certain +to militate against my policy, as I have here described it, than +these outrages and the popular indignation aroused by them. I fully +realized that these individual acts, in defiance of the law of the +land and the resulting spread of Germanophobia, were bound to damage +me in the eyes of the United States Government and public opinion. +It is thus obviously absurd to accuse me of being responsible in +any way for the acts in question, seeing that any such instigation, +or even approval on my part, would have involved the utter ruin of +my own policy! +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Another accusation against my conduct while in America is that +I at all events connived at the commission of crimes under the +direction of officers attached to the Embassy of which I was in +charge, or of other German Secret Service agents. The evidence +for this consists of certain cipher telegrams from the military +authorities in Germany, addressed to the Embassy in Washington; +these were decoded in England and said to contain instructions +for outrages to be committed in Canadian territory. I cannot say +if these messages were genuine or no. Military cipher telegrams, +formally addressed to the military attaché, were frequently +received at the Embassy, but were always sent forward at once by +the registry to Captain von Papen's office in New York, as a matter +of routine, and without being referred to me in any way. Von Papen +certainly never told me a word about any instructions from his +superiors that he should endeavor to foment disorders as alleged. +For the present, then, I consider that there is insufficient evidence +for his having received any such orders; but in all these matters +I can, of course, speak only for myself, military matters being +entirely out of my province. <a name="page_109"><span class="page">Page +109</span></a> Soon after von Papen's recall I entered a protest +against the sending of a successor, as there was no longer any +useful purpose to be served by the employment of a Military +Attaché, whose presence would only serve as a pretext for +a renewed hostile agitation against us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Whether the illegal acts of the Secret Agents sent to the United +States by the military authorities were committed in accordance +with their orders or on their own initiative I had no means of +knowing at the time, nor have I been able to discover since my +return home. I may observe, however, that I more than once urgently +requested the Foreign Office to use all their influence against +the dispatch of Secret Service men to America. Moreover, I had +published in the Press a notice, couched in strong terms and signed +by myself, warning all Germans domiciled in the United States not to +involve themselves in any illegal activities under any circumstances +whatever. And I think I am justified in saying that twelve months +before the severance of diplomatic relations, I had made a clean +sweep of all "conspiracies" and extorted a promise that no more +"agents" should be sent over from Germany. On my arrival home, +I was held by some to have been at fault for not having put down +the movement earlier; to which my reply must be that as a matter +of fact it was the cases of Rintelen and Fay that first earned +us the reputation of "conspirators"; all the rest came to light +later, and were in great measure connected with their machinations. +I took steps, as soon as I heard of these two affairs, to avoid +any repetition of them, in which effort I was successful. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following throws some light on the attitude of the United States +Government towards me in the matter of the "conspiracies." When in +November, 1915, the Press campaign had reached the height of its +violence, <a name="page_110"><span class="page">Page 110</span></a> +I forwarded a Note to Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, protesting +strongly against the unjustifiable attacks aimed at myself and my +colleagues of the Embassy and requesting that some effort should +be made to suppress them, as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, Nov. 16, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The continuance of the baseless attacks on myself and the colleagues +of my Embassy in the columns of the <i>Providence Journal</i> impels +me to ask whether your Excellency cannot see your way to make it +clear that these attacks are not countenanced by the American +Government. Such slanders against the representatives of a friendly +Power who have a right to claim the protection and hospitality of +the United States authorities would be incomprehensible, were it +not a matter of common knowledge that the <i>Providence Journal</i> +is a 'hyphenated' Anglo-American paper. To borrow the phrase of +the United States President, this journal is obviously a greater +friend of other countries than its own. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"For the last fifteen months I and all my colleagues have had, +if I may say so, a whole army of American private detectives on +our track. Day and night they have pursued us in the service of +our enemies. Yet, although official German documents have been +stolen, no one has yet succeeded in producing a single proof of +illegal activities on the part of anyone of us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I should esteem it a great favor if your Excellency could see your +way to secure this Embassy against a repetition of these baseless +attacks, which have as their sole foundation the pre-supposition +of conspiracies which have no existence in fact." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I never received any reply to this letter, but a short time after +Mr. Lansing while informing me that the <a name="page_111"><span +class="page">Page 111</span></a> American Government felt itself +compelled to ask for the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen, as +being no longer acceptable to them (this affair I propose to refer +to again in another place), stated in the most explicit terms that I +was in no way implicated in the matter. The fact that the American +Government, even after the departure of the two attachés, +maintained the same intimate relations with me throughout the fourteen +months which elapsed before its diplomatic representatives were +recalled from Germany, proves that this was no empty compliment +but was meant in all sincerity. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I feel myself compelled to insist on these facts, in view of the +efforts subsequently made to represent me as the originator or +leader of the famous "conspiracies," which were later immeasurably +exaggerated by American propaganda. This propaganda has poisoned +the mind of the average American citizen to such an extent that he +firmly believes the German Embassy to have been a nest of anarchists, +who even during the period of his country's neutrality "waged war" +in the most dastardly manner against her. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +And yet these stories of so-called conspiracies, with their legions +of conspirators, and resulting lengthy lists of German outrages +in America, will not bear serious examination. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Irrefutable evidence on the subject can be found in the official +report of the Senate Committee of Inquiry into the activities of +German propaganda, which has already been mentioned more than once. +After the depositions of Mr. Bruce Bielaski on this subject had +gone on for two days, Senator Nelson, being tired of this dry +recital—he had already expressed the opinion that most of +the evidence given so far was too academic—asked this officer +of the Department of Justice for a report on the German attempts "to +foment strikes and cause <a name="page_112"><span class="page">Page +112</span></a> explosions in munition factories" which he apparently +considered to be an integral part of German propaganda. Mr. Bielaski +then referred to the "more important cases of offences against +the law, which had been fathered by the German Government." He +prefaced his statement with the remark that the list he was about +to give was complete in every way; twenty-four cases were dealt with, +and the names of the incriminated individuals given, as reproduced +below: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +1. Falsification of passports (von Wedell, Rueroede). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +2. Destruction of a bridge in Canada (Horn). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +3. Falsification of passports (Stegler, Madden, Cook). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +4. Falsification of passports (Lüderitz). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +5. Attempted destruction of a canal in Canada (von der Goltz, Tauscher, +Fritzen). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +6. Falsification of passports (Sanders, Wunmerburg, and two +accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +7. Supplying of coal, etc., to German men-of-war at sea (Bunz, Koeter, +Hofmeister, Poppinghaus). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +8. Attempt to bring about a revolution in India (Bopp, von Schack, +von Brinken, Ram Chandra, and twenty-five accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +9. Attempt to blow up a railway tunnel in Canada (Bopp and three +accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +10. Attempted destruction of munition factories and railway bridges +in Canada (Kaltschmidt, and five accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +11. Plot to destroy Allied munition ships by infernal machines (Fay, +Scholtz, Dächer and three accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +12. Plot to destroy Allied munition ships by incendiary bombs (Scheele, +von Kleist, Wolpart, Bode). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +13. Attempt to foment strikes in factories engaged in the making +of war materials (Rintelen, Lamar, Martin). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_113"><span class="page">Page 113</span></a> 14. Attempt +to foment strikes among the dockers (no convictions). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +15. Sending of spies to Canada (König). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +16. Perjury in the matter of the arming of the <i>Lusitania</i> +(Stahl). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +17. Attempt to smuggle rubber to Germany (Jaeger and five accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +18. Attempt to smuggle ashore chronometer of an interned German +ship (Thierichens). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +19. Attempt to smuggle nickel to Germany (Olsen and two accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +20. Attempt to smuggle rubber to Germany (Newmann and accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +21. Sinking of a German ship at the entrance of an American harbor +(Captain and crew of the <i>Liebenfels</i>). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +22. Attempt to smuggle rubber to Germany (Soloman and accomplices). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +23. Falsification of passports (Rintelen and Meloy). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +24. Plan to destroy Allied army horses by means of bacteria (Sternberg). +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The above is the substance of the evidence given by Bielaski. I +have no wish to extenuate, in the slightest degree, the few serious +offences against common law included in this list, but I imagine +that the unprejudiced reader will not fail to observe that Mr. +Bielaski found it necessary to rake up everything possible in order +to be able to present the Committee with a respectable catalogue of +crimes instigated by the German Government in the United States. +Apparently his only object was to produce a list of imposing length, +and for this purpose he included in it cases in which it would +be difficult for even the most suspicious mind to discover the +hand of the German Government. Moreover even he himself <a +name="page_114"><span class="page">Page 114</span></a> did not +venture directly to assert the complicity of the representatives +of the German Empire in any single one of these offences. In reply +to Senator Overman, who asked if Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed were +held to be implicated in all these illegal acts, Mr. Bielaski gave +the following evasive answer: "The most important, and most serious +of these illegal acts, were, generally speaking, inspired, financed +and conducted by one or other of the accredited representatives +of Germany." Officials or agents in the service of Germany were, +however, mentioned by name as leaders or accomplices only in the +first fourteen and the two last cases, and I may be allowed to +emphasize the fact that by the admission of Mr. Bielaski himself, +my own name was coupled only with the agitation for a revolution in +India, which was supposed to be a part of Germany's designs. Even +if we take Mr. Bielaski's unconfirmed evidence as being reliable, +the total number of individuals convicted on these charges in the +American Courts of Justice amounts only to sixty-seven, of whom +apparently only sixteen were German nationals; and their offences +fall under the following heads: the case of the Hamburg-Amerika Line +and the five cases of falsification of passports already mentioned: +the so-called Indian plot: one case of successful and three of +attempted sabotage in Canada: and finally the cases numbered ten +to fourteen and twenty-four in Bielaski's list of the illegal acts +planned by the agents Rintelen, Fay and Sternberg. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I propose to go into the details of these cases later. What I am +now concerned to establish is that the list in question is from +one point of view more interesting for what it omits than for what +it includes. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the first place one may notice the absence of the accusation +previously made against us more than once, that we had plotted +to embroil the United States in war <a name="page_115"><span +class="page">Page 115</span></a> with Mexico and Japan; from the +fact that Mr. Bielaski made no mention of this in his evidence +before the Senate Committee it must be supposed that these ridiculous +stories with which American public opinion had been at one time +so assiduously spoon-fed were finally exploded. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a matter of fact, during my service in Washington, nothing was +further from my thoughts than to conspire with Mexican Generals, +as any such action would have seriously interfered with my chosen +policy. As concerning Japan I may, incidentally, remark that Mr. +Hale, when he was acting in collaboration with us in propaganda +work, particularly stipulated that we should not undertake anything +which might inflame the existing antagonism between America and +Japan—a condition which Dr. Dernburg accepted without hesitation, +since both he and his assistant Dr. Fuehr, who knew Japan well, +were decidedly opposed to any such agitation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In order to avoid misunderstanding, I wish expressly to state that I +do not deny that instructions were sent by Zimmermann, the Secretary +of State, to our Embassy in Mexico, which envisaged co-operation with +that country against the United States as well as an understanding +with Japan, but must point out that this was recommended in the +event—<i>and only in the event</i>—of the United States +declaring war on us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I shall return to these instructions later, only remarking here +that it was my duty to pass them on to von Eckhardt. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It should further be noted that the design, frequently imputed +to us in earlier days, of endeavoring to stir up a negro rising +in the United States was also omitted from Mr. Bielaski's list. +To the request of a Senator of a Southern State for his opinion +on this point, he replied without hesitation that no efforts in +this direction had <a name="page_116"><span class="page">Page +116</span></a> been made by any of the official representatives +of Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is noteworthy, moreover, that this agent of the Department of +Justice, who had heretofore consistently held us guilty of promoting +strikes in munition factories and sabotage of all kinds, failed +to follow up his charges. I must admit that, in view of what had +already appeared in the Press on the subject of German "conspiracies," +I had expected that definite proceedings would be taken on this +charge, if they were taken at all; and apparently the members of +the Senate Committee were also of this opinion, for one of them +expressly asked Mr. Bielaski if he had any evidence to produce +on the subject. His reply was: "I know very little, if anything, +of that; I don't think that during our neutrality there were any +instances of criminal activities of that kind." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Again, the Bureau for the Employment of German Workers, which was +likewise at one time proclaimed as a device or cloak for a dangerous +"German Conspiracy," was not mentioned in Bielaski's catalogue, +which conclusively proves that this calumny had been allowed to +drop. The office in question, which was known as the Lübau +Bureau from the name of its chief, was started by Captain von Papen +with the assistance of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, after Dr. +Dumba and I had pointed out clearly to our fellow-countrymen working +in the American munition factories that any of them who took part +in the manufacture of arms or supplies for our enemies would render +themselves liable to be tried for high treason in their native +land. After this it was the bounden duty of both Embassies to find +employment for all those who voluntarily resigned from the factories +working for the Entente; and from first to last this office, which +had branches in Philadelphia, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Cleveland, +and provided about <a name="page_117"><span class="page">Page +117</span></a> 4,500 men with fresh employment of an unobjectionable +nature, was never guilty of any illegal act. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +My open reference to the German law of high treason, however, was +much criticized by the greater part of the American Press, which +stigmatized it as an attempt "to introduce the German criminal +code into America," and as an infringement of the sovereignty of +the United States. Such criticism appears somewhat unwarranted in +view of the wide application given to the law of treason by the +Americans themselves shortly afterwards. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After this digression on the subject of the conspiracies which +had been previously imputed to us, but were now dropped out of +Bielaski's list, I propose to return to the instances of illegal +action which were definitely laid to our charge. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The first of these is the action of Werner Horn, a retired German +officer, which gained us for the first time the opprobrious epithet +of "dynamiters." Horn, of whose presence in America I was not aware +until the story of his crime appeared in the papers, contrived +in February, 1915, to blow up a railway bridge near Vaneboro, in +the territory of Canada, on the line running through the State +of Maine to Halifax. Apparently he believed, as did many other +people, that this railway was being utilized for the transport +of Canadian troops. As the act was quite senseless, and could at +worst only have held up traffic for a few hours, Captain von Papen +saw no objection to advancing to Horn, who was without means, a +sum sufficient to pay the fees of his defending counsel. To the +best of my knowledge Horn was simply kept under observation for +some time, and it was only after America's entry into the war that +he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a breach of the +regulations with regard to the transport of explosives (he had +apparently carried his dynamite with him in a hand-bag). +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_118"><span class="page">Page 118</span></a> Of the +three attempts at sabotage in Canada the Welland Canal affair caused +at the time the greatest sensation in New York. The Welland Canal +connects Lake Ontario with Lake Erie, west of Niagara Falls, i.e., +through Canadian territory, and it is a highway for all seaborne +traffic on the great lakes, and particularly for the transport +of corn to the coast. It was therefore considered advantageous +from a military point of view to attempt the destruction of the +canal. This had apparently already been projected in September +by a German adventurer, calling himself Horst von der Goltz, but +for some unexplained reason the idea had been abandoned at the +last moment. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Captain Hans Tauscher, Krupps' representative in New York, was +charged in 1916 with having supplied dynamite for this scheme, +but was acquitted on his calling evidence to prove that he had no +knowledge of the use which was to be made of the explosive. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The first information that I had about the attempt on the Welland +Canal was the report of the proceedings against Captain Tauscher. +Even to-day the full truth of the matter has not yet come to light. +The leading figure of the drama, von der Goltz, while on his way +to Germany in October, 1914, fell into the hands of the British. +When Captain von Papen returned to Germany in December, 1915, under +safe conduct of Great Britain, his papers were taken from him at +a Scottish port; among them was his American check book, and an +examination of this led to the identification of von der Goltz as +the individual who had planned the destruction of the Welland Canal. +The latter, it would seem, was thereupon offered, by the English +authorities, the alternatives of being shot or of returning to America +under a guarantee of personal safety, and giving evidence against +Germany in open court. He chose the latter <a name="page_119"><span +class="page">Page 119</span></a> course, and turned "State's evidence" +in New York, where he was kept under constant supervision. His +statements, however, in view of the pressure brought to bear upon +him, and of his doubtful past, can only be regarded as of somewhat +doubtful value. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During the whole course of my period of office in the United States +I heard nothing about the case of Albert Kaltschmidt, the German +resident in Detroit who after America's declaration of war, was +arrested on a charge of conspiring—apparently some time in +1915—to blow up a munition factory, an arsenal and a railway +bridge in Canada, and sentenced in December, 1917, to penal servitude, +together with four of his confederates, and the statements made +in the American Press which fastened upon me the responsibility +for the deeds of violence then simmering in the brain of this +individual, on the ground that, in October, 1915, he had received +a considerable advance from a banking account opened in my name +and that of Privy Councillor Albert, I most emphatically deny. +Kaltschmidt, who was a well-known business man had acted on behalf +of Albert and von Papen in several negotiations, with the object +of forestalling the Entente's agents in the purchase of important +war material, and had consequently been in receipt of considerable +sums of money for this purpose, both from von Papen and from the +general funds of the Embassy. This had, of course, earned him the +undying hatred of the outwitted agents of our enemies, and he had +also, in company with his sister and brother-in-law (both of whom +were later convicted of complicity in his designs), got himself +disliked for the prominent part he played in the agitation for +an embargo on the export of arms and munitions of war. It seems +quite possible that the charges against him were the work of private +enemies, and that the American Criminal Court, which condemned +him, was <a name="page_120"><span class="page">Page 120</span></a> +hoodwinked by the schemings of certain Canadians; the fact that +these criminal designs on Kaltschmidt's part only came to light +after the United States had become a belligerent adds probability +to the supposition. One thing, however, is certain, that even if +the alleged plot on the part of Kaltschmidt and his relations had +any real existence, the initiative was theirs alone, and cannot +be laid at the door of the Embassy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The affair of Bopp, the German Consul-General at San Francisco, was +also one which aroused much feeling against Germany. This gentleman +had already, as early as 1915, been accused of having delayed or +destroyed certain cargoes of military material for Russia, with +the aid of certain abettors; his subordinates, von Schack, the +Vice-Consul, and von Brinken, the Attaché, were also believed +to be implicated. In the following year he was further charged +with having incited one Louis J. Smith to blow up a tunnel on the +Canadian Pacific Railway, with the idea of destroying supplies on +their way to Russia. All three officials were therefore brought to +trial, but dismissed with a caution. However, at the end of 1916, +he and his two subordinates were again brought up on a serious +charge and sentenced on the testimony of their chief lieutenant, +Smith, who turned State's evidence[*] against them, to a term of +imprisonment. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote *: For the benefit of the reader not familiar with American +legal procedure, it should be explained that in cases where several +individuals are charged in common with an offence, any one of them +may be assured of a pardon if he turns State's evidence and informs +against his associates. This course of action, reprehensible as +it undoubtedly is, from a moral point of view, has the advantage +of facilitating the task of police spies!] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +All three resigned from their posts and lodged an appeal, but were +again found guilty in the second instance, after America had entered +the war. Consul-General Bopp and his colleagues if they had in +reality committed the offences of which they were accused, were <a +name="page_121"><span class="page">Page 121</span></a> certainly +actuated in no way by the Embassy or any high authorities, but must +be held solely and entirely responsible for the course they adopted. +In his reports to me, Bopp invariably asserted his innocence, and +I am rather inclined to believe that he really fell into one of +the traps which the Allied Secret Service were always setting for +our officials in America. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +According to common report, Consul-General Bopp, Schack and von +Brinken later underwent yet a further term of imprisonment for +their complicity in the so-called Indian conspiracy. I am quite +certain that nothing was ever heard of this affair until after +the American declaration of war; then, however, newspaper reports +were shown me, the effect that in the year of 1916 an attempt had +been made by the Indian Nationalists in San Francisco, with German +co-operation, to bring about an armed rising in British India—an +absolute "wild-goose chase," which, of course, came to nothing. It +was asserted in this connection that a cargo of arms and ammunition +on board the small schooner <i>Annie Larsen</i>, and destined for our +forces in German East Africa, was, in reality, dispatched to India +via Java and Siam; but no proofs were brought forward in support +of this statement. In connection with this design, four persons +were sentenced at Chicago, in October, 1917, and ten (according to +Bielaski twenty-nine in all) at San Francisco, in August, 1918, to +long terms of imprisonment, for having "illegally conspired in the +United States to make war against the territories and possessions +of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and Emperor of +India." It seems that this affair was exploited with great success +by the American propaganda service to inflame the minds of its people +against Germany. As a matter of fact, I cannot too strongly condemn +on principle all military enterprises undertaken from neutral <a +name="page_122"><span class="page">Page 122</span></a> territory; +but, from the purely moral point of view, I cannot but remark that +it ill befits America to give vent to righteous indignation over +such activities, considering the facilities she afforded to Czechs +and Poles, during her period of neutrality, for supporting to the +utmost of their power their blood brothers in their designs against +the Central Powers. Besides, even if it be admitted that the schooner +in question was actually sent by the Indian Nationalists with her +cargo of arms, it is absurd to regard the dispatch of this small +supply of war material as a crime, and gloss over the fact that +whole arsenals and ammunition columns were being shipped every +day to France! +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I now propose, in conclusion, to deal with the illegal +activities attributed by American opinion to the secret agents +controlled by the German military authorities, and sent by them +to the United States. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As regards the machinations of Franz Rintelen, my first information +about him reached me in the late autumn of 1915, and even now I have +to rely for most of the details on the American papers. Rintelen, +who was a banker by profession, and during the war held a commission +as Captain-Lieutenant in the Imperial Naval Reserve, appeared in +America in April, 1915, and presented himself to me during one of +my periodical visits to New York. He declined at the time to give +any information as to his official position in the country, or the +nature of his duties; I therefore wired to the Foreign Office for +some details about him, but received no reply. Some time afterwards +he applied to me for proofs of identity, which I refused to grant +him, and as his continued presence in New York was considered +undesirable by both von Pap en and Boy-Ed, they took steps to have +him sent back to Germany. He was captured, however, by the British, +on his voyage home. Shortly after this, <a name="page_123"><span +class="page">Page 123</span></a> the affair of Rintelen became a +matter of common talk, and the first indications of his mysterious +intrigues for the purpose of interfering with the delivery of munitions +from the United States to the Allies appeared in the Press; the +Foreign Office thereupon instructed me to issue an official +<i>démenti</i> on the subject. Mr. Lansing, the Secretary +of State, however, informed me that, as a matter of fact, Rintelen, +while in England, had confessed himself to be an emissary of the +German Government. I then heard from Captain Boy-Ed that Rintelen, +by representing himself as empowered to purchase large stocks of +raw material for Germany in the United States, had obtained a +considerable advance from the Embassy's funds. This fact was one of +the main reasons for the American Government's request in December, +1915, that Boy-Ed should be recalled. I was never able either in +America or Germany to discover the details of Rintelen's intrigues; +he himself never allowed anything to leak out about it at the Embassy, +and was unable to send any report on the subject to Germany, as +he was handed over to the United States by the British after the +American declaration of war and sentenced to some years' penal +servitude. The current story in the United States is that he was +proved to have been in touch with the Mexican General Huerta with +the object of bringing about war between the two Republics—an +offence of which the famous list of Mr. Bielaski makes no mention. +Further, he was supposed to have founded, in conjunction with a +member of Congress, and two individuals of evil reputation, a society +of workmen in Chicago, With the object of obtaining from Congress an +embargo on the export of arms—an undertaking which according +to the aforementioned report cost a great deal and proved entirely +valueless from the point of view of the German Government. It is +not known whether this undertaking brought <a name="page_124"><span +class="page">Page 124</span></a> Rintelen and his assistants within +the reach of the Sherman Act against conspiracies inciting industrial +disorders, or whether he had, in addition, made efforts to bring +about strikes in munition works. He was certainly suspected of +endeavoring to cause trouble among the dockers of New York, in +the hope of preventing or delaying the shipment of war material to +the Allies; but even Bielaski admitted before the Senate Committee +that there was no tangible evidence of this. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a matter of fact, the real grounds of Rintelen's conviction were +apparently that he had prepared, through the agency of a certain +German chemist, domiciled in America, named Scheele, a number of +incendiary bombs, which were apparently to be secreted by three +officers of the German Mercantile Marine on board Allied munition +ships, with the object of causing fires on the voyage. After America's +entry into the war, Rintelen and his accomplices were sentenced +on this count to fairly lengthy terms of imprisonment, and these +sentences they are serving at the present moment in the Federal +prison at Atlanta. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I have been unable to discover how far Rintelen was actually guilty +of the offences imputed to him; but I can only observe that he, +and, in so far as he acted under orders, his superiors, gravely +compromised the position of the German official representatives in +the United States, and afforded our enemies an excellent opportunity +of inflaming public opinion against Germany. It is impossible to +over-estimate the unfortunate effect produced throughout the world +by the discovery of bombs on board a German passenger-steamer, +and of their secretion in the holds of Allied munition ships. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Another attempt of a similar kind, which had most unfortunate results +from our point of view, was that attributed to a German, Lieutenant +Fay, who had likewise <a name="page_125"><span class="page">Page +125</span></a> come to America in April, 1915, and two other Germans, +by name Scholz and Däeche. Their idea was to put Allied munition +ships out of action by means of infernal machines, fastened to the +rudders, and timed to explode shortly after their departure. My +first information concerning these gentlemen was the report in +the Press of their arrest, which was apparently effected while +they were experimenting with their apparatus under cover of a wood. +A telegraphic inquiry elicited from Berlin the reply that Fay was +absolutely unknown there; it is possible, however, that he had +really come to America on some business of an official nature. +He and his accomplices were sentenced in May, 1916, to several +years' penal servitude, although no proof was adduced that any +real damage could possibly have been caused by their contrivance, +which experts informed me was not a practicable one. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Last of all, on Bielaski's list comes the case of the German agent +Stermberg, of whom, also, I had never heard. In January, 1915, he was +arrested on a charge of having attempted to inoculate horses, purchased +for the Allied Armies, with disease germs. As his practical knowledge +was not great, his intentions were in excess of his performances. +Bielaski, in his evidence before the Senate Committee, at first +hesitated to mention this case at all, and was only induced to do +so by the insistence of another Government official; it is clear, +therefore, that he attached very little importance to it, and, as a +matter of fact, the charge was not supported by any witnesses in +a court of law, or by any legal attestation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In a word, during all our period of service in America, as +representatives of the German Empire, practically nothing of all +that was alleged against us was proved to be true. A few of the +stories of illegal activity, however, were based on some foundation +of truth, and were <a name="page_126"><span class="page">Page +126</span></a> popularly but erroneously supposed to further the +interests of Germany. By these means we were first brought into +discredit, and from that time on, every rumor, or piece of gossip +concerning acts of violence on the part of Germans, whether based +on fact or not, served only to increase the wide-spread popular +suspicion and distrust of everyone and everything German. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_127"><span class="page">Page 127</span></a> +CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On August 6th, 1914, the Government of the United States proposed to +all the belligerent Powers that the laws of war at sea, as laid down +in the Declaration of London of 1909, should be observed throughout +the present war. This reasonable suggestion, which, had it been +generally observed, would have saved the world much distress, came +to nothing, owing to the refusal of Great Britain to accept it as +it stood without reservation. The United States Government thereupon +withdrew its proposal on October 24th, and announced that "It was +resolved in future to see that the rights and duties of the Government +and citizens of the United States should be settled in accordance +with the accepted principles of international law and the treaty +obligations of the United States, without reference to the provisions +of the Declaration of London." Moreover, the American Government +drew up protests and demands for compensation, for use in case +of any infringement of these rights, or of any interference with +their free exercise on the part of the belligerent Powers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On November 3rd, 1914, Great Britain declared the whole of the +North Sea a theatre of war, and thereupon instituted, in flagrant +violation of the Law of Nations, a blockade of the adjoining neutral +coasts and ports. General disappointment was felt in Germany that +the <a name="page_128"><span class="page">Page 128</span></a> United +States made no attempt to vindicate her rights in this matter, and +confined herself to demanding compensation in individual cases +of infringement. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Both in Germany and elsewhere it was clearly recognized that England's +design was to use this illegal blockade for the purpose of starving +out the German people. During a discussion between myself and Mr. +Lansing, later Secretary of State, on the matter of assistance +to be sent by America to Belgium, he expressed the opinion that +nothing would come of the scheme, as Lord Kitchener had adopted +the attitude that no food supplies could under any circumstances +be sent to territory in German occupation. I answered that I had +expected this refusal, as it was England's intention to starve +us out, to which Mr. Lansing replied: "Yes, the British frankly +admit as much." It will be remembered that, as a matter of fact, +Lord Kitchener withdrew his refusal in view of the pressure of +English public opinion, which demanded that relief should be sent +to Belgium on account of the distress prevalent there, and despite +the fact that such a measure was of indirect assistance to us. A +subsequent proposal from the American Government for the dispatch +of similar relief to Poland was declined in London. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +We Germans had hoped that the neutral States would vigorously claim +their right to freedom of mutual trade, and would take effective +measures, in conjunction with the leadership of the United States, +to force the British Government to suspend the oppressive and +extra-legal policy. This they failed to do, at any rate, in time to +forestall the fateful decision on our part to undertake submarine +warfare. It is now impossible to tell whether this policy might not +have had more favorable results, had not the growing estrangement +between Germany and America caused by the new campaign nipped in +the <a name="page_129"><span class="page">Page 129</span></a> bud +any possibility of serious Anglo-American differences. In the other +neutral countries this submarine warfare alienated all sympathy +for us, and no doubt was one reason why the neutral States, which +in previous wars had always attempted to vindicate their rights +as against the Power which had command of the sea, now refrained +from any concerted action to this end. Such a procedure on their +part would have indirectly influenced the situation in favor of +Germany, as the weaker Power at sea; it will be remembered that the +United States, during their War of Independence against England, drew +much advantage from a similar attitude on the part of the European +Powers. My knowledge of America leads me to believe that, had we +not incurred such odium by our infringement of Belgian neutrality +and our adoption of submarine warfare, the action of the Washington +Government might have been other than it was; had it even raised +a finger to protest against England's methods, the latter must +instantly have given way, as had so frequently happened during +the last twenty-five years, when the United States took up on any +point an attitude hostile to Britain. The contrast between this +passive attitude on the part or the President and the traditional +forward policy of America <i>vis-à-vis</i> England, goes far +to support the contention of Wilson's detractors in Germany—that +these two countries were in league and were playing a preconcerted +game. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is impossible to convince one's political foes on any point +except by positive proof, and until the time comes when the enemy's +archives are published, such proof cannot, of course, be adduced +on this particular matter. This time is still far distant. Why +should the enemy publish their archives? They have won and have +therefore no reason to grumble at the course of events. Thus <a +name="page_130"><span class="page">Page 130</span></a> I can at +present only combat with counter-arguments the contention that I +misunderstood the true state of affairs in America. The hypothesis +of secret collusion between America and England seems in the present +case unnecessary; the attitude of public opinion in America is +in itself sufficient explanation of the situation at the time. +Sympathy for us from the very first day of the war there was none; +but had the general feeling been as strongly for us as it actually +was against us, no doubt the Government would have kicked against +the English illegalities, and enforced an embargo against her. I +still hold to my view that Mr. Wilson made a real effort to maintain +the observance of a strict neutrality; but the decisive factor was +that he found himself, as a result of his efforts, in increasing +measure in conflict with the overwhelming Germanophobe sentiment +of the people, and continually exposed to the reproach put forward +in the Eastern States that he was a pro-German. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The American public, indifferent as it was to the affairs of Europe +and entirely ignorant of its complicated problems, failed to understand +the full extent of the peril to the very existence of the German +Empire, which compelled its rulers, much against their will and +with heavy hearts, to have recourse to the invasion of Belgium. +They themselves, living in perfect security and under pleasant +conditions, had no means of realizing the perilous position of +a comparatively small people, such as the Germans, surrounded by +greedy foes, and straitened within narrow frontiers; their judgment, +as already remarked, was swayed by their individual sentiments of +justice and humanity. The attitude of the Allied and Associated +Powers at Versailles might have enlightened the American people as +to the peril of dismemberment which threatened a defeated Germany; +but such realization, even supposing it to have taken place, <a +name="page_131"><span class="page">Page 131</span></a> has come +too late to affect the consequences of the war. I am convinced that +they will in a few years be forced to admit that Germany during +the course of her struggle was, contrary to the generally accepted +view of to-day, quite as much sinned against as sinning. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The German Government, then, decided upon the adoption of submarine +warfare, and issued a declaration to this effect. This document, +together with explanatory memorandum, was delivered by me on February +4th, 1915, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan; it was to the +effect that the territorial waters of Great Britain and Ireland, +including the whole of the English Channel, were declared a war area. +From February 18th onwards every enemy merchant ship encountered +in this area was liable to be sunk, without any guarantee that +time could be given for the escape of passengers and crew. Neutral +shipping in the war zone was likewise liable to the same dangers, +as owing to the misuse of neutral flags resulting from the British +Government's order of January 31st, and the chances of naval warfare, +the possibility of damage to other shipping as a result of attacks +on hostile vessels might sometimes be unavoidable. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I regarded it as my main duty, when handing this document to Mr. +Bryan, to recommend to the United States Government that they should +warn all American citizens of the danger to the crews, passengers and +cargoes of hostile merchant ships moving within the war area from +this time onwards. Further, I felt it necessary to draw attention to +the advisability of an urgent recommendation that American shipping +should keep clear of the danger zone, notwithstanding the express +statement in the memorandum that the German naval forces had orders +to avoid any interference with neutral vessels clearly recognizable +as such. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_132"><span class="page">Page 132</span></a> Mr. Secretary +Bryan was at first incredulous; he believed a submarine campaign +of this nature to be unthinkable, and my statements to be merely +bluff. The American Government therefore resolved to take no measures +of precaution, but to dispatch a Note to Berlin on February 12th, +summarizing the two conflicting points of view, which remained +irreconcilable throughout the whole controversy, on the subject of +the submarine war. Germany, on the one hand, defended her course +of action as a reprisal justified by the British blockade, which +both parties to the discussion agreed to be contrary to the Law of +Nations. The United States, for her part, maintained that as long +as the blockade of Great Britain was not made effective, neutral +shipping had the right to go where it wished unharmed, and that the +German submarines were empowered only to hold up merchant ships +for search purposes, unless these same ships offered resistance +or endeavored to escape. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The chief germ of dissension lay in the fact that the British blockade, +which was defended by its authors as being merely an extension +of the rights of sea warfare to square with the progress of the +modern military machine, was met on America's part only by paper +protests, while our own extension of the same rights by means of +submarine warfare was treated as a <i>casus belli</i>. At a later +period of the war the Imperial Government made certain proposals to +the United States, who might, by accepting them, have safeguarded +all their commercial and shipping interests, not to mention the lives +of their citizens, to the fullest possible extent, and yet have +allowed us a free field for our submarine warfare. These proposals +the United States rejected; thus she set herself to combat with all +her strength any continuance of the blockade restrictions through +our submarines, while conniving at the similar restrictions exercised +by England, although <a name="page_133"><span class="page">Page +133</span></a> these latter infringed far more seriously the rights +of neutral Powers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following extract from the American Note of February 12th clearly +presaged the conflict to come: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"This Government has carefully noted the explanatory statement +issued by the Imperial German Government at the same time with +the proclamation of the German Admiralty, and takes this occasion +to remind the Imperial German Government very respectfully that the +Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms +for unneutral action to which the German Government believe the +governments of certain other neutral nations have laid themselves +open; that the Government of the United States has not consented or +acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken by the other +belligerent nations in the present war which operate to restrain +neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all such matters a +position which warrants it in holding those governments responsible +in the proper way for any untoward effects upon American shipping +which the accepted principles of international law do not justify; +and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance +to take with a clear conscience and upon accepted principles the +position indicated in this Note. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the +presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used +in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American or the +lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government +of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an +indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very +hard indeed to reconcile with the <a name="page_134"><span +class="page">Page 134</span></a> friendly relations now so happily +subsisting between the two Governments. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German +Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United +States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government +to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, +and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard +the American lives and property and to secure to American citizens +the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The Imperial Government reaffirmed its standpoint in a further +Note, dated February 16th, the gist and conclusion of which was +as under: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"If the American Government, by reason of that weight which it is +able and entitled to cast into the balance which decides the fate +of peoples, should succeed even now in removing those causes which +make the present action of the German Government an imperious duty; +if the American Government, in short, should succeed in inducing the +Powers at war with Germany to abide by the terms of the Declaration of +London, and to permit the free importation into Germany of foodstuffs +and raw material, the Imperial Government would recognize in such +action a service of inestimable value, tending to introduce a spirit +of greater humanity into the conduct of the war, and would willingly +draw its own conclusions from the resulting new situation." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This Note was effective, in that it induced the American Government +to dispatch on February 22nd an identical Note to Great Britain +and Germany, with the object of arriving at a <i>modus vivendi</i> +in the matter. Their proposal was as follows: Submarines were not +to be <a name="page_135"><span class="page">Page 135</span></a> +employed in any attack on merchant ships of whatever nationality, +save in execution of the rights of detention or search; merchant +ships, for their part, were not to make use of neutral flags, whether +as a <i>ruse de guerre</i> or to avoid identification. Great Britain +would give free passage to provisions and food supplies consigned +to certain agents in Germany, to be named by the United States. +These agents would receive all goods thus imported and dispatch +them to specially licensed distributing firms, who were to be +responsible that they were issued exclusively to the civilian +population. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The above project was concurred in by the German Government in a +Note of February 28th, which added that "The Imperial Government +considered it right that other raw materials, essential to manufacture +for peaceful purposes, and also fodder, should also be imported +without interference." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The British Government, as was to be expected, rejected the American +proposal on somewhat flimsy pretexts, for England's sea supremacy +was at stake in this as in her previous wars. "Britannia rules the +waves" was, and ever must be, the guiding principle of all her +policy, while her world-Empire endures. On this vitally important +question England could not be expected ever to yield an inch of +her own free will. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus the American attempt at mediation died a natural death. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Our adoption of submarine warfare was to be regarded, according to +our Note of February 16th, as a measure of reprisal in answer to +the English blockade. From a tactical point of view, this contention +was unfortunate, as it afforded America the opportunity of agreeing +at once, and thus of conceding us a point which benefited us not +at all, but merely gave the United States all the more right to +renew its protests against the submarine <a name="page_136"><span +class="page">Page 136</span></a> war. It would have been wiser +for us to have initiated the submarine campaign simply as a new +weapon of war without reference to the English blockade; still +better, to put it into operation without declaring a blockade of +Great Britain and Ireland, which could never be really effective, +and caused constant friction between ourselves and America. Our +declaration that the territorial waters of Great Britain were to +be regarded as a war area was a legal formality modelled on the +earlier English proclamation of the barred zones, and at once +antagonized public opinion in the United States. By adopting the +point of view we did with regard to reprisals, we laid ourselves +open to the charge of illegality, and added to the ill-feeling +already excited by the submarine campaign. If the contention of +certain naval authorities that the observance of the Declaration of +London by our enemies would have brought us no important material +advantage is correct, the issue of our Note of February 16th becomes +even less comprehensible. Having admitted in this Note that the +declaration of the barred zones was caused by the fact that all +was not well with us, we could hardly expect England would fall +in with the proposal made at our suggestion by Mr. Wilson, and +thus allow us so easy a diplomatic triumph. The President, however, +after his rebuff from England, was bound, in order to maintain +his prestige, to bring all possible pressure to bear on us, in +the hope of compensating by diplomatic success in Berlin for his +failure in London. My subsequent attitude was laid down, but at +the same time made more difficult, by this interchange of Notes; +but, generally speaking, my personal action in the matter began with +the <i>Lusitania</i> incident; previous to this the negotiations +had been entirely in the hands of Berlin. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Washington Government then for the present assumed <a +name="page_137"><span class="page">Page 137</span></a> a waiting +attitude, until such time as loss of American lives through our +submarine activities should compel its intervention. With regard +to damage to property, the standpoint was consistently maintained +that claims for compensation for financial loss must be fully met. +Every day might see a serious conflict, and this possibility was a +source of constant anxiety to us Germans in the United States. The +American Government, we thought, still underestimated the dangers +of the situation, and failed to take any measures of precaution. +In the middle of April I held a meeting in New York, with the +representatives of the other German administrative departments, and +in view of the great responsibility incumbent on us, we resolved +on the motion of Dr. Dernburg to issue a warning to the Press in +the form usually adopted for shipping notices. As a rule, these +shipping notices were published by the Consulate as a matter of +routine. Dr. Dernburg having, however, been unable to come to an +agreement with the New York Consulate on the matter, I took upon +myself to issue the advertisement as from the German Ambassador. +It ran as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"Travellers intending to embark for an Atlantic voyage are reminded +that a state of war exists between Germany and her Allies and Great +Britain and her Allies; that the zone of war includes the waters +adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with the formal +notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the +flag of Great Britain or any of her Allies are liable to destruction +in those waters; and that travellers sailing in the war zone in +ships of Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +"<span class="sc">Imperial German Embassy</span>, Washington. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<i>April 22nd</i>, 1915." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_138"><span class="page">Page 138</span></a> This +notice was intended to appear in the Press on April 24th and the +two following Saturdays. By one of those fatal coincidences beloved +of history, it happened that owing to technical difficulties the +<i>communiqué</i> was not actually published until May +1st—the very date on which the <i>Lusitania</i> left New York +harbor. This conjunction was bound to appear intentional rather +than fortuitous, and even to-day the majority of Americans believe +that I must have known beforehand of the design to torpedo the +<i>Lusitania</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As the true facts of the matter are not yet clear, and were never +explained officially, I have no means of saying whether the destruction +of the <i>Lusitania</i> was the result of a deliberate purpose +on the part of our naval authorities. To the best of my belief +technical factors render it impossible for a submarine commander +to make any one particular ship the object of his attack, so that +the officer responsible for the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i> +could not have been certain what vessel he had to deal with. In +any case, whether the action of our naval authorities was planned +out beforehand or not, we in America had no knowledge of any such +plan; indeed, until it actually occurred, I believed the destruction +of the <i>Lusitania</i> to be unthinkable, not merely for humanitarian +reasons, but because it was obviously sound policy to refrain as far +as possible from any attack on passenger ships. I did not at the +time realize how difficult it was for our naval forces to insure +the safety of such vessels without impairing the efficiency of the +submarine blockade. Again, I did not believe it possible to torpedo +a rapidly-moving ship like the <i>Lusitania</i> if she were going +at full speed; and, finally, I supposed that a modern liner, if +actually struck, would remain afloat long enough to allow of the +rescue of her passengers. The captain of the <i>Lusitania</i> himself +seems to have been quite <a name="page_139"><span class="page">Page +139</span></a> at ease in his mind on the matter; at all events, +he took no precautionary measures to avoid the danger threatening +him, or to insure the safety of the people on board in case of +need. The rapidity with which the ship went down and the resulting +heavy death-roll can only be attributed to the explosion of the +masses of ammunition which formed part of the cargo. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Let me once more lay stress on the fact that our notice to the +Press had no particular reference to the <i>Lusitania</i>, but +was simply a general warning, the publication of which was motived +simply by humanity and wise policy, and was rendered necessary +by the apathetic behavior of the Washington authorities in the +matter. We rightly imagined that many Americans had not taken the +trouble to read the Notes officially exchanged, and would thus +rush blindly into danger. Our failure to achieve any result by +our efforts may be appreciated from an extract from the London +<i>Daily Telegraph</i> of May 3rd, which is before me as I write. +The New York correspondent of this paper dealt with our warning +in the following headlines: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">German Threat to Atlantic Liners.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Berlin's Latest Bluff.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Ridiculed in America.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On May 7th I travelled to New York in the afternoon—a fact +in itself sufficient to prove that I was not expecting the disaster +to the <i>Lusitania</i>. It chanced that Paul Warburg and another +American banker were on the same train. I bought an evening paper +at Philadelphia, and there read the first news about the sinking +of the great liner; I read them to my two travelling companions, +both of whom disbelieved the story at the time; but Jacob Schiff +met us in New York with the news that <a name="page_140"><span +class="page">Page 140</span></a> it was all too true, and that +in the first moment of excitement he had hurried to the station +to inform his brother-in-law, Warburg, of what had happened. I +had come to New York with the intention of being present at a +performance of <i>The Bat</i>, given by a German company for the +benefit of the German Red Cross; but when I learned on my arrival +at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel that over one hundred Americans, including +many women and children, had lost their lives in the sinking of +the <i>Lusitania</i>, I at once gave up all idea of attending the +performance. As the hotel was soon surrounded on all sides by newspaper +reporters, I remained indoors until my departure on the morrow; +I should have returned to Washington at once, but for having to +interview certain German gentlemen in New York. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Unfortunately it so happened that Dr. Dernburg was then away at +Cleveland, addressing a meeting; he took the opportunity of defending +the destruction of the <i>Lusitania</i> on the ground that she was +carrying munitions of war. This speech aroused a storm of execration +throughout the country, which was already indignant enough over the +fatal event itself. Even to-day no German seems to realize the full +violence of the passion thus aroused; we, accustomed as we have been +to daily reports of battles and casualties, were little impressed +by the destruction of a solitary passenger ship. America, however, +execrated us whole-heartedly as murderers of women and children, +oblivious of the fact that the victims of the submarine campaign +were far less numerous than the women and children killed by the +English blockade, and that death by drowning is no more dreadful +than slow starvation. Everyone naturally realizes his own misfortunes +more vividly than those of others, and the <i>Lusitania</i> incident +first brought home to the United States the horrors of war, and +convinced all her people <a name="page_141"><span class="page">Page +141</span></a> that a flagrant injury had been done them. On my +departure from New York I found myself at once face to face with +this immense popular excitement. I left my hotel by a side door, but +did not manage to escape notice; several cars filled with reporters +followed me to the station, and pressed round me so persistently +that I was unable to shake them off. I could only refuse to make +any statement, which only increased the excitement of the reporters; +but had I said anything at that time, I should but have added fuel +to the fire which was already raging in the minds of all. Finally +I succeeded in forcing my way through the infuriated and howling +mob of pressmen and reaching the train. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For the first few days after my return to Washington I remained in +seclusion, so as to avoid any possibility of unpleasant incidents. +Those Germans who live in the congenial surroundings of their homes +can have little conception of the hostility with which we in America +had to contend. We had many true friends, who right up to the final +breach between the two countries never deserted us. To them I shall +ever feel myself indebted, more particularly in view of their harsh +treatment at the hands of their fellow-countrymen and enemy +diplomatists, as a result of their staunchness. The pro-Entente +elements of the country proposed not only to boycott us socially, +but also to terrorize all pro-German Americans. In this connection +it is of interest to note that a certain neutral representative was +accused by his Government of having taken our part; he was led to +believe that this charge had originated in the Russian Embassy, and +taxed M. Bakmetieff with the fact. The latter had no better proof +of it to adduce than the report that the Dutch Ambassador—for +he it was who had been thus attacked—occasionally had breakfast +with me at my club, and always stayed at the German headquarters, +the Ritz-Carlton <a name="page_142"><span class="page">Page +142</span></a> Hotel, whenever he came to New York. The above example +is typical of the attitude usually adopted towards us; despite it +all, throughout the war I never wanted for true and loyal friends +in America, even though, particularly after the <i>Lusitania</i> +incident, one or other shrank from braving the resulting public +odium. Such halfhearted champions we could easily dispense with; +the situation at the moment was so strained that we had no use for +any save trustworthy and reliable men on our side. I may take this +opportunity to place it on record that my relations with all the +State Departments remained to the last of the friendliest; I should +be doing them an injustice, did I not expressly affirm this. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +President Wilson must certainly have under-estimated the spirit +of angry hostility towards Germany which then held sway over his +people's minds, otherwise he would probably not have gone directly +counter to it, as he did in a speech which has now become famous. +On May 10th at Philadelphia he gave evidence of his peaceful +inclinations in the following words: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The example of America must be a special example. The example of +America must be the example not merely of peace because it will +not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating +influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as +a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation +being so right that it does not need to convince others by force +that it is right." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This speech did but increase the indignation raging throughout the +country, and the phrase "Too proud to fight" became the favorite +joke of the Jingo and Entente party against Mr. Wilson. Public +opinion with one voice demanded the severance of diplomatic relations +with <a name="page_143"><span class="page">Page 143</span></a> +Germany; and before this powerful pressure the President deemed +it advisable to explain away his words. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It may be said, perhaps, in answer to the above, that America was +indeed bitterly angry, but still not resolved on war; and that +public opinion was indignant, not at Wilson's desire to keep the +peace, but at the unfortunate expression "Too proud to fight." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This view was held, for example, by von Tirpitz, and also found +expression more than once in the reports of the so-called German +Chamber of Commerce in New York, which were regularly transmitted +to Germany, and exercised considerable influence on opinion in that +country, although their author was a man of no political insight, +and the Chamber of Commerce had, as a matter of fact, no actual +existence. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +They were simply a journalistic device on the part of the paper which +published these reports. During the war, and under the influence of +the passions which it aroused, there was continually going on in +America any amount of mischievous gossip and intrigue concerning +which many interesting stories might be told. I have no intention, +however, of concerning myself with these unworthy matters now, any +more than I allowed them at the time to color my official reports +to the home Government; I can only say that if the reports of the +Chamber of Commerce had any sort of influence on German opinion, +it was much to be regretted. The opinion, therein expressed, that +the United States would never, under any circumstances, embark on +hostilities against us was unfortunately belied by later events, +and the idea that America was at that time compelled to keep the +peace by defects in her military equipment, had no foundation in +fact. Admittedly, she was in the year 1917 insufficiently equipped +for war, and the question of making <a name="page_144"><span +class="page">Page 144</span></a> good her deficiencies had not +got beyond the stage of discussion. I should, of course, have been +only too pleased if my repeated warnings as to the danger of war +with America had proved to be unfounded; in point of fact, after +the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, America was, for a period of three +weeks, on the verge of breaking off diplomatic relations, and panic +reigned on the Stock Exchanges throughout the country. The fact +that Congress was not sitting at the time prevented a flood of +speeches which would only have increased the tension. It will be +remembered that by the American Constitution the annual sessions +of Congress are short and long alternately; the short session had +come to an end on March 4, 1915, and the President had refrained +from summoning Congress again, as he wished to avoid discussion +on the question of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The irresistible strength of the popular indignation may be accurately +estimated from the fact that even the German-Americans were +terror-stricken by its violence. Not only did our propaganda collapse +completely, but even our political friends dared not open their +mouths, and only ventured to assert themselves once more after +the settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> case. Germanism in America +may be said to have been absolutely killed by the <i>Lusitania</i> +incident, and only gradually came to life again. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The first expressions of opinion which I received from the President +and Mr. Bryan gave me good grounds for hope that these gentlemen +would do everything in their power to preserve peace. I append +the two telegrams which I sent to the Foreign Office: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +(1). "Washington, May 9th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"<i>Lusitania</i> incident has caused great excitement, especially +in New York, which is most affected, but I hope that no serious +consequences will ensue. Mr. Wilson <a name="page_145"><span +class="page">Page 145</span></a> regards matters calmly. I recommend +expression of regret for loss of so many American lives, in whatever +form may be possible without admission of our responsibility." +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +(2). "Washington, May 10th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Bryan spoke to me very seriously concerning <i>Lusitania</i> incident. +His influence will, in any case be exercised in favor of peace. This +influence is great, as Wilson depends on Bryan for his re-election. +Roosevelt, on the other hand, is beating the patriotic drum, in +order to win over the Jingo elements. It is significant of Bryan's +real views that he regrets that we did not support his well-known +attempt at mediation; therefore, I again recommend that we should +endeavor to bring about an attempt at mediation in some form, in +case the position here becomes critical. This would be a good +<i>argumentum ad hominem</i> in order to avoid war. Another way +out, which is recommended, is that we should renew our offer to give +up submarine warfare provided that England adheres to the principles +of International Law, and gives up her policy of starvation. The +position is in any case <i>very serious</i>; I hope and believe +that we shall find a way out of the present crisis, but in case +of any such recurrence, no solution can be guaranteed." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +American indignation was directed particularly against Dr. Dernburg, +who had defended, in public, the torpedoing of the <i>Lusitania</i>. +I had, therefore, no other resource but to advise him to leave the +country of his own accord. He would probably have been deported +in any case, and his continued presence in America could no longer +serve any useful purpose, while it was to be hoped that his voluntary +departure would appease the popular wrath in some degree, and postpone +the imminent rupture of diplomatic relations. The sea was raging <a +name="page_146"><span class="page">Page 146</span></a> and demanded +a sacrifice. I sent the following report to Berlin on the subject +of Dr. Dernburg's resolve to leave the country: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +"Washington, May 17th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As I have already wired to your Excellency, Dr. Dernburg has decided +to leave the country of his own free will. I believe that, in so +doing, he is rendering a great service to the Fatherland, a service +rendered easier by the fact that he could no longer hope to continue +in the exercise of his former duties. As I have already reported, +he had exposed himself to attack by our enemies by his action in +going counter to the present outbreak of hysterical feeling in a +speech and an interview which were, unfortunately, not in accordance +with your Excellency's instructions, received by me on the following +day. So long as Dernburg only wrote articles for the papers, he +rendered distinguished and highly appreciated service, but when he +commenced to deliver speeches at German-American meetings he trod +on very dangerous ground. On this point we are all in agreement +here. In any case, in war every possible method must be tried, and +if any individual is sacrificed it must be regarded as unfortunately +unavoidable. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"When I informed Mr. Bryan that Dr. Dernburg had decided to return +home if the American Government would secure him a safe conduct +from our enemies, the satisfaction of the Secretary of State was +even more pronounced than I had expected. He remarked that Dr. +Dernburg's speeches had given rise to the suspicion that the German +Government wished to inflame the minds of the American people against +President Wilson's administration. It might be possible, now that +there were no longer any grounds for this idea, to avoid an immediate +rupture of diplomatic relations." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_147"><span class="page">Page 147</span></a> On May +13th the American Government dispatched a strongly worded Note to +Berlin, which restated their point of view, as previously given. +I reproduce textually the following passage from the Note, which, +from the point of view of subsequent events, is of fundamental +importance. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call +the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost +earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method +of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical +impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce +without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and +humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is +practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a +merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically +impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they cannot +put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without +leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea +in her small boats.... Manifestly submarines cannot be used against +merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable +violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking +their ships and in travelling wherever their legitimate business +calls them on the high seas, and exercise those rights in what +should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be +endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged +international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that +their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their +rights. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_148"><span class="page">Page 148</span></a> "There +was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I +regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, +purporting to come from the Imperial Germany Embassy at Washington, +addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, +that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of +free travel upon the seas, would do so at his peril if his journey +should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial +German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great +Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful, but very earnest +protests of his Government, the Government of the United States. +I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention +of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising +irregularity of a communication from the Imperial Germany Embassy +at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through +the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no +warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can +possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or +as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission. +</p> + +<hr class="line"> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Government of the United States cannot believe that the commanders +of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so +except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial +German naval authorities.... It confidently expects, therefore, +that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which +the Government of the United States complains, that they will make +reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are +without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent +the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles +of warfare for which the Imperial German <a name="page_149"><span +class="page">Page 149</span></a> Government have in the past so +wisely and firmly contended. +</p> + +<hr class="line"> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government +of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the +performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the +United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise +and enjoyment." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The demands contained in the above Note would have made the continuance +of the submarine campaign impossible, and this was, no doubt, the +intention of the Union Government. The German answer of May 28th, +which defended the torpedoing of the <i>Lusitania</i> on the grounds +that she should be considered as an auxiliary cruiser and provided with +guns, changed the situation in no way. Besides, the <i>Lusitania</i> +had ammunition and Canadian troops on board; there can be no doubt +that the main reason why she sank so rapidly was the exploding +of her cargo of ammunition by the torpedo which struck her. With +regard to the loss of human life, the German Government had already +expressed, to the neutral Powers concerned, its deep regret for the +death of their subjects—I had in person conveyed these regrets +to the United States Government a few days after the destruction +of the <i>Lusitania</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After this first exchange of Notes, the gulf between the two points +of view appeared fixed, and was bound in face of the prevalent +excitement to lead to a severance of diplomatic relations, unless +sufficient time were gained to allow the storms of passion to abate. +Telegraphic communication between the German Government and the +Embassy at Washington was carried out by a circuitous route, which +made it extremely slow; thus I was compelled <a name="page_150"><span +class="page">Page 150</span></a> to decide on my own responsibility +and take immediate action. I fully realized that the rupture of +diplomatic relations would mean war. In America we were face to +face with a vigorous hostile propaganda, which had as its sole +object to draw the United States into war, and thus bring about a +decision by force of arms. From the time of the <i>Lusitania</i> +incident onwards, the diplomatic struggle between ourselves and +the Entente was centred entirely around the question of the future +action of the United States. The threatened rupture of relations +between that country and Germany would have left the field open +for hostile propaganda, by taking from us all chance of combating +it. War would thus have been inevitable sooner or later. The first +and most urgent necessity was, therefore, the avoidance of such a +rupture at whatever cost, and my efforts were now solely directed +to this end. As things turned out, it might, perhaps, have been +better if the United States had actually gone to war at this moment. +Her military pressure, and our consequent defeat, would have come +two years earlier, before the German people had been demoralized +and exhausted by four years of war and blockade. But at that time I +had good hopes of being able to bring about peace through American +mediation, and consequently wished to gain time at all costs. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I resolved, without waiting for instructions from Berlin, to make +use of my privileged position as Ambassador to demand an audience +with the President. I heard later, among other things when I was at +Manila, that on this very day, June 2nd, all preparations had been +made for breaking off relations, and for the inevitable resulting +war. As a result of my interview, however, they were cancelled. I +had a long conversation with the President and two of his advisers. +Mr. Wilson felt the position acutely, and was animated solely by +a desire to preserve <a name="page_151"><span class="page">Page +151</span></a> peace. We both realized that it was a question of +gaining time, and succeeded in coming to an agreement on the measures +to be taken to mitigate the crisis. We took the view that the isolation +of Germany had given rise to an atmosphere of misunderstanding +between her and the United States, and that the establishment of +some sort of personal relationship might be expected to ease this +tension; I, therefore, proposed, and the President agreed, that +Meyer Gerhardt, a member of the Privy Council, who had accompanied +Dr. Dernburg to America, and was then acting on behalf of the German +Red Cross, should at once go to Germany and report in person to +the Government. Mr. Wilson, for his part, undertook that no final +decision should be taken until Meyer Gerhardt had reported the +results of his mission. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the end of this interview I was convinced in my own mind that +the President would never enter on war with Germany, otherwise I +could not conceive why he should have concurred in my proposals +instead of breaking off relations at once. He would, had he chosen +the latter course, have had American public opinion more decidedly +behind him than it was later, at the time of the final breach. Not +a voice would have been raised in opposition, except that of the +Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, who, as it was, resigned his office +on the ground that the exchange of Notes threatened to involve the +United States in war, and could not be reconciled, therefore, with +his own pacific intentions. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is certain that if I had not at this stage of the <i>Lusitania</i> +crisis had my interview with the President, relations would have +been broken off and war between the United States and Germany must +inevitably have followed. The view is still held in many quarters +that we might safely have disregarded American susceptibilities, +as President Wilson was entirely averse to war and would <a +name="page_152"><span class="page">Page 152</span></a> have avoided +it by whatever means; then we should have been free to carry on +our submarine campaign. This was not the opinion held by myself +or any of my colleagues at the Embassy, and later events proved +us to have been in the right, as against those Germans and +German-Americans, who, in May, 1915, and afterwards, averred that +the United States would never declare war on us, and maintained +the same view in January and February, 1917. The principles of +my later policy were based on the events of this <i>Lusitania</i> +crisis; I had then gathered the conviction that Mr. Wilson wanted +peace but the country wanted war; that the President alone had +prevented an immediate rupture, but that as the responsible leader +of the American people, he would be compelled to bow eventually to +public opinion. When Mr. Wilson had to explain away his unlucky +speech at Philadelphia, no action was taken from the German side, +and no information given him which might lead him to understand +that Germany desired to avoid a <i>casus belli</i> at all costs, +for fear of giving Mr. Wilson an opportunity to gain a cheap triumph +over Germany in a verbal wrangle. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I believe it unjust to Mr. Wilson to suppose that he wished to +bluff us into surrender at this time. He had, while fully realizing +the danger of war, sought all ways and means to avoid it, and on +this hypothesis my whole policy was founded. Moreover the President +had then mentioned to me for the first time that he was considering +an attempt at mediation between the belligerents. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After my audience at the White House I sent the following wire to +the Foreign Office: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, June 2nd, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Seriousness of the present situation here induced me to seek interview +with President Wilson. In most cordial <a name="page_153"><span +class="page">Page 153</span></a> exchange of views, in course of +which we repeatedly emphasized our mutual desire to find some solution +of the present difficulties, Wilson always came back to point that +he was concerned purely with humanitarian aspect of matter, and +that question of indemnification for loss of American lives in +<i>Lusitania</i> was only of secondary importance. His main object +was complete cessation of submarine warfare, and from point of +view of this ultimate aim, smaller concessions on our part could +only be regarded as half measures. It behooved us by giving up +submarine campaign to appeal to moral sense of world; for issue of +the war could never be finally decided by armies but only by peace +of understanding. Our voluntary cessation of submarine warfare would +inspire Wilson to press for a raising of English hunger blockade. +<i>Reliable reports from London state that present Cabinet would +agree to this.</i> Wilson hopes that this might be first stage +in a peace movement on large scale, which he would introduce as +head of leading neutral Powers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"American reply may be expected to lay little stress on purely +legal aspect of matter and to dwell rather on question of humanity, +emphatically enough, but as Wilson told me, in a sharper form. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"President remarked that on one point at least we should be in +agreement, as both Germany and United States of America had always +been in favor of freedom of seas. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Cordiality of conversation must not blind our eyes to seriousness +of situation. If our next Note does not tend to tranquilize matters, +Wilson is bound to recall his Ambassador. I recommend most earnestly +that this should be avoided at all costs, in view of its disastrous +moral effect and fact that this result would be immediate increase in +export of munitions, and in financial support <a name="page_154"><span +class="page">Page 154</span></a> for our enemies on immense scale. +Good prospect exists of success of present movement for forbidding +export of arms should understanding be reached; and also movement +by Wilson in direction of peace is sure to follow. Decisive factor +in result is that our reply should strike correct note from point +of view of public opinion, which is decisive factor in balance +here. For this essential to leave out legal details and to lift +discussion to level of humanitarian standpoint. Meyer Gerhardt +leaves tomorrow for Germany as Red Cross representative; he will +report fully in Berlin on situation. Beg that our reply be held +up till his arrival. Wilson concurs in this." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Meyer Gerhardt was in a position to give for the first time a full and +accurate review of the American situation to the Berlin authorities. +I had given him most precise information of my own views and had +placed him in full possession of the details of my interview with +Mr. Wilson. For the rest I had to content myself with short telegrams +by circuitous routes. During our conversation, however, the President +offered for the first time to permit me to dispatch a cipher telegram +through the State Department, to be sent on by the American Embassy +in Berlin. My reports as a matter of fact were somewhat infrequent +and always short, as we had to put all our messages into cipher, +and this was not always possible. In explanation of the inevitable +incompleteness of my communication with the Foreign Office, I may +remark that the telegrams of the Wolff and Trans-Ocean Bureaus +were regarded as the main sources of information for either side, +and that I made use of various arrangements of words, to which +the Foreign Office alone had the key, for the purpose of making +my own views easily distinguishable in these telegrams. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_155"><span class="page">Page 155</span></a> Meyer +Gerhardt, armed with a certificate from Mr. Bryan, to the effect +that he was undertaking his journey at the express desire of the +American Government, crossed over to Germany with all possible +speed. It may be doubted if the English authorities would have +taken any notice of this safe conduct, but by good fortune the +Norwegian vessel which took him over escaped the attention of their +cruisers. His mission was so far successful that the excitement +in the United States had time to die down somewhat and the first +crisis in German-American relations was thereby tided over +satisfactorily. Apart from that, Meyer Gerhardt's mission had no +effect on the future course of negotiations. The exchange of Notes +between Washington and Berlin continued without an understanding +being arrived at; both Governments persisting in their original +points of view. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The second American Note, dispatched on June 10th, led to the +resignation of Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State. He considered that +American citizens should be forbidden to take passage in vessels +bearing the flag of any belligerent nation, and holding these views as +he did, declined to make himself responsible for a further exchange +of Notes which he believed was bound in the end to result in war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The resignation of the Secretary of State had another diplomatic +prelude of a tragi-comic character. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, +Dr. Dumba, besought Mr. Bryan to discuss the German-American conflict +with him; both gentlemen wished to find some solution to the dispute +and hoped that the Ambassadors not directly concerned in it might +profitably try to mediate. It was said later and probably with +truth, that there was a mutual misunderstanding on this subject; +but whatever be the truth of that, Dr. Dumba took upon himself to +<a name="page_156"><span class="page">Page 156</span></a> send a +radiogram to Vienna, by way of Nauen, in which he gave the following +résumé of Mr. Bryan's views: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The United States desire no war. Her Notes, however strongly worded, +meant no harm, but had to be written in order to pacify the excited +public opinion of America. The Berlin Government therefore need +not feel itself injured, but need only make suitable concessions +if it desires to put an end to the dispute." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This telegram from Dr. Dumba had just reached the German Foreign +Office at the moment when the American Ambassador arrived to inform +the Under Secretary of State, Zimmermann, in his customary blunt +and abrupt manner, that Germany must yield to America's demands or +war would inevitably follow. Zimmermann thereupon, with the object +of causing Mr. Gerard to moderate his tone, showed him Dumba's wire, +which pointed to the inference that the attitude of the American +Ambassador was merely a bluff. Mr. Gerard, as in duty bound, reported +the facts to Washington; mutual recriminations ensued and the Press +got hold of the story (nothing ever remained a secret for long +in the American capital). The general impression there was that +Germany, once she were convinced of America's serious intentions +to appeal if necessary to arms, would back down; and that now Mr. +Bryan was made to appear as a wrecker of the President's policy. His +resignation thus became more necessary than ever, and Mr. Lansing, +hitherto head of the State Department of Justice, replaced him. +American opinion, however, laid the chief blame for what had occurred +on Dr. Dumba, who was henceforward regarded as a dangerous intriguer. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mr. Lansing was a lawyer, not a politician, and looked at everything +from the point of view of a lawyer and his <a name="page_157"><span +class="page">Page 157</span></a> position as the President's sole +legal adviser. He was, so to speak, Mr. Wilson's legal conscience. +My personal relations with him were always extremely cordial. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mr. Bryan's point of view was in every sense that of a neutral. +The only really effective way of safeguarding American interests +was, of course, to forbid the use of hostile passenger ships by +citizens of the United States, who could perfectly well travel on +their own vessels, or those of Holland or Scandinavia. However, +the greater part of American public opinion did not accept this +strict view of neutrality, and Mr. Wilson, therefore, adapted himself +to the predominant opinion. It was useless for us to demand that +the President should interpret his neutrality in the manner most +convenient to us; we had to accept the fact that his ideas on this +subject were neither ours nor Mr. Bryan's, and, on this basis, +endeavor to come to an understanding with Mr. Wilson, if we did +not intend to bring the United States into the war. It must be +remembered that, as I have already said, we had no means of bringing +pressure to bear on America, whereas from her point of view war +with Germany would be a comparatively simple affair, which would +involve no vital risks for her, but would, on the contrary, greatly +benefit her from an industrial point of view, besides gratifying +the jingoes, by giving them an opportunity of making full use of +their long-desired Army, Navy and commercial fleet. There could +be considered, as factors tending to the preservation of peace, +only the pacific sentiment of the majority of the people working +in alliance with the dilatory policy of the President, who still +nourished a hope that some favorable turn or other in events, or +perhaps the advent of peace, would give him a chance to avoid breaking +of relations with Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The diplomatic incident, mentioned above, made such <a +name="page_158"><span class="page">Page 158</span></a> an impression +on Mr. Gerard, as to induce him to make, on his own initiative +in Berlin, at the time when the American Note of 10th June had +to be answered, a proposal which met with a by no means cordial +reception. His suggestion was that a certain number of passenger +ships, detailed beforehand for the purpose, and rendered clearly +recognizable, should be used for the transport of Americans to +England; but though this scheme was embodied in the German Note +of 8th July, it was at once rejected at Washington. Any assent +to it would no doubt have involved a further departure from the +principles laid down by the American Government—principles +which it desired should be generally accepted, but which had already +been in some measure compromised. The vessels which it was suggested +should be employed in this service were to be marked in red, white +and blue stripes, and as barbers' shops in the United States are +decorated in this manner, they were called "Barber Ships." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the 21st of July, the final American Note on the <i>Lusitania</i> +case was dispatched. The Washington Government modified their position +to the extent that they recognized the legality of submarine warfare, +provided that before the sinking of any merchant ship, the crew and +passengers were given a chance to leave in safety; in the main, +however, the Note maintained the original American point of view. +It read as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring +the lives of neutrals as well as their property, humanity as well +as justice and due regard for the dignity of neutral Powers should +dictate that the practice be discontinued. If persisted in it would +in such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offence against +the Sovereignty of the neutral nation affected ... the Government +of the United States cannot believe <a name="page_159"><span +class="page">Page 159</span></a> that the Imperial Government will +longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander +in sinking the <i>Lusitania</i> or offering reparation for the +American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for the needless +destruction of human life by that illegal act. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In the meanwhile the very value which this Government sets upon +the long, unbroken friendship between the people and Government +of the United States and the people and Government of the German +nation, impels it to press most solemnly upon the Imperial German +Government the necessity for the scrupulous observance of neutral +rights. This is a critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to +say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders +of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights +must be regarded by the Government of the United States when they +affect American citizens as deliberately unfriendly." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The first act of the German-American negotiations on the subject +of submarine warfare thus closed with this open threat that war +would follow any further action by Germany on the lines of the +torpedoing of the <i>Lusitania</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I think it well to reproduce here four of my reports, dated from +Cedarhurst, a suburb of New York, where the Embassy usually had +its headquarters during the hot summer months. +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(1) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, June 9th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The political outlook in America appears at present as calm as a +summer's day. The position abroad is perhaps reacting on internal +affairs to some extent, as Mr. Wilson, as is usual in this country, +considers foreign <a name="page_160"><span class="page">Page +160</span></a> affairs primarily from the point of view of their +influence on the prospects of next year's presidential campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The tide of anti-German feeling aroused by the <i>Lusitania</i> +incident is still running pretty high, but it may now be regarded +as certain, that neither the President nor the American people +want a war with Germany. Mr. Wilson, then, will, I believe, have +public opinion on his side, if he can find an honorable solution to +his differences with us, and make use of this solution as the basis +for a peace movement on a large scale. I am now even more convinced +than I was a short time ago, at the time of my long interview with +him, that the President's ideas are developing in this direction, +and that this is the cause of his suddenly taking up the Mexican +question again, as he hopes to find in it a means of diverting +public opinion. I am unwilling to give any grounds for exaggerated +optimism, but my recent observations incline me to the belief that +the President and his Cabinet are more neutral than is commonly +supposed. England's influence here is tremendous, permeating as it +does through many channels, which we have no means of closing; but +the Central Government, none the less, is really trying to maintain +a neutral attitude. It is an astonishing thing, no doubt, but well +established none the less, that all influential Americans who come +from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, the English headquarters in +this country, to Washington, complain about the pro-German feeling +there. I feel sure in my own mind that the Government hopes, by +reviving the Mexican question, to diminish the export of arms and +munitions to Europe. Public opinion, apart from the anti-German +clique, would probably welcome such a move, as it is widely felt +that the traffic in arms and munitions is hardly consistent with +the continual appeals to humanity sent out all over the world from +Washington. My general impression, as will <a name="page_161"><span +class="page">Page 161</span></a> be seen from the above, is that Mr. +Wilson considers his best chance of re-election lies in bringing +peace to Europe and restoring order in Mexico; for the latter purpose +he will probably employ General Iturbide, who spent the whole of +last winter in New York and Washington. He was at one time governor +of the district of Mexico City, where he acquitted himself with +courage and credit. He impressed me personally as a man of great +ability. He should be able to find sufficient partisans in Mexico +to enable him to raise an army, and the bankers of New York would +be prepared to advance him the necessary sums. General Iturbide +enjoys the full confidence of the present Administration, but only +the future can show whether he will succeed in establishing a stable +Government in Mexico, without the intervention of the United States." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(2) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, 12th June, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Since the publication of President Wilson's second Note on the +<i>Lusitania</i> incident, the daily Press has been busy with +conjectures as to the real reasons for Mr. Bryan's resignation. +It is generally agreed that the Note itself could hardly have been +the occasion of the Cabinet crisis; as Bryan had concurred in the +first Note, and there was no reason, therefore, why he should not +have assented to the second one as well. On the other hand, no +one can believe that the controversy with Germany was in reality +simply an excuse for a personal trial of strength between Wilson +and Bryan, after the manner of the earlier rivalry between Taft +and Roosevelt. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Bryan has now published in the <i>World</i> a manifesto addressed +to the German-American community defending his attitude in this +matter; but it is fortunately couched in terms which are unlikely +to find favor in the <a name="page_162"><span class="page">Page +162</span></a> eyes of those for whose benefit it was written. It +would certainly be undesirable from our point of view that Bryan +should be regarded as the champion of the German cause in this +country; no useful result could follow from such advocacy. We must +use all our efforts to come to an understanding with Mr. Wilson, +if possible without compromising our present point of view; he is +undoubtedly at the moment the most influential man in the country, +and if he is antagonized we shall be powerless against him!" +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +(3) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, July 2nd, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In spite of the English interference with the American mails reported +here to-day, I hope that the reports dispatched in the ordinary +course of my duty have all reached your Excellency safely. In case +they have not done so, I may report that since my audience with +Mr. Wilson, the removal of the 'agitator' Dernburg, the mission +of Meyer Gerhardt, and the arrival of the Press telegrams from +Berlin giving details of the last-named, things have been pretty +quiet generally; the situation has reverted to the normal, and will +remain normal if our next Note shows a conciliatory disposition. +I might even go further, and say that the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, +taking it all in all, despite the manner in which we dealt with it, +has exercised and will exercise in the future a favorable influence +on our mutual relations. Of course it has brought us into even +greater odium with our avowed enemies; Anglophile 'Society' in New +York, Philadelphia and Boston is infuriated, and the Wall Street +magnates are little better; but these two cliques have always been +inveterate supporters of England. The Government has lost ground for +the first time as a result of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, and it +now fully realizes the importance of these <a name="page_163"><span +class="page">Page 163</span></a> questions of sea warfare; whereas +when I first spoke in February, March and April to various exalted +personages about the submarine campaign and kindred matters, no +one would listen to me, and the full seriousness of the situation +was quite unrealized. Now, however, 'the freedom of the seas' has +become the test question of American politics. Every preparation +has been made to take energetic measures with regard to England if +our answer to the last American Note renders further negotiations +possible. Even the New York Press has become more reasonable, and +capable of discussing war questions impartially; and this was notably +the case over the torpedoing of the <i>Armenian</i>. In a word, at +no time since the outbreak of war have the omens been so favorable +for a rational policy on the part of America." +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, July 22nd, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If we ask what have-been the results of our eleven weeks' negotiations +over the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, and which involved the employment +of all our available arts of persuasion, we may well reply that we +have, despite our grave difficulties, averted the severance of +diplomatic relations and the inevitable war that must have followed. +The former possibility, at all events, was at one time considerably +more probable than most people in Germany are aware of. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"There could have been but one opinion among those I who saw and +felt it as to the popular attitude of mind during the first few +weeks following the <i>Lusitania</i> incident. In such circumstances +we had only one possible resource left to us, to gain time, and +hope for the restoration of a more friendly disposition in this +country. The continuation of negotiations rendered this contingency +possible; and so matters eventually turned out. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We can hope for further results only if the American <a +name="page_164"><span class="page">Page 164</span></a> Government +decides to institute simultaneous negotiations with Berlin and London, +with the object of bringing about a settlement. Our own views and +those of America are radically divergent, and no mere one-sided +discussion between us can bridge the gulf. The American Government +went too far in its first Note to allow of its withdrawing now; +although it admits our submarine campaign to have been a legitimate +form of reprisal against the English hunger blockade, it still +persists in holding us responsible for damage to American lives +and limbs resulting from these reprisals. Put briefly the demands +of the United States are therefore: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"1. A full apology in some form or other, and indemnification for +the lives lost in the <i>Lusitania</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"2. An undertaking that no passenger ships shall in future be sunk +without preliminary warning. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The latest Note from America, which is already on its way to Berlin, +will in a sense bring the negotiations to a conclusion, as the +Government want to have a definite basis of agreement which may +form the foundation of their discussions with England. In my +conversations with Mr. Lansing I have been given to understand +that the Government wish to know verbally or in writing whether +we are in a position to incline somewhat to the American point of +view, and whether we can see our way to assist the present Government +to secure by means of joint conversations with Germany and England +the freedom of the seas, which has always been the main object +of Mr. Wilson's endeavors." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Dr. Dernburg returned to Germany in the middle of June, having +been provided, by request of the American Government, with a safe +conduct from the Entente. I <a name="page_165"><span class="page">Page +165</span></a> went to New York to take leave of Dr. Dernburg and +invited a few friends to dinner in the roof-garden of the Ritz-Carlton +Hotel on the eve of his departure. One incident of our gathering may +be regarded as typical of the atmosphere of these <i>Lusitania</i> +days: a party of people for whom the next table to ours had been +reserved refused to take it, as they declined to sit down in the +neighborhood of Germans. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After Dr. Dernburg's departure I deemed it advisable, in view of +the popular hostility towards us, to redistribute the greater part +of Dr. Dernburg's duties. I did so, therefore, in agreement with +the Foreign Office, and with the assistance of Dernburg's former +colleague, Councillor Albert took over, in addition to his former +business with the Central Purchasing Company, all financial and +economic affairs, and was attached to the Embassy as commercial +adviser. Dr. Alexander Fuehr became Chief of the Press Bureau and +Captain Hecker took over the duties connected with the German Red +Cross. Unfortunately the generosity of many in America, and particularly +those of German descent, has not been fully recognized or appreciated +by the people of Germany. The total sum remitted to Germany for our +Red Cross and other similar societies amounts to over 20,000,000 +marks. The disillusion of our people at home when they realized +the slight political influence exercised by the German-American +element in the United States has led them to overlook their great +achievements in the cause of charity, which were inspired by a +heartfelt sympathy with the sufferings of the German nation. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_166"><span class="page">Page 166</span></a> +CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE "ARABIC" INCIDENT +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A few days after the dispatch of the last American Note concerning +the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, on July 21st, 1915, Mr. Lansing asked +me to call on him. He then told me that the American Government +had come to the end of its resources, and if any further cases +occurred of loss of American lives by the torpedoing of merchant +ships, war must inevitably result. The United States Government +intended to write no more Notes, which had been proved useless, but +would request me to undertake further negotiations in person. My +action in the <i>Lusitania</i> incident had given proof of my earnest +desire to avoid war, and the American Government were confident that +I should succeed, even under such difficult conditions in finding +some way out of the present <i>impasse</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From this time onwards, Mr. Lansing agreed with me that, as a regular +thing, I should be permitted, whatever negotiations were going on, +to send cipher dispatches to my Government through the channels +of the State Department and the American Embassy in Berlin. It +will be remembered that a similar privilege had been granted me +at the time of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +My sole ground of hope for success lay in one passage of the American +Note of July 21st, which read as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government, +contending for the same great object, long stood together in urging +the very principles <a name="page_167"><span class="page">Page +167</span></a> on which the Government of the United States now +so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of +the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to +contend for that freedom from whatever quarter it is violated, +without compromise and at any cost. It invites the practical +co-operation of the Imperial German Government at this time, when +co-operation may accomplish most, and this great common object can +be most strikingly and effectively achieved. The Imperial German +Government expresses the hope that this object may in some measure +be accomplished even before the present war ends. It can be. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Government of the United States not only feels obliged to +insist upon it, by whomsoever it is violated or ignored, in the +protection of its own citizens, but it is also deeply interested +in seeing it made practicable between the belligerents themselves. +It holds itself ready at any time to act as a common friend who +may be privileged to suggest a way." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +It seemed possible to reach some sort of agreement on the basis +of the above request from America that we should co-operate in +endeavoring to restore the freedom of the seas; but there remained +the question of finding a formula which should serve as a basis +for the settlement of the <i>Lusitania</i> question and prevent +any repetition of such incidents. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I was aware that there were two political counter-currents in Berlin: +the one party desiring at all costs to prevent war with the United +States, the other preferring to risk war for the sake of continuing +the submarine campaign. I was clearly bound to co-operate with the +first named, as I was convinced that America's participation in +the war would certainly result in our eventual defeat; this view +was, I knew, that Von Jagow, Secretary <a name="page_168"><span +class="page">Page 168</span></a> of State for Foreign Affairs, whose +opinion on this point was identical with mine. Up to January 31st, +1917, however, I could never ascertain which of these two views was +the accepted one in Berlin, although, of course, I always hoped +that the party of common sense would eventually prevail, nor was +I able to discover what degree of success, if any, Meyer Gerhardt, +who had been sent to represent my views to the authorities in Berlin, +or Dr. Dernburg, who was working for the same end, had managed to +achieve. As will be seen from my account of the subsequent course +of events, my information on this point was very insufficient, +and I was not even made acquainted with the views of the Berlin +Government, on the conduct of the submarine campaign, or on the +subsequent peace proposals put forward by the President. I was +never informed beforehand as to the real intentions of Berlin, and +I cannot understand, even to-day, why I was not told, until after +the <i>Arabic</i> incident, that the German submarine commanders +had been instructed immediately after the torpedoing of the +<i>Lusitania</i> not to attack liners. A knowledge of this fact +at the time would have assisted me greatly in my dealings with +Washington. I do not intend to assert that in all this there was +any deliberate neglect on the part of the Berlin Government but +neither, on, the other hand, can I credit the commonly accepted +explanation that the technical difficulties of transmitting reports +were insuperable. It should have been possible to give me definite +information on these matters by any one of the various channels +of communication which were available between the Foreign Office +and the Embassy at Washington. No other explanation is possible, +except that which is to be found in the conflict of the two parties +in Germany. The head of the Foreign Office was well aware that +my policy in Washington was the same as his own in Berlin, but +he <a name="page_169"><span class="page">Page 169</span></a> was +frequently unable to send me definite and early information because +he, himself, could not tell whether his own views could be accepted +and acted upon. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this time I sent the following report to Berlin: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +"Cedarhurst, 28th July, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I have on more than one occasion respectfully begged your Excellency +to be so good as to wait for my report before deciding whether the +last American <i>Lusitania</i> Note is to be answered, and if a +reply is to be sent, in what sense it should be drafted. Neither +the Government nor public opinion considers such a reply absolutely +necessary, so that there is no danger in delay; but I respectfully +request that I may be permitted at all events to undertake further +negotiations here, verbally and confidentially, even if my instructions +have to be sent by letter. Experience has proved that negotiations, +if they are to have any prospect of success with the American +Government, must be carried on in Washington. Both President Wilson +and Mr. Lansing are now prepared to attempt to reach an agreement +by this means. In Germany, where the tone of the American Note +must have appeared unnecessarily abrupt, this fact is perhaps not +realized the explanation of course is that Mr. Wilson was carried +away by the popular excitement over the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, +and was, thus, compelled to adopt an intransigent attitude, from +which he cannot now recede, without making his position impossible +here. Then besides the resignation of Mr. Bryan, and that unfortunate +telegram of Dr. Dumba's, which has become known here has convinced +him that we are not in earnest. Finally, he wishes to come to some +kind of settlement with us by means of this exchange of Notes, +in order that he may then turn his attention to England; and his +well-known pride confirms him in the view that only after he <a +name="page_170"><span class="page">Page 170</span></a> has concluded +his negotiations with us, can he take up the matter with her. It +should be clearly understood that Mr. Wilson does not want war with +us, nor does he wish to side with England, despite all statements +to the contrary in the Press of the Eastern States. This Press, in +agreement with other powerful and influential circles is Anglophile +to a degree and not altogether averse to a war with Germany; but +this view is not shared by Mr. Wilson, or the large majority of +the American people. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The great danger of the present situation is that we may be driven to +war, either by the efforts of this Press, or by a new <i>Lusitania</i> +incident. What Mr. Wilson wants is to satisfy public opinion here, +by the serious tone of the Note sent to us, and at the same time +to induce us to make certain concessions and thus carry out his +darling project of the freedom of the seas, by finding some middle +course between the German and English views. In his last note, the +President has certainly modified his views in our favor by his +admission that submarine warfare is legitimate, whereas he formerly +maintained that it could not be regarded as permissible from the +point of view of international law. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It is not my business, even were I in possession of all the necessary +facts, to say whether it would be better policy from our point of +view, to reply to this Note, or to leave it unanswered; I can only +describe the situation, as it appears to me at the moment. From +that point of view the decision must depend very largely on the +results which we expect to follow from the submarine campaign. If +this campaign is regarded as an end in itself, and we are justified +in believing that it can bring about the overthrow of England, it +would be wiser to leave the American note unanswered, and carry on +with the submarine campaign and turn a deaf ear to neutral protests. +If, on the other hand, this campaign is only a means to an end, the +<a name="page_171"><span class="page">Page 171</span></a> end being +the removal or slackening of the British blockade restrictions, +then I beg respectfully to urge that it would be worth our while +to make some concessions to President Wilson's convictions, in +the hope of achieving our object through his co-operation. He is +reported by a witness in whom I have complete confidence, to have +said: 'If I receive a favorable answer from Germany I will see +this thing through with England to the end.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Before this report reaches your Excellency, Wilson's Note will +have been delivered to the English Government. If this is couched +in as peremptory a tone as the one addressed to us, then I urgently +recommend that we should endeavor to come to an agreement with +the American Government on the basis of the following draft note. +I hope that your Excellency will send me an authorization by +wireless—it should be sent in duplicate for greater safety's +sake—to enter into negotiations on this basis; I believe +that I can guarantee to find a satisfactory principle to serve as +a weapon for Wilson in his attack on England. If we show ourselves +ready to help him out of his present difficulties, I am sure he for +his part will energetically prosecute against England his design +of vindicating the validity of international law. 'It can be,' +said the President himself in his last Note. In these three words +may be seen the conviction of Mr. Wilson, that he can impose his +will upon England in this matter. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As I have already reported, I earnestly hope that it will be decided +to reply to the American note; and a reply should, to my mind, +deal with these three points: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"(1) Settlement of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident. In this connection +it would be well to state that from the point of view of reprisals +we were entirely justified in attacking the <i>Lusitania</i>. In +so doing, however, we had no intention of taking American lives, +and deeply regret that through a combination of unfortunate +circumstances this has <a name="page_172"><span class="page">Page +172</span></a> actually occurred. If any distress still exists +among the survivors of the disaster, we should be quite prepared +to leave the amount of financial compensation to be decided by +a later agreement. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"(2) We propose in the future course of the submarine campaign to +abide by the practice recently adopted. As things stand at present, +the arrangement is that no liner is to be torpedoed without warning. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"(3) We should be prepared to support to the utmost of our power +the efforts of President Wilson, to insist on the observation of +the dictates of international law during the present conflict, +and leave it to his discretion to enter into conversations to this +end with the British Government. The Declaration of London might +serve as a basis for these conversations, more especially as it +was drawn up at the time by the American Government. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If we act in accordance with these my respectful recommendations, +the breakdown of the negotiations with England is the worst that +can happen; and then it would be clear for all the world to see +that our enemies were to blame for this breakdown, and Mr. Wilson +would come over to our side. Knowing the President as I do, I have +not the slightest doubt of this." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I gather from the account in Karl Helfferich's "World War," Vol. +II., p. 322, that the Secretary of the Treasury in Berlin was in +favor of this policy, which I held to be the only possible one. +When he stated, as before mentioned, that his proposal had found +no support from the Foreign Office, I was much astonished. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I was instructed to commence negotiations verbally and confidentially +with Mr. Lansing on these lines, and was convinced myself that +these would lead to nothing, so long as we persisted in carrying +on our submarine campaign on the old lines. Policy should be based +on what is <a name="page_173"><span class="page">Page 173</span></a> +possible; now it was not really possible to unite these two +contradictory methods, and to come to an understanding with the +United States over the freedom of the seas, and at the same time +to bring her to agree to the continuation of submarine warfare on +the existing lines. We were bound to decide once for all on the +one policy or the other. I supposed that Berlin had decided for +the former course of action, as I knew that our submarine commanders +had lately been ordered to arrange for the rescue of noncombatants +before torpedoing merchantmen, and I was confirmed in my supposition +by the very fact that I had been authorized to open conversations +with Mr. Lansing. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Scarcely had these conversations begun, when on August 19th the +passenger steamer <i>Arabic</i> was sunk, and again some American +lives were lost. Excitement at once attained a high pitch, and +once more we seemed to be on the brink of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On August 20th I dispatched by one of my usual routes the following +wire (written for reasons of safety in French) to the Foreign Office: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"I fear I cannot prevent rupture this time if our answer in +<i>Arabic</i> matter is not conciliatory; I advise dispatch of +instructions to me at once to negotiate whole question. Situation +may thus perhaps be saved." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +At the same time, without writing for instructions, I explained +both officially and also through the Press that on our side the +United States would be given full compensation, if the commander of +the <i>Arabic</i> should be found to have been treacherously dealt +with. It was my first preoccupation to calm the public excitement +before it overflowed all bounds; and I succeeded in so calming it. +The action I thus took on my own responsibility turned out later +to have been well advised, as, although <a name="page_174"><span +class="page">Page 174</span></a> I did not know this at the time, +the submarine commander's instructions had, in fact, been altered +as a result of the disaster to the <i>Lusitania</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the 24th of August, in accordance with instructions from Berlin, +I wrote to Mr. Lansing the following letter, which was immediately +published: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"I have received instructions from my Government to address to you +the following observations: Up to the present no reliable information +has been received as to the circumstances of the torpedoing of the +<i>Arabic</i>. The Imperial Government, therefore, trusts that the +Government of the United States will refrain from taking any decided +steps, so long as it only has before it one-sided reports which my +Government believe do not in any way correspond to the facts. The +Imperial Government hopes that it may be allowed an opportunity +of being heard. It has no desire to call in question the good faith +of those eyewitnesses whose stories have been published by the +European Press, but it considers that account should be taken of +the state of emotion, under the influence of which, this evidence +was given, and which might well give rise to false impressions. If +American subjects have really lost their lives by the torpedoing +of this ship, it was entirely contrary to the intentions of my +Government, which has authorized me to express to the Government of +the United States their deepest regrets, and their most heartfelt +sympathy." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Fortunately, as already mentioned, orders had been given before +the torpedoing of the <i>Arabic</i>, to all submarine commanders +that no liner should be sunk before preliminary warning had been +given, and the non-combatants had been placed in safety, unless +any ships tried to escape or offered resistance. At the end of +August I <a name="page_175"><span class="page">Page 175</span></a> +received an official statement to this effect, intended for my +use in the negotiations over the <i>Lusitania</i> question. This +statement caused the first hitch in these negotiations. The American +Government regarded the term "liner" as comprising every steamer +plying on recognized routes as distinguished from the so-called +"tramp steamer." The German Naval authorities, on the other hand, +averred that their reservation only applied to the large ships +of the regular passenger services. However, this divergence of +opinion only became important at a later date, and was not for the +moment an obstacle to our proceedings. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the other hand, it was certainly unfortunate for us that up to +the 31st January, 1917, neither of the two contending parties in +Berlin were able to gain complete control in the matter of policy. +I, myself, was never in favor of the submarine campaign, because +I was convinced that it could not fulfil its avowed object, and +would probably involve us in hostilities with the United States; +but bad as this policy was, it would have been better to follow +it consistently than to halt between two opinions. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The submarine campaign was in the end gradually and unwillingly +sacrificed, owing to our desire to placate the United States. If +we had made a clean sweep of it, once and for all, after the +<i>Lusitania</i> incident, or, at any rate, after the sinking of +the <i>Arabic</i>, as we actually did after the torpedoing of the +<i>Sussex</i>, considerable advantages would have been gained from +the diplomatic point of view. To my mind, there was now only one +thing to be done—to abandon our pretensions that the submarine +campaign was being conducted in accordance with the recognized +principles of cruiser warfare, laid down by international law, +and to offer compensation for the loss of the <i>Lusitania</i> +and the <i>Arabic</i>. Having done this, we could then proceed +to recall to the American Government <a name="page_176"><span +class="page">Page 176</span></a> their oft-expressed original view +of the freedom of the seas. As a matter of fact, immediately after +the settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> incident, Mr. Lansing sent +a peremptory Note to England. But the prospect of any favorable +result for ourselves from this exchange of Notes was never fulfilled, +as our methods of war at sea always resulted in fresh incidents +and fresh conflicts. There was, of course, a second possibility: +that is, while persisting in the submarine campaign to recognize +that it was inevitably bound to lead to friction with America, +and to discount all the ensuing consequences. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Neither of these two courses was consistently followed in our policy. +We were for ever trying to square the circle, and to conduct a submarine +campaign which should be from a military point of view effective, +without at the same time leading to a breach with America. The order +that "liners" should not be torpedoed under any circumstances was +regarded simply as a piece of red tape, and not applicable to war +conditions, as the submarine was not in a position to distinguish +through its periscope between "liners" and other craft. We thus +contrived at one and the same time to cripple our submarines, and +yet to fail to give satisfaction to America. Probably the German +Government did not venture in face of public opinion in the country +to desist altogether from the use of submarines. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It has been said that "the freedom of the seas" was an unattainable +ideal, a mere phrase, a red herring drawn across our track; but +it was in reality none of these things. America attached to this +phrase a definite and concrete meaning; namely, the abolition of +the law of capture at sea, and I am convinced that after the World +War America will yet fall out with England over this question, +and will not rest till she has achieved her object. Certainly the +original sin of the United States against <a name="page_177"><span +class="page">Page 177</span></a> the spirit of neutrality lay in +the fact that she suffered the violation of her admitted rights by +England's interference with the reciprocal trade of the neutral +States. Messrs. Wilson and House often talked with me about this +matter of the law of capture at sea. It would be a complete +misconception of American policy to deny that in this phrase, "the +freedom of the seas," one of their dearest desires found expression. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When I informed Mr. Lansing confidentially at the end of August +of the latest instructions to our submarine commanders, he was +much gratified, but explained at once that the fact of its being +confidential would deprive the information of all its value; something +must, at all costs, be done to reassure public opinion. I could +not but admit that the view of the Secretary of State was correct +in this respect. The factor of public opinion obviously appeared +of less importance in Berlin than in Washington; besides, I knew +from experience that no secret could be kept in Washington for +long, and that in a few days this, our first sign of yielding, +would be common knowledge. I thought it best, therefore, to get +the full diplomatic advantage from the new situation, and took it +upon myself, on September 1st, to publish my instructions. This +exercise of initiative got me a reprimand from Berlin, but I attained +my object none the less, in that I avoided any immediate danger +of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Concerning these negotiations the following correspondence took +place with Berlin: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(1) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, August 30th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I have tried to wire reports to your Excellency by the route placed +at our disposal, and inform you as to the progress of the negotiations +between myself and Mr. Lansing over the <i>Arabic</i> incident. +In consequence of the <a name="page_178"><span class="page">Page +178</span></a> instructions given to me and the information given +by your Excellency to the Associated Press in Berlin, the general +situation here has taken a turn for the better. The prospect of war +is becoming more remote; there are signs of returning confidence +on the Stock Exchange, and I have even succeeded in inducing the +Press to see things in a more reasonable light. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Thus up to the present, everything seems to be going well, and a +rupture of diplomatic relations appears once more to be indefinitely +postponed. None the less, our difficulties are really much greater +than at the time of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident. The American +Government's intentions are undoubtedly peaceful, and the case of +the <i>Arabic</i>, involving as it did the loss of only two American +lives, may be said to be in itself comparatively unimportant. There +are other factors, however, to be considered. Both the Government +and the people are beginning to have shrewd suspicions, which for +reasons of policy they refrain from expressing at present, that we +cheated the United States in the matter of the <i>Lusitania</i>, +that we spun out the discussion as long as possible, and then replied +to President Wilson's last and most peremptory Note, by torpedoing +the <i>Arabic</i>. I am convinced that Mr. Lansing, who is an able +lawyer, and as a result of his American training alive to every +possible move of an opponent, expects us to follow the same policy +over the matter of the <i>Arabic</i>. He has thus no great confidence +in our good faith, though the President, I am told, is more optimistic, +his friend House having informed him that his policy of the 'freedom +of the seas' commands general assent in Berlin. The facts of the +situation, then, are that the President will not permit any +procrastination in the negotiations over the <i>Arabic</i> affair, +for should no more satisfactory conclusion be reached now than +was the case after the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, Wilson would +<a name="page_179"><span class="page">Page 179</span></a> forfeit +the respect of his countrymen, and would have no other resource +but to forego his cherished design with what face he might, or +else break off diplomatic relations with Germany. There can be no +doubt in the minds of any who are well versed in American affairs +that he would elect for the latter course. The Spanish-American +War arose out of just such a situation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The following conclusions result from the above: I gather from +the Berlin reports of the Associated Press that your Excellency +has decided to settle the present dispute with the United States +on the lines which I have respectfully suggested to you. If this be +so I urge the utmost expedition in the matter, that confidence here +may be restored, and the way opened for negotiations with England. It +is not so much a matter of making apologies or giving explanations, +but rather of making a full statement to this Government as to the +instructions given to our submarine commanders. If we can prove +by this means that after the <i>Lusitania</i> incident, orders +had been given to attack no passenger ships while negotiations with +the United States were going on, or to do so only under certain +conditions, all outstanding questions could be solved without +difficulty." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(2) <span class="sc">Cipher Dispatch</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, September 10th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"<i>Daily Telegraph</i> of September 2nd publishes what purports +to be extract from your aforesaid letter to Mr. Lansing, informing +him of instructions issued to submarine commanders. Extract ends +as follows: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"'I have no objection to your making any use you please of the above +information.' +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"If <i>Daily Telegraph</i> has reproduced your letter correctly, +<a name="page_180"><span class="page">Page 180</span></a> above +statement is contrary to instructions, which authorized you only to +give information confidentially to American Government. Premature +publication in American Press places us in difficult position here, +especially as no official report of actual contents of your +communication to Mr. Lansing has reached us. I beg that you will +kindly furnish an explanation. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +(Signed) <span class="sc">Jagow</span>." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(3) <span class="sc">Cipher Report</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, October 2nd, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Reference your wire No. A 129 of September 10th, I ask your Excellency +to be kind enough to pardon me for having taken upon myself to act +on my own responsibility over the submarine question. The position +at the end of August rendered some action to pacify public opinion +imperative, if a breach were to be avoided. Owing to the difficulties +of communication with Berlin I could do nothing but acquaint Mr. +Lansing with a portion of my instructions concerning the case of +the <i>Lusitania</i>—the only ones which had then reached +me. I at once reported my action to your Excellency in my wireless +message, No. 179, and in a previous telegram, No. 165, and requested +approval of my action; probably these messages have been delayed in +transit, or have not reached Berlin. In further explanation, I may +add that in this country, confidential matter, in the European sense, +does not exist, and such matter can never be kept a secret from the +Press. Sometimes I have been able to come to an agreement with the +Government over the wording of their <i>communiqués</i> to +the Press; that is one of the great advantages of conducting the +negotiations on the spot. Had the whole American Press entirely +refused to accept <a name="page_181"><span class="page">Page +181</span></a> our official explanations, nothing further could +have been done with the Government." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +While my negotiations with Mr. Lansing in Washington for a simultaneous +settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> and <i>Lusitania</i> questions +were still in progress, a memorandum was handed to Mr. Gerard, the +American Ambassador in Berlin which purported to justify the action +of the offending submarine commanders. Thus the situation once more +became acute. The contents of this document were as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"On August 19th a German submarine held up the English steamer +<i>Dunele</i> about sixty miles south of Kinsale, and having ordered +the crew to leave the ship, were about to sink it by gun-fire when +the commander observed a large steamer heading directly towards +him. This latter, which afterwards proved to be the <i>Arabic</i>, +bore no ensign, or other marks of neutrality, and was thus obviously +an enemy. Approaching nearer, she altered her original course, and +again made directly for the submarine thus leading the commander +of the latter to suppose that she was about to attack and ram him. +In order to parry this attack, the submarine dived and fired a +torpedo which struck the ship. The submarine commander observed +that those on board got away in fifteen boats. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"According to his instructions, the German commander was authorized +to attack the <i>Arabic</i> without warning, and without allowing +time for the rescue of her crew, in case of an attempt at flight +or resistance. The action of the <i>Arabic</i> undoubtedly gave +him good grounds for supposing that an attack on him was intended. +He was the more inclined to this belief, by the fact that a few +days before, on the 14th, he had been fired at from long range +<a name="page_182"><span class="page">Page 182</span></a> by a +large passenger steamer, apparently belonging to the British Royal +Mail Steam Packet Company, which he saw in the Irish Sea, but which +he had made no attempt to attack or hold up. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The German Government deeply regrets that loss of life should have +resulted from the action of this officer, and it desires that these +sentiments should be conveyed more particularly to the Government of +the United States, as American citizens were among the missing. No +obligation to make compensation for the damage done can, however, +be admitted, even on the hypothesis that the submarine commander +mistook the intentions of the <i>Arabic</i>. In the event of an +insoluble difference arising on this point between the German and +American Governments, the German Government suggests that the matter +in dispute should be referred to the Hague Tribunal as a question +of international law, in accordance with Article 38 of the Hague +convention for the peaceful solution of differences between nations; +but it can do so only with this reservation, that the arbitrator's +award shall not have the validity of a general decision as to the +international legality or otherwise of the German submarine warfare." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following three reports or telegrams dispatched by me to the +Imperial Chancellor describe the situation in Washington at this +juncture: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(1) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, September 14th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Lansing has given me permission to wire you by this route, without +the messages being seen by him; he will also forward your Excellency's +reply, and from this it appears to be the Government's view, that +any further exchange of Notes, the subsequent publication of which, +<a name="page_183"><span class="page">Page 183</span></a> in both +countries, would merely involve further misunderstandings, is bound +to lead to a breach. It considers the present system of confidential +negotiations with me as the only promising method of arriving at an +agreement. The memorandum on the <i>Arabic</i> is not understood +here, and in so far as it is understood, is considered to be a +manifestation of German bad faith—a sign that we may perhaps +give way in principle, but will always in practice seek to evade +our obligations thus incurred. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Lest this telegram should, by its length, give offence to the +British, Mr. Lansing is forwarding the evidence in the <i>Arabic</i> +case to Mr. Gerard for transmission to your Excellency; he is himself +quite convinced that the submarine commander was not compelled in +self-defense to torpedo the <i>Arabic</i>, and that his action in +so doing was therefore unjustified. He hopes that your Excellency +will after study of the evidence, agree with him in this. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"To obtain full and complete agreement it is first of all necessary +that I should be empowered to publish in full those instructions +given to our submarine commanders in so far as these were not given +in my previous summaries on the matter. If we still consider ourselves +bound to maintain that the officer concerned in the <i>Arabic</i> case +was only obeying orders, we can never hope to come to an agreement, +for no one can possibly feel any confidence in the sincerity of our +intentions. In the meantime I shall try to reach a settlement on +the matters now in dispute by means of arbitration. Finally, the +question of compensation must, in accordance with my instructions +for the <i>Lusitania</i> case, be referred to the Hague Tribunal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I am quite certain that if we fail to reach an agreement, severance +of diplomatic relations cannot but follow. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Lansing will not reply to the <i>Arabic</i> memorandum, and, as I +said before, will conduct the diplomatic exchanges on this matter only +through me. He considers <a name="page_184"><span class="page">Page +184</span></a> this as the only possible course on the ground that +Wilson and I are alike committed to the policy of 'the freedom +of the seas.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Finally, I may observe that everyone here would be much gratified +if we could see our way to extend the scope of our latest instructions +to our submarines so as to include all merchant shipping. It is +argued that these vessels are slow moving and could easily be warned; +the advantage of acting without warning is only of importance in +the case of swift passenger ships, which we have, none the less, +undertaken not to attack without notice. The suggested proposal, +therefore, could not harm us; it would, on the other hand, make us +very popular here and give the United States a very strong position +in her negotiations with England. Of course, I may be able to effect +an agreement without this. The main point in dispute is the verdict +on the action of the commander in the <i>Arabic</i> case, because +this involves the whole question of our good faith. Anyway, there +is no doubt whatever that a second <i>Arabic</i> case is bound +to result in war." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(2) <span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, September 22nd, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As position is still very difficult, I am carrying on conversations +in strict confidence through personal friend of Wilson's. Request, +therefore, that no directions be sent as regards question of +responsibility for <i>Arabic</i> incident, till your Excellency hears +again from me. Lansing at present gone on leave. Personally I do not +believe that I shall manage to secure International Commission of +Inquiry. According to present view, main point of dispute is question +of disavowing action of submarine commander. I hope, however, that +after reviewing American evidence, your Excellency will be able +to find formula for <a name="page_185"><span class="page">Page +185</span></a> such disavowal, agreeable to both Governments, especially +if I can get concurrence of Wilson before press gets hold of it. +Request, therefore, that American correspondents in Germany be +told nothing more than that American evidence being carefully gone +into in Berlin." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(3) <span class="sc">Cipher Report</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, September 28th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The negotiations about the submarine campaign are at a standstill +at present. From the fact that Lansing has not been recalled from +leave and that President Wilson does not seem over-eager to give +an opinion on the proposals which I have put forward for his +consideration, I consider myself justified in concluding that the +Americans do not consider the situation to be any longer critical. +Even the Press is no longer agitated, as in all recent cases of +attack by German submarines. Their commanders have acted quite +in accordance with our assurances. Under these circumstances Mr. +Wilson may possibly fall in with our proposal that the particular +case of the <i>Arabic</i> should be dealt with by an International +Commission of Inquiry. In any case, some means must be found of +finishing once for all with the <i>Arabic</i> and <i>Lusitania</i> +incidents; only then shall we be in a position to see whether President +Wilson will keep his word, and take energetic measures <i>vis à +vis</i> England. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Anglo-French Loan Commission, assisted by their agency, the +Morgan group, are working at high pressure. Stories of Allied victories +in Europe are sedulously spread abroad in order to enlist the support +of public opinion. Despite these efforts the commission found Chicago +so invincibly hostile that they were compelled to proceed there in +person, but they will probably, in any case, manage to raise a +loan, as the Morgan group <a name="page_186"><span class="page">Page +186</span></a> are quite strong enough for the purpose. The rate +of interest they are demanding is very high, as up till now they +have financed all English purchases here. By these means, they +are, no doubt, making considerable profits, but in order to secure +them, they will, of course consolidate their floating debt and +unload it on to the public. The only question is to what extent +they will be able to do this. Opinion varies as to the size of +England's present debt; a prominent banker here, in close touch +with the Morgan group, estimated the total to 500,000,000 dollars; +if this estimate is correct, a loan of 500,000,000 dollars would +only just cover the liabilities hitherto existing. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Morgan group certainly had to make two great concessions: +first, that the proceeds of the new loan shall not be employed for +the purchase of munitions, and second, that Russia shall be excluded +from the loan; only by these means could they overcome the opposition +of the German-Americans and the Jews. Our Jewish friends here are +in no easy position. Their action, or rather inaction, takes the +form of what is commonly known as 'egg-dancing,' or 'pussyfooting'; +they wish to stand well with all sides, but have not the courage of +their convictions, and are very anxious to make money. All this is +very easily understood, when one remembers the ambiguous position +of these gentlemen. A regular devil's dance around the 'Golden calf' +is now going on here. All the European Governments are coming to buy +in the American market, and usually paying double for their goods, +as they only purchase what they urgently need. <i>One lesson</i> we +may learn for future reference from the present state of affairs, +and that is that we must not allow ourselves again to be left to +the tender mercies of the German-Jew bankers here. After the war, +we must have branches of our large banks in New York just as we +<a name="page_187"><span class="page">Page 187</span></a> have +in London. All evidence goes to show that New York will then be +the center of world-finance, and we should, therefore, take all +steps to act on this assumption as soon as possible." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The Foreign Office in Berlin, who naturally wished to avoid a rupture +with the United States, accordingly dispatched to me the following +telegraphic instructions: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We have no doubt that in this instance submarine commander believed +<i>Arabic</i> intended to ram and had every reason for such belief. +However, German Government prepared to give credence to sworn evidence +of English officers of <i>Arabic</i> and agree that in reality no +such intention existed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Attack of submarine thus was unfortunately not in accordance with +instructions; communication to this effect will be made to commander. +German Government is for sake of final settlement by friendly agreement +prepared without admission of responsibility from point of view of +international law, to give indemnification for death of American +citizens. Your Excellency is empowered to notify American Government +of above, and to negotiate with them in case of acceptance concerning +amount of compensation, subject to our concurrence. Confidently +expect that incident will thus be finally liquidated, as above +is limit of possible concessions." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The American Government during verbal negotiations with me on this +matter considered it essential that a phrase expressing Germany's +disapproval of the commander's action should be incorporated in the +explanation which I proposed to publish. I was not sure whether +I was really authorized by the above instructions to comply with +this condition, but in view of the fact that it was the only hope +of avoiding a breach and further <a name="page_188"><span +class="page">Page 188</span></a> delay in the negotiations would +profit us nothing, as we were bound to make some sort of reply to +the American demand within a certain definite time, I acted once +more on my own responsibility and gave the following explanation +to Mr. Lansing: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The Government of his Majesty the Kaiser, in its orders with which +I previously made you acquainted, has so framed its instructions to +its submarine commanders as to avoid any repetition of incidents +such as that of the <i>Arabic</i>. According to the report of the +officer who sank the <i>Arabic</i> and his sworn evidence, together +with that of his crew, this commander believed that the <i>Arabic</i> +intended to ram the submarine. On the other hand, the Imperial +Government does not desire to call in question the good faith of +the English officers of the <i>Arabic</i>, who have given evidence on +oath that the <i>Arabic</i> had no intention of ramming. The action +of the submarine was therefore contrary to orders, and the Imperial +Government both disapproves of it and regrets it. A communication +to this effect has been made to the officer in question. Under +these circumstances my Government is prepared to give compensation +for the lives of American subjects drowned, to their great regret, +in the <i>Arabic</i>. I am empowered to discuss with you the amount +of this compensation." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The above explanation finally resolved the second crisis. The German +naval authorities naturally complained of my action, as the +"disapproval" stuck in their throats, and I was once more taken to +task—a matter which weighed little with me. For I felt that +my interpretation of the instructions from the Foreign Office was the +only one which could have saved us from war, and that now the road +was open for the final settlement of the <a name="page_189"><span +class="page">Page 189</span></a> <i>Lusitania</i> incident and the +discussion of the great question of "the freedom of the seas." +The outlook for us was most promising. Opinion in America as a +result of the solution of the <i>Arabic</i> question was once more +favorable to us. A leading American paper, the <i>New York Sun</i>, +said at this time in its leading article: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The successful issue of the conversations with Germany over the +submarine campaign cannot fail to be of benefit to an nations, +as a proof of the possibilities of diplomacy as against war. It +has been a personal triumph for both the participants, President +Wilson and Count Bernstorff." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The position of both men has been much strengthened thereby, and +what they have already achieved is no doubt only a presage of still +greater results in the future. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The following four reports to the Foreign Office deal with the +settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> case: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +(1) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, October 6th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> case reported to your Excellency +in my wire, has caused great satisfaction in all circles here. +Of course a few avowedly Anglophile papers, such as the <i>New +York Herald</i> and the <i>New York Tribune</i>, reveal the cloven +hoof, and are clearly disappointed that a rupture of diplomatic +relations between America and Germany has been averted; for the +rest, at no time since the outbreak of war have we had such a good +Press as at this moment. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"History alone will be in a position to say whether the settlement +of the <i>Arabic</i> case really prevented a war with the United +States or not; but your Excellency knows my <a name="page_190"><span +class="page">Page 190</span></a> views that without this settlement +a conflict must eventually have become inevitable. I respectfully +submit that the preservation of peace alone was a sufficient motive +to induce us to come to terms; but you also know that this was by +no means my sole object. I wished also to induce the Government +of the United States to take energetic proceedings against England, +with the object of translating into fact its idea of the freedom +of the seas. I trust we shall not be disappointed in this regard, +and I shall, certainly, leave no stone unturned to keep Mr. Wilson +on the right path. Whatever may be one's personal opinion of the +President, whether one believes him to be really neutrally-minded, +or not, his great services to the cause of peace cannot be denied. +A Republican President would certainly not have stood up, as he +has done, against the united forces of anti-Germanism represented +by Wall Street, the Press, and so-called Society. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"At the present moment it looks as if the American Government are +ready to let the <i>Lusitania</i> matter drop altogether, provided +we agree to refer the question of compensation to the Hague Tribunal +after the war. The general belief here is that judicial proceedings +are out of the question during the continuance of hostilities. At +least I gather as much, indirectly, of course, from one of the +President's friends." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(2) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, October 15th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I much regret that owing to a mistake on the part of the State +Department, your Excellency was not earlier informed of the settlement +of the submarine question. Mr. Lansing left my letter, which should +have accompanied the telegram, in his writing-table by mistake, +for which oversight he afterwards apologized to me. The Imperial +Embassy was in no way to blame. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_191"><span class="page">Page 191</span></a> "The +importance attached by the President, from the very first, to those +main points on which we were unable to make concessions rendered +the task of arriving at an agreement by no means an easy one. Thus +on three of the most important points no agreement has been reached +and over these we must, for the present, draw the veil. Only a +few of the most rabid of the pro-English papers venture openly +to reproach President Wilson with having achieved nothing but the +security of passenger-ships, but all Americans are prepared to +admit in confidence that the Government has completely departed +from its original position. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The three important questions still in dispute, as mentioned above, +are the following: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"(1) The German Government's responsibility for American lives lost +in the torpedoing of British Ships. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"(2) The responsibility for the payment of compensation for the +American lives so lost. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"(3) The American demand that <i>all</i> merchant ships should be +warned by our submarines before being attacked. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"This demand was at first so worded as to imply that submarines, +like other warships, had only the right of search. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Government, realizing that we could not make concessions on +the above three points, had to be content with our admission that +the case of the <i>Arabic</i> should be regarded as exceptional. +This very fast rendered it impossible to reach a similar settlement +in the case of the <i>Lusitania</i>, in which no error on the part +of the submarine commander concerned could be adduced. However, +the Government seemed to be only too satisfied to have come so +well out of their difficulties, and have no wish to raise <a +name="page_192"><span class="page">Page 192</span></a> any further +obstacles because of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident. This matter, +as I have already had the honor to report, may now well be left to +drag on indefinitely, and can be referred in the end to the Hague +Tribunal after the war. Our Press should, therefore, be warned +that further discussion of the controversy between Germany and +America over the submarine campaign is undesirable." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(3) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Cedarhurst, October 20th, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your Excellency's last wireless requested me to render a report +on the settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> question. I have already +complied with these instructions, and the documents are now on +their way to you, and should have reached you. However, it may +be advisable to explain briefly the more important points of the +matter. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"From the date of the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i>, America +has always been on the verge of breaking off diplomatic relations +with us. The German people, I am convinced, have no idea of the +full danger of the situation, at least, if one may judge from our +Press. On two occasions we were compelled to sacrifice individuals +in order to avoid a breach, Dernburg and Dumba being our scapegoats. +Their mistakes would under normal circumstances have been overlooked, +but their removal was at the time necessary in order to give the +American Government the opportunity of showing its strength without +breaking off diplomatic relations with us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As I have more than once explained in my reports, no solution of +the <i>Lusitania</i> question, agreeable to the Americans, could be +found, so long as we were not prepared to admit the responsibility +of the Imperial Government for the disaster, or its obligation to +make reparation, and so long as our views on the principles of <a +name="page_193"><span class="page">Page 193</span></a> submarine +warfare differed from those held by the American Government. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"By dint of drawing out the negotiations as long as possible, and +by the employment of all my persuasive powers, I succeeded in tiding +over the moment of <i>acute</i> tension. Then came the incident of +the <i>Arabic</i>. My laboriously constructed diplomatic edifice +came tumbling about my ears, and things looked blacker than ever. +The American Government regarded the <i>Arabic</i> incident most +seriously, believing as they did that it was typical of the whole +German policy <i>vis-à-vis</i> America. They argued that +either the whole affair had been prearranged as a manifestation +of our intention to have our own way in the matter of submarine +warfare, or else it was a blunder which could be dealt with in +the ordinary course of diplomacy. Negotiation became possible when +your Excellency notified this Government that satisfaction would be +given in the event of the submarine commander being proved to have +acted contrary to his instructions. Further negotiations followed +on this basis, and it was finally agreed that we should admit the +exceptional nature of the <i>Arabic</i> case, without yielding our +ground on the main points. Such agreement would have been impossible +had President Wilson adhered to his previous position, but he wished +to have done with the whole business, and could only do so by throwing +dust in the eyes of the American public. He hoped by these means +to get rid of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident unostentatiously, and +told me, through one of his personal friends, 'to let it drift.' +The idea at the back of his mind is that it shall be left to an +international tribunal sitting after the war, to decide whether +we shall pay compensation or not. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The only really important question as regards the settlement of +the <i>Arabic</i> case, is whether it is worth while for us to risk +a rupture of relations with the United <a name="page_194"><span +class="page">Page 194</span></a> States, for the sake of this affair. +I still persist in my opinion, that it would infallibly have led +us into a new war." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(4) <span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 1st November, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your Excellency's last wire on the matter of the submarine campaign +raises two points of the highest importance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"First, as to Wilson's policy of the 'freedom of the seas;' this +has been the idea underlying all our recent negotiations over the +submarine warfare. Our agreement with this policy has been constantly +emphasized in all my conversations with leading men here; but it is +of course necessary carefully to choose our moment for the public +declaration of our agreement with Wilson's point of view, as people +here naturally fear that if England believes us to be behind any +agitation for the freedom of the seas she will resist it all the +more firmly. I respectfully recommend, therefore, that we should +leave Mr. Wilson to carry on his present controversy with England, +for the present at all events, unaided. We shall lose nothing by +so doing, and if an opportunity comes for our participation, we +can make use of it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"After this expression of opinion, let me pass on to the second +point I have always clearly stated here, that we reserve to ourselves +full liberty of decision, if England refuses to receive our advances. +At present, now that the <i>Arabic</i> case has been recognized as +exceptional, this 'freedom' is only being encroached upon from +one direction as we have undertaken not to sink passenger ships +without warning, etc. By this undertaking we must abide, unless +we wish to go to war with the United States of America. Any future +destruction of passenger ships with Americans on board, especially +if such took place <a name="page_195"><span class="page">Page +195</span></a> without warning, and with the approval of the Imperial +Government, would inevitably cause a rupture." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The political sky in the United States was thus becoming more propitious +day by day; but our enemies' exertions for the purpose of undermining +the present friendly relations, redoubled in proportion. The German +Embassy became the chief object of attack, owing to the fact being +clearly realized by our foes, that so long as its influence in +Washington political circles remained unimpaired, no rupture of +diplomatic relations could be hoped for. Entente diplomacy left no +stone unturned which could be of service against us; lies, robbery, +personal defamation, gossip, were all used to discredit us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The conduct of a British officer on duty in Washington affords +a good example of the unscrupulous policy of our foes. According +to the evidence of Dr. Fuehr, this gentleman, now holding a high +position in London, attempted in the early months of 1916 to corrupt +a messenger of our Press Bureau in New York, one Alfred Hoff, whose +daily duty it was to take newspaper cuttings to Councillor Albert's +office. Two of his people stopped this boy in the street and invited +him to the British Consular offices; here he was received by the +Captain himself, who showed him a bag filled with bank notes and +promised him a liberal reward, if he would undertake to obtain +some letters from Dr. Fuehr's desk. Hoff pretended to fall in with +this suggestion, but at once informed his employer of the incident. +The Captain then made a second effort to bribe Hoff by the promise +of a money reward for every document from the Press Bureau, and +also a ride in a motor for the letters which it was his duty to +take from the Bureau to the German Embassy at Cedarhurst, during +the coming summer. One of the British agents told Hoff that he would +be well paid if he handed over the letters of Dr. Fuehr, which he +often <a name="page_196"><span class="page">Page 196</span></a> used +to seal and frank, and also certain other documents of a specially +confidential nature. Dr. Fuehr finally put an end to this unsavory +episode, which had been fully investigated by private detectives, +by publishing a detailed account of the whole affair in the Hearst +papers. At the same time he brought the matter before the Public +Prosecutor, who, however, was unwilling to interfere in the matter +unless it should be further discussed in the Press. This limited +comprehension of duty Dr. Fuehr could hardly be expected to agree +with. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +During my encounters at this time with the Entente, I entirely lost +any respect I may previously have felt for their moral character, +which was reputed to be so high. I came then to realize that we +could expect nothing better from them in the hour of our defeat, +than a Peace of Versailles, which would make of no account all their +earlier loftier professions. We, in Washington, were therefore, +in duty bound, to strain every nerve to avert such a catastrophe to +our country. Unfortunately the activities of the agents dispatched +from home invariably deranged our plans in a most unfortunate manner, +and, while affording our foes the desired opportunities for damaging +our cause, achieved nothing of advantage in compensation. The English +Secret Police, and all the detective agencies of the United States +which were in their pay, were always at our heels, endeavoring +to establish some collusion on the part of the German Embassy in +these isolated cases of sabotage. However, all this subterranean +plotting and counter-plotting was but so much lost labor. It was +the decision on the policy of continuing or not continuing the +submarine campaign which finally turned the scale. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the beginning of August one of these agents managed to steal a +portfolio of documents from Councillor Albert while he was traveling +on the New York elevated <a name="page_197"><span class="page">Page +197</span></a> railway, and its contents were published in the +<i>World</i> from the 15th of August onwards. We always thought +the perpetrator of this theft was an Entente agent, but it now +appears from Senator Frelinghuysen's evidence before the Senate +Committee of Enquiry on 13th July, 1919, that the guilty individual +was really a member of the American Secret Police. It would certainly +have been an unheard-of thing for an American agent to have robbed +a member of the diplomatic corps and sold the proceeds of his deed +to the Press. Probably what really happened was that the man was in +the pay of the Entente. The investigations at the Senate Committee +disclosed a number of cases of corruption and theft which the agents +of the Entente did not scruple to use in their efforts to compromise +and discredit the German Embassy; so this supposition is in itself +by no means improbable. The affair was merely a storm in a tea-cup; +the papers as published afforded no evidence of any action either +illegal or dishonorable; otherwise the American Government would +certainly have demanded the recall of Albert as they did later +in other cases. The Press manufactured a considerable sensation +out of the contents of the portfolio, but generally speaking the +efforts of the Entente in this affair proved completely without +effect. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Entente agents, however, were more successful in their next +attack, to which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador fell a victim. +Dumba had already in the winter of 1914-15 recommended to me the +American war correspondent James Archibald, who had been at the +Austro-Hungarian Front, as having German sympathies. Thereupon I +also recommended this gentleman in Berlin, where he was granted all +facilities. In the Summer of 1915 Archibald returned to America, to +lecture on his experiences. As he was anti-Entente, these lectures +brought us financial profit, and therefore we paid Archibald's +traveling <a name="page_198"><span class="page">Page 198</span></a> +expenses. At the beginning of September, 1915, he went once more +to Europe, and dined on the eve of his departure with Dumba and +myself on the roof-garden of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York. +By this means our personal connection with Archibald was openly +recognized. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, confiding in his character +and his American nationality, gave him certain political reports +which were not even in cipher, to take to Vienna. Archibald had +also offered to take papers to Berlin for me. I, however, declined +with thanks, as I scented danger, and I would have warned Dumba +also, if I had known that he intended to entrust dispatches to +Archibald. The English seized the latter in Kirkwall and took away +all his papers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Since then I have never set eyes on Archibald, and I could not +help suspecting that there was something uncanny about the case. +By arresting Archibald the English undoubtedly thought they would +compromise me. I cannot prove that there was anything wrong with +Archibald, but in all the circumstances he could easily have destroyed +the papers, had he wished to do so. In the meanwhile a report was +found among the dispatches of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador +transmitting to his Government a memorandum from the Hungarian +journalist, Warm. In this note Warm recommended propaganda to induce +a strike among the Hungarian workers in arms and munitions factories, +and demanded money for this object. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The statement of Dumba's report that the Ambassador had shown the +suggestion to Captain von Papen, who had thought it very valuable, +was very compromising for us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The German Military Attaché was therefore placed in an awkward +position; the letter contained several other blazing indiscretions. +Thus, for instance, in one paper Dumba described President Wilson +as self-willed, and <a name="page_199"><span class="page">Page +199</span></a> von Papen in a letter to his wife spoke of the "imbecile +Yankees." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As I previously mentioned, the position of the Austro-Hungarian +Ambassador was much shaken by the Dumba-Bryan episode. His defence, +that he had only forwarded the note of an Hungarian journalist, +without identifying himself with it, was not favorably received by +the American Government. A few days later his passport was presented +to him; at the same time the Entente granted him a safe conduct. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Previous to his departure from New York similar scenes took place +to those which followed the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Hotel St. Regis, in which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador lived, +was surrounded day and night by innumerable reporters. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When I called on him there to take leave of him, I had to make +use of a back entrance to the hotel in order to avoid numerous +impertinent questions. Dumba himself was followed at every step +by reporters, who among other things often chased him for hours +on end in motor-cars. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the meanwhile Rintelen (mentioned in the fifth chapter) had +been taken prisoner in England. Further, the case of Fay led to +a disagreeable discussion in public, and lastly action was taken +against the Hamburg-Amerika Line for supplying our squadron of +cruisers with coal and provisions. Thus it was easy for the Entente +agents to establish connection between these offenders and the +Military and Naval Attachés of the German Embassy. How far +these gentlemen were really implicated I did not know at the time, +nor do I now. In this they must plead their own case. As far as +I am concerned both gentlemen always denied that they in any way +transgressed against the American law. It cannot, +<a name="page_200"><span class="page">Page 200</span></a> +however, be denied that they were, in fact, compromised by their +relations with these guilty parties; I do not think that anything +beyond this can be authenticated. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Captain von Papen's reputation, therefore, suffered from the time +of the Dumba-Archibald incident; both he and Captain Boy-Ed were +constantly attacked in the anti-German Press, and accused of being +behind every fire and every strike in any munition factory in the +United States. The <i>New York Herald</i> and the <i>Providence +Journal</i> took the leading parts in this business. At the same +time a campaign was begun against the German-Americans, who were +accused of being practically without exception disloyal citizens of +the United States. All the various incidents, accusations, so-called +conspiracies, etc., were grist to the Entente's mill, and were +exploited to the full. Congress was about to assemble, and it was +therefore to be expected that the Government would take steps to +strengthen its position. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mr. Lansing asked me on 1st December to call on him and informed +me that the American Government had requested that von Papen and +Boy-Ed should be recalled, as they were no longer <i>personœ +gratœ!</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To my inquiry as to the reasons for this action, Lansing refused +to reply; he merely remarked that any Government was within its +rights in simply stating that a member of a diplomatic corps was +not <i>persona grata</i>. In the course of further conversation, +however, I discovered one thing at least, that Capt. Boy-Ed was +supposed to have been conspiring with the Mexican General +Huerta—an obviously baseless charge, considering that Boy-Ed +had never made the acquaintance of the ex-President. It is true, +however, that Rintelen had had dealings with Huerta, and it was +known that Rintelen had received from Boy-Ed the sum of half a +million dollars previously mentioned. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_201"><span class="page">Page 201</span></a> My first +message—written in English—to Berlin on this affair +ran as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Message</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 4th December, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In an official Note of to-day's date American Government, as stated +in previous conversations with me, request immediate recall of +Military and Naval Attachés, on the ground of various facts +brought to notice of Government, particularly implication of these +Attachés in illegal and doubtful activities of certain +individuals within United States. Government deeply regrets necessity +for this step, and trusts Imperial Government will understand that +no other course seems to them to be compatible with the interests +of the two Governments and their reciprocal friendly relations." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I also telegraphed as follows to my Government on September 5th: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"Explanations of von Papen and Boy-Ed herewith as requested by Military +and Naval Authorities: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"'State Department request my recall. Reasons for this given to +Ambassador. Case of Stegler and my two supposed meetings with Huerta. +Stegler case settled since March. Stegler in matter of his pass +proved a liar. Had nothing to do with his transactions; not the +least proof that I ever had; see my report No. 4605, March 20th, and +others. I have never in my life met Huerta; I have never concerned +myself with Mexican affairs in any way; I have never to my knowledge +acted contrary to the interests or laws of the United States. +Conjectures and absurd newspaper stories about me result of English +<a name="page_202"><span class="page">Page 202</span></a> influence and +money. Must therefore request my recall be considered unjustifiable. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"'<span class="sc">Boy-En.</span>' +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"'No illegal action can be laid to my charge; demand for recall +unjustified. Importance of military interests of our enemies here +renders necessary effective representation of Central Powers, so +long as America officially neutral. Therefore it should be insisted +on that American Government secure safe-conduct for my successor. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"'<span class="sc">Papen.</span>'" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +In view of the approaching session of Congress, the Government, +on December 5th, published the fact that they had demanded the +recall of the Attaches. This fact, with slight foundation for the +American Government's suspicions, made a bad impression in Berlin; +I went therefore, to see Mr. Lansing on December 8th, and obtained +from him this letter: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"As I have already stated, the demand for recall of the two +Attachés of your Embassy was made as a result of the careful +investigation of a number of facts and circumstances, which convinced +this Government that they could no longer consider these two officers +as <i>personœ gratœ</i>, and that their continued residence +in the United States was, therefore, no longer compatible with diplomatic +propriety. This being the considered and deliberate view of this +Government, it would seem that the mere fact of Captains von Papen +and Boy-Ed being no longer acceptable, should have been sufficient +justification for their immediate recall by the German Government +without further discussion. The expectations of the United States +Government, in this respect, were in accordance with all diplomatic +precedent in cases where such requests <a name="page_203"><span +class="page">Page 203</span></a> have been made, and there seemed +to be, therefore, no reason why this demand should have been kept +a secret. It is regretted that the Imperial Government should have +regarded the publication of the American request as an act of +discourtesy towards itself. The United States Government does not +share this view of its action, and, therefore, cannot be expected +to express its regret for having acted as it has done. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"This Government is surprised that the Imperial Government should +not have complied at once with its request for the recall of the +two Attachés, who are no longer <i>personœ gratœ</i> +here. It seems to me obvious that whatever may have been the reasons +for such request, it is for this Government, and not for the German +Government, to say whether the charges alleged against the members +of a German diplomatic mission appear sufficiently well-founded to +justify action such as that now taken. In other words, the causes +of the demand are legitimate and sufficient, as being based on +suppositions or suspicions of undesirable activities on the part +of these two officers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In any case, the fact remains, that Boy-Ed and von Papen are no +longer acceptable to this Government. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As I already apprised you by word of mouth, and in my letter of +4th of this month, the relations of the two Attachés with +individuals who participated in illegal and questionable activities, +are established. The names of von Wedell, Rintelen, Stegler, +Buröde, Archibald and Fay may be mentioned as some of those +who have transgressed against our laws. I could also name other +men and cite other examples of their activities, but as these are +at present the object of an official inquiry, I, by this means, +should only prevent the arrest of those who violated our laws and +still continue to violate them. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Although I have already said that this Government <a +name="page_204"><span class="page">Page 204</span></a> does not +want to do anything further than to request the recall of Boy-Ed +and von Papen, since they are no longer <i>personœ gratœ</i>, +I, nevertheless, do not desire to go beyond the above declaration; +so that your Government may be in a position to institute an inquiry +into the manner of dealing with your Attachés, should it +wish to do so. If I should go into further details on this matter +I might interfere with the inquiry which is now being taken up +by this Government, dry up very valuable sources of information, +and thus hinder the course of justice. On the other hand there +might thus be raised other grounds for suspicion, serving rather +to disturb than to improve the present friendly relations between +the two countries. I need not tell your Excellency, that it is +the sincere wish of this Government to avoid difficulties of this +kind, so far as may be consistent with its dignity and its +responsibilities." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Besides dispatching a copy of the above letter, I wired to Berlin +on 8th December, as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Convinced that Rintelen is the main cause of the Attachés' +recall. Immediate categorical disavowal is absolutely necessary. Only +possible connection with us is matter of 500,000 dollars, received +from the Naval Attaché and demanded for the exportation of +goods." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Thereupon I received the following wireless message in English: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"You are empowered to disclaim connection with Rintelen, who had +no orders to do anything whatsoever, which was an offence against +the American law. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Jagow.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_205"><span class="page">Page 205</span></a> The peculiar +relations of the Naval and Military Attachés with the Embassy +had, even in times of peace, often led to diplomatic difficulties. +For instance, it has often happened to us and to other countries to +have to recall Military or Naval Attachés for spying. The +diplomatic standing of the head of the Mission would not generally +be affected thereby, but, in view of the passions of wartime, and the +general tension of nerves, I realized that I might be compromised +by the demand for the recall of the Attachés. I questioned +Lansing outright on this point, and added that I should immediately +hand in to my Government my resignation, if I was considered to +be myself "tarred with the same brush." The Secretary of State +assured me that I was by no means involved, and that I should not +on any account give up my post, since I had to carry on the momentous +negotiations now in course, and the American Government had full +confidence in me. Under the circumstances I saw no reason why the +enforced recall of the Attachés should have any further +results, and I was confirmed in this view a few days later when +House repeated to me Lansing's assurance with even greater emphasis. +His exact words were as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"You must not dream of going home before peace is declared. You +are the one tie that still binds us to Germany. If this tie should +break, war would be inevitable." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Both Attachés returned to Berlin under safe-conduct from +the Entente at the end of December, 1915. Their offices were taken +over by their representatives, but only for the purpose of settling +up any outstanding matters. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the beginning of 1916, there was in the United States no single +German organization which merited the name of "propaganda." Thus no +activities which could compromise us in any way ensued henceforward. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_206"><span class="page">Page 206</span></a> The political +situation had become so serene that we had no need for propaganda. +The pacifist elements in the United States did this work for us. +The only question was as to whether we would remain really at one +with them, or whether we meant to persist in submarine warfare, +which must inevitably lead us into war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +President Wilson opened Congress on 7th December, 1915, with a +message, in which he set forth the new programme for national defence. +"Preparedness" became the order of the day in the United States. +The message demanded that the Army and Navy should be increased, +and added: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The urgent question of our mercantile and passenger shipping is +closely connected with the problem of national supply. The full +development of our national industries, which is of such vital +importance to the nation, pressingly calls for a large commercial +fleet. It is high time to make good our deficiencies on this head +and to restore the independence of our commerce on the high seas." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +In this message may be recognized the second important point in +the Presidential programme for the next election. "Peace and +Preparedness" was to be the battle-cry of the Democratic Party. The +Mexican imbroglio of 1913-14 had proved that the armed forces of +the United States were unequal even to the demands of a comparatively +small campaign; and the American Government, for lack of means, +had been unable to impose its will on Mexico. Now the European +War stirred all imaginations and offered a favorable occasion for +overcoming the prejudices of the pacifist section against military +armaments. It was not so long since the song "I didn't raise my +boy to be a soldier," was sung with fervor all the land over; but +now events had too clearly proved the powerlessness of any but +well-armed nations <a name="page_207"><span class="page">Page +207</span></a> even to follow their own lines of policy; and the +necessity of a mercantile marine of their own grew daily clearer +to the people of the United States. Hitherto the Americans had +always found enough of foreign vessels for the transport of their +goods, had found it cheaper to make use of these facilities than to +supply their own under the conditions existing in the States. Now, +however, the shortage of merchant tonnage was acute, and American +goods were piled roof high in all the warehouses of New York harbor. +It was clear that now or never was the time to seize the chance +afforded by the war of persuading Congress to sanction the provision +of a strong Army and Fleet. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Presidential message also touched on the "conspiracies," but +without any mention of the German Embassy's supposed share in them. +The period of these so-called "conspiracies" thus closed with a +sharp reprimand addressed by Mr. Wilson to the German-Americans, +and with my official recommendation to the Germans in the United +States to abstain from all forms of illegal action. The after-effects +of this period, however, may be traced in the subsequent lengthy +trials of the various offenders. I cannot be sure that since the +beginning of 1916, not one single incident which could be comprised +under the term "conspiracy" came to light; but these trials and +Entente propaganda kept the recollection of such affairs alive, and +the American war propaganda service had no difficulty subsequently +in retelling the old tales which, but for the entry of the United +States into the war, would have passed into oblivion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The paragraphs of the message dealing with this subject ran as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"We are at peace with all the nations of the world, and there is +reason to hope that no question in controversy <a name="page_208"><span +class="page">Page 208</span></a> between this and other Governments +will lead to any serious breach of amicable relations, grave as +some differences of attitude and policy have been and may yet turn +out to be. I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our +national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. +There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under +other flags, but welcomed by under our generous naturalization laws +to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured +the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national +life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our +Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they +thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at +them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. +Their number is not great as compared with the whole number of +those sturdy hosts by which our nation has been enriched in recent +generations out of virile foreign stocks; but it is great enough to +have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have made it necessary +that we should promptly make use of processes of law by which we +may be purged of their corrupt distempers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we +are without adequate federal laws to deal with it. I urge you to +enact such laws at the earliest possible moment, and feel that in +doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and +self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty +and anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are +infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close over +them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property, they have +entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government, +they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of +the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. <a +name="page_209"><span class="page">Page 209</span></a> It is possible +to deal with these things very effectually. I need not suggest the +terms in which they may be dealt with." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The message, up to a point, maintained an impartial attitude, for it +not only blamed the German-Americans but continued in the following +words, aimed solely at the many Americans in London and Paris who +disapproved of Wilson's policy of peace and neutrality: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"I wish that it could be said that only a few men, misled by mistaken +sentiments of allegiance to the governments under which they were +born, had been guilty of disturbing the self-possession and +misrepresenting the temper and principles of the country during +these days of terrible war, when it would seem that every man who +was truly an American would instinctively make it his duty and +his pride to keep the scales of judgment even and prove himself a +partisan of no nation but his own. But it cannot. There are some +men among us, and many resident abroad who, though born and bred in +the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so forgotten +themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their passionate +sympathy with one or the other side in the great European conflict +above their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States. +They also preach and practise disloyalty. No laws, I suppose, can +reach corruptions of the mind and heart; but I should not speak of +others without also speaking of these and expressing the even deeper +humiliation and scorn which every self-possessed and thoughtfully +patriotic American must feel when he thinks of them and of the +discredit they are daily bringing upon us." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +About the turn of the year 1915-16, the severance of diplomatic +relations between the American and Austro-Hungarian <a +name="page_210"><span class="page">Page 210</span></a> Governments +had become imminent. The Italian liner <i>Ancona</i> was torpedoed +on November 7th in the Mediterranean Sea by an Austro-Hungarian +submarine and went down before all the passengers could succeed +in escaping; many lives were lost, American citizens being among +them. In consequence, the Washington Government dispatched to Vienna +a Note couched in far stronger terms than any it had yet sent; +demanding that the action should be admitted to be unlawful and +inexcusable, that compensation should be made, and that the officer +responsible should be punished for his deed, which would be branded +by the whole world as inhuman and barbarous, and would incur the +abhorrence of all civilized nations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Austro-Hungarian representative, Baron Zwiedeeneck von Suedenhorst, +found himself in an extremely difficult position. Owing to the +fact that he only ranked as chargé d'affaires, and that +his appointment only dated from Dr. Dumba's departure, he was not +empowered to enter into negotiations. He had always proved himself +a very loyal colleague and acted in close co-operation with me, but +in this instance, as the matter was one solely for Vienna's decision, +I could be of little service to him. I counselled him to telegraph +frankly to his Government, that if the American demands were not +conceded, a breach was to be expected. I was myself inclined to +believe that, as in the case of our Naval and Military Attachés, +Mr. Wilson's real purpose was to give the lie to those accusations +of weakness which the Entente party was constantly casting in his +teeth, and this, I thought, accounted for the unwonted sternness of +the American Note, which seemed absolutely to challenge a rupture. +It was not conceivable that the Austrian Government could swallow +this bitter pill, while from the point of view of the American +Government, the breaking-off of relations would be a real <a +name="page_211"><span class="page">Page 211</span></a> diplomatic +victory; for on the one hand the political situation would remain +unchanged so long as the German Embassy was in Washington, and +on the other hand, Mr. Wilson would have achieved his object and +shown the Berlin Government that his threats of war were seriously +meant. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +However, the Austro-Hungarian Government, after a short further +exchange of Notes, complied under protest with the American demands. +I learned after my return home that in so doing, they acted under +pressure from the German Foreign Office. Thus, this crisis also +blew over, not, however, without a serious loss of prestige for +the Central Powers, who had been compelled to yield to demands +generally regarded as utterly unacceptable. Nothing could be more +fatal to our position in the world than this alternation of defiance +and submission, which served no diplomatic object and merely betrayed +infirmity of purpose. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_212"><span class="page">Page 212</span></a> +CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" CRISIS +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In Germany, and particularly before the Committee of the National +Assembly, the American Government has been reproached with <i>mala +fides</i> for having unnecessarily reopened the <i>Lusitania</i> +question. The line of argument is approximately as follows: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> case one can suspect the +obstinate harping on the <i>Lusitania</i> affair, which had really +died down, as a sign of <i>mala fides</i>. Did the Americans want +to secure a fresh diplomatic success against us? They had already +carried their principle with the settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> +case; was their object now to make a still greater splash? The +continued possibility of a conflict with Germany—which was +quite within practical politics if nothing intervened—made a +very favorable background to make clear to American public opinion, +in conjunction with a campaign on the same lines by Wilson himself, +the following point: "We must get ourselves out of this situation +pregnant with war by vindicating our right with both sides." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Apart from the fact that the negotiations on the <i>Lusitania</i> +question had been allowed to hang fire for about six weeks I believe +that in this case we have again underestimated the significance of +hostile public opinion in America. The best way of making clear the +situation in the United States will probably be for me to reproduce +here the telegrams and reports in which I informed Berlin of the +reopening of the <i>Lusitania</i> negotiations. +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<a name="page_213"><span class="page">Page 213</span></a> +1. <span class="sc">Report in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +Washington, 23rd November, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Secretary of State Lansing after long hesitation took up the +<i>Lusitania</i> question again with me. At the beginning of October +I had handed to him a draft of a letter which contained what I thought +myself able to write to him within the scope of my instructions. +This draft was merely intended to serve as a basis for more detailed +negotiations and was only to be regarded as official in case the +American Government should regard the whole incident as satisfactorily +settled. There was nothing to be gained by stirring up public opinion +again here by publishing documents which were regarded from the +beginning as unsatisfactory. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As I have several times had the honor to report, there is, in my +opinion, no hope of settling the <i>Lusitania</i> question, as the +American Government does not think that it can agree to refer it +to a court of arbitration <i>now</i>. They are, however, counting +here on a decision at a later date by such a court, which would +be sure to award the Americans an indemnity, because the Hague +court of arbitration from its very nature is obliged to stand for +the protection of neutral non-combatants. Consequently, Mr. Lansing +cannot understand why we do not pay the indemnity of our own accord +and so settle the whole matter, especially as, in view of our pledge +for the future, it is of no practical importance to us. Mr. Lansing +is primarily concerned with the indemnity, whereas President Wilson +now, as formerly, lays the chief weight on the pledge for the future +and the humanitarian aspect of the question. Mr. Wilson always keeps +his eye fixed on the two closely connected goals: the development +of international law with regard to the freedom of the seas and +the restoration of peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_214"><span class="page">Page 214</span></a> Mr. Lansing +now reopens the <i>Lusitania</i> question for the following reasons, +part of which he has himself openly stated, and the rest have become +known to me through other channels. In the first place the Government +is afraid of attacks in the impending Congress. It was, therefore, +eminently desirable that it should be able to inform Congress that +something had been done in the <i>Lusitania</i> affair. Even if +nothing comes of it they could answer that they are waiting for a +reply from Germany. President Wilson himself does not believe in +the possibility of the question being solved, and hopes to keep +the matter in the air until the conclusion of peace, provided that +public opinion does not become restive or new eventualities occur. +The <i>Ancona</i> affair has had an unfavorable effect in this +respect. Even though it has not aroused any great excitement, it +has caused the whole question to be reopened, and everyone on this +side lays at our door the responsibility for the Austrian act; +for they base their reasoning on the assumption that the war is +directed entirely from Berlin. Whenever mention is made of the +<i>Ancona</i> incident it recalls the fact that the <i>Lusitania</i> +question still remains unsettled. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is a well known fact that we are faced here with an anti-German +ring of great influence. I have repeatedly pointed this out in +my reports. This ring is trying to exploit the <i>Ancona</i> and +<i>Lusitania</i> questions with a view to driving into the background +the American Note to England and the British infringements of +international law. The Government is treating this anti-German +ring with the same weakness as are the majority of American private +citizens. They are submitting patiently to terrorization as well +as continual baiting and sneering. The recluse at the White House +has, indeed, great plans, but his freedom of decision is seriously +compromised by his anxiety to be re-elected. He refuses to allow +himself to <a name="page_215"><span class="page">Page 215</span></a> +be drawn into too serious extravagances; and so he certainly deserves +the credit for having prevented war with Germany, but he allows +himself, nevertheless, to be influenced by the anti-German ring +and hampered in the pursuit of his plans. +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +2. <span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 2nd December, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Government here have lost their nerve as a result of the impending +Congress, the Hapag case, the <i>Ancona</i> incident, and the explosions +and fires in munition and powder works, and like all private individuals +here are allowing themselves to be terrorized by the anti-German +ring. Hence the anxiety for the recall of Papen and Boy-Ed. The +Government fear that Congress will take the above questions, as +well as the <i>Lusitania</i> affair, into their own hands, and +deal with them in more radical fashion than the Government. This +is the reason for the present demand for the recall—which +is intended to serve as a safety-valve—lest Congress should +break off diplomatic relations with us. Whether there is any real +danger of this happening it is difficult to say. Lansing thinks +there is. In any case everything is possible in the present state +of public feeling. They have not the courage to swim against the +stream. Perhaps the recall of the attachés will still the +storm for a time, as was the case with Dernburg and Dumba; meanwhile +everything turns on the attitude of Congress, who, it is to be +hoped, will not be anxious to declare war on us. Colonel House, +who is a good reader of the barometer here, sees no danger. I, +personally, also do not believe that Congress will decide to resort +to extremes on one side,—<i>i.e.</i>, without attacking +England—for the breaking-off of diplomatic relations would +certainly be quickly followed by war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_216"><span class="page">Page 216</span></a> "In any +case it is my sacred duty to inform your Excellency that Congress +may produce unpleasant surprises, and that we must, therefore, be +prepared to do <i>something</i> with regard to the <i>Lusitania</i> +question. How far we can approach the Lansing draft it is difficult +to judge from here. It depends in the first place on the state of +public opinion in Germany, for the matter has no further practical +importance since we have pledged ourselves to spare passenger-ships. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Hitherto my personal relations with the American Government have been +so good that it was always possible to prevent the worst happening. +Lansing volunteered yesterday to send this telegram. But if the +matter once gets into the hands of Congress it will be much more +difficult to exert influence, especially as nothing can be kept +secret here. It is not yet possible to say when Congress will ask +for the <i>Lusitania</i> documents, but it will probably be in a +few weeks' time, provided that no diplomatic understanding can +be reached meanwhile." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +3. <span class="sc">Report in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 7th December, 1915. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The action that <i>Congress</i> will take with regard to the +<i>Lusitania question</i> is of primary importance for us. It is +my opinion that President Wilson, when he asked for the recall of +our two attachés, had the thought in the back of his mind +that Congress would let the <i>Lusitania</i> question rest for a time, +because relations with Germany are already sufficiently strained and +only the rabid pro-English want war. One cannot, however, count on +anything now, because the anti-German ring are seeking to terrorize +all who do not agree with them. The senators and members of Congress +from the west are certainly more difficult to influence, as their +constituents have only <a name="page_217"><span class="page">Page +217</span></a> a slight economic interest in the cause of our enemies. +It is also probable that the senators from the south will all stand +by us, because they are very much embittered against England on +account of the cotton question. Nevertheless, we must, as I have +already pointed out by telegram, be fully prepared for further +negotiations on the subject of the <i>Lusitania</i>. If we refuse +to give way at all, the breaking of diplomatic relations, followed +by war, is inevitable. In my opinion it is out of the question to +find a formula that will satisfy public opinion on both sides. +It may, however, be possible to find a formula that will skim over +the points of contention, as was done in the <i>Arabic</i> case. +In spite of all the outcry over here there is no doubt that the +American Government and the greater part of public opinion would +be only too delighted if we could find a graceful way of settling +the <i>Lusitania</i> question without a conflict. What is required +in the first place is: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"1. A. declaration on our side that the attack on the <i>Lusitania</i> +should be regarded as an act of reprisal and, therefore, not within +the scope of existing international law. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"2. The payment of an indemnity, which in my opinion could be made +without committing ourselves on the question of responsibility. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"President Wilson had hoped that the whole question could be shelved +until after the end of the war. Now the war still drags on, and Mr. +Wilson is afraid of radical intervention on the part of Congress. +Over here it is quite impossible to prophesy. The unexpected is the +only thing that consistently recurs. No one can say what Congress will +do. Meanwhile, it is my duty to describe the situation as I see it +to-day. Whether the <i>Lusitania</i> question <a name="page_218"><span +class="page">Page 218</span></a> is of sufficient practical importance +to allow it to bring upon us the breaking-off of diplomatic relations +and war with the United States I must leave it to the exalted judgment +of your Excellency to decide." +</p> + +<hr class="line"> + +<p class="indent"> +The American Government had established a basis for the negotiations +with regard to the <i>Lusitania</i> and "the Freedom of the Seas" +which was in our favor when, on the 21st October, they sent a very +circumstantial Note to London in which they demonstrated that the +English blockade was a breach of international law and definitely +stated that this blockade was neither effective, legal nor defensible. +Further, that the United States could not, therefore, submit to an +infringement of her rights as a neutral through measures which were +admittedly reprisals, and, consequently, contrary to international +law. That she could not with equanimity allow her rights to be +subordinated to the plea that the peculiar geographical position +of the enemies of Great Britain justified measures contrary to +international law. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The conclusion of the Note read as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"It is of the highest importance to neutrals not only of the present +day, but of the future, that the principles of international right +be maintained unimpaired. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which +have received the sanction of the civilized world against the lawless +conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the great +conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United +States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that +task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality +which from the outbreak of the war it has <a name="page_219"><span +class="page">Page 219</span></a> sought to exercise in its relations +with the warring nations." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The above programme was in accordance with the proposal of the +American Note of 21st July, which had touched on the subject of +co-operation in realizing the "Freedom of the Seas." It was, however, +clear to me, apart from anything else, that the United States would +not expend energy in championing the rights of neutrals so long +as a conflict with Germany threatened. The settlement of the +<i>Arabic</i> question gave grounds for hope that the views of +the two Governments on the question of submarine warfare would +coincide. This appeared to me to be the most important point; the +American Government, however, insisted on the settlement of the +<i>Lusitania</i> incident, which I foresaw was going to prove a +very difficult problem. Even in the <i>Arabic</i> affair it was +only by my own independent action that it was possible to avoid +a break. The <i>Lusitania</i> question, however, was much more +unfavorable to us because at that time the old instructions to +submarine captains were still in force. I should, therefore, have +been glad to avoid negotiations on the <i>Lusitania</i> question, +but Mr. Lansing insisted on a settlement before he spoke on the +future "Freedom of the Seas." The reason for this attitude of the +Secretary of State, as appears in my reports reproduced above, lay +in the state of public opinion. It was unfortunately impossible +for the American Government to carry through the policy they had +adopted in respect to England so long as the <i>Lusitania</i> question +was brought forward daily in the American Press. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The negotiations should have been carried through orally and +confidentially between Mr. Lansing and myself. Unfortunately, however, +it was impossible to keep anything confidential in Washington, +particularly as, very <a name="page_220"><span class="page">Page +220</span></a> much against my wishes, the conversations were protracted +for weeks. The state department was continually besieged by journalists, +who reported in their papers a medley of truth and fiction about +each of my visits. In this way they provoked denials, and so ended +by getting a good idea of how the situation stood. In addition to +this, authoritative persons in Berlin gave interviews to American +journalists, who reported to the United States papers everything +that they did not already know. Consequently, the negotiations did +not progress in the way Mr. Lansing and I had expected. We wanted +to arrive quickly at a formula and make it known at once. Public +opinion in both countries would then have been set at rest, and the +past would have been buried so long as no fresh differences of opinion +and conflict arose out of the submarine war. The formula, however, +was not so easy to arrive at. The wording of the Memorandum which +I was to present to the American Government had to be repeatedly +cabled to Berlin, where each time some alteration was required in +the text that Mr. Lansing wanted. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The American Government held to the point of view which they had +formulated in the Note of the 21st July, as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"...for a belligerent act of retaliation is <i>per se</i> an act +beyond the law and the defense of an act as retaliatory is an admission +that it is illegal." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The standpoint of the American Note of the 21st July, 1915, shows +clearly the mistake of treating the submarine war as reprisals. +It shows how every surrender of a position compromises the next. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The German Government, on the other hand, refused under any +circumstances to admit the illegality of the submarine warfare within +the war-zone, because they regarded the right to make reprisals +as a recognized part <a name="page_221"><span class="page">Page +221</span></a> of the existing international law. Further, the +American demand was regarded in Germany as a deliberate humiliation, +as well as an attempt to coerce us unconditionally to renounce +unrestricted submarine warfare once and for all. To have admitted +that the submarine war was a breach of international law would +have involved us in the same unpleasant consequences to which now, +after our defeat, we are compelled to submit. If we admitted the +illegality of the submarine campaign we should have been obliged, +on the conclusion of peace, to meet all the demands for damages +arising out of it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For the third time, then, the word "illegal" brought us face to +face with a crisis which was within an ace of causing a rupture +of diplomatic relations. The last days of the negotiations turned +out very unfortunately for us. Mr. Lansing and I had agreed upon +a formula in which the word "illegal" did not occur, because my +instructions categorically prohibited its use. In Berlin it was +not yet known that we had arrived at the desired agreement, and +it was there thought necessary to call public attention to the +danger of the situation, and explain the seriousness of the position +in the hope that by this means the American Government might be +moved to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On 5th February, Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann gave an interview +to the Associated Press in which he said he did not wish to conceal +the seriousness of the position. That Germany could under no +circumstances admit the illegality of the submarine campaign within +the war-zone. The whole crisis arose from the new demand of America +that Germany should admit the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i> to be +an act infringing the law of nations. Germany could not renounce +the submarine as a weapon. If the United States insisted on bringing +about a break Germany could do nothing further to avoid it. The <a +name="page_222"><span class="page">Page 222</span></a> Imperial +Chancellor confirmed these statements in a conversation with the +Berlin correspondent of <i>The World</i>. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +These interviews compromised once more the settlement of the +negotiations, because the American Government were doubtful as to +whether they could allow the word "illegal" to be omitted, after the +sharp difference of opinion between the two Governments had become +public property. The agreement which had been reached voluntarily +now looked like a weak surrender before a German threat. In the +end, however, a compromise was arrived at. I handed to Mr. Lansing +in writing a declaration amounting to an admission that reprisals +were admissible, but that they should not be allowed to injure +neutrals, and that therefore the German Government regretted the +incident and were prepared to offer satisfaction and compensation. +The American Government were willing to confirm the receipt of this +Memorandum and declare themselves satisfied. Fate, however, had +decreed that I should play the rôle of Sisyphus at Washington. +Scarcely were the negotiations terminated when the German Government, +on the 8th February, declared the so-called "ruthless submarine +war," <i>i.e.</i> announced to the sea powers their intention of +sinking armed merchantmen without warning and without regard to +crew or passengers. In view of this the American Government refused +to complete the exchange of letters on the subject of the +<i>Lusitania</i>. Instead of this there began a new controversy +on the question of "armed merchantmen." My hope of settling the +<i>Lusitania</i> question and then passing on to the discussion +of "Freedom of the Seas" was shattered. This hit me all the harder +as I was convinced that the conversations on the latter question +would have developed into peace negotiations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The opinion has been expressed in Germany that the <a +name="page_223"><span class="page">Page 223</span></a> breaking-off +of diplomatic relations at this stage was regarded, even in America, +as precipitate, since no really acute provocation had been given. +That it was a shamelessly engineered break after we had in principle +yielded on every point. That the Americans had apparently been +bluffing and continually increasing their demands with a view of +enhancing their own prestige by scoring further diplomatic successes +against us which, in view of the previous course of events, they +could regard as certain. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In this case I do not myself believe that the American Government +were really thinking seriously of breaking off diplomatic relations. +They only wanted to pacify public opinion by a settlement of the +<i>Lusitania</i> question, which was essential before passing on +to negotiations with regard to the "Freedom of the Seas" or to +steps for peace. Threats of war arose only because the negotiations +were protracted for weeks, and the word "illegal" was discussed in +the Press in every possible tone. It was a misfortune that these +negotiations were not carried on—like the subsequent conversations +with regard to peace—in secret. I had actually persuaded the +American Government to give way on the word "illegal," which had +become much more difficult for them owing to the publicity that +was given to the negotiations. Had it not been for the ruthless +submarine campaign the <i>Lusitania</i> question would have been +finally buried and the negotiations could have been continued in a +friendly spirit. Moreover, the so-called ruthless submarine campaign +was, according to the opinion of Admiral von Tirpitz, who was at +that time still in office, although he was not consulted until +the decision was taken, a military farce. He declared the order +to be technically nonsense, and the pompous way in which it was +issued as unnecessarily provocative and a challenge. The whole +thing was neither "fish nor flesh." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_224"><span class="page">Page 224</span></a> The +controversy over the "armed merchantmen" had a prologue which could +only be described as a comedy of errors, were the matter not so +serious. It is well known that the constitution of the United States +allows the President the right of independent political action. +He alone is responsible, and his Secretary of State and the other +Ministers are only his assistants, without personal responsibility. +Mr. Wilson has made much greater use of his rights in this respect +than even Mr. Roosevelt. From the very beginning his administration +was a one-man Government. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In general terms the development of democracy in America amounts +to this, that the electors vest unlimited rights in one man for a +short time, and after that they re-elect or replace him according +to whether he has won or lost their confidence. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus arises a sort of temporary autocracy which combines the advantages +of a monarchy and a democracy. Whether this historically developed +system really coincides with our idea of formal democracy is another +question. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +However this may be, the political life of a nation is not to be +ruled by catch-words. History is the only builder of state organisms. +No one can foretell in what direction our young democracy will +develop. In view of the indifference of the German people to politics +it may be assumed, however, that it will develop on similar lines +to that of America when we have once accepted the principle of the +election of the President by the people. Such a President will +always possess great power and authority in his relation to other +bodies, while it is probable that the German people will be willing +to leave political affairs in the hands of the man they have elected, +and will even give him charge of their economic affairs. The German +President of the future will certainly find <a name="page_225"><span +class="page">Page 225</span></a> himself involved in the same +differences with the Ministers responsible to the majority in the +Reichstag as the American President has had so frequently with the +Senate. In such cases the American people nearly always support +the President, directly chosen by them, and so bring corresponding +pressure to bear on the Senate. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The brief constitutional diversion from the question of "armed +merchantmen" was to give an opportunity for announcing the surprising +catastrophes which had occurred in the course of the development of +this question. About the end of the year 1915 Mr. Wilson had married +for the second time and was absent for a time from Washington. +Consequently the President seems not to have exerted the same close +control as usual over the political actions of his Ministers. In any +case he had not read, or only hastily glanced through, a Memorandum +on the submarine campaign which Mr. Lansing had handed on the 18th +January, 1916, to the representatives of the Entente, and had not +therefore realized its far-reaching importance. This Memorandum +only came to the knowledge of the Central Powers at a later date, +through the medium of the Press, which had got to know of it from +one of the Entente representatives or through some indiscretion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Memorandum went even further than the Note of the 21st July, +1915, and recognized that the use of submarines could not be prohibited +to the combatants after they had proved their value in attacking +enemy commerce. It laid down, however, that the submarine campaign +must, without interfering with its effectiveness be brought into +harmony with the general provisions of international law and with +the principles of humanity. It was, therefore, necessary on the +one side that the submarines should be instructed to conduct their +campaign within the limits laid down for cruiser-warfare against +<a name="page_226"><span class="page">Page 226</span></a> merchant +shipping, <i>i.e.</i>, they must not sink without first stopping +and examining the ship and giving the passengers and crew a chance +to save themselves. On the other side, the merchant ships were not +to carry arms, since, owing to the nature of the submarines, it +would be impossible for them to conduct their operations on the +lines of cruiser-warfare if the merchantmen were even lightly armed, +as had hitherto been permitted by the principles of international +law for purposes of defense. Under the prevailing circumstances any +arming of a merchant ship would have an offensive character. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Memorandum concluded as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness +of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any +sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the defensive +weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser +and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent Government, +and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Although this Memorandum bears no historical weight I deal with it +in detail here because it plated a leading part before the Committee +of the National Assembly as a proof that no confidence could be +placed in Mr. Wilson as a peace mediator. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I have no doubt that the Memorandum was intended to carry on the +policy of the American Notes of the 21st July and 21st October, +1915, which had given rise to the American struggle for the "Freedom +of the Seas." It was not, however, in keeping with Mr. Wilson's usual +methods to make such a sharp thrust at the Entente as the concluding +paragraph of the Memorandum represented, <a name="page_227"><span +class="page">Page 227</span></a> so long as the negotiations with +me on the subject of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident were not yet +concluded and so long as it was not absolutely sure of the support +of public opinion. Just as the Note of the 21st October, 1915, +was not sent to London until the President thought he had cleared +the way with respect to us by the settlement of the <i>Arabic</i> +question, so in January, 1916, he wanted to keep his hands free +until the chance of a conflict with us was past. The popular saying +in America is that Wilson has a single-line brain and only deals with +one matter at a time. Moreover, out of regard for the state of public +feeling in the country the President wanted to take each political +step without being openly coerced by us. It is not my intention +to defend Mr. Wilson's conception of neutrality to-day, after I +have opposed it for years, but I will only attempt, without any +personal ill-will, to contribute to Klio's work of discovering +the real truth. To me personally the matter of paramount interest +today, as at that time, is not what Mr. Wilson did or did not do, +but the question what we ought to have done in the interest of +Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I shall often have to return to the developments which, after the +31st January, 1917, made the President our open enemy. If we wish +to be lovers of truth we must distinguish sharply between the two +periods before and after the 31st January, 1917. It is certain that +Mr. Wilson was never even near to being pro-German. By descent, +education and training he was unconsciously much too much under the +English influence already mentioned. But until the 31st January, 1917, +the President had striven to be neutral. All his speeches testify +to this. No un-neutral remark of Mr. Wilson, even in private, has +ever reached my ears. He always resisted the pressure of the Entente +party, in spite of the fact that he was almost entirely surrounded +by anti-Germans. The <a name="page_228"><span class="page">Page +228</span></a> only one I could mention whose advice to the President +was always definitely neutral was Mr. House. For the rest in the +east of the United States we found ourselves morally in an enemy +country. Every neutral step taken by Mr. Wilson was immediately +hailed as "pro-German." For instance, I am convinced that the President +could never have carried out the threat contained in the final +clause of the Memorandum of the 18th January. Gradually all the +Entente merchantmen were armed. If these were to be treated in +American ports as auxiliary cruisers the whole of American commerce +would of necessity have come to a standstill, for it was already +suffering seriously from lack of freight space. The Entente knew +exactly how much value all Americans placed on their commerce, +and could therefore reject the proposal of the United States with +equanimity. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nevertheless, it is well worthy of notice that in the Memorandum +of the 18th January, 1916, the legally trained and legally minded +Secretary of State Lansing, as well as Mr. Bryan, brought forward +or attempted to bring forward a different kind of neutrality from +that of the President. The only question is whether Mr. Wilson +could at that time have carried through the Lansing policy. I do +not think so. This does not in itself relieve the President of the +responsibility of not wishing to make such a sharp thrust against +the Entente as was represented by the Memorandum so long as the +negotiations on the <i>Lusitania</i> affair still remained unsettled. +Yet throughout the whole war Holland has never followed the regulations +of the Memorandum. This fact remains. Mr. Wilson did not enforce +the Memorandum because he could not do so without prejudicing the +interests of American commerce. In this case Mr. Lansing was the +neutral advocate and the President the American politician, whose +decisions on foreign questions, as usually <a name="page_229"><span +class="page">Page 229</span></a> happens in the United States, +were actuated by domestic politics. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the issue of Mr. Wilson's protest against the English blockade, +and in view of the turn that the Lansing action against armed +merchantmen had taken, it can be understood that the German Imperial +Government hence-forward was suspicious of the good-will and power +of the President as a peace mediator. Meanwhile there came a change +in the domestic situation, and this, as I have already mentioned, +is always the decisive factor in the United States in all questions +of foreign policy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It would have been a good move on our part to wait for the result +of the <i>Lusitania</i> negotiations, and then to give Mr. Wilson +time to take in hand his policy with regard to the "Freedom of +the Seas" on his own initiative. Berlin, however, was always in a +hurry to bring in the new measures of submarine warfare, although +the disadvantages that this would cause us always outweighed the +advantages. However, the Americans themselves will perhaps some +day have occasion to regret that they did not seize the opportunity +of the war to insure the "Freedom of the Seas." If during the five +years of war—from the mobilization to the peace offer and +the armistice—we Germans were always in too great a hurry +with our decisions, the American Government, on the other hand, +lost through hesitation many an opportunity of keeping out of the +war. There could be no doubt that the United States could, as a +neutral power, have brought about a better peace than they have +done as the decisive combatant power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In January, 1916, there occurred an unfortunate misunderstanding, +which must have strengthened the German Government in their intention +of declaring the unrestricted submarine war. The Austrian representative +had an interview with Mr. Lansing with reference to the <a +name="page_230"><span class="page">Page 230</span></a> <i>Ancona</i> +incident, in which he understood the Secretary of State to say that +it would be agreeable to the American Government if the Central +Powers in future regarded armed enemy merchantmen as auxiliary +cruisers. Baron Zwiedineck sent a wireless report of this interview +to his Government via Nauen. As has already been mentioned, all our +wireless messages were read by the American Government departments, +and it had often occurred that objection had been raised. As this +message of Baron Zwiedineck was sent without protest I assumed +that Mr. Lansing had agreed to its contents. Later a confidential +discussion took place between the Secretary of State, Baron Zwiedineck +and myself, on the subject of this incident. Mr. Lansing said that +he had not read the wireless message, as such messages were only +examined by the censor, with a view to seeing that they did not +compromise the neutrality of the United States. Further, he maintained, +that Baron Zwiedineck must have misunderstood him, as he had not +made the statement imputed to him in the message. We did not treat +the conversation as official, in order not to put any greater +difficulties in Mr. Lansing's way than he already had to face as +a result of his Memorandum of 18th January. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The German Memorandum of 8th February, 1915, proclaiming the +unrestricted submarine campaign, was handed to Mr. Gerard in Berlin. +I had for the moment no further negotiations to conduct, as the +<i>Lusitania</i> question was never again reopened and the question +of the "Freedom of the Seas" had been quashed by the unrestricted +submarine campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Meanwhile Colonel House had gone for a second time to Europe, this +time as the official representative of the President. He was in +Berlin just at the time when the second <i>Lusitania</i> crisis +reached its apogee. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I had announced his visit to Berlin, and prepared <a +name="page_231"><span class="page">Page 231</span></a> everything +so that he might have every opportunity for conversation with the +authoritative political personages. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When Colonel House returned to America he told me that the time +had not yet come for the mediation of the United States. He had, +however, had the opportunity to state his views in London, Paris +and Berlin, and had met with the greatest opposition in Paris, +because France had suffered so seriously in the war that she had +little more to lose by prolonging it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In Berlin, on the other hand, he had found a disposition to agree +to mediation by Mr. Wilson when a favorable opportunity occurred. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In accordance with the wish of the President I had discussed the +peace question exclusively with Colonel House since his second +visit to Europe. This made it possible for the conversations to +be kept strictly confidential. I could call on Colonel House at +his private residence in New York at any time without attracting +attention, whereas the State Department and the White House were +always besieged by journalists as I have already mentioned. As a +rule, I took the night train to New York and called on Colonel +House in the morning, before the Press were aware that I had left +Washington. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the 8th March, according to my instructions, I handed to the +American Government a further Memorandum, which set out in concise +terms the German standpoint. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After recapitulating the various phases of the negotiations which +are already known to the reader, it defined the existing situation +with regard to the war at sea as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +England was making it impossible for the submarines to carry on +their campaign against commerce in accordance with the provisions of +international law by arming <a name="page_232"><span class="page">Page +232</span></a> practically all merchantmen, and ordering the use +of their guns for offence. Photographs of the English orders had +been sent to the neutral Governments, with the Memorandum of the +8th February, 1916. These orders are directly contrary to the +declarations of the English Ambassador in Washington on the 25th +August, 1914. The Imperial German Government had hoped that these facts +would prompt the neutral Governments to carry out the disarmament of +merchant vessels on the lines of the proposals for disarmament made +by the United States Government on 23rd January, 1916. Actually, +however, the arming of these ships with guns provided by our enemies +has been energetically pursued. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Advantage was taken by England and her Allies of the American +Government's decision not to keep her citizens off enemy merchant +ships to arm merchantmen for attack. This makes it easy for merchantmen +to destroy the submarines, and, in case of the failure of their +attack, to count themselves secure owing to the presence on board +of American citizens. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The order as to the use of arms was supplemented by instructions +given to the masters of the merchant vessels to fly false colors +and to ram the submarines. The news that prize-money was paid to +successful captains of merchant ships and honors conferred upon +them increased the effectiveness of these orders. The Allies have +associated themselves with these English measures. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Germany now finds herself faced with the following facts: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +(<i>a</i>) That for a year a blockade contrary to international law +has kept neutral commerce away from German ports and made export +from Germany impossible. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(<i>b</i>) That for six months an extension, contrary to international +law, of the laws of contraband has hampered <a name="page_233"><span +class="page">Page 233</span></a> the maritime commerce of neutral +neighbors in respect of Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(<i>c</i>) That interference with the post, contrary to international +law, is striving to cut Germany off from all communication with +the outside world. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(<i>d</i>) That systematically increased coercion of neutrals, +on the principle that "Might is right," is stopping trade with +Germany across the land frontiers, with a view to completing the +starvation blockade of the non-combatant population of the Central +Powers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(<i>e</i>) That Germans who are found at sea by our enemies are +robbed of their liberty regardless of whether they are combatants +or non-combatants. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(<i>f</i>) That our enemies have armed their merchant ships for +attack, and have thus made impossible the use of submarines in +accordance with the principles of the Declaration of London. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The English White Book, of the 5th January, 1916, with regard to the +restriction of German commerce, boasts that through these measures +Germany's export trade has been almost completely stopped, and that +her imports have been made dependent on the good-will of England. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Imperial Government may hope that, in view of the friendly +relations that have existed between the two countries for a hundred +years, the standpoint herein laid down will meet with the sympathy of +the people of the United States, in spite of the increased difficulty +of mutual understanding brought about by the conduct of our enemies. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The last words of this Memorandum were vigorously commented on by +the American Press as a proof that we wished to appeal, not to the +American Government, but to the American people, as a result of the +movement <a name="page_234"><span class="page">Page 234</span></a> +which had been set on foot in Congress, and especially in the Senate, +that American citizens should be prohibited from travelling on the +armed merchant vessels of combatant States. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The struggle which was at that time being waged in Congress has +been greatly exaggerated in Germany. At home it was thought that the +weight of opinion in Congress in favor of the warning of passengers +was very great. On the pro-German side in New York it was thought +that Congress was anxious to avert danger of a conflict. If this +could have happened through a yielding on the part of Germany, it +would, of course, have made things much easier for the Americans; +if, however, Germany refused to give way, they thought the United +States would have found a more conciliatory formula, as the country +was seeking before all things to avert war. They believed that the +re-election of 1916 had been largely won through the battle-cry, +"He kept us out of the war," which showed that Congress, with its +love of freedom, reflected the general opinion. It was, moreover, +doubted in the same quarter whether Wilson, as a pacifist candidate +for the Presidency, could declare war at that time, when there was +as yet no definite provocation—as, for example, the Mexico +Dispatch. The theory of this small pro-German group in New York +was that Congress would at that time have done anything to avoid +war, and that they had only accepted the Gore resolution in order +to humiliate the President in the eyes of the world as no head +of a State had ever been disavowed before. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the same quarter—as also happened before the Committee +of the German National Assembly—the whole question aroused +indignation. It was said that when the Germans read that it had +been pompously brought forward as a point of honor whether a few +Americans should <a name="page_235"><span class="page">Page +235</span></a> travel by enemy armed vessels, they bristled with +anger. It looked to them as though the alternatives were whether +these few Americans should travel in the war-zone on neutral ships, +or whether a great civilized nation like Germany should go under! The +matter developed from the "too proud to fight" attitude—when +Wilson really believed there was a danger of war, and so drew +back—to the tone of February, 1916—when he no longer +believed in the possibility of war, but felt sure that he could +subdue us with hard words. They thought it strange, moreover, to hear +Wilson speaking of the gradual breakdown of the delicate structure +of international law. That had resulted from England's attitude, +and in 1812 America had declared war on the English because of +an illegal blockade. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Politics are not to be carried on by indignation, but only with a +cool head and a clear vision for political realities. We could not +alter the American situation, but must strive to conduct ourselves +in such a way as to prejudice the position of the United States as +little as possible. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I had from the beginning little doubt that Mr. Wilson would make +his will prevail, because the domestic position in the United States +made any other issue impossible. The presidential election was +imminent, and the Democratic party had no likely candidate apart +from Mr. Wilson. If a split occurred within the party the Republicans +would be bound to win. Senators Stone and Gore were the leaders +of the Democratic Opposition, while the Republicans in this case +supported the policy of the President, partly because they were +on the side of the Entente, partly because they wanted to assure +the interests of American commerce. As has already been mentioned, +Senator Stone had always maintained a neutral attitude to the last, +chiefly because he was one <a name="page_236"><span class="page">Page +236</span></a> of the two representatives of Missouri, and could +not ignore the large number of Germans among his constituents. +For this reason he was called by the pro-Entente Press, like the +<i>New York Herald</i>, "pro-German Mr. Stone." Senator Gore was +a Pacifist on principle, and thought that the resolution for which +he was responsible, to prohibit Americans from travelling on armed +merchantmen, would avert the danger of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The whole Congress story can only be read as a domestic party skirmish, +with a view to the approaching Presidential election; one section of +the Democratic party wanted a candidate other than Wilson. Just as it +was at that time a mistake to expect any advantage from the Congress +Opposition, so to-day a similar mistake is made in Germany, when it +is assumed that the struggle in the Senate over the ratification +of the Peace Treaty has a pro-German background. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The debate in Congress was not in any way connected with an acute +German-American situation. It seems necessary to give here a short +survey of the negotiations, as they appeared from my point of view. +Our first concession occurred after the <i>Arabic</i> incident, our +second later, after the <i>Sussex</i> incident. Between these two +there was never any concession to America on the part of Germany, +for the shelving of the second <i>Lusitania</i> crisis constituted a +compromise. Between February, 1915, and the <i>Lusitania</i> incident +we were conducting an unrestricted submarine campaign, subsequently +a limited one, though this was not known to America until after the +sinking of the <i>Arabic</i>; after February, 1916, the unrestricted +campaign was renewed until the <i>Sussex</i> incident, after which +cruiser warfare was begun. This is all that concerned me in this +connection. Internal differences of opinion within the German +Government, such as occurred after February, 1915, did not make their +way <a name="page_237"><span class="page">Page 237</span></a> across +the Atlantic; for instance, the resumption of the unrestricted +submarine campaign in February, 1916, was discussed with me as +little as it was with the American Government itself. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From these facts it is evident that the action of Congress was +of no practical importance for us, for when, after this debate, +the <i>Sussex</i> incident occurred—when, moreover, it was +a question of an unarmed ship—Mr. Wilson was free to issue +his ultimatum, and could also have broken off diplomatic relations, +if we had refused to give way. The American Government had then no +thought of a complete defeat of Germany, such as later occurred, +for otherwise they could easily have found an excuse for coming +into the war. At that time Mr. Wilson was convinced that the war +would end in a peace without victory, for which he intended to use +his influence. The whole question was merely whether we realized +these facts and would avail ourselves of them or not. Our one asset +in America was the disinclination of the majority of the people +for war, for otherwise—as appeared later—it would have +been only too easy for the United States to make war upon us with +success. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The President wanted to continue the policy he had adopted hitherto, +by standing firm to the point of view that the submarine war must +be conducted according to the principles of international law, and, +further, was waiting to see whether the unrestricted submarine +campaign would give rise to any further incidents. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In a letter written to Senator Stone, on the 24th February, the +President defined his policy in the following terms: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to +keep the United States out of the war. I think the country will feel +no anxiety about my line of <a name="page_238"><span class="page">Page +238</span></a> action in this respect. I have devoted many anxious +months to this task under much greater difficulties than appeared on +the surface, and so far with success. The course which the Central +Powers intend to adopt in future with regard to submarine warfare, as +shown by their Memorandum, seems at the moment to raise insuperable +difficulties; but its contents are at first sight so difficult to +reconcile with the specific assurances which the Central Powers +have recently given us as to the treatment of merchant shipping +on the high seas, that I think that explanations will shortly be +forthcoming which will throw a different light on the matter. We +have in the past had no reason to doubt their good faith, or the +sincerity of their promises, and I, for my part, am confident that +we shall have none in the future. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, +has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard +the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation +of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of +American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by +any such action, we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice +as to what our own course should be. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights +of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect +of the Nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it +at any cost but the loss of honor. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be +called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. +It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the +violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation +or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto +proud position as spokesmen, even amid the <a name="page_239"><span +class="page">Page 239</span></a> turmoil of war, for the law and the +right. It would make everything this Government has attempted and +everything that it has accomplished during this terrible struggle +of nations meaningless and futile. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed +expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevitably +be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement +of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and +the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our +hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is +of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign +nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as +a Nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position +among the nations of the world." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Soon afterwards—on the 3rd March—the Senate decided by +68 votes to 14 to postpone the discussion of the Gore resolution +<i>sine die</i>. The struggle had then already ended in a victory +for Mr. Wilson when I handed over the above-mentioned Memorandum. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Regarded from our own point of view, the declaration of the +"unrestricted submarine war" was a serious political mistake, which +was not even justified by the results of the measure. The least we +could have done was to wait for the settlement of the Lusitania +question and the subsequent action of Mr. Wilson. The "unrestricted +submarine war" was not the right way to improve our situation, but +was bound inevitably to lead to a new conflict with America. It +was absolutely impossible for the submarine captains to ascertain +with certainty through the periscope whether an enemy merchant +ship was armed or not. Mistakes, therefore, were sure to arise +sooner or later. On the other hand, the Americans would <a +name="page_240"><span class="page">Page 240</span></a> not refrain +from travelling on enemy passenger ships, as their business took +them mostly to England and France, and there were not enough of +their own or neutral ships at their disposal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The one hope for the continued avoidance of a conflict was that +the Imperial Government should not withdraw the concessions they +had made on the 5th October, 1915, with regard to "liners," and +that enemy passenger ships should not be unarmed out of regard +for their neutral passengers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +There were, as a rule, no Americans on cargo ships, for there were at +that time few sailors in the United States. From the above-mentioned +letter of Mr. Wilson to Mr. Stone, however, it appeared that the +American Government regarded our concessions as applying to all +merchant vessels, while, as I have already stated, the German naval +authorities had only intended to include passenger steamers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This misunderstanding might now give rise to a fresh conflict, +even if mistakes on the part of submarine captains were by special +good fortune avoided. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_241"><span class="page">Page 241</span></a> +CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE "SUSSEX" INCIDENT +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the 24th March the unarmed passenger-ship <i>Sussex</i> was +torpedoed without warning, and several Americans lost their lives. +The first information about this incident was so vague that the +matter was at first treated in a dilatory fashion in Washington. +At the time I sent the following report to Berlin: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Report in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 4th April, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"During the fourteen months that have passed since the opening of +the submarine campaign there have been intermittent periods in which +the American Government have shown themselves aggressive towards +us, and others in which the now proverbial expression 'watchful +waiting" formed the <i>Leit-motif</i> of their attitude. The past +month belonged to the second category until the sinking of the +<i>Sussex</i> and other similar incidents stirred American public +opinion to fresh excitement. Officially I have, during the last +four weeks, heard nothing further from the American side on the +subject of the submarine campaign. During this time Mr. Lansing +even allowed himself a fortnight's holiday for recuperation. On +my side there was no occasion to reopen the submarine question +as a complete understanding with the American Government cannot +be attained,[*] and in my opinion it is advisable to avoid as far +as possible any new crisis in our <a name="page_242"><span +class="page">Page 242</span></a> relations with the United States. +I therefore contented myself with keeping in touch with Colonel House +so that I should not be taken by surprise by any <i>volte-face</i> +on the part of the American Government. As soon as a new crisis +arises Mr. Wilson will, as usual, be in a fearful hurry and bring +us to the brink of war. Whether such a crisis will be precipitated +by the <i>Sussex</i> incident, and whether the President in that +case will shrink from war at the last moment, it is difficult to +foretell, as this question—like all others at the present +moment—will be viewed exclusively from the standpoint of +the approaching presidential election. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote: *i.e., Without instructions from Berlin.] +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Except for the surprises that are usual over here, things are +at present quite calm. This is due, in the first place, to the +desire for peace shown by the population, who are not anxious to +be disturbed in their congenial occupation of money-making, and +secondly, to the development of the Mexican question. This latter +question stands in the forefront of public interest, and it seems +to be increasingly probable that the punitive expedition against +Villa will lead to a full-dress intervention. A few days ago it +was reported that Villa was defeated, then wounded, and finally +even a prisoner. All this good news proved later to be false and now +Villa is said to have escaped south and won over fresh supporters. +So long as the Mexican question holds the stage here we are, I +believe, safe from an act of aggression on the part of the American +Government. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"On the other hand it looks as though Mr. Wilson were looking for +a fresh way out of the <i>impasse</i> into which his attitude on the +question of the submarine campaign has led him. As I have already +had the honor to cable, Colonel House holds out the prospect of an +early move towards peace by the President. The view is entertained +here, and strengthened by the impressions gathered from <a +name="page_243"><span class="page">Page 243</span></a> Colonel +House, that gradually the stress of circumstances will force all +the neutral Powers into the war. If this happens there will be no +further prospect of the conclusion of peace, as there will be no one +available to set the ball rolling. It is therefore essential that the +foundations of peace should be laid before the world conflagration +spreads any further and finally destroys the prosperity of every +nation. This view may sound like pure theory, but it gains substance +from the fact that it can very well be made to harmonize with Mr. +Wilson's election campaign. In his capacity of founder of peace in +Europe, and peace-maker—i.e., indirectly conqueror—of +Mexico, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to vanquish Mr. +Wilson in the election. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt would then shout +himself hoarse to no purpose and Mr. Charles Hughes, the strongest +Republican candidate, would perhaps not even go so far as nomination +if his position seemed hopeless." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In that report I announced for the first time that Mr. Wilson had +so far changed his policy as now to put peace mediation in the +foreground and to give the question of the 'Freedom of the Seas' +second place. I shall return later to this political development. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When news reached Washington which left no doubt that the <i>Sussex</i> +had been torpedoed by a German submarine, I immediately cabled +to Berlin for instructions in order to be in a position to give +an official disavowal of the act. It required nothing further to +convince me that it was now a question of bend or break. I had no +means of knowing whether the supporters of the submarine campaign +or the partisans of an understanding with the United States would +win the day. In the former case war was inevitable. To provide for +the second alternative I recommended in my cablegram that there +should be no question of an official exchange of Notes, because I <a +name="page_244"><span class="page">Page 244</span></a> was anxious +that our withdrawal should not be accompanied by a humiliation. If our +Government were prepared to give way I regarded as the most appropriate +<i>modus procedenti</i> the immediate issue of instructions to me, +empowering me to offer the American Government satisfaction and +compensation for this fresh incident. There was no hope of purchasing +immunity from a break with any less concession than a pledge to +carry on the submarine campaign for the future in accordance with +the principles laid down by international law for cruiser warfare. I +recommended, however, a provisional cessation of the submarine war +on the basis of an oral agreement with the American Government. +If this proposal had been acted on, the American Government would +have been obliged to follow suit and there would have been no sharp +exchange of Notes, which still further prejudiced the position +on both sides. If, after such a pause in the submarine war and the +establishment of a really clear diplomatic situation, Mr. Wilson +failed us and made no positive progress either with regard to his +programme for the 'Freedom of the Seas' or the conclusion of peace, +we should have held quite a different position from which—if we +really thought it desirable—to reopen unrestricted submarine +warfare. We had always made the mistake of dealing in half-hearted +concessions. In my opinion it was essential for us to strive for +a complete understanding with America if we were not prepared to +carry on the submarine campaign without regard to consequences. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +No attention was paid to my suggestion in Berlin at the time. Admiral +von Tirpitz had just resigned and the decision had been taken against +the continuance of unrestricted submarine warfare. I do not know +why the dispatch of an official Note was preferred to the oral +negotiations I had suggested, but I think that the deciding <a +name="page_245"><span class="page">Page 245</span></a> factor was +consideration for public opinion in Germany. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +A few days later I cabled the following to Berlin: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 8th April, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"House gave me a very gloomy view of the position with regard to +the <i>Sussex</i>. At the White House the situation is regarded +as hopeless because the view is held that, in spite of Tirpitz's +resignation, the German Government, with the best will in the world, +cannot curb the submarine campaign. It has hitherto been merely +due to good luck that no American has lost his life and any moment +might precipitate a crisis which would be bound to lead to a break. +The American Government are convinced that the Sussex was torpedoed +by a German submarine. A repetition of such mistakes would be bound +to drive the United States of America into war with us, which Wilson +would greatly regret, as he is anxious—as I have already +reported—to lay the foundations of peace in a few months. +If the United States were drawn into the war all hope of an early +peace would be at an end. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I request to be furnished with instructions on the basis of which +I can pacify the Government here, which now has doubts of our <i>bona +fides</i>." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After Mr. Gerard, apart from other questions concerning doubtful +cases of torpedoing, had also submitted a similar inquiry to the +Foreign Office on the subject of the <i>Sussex</i> incident, an +official reply was handed to him on the 10th April which read in +the following terms: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"A decision as to whether the Channel steamer <i>Sussex</i> was damaged +by a German submarine or not is made extraordinarily difficult owing +to the fact that no exact <a name="page_246"><span class="page">Page +246</span></a> information is known as to the place, time and +accompanying circumstances of the sinking, and moreover a picture +of this ship could not be obtained until the 6th April. Consequently +the inquiry has had to be extended to all submarine enterprises +which took place on the day in question, 24th March, in the Channel +anywhere on the course between Folkestone and Dieppe. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In this area on the 24th March, in the middle of the English Channel, +a long, black vessel, flying no flags, with a gray funnel, small gray +superstructure and two high masts was hit by a German submarine. +The German captain was definitely convinced that she was a ship of +war, and indeed a mine-layer of the newly-built English <i>Arabic</i> +class. He was led to this conviction: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"1. By the flush deck of the ship. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"2. By the shape of the stern, which sloped outwards. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"3. By the paintwork, which was that of a ship of war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"4. By the high speed of about eighteen knots which the ship developed, +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"5. By the fact that the ship was not steering the course north +of the light buoys between Dungeness and Beachy Head within which +frequent observation had led the German submarines to keep a look +out for merchant shipping, but was in mid-Channel, heading almost +for Le Havre. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Consequently, the submarine fired a torpedo at 3.55 p.m. Central +European time, 1-1/2 knots southeast of the Bull Rock. The torpedo +struck, and so heavy an explosion occurred that the whole of the +ship forward of the bridge broke away. The unusually heavy explosion +leaves no doubt that there were large stores of ammunition on board. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The German captain has prepared a sketch of the ship he attacked, +of which two copies are sent herewith. The two copies of pictures +of the <i>Sussex</i>, also enclosed, <a name="page_247"><span +class="page">Page 247</span></a> were photographed from the English +newspaper <i>The Daily Graphic</i>, of the 27th inst. A comparison +of the sketches and the photograph shows that the vessel attacked +is not identical with the <i>Sussex</i>; particularly striking +is the difference in the position of the funnel and the shape of +the stern. No other attack was made by a German submarine on the +course between Folkestone and Dieppe at the time of the <i>Sussex</i> +incident. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"From this the German Government are obliged to assume that the +sinking of the <i>Sussex</i> is to be set down to other causes +than attack by a German submarine. Some light may be thrown on +the incident by the fact that on the 1st and 2nd April alone no +less than twenty-six English mines were destroyed in the Channel by +German naval forces. In general the whole of that area is rendered +dangerous by drifting mines and not torpedoes. Off the English +coast the Channel is also made increasingly dangerous by German +mines which have been laid for the enemy naval forces. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If the American Government should have at their disposal any further +data that may help to elucidate the <i>Sussex</i> incident, the +German Government beg that it may be communicated to them so that +they may subject it to examination. In the event of differences of +opinion arising between the two Governments the German Government +now declare themselves ready to submit the whole incident to an +International Commission in accordance with the third clause of +the 'Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International +Disputes of the 18th October, 1907.'" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I have reproduced this Note in full because its influence was quite +particularly fateful and because it was probably the most unfortunate +document that ever passed from Berlin to Washington. Mr. Wilson +thought he detected <a name="page_248"><span class="page">Page +248</span></a> a direct untruth, and the mixture of an uneasy conscience +and clumsiness which the German Note appeared to betray prompted the +sharp tone of the President's reply. For the sake of his prestige +Mr. Wilson was now compelled by the recent course of events to take +action, although the excitement of public opinion was this time +undoubtedly less than was the case after the torpedoing of the +<i>Lusitania</i> and the <i>Arabic</i>. The American Government, +therefore, couched the Note which they dispatched on the 18th April +in the terms of an ultimatum. In the meantime, the discovery in the +hull of the <i>Sussex</i> of a piece of a German torpedo placed +the matter beyond all doubt. Additional importance was given to +the ultimatum by the fact that before dispatching it Mr. Wilson +laid it personally before Congress at a special sitting. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It is my firm conviction that had it not been for this ultimatum +diplomatic relations would not have been broken off immediately, +even in 1917. In the increased tension of the situation resulting +from the exchange of Notes on the subject of the <i>Sussex</i> I +see, therefore, one of the immediate germs of the war with America. +After this exchange of Notes a challenge in the form of our formal +declaration of the 31st January, 1917, could no longer be tolerated. +The clumsiness of such formal declarations was, as I have said, +only surpassed by the regrettable impression of a juristic argument +produced by our first <i>Lusitania</i> Note. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As the American ultimatum later formed the basis on which the American +Government, immediately after the declaration of unrestricted submarine +warfare, broke off diplomatic relations, I here give the vital +contents of the American Note of the 18th April verbatim: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances +to the Government of the United <a name="page_249"><span +class="page">Page 249</span></a> States that at least passenger ships +would not be dealt thus with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted +its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire +impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would +regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the +armed naval forces of its adversaries, and deal with them as with +men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give +warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security +of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation +their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Government of the United States has been very patient. At +every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy +it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration +of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war, and to +be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people +and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations +and assurances of the Imperial Government as of course given in +entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, +that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so +to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square +its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in +the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented +conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became +unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute +an indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of +submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States +must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international +law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the <a +name="page_250"><span class="page">Page 250</span></a> Government +of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there +is but one course to pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should +now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present +methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying +vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but +to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. +This action the Government of the United States contemplates with +the greatest reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf +of humanity and the rights of neutral nations." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After this Note it is obvious that there was no longer any doubt +in Berlin, that persistence in the point of view they had hitherto +adopted would bring about a break with the United States, for I +received instructions to make all preparations for German merchant +ships lying in American ports to be rendered useless by the destruction +of their engines. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I also received orders to arrange that Mr. Gerard, who had not +been informed of the minimum demands of the American Government, +should be instructed accordingly. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +My reply was as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cablegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 1st May, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"House has informed me that at his request Gerard has already been +informed of the minimum demands of the American Government. Wilson +is strongly influenced by peace votes. Even the anti-German ring +desires the end of the war, as otherwise they fear financial loss. My +suggestions are based on the view that submarine warfare, according +to international law, is valueless, and in any case, the opening +of peace negotiations is more important. It would be advisable in +the Note of reply to touch only on the principal points, to talk +much of international <a name="page_251"><span class="page">Page +251</span></a> law and humanity, and to leave details to be settled at +a later date. I fear that the continuance of the submarine campaign, +on the lines of cruiser warfare, only means the postponement of +the rupture as fresh incidents are bound to occur." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +On the 4th May followed the German reply, which averted the fourth +serious crisis, by declaring that the submarine campaign would +return to the recognized laws of cruiser-warfare. The Note began +by opposing, in strong terms, the American view, and concluded +with the following sentences: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The German Government feel themselves justified in declaring that +it would be impossible to answer to humanity and history, if, after +twenty-one months of war the contention over the submarine war were +allowed to develop into a serious menace to peace between the German +and American peoples. Such a development the German Government +will do everything in their power to prevent. They desire, at the +same time, to make a final contribution towards confining—so +long as the war lasts—the war to the present combatant Powers, +an aim which includes the freedom of the seas, and in which the +German Government believe themselves still to be in agreement with +the Government of the United States. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"On this assumption the German Government beg to inform the Government +of the United States that instructions have been issued to the German +naval forces to observe the general principles of international +law, with regard to the holding up, searching and destruction of +merchant vessels, and not to sink any merchant vessel, even within +the war zone, without warning and rescue of the passengers and +crew, unless they attempt to escape or offer resistance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The German Government hope and expect that these <a +name="page_252"><span class="page">Page 252</span></a> new instructions +to the naval forces will also remove in the eyes of the United +States Government every obstacle that might stand in the way of the +realization of the offer of co-operation contained in the Note of +the 23rd July, 1915, towards restoring the freedom of the seas during +the war, and they do not doubt that the United States Government will +now insist with all possible emphasis on the immediate observation +by the British Government of those international rules which were +universally accepted before the war, and which are specifically stated +in the Notes of the American Government to the British Government +of the 28th December, 1914, and the 5th November, 1915. Should +it happen that the steps taken by the Government of the United +States do not meet with the desired result of insuring recognition +of the laws of humanity by all the combatant nations, the German +Government would consider themselves faced by a new situation, for +which they must reserve for themselves full freedom of decision." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The German Note reached the German Embassy piecemeal, and while +the first part was being deciphered, its harsh tone produced in +an increasing degree the impression: "Then it is war," which was +not relieved until we came to the conclusion of the text. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The attempt made by the Imperial Government to reserve to themselves +the right to resume the submarine campaign at a later date was not +accepted by Mr. Wilson, and so the difference of opinion remained, +which was bound to become a <i>casus belli</i> if we reverted to +unrestricted submarine warfare. This reservation led to a further +Note from Washington, which I give here: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The Note of the Imperial German Government under date of May 4th, +1916, has received careful consideration by the Government of the +United States. It is especially <a name="page_253"><span +class="page">Page 253</span></a> noted, as indicating the purpose +of the Imperial Government as to the future, and that it 'is prepared +to do its utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest +of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents,' and +that it is determined to impose on all its commanders at sea the +limitations of the recognized rules of international law upon which +the Government of the United States has insisted. Throughout the +months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced +on February 4th, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, +the Government of the United States has been constantly guided +and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts +to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising +from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration +of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced +the good relations between the two countries, the Government of +the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth +of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will +remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations +existing between the United States and Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state +that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government +does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly-announced +policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic +negotiations between the Government of the United States and any +other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain +passages in the Imperial Government's Note of the 4th instant might +appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to +avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United +States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment +entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion <a name="page_254"><span +class="page">Page 254</span></a> that respect by German naval +authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon +the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made +contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the +rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters +is single, not joint; absolute, not relative." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This American Note, however, in no way affected the peaceful conclusion +of the negotiations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As a direct result of the <i>Sussex</i> incident, a step forward +was taken in the question of American peace mediation. When I called +on Colonel House, during the last days of the crisis, we had a long +conversation on this question. As always, Colonel House had used +his influence on the side of peace with regard to the <i>Sussex</i> +incident. He took this opportunity to convey to me the pleasing +news contained in a cablegram from Mr. Gerard, that the German +Government were now ready to agree to American mediation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This cablegram was the outcome of the following facts: Mr. Gerard, +on account of his anti-German tendency, was not popular in Berlin. He +regarded it as a personal slight that the most important negotiations +should have been carried on partly in Washington, and partly by +Colonel House in Berlin. The Ambassador wanted therefore, to use +the opportunity of the <i>Sussex</i> incident to assert himself, and +expressed a desire to visit G.H.Q. and explain the American point +of view in person to the Emperor. On the 1st May, Mr. Gerard was +received by the Emperor, in the presence of the Imperial Chancellor, +on which occasion he received the assurance contained in his telegram. +Karl Helfferich's account in <i>Weltkrieg</i> gives the impression +that the question of American mediation was mentioned for the first +time on the 1st <a name="page_255"><span class="page">Page +255</span></a> May. The two journeys of Colonel House, which were +of far greater importance than Mr. Gerard's visit to G.H.Q., are +not mentioned in the Helfferich account. For the rest I have to +rely for my information about events in Germany on this and other +publications, in addition to the evidence given before the Commission +of the National Assembly. In any case, Colonel House regarded the +telegram from Berlin as the sequel of his own negotiations there, +which point was placed beyond all doubt by the text of the information +he communicated to me. In order to inform myself on my side also as +to the attitude of our Government, I sent the following telegram +to Berlin, to ascertain whether the information from the American +Ambassador was in accordance with the facts: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, No. 26, 4th May. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"House informs me that Gerard has cabled that we would agree to the +President's mediation, and that a visit from House to Berlin, with +this object, would be welcomed. Nothing known here about solution +of <i>Lusitania</i> question. Mediation naturally depends on this +running smoothly, which would be most easily assured by cessation +of submarine campaign during negotiations." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I received the following reply from the Imperial Chancellor: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> + "Berlin, 6th May, 1916.<br> + "Reply to telegram No. 26.<br> +"For Your Excellency's information. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We hope that our Note and great concession finally removes cause +of mistrust, and opens era of greater <a name="page_256"><span +class="page">Page 256</span></a> mutual confidence. Animosity of +public opinion here against Wilson, as result of tone and contents +of his Note and impression of <i>parti pris</i> against us, however, +so great that he must take open and unmistakable action with regard +to England before he would be accepted as unbiassed mediator by +German people. To this extent Gerard's telegram is premature. If +Wilson neglects to take such action, there is danger that the animosity +may become irremediable and possibility of mediation driven into +distant future. Smoothing the way for peace, of course, always +desired. Action against England, however, seems necessary to encourage +conciliatory attitude there, if a peace exclusively favorable to +England is to be avoided. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If it is found impossible to induce England to discuss peace with +us, even though unofficially perhaps at first, we shall, as England +refuses to return to the provisions of the Declaration of London, +be placed in an absolutely free position with regard to our great +concession amounting to abandonment of submarine campaign. A visit +from House very welcome here at any time. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Bethmann-Hollweg.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Karl Helfferich's account confirms the view I held at that time, +that our concessions in respect of the submarine campaign were +essentially prompted by the hope of mediation by Mr. Wilson. The +following words of the Emperor make this plain: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"In politics it is necessary, before all things, to know the other +party's point of view; for politics are a question of give and take. +Gerard's utterances had made it clear that Wilson was seeking a +ladder for re-election. It was better, then, that we should offer +him the ladder of <a name="page_257"><span class="page">Page +257</span></a> peace than the ladder of war, which will eventually +fall on our own heads." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Moreover, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has declared before the Commission +of the National Assembly that he had expressed to Mr. Gerard the +hope that the President would now take steps to bring about the +restoration of peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When, at that time, Colonel House was discussing with me the German +reservation in the Note of the 4th May, in connection with the +questions of the "Freedom of the Seas" and peace, he said that the +circumstances were then such that the President no longer possessed +the power to compel England to observe international law. England +would only give way before the menace of war. In view, however, +of the state of natural feeling in the United States, and the +development of trade relations between America and the Entente, +war with England was out of the question. On the other hand, Mr. +Wilson possessed the power to bring about peace, because on this +question he could rely on the support of the majority of the American +nation. When the time was ripe, the President would take the desired +steps, but a neutral act of this nature would be cried down by +the very active Entente party in the United States as pro-German, +and could only be carried through if the national feeling towards +Germany took a more friendly turn. It was, therefore, necessary +that there should be a period of lull, during which Germany should +possibly not be discussed at all. The approaching hot season and +the usual exodus of political personages from Washington to the +country would offer a favorable opportunity to let all negotiations +rest, especially as, after the settlement of the <i>Sussex</i> +question, no new incidents were to be expected. Colonel House's +remarks accurately reflected the actual <a name="page_258"><span +class="page">Page 258</span></a> position in the United States +at the time. I could not but express my agreement, and felt no +doubt that the American mediation would begin in the late summer. +After our giving way on the submarine question in order to avoid +a break with the United States, I regarded it as certain that we +would not directly bring about the rupture which had just been +averted with such difficulty by reopening the unrestricted submarine +campaign, for in view of the American ultimatum of the 18th April, +1916, there was no alternative. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I should like to take this opportunity of making clear that I always +regarded American mediation as the only possible way out of the +war. I had no faith in the submarine campaign as likely to save +the situation, because the entry of the United States into the war +would more than outweigh all the advantages that the submarines could +bring us. On the other hand I was convinced that If the American +Government established a peace conference, this would be sure to +lead to peace itself. It could not be imagined that, in view of the +nations' need of peace, such a conference could break up without +having reached any result. Moreover, after the meeting of a conference, +the United States would no longer be in a position to enter the +war, because American public opinion would not have allowed it. +But without the help of the United States, the Entente could not +win. It resolved itself, therefore, into a question of the skill of +our negotiators to ensure a tolerable peace for us, as the result +of the conference. Diplomatic negotiations have a way of ending +owing to general weariness, in which case the party which holds +the best cards secures the greatest advantages. If this happened, +we should have the advantage of the position as our military gains +would give us a strong lever in the negotiations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Here I may touch on another question which was engaging <a +name="page_259"><span class="page">Page 259</span></a> my attention +at that time. Since the <i>Lusitania</i> catastrophe I had adopted +the principle, and put it into practice as far as possible, of leaving +the propaganda to our American friends, who were in a position to +get an earlier hearing than we, and in any case understood the +psychology of the Americans better than the Imperial German agents. +Indeed, the words "German propagandist" had already become a term of +abuse in America. We were reproached there with being too indulgent, +while in Germany the opposite criticism was levelled at us. In spite +of the difficulty of the situation, however, there were Americans +of German and other origin, who had the courage openly to champion +our cause and to swim against the stream. Among others, a "Citizens' +Committee for Food Shipments" was formed, whose activities spread +through the whole country, and were avowedly pro-German. A special +function of the committee with Dr. von Mach as executive chief, was +a month of propaganda throughout the country, with the object of +obtaining the means to supply the children of Germany with milk. The +English control of the post even led to the bold plan of building a +submarine to run the milk through the English blockade. The propaganda +was very vigorously attacked by the greater part of the American +Press, but pursued its course unafraid, collected money, submitted +protests to the State Department against the attitude of the Entente, +and so on. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Dr. von Mach succeeded in bringing the matter to the notice of +the President who actively interested himself in it, and promised +to see that the milk should pass the English blockade and reach +Germany in safety. Accordingly, the State Department instructed +the American Embassy in Berlin to issue a statement. Meanwhile, the +well-known American journalist, McClure, returned from a tour of +investigation in Germany, where he had been <a name="page_260"><span +class="page">Page 260</span></a> supported in every way by the +German Government departments. He gave a very favorable account +of the milk question, as of the feeding of infants in general, and +this gave rise to the first disagreeable controversy. Mr. McClure +took up an unyielding attitude. Unfortunately, however, the State +Department then published an equally favorable report, which, coming +from the American Embassy and published with the approval of the +Foreign Office in Berlin, caused the complete collapse of Dr. von +Mach. This incident made a very painful impression in America, and +led to a series of bitter attacks on Dr. von Mach and the whole +movement, which was thus exposed in a most unfortunate light. The +favorable report on the milk question was drawn up by a Dr. E. A. +Taylor, and definitely confirmed, and, indeed, inspired, by the +German authorities. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I mention this incident to show that our propaganda was not by any +means made easier by Germany, although our Press Bureau repeatedly +brought up this very question in Berlin. This movement was particularly +dear to us, because the Americans are most easily won over when an +appeal is made to their humanity. Moreover, the favorable reports +on the question of supplies in Germany did not coincide in any way +with our defence of the submarine campaign as an act of reprisal. +This method of propaganda from home lost us our best argument. +Even to-day the majority of Americans certainly have no idea how +many children have been murdered by the blockade. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the time of which I am speaking occurred also the much discussed +Bolo affair. It is quite astonishing how many lies were told before +the commission of inquiry of the American Senate with regard to this +affair. Among others, hotel servants, chauffeurs, etc., were sworn, +and gave evidence that I had met Bolo in the apartments of Mr. Hearst. +True, I have often visited Mr. Hearst, which <a name="page_261"><span +class="page">Page 261</span></a> goes without saying, as he was +the only important newspaper proprietor who maintained a neutral +attitude throughout the war. I did not, however, meet Bolo, either +there or anywhere else; I have never made his acquaintance, or +even seen him in the distance. I heard his name for the first time +when he was brought up for trial in Paris. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +If the statements made before the commission of inquiry are to be +relied on in any point at all, it is to be assumed that Bolo first +came to America to arrange a combine between the <i>Journal</i> +and the Hearst Press. This combine was to support the cause of +Pacifism after the war. Who Bolo's principal was I do not know, +but so much seems to be established, that he was connected with +the <i>Journal</i>. Apparently, Bolo wanted to sell shares in this +paper to Mr. Hearst, in order to acquire funds for the Pacifist +agitation. This theory seems justified since Bolo, on the voyage to +America, got into touch with Mr. Bartelli, Hearst's representative +in Paris. The latter did fall in with Bolo's ideas. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Later—whether intentionally or not I do not know—Bolo +met the co-proprietor of the firm Amsinck and Co., Herr Pavenstedt, +who was one of the most respected, if not <i>the</i> most respected, +Imperial German in New York, and intimately acquainted with all the +members of the Embassy. Herr Pavenstedt, who as a private citizen +was not in a position to accept Bolo's suggestions, then travelled +to Washington to lay the matter before me. He gave me to understand +that a French acquaintance of long standing, for whose good faith +he could vouch, had come to America to raise funds for a Pacifist +agitation in France. He said that national feeling in that country +had reached a point which promised success for such a movement, +if the prospect could be held out of a peace by negotiation. Herr +Pavenstedt said that he could not, <a name="page_262"><span +class="page">Page 262</span></a> under any circumstances, disclose +the gentleman's name. As the plans of the Frenchman recommended +by Herr Pavenstedt coincided with my policy for bringing about +a peace by negotiation, and I had absolute confidence in Herr +Pavenstedt, I communicated the matter to Berlin, where the necessary +money was granted. Later, the breaking off of diplomatic relations +with the United States interrupted the policy I had initiated, and +also put an end to any prospect of effecting a change of feeling +in France, where the hope of American assistance revived enthusiasm +for the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I do not know how Bolo's enterprise came to the knowledge of the +French Government. In any case this cannot have been due to the +deciphering of my telegrams to Berlin, as I did not know Bolo's +name. Owing to this ignorance on my part it was arranged between +Herr Pavenstedt and myself, at a second interview, that the anonymous +Frenchman should at a given time address further communications +on the progress of the movement to our Embassy at Bern under the +pseudonym "St. Regis." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the time of the <i>Sussex</i> crisis a further awkward incident +occurred which took us back to the days of conspiracies. In consequence +of the Welland Canal case the American secret police came down upon +Herr von Igel, the representative of the Military Attaché, in +his New York office, for alleged complicity, arrested him by force +and seized papers which were found on his table. I immediately +laid a protest before the State Department, whereupon Herr von +Igel was set at liberty and a long international controversy arose +which had not come to an end when Herr von Igel returned with me to +Germany. The American Law Department maintained that Herr von Igel +was suspected of complicity in a legal offence, that he could not +therefore plead extra-territoriality, and <a name="page_263"><span +class="page">Page 263</span></a> must stand his trial before an +American Court. The State Department, it is true, had doubts as to +whether an office in New York could be recognized as extraterritorial, +but for the rest maintained a correct attitude and refused to agree +to the opening of proceedings against Herr von Igel. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The seized documents were handed over to the State Department, +where they probably still lie. The State Department declared to +me their readiness to hand back the papers if I wished to declare +them Embassy documents. I, however, thought that an attempt might +be made later to use such a declaration against me as a trap and +I rejected the offer to return the papers on these conditions, as +they were of no further importance to us. If there was among them +material which could be used against the former Attachés +it might be assumed that the Law Department would long ago have +had the documents copied. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The Igel affair had no definite political result, as the American +Government dropped all controversies when they began to take up +the question of mediation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To return to the settlement of the <i>Sussex</i> incident it should +be mentioned that our surrender on the submarine question was widely +resented in Germany. Further, it caused a check in submarine +construction. At least, Secretary of State von Capelle has declared +before the Commission of the National Assembly that an extensive +submarine construction programme had to be abandoned because it +would have been too sharp a contrast with Germany's attitude after +the settlement of the <i>Sussex</i> affair. As a matter of fact, +submarine construction was never carried on with full vigor after +1916 as has been pointed out by Messrs. Struve, Gothein and Co. In +the light of this the gravity of the decision in 1917 to resort +to unrestricted submarine warfare is doubled. It will <a +name="page_264"><span class="page">Page 264</span></a> be seen +clearly here how our divided policy on the one hand permanently +crippled the submarine policy and on the other that of mediation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To conclude the <i>Sussex</i> question, I will add one more telegram +which I sent to the Foreign Office after Secretary of State Lansing +had publicly mentioned an Anglo-American agreement—a remark +which in Berlin was taken to mean that America had formed an alliance +with England. It is well known that during the war such a statement +has frequently been made. +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 21st May, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I am working confidentially in co-operation with House for the +settlement of such still unsettled questions as the <i>Lusitania</i> +and the Igel cases, so as to clear the air completely. Feeling here +now more favorable owing to the influence of the Irish executions. +Wilson regards conflict with us as a thing of the past and desires to +let things rest and soon to lay the foundations of peace. Lansing's +speech as to Anglo-American agreement refers to the Bryan agreement. +He desired to make clear that war with England because of the blockade +is out of the question, and therefore there is no means of bringing +pressure to bear. The speech coincides with the American view I +have already reported that it would be easier to bring the war +to an end than to force England to raise the blockade." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Hitherto I have not mentioned the different German vessels which +visited United States ports during the war. Besides their history +is well known. I will therefore only describe their psychological +influence and my own experiences. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_265"><span class="page">Page 265</span></a> The auxiliary +cruisers <i>Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i> and <i>Eitel Friedrich</i> +were the first German ships to enter Hampton Roads, there to be +interned. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Much more interest was aroused by the arrival on the 15th February, +1916, of the <i>Appam</i>, because it was then a long time since +the German flag had been seen on the American side of the Atlantic. +The facts are familiar to German readers from Count Dohna's +<i>Möve</i> book. Lieutenant Berg's exploit met with general +appreciation in the United States, especially as his conduct was +completely in accord with the American conception of international +law. Even to-day I can hear the tone of absolute conviction in +which Secretary of State Lansing told me at the Metropolitan Club +that the voyage of the <i>Appam</i> was a "marvellous achievement." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the far-off future, students of international law will quote the +<i>Appam</i> case as a classic. At the German Embassy in Washington +volumes were filled with the opinions of eminent lawyers, for the +incident was not treated politically by the American Government, +but submitted to the courts. Meanwhile the <i>Appam</i> remained +interned in Hampton Roads as a prize. The case was not settled +until after the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, when it was +no longer of any importance to us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The interest roused by the <i>Appam</i> shrank into nothing before the +excitement caused by the arrival of the submarine <i>Deutschland</i> +on the 8th July, 1916. Apart from those that followed the agreement +on the <i>Arabic</i> incident, the few days after the arrival of the +<i>Deutschland</i> were the pleasantest I experienced in America +during the war. Feeling on all sides was openly friendly, and Captain +König was the most popular man in the United States. If we had +sent ten such merchant submarines to America and for the rest had +carried on the submarine campaign according to the principles laid +down for cruiser warfare, <a name="page_266"><span class="page">Page +266</span></a> we should have attained far greater political results +than has been the case. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The arrival of the submarine <i>Deutschland</i> at Baltimore and +Captain König's first visit to the town resembled a triumphal +procession. I had intended to go there at once to welcome the hero +of the day and his bold seamen, but thought it better to wait and +see what would be the American attitude towards the protests of +the English and French Ambassadors, who had both claimed that the +<i>Deutschland</i>, as a submarine, should be regarded without +hesitation as a ship of war. On the 13th July a most minute inspection +of the <i>Deutschland</i> was made by an American Government Commission +consisting of three naval officers, and she was recognized as a genuine +merchant vessel. In consequence the <i>Deutschland</i> had a right +to lie at Baltimore as long as was necessary to take a cargo on +board for the return journey. It was now possible for me to pay an +official visit to Baltimore and to view the <i>Deutschland</i>. The +Mayor of the town accompanied me and went down with me, in spite +of the terrific heat of about 40° centigrade, into the lowest +parts of the submarine, which cost the stoutly-built gentleman +considerable effort and a good deal of perspiration. In the evening +the Mayor gave a banquet which passed off as in the good days before +the war. The rooms were decorated with German and American flags, +the band played the "Wacht am Rhein," and many speeches were made +on the good relations between the two countries. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Again on her second visit, which took place in October in New London +(Connecticut), the <i>Deutschland</i> met with a very friendly +reception, even though the atmosphere was appreciably cooler. Feeling +in the New England state has always been particularly unfavorable +to us. But there, to, I passed a very pleasant day with Captain +König. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_267"><span class="page">Page 267</span></a> In contrast +to the moral gain of the visit of the <i>Deutschland</i> was the +generally unfavorable impression created by the visit at the same +time of the U53. Quite unexpectedly I received the news that a +German submarine had arrived at Newport, the captain of which had +reported himself to the American commandant and had handed him a +letter addressed to me. The letter attracted a good deal of attention +in the Press, but it actually contained nothing further than the +introduction of the captain. The episode of the U53 was, from a +political point of view, most undesirable and of no military value. +When, moreover, a few days later the news arrived that the U53 +had sunk several ships off the American coast—always, it is +true, according to international law—the incident assumed a +fairly serious aspect. Meanwhile I travelled direct to Shadow Lawn, +the President's beautiful summer residence on the New Jersey coast, +to hand to Mr. Wilson a letter from the Emperor. The President had +appealed to the Heads of all the combatant States to urge them +to permit relief to starving Poland, as had been done for Belgium. +As was to be expected, the Entente rejected the proposal while the +Central Powers agreed to it. The Emperor's approval was contained +in the letter which I brought to Mr. Wilson. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The President took this opportunity to speak to me very seriously on +the cruise of the U53, and urged me to see to it that this incident +was not repeated. Otherwise he could not be responsible for public +feeling in the United States, which might again become very bitter. +The affair was very disagreeable to me personally, because I was +building hopes on Mr. Wilson's mediation and because I feared that +the cruise of the U53 would be interpreted as an attempt on our +part to put difficulties in the way of the President's re-election. +It might be assumed that his Republican opponents would say that <a +name="page_268"><span class="page">Page 268</span></a> Germany could +now do what she liked, as Mr. Wilson had never adopted energetic +measures. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the subject of this conversation with Mr. Wilson I sent the following +telegram to the foreign office: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 11th October, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I had a conversation with Mr. Wilson on the occasion of handing +over the Emperor's autograph letter with regard to Polish relief. +The President is anxious to carry the matter further and asked +me how this could best be done. I replied that the difficulties +lay exclusively on the English side. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The cruiser warfare undertaken by our submarines off the American +coast is naturally regarded by Mr. Wilson with anxiety, because +all his hopes of re-election are based exclusively on the fact +that according to the opinion held over here he has kept the United +States out of the war and in spite of that has put an end to our +so-called illegal attacks on American lives. His whole position +falls to pieces if American lives are lost now, or if indignation is +aroused by a submarine campaign off the American coast. So far this +has not occurred. The exploit of U53 is even hailed as a sporting +achievement. This view will, however, be changed if the incident is +repeated. For this reason Wilson spoke plainly about a continuance +of the submarine campaign off the American coast. He regarded as +particularly serious the fact that two neutral ships were sunk, as +well as a Canadian passenger vessel making for the United States. +He said that such incidents could not be understood by the American +public." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +To this telegram I received from the Imperial Chancellor the following +reply: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<a name="page_269"><span class="page">Page 269</span></a> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 4th October, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"England entirely responsible for difficulties with regard to Polish +relief. For Your Excellency's exclusive information it is not intended +to continue submarine campaign off American coast. Final decision as +to activity of U53 not possible until she returns. Our concessions +to America are being strictly observed and will be until explicitly +revoked. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Bethmann-Hollweg</span>." +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_270"><span class="page">Page 270</span></a> +CHAPTER X</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +AMERICAN MEDIATION +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At midsummer, 1916, the political lull desired by Colonel House +actually set in. The Colonel betook himself to one of the beautiful +lakes of New Hampshire, in the far north of the United States, where +in the ordinary way I could only reach him by letter or telegram. How +secret we kept our communications is shown by the fact that, according +to agreement, I wrote and telegraphed to Colonel House under the +pseudonym "Martin." This caution proved to be fully justified, as +the inquiry by the Senate Committee has shown that the letters +from the Embassy were frequently opened by agents of the Entente +propaganda, whether with or without the connivance of the American +secret police I will not definitely say. I have already had occasion +to mention this question in connection with the robbing of Mr. +Albert. There are in the secret police of all countries men of +doubtful honor. It might be taken as certain that there were such +men in the pay of the Entente agents. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Soon after the settlement of the <i>Sussex</i> incident—on +27th May—Mr. Wilson made public, for the first time, his +plan for the League of Nations. This idea was to constitute the +foundation-stone of his mediation and fulfil all the hopes of the +American pacifists for a compulsory court of arbitration in +international disputes and general disarmament. Before the war +many shrewd men in the United States thought that the arbitration +system <a name="page_271"><span class="page">Page 271</span></a> +initiated by the American Government would exclude the possibility +of great wars. The outbreak of the World War showed that this was +an illusion, and the question arose what precautions could be taken +to prevent a recurrence of the world catastrophe. Mr. Wilson was +one of the first in whom the idea matured that the scheme, hitherto +regarded as utopian, of a league binding all civilized nations +to a peaceful settlement of their disputes was capable of being +made a practical proposition if backed, as a means of compulsion, +by a commercial boycott, similar to that which the Entente, in +contravention of international law, employed with such terrible +results against Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The most important sentences of the speech which the President addressed +to the American peace league ran as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"When the invitation for me to be here to-night came to me, I was +glad to accept,—not because it offered me an opportunity +to discuss the programme of the League,—that you will, I +am sure, not expect of me,—but because the desire of the +whole world now turns eagerly towards the hope of peace, and there +is just reason why we should take our part in counsel upon this +great theme.... +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure +fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are +not interested to search for or explore.... +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a +matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made +poignantly clear is, that the peace of the world must henceforth +depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great +nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to +what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, <a +name="page_272"><span class="page">Page 272</span></a> and as to +some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group +of nations seek to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel +that civilization is at least in a way of justifying its existence +and claiming to be finally established. It is clear that nations +must in future be governed by the same high code of honor that +we demand of individuals.... +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great +nations now engaged in the war have made it plain that their thought +has come to this, that the principle of the public right must henceforth +take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, +and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves +together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish +aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against +alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must +be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart +of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples +and mankind.... +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is what we ourselves +will say when there comes a proper occasion to say it.... +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has +a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Like +other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended +that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, +as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but +it has become more and more our rule of life and action. Second, +that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the same +respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity +that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, +that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance <a +name="page_273"><span class="page">Page 273</span></a> of its peace +that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of +peoples and nations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I +speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that +the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible +association of nations formed in order to realize these objects +and make them secure against violation.... +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"But I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a programme. I +came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I +feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, +when some common force will be brought into existence which shall +safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interests of all +peoples and all governments, where coercion shall be summoned, +not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but +to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common +peace. God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and +of settled peace, concord, and co-operation may be near at hand!" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This speech displayed all the characteristics of Mr. Wilson's oratory: +brilliant command of the English language, dazzling wealth of vocabulary +and nebulous sentence construction which made the purpose clear only +to the initiated. Nevertheless, the vital points of the speech +could not be misunderstood. It prepared the world for American +mediation by strong emphasis of the League of Nations idea. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The political lull of midsummer brought an important improvement in +public feeling towards us. This change for the better was reflected +with special clearness in the reception given to the merchant submarine +<i>Deutschland</i>, as I have already described. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_274"><span class="page">Page 274</span></a> At the +time of this speech of Mr. Wilson's, I sent the following report: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Report in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 28th May, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The placation of American public opinion is progressing. Hardly any +mention is now made in the Press of German-American relations. Only +two persons are still wavering. The American Government are delaying +the publication of my letter on the subject of the <i>Lusitania</i> +settlement, because they think that it will not satisfy public +opinion here. It may be assumed that its publication will take +place at the beginning of June, during the Republican National +Convention, so that it may pass as far as possible unnoticed in the +general excitement about domestic politics. The American Government's +delay in this matter shows clearly how great the opposition has +been. While we thought to have made important concessions, the +American Government here consider that they have not attained the +objective prescribed for them by public opinion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Further, the Igel incident is not yet settled. On this question +there is a difference of opinion between the State and Law Departments. +The former confirming our standpoint that the seizure of the papers +was illegitimate and that they must be returned. The Law Department, +on the other hand, holds that Herr von Igel has been guilty of +a legal offence and so has forfeited his diplomatic privileges. +Consequently I get no further, and the case is continually deferred. +It is to be hoped that the State Department will soon bestir itself +to make a decision which will, however, in any case, necessitate +the recall of Herr Igel. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Mr. Wilson's peace plans are becoming more and more tangible. +The only question is whether he possesses <a name="page_275"><span +class="page">Page 275</span></a> sufficient authority to force +our enemies to agree to negotiations. Colonel House is convinced +that Mr. Wilson will succeed. The President is considering the +plan of calling together a conference at the Hague, in which the +neutrals will only participate so far as the 'Freedom of the Seas' +is concerned. If the project materializes, Colonel House is sure to +take part in the conference, even though he may not be the official +American representative. His influence, however, would be sure to be +great, for no one else is so completely in touch with Mr. Wilson's +views. The latter is still of the opinion that the United States +should under no circumstances take part in the actual settlement +of the peace conditions. He and his <i>alter ego</i> are meanwhile +very much afraid that our enemies might remain obdurate, since they +are under the impression, or are trying to spread the impression, +that the President, in opening the peace negotiations, is acting +for Germany. Certainly England continually drags this idea into +the discussion. At one time it is said that Prince Bülow is +coming here to submit the German peace conditions to Mr. Wilson; +at another, that Germany is on the brink of starvation and must +therefore sue for peace. We ought as far as possible to counteract +this propaganda of our enemies. It is to be hoped that it will +not do serious harm, because the peace vote in America continues +to grow and Mr. Wilson can count with certainty on re-election +if he establishes a peace conference. We shall therefore daily +gain ground here so long as we appear to be ready to encourage the +American peace movement, while our enemies adopt an unfavorable +attitude. The American people is now pacifically minded. It becomes +clearer every day how difficult it is to arouse enthusiasm for war +preparedness, etc. No one who has lived here for any length of +time can help coming to the conclusion that peaceful money-making +is the Americans' <a name="page_276"><span class="page">Page +276</span></a> chief interest in life. Only when they think that +their rights have been seriously infringed do they lash themselves +into an hysterical war-fever. Why should war passion smoulder in +the hearts of a people whose boundaries are so secure that no enemy +has ever been seen inside them, nor in all human probability ever +will be?" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +After the settlement of the <i>Sussex</i> incident the Imperial +Government naturally hoped that Mr. Wilson would take steps to +justify our concessions with regard to the submarine question. +Accordingly I received the following general instructions: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +"Berlin, 7th June, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Order A. 56. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"<i>Confidential.</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"More than a month has passed since our last Note to the United +States without President Wilson making up his mind to approach +the English Government on the question of the blockade. True I +do not expect that England would allow herself to be influenced +by the United States to abandon her infringement of international +law; nor do I imagine that a rejection of the American demands +by England would lead to a serious disturbance of the relations +between these two countries. The existing arbitration treaty, which +makes it possible in extreme cases to delay the settlement of the +points of contention indefinitely, rules this out. But the complete +passivity of Mr. Wilson, which could be understood so long as he +wished to avoid giving the impression that he was acting under +German coercion, but which cannot continue to be justified on these +grounds, is bound to re-act very unfavorably on public opinion +here and puts the Imperial Government in an extremely difficult +position. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_277"><span class="page">Page 277</span></a> "From +the information which has reached you, Your Excellency will already +realize that our surrender to America on the submarine question has +met with approval in wide and influential circles in Germany. If +President Wilson persists in his passive attitude towards England, +it is to be feared that the section of German public opinion whose +attitude has so far been favorable to the Government will ally +themselves with the opponents of the Government policy, and that the +whole of public opinion in Germany will clamor for the resumption of +the submarine campaign on the old lines. In that case, the Imperial +Government would be all the less in a position to resist this demand +for any length of time, as all the military authorities have always +been unanimous in regarding and urging unrestricted submarine warfare +as the only effective means to bring about the defeat of England. +Moreover, as we have received secret information that the Entente +have decided on a drastic tightening of the blockade, and at the same +time have agreed in future to meet the protests of the neutrals, and +particularly America, with the argument that only in this way can +the end of the war, which is also in the interests of the neutral +countries, be brought about. Your Excellency will therefore bring +to the notice of President Wilson and Mr. House the serious dangers +which his passivity towards England involves. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"With regard to Mr. Wilson's plans for mediation, they are meanwhile +meeting with vigorous opposition in England. If they are rejected +by England, the result cannot but be favorable to us, for we are +naturally sceptical of mediation on the part of a statesman so +partial to England, and at the same time so naïve as President +Wilson. This necessarily follows on the consideration that the +President would primarily be concerned to construct peace on the +basis of the <i>status quo ante</i>, and particularly <a +name="page_278"><span class="page">Page 278</span></a> in respect +of Belgium. Although there is to-day little on which to form an +estimate as to how far we shall be in a position to bring about +a solution in conformity with our own interests to the Belgian +question, which is the direct result of the war, so much is certain, +that if the war continues in our favor, a peace on the basis of +the absolute status quo ante would not be acceptable to us. So, +as the President interprets his rôle as the chosen champion +of all that, in his opinion, is right and just, it is to be feared +that a refusal on our part to make peace on this basis might induce +him to go over openly to the enemy's camp. It is not, however, +out of the question that public opinion in England may in time +again turn to Mr. Wilson and his desire for mediation. As soon, +therefore, as Mr. Wilson's mediation plans threaten to assume a +more concrete form and there is evidence of an inclination on the +part of England to fall in with them, it will be Your Excellency's +duty to prevent President Wilson from approaching us with a positive +proposal of mediation. The choice of means for attaining this object +without endangering our relations with the United States I think +I may leave to Your Excellency's diplomatic skill, as from here +I am not in a position to get a clear insight into the position +of affairs in America. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Von Jagow.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I have already mentioned that Mr. Wilson had for some time past +subordinated the question of the "Freedom of the Seas," i.e., in +this concrete instance the English blockade, to his desire for +mediation. Regarded from his point of view, this new ordering of his +plans was based on an entirely correct political train of thought. +The President gave first place to the attainable, with a view to +taking up later what was for the time being unattainable. In view +of the fact that we could bring no pressure <a name="page_279"><span +class="page">Page 279</span></a> to bear to change Mr. Wilson's +point of view, it only remained for us to exploit his plans as +far as possible in the interests of German policy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As my instructions on the most important point—the question +of mediation—did not appear to me sufficiently clear, I asked +in the following report, dated from the summer quarters of the +Embassy, for a more detailed explanation: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Report in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"In reply to Order A. 56,<br> +"Rye, 13th July, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The inactivity of Mr. Wilson, who has only one thought, re-election, +is due in the first place to the fact that no pressure is being put +upon him by American public opinion to take action with regard to +England. It is obvious that conditions here are not favorable to +such action. Those American circles which are suffering financial +losses as a result of the English blockade, have no weight in face +of the tremendous stream of gold which our enemies have poured +lavishly over this country, not haggling over details, and conniving +at 'graft.' For the rest, Mr. Wilson's train of thought with regard +to action in respect of England practically coincides with that +expressed by Your Excellency. He does not think at present that it +is likely to meet with any success, as he has no means of bringing +pressure to bear. No one would take him seriously if he threatened +England with war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The position is quite different with the President's well-known +anxiety to bring about peace in Europe. In this matter he now has +the whole of American public opinion behind him. He also believes +that, after the expected failure of their present offensives, our +enemies will be ready to open peace negotiations. If this assumption +<a name="page_280"><span class="page">Page 280</span></a> proves +unfounded, and our enemies reject an American invitation on these +lines, the main question dealt with in Your Excellency's instructions +to me will be settled. Meanwhile, he is sure to make an attempt +to negotiate peace, if only for election purposes. I therefore +venture to request Your Excellency to cable me further brief +instructions as to how I am to interpret the words 'more concrete +form of mediation plans,' and 'positive proposal of mediation.' +I am assuming that the main part of my respectful reports will +only reach Your Excellency at the same time as this. Therefore, +Mr. Gerard, when Your Excellency spoke with him at the beginning of +May, on the question of mediation, would not have received detailed +instructions as to the President's intentions. In any case, he +was mistaken as to the attitude Your Excellency should adopt with +regard to an American peace-movement. On the strength of a telegram +received at that time from Mr. Gerard, Mr. Wilson believed that +the Imperial Government was ready to accept his mediation, and +I accordingly contradicted this assumption as instructed. As far +as I know, Mr. Wilson refuses definitely to take any part in the +discussion of territorial questions, but confines his interest to +'disarmament' and 'Freedom of the Seas.' His idea is that there +should be a conference at the Hague, in which the United States +and other neutral Powers would only take part in so far as these +two questions are concerned. 'Disarmament' may certainly be very +undesirable for us, but, on the other hand, the 'Freedom of the +Seas,' ought, without a doubt, to bring us on the side of the United +States. If it once comes to peace negotiations between the combatants, +I regard it as out of the question—even were they to +fail—that the United States would enter the war against us. +American public feeling in favor of peace is too strong for that. It +required the hysterical excitement roused by <a name="page_281"><span +class="page">Page 281</span></a> the <i>Lusitania</i> question, and +the incidents connected with it, to produce a state of mind among +Americans which at times made war seem inevitable. In the absence +of similar incidents, such a state of public feeling could not be +aroused. The admiration with which the cruise of the submarine +<i>Deutschland</i> was regarded showed plainly which way the wind +blows now. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I made the above mentioned request because I consider it out of +the question to prevent Mr. Wilson from taking action with regard +to peace. I am in doubt, however, whether by a 'positive proposal +of mediation' your Excellency means such a proposal as that made +by Mr. Roosevelt after the Russo-Japanese War. On that occasion it +is well known that the negotiations were carried on under direct +American influence. This, as I have already said, is not what Mr. +Wilson wants. He only wants to play the part of peace-instigator; he +would like to deserve the credit for having brought the combatants +to negotiate one with the other. Such a success would, in view of +the state of feeling here, probably assure his re-election. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I am therefore convinced that within the next few weeks the President +will institute proceedings with regard to peace, provided that the +enemy offensive continues to prove abortive. Mr. Wilson will then +tell England that he has been obliged on the grounds of domestic +politics to make a sharp protest against the blockade, provided that +peace negotiations have not been opened. For me the question now +arises whether I am to try to stand in the way of these proceedings. +Of course I could exert strong influence on Colonel House. Wilson, +however, would immediately suspect that we were attempting to deal +with his successor, and to give Mr. Hughes the honor of instigating +peace proceedings. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_282"><span class="page">Page 282</span></a> "As far +as I can judge from here, there seem to be three possibilities: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"1. That the Wilson peace movement should fail in consequence of +the obduracy of our enemies. In that case, if we were to reopen +the submarine campaign to bring England to her knees, the situation +would at least be more favorable to us than before. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"2. That the peace movement should fail through us, and that we +should resume the submarine war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"3. That the peace movement should be accepted by both sides. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In the first case, I consider war with the United States probable; +in the second, certain. This is the reason for my request for more +definite instructions as to whether I am to impede a peace movement, or +only a positive proposal that would bind us in respect of territorial +conditions." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +To this report I received the following reply, containing quite +clear instructions, emphatically to encourage Mr. Wilson in whatever +course he might take: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 18th August, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"In reply to report A. 350 of the 13th inst. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Mediation by the President intended lead to the opening of peace +negotiations between the combatants we are gladly ready to accept. +Please encourage emphatically the President's efforts in this direction. +Naturally it must not be imagined that in accepting such mediation +we bind ourselves to any concrete peace conditions. A general peace +conference with participation of neutrals only tolerable on the +lines of previous successful peace-negotiations between combatants +with <a name="page_283"><span class="page">Page 283</span></a> +regard to general and international questions of Freedom of the +Seas and Disarmament. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Bethmann-Hollweg.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +In close connection with the above exchange of letters with Berlin, +stood an interchange of telegrams dealing with the eventual reopening +of the unrestricted submarine campaign. I received the following +telegrams: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"(Strictly confidential.) +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 12th June, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Army and Navy are again urging submarine warfare as the only +weapon against England, and particularly against her blockade, to +which President Wilson has never, nor can very well, take exception. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It now remains to be decided: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"1. Whether after his nomination Wilson would still be prepared +to press matters as far as a rupture and war, even if we spare +human life in the new submarine war? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"2. What attitude the Republican candidate would adopt on this matter? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Public opinion in England is opposed to mediation by Wilson, which +is also not wanted on principle here, because too unpopular. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Von Jagow.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I dispatched as quickly as possible to Berlin the following telegram: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 19th June, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Assuming that it is intended that the resumption of the submarine +campaign be accompanied by the official <a name="page_284"><span +class="page">Page 284</span></a> or clandestine withdrawal of the +concessions granted in our Note of the 4th May, such a withdrawal +or modification of our concessions would in my opinion lead to a +rupture and America's entry into the war. By condoning such a move +Wilson would forfeit all hope of being re-elected and Hughes, who is +already suspected of being the German candidate, could not afford +to recommend a surrender. With regard to mediation and blockade I am +in constant communication with House. The former to be expected +in course of summer, for election reasons; probably Wilson will +inform our enemies that he will have to resort to sharp measures +if peace is not attained." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +From the orders and telegrams here reproduced I gathered that the +political situation was, as far as I was concerned, to be regarded +as a kind of race between the unrestricted submarine campaign on +the one hand and the American peace mediation on the other. There +was apparently no third possibility. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the 1st September I saw Colonel House again. In order that this +visit should not attract notice I went to stay with other friends +in New Hampshire for the customary American September holidays +(Labor Day). From there I motored to New London, where Colonel House +had been spending the summer. The conversation brought out that the +President considered a postponement of mediation unavoidable, because +the Entente were now filled with hopes of victory in consequence of +Rumania's entry into the war. In all my conversations with Colonel +House we both proceeded from the assumption that an attempt to +bring about American mediation could only succeed provided that +the Entente had given up hope of victory without the entry into the +war of the United States. For this reason Colonel House repeated +<a name="page_285"><span class="page">Page 285</span></a> his advice +that there should be less public talk in Berlin of an early peace +than had hitherto been the case, since in this way we were betraying +weakness and making America's task more difficult. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Colonel House also said that the President now intended to await +the further development of the war, and, if he should be re-elected, +immediately to take steps towards mediation. Before the presidential +election the time was too short for any action, for the Entente +would pay no heed to the mediation of a problematical candidate. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Looking back, I am still convinced even to-day that Colonel House's +estimate of the situation with regard to the President was entirely +correct from the American point of view. Mr. Wilson could only afford +to offer his mediation provided that he was sure of success. For us +the position was in my opinion different. For Germany American +mediation would have been welcome at any time. It would either +succeed and bring about an acceptable peace, or the Entente would +reject Wilson's proposal after we had accepted it. In the latter +case we should score a diplomatic success in Washington which would +make it very difficult for the American Government to enter the +war. The third possibility, that the German Government, after all +that had passed, might refuse Mr. Wilson's mediation, I did not +even consider. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Immediately after my return from New Hampshire I telegraphed the +following to the Foreign Office: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher No.</span> 100 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Rye, 6th September, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson's mediation postponed until further notice because for +the moment out of question, owing to Rumania's entry into war and +consequent renewed prospect <a name="page_286"><span class="page">Page +286</span></a> of victory for our enemies. Wilson thinks he cannot +now mediate before the election, because England might pay little +attention to him until after the election, and if he were not elected +would have nothing further to do with him. If, however, Wilson +wins at the polls, for which the prospect is at present favorable, +and if the war meanwhile remains at a standstill, the President +will at once take steps towards mediation. He thinks in that case +to be strong enough to compel a peace conference. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson regards it as in the interest of America that neither of +the combatants should gain a decisive victory." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This telegraphic report of my conversation with Colonel House reached +Berlin when they were beginning to grow impatient of the delay in +the peace movement. According to Karl Helfferich's account the +question was discussed at the time between himself, the Imperial +Chancellor and Herr von Jagow. Thereupon, according to General +Ludendorff's "War Memories," "the Chancellor proposed to His Majesty +that instructions should be given to Ambassador Count Bernstorff +to induce the President at the earliest possible moment, and in +any case before the presidential election, to make a peace offer +to the Powers." Herr Helfferich then goes on to report that the +Chancellor cabled to me to question me quite personally as to my +opinion of Wilson as a peace mediator. The accounts of both these +gentlemen are doubtless accurate, but they do not mention that +the inquiry addressed to me did not, nor was intended to, create +a new situation, but had as its sole object to obtain my opinion +as to the prospects of a movement which had long been set on foot. +In the inquiry, as Herr Helfferich also reports, I was informed +that we would evacuate Belgium. This was of course a necessary +preliminary to Mr. Wilson's mediation, which otherwise, in view +of the <a name="page_287"><span class="page">Page 287</span></a> +feeling prevailing in America, would have been entirely out of +the question. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The Chancellor's inquiry read as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher No.</span> 74 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin,2nd September, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"<i>Confidential.</i> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Our West Front stands firm. East Front naturally threatened somewhat +by Rumania's declaration of war. Rolling up of front or collapse +of Austria, however, not to be feared. Turkey and Bulgaria to be +relied on. Greece uncertain. Hopes of peace before winter, as result +of Russian or French war-weariness, diminished by this development. +Apparently, if no great catastrophe occurs in East, Wilson's mediation +possible and successful if we guarantee required restoration of +Belgium. Otherwise, unrestricted submarine warfare would have to +be seriously considered. Request you give purely personal opinion +without inquiry in any quarter. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Bethmann-Hollweg.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +To this inquiry I replied as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher No.</span> 101 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Rye, 8th September, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"In reply to Telegram No. 74. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your question answered in substance by my telegram No. 100. I take +it then that your Excellency intends yourself to invite Wilson's +mediation. In so far as the United States of America concerns itself +with territorial questions—which hitherto I have always +categorically opposed—restoration of Belgium should constitute +America's principal interest, since public opinion is almost exclusively +favorable to this. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_288"><span class="page">Page 288</span></a> "If Wilson +is re-elected, I think there is good prospect of his mediation +before the end of the year. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"From this point of view the attainment of peace through unrestricted +submarine war seems hopeless, since the United States would inevitably +be drawn into the war—no matter what may be the result of the +election—and consequently the war would be prolonged." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I should like particularly to draw the reader's attention to this +telegram, because it expresses definitely my opinion that the submarine +campaign could not bring us peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Soon afterwards I was again instructed by the Chancellor to hasten +Mr. Wilson's peace movement. His telegram is here reproduced: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 26th September, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"For Your Excellency's personal information. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The enemy's intention of breaking through our fronts has not, so +far, succeeded, and will not succeed, any more than his Salonika +and Dobrudja offensives. On the other hand, the operations of the +Central Powers against Rumania are making encouraging progress. +Whether we shall succeed this year in gaining a victory there that +will bring the war to an end is still doubtful; therefore, for the +present we must be prepared for a further prolonging of the war. +Meanwhile, the Imperial navy is confident that by the unrestricted +employment of large numbers of submarines they could in view of +England's economic position, meet with a success which would in +a few months make our principal enemy, England, more disposed to +entertain thoughts of peace. It is therefore essential that G.H.Q. +should include a submarine campaign among their other measures to +relieve the situation on the Somme Front, by impeding the transport +<a name="page_289"><span class="page">Page 289</span></a> of munitions, +and so making clear to the Entente the futility of their efforts +in this area. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The whole situation would change if President Wilson, following +out the plans he has already indicated, were to make an offer of +mediation to the Powers. This would, of course, not have to include +any definite proposals of a territorial nature, as these questions +should form part of the agenda of the peace negotiations. Such a +move, however, would have to be made soon, as otherwise we could +not continue to stand calmly aside and watch England, realizing +as she does the many difficulties to be reckoned with, exert with +impunity increasingly strong pressure on the neutrals, with a view +to improving her military and economic position at our expense, and +we should have to claim the renewed liberty of action for which +we stipulated in the Note of the 4th of May of this year. Should +Mr. Wilson insist on waiting until immediately before or after +the election, he would lose the opportunity for such a step. Also +the negotiations should not at first aim at the conclusion of an +armistice, but should be carried on solely by the combatant parties, +and within a short period directly bring about the preliminary +peace. A further prolongation would be unfavorable to Germany's +military situation, and would result in further preparations being +made by the Powers for the continuance of the war into next year, so +that there would be no further prospect of peace within a reasonable +time. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your Excellency should discuss the position cautiously with Colonel +House, and find out the intentions of Mr. Wilson. A peace movement +on the part of the President which bore the outward appearance of +spontaneity would be seriously considered by us, and this would +also mean success for Mr. Wilson's election campaign. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_290"><span class="page">Page 290</span></a> "Gerard +has applied for leave, as the result of a private letter from Colonel +House, but he has received no reply from the State Department. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Bethmann-Hollweg.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The explanation of the final sentence of the above telegram is as +follows. I have already mentioned that Mr. Gerard was not popular in +Berlin, owing to his very highly-strung temperament, his impetuosity +and his want of tact. His recall was eagerly desired. Consequently, I +had received instructions to arrange, if possible, for the replacement +of Mr. Gerard, and in any case that the Ambassador should be recalled +for a time to Washington, so that his nerves might have a chance +to rest. As always, in strictly confidential matters, I referred +this to Colonel House, who told me that in view of the existing +political situation there could be no question of a recall of Gerard. +He would, however, arrange for the Ambassador to be summoned at once +to Washington for fresh instructions. If once Mr. Gerard learned +that the President now had the definite intention of mediating +with a view of peace, Colonel House thought he would be received +in a more friendly manner in Berlin. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I answered the Chancellor's last telegram as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 5th October, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"No. 121. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Telegram No. 89 discussed according to instructions. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"No change here in the situation reported in telegrams Nos. 100 +and 101. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In view of possibility of surprises in war and election, Wilson, for +reasons already stated, refuses to attempt mediation until re-elected. +Result of election, <a name="page_291"><span class="page">Page +291</span></a> which is being fought exclusively on foreign politics, +uncertain. President showing surprising firmness. If unrestricted +submarine campaign unavoidable, advise emphatically, postpone at +least until after election. Now, immediate rupture with United +States would be certain; after election Wilson's mediation probable +on the one hand; on the other hand at least slight possibility of +finding <i>modus vivendi</i> by negotiation with United States." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The instructions from Berlin gave me occasion for repeated conversations +with Colonel House. The Imperial Government were now ready to accept +Mr. Wilson's League of Nations programme, which provided for general +disarmament, freedom of the seas, and compulsory arbitration. My +reports to Berlin on this question had the result that on 9th November +the Chancellor in a speech publicly espoused this programme, and +that I, at my own suggestion, received permission to communicate +officially the Chancellor's speech to the American Peace League, +which published my communication. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the other hand, the Imperial Government desired that the territorial +questions should be regulated by direct negotiations between the +combatant Powers. Mr. Wilson, as Colonel House told me, was in +agreement with this. Mr. Wilson had already expressed himself to +this effect in the above mentioned speech of the 27th May, and +in general adopted the point of view that the United States had +no interest in the details of territorial adjustment; but that it +was of equally fundamental importance for America as for Europe +that in future wars should be avoided. The President was only willing +to intervene in so far as he was certain of having American public +opinion behind him. In my conversations with Colonel House we never +spoke of the evacuation of any German <a name="page_292"><span +class="page">Page 292</span></a> territory. We always confined +ourselves exclusively to a real peace by negotiation on the basis +of the <i>status quo ante</i>. With such a peace Germany's position +in the world would have remained unimpaired. The freedom of the +seas, a principal point in the Wilson programme, could not but +be welcome to us. The President and Colonel House have been the +sponsors of this idea in America. Both were indefatigable in their +efforts to materialize this idea in such a way that war on commerce +should be abolished and that all commerce, even in war-time, should +be declared free. As a necessary result of this development of the +laws of naval warfare Mr. Wilson hoped to bring about general naval +disarmament, since navies would lose their <i>raison d'être</i> +if they could only be used against each other and no longer against +commerce and for purposes of blockade. It is a regrettable fact +that at the Hague Conference we accepted the English standpoint +on the question of war on commerce, and not the American. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In October I was again instructed from Berlin to speed up Mr. Wilson's +peace movement. With regard to this new urgency Herr von Jagow, +on the 14th April, 1919, granted an interview to the Berlin +representative of the <i>New York Sun</i>, the substance of which +was as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"In the autumn of 1916 the Emperor, Count Bernstorff and I opposed +the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, which was urged +with increasing vigor by our military and naval departments, as +being the only means of bringing the war to an early conclusion. +Week after week we watched for the hoped-for peace move of President +Wilson, which, however, did not come. At last, in October, the Emperor, +upon whom increasing pressure was being brought to bear to give his +consent to the unrestricted submarine campaign, sent a memorandum +to <a name="page_293"><span class="page">Page 293</span></a> the +American Government, reminding them or certain mediation promises +which had been made at the time of the <i>Sussex</i> crisis. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"When this memorandum, addressed to Mr. Gerard, reached Berlin +Mr. Gerard had already left for America. I, therefore, cabled the +text to Washington and instructed Count Bernstorff to hand the +memorandum to Mr. Gerard on his arrival in New York. Count Bernstorff, +who had been made fully aware that the Emperor wished to avert +the submarine campaign and a rupture with the United States, was +also informed by me that the memorandum had been written by the +Emperor in person. For reasons which there is no need for me to +mention here, Count Bernstorff handed the memorandum, not to Mr. +Gerard, but to Colonel House, who certainly communicated it to +the President." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The telegram in which the Emperor's memorandum was communicated +to me read as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 9th October, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"His Majesty the Emperor desires that the following memorandum should +be handed to Ambassador Gerard on the latter's arrival. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your Excellency should do this in strict confidence and say that +the memoir is not intended to convey a threat of submarine warfare. +I should only like you to remind the Ambassador before his interview +with the President of the expectations we based in the spring on +Wilson and to call his attention to the increasing ruthlessness +with which the enemy is carrying on the war. I take it for granted +that Gerard will treat my memoir as strictly confidential and will +not publish it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Should Your Excellency, however, regard the delivery <a +name="page_294"><span class="page">Page 294</span></a> of the memorandum +as indiscreet, I request that it may be deferred. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"For Your Excellency's information (strictly confidential): +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"1. The memorandum is written personally by His Majesty. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"2. Unrestricted submarine warfare is for the present deferred. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Memorandum</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your Excellency hinted to His Majesty in your last conversation at +Charleville in April that President Wilson possibly would try towards +the end of summer to offer his good services to the belligerents for +the promotion of peace. The German Government has no information +as to whether the President adheres to this idea, and as to the +eventual date at which his step would take place. Meanwhile the +constellation of war has taken such a form, that the German Government +foresees the time at which it will be forced to regain the freedom +of action that it has reserved to itself in the Note of May 4th +last, and thus the President's steps may be jeopardized." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Mr. Gerard arrived in New York a few days after I had received the +Emperor's memorandum. He was accompanied by the American journalist, +Herbert Swope, a correspondent of <i>The World</i>, who had spent +a considerable time in Berlin. This gentleman professed to be Mr. +Gerard's confidant, and even from the ship sent wireless messages +to his paper in which he reported that the unrestricted submarine +campaign was imminent. The Ambassador also, after landing in New +York, expressed himself, as I at once learned, to the same effect, +and Mr. Swope continued his open Press-campaign in this direction. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_295"><span class="page">Page 295</span></a> Under +these circumstances I considered it inopportune to give Mr. Gerard +the Emperor's memorandum, as I assumed that he would read into it +merely a confirmation of his view, and would discuss it in that +light. If, however, the idea spread abroad that we were about to +begin the unrestricted submarine campaign all prospect of success +for peace mediation was lost. It was indeed clear that the Entente +would not accept American mediation if they could hope for the +submarine campaign and consequent declaration of war by the United +States. It must continually be repeated that mediation could only +succeed if the Entente had already abandoned all hope of American +assistance. On these considerations I handed the memorandum to +Colonel House, of whose discretion I had two years' experience. In +this way it came into the hands of the equally unusually discreet +President, without anyone else learning anything about it. The +memorandum at once produced a great effect, as now the American +authorities had no further doubt that the Imperial Government would +accept the intended mediation. This could, however, not be speeded +up because Mr. Wilson did not want to undertake a great political +movement so shortly before the election. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At this time I sent the following report to the Chancellor: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 17th October, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"For a week there has again been some excitement here about foreign +policy. This is due to a variety of causes. At first the rumor +was that Ambassador Gerard was bringing with him a peace proposal +from the German Government. In spite of all denials this rumor was +believed for a time, because it was started by one of the first +bankers of New York. Unfortunately Mr. Gerard <a name="page_296"><span +class="page">Page 296</span></a> heard of this canard while he was +still on the ship, and as he was travelling with Herbert Swope +a denial, sent by wireless, appeared in <i>The World</i>, which +was worse than the rumor itself. In this Swope reported that Mr. +Gerard was coming over to announce the approaching beginning of +ruthless submarine war. Just at this moment the U53 appeared at +Newport, and two days later I had an audience of the President, +which had been arranged a long time before, that I might hand to +Mr. Wilson the reply of His Majesty the Emperor and King on the +question of Polish relief. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Colonel House, with whom, as is known, I am in constant communication, +expected that on his landing Mr. Gerard would let fall some intentional +or unintentional diplomatic <i>lapsus linguœ</i>, and therefore +went in the early morning to the quarantine station in order to protect +Gerard from the reporters. Mr. Gerard received a very hearty reception, +which, however, had certainly been engineered for election purposes, +because it is to the interest of the Democratic Administration to +extol their ambassador and their foreign policy. Immediately after +the reception Gerard breakfasted with House, and there everything +was denied that had been actually said or implied. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As I have known Mr. and Mrs. Gerard for many years I had a longish +conversation with them on the day after their arrival. The quintessence +of the ambassador's remarks was that he was completely neutral, +but that Berlin expected more than that. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Now everything has calmed down again here, and nothing is talked +about except the election, which will be decided in three weeks' +time. As I have several times had the honor to report, the result +is most uncertain. While four months ago a Republican victory seemed +certain, to-day Wilson's success is very possible. This is <a +name="page_297"><span class="page">Page 297</span></a> explained +by the fact that Mr. Hughes has made no permanent impression as a +speaker, whereas Roosevelt blew the war trumpet in his usual bombastic +fashion. If Hughes should be defeated he can thank Roosevelt. The +average American is, and remains a pacifist '<i>Er segnet Friede +und Friedenszeiten</i>,' and can only be drawn into war by passionate +popular excitement." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +With the facts contained in the above report the following telegram +is also concerned, which I despatched after the visit to the President +mentioned above: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Telegram in Cipher</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 11th October 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson gave particular force to his remarks by pointing out that +the leaders of the opposition Roosevelt, Lodge and Co., desired +war with Germany, which he was quite unable to understand. His +only desire was to remain neutral, and to help to bring the war +to an end as a decision by force of arms seemed to him out of the +question. He thought that neither of the belligerent parties would +be able to gain a decisive victory. Therefore it was better to +make peace to-day than to-morrow. But all prospect of ending the +war would vanish if the United States were also drawn in. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As Wilson always spoke as though he was holding himself in readiness, +in case his services as mediator were required, I told him that +in my opinion there was no prospect of any advances being made +by the belligerent Powers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It was obvious that Wilson would have preferred to be directly +encouraged to make peace before the election because in that case +he would have been sure of being re-elected. If, however, he were +re-elected without this, he would have to make up his mind to take the +initiative <a name="page_298"><span class="page">Page 298</span></a> +himself. Result of the poll still very doubtful. Wilson surprisingly +strong, as Hughes has little success as a speaker and Roosevelt +does more harm than good." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To this I received the following reply from the Chancellor: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 14th October, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Demand for unrestricted submarine campaign increasing here with +prolongation of war and improbability of decisive military blow, +without, however, shaking the Government's attitude. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Direct request for Wilson's mediation still impossible, in view +of favor hitherto shown to Entente, and after last speeches of +Asquith and Lloyd George. Spontaneous appeal for peace, towards +which I again ask you to encourage him, would be gladly accepted +by us. You should point out Wilson's power, and consequently his +duty, to put a stop to slaughter. If he cannot make up his mind +to act alone he should get into communication with Pope, King of +Spain and European neutrals. Such joint action, since it cannot be +rejected by Entente, would insure him re-election and historical +fame. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Bethmann-Hollweg.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The incident of the Emperor's memorandum closed with the following +telegram sent by me: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 20th October, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I thought it better to give memorandum to Gerard for House, as +in this way greater discretion is assured. Latter was incautious +in his utterances to Press here. House will speak with Gerard. +Both gentlemen see Wilson shortly, and are accordingly in constant +touch. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It is still not to be expected that Wilson will make peace advances +before the election. Nor that he will get <a name="page_299"><span +class="page">Page 299</span></a> into communication with Pope or +King of Spain as hitherto every suggestion of joint action has met +with immovable opposition, chiefly based on tradition. Meanwhile +prospect of Wilson's re-election becomes obviously greater every +day. Should this occur I believe that Wilson will very soon attempt +mediation and with success, chiefly because the feeling against +England has greatly increased, which England is seeking to hide. +If peace is not concluded serious Anglo-American differences of +opinion are to be expected. Until now every fresh dispute with Germany +with regard to the submarine question has always been exploited by +our enemies here to bridge the differences with England. Already +the agitation in the German Press for unrestricted submarine warfare +is persistently used for this purpose." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +After a hard struggle Mr. Wilson was re-elected President. The +pacifist tendency in the United States had won, for the battle +was fought under the watchword that Mr. Wilson had preserved peace +for the United States. "He kept us out of the war" had been the +battle-cry of the Democrats. The few electioneering speeches made +by the President breathed the spirit of neutrality and love of +peace. It is particularly to be noticed that at that time, Mr. +Wilson, in an address, dealt in a thoroughly objective way with +the question of guilt for the origin of the war, which was later to +be the determining factor in his attitude towards us. The way was +now cleared for the opening of the peace movement. Public feeling +had also become more favorable to us, inasmuch as the American war +industry no longer attached so much importance to the prolongation +of the war after the victorious Democratic party had drawn up an +extensive armament programme and so indicated to the industry the +prospect of great State contracts. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_300"><span class="page">Page 300</span></a> On the +subject of my own attitude with regard to the election, innumerable +legends have been spread through Germany. The few German-Americans +who shared the views of the so-called "German-American Chamber of +Commerce" have reproached me with having brought about Mr. Wilson's +election by influencing the German-Americans. Anti-German-American +newspapers maintained, on the other hand, that I had used every +lever to bring about the election of the Republican candidate, Mr. +Hughes, so as to punish Mr. Wilson for his attitude towards the +submarine campaign. My position was an extraordinarily difficult +one, as I could neither take part in the election nor give up the +relations which naturally and in the course of my duty bound me +to the German-Americans and pacifists. In general I may say that +the vast majority of German-Americans had absolute confidence in +me throughout. A splendid testimony of this was given at the great +German bazaar which was held in New York in aid of the Red Cross. +This undertaking made the astounding net profit of 800,000 dollars. +At the opening nearly 30,000 people were present, who gave me an +indescribably enthusiastic ovation simply because they believed +that I had prevented war between Germany and the United States. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I never for a moment denied that I personally should be glad to +see Mr. Wilson re-elected, as I was convinced that he had the +determination and the power to bring about peace. It was at that +time impossible for me to foresee that our Government would change +its attitude to this question. All American pacifists belonged to +the Democratic camp, all militarists belonged to the Republican +party. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A change in our favor was, therefore, not to be expected from the +election of Mr. Hughes. Apart from the usual relations with the +pacifists and German-Americans <a name="page_301"><span +class="page">Page 301</span></a> already mentioned, which were in no +way altered during the election, I held myself aloof as my position +demanded. If it had been possible to accuse me of taking sides, the +agents of the Entente would not have missed the opportunity of +bringing me to book, as this they regarded as their object in life. +I continually received letters from <i>agents provocateurs</i>, +asking for my opinion on the elections. Of course I never replied to +these. Neither were the false statements of anti-German newspapers +any more successful which announced that on the day of the election +I had openly shown my support of Mr. Hughes. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +New York at night after the polling is one of the sights of America. All +streets, squares, theatres and restaurants are filled to overflowing. +The election results are displayed everywhere by electric light and +cinematograph. Particularly when the result is very uncertain, as +in 1916, the crowd are tremendously excited. At 11 p.m. the election +of Mr. Hughes seemed certain, as the Eastern States had voted for +him almost to a man, and it was said that a Democratic candidate +can only gain the victory if he wins over New York State. Next day +the picture changed, after the results had come gradually from +the West, where the Democratic party was everywhere triumphant. +The majority, however, was so slight that it was several days before +Mr. Wilson's election was secure. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The malcontents among the German-Americans already mentioned maintain +that if Mr. Hughes had been elected, Congress would have used the +four months between the election and the 4th March, during which +Mr. Wilson was powerless and Mr. Hughes had not yet got the reins +into his hands, to rush through the warning of American citizens +against travelling on British passenger-ships. In that case, Mr. +Hughes, on assuming office, would have found himself faced with a +situation which would have <a name="page_302"><span class="page">Page +302</span></a> prevented him from entering the war, in view of the +national inclination towards peace. Therefore, the German-Americans +ought to have supported Hughes. This had been clear to the Germans +in the East. They maintained that Wilson's re-election was due to +the German votes in the Western States which had obeyed a more +or less clear order from the German Embassy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This line of argument is yet another proof that the Germans in +question had no idea of the situation in America. They kept exclusively +to themselves in the <i>Deutscher Verein</i>, and scarcely ever +saw a real, true-bred American. To begin with, it is difficult +to see why the Germans in the West should obey the alleged order +from me if the Germans in the East did not do so. But the important +thing is that Wilson had firmly made up his mind, in case Mr. Hughes +was elected, to appoint him Secretary of State immediately and, +after Hughes had informed himself on the political position in +this office, to hand over the presidency and himself retire. Mr. +Wilson considered it impossible to leave the country without firm +leadership at such a dangerous moment. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Immediately after the official announcement of his reelection, +Mr. Wilson wrote a Peace-Note, but unfortunately kept it in his +desk, because, unhappily, just at that time a new anti-German wave +swept over the country on account of the Belgian deportations. Mr. +Wilson was at that time in the habit of typing the drafts of his +Notes and speeches himself, and only submitting them to his advisers +on points of law or other technicalities. Whether he still works +in this way I do not know. If the unhappy measure of the Belgian +deportations had not been adopted, and particularly just as we had +informed the President that we did not want to annex Belgium, the +history of the world would probably have taken a different course. The +American mediation would have anticipated <a name="page_303"><span +class="page">Page 303</span></a> our peace offer and, therefore, would +probably have succeeded, because we could not then have reopened +the unrestricted submarine campaign without letting the mediation +run its course. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In November several submarine incidents occurred in which there +was a doubt as to whether the rules of cruiser warfare had been +followed. The ships <i>Marina</i> and <i>Arabia</i> came under +particular consideration. I will not go into these cases as they had +no political importance. President Wilson caused the investigations +to be carried on in a dilatory fashion because he did not want to +see his peace move disturbed by controversies. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Of greater importance was the wish that was again cropping up in +Berlin to open the so-called "intensified submarine campaign." I +learned this in the following from Secretary of State von Jagow: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 112. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 8th November, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Navy wishes at least torpedo armed enemy cargo-vessels without +warning. Does Your Excellency consider this dangerous, apart from +probable mistakes, particularly in view of fact that now many Americans +are lured to travel on such steamers! +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Von Jagow.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +As the "intensified submarine campaign" would have destroyed all +prospect of American intervention, I advised strongly against it +in the two following telegrams: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(1) <span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 152 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 17th November, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It is urgently desirable not to reopen disputes about armed +merchantmen, especially in view of Wilson's peace plan." +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<a name="page_304"><span class="page">Page 304</span></a> +(2) <span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 20th November, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In reply to telegram No. 112 which was delayed. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Pursuant to Telegram No. 152. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Urge no change in submarine war, until decided whether Wilson will +open mediation. I consider this imminent." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +At the same time I received the first news of the intended peace +offer of the German Government. To begin with, the following telegram +arrived from Secretary of State von Jagow: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 16th November, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Desirable to know whether President willing to take steps towards +mediation, and if so, which and when? Question important for decision +of possible steps in same direction elsewhere. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"How does Mexican question stand? +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Von Jagow.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Then followed a further telegram which read as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 22nd November, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Strictly confidential. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"For Your Excellency's strictly personal information. So far as +favorable military position permits we intend, in conjunction with +our Allies, immediately to announce our readiness to enter into +peace negotiations. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Von Jagow.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_305"><span class="page">Page 305</span></a> To the +first of these two telegrams I sent the following reply: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 21st November, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson spontaneously commissioned House to tell me in strict confidence +that he is anxious to take steps towards mediation as soon as possible, +probably between now and the New Year. He makes it a condition, +however, that until then, mediation should be spoken and written +of as little as possible, and further, that we should conduct the +submarine war strictly according to our promises and not allow +any fresh controversies to arise. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson's reasons for the above conditions are as follows: He believes +that he can only resort to mediation provided that public opinion +over here remains as favorable to us as it has been during the +last few months. On this account he deplores the so-called Belgian +deportations. Any new submarine controversy would again affect +public feeling adversely for us, whereas if this question can be +eliminated the tension with regard to England will increase. The +British reply on the subject of the black lists and the English +Press utterances on Wilson's election have created a bad impression +in Government circles over here. The submarine question, however, +will always divert this resentment against us again. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson still hesitates to intervene because the State Department +expects a refusal on the part of our enemies, while House urges it +strongly and is very hopeful. I have, according to instructions, +encouraged him as much as possible, by telling him, that in my +opinion, our enemies would be quite unable to refuse to enter into +negotiations, and that is all that Wilson has in view. House seemed +very much impressed when I reminded him how, throughout the whole war, +the English Government had <a name="page_306"><span class="page">Page +306</span></a> tried by lying and diplomatic trickery to bring +public opinion on to their side. This house of cards, built on +lies and deception, would immediately collapse if our enemies were +now to refuse negotiations and thus would have to admit openly +their desire for conquest. I am rather afraid that England may +make a pretense of entering into negotiations and then try to put +us in the wrong. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I chose this line of argument because Wilson fears above all things +the humiliation of a refusal. If it does come to negotiations, even +unsuccessful, Wilson will have scored a great success. Whether +the negotiations will lead to a definite result I cannot judge +from here. In any case, if it should come to negotiations, strong +pressure will be exerted by the Government over here in the direction +of peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Mexican question is still in a state of stagnation as a result +of diplomatic negotiations. This affair interests practically no +one any more and proved to have no influence on the election. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If Your Excellency still desires Wilson to intervene it is necessary, +in view of the above, to get rid as soon as possible of the +<i>Marina</i> and <i>Arabia</i> incidents without further controversy +and not to allow any fresh controversies to arise. I think that, +with the help of House, I can bury these two incidents without +attracting much attention, as this is the wish of Wilson himself. +As House said, the President takes a tragic view of these incidents, +because, after the <i>Sussex</i> Note, he could not possibly write +another Note, and therefore, there is nothing left but to break +off diplomatic negotiations, should it be impossible to dispose +of the matter privately and confidentially with me. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Next week Gerard will be in Washington for a day or two: he will +lunch with me and dine with Lansing. House <a name="page_307"><span +class="page">Page 307</span></a> keeps him in strict control. In +case Gerard's return to Berlin is not desired, please send me +instructions. Otherwise he should be there again at the end of the +year." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +To this telegram, which announced very definitely the American +mediation, I received from the Foreign Office the following reply: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 121 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 26th November, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Replacement, or at least further retention, of Gerard in America +desired in Berlin, provided that it is possible without wounding +his vanity and sensitiveness to our disadvantage, that it is certain +that this hint from our side will not become known in America and +that a suitable successor is available. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We should prefer Wilson's peace move to the step on our part mentioned +in our telegram No. 116 of the 22nd November. For this reason it +is eminently desirable that Wilson should make up his mind for +immediate action if possible at the opening of congress or immediately +afterwards. If it is put off until the New Year or later, the lull +in military operations during the winter campaign would moderate the +desire of public opinion for peace, and on the other hand would make +preparations for the spring offensive necessary which would probably +strengthen the military opposition of a peace movement. Please place +this point of view cautiously and without <i>empressement</i> before +House as your personal opinion and keep me closely instructed by +telegram as to the position. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Zimmermann.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_308"><span class="page">Page 308</span></a> +To this telegram I sent the following replies: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 164 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Reply to Telegram No.</span> 121 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 1st December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"To-morrow I shall see House in New York and will try to arrange +that Gerard, who is to sail on 5th December, is kept back. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Lansing expressed himself very strongly to me on the subject of +the American protest with regard to the Belgian deportations. These +have endangered the whole Belgian relief movement; in addition, +feeling here has been poisoned against us, and that just at a moment +when it looked as though peace negotiations might be begun. Lansing +expressed the view that, if the Imperial Government could find a +way of yielding to the protests of the neutrals, this would make a +strong impression in our favor and that it would probably be possible +immediately afterwards to propose the opening of peace negotiations. +Hitherto, unfortunately, something has always intervened. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Federal Reserve Board's warning to the banks against unsecured +promissory notes of foreign States is the first sign that the Government +here wishes to put pressure on our enemies." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 4th December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Pursuant to Telegram No. 164 of the 1st inst. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"House told me in strict confidence question of Mr. Gerard's return +has been thoroughly discussed by him with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing. +Mr. Gerard's unpopularity in Berlin and his unfriendly manner were +well known here. However, no satisfactory successor was <a +name="page_309"><span class="page">Page 309</span></a> available, +and Mr. Gerard is at least straightforward and does exactly what +he is told. He has received very detailed instructions here, and is +even quite enthusiastic over the idea of assisting in bringing about +peace. In addition, Mr. Gerard was so pleased at the appointment of +the Secretary of State that he is sure to adopt a more friendly +attitude in future. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As a matter of fact, Mr. Gerard has everywhere described the changes +in the personnel at the Foreign Office as extraordinarily favorable +for German-American relations, and laid particular stress on his +personal friendship with the Secretary of State. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Everything is prepared for a peace move, but with Mr. Wilson still +hesitating, it is still doubtful when he will take action. All +the authorities here have now been won over to favor such a step. +This may then come at any time, especially if it is possible for +us to adopt a conciliatory attitude on the Belgian question. Mr. +Wilson believes that he is so hated in England that he won't be +listened to. This train of thought largely explains his eagerness +in the Belgian question. In any case, so much is certain, that +House is continually urging Mr. Wilson to take action; moreover, +peace propaganda here is steadily increasing, notwithstanding that +it is for the moment very seriously hampered by the Belgian question. +If Mr. Wilson—as is to be expected—finds a strong feeling +for peace in Congress, he should at last make up his mind." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +After a stay of about two months in America, Mr. Gerard, furnished +with fresh instructions, left for Berlin on the 5th December. When +later the Ambassador, at the much discussed Adlon dinner, declared +that the relations between the United States and Germany had never +been so good as at that moment since the beginning of the war, this +speech was the keynote of his instructions. <a name="page_310"><span +class="page">Page 310</span></a> If on the other hand Herr Helfferich +said that the exuberance of the Ambassador astonished him, this is +explained by the fact that Berlin never believed in Mr. Wilson's +intention to bring about peace. Why such incredulity should persist +notwithstanding that Colonel House had twice travelled to Berlin for +this very purpose, and that the President's peace policy had been +the burden of all my reports, I shall never be able to understand, +while, on the other hand, I can quite understand that Mr. Wilson's +passivity with regard to the English breaches of international +law had engendered strong distrust of him in Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +For the rest, Mr. Gerard seemed to be imperfectly informed about +the situation in Berlin. He was certainly right in his prediction +of the unrestricted submarine campaign, but in this case the wish +was father to the thought. It accorded with Mr. Gerard's anti-German +feeling, to which he gave expression later in his gossipy literature +and film production, that he should welcome the submarine campaign, +and with it the rupture with the United States, as well as our +defeat. But after all, the Ambassador' proved at the Adlon dinner +that he could sing another tune. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When Mr. Gerard lunched with me in Washington, I had just learned +by cable from Berlin that Herr von Jagow had resigned and had been +replaced by Herr Zimmermann. On hearing this news, the Ambassador +said that now there would be no rupture between Germany and the +United States, for Herr Zimmermann was his personal friend and +was opposed to war, while Herr von Jagow, as an aristocrat, did +not love the Americans, and looked down on bourgeois Gerard. A +grosser misreading of the actual situation in Berlin can scarcely +be conceived, as the unrestricted submarine campaign was only made +possible by the resignation of Herr von Jagow, who was <a +name="page_311"><span class="page">Page 311</span></a> the chief +opponent in Berlin of the submarine campaign, and the pillar on +which the idea of American intervention rested. As long as Herr +von Jagow remained Secretary of State, a breach with the United +States was regarded as impossible. One of his last official acts +was to write a private letter to me on the 20th November, 1916, +concluding with the following sentence: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"As you have seen from your instructions, we are thoroughly in +sympathy with the peace tendencies of President Wilson. His activity +in this direction is to be strongly encouraged. Naturally his mediation +tendencies must not extend to concrete proposals (because these +would be unfavorable to us.)" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +We now come to the moment in this account when the peace offer of +the Imperial Government got involved with Mr. Wilson's plans for +mediation. It is not my intention to go closely into the events +that occurred in Berlin or the considerations that took effect there, +as I only know them through their reaction on the instructions +sent to me. I will only mention briefly, that, according to the +statement of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg before the Commission of +the National Assembly, the peace offer of the Imperial Government +was made with a view to influencing the pacifist minorities in +the Entente countries, and working, through the people, on the +Governments. Beyond this there was no intention of cutting out +Mr. Wilson's peace move, but the Imperial Government wanted to +have "two irons in the fire." Finally, all the utterances of the +Imperial Government, which do not seem to tally with these two +principles of their policy, are to be regarded as based on purely +tactical motives. Accordingly, the decisive turn in our policy +did not occur until the 9th January, 1917, when the decision to +resort <a name="page_312"><span class="page">Page 312</span></a> +to the unrestricted submarine war was taken. Until then the policy +followed was that of "two irons in the fire." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This is the way in which I read the situation in Washington at +the time. If I had been convinced that the resignation of Herr von +Jagow and the German peace offer meant a definite departure from +the policy which we had hitherto followed with regard to Mr. Wilson's +peace step, I should have immediately sent in my resignation, as +I was completely identified with this policy. However, I shall +return to this side of the question later. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The following telegram from the Foreign Office gave me the official +information of our peace offer: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 128 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 9th December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Confidential, for your personal information. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We have decided to make use of the favorable position created +by the fall of Bukarest in order, according to telegram number +116 of the 21st November, to make a peace offer in conjunction +with our Allies, probably on Thursday, the 12th December. We do +not at the present moment run any risk of damaging our prestige +or showing signs of weakness. Should the enemy reject the offer +the odium of continuing the war will fall upon them. For reasons +stated in telegram number 121 we could not wait any longer for +President Wilson to make up his mind to take action. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The American Embassy here will at the given moment receive a Note +in which the American Government will be requested to communicate +our peace offer to those of our enemies with whom they represent +our interests. Our other enemies will be informed through the medium +of Switzerland and Spain respectively. American representative +in conversation with Chancellor on 5th <a name="page_313"><span +class="page">Page 313</span></a> December expressed himself, in +confidence, on the President's mission, among other things, as +follows: 'What the President now most earnestly desires is practical +cooperation on the part of German authorities in bringing about +a favorable opportunity for soon and affirmative action by the +President looking to an early restoration of peace.' Chancellor +replied to American representative, he was 'extremely gratified +to see from the President's message that in the given moment he +could count upon the sincere and practical co-operation of the +President in the restoration of peace, as much as the President +could count upon the practical co-operation of German authorities.' +We think we may assume that our action meets the wishes of the +President. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Please interpret it in any case in this sense to the President +and House. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Von Stumm</span>." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +To this telegram I replied as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 13th December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"In reply to Telegram No. 128. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Have carried out instructions with House, who is at present staying +at the White House. I have not yet received answer from Wilson, +but it is generally believed here that he will strongly support +peace proposals. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Mr. Gerard, in a speech at a farewell dinner given to him in New +York, declared that Germany had won, and could not be robbed of her +victory. Although not published, this speech attracted attention, +especially as Mr. Gerard emphasized the fact that he had reported +to Mr. Wilson in this sense." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Before the Commission of the National Assembly I <a +name="page_314"><span class="page">Page 314</span></a> was asked +whether I had made an attempt to stand in the way of our peace +offer, lest it should interfere with Mr. Wilson's action. I took no +such steps, because I thought that I was faced with a firm resolve +of the Imperial Government, and because I did not think that our +peace offer would substantially compromise Mr. Wilson's action. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It was also stated before the commission that I might have helped +my policy to prevail in Berlin if I had insisted on it more strongly. +With regard to this, I must say at once, that I did not consider +stronger influence on my side really called for, as my instructions +had always categorically laid down that I was to encourage Mr. +Wilson to take peace action. I had also been informed that the +Imperial Government would prefer such action to a peace offer from +our side, and that the correct moment for the latter would have +to depend on the military situation. I was, therefore, until the +arrival of the Berlin telegram, number 128, not clear as to which +of the actions would come first, especially as, according to my +instructions, I was to keep our peace offer secret and could not +discuss it with Colonel House. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Under ordinary circumstances, I should have travelled to Berlin +several times during the war to confer with the authorities. +Unfortunately, however, that was impossible, as the English would +never have allowed me to travel to and fro. If I had had the ways +and means to enlighten German public opinion on the situation in +America, it would certainly have done a lot of good. According to +the evidence given before the Commission of the National Assembly, +the chief reason for our rejection of mediation was distrust of +Mr. Wilson. Nevertheless, I still believe that ignorance and +undervaluation of America was a stronger influence. At least I +cannot conceive that all the authorities concerned would have <a +name="page_315"><span class="page">Page 315</span></a> voted for +unrestricted submarine war if they had been firmly convinced that +the United States would come into the war with all her military and +economic power. However that may be, I tried at least to do what I +could and I made an attempt to send Herr Albert, who was completely +in accord with me, to Berlin on the submarine <i>Deutschland</i>. +The captain of the <i>Deutschland</i>, however, had scruples against +carrying passengers, and Herr Albert's voyage had therefore to +be given up. After my experience of the journeys of Herren Meyer +Gerhardt and Dernburg, I certainly do not think that Herr Albert +would have done very much in Berlin. Even I could hardly have hindered +the opening of the unrestricted submarine campaign where Herr von +Jagow, Herr von Kühlmann and others had failed, and after +all, that was the main point. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mr. Wilson's intention of bringing about peace had been reported +to me so definitely and so often that I took it for granted that +the President would carry through his plan in spite of our peace +offer. As I had received no instructions to the contrary, I held +to my previous interpretation of the situation, and assumed that, +although it was true that we had ourselves made a peace offer because +Wilson's action was so long in coming, we should nevertheless still +be glad to avail ourselves of the President's help. In my opinion, +this was the only interpretation that could be put on the Foreign +Office telegram number 128, given above. The President himself, +as Colonel House told me, was very disappointed when he received +the news of our peace offer. Colonel House told me that he would +naturally have liked to take the first step himself. Apart from this, +he had always warned us against mentioning peace, because this would +be interpreted by the Entente as weakness. He therefore regarded our +peace offer as an obstacle to action on <a name="page_316"><span +class="page">Page 316</span></a> his part, as it was bound to diminish +the enemy's readiness to enter into negotiations. On the other hand, +the step of the Imperial Government exerted a favorable influence +on American public opinion, and this influence would have been even +more favorable if the offer had been made less in the tone of a +victor. The attitude of American public opinion, and the fear lest +peace negotiations might be opened without his co-operation, must +have been the chief reasons that influenced Mr. Wilson publicly +to support our peace offer. In connection with this I sent the +following information to Berlin: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 16th December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Lansing tells me the following statement, which I could not send +by wireless to-day, comes from Wilson personally. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"President Wilson has decided that the Notes of the Central Powers, +proposing a discussion of peace to the Entente Allies, will be +sent forward by the American Government acting as intermediary +without any accompanying offer of his own. He has not determined +whether any action on behalf of peace will be taken later by the +United States on its own account, but is holding himself in readiness +to serve in any possible way towards bringing the warring nations +together." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"From Lansing's remarks I gather that he is convinced that our enemies +will agree to a conference and that then the American Government will +have an opportunity to speak in favor of peace. As the Press here +is also in general of the opinion that our enemies cannot refuse +a conference without turning public opinion against themselves, I +have grounds for assuming that the American <a name="page_317"><span +class="page">Page 317</span></a> Embassy in London, in spite of +the official statement mentioned above, will assert this view." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As I expected, the President did not allow himself to be turned +from his purpose, and on the 18th December dispatched the Note which +had long been ready, with certain alterations, to the belligerent +Powers. He certainly would not have taken this step if he had not +reckoned on certain success. Mr. Wilson's Note could not help but +bear out our peace plans, and was therefore regarded throughout +America as "pro-German." For this very reason it caused a sensation. +On the New York Exchange it was followed by a slump in war industry +values. A few anti-German newspapers, which began to suspect that +I was the only diplomatist in Washington who knew anything of the +President's intentions, declared that I had made millions by speculating +on this probability. I had already been accused of every other +imaginable crime by the Jingo and Entente Press. Mr. Wilson's +son-in-law, Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, was also suspected +of having abused his political information to speculate on the +Exchange. Soon afterwards, when I was dining with the President, +he asked me in jest what I had to say to the accusation of the +American Press that I had made millions in this way. I replied +that I had gradually got used to such attacks, and they only amused +me. Mr. Wilson replied: "That is right. My son-in-law takes the +matter much too seriously. I tell him 'If you get so angry, people +will think the story is true.'" +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The American Press was thrown into the greatest excitement by the +President's Note and stormed the State Department. Mr. Lansing was +surrounded by questioners and remarked that the United States had the +greatest interest in bringing the war to an end, because otherwise she +would be drawn in herself. As of late, as has already been mentioned, +several doubtful submarine incidents <a name="page_318"><span +class="page">Page 318</span></a> had occurred, the Press took this +remark to mean that the United States would enter the war against +us if the intervention move came to nothing. Mr. Wilson immediately, +realized that such an interpretation of Mr. Lansing's words would +seriously jeopardize his peace move. If the Entente could hope +for American participation in the war, there would be no prospect +of their consenting to a "peace without victory." In that case +the direction of their policy was defined beforehand. They only +required to reject the offer of mediation to reach the goal of their +long-cherished hopes. The President therefore at once requested Mr. +Lansing to contradict the statements of the Press. This was done, +with the observation that there was no probability of the United +States entering the war. The harm could not, however, be completely +wiped out, as denials are always regarded with doubt. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The vital parts of Mr. Wilson's Note read as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out +from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective +views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and +the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty +against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in +the future, as would make it possible frankly to compare them. +He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He +would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative +in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but +he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. +One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great +object he has in mind be attained. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In the measures taken to secure the future peace of the world the +people and the Government of the United <a name="page_319"><span +class="page">Page 319</span></a> States are as vitally and as directly +interested as the Governments now at war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The President does not feel that it is right and his duty to point +out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently +be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its +conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly +hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more +than all, an inquiry be done civilization itself which can never +be atoned for, or repaired. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never +been definitely stated. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said +stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, +they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative +spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, +if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been +fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definite +results, what actual exchange of guaranties, what political or +territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success +even, would bring the war to an end. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which +the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it +necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have +feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least +for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a +hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately +practicable. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering +mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order +that we may learn, the neutral with the belligerent, how near the +haven of peace may <a name="page_320"><span class="page">Page +320</span></a> be for which all mankind longs with an intense and +increasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he speaks +and the objects which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, +and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new +light into the affairs of the world." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +As this Note in its positive proposals was considered rather tentative +and obscure—with the intention, of course, of making a direct +negative answer impossible—I asked Mr. Lansing what procedure +the President would like. With regard to this conversation I reported +to Berlin in the following telegram: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 188 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 21st December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Lansing informed me a few days ago of Wilson's Peace Note, and said +that the American Government were becoming more and more involved +in an intolerable position as a result of repeated infringements +of their rights. Therefore they hoped for frank statements from +the belligerent Powers on their peace conditions. I gave it as +my personal opinion that this would be difficult except through +a conference because of the press, etc. Lansing replied that the +statements could be confidential, and might gradually lead to a +conference. This seems to bear out the view, widely held here, +that Wilson would like to act as a 'clearing house' for the further +steps towards peace. He has American public opinion behind him +with the exception of our inveterate enemies, who regard Wilson's +Note as pro-German." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +My conversation with Mr. Lansing, and the wording of the American +Note, made it perfectly clear that the President, in the first place, +only wished to be informed of the peace conditions of both sides. +This was just what the <a name="page_321"><span class="page">Page +321</span></a> Berlin Government did not want, because it would have +aroused a bitter struggle between the different shades of public +opinion as to the "war aims." My telegram therefore received the +following negative reply: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 142 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 26th December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"In reply to Telegram No. 188. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I would reply to the American Peace Note that a direct interchange +of ideas seems to us most likely to attain the desired result. We +should, therefore, propose immediate conference of delegates of +belligerent States in neutral place. We share President's view that +work of preventing future wars could only begin after conclusion +of present war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"For your exclusive personal information: as place for possible +conference of delegates only neutral Europe can be considered. Apart +from the difficulty of getting to and from America, the Portsmouth +experiences teach that American indiscretion and interference make +appropriate negotiations impossible. Interference by President, even +in form of 'clearing house,' would be detrimental to our interests +and is, therefore, to be prevented. The basis for future conclusion +of peace we must decide in direct conference with our enemies if +we are not to run the risk of being robbed of our gains by neutral +pressure. We, therefore, reject the idea of a conference. On the +other hand, there is no objection, after conclusion of peace, to +sending delegates to an international congress to confer on problem +of safeguarding future world peace. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Zimmermann</span>." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +From this telegram it might be assumed that the Imperial Government +wished to limit Mr. Wilson's activity <a name="page_322"><span +class="page">Page 322</span></a> to bringing the belligerent parties +to the conference table. We might also very well have gone on working +with the President if the unrestricted submarine campaign had not +intervened. It was, however, understandable that the Imperial +Government, on grounds of domestic politics, should not want to +name our peace terms at once. Accordingly the answer to the Wilson +Note, which reached Berlin with extraordinary promptness on the +26th December, amounted to a friendly negative. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The German Note ran as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The Imperial Government have received and considered the President's +magnanimous suggestion, that the foundation should be laid on which +to build a lasting peace, in the friendly spirit which permeates +the President's communication. The President points to the goal +which is dear to his heart, and leaves the choice of the way open. +To the Imperial Government a direct interchange of ideas would +seem the most appropriate way of attaining the desired result. +They, therefore, have the honor to suggest, in the sense of their +statement of the 12th inst., in which they offered the hand to +peace negotiations, an immediate conference of delegates of the +belligerent States in a neutral place. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The Imperial Government are also of the opinion that the great +work of preventing future wars cannot be begun until after the +conclusion of the present struggle of the nations. When this time +has come they will gladly be ready to co-operate with the United +States of America in this noble work." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The reasons of domestic politics which prevented the Imperial Government +from naming our peace conditions were not understood in America. +When Secretary of <a name="page_323"><span class="page">Page +323</span></a> State Lansing discussed with me the German Note of +26th December he said that he did not understand why we refused to +name our conditions. If both the belligerent parties communicated +their conditions a compromise would eventually be reached. To my +objection that our demands were so moderate that they would be +interpreted as weakness he replied that we ought to ask for more, +indeed, ask for anything at all so long as we said something that +would provide a starting-point from which negotiations could be +opened and settled. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This conversation had no immediate practical results, as Colonel +House asked me on the same day to call on him in New York With +regard to the result of our conversation I telegraphed to Berlin +as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 192 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 29th December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"House told me it is Wilson's opinion that a conference will not +come about without previous confidential negotiations, for our +enemies, as things are at present, would refuse the invitation or +make their consent dependent on conditions. These words of Colonel +House were accompanied by an invitation to strictly confidential +negotiations, of which only he and Mr. Wilson should know. Under +these circumstances complete discretion was assured, as Wilson and +House, unlike most Americans, are both fairly clever at keeping +secrets. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I beg for early instructions as to whether I should reject such +negotiations, or whether your Excellency wishes to authorize me +to accept and will furnish me with instructions accordingly. As I +have always reported, Wilson lays comparatively little importance +on the territorial side of the peace conditions. I am still of the +opinion that the chief emphasis should be laid on what are here +called the guarantees for the future. If <a name="page_324"><span +class="page">Page 324</span></a> we could give Wilson these as +fully as possible he thinks he could bring about a conference, +for with that the chief argument of our enemies would be disposed +of. The latter maintain that we would like to make peace now in +order to begin the war when a more favorable opportunity occurs, +while our enemies are obliged to hold together the coalition that +has been formed against us in order to attain a lasting peace. +Wilson's ideas about such guarantees are known to Your Excellency. +They consist, in the first place, of disarmament by land and sea +(freedom of the seas), provisions for arbitration and a peace league. +I think, from Your Excellency's speech in the Reichstag, that the +Imperial Government would give such guarantees on condition that +peace was restored. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"With House I adopted chiefly a listening attitude in order not +to compromise Your Excellency in any way. However, I agree with +Colonel House's view that a peace conference cannot be brought +about without the help of the United States. Our enemies will try +to put us in the wrong by saying that we did, indeed, propose a +conference but would not breathe a word about our conditions or +guarantees. I can, of course, only judge from the American standpoint. +We have, by our peace offer, brought about a great change in public +opinion over here. This advantage we shall lose entirely if the +idea spread by our enemies that we have only made a deliberately +theatrical peace gesture for the benefit of German public opinion +is confirmed. What steps Wilson will take should Your Excellency +empower me to enter upon such negotiations is not yet certain and +depends entirely on Your Excellency's instructions. House had an +idea of travelling to England in person. The more detailed the +information Your Excellency can give me as to our conditions and +readiness to give guarantees the better from my point of view. +However, I do not know whether Your <a name="page_325"><span +class="page">Page 325</span></a> Excellency may not perhaps prefer +to let the negotiations break down rather than accept American +help. In my opinion it is not necessary that the United States +should take part in all the negotiations. All that is necessary +would be for us to pledge ourselves to the guarantees, which would +be settled in detail at a general conference, after a conference +of the belligerents had concluded a preliminary peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I submit to Your Excellency the above proposal because I am convinced +that our enemies will not consent to negotiations unless strong +pressure is brought to bear. This, however, will, in my opinion, +occur if Your Excellency thinks it possible to accept American +intervention. With the exception of the Belgian question the American +Government ought to bring us more advantage than disadvantage, as +the Americans have only just come to realize what England's mastery +of the seas means." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +This telegram I consider the most important of the entire negotiations, +inasmuch as it reached Berlin on the 3rd January, therefore six days +before the decision in favor of unrestricted submarine war. When I +re-read my telegrams to-day, I still—even after the evidence +given before the Commission of the National Assembly—have the +same impression as at that time, that Mr. Wilson agreed with our wishes +and regarded it as his principal task to bring about a conference of +the belligerent parties. I cannot, therefore, understand how it was +possible to regard this American offer as anything but an offer of +peace mediation, and how the Foreign Office could declare to G. H. +Q. that there had never been any question of peace mediation by Mr. +Wilson. On the other hand, I quite understand that Bethmann-Hollweg, +as he stated before the Commission of the National Assembly, was +very sceptical with regard to the President's policy. <a +name="page_326"><span class="page">Page 326</span></a> Nevertheless, +an offer of mediation was made which had to be accepted or refused. +In the first case it was necessary to bring forward the submarine +war as little as possible; in the other we should have to create +a clear diplomatic situation in Washington, if we were to avoid +the reproach of having negotiated with Wilson on the subject of +peace while at the same time planning the submarine campaign, which +was bound to bring about a rupture with the United States. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When I spoke with Colonel House at that time I assumed that the +principal aim of the German Note of the 26th December was to lay +particular emphasis on our old point of view, already known to +Mr. Wilson, according to which the regulation of territory was to +be dealt with by the belligerent Powers, and the League of Nations +question in a world conference under the American presidency. At the +time Colonel House himself always spoke of two conferences which +the President hoped to bring together at the Hague. The one was +to consist only of the belligerent Powers and settle the territorial +questions, the other was to be a world conference to found the +League of Nations. Mr. Wilson did not wish to invite the conference +to Washington because of the great distance from Europe and the +peculiar position of the American Press. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As I have already mentioned, their opening of the "intensified +submarine campaign" had been planned weeks before. This question +had now become acute, and I received the two following Foreign +Office telegrams on this subject: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 145 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 4th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Question of armed merchantmen in opinion of navy and G. H. Q. cannot +be further postponed. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_327"><span class="page">Page 327</span></a> "Request +you discuss with Lansing following memorandum which is closely +connected with American memorandum of 25th March and leave with +him as <i>aide-memoire</i>. Our action against armed merchantmen, +which will follow the lines of the memorandum, does not, of course, +imply any withdrawal of our assurance in the Note of 4th May, 1916, +as to sinking of merchantmen. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Zimmermann.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 148 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 5th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Pursuant to Telegram No. 145 of 4th January. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Please telegraph to me immediately Your Excellency's personal +opinion as to impression and consequent action with regard to Telegram +No. 145. This must, not, however, be discussed with Lansing, as, +for your own strictly personal information, action against armed +ships will begin immediately. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Von Stumm.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +As the question of the "intensified submarine war," in consequence +of the further course of events, became of no importance, there +is no need for me to go into detail, and I will confine myself +to giving my two answers as follows: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(1) <span class="sc">Coded Wireless Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 9th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Telegrams Nos. 145 and 148 received to-day. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Request most urgently to postpone further steps till you have received +my answer." +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<a name="page_328"><span class="page">Page 328</span></a> +(2) <span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 10th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"In reply to Telegram 1488. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Memorandum Lansing received. In my opinion steps in sense of this +memorandum will cause collapse of Wilson's peace mediation, and bring +about instead a rupture with America, unless action is postponed at +least until agreement is reached with American Government. It may +perhaps be possible to arrange that Americans should be warned against +serving on ships armed for attack. In any case, however, time must +be allowed the Government here to bring this about. As everything +is decided by Wilson, discussion with Lansing is mere formality. +He never gives an answer until he has received instructions from +Wilson. In present case latter must read memorandum first. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"How much importance Your Excellency attaches to Wilson's peace +mediation I cannot judge from here. Apart from that it is my duty to +state clearly that I consider rupture with the United States inevitable +if immediate action be taken on the lines of the memorandum." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +At the time of sending the telegram I received, in the following +telegram, the reply of the Foreign Office to Mr. Wilson's last +proposals, which had been communicated to me through Colonel House: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 149 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 7th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"In reply to Telegram No. 192 of 29th December. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"For your personal information. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"American intervention for definite peace negotiations is entirely +undesirable to us owing to public opinion here. Also at the present +moment we must avoid anything that <a name="page_329"><span +class="page">Page 329</span></a> might deepen the impression among +our enemies that our peace offer is in any way the result of our +finding ourselves in a desperate position. That is not the case. +We are convinced that economically and from a military point of +view, we can bring the war to victorious conclusion. The question +of stating our conditions, therefore, Your Excellency will handle +dilatorily. On the other hand, I authorize you to state now our +readiness to cooperate in that part of the programme in which the +President is particularly interesting himself, and which seems +to be identical with the so-called 'Second Convention' outlined +by Colonel House here. In this we include arbitration machinery, +peace league, and examination of the question of disarmament and of +the freedom of the seas. We are, therefore, in principle, prepared +for those guarantees which could be settled in detail in a general +conference after a conference of the belligerents has brought about a +preliminary peace. To prove our <i>bona fides</i> in this direction, +we are also ready in principle to open immediate negotiations with +the United States. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your Excellency will be so good as to inform the President of this, +and request him to work out the programme for the conference to +secure world peace, and to communicate it to us as soon as possible. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Please also emphasize to Colonel House and President Wilson that +our actual peace conditions are very moderate, and, in contrast +to those of the Entente, are kept within thoroughly reasonable +limits; this is also particularly the case with regard to Belgium, +which we do not wish to annex. Moreover, we desire regulation of +commercial and traffic communications after the war without any +idea of a boycott, a demand which we think will be understood at +once by all sane people. On the other hand, the question of Alsace +and Lorraine we cannot consent to discuss. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_330"><span class="page">Page 330</span></a> "I should +like to know how Your Excellency thinks that pressure could be +brought to bear by President Wilson to incline the Entente to peace +negotiations. In the light of our experience during the two years +of war, it seems to us that a prohibition of the export of war +material and foodstuffs, which would be the step most likely to +bring the Entente into line and would also be the best for us, +is unfortunately little likely to be realized. Only an effective +pressure in this direction could relieve us on our side of the urgent +necessity of resorting again to unrestricted submarine warfare. Should +Your Excellency have proposals to make as to how the unrestricted +submarine warfare can be conducted without causing a rupture with +America, I request you to report, immediately by telegram. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Zimmermann.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I understood from this telegram that I was to continue the negotiations +with Colonel House. The refusal contained in this telegram was only +concerned with a demand which had never been made by the United +States. Moreover, I have never personally had much faith in the +appeal to public opinion which would have nothing to do with Mr. +Wilson. If the Imperial Government had a few weeks before desired +such intervention, they must have believed that German public opinion +would agree to it. In my opinion, too, an agitation in favor of +American intervention would have set in in Germany quite on its +own account if the German people had known that such action by +President Wilson offered good prospects of leading to a peace by +understanding. Later, when I returned from America to Germany, +I was struck by the small number of my countrymen who privately +favored the submarine war. I therefore still think that German +<a name="page_331"><span class="page">Page 331</span></a> public +opinion could easily have been persuaded to accept Mr. Wilson's +mediation, if the terrorism of the supporters of submarine war +had been dealt with in time. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has spoken +before the Commission of the National Assembly of the hypnotic +effect exerted on German public opinion by the submarine war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Though the Foreign Office telegram of the 7th January mentions +the ways in which President Wilson could bring pressure to bear +on the Entente, it had already struck me at that time that the +first step taken by the United States to force the conclusion of +peace had not made the impression in Germany that its importance +warranted. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The various "War Memories" that have now been published in Germany +do not touch on this point. As has already been mentioned, the +"Federal Reserve Board," which corresponds to our Reichsbank, had +issued a warning against the raising of loans for belligerent States. +In this way the American source of funds was practically cut off. +Already foreign securities were in general unwillingly handled. +If the loans had been completely forbidden, such results would +not have transpired, as the American avails himself of bank credit +to a far greater extent than is usual in other countries. It is +well known that the Government of the United States, after they had +entered the war, themselves raised "Liberty loans," and advanced +money to their Allies because this procedure accorded much more +closely with American inclinations than the raising of foreign +loans. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As is well known, after the German peace action had failed, the +definite decision to declare unrestricted submarine war was taken in +Pless on the 9th January. In this way, as the Chancellor said, the +Rubicon was crossed. War with the United States seemed inevitable, +unless it were found possible at the eleventh hour to annul the <a +name="page_332"><span class="page">Page 332</span></a> decision +of the German Government. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has declared +before the Commission of the National Assembly that he had not +sufficient faith in Mr. Wilson's peace intervention to advise the +Emperor to oppose the demand of G. H. Q. for the declaration of +unrestricted submarine war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the end of this chapter I give a report which I drew up on the +attitude of American public opinion towards intervention. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I should like once more to emphasize that in judging and estimating +American politics I have always given more weight to public opinion +than to the views or intentions of any individual statesman. +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +"Washington, 11th December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"During the last phases of the presidential elections the American +Press used to be so much occupied with questions of domestic policy +that there was little space left for the discussion of foreign +events. In contrast with this, in this year's campaign the Press +politics on questions of foreign policy played a very important +part, but the discussion was naturally so much under the influence +of the aims and considerations of party politics that a report +on the attitude of the Press towards the European belligerents +at that time could not have given a true picture. This was quite +particularly the case with regard to Germany. On one hand the Republican +organs, out of regard for the votes of the German-Americans, found +it necessary considerably to moderate their speech, while on the +other the Democratic Press branded the Republican candidate as a +'Kaiserite,' owing to his German-American following, and at the +same time threw more mud than ever over Germany and everything +German; until in the last weeks of the election campaign the dawning +hope of bringing over great masses of <i>Bindestrichler</i> <a +name="page_333"><span class="page">Page 333</span></a> into the +Democratic camp brought about a sudden moderation in the tone of +this organ. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Only now, after the absurdities of the presidential election are +over, is it again possible to arrive at an approximately clear +judgment as to the attitude of the Press towards Germany and the +other belligerent nations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"This judgment may be briefly stated as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The American Press in general takes sides less passionately with +either party than was formerly the case, and is heartily tired of +the war. This does not in any way imply that our enemies have not +still the support of a number of very influential partisans, who +are all the time fighting loyally for the 'Cause of the Allies,' +let slip no opportunity to malign Germany and, in the event of a +threatened crisis, form an element of danger for us which should +not be underestimated. It may even be admitted that the tone which +the organs of this tendency, particularly strongly represented +in New York, Boston and Philadelphia, adopt against Germany has +become, if possible, more bitter during the last few months. But it +is questionable whether the great mass of the influential papers, +particularly in the remoter districts of the Atlantic coast, have +become more impartial. They don't like us and don't trust us, but +have also gradually got to know but not to esteem England. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The present attitude of America towards the cause of the Entente +Powers, with which that of the greater part of the independent Press +coincide, was defined as follows by the <i>New York Tribune</i>, one +of the most inveterate champions of our enemies at the present time: +'Despite a very widespread sympathy for France and a well-defined +affection for Great Britain in a limited circle of Americans, there +has been no acceptance of the Allied <a name="page_334"><span +class="page">Page 334</span></a> points of view as to the war, +and there is not now the smallest chance that this will be the +case.... The thing that the British have failed to get before the +American people is the belief that the war was one in which the +question of humanity and of civilization was uppermost for the +British. The Germans have succeeded in making Americans in very +great numbers believe that it is purely and simply a war of trade +and commerce between the British and the Germans, and the various +economic conference proposals have served to emphasize this idea.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The violation of Greece, the ruthless procedure against Ireland +since the Easter rebellion—on which a well-directed Press +service of American-Irish, in spite of the strict English censorship, +keeps public opinion constantly informed—the selfish sacrifice +of Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania, as well as the illegal economic +measures against Holland and Scandinavia, have seriously shaken +England's reputation here as the protectress of the small nations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Certain remarks of the English Press of altogether too free a +nature on the American Government, their disparaging cartoons of +the President and the patronizing air adopted by many English war +journals and often in the English daily Press towards America—as, +for example, in a recent number of the <i>Morning Post</i>, alleged +former German hankerings for colonies in South America, from the +realization of which the Union is said to have been protected by +England—are arousing increasing dissatisfaction here. The +persistent and systematic attempts of the British Press Bureau to sow +dissension between America and Germany on the question of the submarine +war are resented. The sharp British replies to American representations +on the question of the 'black list' and the 'post-blockade,' and, +England's latest pin-prick, the refusal of the request for a free +passage for <a name="page_335"><span class="page">Page 335</span></a> +the Austrian Ambassador, condemned even by such a pro-British paper +as the Philadelphian <i>Public Ledger</i> as a 'British affront,' +have created a very bad impression. 'It is unmistakable,' says the +pro-Entente <i>Evening Sun</i>, 'that American opinion has been +irritated and sympathy estranged by many acts which have damaged +our interests and wounded our national self-respect.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Above all, however, the serious shortcomings of the enemy General +Staffs, which are criticised here with unprofessional exaggeration, +and their ineffectiveness—'a lamentable succession of false +moves,' as they are called by the respected <i>Springfield +Republican</i>—have produced a general disillusionment as +to the efficiency of our enemies, which has damped even the old +enthusiasm over the heroic bearing of the French army and its +commander-in-chief, who is very popular over here. 'We give thanks +for Joffre,' was the heading of a typical leading article in the +<i>New York Sun</i> on Thanksgiving Day. The recent warning of the +American banks by the Federal Board against accepting through the post +large quantities of unsecured foreign treasury notes—a warning +which could only refer to the issue by the Morgan bank of English and +French short-dated securities—has also shattered the belief +in the inexhaustible economic resources of France and England. With a +quite exceptional expenditure of effort the newspapers under British +or French influence, of which the most important are the <i>New York +Times</i>, <i>New York Herald</i> and <i>Evening Telegram</i>; +the Philadelphian <i>Public Ledger</i>, the <i>Chicago Herald</i>, +and the <i>Providence Journal</i>, in addition to a number of other +sworn partisans of the Entente Powers, among which may be mentioned +particularly the <i>New York Tribune</i>, New York <i>Sun</i> and +<i>Evening Sun</i>; <i>New York Evening Post</i>, <i>Journal of +Commerce</i>, <i>New York Globe</i>; Brooklyn <i>Daily Eagle</i>, Boston +<i>Evening Transcript</i> and Philadelphian <a name="page_336"><span +class="page">Page 336</span></a> <i>Inquirer</i>, have lately been +trying to raise our enemies in the esteem of public opinion here. +This is shown particularly in the headlines and the arrangement +of the war news in these papers. All news that is detrimental to +the German cause, even when it comes from an unreliable source, +is printed in heavy type in the most striking position. Every gain +of ground by the Allies, however, slight, is hailed as a great +victory, and even the communications of private agencies which +are in contradiction to the official reports of the enemy, and +obviously inventions, appear as accomplished facts in the headlines +of the papers. Their leading articles pour out hatred and malice +against Germany. Their letter boxes are filled with contributions +which are full of venom and gall against Germany and her allies, and +their feuilletons or Sunday supplements contain about the strongest +attacks that have ever been brought against us even in the American +Press. But it looks as though their tactics no longer have the +same success as of old. Their utterances, apart from such as deal +with the Belgian or <i>Lusitania</i> themes, no longer make any +impression. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"On the other side the consistently friendly attitude of the ten +papers of the Hearst syndicate, which come daily into the hands of +more than three million readers in all parts of the country, has of +late become even much more friendly as a result of the English boycott +of the International News Service and the exclusion of all the Hearst +publications from circulation in Canada. Mr. Hearst has replied to +the inconceivably shortsighted policy of the British authorities +towards his news service in a series of forcible, full-page leading +articles against the British censorship which must have seriously +shaken the confidence, apart from this already weakened long ago, +of the American Press in all news coming from England. Not only +did the articles in question contain a <a name="page_337"><span +class="page">Page 337</span></a> crushing criticism of the English +system of suppressing and distorting the truth, but they also proved +that for years America had been misled systematically from London in +its judgment of foreign nations—e.g., the 'degenerate' French. +Apart from this the Hearst newspapers repeatedly explained in detail +how in the autumn of 1916 the position of the Central Powers was +excellent, while that of England and her allies was completely hopeless. +It should be emphasized that the Hearst newspapers are, nevertheless, +not to be regarded as blindly pro-German, for they publish a good +deal that can hardly be desirable for us—e.g., occasional +articles on the 'German Peril,' for which new food was provided by +the exploits of the <i>Deutschland</i>, and more especially U53, +and was exploited here to support the idea of increasing the army +and navy. The papers named are based on a sound American policy, +but with their sharp, anti-English tendency do us much more good +than papers with admitted pro-German bias. The chief value of the +pro-German attitude of the organs of the Hearst syndicate lies in +the fact that their influence is not limited to any particular +town or district, but extends over the whole Union. An English +critic, S. K. Ratcliffe, recently wrote about American newspapers +in the <i>Manchester Guardian</i>.... 'Northern papers are of no +account in the South; the most influential New York journals do not +exist for the people of the Pacific coast, and carry little weight +in the Middle States. Hence, summaries of opinion—confined to +a small number of papers published east of the Mississippi—are +imperfectly representative of the Republic.' This accurately observed +geographical limitation of the influence of the leading American +newspapers is substantially overcome by the Hearst organization, for +the leading articles which appear in the <i>New York American</i> +to-day will appear to-morrow in the allied papers of Boston, Chicago +<a name="page_338"><span class="page">Page 338</span></a> and Atlanta, +and the day after in San Francisco and Los Angeles. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Another factor that has improved the attitude of the American +Press towards Germany is the recent important development of the +wireless news service. By this I do not mean so much the extension +of the trans-Atlantic service in the communications of which a +considerable part of the Press here seems unfortunately to take +little interest, but the radiographic transmission of the full +reports of American correspondents in Berlin and on the German fronts +to the American newspapers or news agencies. Among the interesting +reports that have been received direct and unmutilated in this way +those of Messrs. William B. Hale, Karl von Wiegand, Cyril Brown +and Karl W. Ackerman have exerted a particularly favorable influence +for us, especially at the critical moments of the break-through in +southern Galicia and the battles of the Somme, when, without the +special news service via Nauen, the American Press would have been +completely misled by the mass of reports that were flowing in from +London. Among American journalists who worked in Germany, Herbert Swope +should be particularly mentioned, who, after his return, published +in <i>The World</i> and other Pulitzer papers, a series of fourteen +articles on the situation and feeling in Germany which attracted +the attention of both the Press and the reading public. In a most +undesirable way Mr. Swope in his first articles which appeared +immediately before the election—it was simply an electioneering +manœuvre—emphasized the deep hatred of the German people +for the United States and the alleged general wish of all German +circles to see Mr. Wilson defeated at the election as a punishment +for his unneutral attitude. To compensate for this he performed +a very valuable service for us in his later articles by giving +a convincing account of the economic <a name="page_339"><span +class="page">Page 339</span></a> situation in Germany at that time, +which removed all doubt over here as to the ability of our enemies +to starve Germany out, and revived public respect for Germany's +efficiency and organizing-power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The great and respectful tribute which the American Press pays +to German 'efficiency' at every opportunity—and during the +last few months there have been many such opportunities—can, +however, do little or nothing to alter the deep 'sentiment' against +Germany. As soon as the above-mentioned themes of Belgium and the +<i>Lusitania</i> are mentioned, there are few papers that do not +indulge, either in aggressive or more moderate terms, in expressions +of horror at German 'frightfulness' and 'ruthlessness.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"This deep-rooted feeling of the whole Press has been once more +revived in very regrettable fashion by the recent Belgian deportations. +The indignation of the Press at this 'slavery' which is being imposed +on Belgium is general, deep-rooted and genuine. Even newspapers which +express themselves in pretty harsh terms on the subject of the English +illegalities condemn these deportations in no measured terms. The +interview given by Governor-General von Bissing to the journalist +Cyril Brown on the subject of these deportations, published on the +front page of the <i>New York Times</i>, has unfortunately not +made the slightest impression here. General von Bissing's second +statement on the same subject in which, among other things, he +emphatically declared it his duty to see that as few Germans as +possible should be kept out of the firing line to guard Belgium, +was grist for the mill of the enemy Press. 'The cat is out of the +bag,' writes the <i>New York Times</i>, which does not miss the +opportunity of reminding its readers of General von Bissing's +responsibility for the shooting of Edith Cavell. 'Not a word about +economic necessity, Germany needs <a name="page_340"><span +class="page">Page 340</span></a> men at the front. Simple, almost +crude in fact, and completely German.' The Philadelphian <i>Public +Ledger</i> says: 'The original offence, the invasion of Belgian +territory, regardless of treaty obligations, has almost been obliterated +by the cruelty which is now depopulating the land, stripping it +of all its resources, sending its people into exile and slavery, +making a wilderness and calling it order. There has not been such +a tragedy since the fierce barbarian tribes swept over Europe; +none would have believed two years ago that it could be enacted.' +Such expressions as 'Huns,' 'Attila,' 'Hohenzollern slave trade,' +and others of a similar nature are the order of the day, and the +excitement is further fanned by reports from London and Le Havre, +which no one here can verify, and provocative interviews, among +which special mention must be made of that of Herr Carton de Wiart +with the <i>World</i> correspondent. The news that Mr. Lansing had +forwarded to Berlin a protest against the Belgian deportations +was received with great applause by the whole of the Press. The +resulting official statement that this protest had been made not +in the name of the United States but in the name of the Kingdom +of Belgium, represented by the American Government, caused +dissatisfaction and a demand that the United States Government +should also protest to Berlin on its own account. Resolutions of +protest were sent to the President and published in the Press, +and indignation meetings on a large scale are announced to take +place in Boston and New York which will offer the Press further +opportunities for anti-German demonstrations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"With regard to the question of submarine warfare the American +Press are quite unanimous on one point, that a withdrawal of the +assurances given by Germany after the <i>Sussex</i> incident, or +even an intentional breach of these, is bound to bring about, as +it were, automatically, <a name="page_341"><span class="page">Page +341</span></a> a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Germany; +and it is also clear that such a rupture would only be the first +step towards open war. The great majority of the leading American +newspapers express at every opportunity the genuine hope that such +a contingency will not arise. Only the chauvinistic, anti-German +element in the Press holds that the <i>casus ruptionis</i> has +actually arisen and devotes itself to publishing and commenting on, +in the most sensational manner, the alleged crimes of the German +submarines. The newspapers of this order are abundantly supplied +with pertinent material, particularly news of alleged sinkings +without warnings, of which they on their side—probably with +the co-operation of the British authorities here—know how to +increase the effect by means of exaggerated reports of out-of-date +'sacrifices to German frightfulness,' which are eagerly swallowed +here. In spite of the masterly skill with which this working on public +feeling against the handling of our submarine war is managed, it may +be taken for granted that it does not get a hold. However deep and +however genuine may be the horror with which the American people regard +such incidents as the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i>—a fact +that must be continually emphasized—equally great is obviously +their indifference towards the destruction of non-American neutral +shipping, <i>so long as the rules of cruiser warfare continue to be +observed</i>. People over here have gradually got accustomed to +reading daily reports of the sinking of another half dozen British +or other vessels. The daily papers print them quite as a matter of +course, and only in a prominent position when the bag reaches an +unusually high figure. In the editorial columns of many papers a +certain malicious joy is even observable, that England, who boasts +of having mastered the submarine, should now be so mercilessly +and persistently bled. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_342"><span class="page">Page 342</span></a> "One +phase of the submarine war has, indeed, thrown nearly the whole of +the American Press into a state of excitement, namely, the piratic +exploits of U53 off the coast of New England. The destruction wrought +by this boat so close at hand, and the consequent paralysis for +several days of all merchant shipping, was too much even for the +moderate papers, and resulted in strong outbursts against our +'ruthlessness.' Apparently this circumstance has recently been +exploited by our enemies as a new way of influencing public opinion +against us. Mysterious British battleships off the Atlantic coast +are supposed to send out wireless warnings against the alleged +approach of German submarines, and these are published in the +American Press partly under panic headlines, and arouse indignation. +This shady procedure, in which the pro-English press naturally +takes the lead, recently aroused Mr. Lansing to make a forceful +speech against the unknown originators of these rumors. It may +be particularly emphasized, speaking quite generally, that the +great influence exerted by the State Department on the Washington +correspondents of the leading newspapers during the last few months, +during which there has been a constant threat of the submarine +question coming to a head, has always been on the side of peace, +with the result that in more than one case, and particularly in +the cases of the sinking of the <i>Marina</i> and <i>Arabia</i>, +any serious agitation on the part of the Press has been avoided. +With regard to the general war situation, the conviction has for +some time been gaining ground with the great majority of the leading +American newspapers, that a decisive victory by either of the two +belligerent groups of Powers is no longer to be expected. With the +exception of a continually dwindling minority which even to-day +still promise their readers the 'ultimate victory' of the Entente +Powers, the verdict of the <a name="page_343"><span class="page">Page +343</span></a> American Press on the probable result of the war is +'a draw,' 'a stalemate.' Only a few newspapers, to which belong +those of the Hearst Syndicate, confess to the belief in 'a stalemate, +or a victory of the Teutonic Allies.' How those newspapers which +are at the service of our enemies, and which still hold to the +legend of a miscarried German war of aggression, really judge the +situation is only seen occasionally from incidental statements like +the following confession of the <i>New York Tribune</i>, which +preaches against a peace on the basis of the present position; +this paper says that the American people should see that if the +Allies were to conclude peace now the result would be a tremendous +victory for Germany. Such isolated, misleading views as this do not, +however, succeed in affecting in any way the general impression +that by far the greater part of the leading newspapers regard the +war as indecisive, especially after the fruitless conclusion of +our operations before Verdun, the collapse of the great offensives +on the Somme and in southern Galicia, as well as in view of the +fact, confirmed on many sides, that the British blockade has not +attained its end, the starvation of Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Our recent feats of arms in Rumania have hardly affected this +opinion. In view of the great hopes, placed by our enemies and +the newspapers in their service, on Rumania's entry into the war, +these successes are recognized on all sides readily or grudgingly +and without any spark of sympathy for the defeated country, and in +some cases are even hailed as brilliant military achievements of +the first rank. The preponderating opinion of the Press, however, +passes over the fact that the conquest of Rumania, although opening +up to Germany important new resources, is scarcely likely to influence +to any considerable degree the situation which has resulted from the +war <a name="page_344"><span class="page">Page 344</span></a> of +positions in East and West, and the still unbroken British mastery +of the seas. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The view that the war has reached a stalemate which, since President +Wilson's speech at Charlotte in May of this year, had been maintained +by several papers, but which has recently become general, apart +from the definitely pro-Ally organs, is closely connected with +the discussion of the question of peace restoration which for the +American Press is in many cases synonymous with the question of +intervention by the United States or all the neutral nations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"There was a time when a very important part of the American Press +seemed to stand on the level of the catch-phrase which was going +the round at that time: 'Wall Street now fears nothing except the +outbreak of peace.' These times, however, are long since past. The +desire for a speedy end of the hostilities in Europe is to-day +genuine, and shared by almost the whole Press. From the enemy camp +we get the following testimony in the <i>New York Tribune</i>, +which would like to convert its readers to less humane views: 'For +millions of Americans this war is a tragedy, a crime, the offspring +of collective madness,' and in its view the greatest service that +America can render to the world—an allusion to the catch-phrase +coined by Henry Ford for his ill-starred peace mission is—'to +fetch the lads out of the trenches.' The discussion of the premises +for the conclusion of peace, therefore, has for some time occupied +an important place in the daily papers, and also to some extent in +the reviews. Reports on the meetings of the many American peace +societies are given with the greatest fulness, and anything in +the overseas news connected with the question of a restoration +of peace is printed in a prominent position and duly discussed in +the leading articles. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It would lead me too far to give even an approximately <a +name="page_345"><span class="page">Page 345</span></a> complete +picture of this discussion with which the whole Press is occupied. +But one point demands closer examination: the attitude of the leading +papers to the German readiness for peace, publicly expressed by +Your Excellency on three different occasions in the last few weeks. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your Excellency's great speech before the Budget Committee of +the Reichstag unfortunately reached here at a time when the whole +interest of the Press and public was directed to the at first uncertain +result of the presidential election. Though generally printed, in +the evening papers for the most part only in extracts, it was +practically passed over in the editorial columns. An attempt to +start a belated Press discussion of the speech by circulating it +in the form of specially printed brochures, or at least to induce +those papers which had only given extracts to publish the whole +text, unfortunately failed; only the <i>Current History</i>, a +special war magazine of the <i>New York Times</i>, felt itself +called upon to reprint the speech <i>in extenso</i> in its December +number. On the other hand, the passage of the speech which stated +our readiness after this war to take a part in international +organizations for insuring peace was widely circulated here, and +attracted corresponding attention. As I, according to instructions, +communicated this passage to the 'League to Enforce Peace' as the +official German message for their banquet held here on the 24th +inst., it was circulated throughout the country in the detailed +Press reports on this association, which is greatly respected here, +and commented on by many newspapers with all the more sympathy +since Germany's sceptical reserve hitherto towards the question +of a peaceful settlement of international differences has always +worked strongly against us here. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The interview granted by Your Excellency to the <a +name="page_346"><span class="page">Page 346</span></a> American +journalist Hale has been printed particularly fully by the ten +Hearst newspapers, and further by all the other subscribers to +the International News Service. In the <i>New York American</i> +on Thanksgiving Day it occupied, together with a portrait of Your +Excellency, the whole front page. At special request from many +quarters the paper repeated the report three days later. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Germany's readiness to enter into peace negotiations, expressed +once more by Your Excellency at this interview, as well as Your +Excellency's statement in the Reichstag on the 29th inst., that +Germany is ready for any peace that will guarantee her existence +and future, have during the last few days been fairly thoroughly +discussed in the New York papers, which particularly dwell on the +words 'a peace guaranteeing our existence and future,' and agree +unanimously as to the urgent desirability of a further and more +exact formulation of the German peace conditions. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The <i>New York Times</i> says: 'All depends on what guarantees +of the existence and the future of Germany are expected.' The paper +goes on to ask how Germany could imagine her future assured from +a territorial point of view, but points out in conclusion that +these are only external details, and concludes, returning to its +favorite theme, as follows: 'Deeper than all, fundamental in any +discussion of peace, is the question of the German political ideals, +of German <i>Machtpolitik</i> and <i>Weltpolitik</i>, of Prussian +militarism.' ... 'The fear, the practical certainty, that Von +Bethmann-Hollweg's guarantees would be not merely guarantees of +the existence and future of Germany, but of new and not distant +wars with her, stands in the way of any serious discussion of his +remarks.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The <i>Evening Sun</i> remarks sarcastically that obviously no +such guarantees as <i>Deutschland über Alles</i> should be +<a name="page_347"><span class="page">Page 347</span></a> given +to any country. Its verdict, too, is that: 'The peace that Germany +craves still is a peace that will enable her to begin the next war +in five or ten years, with a certainty of immediate victory and +complete conquest of the overlordship of Europe, if not America.' +The <i>Brooklyn Daily Eagle</i> writes: 'If an inconclusive peace, a +peace based upon the theory that the war is a draw, a peace fertile +in the liabilities to future trouble, is not in the mind of the +German Chancellor, what is in his mind? He should speak out. He +will never have a better opportunity to be specific. The whole +neutral world is listening, ready to give careful and intelligent +consideration to his words.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"More important than these and other utterances of the papers which +follow in our enemies' wake is the trenchant leading article of the +<i>World</i>, which on foreign questions generally expresses the +point of view of the Administration. This paper says: 'If Germany +is ready to end the war, the first thing for the Imperial Government +to do is to make definite proposals for peace. Those proposals need +not be made officially to the Allies, to the United States, or any +other intermediary. They could be made to the world at large. The +Chancellor could describe to the Reichstag the conditions under which +Germany would regard her Existence and Future assured.' 'Germany +began the war. It is proper that Germany should take the first +steps towards ending the war, but something more than vague +generalizations is necessary. At present there is nothing to talk +about. There are no terms, not even extravagant and ridiculous +terms, that can be discussed as a possible basis of settlement. +Thus far there has been no evidence of good faith in the repeated +German professions of a desire for peace. In consequence nobody +takes them seriously until there is at least a tentative proposal +of terms. When that is made, the responsible Ministers of other +belligerent Governments <a name="page_348"><span class="page">Page +348</span></a> will be forced to meet the issue. Public opinion +in Great Britain and France, no less than in Germany and +Austria-Hungary, will have a chance to make itself heard. When +peace comes it cannot be merely the peace of diplomats and of +Governments. It must be a peace in which popular sentiment has +the final word, and popular sentiment has no means of expression +until there is something tangible to discuss.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The general impression left by the utterances of the American +Press on the subject of peace is that on the one hand—apart +from a small number of influential papers—it is anxious for +peace, from which anxiety it is obvious that it intends to pass over +the extravagant war aims so often heard from the Entente statesmen; +but that on the other hand it cannot as yet find any practicable +way of bringing about an early conclusion of peace, and also that +it cannot see any advance in this direction in the last statements +of Your Excellency, which only a few papers have discussed to any +extent. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The change in the direction of the Foreign Office has been discussed +at comparative length in the leading articles of the important +newspapers, which, as a rule, deal with European Ministerial changes +only in their news columns—less with regard to the personality +of the retiring Minister, who was not very well known here, than that +of the new Secretary of State. The only paper which devoted a few +friendly words to Herr von Jagow was the <i>New York Times</i>, which +described him, in connection with his conferences with Baron Beyens +and Sir Edward Goschen at the outbreak of war, as a 'Gentleman in +War and Peace,' and also recognized his sympathetic attitude during +the negotiations on the submarine war controversy. Herr Zimmermann's +appointment as Secretary of State, on the other hand, was greeted +by many papers, and indeed by the Press in general—only a few +papers <a name="page_349"><span class="page">Page 349</span></a> +were made somewhat uneasy by the news received lately by telegram, +of his attitude towards the question of armed merchantmen—with +great applause. The tone of these comments must have been set by +the flattering and sympathetic utterances of Ambassador Gerard +and the journalist Swope, on the subject of the new Secretary of +State, and a longer article by Gilbert Hirsch published by the +<i>New York Evening Post</i> and other papers under the heading +'Our Friend Zimmermann.' The note struck by this article and by +the German Press comments transmitted and printed everywhere over +here, that Herr Zimmermann is a particularly warm friend of the +United States was joyfully echoed by the whole American Press. +Also the fact was everywhere emphasized that in Herr Zimmermann the +important post of chief of the Foreign Office hitherto reserved +for 'Prussian Junkerdom,' had been given to a member not of the +diplomatic, but of the humbler consular service, and indeed, to a +bourgeois. Here and there speculation was indulged in as to whether +this appointment might not be interpreted as the first step towards +a 'Liberal régime,' in which a not unimportant section of +the American Press still sees the future salvation of Germany and +of the world. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The announcement of autonomy for Poland is, to say the least of +it, received with scepticism by the American Press which is +comparatively well informed on the Polish question. The words of +the virtuoso Paderewski, who is working here in the interests of the +Polish sufferers through the war: 'This means only more suffering +for my people; it means that another army will be raised, and that +there will be more killing and more devastating,' were reproduced +by many newspapers and regarded as an authoritative statement of +what might be expected from the German-Austrian proclamations. +Many papers declared it to be simply a move to raise more recruits. +<a name="page_350"><span class="page">Page 350</span></a> Others +sarcastically pointed out that the proclamation left the most vital +questions, such as the boundaries of the new State and its form +of government, to be settled later. Only a few of the leading +newspapers, among them the <i>New York Evening Post</i> and the +Philadelphia <i>North American</i>, allowed the Allied Governments +a certain modicum of recognition, for, as they pointed out, in no +case could the heavy hand of Russia, which had so long oppressed +the country, be forgotten. The Polish Press here was at first very +reserved. Their point of view is represented by the following leading +article of the weekly paper <i>Free Poland</i>, founded since the war +and published by the Polish National Council of America: 'What the +Poles desire is an independent Poland. The Powers have acknowledged +Poland's right to live, but either with a limitation of independence +or diminution of territory. The Russians would fain lop off eastern +Galicia. And now the Germans grant Poland an autonomy, but without +Posen, West Prussia, or Silesia, in return demanding a Polish army +to take up their cause against Russia. Though this move on the +part of Germany will at least draw the world's attention to the +inalienable rights of Poland as a nation, and make of the Polish +question an international one, yet it must not be forgotten that +the Poles in Europe will vehemently protest against any curtailment +of their national aims and aspirations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The impression, on the whole unfavorable, made by the Polish measures +on the American Press was gradually in part balanced by the announcement +that the Polish Jews had been recognized as an independent religious +community. Since it was thought in many quarters that this might be +taken to be the first step towards cultural and political emancipation +of the Eastern Jews, it was discussed with great interest, in view +of the strong influence <a name="page_351"><span class="page">Page +351</span></a> exerted by the American Jewish community on an important +section of the American Press, particularly that of New York. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Finally, there remains to be examined the attitude of the Press +towards one question, in itself of a purely domestic, economic +interest, but which promises to become of the most wide-reaching +importance for foreign politics, namely, that of an embargo on corn. +The price of most articles of food has risen to such an abnormal +height during the last few months that the <i>New York Sun</i> can +say without too great exaggeration, that if the war had lasted +two more years the cost of living in Berlin and Vienna would have +risen to the level of that of New York. In particular the serious +position of the wheat market and the fairly certain prospect of an +acute rise in the price of wheat in the course of the winter or +next spring prompt the Press to constant discussion, the burden of +which is the question whether the Government of the United States +should or should not prohibit the exportation of corn. The opponents +of such a measure, among which are the <i>World</i>, <i>New York +Times</i>, <i>New York Evening Post</i>, <i>Journal of Commerce</i>, +the Boston <i>Evening Transcript</i>, the Philadelphia <i>Public +Ledger</i>, the Saint Louis <i>Globe-Democrat</i>, the <i>Pittsburg +Post</i>, the Saint Paul <i>Pioneer Press</i>, the Indianapolis +<i>News</i> and many others, maintain that the supporters of the +embargo, whose main object is to injure the Allies, represent the +situation as much more threatening than it is in reality. The +<i>World</i> tries to console its readers by explaining that the +high price of food represents the American people's contribution +to the cost of the greatest war of destruction in the history of +the world; while the <i>New York Times</i> points out the danger +of estranging the Allies through an embargo. The newspapers which +are friendly to Germany, particularly the Hearst newspapers, and the +Milwaukee <a name="page_352"><span class="page">Page 352</span></a> +<i>Free Press</i>, energetically urge an embargo on all articles of +food, by which, as they more or less openly allow it to appear, +England would be forced to make peace. But in addition a number of +the most bitter opponents of Germany, for example the Philadelphia +<i>Inquirer</i>, favor an early embargo for purely material reasons. +It is to be expected that this question will be one of the first +to come up at the opening of the approaching session of Congress, +when the Press polemics of the opponents of the embargo, with the +<i>arrière pensée</i> of protecting England's interests +and those of her Allies, should reach their climax." +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_353"><span class="page">Page 353</span></a> +CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Before I received official notice of the opening of the unrestricted +U-boat campaign, I had a further interview with Mr. House, concerning +the peace activities of the President, and the telegram describing +it which I sent to the Foreign Office, Berlin, is reproduced below: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram No.</span> 212 +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"(Answer to Telegram No. 149 of the 7th January.) +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, January 16th, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Your Excellency's authority in regard to Mr. House duly availed +of. He told me Wilson considered this pronouncement of Imperial +Government supremely valuable. As regards further developments +of Wilson's efforts for peace, I can say nothing definite. This +much only is certain, that at present moment President has no other +thought than that of bringing about peace, and will endeavor to +achieve this end with the utmost energy and all means in his power. +A further pronouncement of Wilson's is expected almost immediately; +it will probably take form of a communication to Congress. Apparently +it will consist of an appeal to the American people to help him to +enforce peace; in any case both he and House praise the Hearst +Press article, which is written from that point of view. Whether +means adopted will be to place an embargo on all exports is difficult +to say. <a name="page_354"><span class="page">Page 354</span></a> +Maybe the threat of an embargo will be enough to force our enemies +to a conference. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"From the above it is clear that we cannot afford to have any +difficulties over the old U-boat question. As regards the question +of armed merchant vessels, I hope to arrive at a <i>modus vivendi</i>. +But we must be careful not to act hastily and carelessly, so as +not to create conflict before President has taken further steps. +Remarkable as this may sound to German ears, Wilson is regarded here +very generally as pro-German. His Note was traced to our influence, +and Gerard's speech strengthened this impression. This speech is in +accordance with instructions which Mr. Gerard is receiving. Our +present enemies have gone literally raving mad, and leave no stone +unturned in order to put obstacles in Wilson's way. This explains +the attacks against the President, as also the scurrilous attempt +engineered by the Republicans to charge the Administration with +Stock Exchange speculations. Without any justification, of course, +my name also was mentioned in this regard. The German Embassy, as +is well known, is held responsible for everything by our enemies +in this country." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +At the same time as the above telegram, I wrote the following report +describing the prevailing political attitude in Washington: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Report</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 14th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Ever since the Presidential election the political situation here +has not changed. Apart from the question of ending the world-war, +the public mind has not been constantly or earnestly concerned +with any matter. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Congress has dealt with the customary Budget proposals, <a +name="page_355"><span class="page">Page 355</span></a> and the +fruitless negotiations about the Mexican question drag slowly on. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Meanwhile, the attitude towards ourselves, which after the +<i>Sussex</i> incident took a decided turn for the good, has slowly +improved. This change in the public temper can be observed on all +sides. It is true that it is only very slightly noticeable, if +at all, in the Press, and our most rabid opponents are driven, +owing to the general improvement in German-Americans' relations, +to ever more violent attacks against us. Since President Wilson +dispatched his Peace Note, our enemies' fury knows no bounds. Without +exaggeration, it can be said that this note voices the spirit of +almost the whole American people. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Only Wall Street and the anti-German ring, as also their friends +in the press, are dissatisfied and are endeavoring to put obstacles +in the President's way. In these circles, which are always under +English influence, the belief has taken root, that Mr. Wilson has +fallen under German spell. The well-known anti-German Republican, +Senator Lodge, boldly expressed this view in the Senate; but he +could not prevent the Senate from voting in favor of Mr. Wilson's +Peace Note, by a huge majority. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The public mind is engaged principally with the question why precisely +the President dispatched his note immediately after the German offer +of peace. It is well-known that this Note had been prepared for some +time, and would have been sent off at Christmas, quite irrespective +of our own proposals, although, in view of Mr. Wilson's inclination +to temporize, and to treat all questions somewhat dilatorily, this is +by no means certain. I believe that the President's principal motive +was his pressing desire to play the rôle of mediator—a +prospect which seemed to be imperilled if our enemies agreed to <a +name="page_356"><span class="page">Page 356</span></a> deal directly +with us. This may possibly explain why that particular moment was +chosen, for which our enemies regard Mr. Wilson so unfavorably. +A cartoon published by that most anti-German paper, the <i>New +York Herald</i>, depicts Mr. Wilson's dove of peace as a parrot, +faithfully babbling out the German proposals. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Apart from the choice of this particular moment for its expression, +the President's desire to bring about peace is in any case very +comprehensible, seeing that he was re-elected principally on the +basis of this programme. Furthermore, the Americans are genuinely +alarmed by the extension of Japanese power in the Far East, and +finally, since our Rumanian victories, Mr. Wilson has ultimately +come to the conclusion that our enemies are no longer able to defeat +us. One is constantly hearing the opinion expressed, both by members +of the Cabinet and other friends of the President, who enjoy his +confidence, that neither of the belligerent parties will now be +able to achieve a decisive victory, and that further bloodshed +is therefore useless. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As already stated above, the anti-German party is doing its utmost +to put every possible obstacle in Mr. Wilson's way, while the Press +does not cease from repeating that the Peace Note is to be regarded +as a menace against Germany. It is thus hoped to stiffen our enemies' +backs, by dazzling them with the expectation of America's entry +into the war; much, too, is made of the argument—and this was +particularly so in the Senate—that Mr. Wilson's intervention +was imperilling the traditional policy of the United States, which +rests primarily upon the Monroe Doctrine, and upon the principle +of non-interference with European affairs. Finally, a scurrilous +attempt has been made by the Republican party to attack Wilson +in the flank, by getting a notorious Stock Exchange speculator +publicly to proclaim that members <a name="page_357"><span +class="page">Page 357</span></a> of the Administration, who knew +beforehand of Wilson's action, had taken advantage to speculate +heavily upon it. As this man could, however, produce no proofs, +he simply made himself ridiculous. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I have already frequently called attention in my report to the fact +that the prolonged war hysteria over here has created an atmosphere +of gossip and tittle-tattle, which at other times would have been +regarded as impossible. For instance, even quite responsible people +believe that I have obtained for cash certain compromising letters +of Wilson's in order to be able to get a hold over him by this +means. Senator Lodge, in his own house, privately expressed the +view that this was a credible rumor, and then turned it to account +in the Senate. The President is so terribly put out by this and +other similar machinations on the part of the Republicans, who +refuse to grant him the fame of the peace-maker, that he recently +kept away from a public festival, because Mr. Lodge was to be the +principal speaker there. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Owing to the incredible rumors which are bandied from mouth to +mouth here, I regarded it as necessary to bring an action against +one notorious swindler and blackmailer. I wanted to convince public +opinion that the Embassy had nothing to fear. I intend doing the +same thing in the case of all future attempts at blackmail, once +we have got a clean slate in regard to all compromising questions. +Our enemies will, however, persist in leaving no stone unturned in +order to cast a slur upon the Embassy, for their principal object is +to succeed in bringing about my recall, or the rupture of diplomatic +relations with Germany. Once they have accomplished this, they +are convinced that it will be an easy matter to draw the United +States into the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As is well known, President Wilson received a reply from the Entente, +in response to his peace move, which <a name="page_358"><span +class="page">Page 358</span></a> contained conditions utterly +unacceptable to us. Messrs. Wilson and House regarded these conditions +as 'bluff,' and were as convinced, as they had previously been, +that the Entente would accede to a peace by arrangement. People +frequently alluded in those days to the fact that in the last +Anglo-American War of 1812-1814, the English, very shortly before +the peace settlement, had proposed unacceptable peace terms which they +suddenly allowed to drop later. I also believed, and believe still, +that the Entente were perfectly well acquainted with the political +situation in Germany, and wished by proposing such conditions to +strike panic amongst us and compel us to declare an unrestricted +U-boat war. The Entente never diverged from its one object, which +was to draw the United States into the war, and thus to bring about +a decision. Moreover, the negative reply sent to our Government +by the Entente had sufficed to achieve this object; for the final +resolution to declare an unrestricted U-boat war was formed before +the peace conditions framed by the Entente became known in Berlin." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +On the 19th of January I received official notice that the unrestricted +U-boat campaign would begin on February 1st, and I was to give +the American Government notice accordingly on the evening of the +31st January. After all that had happened, I could but regard this +intimation as a declaration of war against the United States, and +one which, in addition, put us in the wrong; because it put an end +to the peace overtures made by Mr. Wilson, which had been started +with our approval. I did my utmost to try to get the Berlin resolution +cancelled, or at least to obtain a postponement of the date on +which it was to come into force, and with this end in view I sent +the following telegram to Berlin: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<a name="page_359"><span class="page">Page 359</span></a> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 19th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"War inevitable in view of the proposed action. Danger of rupture +could be mitigated by the fixing of a definite interval of time, +say one month, so that neutral vessels and passengers may be spared, +as any preliminary and timely warning seems impossible if present +programme is carried out. I shall have to give the password for +unnavigable German steamers on February 1st, as effect of carrying +out of my instructions here will be like declaration of war, and +strict guard will be kept. In any case an incident like that of +the <i>Lusitania</i> may be expected soon. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If military reasons are not absolutely imperative, in view of my +Telegram 212, postponement most urgently desirable. Wilson believes +he can obtain peace on the basis of our proposed equal rights of +all nations. House told me again yesterday, that Wilson proposed to +take action very shortly, for in view of our declaration regarding +future Peace League, etc., he regards prospects of a Peace Conference +as favorable." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +In my efforts to avoid a breach with the United States, the President +helped me to the extent of making a communication to the Senate on +January 22nd, which he personally read to them in solemn session. In +this communication, Mr. Wilson exhaustively developed his programme of +a "Peace without Conquest." As the President officially communicated +this proposal to all the belligerent Powers on the same day, it +was to be regarded as a fresh and most solemn step towards peace. +As, on the other hand, it is also a document which expresses most +plainly Mr. Wilson's desires and mentions before his entry into +the war, I quote it verbatim below. Those <a name="page_360"><span +class="page">Page 360</span></a> who read it to-day cannot help +feeling that certainly no more scathing criticism of the Versailles +Peace has ever been written,—a peace which contained all +the signs of having been imposed upon the vanquished, and against +which the President's communication was a warning. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"On the eighteenth of December last I addressed an identical note +to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to +state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either +group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it +possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the +rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most +vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central +Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready +to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. +The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, +in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply +details the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which +they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory +settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the +peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer +the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter +hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that +must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must +be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it +virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm +us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man +must take that for granted. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought +that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the +final determination of our <a name="page_361"><span class="page">Page +361</span></a> international obligations, to disclose to you without +reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my +mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come +when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the +foundations of peace among the nations. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play +no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will +be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves +by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved +practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a +new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that +it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor +withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. +They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and +to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under +which they will feel free to render it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority +and their power to the authority and force of other nations to +guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement +cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes +this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which +it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal +and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt +to state those conditions. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and +to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as +our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it +makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms +it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end +must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth <a +name="page_362"><span class="page">Page 362</span></a> guaranteeing +and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not +merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate +aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining +what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice +in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the +guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is +fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency +should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples +of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; +and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America +could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be +elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of +the American governments, elements consistent with their political +faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America +have once for all embraced and undertake to defend. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I do not mean to say that any American government would throw +any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the governments now +at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever +they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace +between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents +themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will +be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of +the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of +any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected +that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or +withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it +must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind! +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_363"><span class="page">Page 363</span></a> "The +terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it +is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question +upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends +is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, +or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for +a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, +the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil +Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of +power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an +organized common peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. +The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against +one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, +that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their +antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be +equally clear to all,—may not be the same on both sides of +the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth +what we understand them to be. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. +It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to +put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood +that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to +face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory +would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed +upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under +duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a +resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not +permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals +can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a +common participation in a <a name="page_364"><span class="page">Page +364</span></a> common benefit. The right state of mind, the right +feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is +the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial +and national allegiance. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it +is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged +must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations +and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. +Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual +strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. +Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; +nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful +and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one +asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind +is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right +among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which +does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive +all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that +no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to +sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for +instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen +everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, +and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of +life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should +be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power +of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their +own. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract +political principle which has always been held <a name="page_365"><span +class="page">Page 365</span></a> very dear by those who have sought +to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have +spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly +indispensable,—because I wish frankly to uncover realities. +Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will +inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the +convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations +will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will +sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, +and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where +there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of +freedom, and of right. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling +towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should +be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where +this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt +be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the +general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right +comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from a free access +to the open paths of the world's commerce. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The +freedom of the seas is the <i>sine qua non</i> of peace, equality, +and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of +many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be +established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free +and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, +but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There +can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without +them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is +an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It +<a name="page_366"><span class="page">Page 366</span></a> need +not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the +seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to +an agreement concerning it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval +armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping +the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval +armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the +limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. +Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced +with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation +if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. +Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can +be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great +preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there +to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan +for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy +to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless +contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land +or sea is the most immediately and intensely practical question +connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with +the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary +if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free +voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority +amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak +and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I +am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great +government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people +of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add, that I +hope <a name="page_367"><span class="page">Page 367</span></a> +and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends +of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty? +I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of +mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity +to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they +see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold +most dear. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government +of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the +world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I +have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because +it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise +no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but +a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven +for. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord +adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: +that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other +nation or people, but that every people should be left free to +determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, +unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances +which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net +of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with +influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance +in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and +with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free +to live their own lives under a common protection. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I am proposing government by the consent of the <a +name="page_368"><span class="page">Page 368</span></a> governed; +that freedom of the seas which in international conference after +conference representatives of the United States have urged with +the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; +and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies +a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of +selfish violence. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"These are American principles, American policies. We could stand +for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of +forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, +of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind +and must prevail." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +In Helfferich's account of these matters, the author charges this +appeal of Mr. Wilson's with having favored the Entente side, because +in it the conditions laid down are regarded as an acceptable basis +for peace. When I returned to Germany the Imperial Chancellor advanced +the same argument in my presence; I have heard it repeated again +and again at home, and among other places, before the Examination +Committee of the National Assembly. It seems to me that this view +is rather a Berlin <i>fable convenue</i>. There is no word in the +document which would justify one in drawing such a conclusion. +The President stated simply that he had invited both belligerent +parties to define the conditions under which they would make peace, +and that the Entente had replied fully to the invitation, whereas +the Central Powers had not submitted their terms. He then proceeded +to say that in so far as the conditions insisted upon by one side +had become known, we had advanced a step nearer to the discussion +of peace. If we read the wording of the document without prejudice, +and in connection with the views expressed by American statesmen, <a +name="page_369"><span class="page">Page 369</span></a> it becomes +abundantly clear that the President regarded the terms laid down by +our enemies as maximum conditions, and further, that he believed +that we also would submit our maximum terms, and finally come to +an agreement by adopting a middle course. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Herr Helfferich makes a similar charge against Wilson's Note of +the 18th December, owing to the threats that it contained. But +this charge strikes me as being just as gratuitous as the first. +The threats were uttered in London quite as plainly as they were +in Berlin. The charge of partiality would have been justified only +if the threats had been contained simply in the version of the +Note which was sent to Berlin. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Besides, in all Entente countries, it was maintained that both +the Note of the 18th December and the appeal of the 22nd January +revealed partiality for the Central Powers. The diplomats of the +Entente in Washington were quite beside themselves with anger, +and plainly revealed their displeasure to Mr. Wilson. I am not +concerned now with criticizing the President's efforts for peace +in retrospect. The fact that Mr. Wilson became our personal enemy +after the 31st January, 1917, and that he consented to the Peace +of Versailles, is no proof of the contention that, before the 31st +January, 1917, he would have proved a similar failure as a peacemaker. +The President's spiteful censure and treatment of us, both during +the war and at Versailles, may be explained psychologically, by +the fact that we rejected his efforts as a mediator, and declared +the U-boat war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Mr. Wilson's personal sensitiveness and egocentric nature played +an essential part in all the negotiations. When the French and +English Press derided the President, in November, 1916, after the +first cables had announced the election of Mr. Hughes, Mr. Wilson +was deeply mortified. A further improvement in his attitude <a +name="page_370"><span class="page">Page 370</span></a> towards us +followed, when we showed that we were favorably disposed to his +mediation for peace. The fact that Germany relied on him, stimulated +his self-esteem to such an extent that he became, to a certain degree, +interested in bringing about a peace that would be satisfactory +to Germany. Nor should the interest he showed in this matter be +underrated. I openly confess that it was also my ambition to assist +in restoring peace, in order to save our country from the catastrophe +that threatened to overtake it, and to spare the world any further +suffering. To this day I am still convinced that, had the Germans +skilfully conducted their share in these peace negotiations, we +should have achieved all we wanted to achieve. The happy personal +relations which, in that case, would have prevailed between Mr. +Wilson and the German representatives at the Peace Conference, +would, in view of the element of chance, which is so conspicuous at +such congresses, have turned the scales in our favor to a surprising +extent. On the other hand, I was, and am still, of the opinion +that the peace which would have been settled at that time, would +not have satisfied the public opinion of the moment in Germany. +But I attached no importance whatever to this consideration. He +who practises politics in the interests of his native country, +must be ready at any moment to plunge like Curtius into the abyss, +in order to save his nation. This, however, is what made Curtius +immortal. Besides, in a few years, if not sooner, the German people +would surely have realized that "Peace without Victory" constituted +a victory for Germany. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the 31st January, 1917, Mr. Wilson was incapable of an impartial +attitude towards Germany. He saw red whenever he thought of the +Imperial Government, and his repugnance against it knew no bounds. +Even to-day the bitter feeling still rankles within him, that the +German <a name="page_371"><span class="page">Page 371</span></a> +Government deprived him of the glory of being the premier political +personage on the world's stage. It goes without saying, that at +Versailles the Entente exploited with a vengeance both this attitude +on the part of the President, and his peculiar idiosyncrasies. +Intercepted wireless messages from Paris had made us aware of the +fact that the original American interpretation of the fourteen +points entirely agreed with our own; and thus we in Berlin were +filled, not without reason, with certain hopes of America's help. +But Mr. Wilson, who would have acted more wisely had he never gone +to Versailles, sat there alone, facing three European statesmen, +for whom he was no match. They played upon his weakest point, by +suggesting to him the view that, in addition to the German Government, +the German people, who were guilty, too, should also be punished, +and that the obligation to punish the guilty took precedence of +the fourteen points. Had Mr. Wilson, after January, 1917, really +come to the definite conclusion that he held the proofs of Germany's +war guilt and lust of world empire? Whereas, theretofore he had +considered the question of war guilt impartially, he now agreed +that the Germans would have been able to obtain a reasonable peace +through his mediation, but had rejected it and chosen to declare +the U-boat war instead, in order to achieve a complete victory. +Consequently, the Germans had not been concerned all this time +with bringing about a reasonable peace, but with gaining the empire +of the world, a conclusion from which their war guilt was also to +be inferred. It was as the result of these ideas that Mr. Wilson +preached the crusade against militaristic and autocratic Germany, +who wanted to achieve the mastery of the world. Only by means of +the belief in a crusade could the peace-loving American people +be prevailed upon to wage war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Regarding the effect upon the Senate of the President's <a +name="page_372"><span class="page">Page 372</span></a> appeal, I +sent the following telegram to the Foreign Office: +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, January 23rd, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson's appeal has met with general approval in Senate, and is +regarded as a further energetic step in peace movement. Only our +wildest opponents have again attacked President as a pro-German. +Almost throughout views expressed about appeal contain the wish +that Central Powers will also state their peace terms now. House +also begged me urgently that this might be done, either publicly or +secretly. Then Wilson would immediately propose Peace Conference; +President also seems inclined to conclude the Bryan Treaty with +us. Time is now, alas, too short, otherwise treaty might perhaps +have helped us to avert war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As result of proposed unrestricted U-boat war, peace movement +will presumably come to an end. Nevertheless, it is possible on the +other hand that Wilson will make redoubled efforts for peace, if a +time-limit be allowed. I should like to leave no stone unturned in +order to avert war with United States. As I understand the situation, +our refusal to submit our peace terms arises out of the fear that +they may appear too moderate to public opinion in Germany. Would +it perhaps be possible, before opening the unrestricted U-boat +war, to state the peace terms, which we should have submitted at +the Peace Conference we proposed, and to add, that, in view of +our enemies' insolent rejection of our scheme, we could no longer +abide by these moderate terms? And then we might hint that, as +victors, we should demand an independent Ireland. A declaration +of this sort would win over public opinion on this side, as far as +this is <a name="page_373"><span class="page">Page 373</span></a> +possible, and might perhaps also satisfy public opinion in Germany." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The day after the President had read his appeal to the Senate, I +received a telegram inviting me to visit Mr. House in New York. +During the interview the Colonel read me a memorandum of Mr. Wilson's, +in which the President formally offered us to act as mediator, in +order to bring about a peace by arrangement. The memorandum left +me in no doubt whatever that Mr. Wilson was certain of being able +to achieve this end. With the utmost possible speed I sent the +following telegrams about my interview with Mr. House, by three +different routes to Berlin, on the assumption that it was impossible +for us to abide by our former resolve: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +(1) <span class="sc">Cipher Wireless Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +(Most urgent) +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 27th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"After having had very important conference request most urgently +postponement till my next two messages received. Suggest reply +by wireless." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(2) <span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 26th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson offered officially, but in first place privately, to mediate +for peace, on basis of his appeal to Senate, that means without +interference with territorial terms of peace. Wilson's simultaneous +request for communication of our peace terms not to be regarded +as private. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I am wiring with full particulars through State Department. To +begin U-boat war without previous negotiations regarding above +proposals would among <i>other things</i> put us seriously in the +wrong, and owing to <a name="page_374"><span class="page">Page +374</span></a> Wilson's personal sensitiveness, would make prevention +of rupture quite impossible." +</p> + +<p class="rshift_gap"> +(3) <span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Washington, 27th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"House suddenly invited me to visit him on behalf of Wilson, and +told me the following as an official message from President: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"First of all, Wilson offers privately to mediate for peace on +basis of his appeal to Senate, i.e., therefore without interference +in territorial terms of peace. Wilson's simultaneous request to us +to submit our terms of peace is not to be regarded as private. House +revealed to me following thoughts of the President. Our enemies had +openly expressed their impossible peace terms. Thereupon President +had, as a direct contrast to these, developed his programme. Now +we are also morally bound to make our peace terms known, because +our desire for peace would otherwise appear insincere. After Your +Excellency had informed Mr. Wilson that our peace terms were moderate, +and that we agreed to second Peace Conference, President thought he +had given expression to our wishes in his appeal to the Senate. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Wilson hopes that we shall communicate our peace terms to him, +which might be published both in Germany and over here, so that +they could become known immediately all over the world. If only +we had confidence in him, President was convinced that he would be +able to bring about both Peace Conferences. He would be particularly +pleased if Your Excellency were at the same time to declare that we +are prepared to enter the second Peace Conference on the basis of +his appeal. Our declaration might be shown to have been actuated +by Wilson's having sent us a direct request for our peace terms. <a +name="page_375"><span class="page">Page 375</span></a> President +is of opinion that Note sent to him by the Entente was a piece +of bluff which need not be taken seriously. He hopes definitely +to bring about Peace Conferences, and quickly too, so that the +unnecessary bloodshed of the Spring Offensive may be averted. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"To what extent Your Excellency will and can meet Wilson, it is +impossible to tell from this side. Meanwhile I urgently beg leave, +to submit the following remarks for your consideration. If the U-boat +campaign is opened now without any further ado, the President will +regard this as a smack in the face, and war with the United States +will be inevitable. The war party here will gain the upper hand, and +the end of the war will be quite out of sight, as, whatever people +may say to the contrary, the resources of the United States are +enormous. On the other hand, if we acquiesce in Wilson's proposal, +but the scheme nevertheless comes to grief owing to the stubbornness +of our enemies, it would be very hard for the President to come into +the war against us, even if by that time we began our unrestricted +U-boat war. At present, therefore it is only a matter of postponing the +declaration for a little while so that we may improve our diplomatic +position. For my own part, I confess that I am of opinion that we +shall obtain a better peace now by means of conferences, than we +should if the United States joined the ranks of our enemies. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As cables always take several days, please send instructions by +wireless, in case telegraphic privileges 157 cannot be used on +February 1st." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I had hoped that the communication of the President's appeal through +Mr. Gerard, would have led to a postponement of the unrestricted +U-boat war. This, however, was not the case. I can pass over all +that happened in Berlin at that time, and all the deliberations which +led to <a name="page_376"><span class="page">Page 376</span></a> the +ultimate decision, for not only did I not take part in them, but +they have also become general knowledge since the taking of the +evidence before the Examination Committee of the National Assembly. +I need only mention here that I received the following reply to my +proposals, from the Imperial Chancellor: +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +<span class="sc">Cipher Telegram</span> +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"Berlin, 29th January, 1917. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Please thank President on behalf of Imperial Government for his +communication. We trust him completely, and beg him to trust us +likewise. Germany is ready to accept his secret offer of mediation +for the purpose of bringing about a direct Conference of the +belligerents, and will recommend similar course to her Allies. +We wish our acceptance of offer, as well as offer itself, to be +treated as quite secret. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"A public announcement of our peace terms is at present impossible, +now that Entente has published their peace terms which aim at the +degradation and annihilation of Germany and her Allies, and have +been characterized by President himself as impossible. We cannot +regard them as bluff, as they entirely agree with professed opinions +of enemy Powers expressed not only before, but afterwards. They also +correspond exactly with the objects for which Italy and Rumania +entered the war, and as regards Turkey, with the assurances made on +behalf of Russia by both England and France. So long as these war +aims of our enemies are publicly maintained, it would be impossible +to interpret public announcement of our own peace terms, as anything +else than a sign of weakness which at present does not exist, and would +only lead to a prolongation of the war. In order to give President +Wilson a proof of our confidence, however, tell him just for his +own private information <a name="page_377"><span class="page">Page +377</span></a> the terms on which we should have been prepared to +take part in peace negotiations, if the Entente had accepted our +offer of peace on the 12th December, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The restitution to France of that part of Upper Alsace occupied by +her. The acquisition of a strategical and economic safety-frontier-zone, +separating Germany and Poland from Russia. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Colonial restitution in the form of an understanding which would +secure Germany colonial possessions compatible with the size of +her population and the importance of her economic interests. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Restoration of those parts of France occupied by Germany, on condition +that certain strategic and economic modifications of the frontier +be allowed, as also financial compensation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Restitution of Belgium under definite guarantees for the safety of +Germany, which would have to be determined by means of negotiations +with the Belgian Government. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Economic and financial settlement, on the basis of exchange, of +the territory invaded by both sides, and to be restituted by the +conclusion of peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Compensation for German undertakings and private persons who have +suffered damage through the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Renunciation of all economic arrangements and measures, which +after the peace would constitute an obstacle in the way of normal +commerce and trade, with the conclusion of corresponding commercial +treaties. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The Freedom of the Seas to be placed on a secure basis. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The peace terms of our Allies coincide with our own views, and +observe the same limits. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We are, moreover, prepared to enter the International Conference +which he wishes to invoke after the war on the basis of his +communication to the Senate. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_378"><span class="page">Page 378</span></a> "Your +Excellency will give President these details at the same time as +you hand him Note relating unrestricted U-boat war, and will inform +him as follows: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"If his offer had only reached us a few days earlier, we should have +been able to postpone opening of the new U-boat war. Now, however, in +spite of best will in the world, it is, owing to technical reasons, +unfortunately too late, as far-reaching military preparations have +already been made which cannot be undone, and U-boats have already +sailed with new instructions. Form and content of enemy's reply to +our offer of peace, and the Note of the President, were so abrupt +and harsh, that, in view of the life and death struggle which has +once again been proclaimed against us, we cannot any longer delay +the use of those means which appear to us best calculated to end the +war quickly, and for the relinquishment of which we could not have +taken the responsibility in the face of our whole nation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"As the order regarding the unrestricted U-boat war shows, we are +prepared, at any moment, to make every possible allowances for +America's needs. We would beg the President to prosecute—that +is to say, pursue, his plan notwithstanding, and declare ourselves +ready to discontinue the unrestricted U-boat war the moment we +are completely assured that the President's efforts will lead to +a peace that would be acceptable to us. +</p> + +<p class="rshift"> +"<span class="sc">Bethmann-Hollweg.</span>" +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I immediately communicated the peace terms contained in this telegram +to Mr. House, and I still cherished a small hope that he would, +after all, perhaps, be able to exercise a favorable influence over +the President. Truth to tell, he actually went to Washington in +order to take part in the deliberations which were to decide the +attitude which America was henceforth to adopt towards us. <a +name="page_379"><span class="page">Page 379</span></a> Apart from +the fact that the secrecy covering the communication of our peace +terms deprived them of all diplomatic value, the simultaneous +declaration of the unrestricted U-boat war gave the death-blow to +all hope of maintaining peace. As Herr von Betmann-Hollweg declared +before the Examination Committee of the National Assembly: "It was +perfectly clear to the authorities in Germany, that the decision +to prosecute the unrestricted U-boat war would destroy all chance of +further efforts on the part of the President to bring about peace. +The U-boat war meant rupture, and ultimately war with America. +The discussions between General Head Quarters and the Political +Leaders had turned upon this question for years. That which led +to the decisive step being taken was, that General Headquarters +was firmly resolved to face even the risk of America's entry into +the war, and that it wished to use the circumstances as a trial +of strength with the political leaders." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On January 31st, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, I handed Mr. Lansing +the official communication about the U-boat war. This was my last +political interview in America. We both knew that the end had come, +but we did not admit the fact to each other. The Secretary of State +contented himself with replying that he would submit my communication +to the President. I cherished no illusions regarding the expected +outcome of this interview, for the Ultimatum of April 18th, 1916, no +longer allowed of any chance of preventing the rupture of diplomatic +relations. Consequently on the morning of the 31st January, I had +already given the order that the engines of all ships lying in +American harbors were to be destroyed. I had already been given +instructions to this effect at the time of the <i>Sussex</i> crisis, +and these instructions had now been repeated from Berlin. As a +matter <a name="page_380"><span class="page">Page 380</span></a> +of fact it was, dangerous to allow of any delay, for on the evening +of January 31st our ships were already seized by the American police. +As far as I know, however, all of them without exception were made +unfit for use before this occurred. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the 3rd February, at twelve midday, Mr. Wilson announced to +a joint meeting of both Houses of Congress, the rupture of all +diplomatic relations with Germany, and at the same time my pass +was brought to me by a higher official of the Department of State. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Thus war was decided upon, even if it was not immediately declared. +Everything that followed amounted only to preparation for war or war +propaganda. Nothing except the abandonment of the U-boat campaign +could have prevented war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It has frequently been asserted that the notorious Mexico telegram +led to the war with the United States. I do not believe this is +correct. The telegram was used with great success as propaganda +against us; but the rupture of diplomatic relations—as I have +already pointed out—was, in view of the situation, equivalent +in all circumstances to war. I had nothing to do with the Mexico +telegram, which took me completely by surprise. It was addressed, in +the usual way, direct to the legation in Mexico, and passed through +the Embassy at Washington on the same day on which I received the +notification that the unrestricted U-boat war was to be declared. +I had neither the right, nor was it my duty, to hold up the telegram, +although I disapproved of its contents. But even if I had held +it up, I should have served no useful purpose. As I afterwards +heard from a certain Englishman, there was an office in England +which deciphered all the telegrams which we sent over the English +cable and this office placed all their intercepts at the disposal +of the American Government after the rupture of diplomatic <a +name="page_381"><span class="page">Page 381</span></a> relations. +There is nothing surprising in this, for we also deciphered all +enemy telegrams which we were able to intercept. Nowadays there +is no cipher which is absolutely safe, if it has been in use for +some time. At that time, however, I did not know that all our cipher +telegrams were being read by the English. If, therefore, I had held +up the Mexico telegram in Washington, its contents would have been +revealed to the American Government by the English, notwithstanding, +and no one would have believed that the message had not been forwarded +in some way to Mexico. Moreover the telegram, as is well-known, +was only conditional; the instructions it contained were only to +hold good if the United States came into the war. I strained every +nerve, at that moment, to prevent this from taking place. If I had +been successful, the Mexico telegram would have served no purpose. +I am therefore able to say, with a clean conscience, that I did +everything that stood in my power, to remedy the error committed +in the dispatch of the telegram. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In Helfferich's account of these events, the author says: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"If Count Bernstorff was, and apparently is still, of the opinion, +that Wilson was actually engaged in trying to bring about a peace +which would have been acceptable and tolerable to us, and with +a promise of success, this can only be explained as the result +of the enduring effect of suggestion, which, acting upon him for +two years, had had no really adequate knowledge of home opinion to +counteract it. As the communication between Berlin and the German +Embassy in Washington was completely cut off, it is not surprising +that our representatives on the other side of the vast ocean should +have lost touch with their fellow-countrymen struggling for their +lives, and <a name="page_382"><span class="page">Page 382</span></a> +should have failed to retain the proper standpoint in regard to +what was either necessary or tolerable." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To this I should like to reply, in the first place, that the +unrestricted U-boat war did not in the least bring the German people +either what was necessary or tolerable. Furthermore, not only I +myself, but almost all those gentlemen who returned with me to +Germany, had the feeling, on reaching home, that we in America +had formed a much clearer notion of the true state of Germany, +than those of our fellow-countrymen who had been living at home; +for they had been completely cut off from the world by the Blockade. +After we had seen the conditions prevailing in Germany, we could +understand even less than we had before, why the Imperial Government +had not snatched with joy at the chance of making peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As to the question whether we should have obtained an acceptable +and tolerable peace through Mr. Wilson's efforts, I am still firmly +convinced to-day, that this would have been the case. The President +would not have offered to mediate if he had not been able to reckon +with certainty upon success, and he was better situated than any +German, to know the attitude of the Entente. In his farewell letter +to me, Mr. House wrote: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"It is too sad that your Government should have declared the +unrestricted U-boat war at a moment when we were so near to peace. +The day will come when people in Germany will see how much you +have done for your country in America." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Moreover, later on, Mr. Bonar Law publicly admitted in the English +Parliament that Great Britain would have collapsed financially, if +American help had not saved her. The war-spirit in France, during +the year 1917 was simply upheld by the hope of American help, and +finally, <a name="page_383"><span class="page">Page 383</span></a> +in March, the Russian Revolution broke out. If we had accepted +Wilson's mediation, the whole of American influence in Russia would +have been exercised in favor of peace, and not, as events ultimately +proved, against ourselves. Out of Wilson's and Kerensky's Peace +programme, we might, by means of diplomatic negotiations, easily +have achieved all that we regarded as necessary. My conviction +that we could in the year 1917 have obtained a peace which would +have been acceptable to ourselves, is based not so much on Wilson's +good will, as upon the fact that, without American help, the Entente +could not possibly have achieved a victory. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Against this view, the argument is advanced that the United States +would in any case have entered the war, in order to avoid a German +victory. I have already pointed out, that according to my view, +no "German Peace" was any longer possible after the first battle +of the Marne. Besides, it was precisely the object of the policy +which was directed at American mediation, to prevent the United +States from entering the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At the present time, even Mr. Wilson himself is produced as +crown-witness in support of the view that America would have entered +the war against us whatever might have happened. In the discussions +about the Peace Treaty, which the President held in the White House +on the 19th August, 1919, much stress is laid upon a certain passage +in particular, which gives the impression that Mr. Wilson would have +wished America to enter the war, even if Germany had not declared +the unrestricted U-boat campaign. Almost without exception, all +the German national newspapers interpreted the short dialogue in +question between the President and Senator McCumber in this way, +and the <i>Deutsche Tageszeitung</i> even went so far as to regard +it as a striking proof of what they called Wilson's "<i>a priori</i> +resolve to have war with Germany." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_384"><span class="page">Page 384</span></a> I must +most emphatically reject this interpretation of the passage under +discussion, which was turned to account by some papers in America +in the political fight. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In the first place I should like to point out that it is obviously +inadmissible to take the above-mentioned passage out of the context, +and to regard it in itself as an interchange of views between Mr. +Wilson and Mr. McCumber. It ought, on the contrary, to be judged +in conjunction with the passage that precedes it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The proposition for discussion was the President's motion that the +League of Nations made it obligatory upon all States united, under +it, to take common action against any country guilty of a breach of +international law. Senator Harding, one of the keenest opponents +of the League of Nations, suggested the idea in the debate that +it was impossible for a sovereign State like the United States of +America to have her moral obligation in any international conflict +dictated to her by an external body consisting of the Council of +the League of Nations. Driven into a corner, Mr. Wilson had to +acknowledge this fact; but he emphasized the point that in spite +of this the value of the League of Nations was in no way impaired. +He said: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The American Republic is not in need of any advice from any quarter, +in order to fulfil her moral duty; but she stabilizes the whole +world by promising in advance that she will stand by other nations +who regard matters in the same light as herself, in order to uphold +Justice in the world." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Following upon this, Senator McCumber then tried to confute the +President's theory, by applying it practically to the most recent +events in the world's history. He <a name="page_385"><span +class="page">Page 385</span></a> referred to the last war, at the +outbreak of which there was no League of Nations in existence, +and the following discussion took place: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +<i>McCumber:</i> Would our moral conviction of the injustice of +the German war have drawn us into this war, if Germany had been +guilty of no aggressive acts, and, what is more, without the League +of Nations, for of course we had no League of Nations then? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<i>Wilson: As things turned out,</i> I hope that it would finally +have done so, Mr. Senator. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<i>McCumber:</i> Do you believe that, if Germany had been guilty +of no act of injustice against our own citizens, we should have +come into this war? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<i>Wilson:</i> I believe it. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<i>McCumber:</i> You believe that we should have come in whatever +happened? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<i>Wilson:</i> Yes. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +It is abundantly clear that with his first answer, "as things turned +out, I hope that it"—that is to say, America's moral conviction +of the injustice of the German war—"would finally have drawn +us into the war"—the President lays the emphasis on the words +"as things turned out." There can be no doubt that he meant to say: +"As things turned out in regard to his efforts for peace," the first +ready concurrence of the Imperial Government, notwithstanding, was +thwarted at the decisive moment. With such a Government, Mr. Wilson +seems to imply, it was impossible in the long run for America to +remain on terms of peace. From that time henceforward—there +can be no question of any earlier period, because up to that moment +he had been in constant negotiation with us—he regarded the +Imperial Government as morally condemned. Then, however, he calls +to mind very clearly <a name="page_386"><span class="page">Page +386</span></a> the feeble war-spirit of the American people in +the spring of 1917, which, as is well known, had to be whipped +into the war by propaganda on a prodigious scale. That is why the +President says he "hopes," that the moral conviction of the American +people regarding the injustice of Germany's cause would finally have +triumphed over his readiness for peace expressed so brilliantly +as late as November, 1916. His words are, therefore, to be regarded +as a reflection in retrospect, not as a proof of an <i>à +priori</i> intention to urge the United States into the war in +any circumstances. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Truth to tell, if Mr. Wilson had really been striving to declare +war against us, he would, of course, only have needed to nod in +order to induce his whole country to fight after the <i>Lusitania</i> +incident, so great was the war feeling at that critical time. Later +on, the President concentrated all his efforts upon the idea of +being the Peacemaker of the world, and even made such prominent +use of the motto, "He kept us out of the war," in the campaign for +his re-election, that it is quite unthinkable that all this time +he should have secretly cherished the intention, ultimately, to +enter the war against Germany. In this matter, the fact that after +the rupture of diplomatic relations between America and Germany, +Mr. Wilson really did urge on the war by every means in his power, +proves nothing. For, after January 31st, 1917, Wilson himself was +a different man. Our rejection of his proposal to mediate, by our +announcement of the unrestricted U-boat war, which was to him utterly +incomprehensible, turned him into an embittered enemy of the Imperial +Government. But this is by no means a proof of the contention that, +before the date named, he was secretly watching for an opportunity +to make war upon Germany. Neither does it excuse the President +for having allowed himself at Versailles to be convinced of <a +name="page_387"><span class="page">Page 387</span></a> the alleged +complicity of the German people in the general war-guilt. Theretofore +he had certainly always differentiated between the autocracy, as also +Militarism, on the one hand, and the German people on the other. +At Versailles he suddenly advanced the theory that the Germans +must be punished for their crimes, and not only those among them +who were responsible, but also the innocent German people, who +neither desired the breach of Belgium's neutrality, nor understood +the moral consequences of the U-boat war, nor were aware of Mr. +Wilson's mediation for peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The above dialogue is also interesting from the standpoint that +the President is most clearly convinced that the Entente could +not have conquered without American help. If to-day he concludes +therefrom that America would have been obliged ultimately to join +in the war, in order to punish Germany, in former days he concluded +that his duty was to bring about a Peace without victory. If he had +succeeded in doing this, all of us, friend and foe alike, would +now be living in a better world than the present one. It would be +the world as we had been shown it in a vision of the future on the +22nd January, 1917, and not the world of the Peace of Versailles, +blooming with starvation, Bolshevism and nationalistic hatred. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In his Memoirs, Herr von Tirpitz says that of all the practical +advantages which I declared would follow from a compliant attitude +on our part, not one had fallen to our lot. But I must confess, I +was not aware that the U-boat war had brought us any advantages +either. Its results have been a heavy moral debt and a huge bill +of costs that the German people must pay. And how could the policy +which I recommended have yielded practical results, seeing that I +was never able, or even allowed, to carry it through? Never at any +time was the U-boat war really given up. Every time a diplomatic +success was in <a name="page_388"><span class="page">Page 388</span></a> +view, an incident occurred which made it necessary to start one's +labors all over again. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Other people have said that as I was not in agreement with the +policy of the Imperial Government, I ought to have resigned my +office. This view does not take into account all the facts of the +case. As long as Herr von Jagow was Secretary of State for Foreign +Affairs, I worked in complete harmony with him. We both worked +together in trying to avert war with the United States. I knew as +little as Herr von Jagow himself did, whether we should succeed +in scoring every point in the policy we pursued, for the Secretary +of State was in perpetual conflict with the Military and Naval +Authorities. If I had heard in time that Herr von Jagow's resignation +had occurred in connection with the question of the U-boat war, and +was the result of it, I should have resigned at the same time as he +did; because my name was identified with the idea of American mediation +for peace. Moreover, up to the 9th, or rather the 19th, January, +1917, I was completely in accord with the Imperial Chancellor; for +Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg declared before the Examination Committee +of the National Assembly: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"The whole of my work in connection with Wilson's efforts for peace +was, indeed, directed towards rendering the threat of a U-boat +war unnecessary, by bringing about a peace movement which would, +of course, have some promise of proving successful." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +These words amount to a complete approval of the policy which I +pursued in Washington. When, therefore, on the 19th January, I +received the Note informing me of the intended opening of the +unrestricted U-boat campaign, I could not tender my resignation, +for I regarded it as my duty to the German people, to resist until +the <a name="page_389"><span class="page">Page 389</span></a> last +the unrestricted U-boat war, and, if possible, to avert a breach +with the United States. When, on the 31st January, 1917, the U-boat +policy had definitely triumphed, I had no further chance of resigning +my office, seeing that owing to the immediate rupture of diplomatic +relations it was lost to me. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The various reasons, for and against Mr. Wilson's mediation, were all +thrashed out in great detail in this country, before the Examination +Committee of the National Assembly, in the winter of 1916-17. And, +according to the evidence given, the decisive cause of the failure +of the scheme was the distrust which the most influential statesmen +felt towards the President. If any confidence had been felt in Mr. +Wilson, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would have opposed the adoption +of the U-boat war, and would have allowed the President's efforts for +mediation to pursue their course. As a witness before the Committee, +he himself said: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"There can be no doubt, now that we can look back upon events, +that we should have done better had we placed our fate in President +Wilson's hands, and had accepted his offers of mediation." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +As I have already pointed out, the factor which in my opinion was +largely responsible for determining the course we ultimately adopted +was the under-estimation and ignorance of America which was so +widespread in Germany. From the very first moment the problem was +not properly understood by the German nation. The fact was overlooked +that the most important battle of the war was taking place in +Washington, and when the tragedy reached its climax, no one believed +that, with all her political, military and economic power, the +United States of America would ever enter into the War. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_390"><span class="page">Page 390</span></a> Finally, +it has been pointed out as an objection to my view, that, after +all, the Entente would have rejected Wilson's efforts at mediation. +I am no longer in a position to prove the contrary to-day, and it +is, of course, just possible, that the President and Mr. House +were mistaken in assuming as much as they did. If at that time, +however, we expected the Entente to reject Mr. Wilson's offer of +mediation, we should at all events have postponed the U-boat war, and +accepted American intervention, in order to improve our diplomatic +position in Washington, before having recourse to the <i>ultima +ratio</i>. It seems to have been our destiny that all our most +important decisions of the war were the outcome of military and +not of political considerations. On the Entente side, the converse +was always true, and that is why, though it suffered many military +reverses, the Entente won the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In pursuing the policy I advocated, I was influenced by considerations, +which now, in conclusion, I should like to sum up as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +(1) It was no longer possible to achieve a decisive German victory +after the first Battle of the Marne, that is why German policy +should have been directed towards obtaining "Peace without Victory"; +and, as things turned out, such a victory was only to be obtained +by means of American mediation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(2) The personality of Mr. Wilson played no decisive part in determining +my attitude. I never once reckoned upon his personal friendliness +towards ourselves; for I knew him too well to suppose him capable +of pro-German tendencies. I expected nothing more from him than +that he would play America's game—America's and no other +country's—supported by the public opinion of the United States. +American policy, however, pursued the object <a name="page_391"><span +class="page">Page 391</span></a> of a "Peace without Victory," from +the standpoint of practical politics, in order that, neither Germany +nor England should attain to a superlatively powerful position. A +"Peace without Victory" of this sort, under American patronage, +would have left the United States in the undisputed position of +the first political power in the world. To this, there was added +certain other reasons of an ideal political nature, owing to the +fact that both Mr. Wilson and the great majority of the American +people wished to put an end to all the bloodshed and misery. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(3) The beginning of the unrestricted U-boat war was bound, as things +had developed, to lead automatically to the rupture of diplomatic +relations with the United States. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(4) As matters stood in America, the rupture of diplomatic relations +was equally bound automatically to bring about war with the United +States. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(5) War with the United States had to be averted at all costs, +because America's help meant giving our enemy such an overwhelming +preponderance of power, that a German defeat became an absolute +certainty. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(6) The political situation was such that, the acceptance of the +American offer of mediation was the only means of preventing the +United States from entering the war. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(7) If America did not enter the war, the Entente were not in a +position to beat us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(8) If Mr. Wilson had succeeded in bringing both belligerent parties +to the conference table, a sort of Hubertsburg Peace[*] would have +been concluded. In <a name="page_392"><span class="page">Page +392</span></a> view of the situation, a peace unfavorable to ourselves +was unthinkable. Who, at that time, could have compelled us to accept +terms which we regarded as incompatible with Germany's position in +the world? Herr Helfferich before the Examination Committee of the +National Assembly, expressed the view that in the end Mr. Wilson +would have forced peace upon us with the butt-end of a rifle. But +whence would he have obtained this butt-end? He had not one, and +it took him a year to create an army. No one who is familiar with +the United States can believe that it would ever have been possible +to drive the Americans into the war, once a Peace Conference had +assembled. For then it would only have been a matter of deciding +the fate of one or two pieces of territory or colonies, in which the +Americans would not have felt the slightest interest. Naturally, +we should have had to restore Belgium and accept the disarmament +programme, etc. But we had already declared ourselves ready to take +these measures, and, as regards disarmament, etc., this reform was +inevitable, in view of the economic position of all the countries +concerned. If America had not entered the war, no one could have +forced us to accept less advantageous terms than the <i>status +quo ante</i>, with possibly some mutual compensation. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +[Footnote *: This refers to the Treaty of Hubertsburg, which was +one of the treaties that put an end to the Seven Years War on the +15th February, 1763. It was concluded between the States of Prussia, +Austria and Saxony. Nobody seems to have derived any advantage from +the treaty, except perhaps Frederick II., on whose province of +Silesia Marie-Thérèse renounced all further claim.] +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_393"><span class="page">Page 393</span></a> +CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<p class="subtitle"> +THE RETURN HOME +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After the rupture of diplomatic relations, I entrusted the care +of our interests to the Swiss Legation, and from that time I did +not speak a word to any American official except to the Assistant +Secretary of State, Breckenridge Long, who accompanied us as far +as the boat at New York. From the majority of those gentlemen with +whom I had official relations, however, I received very friendly +letters of farewell. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The principal passage in the letter from Lansing, the Secretary +of State, was as follows: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"I shall bear in mind all your earnest efforts in the cause of +peace, and will gladly recall our personal relations, which, in +spite of the difficulties of the situation, were always a pleasure +to me." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In view of the conditions prevailing at the time, the preparations +for our departure took a long time. It was only with difficulty +that we were able to obtain the necessary accommodation for the +large number of German officials and their families on the Danish +ship <i>Friedrich VIII</i>. The business of getting the necessary +paper—such, for instance, as the Entente's safe conduct—also +necessitated lengthy negotiations, which were conducted by the Swiss +Legation with the assistance of Prince Hatzfeldt, the Secretary +of the Embassy. Our departure could only take place on the 14th +February. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +It was not pleasant to be obliged to remain eleven days longer +in Washington. The moment the rupture of diplomatic <a +name="page_394"><span class="page">Page 394</span></a> relations +occurred, the secret police took possession of the Embassy, and +shadowed every one of my movements. These precautionary measures +were supposed to guarantee my personal safety; but I should have +been quite safe without them, for all Americans behaved towards me +with perfect propriety and courtesy. Our personal friends did not +allow the rupture of diplomatic relations to make any difference +in their attitude towards us. Until the very day of our departure, +my wife and I were the daily guests of American friends. Even the +Press, with but a few exceptions, maintained a friendly attitude; +for all the journalists knew that I had worked hard to maintain +peace. As an example of this, I reproduce below an article from the +<i>New York Tribune</i>, which is one of the leading anti-German +papers in America. I give the article, somewhat abbreviated, in +the original, in order to preserve its American character: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"Diplomacy and Friendship twin arts of Bernstorff. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Departing German Envoy, target of critics here and at home, quits +post with brilliant record and many personal friends. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The sailing of <i>Friedrich VIII.</i> invites the cordial obituary +style, though diplomatic deaths are supposed to warrant no sadness. +And yet, curiously enough, Count Bernstorff probably finds himself +leaving when more people are personally for him and fewer against +him than at any time in the last two years. A less distinguished +diplomat would not have had the art to stay so long. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"A letter from Washington, dated June, 1915, is in my desk. It +tells incidentally about the visit of a friend to the Ambassador +shortly after his interview with the President. 'It's coming out +all right,' the Count said cheerfully, his melancholy eyes lighting +up, and the anxious lines etched in his face during the months +past <a name="page_395"><span class="page">Page 395</span></a> +lightening. 'No, they're not going to get rid of me yet for a while,' +referring to the Press clamor for his dismissal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"'I'm glad of that,' answered the friend. 'Then you'll stay and +get some more degrees.' (Eight American universities had honored +him.) 'Oh,' he answered with a gesture, 'I may leave by degrees.' +It is winning to catch an Excellency at puns. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"At his departure many persons—close friends of the last +eight years and newspaper correspondents—are going to miss +his amazing charm and the easy candor of his talk. He has had an +intimate directness in his dealings with all sorts and conditions +of people, that only a personage of magnetic personality can adopt. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Sheer charm alone can forget caste consciousness. Count Bernstorff +has had none of the patent heavy regard for himself that makes +three-quarters of official Germany a chore to meet. 'I'll put you +through' the little telephone girl, at his favorite New York hotel +used to say promptly, when his Excellency was asked for, and knew +that she was safe. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Reporters will miss seeing him teeter informally by the Embassy +fireplace as he interviewed them, or gave out a significant something +from behind a hastily-raised newspaper. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The insistent friends of Germany, heavily friendly and advisory, +will miss his English, very soft with an attractive ghost, now and +then, of a lisp. He learned it in London, his first language, for +he was born there fifty-five years ago. His father, Count Albrecht +was on service as Ambassador to the Court of St. James. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Count Bernstorff came to America from his post as Consul-General +in Cairo. He was stationed there in the trying diplomatic period +of Anglo-French rapprochement and the rise of naval competition +between the English <a name="page_396"><span class="page">Page +396</span></a> and the German empires. By many, Count Bernstorff +is credited with saving Turkish Egypt and most of the Moslem world +to the German balance. They say he did it over coffee with Khedive +Abbas Hilmy, who never, never was bored by his wit, nor failed to +appreciate the graces bred down from thirteenth-century Mecklenburg +of the tall Herr Consul-General. And in return from the Moslem +Count Bernstorff may have caught some of his comforting regard for +kismet. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"The man is more than a little fatalist. 'What happens must happen,' +he was wont to say, as he sorted the threatening letters from his +morning correspondence. And again: 'What difference does it make? +They've killed so many that one more can make no difference.' +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"He goes back to Berlin now, there as here different things to +different people. A rank Social Democrat I have heard him called +in drawing-rooms, where news of his earnest plea to his Government +for a liberal <i>Lusitania</i> Note had leaked out. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"It has not been easy for him to construe and weigh the American +situation for his Government, and have his judgment taken, any +more than it has been easy for Mr. Gerard to convince the German +Foreign Office that the American Notes were really meant. Often +the same agent knocked both men and got in ahead of either as the +authority on what America would do. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"A certain American Baroness, Egeria to the American journalists +in Berlin, who has no use for Bernstorff or Gerard or Zimmermann, +has been one of his many cockle burrs. Most of the German-Americans +who chose to protest about the shipment of munitions and all of +pro-submarine Germany plus an aspirant or two for his post—all +of these have been busy against him. And the Americans are legion +who have seconded the hate. He himself has been silent, with an +occasional wry smile over it all. <a name="page_397"><span +class="page">Page 397</span></a> He has never excused himself +when attacks on him, personally, followed German actions against +which he had counselled. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"He has tried over and over again to explain to the German Foreign +Office the temper of the American people, whose sentimentality is +so different from that which prevails in the Hanover-Bremen-Leipzig +breast. The <i>Hamburger-Nachrichten</i> has reviled him. It has +been hard to see with Hamburg eyes what Count Bernstorff must +know—that hardly a diplomat alive could have stayed so long +on friendly terms with Washington, through these two years, or +reaped so heavy a harvest of understanding from his study of poker +and baseball as well as American commerce and institutions. People +like to write—I, too—of his melancholy eyes, his gently +cynical estimates of most dreamers' hopes. Over one circumstance +he has been always hopeful. He has clung always to the hope that +America neutral would be a leader in the erection of peace machinery, +eager that every diplomatic transaction should perhaps have the +possibility of an instrument. His real object in leaving, I am +sure, is that not again will he turn over a communication from the +American State Department to read a faint hope of peace between +lines." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Apart from the measures taken for our security, our departure from +Washington and New York was not very different from what it would +have been in ordinary times, had I been moving to take up my duties +in another country. Many friends came to the railway station at +Washington, and on the boat at New York. Telegrams and letters of +farewell came in hundreds, and our cabins were full of presents, +consisting of baskets of fruit, flowers, cigars, books, beverages +of all kinds, which are the custom at leavetakings in America. In +these circumstances, <a name="page_398"><span class="page">Page +398</span></a> and after all that I have described in the foregoing +pages, I was nota little astonished when, about a year later, the +American War-Propaganda Department began to hold me responsible for +proceedings which were partly simply fiction, and for the rest of +a kind that had occurred without any assistance from me whatever. +I can understand perfectly the wish of the American Propaganda +Department to create a war spirit, just as the same department in +all belligerent countries strove to do; nevertheless, it was not +necessary to adorn the war propaganda with unjustifiable personal +attacks. Nothing happened after my departure from America to prompt +such attacks. A few of my telegrams were, to be sure, deciphered +and published in order to prove that I had hatched a conspiracy. +When the Military and Naval Attachés were compelled to leave +the United States, I could not very well avoid discharging the +whole of the naval and military business myself. But this does not +prove that I had previously had any dealings with these matters, +even admitting that the Naval and Military Attachés had been +guilty of illegal practices, which, despite all the uproar created +by enemy propaganda, I do not believe to have been proved. Once +the fever of war has died down, no one, presumably, will feel any +interest in devoting any attention to such questions. If, however, +later on, anyone should feel inclined to investigate the "German +conspiracies," and "German propaganda," in the United States, in an +impartial spirit, he will be astonished to find how many fantastic +fictions were brought to the notice of the Investigation Committee +of the Senate, and what small justification lay at the bottom of +the charges made against the German Embassy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When, on the afternoon of the 14th of February, we took to sea, we +had no idea that we were to enjoy the hospitality of the gallant +steamer <i>Friedrich VIII.</i>, and <a name="page_399"><span +class="page">Page 399</span></a> its amiable captain, for four long +weeks. Ever since the establishment of regular lines of passenger +steamers between America and Europe, we must certainly have broken +all records in regard to the length of time we took to complete +the journey. There were on board the <i>Friedrich VIII.</i>, in +addition to the whole of the staff of the Embassy, together with +their wives and children, the complete personnel of the consulates, +as also a few native Germans, who for some reason or other, happened +to be in America and had not yet had an opportunity of returning +home. A few Scandinavians completed the list of the passengers. The +total number of Germans was approximately two hundred. According to +the wording of the Safe Conduct which we had been granted, we were +allowed to take with us our personal belongings and "a reasonable +amount of money." We were expressly forbidden to carry any papers. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +The first twenty-four hours of the journey were the most pleasant. +The sea was calm and the weather was not too cold, and on the following +evening we reached Halifax, which was the port at which we were to +be examined. It was selected in order that we might not have to +enter the war zone. Here we had the first taste of the vexations +of the journey. Our captain wanted to enter the port; but he was +ordered to anchor outside. On the following morning the authorities +allowed us to enter. We were placed under the supervision of the +English cruiser <i>Devonshire</i>, and I cannot help admitting +that the English naval officers discharged the undignified and +distasteful duties imposed upon them with great courtesy. The Canadian +officials, on the other hand, behaved with the utmost disrespect +and boorishness. They appeared to be accustomed to dealing only +with immigrants and stowaways. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I do not know to this day, why, in spite of our Safe <a +name="page_400"><span class="page">Page 400</span></a> Conduct, +we were held up twelve days in the Bedford Basin, which, with its +encircling snow-clad hills, was completely shut off from the rest +of the world. The examination in itself could not adequately account +for this strange and uncustomary behavior, particularly towards an +Ambassador: for although the ship's coal was ultimately sifted in +the search for contraband goods, if any good-will had been shown, +the examination could have been finished in three to four days +at the outside. I suppose, however, that the delay was intended +to serve political ends. The English probably wanted to keep us +shut up in Halifax until the United States had entered into the +war. They were perfectly well aware of my views, and feared that +in Berlin I might after all succeed in effecting an understanding +with the American Government. As, however, developments in the +United States dragged on very slowly, and at first only an armed +neutrality was contemplated, the English were ultimately obliged +to allow us to continue our journey, because they could not very +well keep us confined for weeks. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Personally, I cannot complain of the treatment to which I was subjected +at Halifax, for I was the only one among all my fellow passengers +of German nationality who had not to submit to having my person +searched, and was only required to sign a declaration that I was +carrying no papers. Everybody else—even my wife—had +to consent to being searched, an operation which was performed in +a humiliating manner, and which led to many an unpleasant scene. +Even little Huberta Hatzfeldt, who was only three months old, was +stripped of her swaddling clothes. The Canadian authorities assessed +the "reasonable sum of money" allowed at ninety dollars a head, +and confiscated all moneys above that sum as contraband. In this +way, Countess Manfred Matuschka lost 25,000 dollars, which, in +ignorance of the regulations, she had <a name="page_401"><span +class="page">Page 401</span></a> brought with her. The sum was +to be deposited with a Canadian Bank, but has probably been lost +forever by its owner. As I was forbidden to have any communication +whatsoever with the outside world, I was not able to carry out +my intention of lodging a complaint at Washington regarding this +breach of the Safe Conduct that had been granted to us. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At last, however, our imprisonment came to an end, and we were +allowed to pursue our journey. Amid the cheers of all on board, +including particularly those of our excellent captain, who felt +the affront we had received very deeply, we weighed anchor. Judge +of the almost panic-stricken disappointment of all the passengers, +therefore, when at the end of a few knots, the ship turned back +on her course! To the great relief of all concerned, however, it +appeared that we had only forgotten to take on board the wireless +telegraphy apparatus which had been taken from us at Halifax. From +that moment, apart from very bad and cold weather, we continued +our journey without further incident. We took a sweeping curve +northward, then sailed down the Norwegian coast without meeting +either an enemy ship or a German submarine. Some of the neutral +passengers were so much terrified of the latter, that they did +not retire to their beds for many nights at a stretch. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +At ten o'clock in the morning we landed in the snow in Christiania. +Meanwhile the Mexico telegram had been published in Washington, and +Michaelis, the German Ambassador, in accordance with instructions, +came on board, in order to learn from me whether I could offer any +explanation of the fact—that is to say, whether I suspected +treachery on the part of any of my staff. It is indeed plain from +the oft-quoted reports of the Committee of the Senate, that a host +of underhand tricks must have been played, particularly in the Post +Office; <a name="page_402"><span class="page">Page 402</span></a> +nevertheless, I am of opinion that in this case the explanation +which I gave above is the correct one. The telegram in question, +like many others, was presumably deciphered by the English. From +the experience gained during the war, we have learned that the +diplomacy of the future will never be allowed to rely, for important +matters, upon the secret of a cipher; for skilful experts are now +able to discover the most complicated code, provided that they +are able to intercept a sufficient number of telegrams. Over and +above this, owing to our isolation in Washington, we were able to +alter the cipher but very seldom. As to the suggestion of treachery +on the part of any member of my staff—I never believed in +this at the time, nor do I believe in it now. In very hard times +they all proved themselves to be thoroughly loyal and efficient. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +We had to remain in Christiania longer than we expected, because +the route across the Sound to Copenhagen was entirely ice-bound. +Finally, with the help of ice-breakers, even this obstacle was +overcome, and after a day's halt at Copenhagen, we at last reached +Berlin via Warnemünde. We had received an extremely hospitable +and cordial welcome at Christiania and Copenhagen, at the hands of +the Ambassadors, Michaelis and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau—we +also had an opportunity of convincing ourselves that the feeling +in Denmark and Norway had turned against us just as sharply as +in America. The balance of power was, however, different. If our +neutral neighbors had not been living in fear of German power, +they would at this time have responded to Mr. Wilson's call, and +would have broken off all diplomatic relations with us. I believe +that the President was hoping that events might take this turn, +and that he would thus be spared the need of waging war. If all +the countries in the world were to declare war against Germany and +her Allies—this is what was assumed in Washington—the +<a name="page_403"><span class="page">Page 403</span></a> economic +pressure would alone suffice to compel the Central Powers to yield. +The policy proposed was similar to the one which, in the future, the +League of Nations would pursue against any refractory member of its +body, and which the Entente proposes to adopt to-day against Bolshevist +Russia. The great length of time which it took the United States to +enter the war is, in my opinion, to be explained in this way. The +idea was to wait and see how things would develop. Meanwhile, thanks +to the Mexico telegram, war-propaganda in America was being worked +with great success, and the military preparations made such steady +progress, that even if economic measures did not prove sufficient +to end the war, the United States would have obtained the army +they had longed for for so many years, as also the fleet of war +and merchant ships, for which in times of peace Congress would +never have voted the necessary funds. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +On the evening of the day after our arrival in Berlin, I was received +by the Imperial Chancellor, with whom I had a long interview. It +was on this occasion that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg informed me +that he could not help consenting to the U-boat war, as the German +people would never have understood it if we had concluded an +unsatisfactory peace, without attempting to bring about a happy +decision by means of the last and most effective weapon in which +the nation felt any confidence. He also said that he would have +been unable to go before the Reichstag with an offer of mediation +from Mr. Wilson, because such intervention would not have been +popular, public opinion would not have liked it, and it would only +have been accepted by the Social Democrats. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg +declared that the Reichstag would have "thrown him out." This was +the very expression he used. But this did not explain why, a few +weeks previously, Mr. Wilson's mediation had seemed desirable, +if, <a name="page_404"><span class="page">Page 404</span></a> as +a matter of fact, it was impossible to get the Reichstag to agree +to it. Meanwhile, the political situation at that time has been +completely elucidated by the evidence which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg +gave before the Examination Committee of the National Assembly. In +his account of the interview he had with me, he spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +"As regards my interview with Count Bernstorff, on his return from +America, I should like to make the following remarks: I cannot recall +all the details of the conversation I had with Count Bernstorff. +Count Bernstorff has revealed in his evidence what I said to him, +and I have no doubt that he has accurately reproduced my actual +words. My duty was—and this is an idea I already touched +upon earlier in the day—once the policy of an unrestricted +U-boat war was resolved upon, never to reveal to anyone any doubts +as to the efficacy of the scheme. In this case, too, I had to say, +we shall achieve something by means of it. And that is why in my +conversation with Count Bernstorff, I did not reveal my inmost +feelings on the subject—there was no need for me to do +so—but simply referred to the reasons which could be adduced +in favor of the U-boat war." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +The reception which I was given in Berlin, certainly at first left +nothing to be desired. The Imperial Chancellor, on the occasion of +our first meeting, had thanked me in a very hearty manner for my +work in Washington, and a few days later, proposed that I should go +on an extraordinary mission to Stockholm. On principle I was quite +prepared to do this, seeing that the recent outbreak of revolution +in Russia, and the prospective international Socialist conference +in Stockholm, would offer fresh possibilities of peace, and an +opportunity for useful <a name="page_405"><span class="page">Page +405</span></a> work. From various things I had noticed in Berlin, I +gathered that—as the evidence before the Examination Committee +proved—the Imperial Chancellor would have preferred to give up +the idea of the U-boat war, and to accept American intervention in +favor of peace, but that he was compelled to give in, owing to the +overwhelming advocacy of the U-boat campaign. It was to be hoped, +therefore, that with the expected speedy failure of U-boat tactics, +Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would snatch at the next opportunity of +making peace. As he remained in Office, in spite of the U-boat +war, his chief motive for so doing must certainly have been that +"after his departure the whole of the power, both of external and +internal politics, would have gone over without resistance to the +machinery of war-fever." I regarded any policy as the right one, +which arrived at a prompt conclusion of peace, provided that we +did not make any confession of weakness by ourselves initiating +fresh offers of peace. We had already erred once in this way. But +in Stockholm it seemed likely that opportunities might occur of +winning either the Russians or the foreign Socialists over to a +movement in favor of peace. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +As I heard nothing, either about the Stockholm Mission, or about an +audience with the Kaiser, which I was led to expect in connection with +it, I went at the end of a few days to find out what had happened, +and I was told that the Kaiser had declined to sanction my mission +to Stockholm. Although I had a second interview with the Imperial +Chancellor, I was never able to ascertain definitely the reason of +the Kaiser's anger against me. Since, however, General Ludendorff, +simply on the grounds of my particular views, made his "impassioned" +attack on me before the Examination Committee of the National Assembly, +I have no longer been in any doubt whatsoever as to the nature of +the influence that was at <a name="page_406"><span class="page">Page +406</span></a> work at General Headquarters. At the time, I only +suspected the prevalence of some such feelings in that quarter, +because I had heard it whispered that the Monarch did not like +my "democratic views." The reasons for the Kaiser's anger, which +were given me officially, were of too trivial a nature to be even +plausible. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I must next refer to the dispatch box of the Swedish Legation in +Washington. At New York Herr Ekengren had put on board the steamer +<i>Friedrich VIII.</i> a box containing Swedish telegrams, which +was to be forwarded to its destination. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +This box, the very existence of which we Germans knew nothing about, +was taken possession of by the British authorities in Halifax, +and dispatched to England. The London newspapers then reported +that a dispatch box, belonging to Count Bernstorff, and containing +documents of the German Embassy, had been opened there. Although +the mistake, whether intentional or the reverse, was very soon +elucidated, someone had laid the matter before the Kaiser in a +distorted light. Apparently the Kaiser was allowed to form the +suspicion that the opening of the box had betrayed the secret of +the Mexico telegram. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +A further reason for his displeasure, at the time, was told me +subsequently at Constantinople by the Kaiser himself. He said that +I had "let him down most dreadfully," when I had recommended Mr. +Gerard as American Ambassador to Berlin. I ought never to have +supported the nomination of such a "Tammany Hall" creature. If +he—the Kaiser—had only known at the time who Gerard was, +and what Tammany Hall could be, he would never have accepted this +Ambassador. In Constantinople I was able to reply to the Kaiser pretty +fully, as the interview took place during a somewhat long journey on +the Bosphorus. I certainly did recommend <a name="page_407"><span +class="page">Page 407</span></a> Mr. Gerard in due course, but only +after he had already been selected as Ambassador by Mr. Wilson. +Before he had been chosen I was not asked. If at that time—in +the year 1913—I had advised the rejection of Mr. Gerard, it +would only have created a lot of unnecessary ill-feeling, as was +the case at the nomination of Mr. Hill. It is the custom in America +to select the Ambassadors from politically influential circles of +the triumphant party; irrespective of whether Tammany Hall or any +other organization is concerned. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Moreover, in 1903 I believed that Mr. Gerard would be welcome in +Berlin, for social reasons alone. Everybody knew that the Kaiser +liked to have Ambassadors who entertained on a lavish scale. Mr. +Gerard was the only man, among all the candidates of that day, who +seemed fitted for this and in a position to live up to it, while +his rich and amiable wife was admirably suited to help him in his +task. Before the war, an American Ambassador in Berlin really never +had any political business to transact, for it was the tradition +with the United States Government to conduct all negotiations almost +exclusively with the diplomatic corps in Washington. In 1913, therefore, +I had no reason to advocate the rejection of Mr. Gerard in Berlin. +Unfortunately, it was precisely in the social sphere that he had, +before the war, experienced certain disappointments in Berlin, +which, as far as we were concerned, might have been avoided, and +it is possible that Mr. Gerard may have been influenced by these +regrettable incidents. In any case, the Ambassador did not like +Berlin, and he took too little pains to conceal the fact. Mr. Gerard +was not the sort of man to be able to swim against the tide of +anti-German feeling, once it had become the proper thing in America +to be pro-Ally. As to whether any other United States Ambassador +would have shown less hostility to us, however, may be <a +name="page_408"><span class="page">Page 408</span></a> reasonably +doubted. I have already singled out the Adlon dinner as a proof +of the fact that Mr. Gerard could behave differently. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Be all this as it may, the reasons which were alleged genuinely +to justify the hostile attitude of General Headquarters towards +myself, struck me as not being sufficiently weighty. I say "General +Headquarters" intentionally, for the Kaiser was manifestly only +prejudiced against me by the usual whisperings that characterized +the Wilhelminian epoch. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Nevertheless, I had conducted the most important negotiations of +the war, and the Monarch must, in any case, have had the wish to +hear the report of it all from the person chiefly concerned. Besides, +the Kaiser knew as well as I did, that in Washington I had pursued +the policy of which he and the Chancellor were actually in favor. +Otherwise, the Imperial Memorandum, which was sent to me about +the U-boat war, and to which I have already referred, would be +inexplicable. Meanwhile, however, this policy had not been able +to prevail against the preponderating influence of the military +party, who demanded the U-boat campaign. Now, of course, I have no +longer any doubt that the views which General Ludendorff expressed +against me before the Examination Committee of the National Assembly, +simply as his personal opinion and without proof, constituted more +or less what was suggested to the Kaiser at this time. Briefly, they +wished to make me the scapegoat for the United States' entry into +the war, and this, despite the fact that all that I had prophesied +in regard to American policy had proved correct, and all that my +opponents had prophesied had proved wrong. In their efforts to +accomplish this end, they found that a poisonous mixture could be +brewed out of my efforts for peace, and my well-known democratic +views, which the Kaiser was not able to resist. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_409"><span class="page">Page 409</span></a> The unhappy +Monarch unfortunately never once realized that the "Democrats" +were his best friends. The Imperial power could, in the long run, +only be upheld, if it found both its support and its counter-weight +in a strong democracy. Like Friedrich Wilhelm IV., William II. +was also unable to adapt himself to the changing circumstances of +his time. The one-sided composition of his entourage, which was +always recruited from among people who held his own views, was, +at all events, chiefly to blame for this. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Although the Imperial Chancellor had told me that he would overcome +the Kaiser's displeasure in regard to myself, almost two months +elapsed before I was received at General Headquarters, and even +then, it was only because a question had been asked about the matter +in the Reichstag. When I saw the Kaiser, towards the beginning of +May, in Kreuznach, the American question was of interest merely to +historians, and no longer to politicians. Consequently, my interview +with the Monarch, which took place on a walk, was not of very great +moment. With his customary skill, the Kaiser steered clear of any +attempt to enter deeply into the political problems of the hour, +and behaved towards me, for the rest, just as affably as he had +been wont to do in the past. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I had made the journey to Kreuznach in the company of my late friend, +Ballin, whom I was never to see again. Whereas I was invited to +lunch at the Imperial board, Herr Ballin was only asked to dinner. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Among the many and various charges which were brought against me +in my Washington days, was the allegation that I was principally +an agent of Ballin's. I had, in cordial agreement with Herr Ballin, +always energetically supported the interests of German Shipping +Companies; but even my most bitter enemies can only justify their +charge against me for the period preceding <a name="page_410"><span +class="page">Page 410</span></a> the war. For, during the war, +Herr Ballin had no influence at all, either in America or at home. +He was, for instance, kept aloof from the Kaiser, because he was +regarded as an "interested party" and as a pessimist. On the occasion +in question, a high official of the Court said to me at the Imperial +table that if I was seeing Ballin again before I left Kreuznach, +would I please tell him that he was not to speak so pessimistically +to the Emperor as he was wont to do. The Emperor ought not to be +allowed to hear such stuff, otherwise he would lose nerve. This +little passage of conversation is a proof of the carefully "insulated" +position in which, as everyone knows, the Kaiser was kept. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +After lunch I paid a visit to both of our great Army Commanders, +whose acquaintance I made for the first time on this occasion. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"Bowing to necessity rather than to my own personal tastes," I must +now, unfortunately, enter into personal matters, which hitherto +I have diligently avoided in this book. I cannot, however, help +referring here to the utterly unwarranted attacks made upon me by +General Ludendorff, in his evidence before the Examination Committee +of the National Assembly, with the view of refuting my own account of +the interview which we had at G. H. Q. At all events, the General so +completely lost control of himself before the Examination Committee, +that this possibly explains his false interpretation of my evidence. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +To deal first with the reason which actuated me in visiting General +Ludendorff, I reproduce below the dialogue which took place thereanent +before the Examination Committee: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +<i>Delegate Dr. Cohn:</i> Was your interview with Field-Marshal +Hindenburg and General Ludendorff brought <a name="page_411"><span +class="page">Page 411</span></a> about by any particular person +or persons—either by yourself, by the Imperial Chancellor, +or by the Foreign Office; or was it purely accidental? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<i>Witness Count von Bernstorff:</i> It was the outcome of the +circumstances. I received a telegram which informed me, through the +Foreign Office, that I was to report to the Kaiser at Kreuznach on +the 4th of May. Now, Field-Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff +were also present at the lunch table, and I felt that I was bound +in courtesy to pay a visit to the two gentlemen after the meal. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<i>Delegate Dr. Cohn:</i> Good. If I understand you correctly, +my lord, G. H. Q. did not even feel the need of speaking with the +Ambassador just recently returned from America? +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<i>Witness Count von Bernstorff:</i> No. I never received any summons +for that purpose. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +I abide by these utterances to this day, because I actually remained +seven weeks without being summoned to an interview with General +Ludendorff, and then only visited him of my own free will, on the +occasion when I reported to the Kaiser. In these circumstances, +therefore, I was entirely justified in describing my visit as simply +an act of courtesy. In view of the circumstances, I might perhaps +say: an act of super-courtesy. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I do not dispute General Ludendorff's statement that I had expressed +the wish to see him; for if I had not had the wish, I should have +left Kreuznach without paying him a visit. As, however, General +Ludendorff, in his evidence before the Examination Committee, allowed +it to be plainly understood that, owing to the difference of our +views, he did not like to have anything to do with me, I will at +once emphasize the fact, that my wish to see him was actuated by +purely official motives. In politics <a name="page_412"><span +class="page">Page 412</span></a> I have at all times laid all personal +feelings entirely aside, and, have thought only of the business +and the interests of my country. While I was kicking my heels in +Berlin for all those weeks, waiting upon a summons to the Emperor, +I was urged by many people to try and obtain an interview with +General Ludendorff, in order to enlighten him regarding American +affairs, as in this respect he was very badly informed. The latter +fact, has, at all events, been substantiated by General Ludendorff +himself, in his evidence before the Committee. The gentlemen who +urged me to obtain this interview, themselves made efforts to bring +it about. But these efforts were of no avail, and I therefore regarded +them as too insignificant to be mentioned in my own evidence. In all +my utterances before the Committee, I refrained from all allusion +to personal and subjective matters. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +General Ludendorff has further maintained that I impugned his honor +by declaring that, generally speaking, he did not wish to conclude +peace. I naturally never made such a nonsensical statement. Immediately +after my visit to General Ludendorff at G. H. Q., I made notes +of the essential passages of our interview; because I suspected, +what in my opinion has since become a certainty, to wit, that the +General wished to heap all the blame of the war with America upon +my shoulders. Every impartial reader who examines the Notes given +below, will be forced to admit, that they contain nothing whatsoever +except assertions, which have been confirmed by all the evidence +given before the Committee of the National Assembly; that is to +say: +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +(1) That I wished to accept Mr. Wilson's offer of mediation. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(2) That the Imperial Government—that is to say, G. H. Q. or +whoever was responsible for taking the final <a name="page_413"><span +class="page">Page 413</span></a> decision—did not wish to +accept Mr. Wilson's offer of mediation, in order to declare the +unrestricted U-boat war instead. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +(3) That the Naval Authorities had declared themselves in a position +to bring about a desire for peace in England in five months from +the 1st of February. +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +My notes about the interview I had with General Ludendorff ran as +follows: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +General Ludendorff received me with the following words: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"In America you wanted to make peace. You evidently thought we were +at the end of our tether." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I replied: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"No, I did not think that; but I wanted to make peace before we +came to the end of our tether." +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +Whereupon the General said: +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +"We, however, did not want to. Besides, it would not have been +surprising if you had thought that we had come to the end of our +resources. The communications you received, which I read from time +to time, certainly led to that conclusion." +</p> + +<p class="gap"> +Later on in the conversation, General Ludendorff asked me when, +in my opinion, the Americans would participate in the war with +great force. I replied that in twelve months a large American army +was to be expected in France, and that this army would be organized +with comparative ease. To this the General rejoined that in that +case we had ample time to end the war meanwhile; for the U-boats +would force England to a peace in three months. He had received +absolutely certain information on this point. When I was on the +point of leaving, General Ludendorff repeated this remark very +positively. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +<a name="page_414"><span class="page">Page 414</span></a> Though +the sense was the same, the actual wording of my evidence before +the Examination Committee differs somewhat from that of the notes +given above. This is explained, however, by the fact that I spoke +quite freely, and therefore prefaced my remarks with the words: +"So far as I can remember, and so far as I am able to say, under +oath, the conversation was more or less as follows," etc. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +I did not enter into the personal views which General Ludendorff +thought fit to express in his evidence before the Examination Committee; +for I am of the opinion that the duty of the Committee was simply to +establish the real truth by an inquiry into the facts. It is open +to the Committee to put to me any questions they like concerning my +activities in Washington, and I will answer them frankly; but I think +that a quarrel between witnesses about their own personal opinions +would have been an undignified spectacle, in which I distinctly +refused to participate. I gladly leave it to the reader of the present +volume to form his own ideas regarding my work in America. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In May, 1917, I left G. H. Q., feeling quite convinced that for +the moment there was no room for me in German diplomacy; for the +only policy which I regarded as right, had no prospect of being +realized. After my return from America, I was placed on half-pay. +I was therefore at liberty to return home, however unwilling I may +have felt, at that moment of great tribulation for my country, +to give myself up to a life of ease and idleness. During my period +of rest, a Reichstag resolution was passed, and there was a change +of Chancellors. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +When Herr von Kühlmann, who is a friend of mine, took over +the Foreign Office, he summoned me by telegram to Berlin, and told +me that the Imperial Chancellor, Michaelis, was going to offer me +the post of Ambassador <a name="page_415"><span class="page">Page +415</span></a> in Constantinople. Some years previously Herr von +Kühlmann and I had worked together in London. We had been on +very good terms, and since then I had never lost touch with him. +As he assured me very positively that he had taken over the Foreign +Office in order to conclude peace, I felt no qualms about returning +once more to diplomatic duties. I did not, however, conceal from Herr +von Kühlmann, that I expected that there would be very strong +opposition at G. H. Q. to my being employed again on Foreign Service. +The Secretary of State was of the opinion that we might confidently +leave this side of the question to the Imperial Chancellor, who +at that moment was on his honeymoon, and was therefore admirably +situated to carry things through. My interview with Herr Michaelis +only made me more eager than ever to undertake the Mission to +Constantinople. He said to me that he was offering me a very difficult +and unpleasant billet, for I should have to wring concessions from +the Turks with the object of bringing about peace. This view of +the situation corresponded entirely with my own. Contrary to my +expectations, the Imperial ratification of my appointment arrived; +but the Monarch also seized the opportunity of making certain remarks +about my democratic views, without, however, withholding his signature +from my credentials. +</p> + +<p class="indent"> +In September I set out for Constantinople, where thirty years previously +I had started my diplomatic career, and where I was now to end it. +</p> + +<h2><a name="page_417"><span class="page">Page 417</span></a> +INDEX</h2> + +<p class="title"> +<a name="page_419"><span class="page">Page 419</span></a> +INDEX +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Ackerman, Karl, <a href="#page_338">338</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Albert, Privy Councillor, appointment of, +<a href="#page_36">36</a>; financial affairs of, +<a href="#page_40">40</a>, <a href="#page_42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_46">46</a>; office of, <a href="#page_41">41</a>; +propaganda work of, <a href="#page_49">49</a>; moving picture work +of, <a href="#page_56">56</a>; shipping activities of, +<a href="#page_80">80</a> ff., <a href="#page_85">85</a> ff.; hindrance +of, <a href="#page_83">83</a> ff.; marine insurance and, +<a href="#page_89">89</a>, <a href="#page_92">92</a>; "conspiracies" +and, <a href="#page_119">119</a>; duties of, +<a href="#page_165">165</a>; robbing of, <a href="#page_196">196</a> +ff., <a href="#page_270">270</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Albrecht, Count, <a href="#page_395">395</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Algeciras Conference, <a href="#page_13">13</a> +ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Alsace, <a href="#page_329">329</a>, <a href="#page_376">376</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> America, see United States </p> + +<p class="index"> American Criminal Court, <a href="#page_110">110</a> +</p> + +<p class="subindex"> +Embassy in London, <a href="#page_316">316</a> ff.<br> +Institute in Berlin, <a href="#page_23">23</a><br> +Law Department, <a href="#page_44">44</a>, <a href="#page_262">262</a>, +<a href="#page_274">274</a><br> +Peace League, <a href="#page_291">291</a><br> +Peace Note, <a href="#page_318">318-321</a><br> +Press, <a href="#page_49">49</a> ff., <a href="#page_57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_94">94</a>, <a href="#page_316">316</a> ff., +<a href="#page_326">326</a>, <a href="#page_332">332</a> ff., +<a href="#page_336">336</a> ff., <a href="#page_342">342</a> ff., +<a href="#page_394">394</a><br> +Press Bureau, <a href="#page_47">47</a><br> +Secret Service, <a href="#page_47">47</a>, <a href="#page_197">197</a><br> +War Propaganda Department, <a href="#page_398">398</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Amsinck and Company, <a href="#page_261">261</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Ancona</i>, sinking of, +<a href="#page_210">210</a>, <a href="#page_214">214</a> ff.; Lansing +and sinking of, <a href="#page_230">230</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Andrew</i>, <a href="#page_83">83</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Anglo-Saxons, <a href="#page_21">21</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Annie Larsen</i>, <a href="#page_121">121</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Appam</i>, <a href="#page_265">265</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Arabia</i>, <a href="#page_303">303</a>, +<a href="#page_306">306</a>, <a href="#page_342">342</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Arabic</i>, sinking of, <a href="#page_90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_144">144</a>, <a href="#page_168">168</a>, +<a href="#page_173">173</a>; effect of sinking of, +<a href="#page_173">173</a> ff., <a href="#page_248">248</a>; +negotiations concerning, <a href="#page_176">176</a> ff., +<a href="#page_180">180</a> ff., <a href="#page_187">187</a> ff., +<a href="#page_191">191</a> ff.; defense of sinking of, +<a href="#page_181">181</a> ff.; settlement of, +<a href="#page_212">212</a>, <a href="#page_217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_219">219</a>, <a href="#page_227">227</a>, +<a href="#page_236">236</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Arbitration Treaty, <a href="#page_24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_27">27</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Archibald, James, <a href="#page_197">197</a> +ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Armenian</i> sinking of, +<a href="#page_163">163</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Asquith, Herbert, <a href="#page_298">298</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Associated Press, <a href="#page_32">32</a> ff., +<a href="#page_51">51</a>, <a href="#page_179">179</a>, +<a href="#page_221">221</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Atlanta, <a href="#page_102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_124">124</a>, <a href="#page_338">338</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Atlantic</i>, <a href="#page_87">87</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Austria-Hungary, Germany allied with, +<a href="#page_2">2</a>, <a href="#page_5">5</a>; Serbian threat to, +<a href="#page_7">7</a>; battle front of, <a href="#page_287">287</a>; +desire for peace in, <a href="#page_348">348</a> </p> + +<p class="index_gap"> +Bagdad, <a href="#page_20">20</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Bakmetieff, <a href="#page_141">141</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Balkans, <a href="#page_7">7</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Ballin, <a href="#page_409">409</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Baltimore, <a href="#page_266">266</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Baltimore <i>Sun</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Bartelli, <a href="#page_261">261</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Baumgarten, Prof., <a href="#page_20">20</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Beachy Head, <a href="#page_246">246</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Beecher, Henry Ward, <a href="#page_43">43</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Belgium, invasion of, <a href="#page_30">30</a>, +<a href="#page_59">59</a>, <a href="#page_130">130</a>, +<a href="#page_387">387</a>; atrocities in, <a href="#page_39">39</a>, +<a href="#page_53">53</a>; atrocities of, <a href="#page_64">64</a>; +American aid to, <a href="#page_128">128</a>, +<a href="#page_267">267</a>; proposed restoration of, +<a href="#page_278">278</a>, <a href="#page_287">287</a>, +<a href="#page_329">329</a>, <a href="#page_377">377</a>, +<a href="#page_392">392</a>; deportations from, +<a href="#page_302">302</a>, <a href="#page_305">305</a>, +<a href="#page_308">308</a> ff., <a href="#page_339">339</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Berchtold, Count, <a href="#page_7">7</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Berlin, <a href="#page_6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_36">36</a>, <a href="#page_42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_46">46</a>, <a href="#page_50">50</a>, +<a href="#page_53">53</a>, <a href="#page_69">69</a>, +<a href="#page_71">71</a>, <a href="#page_95">95</a>, +<a href="#page_98">98</a> ff., <a href="#page_145">145</a>, +<a href="#page_154">154</a>, <a href="#page_162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_164">164</a>, <a href="#page_167">167</a> ff. +<a href="#page_173">173</a>, <a href="#page_178">178</a> ff., +<a href="#page_197">197</a>, <a href="#page_214">214</a>, +<a href="#page_220">220</a> ff., <a href="#page_230">230</a> ff., +<a href="#page_243">243</a> ff., <a href="#page_247">247</a>, +<a href="#page_250">250</a>, <a href="#page_254">254</a> ff., +<a href="#page_259">259</a>, <a href="#page_262">262</a>, +<a href="#page_264">264</a>, <a href="#page_283">283</a>, +<a href="#page_285">285</a> ff., <a href="#page_290">290</a>, +<a href="#page_292">292</a> ff., <a href="#page_307">307</a>, +<a href="#page_309">309</a> ff., <a href="#page_314">314</a> ff., +<a href="#page_320">320</a>, <a href="#page_322">322</a> ff., +<a href="#page_325">325</a>, <a href="#page_340">340</a>, +<a href="#page_351">351</a>, <a href="#page_358">358</a>, +<a href="#page_368">368</a> ff., <a href="#page_371">371</a>, +<a href="#page_373">373</a>, <a href="#page_375">375</a>, +<a href="#page_379">379</a>, <a href="#page_400">400</a>, +<a href="#page_402">402</a>, <a href="#page_407">407</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Bern <i>Freie Zeitung</i>, <a href="#page_44">44</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Bernstorff, Count, in London, <a href="#page_1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_16">16</a>; pre-war policy of, <a href="#page_1">1</a> +ff.; arbitration efforts of, <a href="#page_6">6</a> ff.; American + +<a name="page_420"><span class="page">Page 420</span></a> + +relations with, <a href="#page_9">9</a>; peace efforts of, +<a href="#page_10">10</a> ff., <a href="#page_60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_69">69</a>; appointment of, <a href="#page_23">23</a>, +<a href="#page_28">28</a>; Roosevelt and, <a href="#page_28">28</a>; +newspapermen and, <a href="#page_39">39</a> ff.; Bryan and, +<a href="#page_68">68</a>, <a href="#page_75">75</a>; munition +traffic and, <a href="#page_73">73</a>; Col. House and, +<a href="#page_79">79</a>, <a href="#page_231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_270">270</a>, <a href="#page_281">281</a>, +<a href="#page_284">284</a>, <a href="#page_290">290</a> ff., +<a href="#page_295">295</a> ff., <a href="#page_373">373</a> ff.; +forged passports and, <a href="#page_104">104</a>; "conspiracies" +and, <a href="#page_108">108</a> ff., <a href="#page_114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_119">119</a>; submarine warfare and, +<a href="#page_136">136</a> ff., <a href="#page_358">358</a> ff.; +<i>Lusitania</i> affair and, <a href="#page_138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_149">149</a> ff., <a href="#page_152">152</a> ff., +<a href="#page_222">222</a> ff.; <i>Lusitania</i> reports of, +<a href="#page_159">159</a> ff., <a href="#page_169">169</a>, +<a href="#page_171">171</a> ff., <a href="#page_213">213</a> ff.; +Lansing and, <a href="#page_166">166</a>, <a href="#page_172">172</a> +ff., <a href="#page_177">177</a>, <a href="#page_180">180</a> +ff., <a href="#page_205">205</a>; <i>Arabic</i> affair and, +<a href="#page_173">173</a>, <a href="#page_188">188</a> ff.; +<i>Arabic</i> reports of, <a href="#page_177">177</a> ff., +<a href="#page_180">180</a>, <a href="#page_182">182</a> ff., +<a href="#page_189">189</a> ff.; German telegram on <i>Arabic</i> +affair to, <a href="#page_179">179</a> ff.; Archibald affair and, +<a href="#page_197">197</a> ff.; Boy-Ed, report of, +<a href="#page_201">201</a>; <i>Sussex</i> reports of, +<a href="#page_241">241</a> ff., <a href="#page_244">244</a> ff., +<a href="#page_250">250</a> ff., <a href="#page_264">264</a>; Bolo +affair and, <a href="#page_260">260</a>; Polish relief report +of, <a href="#page_268">268</a>; mediation reports of, +<a href="#page_274">274</a> ff., <a href="#page_279">279</a> ff., +<a href="#page_285">285</a> ff., <a href="#page_295">295</a>, +<a href="#page_353">353</a> ff.; 1916 election and, +<a href="#page_300">300</a> ff.; Commission of National Assembly +and, <a href="#page_313">313</a> ff.; "American opinion" described +by, <a href="#page_332">332</a> ff.; Wilson's speech reported by, +<a href="#page_372">372</a>; departure of, <a href="#page_393">393</a> +ff.; article on, <a href="#page_394">394</a> ff.; arrival in Germany +of, <a href="#page_403">403</a>; German examination of, +<a href="#page_403">403</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index">Bethlehem Steel Works, <a href="#page_95">95</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Bethmann-Hollweg, von, <a href="#page_257">257</a>, +<a href="#page_311">311</a>, <a href="#page_325">325</a>, +<a href="#page_331">331</a> ff., <a href="#page_346">346</a>, +<a href="#page_379">379</a>, <a href="#page_388">388</a> ff., +<a href="#page_403">403</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Bielaski, Commissioner Bruce, +<a href="#page_44">44</a>, <a href="#page_111">111</a> ff., +<a href="#page_121">121</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Bismarck, <a href="#page_2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_4">4</a>, <a href="#page_11">11</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Bissing, von, <a href="#page_339">339</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Bode, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Bopp, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_120">120</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Bosch Magneto Company, <a href="#page_96">96</a> +ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Boston, <a href="#page_160">160</a>, +<a href="#page_162">162</a>, <a href="#page_333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_337">337</a>, <a href="#page_340">340</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Boston <i>Evening Transcript</i>, +<a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_351">351</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Boy-Ed, Captain, office of, <a href="#page_41">41</a>; +recall of, <a href="#page_111">111</a>, <a href="#page_123">123</a>, +<a href="#page_201">201</a> ff.; conspiracies of, +<a href="#page_114">114</a>, <a href="#page_200">200</a>; Rintelen and, +<a href="#page_122">122</a> ff.; attacks on, <a href="#page_200">200</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Bremen, <a href="#page_94">94</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Bridgeport Projectile Company, +<a href="#page_95">95</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Brinken, von, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_120">120</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> British Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, +<a href="#page_182">182</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Brooklyn Daily Eagle</i>, +<a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_347">347</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Brown, Cyril, <a href="#page_338">338</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> Bryan, William Jennings, <a href="#page_26">26</a>; +character of, <a href="#page_21">21</a>, <a href="#page_68">68</a>; +pacifism of, <a href="#page_68">68</a>, <a href="#page_75">75</a>, +<a href="#page_157">157</a>; submarine warfare and, +<a href="#page_131">131</a> ff.; peace efforts of, +<a href="#page_144">144</a> ff.; resignation of, +<a href="#page_151">151</a>, <a href="#page_155">155</a> ff., +<a href="#page_161">161</a>, <a href="#page_169">169</a>, +<a href="#page_228">228</a>, <a href="#page_264">264</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Bukarest, <a href="#page_312">312</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Bulgaria, <a href="#page_287">287</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Bülow, Prince, <a href="#page_3">3</a>, +<a href="#page_4">4</a>, <a href="#page_7">7</a>, +<a href="#page_24">24</a>, <a href="#page_275">275</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Bünz, Dr., <a href="#page_102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_112">112</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> "Bureau for Employment of German Workers," +<a href="#page_116">116</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Buröde, <a href="#page_203">203</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Cairo, <a href="#page_395">395</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Canada, <a href="#page_112">112</a> ff., +<a href="#page_117">117</a> ff., <a href="#page_336">336</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Canadian Bank, <a href="#page_401">401</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Canadian Pacific Railway, <a href="#page_120">120</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Capelle, von, <a href="#page_263">263</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Caprivi, <a href="#page_2">2</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Carolyn</i>, <a href="#page_86">86</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Carranza, <a href="#page_77">77</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Cavell, Edith, <a href="#page_53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_339">339</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> "Central Office for Foreign Service," +<a href="#page_42">42</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> "Central Purchasing Company," +<a href="#page_36">36</a>, <a href="#page_165">165</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Charlotte, <a href="#page_343">343</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Chicago, <a href="#page_102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_116">116</a>, <a href="#page_121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_123">123</a>, <a href="#page_338">338</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Chicago <i>Herald</i>, <a href="#page_335">335</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Chicago <i>Tribune</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_47">47</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +China, <a href="#page_17">17</a>, <a href="#page_99">99</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Christiania, <a href="#page_401">401</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Cincinnati, <a href="#page_28">28</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> "Citizen's Committee for Food Shipments," +<a href="#page_259">259</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Claussen, M. B., <a href="#page_48">48</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Clemenceau, <a href="#page_64">64</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> + +<a name="page_421"><span class="page">Page 421</span></a> + +Cleveland, <a href="#page_116">116</a>, <a href="#page_140">140</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Collector of the Port of New York, +<a href="#page_84">84</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Commission of Inquiry, <a href="#page_43">43</a> +ff., <a href="#page_49">49</a>, <a href="#page_111">111</a>, +<a href="#page_116">116</a>, <a href="#page_124">124</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Commission of National Assembly, +<a href="#page_332">332</a>, <a href="#page_368">368</a>, +<a href="#page_376">376</a>, <a href="#page_379">379</a>, +<a href="#page_389">389</a>, <a href="#page_404">404</a> ff., +<a href="#page_408">408</a>, <a href="#page_410">410</a>, +<a href="#page_414">414</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Congress, <a href="#page_72">72</a>, +<a href="#page_95">95</a>, <a href="#page_123">123</a>, +<a href="#page_144">144</a>, <a href="#page_206">206</a>, +<a href="#page_214">214</a> ff., <a href="#page_234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_236">236</a> ff., <a href="#page_301">301</a>, +<a href="#page_309">309</a>, <a href="#page_352">352</a> ff., +<a href="#page_379">379</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Constantinople, <a href="#page_2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_68">68</a>, <a href="#page_406">406</a>, +<a href="#page_415">415</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Copenhagen, <a href="#page_402">402</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Creel, George, <a href="#page_47">47</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Current History, <a href="#page_345">345</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Czechs, <a href="#page_122">122</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Dächer, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, <a href="#page_125">125</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Danger Zone, <a href="#page_4">4</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Declaration of London, <a href="#page_90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_127">127</a>, <a href="#page_134">134</a>, +<a href="#page_136">136</a>, <a href="#page_172">172</a>, +<a href="#page_256">256</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Democratic Party, <a href="#page_17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_26">26</a>, <a href="#page_34">34</a>, +<a href="#page_62">62</a>, <a href="#page_235">235</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Denmark, <a href="#page_402">402</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Department of Justice, <a href="#page_111">111</a>, +<a href="#page_116">116</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Dernburg, Dr., appointment of, +<a href="#page_86">86</a>; duties of, <a href="#page_36">36</a>; failure +of mission of, <a href="#page_40">40</a>, <a href="#page_80">80</a>; +propaganda of, <a href="#page_41">41</a> ff., <a href="#page_44">44</a> +ff., <a href="#page_50">50</a>, <a href="#page_55">55</a> ff., +<a href="#page_115">115</a>; funds of, <a href="#page_47">47</a>; +unpopularity of, <a href="#page_72">72</a>, <a href="#page_145">145</a>; +submarine warfare and, <a href="#page_137">137</a>; <i>Lusitania</i> +affair defended by, <a href="#page_140">140</a>; withdrawal of, +<a href="#page_146">146</a>, <a href="#page_162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_164">164</a> ff., <a href="#page_215">215</a>; +Bernstorff supported by, <a href="#page_168">168</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Deutsche Bank, <a href="#page_100">100</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Deutsche Tageszeitung</i>, +<a href="#page_383">383</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Deutscher Verein, <a href="#page_302">302</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Deutschland</i>, <a href="#page_265">265</a> +ff., <a href="#page_273">273</a>, <a href="#page_281">281</a>, +<a href="#page_315">315</a>, <a href="#page_337">337</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Dewey, Admiral, <a href="#page_102">102</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> De Wiart, Carton, <a href="#page_340">340</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Diedrichs, Admiral, <a href="#page_15">15</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Dieppe, <a href="#page_246">246</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Dobrudja, <a href="#page_288">288</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Dohna, Count, <a href="#page_265">265</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +"Dollar Diplomacy," <a href="#page_11">11</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Dover, <a href="#page_31">31</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Dumba, Dr., <a href="#page_116">116</a>; peace +efforts of, <a href="#page_155">155</a> ff., +<a href="#page_169">169</a>, <a href="#page_192">192</a>; Archibald +affair and, <a href="#page_198">198</a> ff.; recall of, +<a href="#page_199">199</a>, <a href="#page_210">210</a>, +<a href="#page_215">215</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Dunele</i>, <a href="#page_181">181</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Duneyre</i>, <a href="#page_83">83</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Dungeness, <a href="#page_246">246</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> East Asiatic Squadron, <a href="#page_15">15</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Eastern Policy, <a href="#page_2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_12">12</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Eckhart, von, <a href="#page_115">115</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Eir</i>, <a href="#page_83">83</a>, <a href="#page_86">86</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Eitel Friedrich, <a href="#page_265">265</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Ekengren, <a href="#page_406">406</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Encirclement Policy, <a href="#page_3">3</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> England, <a href="#page_43">43</a>, +<a href="#page_71">71</a>, <a href="#page_88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_94">94</a>, <a href="#page_179">179</a>, +<a href="#page_194">194</a>, <a href="#page_240">240</a>; German +relations with, <a href="#page_1">1</a> ff., <a href="#page_36">36</a>; +Venezuela affair and, <a href="#page_16">16</a>; cables cut by, +<a href="#page_38">38</a>; international law violated by, +<a href="#page_40">40</a>, <a href="#page_80">80</a>; propaganda +expenses of, <a href="#page_47">47</a>; American press and, +<a href="#page_51">51</a> ff., <a href="#page_333">333</a>; American +relations with, <a href="#page_67">67</a>, <a href="#page_190">190</a>, +<a href="#page_215">215</a>, <a href="#page_217">217</a> ff., +<a href="#page_257">257</a>, <a href="#page_264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_299">299</a>, <a href="#page_305">305</a>; blockade +by, <a href="#page_81">81</a> ff., <a href="#page_92">92</a> ff., +<a href="#page_99">99</a>, <a href="#page_103">103</a>, +<a href="#page_127">127</a> ff., <a href="#page_132">132</a>, +<a href="#page_145">145</a>, <a href="#page_153">153</a>, +<a href="#page_164">164</a>, <a href="#page_218">218</a>, +<a href="#page_229">229</a>, <a href="#page_232">232</a> ff., +<a href="#page_235">235</a>, <a href="#page_259">259</a>, +<a href="#page_264">264</a>, <a href="#page_276">276</a> ff., +<a href="#page_281">281</a>, <a href="#page_283">283</a>, +<a href="#page_343">343</a>, <a href="#page_382">382</a>; Wilson +and, <a href="#page_171">171</a>, <a href="#page_256">256</a> ff., +<a href="#page_309">309</a>; American notes to: February 22, 1915, +<a href="#page_134">134</a> ff.; January 18, 1916, +<a href="#page_225">225</a>; July 21, 1915, <a href="#page_226">226</a>; +October 21, 1915, <a href="#page_276">276</a> ff.; Lansing's note to, +<a href="#page_76">76</a>; debt of, <a href="#page_186">186</a>; +merchantmen armed by, <a href="#page_232">232</a>; Polish relief +and, <a href="#page_267">267</a> ff.; mediation and, +<a href="#page_275">275</a> ff., <a href="#page_289">289</a>, +<a href="#page_306">306</a>; resources of, <a href="#page_335">335</a>; +submarine warfare and, <a href="#page_341">341</a>, +<a href="#page_413">413</a>; peace feeling in, +<a href="#page_348">348</a>; wheat embargo against, +<a href="#page_352">352</a>; peace terms of, +<a href="#page_374">374</a>, <a href="#page_376">376</a>; American +financial aid of, <a href="#page_382">382</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> English Press, <a href="#page_16">16</a>, +<a href="#page_19">19</a>, <a href="#page_305">305</a>, +<a href="#page_334">334</a> ff., <a href="#page_337">337</a>, +<a href="#page_369">369</a> propaganda, <a href="#page_30">30</a> +Secret Police, <a href="#page_196">196</a> White Book, +<a href="#page_233">233</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> + +<a name="page_422"><span class="page">Page 422</span></a> + +Entente Note, quotations from, <a href="#page_6">6</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Entente Powers, see England, France </p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Falmouth, <a href="#page_92">92</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Fatherland</i>, <a href="#page_39">39</a>, <a href="#page_52">52</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Fay, Lt., <a href="#page_109">109</a>, +<a href="#page_112">112</a>, <a href="#page_115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_124">124</a> ff., <a href="#page_199">199</a>, +<a href="#page_203">203</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Federal Reserve Act, <a href="#page_93">93</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Federal Reserve Board, <a href="#page_308">308</a>, +<a href="#page_331">331</a>, <a href="#page_335">335</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Five Years War, <a href="#page_2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_6">6</a>, <a href="#page_13">13</a> ff., +<a href="#page_19">19</a>, <a href="#page_26">26</a>, +<a href="#page_29">29</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Flood, Representative, <a href="#page_75">75</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Folkestone, <a href="#page_246">246</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Ford, Henry, <a href="#page_344">344</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Franc-tireurs, <a href="#page_64">64</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> France, <a href="#page_3">3</a>, +<a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_240">240</a>; German +relations with, <a href="#page_3">3</a>, <a href="#page_5">5</a>; +desire for war in, <a href="#page_7">7</a>; propaganda expenses +of, <a href="#page_47">47</a>; munitions sent to, +<a href="#page_122">122</a>; mediation and, <a href="#page_231">231</a>; +pacifist agitation in, <a href="#page_261">261</a> ff.; American +sympathy for, <a href="#page_333">333</a>; resources of, +<a href="#page_335">335</a>; public opinion in, +<a href="#page_348">348</a>; peace terms of, +<a href="#page_374">374</a>, <a href="#page_376">376</a>, +<a href="#page_377">377</a>; hope of American aid in, +<a href="#page_382">382</a> ff.; American army in, +<a href="#page_413">413</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Francis-Ferdinand, Archduke, <a href="#page_35">35</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Frederick, Emperor, <a href="#page_1">1</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Frederick the Great, <a href="#page_66">66</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Free Poland, <a href="#page_350">350</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Frelinghuysen, Senator, <a href="#page_197">197</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Friedjung, Heinrich, <a href="#page_6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_15">15</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Friedrich VIII</i>, <a href="#page_393">393</a> +ff., <a href="#page_398">398</a> ff., <a href="#page_406">406</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Fritzen, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Fuehr, Dr. Alexander, <a href="#page_48">48</a> +ff., <a href="#page_57">57</a>, <a href="#page_115">115</a>; duties +of, <a href="#page_165">165</a>; Hoff affair and, +<a href="#page_195">195</a> ff. </p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> Gerard, Ambassador, <i>Lusitania</i> affair +and, <a href="#page_156">156</a>, <a href="#page_158">158</a>; +German memorandum to, <a href="#page_181">181</a> ff.; memorandum +from, <a href="#page_183">183</a>; submarine warfare and, +<a href="#page_230">230</a>, <a href="#page_245">245</a>, +<a href="#page_250">250</a>, <a href="#page_254">254</a> ff.; return +of, <a href="#page_293">293</a> ff.; negotiations with, +<a href="#page_306">306</a> ff., <a href="#page_313">313</a> ff., +<a href="#page_354">354</a>, <a href="#page_375">375</a>, +<a href="#page_396">396</a>, <a href="#page_406">406</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Gerhardt, Meyer, <a href="#page_40">40</a>, +<a href="#page_49">49</a>; mission of, <a href="#page_151">151</a>, +<a href="#page_154">154</a> ff., <a href="#page_162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_168">168</a>, <a href="#page_315">315</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> German-Americans, <a href="#page_22">22</a> ff., +<a href="#page_72">72</a>, <a href="#page_94">94</a> ff., +<a href="#page_152">152</a>, <a href="#page_186">186</a>, +<a href="#page_200">200</a>, <a href="#page_209">209</a>, +<a href="#page_300">300</a>, <a href="#page_302">302</a>, +<a href="#page_332">332</a> ff.; illegal activities of, +<a href="#page_101">101</a>, <a href="#page_105">105</a>; Red Cross +work of, <a href="#page_165">165</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +German-American Chamber of Commerce, + <a href="#page_85">85</a>, <a href="#page_300">300</a> +Press, <a href="#page_52">52</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> German Embassy in London, <a href="#page_1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_395">395</a> </p> + +<p class="subindex"> +Embassy in Washington, <a href="#page_24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_148">148</a>, <a href="#page_168">168</a>, +<a href="#page_195">195</a> ff.<br> +Foreign Office, <a href="#page_5">5</a>, <a href="#page_14">14</a> ff., +<a href="#page_42">42</a>, <a href="#page_122">122</a>, +<a href="#page_154">154</a>, <a href="#page_165">165</a>, +<a href="#page_168">168</a>, <a href="#page_172">172</a> ff., +<a href="#page_187">187</a>, <a href="#page_211">211</a>; +"Information Service," <a href="#page_48">48</a><br> +Mercantile Marine, <a href="#page_124">124</a>; +"Peace," <a href="#page_59">59</a> ff., <a href="#page_383">383</a><br> +Red Cross, <a href="#page_36">36</a>, <a href="#page_40">40</a>, +<a href="#page_47">47</a>, <a href="#page_140">140</a>, +<a href="#page_151">151</a>, <a href="#page_165">165</a>, +<a href="#page_300">300</a><br> +Union, <a href="#page_85">85</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Germany, policy of, <a href="#page_1">1</a> ff.; +English relations with, <a href="#page_1">1</a> ff.; American relations +with, <a href="#page_1">1</a>, <a href="#page_6">6</a> ff., +<a href="#page_9">9</a> ff., <a href="#page_10">10</a>, +<a href="#page_14">14</a>, <a href="#page_16">16</a> ff., +<a href="#page_29">29</a> ff., <a href="#page_71">71</a>, +<a href="#page_91">91</a>, <a href="#page_128">128</a> ff., +<a href="#page_150">150</a>, <a href="#page_234">234</a> ff., +<a href="#page_250">250</a>, <a href="#page_258">258</a>, +<a href="#page_266">266</a>, <a href="#page_309">309</a>, +<a href="#page_311">311</a>, <a href="#page_331">331</a> ff.; French +relations with, <a href="#page_3">3</a>, <a href="#page_5">5</a>; +Russian relations with, <a href="#page_2">2</a> ff.; statesmen of, +<a href="#page_4">4</a>; world politics of, <a href="#page_4">4</a> +ff.; attempt to avoid war by, <a href="#page_7">7</a>; spirit of, +<a href="#page_8">8</a>; Philippine affair and, +<a href="#page_15">15</a>, <a href="#page_30">30</a>; Venezuelan +affair and, <a href="#page_16">16</a>, <a href="#page_30">30</a>; +propaganda of, <a href="#page_42">42</a> ff.; object of war in, +<a href="#page_60">60</a>; opinion of Wilson in, +<a href="#page_61">61</a> ff.; wireless stations of, +<a href="#page_65">65</a> ff.; American notes to, +<a href="#page_78">78</a>, <a href="#page_132">132</a> ff., +<a href="#page_134">134</a> ff., <a href="#page_147">147</a> ff., +<a href="#page_155">155</a>, <a href="#page_158">158</a> ff., +<a href="#page_166">166</a> ff., <a href="#page_218">218</a>, +<a href="#page_220">220</a>, <a href="#page_248">248</a> ff., +<a href="#page_252">252</a> ff.; finances of, <a href="#page_80">80</a>, +<a href="#page_98">98</a> ff.; American exports to, +<a href="#page_80">80</a> ff.; conspiracies of, +<a href="#page_101">101</a> ff.; concessions of, +<a href="#page_236">236</a>; 1916 conditions in, +<a href="#page_287">287</a>, <a href="#page_343">343</a>.; 1916 +peace offer of, <a href="#page_312">312</a> ff., +<a href="#page_376">376</a> ff.; American offer refused by, +<a href="#page_322">322</a> ff.; submarine warfare adopted by, + <a href="#page_331">331</a> ff., <a href="#page_353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_358">358</a> ff., <a href="#page_369">369</a>, +<a href="#page_372">372</a> ff., <a href="#page_375">375</a>, +<a href="#page_378">378</a> ff., <a href="#page_382">382</a> ff., +<a href="#page_387">387</a> ff., <a href="#page_405">405</a>; American +Press and, <a href="#page_333">333</a> ff.; desire for peace in, +<a href="#page_348">348</a>; rupture of American relations with, +<a href="#page_380">380</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> + +<a name="page_423"><span class="page">Page 423</span></a> + +Goltz, Horst von der, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_118">118</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Goschen, Sir Edward, <a href="#page_348">348</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Greece, violation of, <a href="#page_53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_334">334</a> </p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> Hague Conference, <a href="#page_6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_66">66</a>, <a href="#page_71">71</a> ff., +<a href="#page_182">182</a> ff., <a href="#page_190">190</a>, +<a href="#page_247">247</a>, <a href="#page_292">292</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Hale, William Bayard, <a href="#page_48">48</a>, +<a href="#page_115">115</a>, <a href="#page_338">338</a>, +<a href="#page_346">346</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Halifax, <a href="#page_399">399</a> ff., +<a href="#page_406">406</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Hamburg, <a href="#page_20">20</a>, +<a href="#page_35">35</a>, <a href="#page_92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_101">101</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Hamburg-Amerika Line, <a href="#page_48">48</a>, +<a href="#page_73">73</a>, <a href="#page_80">80</a> ff., +<a href="#page_101">101</a> ff., <a href="#page_105">105</a>, +<a href="#page_114">114</a>, <a href="#page_199">199</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Hamburger Nachrichten</i>, <a href="#page_297">297</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hampton Roads, <a href="#page_265">265</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hapag Case, <a href="#page_215">215</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Harding, Senator, <a href="#page_384">384</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hatzfeldt, Prince, <a href="#page_393">393</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hatzfeldt, Huberta, <a href="#page_400">400</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Hay, John, <a href="#page_14">14</a>, +<a href="#page_17">17</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Hearst, William Randolph, <a href="#page_68">68</a>, +<a href="#page_260">260</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Hearst Press, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_196">196</a>, <a href="#page_261">261</a>, +<a href="#page_336">336</a> ff., <a href="#page_343">343</a>, +<a href="#page_346">346</a>, <a href="#page_351">351</a>, +<a href="#page_353">353</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Hecker, Rittmeister, <a href="#page_40">40</a>, +<a href="#page_47">47</a>; Red Cross work of, +<a href="#page_165">165</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Helfrerich, Karl, <a href="#page_172">172</a>, +<a href="#page_254">254</a> ff., <a href="#page_286">286</a>, +<a href="#page_310">310</a>, <a href="#page_368">368</a> ff., +<a href="#page_381">381</a>, <a href="#page_392">392</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Henry, Prince, <a href="#page_23">23</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Hermann, F. & Co., <a href="#page_88">88</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Hilmy, Khedive Abbas, <a href="#page_396">396</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hindenburg, Marshal, <a href="#page_410">410</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hirsch, Gilbert, <a href="#page_349">349</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hoff, Alfred, <a href="#page_195">195</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hofmeister, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Holland, <a href="#page_81">81</a>, +<a href="#page_157">157</a>, <a href="#page_228">228</a>; allied +measures against, <a href="#page_334">334</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Holstein, von, <a href="#page_5">5</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Hong Kong, <a href="#page_102">102</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Horn, Werner, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_117">117</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> House, Col., <a href="#page_29">29</a>, +<a href="#page_69">69</a> ff., <a href="#page_78">78</a>, +<a href="#page_242">242</a> ff., <a href="#page_270">270</a>; mediation +supported by, <a href="#page_79">79</a>, <a href="#page_231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_275">275</a>, <a href="#page_277">277</a>, +<a href="#page_284">284</a> ff., <a href="#page_291">291</a> ff., +<a href="#page_295">295</a>, <a href="#page_305">305</a> ff., +<a href="#page_313">313</a> ff., <a href="#page_353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_382">382</a>, <a href="#page_390">390</a>; Bernstorff +and, <a href="#page_205">205</a>, <a href="#page_231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_257">257</a>, <a href="#page_264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_298">298</a>; neutrality of, <a href="#page_228">228</a>; +German peace offer and, <a href="#page_323">323</a> ff., +<a href="#page_328">328</a> ff., <a href="#page_378">378</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Huerta, <a href="#page_77">77</a>, +<a href="#page_123">123</a>, <a href="#page_200">200</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Hughes, Charles Evans, <a href="#page_243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_281">281</a>, <a href="#page_284">284</a>, +<a href="#page_296">296</a>, <a href="#page_298">298</a>, +<a href="#page_300">300</a> ff., <a href="#page_369">369</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +"Hull Insurance," <a href="#page_88">88</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> Igel, von, <a href="#page_262">262</a> ff., +<a href="#page_274">274</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> India, German plots in, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_121">121</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Indianapolis <i>News</i>, <a href="#page_351">351</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> International Commission of Inquiry, +<a href="#page_184">184</a> </p> + +<p class="subindex"> Law, <a href="#page_40">40</a>, +<a href="#page_132">132</a>, <a href="#page_145">145</a>, +<a href="#page_257">257</a>, <a href="#page_271">271</a><br> +News Service, <a href="#page_336">336</a>, <a href="#page_346">346</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Ireland, <a href="#page_131">131</a>, +<a href="#page_136">136</a>; Easter rebellion in, +<a href="#page_334">334</a>, <a href="#page_372">372</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Italy, <a href="#page_81">81</a>, +<a href="#page_376">376</a>; Austrian relations with, +<a href="#page_5">5</a>; English relations with, <a href="#page_5">5</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Iturbide, General, <a href="#page_161">161</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Jaeger, <a href="#page_113">113</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Jagow, von, <a href="#page_167">167</a> ff., +<a href="#page_180">180</a>, <a href="#page_204">204</a>, +<a href="#page_286">286</a>, <a href="#page_292">292</a>, +<a href="#page_303">303</a> ff., <a href="#page_310">310</a> ff., +<a href="#page_315">315</a>, <a href="#page_348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_388">388</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Japan, policy of, <a href="#page_3">3</a>, +<a href="#page_17">17</a>; American relations with, +<a href="#page_15">15</a>, <a href="#page_115">115</a>; entry into +war of, <a href="#page_48">48</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Java, <a href="#page_121">121</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Joffre, Marshal, <a href="#page_335">335</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Journal of Commerce</i>, +<a href="#page_335">335</a>, <a href="#page_351">351</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Jusserand, M., <a href="#page_19">19</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> Kaiser William, note from, +<a href="#page_256">256</a> ff., <a href="#page_296">296</a>; +submarine warfare and, <a href="#page_293">293</a>; mediation and, +<a href="#page_294">294</a>; Bernstorff and, <a href="#page_406">406</a> +ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Kaltschmidt, Albert, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_119">119</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Karlsruhe, <a href="#page_54">54</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Kerensky, <a href="#page_383">383</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Kirkwall, <a href="#page_198">198</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Kitchener, Lord, <a href="#page_128">128</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Kleist, von, <a href="#page_172">172</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Knox, Philander, <a href="#page_17">17</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Koeter, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> König, Capt., <a href="#page_265">265</a> +ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Kreuznach, <a href="#page_409">409</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Kronpriz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>, +<a href="#page_265">265</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Kruger Telegram, <a href="#page_3">3</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Kühlman, von, <a href="#page_315">315</a>, +<a href="#page_414">414</a> ff. </p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Lake Erie, <a href="#page_118">118</a> +</p> + +<p class="subindex"> +Ontario, <a href="#page_118">118</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Lamar, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Lansing, Robert, <a href="#page_44">44</a>, +<a href="#page_200">200</a>, <a href="#page_203">203</a>, +<a href="#page_241">241</a>, <a href="#page_265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_306">306</a>, <a href="#page_316">316</a>, +<a href="#page_393">393</a>; German note to, +<a href="#page_110">110</a>; appointment of, +<a href="#page_156">156</a>; qualities of, <a href="#page_157">157</a>; +<i>Lusitania</i> + +<a name="page_424"><span class="page">Page 424</span></a> + +negotiations and, <a href="#page_164">164</a>, +<a href="#page_166">166</a>, <a href="#page_169">169</a>, +<a href="#page_172">172</a> ff., <a href="#page_181">181</a>, +<a href="#page_213">213</a> ff., <a href="#page_219">219</a> ff., +<a href="#page_222">222</a>; <i>Arabic</i> negotiations with, +<a href="#page_174">174</a>, <a href="#page_177">177</a>, +<a href="#page_180">180</a> ff., <a href="#page_183">183</a> ff., +<a href="#page_188">188</a>, <a href="#page_190">190</a>; January, 1916, +note of, <a href="#page_225">225</a> ff., <a href="#page_228">228</a> +ff.; <i>Sussex</i>; and, <a href="#page_264">264</a>; Anglo-American +agreement and, <a href="#page_264">264</a> ff.; Belgian deportations +and, <a href="#page_308">308</a>, <a href="#page_340">340</a>; peace +note and, <a href="#page_317">317</a> ff., <a href="#page_320">320</a>, +<a href="#page_323">323</a>; submarine warfare and, +<a href="#page_327">327</a>, <a href="#page_342">342</a>, +<a href="#page_379">379</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Law, Bonar, <a href="#page_382">382</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> League of Nations, <a href="#page_270">270</a> +ff., <a href="#page_291">291</a>, <a href="#page_326">326</a>, +<a href="#page_384">384</a> ff., <a href="#page_403">403</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> League to Enforce Peace, <a href="#page_345">345</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Lechartier, G., <a href="#page_43">43</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Le Havre, <a href="#page_246">246</a>, +<a href="#page_340">340</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Lester, Capt., <a href="#page_49">49</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Liebenfels</i>, <a href="#page_113">113</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Lincoln, Abraham, <a href="#page_43">43</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Lloyd-George, David, <a href="#page_298">298</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Lodge, Henry Cabot, <a href="#page_297">297</a>, +<a href="#page_355">355</a>, <a href="#page_357">357</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +London, <a href="#page_1">1</a>, <a href="#page_19">19</a>, +<a href="#page_54">54</a>, <a href="#page_69">69</a> ff., +<a href="#page_164">164</a>, <a href="#page_187">187</a>, +<a href="#page_195">195</a>, <a href="#page_209">209</a>, +<a href="#page_231">231</a>, <a href="#page_337">337</a> ff., +<a href="#page_340">340</a>, <a href="#page_369">369</a>, +<a href="#page_395">395</a>, <a href="#page_406">406</a> +</p> + +<p class="subindex"> +<i>Daily Graphic</i>, <a href="#page_247">247</a><br> +<i>Daily Telegraph</i>, <a href="#page_139">139</a><br> +<i>Morning Post</i>, <a href="#page_334">334</a><br> +<i>Times</i>, <a href="#page_31">31</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Long, Breckenridge, <a href="#page_393">393</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Long Island, <a href="#page_65">65</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Lorraine, <a href="#page_329">329</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Los Angeles, <a href="#page_338">338</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Lübau Bureau, <a href="#page_116">116</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Luckenbach, <a href="#page_86">86</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Ludendorf, General, <a href="#page_286">286</a>, +<a href="#page_405">405</a>, <a href="#page_408">408</a>, +<a href="#page_410">410</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Lüdentz, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Lusitania</i>, effect of sinking of, +<a href="#page_30">30</a> ff., <a href="#page_56">56</a>, +<a href="#page_141">141</a> ff., <a href="#page_150">150</a> ff., +<a href="#page_162">162</a>, <a href="#page_166">166</a>, +<a href="#page_175">175</a>, <a href="#page_248">248</a>, +<a href="#page_259">259</a>, <a href="#page_280">280</a>, +<a href="#page_341">341</a>, <a href="#page_386">386</a>; sailing of, +<a href="#page_138">138</a>; sinking of, <a href="#page_138">138</a> +ff.; defence of sinking of, <a href="#page_149">149</a>; negotiations +concerning, <a href="#page_138">138</a>, <a href="#page_149">149</a> +ff., <a href="#page_152">152</a> ff., <a href="#page_159">159</a> +ff., <a href="#page_169">169</a>, <a href="#page_171">171</a> ff., +<a href="#page_178">178</a>, <a href="#page_190">190</a> ff., +<a href="#page_212">212</a> ff., <a href="#page_215">215</a> ff., +<a href="#page_221">221</a> ff., <a href="#page_227">227</a> ff., + <a href="#page_236">236</a>, <a href="#page_239">239</a>, +<a href="#page_255">255</a>, <a href="#page_264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_274">274</a> </p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +McAdoo, William, <a href="#page_317">317</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +McClure, <a href="#page_259">259</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> McCumber, Senator, <a href="#page_383">383</a> +ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Macao, <a href="#page_103">103</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Mach, von, <a href="#page_259">259</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Madden, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Manchester <i>Guardian</i>, <a href="#page_337">337</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Manchuria, <a href="#page_17">17</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Manila, <a href="#page_15">15</a>, +<a href="#page_102">102</a>, <a href="#page_150">150</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Mannheimer Versicherungsgesellschaft, <a href="#page_88">88</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Marina</i>, <a href="#page_303">303</a>, +<a href="#page_306">306</a>, <a href="#page_342">342</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Marne, battle of, <a href="#page_8">8</a>, +<a href="#page_11">11</a>, <a href="#page_59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_383">383</a>, <a href="#page_390">390</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Marschall, <a href="#page_2">2</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Martin, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Matuschka, Countess Manfred, +<a href="#page_400">400</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Maumee</i>, <a href="#page_83">83</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Mechlenburg, Dr., <a href="#page_49">49</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Mediterranean, English power on, +<a href="#page_5">5</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Meloy, <a href="#page_113">113</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Metropolitan Club, <a href="#page_35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_265">265</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Mexico, <a href="#page_77">77</a>, <a href="#page_115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_161">161</a>; punitive expedition into, +<a href="#page_242">242</a> ff.; American relations with, +<a href="#page_304">304</a>, <a href="#page_306">306</a> +</p> + +<p class="subindex"> Dispatch, <a href="#page_234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_380">380</a> ff., <a href="#page_403">403</a>, +<a href="#page_406">406</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Michaelis, <a href="#page_401">401</a> ff., +<a href="#page_414">414</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Milwaukee, <a href="#page_23">23</a> +</p> + +<p class="subindex"> +<i>Free Press</i>, <a href="#page_352">352</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Monroe Doctrine, <a href="#page_14">14</a>, +<a href="#page_17">17</a>, <a href="#page_20">20</a>, +<a href="#page_356">356</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Montenegro, sacrifice of, <a href="#page_334">334</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Morgan, J. P. & Co., <a href="#page_98">98</a>, +<a href="#page_186">186</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Munich, <a href="#page_36">36</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Nauen, <a href="#page_156">156</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Nelson, Senator, <a href="#page_111">111</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +New England, <a href="#page_342">342</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> New Hampshire, <a href="#page_270">270</a>, +<a href="#page_284">284</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> New Jersey, <a href="#page_25">25</a>, +<a href="#page_65">65</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +New London, <a href="#page_260">260</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Newmann, <a href="#page_113">113</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Newport, <a href="#page_267">267</a>, +<a href="#page_284">284</a>, <a href="#page_296">296</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +New Republic, <a href="#page_81">81</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +New York, <a href="#page_38">38</a> ff., <a href="#page_47">47</a>, +<a href="#page_80">80</a> ff., <a href="#page_84">84</a> ff., +<a href="#page_88">88</a>, <a href="#page_94">94</a>, +<a href="#page_102">102</a> ff., <a href="#page_118">118</a> ff., +<a href="#page_122">122</a>, <a href="#page_124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_139">139</a>, <a href="#page_142">142</a>, +<a href="#page_160">160</a> ff., <a href="#page_165">165</a>, +<a href="#page_186">186</a> ff., <a href="#page_231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_234">234</a>, <a href="#page_261">261</a>, +<a href="#page_294">294</a>, <a href="#page_308">308</a>, +<a href="#page_313">313</a>, <a href="#page_333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_340">340</a>, <a href="#page_350">350</a> ff., +<a href="#page_396">396</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="subindex"> <i>American</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_337">337</a>, <a href="#page_346">346</a><br> +<i>Evening Post</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_335">335</a>, <a href="#page_349">349</a> ff.<br> +<i>Evening Sun</i>, +<a href="#page_335">335</a>, <a href="#page_346">346</a><br> +<i>Evening Telegram</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_335">335</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> + +<a name="page_425"><span class="page">Page 425</span></a> + +New York Exchange, <a href="#page_317">317</a> </p> + +<p class="subindex"> +<i>Staats-Zeitung</i>, <a href="#page_39">39</a><br> +<i>Globe</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_335">335</a><br> +<i>Herald</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_200">200</a>, +<a href="#page_236">236</a>, <a href="#page_335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_356">356</a><br> +<i>Journal</i>, <a href="#page_261">261</a><br> +<i>Press</i>, <a href="#page_32">32</a>, <a href="#page_41">41</a>, +<a href="#page_163">163</a><br> +<i>Sun</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_189">189</a>, +<a href="#page_292">292</a>, <a href="#page_335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_351">351</a><br> +<i>Times</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_339">339</a>, <a href="#page_345">345</a> ff., +<a href="#page_348">348</a>, <a href="#page_351">351</a><br> +<i>Tribune</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a>, <a href="#page_333">333</a> ff., +<a href="#page_343">343</a> ff., <a href="#page_394">394</a> ff.<br> +<i>World</i>, <a href="#page_161">161</a>, <a href="#page_197">197</a>, +<a href="#page_222">222</a>, <a href="#page_294">294</a>, +<a href="#page_296">296</a>, <a href="#page_338">338</a>, +<a href="#page_340">340</a>, <a href="#page_347">347</a>, +<a href="#page_351">351</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Noordam</i>, <a href="#page_37">37</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Norddeutsche Versicherungsgesellschaft, <a href="#page_88">88</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Northcliffe, Lord, <a href="#page_51">51</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Norway, <a href="#page_402">402</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Olsen, <a href="#page_113">113</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> "Open Door" Policy, <a href="#page_14">14</a>, +<a href="#page_17">17</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Oriental Policy, see Eastern Policy </p> + +<p class="index"> +Overman, Senator, <a href="#page_114">114</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> Paderewski, Ignace, <a href="#page_349">349</a> +ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Panama Canal, <a href="#page_14">14</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Pan-German Party, <a href="#page_20">20</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Papen, van, office of, <a href="#page_41">41</a>; +financial affairs of, <a href="#page_46">46</a>, +<a href="#page_96">96</a>; conspiracies of, <a href="#page_108">108</a> +ff., <a href="#page_114">114</a>, <a href="#page_116">116</a> ff., +<a href="#page_198">198</a> ff.; recall of, <a href="#page_111">111</a>, +<a href="#page_202">202</a> ff., <a href="#page_215">215</a>; Rintelen +and, <a href="#page_122">122</a>; attack on, <a href="#page_200">200</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Paris, <a href="#page_69">69</a>, +<a href="#page_209">209</a>, <a href="#page_231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_261">261</a>, <a href="#page_371">371</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Parker, Sir Gilbert, <a href="#page_52">52</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Pavenstedt, <a href="#page_261">261</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> Peace of Portsmouth, <a href="#page_14">14</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Philadelphia, <a href="#page_116">116</a>, +<a href="#page_140">140</a>, <a href="#page_142">142</a>, +<a href="#page_152">152</a>, <a href="#page_160">160</a>, +<a href="#page_162">162</a>, <a href="#page_333">333</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Philadelphia <i>Inquirer</i>, <a href="#page_336">336</a> +</p> + +<p class="subindex"> <i>North American</i>, <a href="#page_350">350</a><br> +<i>Public Ledger</i>, <a href="#page_335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_340">340</a>, <a href="#page_351">351</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Philippines, American policy toward, +<a href="#page_15">15</a>; Taft in, <a href="#page_11">11</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Pittsburgh, <a href="#page_116">116</a> +</p> + +<p class="subindex"> +<i>Post</i>, <a href="#page_351">351</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Plage; Herr, <a href="#page_49">49</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Poland, plan for relief of, +<a href="#page_267">267</a> ff.; autonomy of, +<a href="#page_349">349</a> ff., <a href="#page_376">376</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Poppinghaus, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Posen, <a href="#page_350">350</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Prince Waldemar, <a href="#page_83">83</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Princess Royal of England, <a href="#page_1">1</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Providence <i>Journal</i>, +<a href="#page_105">105</a>, <a href="#page_110">110</a>, +<a href="#page_200">200</a>, <a href="#page_335">335</a> </p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Ram Chandra, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Ratcliffe, S. K., <a href="#page_337">337</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Reed, Senator, <a href="#page_46">46</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Reinsurance Treaty, <a href="#page_5">5</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Republican National Committee, +<a href="#page_274">274</a> </p> + +<p class="subindex"> Party, <a href="#page_17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_26">26</a> ff., <a href="#page_235">235</a>, +<a href="#page_356">356</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Rheims Cathedral, destruction of, +<a href="#page_54">54</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Riano, Señor, <a href="#page_35">35</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Rintelen, Franz, <a href="#page_109">109</a>, +<a href="#page_112">112</a> ff., <a href="#page_122">122</a> ff., +<a href="#page_199">199</a> ff., <a href="#page_203">203</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Risikofiotte</i>, <a href="#page_4">4</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Ritz-Carlton, <a href="#page_42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_140">140</a> ff., <a href="#page_165">165</a>, +<a href="#page_198">198</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Roosevelt, Theodore, <a href="#page_17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_161">161</a>, <a href="#page_224">224</a>, +<a href="#page_243">243</a>; policies of, <a href="#page_13">13</a> +ff.; Venezuela affair and, <a href="#page_16">16</a>; "trusts" +and, <a href="#page_26">26</a>; Bernstorff's personal relations +with, <a href="#page_28">28</a>; <i>Lusitania</i> affair and, +<a href="#page_145">145</a>; Russo-Japanese war and, +<a href="#page_281">281</a>; 1916 election and, +<a href="#page_297">297</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Rotterdam, <a href="#page_37">37</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Rumania, <a href="#page_284">284</a> ff., +<a href="#page_287">287</a> ff.; sacrifice of, +<a href="#page_334">334</a>; conquest of, <a href="#page_343">343</a>, +<a href="#page_376">376</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Ruroede, Carl, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Russia, German relations with, <a href="#page_2">2</a> +ff.; desire for war in, <a href="#page_7">7</a>; Japanese relations +with, <a href="#page_17">17</a>; war begun by, +<a href="#page_36">36</a>; German conspiracy against, +<a href="#page_120">120</a>; Poland oppressed by, +<a href="#page_350">350</a>; peace terms for, +<a href="#page_376">376</a> ff.; revolution in, +<a href="#page_383">383</a>, <a href="#page_404">404</a>; Bolshevism +in, <a href="#page_403">403</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Russo-Japanese War, <a href="#page_14">14</a>, +<a href="#page_281">281</a> </p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> St. Louis <i>Globe-Democrat</i>, +<a href="#page_351">351</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> St. Paul <i>Pioneer Press</i>, +<a href="#page_351">351</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> St. Regis Hotel, <a href="#page_199">199</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Salonika, <a href="#page_288">288</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> San Francisco, <a href="#page_120">120</a> ff., +<a href="#page_338">338</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Sayville Wireless Station, <a href="#page_53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_65">65</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Scandinavia, <a href="#page_81">81</a>, +<a href="#page_157">157</a>; Allied measures against, +<a href="#page_334">334</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> + +<a name="page_426"><span class="page">Page 426</span></a> + +Scandinavia-American Line, <a href="#page_82">82</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Schack, von, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_120">120</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Scheele, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, <a href="#page_124">124</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Schiff, Jacob, <a href="#page_139">139</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Scholtz, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, <a href="#page_125">125</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Schurz, Carl, <a href="#page_22">22</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Serbia, war declared on, <a href="#page_7">7</a>; +sacrifice of, <a href="#page_334">334</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Seven Years War, <a href="#page_8">8</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Sherman Act, <a href="#page_124">124</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Siam, <a href="#page_121">121</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Sielcken, Hermann, <a href="#page_25">25</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Silesia, <a href="#page_356">356</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Smith, Louis J., <a href="#page_120">120</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Soloman, <a href="#page_113">113</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Somme Front, <a href="#page_288">288</a>, +<a href="#page_338">338</a>, <a href="#page_343">343</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> South America, <a href="#page_20">20</a>, +<a href="#page_47">47</a>, <a href="#page_53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_57">57</a>, <a href="#page_89">89</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Spain, <a href="#page_81">81</a>, +<a href="#page_102">102</a>, <a href="#page_312">312</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Spanish-American War, <a href="#page_13">13</a>, +<a href="#page_15">15</a>, <a href="#page_179">179</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Speyer, James, <a href="#page_68">68</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Springfield <i>Republican</i>, <a href="#page_335">335</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Stahl, <a href="#page_113">113</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Starnberg, <a href="#page_35">35</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> Stegler, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_201">201</a>, <a href="#page_203">203</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Sternberg, <a href="#page_113">113</a> ff., +<a href="#page_125">125</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Stockholm, <a href="#page_404">404</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> Stone, Senator, <a href="#page_75">75</a>, +<a href="#page_235">235</a> ff.; Wilson's note to, +<a href="#page_337">337</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Straus, Oscar, <a href="#page_68">68</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Struve, Gothein & Co., <a href="#page_263">263</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Stumm, von, <a href="#page_313">313</a>, +<a href="#page_327">327</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Stuttgart, <a href="#page_96">96</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> Suedenhorst, Zwiedeneck von, +<a href="#page_210">210</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> <i>Suusex</i>, <a href="#page_236">236</a> ff.; +sinking of, <a href="#page_241">241</a>, <a href="#page_243">243</a>, + <a href="#page_245">245</a> ff.; result of sinking of, +<a href="#page_248">248</a>, <a href="#page_254">254</a>, +<a href="#page_257">257</a>, <a href="#page_379">379</a>; negotiations +over, <a href="#page_248">248</a> ff., <a href="#page_306">306</a>; +settlement of, <a href="#page_263">263</a> ff., +<a href="#page_270">270</a>, <a href="#page_276">276</a>, +<a href="#page_293">293</a>, <a href="#page_340">340</a>, +<a href="#page_365">365</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Switzerland, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Swope, Herbert, <a href="#page_294">294</a>, +<a href="#page_296">296</a>, <a href="#page_338">338</a> ff., +<a href="#page_349">349</a> </p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> Taft, William, policy of, +<a href="#page_17">17</a> ff.; Bernstorif's personal relations with, +<a href="#page_28">28</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Tammany Hall, <a href="#page_406">406</a> ff. +</p> + +<p class="index"> Tauschen, Hans, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_118">118</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Taylor, Dr. E. A., <a href="#page_260">260</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Thierichens, <a href="#page_113">113</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Tirpitz, von, <a href="#page_4">4</a>, +<a href="#page_143">143</a>, <a href="#page_223">223</a>, +<a href="#page_244">244</a> ff., <a href="#page_387">387</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Trans-Ocean Bureau, <a href="#page_154">154</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Treaty of Amiens, <a href="#page_59">59</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Triple Alliance, <a href="#page_2">2</a> ff., +<a href="#page_5">5</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Tuckerton Wireless Station, <a href="#page_53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_65">65</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Tumulty, <a href="#page_34">34</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Turkey, <a href="#page_287">287</a>, <a href="#page_376">376</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> U-Boat campaign, opening of, +<a href="#page_9">9</a>; prosecution of, <a href="#page_10">10</a> ff.; +negotiations concerning, <a href="#page_27">27</a>; "armed merchantmen" +and, <a href="#page_222">222</a>, <a href="#page_224">224</a> ff., +<a href="#page_230">230</a>, <a href="#page_237">237</a> ff., +<a href="#page_258">258</a>, <a href="#page_260">260</a>, +<a href="#page_354">354</a>; surrender of, <a href="#page_263">263</a>, +<a href="#page_277">277</a>; American coast, <a href="#page_267">267</a> +ff.; proposed reopening of, <a href="#page_282">282</a> ff., +<a href="#page_288">288</a>, <a href="#page_292">292</a> ff., +<a href="#page_296">296</a>, <a href="#page_298">298</a> ff., +<a href="#page_303">303</a> ff., <a href="#page_310">310</a> ff., +<a href="#page_314">314</a> ff., <a href="#page_325">325</a> ff.; +<a href="#page_330">330</a>, <a href="#page_346">346</a> ff., +<a href="#page_358">358</a>; German desire for, +<a href="#page_330">330</a> ff., <a href="#page_408">408</a>; reopening +of, <a href="#page_331">331</a> ff., <a href="#page_353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_358">358</a> ff., <a href="#page_369">369</a>, +<a href="#page_372">372</a> ff., <a href="#page_375">375</a>, +<a href="#page_378">378</a> ff., <a href="#page_380">380</a>, +<a href="#page_382">382</a> ff., <a href="#page_387">387</a> ff., +<a href="#page_405">405</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> U-53, visit of, <a href="#page_267">267</a> ff., +<a href="#page_296">296</a>, <a href="#page_337">337</a>; piracy +of, <a href="#page_342">342</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Ultimatum of April 18, 1916, +<a href="#page_379">379</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> United States, German relations with, +<a href="#page_1">1</a>, <a href="#page_6">6</a> ff., +<a href="#page_9">9</a> ff., <a href="#page_14">14</a>, +<a href="#page_16">16</a>, <a href="#page_18">18</a> ff., +<a href="#page_29">29</a> ff., <a href="#page_60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_71">71</a>, <a href="#page_91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_128">128</a> ff., <a href="#page_150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_234">234</a> ff., <a href="#page_250">250</a>, +<a href="#page_258">258</a>, <a href="#page_266">266</a>, +<a href="#page_309">309</a>, <a href="#page_311">311</a>, +<a href="#page_331">331</a> ff.; pre-war conditions in, +<a href="#page_13">13</a>, <a href="#page_29">29</a>; pan-American +policy of, <a href="#page_14">14</a> ff.; Japanese relations with, +<a href="#page_14">14</a>; Philippine affair and, +<a href="#page_16">16</a>; characteristics of, +<a href="#page_18">18</a>; English relations with, +<a href="#page_18">18</a> ff., <a href="#page_21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_29">29</a>, <a href="#page_81">81</a>, +<a href="#page_128">128</a>, <a href="#page_130">130</a>; +<i>Lusitania</i> affair and, <a href="#page_30">30</a> ff., +<a href="#page_50">50</a>, <a href="#page_141">141</a> ff., +<a href="#page_150">150</a> ff., <a href="#page_162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_166">166</a>, <a href="#page_175">175</a>, +<a href="#page_248">248</a>, <a href="#page_259">259</a>, +<a href="#page_280">280</a>, <a href="#page_341">341</a>, +<a href="#page_386">386</a>; public opinion in, +<a href="#page_31">31</a> ff., <a href="#page_58">58</a>; German +wireless stations in, <a href="#page_65">65</a> ff.; neutrality of, +<a href="#page_58">58</a> ff., <a href="#page_65">65</a> ff.; munition +traffic, <a href="#page_71">71</a> ff., <a href="#page_75">75</a> +ff.; German notes to, <a href="#page_73">73</a> ff., +<a href="#page_134">134</a> ff., <a href="#page_149">149</a>, +<a href="#page_158">158</a>, <a href="#page_231">231</a> ff., +<a href="#page_245">245</a> ff., <a href="#page_251">251</a> ff., + <a href="#page_257">257</a>; German propaganda in, +<a href="#page_42">42</a> ff., <a href="#page_89">89</a>, +<a href="#page_259">259</a> ff.; propaganda + +<a name="page_427"><span class="page">Page 427</span></a> + +work of, <a href="#page_43">43</a> ff.; German ships coaled in, +<a href="#page_73">73</a> ff.; German finances in, +<a href="#page_80">80</a>; port control in, <a href="#page_83">83</a> +ff.; German economic activities in, <a href="#page_80">80</a> ff.; +German dyestuffs exported to, <a href="#page_99">99</a>; German +conspiracies in: coaling, <a href="#page_101">101</a> ff.; forged +passports, <a href="#page_103">103</a> ff.; bomb outrages, +<a href="#page_105">105</a> ff., <a href="#page_112">112</a> ff.; +submarine warfare against, <a href="#page_131">131</a> ff., +<a href="#page_222">222</a>, <a href="#page_224">224</a> ff., +<a href="#page_230">230</a>, <a href="#page_237">237</a> ff., +<a href="#page_258">258</a>, <a href="#page_260">260</a>, +<a href="#page_282">282</a> ff., <a href="#page_288">288</a>, +<a href="#page_292">292</a> ff., <a href="#page_296">296</a>, +<a href="#page_298">298</a> ff., <a href="#page_303">303</a> ff., +<a href="#page_310">310</a> ff., <a href="#page_314">314</a> ff., +<a href="#page_325">325</a> ff., <a href="#page_330">330</a>, +<a href="#page_340">340</a> ff., <a href="#page_358">358</a>, +<a href="#page_369">369</a>, <a href="#page_372">372</a> ff., +<a href="#page_375">375</a>, <a href="#page_378">378</a> ff., +<a href="#page_380">380</a>, <a href="#page_382">382</a> ff., +<a href="#page_387">387</a> ff., <a href="#page_405">405</a>; +<i>Arabic</i> affair and, <a href="#page_173">173</a> ff.; <i>Arabic</i> +negotiations with, <a href="#page_176">176</a> ff.; English intrigue +in, <a href="#page_195">195</a> ff.; <i>Ancona</i> affair in, +<a href="#page_210">210</a>; <i>Sussex</i>; affair in, +<a href="#page_236">236</a>; desire for peace in, +<a href="#page_344">344</a>; rupture of German diplomatic relations +with, <a href="#page_380">380</a> ff.; army of, +<a href="#page_413">413</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> University of Berlin, <a href="#page_28">28</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +Vaneboro, <a href="#page_111">111</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +<i>Vaterland</i>, <a href="#page_35">35</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Venezuela, American relations with, +<a href="#page_13">13</a>; English and German ultimatum to, +<a href="#page_16">16</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Vera Cruz, <a href="#page_21">21</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> +Verdun, <a href="#page_343">343</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Versailles, Wilson at, <a href="#page_10">10</a>, +<a href="#page_61">61</a>, <a href="#page_63">63</a> ff., +<a href="#page_369">369</a> ff., <a href="#page_386">386</a> ff.; Peace +Conference at, <a href="#page_14">14</a>, <a href="#page_36">36</a>, +<a href="#page_130">130</a>; Peace of, <a href="#page_63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_196">196</a>, <a href="#page_360">360</a>, +<a href="#page_387">387</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Vienna, <a href="#page_156">156</a>, +<a href="#page_198">198</a>, <a href="#page_210">210</a>, +<a href="#page_351">351</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Viereck, G. S., <a href="#page_39">39</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Villa, Pancha, <a href="#page_242">242</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> Wall Street, <a href="#page_26">26</a>, +<a href="#page_162">162</a>, <a href="#page_190">190</a>, +<a href="#page_355">355</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Warburg, Paul, <a href="#page_140">140</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Warm, <a href="#page_198">198</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Washington, D. C., <a href="#page_6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_19">19</a>, <a href="#page_23">23</a> ff., +<a href="#page_33">33</a>, <a href="#page_35">35</a> ff., +<a href="#page_40">40</a> ff., <a href="#page_50">50</a>, +<a href="#page_60">60</a> ff., <a href="#page_66">66</a>, +<a href="#page_72">72</a>, <a href="#page_90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_140">140</a> ff., <a href="#page_148">148</a>, +<a href="#page_161">161</a>, <a href="#page_168">168</a>, +<a href="#page_181">181</a>, <a href="#page_196">196</a>, +<a href="#page_211">211</a>, <a href="#page_219">219</a>, +<a href="#page_222">222</a>, <a href="#page_231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_241">241</a>, <a href="#page_243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_247">247</a>, <a href="#page_252">252</a>, +<a href="#page_254">254</a>, <a href="#page_257">257</a>, +<a href="#page_261">261</a>, <a href="#page_265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_290">290</a>, <a href="#page_293">293</a>, +<a href="#page_306">306</a>, <a href="#page_310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_326">326</a>, <a href="#page_342">342</a>, +<a href="#page_369">369</a>, <a href="#page_378">378</a>, +<a href="#page_380">380</a> ff., <a href="#page_389">389</a>, +<a href="#page_393">393</a> ff., <a href="#page_397">397</a>, +<a href="#page_400">400</a> ff., <a href="#page_406">406</a> ff., + <a href="#page_409">409</a>, <a href="#page_414">414</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Washington <i>Post</i>, <a href="#page_38">38</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Wedell, H. A. von, <a href="#page_112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_203">203</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Welland Canal Case, <a href="#page_118">118</a>, +<a href="#page_262">262</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Western Policy, <a href="#page_1">1</a> ff., +<a href="#page_12">12</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +West Prussia, <a href="#page_350">350</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> White, Andrew D., <a href="#page_15">15</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> Whitehouse, Mrs. Norman, <a href="#page_44">44</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Wiegand, von, <a href="#page_338">338</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> Wilson, President, <a href="#page_31">31</a>, +<a href="#page_61">61</a>, <a href="#page_63">63</a> ff.; character +of, <a href="#page_8">8</a>, <a href="#page_25">25</a> ff., +<a href="#page_28">28</a> ff.; English influence on, +<a href="#page_8">8</a>, <a href="#page_217">217</a>; Vera Cruz +speech of, <a href="#page_21">21</a> ff.; public opinion and, +<a href="#page_34">34</a>, <a href="#page_62">62</a>; foreign loans +prohibited by, <a href="#page_46">46</a>; neutrality of, +<a href="#page_58">58</a> ff., <a href="#page_65">65</a>, +<a href="#page_130">130</a>, <a href="#page_136">136</a>, +<a href="#page_227">227</a> ff.; munition traffic and, +<a href="#page_72">72</a> ff.; <i>Lusitania</i> speech of, +<a href="#page_142">142</a> ff.; <i>Lusitania</i> negotiations +with, <a href="#page_144">144</a>, <a href="#page_150">150</a> +ff., <a href="#page_161">161</a> ff., <a href="#page_169">169</a> +ff., <a href="#page_212">212</a> ff., <a href="#page_216">216</a> +ff., <a href="#page_226">226</a> ff.; <i>Arabic</i> affair and, +<a href="#page_178">178</a> ff., <a href="#page_184">184</a> ff., +<a href="#page_189">189</a>; policy of, <a href="#page_194">194</a>; +description of, <a href="#page_198">198</a>; Congress opened by, +<a href="#page_206">206</a> ff.; <i>Ancona</i> affair and, +<a href="#page_210">210</a> ff.; autocracy of, +<a href="#page_224">224</a>; marriage of, <a href="#page_225">225</a>; +mediation efforts of, <a href="#page_231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_243">243</a>, <a href="#page_256">256</a> ff., +<a href="#page_267">267</a>, <a href="#page_274">274</a> ff., +<a href="#page_291">291</a>, <a href="#page_303">303</a> ff., +<a href="#page_309">309</a> ff., <a href="#page_325">325</a> ff., +<a href="#page_328">328</a> ff., <a href="#page_344">344</a>, +<a href="#page_353">353</a> ff., <a href="#page_373">373</a> ff., +<a href="#page_381">381</a> ff., <a href="#page_386">386</a> ff., +<a href="#page_390">390</a>, <a href="#page_403">403</a>, +<a href="#page_412">412</a> ff.; candidacy of, +<a href="#page_234">234</a> ff., <a href="#page_243">243</a> ff., +<a href="#page_256">256</a>, <a href="#page_267">267</a>, +<a href="#page_275">275</a>, <a href="#page_279">279</a>, +<a href="#page_286">286</a>, <a href="#page_291">291</a>, +<a href="#page_296">296</a>; changed attitude of, +<a href="#page_235">235</a>; submarine warfare and, +<a href="#page_237">237</a> ff., <a href="#page_242">242</a>, +<a href="#page_252">252</a>, <a href="#page_303">303</a>; <i>Sussex</i> +and, <a href="#page_242">242</a>, <a href="#page_247">247</a> ff., + <a href="#page_250">250</a>; Kaiser's letter to, +<a href="#page_267">267</a>, <a href="#page_296">296</a>; Polish +relief and, <a href="#page_267">267</a> ff.; League of Nations +proposed by, <a href="#page_270">270</a> ff.; reelection of, +<a href="#page_299">299</a> ff.; Belgian deportations and, +<a href="#page_302">302</a> ff.; German peace offer supported by, +<a href="#page_316">316</a> + +<a name="page_428"><span class="page">Page 428</span></a> + +ff.; peace note of, <a href="#page_318">318</a> ff., +<a href="#page_355">355</a> ff.; peace speech by, +<a href="#page_359">359</a> ff.; German relations broken by, +<a href="#page_380">380</a>; Germany condemned by, +<a href="#page_385">385</a> ff. </p> + +<p class="index"> Wolff Bureau, <a href="#page_25">25</a>, +<a href="#page_51">51</a>, <a href="#page_154">154</a> </p> + +<p class="index"> +Woolpart, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + +<p class="index"> +Wunmerburg, <a href="#page_112">112</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> +"Yellow Press," <a href="#page_105">105</a> +</p> + + +<p class="index_gap"> Zimmermann, <a href="#page_115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_156">156</a>, <a href="#page_221">221</a>, +<a href="#page_307">307</a>, <a href="#page_310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_321">321</a>, <a href="#page_327">327</a>, +<a href="#page_348">348</a> ff., <a href="#page_396">396</a> </p> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full"> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA***</p> +<p>******* This file should be named 30865-h.txt or 30865-h.zip *******</p> +<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br> +<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/3/0/8/6/30865">http://www.gutenberg.org/3/0/8/6/30865</a></p> +<p>Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed.</p> + +<p>Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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