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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/29917-8.txt b/29917-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3685a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/29917-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8949 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense +Metaphysics, by William Thomas Thornton + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics + With Some of Their Applications + + +Author: William Thomas Thornton + + + +Release Date: September 6, 2009 [eBook #29917] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND +COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS*** + + +E-text prepared by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, and the Project Gutenberg +Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) + + + +OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS + +With Some of Their Applications + +by + +WILLIAM THOMAS THORNTON + +Author of a Treatise 'On Labour' + + + + + + + +London +Macmillan and Co. +1873 + +_All rights reserved_ + + + + 'I entirely agree with you as to the ill tendency of the affected + doubts of some philosophers and the fantastical conceits of others. + I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have + quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools + for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word, that since this + revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature + and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so + that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before + were all mystery and riddle.'--BERKELEY'S HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +The book was all but finished, and only the Preface remained, over which +I was hesitating, apprehensive equally of putting into it too much and +too little, when one of the most frequent 'companions of my solitude' +came to my aid, shewing me, in fragments, a preface already nearly +written, and needing only a little piecing to become forthwith +presentable. Here it is. + +'In these sick days, in a world such as ours, richer than usual in +Truths grown obsolete, what can the fool think but that it is all a Den +of Lies wherein whoso will not speak and act Lies must stand idle and +despair?' Whereby it happens that for the artist who would fain minister +medicinally to the relief of folly, 'the publishing of a Work of Art,' +designed, like this, to redeem Truth from premature obsolescence, +'becomes almost a necessity.' For, albeit, 'in the heart of the speaker +there ought to be some kind of gospel tidings burning until it be +uttered, so that otherwise it were better for him that he altogether +held his peace,' still, than to have fire burning within, and not to put +it forth, not many worse things are readily imaginable. + +'Has the word Duty no meaning? Is what we call Duty no divine messenger +and guide, but a false, earthly fantasm, made up of Desire and Fear?' In +that' Logic-mill of thine' hast thou 'an earthly mechanism for the +Godlike itself, and for grinding out Virtue from the husks of Pleasure? +I tell thee, Nay! Otherwise, not on Morality, but on Cookery, let us +build our stronghold. There, brandishing our frying-pan as censer, let +us offer up sweet incense to the Devil, and live at ease on the fat +things _he_ has provided for his elect,' seeing that 'with stupidity and +sound digestion, man may front much.' + +Or, 'is there no God? or, at best, an absentee God, sitting idle ever +since the first Sabbath, at the outside of His universe, and _seeing_ it +go?' Know that for man's well-being, whatever else be needed, 'Faith is +one thing needful.' Mark, 'how, with it, Martyrs, otherwise weak, can +cheerfully endure the shame and the cross; how, without it, worldlings +puke up their sick existence, by suicide, in the midst of luxury.' Of +how much else, 'for a pure moral nature, is not the loss of Religious +Belief the loss?' 'All wounds, the crush of long-continued Destitution, +the stab of false Friendship and of false Love, all wounds in the so +genial heart would have healed again had not the life-warmth of Faith +been withdrawn.' But this once lost, how recoverable? how, rather, ever +acquirable? 'First must the dead Letter of Religion own itself dead, and +drop piecemeal into dust, if the living Spirit of Religion, freed from +this, its charnel house, is to arise on us, new born of Heaven, and with +new healing under its wings.' + +Beside these burning words of Mr. Carlyle any additional words of mine +would stand only as superfluous foils, and are, therefore, considerately +pretermitted. + +CADOGAN PLACE: _December 1872._ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I. ANTI-UTILITARIANISM 1 + + II. HISTORY'S SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS 84 + + III. DAVID HUME AS A METAPHYSICIAN 113 + + IV. HUXLEYISM 158 + + V. RECENT PHASES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM 199 + + VI. LIMITS OF DEMONSTRABLE THEISM 266 + + + EPILOGUE 298 + + + + +OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS + +AND + +COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +_ANTI-UTILITARIANISM._ + + +I. + +Having, by the heading of this essay, announced that it is intended to +be partly controversial, I can scarcely begin better than by furnishing +the reader with the means of judging whether I myself correctly +apprehend the doctrine which I am about to criticise. If, then, I were +myself an Utilitarian, and, for the sake either of vindicating my own +belief, or of making converts of other people, had undertaken to explain +what Utilitarianism is, I should set about the task somewhat in this +wise:-- + +The sole use and sole object of existence is enjoyment or pleasure, +which two words will here be treated as synonymous; happiness, also, +though not quite identical in meaning, being occasionally substituted +for them. Enjoyment, it must be observed, is of very various kinds, +measures, and degrees. It may be sensual, or emotional, or imaginative, +or intellectual, or moral. It may be momentary or eternal; intoxicating +delight or sober satisfaction. It may be unmixed and undisturbed, in +which case, however short of duration or coarse in quality, it may in +strictness be called happiness; or it may be troubled and alloyed, +although of a flavour which would be exquisite if pure, and if there +were nothing to interfere with the perception of it. Understood, +however, in a sufficiently comprehensive sense, enjoyment or pleasure +may be clearly perceived to be the sole object of existence. The whole +value of life plainly consists of the enjoyment, present or future, +which life affords, or is capable of affording or securing. Now, the +excellence of all rules depends on their conduciveness to the object +they have in view. The excellence of all rules of life must, therefore, +depend on their conduciveness to the sole object which life has in view, +viz., enjoyment. But the excellence of rules of life, or of conduct or +modes of acting, would seem to be but another name for their morality, +and the morality of actions obviously depends on their conformity to +moral rules. Whence, if so much be admitted, it necessarily follows that +the test of the morality of actions is their conduciveness to enjoyment. + +But the enjoyment thus referred to is not that of the agent alone, for +if it were, no action whatever could possibly be immoral. Whatever any +one does, he does either because to do it gives him or promises him +pleasure, or because he believes that the not doing it would subject him +to more pain than he will suffer from doing it. Besides, one person's +enjoyment may be obtained at the expense of other people's suffering, so +that an act in which the actor takes pleasure may destroy or prevent +more pleasure altogether than it creates. The enjoyment or happiness, +therefore, which Utilitarianism regards, is not individual, but general +happiness; not that of one or of a few, but of the many, nor even of the +many only. It is often declared to be the greatest happiness of the +greatest number, but it may with more accuracy be described as the +largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all +concerned.[1] Again, an action which, in some particular instance, +causes more pleasure than pain to those affected by it, may yet belong +to a class of actions which, in the generality of cases, causes more +pain than pleasure, and may thus involve a violation of a moral rule, +and, consequently, be itself immoral. Wherefore the enjoyment which +Utilitarianism adopts as its moral test is not simply the greatest sum +of enjoyment for all concerned, but that greatest sum in the greatest +number of cases. In its widest signification it is the greatest +happiness of society at large and in the long run. From these premises a +decisive criterion of right and wrong may be deduced. Every action +belonging to a class calculated to promote the permanent happiness of +society is right. Every action belonging to a class opposed to the +permanent happiness of society is wrong. + +In the foregoing exposition I have, I trust, evinced a sincere desire to +give Utilitarianism its full due, and I shall at least be admitted to +have shown myself entirely free from most of those more vulgar +misconceptions of its nature which have given its professors such just +offence. Many of its assailants have not scrupled to stigmatise as +worthy only of swine a doctrine which represents life as having no +better and nobler object of desire and pursuit than pleasure. To these, +however, it has, by the great apostle of Utilitarianism, been +triumphantly replied that it is really they themselves who insult human +nature by using language that assumes human beings to be capable of no +higher pleasures than those of which swine are capable; and that, +moreover, if the assumption were correct, and if the capacities of men +and of swine were identical, whatever rule of life were good enough for +the latter would likewise be good enough for the former. But I am not an +assailant of this description. Inasmuch as there undeniably are very +many and very various kinds of pleasure, I of course allow +Utilitarianism credit for common sense enough to acknowledge that those +kinds are most worthy of pursuit which, from whatever cause, possess +most value--that those which are most precious are those most to be +prized. But whoever allows thus much will have no alternative but to +concede a great deal more. The most precious of pleasures is that which +arises from the practice of virtue, as may be proved conclusively in the +only way of which the case admits, viz., by reference to the fact that, +whoever is equally acquainted with that and with other pleasures, +deliberately prefers it to all the rest, will, if necessary, forego all +others for its sake, and values no others obtainable only at its +expense. By necessary implication it follows that, as being more +valuable than any other, the pleasure arising from the practice of +virtue must be that which Utilitarianism recommends above all others as +an object of pursuit. But the pursuit of this particular pleasure and +the practice of virtue are synonymous terms. What, therefore, +Utilitarianism above all other things recommends and insists upon is the +practice of virtue. Now, the practice of virtue commonly involves +subordination of one's own interest to that of other people; indeed, +virtue would not be virtue in the utilitarian sense of the word unless +it did involve such subordination. Wherefore the pleasure arising from +the practice of virtue, the pleasure which occupies the highest place on +the utilitarian scale, and that which Utilitarianism exhorts its +disciples chiefly to seek after, is nothing else than the pleasure +derived from attending to other people's pleasure instead of to our own. + +Nor is this all. In order adequately to appreciate the loftiness of +utilitarian teaching, and its utter exemption from the sordidness with +which it is ignorantly charged, we must devote a few moments to +examination of those distinctive peculiarities of different kinds of +pleasure which entitle them to different places in our esteem. + +All pleasures may be arranged under five heads, and in regularly +ascending series, as follows:-- + +1. Sensual pleasures:--To wit, those of eating and drinking, and +whatever others are altogether of the flesh, fleshly. + +2. Emotional, by which are to be understood agreeable moods of the mind, +such as, irrespectively of any agreeable idea brought forward +simultaneously by association, are produced by music ('for,' as Milton +says, 'eloquence the soul, song charms the sense'), by beauty of form or +colour, by genial sunshine, by balmy or invigorating air. + +3. Imaginative, or pleasures derived from the contemplation of mental +pictures. + +4. Intellectual, or those consequent on exercise of the reasoning +powers. + +5. Moral, or those which are alluded to when virtue is spoken of as +being its own reward.[2] + +That of these several kinds, each of the last four is preferable to any +preceding it on the list will, it is to be hoped, be allowed to pass as +an unquestioned truth, for to any one perverse enough to deny it, the +only answer that can be made is an appeal to observation in proof that +all persons who are equally acquainted with the several kinds do exhibit +the preferences indicated. Neither, so far as the two kinds first-named +alone are concerned, is it possible to go much more deeply into the +reasons why emotional pleasures are to be preferred to sensual, than by +pointing to the fact that all competent judges of both are observed to +like the former best. If all those who are endowed with equal +sensitiveness of ear and of palate prefer music to feasting, and would +any day give up a dinner at Francatelli's for the sake of hearing a +rejuvenescent Persiani as Zerlina, or Patti as Dinorah, the one thing +presumable is, that all such persons derive more enjoyment from perfect +melody than from perfect cookery, and little else remains to be said on +the subject. The same ultimate fact need not, however, limit our inquiry +as to the preferableness of imaginative or intellectual to emotional +pleasures, and of moral to any of the other three. This admits of, and +demands, a more subtle explanation, from which we may learn, not merely +that certain preferences are shown, but also why they are shown. The +preferences in question are demonstrably not due to the greater +poignancy of the pleasures preferred. It is simply not true that the +keenest of imaginative pleasures is keener than the keenest of +emotional, and still less that the keenest of intellectual is so. The +very reverse is the truth. The supremest delight attainable in fancy's +most romantic flight is, I suspect, faint in comparison with the sort of +ecstasy into which a child of freshly-strung nerves is sometimes thrown +by the mere brilliance or balminess of a summer's day, and with which +even we, dulled adults, provided we be in the right humour, and that all +things are in a concatenation accordingly, are now and then momentarily +affected while listening to the wood-notes wild of a nightingale, or a +Jenny Lind, or while gazing on star-lit sky or moon-lit sea, or on the +snowy or dolomite peaks of a mountain range fulgent with the violet and +purple glories of the setting sun. And yet the choicest snatches of such +beatitude with which--at least, after the fine edge of our +susceptibilities has been worn away by the world's friction--we +creatures of coarse human mould are ever indulged, are but poor in +comparison with the rich abundance of the same in which some more +delicately-constituted organisms habitually revel. If we would +understand of what development emotional delight is capable, we should +watch the skylark. As that 'blithe spirit' now at heaven's gate 'poureth +its full heart,' and anon can + + Scarce get out his notes for joy, + But shakes his song together as he nears + His happy home, the ground, + +what poet but must needs confess with Shelley, that in his most +rapturous dream, his transport never came nigh the bird's? And yet what +poet would change conditions with the lark? Nay, what student or +philosopher would? albeit the utmost gratification ever earned by either +of these in the prosecution of his special calling--in acquiring +knowledge, in solving knotty problems, or in scaling the heights of +abstract contemplation--is probably as inferior in keenness of zest to +that which the poet knows, as the best prose is inferior in charm to the +best poetry. It may even be that both poet and philosopher owe, on the +whole, more unhappiness than happiness--the one to his superior +sensibility, the other to his superior enlightenment, and yet neither +would exchange his own lesser happiness for the greater happiness of the +lark. Why would he not? It is no sufficient answer to say that in the +lark's happiness there are few, if any, imaginative or intellectual +ingredients; that it is almost utterly unideal, almost purely emotional, +exactly the same in kind, and only higher in degree, than the glee of +puppies or kittens at play. The question recurs as forcibly as ever, +why--seeing that enjoyment is the one thing desirable, the only thing +either valuable in itself, or that gives value to other things--why is +it that no intelligent man would accept, in lieu of his own, another +mode of existence, in which, although debarred from the joys of thought +and fancy, he nevertheless has reason to believe that the share of +enjoyment falling to his lot would be greater, both in quantity and +sapidity, than it is at present? The following seems to me to be the +explanation of the mystery. + +It might be too much to say that nothing can please a person who is not +pleased with himself, but it is at any rate clear that nothing can +greatly please him which interferes with his self-satisfaction. Now +imaginative and intellectual enjoyment, each of them, involves the +exercise of a special and superior faculty, mere consciousness of the +possession of which helps to make the possessor satisfied with himself. +It exalts what Mr. Mill aptly terms his sense of dignity, a sense +possessed in some form or other by every human being, and one so +essential to that self-satisfaction without which all pleasure would be +tasteless, that nothing which conflicts with it can be an object of +serious desire. In virtue of this special faculty, the most wretched of +men holds himself to be superior to the most joyous of larks. To divest +himself of it would be to lower himself towards the level of the bird, +and to commit such an act of self-degradation would occasion to him an +amount of pain which he is not disposed to incur for the sake of any +amount of pleasure obtainable at its expense. It is, then, the fear of +pain which prevents his wishing to be turned into a lark. He is not +ignorant that he would be happier for the metamorphosis, but he dreads +the pain that must precede the increase of happiness, more than he +desires the increase of happiness that would follow the pain. + +The force of these considerations will be equally, or more apparent, on +their being applied to analysis of moral pleasures. That these are the +most truly precious of all pleasures, is proved by their being +habitually more highly prized than any others by all who are qualified +to make the comparison. But why are they so prized? Not, as I am +constrained, however reluctantly, to admit, on account of their greater +keenness as pleasures. It would be at best but well-meaning cant to +pretend that the self-approval, the sympathetic participation in other +people's augmented welfare, the grateful consciousness of having done +that which is pleasing in our Heavenly Father's sight, together with +whatever else helps to compose the internal reward of virtue, constitute +a sum total of delight nearly as exquisite as that which may be obtained +in a variety of other ways. The mere circumstance of there being +invariably included in a just or generous action more or less of +self-denial, self-restraint, or self-sacrifice, must always sober down +the gratification by which virtue is rewarded, and make it appear tame +beside the delirium of gladness caused by many things with which virtue +has nothing to do. We will charitably suppose that the occupant of a +dukedom, who should secretly light upon conclusive proof that it was not +his by right, would at once abandon it to the legal heir, and we need +not doubt that he would subsequently be, on the whole, well content to +have so acted, but we cannot suppose that he would make the surrender +with anything like the elation with which he entered on the estate and +title. If there were really no pleasure equal to that with which virtue +recompenses its votaries, the performance of a virtuous act would always +make a man happier than previously; moreover, the greater the virtue, +the greater would be the consequent pleasure. But any one may see that +an act of the most exalted virtue, far from increasing, often utterly +destroys the agent's happiness. Imagine an affectionate father, some +second Brutus or second Fitzstephen of Galway, constrained by +overwhelming sense of duty to sentence a beloved son to death, or a +bankrupt beggaring himself and his family by honestly making over to his +creditors property with which he might have safely absconded. Plainly, +such virtuous achievement, far from adding to the happiness of its +author, has plunged him in an abyss of misery, his only comfort being +that in the lowest deep there is, as we shall presently see, a lower +deep still. Far from being happier than he was before acting as he has +done, he would be much happier if, being vicious instead of virtuous, he +had not felt bound so to act. Unquestionably, what either upright judge +or honest bankrupt has incurred--the one by becoming a saticide, the +other by making himself a beggar--is pure and simple pain, unmitigated +by one particle of positive pleasure. Yet it is at the same time certain +that the virtue of each has in some form or other given full +compensation for the pain it has occasioned, for not only was that pain +deliberately incurred in lieu of the pleasure which it has supplanted, +but restoration of the pleasure would now be refused, if reversal of the +virtuous conduct were made a condition of the restoration. In what, +then, does the compensation consist? In nothing else than this, in judge +or bankrupt having been saved from pain still greater than that which he +is actually suffering. Wretched as he is, infinitely more wretched than +he was before there was any call upon him to act as he has done, he is +less wretched than he would be if, recognising the obligation so to act, +he had not so acted. He has escaped the stings of conscience, the sense +of having wronged his neighbour and offended his God; he has escaped, in +short, self-condemnation--a torment so intolerable to those so +constituted as to be susceptible of it, that hell itself has been known +to be, in imagination at least, preferred to it. Mr. Mill's splendid +outburst that, rather than worship a fiend that could send him to hell +for refusing, he would go to hell as he was bid, will doubtless occur to +every reader. + +This, however, is all. In both the supposed cases, as in every one in +which virtue consists of compliance with a painful duty, the pleasure +arising from the practice of virtue cannot in strictness be called +pleasure at all. At best it is but a partial negation of pain; more +properly, indeed, the substitution of one pain for another more acute. +Yet this mere negation, this ethereal inanity, is pronounced by +Utilitarianism to be preferable to aught that can come into competition +with it. Truly it is somewhat hard upon those who attend to such +teaching, to be reproached with their grossness of taste and likened to +hogs, for no better reason than their predilection for the lightest of +all conceivable diets. Still harder will this seem, when we recollect +that Utilitarians are exhorted to be virtuous, less for their own than +for other people's sakes. If, indeed, virtue were practised by all +mankind, the utilitarian idea of the greatest possible happiness, or, at +least, of the greatest possible exemption from unhappiness, would be +universally realised. Still, it is in order that they may afford +pleasure to the community at large, rather than that they may obtain it +for themselves; it is that they may save, not so much themselves, as the +community, from pain, that individual Utilitarians are charged to be +virtuous. Among those pleasures, whether positive or negative, which it +is allowable to them to seek for themselves, the first place is assigned +to the pleasure arising from the sense of giving pleasure to others. +Thus, not only is it the purest of pleasures that Utilitarianism chiefly +recommends for pursuit: even that pleasure is to be pursued only from +the purest and most disinterested motives. + +All this I frankly acknowledge; and I own, too, that, far from deserving +to be stigmatised as irreligious, Utilitarianism is literally nothing +else than an amplification of one moiety of Christianity; that it not +adopts merely, but expands, 'the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth,' +exhorting us to love our neighbour, not simply as well, but better than +ourselves; to do for others, not simply what we would have them do for +us, but much more than we could have the face to ask them to do; not +merely not to pursue our interests at the expense of theirs, but to +regard as our own chief interest the promotion of theirs. That on +account of these exhortations Utilitarianism is godless can be supposed +by those only who suppose that love to one's neighbour is contrary to +the will of God. By those who believe that works are the best signs of +faith, and that love to God is best evinced by doing good to man, +Utilitarianism might rather seem to be but another name for practical +religion. + +So I say in all sincerity, though not without some misgiving, as while +so speaking I involuntarily bethink myself of Balaam, son of Beor, who +having been called forth to curse, caught himself blessing altogether. +Mine eyes, too, have been opened to the good of that which I was +purposed to condemn, and behold I have as yet done nothing but eulogise. +No warmest partisan of Utilitarianism, not Mr. Mill himself, ever spoke +more highly of it than I have just been doing. What censures, then, can +I have in reserve to countervail such praises? What grounds of quarrel +can I have with a system of ethics which I have described as ever +seeking the noblest ends from the purest motives; whose precepts I own +to be as elevating as its aims are exalted? On reflection, I am +reassured by recollecting several, which I proceed to bring forward one +at a time, beginning with a sin enormous enough to cover any multitude +of merits. + +My first charge against Utilitarianism is that it is not true. I do not +say that there is no truth in it. That I have found much to admire in +its premises has been frankly avowed; and in one, at least, of the +leading deductions from those premises I partially concur. I admit that +acts utterly without utility must likewise be utterly without worth; +that conduct which subserves the enjoyment neither of oneself nor of any +one else, cannot, except in a very restricted sense, be termed right; +that conduct which interferes with the enjoyment both of oneself and of +all others, which injuring oneself injures others also, and benefits no +one, cannot be otherwise than wrong; that purely objectless asceticism +which has not even self-discipline in view, is not virtue, but folly; +that misdirected charity which, engendering improvidence, creates more +distress than it relieves, is not virtue, but criminal weakness. But +though admitting that there can be no virtue without utility, I do not +admit either that virtue must be absent unless utility preponderate, or +that if utility preponderate virtue must be present. I deny that any +amount of utility can of itself constitute virtue. I deny that whatever +adds to the general happiness must be right. Equally do I deny that +whatever diminishes the general happiness or prevents its increasing +must be wrong. An action, be it observed, may be right in three +different senses. It may be right as being meritorious, and deserving of +commendation. It may be right as being that which one is bound to do, +for the doing of which, therefore, one deserves no praise, and for +neglecting to do which one would justly incur blame. It may be right +simply as not being wrong--as being allowable--something which one has a +right to do, though to refrain from doing it might perhaps be +praiseworthy. There will be little difficulty in adducing examples of +conduct which, though calculated to diminish the sum total of happiness, +would be right in the first of these senses. Nothing can be easier than +to multiply examples of such conduct that would be right in the third +sense. I proceed to cite cases which will answer both these purposes, +and likewise the converse one of showing that conduct calculated to +increase the general happiness may nevertheless be wrong. + +When the Grecian chiefs, assembled at Aulis, were waiting for a fair +wind to convey them to Ilium, they were, we are told, warned by what was +to them as a voice from heaven, that their enterprise would make no +progress unless Agamemnon's daughter were sacrificed to Diana. In order +to place the details of the story in a light as little favourable as +possible to my argument, we will deviate somewhat from the accepted +version, and will suppose that the arrested enterprise was one of even +greater pith and moment than tradition ascribes to it. We will suppose +that upon its successful prosecution depended the national existence of +Greece; that its failure would have involved the extermination of +one-half of the people, and the slavery of the other half. We will +suppose, too, that of all this Iphigenia was as firmly persuaded as +every one else. In these circumstances, had her countrymen a right to +insist on her immolation? If so, on what was that right founded? Is it +sufficient to say in reply that her death was essential to the national +happiness, to the extent even of being indispensable to prevent that +happiness from being converted into national woe? Manifestly, according +to the hypothesis, it was expedient for all concerned, with the single +exception of herself, that she should die; but were the others thereby +entitled to take her life? Did the fact of its being for their advantage +to do this warrant their doing it? Simply because it was their interest, +was it also their right? Right, we must recollect, invariably implies +corresponding duty. Right, it is clear, can never be rightfully +resisted. If it be the right of certain persons to do a certain thing, +it must be the duty of all other persons to let that thing be done. +Where there is no such duty, there can be no such right. Wherefore, if +the 'stern, black-bearded kings, with wolfish eyes,' who sate 'waiting +to see her die,' had a right to kill Iphigenia, it must have been +Iphigenia's duty to let herself be killed. Was this then her duty? +'Duty,' as I have elsewhere observed,[3] 'signifies something due, a +debt, indebtedness, and a debt cannot have been incurred for nothing, or +without some antecedent step on the part either of debtor or creditor.' +But it is not pretended that in any way whatever, by any antecedent act +of hers or theirs, Iphigenia had incurred or had been subjected to a +debt to her countrymen which could be paid off only with her life. It +could not, then, be incumbent on her to let her life be taken in +payment. If it had been in her power to burst her bonds, and break +through the wolves in human shape that girdled her in, she would have +been guilty of no wrong by escaping. But if not, then, however +meritorious it might have been on her part to consent to die for her +countrymen, it was not her duty so to die, nor, consequently, had they a +right to put her to death. She would have been at least negatively right +in refusing to die, while they were guilty of a very positive and a very +grievous wrong in killing her, notwithstanding that both she and they +were perfectly agreed that for her to be killed would be for the +incalculably greater happiness of a greater number, exceeding the lesser +number in the proportion of several hundreds of thousands to one. + +It is true that throughout this affair every one concerned was labouring +under a gross delusion--that there was no real use in putting Iphigenia +to death, and that nothing but superstition made anybody suppose there +was. I do not think the case is one less to our purpose on that account, +for Utilitarians, like other fallible mortals, are liable to deceive +themselves. They never can be quite secure of the genuineness of the +utility on which they rely, and in default of positive knowledge they +will always be reduced to act, as the Grecian chiefs did, according to +the best of their convictions. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of +those who distrust romance and insist upon reality, we will leave fable +for fact, and take as our next illustration an incident that may any day +occur. + +Imagine three shipwrecked mariners to have leapt from their sinking +vessel into a cockboat scarce big enough to hold them, and the two +slimmer of the three to have presently discovered that there was little +or no chance of either of them reaching land unless their over-weighted +craft were lightened of their comparatively corpulent companion. Next, +imagine yourself in the fat sailor's place, and then consider whether +you would feel it incumbent on you to submit quietly to be drowned in +order that the residuum of happiness might be greater than if either you +all three went to the bottom, or than if you alone were saved. Would you +not, far from recognising any such moral obligation, hold yourself +morally justified in throwing the other two overboard, if you were +strong enough, and if need were, to prevent their similarly ousting you? +But if it were not your duty to allow yourself to be cast into the sea, +the others could have no right to cast you out; so that, if they did +cast you out, they would clearly be doing not right but wrong. And yet, +as clearly, their wrong-doing would have conduced to the greater +happiness of the greater number, inasmuch as, while only one life could +otherwise have been saved, it would save two, and inasmuch as, +_coeteris paribus_, two persons would necessarily derive twice as much +enjoyment from continued existence as one would. Moreover, their +wrong-doing would be of a kind calculated always to produce similarly +useful results. It cannot, I suppose, be denied that a rule to the +effect that whenever forfeiture of one life would save two, one life +should be sacrificed, would--not exceptionally only, but at large and in +the long run--conduce to the saving of life, and therefore to the +conservation of happiness connected with life. + +The foregoing cases are no doubt both of them extreme, involving +exaction of the largest possible private sacrifice for the general good; +but in all cases of the kind, whether the exaction be small or great, +the same governing principle equally applies. If you, a foot-sore, +homeward-bound pedestrian, on a sweltering July day, were to see your +next-door neighbour driving in the same direction in solitary state, +would you have a right to stop his carriage and force yourself in? Nay, +even though you had just before fallen down and broken your leg, would +the compassionating by-standers be justified in forcing him to take you +in? Or, again, if you were outside a coach during a pelting shower, and +saw a fellow-passenger with a spare umbrella between his legs, while an +unprotected female close beside was being drenched with the rain, would +you have a right to wrest the second umbrella from him, and hold it over +her? That, very likely, is what you would do in the circumstances, and +few would be disposed greatly to blame the indignant ebullition. Still, +unless you are a disciple of Proudhon, you will scarcely pretend that +you can have a right to take possession of another's carriage or +umbrella against the owner's will. You can scarcely suppose that it is +not for him but for you to decide what use shall be made of articles +belonging not to you but to him. Yet there can be no doubt that the +happiness of society would be vastly promoted if everyone felt himself +under an irresistible obligation to assist his neighbour whenever he +could do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, or, +consequently, if external force were always at hand to constrain anyone +so to assist who was unwilling to do so of his own accord. + +So much in proof that among things of the highest and most extensive +utility there are several which it would be decidedly the reverse of +right to do, and several others which it would be perfectly right to +leave undone. I proceed to show that there are many other things not +simply not of preponderating utility, but calculated, on the contrary, +to do more harm than good, to destroy more happiness than they are +capable of creating, which, nevertheless, it would be not simply +allowable to do, but the doing of which would be highly meritorious, +acts possibly of the most exalted virtue. + +Let no one distrust the doctrine of development by reason of its +supposed extravagance of pretension who has not duly considered to what +a sublime of moral beauty the united hideousness and absurdity of +Calvinism may give birth. In that Puritan society of New England of +which Mrs. Beecher Stowe has given so singularly interesting an account +in her 'Minister's Wooing,' and among whose members it was an universal +article of belief that the bulk of mankind are created for the express +purpose of being consigned to everlasting flames, there are said to have +been not a few enthusiasts in whom a self-concentrating creed begat the +very quintessence of self-devotion. 'As a gallant soldier renounces life +and personal aims in the cause of his king and country, and holds +himself ready to be drafted for a forlorn hope, to be shot down, or help +to make a bridge of his mangled body, over which the more fortunate +shall pass to victory and glory,' so among the early descendants of the +Pilgrim Fathers many an one 'regarded himself as devoted to the King +Eternal, ready in his hands to be used to illustrate and build up an +eternal commonwealth, either by being sacrificed as a lost spirit, or +glorified as a redeemed one; ready to throw, not merely his mortal life, +but his immortality even, into the forlorn hope, to bridge, with a +never-dying soul, the chasm over which white-robed victors should pass +to a commonwealth of glory and splendour, whose vastness should dwarf +the misery of all the lost to an infinitesimal.' And while by many the +idea of suffering everlasting pains for the glory of God, and the good +of being in general, was thus contemplated with equanimity, there were +some few for whom the idea of so suffering for the good of others dearer +than themselves would have been greeted with positive exultation. 'And +don't I care for your soul, James?' exclaims Mary Scudder to her lover. +'If I could take my hopes of heaven out of my own heart and give them to +you, I would. Dr. H. preached last Sunday on the text, "I could wish +myself accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen," and he went on +to show how we must be willing to give up even our own salvation, if +necessary, for the good of others. People said it was a hard doctrine, +but I could feel my way through it. Yes, I would give my soul for yours. +I wish I could.' Now we must on no account permit admiration of Miss +Scudder's transcendent generosity in desiring to make this exchange +blind us to the fatal effect on social happiness which, if such +exchange were possible, the prevalence of a disposition to make it could +not fail to have. If Calvinism were true instead of blasphemous, if God +were really the Moloch it represents Him, and if, moreover, Moloch were +indifferent as to which of his offspring were cast into the fire, caring +only that the prescribed number of victims should be forthcoming in full +tale, nothing can be conceived more likely to prove an encouragement to +evil-doers, and a terror to them that did well, than observation that +well-doing not infrequently led to eternal misery, and evil-doing to +eternal bliss. Again, if in China, where criminals under sentence of +death are permitted, if they can, by purchase or otherwise, to procure +substitutes to die in their stead, a son were to propose to die for a +parent base enough to take advantage of the offer, could any arrangement +be more plainly repugnant to the common-weal than that by which society +would thus lose one of its noblest, instead of getting rid of one of its +vilest members? Or, when in England, a thrifty son, by consenting to cut +the entail of an estate to which he is heir-apparent, enables a prodigal +father to consume in riotous living substance which would otherwise have +eventually become his, is he not clearly taking the worse course for the +public by permitting the property to be wasted, instead of causing it to +be husbanded? + +Beyond all question, American Puritan, Chinese or English devotee to +filial affection, would thus, each in her or his degree, have, in the +circumstances supposed, acted in a manner opposed to the general +interest, and would therefore be condemned by Utilitarianism as having +acted immorally. Nor could this verdict be gainsaid if utility and +morality were, as Utilitarianism assumes them to be, one and the same +thing. Clearly, that the just should suffer for the unjust, the innocent +for the guilty, is diametrically opposed to the welfare of society; +wherefore, according to utilitarian principles, by consenting so to +suffer, the just becomes unjust, the innocent renders himself guilty. +But can there be a better proof that utilitarian principles are unsound +than that this should be a legitimate deduction from them? Can there be +better proof that utility and morality are not identical, but two +absolutely distinct things? Plainly, there can be no meritorious or +commendable immorality; neither can there be any virtue which is not +meritorious and commendable. Is there, then, no merit, nothing +commendable, in accepting ruin or in volunteering to die temporarily, or +to perish everlastingly, in order to save a fellow-creature from ruin, +or death, or perdition? Does not such conduct, considered independently +and without reference either to its utility or its hurtfulness, command +our instantaneous and enthusiastic admiration? But how, being so +admirable, can it be immoral? how other than virtuous? What else is it, +indeed, but the very perfection of that purest virtue which, content to +be its own reward, deliberately cuts itself off from all other +recompense? Without changing the immemorial meaning of the most familiar +words, there is no avoiding the obvious answers to these questions. If +virtue and morality, right and wrong, are to continue to mean anything +like that which, except by Utilitarians, has always been considered to +be their only meaning, it is not simply not wrong, it is not simply +right, it is among the highest achievements of virtue and morality to +sacrifice your own in order to secure another's happiness, and the +disinterestedness, and therefore the virtue, is surely the greater, +rather than less, if you sacrifice more happiness of your own than you +secure to another. So much follows necessarily from what has been said, +and something more besides. It follows further that Utilitarianism is +not less in error in declaring that actions calculated to diminish the +total sum of happiness must necessarily be wrong, cannot possibly be +allowable, still less meritorious, than it had previously been shown to +be in declaring that actions calculated to augment the sum total of +happiness must necessarily be meritorious. + +There is but one way in which Utilitarianism can even temporarily rebut +the charge of fallacy, of which otherwise it must here stand convicted, +and that is by renouncing all claim to be a new system of ethics, and +not pretending to be more than a new system of nomenclature. And even +so, it could not help contradicting, and thereby refuting itself. That +nothing is right but what is of preponderating utility; that whatever is +of preponderating utility is right; these are propositions perfectly +intelligible, indeed, but which will be found to be tenable only on +condition that the very same things may be both right and wrong. The +confusion, thrice confounded, inseparable from the substitution of such +novel definitions for those which had previously been universally in +vogue, is but the smaller of two evils which must thence arise. It would +be bad enough that the word 'right' could not be used without raising +doubt whether what people had previously understood by the 'just' or the +'generous,' or only the 'expedient' were meant; but a still worse +consequence would be that, even if no doubt of the sort were +entertained, and if all men were agreed to take the word in none but its +utilitarian sense, the landmarks of right and wrong would thereby be +well nigh obliterated. Due credit has already been given to +Utilitarianism for its exemplary zeal in inculcating the practice of +virtue, but its merit in that respect is more than neutralised by its +equally zealous inculcation of principles, according to which it is +impossible to decide beforehand whether any particular practice will be +virtuous or not. + +This is my second charge against Utilitarianism. I maintain it to be a +doctrine in most of its essentials erroneous; but I maintain, further, +that, even if it were correct, instead of furnishing us with an +infallible criterion of right and wrong, it would deprive us of the +means of clearly distinguishing between right and wrong at all times at +which the power of so distinguishing is of practical value. Bluntly +enough, I have pronounced it to be false. With equal bluntness, I now +add that, even if it were true, it would, all the same, be practically +mischievous, and directly opposed to the very utility from which it +takes its name. The argument in support of this charge shall now be +stated. + +According to utilitarian ethics, the morality of actions depends wholly +and solely on their consequences. On this point the language of +authority is distinct, emphatic, unanimous, and self-contradictory. +'Utilitarian moralists,' says the chief amongst them, 'have gone beyond +all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the +morality of an action.... He who saves a fellow-creature from drowning +does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of +being paid for his trouble.' Upon which I would observe, in passing, +that to save a fellow-creature from drowning can be deemed to be +necessarily right by none but uncompromising opponents of capital +punishment. Most others will be disposed to doubt its having been a +sufficient reason for commuting the sentence of death passed upon the +murderer of Dhuleep Sing's gamekeeper, that, owing to physical +malformation, hanging might perhaps have given him more than ordinary +pain in the neck, or perhaps have prolonged the pleasure which, +according to the select few qualified to speak from experience, is +attendant on that mode of strangulation. Neither, without sacrificing +his judgment to his feelings, could one of these doubters, if Rutherford +had been sentenced to be drowned instead of hanged, have stretched out a +hand to save the miscreant from the watery grave he so richly deserved. +That there are no actions which by reason of their beneficial +consequences are always and invariably moral, might be too much to +affirm; but I have no hesitation in saying that there are thousands, the +morality or immorality of which--their results remaining the +same--depends absolutely on their motives. Thus, if two doctors--of +whom, for distinction's sake, we will call one Smethurst and the other +Smith--in attendance on patients afflicted with precisely the same +disease, were by the administration of overdoses of strychnine each to +kill his man, the only difference between them being that whereas one +intended and expected to kill, the other hoped to cure--would the act of +killing be equally immoral in both cases? Would it not in the one case +be murder, in the other mere error of judgment; and would both be +equally crimes, or would the latter be in any degree criminal? And if it +had been Smethurst instead of Smith who committed the error of +judgment--if the overdoses by which he had meant to kill had happened to +cure--would his error of judgment have thereby been rendered moral, +notwithstanding that his motive was murder? + +The same great teacher, who so strenuously insists that the motive has +nothing to do with the morality of an action, does indeed go on to say +that it has 'much to do with the worth of the agent.' Here, however, I +confess myself unable to follow him. That an act may possess morality +independent of the agent, may be intelligible on the assumption that +morality means simply utility, and nothing more; but how, even then, +worth can be evinced by the performance of an immoral action, is beyond +my comprehension, except upon the further assumption that there may be +worth in immorality. + +Waiving, however, these and all other objections, let us for the moment, +and for the sake of argument, assume that morality and utility are +really one and the same thing, that the right or wrong of an act depends +entirely on its results, and then let us observe how utterly without +rudder or compass to assist him in steering correctly will be the +best-intentioned navigator of the ocean of life. + +We can seldom, if ever, be quite sure what will be the result of our +conduct. Meaning to cure, we may only too probably kill; meaning to +kill, we may not impossibly cure. Until a thing is done, we cannot +determine as to its utility; nor, consequently, in an utilitarian sense, +as to the morality of doing it. We must trust implicitly to our skill in +calculating events, and if that skill happen to fail us, our conduct may +become culpable. With the most earnest desire to act righteously, we can +only guess beforehand whether what we propose doing will turn out to be +righteous, and can never be sure, therefore, that we are not going to do +something wicked. + +Here I shall, of course, and very properly, be reminded that what +Utilitarianism requires to be taken into account, are not merely the +probable consequences of some proposed act, but the usual consequences +of all acts of the same description; so that its disciples, instead of +being left to their conjectures about the future, may be said to have +all past experience to refer to. And undeniably Utilitarianism does +require this; thereby, however, contradicting itself as, I just now +hinted, it would presently be found doing. It does indeed declare those +actions only to be moral which in the long run are conducive to, or at +least not opposed to, the general happiness; but it also says that the +morality of each particular action depends on its own particular +consequences. So that the docile disciple who should do something which, +though useful in the long run, happened to be otherwise in his +particular case--who, for instance, should save the life of a +fellow-creature of whom it would have been well for the world to be rid, +would, to his disgust and bewilderment, find that while, with no desire +but that of acting rightly, he had been obeying one utilitarian law, he +had nevertheless been infringing another law of the same code, and +thereby acting wrongly. + +Overlooking, however, this incongruity of two equally authoritative +rules, let us proceed to consider what dangerous latitude of +interpretation is allowed to the followers of either of them. Those who +believe that the merit or demerit of each separate action depends on +that action's separate consequences, need seldom be at a loss for a +pretext for committing the most heinous of crimes. A husband who, hating +his wife, had his hate returned, and loving another woman, had his love +returned, might plausibly reason thus within himself: The prescribed +objects of life are the multiplication of happiness and the diminution +of misery; here are three of us, all doomed to be miserable as long as +we all three live; but the wretchedness of two of us might be at once +converted into happiness, if the third were put out of the way. By some +such logical process, Queen Mary and Bothwell may have satisfied +themselves of the propriety of blowing up Darnley: Mr. and Mrs. Manning, +as they sate at meat with their destined victim over his ready-made +grave, may have argued themselves into self-approval of the crowning +rite with which their hospitalities were to terminate: any scampish +apprentice with designs upon his master's till, any burglar plotting an +entry into a goldsmith's shop, may become convinced of his rectitude of +purpose, and even take credit for public-spirited zeal, in seeking to +appropriate to his own use part of another's wealth, which he may fairly +suppose would be productive of more enjoyment if divided between two or +more than if left in the hands of one, and that one already perhaps the +possessor of more than he knows what to do with. + +Precisely the same sophistry will not indeed suffice for those disciples +who, adopting the alternative law of the utilitarian code, feel bound to +attend to the consequences not of individual actions, but of classes of +actions. The cleverest self-deceiver can scarcely bring himself to +believe that, because it might suit his personal convenience to kill or +steal, killing and stealing would not be prejudicial to society if +generally practised. Still, it is only necessary to have, or to fancy +one has, public instead of private objects in view, in order to be able +to look with approbation, from an utilitarian point of view, on any +amount of homicide or robbery. It was the very same Robespierre that, +while as yet diocesan judge at Arras, felt constrained to abdicate +because, 'behold, one day comes a culprit whose crime merits hanging, +and strict-minded, strait-laced Max's conscience will not permit the +dooming of any son of Adam to die,' who, shortly after, when +sufficiently imbued with the utilitarian spirit, was fully prepared to +wade through floods of slaughter towards the enthronisation of his +principles--one of those principles evidently being that, if the +decimation of mankind would conduce to the greater happiness of the +residue, adding more to the happiness of the nine-tenths whom it spared +than it took from the tenth whom it destroyed, the said decimation would +be a duty incumbent on any one possessed of power to perpetrate it. + +Nor are principles like these appealed to only by those who have +recourse to them for the vindication of their own procedure. At those +_petits-soupers_--bachelors' dinners is their modern English name, +_noctes coenæque deûm_ their ancient classical--for which some of our +London clubs are deservedly celebrated, and with which the Garrick in +especial is, in my mind, gratefully associated--at those choice +gatherings of congenial spirits, conversation, changing from gay to +grave, turns not unfrequently, among other lofty topics, on that which +we are here discussing. Then, even at such divine symposium, one at +least of the guests is pretty sure to take the part of devil's advocate, +and to exercise his forensic skill in showing how easily interchangeable +are the names of virtue and iniquity, crime and well-doing. September +massacres then find, not their apologist, but their eulogist. _Noyades_ +of Carrier, _fusilades_ of Collot d'Herbois, are cited as examples very +suitable for imitation in adequate emergencies. Prussia's seizure, on +behalf of Germany, of Schleswig and Holstein, on pretence of their being +not Danish, but German, and her subsequent retention of them for herself +on the plea of their having always been not German, but Danish, are +applauded as acts perfectly consistent with each other and with the +eternal fitness of things. And all this is urged in the best possible +faith. Of the recited enormities, were not some, steps to the +regeneration of France--others, to the unifaction of Germany? And what +are myriads of lives in comparison with a regenerate--what violation of +the most solemn engagements in comparison with a united, people? Did not +the millions of Frenchmen who survived the Reign of Terror gain more +than was lost by the thousands who were guillotined at Paris, or drowned +at Nantes, or shot down at Lyons? Is not Germany likely to turn Kiel to +far better account than Denmark ever did or could have done? and will +not German ascendency be abundant compensation for Danish decadence? How +culpably misplaced, then, were conscientious scruples that would have +impeded the march of events in such directions! Ends need but to be +great enough to justify any means. Let but the good promise to exceed +the evil, and there is no evil which ought not to be done in order that +good may come of it. Thus slightly qualified, the Satanic adage, 'Evil, +be thou my good,' is, without more ado, accepted as the utilitarian +watchword. + +And what though it be only the most thorough-paced Utilitarians who go +these extreme lengths? These lengths, extreme as they are, are +legitimate deductions from tenets held in common by the most moderate +and cautious as well as by the most reckless of the sect. Crime in the +abstract is condemned not less vehemently by the latter than by the +former; but by both equally it is condemned on account, not of its +inherent vileness, but solely of its observed results. If the results +were different, the agency to which they are due would be fitted with a +different epithet. If a world could be conceived to be so organised, or, +if this world of ours could be conceived to be so changed as that the +practice of killing, stealing, or telling lies would be conducive to the +general good, the practice in question would obtain a new name in the +Utilitarian vocabulary. Crime would become beneficence; and to kill, to +steal, or to tell lies would be not wrong, but right. These are +propositions which, without abjuring the prime articles of his creed, +the most timid Utilitarian has no alternative but to endorse; but how, +then, can he shut his eyes to their obvious application? How presume to +rebuke those earnest philanthropists, who, to judge from their habitual +language, are firmly of opinion that annihilation of one half of mankind +would be a small price to pay for conversion of the other moiety into +citizens of a world-wide Red Republic; or those admirers of Prince +Bismarck, who, holding national aggrandisement to be the national +_summum bonum_, deem the most solemn treaties that might impede it to be +obstacles which it is obligatory on a patriot to set aside? Will not the +effects of any given cause vary with the changes in the circumstances in +which the cause acts? May it not easily happen that the direct effect of +some private crime shall be to augment, instead of to diminish the total +happiness of all the persons affected by it? And is it not, then, +conceivable that a public crime, provided it be of sufficient magnitude, +may more than counterpoise, by the good it is calculated to do, all the +harm that all crimes of the same description either have done or are +likely to do hereafter? It is idle to reply that such a comparison +between public good and evil must needs be mistaken: that the harm, for +instance, which violation of treaties does to mankind by sapping the +foundations of international confidence, rendering impossible +international co-operation, and bringing the very name of international +morality into contempt, is infinitely beyond any good it can do in the +shape of national aggrandisement. Whether this be so or not is matter of +opinion, on which every one may fairly insist on forming his own, and if +that opinion be in the negative, a utilitarian agent, in Prince +Bismarck's circumstances, would be bound in duty to imitate Prince +Bismarck's high-handed policy. In all circumstances of international +import, in all cases bearing upon the general interests of society, a +Utilitarian, after deciding according to his lights which of the various +courses open to him would best promote the general welfare, either +immediately by its direct effects, or subsequently and indirectly by the +example it would set, would be bound in duty to adopt that course. That +course, however wrong it might have appeared in all previous cases, +would now become right, as being apparently the one most conducive to +the future welfare of mankind. Utilitarianism's standard of morality +thus turns out to be, not any fixed and definite notion of expediency, +but one liable to change with every change in individual judgment. Its +boasted criterion of the right or wrong of an action is the best +conjecture which the agent, with or without extrinsic advice, is able to +form of the future consequences of the action. Utilitarian law, in +short, resolves itself into this--that every man shall be a law unto +himself. Of course no Utilitarians will acknowledge this to be their +law, not even those who shape their conduct in exact conformity to it. +Nevertheless, that such is the law follows necessarily from their own +premises. For does not Utilitarianism sometimes--a little heedlessly, +perhaps, but not the less positively--declare that the morality of an +action depends not at all upon its motives, but exclusively upon its +consequences? Does it not, when most guarded in its language, affirm the +morality of actions to depend upon their tendencies, that is to say, on +their consequences at large, and in the long run? But there can never be +perfect certainty as to consequences. With regard to the future, +plausible conjecture is the utmost possible; and by differing judgments +different conjectures will needs be made. So that the value of the rule +of conduct furnished by Utilitarianism to any individual depends upon +the latter's ability, supplemented by that of any counsellors whom he +may consult, to forecast events. He cannot proceed correctly, except in +so far as he or they have the gift of prophecy. However dull his vision +may be, he must content himself with his own blind guidance, unless he +prefer as guide some one who, for aught he can tell, may be as blind as +himself. And it is always for himself to judge whether he will follow +advice: so that in effect every Utilitarian is his own moral law-giver; +and, certainly, a worse assignment of legislative functions cannot be +imagined. + +But the mischievousness of Utilitarianism does not stop here. We have +seen how one of its principles destroys the landmarks between right and +wrong, between virtue and vice, causing each to take continually the +place of its opposite. We have now to see how another of its principles +obliterates all distinctions between different kinds of virtue, +confounding them in one indiscriminate mass, and imparting to them a +sort of general oneness not more lucid than that which, according to +Mr. Curdle, is the essence of the dramatic unities. + +The object which it insists upon as conduct's end and aim is the general +good--the greatest possible aggregate of good or happiness for all. As +the Scriptures enjoin us, whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, +to do all to the glory of God, so Utilitarianism exhorts us to do all +for the welfare of mankind. Now, far be it from me to caricature this +soul-inspiring rule by forcing it, under a strained construction, to an +unnatural extreme. Fairly examined, it will be seen to make no +extravagant demands on our self-denial. As Christianity, even while +bidding us to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, +promises that all other things shall be added unto us, so +Utilitarianism, even while insisting on our seeking first to please +others, permits, nay, directs, us to take as much pleasure for ourselves +as we can lay hold of without depriving others, since the aggregate of +happiness which it is incumbent upon us to augment to the best of our +ability would otherwise be less. Nay, for the same reason, it +disapproves of our foregoing any pleasure of our own, the full +equivalent of which is not transferred to others. The happiness which it +requires us to attend to is that of a society of which each of us is a +component member, and no member of which can deny himself any pleasure +within his reach, and beyond the reach of others, without diminishing +the total of happiness which the whole society might enjoy. 'As between +his own happiness and that of others,' says Mr. Mill, 'Utilitarianism +requires an agent to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and +benevolent spectator.' Thus qualified, the prescribed subordination of +one's own to the general good is no such extravagantly self-denying +ordinance. If for anything, it might rather be reproached for its cold, +calculating equity. With reference quite as much to individual as to +communal happiness it is an excellent rule of conduct, against which not +a word could be said, provided only it were left to be adopted +voluntarily, and were not authoritatively imposed. + +Unfortunately, however, Utilitarianism allows no option in the matter. +Unless we do our very utmost to promote the general weal, at whatever +sacrifice to ourselves, it charges us with sin of omission. In the words +of one of the ablest among able Editors, 'justice is the social idea in +its highest, widest, and most binding expression.... It signifies the +moral principle which obliges each so to shape his conduct and +relations, his claims and his achievements, that they harmonise with the +highest good of all.'[4] To which doctrine of Mr. Morley's, if other +Utilitarians do not subscribe, it can only be because they are less +resolutely logical. Mr. Mill, indeed, though dissenting in appearance on +this point from Mr. Morley, agrees with him in substance. Even when on +one occasion, distinguishing between duty and virtue, he says that there +are innumerable acts and forbearances of human beings which, though +either causes or hindrances of good to their fellow-creatures, lie +beyond the domain of duty, and within that of virtue or merit, he goes +on to assign as the sole reason for placing them in the domain of the +latter that, in respect to them, it is, on the whole, for the general +interest that people should be left free, thereby plainly intimating +that society would be equitably entitled to insist on them if it thought +proper. But conduct that can be equitably insisted on is clearly, in the +strictest sense, duty; and it would be preposterous to claim merit for +doing that which it would be a breach of duty to leave undone. Duties do +not cease to be duties because he on whom they are incumbent is not +compelled under penalty to perform them, any more than debts cease to be +debts because creditors do not choose to ask for payment. All consistent +utilitarian teaching points inflexibly towards Mr. Morley's conclusion, +according to which justice and social virtue are absolutely identical, +and according to which, also, whoever does not shape his 'conduct, &c., +in harmony with the highest good of all,' does less than is due from +him, while it is impossible for him to do more. For whatever he propose +to do must either be or not be in the prescribed harmony. If it be, he +is bound to do it. If not, he is bound not to do it. The very utmost he +can do is no more than is incumbent upon him. Less than his very utmost +is less than is incumbent. No action of his, therefore, can possess any +merit; for mere fulfilment of obligations is reckoned not of grace, but +of debt. Having done everything, he is still but an unprofitable +servant; he has but done that which was his duty to do. Where, then, is +the boast of virtue? It is excluded. By what law? By that of +Utilitarianism, set forth in its full amplitude. Honesty and generosity, +faith, truth, charity, patient endurance, and chivalrous self-devotion, +all are mingled together under the name of justice, and justice itself +only remains just as long as it remains identical with the largest +expediency. + +At this rate we cannot possibly have any virtue to plume ourselves upon. +The best we can do being no more than our duly, the only reward we can +claim is exemption from the punishment we should have deserved if we had +not done it. Whether it be that we have abstained from killing or +robbing our fellow-citizens for our own advantage, or have impoverished +or half-killed ourselves in the service of the State, our meed is the +same. _Loris non ureris. Non pasces in cruce corvos_, is what we are +told. We may congratulate ourselves on having escaped the +cat-o'-nine-tails and the gallows. Well, we have, most of us, so much +self-sufficiency, that to deprive us of all ground for it might be a +fault on the right side. But now comes a second and more awkward +reflection. If you will not of your own accord do your duty, those to +whom performance of the duty is owing have a right to use means to make +you--foul means if fair means will not avail. If, then, you hesitate to +do your utmost for the interests of society, society is warranted in +taking measures to accelerate your movement. If you are not, or what is +practically the same thing, if a numerical majority of your +fellow-citizens think you are not, making the most beneficial use of +your property; if it be generally considered that it would be for the +greater good of the greater number to divide your park and garden into +peasant properties and cottage allotments, to double the wages of the +workmen in your employment, or to subject you and the likes of you to a +graduated income tax for the purpose of setting up national workshops to +compete with you in your own trade; and, if you do not readily enter +into the same views, then the said numerical majority are not simply +warranted in taking the law into their own hands and doing, in spite of +you, what they think ought to be done with your property, but would be +culpably remiss if they neglected so to act. + +Now it is needless to dwell on the extent to which that large numerical +majority of our fellow-citizens which consists of the working classes is +imbued with this notion, nor, except to those who are similarly imbued, +can it be necessary to insist that there is no notion of which it is +more indispensable to disabuse the working-class mind. This, +accordingly, I strove to do throughout a recent work of mine, 'On +Labour,' particularly in the chapter which treats of the claims and +rights thereof. I there earnestly pleaded that there may be, and are, +private rights independent of utility which no public needs can cancel; +that all which any man, or set of men, is entitled to exact from another +is payment or fulfilment of what is due to him or them from that other; +that unless the poverty of the many has been caused by the few, the many +are not warranted in extorting relief of their wants from the few; that +the mere circumstance of their being without food or work does not +entitle the poor to be fed or employed by the rich, for that there is +likewise a justice independent of and superior to utility, consisting +simply of respect for rights, while injustice consists simply of +violation of rights. + +In so arguing, I ran directly counter to Utilitarianism, provoking +thereby a retaliatory assault from Utilitarianism's tutelary champion, +who, as readers of the 'Fortnightly Review'[5] are aware, bore down upon +me with an energy no whit the less effective for being tempered with all +knightly courtesy. Yet, not to say it vaingloriously, I am not conscious +of having been shaken in the saddle, and I now return to the encounter +with modest assurance, firmly believing mine to be the better cause, and +recollecting too that in a contest with Mr. Mill, let the issue be what +it may, I may at least comfort myself with the reflection + + Minus turpe vinci quam contendisse decorum. + +I must at the outset be permitted to remark that one or two of Mr. +Mill's objections to my statements are based upon misconception of their +meaning. I never questioned, but, on the contrary, have always in the +distinctest terms admitted that society is perfectly at liberty to put +an end to the institution of property in land. No extremest Socialist +ever went beyond me in proclaiming that the 'earth was bestowed by the +Creator, not on any privileged class or classes, but on all mankind and +on all successive generations of men, so that no one generation can have +more than a life interest in the soil, or be entitled to alienate the +birthright of succeeding generations.'[6] No one more fully recognises +that property in land exists only on sufferance and by concession, and +that society, which made the concession, may at any moment take it back +on giving full compensation to the concessioners. + +Again, when asserting the inviolability of moveable, as distinguished +from landed, property, I was careful to limit the assertion to property +honestly acquired. I never supposed it possible to acquire by +prescription 'a fee simple in an injustice.' Only, if in any particular +instance it be suspected that property has been acquired by force, +fraud, or robbery, I contend that the _onus probandi_ lies on him who +raises the question. It is for him to show, if he can, that a commercial +fortune has, as Mr. Mill suggests, been built up by 'jobbing contracts, +profligate loans, or other reprehensible practices.' But if this cannot +be shown, the validity of the actual possessor's title must not be +impugned. Property must be treated as of innocent acquisition and +derivation until proved to be of guilty. And that not merely because +there could otherwise be no rights of property at all, since it must +always be impossible for any owner to demonstrate that neither he nor +any one of those from whom he derives ever either overreached in a +bargain or failed in a contract; but also, and much more, because +whether a person be or be not the rightful owner of the wealth in his +possession, no one can possibly be entitled to despoil him unless the +wealth can be shown to have been ill-gotten. That right must be held to +be complete with which no one can show a right to interfere. + +The gravest, however, of Mr. Mill's criticisms is that mine is 'a +doctrine _à priori_, claiming to command assent by its own light, and to +be evident by simple intuition.' This is an imputation to which I am so +unaware of having laid myself open that I can account for its having +been made only on the supposition that Mr. Mill, in common with most +other Utilitarians, imagines that their only opponents are +Intuitionists, and that it is only necessary to set aside the tenets of +these in order to get their own established instead. If this were really +the case, utilitarian advocacy would be a comparatively easy task. +Intuitionism, whether capable or not of being disproved, is by its +nature unsusceptible of decisive proof. If I, in support of the +proposition that there is in the human mind an intuitive sense of any +sort, were to assert that I had such a sense while you denied that you +had, it would be impossible for me to prove you to be mistaken, while, +unless you were mistaken as to your individual experience, I should +clearly be mistaken as to the generalisation which I had based upon +mine. But I never said a word about an intuitive sense of right and +wrong. How could I, seeing, as no one who chooses to look can fail to +see, that the instincts of untutored children prompt them to disregard +all rights but their own, to spit cockchafers, rob birds' nests, and +confiscate younger children's cakes and apples? All I say is that there +may be and are rights independent of and even opposed to utility, and +these, for reasons which shall immediately be stated, I call natural +rights; but I do not say that they are intuitively perceived. As for +sense of justice or of duty, or moral sense or faculty, what I +understand by that is not recognition of certain rights or duties as +such, but recognition of the obligation to respect whatever rights +and to fulfil whatever duties are recognised, according to which +definition it is mere tautology to add that the sense or faculty in +question originates simultaneously with the recognition of any rights +or duties. For inasmuch as rights invariably imply corresponding +obligations--inasmuch as if a thing be rightfully claimed, that same +thing must needs be due or owing, it is of course impossible to perceive +that a thing is _owing_ without perceiving at the same moment that it +_ought_ to be paid. On this account, and with this explanation, I should +not scruple to speak of the moral sense as intuitive; but if for that +reason I am to be called an Intuitionist, so equally must Mr. Mill, for +he has said precisely the same thing. He likewise has said that 'the +moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural out-growth from +it, capable, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously.' + + +II. + +By my avowal of a belief in 'Natural Rights,' I feel that I must have +incurred in philosophic quarters a sort of civil contempt, which I am +very desirous of removing, and which will, I trust, be somewhat +diminished on my proceeding to explain how few and elementary are the +rights that I propose for naturalisation. They are but two in number, +and they are these:--(1) Absolute right, except in so far as the same +may have been forfeited by misconduct or modified by consent, to deal in +any way one pleases, not noxious to other people, with one's own self or +person; (2) right equally absolute to dispose similarly of the produce +either of one's own honest industry, or of that of others whose rights +in connection with it have been honestly acquired by oneself. I call +these 'rights,' because there cannot possibly anywhere exist either the +right to prevent their being exercised, or any rights with which they +can clash, and because, therefore, by their freest exercise, no one can +possibly be wronged, while to interfere with their exercise would be to +wrong their possessor. And I call them 'natural,' because they are not +artificially created, and have no need of external ratification. Whoever +thinks proper to deny this--whoever, as all Utilitarians do, contends +that society is entitled to interfere with the rights which I have +called natural, is bound to attempt to show how society became so +entitled; when for the claim he puts forward on society's behalf he will +find it impossible to produce any plausible pretext, without crediting +society with possession of a right belonging to that same 'natural' +class, the existence of which he denies. For, as there can be no rights +without corresponding obligations or duties, if it be really the right +of society to deal at its discretion with the persons or effects of +individuals, it must be incumbent on individuals to permit themselves +and whatever is theirs to be so dealt with. Have, then, individuals +incurred any such obligation? No obligation, be it remembered, can +arise, except through some antecedent act of one or other or both of the +parties concerned. Either a pledge of some sort must have been given or +a benefit of some sort must have been received. Now undoubtedly there +are no limits to the extent to which society and its individual members +might have reciprocally pledged themselves. It might have been +stipulated by their articles of association that society at large should +do its utmost for the welfare of each of its members, and that each of +its members should do his utmost for the welfare of society at large. +But it is certain, either that no such compact ever was made, or that, +if made, it has always been systematically set at nought. Society has +never made much pretence of troubling itself about the welfare of +individuals, except in certain specified particulars; so that, even if +individuals had, on condition of being treated with reciprocal +solicitude, accepted the obligation of attending to the welfare of +society in other than the same particulars, that conditional obligation +would from the commencement have been null and void. The one thing which +society invariably pledges itself to do is to protect person and +property, and by implication to enforce performance of contracts; and +the two things which individual associates in turn pledge themselves to +do are to abstain from molesting each other's persons and property, and +to assist society in protecting both. In so abstaining and so assisting +consist all those 'many acts and the still greater number of +forbearances, the perpetual practice of which by all is,' as Mr. Mill +says, 'universally deemed to be so necessary to the general well-being, +that people must be held to it compulsorily, either by law or by social +pressure.'[7] Under one or other of these two heads may be ranged +everything that individuals owe to society in return for the mere +protection which they receive from it. + +True, there is an universal understanding that individuals shall be +subject to any laws, whether wise or foolish, provided only they be of +equal and impartial operation, which may be enacted by a numerical +majority of the community to which the individuals belong; and in this +manner individuals may become bound by any number of miscellaneous +pledges, society acquiring simultaneously the right to hold individuals +to the performance of those pledges. Thus, if by the vote of an +unimpeachably representative House of Commons it were declared to be for +the general good, and agreed to accordingly, that every one should be +vaccinated or circumcised, it would be incumbent on every one to submit +quietly to vaccination or circumcision, however deleterious the +operation might be deemed by some. Or if, improving upon a hypothetical +suggestion of Mr. Mill, a parliament elected by constituencies in which +the labouring-class element greatly predominated, should prospectively +forbid the accumulation by any individual of property beyond a specified +amount, then, though the almost certain consequence would be that the +prescribed limit of accumulation would not be exceeded, still if it were +exceeded, the accumulator could not justly complain when the surplus was +forfeited according to law. Yet even thus the obligations or duties +created will correspond exactly with the pledges given; none will be +incurred except such as have been imposed by special legislation--nor +even those, unless the legislation have been impartial. A law requiring +people to pay poor's-rates would not suffice as a pretext for requiring +them to pay education rates likewise. Neither if, instead of passing the +prospective law just now supposed, a governing majority which had +previously always permitted the indefinite accumulation of wealth, were +retrospectively to decree the forfeiture of all past accumulations +beyond a defined amount, would individuals be morally bound to submit to +such a decree if they could contrive to evade it, any more than +sexquipedalians would be bound to lay their heads on the block in +obedience to a law directing everybody six feet high to be decapitated. +All such partial legislation would be tyrannical, and circumstances must +be very peculiar indeed to make submission to tyranny a duty. But of all +conceivable legislation, none could possibly be more partial, or +therefore more tyrannical, than such as should give to society a general +power of dealing at its pleasure with its associates, and of arbitrarily +subjecting separate classes or individuals to exceptional treatment. +Even, therefore, if a law to such monstrous effect were enacted, it +could have no morally binding force. It would be no one's duty to +acquiesce in it. + +I will not here stop to dispute, though I am not sure that I could +without some slight reservation admit, that the receipt of unasked-for +benefits places the recipient under precisely the same obligation to +benefit his benefactor, as if the good received by him had been +conferred on express condition of his availing himself of the first +opportunity to render equal good. I will not stop to dispute, for +instance, that a person saved from drowning at the risk of his own +rescuer's life, would be bound, on occasion arising, to risk his own +life in order to save his former rescuer's. For my immediate purpose, it +may suffice to remark that society has never been in the habit of +showing such parental solicitude for its component members as would +warrant its claiming filial devotion from them. In the matter of +philanthropy its practice has never been in advance of its very moderate +professions. It has invariably contented itself with rendering certain +specific services, never failing to exact in return fully equivalent +services of each species. + +In candour, however, there must be admitted to be innumerable blessings +not yet adverted to, including indeed most of those by the possession of +which man is distinguished from brutes, for which he is in so far +indebted to society that, but for the instrumentality of society, they +would never have been his. Unless individuals had formed themselves into +communities, civilization could have made no sensible progress: there +could have been no considerable advances, material, intellectual, moral, +or æsthetic. Not only should we have been destitute of all the comforts +and luxuries that now surround us, we should have lacked also whatever +cerebral development we have attained, together with all its +concomitants and consequences; whatever of intelligence, or moral +perceptiveness, or artistic taste we have to boast of. Still, though +none of these faculties could have made much approach to maturity except +under the shelter of society, they are not gifts of society. Without the +help of a plough, land cannot be ploughed; but we do not therefore +credit the ploughmaker with the achievements of the ploughman. Neither +is society to take to itself praise because its members have made good +use of the protection which, in consideration of stipulated services on +their part, it has afforded them. Besides, whatever we inherit from +society, we inherit from a society of members no longer in being. Let +the dead come to life again, and it may then become us to examine their +claims upon our gratitude, but we need not meanwhile confound past and +present generations, nor our forefathers with our contemporaries. To the +mass of these latter, at any rate, we are none of us indebted for our +brains or our aptitudes of thought and feeling, and the circumstance of +our being joint sharers with them in patrimony bequeathed by a common +ancestry, affords no very obvious reason why our share of the +inheritance, together with whatever else we possess, should be at their +absolute disposal. + +Thus it appears that in no one of the ways in which alone can +originate the obligations which must always precede or accompany +artificially-created rights, has that particular obligation arisen +without which it is impossible for society to obtain artificially the +right of preventing individuals from doing as they will with their own. +No sufficient pledge has been given by one side, no sufficient benefit +conferred by the other. Individuals never agreed to place their all at +the disposal of society; society never rendered to individuals any +services entitling it to claim such boundless gratitude. One service +which it invariably undertakes is that of protecting person and +property. This is its chief and primary duty, the fulfilment of which is +always the first object of its institution, often the only one it +acknowledges. But clearly it cannot by performance of a duty acquire the +right of doing the exact reverse of that duty. It cannot by protecting +acquire the right of molesting. It cannot by preventing person and +property from being meddled with, acquire in its corporate capacity the +right of itself meddling. Since then this right of meddling, this right +of disposing of what is exclusively some individual's own, otherwise +than the owner wishes, has not been acquired by society artificially, it +must, if it do actually belong to society, have been come by naturally; +and this accordingly is what Utilitarians really, though perhaps +unconsciously, assume, treating moreover this gratuitous assumption of +theirs as a self-evident truth. + +For, as Utilitarians themselves cannot fail on reflection to perceive, +they offer no shadow of argument in support of that 'greatest happiness +principle' on which their whole system rests. Commencing with the +undeniable postulate that happiness is the sole object of existence, and +perceiving that individual happiness alone would be a very misleading +object, they proceed to take quietly for granted that the only happiness +at which life ought to aim is social happiness. Now, undoubtedly social +happiness is of more importance than individual happiness--the happiness +of many than that of one or a few; neither can there be any worthier +object of pursuit than the greatest happiness of the greatest number. +All this is seen without being said, but what is by no means so easily +seen is how it can be incumbent on any one to pursue that object to his +own detriment--how it can be imperative on one or on a few to sacrifice +his or their happiness in order to promote that of the many. Plainly +such self-devotion cannot be for their personal advantage, and +Utilitarianism does not even attempt to show how it can have become +their duty. Meritorious, magnanimous, heroic in the highest degree it +would certainly be, but does not that very circumstance prove +conclusively that it cannot be due, inasmuch as there is nothing +meritorious in merely doing one's duty and paying one's debts? But of +that which is not due, how can payment be rightfully insisted upon? What +the few are under no obligation to yield, how can the many be entitled +to extort, or how can the worthiness of the latter's object excuse their +doing that which they have no right to do? Is any object, however +worthy, to be pursued regardless of all collateral considerations? To +these objections Utilitarians have no answer to make. All they can do is +tacitly to take for granted the disputed duty and right. That the less +ought to give way to the greater, and the few to the many, and that the +many may rightfully therefore, if need be, use force to compel the less +or the few to give way--these are treated by them as incontestable +propositions, even as 'doctrines _à priori_, claiming assent by their +own light, evident by simple intuition.' And although thus from their +own inner consciousness evolving the very first principles of their own +philosophy, the premises of their deduction that social happiness is the +proper aim in life, and that conduciveness to such happiness is the test +of morality--'Intuitionists,' strange to say, is the distinctive +appellation which they propose to affix to all those who hesitate to +accept as ethical foundation stones the results of their intuitional +evolution. + +Scarcely by a taunt so readily rebuttable will anti-Utilitarians be +excited to speedier apprehension of the nature of the lien which +corporate self-interest is presumed to have upon individual +self-devotion. Not the less tenaciously may they cling to their belief +in the right of every one to do as he will with whatever has come by +fair means into his exclusive and complete possession. Neither, I +venture to think, need less store be set by that right in consequence of +an objection very adroitly taken to it by Mr. Mill, which, on account +both of its inherent ingenuity and of its having been addressed more +immediately to myself, it would be inexcusable in me to leave +unexamined. In Mr. Mill's opinion, the right in question, even if valid, +would be valueless, because it would be neutralised by precisely similar +rights belonging to society. If, he argues, individuals are at liberty +to do as they will with their own, so likewise must society be. But +'existing social arrangements and law itself exist in virtue not only of +the forbearance, but of the active support of the labouring classes' who +in every community constitute a numerical majority. This working-class +majority might then if they pleased withdraw their support from existing +arrangements, thereby depriving person and property of social +protection; and by merely threatening such withdrawal they could compel +individuals to acquiesce in their most extravagant demands. 'They might +bind the rich to take the whole burden of taxation upon themselves. They +might bind them to give employment, at liberal wages, to a number of +labourers in a direct ratio to the amount of their incomes. They might +enforce on them a total abolition of inheritance and bequest.' Mr. Mill +maintains that these things, although exceedingly foolish, might +according to my principles, with perfect equity be done; nay, if I +understand him correctly, that according neither to mine nor to any one +else's principles can any adequate reason be assigned why they should +not be done, except that their practical results would be baneful +instead of beneficial. And taking this view, he is fully warranted in +asking what it can matter that according to my theory 'an employer does +no wrong in making the use he does of his capital, if the same theory +would justify the employed in compelling him by law to make a different +use--if the labourers would in no way infringe the definition of justice +by taking the matter into their own hands and establishing by law any +modification of the rights of property which in their opinion would +increase the remuneration of their labour.'[8] + +My reply to this and to the whole argument is the following. So long as +society continues to exist, society cannot divest itself of the primary +function for the discharge of which it was originally constituted. +Society, having come together in the first instance, tacitly pledged to +extend protection to each individual associate, cannot, without breach +of contract, withdraw that protection. It may, indeed, make any +impartial laws it pleases, and attach any penalty it pleases to +violation of any impartial law, but it cannot in equity, whatever it may +in practice, place any of its members outside the law; neither, most +certainly, even if its competence did extend thus far, could it go the +farther length of conferring on any one the right of doing wrong to an +outlaw. It may even be doubted whether, if an outlaw were to injure any +one still belonging to the society, any but the injured person himself +would be warranted in retaliating. The sole reason that I can perceive +why even he would is, that his rights had been infringed, and that +reparation was due to him for any damage sustained by him in +consequence, while, on the other hand, the aggressor had forfeited those +rights of his which might otherwise have forbidden the injured person +from taking the reparation due. But society had had none of its rights +infringed. By society no injury had been sustained. To society, +therefore, no reparation was due; and society, it seems to me, would +have no right to insist on exacting reparation not due to itself from +one whom it had forcibly extruded from its communion, and who, +therefore, was no longer amenable to its jurisdiction. Society might, +indeed, dissolve itself, proclaiming that 'every man for himself, and +God for all,' should thenceforward be the rule. But although it might +thus leave individual rights without other defence than that of the +owner, it could not annihilate individual rights. It might cancel the +right to mutual protection, but it could not, in place of that, create a +right of mutual molestation. One's own person and property would still +be as much one's own as before, and whoever outraged either would not be +the less a wrong doer because society permitted his wrong doing to +remain unpunished. In all ethical investigations it is impossible to +guard too watchfully against the smallest approach to confusion of might +with right. + +Instead of being valueless, the particular rights of which Mr. Mill +speaks so disparagingly, appear to me to possess a value which can +scarcely be exaggerated. They are, as may be readily perceived, +identical with the two which I have termed 'natural,' and of which I +began by saying that they are exceedingly elementary, but of which I +have now to add that they are also all-comprehensive, for that there are +no genuine rights whatever, however numerous or complex, which neither +are included within, nor branch out from, them. This will be manifest on +comparison of them with the items enumerated in any other catalogue of +rights; as, for instance, with the one drawn up by Mr. Mill, according +to whom all rights may be classified as follows:--(1) Legal rights; (2) +moral rights; (3) the right of every one to that which he deserves; (4) +the right to fulfilment of engagements; (5) right to impartiality of +treatment; (6) right to equality of treatment.[9] Each of these +varieties will repay a brief examination. + +Under the head of 'legal' rights are commonly placed, not those only +which are conferred, but those also which are confirmed, by law. Such as +law has merely confirmed, however, are of course not the creatures of +law. But it is admitted on all hands that a law may be unjust--that is +to say, it may without consent from the parties concerned, infringe some +previously existing right--and as the right so violated cannot have been +created by law, inasmuch as what law had been competent to create, law +would be equally competent to cancel--it is clear that there must be +rights other than those created by law, rights whose origin was +independent of, and anterior to, law. It is apparently to rights of this +description that Mr. Mill applies the name of 'moral' rights. Examples +of them are a man's rights to personal liberty and to property in +whatever belongs to him as having become his by honest means, to both of +which, unless he had forfeited them by misconduct, he would be equally +entitled, whether his title to them were or were not recognised by law. +The only genuine rights which law can create, or consequently can have +to confer, are privileges in respect of person or property other than +one's own. But such legalised privileges are not necessarily rights. +Whether they are so actually or not depends mainly on the character of +the legislative authority. A right to interfere with rights not based +upon law cannot be conferred without the consent of the parties in whom +the independent rights are vested, given either directly by themselves +or indirectly through their representatives. If a legislative body be +truly and thoroughly representative of the community which it controls, +then every one of its enactments, however bad or foolish, is virtually +an engagement to which every member of the community is a party, and any +privilege arising out of it becomes to all intents and purposes a right. +If, on the other hand, the legislative authority be autocratic, or if it +represent only certain favoured sections of the community, then none of +its enactments, however wise and good, of which a majority of the public +disapprove, and which interfere with the rights termed by Mr. Mill +'moral,' are morally binding, except on the legislators themselves and +their immediate constituents. Any one else may quite blamelessly break +the law, and resist any privilege thereby created, though he must, of +course, be prepared, in case of detection, to take the legal +consequences of his disobedience. For example, protective duties, +however impolitic, if imposed because a majority of the nation were of +opinion that a certain branch of domestic industry had better be +fostered by protection, could not be evaded without injustice to those +engaged in the protected industry, though there would be no injustice in +smuggling, if they had been imposed in opposition to the general sense +of the public by a packed Parliament or an absolute monarch. The same +legal monopoly, which in the one case could not be justly evaded, could +not in the other be justly enforced. A legal privilege, in short, +becomes a right only when a majority of those at whose expense it is to +be exercised, have formally consented either directly or indirectly to +its being exercised; and it then becomes a right solely because an +engagement has been entered into, in virtue of which, whatever is +requisite for its satisfaction has become due. Thus it appears that, +whatever legal rights are genuine, and are not at the same time 'moral' +rights also, resolve themselves into specimens of the right to +fulfilment of engagements, and belong not more to the first than to the +fourth of Mr. Mill's categories, to which latter, therefore, we may at +once transfer our attention. + +Why is it, then, that every one has a right to fulfilment of +engagements, to have faith kept with him, to have promises observed? +Solely, as it seems to me, because whatever has been promised to any one +becomes eventually his due, and because whatever is due or owing ought +to be paid. A promise is nothing less than a prospective transfer of +property in some thing, or in the advantage derivable from some action, +and when the time appointed for making the transfer arrives, whatever +has been promised, whether actually transferred or not, becomes the +complete property of, and in the fullest sense of the word belongs to +him to whom it has been promised; so that the right to fulfilment of +engagements resolves itself into the moral right of every one to have +that which belongs to him, and we have already seen that every legal +right which cannot on other grounds be shown to be a moral right +resolves itself into a right to fulfilment of an engagement. Whence it +follows that there are no legal rights whatever which are not likewise +moral rights, and which might not therefore be equally rights, even +though they had never been legalised. Whence, and from what has just +been observed with respect to the right to fulfilment of engagements, it +further follows that of the five branches of Mr. Mill's classification, +the first and fourth may without inconvenience be dispensed with, and +that the second will suffice to do duty for itself and for the other +two. + +We have next to consider a person's right to that which he deserves, +with reference to which, and to my assertion that there is no necessary +correspondence between the remuneration which a labourer ought to +receive and either his merits or his needs, Mr. Mill inquires as +follows:--'If justice be an affair of intuition, if we are guided to it +by the immediate and spontaneous perceptions of the moral sense, what +doctrines of justice are there on which the human race would more +instantaneously and with one accord put the stamp of its recognition +than these--that it is just that each should have what he deserves, and +that, in the dispensation of good things, those whose wants are the most +urgent should have the preference?' But surely however just it be that +each should have what he deserves, it is so only on condition that he +have it from those from whom it is due, and do not take it from those +from whom it is not due. The latter, surely, at least as much deserve to +be allowed to keep what they have already by honest means got, as others +to get what they have not yet got. But if so, then that these should be +deprived of their deserts, in order that those may get theirs, is surely +about the very last doctrine that ought to be put forward as +self-evident and intuitive. 'But,' Mr. Mill proceeds to ask, 'if there +be in the natural constitution of things something patently unjust, +something contrary to sentiments of justice, which sentiments, being +intuitive, are supposed to have been implanted in us by the same Creator +who made the order of things that they protest against--do not these +sentiments impose upon us the duty of striving by all human means to +repair the injustice? And if, on the contrary, we avail ourselves of it +for our own personal advantage, do we not make ourselves participators +in injustice, allies and auxiliaries of the Evil Principle?'[10] Now, as +I have already said, I am myself no intuitionist, but if I were, I +should not the less feel warranted in here replying that by no theory of +justice, intuitive or other, can the passive spectator of an injustice +to which he is no party be bound to assist in repairing the injustice, +simply because he has the means. A creditor denied payment of his fair +debts does not get what he deserves; but upon whom, except the +defaulting debtor, does it therefore become incumbent to repair the +latter's injustice by paying his debts? And if there be in the general +order of mundane affairs, as--provided I may attribute the existence of +it, as of all other evil, not to God, but to the devil--I don't mind +admitting there may be--something which prevents many of our +fellow-creatures from getting their desserts, something contrary, +therefore, to our sentiments of justice whether those sentiments have +been implanted in us by the Creator or not, I still maintain that those +sentiments do not impose upon us the duty of striving to correct the +injustice. They necessarily stimulate us more or less powerfully, +according to their own intrinsic strength, to undertake that noblest of +all tasks, but they do not render it imperative upon us. Whether, if we +actively avail ourselves of the injustice for our own profit--though +this, by the way, is no more than every one of us does who takes +advantage of competition among labourers to obtain labour for a less +price than he perceives it to be worth--we are not making ourselves +auxiliaries of the Evil Principle, may be matter of opinion; but, at all +events, we do not even then become participators in an injustice which +we did not create, and do not uphold or help to perpetuate, but merely +accommodate ourselves to. At worst, we are but accessories to it after +the fact. In simply accepting the situation and striving to make the +best of it for ourselves, without trying to make it better and only +abstaining from making it worse for others, our conduct may be +contemptible, mean, base, disgusting, or what you will, only not +iniquitous; for whatever, short of their deserts, may, from the cause +supposed, be received by our fellow-creatures, although in one sense +plainly due to them, is as plainly not due from us, and we cannot, +without palpable injustice, as well as palpable abuse of words, be +charged with injustice for merely declining to pay debts that we do not +owe. + +The rights to impartial and to equal treatment need not detain us long. +There is no right to impartiality except where impartiality is due, and +it is only in a small minority of cases that impartiality is due. There +is nothing iniquitous in showing favour to the extent of giving one +person more than his due, provided no other person be prevented from +having as much as his due. The lord of the vineyard who gave unto all +his labourers alike, the same to those who had wrought for him but one +hour as to those with whom he had agreed that for a penny they should +bear the burden and heat of the day, did the latter no wrong; his eye +was not the less good because theirs was evil. A judge, or an +arbitrator, or the conductor of a competitive examination, is bound to +make his award without respect of persons, because he cannot favour one +without withholding from some other what that other ought to have. On +every distributor of Government patronage, likewise, it is morally +incumbent to select for the public for whom he is trustee, the best +servants he can find. An English Prime Minister has no right to make his +son a Lord of the Treasury or of the Admiralty, if he know of any one +better fitted for the post and willing to accept it; and if he name any +but the fittest candidate, he fails in his duty to the community on +whose behalf he acts. But a private employer, acting for himself alone, +is under no similar obligation, and may take whom he pleases into his +service, and assign to him whatever position therein he pleases, without +affording any cause for reasonable complaint to those more capable +members of his establishment whom he places under one less capable. In +short, except in those rare cases in which impartiality means rendering +what is due, in which cases it is but another name for justice, there is +nothing unjust in disregarding it. + +As for equality, although its 'idea,' as Mr. Mill says, 'often enters as +a component part both into the conception and into the practice of +justice, and in the eyes of many persons constitutes its essence,'[11] I +can think of no single case in which, unless by reason of some special +agreement, it can possibly be due, or in which, consequently, there can +be any right to it. Even that equal protection for whatever is +indisputably one's own, the claim of all to which is commonly admitted +almost as a matter of course, is really due from those only by whom the +obligation to afford it has been tacitly or formally accepted. On this +ground it is due from the public at large, and from those individuals to +whom the public has delegated certain of its tutelary functions, but +from no other individuals whatever. No one else is bound to take, for +the protection of all other people, whatever pains or trouble he takes +for his own security--to watch, for instance, as vigilantly that his +neighbour's house as that his own is not broken into. And while the one +solitary claim of any plausibility to universal equality of treatment +requires to be largely qualified before it can be conceded, there is no +other claim of the kind which does not carry with it its own refutation; +there is no other which does not partake of the absurdity patent in the +communistic notion that all the members of a society are entitled to +share equally in the aggregate produce of the society's labour. How is +it possible that an equal share can be everybody's due, if different +persons may have different deserts, and everyone's deserts be likewise +his due? + +We have now gone completely through the list of artificially created +rights, without finding one that does not derive all its validity from +connection with some pre-existing right. We have seen that among +so-called rights none whatever are genuine by reason merely of any +extrinsic sanction they may have received, but that all real rights +either are such intrinsically, or are based upon, or embody within them, +some right purely intrinsic. We have seen that there are two rights +endued with this intrinsic character--viz., that of absolute control +over one's own self or person, and that of similar control over whatever +else has by honest means come into one's exclusive possession, or become +due or owing to him exclusively; and, because these rights, wherever the +conditions necessary for their exercise occur, of necessity exist, +springing up at once and full grown, in the necessary absence of any +antagonistic rights that could prevent their existing, I have not +scrupled to call them 'natural;' nor do I think that further apology can +be needed for such application of the epithet. To maintain, moreover, +that these natural rights constitute the essence of all artificial +rights, was simply equivalent to saying that no so-called right can be +genuine unless requiring for its satisfaction no more than already +actually belongs or is due to its claimant; while every right which does +require no more must be genuine, because there can nowhere exist the +right to withdraw or to withhold from any one anything that is +exclusively his. These seeming truisms are indeed diametrically opposed +to a theory which enters on its list of friends names no less +illustrious than those of Plato, Sir Thomas More, Bentham, and Mill. +Still, whoever, undeterred by so formidable an array of adverse +authorities, is prepared to accept the description of rights of which +they form part, will have no difficulty in framing a theory of justice +perfectly conformable thereunto. + +The justice of an action consists in its being one, abstinence from +which is due to nobody. The justice of inaction--for just or unjust +behaviour may be either active or passive--consists in there being +nobody to whom action, the reverse of the inaction, is due. 'Justice, +like many other moral attributes, may be best defined by its opposite,' +and all examples of injustice have this one point in common, that they +withhold or withdraw from some person something belonging or due to him, +or in some other way infringe his rights, and consequently wrong him. +Conversely, a point common to and characteristic of all just acts and +omissions, is that they neither prevent anybody from having that which +is due to him, nor in any other way infringe any one's rights, and that +they consequently do no one any wrong. It is not essential to the +justice of conduct that anything due be thereby rendered. It suffices +that nothing due be withheld. All conduct is just by which nobody is +wronged. + +It is further to be noted that all just conduct is of one of three +kinds--that which justice peremptorily exacts; that which she merely +permits, and may even be said barely to tolerate; and that which she +approves of and applauds, without, however, presuming to enjoin it. +Conduct of this last sort is just in that it leaves nothing undone which +justice requires, but it is also more than just in that it does more +than justice requires. To speak of it as simply just, is therefore +somewhat disparaging. It is just in the sense in which the less is +comprehended by the greater. He who faithfully fulfils an engagement +that has provided for his making a reasonable return for whatever +advantage he might obtain under it, shows himself simply just in the +matter, and nothing either more or less. He who, having driven a hard +bargain, insists rigorously upon it, giving nothing less, and taking +nothing more than had been mutually stipulated, is likewise strictly +just, but is also shabby, and deserves to be told so plainly. He who, +besides making full return, according to contract, for value received, +does something more, at some inconvenience to himself, out of regard for +another's need, is not a whit more just than either of the other two, +but he is generous into the bargain, and deserves thanks in proportion. + +Rising out of these considerations are two others equally meriting +attention. + +In the first place, we may see additional cause for distrusting the +testimony which etymology has been supposed to record in favour of 'an +origin of justice connected with the ordinances of law.'[12] That +'_justum_ is a form of _jussum_, that which has been ordered:' that +'[Greek: dikaion] comes directly from [Greek: dikê], a suit of law:' +that '_recht_, from which came right and righteous, is synonymous with +law,' is obvious enough; and it may not be out of place to add that in +French the word _droit_ has, with almost savage irony, been selected as +the technical name, not of law simply, but of legal procedure with all +its crookedness.[13] Still it seems more in the ordinary course of +things to explain this linguistic identification of law with justice, by +supposing conformity to justice to have been the primitive element in +the formation of the notion of law, than by supposing 'conformity to law +to have been the primitive element in the formation of the notion of +justice.' It seems more probable that certain things were commanded +because they were deemed just, than that they were deemed just because +they were commanded. Even the ancient Hebrews, who 'believed their laws +to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being,' although, if asked why +it was wrong to kill or steal, they might very likely have replied, +'Because theft and murder have been forbidden by God,' would still have +acknowledged that it would be wrong to kill or steal, even if there had +been no divine prohibition of the practices. And when we recollect that +among 'other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who, +knowing that their laws had been made by men, were not afraid to admit +that men might make bad laws, ... the sentiment of justice came to be +attached, not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such +laws as ought to exist,' what had previously appeared probable is +converted into certainty. Principles of justice to which law ought to +conform cannot but have been anterior to law, and cannot have originated +in law. And certainty on this point grows still more certain, assurance +becomes doubly sure, when we reflect that, as was pointed out above, +many things are just which, not only does not law command, but which +justice barely tolerates, permitting them, indeed, to be done, but +permitting them also to be reprobated. + +Secondly, we may perceive that in mere justice there can be nothing +praiseworthy. Justice is nothing more than abstinence from injustice, +and no commendation can be due for not doing that the doing of which +would deserve censure. Justice, if entitled to be ranked among the +virtues at all, is at best only a negative virtue, as being the reverse +of a vice. It is distinguished from all other moral qualities, as being +the single and solitary one, compliance with whose behests is a duty +which we owe to others. Of meekness, patience, temperance, fortitude, +courtesy, whatever display it may for any reason be our duty to make, +precisely that display justice requires us to make. Whatever of any one +of these qualities justice does not exact from us, we may, without +wronging any one, omit. We must not, indeed, incapacitate ourselves by +tippling for our proper work, nor offend the eyes or ears of decenter +folk by reeling obstreperously through the streets; but, if we take the +precaution of retiring during an interval of leisure to our privy +chamber, our making beasts of ourselves then and there to our heart's +content, is our own concern, and nobody else's. No doubt, in doing this +we should be doing very wrong, but still there is no contradiction in +saying that we should have perfect right to do it, inasmuch as we should +thereby be wronging no one but ourselves. Of another class of +virtues--of all those which admit of being directly contrasted with +justice, and which may for shortness' sake be without much inaccuracy +comprehended under the general designation of generosity--it may, with +literal truth, be said that the practice of them is no part of our duty +to our neighbour. Provided we are careful to let every one have what, +between him and us, are his bare dues, we may be selfish, mean, sordid +to excess, without infringing any one else's rights, without the +smallest dereliction of our duty to others. True, ethical writers are in +the habit of speaking of 'duties of perfect and imperfect obligation,' +but of these 'ill-chosen expressions,' as Mr. Mill,[14] with abundant +reason, styles them, the latter, more particularly, is of a slovenliness +which ought to have prevented its being used by any 'philosophic +jurists.' What some of these mean by it is stated to be 'duties in +which, though the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of +performing it are left to our choice; as in the case of charity or +beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practise, but not towards any +defined person, or at any prescribed time.' But, according to this +explanation, there are duties of which performance may not only be +indefinitely postponed, even until a morrow that may never come, but of +which performance at one time will warrant non-performance of them +subsequently; so that, for instance, he who has behaved charitably on +past occasions, may be uncharitable afterwards. 'In the more precise +language' of other writers, we are told that while 'duties of perfect +obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right +resides in some person or persons, duties of imperfect obligation are +those which do not give birth to any right.' But, as where there is no +right nothing can be due, it would seem from this that by duties of +imperfect obligation are to be understood duties performance of which is +not due. I hope to be pardoned for declining to accept these illusive +distinctions as the boundaries which separate justice from the other +components of morality. I neither understand how any obligation can be +otherwise than perfect, nor do I recognise any duties whatever except +those of justice. The main distinction between justice and all positive +virtues I take to be that, whereas compliance with its behests is always +imperative, compliance with theirs never is, but is always optional and +discretionary. Of whatsoever is, for whatsoever reason, due, it is +invariably justice, and justice alone, that demands payment or +performance. Justice claims, and claims peremptorily, whatever is owing, +but never puts forward the smallest pretension to anything that is not +owing. But since whatever is _owing_ plainly _ought_ to be paid, and +since justice never claims anything but what is owing, it is clear that +there cannot be any merit in satisfying the claims of justice. Merit is +possible only in actions which justice does not enjoin, but to which +some other virtue exhorts. + +From the main difference here pointed out, a minor collateral difference +ramifies. Of whatever ought to be paid or done, payment or performance +may be righteously enforced. Here I have the satisfaction of proceeding +for a few steps side by side with Mr. Mill, although only, I am sorry to +say, to part company again immediately. 'It is a part,' he says, 'of the +notion of duty in every one of its forms that a person may rightfully +be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be _exacted_ from a +person as one exacts a debt. Unless we think it may be exacted from him, +we do not call it his duty.'[15] Now, since justice never asks for +anything but what is due, never makes a requisition compliance with +which is not a duty, it follows that all those persons to whom its +requisitions are addressed may be rightfully compelled to comply with +them, whereas, since what every other virtue requires is always +something not due, compliance with its requisitions is never a duty, and +cannot, except unrighteously, be enforced. This--viz., the rightfulness +of using compulsion in aid of justice, as contrasted with the +wrongfulness of resorting to it in aid of generosity, rather than the +rightfulness of punishing breaches of the one and not of the other, +seems to me the 'real turning-point of the distinction' between the two. +For gross disregard of generosity, and indeed of any other virtue, may +rightfully be punished, justice fully sanctioning the punishment +although indicating also the nature of the penalty to be inflicted in +each case, and restricting it within certain limits. Whoever plays the +dog in the manger in a manger of his own, or makes an exclusively +selfish use of his wealth or other advantages, refusing to do good to +his neighbour at however little sacrifice on his own part it might be +done, is not thereby infringing anybody else's rights, or thereby +wronging any one else. He is only exercising his own undoubted rights. +Still he is exercising them in a manner deserving of severe reprobation, +and which witnesses of his conduct may justly punish by testifying to +him the scorn, disgust, or indignation he has excited. It is no more +than just that he should have his deserts and receive the punishment +which has become his due. But justice, although permitting him to be +punished for acting ungenerously, does not sanction his being compelled +to make a show of acting generously. If his conduct had been unjust +instead of simply ungenerous, no punishment would be adequate that did +not force him to repair the evil he had done, or to do the good he had +left undone. But the most flagrant breach of generosity, neither keeping +nor taking away anything to which any one has a right, does nothing for +which reparation can be due. It consists simply in a man's making an +exclusively selfish use of what is exclusively his, and to make such use +is one of the rights of property. Whoever exercises that odious right is +justly punished by being shown how hateful we think him, but we must +not, on pretence of justice, commit the injustice of depriving him of a +right which is confessedly his. + +It is not, then, by being rightfully liable to punishment that unjust +differs from ungenerous conduct. The latter also ofttimes deserves and +incurs punishment. But since there can be no merit in doing that the not +doing of which would merit punishment, it may seem that, as in justice +so likewise in generosity there cannot be anything positively +meritorious. Neither in truth would there be if conduct were entitled to +be styled generous simply as being the reverse of ungenerous. Generosity +would then, like justice, be a virtue in no higher sense than that of +not being a vice--a negative virtue if a virtue at all. But an action +does not really deserve to be called generous unless what justice +requires be exceeded by it in a degree more than sufficient to prevent +the agent from deserving the imputation of meanness, nor even then +unless the excess have been done from a purer motive than that of the +hope of praise or other reward. An action is generous only in the +proportion in which it involves self-sacrifice, voluntarily undergone +for the benefit of others, without any view on the agent's part to +further compensation than that derivable from the consciousness of +making other people happy. In such voluntary and disinterested +self-sacrifice consists the merit which is one chief characteristic of +generosity as of most positive virtue, distinguishing it from justice, +in which there is never a surrender of anything which one would be +warranted in keeping, but merely a rendering of what belongs or is due +to others. All conduct, not immoral, admits, as already more than once +intimated, of a tripartite division, into that which may be rightfully +enforced; that of which, though it be not due nor rightfully enforcible, +neglect deserves to be and may justly be punished by reproaches; that +which is neither due nor reasonably to be looked for, but which involves +a voluntary surrender for the good of others of some good which one +might without reproach keep for oneself. Of this last description is the +only conduct in which there is any proper or positive virtue. + +So much and such complex argumentation may not impossibly be deemed a +good deal in excess of what is requisite to establish the conclusion to +which it points, and which may be summed up in the following very simple +propositions:--That, by a person's rights being understood the privilege +of having or doing whatever no other person has a right to prevent his +having or doing, justice consists of abstinence from conduct that would +interfere with that privilege; that justice, therefore, is not dependent +on extrinsic sanction, but arises spontaneously from the nature of +things, and may almost indeed be said to spring necessarily from the +meaning of words; and that its sole merit is exemption from the demerit +that would attach to the withholding or withdrawing from any person +anything belonging or due to that person. With all possible confidence, +however, in the innate vigour of these propositions, I cannot suppose +that they do not require all possible adventitious strengthening to be +qualified to displace the doctrine to which they are opposed. I proceed, +therefore, to test somewhat further the adequacy of the description of +justice which they involve by confronting it with certain intricate +problems, in presence of which the rival utilitarian definition will be +found to be hopelessly at fault. + +There are few subjects on which casuists have differed more widely than +those of the legitimacy, and the proper measure of punishment. One +thinks it unjust that anybody should be punished for the sake of example +to others, or for any purpose except his own amelioration. A second +replies that it is only for the sake of other people's good that an +offender ought to be punished; for that, as for his own good, he himself +should be left to decide what that is, and he is pretty sure not to +decide that it is punishment. A third pronounces all punishment unjust, +seeing that a man does not make himself criminal, but is made so by +circumstances beyond his control--by his birth, parentage, education, +and the temptations he meets with. Then, for the apportionment of +punishment, some persons think there is no principle like that of the +_lex talionis_--an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Others that +the penalty should be accurately proportioned to the immorality of the +offence, by whatever standard that immorality be measured. Others, +again, that punishment should be limited to the minimum necessary to +deter from crime, quite irrespectively of the heinousness of the +particular crime punished. Of the first three of these opinions, Mr. +Mill observes that 'they are all extremely plausible, and that so long +as the question is argued as one of justice simply, without going down +to the principles that lie under justice, and are the source of its +authority, he is unable to see how any one of the reasoners can be +refuted. For every one of them builds upon rules of justice confessedly +true--each is triumphant so long as he is not obliged to take into +consideration any other maxims of justice than those he has selected, +but that as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face, each +disputant seems to have as much to say for himself as the others. No one +can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another +equally binding.'[16] This view of the matter, however, can scarcely be +regarded as satisfactory. If utilitarian notions of justice cannot be +carried out without trampling each other down, they plainly should not +be suffered to go at large, but should be relegated forthwith to the +limbo of oblivion. But right cannot really be opposed to right; justice +cannot really be inconsistent with itself: it never can be unjust to do +what is just. Anti-utilitarian justice tolerates no such intestine +disorder. The sole ground on which she sanctions punishment is the +indispensableness of punishment for the reparation of injury. Whoever +has suffered wrong has been subjected to invasion of some right, +personal or proprietary, and is entitled to amends for the outrage; +while the aggressor from whom the amends are due, ought to render them +because he owes them, and because he ought, may, if necessary, be +compelled, to render them. By the breach of right which he has +committed, he has forfeited his own corresponding right, which may now +be equitably set aside to whatever extent may be requisite for +reparation of the evil he has done, one essential part of such +reparation being adequate security against repetition of the wrong. So +far as may be necessary for this purpose, punishment may equitably go, +but no further. Genuine justice does not permit penal laws of human +enactment to take into account the abstract turpitude of crime. That she +reserves for divine cognisance, recollecting that 'Vengeance is mine, I +will repay,' saith the Lord. Nor does she permit the smallest +aggravation of punishment for the sake either of the offender's own +mental improvement, or to discourage others from evil doing; neither, on +the other hand, does she recognise any claim to abatement on the plea of +an offender not having been able to help acting as he did. She would +not, indeed, punish with death or with stripes an outrage committed by a +lunatic or an idiot, partly because an outrage may be really less +offensive for being committed unwittingly, inasmuch as it does not, at +any rate, add insult to injury, and also because the corporal +chastisement of a lunatic or an idiot could afford no reparation to the +wounded feelings of a healthy mind. But so far as even an idiot or a +lunatic was capable of making good the evil he had done by rendering +what had in consequence become due, Anti-utilitarianism would require +him equally with an erring saint or sage to make it, and equally, too, +would subject him to whatever restraint might be deemed not more than +sufficient to prevent his doing the same evil again. And of course she +does not treat an offender of ordinary intelligence with indulgence +which she would not show even to a lunatic, but exacts inexorably full +reparation for what he has done, requiring him commonly to pay in kind +so far as he can, and to make up with his person for any deficiency. +Within the limits thus marked out she is well content that, with the one +object which alone justifies punishment, other secondary objects with +which justice has no concern, should be combined. She is well content +that the same penal measures as are called for in order to compensate +the injured party, should also subserve the reform of the criminal, and +serve as general deterrents from crime. But she protests against the +notion that these, or any other objects, can ever excuse the +infringement of any ordinance of justice, or of any of even a criminal's +rights which the criminal has not forfeited by crime. Justice, in short, +in her penal, as in all her other arrangements, has but to adhere +closely to the anti-utilitarian principles of rendering what is due, and +of taking nothing that is not due, in order to steer clear of all the +difficulties by which the ablest and most accomplished Utilitarians +confess themselves staggered. + +A second greatly vexed question is, 'whether, in a co-operative +industrial association, it is just or not that talent or skill should +give a title to superior remuneration? On the one side it is argued that +all who do the best they can deserve equally well; ... that superior +abilities have already advantages more than enough in the admiration +they excite, the personal influence they command, and the internal +satisfaction attending them; and that society is bound in justice rather +to make compensation to the less favoured for this unmerited inequality +of advantages, than to aggravate it. On the contrary side, that society, +receiving more from the more efficient labourer, owes him a larger +return; that a larger share of the joint result being actually his work, +not to allow his claim to it is a sort of robbery; that if he is only +to receive as much as others he can only be required to produce as +much.'[17] 'Between these appeals to conflicting principles of justice,' +Mr. Mill considers it impossible to decide. 'Justice,' he says, 'has in +this case two sides to it, which it is impossible to bring into harmony, +and the two disputants have chosen opposite sides; the one looks to what +it is just that the individual should receive, the other to what it is +just that the community should give. Each from his own point of view is +unanswerable, and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must +be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the +preference.'[18] The form of justice depicted with this Janus-like +aspect can scarcely be the utilitarian, since, whoever, on utilitarian +grounds, selects one of its sides, must perforce, on the same grounds, +reject the other. Still, it is spoken of as genuine justice, wherefore +that there is a justice independent of utility, would seem, after all, +to be admitted by Utilitarians themselves. It is for them, however, to +deal with the dilemma which their own ingenuity has thus devised. My +only concern with the two-headed monster they have imagined is to +protest against its being mistaken for the one sole species of justice +which Anti-utilitarianism recognises, and which never presents any such +double-faced appearance. In the case before us anti-utilitarian justice +would decide with her accustomed ease between the two appellants. What +she would look to would simply be that each co-operator should have his +due. But how much soever she might declare an inferior workman to +deserve for doing his best, she certainly would not allow his deserts to +extend to participation in the fruits of the toil of those of his +fellows who had done better than he. His having produced as much as he +was able could not render due to him a share in the larger produce of +others of superior capacity. Very possibly the superior workmen might +agree that all should participate equally in the aggregate results of +their joint labour. If so, well and good. For so liberal a concession +they would deserve credit, and thanks would be due to them from those in +whose favour it was made; but this of itself would be a conclusive +proof, if any were wanting, that the concession was an act, not of +justice, but of generosity, not of debt, but of grace. + +Again, what discordance is there not as to the most equitable +repartition of taxation! That all should be taxed in equal proportion to +their pecuniary means; that taxation should be a graduated percentage on +income, rising as income rose; that all, whether rich or poor, should be +taxed alike; that all should pay equal capitation, but unequal +property-tax--these are some out of many divergencies of opinion, and +'from these confusions' there is, Mr. Mill considers, 'no other mode of +extrication than the utilitarian.'[19] But if there were really no +other, there would, in fact, be none at all. For opinions differ +scarcely less as to the utility, than as to the justice of each +specified mode of taxation. There are quite as many persons who think it +expedient as who think it equitable that people should be taxed either +equally, or according to any of the suggested schemes of inequality. All +the help that Utilitarianism here affords is, as usual, to leave every +one to judge for himself which plan is the most advisable, and then to +pronounce that to be the only moral plan. Anti-utilitarianism offers +guidance of a very different sort. It wastes no time in seeking for an +escape from confusion, for it allows no confusion to exist. It spurns +equally the idea of different persons being required to pay different +prices for equal quantities of the same thing, merely because some of +them can afford to pay more, and that of their being all required to pay +the same price for different quantities, merely because all are equally +in need of the quantities they respectively obtain. It recognises only +an imperfect analogy between a club or a mess to which no one need +subscribe unless he likes, and a national community to whose funds every +resident within its territory has no choice but to contribute; and while +quite content that members of the one should be assessed at any rates to +which they have spontaneously consented, it protests against the +imposition on members of the other of burdens disproportioned to their +several abilities. It denies that the shilling of a man who has but one +in the world is of the same value to him because it is his all, as is to +another an estate bringing him in 100,000_l._ a year, seeing that, if +the former had his pocket picked, he might presently beg, borrow, or +earn a second coin, whereas if the latter were dispossessed of his +estate he might live to the age of Methusaleh without acquiring its +equivalent. It perceives that a rich man, by receiving public protection +for his property as well as his person, is relieved from an expense in +maintaining private watchmen, which a poor man, with nothing but his +carcass to defend, would have as little occasion as ability to incur; +and it concludes that more being thus in effect given to the rich, more +is due from him in return, and more, consequently, may be rightfully +exacted. + +We come, now, to a case that may well give to both Utilitarians and +Anti-utilitarians pause--with this difference, however, that whereas it +brings the former to an everlasting standstill, the latter may, after a +while, go on complacently meditative, at least, if not rejoicing. + +There are certain situations in which justice loses its authority. +'Thus, to save a life, it may be allowable ... to steal or take by force +the necessary food or medicine, or kidnap and compel to officiate the +only qualified medical practitioner.'[20] Wherefore, since to steal or +to kidnap is essentially wrong, it may sometimes be allowable to do +wrong. Mr. Mill's explanation of the paradox is, that 'there are +particular cases in which some other social duty is so important as to +overrule any one of the general maxims of justice; but that in such +cases we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral +principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that +other principle, not just in the particular case.'[21] I submit, +however, that there is no real occasion to resort to any such 'useful +accommodation of language,' in order to be 'saved from the necessity of +admitting that there may be laudable injustice.' Let us never shrink +from looking error in the face, for fear that, after she has slunk away +abashed, some insoluble mystery may remain behind. It is better, at any +rate, to be puzzled than deceived. There can be no doubt about theft +being essentially unjust, and no skill in the arrangement of words can +convert injustice into justice, or prevent injustice from being wrong. +But when, as occasionally happens, the only choice open to us is between +two immoral courses, it is morally incumbent on us to select the less +immoral of the two. The wrong we decide upon does not, however, itself +become smaller because it prevents a larger. A sworn bravo, who had +taken in advance the wages of assassination, would sin less by breaking +than by keeping faith with his employer; but, in either case, would sin. +Abstinence from murder would not absolve him from the guilt of perjury. +If, unless a loaf were stolen, a life would be lost, Anti-utilitarianism +might pardon, but would scarcely applaud the theft. At all events it +would not, like the rival doctrine in a similar strait, be reduced to +double on itself, declaring that wrong had become right and black white, +that the Ethiopian had changed his skin and the leopard his spots. It +would still insist as positively as ever that to steal another man's +bread cannot be just, however benevolent the purpose for which it is +stolen. + +One more illustration and I have done. Whoever believes as I do in the +indefeasible sanctity of honestly acquired _moveable_ property, is +logically bound to hold equally sacred the rights of bequest and +inheritance. With whatever is exclusively your own, you may surely do +anything you please except harm; nor need even harm be excepted if it be +done to yourself alone. If, indeed, you go the length of playing ducks +and drakes with gold pieces, or of lighting cigars with bank-notes, you +are likely enough to be stopped and placed under restraint as a lunatic, +but it is clear that this will be done solely because you are presumed +not to understand what you are doing, and not from any question as to +your right to do it if you do understand, for there are plenty of things +far more objectionable in themselves, only not implying a want of +sanity, which you will be left perfectly at liberty to do. If you +choose, in imitation of Cleopatra, to spoil your fish-sauce by mixing +powdered pearls with it, or, in imitation of a certain Peruvian +viceroy, to shoe your carriage horses with silver, no one will dream of +interfering with you; any more than of preventing courtesans and other +fine ladies from befouling their nether limbs by sweeping the dusty road +with flounces of Brussels lace; or of preventing members of the Cobden +Club from gorging themselves annually, at a cost of five guineas per +paunch, in honour of the prince of practical economists. But property, +which, however great the good it is capable of doing, you are at liberty +to employ solely for your own hurt, you are, of course, at liberty to +destroy, thereby preventing it, at least, from doing any more harm. The +lesser right of abuse is plainly comprehended in the larger. And of that +which is so absolutely your own that you may, if you please, wantonly +waste or destroy it, you may, of course, transfer the ownership, thereby +conveying to another person all your rights in it, and rendering it as +unjust to interfere with the new owner's disposal of the property, as it +would previously have been to interfere with yours. Moreover, since the +gift is a purely voluntary act, you may, if you please, without +impairing its validity, arrange that it shall begin to take effect from +some future date instead of immediately; so that, by naming some date +subsequent to your own decease, you will be converting the gift into an +equally valid bequest. This, I submit, is decisive as to the iniquity of +any legal limitation of testamentary power. The right of bequest is +comprehended within and rests upon the same basis as the right of +possession, so that, unless it would be just to pass a law depriving all +persons of any property possessed by them in excess of a given amount, +it would not be just to deprive them by law of the power of bequeathing +the surplus. + +The rights of inheritance obviously coincide precisely with those of +bequest. Just so much as the testator parts with the legatee obtains. +When the bequest is unconditional, the new owner whom it creates steps +into the precise position which the previous owner has vacated. Often, +however, a legacy is qualified by conditions, and, among others, by +this, that the property bequeathed shall be held in trust for certain +purposes. Now, if these purposes be socially noxious, society need not +hesitate to set aside the will that has provided for them. Quite +justifiably, society might annul the testamentary endowment of a +hospital for fleas and lice, such as Bishop Heber, in his Indian tour, +found existing at Baroach and at Surat, because those particular insect +pests could scarcely be retained within the walls of their infirmary. +Perhaps, too, society might be justified in similarly preventing the +endowment of a hospital for superannuated dogs and cats; whether it +would or not depending mainly on the awkward question whether such +inferior animals have any rights inconsistent with human interests. Be +this as it may, however, where human interests alone are concerned, the +rights of conditional heirship present no ethical difficulty. When it is +for purposes socially innocuous and affecting human beings alone that +property is left in trust, it cannot be equitably diverted from those +purposes without the consent of all the individuals whom the +testamentary arrangements were intended to affect. It matters not how +whimsical or preposterous the object enjoined may be; not even though it +be a periodical dinner, cooked after the manner of the ancients, like +the nauseous one at which Peregrine Pickle assisted; or instruction in +alchemy or in Hindoo astronomy, or in the art of walking on one's head. +Not until there remain no persons at once entitled under the will, and +also wishing to partake of the banquet or the instruction, can one or +the other be equitably discontinued? As long as there are any such +persons left, to stop, without their consent and without adequately +compensating them, arrangements, rights in which have been vested in +them by bequest, would be as palpable a violation of justice as to pick +their pockets of sums equivalent to their several interests, real or +supposed, in the arrangements. + +If scrupulous adherence to the principle thus laid down would heavily +shackle the activity and seriously impair the immediate usefulness of +Mr. Forster and his coadjutors in the Endowed School Commission, I am +exceedingly sorry, but not in the least shaken in my conviction that the +principle ought to be rigidly adhered to. If parochial or other +communities are too stupid or too selfish to consent that school +endowments under their charge shall be applied to purposes of more +extensive utility than the founders contemplated, every effort should be +made to persuade or to shame them into consenting, but without their +consent the thing should on no account be done. On this point +Utilitarianism and Anti-utilitarianism would, I apprehend, give +identical counsel, the former condemning as impolitic what the latter +denounced as unjust. The cause of national education would be ill served +by any course calculated to discourage its future endowment by private +testators, and nothing would be more likely to have that effect than +arbitrary interference with the endowments of former testators. + +The courteous reader may now be temporarily released, with fitting +acknowledgment of his exemplary patience. It would be cruel to detain +him with a recapitulation, without which he may readily trace for +himself, in what has gone before, the outlines of a consistent body of +anti-utilitarian ethics. In these there is little new, little that has +not been anticipated by many an old-fashioned saw and antiquated +apothegm--such as, _Fiat justitia ruat cælum_, 'Be just before you are +generous,' and, I would fain add, 'Honesty is the best policy'--save +that to that Utilitarianism may fairly lay equal claim. My modest +ambition throughout this essay has been to vindicate some of the most +momentous of primeval truths from the slights to which philosophy--not +modern, indeed, but modernised and refurbished--is continually +subjecting them, and I will not deny that I have modest assurance enough +to believe that I have at least partially succeeded. I think I have +shown that there are such things as abstract right and wrong, resting +not on fancied intuition, but on a solidly rational basis, and +supporting in turn abstract justice, whose guidance, whoever accepts it, +will find to be as sure and as adequate as any that unassisted reason is +capable of supplying. Anti-utilitarian justice never tries to look +half-a-dozen different ways at once, never points at the same time in +opposite directions, never issues contradictory mandates, never halts +between two opinions. Her votaries, like other mortals, may often be in +doubt as to accomplished facts; but, provided these be clear, their +course is in general equally clear; there seldom remains aught to +embarrass them. If they sincerely desire to ascertain what is due from +them, they can seldom err, except on the right side, and they will never +dream of disputing that whatever is due from them it must be their duty +to do, without respect of consequences. These they will leave to the +supreme controller of events, if they believe in one, and will leave to +take their chance, if they do not so believe, feeling all the more +certain in the latter case that to control events cannot, at any rate, +be within their power. They never stop to calculate how much good may +perhaps ensue if evil be done. Simple arithmetic, apart from faith, +satisfies them that to add wrong to wrong cannot possibly augment the +sum total of right. The prime article of their creed is the absolute +obligation of paying debts--a piece of unworldly wisdom more than ever +now to Jews a stumbling-block, and to Greeks foolishness, but not the +less to all, whether Jews or Gentiles, who will accept it, a light to +show through the mazes of life, a path so plainly marked that the +foolishest of wayfaring men cannot greatly err therein. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The distinction here drawn is not merely verbal. The greatest +happiness of the greatest number may mean either the largest total of +happiness in which the largest possible number of those concerned can +participate, or a still larger total, which, if some of the possible +participants were excluded, would be divisible among the remainder. The +largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all concerned, +means the largest sum total absolutely, without reference to the number +of participants. Writers on Utilitarianism seem to have sometimes the +first, sometimes the second of these totals in view, but more frequently +the second than the first. + +[2] I do not form a separate class of pleasures of the affections, +because these seem to me not to be elementary, but to be always +compounded of two or more of the other five kinds. + +[3] 'On Labour,' p. 135. + +[4] 'Fortnightly Review,' June, 1868. + +[5] See the No. for June, 1869. + +[6] 'On Labour,' p. 93. + +[7] 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, p. 683. + +[8] See 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, pp. 687-8. + +[9] 'Utilitarianism,' by J. S. Mill, pp. 64-8. + +[10] 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, pp. 684-5. + +[11] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 267. + +[12] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 69, 70. + +[13] 'Les légistes leur fournirent au besoin l'appui du droit contre le +droit même.'--De Tocqueville, 'L'Ancien Régime,' p. 567. + +[14] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 72, 73. + +[15] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 71. + +[16] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 81, 82. + +[17] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 84, 85. + +[18] Ibid. p. 85. + +[19] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 86, 87. + +[20] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 94. + +[21] Ibid. pp. 94, 95. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +_HISTORY'S SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS_. + + _Warwick._ There is a history in all men's lives, + Figuring the nature of the times deceased; + The which observed, a man may prophesy, + With a near aim, of the main chance of things + As yet not come to life, which in their seeds, + And weak beginnings, lie intreasured. + Such things become the hatch and brood of time; + And, by the necessary form of this, + King Richard might create a perfect guess, + That great Northumberland, then false to him, + Would, of that seed, grow to a greater falseness, + Which should not find a ground to root upon, + Unless on you. + + _King Henry._ Are these things, then, necessities? + + _King Henry IV._ Part II. Act. 3, Sc. I. + + +When equally competent thinkers appear to take directly opposite views +of a matter of purely speculative interest, it will commonly be found +that their differences arise from their using the same words in +different senses, or from their being, by some other cause, prevented +from thoroughly apprehending each other's meaning. An illustration is +afforded by the controversy regarding the possibility of constructing a +Science of History, which could scarcely have been so much prolonged if +all who have taken part in it had begun by defining their terms, had +agreed to and adhered to the same definitions, and had always kept +steadily in view the points really in debate. If the word 'science' had +been used only in the restricted, though rather inaccurate sense in +which it is sometimes employed by some of the most distinguished of the +disputants, there would have been less question as to its applicability +to history. No one doubts that from an extensive historical survey may +be drawn large general deductions on which reasonable expectations may +be founded. No one denies that the experience of the past may teach +lessons of political wisdom for the guidance of the future. If it were +not so, history would be as uninstructive as fairy lore; its chief use +would be to amuse the fancy; and little more practical advantage could +result from investigating the causes of the failure of James II.'s +designs on civil and religious liberty, than from an inquiry into the +artifices by which Jack-the-Giant-killer contrived to escape the maw of +the monsters against whom he had pitted himself. What is commonly +understood, however, by a Science of History is something far beyond the +idea entertained of it by such temperate reasoners as Mr. John Stuart +Mill and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. The science, for the reality of which M. +Comte in France and Mr. Buckle in England have been the foremost +champions, would bear the same relation to political events as Optics +and Astronomy do to the phenomena of light and of the solar and sidereal +systems. It would deal less with the conjectural and probable than with +the predicable and positive. 'In the moral as in the physical world,' +say its leading advocates, 'are invariable rule, inevitable sequence, +undeviating regularity,' constituting 'one vast scheme of universal +order.' 'The actions of men, and therefore of societies, are governed by +fixed eternal laws,' which 'assign to every man his place in the +necessary chain of being,' and 'allow him no choice as to what that +place shall be.' One such law is that, 'in a given state of society, a +certain number of persons must put an end to their own lives:' another, +that a certain number of persons must commit murder; a third, that when +wages and prices are at certain points, a certain number of marriages +must annually take place, 'the number being determined not by the temper +and wishes of individuals, but by large general facts, over which +individuals can exercise no authority.' These are general laws; but the +special question as to who shall commit the crimes or the indiscretion +enjoined by them, 'depends upon special laws, which, however, in their +total action must obey the large social law to which they are all +subordinate.' A Science of History would consist of a collection of +'social laws,' duly systematised and codified, by the application of +which to given states of society the historical student might predict +the future course of political events, with a confidence similar to that +with which he could foretell the results of familiar chemical +combinations, or the movement of the planets.[22] + +This is the theory which a few years ago was so much discussed, and +against which, notwithstanding the singular fascination it evidently +possesses for some minds, the moral sense of a much larger number +indignantly revolts, rightly apprehending that its establishment would +be subversive of all morality. For, if the actions of men are governed +by 'eternal and immutable laws,' men cannot be free agents; and where +there is not free agency there cannot be moral responsibility. Nor are +the apprehensions entertained on this score to be allayed by the answer, +ingenious as it is, which has been given to them[23] by one of the +ablest and most judicious apologists for the new creed. It is true that +human actions can be said to be 'governed' only in the same metaphorical +sense as that in which we speak of the laws of nature, which do not +really govern anything, but merely describe the invariable order in +which natural phenomena have been observed to occur. It is true that the +discovery of invariable regularity in human affairs, supposing such a +discovery to have been made, would not prove that there was any +necessity for such regularity. It is conceivable that the orbs of heaven +may be intelligent beings, possessing full power to change or to arrest +their own course, and moving constantly in the same orbits merely +because it pleases them to do so. Invariable regularity, therefore, +would be perfectly consistent with free agency. All this is perfectly +just, but it is also altogether beside the question. The offence given +by the writers on whose behalf the apology is set up consists not so +much in their asserting that there are, as in their insisting that there +must be, uniformity and regularity in human affairs; or, as Mr. Buckle +expresses it, that social phenomena 'are the results of large and +general causes which, working on the aggregate of society, _must_ +produce certain consequences, without regard to the volition of the +particular men of whom the society is composed.' Now, though free agency +may co-exist with _invariable_ regularity, it obviously cannot co-exist +with _necessary_ regularity, which, consequently, is incompatible +likewise with moral responsibility. If men are compelled by the force of +circumstances, or by any force, to move only in one direction, they +cannot be responsible for not moving in a different direction. Nor is it +more to the purpose to undertake a subtle analysis of the nature of +causation, and to explain that it does not, properly speaking, involve +compulsion, but simply means invariable antecedence. Let it be that a +cannon-ball does not really knock down the wall against which it +strikes, and that it would be more correct to say that the ball +impinges and the wall falls; though, seeing that the wall would not have +fallen unless the ball had impinged, the distinction is too nice for +ordinary apprehension. As understood, at any rate, by the joint +headmasters of the new school, causation does involve compulsion. 'Men's +actions,' say they, 'are the product not of their volition, but of their +antecedents,' and 'result from large and general causes which must +produce certain consequences.' Neither, if this be so, is it of any +avail to suggest that, possibly, the large and general causes in +question may be of only temporary operation. 'It may be that the rules,' +in accordance with which the sun has hitherto risen every morning since +the creation of the world, 'will hold good only for a time.' It may be +that the springs, whatever they are, by which the universe is kept in +motion, may require to be periodically wound up like the works of a +clock, and that, unless this be done, 'on some particular day out of +many billions,' the sun may fail to rise, just as the clock, if suffered +to run down, would stop on the eighth day. The conjecture would, of +course, be not less applicable to social than to natural laws. It is +conceivable that the large general causes assumed to regulate human +actions might lose their efficacy at the end of a certain cycle, when +mankind might either have to recommence a social revolution similar to +the one just completed, or might have to begin an entirely different +revolution under entirely different laws. Be it so. Still, if the +causes, as long as they remained in operation, possessed a compulsory +character--if, during the continuance of the supposed cycle, men were +bound to act in a certain way in accordance with certain laws, and +irrespectively of their own volition--what would it matter that those +laws were not eternal and immutable? For the time being men would no +more be free agents than the hands of a clock, while the clock was wound +up. Both would be constrained to move in a prescribed direction, whether +they would or no. Men in such circumstances might well be likened, as by +Mr. Buckle they are likened, to links in a chain, but few would be +prevented from joining in Mr. Goldwin Smith's eloquent protest against +the comparison, by being told that the chain perhaps was not an endless +one. + +It is clear, then, that the principles to which we have been adverting +would, if established, be really subversive of morality, inasmuch as +they are incompatible with free agency, without which there can be no +responsibility. The soundness of a doctrine does not, however, depend +upon its tendencies; and Mr. Buckle was fully warranted in demanding +that his views should be examined with reference, not at all to their +consequences, but solely and exclusively to their truth. They certainly +ought to be so examined, if examined at all; but morality is so +indispensable to the happiness of mankind, that if there were reason for +apprehending it to be based upon error, there would be equal reason for +avoiding an enquiry which might demonstrate the weakness of its +foundations, by bringing forward an antagonistic truth. The only +adequate excuse, therefore, for enquiring, as I now proceed to do, into +the validity of Mr. Buckle's theory, is the confidence I feel that it +will be found to contain not recondite, newly-discovered truth, but, at +best, only skilfully and curiously-compounded fallacies, which, being +dispelled, will leave the foundations of morality as firm and +unimpeachable as before. + +In order that he might be able to prove the possibility of a Science of +History, Mr. Buckle asked no more than the following concessions: +'That, when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some +motive or motives; that those motives are the results of some +antecedents, and that therefore, if we were acquainted with the whole of +the antecedents and with all the laws of their movements, we could with +unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results.' Now, +there is certainly nothing in these demands which may not be +unhesitatingly conceded. As there can be no effect without a cause, so +there can be no action without a motive: the motive or motives of an +action are the product of all the conditions and circumstances among +which the agent is placed--which conditions and circumstances, again, +must have been brought about by antecedent events. The same +circumstances would indeed differently affect persons of different +mental constitutions and characters; but the original constitution of a +man's mind is itself the product of antecedent events, as is also any +subsequent modification of character which it may have undergone. It +cannot be denied, then, that men's motives are the results of +antecedents. Equally undeniable is it that a knowledge of all the +antecedents and of all the laws of their movements would enable us to +foresee their results, for this, supposing the laws referred to to have +any real existence, is merely equivalent to the self-evident +proposition, that if we perceived certain causes and knew exactly how +they would act, we should know beforehand what would be their effects. +But what if there be no such laws? What if, on the showing of Mr. Buckle +himself and of his associates, there neither are nor can be? + +The true nature of a scientific law has never been better explained than +by the writer already quoted as Mr. Buckle's dexterous apologist. A +scientific law is not an ordinance, but a record. It simply professes +to describe the order in which certain phenomena have been observed +uniformly to recur. It differs from a legislative enactment, in that the +one would be a law although it were never obeyed, whereas the other +would cease to be a law if one single exception to its statement could +be pointed out. Thus the Act of Parliament enjoining the registration of +births, would be equally a law although no births were ever registered; +whereas the law, that in a body moving in consequence of pressure the +momentum generated is in proportion to the pressure, would entirely +forfeit its legal character if, on any one occasion or in any +circumstances, momentum were generated in any other proportion. It is +essential, then, to the existence of a scientific law that there should +be uniformity of phenomena. But in human affairs uniformity is +impossible. No doubt, in exactly the same circumstances exactly the same +events must happen; but exactly the same aggregation of circumstances +cannot possibly be repeated. Such repetition is inconsistent with the +very theory, which is based on the assumption that the repetition is +continually happening. + +'In the moral as well as the physical world' there are, say the +exponents of the new theory, not only 'invariable rule' and 'inevitable +sequence,' but 'irresistible growth' and 'continual advance.' In other +words, things can never be twice in precisely the same condition--never, +at least, within the same cycle. It has, indeed, been suggested that +there may be in human affairs the same sort of regularity as is observed +by the hands of a clock; and that, as the latter, at the end of every +twenty-four hours, recommence the movement which they have just +concluded, so at the end of, say 'every ten thousand years,' all the +same events which have been happening throughout the period may begin +to happen over again in the same order as before. Such a succession, +however, would involve quite as much of retrogression as of progression, +and the continual advance so boastfully spoken of would be nothing else +than a tendency of society to return to the condition from which it had +originally emerged. But, even on this uncomfortable hypothesis, there +could be no regularity of occurrences within the same cycle; no clue as +to the future could be obtained from investigation of the past. On the +contrary, the only certainty would then, as now, be that no combination +of events which had happened once could happen again, as long as the +existing order of things continued. The inference here follows +necessarily from the premises. If there be continual advance--if things +are constantly moving forward--they cannot remain in the same state; and +if not in the same state, they cannot produce the same effects. For, if +it be obvious, on the one hand, that precisely the same causes must +invariably produce the same results, it is equally evident, on the +other, that the same results cannot be reproduced except by the same +causes. If causes calculated to bring about certain phenomena undergo +either augmentation or diminution, there must be a corresponding change +in the phenomena. Now, effects cannot be identical with their causes, +and, in the moral world, effects once produced become in turn causes, +acting either independently or in conjunction with pre-existing causes. +They become in turn the antecedents spoken of by Mr. Buckle, from which +spring the motives of human conduct. But, as all such antecedents must +necessarily differ from all former antecedents, they must also give rise +to motives, must be followed by actions, and must bring about +combinations of circumstances, differing from any previously +experienced. Thus, in human affairs, there can be no recurrence either +of antecedents or of consequences; and, as a scientific law is simply a +record of the uniform recurrence of consequences, it follows that in +human affairs there can be no scientific laws. + +It will be understood that human conduct, and the circumstances or +causes which influence it, are here spoken of in the aggregate. It is +not pretended that particular causes or circumstances may not continue +permanently in operation, though with an influence modified by the +concomitance of fresh circumstances; or that they may not continue to +produce consequences differing from their former consequences not more +than in proportion to the modification undergone by the causes. Still +less is it pretended that certain human phenomena, with which human +motives have little or nothing to do, may not be repeated once and +again, notwithstanding the important changes constantly going on in +every human society. It is not denied that marriages may continue for +years together to bear much the same annual proportion to the +population, provided that during those years there be no material change +in the amount of the economical obstacles which commonly interfere, more +than anything else, with men's natural inclination to marry. Still less +is it denied that, in a given number of births, the number of girls may +always preserve nearly the same superiority over that of boys, or that +the proportion between red-haired and flaxen-haired children may +generally be about the same, or that the percentage of letters +misdirected in a given country may vary little during long periods. But, +in the first of these cases, men do not get married, as Mr. Buckle +imagined, irrespectively of their volition. If, for several years +together, marriages continue to bear about the same proportion to +population, it is because during that period circumstances continue to +present a certain amount, and no more, of opposition to men's connubial +proclivities. In the other cases, it is not at all because the parents +wish it that a girl is born instead of a boy, or with flaxen hair +instead of carrots; neither is it from any motive or intention that +letters are often misdirected, but, on the contrary, from want of +thought, and from the carelessness and haste with which letter-writing, +like most other human actions, is unfortunately too often performed. +But, before assuming that this carelessness and haste bear an invariable +proportion to numbers, we should inquire whether the proportion of +misdirected letters is the same in all human societies--the same, for +instance, in France and Spain as in England. If not--if varying +circumstances produce different results in this respect in different +countries--it may be inferred that a variation of circumstances may +produce a difference of result in the same country. It will, at any +rate, be clear that there is no 'necessary and invariable order' in +which letters are misdirected. In one sense, indeed, it may be said that +the proportion of misdirected letters depends upon 'the state of +society,' if by that expression be meant, among other things, the +numerical proportion which individuals of different characters and +habits bear to each other. In that sense, we may accept some far more +startling propositions. We may partly admit that the state of society +determines the number of murders and suicides, if by this be simply +meant that the number of murders and suicides committed will depend upon +the number of persons whose characters have been so moulded by +circumstances as to dispose them to put an end to their own or other +people's lives. But Mr. Buckle, by whom the assertion was made, was +careful to explain that his meaning was the very reverse of what is here +supposed. Speaking of suicide, he declares it to be 'a general law that, +in a given state of society, a certain number of persons must put an end +to their own lives;' adding that 'the question as to who shall commit +the crime depends upon special laws,' and that 'the individual felon +only carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding +circumstances.' In other words, it is not the amount of crime that +depends upon the number of persons prepared to commit it; it is the +number of criminals which depends upon the amount of crime that must +needs be committed. 'Murder,' he elsewhere says, 'is committed with as +much regularity, and bears as uniform a relation to certain known +circumstances, as do the movements of the tides and the relations of the +seasons.' 'The uniform reproduction of crime is more clearly marked, and +more capable of being predicted, than are the physical laws connected +with the disease and destruction of our bodies. The offences of men are +the result not so much of the vices of individual offenders, as of the +state of society into which the individuals are thrown.' + +There is here so much looseness and inconsistency of language, that what +is most offensive in it may easily bear more than one interpretation: +and the shocking dogma that, in a given state of society, the force of +circumstances constrains the commission of a certain amount of crime, +may possibly admit of being explained away and softened down into the +comparatively harmless proposition that, where all the circumstances, +conditions or causes required for the commission of a certain amount of +crime are present, that amount of crime will certainly be committed. But +what is most provoking in Mr. Buckle is the heedlessness or wantonness +with which he is constantly insisting that the causes in question are +necessarily present and uniformly acting. What he calls the uniform +reproduction of crime is likened by him to the uniform recurrence of the +tides. According to him, it is a law that a certain number of suicides +shall take place annually, just as it is a law that there shall be high +and low water twice in every twenty-four hours. Now a law, as the word +is here used, means a record of invariable repetitions of phenomena. Has +it been observed, then, that suicides bear, we will not say an +invariable, but anything like a definite proportion to population? Mr. +Buckle thinks it has, and he adduces some facts in support of the +opinion; but his facts, properly understood, disprove instead of proving +what he asserts; and, even if they proved it, they would yet afford no +support to his main theory. + +In London, for some years past--how many is not stated--about 240 +persons annually have made away with themselves--sometimes a few more, +sometimes a few less--the highest number having been 266 in 1846, and +the lowest 213 in 1849. But, while the number of suicides has thus been +nearly stationary, population has been anything but stationary in the +metropolitan district, but has advanced with vast and unremitting +strides at an average rate of nearly 43,000 a year. In 1841 it was +1,948,369; in 1851, 2,361,640; and in 1861, 2,803,989. The proportion of +suicide to population has consequently been by no means uniform, but has +varied exceedingly, and on the whole has shown a constant tendency to +decrease. But even if it had continued uniform, it would simply have +shown that, during a certain number of years, the general character of +Londoners had, in certain particulars, undergone no material change. It +would not have proved that the regularity of suicide observable among +Londoners was in accordance with any general law. To prove this it would +have been necessary to show that the proportion had been uniform, not +only in the same but in all societies; in Paris as well as in London, +among the Esquimaux of Labrador, and among the Negroes of Soudan. For, +if the proportion were found to vary by reason of the differing +circumstances of different societies, it would plainly be seen to be at +least susceptible of variation in the same society, inasmuch as in no +society do circumstances remain the same from generation to generation. +So equally with murders. Even if there were no doubt that the percentage +of such crimes in England had long continued the same, still that fact +would prove nothing as to the uniform reproduction of crime, if it could +be shown that the percentage had ever varied anywhere else--in France or +Italy, for example, or in Dahomey. For it would be mere childishness to +point to the different conditions of England and Dahomey, and to plead +that no more was intended to be said than that, with uniformity of +circumstances there would also be uniformity of results. So much no one, +in the least competent to discuss the subject, would for a moment dream +of disputing. But in political affairs there cannot be uniformity of +circumstances. The aggregate of circumstances from which spring human +motives cannot, from the nature of things, ever be repeated; and, though +a few general causes may continue permanently in operation, they cannot +continue to produce the same identical results; for even though they +could themselves remain stationary, it would be impossible that their +operation should not be affected by the constant change going on around, +or should not partake of an otherwise universal forward movement. In +political affairs there cannot possibly be any recurrence of identical +phenomena; nor can there, except within a very limited period, be any +occurrence of very similar phenomena. But recurrence (and not merely +recurrence, but complete and invariable recurrence) is the very +foundation of science. Without it there can be no scientific laws, and +without such laws--_i.e._, without records of past recurrences--there +can be no sure predictions as to the future. It is only because certain +motions of certain bodies have hitherto been observed to take place with +invariable regularity, that they are expected to continue to do so, and +it is upon that assumption only that we venture to predict that the sun +will rise to-morrow morning, or that an eclipse will take place next +year. But if no event recorded in history has ever yet been known to +occur twice under precisely the same conditions, and as a consequence of +the same causes, what ground can there be for predicting whether or when +any such event will occur again? What possibility is there of +constructing a science of history, when history supplies no materials +for either foundation or superstructure? + +There is nothing in this conclusion in the slightest degree opposed to +the most approved doctrine of causation. No effect can be without a +cause. No doubt, then, the regency of invariable causation holds good of +human volitions. No doubt the volitions and consequently the actions of +men are the joint results of the external circumstances amid which men +are placed, and of their own characters; which again are the results of +circumstances, natural and artificial. So much must needs be admitted, +and something more besides. Certain causes will infallibly be succeeded +by certain effects. From any particular combination of circumstances, +certain determinate consequences and no others will result; those again +will give rise to consequences equally determinate, and those in turn to +others, and so on in an infinite series. It follows, then, from the +regency of causation, that there is a determinate course already, as it +were, traced out, which human events will certainly follow to the end of +time; every step of which course, however remote, might now be foreseen +and predicted by adequate, that is to say by infinite, intelligence. +Infinite intelligence would do this, however, not by the aid of law, but +by virtue of its own intrinsic and unassisted strength, wherewith it +would perceive how each succeeding combination of causes would operate. +For, as cannot be too often repeated, a law is merely a record of +recurrences; and in human affairs there can be no recurrences of the +same aggregate either of causes or results. There being then no historic +laws, there can be no Science of History, for science cannot exist +without laws. The historic prescience, which is an attribute of Infinite +Intelligence, not being regulated by law, or at any rate not by any law +except that of causation, is not, technically speaking, a science, and +even if it were, would be utterly beyond the reach of human intellect +and attainable only by Infinite Wisdom. + +The admission made in the last paragraph has cleared the way for the +introduction of a question, from which the subject under discussion +derives its principal interest, and which it is indispensable therefore +carefully, though briefly, to examine. If there be certain determinate +lines of conduct which men will infallibly pursue throughout all +succeeding generations, how can men be free agents? How--for it is +merely the old puzzle over again--how can foreknowledge be reconciled +with freewill? The difficulty is not to be got rid of by discrediting +the reality of freewill, and treating it as a thing for which there is +no evidence. When Johnson silenced Boswell's chatter with the words, +'Sir, we know our will is free and there's an end on't,' he expressed a +great truth in language not the less philosophically accurate on account +of its colloquial curtness. The consciousness possessed by an agent +about to perform an act, that he is at liberty to perform it or not, is +really conclusive evidence that the act is free. For it matters not a +jot whether consciousness be 'an independent faculty,' or whether--as, +Mr. Buckle reminds us, 'is the opinion of some of the ablest +thinkers'--it be not merely 'a state or condition of the mind.' If +consciousness be a condition of the mind, so also is perception; but +perception, whatever else it be, is also that which makes us acquainted +with external phenomena, just as consciousness is that which makes us +acquainted with internal emotions. The two informants, it is true, are +not equally trustworthy. Perception often deceives us, but +consciousness, never. We often fancy we perceive what we do not +perceive. We may fancy we see a ghost, when we are merely mocked by an +optical illusion, or we may mistake the impalpable imagery of the Fata +Morgana for solid objects, or the rumbling of a cart for thunder. But +consciousness is infallible. We cannot fancy we experience an emotion +which we do not experience. We cannot fancy we are glad when we are not +glad, or sorry when we are not sorry, or hopeful when in despair; and to +pretend that we can possibly be conscious of willing when we are not +willing, would be as absurd as to meet the _cogito, ergo sum_ of +Descartes, with the reply that, perhaps, we do not really think, but +only think we think. + +Freewill, then, being an indisputable reality, how can it be reconciled +with foreknowledge? There can be no more conclusive way of showing that +the two things are capable of co-existing than to point to an example of +their actual co-existence, and such an example is afforded by the idea +of Infinite Power. Omnipotence, which by its nature implies freewill, +comprehends also Omniscience. Omnipotence can do anything whatsoever +which does not involve a contradiction; but even Omnipotence can do +nothing which Omniscience does not foresee. It can, indeed, do +whatsoever it pleases; but Omniscience foresees precisely what it will +be pleased to do. With unbounded liberty to choose any course of action, +it can yet choose no course which has not been foreseen; but its freedom +of choice is evidently not affected by the fact that the choice which it +will make is known before hand. Neither is that of man. An eager +aspirant to ecclesiastical preferment is not the less at liberty to +refuse a proffered mitre, because all his acquaintances have a well +founded assurance that he will accept. A wayfarer, with a yawning +precipice before his eyes, may or may not, as he pleases, cast himself +down headlong. Whether he will do so or not must always have been +positively foreknown to Omniscience; but that fact in no degree affects +his power of deciding for himself. If arguing on the notion that what is +to be must be, he decide on moving forward to his destruction, then what +has been foreseen is simply that he will so argue and be self-deceived, +and will consequently perish. But the foreknowledge which simply +perceives what direction will be taken by the will is a very different +thing from an over-ruling destiny, which should compel the will to take +some special direction. Still it is obvious that, in this instance also, +foreknowledge is based entirely on causation. It is solely because human +volitions take place as inevitable effects of antecedent causes that +Omniscience itself can be conceived as capable of foreseeing them. + +But on such conditions, how can human volitions really be free? How can +man be really at liberty to will of his good pleasure, if what he is +prompted to will depends on the influence which the circumstances that +happen to surround him may exercise on the constitution and character, +which he has derived from pre-existing circumstances? How can his will +be free, if that will be moulded and shaped by circumstances over which +he has no control? I have, I am aware, by the mode I have adopted of +reconciling free-will with foreknowledge, incurred the obligation of +reconciling it with another co-existence of yet greater apparent +incompatibility. By admitting that 'human volitions take place as +inevitable effects of antecedent causes,' that they must be such, and +cannot be other than such, as antecedent causes make them, I have +admitted that the will, though independent of law, is absolutely subject +to, and _must_ implicitly obey, causes. Freewill, then, must be shown to +be compatible not with foreknowledge only, but with necessity also. For +there is no use in attempting to ignore necessity; no use in exclaiming +with Professor Huxley: 'Fact I know, and Law I know; but what is +Necessity but an empty shadow of the mind's own throwing?'[24] A shadow +it most certainly is not, though it is a bugbear, and the veriest that +was ever suffered to torment a morbid imagination. It is an indisputable +reality, a substantial, but at the same time perfectly harmless, or +rather salutary reality, whose terrors need only to be boldly confronted +in order to disappear and to transform themselves into highly attractive +recommendations. For what, after all, does it imply? What but that +effects must follow their causes, and causes precede their effects, as +plainly they must, unless cause and effect be utterly unmeaning +expletives. Of course we must on all occasions be affected by +surrounding circumstances, in modes exactly accordant with our +idiosyncracies, moral and physical. Of course, too, our volitions must +exactly correspond with our contemporaneous affections. When we are +empty, we must, if in health, feel hungry, and desire to eat; when full, +we must, unless we are hogs, be satisfied, and prefer to ruminate. Most +men are so organised that when tickled they must laugh; when wronged, +must frown or sigh. The sight of distress makes them pity, and desire to +see it relieved. That of virtue makes them admire, and desire to see it +rewarded. That of vice makes them angry, and desire to see it punished. +Would we have all these things reversed? Would it be well for us that +our being starved or surfeited should make no difference in our wish to +feed, or our willingness to fast? Should we like the chances to be equal +whether we should desire distress to be alleviated or aggravated? If +not, what is the bondage under which we groan? What the liberty +wherewith we long to be made free? Our sole grievance is that, according +to actual arrangements, there must be reasons for our wishes, and that +on those reasons our wishes must depend. Should we then prefer that +there were no such reasons? Would we have our wishes to be independent +of reason, and adrift before irrational caprice? Probably we may, on +second thoughts, be content to forego an enfranchisement like this; but, +if not, we may at least console ourselves for its indefinite +postponement, by reflecting that Omnipotence itself is, equally with +ourselves, subject to the sort of necessity under which we are groaning; +equally destitute of the sort of free-will to which we aspire. It is +manifest that, since there cannot be omnipotence without boundless +liberty, omnipotence must possess completest freedom of will. Yet even +the Will of Omnipotence is subject to the despotism of causation. Divine +perfection cannot but be at all times affected in modes as exactly +corresponding with its own excellence as human imperfection is in modes +corresponding with its deficiencies, and the movements of the Divine +Mind cannot but correspond with the affections of the Divine Mind. Those +movements are not unmeaning, purposeless, wayward. They, too, have their +appropriate springs, and proceed by regular process from legitimate +causes, the chief of those causes being the infinite perfection of the +Divine Nature. Divine Power cannot then, any more than human, be +directed by its owner's will to purposes against which its owner's +nature revolts. But is this inability a matter to lament over? Those +must be greatly at a loss for a grievance who make one of its being +impossible for them to will things which they have over-ruling reasons +for not willing. Besides, does man, in order to believe himself free, +require more freedom than his Maker? The disciple is not above his +master, nor the servant above his lord. Surely it is sufficient that +the disciple be as his master, and the servant as his lord.[25] + +The fact, then, that human conduct is subject to causation, and may by +adequate intelligence be predicted in its minutest details until the end +of time, no more proves that it is governed by invariable laws, which +act irrespectively of human volitions, than the corresponding fact with +reference to Divine conduct impairs the freedom of the Divine Will. +There is no one living to whom such a doctrine--degrading man, as it +does, into a helpless puppet, robbing him of all moral responsibility +and of every motive for either exertion or self-control--can be more +utterly repugnant than to Mr. Mill, who nevertheless, although +dissenting from Mr. Buckle's more extreme opinions, makes use of some +expressions which may be construed into a qualified approval of his +general views. Even Mr. Mill speaks of 'human volitions as depending on +scientific laws,' thereby implying that the circumstances from which +human motives and, consequently, human actions result are continually +recurring with a certain regularity. He speaks of 'general laws +affecting communities, which are indeed modified in their action by +special causes affecting individuals, but which, if their effects could +be observed over a field sufficiently wide and for a period sufficiently +long to embrace all possible combinations of the special causes, would +be found to produce constant results.'[26] This proposition seems to +proceed on the assumption that general causes are either of uniform +operation, or that, if they vary in their effects, their variations, and +also those of special causes, occur with a certain regularity, and +constantly recur within a certain definite period. But this is precisely +what cannot possibly happen. Among the general causes referred to, some +few are continuous--those, namely, which are inherent in human nature; +but even these are continually modified in their action by changes +continually taking place in those other general causes which constitute +the existing state of society, and which are not merely continually +changing, but are continually becoming more and more different from what +they were originally. So much is fully admitted by Mr. Mill himself, and +indeed can be scarcely more strongly enforced than by his own words. +'There is a progressive change,' he says, 'both in the character of the +human race, and in their outward circumstances, so far as moulded by +themselves; in each successive age the principal phenomena of society +are different from what they were in the age preceding, and still more +different from any previous age.'[27] It is admitted, then, that there +can be no recurrence of social phenomena; and it is obvious that, the +longer the period of observation, the less possibility can there be of +their recurring, since the greater is the certainty that new causes +will come into operation. But, even though it were possible that all the +external circumstances which have once influenced either communities or +individuals could be repeated, the same circumstances could not a second +time produce the same effects. Men of different characters are affected +in very different ways by the same influences, and the characters of any +particular generation of men are always very different from those of +every preceding generation. Let it be supposed, for the sake of +argument, that the French of the present day could be placed in +precisely the same social condition in which their fathers were towards +the close of the last century; still they would act very differently +from their fathers. Nay, even though they should, with one single +exception, have inherited the dispositions of their fathers, the +difference of character in one single individual might suffice to give +an entirely new turn to the course of events. If every other antecedent +of the first French Revolution were again present, still there might be +no second revolution, provided only that, instead of another Louis the +Sixteenth, a Leopold of Belgium, or a Frederick the Great were king.[28] +With the last mentioned on the throne, there would assuredly be no +repetition of that vacillation of purpose which rocked the cradle and +fostered the growth of popular fury till it culminated in a Reign of +Terror. Since, then, there cannot be either a repetition of the same +circumstances to act upon men, or a reproduction of the same sort of +men to be acted upon by circumstances, human conduct can never exhibit a +repetition of the same phenomena; experience of the past can never, in +social or political affairs, furnish a formula for predictions as to the +future. Accordingly Mr. Mill, in common with Mr. Stephen, disclaims the +idea of positive, and pleads only for conditional, predictions. But the +very term 'conditional predictions' involves a contradiction, since it +is obviously impossible to see beforehand what perhaps may never come to +pass. What is meant by the phrase is really nothing more than +conjectures; and conjectures, however ingenious and reasonable, cannot +be admitted within the pale of science. They cannot be accepted as +fruits of a tree which has by the quality of its fruits proved its right +to be entitled the Science of History. + +With the view of enhancing the value of conditional predictions, it has +been urged that they are of precisely the same description as those +which we are in the habit of hazarding with respect to our familiar +acquaintance. There are, it is said, 'general maxims regarding human +conduct, by the application of which to given states of fact, +predictions may be made as to what will happen;' and all that is +necessary for the construction of historical science, is the employment +of these maxims on a larger scale. If the premiss here be sound, the +inference may be owned to be sufficiently legitimate. If there be any +formula with which the actions of individuals are observed to +correspond, there is every likelihood that the same formula may, by +extension and amplification, be adapted to the actions of communities. +But, although there are plenty of maxims telling men what they _ought_ +to do, there is not one--except that which declares that they must all +die--which affords any positive information as to what they _will_ do. +'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt not kill,' 'thou shalt not commit +adultery;'--all these and many more are moral laws; but of not one of +them--the more's the pity--is the observance sufficiently regular, to +give it the smallest pretension to be styled a scientific law. General +propositions, too, there are in abundance, representing with more or +less accuracy the probable results of particular lines of conduct. Such +are the proverbial sayings, that 'Honesty is the best policy,' that 'A +rolling stone gathers no moss,' that 'The racecourse is the road to +ruin.' But adages like these were never supposed to afford any basis for +prophecy. It may be that an honest man more commonly gets on in the +world than a knave, though there is also much to be said on behalf of +the counter-proposition, that 'The children of darkness are wiser in +their generation than the children of light;' but, at any rate, there is +no doubt that a man may be honest without being prosperous, and that he +is often all the poorer for his probity. But, indeed, is there any one +conceivable situation in life in which a positive rule can be laid down +as to the course which men will follow? Can it even--to make use of an +illustration which has been very effectively employed on the other +side--can it even be said that a man will certainly marry a woman with +whom he is deeply in love, who returns his affection, whom he can marry +if he likes, and whom he has the means of maintaining in a suitable +manner? Nine times out of ten he probably will; but in the tenth +instance a Brahmin's passion may be checked by fear of contamination +with a Pariah, or a King Cophetua's pride may prevent his wedding a +beggar-maid, or the titled owner of an entailed estate may decline to +illegitimatise his offspring by espousing his deceased wife's sister, or +betrothed lovers may be parted by some such mysterious barrier as +sprang up between Talbot Bulstrode and Aurora Floyd, or an Adam Bede, in +spite of the example set by George Eliot's hero, may refrain from +marrying Dinah for fear of breaking his brother Seth's heart. + +Equally vain would be the search for any rule invariably applicable to +political affairs. Even general propositions which sound like truisms +are not universally true. It cannot even be said that misgovernment +always produces discontent, or that the combination of superior strength +and superior strategy is always successful in war; for examples might be +cited of nations remaining patient under an iron despotism, and perhaps +also of campaigns lost by armies with every advantage of skill, numbers, +and discipline on their side. No better specimen can be given of what +are popularly spoken of as historical laws than one propounded by Mr. C. +Merivale, whose careful study of Roman annals has taught him to regard +it as 'a condition of permanent dominion that conquerors should absorb +the conquered gradually into their own body, by extending, as +circumstances arise, a share in their own exclusive privileges to the +masses from whom they have torn their original independence.' The +principle thus laid down is of great value, but it must not be mistaken +for an index pointing unerringly to a goal which will certainly be +obtained by following its direction. At least the offer of Austrian +citizenship had no perceptible effect in overcoming the exclusiveness of +Hungarian nationality; nor in inducing Venetia to become a willing +member of a Teutonic Federation, and to lend the same assistance to the +House of Hapsburg, as Gaul and Spain did to the Cæsars, in suppressing +insurrection on the banks of the Danube. History supplies many +principles similar to the one evolved by Mr. Merivale, all more or less +useful for the guidance of the statesman. So far as they are just, they +indicate the results which would spring from the adoption of certain +lines of policy, unless something unforeseen should happen. It is true +that something unforeseen is almost sure to happen and to divert or +impede the course which events would otherwise take; but still, it is +most important to be able to perceive clearly the influence exerted by +certain causes, how much soever that influence may be disturbed by other +causes; since, if it does nothing else, it will at least prevent the +disturbing causes from producing what would otherwise have been their +full effect. On principles which indicate only a few out of many causes +in simultaneous operation, it is evident that nothing deserving to be +called predictions can be founded; but from them, nevertheless--inasmuch +as they teach that some causes act for good and others for evil, as far +as their action extends--practical rules of government may be deduced. +Such rules, however, which at best can only furnish a loose and shifting +basis for doubtful conjectures, stand without the confines of positive +knowledge; they occupy a middle-ground between science and nescience, +and constitute what, until very lately, was thought to be designated +with sufficient distinctness as the 'Philosophy of History.' By that +term, Mr. Stephen in one place says, is really meant all that he ever +meant by the Science of History; and the observation, were it not +apparently inconsistent with his general reasoning, might seem to imply +that the only question between him and his opponents is whether a thing, +the existence of which is not disputed, ought or ought not to receive a +new appellation. But it is otherwise, at any rate, with Mr. Mill. The +language used by him on this as on all other subjects, is too clear and +precise to admit of its being supposed that he has used a new phrase +without attaching to it a new signification, or to permit the present +writer to believe, as he fain would do, that a point of nomenclature is +the only point of difference between himself and one from whom it is so +difficult to differ without diffidence and self-distrust. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[22] Mr. Buckle's first chapter, _passim_. + +[23] 'Cornhill Magazine,' for June and July, 1861. + +[24] 'Lay Sermons,' p. 158. + +[25] A highly esteemed literary friend, who has done me the favour of +looking over these pages in manuscript, considers that what I have +proved is, not that Omnipotence involves the co-existence of Freewill +and Necessity, but that Omnipotence itself, although capable of +possessing all things, could not possess Freewill, and that consequently +Freewill cannot possibly exist--that there cannot possibly be any such +thing. + +Although, for reasons stated four pages back, not myself prepared to +accept this view of the matter, I should cheerfully accept it if I +could. The argument in the text proceeds upon the assumption that people +mean something when they talk about Freewill. If, however, they have no +meaning, if the phrase be a simple sound signifying nothing, of course +all controversy regarding the possible co-existence of that nothing with +Necessity is settled at once and for ever, while no great amount of +philosophy will be requisite to induce mankind to resign themselves very +placidly to the absence of that same nothing. + +[26] Mill's 'Logic.' Fifth edition. Vol. ii. p. 527. + +[27] Mill's 'Logic,' vol. ii. p. 504. + +[28] 'S'il se fût trouvé alors (vers 1750) sur le trône un prince de la +taille et de l'humeur du Grand Frédéric, je ne doute point qu'il n'eût +accompli dans la société et dans le gouvernement plusieurs des plus +grands changements que la Révolution y a faits, non-seulement sans +perdre sa couronne, mais en augmentant beaucoup son pouvoir.'--De +Tocqueville, _L'Ancien Régime_, p. 274. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +_DAVID HUME AS A METAPHYSICIAN._ + + But the mischief lieth here; that when men of less leisure see them + who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuit of + knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or + advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly + received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions + concerning the most important truths which they had hitherto held + sacred and unquestionable.--Berkeley's _Hylas and Philonous_. + + +In no department of science is it possible for an enquirer to advance +considerably beyond all his predecessors without serving as a light by +whose aid his successors may advance somewhat beyond him. This is the +only apology that I feel disposed to offer for the freedom with which I +am about to criticize one who, having been, by judges so competent as +Adam Smith and Professor Huxley, pronounced to be 'by far the greatest +philosopher' and 'acutest thinker' of his own age, would, doubtless, be +at least on a level with the greatest philosophers of the present age if +he were living now. The veriest cripple that can manage to sit on +horseback may contrive to crawl some few steps beyond the utmost point +to which his steed has borne him, and, if those steps be uphill, may, by +looking back on the course he has come, perceive where the animal has +deviated from the right road. Yet he does not on that account suppose +that his own locomotive power is in any respect to be compared to his +horse's; neither need an annotator on Hume, when pointing to holes in +his author's metaphysical coat, be supposed not to be perfectly aware +that it is the strength, not of his own eyes, but of the spectacles +furnished to him by his author, that enables him to perceive them. + +The concentrated essence of Hume's metaphysics is to be found in 'An +Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,' forming part of a volume of +Essays which Hume published somewhat late in life, and which he desired +might 'alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and +principles.' To a formal, though necessarily rapid, examination of the +results of this 'Enquiry,' the present chapter will be almost +exclusively devoted. Often as the operation has been performed already, +there are two reasons why its repetition here may not be without +utility: for, first, its subject is a treatise containing the germs of +much subsequent and still current speculation which, in so far as it is +merely a development of those germs, cannot but be infected by whatever +unsoundness may be inherent in them; and, secondly, because the subject, +hackneyed as it may seem, is so far from being exhausted, that there is +scarcely one among the doctrines embodied in it to which, as I proceed +at once to show, fresh objection, more or less grave, may not be taken +by a fresh investigator. + +To begin very near indeed to the beginning, let us take, first, the +section of the 'Enquiry' which treats of the 'Origin of Ideas.' All the +perceptions of the mind may, according to Hume, be divided into two +classes, whereof the one consists of all those 'more lively +perceptions,' termed by him indifferently Impressions or Sensations, +which we experience when we 'hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or +desire, or will:' the other, of those 'less lively perceptions of which +we are conscious when we reflect on any of the sensations +above-mentioned,' and which are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. +'All our ideas or more feeble perceptions,' he continues, 'are copies of +our impressions or more lively ones,' the 'entire creative power of the +mind amounting to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, +augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded by the senses and +experience.' So confident is he of the literal accuracy of this +statement, as to proceed to intimate that whenever we find in +conversation or argument 'a philosophical term employed seemingly +without any idea or meaning,' we have only to enquire from what +impression its idea, if it have one, is derived, when, if no impression +can be adduced, we may be sure that no idea is present either. The only +phenomenon opposed to this rule, which he professes himself able to +think of, is that of a person who, of a colour--as, for instance, +blue--with which he is familiar, is able to conceive a shade somewhat +different from any of the shades which he has actually seen; but this +instance he disregards as too singular to affect the general maxim, to +which, as he might have added, it is not really an exception, any more +than would be the power of a person who had never seen a mountain higher +than Snowdon or Mont Blanc to conceive one as high as Chimborazo or +Mount Everest, for, equally in both cases, the ideas are copies of +sensible impressions, although of complex, not simple, ones--of colour +and graduation in the first case, of size and increase in the second. +Still, there is at least one genuine exception, which it is the more +remarkable that Hume should have overlooked, as it may be said to have +stared him in the face from the very subject-matter he was considering. +Our idea of idea itself, from what sensible impression is that derived? +We have just been told that the difference between an idea and a +sensation is that the first is a copy of the second, a feeble copy of a +lively original. The idea therefore is not itself a sensation; the copy +is not itself an original. Neither consequently can the idea or notion +which the mind proceeds to form of any of its previous ideas be derived +from or be a copy of a sensation: it cannot have entered the mind 'in +the only manner by which,' according to Hume, 'an idea can have access +to the mind, to wit, by actual feeling and sensation.' + +Let me not be misunderstood. Let me not be supposed to be courting +collision with the Berkleian thesis of the non-existence of abstract +ideas. I do not for one moment doubt that all our general or class +notions of sensible objects or events are merely concrete ideas of +individual objects or events--that, for instance, whenever we talk of +man or motion in general, we are really thinking of some particular man +or motion, which, as possessing all properties common to all men or +motions, serves as a representative of the entire _genus_. Neither am I +prepared to deny, although scarcely either prepared to admit, that even +of abstract qualities all our general or class notions are equally ideas +of particular specimens of those qualities; that, when we speak, for +instance, of virtue or vice in general, we are thinking of some +particular exhibition of some particular kind of virtue or vice. Nay, I +am not even concerned to deny that our idea of idea in general may +possibly be a copy of some particular one of our previous ideas which, +for the nonce, serves to represent all our other previous ideas. I limit +myself to saying that our idea of idea in general, whether it be or be +not itself an abstraction, is, at all events, not a copy of sensation. I +admit that it thereby differs essentially from most, if not all, other +general ideas. Possibly it may be only through my having myself felt +the promptings of some particular virtue or vice, that I am able to form +an idea of that particular virtue or vice. If so, I admit that my idea +of that particular virtue or vice is but, as Hume would say, a copy of +my feeling. And since, undoubtedly, I can feel myself thinking, or +perceiving, or performing any other mental operation, I am bound to +admit, further, that my idea of any such operation may equally be +described as a copy of a sensation which I have experienced. All I +contend for is that if, after having formed my idea, either of a mental +operation or of anything else whatever, I proceed to ask myself what +sort of an entity that idea is, the answer which I give myself, or, in +other words, the idea which I form of my previous idea, being a copy of +idea, cannot be a copy of sensation. + +So much must surely be conceded to me, for that white, being white, +cannot be also black is not nearly so certain as that idea and +sensation, being two distinct things, idea of idea cannot be idea of +sensation. The concession, indeed, is likely enough to be accompanied by +an exclamation of wonder that so microscopic a flaw in an elaborate +exposition should be thought worth pointing out; but Hume himself would +certainly not have so retorted. Of the doctrine which I am impugning, +viz., that every _idea_ is copied from some preceding _sensation_, he +had spoken as follows:--'Those who would assert that this position is +not universally true, nor without exception, have only one, and that an +easy, method of refuting it, by producing the idea which, in their +opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on +us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression or +lively perception which corresponds to it.' He was much too candid not +to have acknowledged that this challenge of his had been fairly and +fully met. He was not a man to refuse to own himself refuted when, after +distinctly intimating that the production of one single idea, having no +perception correspondent to it amongst those which we experience 'when +we see, or hear, or feel, or love, or hate, or will, or desire,' would +suffice for his entire refutation, he found such an idea produced. He +knew too well also to what enormous errors of thought minute errors of +expression may lead, to disregard any speck of inaccuracy in any one of +his definitions. The apparently slight oversight committed by him on +this occasion will, indeed, be presently seen to have sensibly +contributed to lead him subsequently into a mistake of no small +practical moment. + +We come next to the 'Association of Ideas,' the influence of which +almost all of Hume's successors, as well as himself, seem to me to have +greatly over-rated. That there is a 'principle of connection between the +different thoughts or ideas of the mind' is, as he says, sufficiently +evident; and that this principle is, as he was apparently the first to +remark, threefold, deriving its efficacy from resemblance, contiguity in +time or place, and cause or effect, may also be admitted with little +qualification. But I presume to think that he is quite incorrect in +adding that, in virtue of the aforesaid principle, ideas 'introduce each +other with a certain degree of method or regularity.' You are walking, +let us suppose, through Hyde Park, thinking of nothing more particular +than that the morning is a pleasant one, when you suddenly find yourself +in imagination pacing the shore of the Dead Sea, and, pausing to ask +yourself how you got there, you discover, perhaps, that it was by the +following steps. Remarking some landscape effect in the distance, you +were reminded of a similar one which you had remarked years before while +taking a walk fifty miles off in Sussex. Here resemblance operated. Then +you recollected how during that walk you were thinking about Mr. Buckle, +whose lucubrations you had been conning over before starting. Here +entered contiguity both of time and space. The name of Buckle reminded +you how that promising writer ended his travels abroad by dying of a +fever which he caught while sailing over the sites of the engulphed +cities of the plain. Here cause and effect came into action; and, so +far, everything accords with Hume's theory. But if you repeat the same +walk to-morrow, the same landscape effect will almost certainly suggest +a train of ideas quite different from that of to-day. Perhaps it may +begin by reminding you of landscape effects in general; then of Mr. +Ruskin, who has discoursed so eloquently on that topic, and next of Mr. +Ruskin's 'Stones of Venice,' from whence it is equal chances whether +your thoughts radiate, on one side of the compass, to stone china, or +Stoney Stratford, or Stonewall Jackson, or, on the other, to the +'Venetian Bracelet,' L. E. L. and Fernando Po, or to that effective +adaptation of the Venetian style of architecture, the Railway Station at +St. Pancras, and thence to some town or other on the Midland Line. + +These examples will be readily recognized as fair average specimens of +those unpremeditated trains of thought with which we are all familiar. +Is there, then, in the arrangement of the consecutive thoughts of which +the several trains are composed, any method or regularity common, I will +not say to all, but to any two of them? According to Hume and to most of +his successors in the same path of enquiry, there ought to be. Thus the +illustrious author of the 'Analysis of the Human Mind' affirms, without +rebuke or protest from any one of his not less illustrious commentators, +that 'our ideas spring up or exist in the order in which the sensations +existed of which they are the copies: that of those sensations which +occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically, and +that of the sensations which occurred successively, the ideas rise +successively.' And he adds, 'this is the general law of the Association +of Ideas,' remarking, by way of illustration, that, as 'I have seen the +sun, and the sky in which it is placed, synchronically, if I think of +the one I think of the other at the same time'; and that, as when +committing to memory a passage of words, as, for instance, the Lord's +Prayer, we pronounce the words in successive order, and have +consequently the sensation of the words in successive order, so when we +proceed to repeat the passage, 'the ideas of the words also rise in +succession, _Our_ suggesting _Father, Father_ suggesting _which, which_ +suggesting _art_, and so on to the end.'[29] + +Oh Law! Law! most abused of scientific terms, what an infinity of +dogmatic illegalities are committed in thy name! The one thing which +scientific law implies is regularity of occurrence, but what regulation +is it that is obeyed in common by a number of sequences commencing at +the same point in Hyde Park, yet terminating, one in Africa, another in +America, a third in Palestine, and a fourth in the centre of England? +Can it have been seriously said that it is impossible for us to think of +the sky without thinking simultaneously of the sun which illuminates +the sky? Is it impossible for us to think instead of the ether which +constitutes it, or peradventure even of the resemblance between its +celestial azure and what Moore calls the 'most unholy blue' of some +frolicsome Cynthia's eyes? And is it not notorious that when saying the +Lord's Prayer--a prayer which, in spite of the injunction by which its +original dictation was accompanied, to 'avoid vain repetitions, as the +heathen do,' many Anglican clergymen insist on repeating half-a-dozen +times in a single service--is it not notorious that, so far from the +idea of one word suggesting to us the idea of the next, no small effort +of attention is requisite to enable us to have any idea at all of what +we are saying? + +It would seem that the author of the 'Analysis' either could not help +asking himself questions like these, or, without asking the questions, +could not help seeing the commonplace truths involved in the inevitable +replies to them. It would seem to have been semi-consciousness of the +utter inability of the evidence first cited by him to justify belief in +the necessarily simultaneous or successive occurrence of the ideas of +simultaneously or successively experienced sensations, which made him +have recourse for help to _complex_ ideas. 'If,' he says, 'from a stone +I have had synchronically the sensation of colour, the sensation of +hardness, the sensations of shape and size, the sensation of +weight,--when the idea of one of these sensations occurs, the ideas of +all of them occur.' Because, then, I may have ascertained by experience +that a stone is white, hard, and round, two feet in diameter, and twenty +pounds in weight, am I really incapable, if I happen to break my shin +against it, of thinking how hard it is, without thinking also how heavy; +or, when trying to lift it, of thinking how heavy it is without +thinking likewise of its shape and colour? Elsewhere the same writer +speaks of 'ideas which have been so often conjoined that whenever one +exists in the mind, the others immediately exist along with it, seem to +run into one another, to coalesce, as it were, and out of many to form +one idea.' But which are the ideas whereof this can be said? The writer +instances those simple ideas, colour, hardness, extension, weight, +which, he says, make up our complex ideas of gold or iron. He instances, +too, the ideas of resistance, muscular contractility, direction, +extension, place, and motion, of which he says our apparently simple +idea, weight, is compounded. Does he mean, then, that we cannot +entertain the idea of yellowness without entertaining at the same time +all the other ideas necessary for composing the idea of gold, and +entertaining, too, that idea in addition to all the rest? Does he mean +that a train of thought cannot commence with place without terminating +with weight? Of course he means nothing of the kind, although so he +distinctly says. Rather, he appears to mean the direct converse, viz., +that we cannot have the idea of gold or of weight present to the mind, +without having present also all the simple ideas of which those complex +ideas are compounded--in other words, not that the occurrence of any one +component necessarily calls up all the other components, and forms with +them the compound, but that the appearance of the compound brings with +it all its separate components. + +But neither does this seem to be a strictly correct representation. I am +not sure that I can think of gold without thinking of yellowness, but I +am positive that I can without thinking of hardness. Nor is there any +doubt that the youngest child knows perfectly well what it means when, +trying to lift a stone, it calls the stone heavy, although it might not +be more difficult to make the stone itself than the child understand +what is meant by muscular contractility. I own that if it be here +demanded of me how a compound can be present unless every one of its +components be present also, I may under pressure be constrained to +suggest that possibly, after all, the very term _compound_ or _complex +idea_ may be somewhat of a misnomer, or at any rate that the +constituents of such an idea are much fewer than is commonly supposed. +Be it admitted that the idea, so styled, could not have been formed +without the instrumentality of other and previously-formed ideas, still +it does not follow that the instruments of production should for ever +after accompany the product. The rackful of dry toast which is brought +to you for breakfast could scarcely have been so neatly sliced without +the help of a knife, but the toast is not the less in bodily presence on +the breakfast-table because the knife that cut it has been left behind +in the kitchen. Neither, although you may probably be aware that salt, +suet, sugar, and spice enter into the composition of a Christmas +pudding, do you necessarily think of those separate ingredients when you +think of the pudding, any more than you would see them separately if you +saw the pudding. The only qualities which you apparently cannot help +thinking of when you think of the pudding are its size, shape, and +colour. + +One word more about the assumed regularity in the succession of ideas. +That when you are repeating a familiar form of words or playing a +familiar piece of music, every word uttered or note struck, by reason of +connexion of some sort between itself and the word or note next in +order, enables you without the smallest mental effort to utter that +word or strike that note, is too notorious to be questioned. But I do +very earnestly question whether the connexion that thus operates is an +association of ideas. How can it be, when, as frequently happens, you +have not the smallest idea of what it is you are saying or playing? Have +you not often, after reverently saying grace, like the decent +paterfamilias you probably are, occasioned a giggle round the table by +saying it again a minute or two afterwards, in utter unconsciousness +that you had said it just before? Or, if I may so far flatter myself as +to fancy my reader a fair daughter of the house instead of the staid +house father--has it never happened to you, Miss, while executing a +brilliant performance on the piano, to have been so entirely engrossed +by an animated flirtation carried on simultaneously, that, if at the +conclusion of the piece you had been asked what you had been playing, +you could not have replied whether it was _Là ci darem la mano_ or _Non +mi voglio maritar_? And is it not evident that non-existent ideas cannot +have called real ideas into existence? + +My own modest contribution towards explanation of these mysterious +phenomena is as follows. Apart from association of _ideas_, there is a +separate and independent association--to wit, association of +_volitions_. While committing to memory a form of words, or trying a new +piece of music, every separate movement of your tongue or of your +fingers is consequent on some separate volition. Each series of +movements is consequent on a series of volitions. By being repeatedly +made to follow each other in the same order, the several volitions +become connected with each other, so that whenever the mind desires to +marshal them in the aforesaid order, each one, as it presents itself, +brings with it the next in succession, until the whole series is +completed; while, as each volition has consequent upon it a +corresponding movement, a series of corresponding movements +simultaneously takes place. The mind meanwhile is quite unconscious of +the muscular movements that are going on. What it is conscious of are +the volitions without which no voluntary movements of the muscles could +have been made, and of which the mind must needs be conscious, because a +volition of which the mind was not conscious would be an involuntary +volition, a birth too monstrous for even metaphysics to be equal to. But +although necessarily conscious of these volitions, the mind is only +momentarily conscious. It pays them barely an instant's attention, and +therefore instantaneously forgets them, retaining no more trace of them +than if they had never been. + +The doctrine of Hume's which next confronts us is his famous one +concerning Cause and Effect. He commences it by explaining that all +objects of human enquiry are divisible into two kinds--1. Relations of +Ideas, like those of which geometry, algebra, and arithmetic treat, and +which are either intuitively certain, or 'discoverable by the mere +operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in +the universe,' as, for example, the truths demonstrated by Euclid, which +would be equally incontestable even 'though there were never a circle or +a triangle in nature:' 2. Matters of Fact, as, for example, the sun's +rising and setting, or the emission of light and heat by fire, which are +never discoverable by unassisted reason, because of no one of them would +the opposite imply a contradiction or be consequently inconceivable; and +in our knowledge of any one of which we can never 'go beyond the +evidence of our memory and senses,' except by means of reasons derived +from experience of some fact or facts connected in some way or other +with the particular matter of fact we are considering. + +So far, all is comparatively plain sailing, but Hume now propounds a +difficulty which he at first presents as seemingly insurmountable, but +which I cannot help thinking to be mainly of his own creation, and which +he himself, almost immediately afterwards, suggests a mode, though a +very inadequate mode, of overcoming. His language here is not marked by +his usual perspicuity, or rather--to speak without respect of +persons--it contradicts itself in most astounding fashion; but his +meaning is not the less certainly the following, for there is no other +construction which his words will bear. + +'What,' he asks, 'is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?' +Why is it that, having found that such an object has always been +attended with such an effect, we infer that similar objects will always +be attended with similar effects? The proposition that a certain +antecedent has always been followed by a certain consequent, and the +proposition that the same antecedent will be followed by the same +consequent, are not identical. What, then, is the connexion between them +which causes one to be inferred from the other? The connexion is +unhesitatingly pronounced by him to be neither intuitively perceived, +nor yet to be 'founded on any process of the understanding.' If you +insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, he challenges +you to produce that reasoning, and taking for granted that you have none +to produce, he proceeds to indicate what principle it is which, in his +opinion, does determine us to form the inference. That principle he +declares to be custom or habit, by which alone, he asserts, we are, +after the constant conjunction of two objects, determined to expect the +one from the appearance of the other; adding that all inferences from +experience are effects of custom, not of reasoning. + +What is the correct answer to this question of Hume's I shall be rash +enough to endeavour to indicate a little further on; meanwhile there can +be no temerity in saying that whatever be the right answer, Hume's is +certainly a wrong one. Habit plainly cannot be its own parent. It +enables us to repeat more easily what we have already repeatedly done, +but it cannot be the cause of our doing or being able to do anything for +the first time. An infant that has once burnt its fingers by touching +the flame of a candle, expects that if it touch the flame again it will +burn its fingers again, but it does not expect this because it has been +in the habit of expecting it. Neither, if we be here bidden to +understand that the habit referred to is not any mental habit of our +own, but a habit which we have observed certain phenomena to have of +following each other, shall we thereby be brought one whit nearer the +truth. Our infant with the burnt finger has not observed that flame is +in the habit of burning. It only knows that flame did burn on the one +occasion on which it tried the experiment, which experiment it +consequently declines to repeat. Besides, no one needs to be told that +inferences, though thus capable of being drawn from single occurrences, +are drawn with increased confidence from observation of habit. We all +know already that, having always found that fire burns, we infer that it +always will burn. What we want to know is, why we draw this inference. +This is the question which Hume puts, and respecting which he gives +very positively the negative reply that the inference is not drawn +either intuitively, nor yet by any process of the understanding. Yet +that a body when not moving must needs be at rest, is not more certainly +demonstrable than that inferences cannot possibly be drawn except in one +or other of these two ways. Is not every inference a species of belief, +and must not every belief be either innate within us, or have been +acquired artificially; and, as in the latter case, it is a mental +acquisition, must it not in that case have been acquired by an operation +of the mind or understanding? Is it not clear, then, that inferences +must always be either intuitive or ratiocinative; and is it not strange +that Hume should deny that they ever are so? Yet stranger still is it, +that even while denying them to be either one or the other, he, almost +in the same breath, pronounces them to be both. For, after having on one +page denied that they are founded on reason, or any process of the +understanding, he describes them on the next page as being not simply +founded on, but as being themselves 'processes of the mind,' 'processes +of thought,' and immediately afterwards 'arguments,' nay, '_reasonings_ +from experience;' and, yet again, after as short a pause, these very +same 'reasonings,' and 'arguments,' and 'processes of the mind and +thought,' he concludes by styling 'natural instincts which no reason or +process of the thought or understanding is able either to produce or to +prevent'--'operations of the soul as unavoidable' when the mind is +placed in certain circumstances, as it is 'to feel the passion of love +when we receive benefits, or hatred when we meet with injuries.' + +What are we to say to a description of mental operations which are and +are not 'arguments' and 'reasonings,' which are and are not 'processes +of thought,' which are not 'intuitive,' and which yet are 'instincts?' +How are we to account for such amazing inconsistencies in an exposition +of one of the greatest of philosophers? With all humility, I submit the +following as a possible solution of the enigma. + +The one solitary ground on which Hume denies the argumentative and +ratiocinative character of what he nevertheless terms arguments and +reasonings, is the impossibility of producing the _chains_ of argument +or reasoning of which they are composed. But this impossibility can at +most only prove that the reasonings are elementary, and have, +consequently, no component parts into which they can be resolved. But +reasoning is not the less reasoning for being elementary, or for being +only a single link in a chain, instead of being itself a chain composed +of many links. Still, being elementary, it may occur to, and pass +through, the mind with extreme rapidity--with not less rapidity than an +intuition or instinct, for which therefore it may easily be mistaken, as +accordingly it has actually been by Hume. But that a reasoning from +experience is not really an instinct is certain, firstly, because +intuitive or instinctive reasoning, if not a phrase absolutely devoid of +meaning, is a contradiction in terms; and, secondly, because, if it were +instinctive, it would precede instead of following experience, and a +baby, instead of finding out that flame burns by touching it, would know +beforehand that flame burns, and would therefore not touch it. + +From the species of Belief constituted by an inference from experience, +Hume, by an easy transition, passes on to Belief in general, which he +defines to be 'nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady +conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able +to attain,' referring, by way of illustration, to an animal with the +head of a man and the body of a horse, which anyone can imagine, but no +one can believe in, and desiring us apparently to suppose that if our +groom were to come and tell us that he had found a centaur feeding in +the paddock beside our favourite saddle-horse, our sole reason for +believing in the horse and for not believing in the centaur would be our +greater ability to conceive the one than the other. That such a +definition should for a moment have satisfied its author's curiosity, is +itself a psychological curiosity which must not, however, be suffered to +detain us. Whoever, not content with knowing perfectly well what belief +is, desires to have his knowledge of it set down in writing, should read +the admirable notes on the subject, with which Mr. John Mill and Mr. +Bain have enriched the last edition of Mr. James Mill's 'Analysis of the +Human Mind.' Most readers, however, will probably be disposed to avail +themselves here of a rather favourite phrase of Hume himself, and to +plead that, 'if we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute +about terms;' and it is not unlikely that such of them as may have +formed their notion of metaphysical discussions in general from the +specimens given above, may go so far as to hint a doubt whether any of +the nice verbal distinctions which metaphysicians so much affect, are +really worth the trouble required to understand them. Nor would anyone, +perhaps, be much the worse for acting upon this suspicion, provided +that, in accordance with it, he kept altogether aloof from the studies +which it disparages. His ideas need not be the less clear because he +neither knows nor cares of what they are copies, nor whether they are +copies of anything; nor will the order of their occurrence be at all +affected in consequence of his being similarly careless, whether that +order is or is not governed by a _law_ of association; neither need his +inferences from experience be the less sound in consequence of his never +having enquired how or why they are deduced. But although the most +absolute ignorance and corresponding indifference about these and +kindred topics may not tend in the least to disqualify him for +performance of the whole duty of man, it is not the less important that, +if he do care to know aught about them, his knowledge should be exact, +for there is no knowing beforehand how luxuriantly the minutest germ of +theoretical error may ramify in practice, or into what substantive +quagmire trust in deceitful shadows may lead. These respectable +aphorisms may be beneficially borne in mind during perusal of what is +about to be said. + +If the fact were really, as Hume supposed, that we have _no_ reason for +our inferences from experience, and draw them only because either we +have been in the habit of drawing them, or because we are so constituted +as to be unable to help drawing them, the reason of our drawing them +plainly could not be that we perceive any necessary connection between +antecedent and consequent events, or any force or power binding these +together as cause and effect. Accordingly, Hume does not scruple to +affirm that 'we have no idea of connection or power at all, and that +these words are absolutely without meaning when employed either in +philosophical reasoning or in common life.' Every idea, he argues, +referring to a rule which he somewhat hastily supposes himself to have +already proved to be without exception, must needs have been copied from +some preceding sensible impression, but neither from within nor from +without can we have received an impression from which this particular +idea can have been copied. No keenest scrutiny of any portion of matter, +no study of its external configuration or internal structure could, +previously to experience, enable us to conjecture that it could produce +any effect whatever, still less any particular effect: could enable us +to guess, for instance, that flame would burn, or ice would chill, if +touched. Nor even though on once touching flame we get our fingers +burnt, are mature philosophers like us to conclude, as if we had no more +intelligence than so many babies, that if we touch again we shall be +burnt again. All we have as yet learnt from the experiment is that the +sensation of touching fire has once been followed by the sensation of +burning, but nothing has occurred to suggest that in the first sensation +lurked any secret power of producing the second. And what a single +experiment does not prove, no number of repetitions of precisely the +same experiment with precisely the same results can prove. Even though +on a lengthened course of experience we have found that in every case of +our touching flame our fingers have been burnt, we are still as far as +ever from perceiving any bond of connection between the two events. We +do indeed believe that as flame when touched has hitherto invariably +burnt, so, whenever touched hereafter, it will hereafter invariably +burn; but this, according to Hume, we believe simply because by long +practice we have contracted such a habit of associating the idea of +touched flame with burnt fingers, that whenever we witness the one we +cannot help expecting the other. + +Neither, if, withdrawing our eyes from the outward world, we cast them +inwardly upon the operations of our own minds, shall we, according to +Hume, any the more discover what we are in search of. What though we +know by experience that whatever, within certain limits, our will +appoints, our bodily organs or mental faculties will ordinarily perform; +that our limbs will move as we wish them, and our memory, reason, or +imagination bring forward ideas which we desire to contemplate, what +knowledge have we here beyond that of certain volitions and certain +other acts taking place in succession? What smallest evidence have we of +any connection between the volitions and the other acts? A volition is +an operation of the mind, is it not? and body is matter, is it not? And +do you pretend to know--can you form the smallest approach to a +guess--how mind is united with body, and how it is possible therefore +for the refined spiritual essence to actuate the gross material +substance. If you 'were empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains +or to control the planets in their orbit,' would such extensive +authority be one whit more inexplicable than the supposed ability of +your will to raise your hand to your head or to cause your foot to make +one forward step? + +If, nevertheless, you fancy you understand in what manner the will has +some of the bodily organs under its government, how, pray, do you +account for its not having all equally--the heart and liver as well as +the tongue and fingers? Without trying, you never would have discovered +that your bowels _will not_, any more than without trying you could have +known that your limbs _will_, ordinarily move in conformity with your +wishes. Neither, if one of your limbs were to be suddenly paralysed, +would you, until you tried, become aware that it would no longer move as +you wished. If there be, then, a power attached to the will, it is +plainly experience alone which apprises you of its existence; whereas +if you were independently conscious of it, you would know beforehand +precisely what it can and what it cannot effect, and would, moreover, +when you lost it, become instantly aware of your loss. + +Again, and above all, does not anatomy teach us that when the mind wills +the movement of any bodily member, it 'is not the member itself which is +immediately moved, but certain intervening nerves, muscles, and animal +spirits, or possibly something still more minute and more unknown,' +through which the motion is successively propagated until it reach the +member? So that when the mind wills one event, a series of other events, +quite different and quite unthought of, take place instead; and it is +only by their means that the will's purpose is finally achieved. But how +can the mind be conscious, how can it form the remotest conception, of a +power which not only never does what the mind desires, but never does +aught of which the mind is cognisant? + +And as we are thus utterly unable to perceive any power that the mind +has over the body, so are we equally unconscious of any power of the +mind over itself. We know as little of its internal nature and +constitution as we do of its mode of connection with the body. We know +by experience that at the bidding of the will ideas are continually +brought forward; but by what means they are brought forward we are +absolutely ignorant, as we are also of the reasons of the fluctuation of +mental activity, and why mental operations are more vigorous in health +than in sickness, before breakfast than after a heavy dinner or deep +carouse. + +Such, on the issue immediately before us, is Hume's reasoning, to +which--though necessarily very greatly condensing it--I shall, I am +sure, be acknowledged to have conscientiously striven to do full +justice, by bringing all its points into the strongest light, and +arranging them in the most effective order. Still, with its utmost +strength thus displayed before us, we are fully warranted in asserting +_à priori_ that its whole utmost strength is weakness. If, by following +a leader who has engaged to conduct us to a certain spot, we find +ourselves at our journey's end in a quite different place, no appeal +that the guide can make to maps or finger-posts will persuade us that he +has not mistaken the way. Nor need our judgment be otherwise, even +though our guide be Hume, if, having started with him in pursuit of +truth, we are finally landed in a patent absurdity. With all due respect +for logic, we protest with Tony Lumpkin against being argufied out of +our senses, as we plainly should be if we allowed ourselves to be +persuaded that whenever we use the words _power_ or _connection_ we have +no idea thereto correspondent. Since, then, Hume tells us this, we may +be quite sure that he has been deluded by some fallacy which may be +detected by adequate search; and being, moreover, sensible that we +really have the idea our possession of which is denied by him, we may be +equally sure that the original of which the idea is a copy is similarly +discoverable. In sooth, neither the one nor the other is far to seek. +The fallacy consists simply in confusion of the definite with the +indefinite article. The original of our idea of power Hume himself +indicates even while rejecting it. Although constrained by Hume's +demonstration to confess that we cannot even conjecture of what kind is +_the_ authority which the will exercises over the limbs, we are not the +less sensible that it does exercise _an_ authority of some sort or +other, which they are unable to disobey. We know that in ordinary +circumstances our limbs will move when we wish them to move, and will +remain quiet when we wish them not to move. Nor this only. We moreover +know, or at any rate fancy we know, that they would not have moved +unless we had wished them. In examples like these of volitions followed, +as the case may be, by _premeditated_ motion or rest, we have something +more than the simple sequence observable in the succession of external +events. We do not perceive simply that, as when fire is lighted, heat is +emitted, so when the mind wills the body moves. We perceive clearly that +there must be a connection of some sort between antecedent and +consequent, without which the first certainly _would not_ and, we fancy, +_could not_ have followed the first. We perceive, in short, that the +second followed _because_ the first preceded. If fire were an animated +being, capable of forming and manifesting volitions; and if we observed +that whenever it wished to emit heat, heat was emitted; and that +whenever it wished to withhold heat, heat was withheld; and if we were +thereupon to say that fire has the power of emitting or withholding heat +at its pleasure, our words surely would not be destitute of +signification; they would certainly possess some meaning, and that a +very obvious one. And so they as certainly do when we say that the mind +has power over those bodily movements which we observe to take place and +to cease in constant conformity with its will. I am not saying that what +they mean is necessarily truth--we will come to that presently--all I +say as yet is, that they mean something, and that that something, +whether it be a real or only an imaginary perception, is perfectly +fitted to be the original of that idea of 'power' _connecting_ cause and +effect, or of 'connection' _between_ cause and effect, which Hume +maintains does not exist, because there is no original from which it +can have been copied. It matters not that we are quite ignorant of what +nature is the something from which our idea of power possessed by the +mind over the body is derived, and which, for aught we know, may reside, +not in the mind, but in the body, and may consist, not of any strength +inherent in the former, but of loyalty and docility inherent in the +latter. Just as the authority of a popular general over a +well-disciplined army is not the less real because the soldiers, every +one of whose lives is at the general's disposal, might, if so inclined, +mutiny _en masse_, so it can make no difference in the mind's power over +the body whether the mind be intrinsically able to enforce obedience, or +the limbs be so constituted as to be unable to disobey. As little does +it matter that we are also ignorant of the mode in which the mind's +behests are communicated to the members. It is not the less certain that +in some mode or other they are communicated. Neither does it signify +more that the mind does not communicate directly with the part of the +body which it desires to influence, and acts upon that part only by +means of action propagated through a series of intervening parts; or +that it is able to direct only some organs, and not others, or cannot +direct even those, if by some accident they have become seriously +deranged. A strong-armed blockhead is not the less obviously able to +pump up water because the terms 'muscular contractility' and +'atmospheric pressure' are as heathen Greek to him; or because the +pump-handle, which alone is directly moved by him, touches, not the +water itself, but only the first link in a chain of mechanism connecting +it with the water; or because, if the sucker of the pump got choked, or +the well were to dry up, it would be vain for him to go on moving the +pump-handle. Blockhead as he is, nothing of all this in the least +diminishes his conviction that as long as the pump continues in order +and there remains water in the well, he can oblige the water to rise by +moving the pump-handle; nor can anything analogous prevent the mind from +feeling that whenever, in ordinary circumstances, it wills that the +limbs be moved, the limbs not only will be moved, but cannot help being +moved accordingly. But it is simply impossible that, from the exercise +of volitions which it knows will be obeyed, the mind should not receive +the sensation of exercising causal power; and having thus got the +sensation, it has nothing to do but to copy the sensation in order to +get the idea of causal power. _Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte_; +the first step being taken the others cost nothing. The mind having, by +introspection of its own operations, discovered what Hume, though +professing to look in the same direction, unaccountably contrived to +overlook--the idea, namely, of causal power--proceeds to apply that idea +to the connection of external phenomena. Not only do we, whenever we see +a horse or an ox walking of its own accord, infer that the animal walks +_because_ it wishes to walk; but having observed that, when a stone is +thrown into the air it invariably falls presently afterwards towards the +ground; that a magnet invariably attracts any light piece of iron placed +near it; that red-hot coals always burn; and that water always moistens, +we infer that the second constituent of each brace of phenomena takes +place _because_ of the first, meaning thereby that there is some strong +bond _connecting_ the two and _compelling_ one to follow the other. If +called upon to justify this inference, we may do so by reducing to +absurdity its only possible alternative. If there be supposed to be no +connection between two phenomena constituting one of those invariable +sequences which we are accustomed to denominate cause and effect, the +sequence which they constitute must needs be an unconnected sequence, +and the only reason for styling one of the phenomena a cause is, that it +is an antecedent which the other invariably follows. But according to +this, as has been pointed out over and over again, day would be the +cause of night, and night the cause of day, and tidal flux and reflux +likewise would be each other's causes; and Mr. J. S. Mill has therefore +proposed to interpolate a word, and to define the cause of a phenomenon +as 'the antecedent on which it (the phenomenon) is invariably and +_unconditionally_ consequent.'[30] I must, however, confess myself +unable to perceive how the definition is improved by this emendation. +There is not, and cannot possibly be, such a thing as _unconditionally_ +invariable sequence, as, indeed, Mr. Mill himself virtually admits by +expressly assuming as an indispensable condition of all causation that +'the present constitution of things endure.' But if, notwithstanding the +presence of this indispensable condition, it be permissible to call any +sequence unconditionally invariable, then the sequences of night upon +day and of day upon night are such sequences, and day and night continue +consequently entitled to be styled each other's causes as much under the +amended as under the original definition. For as long as 'the present +constitution of things endures,' that is, as long as the earth continues +to revolve on its axis, and the sun continues to shine, and no opaque +substance intervenes between earth and sun, day and night will continue +to be as invariably and unconditionally each other's antecedents as +sunlight will continue to be the antecedent or concomitant of day. +True, Mr. Mill denies that the earth's diurnal motion is part of the +present constitution of things, because, according to him, 'nothing can +be so called which might possibly be terminated or altered by natural +causes:' but, if so, then neither ought sunlight to be so called, for it +too quite possibly may, nay, in the opinion of many philosophers, most +certainly will, be extinguished eventually by natural causes. If day +ought not to be called the unconditionally invariable consequent of +night merely because it would cease to be so if the earth were to cease +turning on its axis, then neither ought it to be called the +unconditionally invariable consequent of the unshrouded proximity of the +sun, inasmuch as it would cease to be thereupon consequent if the sun +were to become burnt out. If night be not, and if sunlight be, the cause +of day, the reason is not that sunlight always hitherto has been, and, +on one indispensable condition, always will be followed by day, for so +equally has hitherto been, and on the same condition will hereafter be, +night. The real reason is, that sunlight not only always has been and +will be, but also always _must_ be followed by day; that unless the +constitution of nature very materially change, wherever is sunlight day +_must_ be; whereas not only might day be, although night had never +preceded, but unless night had preceded, day must have been from the +beginning. In short, to constitute cause, invariability, however +unconditional, will not suffice. Another quality must be added, and that +quality I contend to be obligatoriness. A cause, I maintain, would not +be a cause unless its effect not only do or will, but _must_ necessarily +follow it. In common with the great unphilosophic mass of mankind, I +hold that between cause and effect there is a binding power which +constrains the one to follow the other. If asked whence we suppose that +power can have been derived, such of us, as conscious that we are 'no +very great wits,' don't mind confessing that we 'believe in a God,' will +not mind either suggesting that the power, wherever not exerted by an +animated creature, may possibly be directly from God. One thing certain +is, that inanimate matter cannot possibly possess or exercise any force +or power whatever, so that, unless matter, although apparently dead, be +really alive, attraction, cohesion, gravitation, and all its other so +called forces, being incompatible with dead inertness, must needs be +manifestations of some living, and possibly divine, power. Far from +there being any difficulty in conceiving Omnipresent Deity to be +exhibiting its might in every speck of universal space in every instant +of never-ending time, it is, on the contrary, impossible to conceive +otherwise. We cannot conceive one single minutest point in limitless +extension to be for one moment exempt from the immediate control of a +divine nature assumed to be + + Diffused throughout infinity's expanse + And co-existent with eternity. + +Here, indeed, we hasten to acknowledge with Hume that 'our line is too +short to fathom the immense abyss' which we have now reached. But we +need not, therefore, follow Hume to the lengths to which his insidious +mock-modesty would fain entice us. We may concede to him that 'we have +no idea of a Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own +faculties,' but we need not imitate him by perversely shutting our eyes +to the evidences of an energy inherent in our own faculties, and thereby +entitle him to insist on our joining him in denying that there is any +evidence of energy in the Supreme Being. We need not, because +constrained to admit that we know no more of the essence of divine, than +we do of human, power, pretend that we cannot even conceive such a thing +as divine power. Hume's affectation of profound ignorance on the subject +must have occasioned unusual amusement in a certain quarter. The Devil +can seldom have had a more hearty grin at his darling sin than when +witnessing this peculiar exhibition of the pride that apes humility. + +That Hume's ignorance was nothing but affectation is proved by his +veering completely round immediately afterwards, and in his very next +chapter, and almost in his very next page, pronouncing it to be +'universally allowed that matter in all its operations is actuated by a +necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely +determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect in such +particular circumstances could possibly have resulted from it.' +Throughout the same chapter he argues in the same sense, and quite +forgetting how obstinately he had just before contended that there are +absolutely no such things as connection or power at all, he defies any +one to 'define a cause without comprehending, as part of the definition, +_necessary_ connection with its effect.' So highly, indeed, does he now +rate that connecting power, whose very existence he had previously so +vehemently denied, that he professes himself unable to set any limit to +its efficacy. Even for those who should undertake to deduce from it the +impossibility of any liberty of human will, and consequently of any +human responsibility, pleading that, inasmuch as with a continued chain +of necessary causes, reaching from the first great cause of all to every +separate volition of every single human creature, it must needs be the +Creator of the world who is the ultimate author of all volitions, and +consequently solely accountable for every crime which man commits, he +affects, with exceedingly ill-sitting sanctimoniousness, to have no +better answer than that such belief, being impious, must be absurd and +cannot be true. It did not suit his purpose to point out that the +volitions of Omnipotence itself, equally with human volitions, are +necessary effects of causes--the causes in their case being the other +attributes with which Omnipotence is conjoined--and that as it is +nevertheless impossible for the volitions of Omnipotence to be otherwise +than absolutely free and uncontrolled, so there is no reason why human +volitions likewise should not, in spite of the same objection, be as +thoroughly free as our own feelings assure us they are. + +Hume's sudden conversion, so amazing at first sight, from flattest +denial to positivest assertion of causal power, becomes intelligible +when he is seen immediately afterwards using his newly adopted creed as +a fulcrum whereon to rest his argumentative lever in his assault upon +Miracles. About that celebrated piece of reasoning, startling as the +avowal may sound, there is, to my mind, nothing more remarkable than its +celebrity, for, on close inspection, it will be found to be entirely +made up of (1) the demonstration of a truism, and (2) the inculcation of +a confessedly misleading rule. Not far from its commencement will be +found a definition which, if correct, would leave nothing to dispute +about. A miracle, we are told, is 'a violation of the laws of nature,' +of laws which a firm and unalterable experience has established. But if +so, _cadit quæstio_. Of course, there can be no alteration of the +unalterable. No need, of course, of further words to prove that a +miracle thus defined is an impossibility. + +Let us suppose, however, the word _unalterable_ to have been used here +by a slip of the pen instead of _unaltered_, and that Hume really meant +by a miracle any alteration of what had previously appeared to be the +constant course of nature. Even so, we shall have him contending that no +amount, however great, of testimony however unimpeachable, ought to be +accepted as adequate proof of such an alteration. Of what he urges in +support of this position much may be at once dismissed as altogether +irrelevant. That the most honest witness may be the dupe of optical or +auricular illusion, or of a distorting or magnifying imagination; that +there is in many minds a natural predisposition to believe in the +marvellous, and that the love of astonishing often gives exaggerated +expression to the exaggerations of the fancy; that self-interest and +religious zeal often furnish additional motives for mendacity, and that +testimony, even when sincere at first, is apt to become corrupted at +every stage as it passes from hand to hand, or is committed to +paper--all this, together with any further enumeration of circumstances +calculated to invalidate testimony, is quite beside the real question. +It merely proves what no one needs to have proved, the propriety, viz., +of weighing evidence and balancing adverse probabilities; and even +though it proved in addition that of all the so-styled miracles on +record, there is not a single one the evidence for which is sufficient, +it would still prove nothing to the purpose. For Hume is arguing against +the credibility, not of any miracles in particular, but of all miracles +in general, those included the witnesses for which are of indisputable +intelligence and undisputed veracity. Be the quality of the testimony +what it may, no quantity of it, according to him, can be sufficient. +This is the essence of his thesis, the only part of it in which there +is any novelty, and in behalf of this part all that he has to say may be +resolved into a sophism, followed by a repetition of the same begging of +the question, as is involved in his afore-cited definition of a miracle. +In substance it runs as follows. All testimony is at best but a +description of the results of sensible experience--of observations of +the senses--but the most faithful description must needs be a less vivid +presentation of truth than the reality described. A single original is +better evidence than any number of copies. Your own personal experience +is more trustworthy than any number of mere records of the experience of +other people, and where the two conflict, the former always deserves +preference. Now the personal experience of each one of us assures us +that many sets of natural phenomena take place in perfectly invariable +sequences, in sequences so invariable as to appear to be, and to be +familiarly spoken of as, manifestations or operations of certain +inflexible laws of nature. Within our experience there has never been a +single deviation from any such law. Wherefore, though all the rest of +mankind should unite in asserting that they have observed such a +deviation, we ought not to believe them. Even though, for example--the +example, however, being not Hume's, but my own--we were, on leaving home +some morning, to hear on all sides that, while we were yet in bed, the +sun was seen to rise in the west instead of the east, and though we +found the statement repeated in the 'Times' and 'Daily News,' and +presently afterwards saw it posted up at the Exchange as having been +flashed by electric wire from New York and Kurrachee, we are not for a +moment to doubt that these reiterated and mutually corroborative +statements are utterly false. For, numerous and consistent as they may +be, they are but copies of the experience of other people, while, +although we may have to oppose to them only our own single experience, +still that single experience is original, and therefore of more worth. +The value, moreover, of any experience is, irrespective of originality, +determined by the difference in number between the results of opposite +kinds which it has discovered. The smaller number is deducted from the +larger, and the balance represents the probability that the results +which have most frequently occurred hitherto will continue to occur +henceforward. The larger the deduction thus to be made, the smaller the +probability, and _vice versâ_; and when the deduction is _nil_, or when +there has hitherto been complete uniformity, the probability becomes +virtual certainty. When two original experiences are opposed to each +other, their respective values, ascertained in the same manner, are +compared, and trust is reposed in one or the other accordingly. Now, +according to these principles, difficult as it might be in the case +supposed for any one to conceive what motive all the rest of the world +could have for lying, it would be still more difficult to believe them +to be speaking truth. For why do we ever believe anything that anyone +says? Why but because we have learnt by experience that, when people +have no apparent motive for lying, they commonly do speak the truth? But +the same experience which has taught us this has taught us likewise that +people do now and then lie without apparent motive. At best, therefore, +there is never more than a probability that people are speaking the +truth, while in this instance, the supposition that they might be +speaking the truth would imply that there may be a truth against which +there is proof amounting to certainty. For what they affirm is that +something has happened the very reverse of what has invariably happened +before in the same circumstances. Is it not infinitely more likely that +people should be lying as they have often done before, than that the +invariable course of nature should have undergone a variation? With +evidence on the one side that has never yet deceived, with no evidence +on the other save what has often proved deceptive, how can we hesitate +which to accept? Even though the unanimity of testimony be such as might +otherwise be deemed complete proof, it is here met by absolutely +complete proof in the shape of a law of nature. The greater probability +overwhelms the lesser. The stronger proof annihilates the weaker, +leaving none of it behind, so that whoever still persists in believing +that a law of nature has been violated, must be content to do so without +one particle of proof. No quantity of testimony can furnish the smallest +proof of a miracle unless the falsehood of the testimony would be a +greater departure from antecedent uniformity--in other words, would be a +greater miracle--than the miracle which it attests. Unfortunately it is +but too notorious that there is not, and never has been, such a thing as +uniform truthfulness of testimony to depart from. + +Such, unless most unintentionally injured by compression, is Hume's +famous argument against miracles, of which the author was sufficiently +proud to boast openly that in it he had discovered what 'will be useful, +as long as the world endures,' as 'an everlasting check to all kinds of +superstitious delusion,' but which, as I nevertheless venture to repeat, +is compounded in about equal moieties of transparent sophism and +baseless assumption. For is it not the veriest juggle of words to insist +on the necessary inferiority of copies to an original, without adverting +to the indispensable proviso that the original with which the copies +are compared should be the original from which the copies have been +taken? May not a copy of Leonardo Da Vinci's 'Last Supper' quite +possibly be equal in force and vividness of expression to the original +painting by Benjamin West bearing the same name? Might it not be wise to +trust rather to an Airy, or a De la Rue, or a Lockyer's account of what +he had observed during a solar eclipse than to your own immediate +observations on the same occasion? Besides, this first branch of Hume's +argument, if sound, would tell quite as much for, as against, miracles, +rendering it equally incumbent on actual witnesses to believe, as on all +but actual witnesses to disbelieve. If you are always to prefer your own +original experience to mere descriptions given by other people of +theirs, then should it happen to be yourself to whom the sun appeared in +the west at an hour when, according to custom, he ought to have been in +the east, you are not to allow the protestations of any number of +persons who, happening at the time to have been looking the other way, +saw the sun in his usual place, to persuade you that what you saw was a +mock sun or an _ignis fatuus_. Rather than imagine that your own senses +can have deceived you, you are to suppose that all about you are in a +league to deceive you. For precisely the same reason for which you +should reject even universal testimony in favour of a miracle which you +have not witnessed, you are equally to reject universal testimony in +opposition to a miracle the similitude of which you have witnessed. + +Or is it possible for a question to be more distinctly begged than when, +to the question whether a miracle has occurred, it is answered that a +miracle is not a miracle unless there be uniform experience against it; +that uniformly adverse experience is direct and full proof against +anything; and that therefore there must always be full proof against +miracles? What is here taken for granted to be full proof is the very +thing requiring to be proved. If past uniformity really be a pledge for +continued uniformity, of course there can be no departure from +uniformity. If the whole question does not at once fall to the ground, +it is because no question has ever really arisen. But what shadow of +pretext is there for treating an hitherto unvaried course of events as +necessarily invariable? From past experience we have deduced what we are +pleased to call _laws_ of nature, but it is morally impossible that we +can seriously think, whatever we are in the habit of saying, that these +laws are self-denying ordinances whereby nature's God has voluntarily +abdicated part of His inalienable prerogative. The utmost efficacy we +are warranted in ascribing to them is that of lines marking certain of +the courses within which God's providence is pleased to move. But how +can we pretend to know for how long a season such may continue to be the +divine pleasure? How do we know that the present season may not be the +first of an alternating series, and that it may not at any moment +terminate, and be succeeded by one of an opposite character? What though +we have some shadow of historical evidence that most physical phenomena +have been going on in much the same order for some six thousand years, +is that a basis whereon to theorise with regard to the proceedings of +Him in whose sight one day is as a thousand years and a thousand years +as one day? Might not as well some scientific member of an insect tribe +of ephemera, whom ancestral tradition, confirmed by personal experience, +had assured that an eight-day clock had already gone on for six days, +pronounce it to be a law of the clock's nature that it should go on for +ever without being again wound up? Would the insect philosopher's +dogmatism be one whit less absurd than that of those human ephemera who +so positively lay down the law about the clockwork of the universe? +Those laws of nature to which unerring regularity and perpetuity of +operation are so confidently attributed, may they not, perchance, be but +single clauses of much farther reaching laws, according to whose other +provisions the force of these isolated clauses may, in novel +combinations of circumstances, be counteracted by some latent and +hitherto unsuspected force? Or is it not, at all events, open to their +divine promulgator to suspend their operation at his pleasure? May it +not conceivably have been preordained that the globe of our earth, after +revolving for a given number of ages, in one direction, shall then, like +a meat-jack, or like an Ascidian's heart,[31] reverse its order of +procedure, and commence a contrary series of revolutions? Or might not +He who prescribed to the earth its rotatory movement, will that the +rotation should for some hours cease, and that the sun should in +consequence seem to stand still, as it is recorded to have done at the +command of Joshua? Improbable as these suppositions may be, who that has +not been taken into counsel by his Creator can presume to say that they +may not be correct? The events which they involve are not inconceivable, +and whatever is not utterly inconceivable may possibly occur, however +numerous the chances against its occurrence. It is not then the fact +that 'past experience,' however unvaried, affords full proof of the +future existence of any event, or constitutes certainty against the +future existence of the reverse of that event. Completest uniformity of +experience cannot create a certainty by which any opposite probability +would be completely annihilated. It only creates a probability which, +however great, is still only a probability, and which would become a +smaller probability by deduction from it of any opposite probability. +But mere probability, however great, always includes some doubt as to +its own correctness, some suspicion that its opposite may possibly be +correct. How much soever, therefore, uniform experience may vouch for +the inviolability of natural laws, it always remains possible for those +laws to be violated, and, as miracles are nothing else but violations of +natural laws, it always remains possible for miracles to happen. But +since miracles are possible, testimony to their occurrence may, with +equal possibility, be true, and no further refutation can, I submit, be +needed for an argument which insists that all such testimony should be +set aside without enquiry as self-evidently false. + +Had Hume been content to insist that testimony in favour of miracles +should never be received without extreme doubt and hesitation, his +lesson might well have passed without further objection than that of its +being superfluous for any one with sense enough to profit by it. Nor +might it have been easy to discover a flaw in his logic, although he had +gone so far as to maintain that no one of the miracles as yet on record +is either adequately attested, or would, even if it had undoubtedly +occurred, afford sufficient evidence of any religious truth. The best +and only adequate evidence for any religious creed is the satisfaction +which it affords to the soul's cravings and promises to the soul's +aspirations; and no rational Christian would be at all the more disposed +to turn Mussulman, even though it should be demonstrated to his entire +conviction that Christ did not raise Lazarus from the dead, and that +Mahomet did turn the hill Safa into gold, instead of prudently confining +himself to boasting that he could have effected the transmutation if he +had thought proper. But for the purpose which Hume had in view, it was +necessary to establish, not merely the doubtfulness, but the absolute +falsehood of the miracular testimony on which, in his opinion, 'our holy +religion' rests, in order that the character of the superstructure being +inferred from that of the foundation, both might be condemned together. +There is, however, an irreligious as well as a religious fanaticism, +and, though it is difficult, while looking at Hume's portrait, to credit +the owner of that plump, good-humoured face with feeling of any sort +warm enough to be termed fanatical, it is humiliating to note from his +example into what strange inconsistency the coolest and calmest judgment +may be warped by irreligious prejudice. Having not long before, in order +to disparage _natural_ religion, emphatically denied the existence of +any causal connection between successive events, he now, in order +equally to discredit the very possibility of _revealed_ religion, +tacitly assumes that same connection, not simply to exist, but to be of +an efficacy which no disturbing forces can impair. Admitting that 'the +Indian prince who refused to believe the first relations concerning the +effects of frost' was wrong in his belief, Hume will have it that the +prince nevertheless 'reasoned justly.' Although recognising truth to be +the sole worthy object of quest, he yet enjoins rigid adherence to a +rule which he is aware must inevitably lead to frequent error. + +Rather strikingly contrasted, in respect of execution, with Hume's +chapter on Miracles, comes the one next in order on a Providence and a +Future State, which, for the skill with which the fallacy involved in it +is disguised, may be regarded as quite a masterpiece of false reasoning. +Among its leading propositions there is but one which does not command +immediate assent. That we can argue but from what we know; that of +causes, known to us only by their effects, our estimate ought to be +exactly proportioned to the effects; that of a Creator manifested only +by His works, no higher qualities, no greater degrees of power, +intelligence, justice, or benevolence, can be confidently +predicated--whatever be conjectured--than are apparent in his +workmanship: all this, on one moment's reflection, is perceived to be +indisputable. Needs must it be, however reluctantly, admitted that +nothing can be more illogical than to return back to the cause, and +infer from it other effects beyond those by which alone it is known to +us, or to infer from creative attributes, distinctly manifested, the +existence of other and not apparent attributes, endowed with some +efficacy additional to that possessed by the former. But does it hence +follow that faith in a superintending Providence is so mere a matter of +'conceit and imagination,' a faith so absolutely irrational as Hume +considered it? A candid examination of God's works will warrant us in +coming to a widely different conclusion. Among those works is man--a +being who, in spite of the utter insignificance of his greatest +_performances_, is capable of forming most exalted _conceptions_ of +justice, benevolence, and goodness in general, and of feeling the most +eager desire to act up to his own ideal. If the divine notions of +goodness in its several varieties be not identical with the human, it +can only be because they are superior; and so, too, of the divine love +of, and zeal for, goodness. It cannot be that the Creator is inferior to +the creature in virtues which the creature derives from Him alone. +Demonstrably, therefore, God is good and just in the very highest degree +in which those qualities can be conceived by man. Demonstrably, too, +since the universe is the work of His hands, He must be possessed of +power which, if not necessarily unbounded, is at least as boundless as +the universe. Thus, rigidly arguing from effects to causes, and +scrupulously proportioning the one to the other, man sees imaged on the +face of creation a creator, both realising his highest conception of +goodness, and wielding measureless might. Is not such a being worthy to +be looked up to, and confided in, and adored and loved as a +superintending providence? Is not faith in such a providence not simply +not irrational, but the direct result of a strictly inductive process? +And would it be an irrational stretch of faith sanguinely to hope, if +not implicitly to believe, that an union of infinite justice with +measureless might may, in some future stage of existence, afford +compensation for the apparently inequitable distribution of good and +evil which, according to all experience, has hitherto taken place among +human beings? + +Were it desirable to amplify the apology with which this paper +commenced, some additional justification of the freedom of the +foregoing criticisms might be found in hints thrown out by Hume in +various parts of the treatise which we have been examining, and +particularly in its concluding chapter, that in many of his most +startling doctrines he was but half in earnest. Hume's temperament, too +cool for fanaticism, had yet in it enough of a certain tepid geniality +to save him from becoming a scoffer. The character which he claims for +himself, and somewhat ostentatiously parades, is that of a sceptic or +general doubter--a character in which, when rightly understood, there is +nothing to be ashamed of. To take nothing on trust, to believe nothing +without proof, to show no greater respect for authority than may consist +in attentive and candid examination of its statements, to accept only +verified facts as bases for reasoning on matters of fact and +existence--these are golden rules of philosophical research, principles +in which lies the secret of all real progress in any of the higher +departments of science. By Hume they were adopted _con amore_, and with +keen appreciation, not more of their practical utility, than of the +sport which he perceived them to be capable of yielding. His serious +purpose was to unmask the numberless pretences which in politics, +political economy, metaphysics, morals, and theology he found +universally current as gospel truths; to expose the ambiguity and +contradictions latent in popular thought, and in the popular forms of +expression which are so apt to be mistaken for thought, and to indicate +the only safe mode of investigation and the only trustworthy tests of +genuine knowledge; his favourite amusement to put time-honoured +commonplaces on the rack, and demanding their _raison d'être_, to pass +on them summary sentence of extinction if they failed to account +satisfactorily for their existence. Unfortunately, in his keen +enjoyment of the fun of the thing, he not unfrequently overlooked the +solid interests at stake. Like a huntsman who, for the sake of a better +run, should outrace his quarry, or who, seeing that the dogs were close +upon the hare, should, in order to prolong the chase, start a fresh +hare, kept till then snug at his saddle-bow, so Hume, in the excitement +of metaphysical pursuit, instead of stopping to gather up whatever +verified affirmations came in his way, would prefer to follow any new +negation that he espied, or, if momentarily accepting any affirmation as +established, would proceed forthwith to affirm its direct opposite with +the view of neutralising both. In this, his practice resembled that of +metaphysicians in general, who take a singular delight in setting +themselves riddle after riddle, which they either assume to be +hopelessly insoluble, or which they no sooner solve than they use the +solution as the subject of another riddle involving its predecessor in +redoubled perplexity. Now, little harm, and little, perhaps, of anything +but good, might thereby be done if the lovers of this game were content +to play it by themselves, without inviting others to join who are +constitutionally unfit for such intellectual wrestling. But mental +exercises may to philosophers be health and invigorating sport, and yet +be death to the multitude; and Hume, as an Utilitarian, stands +self-condemned for making ordinary people uncomfortable by challenging +them to disputations confessedly leading no whither, and bewildering +them with confessedly 'vain and profane babblings, and strivings after +words to no profit, but to subverting of the hearers, and overthrow of +the faith of some.' And it is as poor an excuse for this wanton +tampering with other people's creeds, as it is poor amends for its +mischievous consequences, that Hume offers when, after watching for a +while his puzzled disciples blown about by the winds of adverse doctrine +that he has let loose upon them, he proceeds to rally them on their +'whimsical condition,' which he speaks of as a mere laughing matter got +up chiefly for amusement. It is only an aggravation of offence that, +while, on the one hand, he solemnly pronounces everything to be 'a +riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery,' he, on the other hand, +cheerily exhorts us not to suffer the 'doubts raised by philosophy to +affect our actions.' 'Nature,' he says, 'is always too strong for +principles, will always maintain her rights, and prevail, in the end, +against all reasoning whatever.' 'The great subverter of Pyrrhonism,' he +continues, 'is actual employment and the occupations of common life,' in +presence of which its overstrained scruples 'vanish like smoke.' +Although real knowledge consists solely in knowing that we know nothing, +and in doubting everything, and although sceptics may 'justly triumph' +in principles which lead them to deny even the attraction of +gravitation, still they had better beware how they act on these +principles, lest by stepping unconcernedly out of window they come +fatally to grief on the stones below, and so the sect and its tenets be +annihilated together. So, or to such effect, Hume: but how can there be +just ground for pride in speculations which, as their own professors +admit, would, on the first attempt to reduce them to practice, be +shattered to pieces by hard facts? That cannot possibly, even on Hume's +recommendation, be accepted as metaphysical truth, which flatly +contradicts common sense, nor can there be any unbecoming +self-confidence in seeking, even though Hume pronounce the search +hopeless, for metaphysical truth, with which common sense may be +reconciled. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[29] Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. By James Mill. Edition +of 1869, with Notes by Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater, George Grote, +and John Stuart Mill, vol. i. pp. 78 _et seq._ + +[30] Mill's 'Logic.' 5th Edition. Vol. i. p. 377. + +[31] 'There is a class of animals called Ascidians, which possess a +heart and a circulation, and up to the year 1824 no one would have +dreamt of questioning the propriety of the deduction, that these +creatures have a circulation in one definite and invariable direction; +nor would any one have thought it worth while to verify the point. But +in that year M. von Hasselt, happening to examine a transparent animal +of this class, found to his infinite surprise that after the heart had +beat a certain number of times, it stopped, and then began beating the +opposite way, so as to reverse the course of the current, which returned +by-and-by to its original direction.'--_Huxley's Lay Sermons_, p. 95. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +_HUXLEYISM._ + + '_À force d'esprit tout lui paroît matière._' + + +In one of his interesting 'Lay Sermons,' the most interesting perhaps of +the whole interesting series, Professor Huxley, taking for his theme the +'Physical Basis of Life,' combats 'the widely-spread conception of life +as a something which works through matter, but is independent of it;' +affirming, on the contrary, 'that matter and life are inseparably +connected, and that there is one kind of matter which is common to all +living beings.' The preacher may be safely allowed to have +satisfactorily made out the second portion of this affirmation. With his +own singular felicity of illustration, he shows how all vegetable and +animal tissues, without exception, from that of the brightly coloured +lichen looking so like a mere mineral incrustation on the rock that +bears it, to that of the painter who admires or the botanist who +dissects it, are, however diverse in aspect, essentially one in +composition and structure. He explains how the microscopic fungi +clustering by millions within the body of a single fly, the giant pine +of California towering to the height of a cathedral spire, the Indian +fig-tree covering acres with its profound shadow, the animalcules of +ocean's lowest deep, minute enough to dance in myriads on the point of a +needle, and the Finner whale, hugest of beasts, that disports its ninety +feet of bone and blubber on ocean's billowy heights, the flower that a +girl wears in her hair, and the blood that courses through her veins, +are, each and all, smaller or larger multiples or aggregates of one and +the same structural unit, which, again, is invariably resolvable into +the same identical elements. That unit, he tells us, is an atom or +corpuscle composed of oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, and carbon, which, and +which alone, seem to be required by nature for laying withal the +foundations of vitality, inasmuch as no substance from which any one of +these ingredients is totally absent, ever exhibits any sign of life, +while, on the other hand, not only are these four ingredients sufficient +of themselves to form a substance capable of living, but they actually +do with very little (when any) foreign admixture, form all substances +whatsoever that are ever found vivified. All such substances, he informs +us, are but varieties of _protoplasm_, differing indeed from each other +in texture, colour, and general appearance, even as a diamond differs +from granite, yet all being equally protoplasm, just as a diamond and a +block of granite are equally stones, or as heart of oak and the outer +case of a nettle's sting are equally wood. The human ovum, he gives us +to understand, is in its earliest stage but a single particle of +protoplasm; the human foetus but an aggregation of such particles, +variously modified; the human body perfectly matured, but a larger +aggregation of such particles still further modified. + +He proceeds to point out, as following from these premises, that a +solution of smelling salts, together with an infinitesimal quantity of +certain other salts, contains all the elements that enter into the +composition of protoplasm, and consequently of whatever substance the +very highest animal requires for sustenance. He does not, however, +leave us to suppose that any abundance of the fluid in question would +avail aught to save a hungry creature of any sort from starving, but +continues his exposition to the following effect. Not only is there no +animal, there is not even any vegetable organism, to which the elements +of food can serve as food, as long as they remain elementary. It is +indispensable that hydrogen and oxygen should combine to form water, +nitrogen and hydrogen to form ammonia, carbon and oxygen to form +carbonic acid; and even then, even at a table groaning under whole +hogsheads of these primitive compounds, there is no single animal that +would not find itself at a Barmecide feast. There are many plants +likewise, which in the midst of such uncongenial plenty would be equally +without a drop to drink; but there are also multitudes of others which, +without the aid of any more elaborated nutriment, would be able to grow +into a million, nay million million fold of their original bulk. +Provided there be in the seed or germ of any of these latter one single +particle of living protoplasm to begin with, that single particle may +convert into animated protoplasm an indefinite quantity of inanimate +ammonia, carbonic acid, and water. The protoplasm thus created in the +first instance, and created, let us suppose, in the form of a lichen or +a fungus, is converted by decay into vegetable mould, in which grass may +take root and grow, and which, in that case, will be converted into +herbaceous protoplasm; which, being eaten by sheep or oxen, becomes +ovine or bovine protoplasm, commonly called mutton or beef; which, +again, being eaten by man, becomes human protoplasm, and, if eaten by a +philosopher, becomes part of a mass of protoplasm capable of +investigating and of expounding in lectures or lay sermons, the changes +which itself and its several components have undergone. + +So far we advance with willing steps like dutiful disciples along the +path of knowledge indicated by our distinguished biological teacher, who +here, however, pulls us up short by suddenly intimating that he sees no +break in the series of transubstantiations whereby precisely such +oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon as he is lecturing upon, have +become metamorphosed into him, the lecturer, and us, the lectured +audience, and cannot 'understand why the language which is applicable to +any one term of the series should not be used in regard to any of the +others.' Oxygen and hydrogen, he reminds us, are gases, whose particles, +at and also much below 32° Fahrenheit, tend to rush away from each other +with great force; and this tendency we call a property of each gas. Let +oxygen and hydrogen be mixed in certain proportions, and an electric +spark passed through them, and they will disappear, and a quantity of +water equal in weight to the sum of their weights will appear in their +place. But amongst the properties of the water will be some, the direct +opposites of those of its components; watery particles, for example, at +any temperature not higher than 32° Fahrenheit, tending not to rush +asunder, but to cohere into definite geometrical shapes or to build up +frosty imitations of vegetable foliage. And let the water be brought +into conjunction with ammonia and carbonic acid, and the three will, +under certain conditions, give rise to protoplasm, which again, if +subjected to a certain succession of processes, will rise by successive +stages from protoplasm that gives no other signs of life than those of +feeding and reproducing its kind, to protoplasm endowed with the power +of spontaneous motion, and finally to protoplasm that thinks and +reasons, speculates and philosophises. Now why should any of the various +phenomena of life exhibited by these varieties of protoplasm be supposed +to be of a different class from the appearances of activity exhibited by +any of the varieties of lifeless matter? What reason is there why, for +instance, thought should not be termed a property of thinking +protoplasm, just as congelation is a property of water, and +centrifugience of gas? Professor Huxley protests that he is aware of no +reason. We call, he says, the several strange phenomena which are +peculiar to water, 'the properties of water, and do not hesitate to +believe that in some way or other they result from the properties of the +component elements of water. We do not assume that something called +_aquosity_ entered into and took possession of the oxide of hydrogen as +soon as it was formed, and then guided the aqueous particles to their +places in the facets of the crystal or among the leaflets of the hoar +frost. On the contrary, we live in the hope and faith that, by the +advance of molecular physics, we shall by-and-by be able to see our way +as clearly from the constituents of water to the properties of water, as +we are now able to deduce the operations of a watch from the form of its +parts or the manner in which they are put together.' Why, then, when +carbonic acid, water, and ammonia disappear, and an equivalent weight of +the matter of life makes its appearance in their place, should we assume +the existence in the living matter of a something which has no +representative or correlative in the unliving matter that gave rise to +it? Why imagine that into the newly formed hydro-nitrogenised oxide of +carbon a something called vitality entered and took possession? 'What +better philosophical status has vitality than aquosity?' 'If scientific +language is to possess a definite and constant signification, we are,' +he considers, 'logically bound to apply to protoplasm or the physical +basis of life the same conceptions as those which are held to be +legitimate elsewhere.' Wherefore, he concludes, that 'if the phenomena +exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by +protoplasm _its_ properties,' and that if it be correct to describe 'the +properties of water as resulting from the nature and disposition of its +component molecules,' there can be no 'intelligible ground for refusing +to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and +disposition of its molecules.' + +Here, however, our lay preacher candidly warns us that by the vast +majority of his clerical brethren this doctrine would be denounced as +rankest heresy, and that whoever accepts it is placing his foot on the +first rung of a ladder which, in most people's estimation, is the +'reverse of Jacob's, and leads to the antipodes of heaven.' He frankly +owns that the terms of his propositions are distinctly materialistic: +nay, that whoever commits himself to them will be temporarily landed in +'gross materialism.' Not the less, however, does he, mingling +consolation with admonition, recommend us to plunge boldly into the +materialistic slough, promising to point out a way of escape from it, +and insisting, indeed, that through it lies the only path to genuine +spiritualistic truth. + +In pronouncing this to be exceedingly evil counsel, as with the most +unfeigned respect for its author I feel bound at once to do, it might +not be necessary for me to undertake a detailed topographical survey of +the path alluded to. It might, perhaps, suffice to specify the +conclusions to which the path is represented as leading, in order to +show that those conclusions cannot possibly be reached by any such +route. By Professor Huxley himself they are thus described:--We know +nothing of matter 'except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical +cause of states of our own consciousness,' nor of spirit, except that +'it also is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause of states of +consciousness. In other words matter and spirit are but names for the +imaginary _substrata_ of groups of natural phenomena.' + +But if matter be not a thing, but a name, and a name too not for a real, +but only an imaginary thing, one perfect certainty is that matter cannot +possibly be composed either wholly or in part of molecules, and, by +necessary consequence, that life cannot possibly be 'the product of any +disposition of material molecules,' nor the phenomena of life be +'expressions of molecular changes in the matter of life.' Of the +particular Huxleian doctrine which we are considering, the two moieties +are absolutely irreconcileable; so that on the assumption that either +moiety were true, the truth of that moiety would be decisive against the +other. If matter have no real, and only a nominal existence, life, which +is undeniably a reality, cannot be a property of matter. If life, being +an undisputed reality, be a property of matter, matter must needs be a +reality also, and not merely a name. Any one, however, who, like myself, +is thoroughly convinced that both halves of the doctrine are equally and +utterly erroneous, is precluded from employing one for the refutation of +the other, and in order to prove, as I shall now attempt to do, that +life is in no sense either a product or a property of matter, must +resort for the purpose to independent reasoning. + +I commence by defining one of the principal terms occurring in the +debate. When in scientific discourse we speak of anything as a property +of an object, we mean thereby not simply that it is a thing belonging to +the object, but also that it is a thing without which the object could +not subsist. We mean that it is one of the constituents inherent in and +inseparable from the object, whose union gives to the object its +distinctive character. When we call fluidity at one temperature, +solidity at another, and vaporisation at a third, properties of water, +we mean that matter which did not liquefy, congeal, and evaporate at +different temperatures would not be water. The habits of exhibiting +these phenomena, in conjunction with certain other habits, make up the +aquosity or wateriness of water. They are parts of water's nature, and, +in the absence of any one of them, water would not be its own self, and +could not exist. But in no such sense, nor in any sense whatever, is the +life or vitality whereby what we are accustomed to call animated are +distinguished from inanimate objects, essential to the existence of the +species of matter termed matter of life or protoplasm. Take from water +its aquosity, and water ceases to be water; but you may take away +vitality from protoplasm, and yet leave protoplasm as much protoplasm as +before. Vitality, therefore, evidently bears to protoplasm a quite +different relation from that which aquosity bears to water. Protoplasm +can do perfectly well without the one, but water cannot for a moment +dispense with the other. Protoplasm, whether living or lifeless, is +equally itself; but unaqueous water is unmitigated gibberish. But if +protoplasm, although deprived of its vitality, still remains protoplasm, +vitality plainly is not indispensable to protoplasm, is not therefore a +_property_ of protoplasm. + +And that it is not a _product_ of protoplasm, or a result of any +particular arrangement of protoplasmic particles or molecules, is not +less easily or unanswerably demonstrable. For if it were, as long as the +particular molecular arrangement remained unaltered, life would +necessarily be in attendance; an amputated joint would, until +decomposition set in, be as much alive as the trunk from which it had +been lopped, even as water poured from a jug into a glass is quite as +much liquid as the water remaining in the jug. There would be no such +thing as dead meat, which was not putrid as well as dead, any more than +water can freeze without changing from a fluid to a solid; and there +would moreover be production antecedent in origin to its own producer. +The force of the last at least of these objections is not to be +resisted. Water, ammonia, and carbonic acid cannot, it is admitted, +combine to form protoplasm, unless a principle of life preside over the +operation. Unless under those auspices the combination never takes +place. At present, whenever assuming its presidential functions, the +principle of life seems to be invariably embodied in a portion of +pre-existing protoplasm; but there certainly was a time when the fact +was otherwise. Time was, as geology places beyond all doubt, when our +globe and its appurtenances consisted wholly of inorganic matter, and +possessed not one single animal or vegetable inhabitant. In order, then, +that any protoplasm or the substance of any organism should have been +brought into existence in the first instance, life plainly must have +been already existent. It must at one time have been possible for life, +without being previously embodied, to mould and vivify inert matter; +and it must needs have been by unembodied life that inorganic matter was +first organised and animated. There is no possible alternative to this +conclusion, except that of supposing that death may have given birth to +life--that absolutely lifeless and inert matter may have spontaneously +exerted itself with all the marvellous energy requisite for its +conversion into living matter, exerting for the purpose powers which, +under the conditions of the case, it could not have acquired without +exercising before it acquired them. Whoever declines to swallow such +absurdity has no choice but to admit that unembodied life must have been +the original manufacturer of protoplasm: but to admit this, and yet to +suppose that when now-a-days embodied life is observed to give birth to +new embodied life, the credit of the operation belongs not to the life +itself but to its protoplasmic embodiment, is much the same as to +suppose that when a tailor, dressed in clothes of his own making, makes +a second suit of clothes, this latter is the product not of the tailor +himself but of the clothes he is wearing. + +Thus, irrespectively of whatever grounds there may be for believing that +life still _does_, it is incontestable that life once _did_, exist apart +from protoplasm; and that protoplasm both may and continually does exist +apart from what is commonly understood by life, must be obvious to every +one who is aware that protoplasm is the substance of which all plants +and all animals are composed, and has observed also that plants and +animals are in the habit of dying. That matter and life are inseparably +connected cannot, therefore, it would seem, be asserted except in total +disregard of the teachings both of reason and observation, and 'the +popular conception of life as a something which works through matter but +is independent of it,' would seem to be as true as it is popular. If +the only choice allowed to us be between 'the old notion of an Archæus +governing and directing blind matter,' and the new conception of life as +the product of a certain disposition of material molecules, the absolute +certainty that the latter conception is wrong, may be fairly urged as +equivalent to certainty, equally absolute, that the former notion is +right. + +How far soever it may be true that, as Professor Huxley says, 'the +progress of physical science means, and has in all ages meant, the +extension of the province of matter and causation,' it is certainly not +true that, as he proceeds to predict, the same province will ever be +extended sufficiently to banish from the region of human thought not +'spontaneity' simply, but likewise 'spirit.' In one direction at least, +limits are clearly discernible which scientific investigation need not +hope to overleap. How much soever we may eventually discover of the +changes whereby inorganic matter becomes gradually adapted for the +reception of life, physical science can never teach us what or whence is +the life that eventually takes possession of the finished receptacle. +Possibly we at length may, as Professor Huxley doubts not that we +by-and-by shall, see how it is that the properties peculiar to water +have resulted from the properties peculiar to the gases whose junction +constitutes water; and similarly how the characteristic properties of +protoplasm have sprung from properties in the water, ammonia, and +carbonic acid that have united to form protoplasm; but knowing all this, +we shall not be a hair's breadth nearer to the more recondite knowledge +up to which it is expected to lead. To extract the genesis of life from +any data that completest acquaintance with the stages and processes of +protoplasmic growth can furnish, is a truly hopeless problem. Given +the plan of a house, with samples of its brick and mortar, to find the +name and nationality of the householder, would be child's play in +comparison. Life, as we have seen, is not the offspring of protoplasm, +but something which has been superinduced upon, and may be separated +from, the protoplasm that serves as its material basis. It is, +therefore, distinct from the matter which it animates, and, being thus +immaterial, cannot possibly become better known by any analysis of +matter. + +Of this emphatically vital question Professor Huxley, as has been +already intimated, takes a diametrically opposite view. He does not +merely, in sufficiently explicit terms, deny that there is any intrinsic +difference between matter and spirit, and affirm the two to be, in spite +of appearances, essentially identical. If this were all, I at any rate +should not be entitled to object, for I shall myself presently have +occasion to use very similar language, although attaching to it a widely +different meaning from that with which it is used by Professor Huxley. +But the latter goes on to avow his belief that the human body, like +every other living body, is a machine, all the operations of which will +sooner or later be explained on physical principles, insomuch that we +shall eventually arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, +even as we have already arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat. He +considers that with the same propriety with which the amount of heat +which a pound weight produces by falling through the distance of a foot, +may be called its equivalent in one sense, may the amount of feeling +which the pound produces by falling through a foot of distance on a +gouty big toe, be called its equivalent in another sense, to wit, that +of consciousness. Yet he protests against these tenets being deemed +materialistic, which, he declares, they certainly neither are nor can +be, for that while he himself certainly holds them, he as certainly is +not himself a materialist. Professor Huxley is among the last to be +suspected of talking anything, as Monsieur Jourdain did prose, without +knowing it. He knows perfectly well that he has here been talking +materialism, but he insists that his materialism is only another form of +idealism. He seeks to evade the seemingly inevitable deduction from his +premises by representing both matter and spirit as mere names, and +names, too, not for real things, but for fanciful hypotheses which may +be spoken of indifferently in materialistic or in spiritualistic terms, +thought in the one case being treated as a form of matter, and matter in +the other as a form of thought. The identity of matter and spirit is, in +short, represented by him as consisting in this: that the existence of +both is merely nominal, or at best merely ideal. + +Ordinary folk may perhaps be somewhat slow to derive from this +compromising theory all the comfort which its author deems it capable of +affording. Most of us may, probably, be inclined to think that we might +as well have been left to fret in the frying-pan of materialism as be +cast headlong into idealistic fire, to no better end than that of being +there fused body and soul together, and sublimated into inapprehensible +nothingness. Our immediate concern, however, is not with the +pleasantness of the theory, but with its truth; in proceeding to test +which we shall probably find that there is as little warrant for +idealising matter after this fashion as we have already seen that there +is for materialising mind. + +The originator of the theory about to be examined, or rather, perhaps, +of a somewhat different theory out of which this has been developed--not +to say perverted--may, without much inaccuracy, be pronounced to be +Descartes. He it was who, perceiving that we are surrounded on all sides +by illusions of all sorts, that not only is there no authority or +testimony implicitly to be depended on, but that our senses likewise +often play the traitor, and that we can never be perfectly sure whether +we are really seeing, hearing, or feeling, or merely thinking or +dreaming that we see, hear, or feel, and looking anxiously around for +one single point at least on which complete confidence might be placed, +discovered such a point in thought. Whatever else we may doubt about, we +cannot, he justly argued, doubt that there are thoughts. If it were +possible to doubt this, our very doubt would be thought, constituting +and presenting as evidence the very existence doubted of. Our thoughts, +then, are unquestionably real existences. They may be delusive, but they +cannot possibly be fictitious. + +We may perhaps hereafter have occasion to note how Descartes, having +thus secured one firm foothold and solid resting-place, outwent the +farthest stretch of Archimedean ambition by using it, not as a fulcrum +from whence to move the world, but as a site for logical foundations +whereon he might, if he had persevered, have raised the superstructure +of an universe at once mental and material.[32] Intermediately, however, +we have to observe how two pre-eminent disciples of the Cartesian +school have perverted the fundamental proposition of their great master +by treating its converse as its synonyme. Descartes having demonstrated +that all thought is existence, Bishop Berkeley and Professor Huxley +infer that all existence is thought. So says the Professor in so many +words, and to precisely the same effect is the more diffuse language of +the Bishop, where, speaking of 'all the choir of heaven and furniture of +earth, of all the bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world,' +he declares that their _esse_ is _percipi_, that their 'being' consists +in their being 'perceived or known,' and that unless they were actually +perceived by, or existed in, some created or uncreate mind, they could +not possibly exist at all. + +The reasoning in support of these assertions is in substance as +follows:--We know nothing of any material object except by the +sensations which it produces in our minds. What we are accustomed to +call the _qualities_ of an object are nothing else but the mental +sensations of various kinds which the object produces within us. Some of +these qualities, such as extension, figure, solidity, motion, and +number, are classed as primary; others, as, for instance, smell, taste, +colour, sound, as secondary. Now that these latter have no existence +apart from mind can readily be shown thus. If I prick my finger with a +needle, the pain I suffer in consequence is surely in myself, not in the +needle, nor anywhere else but in myself. If an orange be placed on my +open hand, my sensation of touching it is in myself, not in the orange. +If the orange could feel, what it would feel would be a hand, while what +I am feeling is an orange. Nor are my sensations of pain and touch +merely confined to myself; they are also confined to a particular part +of myself, viz., to the brain, the seat of my consciousness, which it +is, and not the finger or hand, that really feels when the one is hurt, +or when anything comes in harmless contact with the other. To prove +this, let the fine nervous threads, which, running up the whole length +of the arm, connect the skin of the finger with the spinal marrow and +brain, be cut through close to the spinal cord, and no pain will be +felt, whatever injury be done: while if the ends which remain in +connection with the cord be pricked, the sensation of pricking in the +finger will arise just as distinctly as before. Or let a walking-stick +be held firmly by the handle, and its other end be touched, and the +tactile sensation will be experienced as if at the end of the stick, +where, however, it plainly cannot be. It is the mind alone which feels, +but which, by a peculiar faculty of localisation or extradition, seems +to remove a feeling exclusively its own, not only to the outside of +itself, but to the outside also of the walls of its fleshly tenement. +And as it is with pain or touch, so it is with every sensation with +which any of the so-called secondary qualities of matter are identical. +If I look at, or smell, or taste a blood orange, the sensation of +colour, or scent, or flavour I receive is entirely and exclusively my +own, the orange remaining quite unconscious of its own redness, or +fragrance, or sweetness, and not, indeed, possessing in itself any real +qualities of the kind. For to take redness as an example; how does the +sensation of it or of any other colour arise? The waves of a certain +very attenuated medium, the particles of which are vibrating with vast +rapidity but with very different velocities, strike upon an object and +are thrown off in all directions. Of the particles which vibrate with +any particular velocity, some are gathered by the optical apparatus of +the eye, and deflected so as to impinge on the retina and on the fibres +of the optic nerve therewith connected, producing in these fibres a +change which is followed by other changes in the brain, which, again, by +virtue of some inscrutable union between the brain and the mind, create +a feeling or consciousness of colour. What the particular colour shall +be, depends either on the rate of motion in the vibrating medium or on +the character of the retina; and if, while the former remained the same, +the other were to be altered, or if two persons, with differently formed +retinas, and one of the two colour-blind, were to be looking, what had +first seemed red might now seem green, or what seemed red to one +spectator might seem green to the other. But as the same object cannot +itself be both red and green at the same time, it follows that what are +called its redness and greenness are not in it, but in the spectator. +Similarly, the sounds which an object appears to give forth neither are +nor ever were in it: they originate in the mind of the hearer, and have +not, and never have had any existence elsewhere. 'If the whole body were +an eye, where,' asks St. Paul, 'were the hearing? If the whole were +hearing, where were the smelling?' and Professor Huxley more than meets +the drift of the Apostle's questions by pronouncing it 'impossible to +imagine but that if the universe contained only blind and deaf beings, +darkness and silence would reign everywhere.' + +And as with the secondary qualities of matter, so, on the same showing, +must it be with the primary. If colour, taste, scent, and the like, +exist nowhere but in the mind, so neither do extension, solidity, and +the like. If the former could not exist unless there were intelligent +minds to perceive them, then neither could the latter. For, by +extension and its cognates, we understand simply relations which we +conceive to exist between certain qualities of objects identical with +certain of our own visual and tactile sensations, or between these and +our consciousness of muscular effort; but inasmuch as all sensations and +all consciousness are purely mental, and exist nowhere but in the mind, +it follows necessarily that ideas of relation between different +sensations, or between sensations and consciousness, must also be purely +mental, and non-existent save in the mind. All the qualities of matter, +therefore, primary as well as secondary, are alike conceptions of the +mind, and consequently could not exist without a mind for them to be +conceived by and to exist in. But if the qualities did not exist, then +matter, which cannot be conceived otherwise than as an assemblage of +qualities, could not exist either. Wherefore in respect of matter +itself, as well as of the qualities of matter, _esse_ is _percipi_, +essence is perception, to be is to be perceived. Wherefore, finally, if +there were no mind to perceive matter, matter could not exist. Q. E. +D.[33] + +Although in the foregoing summary of an argument to which not Berkeley +and Huxley alone, but others of the deepest and acutest thinkers that +this country has produced, have contributed, I have strenuously laboured +to state all its points as convincingly as the obligations of brevity +would permit, I am not myself by any means convinced by it. On the +contrary, although to say so may seem to imply a considerable overstock +of modest assurance, still I do say that whatever portion of it is +sound is irrelevant, and that whatever portion is relevant is not +sound. So much of it as relates to the nature of the qualities of +matter, is, however interesting or otherwise important, very little, if +at all, to the purpose. No doubt if I prick my finger with a needle, +or--to take in preference an illustration employed by Locke--if my +fingers ache in consequence of my handling snow, it would be supremely +ridiculous to talk of the pain I feel being in the snow; yet not a whit +more ridiculous than to call the snow itself white or cold, if, by so +speaking, I mean that anything in the slightest degree resembling my +sensation of either snowy whiteness or snowy coldness resides in the +snow itself. And as of coldness and whiteness, so of all the other +so-styled secondary qualities. If I smell a rose, or listen to a piano, +the rose or the piano is quite insensible to the scent or sounds by +which my sense is ravished. And of primary qualities, also, precisely +the same thing may with equal confidence be alleged. A stone which I +perceive to be large, round, hard, and either rotating or motionless, +has no more perception of its own extension, figure, solidity, motion, +or rest than a snowball has of its colour or temperature. But all this, +though perfectly true, has nothing to do with the question, which is not +_what_ qualities of matter are, but _where_ they are, and whether they +can exist anywhere but in mind; and this question, I submit, is +distinctly begged by those who assume, as is done throughout the +reasoning under examination, that our _sensations_ with regard to +material objects, and the _qualities_ of those objects, are synonymous +and convertible terms. Incontestably, sensations are affections of the +mind which neither have nor can have any existence outside the mind. If, +then, the qualities of objects are identical with the sensations which +arise in the mind concerning those objects, why, of course, the +qualities likewise can exist nowhere but in the mind. On narrowly +scrutinising, however, the supposed identity, we shall find that it +involves somewhat reckless confusion of diametrical opposites. When I +look at or smell a rose, or eat a beefsteak, or listen to a piano, the +sensations which thereupon arise within me, whether immediately or +subsequently, either are the results of my seeing, smelling, eating, or +hearing, or they are not. To say that they are not is equivalent to +saying that an object need not be within reach of the perceptive +faculties in order to be perceived; that I may see or smell a rose, +though there be no rose to be seen or smelt; may dine sumptuously off +empty dishes, and be raised to the seventh heaven of delight by the +audible strains of a music which is not being executed. _Fortunati +nimium_--only too lucky would mankind be, did this turn out to be a +correct theory, affording as it would a solution of every social +problem, and serving as a panacea for every social evil. Psychology +would then be the only science worth attention, for of whatever things +proficiency in that branch of study had qualified any one to form mental +images, of those same things would he simultaneously become possessor in +full property. Whoever had succeeded in training himself to imagine +vigorously might at once have, do, or be whatever it pleased him to +imagine, becoming _ipso facto_, as the Stoics used to say an acquirer of +virtue does, 'rich, beautiful, a king.' Woe betide any one, however, +who, as long as the cosmical constitution remains what it is, shall +attempt to put the theory into practice, and desisting from all those +animal functions, involving intercourse with a real or imaginary +external world, which are vulgarly supposed essential to animal +existence, shall obstinately restrict himself to the sensations which he +believes the mind to be, without any such intercourse, capable of +creating for the body's sustenance and delectation. The physical +extinction inevitably consequent on such devotion to principle would +speedily render all the devotees physically incapable of testifying in +behalf of their peculiar opinion, and, clearing them away, would leave +no witnesses surviving but such as were signifying by deeds if not in +words their hearty adherence to the popular belief. Practically, then, +there may be assumed to be entire unanimity of assent to the truism that +for our senses to be affected by the presence of external objects, the +objects must needs be present to affect them. On all hands it is in +effect admitted that in some mode or other external objects exist, but +if so, and if the sensations resulting from operations performed by the +bodily organs with external objects would not have resulted unless the +objects had been present to operate or to be operated upon, clearly +there must be resident in, or inseparably bound up with, the objects a +power or powers of producing sensation in conscious mind. But the power +of producing sensation, and sensation itself, are not one and the same +thing, but two separate and distinct things, intrinsically distinct and +locally separate. The feeling, agreeable or painful, according to its +intensity, which heat occasions, is not the same thing as the heat by +which it is occasioned. The twofold taste, sweet to a healthy, bitter to +a distempered palate, of one and the same aliment, cannot be identical +with the single property of the aliment whereby the taste is produced. +In the sense of seeming red to a spectator with normally constructed +eyes, and green to one who is colour-blind, a ruby or a Siberian crab is +at once both red and green, but the two colours which it causes to be +perceived cannot be identical with the peculiar structure, or whatever +else it be, whereby the ruby or Siberian crab communicates to +circumambient ether the one self-same motion that terminates in +different impressions on differently constructed eyes. In these and in +all cases of the kind the feeling is in the mind, the source of the +feeling in matter. The one is a perception, the other a quality, and to +mistake the quality, not merely for a perception, but for the very +perception to which the quality gives rise; and to infer thence that the +quality must likewise be in the mind, is an instance as glaring as can +well be imagined of that most heinous of logical offences, the +confounding of cause with effect. + +By what steps Berkeley was led, and has since led so many after him, +into so grave an error, he has himself acquainted us. Thus it is that he +argues: By sensible things can be meant only such as can be perceived +immediately by sense: and sensible _qualities_ are of course sensible +_things_. But the only perceptions of sense are sensations, and all +perceptions are purely mental. Wherefore, sensible qualities being, as +such, perceptible immediately by the senses, must be sensations, and +being sensations must be perceptions, and being perceptions they are of +course purely mental, and existent nowhere save in the mind. Carefully, +however, as Berkeley fancied he was picking his way, he really had +tripped, and that fatally, at the second step. He calls the qualities of +objects _sensible_ things; but sensible they are not according to his +definition, for they are not capable of being immediately perceived by +the senses. It is not sense which perceives, but reason which infers +them. The senses, as Berkeley elsewhere repeatedly and earnestly +insists, receive nothing from objects but sensations, and these they +communicate to the mind without accompanying them by the slightest hint +as to whence they originally came. The senses suggest nothing as to any +qualities resident in or appertaining to an object corresponding with +the sensations derived from the object. The existence of such qualities +is an inference of reason which, taking for granted that sensations, in +common with all other occurrences, must have causes, and observing that +certain of them commonly occur in the presence of certain objects, and +never occur in the absence of those objects, infers that the causes of +the sensations must exist in the objects. To the causes thus inferred +the name of qualities is given, to distinguish them from the sensations +whereof they are causes; and the Berkeleian transgression consists in +overlooking the distinction between things so diametrically opposite. + +By the commission of such a sin the most powerful intellect becomes +inevitably committed to further enormities. Except by neglecting to +distinguish between sight and hearing, the effects, and light and sound, +their respective causes, it would surely have been impossible for +Professor Huxley to come to the strange conclusion that if all living +beings were blind and deaf, 'darkness and silence would everywhere +reign.' Had he not himself previously explained that light and sound are +peculiar motions communicated to the vibrating particles of an +universally diffused ether, which motions, on reaching the eye or ear, +produce impressions, which, after various modifications, result +eventually in seeing or hearing? How these motions are communicated to +the ether matters not. Only it is indispensable to note that they are +not communicated by the percipient owner of the eye or ear, so that the +fact of there being no percipient present cannot possibly furnish any +reason why the motions should not go on all the same. But as long as +they did go on there would necessarily be light and sound; for the +motions are themselves light and sound. If, on returning to his study in +which, an hour before, he had left a candle burning and a clock ticking, +Professor Huxley should perceive from the appearance of candle and clock +that they had gone on burning and ticking during his absence, would he +doubt that they had likewise gone on producing the motions constituting +and termed light and sound, notwithstanding that no eyes or ears had +been present to see or hear? But if he did not doubt this, how could he +any more doubt that, although all sentient creatures suddenly became +eyeless and earless, the sun might go on shining, and the wind roaring, +and the sea bellowing as before? + +Akin to the inadvertence which, as I presume to think, has led Professor +Huxley thus to misconceive _secondary_ qualities, is an inattention to +the differences between our ideas, or mental pictures, and the originals +whereof those pictures are copies, which seems to me seriously to +vitiate his reasoning with regard to _primary_ qualities. With admirable +perspicuity he shows[34] how it is that our notions of primary qualities +are formed; how the mind, by _localising_ on distinct points of the +sensory surface of the body its various, tactile sensations, obtains the +idea of extension, or space in two dimensions, of figure, number, and +motion: how the power, combined with consciousness of the power, of +moving the hand in all directions over any substance it is in contact +with, adds the idea of geometrical solidity, or of space in three +dimensions: how the ideas thus formed with the aid of the sense of touch +are confirmed by, and blended with, others derived from visual +sensations and muscular movements of the eye: and, finally, how the idea +of mechanical solidity, or impenetrability, arises from experience of +resistance to our muscular exertions. All these details, however, +interesting as they are, are nevertheless quite out of place. What we +are at present concerned with is the nature of the things themselves, +not the nature of our knowledge of them. No question that this latter is +purely mental. If figure, motion, and solidity were really, as Professor +Huxley says, each of them nothing but a perception of the relation of +two or more sensations to one another, no question but that, since the +mind is the sole seat of perception, they could exist nowhere else. But +if all these suppositions be incorrect, if, as we have seen, there be in +matter and apart from mind, potentialities of producing sensations, it +follows that, in matter, and outside of mind, there must be relations +between different potentialities, and there must, moreover, be limits +to, and there may be changes in, those relations. Wherefore, since there +is in matter a potentiality of imparting to the mind those sensations +whence it derives its ideas of place and distance, and since figure is +but a 'limitation of distance,' and motion but a 'change of place,' it +necessarily follows that there is in matter a potentiality of conveying +to the mind those sensations whence it derives its ideas of figure and +motion. And a similar remark applies equally to solidity, and to every +other so-called quality of matter. All of them are substantive +potentialities of producing in the mind those sensations whence our +ideas of themselves (the qualities) are derived. No doubt all these +qualities would be _inconceivable_ in the absence of a mind by which +they might be _conceived_, but it is not necessary that, in order to +_be_, they should be _conceived_. In discussions of any abstruseness we +cannot be too precise in our use of words, and we shall inevitably be +going astray here if we allow ourselves for a moment to forget that a +quality and the conception of that quality are not one single thing, but +two things. Can it be seriously supposed that if all the conscious +creatures, of every description, by which the universe is peopled, were +to fall temporarily into complete stupor, the material universe would, +at the commencement of the trance, be deprived of its extension, +solidity, figure, and all its other constituent properties, recovering +them again as soon as its inhabitants woke up again? Can it be doubted +that, on the contrary, all potentialities resident in its material +composition would pursue the even tenor of their way just as if nothing +had happened; performing, during the temporary absence of external +percipient minds, precisely those operations which, as soon as +consciousness returned to those minds, would be followed by the +perceptions of sight, hearing, and touch? But if so, then plainly it is +exceedingly derogatory to matter to charge it with such absolute +dependence on external support that its very being consists in being +perceived from without. That matter cannot exist without mind I +cheerfully admit, or rather most earnestly affirm, proposing presently +to explain in what sense I make the affirmation. Meanwhile let it +suffice to have ascertained that the mental service with which matter +cannot dispense, whatever else it be, is at any rate not, as the whole +Berkeleian school so positively insist, that of mental testimony to its +existence. + +Let us pause here for a moment to report progress. We have seen, on the +one hand, that unless mind and matter have been eternally coexistent, +mind must have preceded matter, and that it is idle, therefore, to +expect, by any researches into matter, to discover how mind (or life) +originated. We have seen that from a materialism which represents mind +as in any sense a property or product of matter there is no possible +outlet to an idealism which represents matter as owing its being to +mind. To see this is simply to see that the builder of a house cannot +possibly have been born in the house he has himself built. On the other +hand, we have seen that the idealism which represents being or existence +as consisting of perception is utterly incompatible with materialism of +any sort or kind, unless, indeed, with a materialistic nihilism wherein +would be no room for a solitary molecule, still less for any molecular +structure, and least of all for that motion of molecular structures into +which consistent materialists are logically bound to attempt to resolve +all natural phenomena. We have, in short, seen that materialism and +idealism, in the senses in which those terms are commonly used, are +utterly incapable of amalgamation, or indeed of even being harmoniously +approximated, without being first deprived of all the characteristic +traits which at present entitle them to their distinguishing +appellations. + +To which of the two belongs the larger share of blame for this +implacable hostility is easily determined. Materialism, in dealing with +mental phenomena, begins by setting chronology at defiance; but between +idealism and the phenomena of matter there is no such aboriginal +incongruity. From principles common to every form of idealism a theory +is deducible which, while frankly acknowledging the reality of matter, +may, with perfect consistency, maintain that reality to be +mental--although mental in the sense of being, not a perception by, but +a metamorphosis of, mind. Of such a theory the outlines seem to me to +have been sketched, and the foundations partly laid, by Descartes, and +it cannot be otherwise than interesting to inquire in what manner and +how far so consummate an artificer advanced in the work, and where and +wherefore he suddenly stopped short in it. + +When Descartes, after convincing himself of the hollow pretentiousness +of most human knowledge, proceeded to dig away the accumulated drift and +sand of ages in quest of any clay or rock there might be below, the +first indubitable verity he came to was thought, about whose reality +there could, as already explained, be no possibility of doubt, inasmuch +as any doubt concerning it, being itself thought, would be but an +additional proof of it. On the bit of firm ground thus thoroughly +tested, he proceeded to place a formula not less carefully verified, his +famous 'Cogito, ergo sum'--'I think, therefore I am.' By many of his +followers, however, this second verification of his is deemed to be by +no means so satisfactory as it was by himself, Professor Huxley more +especially taking vehement, though, as I make bold to add, somewhat +gratuitous, exception to every single word of the most celebrated of +Cartesian formulæ. No doubt the premiss of the formula assumes the +conclusion, but it likewise includes as well as assumes it. No doubt, +since 'I think' is but another way of saying 'I am thinking,' to say +that 'I think' is to assume that 'I am;' nay, the same thing is equally +assumed by the mere introduction of the pronoun 'I.' But Descartes was +fully warranted in taking for granted the truth of his conclusion. For +by previously showing incontestably that thought and consciousness are +real existences, he had completely proved the premiss wherein his +conclusion is included. What though, as Professor Huxley suggests, +'thought' may possibly 'be self-existent,' 'or a given thought the +result of its antecedent thought, or of some external power'? Be thought +what else it may, it must needs be, also, either an affection or an +operation; if not performed, it must be felt; there must needs be, +therefore, something by which it is either performed or felt, and that +something cannot possibly be other than a thinking and conscious thing. +As surely as thought is, so surely must there be a thinker. This is, in +substance, affirmed even by many who deny it in terms, and Hume, in +particular, when saying, as he somewhere does, that 'all we are +conscious of is a series of perceptions,' denies and affirms it at one +and the same time. For how can there be perception without a percipient? +or how consciousness without a conscious entity? or how can that entity +be conscious of feeling without being simultaneously conscious that it +is itself which feels, without knowing, consequently, that it has a +self, or without being warranted, if it possess the gift of speech, in +declaring, in words even more emphatic than those of Descartes, 'I +_myself_ am'? And how, if these questions do not admit of reply, can +Professor Huxley be warranted in declaring self and non-self to be mere +'hypotheses by which we account for the facts of consciousness,' and +adding that of their existence we 'neither have, nor by any possibility +can have' the same 'unquestionable and immediate certainty as we have of +the states of consciousness which we consider to be their effects'? +Surely the existence of self is one of the most direct and immediate +subjects of consciousness; yet it does not depend for evidence on +consciousness alone, but is as unanswerably demonstrable as that two +straight lines cannot enclose space or that parallel lines cannot meet, +or as any other mathematical negation. No ratiocinative deduction can be +more incontestable than that, since _I_ have thoughts, there must be an +_I_ to have them. + +Whoever thus assures himself of the existence of self obtains +simultaneously equal assurance of the existence of non-self; for feeling +that his conscious self is not boundless, but is confined within limits, +he cannot doubt that beyond those limits there must be space, and, +receiving continual sensations from without, he perceives that there +are, in external space, potentialities of imparting sensations. Thus, I +repeat, Descartes in laying down the first principles of his philosophy +created an intellectual basis for the external universe. Unfortunately, +however, instead of proceeding to place its proper superstructure on the +foundation thus laid, he wilfully stepped aside from what he had just +pronounced the only firm ground in existence, and undertook to raise a +rival edifice on part of the formless void beyond. Deeply struck by the +grand discoveries of his illustrious contemporaries, Galileo and Harvey, +and thence discovering for himself that the phenomena of remotest worlds +and also the involuntary phenomena of our own bodily frames take place +in accordance with forces of uniform operation, he leaped suddenly to +the conclusion that those forces are purely mechanical. The circulation +of the blood, he says, 'is as much the necessary result of the structure +of the parts one can see in the heart, and of the heat which one may +feel there, and of the nature of the blood which may be experimentally +ascertained, as is the motion of a clock the result of the force, +situation, and figure of its wheels and of its weight.' Nor, in his +view, does the heart, by virtue of its structure and composition, merely +cause the blood to circulate. 'It also generates animal spirits,' which, +'ascending like a very subtle fluid, or very pure and vivid flame, into +the brain as into a reservoir, pass thence into the nerves, where, +according as they more or less enter, or tend to enter, they have the +power of altering the figures of the muscles into which the nerves are +inserted, and of so causing all the organs and limbs to move.' He puts +the case thus: Even as the ordinary movements of a water-clock or of a +mill are kept up by the ordinary flow of the water, and even as 'in the +grottoes and fountains of royal gardens, the force wherewith the water +issues from its reservoirs suffices to move various machines, and even +to make them play instruments or pronounce words according to the +different disposition of the pipes which lead the water'--even so do +pulsation, respiration, digestion, nutrition, and growth, and 'other +such actions as are natural and usual in the body,' result naturally +from the usual course of the animal spirits. Moreover, even as intruders +upon the waterworks aforesaid unconsciously by their mere presence cause +special movements to take place, even as, for example, 'if they approach +a bathing Diana, they tread on certain planks so arranged as to make her +hide among the reeds, and, if they attempt to follow her, see +approaching a Neptune who threatens with his trident, or rouse some +other monster who vomits water into their faces'--even so do external +objects, by their mere presence, act upon the organs of sense; even so +do 'the reception of light, sounds, odours, flavours, heat, and such +like qualities in the organs of the external senses, the impression of +the ideas of these in the intellect, the imagination, and the memory, +the internal movements of the appetites and passions, and the external +movements which follow so aptly on the presentation of objects to the +senses, or on the resuscitation of impressions by the memory,' yea, even +so do all these 'functions proceed naturally from the arrangement of the +bodily organs, neither more nor less than do the movements of a clock or +other automaton from that of its weights and its wheels, without the aid +of any other vegetative or sensitive soul or any other principle of +motion or of life than the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire +which burns continually within the heart, and which differs in no wise +from the fire existing in inanimate bodies.'[35] + +Quite fairly it may be urged that the writer of passages like these +would, if writing in modern language, and with the aid of modern +conceptions, have expressed himself much as Professor Huxley does when, +declaring that the circulation of the blood and the regular movements of +the respiratory, alimentary, and other internal organs are simply +'affairs of mechanism, resulting from the structure and arrangement' of +the bodily organs concerned, from 'the contractility of those organs, +and from the regulation of that contractility by an automatically acting +nervous apparatus;' that muscular contractility and the automatic +activity or irritability of the nerves are 'purely the results of +molecular mechanism;' and that 'the modes of motion which constitute the +physical bases of light, sound, and heat are transmuted by the sensory +organs into affections of nervous matter,' which affections become 'a +kind of physical ideas constituting a physical memory,' and may be +combined in a manner answering to association and imagination, or may +give rise to muscular contractions in those reflex actions which are the +mechanical representatives of volition.' Quite fairly may a doctrine, +capable of being thus translated, be described as leading 'straight to +materialism.' Quite justly may its author be claimed by Huxley as joint +professor of a materialistic creed. True, Descartes lodges within his +human mechanism a _chose pensante_ or rational soul, whose principal +seat is in the brain, and who is treated as corresponding to a hydraulic +engineer stationed in the centre of waterworks for the purpose of +increasing, slackening, or otherwise altering their movements. But this +rational soul is a very needless appendage to either the Cartesian or +the Huxleian system, wherein, if its post be not a literal sinecure, +there is, at any rate, little or nothing for it to do which might not +quite as well be done without it. The hydraulic engineer, sitting in his +central office, has to wind up the whole machinery from time to time, +and to turn now this tap, now that, when he wishes to set this or that +particular machine in motion. But, as no one need be told, our _chose +pensante_ has nothing to do with the winding up of our digestive, +circulatory, or respiratory apparatus; and so far from internally +arranging those other internal organs from the mere arrangement of whose +parts, according to Descartes, the reception, conversion, and retention +of sensations, and the movements, whether internal or external, +thereupon consequent, naturally proceed, or from regulating the +molecular mechanism, whence, according to Professor Huxley, results the +automatic nervous activity which, in his opinion, governs the movements +of the limbs not less absolutely than those of the intestines, it, nine +times out of ten, neither knows nor suspects that any such organs or +mechanism exist. If the functions above attributed to the human frame +could be shown really to belong to it, pure, not to say crass, +materialism, would require no further proof. Those particular functions +undoubtedly take place without the cognisance of that particular +sensitive soul which we call ourself, so that if no other sensitive soul +take cognisance of them, they must needs be, not simply automatic +performances, but performances of an automaton of such marvellous powers +as to be quite equal to the performance likewise of whatever human +operations are vulgarly classed as mental. Assume, however illogically, +that motion is a function of matter, and from that premiss, whether true +or false, the conclusion that thought likewise is a function of matter +may be quite logically deduced. 'That thought is as much a function of +matter as motion is' must needs be conceded to Professor Huxley, who, +therefore, if he could show that motion is really such a function, would +be fully justified in adding, that 'the distinction between spirit and +matter vanishes,' that 'we lose spirit in matter.' + +Undeniably, then, of the Cartesian philosophy one moiety is, as +Professor Huxley says, materialistic; but from the self-contradictions +inseparable from every species of materialism the Cartesian variety is, +of course, no more exempt than any other, and it has besides one +self-contradiction peculiar to itself. A clock's pendulum vibrates, and +its hands move, not simply by reason of the situation and figure of its +weight and wheels, but also because some intelligent person, by winding +up the clock, has communicated an impulsive force to the weight and +wheels. Waterworks perform all sorts of antics, not solely because the +pipes are skilfully constructed and arranged with a view to such end, +but because also an intelligent engineer has turned running water into +the pipes. But the only intelligent agent to whom Descartes allows +access to his corporeal machinery is one who not only has no notion how +to apply a moving force except to some few portions of the machinery, +but with regard to the other portions has most likely no suspicion that +they even exist. But how in the absence of some other intelligence, of +some other 'vegetative or sensitive soul or principle of motion or of +life,' is it possible for the inert and inanimate heart to generate +animal spirits?--how is it possible for death thus to give birth to +life?--or, if the generative faculty be supposed to be the necessary +result of a particular molecular structure, how is it that when the +animal spirits become from any cause extinct, they are not immediately +regenerated by the same molecular structure? or rather, how is it +possible for animal spirits to become extinct as long as the molecular +structure of which they are necessary concomitants remains unaltered? In +these questions the old insuperable difficulties reappear in new forms, +but on these we need not dwell. Apart from anti-materialistic arguments +of general applicability, there is a mode of refutation specially +adapted to the Cartesian form of materialism, which, besides flatly +contradicting itself, contradicts not less flatly a twin system of +unimpeachable veracity. Truth cannot be opposed to truth:--a doctrine +cannot be true, even though propounded by Descartes and Huxley, if it +conflict irreconcileably with doctrines which Descartes and Huxley have +unanswerably demonstrated. Now one-half of Cartesian philosophy shows +conclusively that amidst the countless infinity of human notions, the +one single and solitary certainty of independent and self-evident +authority is the existence of thought, and nothing else whatever, +therefore, can be entitled to be regarded as absolutely certain which +cannot be shown to rest mediately or immediately upon this. One thing +which can, by strictest logical process, be shown so to rest, is the +existence of a thinking self; and another is the existence of a non-self +or external universe; but of this external universe we know scarcely +anything beyond the bare fact that it exists. We know that outside the +thinking self there are potentialities capable of somehow or other +communicating sensations to the thinking self; but of the nature of +these potentialities our senses teach us absolutely nothing, and the few +particulars that reason is able to discover, are, with one single though +very momentous exception, to which we are rapidly approaching, purely +negative. We do know to a certain extent what qualities of objects are +not. We know that they are not and cannot be in the least like the +sensations which we call by the same names. We know that what we call +the whiteness and coldness of snow or the hardness and weight of marble, +can no more resemble the feelings we receive from looking at or handling +snow or marble than the mental exaltation produced within us on hearing +one of Bach's fugues is like the organ on which, or the organist by +whom, it is played. We know that of the pictures which our senses form +for us not one can possibly be a correct likeness. We know that what we +fancy we see in matter we do not see; that what we seem to feel we do +not feel; that the apparent structure and composition of matter cannot +therefore possibly be real. To this conviction we are irresistibly drawn +by a chain of idealistic reasoning of which Descartes forged the first +link, and every link of which will stand the severest strain. But if +this be the teaching of an idealism occupying as its base the only +morsel of solid ground to be found in the mental universe, what scrap of +footing is there left for an antagonistic materialism purporting to rest +on what we can see and feel of a structure and composition which, as we +have just satisfied ourselves, we cannot see or feel at all? + +As plainly then as one half of Descartes' philosophy is materialistic, +so plainly, that half, instead of a necessary outgrowth and exact +correlative of the other or idealistic moiety is, on the contrary, the +latter's diametrical and implacable opponent. As plainly, therefore, as +the one is true, must the other be false, and Cartesian idealism, in so +far as its character has been exhibited above, has, I submit, been +demonstrated to be true. The greater the pity that it was not brought to +maturity by its author. In enumerating its first principles, Descartes, +as I must once again observe, was forming a logical basis whereon a +comprehensive and consistent conception of an external universe might +forthwith have been securely deposited, had he not unluckily, instead of +himself proceeding to build on his own foundations, with congruous +materials, left them free for others to build upon with gold, silver, +precious stones, wood, hay, or stubble, as chance might determine. May +I, without presumption, hazard a conjecture as to the sort of fabric +that might have arisen, if he had steadily prosecuted his original +design? + +At the stage which we are supposing him to have reached, very little +remained to complete the work. Around man, around every individual man, +or other conscious intelligence, as its centre, is ranged infinitely +extended space, filled with, or, as it were, composed of various kinds +of matter, every kind and every separate portion of which is endowed +with special qualities capable of communicating corresponding sensations +to the central intelligence. So far all that can be predicated of any +material object or portion of matter is that it is a collection of +qualities; but from hence we may advance boldly to the further negative +discovery that it is nothing else; that there is not and cannot be, in +addition to those qualities, any substance in or to which the qualities +inhere, or are in any way attached. + +The absence from matter of any such substance is evidenced by the +absurdity involved in the idea of its presence. Suppose the substance to +exist: the qualities inherent in it must needs be as completely distinct +from itself as pins are from a pincushion; the extension and solidity of +an extended, solid substance can no more be identical with the substance +than the nominative is identical with the genitive case. The substance, +therefore, although deprived of all its qualities will still retain its +essence unimpaired, will still be equally a substance, just as a +pincushion continues equally a pincushion after its last pin has been +abstracted. Conceive, then, all the qualities of matter to be +abstracted, and consider what remains--a substance without qualities of +any sort. But a substance neither solid, nor fluid, nor yet gaseous; +neither coloured nor colourless; neither singular nor plural; without +form and void, without even extension--what is it? not something, but +nothing; a nonentity or non-existence. The qualities of matter in being +removed from the substance have therefore left nothing behind, and, +consequently, although carrying with them nothing but themselves, have +yet carried with them all the constituents of matter, which is thus +seen to be composed exclusively of qualities without a single particle +of foreign admixture. And since, moreover, the qualities of matter are +clearly not themselves substances, that is to say do not themselves +_stand under_ or uphold anything, it follows that their compound, +matter, must likewise be purely unsubstantial. + +The edifice begun by Descartes has now been raised high and strong +enough to have its layer of negations crowned with an affirmation of +pre-eminent importance. The qualities of matter, being known only by +their effects, are evidently causes: and, being causes, must necessarily +be either themselves forces, or, at the least, manifestations of force; +and inasmuch as force involves exertion, it cannot be inert; and +inasmuch as deadness must be incapable of exertion, all force must be +alive; and life without substance cannot be conceived otherwise than as +some species of spirit or mind. Such therefore must be matter. Matter +can be nothing else than pure spirit of some kind. + +And may we not with good reason congratulate ourselves on this result of +our investigations? Instead of the vision we were threatened with, of +mind losing itself in matter, our eyes are gladdened with that of the +converse operation, of the transmutation of matter into mind. And on no +account is this metamorphosis to be mistaken for annihilation of matter, +whose stolid grossness has vanished, not in order to give place to empty +nominalism or to a thin mist of mere mental perceptions existing only in +virtue of being perceived, but in order to reappear gloriously +etherealised into living energy. By the change that has taken place, +corruption has put on incorruption; the natural body has become a +quickening spirit; death is swallowed up in victory. Matter reappears +converted, not into a perception of percipient mind, but into percipient +mind itself; yet although thus presumably percipient of its own +existence, it not the less has an existence perfectly independent of +perception, either by itself or by any other intelligence. + +Under what head the mind, or combination of living forces, thus +constituting all matter, ought to be classed, is a question, which the +imperfection of human faculties may as well be content to leave +unanswered, though to its being supposed to emanate directly from the +mind of Omnipresent Deity, one insuperable objection may be mentioned, +which should be kept steadily in view. There are few of us who will not +shrink with horror from a notion, according to which man, whenever doing +as he pleases with any material object, applying it, as likely as not, +to some base or criminal purpose, is disposing at his pleasure of a +portion of the Divine essence: few who will not greatly prefer to +believe that the vital principle which manifests itself in the form of a +dunghill or of a poisoned dagger, may be, for the time, as completely +individualised and separate from all other life or mind, as every human +being perceives his own conscious mind or self to be. At all events, we +have now reached a point beyond which it would be rash to rush hastily +on. For a while we may be well content to rest where we are. That matter +is nothing else but a peculiar manifestation, or avatar, of some species +of mind, whatever that species be, is a proposition as demonstrably true +as its converse is demonstrably false. Unless it be possible for death +to give birth to life, it is impossible for living mind to be the +offspring of inanimate matter; but so surely as mind is mind, and that +living force alone can act either on mind or aught else, so surely must +all matter that imparts sensation to mind, be itself a species of living +force and consequently a species of mind. + +An unexpected conclusion this, and widely different, I confess, from +that to which I was myself looking forward at the outset of the +discussion; yet, at the same time, one of which there is the best +possible proof in the impossibility of conceiving its contrary. It is +besides a conclusion to which not only ought Descartes in consistency to +have come, but at which both Locke and Berkeley, though advancing from +opposite points of the compass, did very nearly arrive; nay, which the +latter did almost touch, and must apparently have grasped, had not his +hands been already full of other things. It is, moreover, one from which +I do not apprehend that Professor Huxley himself will seriously dissent. +Indeed, I almost hope that he may object chiefly to its having been +moved by me as an amendment on his original motion, and that he may be +disposed to claim it for himself as a portion of genuine Huxleyism. If +so, I shall readily recognise the claim so far as to admit that things +very similar to many of those said by me above had already been said by +Professor Huxley; though, in justice to myself, I must add that their +complete opposites had likewise been said by him. But the office which I +here proposed to myself was mainly that of an eclectic, who, going over +a field which another husbandman has tilled, separates the wheat from +the tares, and binds up the former into shapely and easily portable +sheaves; and no more satisfactory assurance can be given of my having +been usefully employed in such subordinate capacity than that Professor +Huxley, who, amongst all his numerous admirers, has not one sincerer +than myself, should welcome me as a coadjutor, instead of repelling me +as an antagonist. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[32] Archimède, pour tirer le globe terrestre de sa place et le +transporter en un autre lieu, ne demandait rien qu'un point qui fût +ferme et immobile: ainsi j'aurai droit de concevoir de hautes espérances +si je suis assez heureux pour trouver seulement une chose qui soit +certaine et indubitable.--Descartes, _Méditation Deuxième_. + +[33] Lay Sermons, xiv. 'On Descartes' Discourse;' also an article by +Professor Huxley, on 'Berkeley and the Metaphysics of Sensation,' in +'Macmillan's Magazine' for June, 1871. + +[34] Article on 'Berkeley and the Metaphysics of Sensation,' in +'Macmillan's Magazine' for 1871, pp. 152 et seq. + +[35] The quotations, of which those in the text are abridgments, will be +found in 'Lay Sermons,' xiv. pp. 364-7. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +_RECENT PHASES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM._ + + 'Wonder is the basis of worship. That progress of science which is + to destroy wonder, and in its stead substitute mensuration and + numeration, finds small favour with Teufelsdröckh, much as he + otherwise venerates those two latter processes.'--_Sartor + Resartus._ + + +I. + +By the train of thought pursued in the last chapter, we were led to the +conclusion, not, indeed, that matter has no existence, but that its +nature or constitution is altogether different from what is commonly +supposed. The difference thus discovered does not, however, imply any +corresponding difference with respect to the properties--_sensible_ +properties, as they are commonly called--whereby matter affects the +senses. Equally, whether matter be, in all and each of its various +species, inanimate, inert, passive substance, or a combination of +self-acting forces--equally whether it be the author or merely the +subject of whatever activity it manifests, that activity is equally +manifested in certain sequences which are as unvarying as if they were +prescribed by inexorable and irresistible laws, and which, indeed, by a +convenient, though exceedingly treacherous metaphor, are usually styled +laws--laws of Nature when spoken of collectively, laws of attraction, +repulsion, gravitation, motion, heat, light, and the like, when +separately referred to. Whithersoever we turn our eyes, however closely +we pry, into whatever depths of infinity we peer, we observe the most +perfect harmony between structure and law, law moulding structure and +structure utilising law. Afar off we descry systems upon systems, solar +and sidereal, like sand upon the sea-shore for multitude, and every +individual orb thereof rotating or revolving in strictest accordance +with inflexible mathematical principles, and evidently owing to the +previous influence of those same principles its characteristic +configuration. Near at hand we discern organic forms innumerable, each +with its own special arrangement of component parts admirably apt for +the performance in ordinary circumstances of special functions, +admirably, as circumstances change, accommodating itself by +corresponding changes for continuing the same or undertaking other and +equally appropriate functions, nor merely performing them all in despite +of the restraints imposed by law, but availing itself of those very +restraints as means and aids for their performance. Where so much +aptness is, adaptation surely must have been: where arrangement is so +plainly conducive to ends, the ends must surely have been foreseen, and +the arrangement effected by design and according to preconceived plan. +And there cannot have been design without a designer or designers: the +plan cannot but have had its author or authors: nor could the plan have +been executed without an artificer or artificers. Author or authors, +too, artificer or artificers, be the same singular or plural, must have +possessed, individually or collectively, not less of wisdom, power, and +goodness than are displayed by the finished work. Now of each of these +attributes, the amount to which the aspect of the universe bears +witness, albeit not infinite, inasmuch as the universe is not without +imperfections, is yet indefinite; as plainly without measure as the +universe is without bounds. Wherefore, not only must the universe have +had an author or authors, an artificer or artificers, but his or their +wisdom, power, and goodness, must, whether infinite or not, have been at +least illimitable. + +Such is the argument from design, and such, to my thinking, the only +absolute certainties legitimately deducible from it; and although these, +in comparison with the numerous probabilities ordinarily associated with +them, may appear somewhat meagre, yet are they intrinsically of +exceeding moment. They constitute the only basis on which any rational +religion, any that appeals to the intellect as well as to the feelings, +can rest securely. Whoever accepts them, by whatever other name he +prefer to call himself, is essentially a theist. He only who denies or +ignores them can justly be stigmatised as an atheist. Yet, although an +inquiry into their soundness is thus plainly second in interest to none, +it is not that in which I propose to engage at present, unless +indirectly. My immediate concern is not with the strength of theism, but +with the weakness of atheism, and the hollowness of the latter's +dialectical pretensions. What in every form of piety is most provocative +of philosophic scorn, is its forwardness of faith, its eagerness of +acquiescence; but to this sort of reproach I expect to be able to show +that none are more obnoxious than those very philosophers by whom it is +most freely cast. That nothing is more unphilosophical than +uncompromising irreligion, nothing more credulous than its credulity, no +other beliefs more monstrous than those by which it strives to fill up +the void created by its own unbelief: this is my present thesis, and +this I propound, not unaware what formidable antagonists I am thereby +challenging, but not without something of the same confidence, and +something withal of the same ground for it, as David had when, in equal +strait, exclaiming, 'The Lord is on my side; I will not fear; what can +man do unto me?' + +Let us at the outset consider what denial of plan in the structure of +the universe implies, and note, among other things signified, the +following. The exact conformity on matter's part to Nature's laws, +everywhere observable, and even more striking perhaps in minute details +than in grandiose generalities, is purely accidental. The laws were not +enacted in order to be obeyed; matter's various shapes were not given to +or assumed by it in order that its obedience might serve any particular +purpose. All appearances of ingenious contrivance in the collocation of +elementary particles, or in the co-operation of elementary forces, are +mere appearances. It was not designed that under the influence of the +laws of motion, chaos should resolve itself into systems, and time +divide itself into years and seasons and days and nights. It is quite +unintentionally that the countless varieties of mechanism appertaining +to different vegetable and animal fabrics have been rendered fit for +performing those special processes which, by reason in each case of some +special arrangement of parts, they actually do perform with such +marvellous precision. It is a total mistake to suppose that the eye was +meant for seeing, or the ear for hearing, or the heart for initiating +and regulating the circulation of the blood, or nervous ramifications +for receiving and disseminating sensible impressions. These various +organs have been discovered to be useful, and are used accordingly; but +they were not intended to be so used, or contrived with any such view, +or, indeed, contrived at all. The forces, whatever they be, and whether +identical with or totally distinct from itself, whereby matter, on one +supposition, acts, and, on the other, is acted upon, and by whose +operation the universe and all its contents have been fashioned and are +sustained, are in either case perfectly heedless and reckless forces, +operating always without the slightest reference to result. + +Language like this was much in vogue among the French encyclopædists of +the last century. By opposing it, even Voltaire incurred the reputation +of bigotry, and Hume probably had to listen to a good deal of it on that +memorable occasion when, dining with Baron D'Holbach, and intimating to +his host his disbelief in the existence of atheists, he was informed by +way of reply that he was actually at table with seventeen members of the +sect.[36] That in England, too, it was a good deal talked at about the +same and a somewhat later period, may be inferred from the fact that +against its teaching one of Paley's most celebrated treatises was +expressly directed. Doctrine which was once so fashionable, and which +even now cannot be said to be obsolete, was not, of course, without some +show of reason to support it, and somewhat in this wise the chief +arguments in its behalf were usually marshalled:--In order to account +for actual result, there is no need to imagine previous purpose. All +things that exist, all events that occur, must bear to each other some +relations in situation and time, which relations are not less likely to +be orderly than disorderly, or, rather, indeed, are more likely to be +the former than the latter. For necessarily the rarer rises above the +denser; the stronger compels the weaker; that which is pushed hardest +runs fastest. And even though, among organic forms, orderly and +disorderly had been, by the purely fortuitous concurrence of atoms, +originally produced in equal numbers, the former would be sure in the +course of ages to become the more numerous, and that in proportion to +the orderliness of their composition, and to their consequent +suitableness for the reception and maintenance of organic life, by which +they in turn would be maintained and multiplied, while less aptly +organised forms, succumbing in the struggle for existence, perished and +vanished away. Thus everything arranges itself--_everything_, however, +being here another name for Nature, which alone does or can exist, which +is all and does all; yet, though doing all things in general, does +whatever it does quite unintelligently, and without the least desire of +doing any one thing in particular more than another. + +Though speaking of this as a show of reasoning, I would by no means be +understood to consider it as merely a show. On the contrary, I must +admit that it contains a modicum of reality sufficient, in my opinion, +to secure the position taken up from being utterly overthrown by any +direct attack not followed up by reference to a certain palpable +absurdity which we shall presently perceive to be inseparably connected +with the position. To so much of real reasoning as we have before us, +let then all due respect be shown. No doubt all existences must +necessarily dispose themselves or be disposed somehow. No doubt all +occurrences must succeed each other somehow. No doubt, either, that if +the disposing or otherwise originating forces operated quite +regardlessly of plan, no one disposition or succession would be a whit +less possible than any other--the most symmetric or evenly graduated +than the most disjointed or confused. Now although, since exertion is +utterly inconceivable without volition, and since volition is equally +inconceivable without consciousness, it must be impossible for any +forces ever to exert themselves altogether unintentionally, it is yet +perfectly possible for their exertion to have no ulterior intention +beyond that of gratifying an unprospective will. This is all that one +fidgetting about, as the phrase is, intends, when he has no special +motive for fidgetting in any particular direction more than in any +other, and similarly it may by possibility be the mere fidgettiness of +Nature that gives rise to all natural phenomena. Nature, indeed, cannot, +any more than any other force or combination of forces, be utterly +destitute of intelligence, but its intelligence may not inconceivably be +of no higher sort than that which the sensitive plant exhibits or +mimics. Nature cannot exert itself quite unconsciously, nor consequently +quite unintentionally, but its exertions, though not unintended, may +possibly not be intended for any result. It must be admitted, then, +that, so far, no reason has appeared why the force or forces by which +the universe was originally moulded, may not, as contended, have been +perfectly heedless and reckless; may not, without the least +premeditation or the slightest view to any ulterior object, have +produced certain phenomena in those particular sequences to which the +name of natural laws has been given; and may not, with the same total +absence of purpose, have adopted certain other courses of action which, +very fortunately, though quite undesignedly, have resulted in the +production of endless varieties of mechanism, most of them of +marvellously intricate and complex structure, and all and each of them +of structure marvellously suitable for performing, in co-operation with +Nature's laws, functions of an utility as varied as their structure. And +what any forces have been equal to do once, those same forces, if +remaining unimpaired, must be equal to repeat times without number. +Although, if you found your opponent at dice invariably throwing +double-sixes, you might feel confident that his dice were loaded, your +confidence, unless otherwise corroborated, would not amount to entire +certainty. With unloaded dice there would be nothing strange in +double-six being thrown once; but, if once, why not twice running? and +if twice, why not three, four, or a million times running, provided that +the thrower's strength held out so long? No one of the separate throws, +from the first to the millionth, would be attended with more difficulty +than any other. Whoever made the first might with no greater effort make +any one, and therefore every one, of the rest. In the fact of his having +commenced the series there would be proof of the possibility of his +completing it. In like manner, if it be not inconceivable that Nature's +forces may once, by a single unpremeditated exertion, have bestowed on +the universe its actual constitution, it is not inconceivable that by +continual repetition of similarly unpremeditated exertions, they may +have ever since maintained that constitution. In this supposition there +is nothing patently absurd. It is perfectly legitimate to suppose that +any event or combination of events, not demonstrably impossible, may +have occurred in the absence of complete certainty that they have not +occurred. It may not be illegitimate, therefore, to suppose that all +phenomena of the description termed physical, and all repeated sequences +of such phenomena, may have occurred, not causally, but casually--that +it may have been a fortuitous concourse of atoms which originally +established the existing economy of the universe, and an uninterrupted +succession of similar fortuitous concourses that has ever since +maintained that economy. That supposition, I repeat, involves no +absolute absurdity. What however is, if not absurd, at any rate +egregiously unscientific and most unphilosophically credulous, is to +treat the supposition as a certainty, notwithstanding that the chances +against its representing real facts are as infinity to infinitesimality; +for not less is the preponderance of improbability that the laws of +nature were not intentionally prescribed, and that the wondrously +complex and wondrously useful harmony that has been established between +organic structure and natural law was not designedly established. In +considering this point, it will be convenient to take law first. + +Inasmuch as, on the assumption that all phenomena of inorganic matter +are effects, purely unpremeditated, of Nature's capricious restlessness, +there would of course be no more reason why any one such phenomenon than +any other should not at any time occur, there would equally of course on +the same assumption, be no more reason why it should. An infinity of +phenomena being at all times equally possible, the chances against any +one being, on any occasion, preferred to all the rest, would be infinity +less one. Against any particular sequence of phenomena they would be as +infinity less one multiplied by the number of phenomena composing the +sequence, and against one or more repetitions of the same sequence they +would be the same multiple of virtual infinity multiplied by the number +of repetitions. Against perpetual repetition, they would, as it were, be +virtual infinity multiplied by infinity. On the assumption stated, an +apple loosened from the parent stem, might quite possibly fall to the +ground, but quite as possibly might remain suspended in mid air, or rise +straight upwards, or take any one of the innumerable directions +intervening between zenith and nadir, travelling too, unless +interrupted, in the direction selected for any period, from a single +moment to endless ages. Experience, however, teaches that an apple or +any other body of greater specific gravity than air, does invariably, +when deprived of support, fall straight downward, such downward movement +being part of one of those sequences of phenomena which are classed +under the head of gravitation. Now, to assert that this, or any other, +and consequently every other, specimen of gravitation, cannot possibly +have been unpremeditated would no doubt be unwarrantable. No doubt there +is one solitary, one infinitesimal chance that the force whose action +results in gravitation may, when producing that result, be acting with +as little choice of direction as a fidgetty man makes when moving his +arms or legs about for no better reason than that he will not take the +trouble to keep them quiet. Only, as on the supposition that the force +did not select its course, the chances against its always taking the +same course would be infinity less one indefinitely multiplied, the +probability that it does select must needs be the same indefinite +multiple of virtual infinity. Not less than this is the preponderance +of probability that the invariably recurrent sequences of phenomena +which we are in the habit of referring to gravitation, are premeditated, +and that the law of gravitation has, so to speak, been wittingly +ordained. And in this respect all invariable sequences of phenomena, +otherwise termed laws of nature, stand plainly in the same category. One +solitary and infinitesimal unit is the sole deduction to be made from +what would otherwise be infinite certainty, that the assumption we +started with is false, and that all invariable sequences are +premeditated, all the laws of nature enacted by a law-giver who intended +what he was enacting. + +Intention, however, is not quite the same thing as design. It is +possible for action to be at once intentional and purposeless. If a man, +taking regularly a constitutional walk, is observed always to take the +same road, and to stop exactly at the same point, there can be no +reasonable doubt as to his intention to walk just so far and no farther; +but it does not follow that he has any object in walking which he +supposes would not be equally served by his walking a few paces more or +less. Similarly whatever be the certainty that the laws of nature have +been intentionally established, there is in that certainty no proof of +their having been established for any purpose beyond that of gratifying +some whim or humour of the lawgiver. For indications of design in the +universe we must look rather to organic than to inorganic nature, rather +to structure than to law. We shall find applying to the former the same +reasoning as to the latter, and likewise some more besides. + +Inasmuch as, of the innumerable combinations of which the elements or +elementary forces are susceptible, each and every one, in the absence +of any preference for one over another on the part of the volition on +which the occurrence of all depends, would have equal chances of +occurring, the chances against the occurrence at any particular time of +any particular combination would be as the number, or rather as the +innumerosity, of all the rest to one. Such, in the absence of any +intentional action on Nature's part, would be the odds against any one +single occurrence of any one elemental combination. Against the +perpetual repetition of the same combination the odds would be the same +innumerosity innumerable times multiplied. Nevertheless there actually +is everlastingly recurring, not simply one single specimen, but an +innumerable multitude of the same elemental combinations. Whatever were +the combinations necessary for producing all the existing organisms, +vegetable and animal, with which our earth swarms, the constant +recurrence of those same or nearly the same combinations is +indispensable both for the maintenance of the organisms during life and +for the production of successors to them; and such constant recurrence +is plainly going on. The chances then against its being unintended must +be the aforesaid multiple of innumerosity. But this is not all. The +multiple in question represents the chances against perpetual repetition +of any set whatever of elemental combinations, but about the actually +recurrent set there is this peculiarity, that it produces and maintains +innumerable organisms or machines, which--inasmuch as all of them are +marvellously fit, by reason of their respective specialities of +structure, for performing different obviously useful purposes--have all +the appearance of having been expressly constructed for the performance +of those purposes. If these appearances of adaptation were fallacious, +if the apparent utility were undesigned, the chances against the +perpetual recurrence of so singularly useful, rather than of some +totally useless, set of combinations would be a multiple of innumerosity +similar to that which has clearly been shown to represent the +preponderance of probability against the constant repetition of any set +of combinations whatever, whether useful or useless. If, then, it were +permissible to use so extravagant an hyperbole to indicate an idea of +multitude to which it is not in the power of words to give adequate +expression, it might be said that while the chances against Nature's +habitual action being _unintentional_, or the result as it were of mere +fidgettiness or restlessness, are an indefinite multiple of infinity, +the chances against its being _purposeless_ and _undesigned_, without +view to end or object, is the same multiple doubled. + +Still, in order to give the solitary and infinitesimal chance on the +other side its full due, let us confess it to be as yet not quite +conclusively demonstrated that the actual order of inorganic, and the +actual constitution of organic, nature are results of uninterrupted +repetition of one and the same purposeless volition, and of the same +purely fortuitous concourses of atoms. Let us admit it to be not +absolutely impossible, not utterly inconceivable, that vegetable and +animal organisms were not contrived such as they are with any view to +their becoming habitations of vegetable and animal life, but that having +been accidentally discovered to be fit to be lived in, they have been +taken possession of by life and inhabited accordingly; that, similarly, +the wondrously complex and varied mechanisms of which most organisms are +composed were not made to be used, but are used because certain uses +have been accidentally discovered for them--the eye, for instance, to +take one example out of myriads not less remarkable, not having been +meant to be seen with, but being employed for seeing because, by a happy +coincidence, the particles composing it have got to be collocated in +such wise that a picture of whatever is opposite to it is formed upon +the retina, and is thence by a nervous concatenation transmitted to the +brain. Although, if the most consummate skill, in comparison with which +that displayed in the fabrication of Mr. Newall's telescope were +downright clumsiness, had striven to devise a seeing apparatus, capable +of exact self-adjustment to all degrees of light, all gradations of +distance, all varieties of refrangibility, it could not have adopted a +contrivance more exquisitely ingenious, or evincing more minutely +accurate knowledge of the most secret laws of optics, than the mechanism +of the eye apparently betokens, let it still be admitted to be not quite +beyond the bounds of possibility, that not skill but the blindest and +densest ignorance may have presided over the whole operation. But even +though the modes of procedure involved in these admissions were not +quite impossible or inconceivable, belief in them would, I repeat, be +palpably irrational, and that almost to the last degree. The nearest +approach to a reason that can be imagined for it is the _Credo quia +incredibile est_ to which philosophers in despair have occasionally been +known to resort. _Dudum in scholis audiveram_, says Descartes, _nihil +tam absurdè dici posse quod non dicatur ab aliquo Philosophorum_. In his +early college days he had heard that nothing so absurd can possibly be +said, but that some philosopher or other may say it. Such words are too +hard for me. I make as yet no charges of absurdity, contenting myself +for the moment with saying that no notion can be too unscientific to be +adopted by those scientific men who, gratuitously running counter to the +strongest possible presumption, set the science of probabilities so +utterly at naught as to adopt as reality an hypothesis the chances +against which are but one single iota short of infinite. + +What, however, is unequivocally absurd, is a certain notion which I +hinted would be found to be inevitably consequent on the foregoing +premisses, and whose self-evident falsity carries with it condemnation +of the premisses. To say that the creative agency denominated Nature, or +by whatever other name known, neither had any ends in view when +originally adopting certain sequences of action, and originally +fabricating innumerable organisms exactly suitable for the performance, +in concert with those sequences, of innumerable useful functions; nor, +although ever since repeating the sequences, and maintaining or +reproducing the organisms, has so done with any reference to the +purposes which the sequences and organisms serve, is equivalent to +saying that the agency in question is not even aware that any purposes +are served. He who planted the eye doth not then see. He who fashioned +the ear doth not hear. He who teacheth man knowledge doth not, it seems, +know. Yet what, according to this, creative agency, whether God or +Nature, Creator or Creatress, can not perceive, the creature can. Even +an ass knows that thistles are good to eat, and that certain movements +of his tongue and larynx will result in a bray; while man not only daily +discovers fresh uses for things, but imagines that if he had had the +fashioning of them, he might have materially increased their utility; +King Alfonso of Castile, for instance, boasting of the valuable +cosmogonical advice he could have given had he been taken into council; +and one of Kaiser Wilhelm's predecessors on the throne of Prussia +intimating that he, in like case, would have proved conclusively that +pounded quartz and silex may easily be in excess in arable soil. The +creature, then, has intelligence of which the Creator has always been +destitute. Yet the creature can have nothing save what, either directly +or indirectly, he derives from a creator. Wherefore that, in becoming +endowed with intelligence, man must have received from the Creator that +which the Creator had not to give, is an article inseparable from the +profession of faith of those moderate Atheists who are content to regard +man as a creature. + +There are, however, others of a more uncompromising temper, who do not +hesitate to pronounce creation, in the sense of formation of something +out of nothing, to be an incomprehensible myth; and it cannot be denied +to these that, however difficult it be to conceive an uncreated universe +existing from all eternity, the conception of an eternally existent +Creator is not one whit easier. Fairly enough, therefore, these may +proceed to argue that in the production of that compound, man, the share +of the agency usually styled creative must have been limited to +combining and arranging the elemental particles of his corporeal moiety. +Quite fairly, advancing still farther, they may hazard a conjecture that +it is from the union of the corporeal constituents of man that the +generation of his spiritual moiety has resulted. But for such generation +it is plainly indispensable that the corporeal constituents should have +been not inert particles but self-acting forces, and that, as such, they +must have been in possession of more or less intelligence, which +intelligence again either was or was not equal in amount to that of the +human spirit or mind generated by them. If it were not equal, then the +forces must have given to their offspring more than they had themselves +got to give--which is sheer nonsense. If it were equal, then, inasmuch +as the human mind is quite clever enough to discover uses for the +various parts of the human body and of other organisms, the forces to +which the human mind owes its origin must be at least equally clever. +The elementary forces by whose action the human and other organic bodies +have been constructed, must have been perfectly aware what they were +constructing, and what services the resulting structures would be fitted +to render. In other words, they must in their constructive operations +have worked towards specific ends, according to preconceived plan and +set design, wittingly contriving various machines for various purposes. +The advanced Atheists, with whose speculations we are here especially +concerned, are thus at liberty to choose between two horns of a dilemma, +but must not hope to escape both. Either they stand self-refuted by +assuming something to have been made out of nothing--a process which +they began by pronouncing impossible--or they must imagine intelligence, +competent to devise all organisms, to be diffused throughout the +universe, thereby showing themselves to have assumed their sectarian +appellation without sufficient warrant, and to be in reality rather +Pantheists than Atheists. + +A third hypothesis indeed remains for any who are content to believe +that Nature's elementary forces having, without knowing what they were +about, constructed the human body, the human mind, until then a +houseless wanderer, lit upon it by chance, and, observing it to be a +habitation suitably swept and garnished, entered in and dwelt there. +Upon this supposition there must be, within the limits of our terrene +sphere, two distinct species of intelligence, a greater and a +lesser--the one competent to construct all sorts of marvellously complex +and marvellously serviceable machines, yet incompetent to understand +their utility, the other fully perceiving the utility of the machines, +yet utterly incompetent to fabricate them. But there are probably few +adventurers on the ocean of speculation who would not prefer total +shipwreck to the shelter of such a harbour of refuge as this. + +Atheism must in fairness be acknowledged to have much mended its manners +within the last two or three generations. Its tone and language are no +longer of the rude, scoffing sort at which Voltaire may be readily +pictured as breaking into voluble protest, or Hume as contemptuously +opening his eyes and shrugging his shoulders. Though grown more civil, +however, it cannot be complimented on having grown more rational. At +most may it be credited with being more elaborately irrational than of +old. It now no longer denies, it only ignores. It does not pronounce God +non-existent. It only insists that there is not complete proof that God +exists; thereupon, however, proceeding to argue as if He did not exist, +and thereby, not simply confounding deficiency of proof on one side with +sufficiency of proof on the other, but overlooking an amount of proof +that on any other subject would, provisionally at least, be deemed +conclusive, and perversely rejecting an hypothesis which, whether +correct, or not, is at least a good working hypothesis, coinciding +exactly with most of the facts, and inconsistent with none of them, in +favour of an hypothesis which, even in the hands of a Huxley or a +Darwin, cannot be made to work at all. + + +II. + +To my mind there is a genuine pleasure in giving expression to +admiration of any great intellectual achievement; and it is much rather +for that reason than on account of any value which I imagine my opinion +on such a subject can possess, that, having had occasion to name the +illustrious author of the 'Origin of Species,' I desire to preface my +criticism on what appears to me to be a grave defect in his theory, by +intimating my hearty concurrence in its leading principles. That +inasmuch as, owing to the exceeding fecundity of the generality of +organic beings, more individuals of almost every species are born than +can possibly survive, and that consequently a desperate struggle for +existence must take place amongst them; that in such a struggle the +smallest grain may turn the scale, the minutest advantage possessed by +some individuals over others determine which shall live and which shall +die; that, as the circumstances in which life is to be maintained +change, the character and structure of organisms must change also in +order to be accommodated thereto, but that the changes which +consequently take place in some individuals are better suited to the +altered circumstances than those which take place in other individuals; +that individual offspring, moreover, although always strongly resembling +their parents in the majority of particulars, always exhibit some slight +differences from them; that of these differences such as do not render +the offspring less fit will almost of necessity render them more fit +for coping with their rivals; and that superior fitness, however +acquired, is as likely as any other quality to be transmitted to +succeeding generations--all these are indisputable facts, and from +these, as premisses, it seems to me not so much to be legitimately +deducible that most existing species may have been produced 'by descent, +with modification, through natural selection,' or 'survival of the +fittest,' as necessarily to follow that they cannot have originated in +any other way. For _all_ species to have been created such as they now +are, is simply inconsistent with the premisses. Whatever beings may at +any remote epoch have been created, there must, according to the +conditions involved, have been amongst their descendants some better +fitted, by reason of divergence from the parent type, for engaging in +internecine strife than those, if any such there were, which adhered +closely to that type. Whether, then, among the survivors from the first +engagement in that never-ending struggle for life which must have +commenced soon after the creation, there were or were not any exact +representatives of the parent type, there must have been some exhibiting +more or less of divergence from that type. Among the descendants of +these, again, there must have been some who, together with the +structural or other advantages inherited from their immediate ancestors, +possessed, moreover, some advantages first nascent in themselves, and +who were similarly enabled thereby to prevail over their less gifted +competitors, and similarly to transmit all their advantages to a +posterity, some members of which would similarly be born with certain +new advantages in addition. By continual repetition of these processes, +and the consequent accumulation of divergencies from the original +pattern, however slight those divergencies might separately be, there +could not but eventually become formed breeds so distinct from each +other as to be to all intents and purposes distinct species, in +whichsoever of its many vague senses the term 'species' be understood. +Now these species, instead of having been created, would be the result +of divergence from their created progenitor. Whether, therefore, any +created species do or do not still exist, it is certain that among +existing species there are some that were not created, but which have +been gradually evolved, and evolved, too, through survival of the +fittest. Mr. Darwin, then, is fairly entitled to the praise of having +placed beyond dispute that a process called by himself 'Natural +Selection,' and by Mr. Herbert Spencer 'Survival of the Fittest,' has +almost from the commencement of organic life been, and still is, in +active operation; that it is a cause which must needs have originated +some species, and is quite competent to have originated all that still +exist; whereas creation, the only other suggested cause, cannot be +conceived to have done this latter unless every minutest shade of +difference between offspring and parent be regarded as the effect of a +separate creative act. Unless creation have originated every one of +those divergencies the accumulation of which constitutes a species, +clearly it cannot have originated that species. With some of the +phenomena connected with species the theory of creation cannot be +reconciled unless this novel interpretation be placed upon the word +creation, whereas there are none of the phenomena with which the +evolutionary hypothesis conflicts, and few, if any, which, when +restricted to its proper office of auxiliary, it will not help to +explain. + +To what we might thus be assured of, even if we had only general +principles to guide us, all obtainable evidence unanimously testifies. +Geology distinctly proclaims that every portion of our globe's surface +has undergone vast changes, and that its organic inhabitants have +changed simultaneously and proportionately. The proof absolute, which it +furnishes, that at a period when few, if any, existing species had made +their appearance, many species now extinct already existed, is proof +equally absolute that if all species extinct and extant were created, +they cannot, at any rate, have been created at the same time. Of so much +at least we must be satisfied, unless we are prepared to accept the +ingenious conjecture of an orthodox divine, that, while our earth was +being formed out of chaos, Satan, to confound the faith of remote +generations, brought over bones of monsters from other worlds and +embedded them in the soil of ours, or that, as the same idea has been +otherwise expressed, while the earth's crust was a baking the devil had +a finger in the pie. Moreover, on the supposition that there was a break +of ages between the creations of extinct and of extant species, as +geology positively declares there must have been if both were separately +created, how passing strange is the 'grand fact that all extinct beings +can be classed with all recent beings'! The strangeness disappears, +however, when both are regarded as descendants of common progenitors. +The wonder would then be if they could not be so classed. Again, how +astonishing on the creative, how natural on the evolutionary hypothesis, +that the arrangement of bones in the hand of a man, the wing of a bat, +the fin of a porpoise, the leg of a horse, should be precisely the same; +the number of vertebræ in the neck of a giraffe, and in that of an +elephant the same; the primitive germs from which a man, a dog, a frog, +and a lobster are gradually evolved, to all appearance the same--the +same microscopic atom of homogeneous matter, undistinguishable by any +known test from an animalcule almost at the bottom of the organic scale! +Above all, that the courses by which animals of all degrees of +complexity are gradually developed from apparently equally simple germs +should, whenever traceable, be found to consist of progressive +ramifications, so that every higher animal, before arriving at maturity, +passes through several stages at the end of each of which lower animals +have stopped! How impossible, or how easy, to understand, according as +the one or the other hypothesis is adopted, is the phenomenon of what in +the one case will be treated as rudimentary, in the other as obsolete, +organs! No one need scruple to regard these as apparatus which the +creature has outgrown and allowed to fall into decay through neglect; +but whatever there is in us of real nobleness of feeling revolts against +the notion of their being apparatus which a divine Creator began to +build but was not able to finish. And yet again, how insultingly +irreconcilable with any rational estimate of Divine nature is the +possibility of any existing type of mammals having been created, seeing +that if so, it must have been created with _false_ marks of nourishment +from the womb of a mother that never existed! + +These are some of the main grounds on which the Darwinian theory rests. +Of the abundance of detailed illustrations from which it may derive +additional support no adequate idea can be formed, except by careful +perusal of its author's own writings, and these fortunately may without +much exaggeration be said to be in everybody's hands. Of the arguments +that have been brought forward in opposition to it, all seem to me to +be susceptible of very complete answers, and one or two of the +strongest, of answers more complete than they have yet received. True, +there is no disputing the testimony borne by the paintings and +sculptures of Egyptian tombs, and of Ninevite palaces, that the basement +floors in Thebes and Memphis were infested by much the same sort of +beetles as those which are such nuisances in London kitchens; that +Sardanapalus, if ever he exchanged indoor for outdoor sports, may have +hunted with dogs and horses that might pass muster at an English meet, +and that the Pharaohs were served by negro slaves as like as two peas in +all externals to those who in the United States have recently and +prematurely been metamorphosed into free and independent electors. But +all this only proves that certain species which existed 4,000 years ago +are still represented by unchanged descendants. It does not prove that +other descendants and groups of descendants from the same species have +not within the same period undergone changes sufficiently great to +convert them into distinct races; neither, if it did prove thus much, +would it do more than afford a presumption, and a very deceptive one, +that 4,000 years are too short a time for the formation of a new race, +affording besides, at the same time, much stronger presumption that, +within the remotest limits to which Mosaic chronology can be pushed +back, the various races of mankind, white, black, and intermediately +tinted, can not possibly have descended from one pair of ancestors. + +That domesticated animals, when suffered to run wild, always return to +the primitive wild type--this, instead of an argument against, is one of +the strongest arguments for the evolution theory, from which it is +indeed, as Mr. G. H. Lewes says, a necessary deduction. It is simply +because, as the conditions of life change, structure must, for +adaptation's sake, change likewise, that wild animals are capable of +being domesticated, of being, that is, made to undergo modifications by +being brought from the conditions of wildness to those of domesticity. +How, then, should they possibly retain those modifications, how escape +return to their previous shape and habits, when retransferred from +domesticity to wildness? + +The question, Why are not new species continually produced? may be aptly +met by another. How, consistently with the theory, is it possible they +should? Natural Selection is represented as acting 'solely by +accumulating slight successive favourable variations,' as taking only +short and slow steps. By what possibility, then, can it suddenly produce +modifications sufficiently conspicuous to mark off a new species? New +species may be, and indeed are, constantly in process of formation on +all sides, under our very eyes, without our being aware; for since the +process requires ages for its accomplishment, it must needs be +imperceptible by the keenest observation. So that even when a new +species is completed, it is not recognised as new, so minute is the +difference between the perfection to which it has attained, and the +imperfect state in which we and our fathers before us had long known it. + +'Why, however, since, according to the theory of Natural Selection, an +interminable number of intermediate forms must have existed, linking +together all the species in each group by gradations as fine as are our +present varieties--why do we not see these linking forms all around us?' +To this objection the very theory against which it is urged affords a +partial and almost adequate reply, the deficiencies of which are +besides to some extent supplied by embryology and geology, and to a +farther extent accounted for by the meagreness of the geological record. +Natural selection for survival necessarily implies extinction of all +that are not selected to survive, so that fossil remains are now the +only procurable evidence that any of these latter that have long been +extinct ever existed. But very many organic beings are incapable of +being preserved in a fossil condition, while of those which can be so +preserved 'the number of specimens in all our museums is absolutely as +nothing compared with the countless generations of countless species +that must have existed.' It should be recollected, too, that among still +existing forms are to be included several which result from uterine +transformation, and are never found alive except _in utero_. + +Another objection, notwithstanding the great stress often laid on it, +seems to me to be altogether beside the real issue. It is the one +derived from the invariable sterility, real or supposed, of hybrids. A +fact cited by Mr. Lewes,[37] that of the fecundity of a cross called +_Leporides_, bred by M. Rouy of Angoulême, between the hare and rabbit, +of which a thousand on an average were for many years, and probably are +still, sent annually to market, would seem to be decisive against the +assumed sterility; but, however this be, matters not the least in regard +to the efficacy of Natural Selection, which, be it once again observed, +is represented as producing new species, not suddenly by the copulation +of two old and utterly distinct ones, but very gradually and slowly, by +the accumulation of minute differences occurring in successive +individuals of the same species. + +The chief if not the only serious obstacles to acceptance of Darwinism +seem to me to be of the author's own creation. Now and then he appears +somewhat needlessly to overstrain his principles, as for instance when +he intimates his conviction that 'all individuals of the same species, +and all the closely allied species of most genera,' will hereafter be +discovered to 'have descended from one parent and to have migrated from +some one birthplace.' This, to my mind, is much more unlikely than his +further suggestion that 'all animals and plants are descended from some +one prototype.' Startling as this second proposition may be on first +hearing, it may not very improbably express the real fact, provided by +'some one prototype' be signified, not a single individual, but several +individuals of one and the same type. Beyond all doubt there was a time +when on and about our earth all matter was as yet inorganic, and when +whatever spirit,[38] of the sort so termed in contradistinction to +matter, either permeated the earth's substance or moved about its +surface, must have been as yet unembodied. Mr. Darwin demands whether +any one can 'really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's +history, elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into +living tissues.' I for one certainly am far from believing this. I see +no reason for believing that, whatever other phenomenon, at all similar, +may at any stage of the world's progress have occurred, it has at +innumerable subsequent stages been repeated; neither do I consider that +the phenomenon is likely to have worn the guise of a sudden flash. But I +do firmly believe, and am quite unable to substitute any equally +plausible substitute for the belief, that when the crust of the earth +had sufficiently cooled, and when other physical conditions had become +such as to admit of the manifestation of that life which we are +accustomed to distinguish by attaching to it the epithet 'organic,' +certain of those forces[39] which, in my opinion, constitute matter, +did, either of their own accord or under superior direction--not +suddenly flash, but--slowly elaborate themselves into organic structures +of some exceedingly simple type; that in the course of ages these simple +structures either developed themselves or were developed into structures +rendered by slow degrees more and more complex, until the degree of +complexity attained, being such as to fit them for being inhabited by +spirit previously unembodied, they were, by individualised portions of +such spirit, appropriated and inhabited accordingly. Beyond all doubt, +at some period or other, what had always previously been unorganised +matter must have become organised. Of two things one, then. Either this +matter must, whether under superior direction or not, have organised +itself, or it must have been organised by some other agency. Mr. Darwin, +together with all thorough-going Darwinians, inclines, I suspect, to the +opinion that matter organised itself; but if so, it cannot possibly have +been inert or lifeless, but must have been active and animate, and +capable of volition; and on that condition, there is no great stretch of +fancy in imagining it to have spontaneously adopted the series of +arrangements indicated. If, on the other hand, we are content to admit +that some external superior intelligence may have performed, or +conducted, or presided over operations, all room for wonder vanishes. + +In regard to the character of the structural prototype, that, of course, +would depend in part on surrounding physical conditions, and if these +have ever been the same in all parts of the globe, there is no apparent +reason why any number of specimens of the prototype may not anywhere +have been independently elaborated. It is not possible, however, that, +since the earth began to revolve round the sun, physical conditions can +have been _simultaneously_ the same in all latitudes; while, on the +other hand, it seems probable that, although the same set of conditions +might perhaps admit of the production of only one organic type, there +might be other sets of conditions favourable to the production of other +types. On the whole, then, it seems more probable that inorganic matter +combined (or _was_ combined) in the first instance in several modes, +than in one single mode, in order to become organic. But whatever may +have been the organic form or forms it first took, to assume that only a +single individual of each form was independently elaborated, and that +all other individuals, both of the same form and of all the more complex +forms, gradually evolved from that one--are descendants from the same +first individual, the same first parent--surely very gratuitously +increases the difficulties of the subject. Especially it complicates the +problem of the distribution of the same plants and animals over +countries immemorially separated by gulfs apparently impassable by +natural means. + +The obstruction which Mr. Darwin has created to the progress of his +opinions by the exaggerated shape in which some of them have been +presented is, however, as nothing in comparison with the injury he does +to his theory by obstinately rejecting certain materials indispensable +for its satisfactory completion. What an admirable theory it is so far +as it goes! How nicely it fits into all the facts it comes in contact +with, even into those which it is, of itself and unassisted, incompetent +to explain! How elevating too and ennobling, when rightly conceived! for +who can fail to rejoice in the view it presents of 'Natural selection +working solely by and for the good of each being' that it spares, and +causing 'all corporal and mental endowments to tend towards perfection'? +or who need mind suspecting himself to be descended, through an ape, +from a triton or a hydra, if he may compensate himself by hoping to have +a distant posterity of angels? How well, moreover, would it, if +permitted, chime in with any rational religion, besides being, as +already hinted, absolutely essential to that part of the Mosaic creed +which represents all the variously coloured and variously featured races +of men as springing from one single couple. By what perversity then is +it that Mr. Darwin takes such pains, if not to render his theory +irreligious, at least to exclude from it the assistance which religion +alone can afford, and which it so greatly needs, that whoever, without +that assistance, attempts to apply the theory to the complete +elucidation of phenomena, will be found inevitably committing himself to +the most astounding hypotheses? Here I picture to myself a curl on the +lip of some advanced Darwinian who, having accompanied me so far, cannot +altogether suppress his compassionate scorn at the proposed recurrence +now-a-days to a mode of thought so obsolete in the treatment of +scientific subjects as the theological. 'Positive biology,' he will +perhaps superbly exclaim, repeating the words of Mr. G. H. Lewes, +'declines theological explanations altogether.' Yes, but positive +biology is therein very unwise, for as, if the same reader will +accompany me a little further, I pledge myself to show, it is the +untheological or atheistical, not the theistical, mode of treatment +which is here utterly out of place and flagrantly unscientific. Be it, +without the slightest reserve, admitted that the formation of almost +all, and probably of quite all, existing species is due, and cannot be +otherwise than due, to survival of the fittest, the superior fitness of +these, moreover, being due to the gradual accumulation of innumerable +and, for the most part, exceedingly slight divergencies from the parent +stock. But whence and why these divergencies? It cannot be without a +cause that even one more feather than the parent possessed appears in +the offspring's wing, or a novel tint on its coat, or that the curve of +beak or talons is not precisely the same in each. What then is the +cause? Unphilosophic people will most likely call it 'all chance,' +getting sneered at for their pains, and justly too, as using words +without meaning. But are not philosophers themselves doing much the same +thing, and merely restating facts which they profess to explain, when, +like Mr. Lewes,[40] they talk of the 'specific shape' assumed by an +'organic plasma' being 'always dependent on the polarity of its +molecules,' 'or due to the operation of immanent properties;' or declare +that, in the process of organic evolution, 'each stage determines its +successor,' 'consensus of the whole impressing a peculiar direction on +the development of parts, and the law of Epigenesis necessitating a +serial development,' insomuch that, 'every part being the effect of a +pre-existing, and in turn the cause of a succeeding part,' the reason +why, when a crab loses its claw, the member is reproduced, is that the +group of cells remaining at the stump 'is the necessary condition of +the genesis' of precisely that new group which the reproductive process +imperatively requires to follow next in order, this second group equally +the necessary condition for genesis of the one required third, the third +for the fourth, and so on; and that the reason why the thorns of a +blackberry admit of somewhat close comparison with the hooks and spines +of certain crustaceæ, is that portions of the integument of both plant +and crawfish '_tend_ under similar external forces to develop' into +similar forms? + +I pass rapidly over one or two minor difficulties that here present +themselves. I will not stop to ask how--if reproduction of lost limbs be +due to polarity of the molecules, in other words to the direction which +in the circumstances of the case the molecules are bound to take, and if +the polarity of each particular set of molecules be impressed upon them +by the group formed immediately previously--how it is that the group +terminating the docked stump of a limb, which group is represented as +commencing the work of reproduction, imparts a different direction or +tendency to the fresh molecules of nourishment that are supplied to it, +from that which it has been accustomed to communicate to previous +molecular supplies. Hitherto it has used such molecules solely for the +repair of its own waste; now it employs a large portion of them to build +up an entirely new fabric. It seems then that molecular polarity is not +a fixed but a variable property, and, being such, cannot be inherent or +originate in the molecular nature. But I will not linger over this point +nor yet over the fact, absolutely unintelligible on the polar +hypothesis, that it is comparatively only few animals that are capable +of reproducing severed parts. Although the process required, no doubt, +is, as Mr. Lewes says, 'in all essential respects the same as that which +originally produced' the parts, the last layer of cells left at the +place of excision after a human leg or arm has been cut off, lacks the +skill to repeat an operation, which according to the hypothesis it has +once before performed. It cannot so determine the polarity of the +molecules with which it is supplied by the arteries as to constrain them +to group themselves into a new layer, instead of merely repairing an old +one. A crab or a lobster, or a polype's molecules are clever enough for +this, a man's not. Without pressing these objections, but on the +contrary, conceding for the nonce and for argument's sake, to molecular +polarity, to immanent properties, to Epigenetic evolution, all the +efficacy claimed for them, I limit myself to inquiring what causes the +various tendencies and directions which these imply. Tendency +pre-supposes impulse; direction control. What is it that here imparts +the impulse and exercises the control? Whatever else it be, it must, for +reasons stated at length on a previous page, be something possessing at +least enough of intelligence to exercise volition, and which at least +intends that the movements which it originates shall take place, whether +it further intends or not the ends which eventually result from the +movements. To myself it seems barely conceivable that even the least +marvellous of these ends should have been undesigned. Take, for +instance, half a dozen _infusoria_ of some exceedingly low type, all +individually single cells or sacs of matter perfectly transparent and +destitute of any approach to structure that can be detected with a +magnifying power of five thousand diameters. Observe how, after feeding +for a while, and increasing proportionately in size, one will divide +itself in half, each half becoming a separate and complete animalcule, +another line itself internally and clothe itself externally with +clustered cells, which, by a series of differentiations, traceable +through a number of animalcular varieties, eventually exhibit the +outlines of respiratory and circulatory systems. To me, I repeat, it +seems all but inconceivable, and altogether incredible, that the +intelligence which willed these cellular divisions, multiplications, and +differentiations to take place, did not foresee what would be their +results, and did not will them for the sake of those results. And if I +do not deem it still more incredible that there should be _natural_ +selection separating the fittest for survival by accumulating upon them +slight advantages which qualify them to survive, without there being at +the same time a _nature_, or other exalted intelligence, however +designated, which selects, and which accumulates advantages upon the +objects of its selection, _in order_ that they may survive, it is only +because I consider the extremest limits of credibility to have been +already passed. But I forget. On reflection I perceive that I am doing +scant justice to the elasticity of philosophic belief. How far this is +capable of stretching on occasion, let one or two notable Darwinian +specimens show. + +No single piece of organic mechanism is oftener or more confidently +appealed to by Theists as rendering conclusive evidence on their side +than the eye, nor would they run much risk by allowing sentence to go +for or against them according as Mr. Darwin has or has not succeeded in +his attempt to explain that evidence away. Possibly he may disclaim +having made any attempt of the kind, and I must admit that it is less by +what he says than by what he leaves unsaid, that he lays himself open to +the charge. Indeed, in almost all he says on the subject, I myself +cordially agree, embracing even some of his views with less of +hesitation than he seems to have felt in putting them forward. He seems +to me, for instance, to have somewhat gratuitously admitted it to be +apparently 'in the highest degree absurd to suppose that the eye, with +all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different +distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the +correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed +by natural selection.' For since, as he proceeds unanswerably to argue, +'numerous gradations, from an imperfect and simple eye to one perfect +and complex, each grade being useful to its possessor, can certainly be +shown to exist;' since, as certainly, slight variations of the eye do +occur, and are inherited, and since of these variations there cannot but +be some which are useful to the animal exhibiting them under changing +conditions of life, the difficulty of believing in the formation of a +perfect and complex eye by natural selection can be little else than a +prejudice of the imagination. He proceeds to indicate some probable +stages in the assumed process. Some of the lowest organisms, in which no +trace of nerves can be detected, are known to be sensible to light, +owing, probably, to the presence in the _sarcode_ of which they are +mainly composed, of certain elements which, in organisms somewhat higher +in the scale, become aggregated and developed into nerves specially +endowed with the same sensibility. An optic nerve thus formed, +surrounded by pigment cells, and covered by translucent skin, is the +simplest organ that can be called an eye, but it is an eye incapable of +distinct vision, and serving only to distinguish light from darkness. In +certain star-fishes, small depressions in the layer of pigment-cells +are filled with transparent gelatinous matter projecting with a convex +surface like a rudimentary cornea, and this, it has been suggested, may +serve, not only to form an image, but to concentrate the luminous rays. +In insects, the numerous facets in the cornea of their great compound +eyes have now been ascertained to form true lenses, the cones, moreover, +having been discovered to include curiously modified nervous filaments. +It is impossible not, in this series of changes, to perceive the +appearance of graduation, nor ought there to be much difficulty in +believing the apparent graduation to be real, when we consider how few +comparatively are the still living forms in which the changes cited have +been observed, and how far more numerous the extinct forms by which +intermediate changes may have been presented. If there be no +extravagance in supposing that natural selection may have occasioned +these early steps, neither is there any in supposing that, by continued +progress in the same direction, it may at length have fabricated the +most perfect optical instrument possessed by any member of the +_articulata_. And, if credited so far, why not still further? why not +with competence to form a man's or an eagle's eye? So far I am as +completely at one with Mr. Darwin in respect to the eye as in respect to +any other of the subjects taken by him for illustration. The fact is, +however, that in this, as in every similar instance, he has completely +evaded the real difficulties of the case. It is not a whit more +startling to be told that the most complex eye, with all the latest +improvements, than to be told that the earliest rudiment of an optic +nerve, may have been formed by the gradual accumulation of minute +differences. Only allow time enough for the requisite accumulation, and +neither operation is one whit more unintelligible than the other. The +difficulty, equally and utterly insuperable in both cases, is to +understand how the difference can have been undesigned. 'How a nerve +comes to be sensitive to light,' says Mr. Darwin, 'hardly concerns us +more than how life itself originated.' Perhaps not; nor, indeed, very +well could it, for the second question of the two is surely one of +almost unsurpassed concernment; but, at any rate, when either of the two +is asked, nothing can be more reprehensible than, by studiously ignoring +the only alternative reply, to leave it to be inferred that the nerve +made itself, or that life caused itself to live, that both are in short +examples of what Mr. Darwin strangely calls '_variation causing +alterations_.'[41] Let us briefly consider a few of the results supposed +to be attributable to this singular process. The eye, as every reader of +course knows, though here and there one perhaps may not be the worse for +being reminded, consists of four coats--the _sclerotic_, outermost and +strongest, which constitutes the white of the eye; the circular, tough, +and coloured, yet pellucid, _cornea_, in the centre of which is seen the +pupil; the _choroid_, full charged with black pigment, and lining the +sclerotic; the _retina_, an expansion of the optic nerve, lining in its +turn the choroid; of the _iris_, a flat membrane, dividing the eye into +two very unequally-sized chambers; of a lens termed the _crystalline_, +suspended in the posterior chamber immediately behind the iris; and of +two humours (also virtual lenses), whereof one, the _aqueous_, is +enclosed in the anterior chamber formed by the iris and the cornea, +while the other, the _vitreous_, fills the whole of the posterior +chamber save what is occupied by the crystalline lens. By what nice +interlacement of filaments the fibrous ring that margins the pupil, or +aperture through the iris, regulates the admission of light, contracting +or expanding, yet always preserving its circular form, according as the +brilliance is excessive or deficient; how the humours or lenses are +continually varying in figure and relative position so as to concentrate +every pencil of light admitted on that point exactly where the retina is +spread out to receive it; how, according as the object looked at is near +at hand or far off, certain muscles perform quite opposite services, +rendering the cornea more or less prominent, pushing the crystalline +lens forward or backward, and thereby lengthening or shortening the axis +of vision, so that, whether the rays enter divergently from a near +object, or parallel from a remote one, they equally fall into focus at +the same distance beyond, and equally form on the retina a picture of +the object from which they come, perhaps compressing a landscape of five +or six square leagues into a space of half an inch diameter, and anon +allowing the page of a book or a dinner-plate to occupy the entire field +of vision--to these and to any kindred marvels it would be superfluous +more than momentarily to refer. Suffice it to note how measureless the +superiority, as a mere piece of mechanism, of an average eye to the +finest of telescopes, and how just, nevertheless, is the +telescope-maker's claim to praise for skilful adaptation to the laws of +optics, when he has succeeded in a faint and feeble imitation of some +minor part of nature's visual apparatus. Yet nature's original and +infinitely more beautiful aptitudes we are forbidden to deem +adaptations, being required instead to regard them as self-produced, or, +at any rate, as having been undesigned. Now I unreservedly admit that, +among all conceivable forms, among the most exquisitely beautiful and +most usefully intricate and complex, there is not one which may not +possibly have been produced without aim or purpose by the mere +restlessness of elemental forces; the amount of probability of their +having been so produced being, however, according to the formula already +set forth in its proper place, as one to infinity multiplied more or +less frequently by itself. But what adequate superlative shall we invent +to express the credulity, the credulosity run mad, of those who, in a +matter of scientific belief, deliberately accept such odds. Observe how +at once extravagantly gratuitous and painfully elaborate such +credulosity is; how easily, on the one hand, all its ends could be +served by the simple expedient of supposing a superintending +intelligence; how, on the other, it compels ingenuity like Mr. Darwin's +to entrench itself behind a phrase of utterly unmeaning gibberish. + +If you see a man moving slowly, with head down, over an extensive plain, +you may fairly suspect that he does not know where he is going, and +possibly does not mean to go anywhere in particular. But if you perceive +that on reaching a ditch he takes a leap over, you are quite sure that, +when leaping, he meant to get to the other side. To that extent his +saltatory movement is unequivocal evidence of design. It is perhaps to +escape the necessity of a similar inference that Mr. Darwin so +frequently quotes the proverb _Natura non facit saltum_; but, if so, he +leans on a broken reed--on a bit of proverbial philosophy as weak as the +weakest of Mr. Tupper's. That Nature does sometimes make a leap, and a +pretty long one, must be obvious to any visitor to the Museum of the +London College of Surgeons, who has examined the two-headed and +four-legged human foeti there preserved in spirits. It may be said +that these are leaps in the wrong direction. Be it so. Still, whoever +can leap backward can make an equal leap forward, and most people will +find the latter the easier feat of the two. The power, whatever it be, +that coupled together the Siamese Twins, and gave to those respected +brothers, the late William and Robert Chambers of Edinburgh, twelve +fingers and twelve toes apiece, would not have gone at all more out of +the way by doing, suddenly and at once, several of those things which +Mr. Darwin doubts not that it does slowly and by degrees--by single +acts, for instance, instead of by a succession of acts, aggregating into +the semblance of an optic nerve certain elements in the _sarcode_ of +certain low organisms, spreading out the nerve thus formed into a +network or retina, forming a number of separate pigment-cells into a +homogeneous cornea, and following up these first steps by others which, +how much soever more apparently complex, would cost comparatively little +after the earlier and simpler ones had been taken. Now let but the power +competent to do these things be credited with sense enough to be aware +of its competence, and it may then be regarded as not unlikely to have +done some of them on purpose. Whereupon, the genesis of the eye ceases +to be a mystery. All the appearances of contrivance that have resulted +from the operation find their obvious and complete explanation in the +assumption of a contriver, and all such hazy films as that of +variability producing variation cease to be capable of serving as +excuses for wilful blindness. And why should not the power in question +be so credited? Here is Mr. Darwin's solitary reason why. He doubts +whether the inference implied may not be 'presumptuous.' He apprehends +that we have no 'right to assume that the Creator works by intellectual +powers like those of a man.' Truly, of all suggested modes of marking +respect for creative power, that of assuming it to have worked +unintelligently is the most original. + +The hypothesis offered by Mr. Darwin in explanation of the most perfect +of organic structures, is deemed by him to be equally explanatory of the +most marvellous of animal instincts. Parenthetically, here, never having +as yet met with a definition of instinct which I am able to accept as +satisfactory, I make bold to offer a description of my own. Instinct is +innate knowledge how to perform any useful actions, accompanied by a +tendency or propensity to perform those actions, but wholly +unaccompanied by knowledge of any purpose which they can serve. This is +pure instinct, an example whereof is afforded by the beaver, of which +animal I have somewhere read that one caught when newly born, and +brought up by itself in a room in its captor's house, proceeded after a +while to build up across the apartment the semblance of a dam, composed +of brushes, rugs, billets of wood, and other litter. Pure instinct +differs essentially, not in degree only, but in kind, from reason, which +is not knowledge, but an instrument for acquiring knowledge. Instinct, +however, is rarely if ever found pure, being apparently always +accompanied by more or less of reason. Even a polype makes some show of +reason by moving its _cilia_ in one mode when it desires to suck in +food, and in another when it merely wishes to move on; while it is +scarcely possible for an unprejudiced spectator to doubt of its being by +a rational deduction from experience that a dog knows that it will get +kicked if it presume to snatch at the meat on its master's plate, +instead of waiting for the scraps he may be pleased to throw to it when +he has done. Instinct by necessary implication involves habit; habit as +necessarily always more or less modifies structure; structural +modification always may be, and often is, inherited, carrying with it a +tendency to the habit out of which itself arose; therefore habit and +instinct are likewise heritable. Some instincts are originated +artificially. The reason why, on the very first opportunity, a young +pointer has been known to point at game, and a young sheep-dog to run +round, instead of at, a flock of sheep, is that some of their respective +ancestors had been carefully trained so to point and to wheel. These, +however, are exceptions to the general rule. Most instincts are of what +every one would call natural, and Mr. Darwin calls 'spontaneous' origin, +he explaining the meaning of the latter term to be that the slight +variations from a primordial type, the accumulation of which is +considered by him to constitute actual instinct, are 'variations +produced by the same unknown causes as those which produce slight +deviations of bodily structure.' But here I am once more compelled to +join issue with him. Of the causes which he styles unknown, I maintain +that we know at least thus much--either they are themselves intelligent +forces, or they are forces acting under intelligent direction; and in +support of this proposition I need not perhaps do more than show from +Mr. Darwin's example what infinitely harder things must be accepted by +those who decline to accept this. + +Mr. Darwin, like every really truth-loving controversialist, far from +desiring to shroud, invites special attention to any seeming weaknesses +in his position; and, therefore, when contending that all the faculties +commonly classed as instincts, are exclusively due to natural selection, +of course takes care to particularise the cellmaking faculty of the hive +bee. And here, again, I gladly bear my humble testimony to the partial +success he has achieved. Although bound to protest against the claim set +up by him, on behalf of natural selection, to the entire credit of +producing the hive bee's most remarkable characteristic, I cannot but +think he has succeeded in removing all the apparent difficulties of +believing that natural selection's share may have been not less +important in that than in any other productive operation in which it +takes part. + +In popular estimation the hive bee is a heaven-born mathematician which, +having been set the problem how to fill a given space with waxen cells +with the least loss of room and expenditure of material, arrives by +intuition and instantaneously at a solution which Newton himself was +ignorant of, and to which, but for his discovery of the fluxional +calculus, it would have been impossible for his follower, Maclaurin, to +attain. And, doubtless, it may excusably be deemed supernatural that the +insect should adopt off-hand precisely that six-sided figure, and +precisely that inclination of the angles of the same figure's pyramidal +roof or floor, which, only by very refined and recondite investigation, +can be scientifically shown to be those best fitted for the purpose. Mr. +Darwin has, however, adduced strong grounds for supposing the amazing +architectural skill thus displayed to have been acquired, not suddenly, +but by the same slow degrees as those which are so clearly traceable +throughout organic progress in general. At the lower end of a short +apiary series, he observed humble bees using their old cocoons for +honey pots, sometimes adding to them short tubes of wax, and likewise +making separate and very irregular cells entirely of wax. At the higher +end of the series, he saw hive bees making double layers of cells, each +cell an hexagonal prism with the basal ends of its six sides bevelled so +as to fit on to a pyramid formed of three rhombs, and each of the three +rhombs which compose the pyramidal base of a single cell on one side of +the comb entering into the composition of one of the three adjoining +cells on the opposite side. Intermediately, he found the Mexican +_meliponæ domesticæ_ depositing their honey in cells nearly spherical, +and of nearly equal sizes. 'These cells, although aggregated into a mass +otherwise irregular, are always at such a degree of nearness to each +other that they would have intersected or broken into each other if the +spheres had been completed. But this is never permitted, the bees +building perfectly flat walls of wax between the spheres which thus tend +to intersect. Hence, each cell consists of an outer spherical portion, +and of two, three, or more, perfectly flat surfaces, according as the +cell adjoins two, three, or more cells; and when one cell rests on three +others, as from the spheres being nearly of the same size is very +frequently and necessarily the case, the three flat surfaces are united +into a pyramid rudely resembling the three-sided pyramidal base of the +hive bee's cell, and necessarily enter, like the three rhombs of the +latter, into the construction of three adjoining cells.' Reflecting on +these remarkable gradations, it occurred to Mr. Darwin that if the +melipona were to make its spheres of precisely equal sizes, and to +arrange them symmetrically in double layers, and were further so to +dispose them as that the centre of each should be at the distance of +radius x [mathematical symbol 'square root']2 or radius × 1.41421 from the +centres of the six surrounding spheres in the same layer, and at the +same distance from the centres of the adjoining spheres in the other and +parallel layer--then 'if planes of intersection between the several +spheres on both layers were formed, there would result a double layer of +hexagonal prisms united together by pyramidal bases formed of three +rhombs; and the rhombs and the sides of the hexagonal prisms would have +every angle identically the same with the best measurements that have +been made of the cells of the hive bee.' Then, submitting this view to +Professor Miller of Cambridge, he had the gratification of being assured +by that distinguished geometer that it was strictly correct. Certainly a +very happy example of an ingenious conjecture verified by a species of +demonstration hardly inferior to the experimental. Certainly a very +valuable testimony to the soundness of all the main and really essential +principles of Darwinism. Good cause, certainly, is hereby shown for +believing that the cell-making faculty of the hive bee may be nothing +more than the aggregate of many minute and successive improvements upon +that of the melipona, and this, again, than a similar aggregate of +improvements on that of the humble bee; and for believing further that +hive bee and melipona may both be either descendants from the humble +bee, or joint-descendants with it from some still earlier common +progenitor. In order to believe this it suffices to believe that a bee +which at one period made, like the humble bee, cells very unequally +sized and irregularly rounded, came gradually, in the course of time, to +make them as nearly equal in size and as nearly spherical as those of +the melipona; and subsequently, during a further lapse of time, came to +arrange them at the same distances from each other, and in double +layers like those of the humble bee. To assume thus much requires no +inordinate stretch of faith; and thus much being assumed, it is seen at +once that the hive bee, requiring for its cells only about half as much +wax as the humble bee does, and consequently only about half as much +honey for the secretion of the requisite wax, would, in a struggle for +existence, leave the humble bee so little chance that in all probability +the two species would nowhere coexist, were it not for the special +resource derived by the humble bee from possession of a trunk long +enough to enter the nectaries of certain flowers, which the shorter +trunk of the hive bee is unable to tap. But though there be no +difficulty in assuming the improvements in question to have gradually +taken place, and to have become aggregated in the manner supposed, there +is, to my mind, an insuperable objection to supposing that successive +generations of bees should have successively adopted the improvements +without either having the sense to know what they were doing, or being +prompted by some superior intelligence that did know. I will not be so +superfluous as to exaggerate the difficulty. Passing over the earlier +stages of the process, and confining myself to one or two of the later, +I will content myself with showing how infinitesimally small, when +magnified to the utmost, are the chances in favour of these having been +passed through blindly. I will admit it to be possible that in a society +of purely meliponish habits, there might, in virtue of one or other of +those inscrutable causes classed under the general name of spontaneous +variation, arise some two or three individuals with an innate propensity +to make accurately spherical and equally sized cells; that these +individuals, if either males or fertile females, and not sterile +neuters, might help to generate others with the same propensity, these +again generating others, and so on, until the greater part or the whole +of the community became possessed of the same constructive aptitude. I +will admit further that, in virtue of the same inscrutable causes, +individuals, at first few, but gradually increasing in number, might +similarly be born with the additional tendency to make cells at the +same, and that the most appropriate, distance from all adjoining cells; +and will freely acknowledge that the bees, modifying their previous mode +of construction, as meliponæ necessarily would do under these altered +circumstances, would construct a layer of cells similar in all respects +to those on one side of the hive bee's comb, except that their bases +would be flat instead of pyramidal. Further, I admit that the bases +would become pyramidal in case the bees should set about constructing +double instead of single layers of cells on the same principle. Not a +little liberality is required for these admissions. For, in the first +place, the fact of the bees having acquired the habit of making perfect +and equally sized spheres would not of itself be of any obvious benefit +either to individual bees or to the society at large: in order that it +should enable material and labour to be saved it would have to be +accompanied by the habit of making the cells at special distances from +each other. And, in the second place, though some few individuals should +present themselves with an innate tendency to choose these special +distances, whatever advantage might result therefrom, whatever saving of +material or labour, would be shared in equally by the whole community, +the particular individuals to whom it was due benefiting by it no more +than any of the rest, and not being, in consequence, more likely than +they to survive in any struggle for existence, or to leave behind them +offspring inheriting their special characteristics. No help, therefore, +can be derived from Mr. Darwin's principles towards conjecturing why a +small minority of such specially endowed bees should be gradually +converted into a majority, and should eventually constitute the whole +community, thereupon becoming in fact converted into a new species. Let +us, however, liberally waive this and all similar objections, and assume +a community of hive bees to have been, in the utterly unaccountable +manner indicated by the term spontaneous variation, developed from a +meliponish stock. Unfortunately, all our liberality will be found to +have been thrown away without perceptibly simplifying the problem to be +solved. For, whatever be among meliponæ the distribution of the +generative capacities, among hive bees, at any rate, all workers are +sterile neuters, which never have any offspring to whom to bequeath +their cellmaking skill, while the queen bee and drones, which alone can +become parents, have no such skill to bequeath. Clearly the formula of +'descent with modification by natural selection,' is, in its literal +sense, utterly inapplicable here. In whatever manner the cell-making +faculty might have been acquired by the first homogeneous swarm of hive +bees, it must inevitably have terminated with the generation with which +it commenced, if transmission by direct descent had been necessary for +its continuance. The only resource open to Mr. Darwin is to suppose, not +merely (what is, indeed, obviously the fact) that queen bee after queen +bee, besides generating each in turn a progeny of workers endowed with +instincts which their parents did not possess and could not therefore +impart, generated also princess bees destined in due season to generate +a working progeny similarly endowed with instincts underived from their +parents; but to suppose further that all this has happened in the total +absence of aim, object, intention, or design. Now that all this should +have so happened, although not absolutely inconceivable, nor, therefore, +absolutely impossible, is surely too incredible to be believed except in +despair of some other hypothesis a trifle less preposterous. It is +surely not worth while to set the doctrine of probabilities so +completely at naught, for the sake of an explanation which avowedly +leaves every difficulty unexplained, referring them all to causes not +simply unknown but unconjecturable. What excuse, then, have +philosophers, of all people, for doing this in preference to the simple +expedient of supposing that, although the parturient bee, queen or +other, cannot intend that any of her progeny should be more bounteously +endowed than herself, there is an independent intelligence that does so +intend? To content oneself with pronouncing such preference to be +eminently unscientific is tenderness of language nearly akin, I fear, to +literary bathos. + + +III. + +I have said that the form of unbelief to which, on the principle of +calling a spade a spade, I have taken the liberty of giving the name of +Scientific Atheism, manifests itself now-a-days rather by ignoration +than by formal denial of God. This, however, is not a new feature in any +atheism really worthy of being styled scientific. Even as Mr. Darwin +verbally recognises a Creator, although without assigning to Him any +share in creation, even so Kant, when more than a century ago +undertaking, in his 'General Natural History and Theory of the Celestial +Bodies,'[42] to account for the constitution and mechanical origin of +the universe on Newtonian principles, spoke of the elements as deriving +their essential qualities from the 'eternal thought of the Divine +Intelligence,' without, however, crediting the said Intelligence with +having interposed in order to carry out His thoughts. 'Give me matter,' +he says, 'and I will build the world;' and without other data than +diffused atoms of matter endowed with simple attractive and repulsive +forces, he proceeds to expound a complete cosmogony. + +He pictures to himself the universe as originally an infinite expansion +of minutely subdivided matter, and supposing a single centre of +attraction to be somewhere therein set up, he endeavours to show that +the result must be a prodigious central body surrounded by systems of +solar and planetary worlds in all stages of development. 'In vivid +language,' says Professor Huxley,[43] 'he describes the great +world-maelstrom widening the margin of its prodigious eddy in the slow +progress of millions of ages, gradually reclaiming more and more of the +molecular waste, and converting chaos into cosmos.' Then, fixing his +attention more particularly on our own system, he accounts for the +relation between the masses and densities of the planets and their +distances from the sun, for the eccentricity of their orbits, for their +rotation, for their satellites, for the general agreement in the +direction of rotation among the celestial bodies, for Saturn's ring, and +for the zodiacal light. All this he does, according to Professor Huxley, +by 'strict deduction from admitted dynamical principles,' and I, well +aware of my own inability to form an independent judgment on the point, +gladly take so high an authority's word for it. For aught that I know, +Kant's attractive and repulsive forces being admitted, the establishment +of centres of attraction, and of circle within circle of revolutions +round them, and all his other details, would follow naturally and of +course. I limit myself to asking, Whence these simple forces?--and when +Kant replies, 'From the Eternal Thought of the Divine Understanding,' I +should be the last to criticise if his answer stopped there. +Unfortunately, he adds that the forces were 'evolved without purpose'; +in other words, that the Intelligence which thought them into existence +failed to think of any purpose for them. 'Matter,' he proceeds, 'is +purely _passive_, yet, nevertheless, has in its simplest state a +_determination_ towards the assumption of a more perfect constitution in +the way of natural development, whereby it _breaks up_ rest, _stirs_ up +nature, gives to chaos shape.' For the elements whereof this passively +stirring up matter is composed 'have native powers of setting each other +in motion, and are to themselves a spring of life;' and when, having of +course being previously dead, they have given themselves life, they +forthwith begin to attract each other with a strength varying with their +varying degrees of specific gravity. The scattered elements of the +denser sort collect by attraction all particles of less specific gravity +out of their immediate neighbourhood, and are themselves similarly +collected by particles of still denser sort, these again by others +denser yet, and so on, until, as results of this particular action, +several masses are formed which in like manner would converge towards +and be united with the largest and densest of their number, were it not +that the counter principle of repulsion now comes into play. This +principle--familiarly exemplified in the elasticity of vapours, the +emanations from strong smelling substances, and the expansion of all +spirituous substances--causes the vertical movements of the converging +masses to be deflected laterally, so as ultimately to enclose the +central mass within circles which, at first intersecting each other in +all directions, are at length, by dint of mutual collision, made all to +revolve in the same direction, and nearly the same plane. + +Now I most earnestly protest against being suspected of what in me would +be the intolerable impertinence of desiring to cast ridicule on these +magnificent speculations, the grandeur of which I thoroughly appreciate +so far as my scant mathematics enable me to follow them. I take +exception to them only because the language in which they are couched +seems to imply that operations, of whose nature one of the most powerful +of human intellects could, at its utmost stretch, catch only a faint +hazy inkling, may yet have been initiated and perfected without the +intervention of any intellect at all. This is a falsism against which my +respect for philosophy and philosophers makes me only all the more +indignant when I find any of the latter falling into it, as those of +them inevitably must who, busying themselves, early or late, + + With a mighty debate, + A profound speculation about the creation + And organical life, and chaotical strife, + With various notions of heavenly motions, + And rivers and oceans, and valleys and mountains, + And sources of fountains, and meteors on high, + And stars in the sky,--propose by and bye, + +like John Hookham Frere's Aristophanic Birds, + + If we'll listen and hear, + To make perfectly clear + +how creation took place without a conscious Creator. All their fancied +solutions of this hopeless puzzle have one feature in common--a family +likeness which the wickedest wit finds it difficult to caricature. There +is a note to Frere and Canning's 'Loves of the Triangles' which the +reader will be grateful to me for transcribing here, the more frequently +he may have laughed at it already, laughing now all the more, and +laughing heartily at it now though he may never have before. + +It begins by tracing the genesis or original formation of _Space_ to a +single point, in the same manner as the elder Darwin had, in his +'Zoonomia,' traced the whole organized universe to his six Filaments. It +represents this primeval Point or _Pinctum saliens_ of the universe, +after '_evolving itself by its own energies_, to have moved forwards in +a right line _ad infinitum_ till it grew tired.' Whereupon, 'the right +line which it had generated would begin to put itself in motion in a +lateral direction, describing an area of infinite extent. This area, as +soon as it became conscious of its own existence, would begin to ascend +or descend, according as its specific weight might determine, forming an +immense solid space filled with vacuum, and capable of containing the +present existing universe.' + + Thus slow progressive points protract the line, + As pendant spiders spin the filmy twine: + Thus lengthened lines impetuous sweeping round, + Spread the wide plane, and mark its circling bound; + Thus planes, their substance with their motion grown, + Form the huge cube, the cylinder, the cone. + +It then proceeds as follows:-- + +'SPACE being thus obtained, and presenting a suitable _nidus_ or +receptacle for the _generation_ of _chaotic matter_, an immense deposit +of it would gradually be accumulated; after which the filament of fire +being produced in the chaotic mass by an _idiosyncrasy_ or _self-formed +habit_ analogous to fermentation, explosion would take place, suns would +be shot from the central chaos, planets from suns, and satellites from +planets. In this state of things, the filament of organization would +begin to exert itself in those independent masses which, in proportion +to their bulk, exposed the greatest surface to the action of light and +heat. This filament, after an infinite series of ages, would begin to +ramify, and its viviparous offspring would diversify their forms and +habits so as to accommodate themselves to the various _incunabula_ which +nature had prepared for them. Upon this view of things, it seems highly +probable that the first effort of Nature terminated in the production of +vegetables, and that these being abandoned to their own energies, by +degrees detached themselves from the surface of the earth, and supplied +themselves with wings and feet, according as their different +propensities determined them in favour of aerial or terrestrial +existence. Others, by an inherent disposition to society and +civilisation, and by a stronger effort of volition, would become men. +These in time would restrict themselves to the use of their hind feet; +their tails would gradually rub off by sitting in their caves or huts as +soon as they arrived at a domesticated state; they would invent language +and the use of fire, with our present and hitherto imperfect system of +society. In the meantime, the _Fuci_ and _Algæ_, with the Corallines and +Madrepores, would transform themselves into fish, and gradually +populate all the submarine portions of the globe.'[44] + +Although the writers of this delicious drollery seem to have had Dr. +Erasmus Darwin only in view, they could not, we thus see, parody his +peculiar crotchets without hitting off not less neatly some of the +corresponding extravagances of both earlier and later expounders of +Nature. Nature is a phrase which, greatly to the confusion of those who +so employ it, is habitually used simultaneously in two quite opposite +senses, so as to denote at the same time both the agency in virtue of +whose action the universe exists, and likewise the universe itself which +results from that action. Nature, in either signification, becomes to a +great extent interpretable when the agency so designated is credited +with sufficient sense to foresee and to intend the results of its own +action. On that condition, although among the many unsolved problems she +may continue to present there will be some evidently lying beyond the +limits of human comprehension, there will be none running counter to +human reason. Except on that condition, the universe is not simply +uninterpretable, it is a bewildering assemblage of irreconcilable +certainties. Philosophy's choice lies between such patent truisms as +that there can be no force but living force, no _vis_ but _vis vivida_, +no _vis inertiæ_ otherwise than metaphorically, and such blatant +falsisms as that inertness and exertion may coincide, unintelligence +generate intelligence, agency of whatsoever sort produce, merely by its +own act, and merely out of its own essence, other agency capable of +higher action than its own. Philosophy, when with these sets of +alternatives before her she deliberately chooses the latter, becomes +Scientific Atheism, all the varieties of which have one point in common, +resembling each other in their proneness to rush upon and embrace +demonstrable impossibilities for the sake of avoiding a few things hard +to be understood. One variety, however, the Comtist, far exceeds all the +rest in the lengths to which it is carried by this propensity. + + +IV. + +If, in speaking as I am about to do of Comtism, I commit--heedless of +Mr. Lewes' solemn warning--the grave offence of speaking confidently +about a writer whom I have never read, I may at least plead in +extenuation of my fault, that, although my knowledge of that writer be +confessedly merely an echo of what others have said of him, those +others, at any rate, far from being his antagonists, are two of the most +ardent of his not undiscriminating admirers. It is from Mr. Mill[45] and +from Mr. Lewes[46] himself that I have derived the notions of Comtist +philosophy that suggest to me the following notes. + +I lay no stress on certain flaws in the fundamental propositions that +'we have no knowledge of anything but phenomena, and that our knowledge +of phenomena is only relative, not absolute; that we know not the +essence nor the real mode of production of any fact, but only its +relations to other facts in the way of succession or similitude; that +the constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the +constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are +all we know about them, and that their causes, whether efficient or +final, are unknown and inscrutable.' I will only suggest that our mere +consciousness of possessing some knowledge of phenomena is itself a +knowledge distinct from the knowledge which constitutes its +subject--distinct, that is, from the knowledge of phenomena; that if it +were possible for us to be aware of only one single fact, we should know +something about that fact, notwithstanding that there were no other +facts which it could be perceived to have preceded or followed, or to +which it could be likened, even as a polype with a stomach-ache would +know something about a stomach-ache, although ignorant that it had a +stomach, and oblivious of any former sensation, whether painful or +pleasurable; and that if the causes of phenomena be utterly unknown, our +ignorance of them ought not to be so signified as to sound like +knowledge, as it does when resemblances are said to link, and sequences +to unite, phenomena together, thereby warranting the inference that one +phenomenon succeeds another _because_ the two are so linked and united. + +These, however, are trifles--mere spots on the sun one might say, were +but the surface on which they appear altogether sunlike--and I leave +them without additional remark except that, although it may perhaps have +been hypercritical to point them out, still the language of a new +philosophy, claiming to supersede all old ones, ought to be proof even +against hypercriticism. I pass on to a generalisation, termed by Mr. +Mill 'the key to Comte's other generalisations: one on which all the +others are dependent, and which forms the back-bone, so to speak, of his +philosophy,' insomuch that 'unless it be true he has accomplished +little.' This is the so much vaunted discovery that all human thought +passes necessarily through three stages, beginning with the +theological, and proceeding through the metaphysical to the positive. +These three terms, however, in the novel sense in which they are used by +Comte, stand very urgently in need of definition. By the theological is +to be understood that stage of the mind in which the facts of the +universe are regarded as governed by single and direct volitions of a +being or beings possessed of life and intelligence. It is the stage in +which winds are supposed to blow, seas to rage, trees to grow, and +mountains to tower aloft, either because winds, seas, trees, and +mountains are themselves alive and so act of their own accord; or +because there is a spirit dwelling in each of them which desires that it +shall so act; or because each separate class of objects is superintended +by an out-dwelling divinity, which similarly desires; or, finally, +because one single divinity, supreme over all things, initiates and +maintains all the apparently spontaneous movements of inanimate bodies. +In the metaphysical stage, phenomena are ascribed not to volitions, +either sublunary or celestial, but to realised abstractions--to +properties, qualities, propensities, tendencies, forces, regarded as +real existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in +which they reside; while the characteristic of the positive stage is the +universal recognition that all phenomena without exception are governed +by invariable laws, with which no volitions, natural or supernatural, +interfere. These being the three stages, the discovery of which as a +series necessarily passed through by human thought in its progress +towards maturity, constitutes one of Comte's chief glories, I almost +tremble at my own audacity, shrinking from the sound myself am making, +when by inexorable sense of duty constrained to declare that the grand +discovery is after all merely that of a distinction without a +difference. + +What Comte chiefly condemned in the metaphysical mode of thought, are +the conception of mental abstractions as real entities which exert power +and produce phenomena, and the enunciation of these entities as +explanations of the phenomena; and certainly 'it is,' as Mr. Mill says, +or rather was, previously to his own ingenious solution of it, 'one of +the puzzles of philosophy, how mankind, after inventing a set of mere +names to keep together certain combinations of ideas and images, could +have so far forgotten their own act as to invest these creations of +their will with objective reality, and mistake the name of a phenomenon +for its efficient cause.' Those natural laws, however, on which +Positivism relies--are not they as purely mental abstractions as the +essences, virtues, properties, forces, and what not, for which it is +proposed to substitute them? Yet since Positivism regards these laws as +'governing' phenomena, and having phenomena 'subject' to them, must it +not necessarily regard them likewise as realised abstractions, as real +entities? Plainly, if its language be taken literally, its professors +must acknowledge that it does, unless they prefer to stultify themselves +by propounding such unmitigated nonsense as that power may be exercised, +and phenomena produced, by _non_-entities. But if so, what else is +Positivism than another form of that very metaphysicism which it +condemns? and a form, too, peculiarly obnoxious to Mr. Mill's caustic +remark that 'as in religion, so in philosophy, men marvel at the +absurdity of other people's tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities +remain in their own, and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that +words can be mistaken for things, who is treating other words as if they +were things every time he opens his mouth.' + +Possibly, however, it may be replied that 'government by natural laws' +is a phrase which Positivists never use except metaphorically, and by +which they never mean more than certain successions of events.[47] Very +well. Either, then, they acknowledge no real government of phenomena at +all, in which case to speak of phenomena as governed by law is, if not a +purely gratuitous mystification, as glaring an instance as can well be +conceived of a 'bare enunciation of facts, put forward as a theory or +explanation of them:' or, if they do recognise real government, then +they must suppose that, behind those mere mental abstractions, laws or +order of Nature, there must be some lawgiver or other being that +originally issued the laws, or ordained the order, and still enforces +them, or maintains it. But if this be the positivist faith, then, that +we may discover its other self, we have only to go still further back; +as far back, however, as to the theological stage, supposed to have been +so early left behind, yes, even unto the deities or deity that the +metaphysical entities had displaced. Positivism, in short, is in this +dilemma: either the mode of thought claimed by it as peculiarly its own +is simply that process so justly ridiculed by Comte himself as the 'naïf +reproduction of phenomena as the reason for themselves,' and by Mr. +Lewes as 'a restatement' (by way of explanation) 'of the facts to be +explained;' or it is at any rate nothing more than a return, either to +the metaphysical or to the theological mode of thought, according as one +or the other is adopted of the only two interpretations that can +possibly be placed on its own nomenclature. A new mode it certainly is +not. It is either no mode of thought at all, but merely an empty form of +words; or it is at best only a new name for one or other of two +old-fashioned modes, both of which its author denounces as false from +the beginning, and now worn out and obsolete into the bargain. + +Of other features of Comtist philosophy it would be out of place to +speak here,[48] where, indeed, that philosophy would not have been +mentioned at all but for its having been transformed by its author into +a religion, and that, too, an atheistical religion--the 'Religion of +Humanity.' To myself, as to most people, a religion without a God is a +contradiction in terms. To constitute what is almost universally +understood by religion it does not suffice that there be a 'creed or +conviction claiming authority over the whole of human life: a belief or +set of beliefs deliberately adopted respecting human destiny and duty, +to which the believer inwardly acknowledges that all his actions ought +to be subordinate:' nor that there be in addition 'a sentiment connected +with this creed or capable of being invoked by it, sufficiently powerful +to give it, in fact, the authority over human conduct to which it lays +claim in theory:' nor yet that there be, moreover, 'an ideal object, the +believer's attachment and sense of duty towards which are able to +control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities, and +prescribe to him a rule of life.'[49] That such an object is fully +capable of gathering round it feelings sufficiently strong to enforce +the most rigid rule of life, will certainly not be denied by me, +privileged as I am to count among my friends more than one whose whole +life is little else than a life of devotion to an object, 'the general +interest of the human race,' plainly incapable of affording them in +exchange that 'eternity of personal enjoyment' to which ordinary +devotees look forward as their reward, and whose virtue I honour as +approaching the sublime, on account of its independence of all the props +and stimulants which ordinary virtue finds indispensable. But the +sublimest virtue does not of itself constitute religion. For, besides +the 'creed,' 'conviction,' and 'sentiment' indicated above, there is +needed some suitable object of worship to which the soul may alternately +bow down in humble reverence, and look up in fervent love--some being to +whom its prayer, praise, and thanksgiving may be fittingly addressed. +This want, recognised--as one of the few who do not recognise it +admits--by nine out of every ten persons, was distinctly recognised by +Comte, who, however, attempted to supply it by pointing, not to God, but +to Man. His reason for this was not a conviction that there is no God. +On the contrary, he habitually disclaimed, not without acrimony, +dogmatic atheism; and once even condescended so far as to declare that +'the hypothesis of design has much greater verisimilitude than that of a +blind mechanism.' But in the 'mature state of intelligence' at which his +mind had arrived, 'conjecture founded on analogy did not seem to him a +basis to rest a theory upon.' He preferred a religious theory without a +basis, and therefore adopted one as destitute of support as the tortoise +on which stands the earth-upholding elephant of Hindoo mythology; +selecting, as the 'Grand Être' to be worshipped, 'the entire Human Race, +conceived as a continuous whole, past, present, and future.' For this +great collective _non_-existence, this compound of that which is, that +which has been but has ceased to be, and that which is not yet, he +elaborated a minute ritual of devotional observances, and would, if he +had had the chance, have consecrated a complete sacerdotal hierarchy, +subordinated to himself as supreme pontiff. Having, for fear of +recognising what possibly might not be, begun by, wilfully and with his +eyes open, recognising what could not possibly be, he proceeded to +invest this sanctified non-existence with precisely those attributes +best calculated to render it unfit to receive the admiration he +prescribed for it. That feeble Humanity--the actually living portion +thereof, that is--may need and be the better for our services, which +Divine Omnipotence of course cannot be, was distinctly urged by him as a +reason why _prayers_, or at least those outpourings of feeling which he +so designated, should be addressed to the former and not to the latter. +That Humanity is in a constant state of progress, so that both the +collective mass and choice specimens of each successive generation of +men must always be superior to the corresponding masses and specimens of +all previous generations, is a prime article of the Comtist creed; but +not the less is it an imperative injunction of the Comtist rubrick that +religious homage shall be paid, not only to the collective 'Grand Être' +of Humanity, but also to individual worthies of past ages--that +superiors shall consequently fall down before, and worship, and take as +models, their intellectual and moral inferiors. The fact of a religion +made up of tenets like these having been thought out by one of the +profoundest of reasoners does not prevent its being the very perfection +of unreason. Even though on the one side there were nothing more than +some doubt whether Deity might not exist, still with complete certainty +on the other of the non-existence of 'Humanity,' Deity ought in fairness +to have at least the benefit of the doubt. In selection for adoration, +that which only perhaps may be, at any rate deserves to be, preferred to +that which positively is not. The excess of superstition with which St. +Paul reproached the Athenians, for raising an altar to the 'Unknown +God,' looks like excessive circumspection, beside the solemn dedication +of temples to a chimera known not to be. Nay, even Isaiah's maker of +graven images is at length outdone. Even he who, having hewn down a +tree, 'burneth part thereof in the fire, with part thereof eateth flesh, +roasteth roast, and is satisfied, warmeth himself, and saith, Aha, I am +warm, I have seen the fire; and with the residue maketh a god, yea, his +graven image, and falleth down unto it and worshippeth it, and prayeth +unto it, and saith, Deliver me, for thou art my god'--even he has at +last found more than his match in irrationality. For he has at least +before him a visible tangible block of wood, not the mere memory of one +that has long ago rotted, nor the dream of one that is yet to grow, +whereas that mental figment, Consecrated Humanity, is not even a real +shadow, but only a fancied one, a shadow cast by no substance. And it is +to Comtists of all people--intellectual salt of the earth as they +are--that this figment is recommended for adoration--yes, to those who, +pharisaically standing aloof from the common herd, thank their imaginary +substitute for God, or whatever else it is they deem thankworthy, that +they are not blind as other men are, and least of all as those dazed +metaphysicians who actually personify their own mental abstractions. No +wonder that such extreme provocation should try the patience of all but +the stanchest disciples. No wonder that Mr. Lewes himself should seem +half inclined to apostrophise his quondam master in words resembling +those once addressed to Robespierre, 'Avec ton Grand Être, tu commences +à m'embêter.' + +Here make we one more pause. This chapter's theme is, as was betimes +premised, not the strength of theism, but the weakness of atheism. I +have in it attempted to execute a design which, according to Boswell, +was conceived by Lord Hailes, and approved by Dr. Johnson, that of +writing an essay, _Sur la crédulité des incrédules_, and I think I have +succeeded so far as to show that, if any one who can swallow atheism +affects to strain at theism, it cannot, at any rate, be for want of a +sufficiently capacious gullet. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[36] The story was thus told by Diderot, to Sir Samuel Romilly, when a +young man:--'Je vous dirai un trait de lui, mais il vous sera un peu +scandaleux peut-être, car vous autres Anglais, vous croyez _un peu_ en +Dieu; pour nous autres, nous n'y croyons guères. Hume dîna dans une +grande compagnie avec le baron D'Holbach. Il était assis à côté du +baron; on parla de la religion naturelle. "Pour les athées," disait +Hume, "je ne crois pas qu'il en existe; je n'en ai jamais vu!" "Vous +avez été un peu malheureux," répondit l'autre, "vous voici à table avec +dix-sept pour la première fois."'--_Edinburgh Review_ for January 1847. + +[37] 'Studies in Animal Life,' chap. v. + +[38] The reader who, having skipped some of the earlier chapters, may +find this language obscure, is requested to turn back to the essay on +'Huxleyism,' pp. 194-6. + +[39] See again, pp. 194-6. + +[40] 'Mr. Darwin's Hypotheses.' Part II. 'Fortnightly Review' for June +1868. + +[41] 'Origin of Species,' p. 226. + +[42] Of this treatise, no English or French translation has, I believe, +been published. For my own very limited acquaintance with it, I am +indebted to the extreme kindness of my friend, Professor Croom +Robertson, who has most obligingly favoured me with a manuscript version +of the portion referred to in the text. + +[43] 'Lay Sermons,' p. 240. + +[44] 'Beauties of the Anti-Jacobin,' 1799, pp. 214-6. + +[45] 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' _passim_. + +[46] 'History of Philosophy,' 4th edition, vol. ii. pp. 654-735. + +[47] Not that so restricted a meaning can, with any propriety, be placed +on positivist definitions of law. See, for instance, that of Mr. Lewes +('History of Philosophy,' vol. ii. p. 701), who defines law to be 'the +invariable relation between two distinct phenomena, according to which +one depends on the other.' + +[48] Some few additional random remarks, however, though not permissible +in the text may, perhaps, be less inappropriate in a note. + +My scientific deficiencies do not prevent my understanding or, at least, +fancying I understand, that Comte's famous 'Classification of the +Sciences' may be extremely serviceable as indicating in what order the +sciences may most profitably be studied. That a student's general +progress would be swifter and surer if, before entering on physics or +chemistry, he had already made considerable progress in algebra, +geometry, and mechanics, than if he commenced all five sciences +simultaneously, seems probable enough. If, however, the classification +be intended also to indicate historically the order in which the +sciences have actually been studied, I cannot but suspect it to be +misleading. Certainly, if knowledge of number was the earliest knowledge +acquired by man, those savage races which have not even yet learnt how +to count beyond four, must have been content with very few lessons in +arithmetic when turning off to other branches of learning. + +As to the measure of success that attended Comte's scheme of creating a +Philosophy of General Science, I presume not to utter one syllable of my +own, preferring to cite what Mr. Mill says of that 'wonderful +systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences from +mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would +have stamped him on all minds competent to appreciate it as one of the +principal thinkers of the age.' In all sincerity, I say that the mere +conception of the enterprise, whose vastness is so luminously expounded +by Mr. Lewes, in the last edition of his 'History of Philosophy,' seems +to me to betoken superior genius. I feel, as it were, simply awe-struck +in the presence of an intellectual ambition, that within the brief span +of one human life could aspire to a mastery over all the sciences, +sufficient, first for co-ordinating the fundamental truths and special +methods, and so obtaining the philosophy of each, and then for +co-ordinating the manifold philosophies so obtained, and--by condensing +them all into one homogeneous doctrine, and blending them into one +organic whole, whereof each part would be seen to depend on all that +preceded, and to determine all that succeeded--transforming all science +into philosophy. + +One point however remains on which I shall speak with some confidence, +that, namely, of the inclusion among 'Comte's titles to immortal fame' +of the creation of a Science of Sociology. 'What the law of gravitation +is to astronomy, what the elementary properties of tissues are to +physiology,' that, says Mr. Lewes, in the opinion of Comte's disciples, +'is the law of the three stages to sociology.' But if, as I have shown, +there are not really three but only two stages, the so-called third +stage being simply a return to either the second or the first, the law +of the three stages cannot be much of a law, nor the science of which it +is the essence much of a science. + +Mr. Lewes, nevertheless, maintains that M. Comte created Social Science. +Mr. Mill considers that he did not create it, but only proved its +creation to be possible. With all possible deference, I submit that what +he really did was to prove its creation to be impossible. + +In a passage of Mr. Mill's 'Positivism,' quoted with approval in Mr. +Lewes's 'History of Philosophy,' and presumably, therefore, expressing +the sentiments of both writers, Comte is described as pronouncing +inappropriate to the Science of Society, the method universally admitted +to be proper to all other sciences--that, namely, of obtaining by +induction the laws of the elementary phenomena, then, from these laws +thinking out deductively those of the complex phenomena, and, finally, +of verifying by specific observation the laws obtained by deduction. +Among social phenomena, he is described as arguing, the elementary ones +are human feelings and actions, the laws of which are the laws of +universal human nature. But the human beings, on the laws of whose +nature social facts depend, are not abstract or universal, but +historical human beings, already shaped and made what they are, not by +the simple tendencies of universal human nature, but by the accumulated +influence of past generations of human society. This being the case, the +laws of universal human nature evidently cannot serve as materials, +whence it would be possible for any powers of deduction, starting from +the bare conception of the Being Man, to predict beforehand how +successive generations of men would feel and act. Wherefore, in order to +get at social laws, we must reverse the ordinary method, seizing upon +any generalizations which the facts of history, empirically considered, +will supply, and then using the universal laws of human nature for the +verification of these generalizations. + +I will not linger over the glaring inconsistency involved in the +conclusion thus arrived at, of appealing, for the verification of +empirical generalizations, to a species of deduction confessed to be +impracticable for want of the requisite materials. I prefer to show that +from Comte's own premises, as rendered by Mr. Mill, necessarily results +a separate conclusion, absolutely fatal to his sociologically creative +pretensions. According to him, as we have seen, the laws of elementary +social facts, or of human actions and feelings, are the laws of +universal human nature, which latter can, of course, be no other than +whatever habits of invariably, in given circumstances, feeling and +acting in given modes, may be common to all mankind. But it is admitted +that the particular generation of human beings at any time existing +must, by the accumulated influence of preceding generations, have been +rendered very different from every preceding generation: and nothing is +more certain than that two generations differing widely from each other +in character, would, in many given circumstances, not only not feel and +act in precisely the same, but would inevitably feel and act in widely +different, manners. Nor is this all. The circumstances by which any +generation is surrounded have been partly shaped for it by preceding +generations, partly modified by itself--so that it is not possible for +any two generations ever to find themselves in the same circumstances. +Wherefore, as there never can be a repetition of either men or of +circumstances precisely the same, it is manifestly impossible for any +habits of feeling and thinking, in given modes in given circumstances, +to be common to any two generations of men, still less to universal +mankind. In other words, there cannot possibly be any laws of human +nature: and if no laws of human nature, then no laws of elementary +social facts; and if no laws of elementary social facts, then no laws of +complex social facts; and if no laws of social facts, elementary or +complex, then no single particle of material wherewith to build up the +Science of Society or Sociology. + +[49] 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' pp. 133-4. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +_LIMITS OF DEMONSTRABLE THEISM._ + + Thought without Reverence is barren. The man who cannot wonder, who + does not habitually wonder (and worship), were he president of + innumerable Royal Societies, and carried the whole _Mécanique + Céleste_ and Hegel's _Philosophy_, and the epitome of all + laboratories and observatories with their results, in his single + head, is but a pair of spectacles, behind which there is no eye. + Let those who have eyes look through him; then he may be + useful.--_Sartor Resartus._ + + +'I wouldn't mind,' said once a representative of extreme heterodoxy, in +debate with a champion of its diametrical opposite--'I wouldn't mind +conceding the Deity you contend for, were it not for the use commonly +made of him after he is conceded.' And no doubt that use is such as +might well provoke a saint, provided the saint were likewise a +philosopher. To whatever extent it be true that man was created in the +image of God, it is certain that in all ages and countries God has been +created in the image of man, invested with all human propensities, +appetites, and passions, and expected to demean himself on all occasions +as men would do in like circumstances. As popularly conceived, so long +as sensual gratification was esteemed to be the _summum bonum_, he +wallowed in all manner of sensual lust; when some of his more fervent +worshippers turned ascetics out of disgust with fleshly surfeit, he +became ascetism personified: at every stage his great delight has been +flattery, and his still greater, revenge; in the exercise of power he +has always been capricious and often wanton--ruthlessly vindictive +against impugners of his honour and dignity, unspeakably barbarous to +unbelievers in his reality. Now, as knowledge advanced, unbelief in a +God so much below the level of ordinarily virtuous men advanced equally, +quickening its pace, too, as the particular branch of knowledge styled +'physics' spread, and, spreading, exposed the utter impossibility of +many of the fables in which theological views had been expressed. +Wherefore, theological oracles have in every age and country been apt to +confound scientific inquisitiveness with unbelief, and to denounce +_physical_ science especially as a delusion and a snare, and its +cultivators as impostors none the less mischievous for being at the same +time dupes. Of course, the latter have not been slow to return the +compliment. Hearing the truths discovered by them stigmatised as +falsehoods, they naturally enough retorted the charge of falsity against +the divine authorities in whose name it was made. Finding war waged +against them by every religion with which they were acquainted, they +naturally enough in turn declared war against all religion, even with +that form thereof which underlies every other except when sufficing to +itself for superstructure as well as base. Natural enough this, for +_humanum est errare_; but very humanly erroneous withal, for to include +Deity itself in the same denial with pseudo-divine attributes is about +as sagacious a proceeding as to refuse to recognise the sun at midday on +account of his not appearing in Phoebus's chariot and four. + +When religion on the defensive declares herself opposed to reason, so +much the worse for religion. She is thereby virtually surrendering at +discretion, since to appeal to her only other resource--revelation--is +to beg the whole subject in dispute. Similarly, the worse and still less +excusable is it for science to declare herself irreconcileable with +religion, for she, too, is thereby slighting reason. It is only by +forsaking the single guide in whom she professes to trust, and blindly +giving herself up to angry prejudice, that she can fail to discover the +rational solidity of so much of every religion as consists of theism. + +For this, as we have seen, the argument from design abundantly suffices, +although the only absolute certainty thence deducible be that the +universe must have an author or authors fully equal to its original +construction, its subsequent development, and its continued maintenance. +Even if it be not inconceivable, notwithstanding that the chances to the +contrary be many times infinity to one, that the mere restlessness of +some utterly unintelligent force may have fabricated all material +structures, and imparted to all their movements certain orderly +successions, it is still manifestly impossible for unintelligence to +have brought forth intelligence--for the speculative, critical, carping +spirit of man to have been generated by that which has no speculation in +its eyes, nor any eyes, to have speculation in; impossible, in short, +for the creature to be more richly endowed than its creator. Since +numerous embodied intelligences actually exist, they must have been +preceded by intelligence capable of creating them and all other existing +intelligences that have not eternally existed; and it is simply +impossible that creative intelligence, whose creatures owe to it +whatever intelligence they possess, should on any occasion have +exhibited a want of intelligence which they are competent to detect. + +But although it be thus demonstrably certain that an author of the +universe exists, it does not follow that there is only one. As to this +no proof positive, only probabilities, can be adduced; but the +probabilities are of an amount all but equivalent to certainty. They are +forcibly urged by Mr. Mill. Many exactly uniform occurrences, he +observes, are more naturally referred to 'a single, than to a number of +wills precisely accordant.' But the classes of uniform occurrences being +exceedingly numerous, if there were a separate will for each class, +there would be equally numerous wills, and 'unless all these wills were +in complete harmony (which would itself be the most difficult to credit +of all cases of invariability, and would require beyond anything else +the ascendancy of a supreme Deity),' it would be 'impossible that the +course of phenomena under their government should be invariable.' Every +fresh appearance of resemblance extending through all nature 'affords +fresh presumption that the whole is the work, not of many, but of the +same hand, and renders it vastly more probable that there should be one +indefinitely foreseeing Intelligence and immoveable Will than that there +should be hundreds and thousands of such.'[50] I will not run the risk +of weakening this reasoning by expansion. Its obvious inference that, +there being a God, there cannot be more than one, could not be set forth +more irresistibly. + +That the wisdom of the Creator cannot be less than the amount thereof +manifested in His works is a self-evident proposition, which none will +be hardy enough directly to dispute. There is, however, one critic, of +great ability and yet greater daring, who appears to doubt whether the +wisdom manifested in the universe is anything to speak of. Mr. Lewes' +faculty of veneration is, I suspect, but imperfectly developed, since +'the succession of phases which each (animal) embryo is forced to pass +through,' is sufficient to give its action pause. 'None of these +phases,' he remarks, 'have any adaptation to the future state of the +animal, but are in positive contradiction to it, or are simply +purposeless; _many_ of them have no adaptation even to its embryonic +state; whereas _all_ show stamped on them the unmistakable characters of +_ancestral_ adaptations and the progressions of organic evolution.' +'What,' he asks, 'does this fact imply?' 'There is not,' he continues, +'a single known example of an organism which is not developed out of +simpler forms. Before it can attain the complex structure which +distinguishes it, there must be an evolution of forms which distinguish +the structures of organisms lower in the series.... On the hypothesis of +a plan that pre-arranged the organic world' (by no means, however, +necessarily in types that could not change, but rather in types adapted +and calculated to change), 'nothing,' he considers, 'could be more +unworthy of a supreme intelligence than this _inability_ to construct an +organism at once without making several _tentative_ efforts, undoing +to-day what was so carefully done yesterday, and repeating for centuries +the same _tentatives_ and the same _corrections_ in the same +succession.' 'Anthropomorphists,' he says, 'talk of "The Great +Architect," emphasising the name with capitals,' but 'what should we say +to an architect who was unable, or, being able, was obstinately +unwilling, to erect a palace except by first using his materials in the +shape of a hut, then pulling it down and rebuilding them as a cottage, +then adding storey to storey and room to room, not with any reference to +the ultimate purposes of the palace, but wholly with reference to the +way in which houses were constructed in ancient times? What should we +say to the architect who could not form a museum out of bricks and +mortar, but was forced to begin as if going to build a mansion, and, +after proceeding some way in this direction, altered his plan into a +palace, and that again into a museum? Would there be a chorus of +applause from the Institute of Architects, and favourable notices in the +newspapers of this profound wisdom?'[51] + +Notwithstanding the exulting tone in which these questions are put, and +which seems to imply that in their proposer's opinion they are +unanswerable, they may, I think, be very summarily disposed of. Whatever +other comments might be made on the conduct of an architect who should +build in the complex manner suggested, surely the very last thing said +would be that he did not know how to build in simpler wise. His having +actually built a palace would be decisive proof of his knowing how to +build a palace; and of all queer reasons for questioning his possession +of that much architectural knowledge, about the queerest would be the +fact of his having built, not a palace only, but a hut and cottage in +addition. And if, adopting a still more complicated style, he should +begin by so constructing a hut that, if left to itself, it would draw up +brick and mortar from the earth, and grow into a cottage, and then go on +growing and adding storey to storey till it became a palace, this surely +would be a proof not of less, but of infinitely more, architectural +knowledge than if he had commenced and completed the palace with his own +hands. Not unwarrantably, perhaps, may Mr. Lewes, reflecting that his +own and every other human organism's genesis has consisted of at least +three stages, oval, foetal, and infantine, wonder why he was not +formed all at once, 'as Eve was mythically affirmed to be taken from +Adam's rib, and Minerva from Jupiter's head,' and why he was not brought +forth full dressed in an indefinitely expansible suit of clothes. Not +quite inexcusably, perhaps, might he conceive the reason to be some mere +whim or humour of his Maker, though there might be more gratitude in +conjecturing that the triple process was adopted for the purpose of +assisting biological enquirers like himself in their special researches. +From so practised a logician, however, about the very last thing to have +been here expected was that he should suggest creative 'ignorance and +incompetence' as the only apparent alternative to denying a Creator +altogether, as if incapacity for a comparatively easy process were a +likely reason for choosing one greatly more difficult. It might have +occurred to Mr. Lewes that, if there were any absurdity in the choice, +the Being who made him and bestowed on him the faculty of perceiving the +absurdity, could not have failed himself likewise to perceive it and +consequently to avoid it. + +Of divine power, the measure or measurelessness is obviously identical +with that of divine wisdom. Both attributes must be at least +co-extensive with the universe; both consequently illimitable. Divine +goodness, moreover, inasmuch as the creature's moral ideal cannot be +superior to his Creator's, must be at least as vast as human +imagination: God must be at least as good as man can conceive Him. But +how, by goodness so transcending, conjoined with immeasurable might, can +the co-existence of evil be tolerated? To this last, and perhaps +greatest, among the many great questions brought forward for renewed +discussion in these pages, I have long had by me an attempt at a reply, +which, finding myself unable either to strengthen or shorten it by +turning it into prose, I venture to submit in its original rhythmical +form. + + A Voice came to me as I sate apart, + Pondering the burthen of life's mystery, + In dim perplexity, with troubled heart. + With whisper weak and faint it came to me, + Like feeble glimmer of the struggling moon + To wildered mariner on midnight sea: + With whisper weak at first, but strengthening soon, + Like the moon's beam when filmy clouds disperse, + And through my scattered doubts, with quiet tune, + Uttering in clear, apocalyptic verse, + Truth, which for comfort and monition sent, + E'en as the voice revealed, do I rehearse. + + 'What art thou? Whence derived? With what intent + Placed where perpetual hindrances exhaust + Thy wasted strength, in baffled effort spent? + Where in blind maze, with crafty windings crossed, + With stumbling-blocks beset, with pitfalls strewed, + Thou wanderest, in endless error lost; + Athirst beside glad rivers that elude, + With mocking lapse, thy tantalized pursuit, + And hungering where gilded husks delude + With bitter ashes as of Dead Sea fruit, + Ashes of Hope, but seed of Discontent, + That rears its upas growth from blighted root? + Around, thou hear'st Creation eloquent, + Hymning creative attributes, and seest + The starry marvels of the firmament, + And marvels of the nearer earth, released + By impulse from within, not dimly shown, + Nor plainlier in the greatest than the least: + And, through the known discovering the unknown, + Acknowledgest thy Maker, power supreme, + Might, and dominion, deeming His alone. + Nor His the lax dominion mayst thou deem + That builds up empire, and when built, neglects. + Lo! where, afar, sidereal orbits gleam, + What first impelled, impelling still, directs: + Urges and guides each solar chariot, + The mundane mass of every globe connects, + By its own energy cohering not, + E'en as dead leaves, decaying languidly, + Not from themselves derive the force to rot. + + 'All-strengthening, all-sustaining Deity, + Diffused throughout the infinite, abides, + Dwells and upholds:--then, haply, dwells in thee? + Yea, verily. Within thy frame resides + What, by its movement only mayst thou know. + The circling blood, thy being's ambient tides, + Is't thine own will that bids them ebb and flow, + And from their inundating flood depose + Organic germs, whence health and vigour grow? + Yet though such witness serve thee to disclose + In human tenement divine abode, + Not thine be the material creed that shows + The spirit's birthplace in the moulded clod; + Not thine the pantheist raving, that because + God dwelleth with thee, thou thyself art God. + Bethink thee--is't self-reverence that o'erawes + Thy prostrate soul, and from thy faltering tongue, + Subdued, involuntary homage draws? + And when by harrowing pang thine heart is wrung, + Is't for self-aid thy wandering eyes inquire, + Heavenward, at length, in fervid suppliance flung? + And from thy native slough of sensual mire, + Is't to the mark of thine own purity + Thy loftier aims and holier hopes aspire? + Harshly thy fleshly fetters bear on thee, + In dark and dreary prison-house confined, + Cramped and diseased with long captivity, + And hath divine Intelligence designed + That noisome dungeon for her own restraint-- + By her own act to galling bonds consigned,-- + Self-doomed, with wilful purpose, to acquaint + Herself with sin and sorrow, and pollute + Æthereal essence with corporeal taint? + How doth thy helpless misery confute + That frantic boast of vain conceit, untaugh + The paltriest of its plans to execute! + + Hast thou the art to add, by taking thought, + One cubit to thy stature? and hast thou, + Or such as thou, Nature's whole fabric wrought? + Not thine such vaunt--not thine to disavow + The lustre of thy genuine origin. + To the Most Highest, as thine author, bow + With rapture of exulting faith, wherein + Devotion's cravings their desire achieve, + The bright ideal that they imaged, win. + Rejoice that thus 'tis given thee to believe,-- + To recognise transcending majesty, + Worthy all praise--all honour to receive: + Rejoice in that high presence, gratefully + Offering the vows that thy full heart dilate: + Rejoice that thence there floweth light, whereby + Thy emulative quest to elevate + Thitherward, where unblemished holiness + Irradiates sovereignty, benign as great. + + 'But here thou pausest, scrupling to confess + A providence of aspect all benign. + Fear not that sceptic scruple to express. + Of truth, Almighty Goodness could assign + Good only to the work of His own hand, + Warmed into life by His own breath divine: + And, where unchecked Beneficence had planned + A home for creatures of a fragile race, + Evoked from nothingness at His command, + Nor care, nor want, nor anguish should have place, + Nor fraud betray, nor violence oppress, + Nor hate inflame, nor wallowing lust debase, + Nor aught be found, save what conspired to bless + The sentient clay, wrought surely for that end,-- + For wherefore wrought, if not for happiness? + + 'Not, as some teach, for mastery to contend + With fate,--in doubtful conflict to engage,-- + Struggling, in pain and peril, to ascend + Slowly, through this probationary stage, + Sore let, but tried and chastened, and thereby + Earning on earth a heavenly heritage. + + Was there then need that prescience should try, + By ordeal pitiless, assured event, + Disclosed beforehand to prophetic eye? + Need was there, by austere experiment, + To test the frailty and the fall foreknown + Of man, beneath o'erwhelming burthen bent? + In this was tutelar prevision shown? + Hardly may he, in such belief confide, + Who sees his fellow myriads left to groan + In barren penance, without light or guide, + E'en from their birth by fostering vice controlled, + Doomed as they cross life's threshold--doomed untried. + + 'As hardly, too, may he the dogma hold + That fetters reason with a graduate chain + Of beings, linked in order manifold, + Where, to each link, 'tis given to sustain + A part subservient to the general weal,-- + Duly to share the mutual burthen's strain:-- + Though who from such allotment would appeal, + Could it be truth that wisdom's masterpiece + Such aid could lack, such feebleness conceal, + Suing its own constituents for release + From wrong innate, throughout its texture wove, + By hard necessity, not light caprice? + But to what purport could premonished Love + A system twined with mutual suffering weave, + When but a word all suffering would remove? + And wherefore yet delayeth the reprieve + Of Love, that doth not willingly afflict + Its children, neither wantonly aggrieve? + Can aught the gracious purpose interdict + Of Him, whose piercing eye, whose boundless sway, + No cloud can dim, no barrier restrict? + Say'st thou, "By path inscrutable, and way + Past finding out, perchance, may mercy bend + To its own use, whate'er its course would stay, + And through the labouring world high mandate send + That all things work together unto good, + Work, though by means corrupt, to righteous end?" + + Beware how such conjectures must conclude. + Can means impure Omnipotence befit, + And clog the range of its solicitude? + Can finite bonds confine the Infinite? + Though man, by choice of ill, must needs offend, + Need God do ill that good may come of it? + Must havoc's mad typhoon perforce descend? + May naught else serve to fan the stagnant air? + Must captive flame earth's quaking surface rend, + Or seek escape in lava flood? and ere + Effete society new structure raise, + Must dearth or pestilence the ground prepare? + Thus is it that a parent's care purveys + His bounty, and, exacting rigorously + The price in tears, each boon's full cost defrays? + Thus, with vain thrift withholding the decree, + That from his treasury's exhaustless store + To all could grant unbought felicity? + + 'But haply still 'tis reasoned (and with more + Of reason's semblance were the plea maintained), + That higher yet would life's ambition soar, + Not for mere scheme of happiness ordained, + But for advance in virtue,--for the growth + By patient zeal and meek endurance gained: + That, at the table of voluptuous sloth, + Though banqueted on sweets without alloy, + Unsated were a generous nature, loth + To feast where unearned lusciousness would cloy, + Faint with the tedium of unbroken rest, + Sick with the sameness of unruffled joy: + That for more poignant pleasure, and of zest + Heightened and edged by healthful exercise,-- + For scope wherein her conscious strength to test + In keen pursuit and venturous enterprise, + For dear exemplars, in whose course serene + Affection's tearful warmth might sympathise, + For these the yearning mind would languish, e'en + Though with all else that wish could name endued, + While, in her striving for self-discipline, + Foiled, and with fervid impulses imbued + Vainly, where neither aught could valour dare + Nor aught confront and challenge fortitude: + And where no outward token could declare + The hidden worth congenial heart would hail, + Hail with each kindred chord vibrating there;d + Since virtue wakes not but when griefs assail, + Or travail burthens, or temptations try, + Slumbering supine, till roused by adverse gale, + In the deep sleep of moral lethargy, + Joy's fullest cup, by hope or doubt unstirred, + Curdling the while to dull satiety. + + 'Thus haply some have reasoned, undeterred + By reasoning, with equal emphasis + But counter aim, as readily preferred: + Since Heaven's perfection striveth not, nor is + In peril lest it lapse to apathy, + Or lassitude invade its tranquil bliss. + And were it as they deem, and righteously + Were man adjudged with his brow's sweat to eat + Bread leavened with embittering misery, + E'en then affliction's measure to complete, + Amply might pain, and want, and death suffice, + And feeling's blight, and baffled love's defeat, + And, on the altar of self-sacrifice, + Hope's withered blooms by resignation laid: + Nor were it needed that incarnate vice, + In human mould, in the same image made, + Trampled with iron hoof his fellow man, + Virtue's chastised development to aid. + For whence was Vice derived? Ere life began, + For His own offspring could their Maker trace + Their loathsome office, and beneath his ban + Place them, accurst (creating to debase), + And doom as fuel for the flames that test + A favoured few, elect by partial grace? + + Elect or outcast--if alike confessed + Of the same parent, sons--brethren who bear + No differing lineaments, save those imprest + By his prevision--in their parent's care + Should not all be partakers? Should not all + Freely, alike, his nurturing guidance share? + Are any worthier? 'Tis that warning's call + Extends to them alone--'tis that to them + Alone is given vigour, wherewithal + Temptation's fraudful violence to stem-- + And how shall He, who needful strength denies, + Weakness for its predestined fall condemn? + How, when the creature of His wrath replies + With feeble wail and inarticulate moan, + The sighing of that contrite heart despise? + What man amongst thy fellows hast thou known + Who, if his son ask fish, will jeeringly + Give him a serpent, or for bread a stone? + If ye, being evil, at your children's cry + Know how to give good gifts, should not much more + Your heavenly Father His good things supply + To them who ask Him? Should He not restore + A cleansed heart within them, and renew + An upright spirit? not, what they implore + Reversing, and restraining, lest they do + The good they would,--constraining them withal + To do the evil they would fain eschew? + How wilt thou to the same original + Whence all just thoughts and pure desires proceed, + Impute corrupt imaginings, whose thrall + Enslaves anew the soul but newly freed + From their pollution? Can a hybrid growth + Arise spontaneous from unmingled seed? + Are grapes upon the bramble borne, or doth + The fig bear olive berries? Canst thou show + Twin waters, sweet and bitter, issuing both + From the same fountain? Neither should there flow + Blessing and cursing from one mouth, nor yet + From the same Providence both weal and woe. + + 'Vile as thou art, ofttimes in thee have met + Mercy and Truth--and Peace and Righteousness + Have kissed each other; and thine heart is set + Ofttimes to follow what is just, redress + Where thou hast trespassed, rendering; ofttimes, too, + Forgiving other's trespass: to distress + Thou grudgest not its sympathetic due + Of kindly deed, or word, or mutual tears, + Nor in vain wholly labourest to subdue + The hydra host whose foul miasm blears + Thy vision, and the distant gleam obscures + That dimly through thy prison casement peers. + E'en to the darkened dungeon that immures + Thy soul, some feeble glimmer finds its way. + Crushed beneath earthly durance, still endures + Some lingering fire below that weight of clay, + Some generous zeal, some honest hardihood, + Some faith--some charity.--And whence are they? + If not of Him whose quickening breath endued + All things with life,--and, when he looked upon + What He had made, beheld that all was good: + All good,--but chiefly man, in whom alone + Some likeness of Himself--some clouded light, + From His own countenance reflected, shone. + Doth not the sun outshine the satellite? + And shall not He who in the murkiest hour + Of sin's defilement, streaks thy dreary night + With beams that bid thee, lower yet and lower + Descending, hope, perchance, to rise again,-- + Say--shall not He in holiness as power + Transcend the creature whom His gifts sustain! + And here, if sneering casuist blaspheme, + And to divided nature's sovereign, + Ascribe, in nature's opposite extreme + Like eminence, and nature's God aver + In evil, even as in good, supreme,-- + Heed not, or ask if man's Artificer + With His own work, in virtue matched, can prove + At once more holy and unholier? + + 'Yet since all good is fruit of love, and love + Worketh no ill, how still doth ill abound? + Is't haply that with love a rival strove? + + Mark well this parable. In chosen ground + Only good seed a husbandman had sown, + Yet when the blade sprang up, therewith he found + Tares that amid the stifled wheat had grown. + Then knew he well, how, entering unawares, + This, while men slept, an enemy had done. + And 'tis an enemy who, scattering tares + Amid the corn sown in Creation's field, + With deadly coil the growing plant ensnares. + And no mean enemy, nor one unsteeled + For bold defiance, nor reduced to cower + Ever in covert ambuscade concealed, + But at whose hest the ravening hell-hounds scour + A wasted world, while himself prowls to seek, + Like roaring lion, whom he may devour, + And upon whom his rancorous wrath to wreak, + Sniffing the tainted steam of slaughter's breath, + And lulled by agony's despairing shriek. + For it is he who hath the power of death, + Even the devil, by whom entereth sin + Into the world, and death engendereth: + Yea! by whom entereth whatsoe'er within + Warreth against the spirit,--sordid greed, + Pride, carnal lust, envy to lust akin, + And malice, and deceit, whose treacheries breed + Strife between brethren, and the faith o'erthrow + Of many, and the duped deserters lead, + Beneath the banner of their deadliest foe, + In rebel arms a Parent to defy, + Whom, by His gifts alone, His children know. + + 'Not less that Parent marks with pitying eye + The blinded rage that rivets its own chain: + Not less to His own glorious liberty + Seeks, from corruption's bondage, to regain + His erring children,--by device, or lewd, + Or threatening, lured, or goaded to their bane: + Not less to overcome evil with good + Labours, and shall therewith all things subdue + Unto Himself--but hath not yet subdued. + + And wherefore? wherefore tarrieth He, while through + Eden, by daring foray oft defaced, + Marauding fiends malignant raid pursue, + Winging the turbid whirlwind's frantic haste, + Pointing the levin's arrowy effluence, + Over the mildewed harvest's hungry waste, + Breathing the fetid breath of pestilence, + And crying havoc to the dogs of war, + Let slip on unresisting innocence? + Why suffereth He that thus a rival mar + His cherished work--through devastated fields + Borne on triumphant in ensanguined car?-- + Him, who with power to rescue, tamely yields + His helpless charge to persecuting hate, + Nor His own offspring from the torturer shields, + But sits aloof, callously obdurate, + While but the will is lacking to redeem,-- + Him, how shall fitting stigma designate? + + 'But 'tis not thus thy calmer doubts esteem + The loving-kindness that with open hand + Dispenses bounty in perennial stream. + Oft hast thou proved, while in a foreign land + A sojourner, as all thy fathers were, + Thou pacest painfully the barren sand, + How o'er thy path watches a Comforter, + And scatters manna daily for thy food, + And bids the smitten rocks that barrier + The arid track, well out with gurgling flood, + And oft to shade of green oasis leads, + And, from pursuer thirsting for thy blood, + Such scanty shelter as is thine provides: + And though full oft that shelter fails, and though + Its torn defence demoniac glee derides, + Yet not for this the cheerful faith forego, + That memory of uncounted benefits + And conscious instinct's still, small tones bestow. + Charge not thy God with aught that unbefits + Tenderest compassion, nor believe that He + With hardened apathetic scorn commits + A favoured people throughout life to be + Subject to bondage. Doubt not of His will + To rescue from that galling tyranny. + Yet, if in His despite creation still + In thraldom groan and travail--what remains? + What but that strength is wanting to fulfil + His scheme of mercy? What but that He reigns, + Not as sole wielder of omnipotence, + But, o'er a world unconquered yet, maintains + Encounter with opposing influence, + Which He shall surely quell, but which can stay, + Awhile unquelled, His mightier providence. + + 'And doth this sadden only, or dismay? + Grieves it that He, whose follower thou art, + Rules not supreme with unresisted sway? + Or that, the progress of His grace to thwart, + Satanic might the host of hell arrays? + And doth it not a thrill of joy impart + That not alone need barren prayer and praise + Thine homage be,--thy choicest offering + The formal dues prescribed obedience pays? + Henceforth with firmer step approach thy King. + Some puny succour, thou, in thy degree, + Some feeble aid, thou, even thou, mayst bring! + In the fell conflict raging ceaselessly + Around, thou, too, mayst join--thou, too, engage + In that dread feud, twin with eternity, + Which faithful angels and archangels wage + Against the powers of darkness, to extend, + O'er realms retained in demon vassalage, + Their sovereign's pure dominion,--and to blend + All worlds beneath one righteous governance, + Into one kingdom which shall have no end. + + 'Wouldst thou, if haply so thou mayst, advance + That blessed consummation? Wouldst thou speed + The lingering hour of Earth's deliverance? + Arise--the naked clothe, the hungry feed, + The sick and wounded tend,--soothe the distressed. + If thy weak arm cannot protect, yet plead + With bold rebuke the cause of the oppressed, + Kindling hot shame in Mammon's votaries, + Abashed, at least, in lucre's grovelling quest; + And, in the toil-worn serf, a glad surprise + Awakening--when, from brute despondency, + Taught to look up to heaven with dazzled eyes.-- + Thus mayst thou do God service,--thus apply + Thyself, within thy limit, to abate + What wickedness thou seest, or misery: + Thus, in a Sacred Band, associate + New levies, from the adverse ranks of Sin + Converted,--against Sin confederate. + Or--if by outward act to serve, or win + Joint followers to the standard of thy Lord, + Thy lot forbid,--turn, then, thy thought within: + Be each recess of thine own breast explored: + There, o'er thy passions be thy victories won: + There, be the altar of thy faith restored, + And thou, a living sacrifice, thereon + Present thyself.--This ever mayst thou do, + Nor, doing this, wilt aught have left undone.' + + Here ceased the Voice, commissioned to renew + Truth, which, of old, when Bactrian sage began + Nature's dim maze to thread with slenderest clue, + Its doubtful scope and dark design to scan, + With inward whisper, hopeful witness bare, + And justified the ways of God to man. + And suddenly its warning ceased, but ere + It ceased, the scales had fallen from my eyes, + And I beheld, and shall I not declare + What my uncurtained vision testifies? + Shall coward lips the word of life suppress? + The oracle vouchsafed from Heaven disguise? + Nay, as one crying in the wilderness, + Where none else hearken, to the vacant air + And stolid mountains utters his distress, + E'en so will I too cry aloud, 'Prepare + Before Him the Lord's way. Make His path straight,' + Nor heed though none regard me, nor forbear + Though all revile, but patiently await + Till, like light breath that panting meads exhale, + And scornful zephyrs lightly dissipate, + But which, full surely, down the echoing vale, + Shall roll with sounding current, swift and loud, + My slighted message likewise shall prevail, + Entering the heart of many a mourner, bowed + Beneath despair, and with inspiring voice + Calling to hope to cleave her midnight cloud, + And bidding grief, in hope's new dawn, rejoice. + +This is a creed which long since came to me after earnest inward +communings, and which, though subsequent reflection has in some few +particulars modified it, I still in substance hold, clinging to it with +a grateful consciousness of ever-multiplying obligations. For in it the +soul has free scope for its loftiest aspirations and its widest and +deepest sympathies, strongest incentives to zeal, surest guidance for +activity, solace in every distress, support under every difficulty, +added cause for exultation in every success, renewed resolution in every +defeat. Still, it is here offered, not as ascertained truth, but merely +as a sample of those guesses at truth by which alone ordinary mortals +need hope to promote the common cause of humanity in any of its higher +bearings. Such guesses, however, when harmonising with all the +conditions of their subject-matter, may fairly claim to be provisionally +regarded as truths--nay, to be adopted as working hypotheses until +superseded by new hypotheses capable of doing the same work better; in +which supercession none ought to rejoice, nor, if sincere truth-seekers, +will rejoice, more cordially than the propounders of the discredited +doctrines. It is in this spirit and with these reservations that the +articles of faith above recited are submitted for consideration. How +much soever they may fall short of the truth, they are, I feel, in the +absence of any nearer approach to the truth, capable of rendering +excellent service. However faintly and hazily the outlines of Deity be +shown in them, the Deity whom they so imperfectly delineate is yet one +to whom may justly be ascribed glory in the highest, one worthy of all +trust, love, and adoration--of an adoration, too, inclusive not more of +praise than prayer. + +If the divine claim to the last-named tribute be disputed, it had better +be by arguments other than those on which certain writers, with Mr. +Galton for their leader and Professor Tyndall for their backer, have +been recently expending much misapplied ingenuity. If the efficacy of +prayer be, as the foremost of these declares it to be, 'a perfectly +appropriate and legitimate subject of scientific enquiry,' the enquiry +ought at least to be conducted according to scientific rules. On this +point Mr. Galton himself lays much stress, intimating that whereas an +unscientific reasoner may be expected to be 'guided by a confused +recollection of crude experience, a scientific reasoner will scrutinise +each separate experience before he admits it as evidence, and will +compare all the cases he has selected on a methodical system.' +Nevertheless, a brief examination of the experiences on which he and his +principal associate rely, may suggest some doubt as to which of the two +specified classes of reasoners it is that they themselves belong. + +The facts or fancies cited by Mr. Galton in proof that praying is of no +use are the following: 1. 'Sick people who pray or are prayed for do not +on the average recover more rapidly than others.' 2. Although 'the +public prayer for the sovereign of every state, Protestant or +Catholic, is and has been in the spirit of our own--"Grant her in health +long to live"--sovereigns are literally the shortest-lived of all +persons who have the advantage of affluence.' 3. The 'clergy are a far +more prayerful class' than either lawyers or medical men, it being +'their profession to pray,' and 'their practice that of offering morning +and evening family prayers in addition to their private devotions,' yet +'we do not find that the clergy are in any way more long-lived in +consequence;' rather, there is room for believing their class to be the +'shortest-lived of the three.' Nay, even missionaries, eminently +prayerful as they are themselves, and prayed for as they are with +especial earnestness by others, 'are not supernaturally endowed with +health,' and 'do not live longer than other people.' 4. 'The proportion +of deaths at the time of birth is identical among the children of the +praying and the non-praying classes.' 5. Though 'we pray in our Liturgy +that "the nobility may be endowed with grace, wisdom, and +understanding,"' our 'nobility are peculiarly subject to insanity;' as +are likewise, indeed, 'very religious people of all denominations,' +'religious madness being very common indeed.' 6. So far from 'religious +influences' appearing to have 'clustered in any remarkable degree round +the youth of those who, whether by their talents or their social +position, have left a mark upon English history,' 'remarkable devotional +tendencies' have been conspicuous chiefly by their absence from 'the +lives either of our Lord Chancellors or of the leaders of our great +political parties;' while, out of our twenty-three extant dukes, four at +least, if not five, are descended from mistresses of Charles II., not a +single one of them, on the other hand, being known to Mr. Galton to be +of 'eminently prayerful qualities.' 7. In respect of those +'institutions, societies, commercial adventures, political meetings and +combinations of all sorts' with which England so much abounds, and of +which 'some are exclusively clerical, some lay, and others mixed,' Mr. +Galton 'for his own part never heard a favourable opinion of the value +of the preponderating clerical element in their business committees.' +'The procedure of Convocation which, like all exclusively clerical +meetings, is opened with prayer, has not inspired the outer world with +much respect.' Nay, 'it is a common week-day opinion of the world that +praying people are not practical.' 8. In those numerous instances in +which an enterprise is executed by the agency of the profane on behalf +not of the profane themselves but of pious clients, 'the enterprises are +not observed to prosper beyond the average.' Underwriters recognise no +difference in the risks run by missionary ships and by ordinary traders, +nor do life insurance companies, before they accept a life, introduce +into their 'confidential enquiries into the antecedents of the +applicant' any 'such question as "Does he habitually use family prayers +and private devotions?"' Neither are the funds of devout shareholders +and depositors at all safer than those of the profane when entrusted to +the custody of untrustworthy directors, not even though the day's work +of the undertaking commence, as that of the disastrous Royal British +Bank used to do, with solemn prayer.[52] + +Two or three minutes' attention to the grounds for, and the +circumstances connected with, these statements, may assist us in +appreciating Mr. Galton's notion of the difference between confusedly +recollected experiences and experiences properly scrutinised and +methodically selected. + +For the statement first on the list, some negative evidence is +considered to be afforded by the absence of any 'single instance in +which papers read before Statistical Societies have recognised the +agency of prayer either in disease or in anything else.' The chief +authority for it, however, is the eloquent silence of medical men 'who, +had prayers for the sick any notable effect, would be sure to have +observed it,' seeing that they are 'always on the watch for such +things.' But are they really, in every case of recovery from illness +that comes under their notice, so particular and so successful in their +enquiries whether any, and, if so, how much, prayer has been offered on +behalf of the patient, as to be qualified to judge whether prayer has +had anything to do with the cure? If not, although they may be showing +their discretion by not speaking on the point, the 'eloquence of their +silence' must not be too hastily interpreted. For doctors, of all men, +should be the last to deny, as an abstract proposition, the efficacy of +prayer in disease, knowing, as they do, how great is the curative +influence of prayer when addressed to themselves. How, they may +naturally ask, is it to be expected that sickness should be cured unless +properly treated? and how can it be properly treated without a doctor? +and how can a doctor be expected to attend unless he be asked? Upon +which very natural queries others naturally follow. What would be the +good of the doctor's coming unless he prescribed judiciously? and will +he not more certainly prescribe judiciously if his judgment be guided by +special interposition of divine grace? and if prayer to himself has +plainly been one condition of his coming, why may not prayer to God +have been one condition of his judgment having been rightly guided? Will +it be pretended that God's proceedings are abjectly submissive to +inexorable laws from which those of the doctor are exempt, and that +though the latter would certainly not have attended unless he had been +asked, the grace of God, if given at all, must have been given equally +whether asked for or not? + +Statements 2 and 3 are founded on a memoir by Dr. Guy, purporting to +show the 'Mean Age attained by males of various classes who had survived +their 30th year from 1758 to 1843,' and whose deaths were not caused by +violence or accident. According to this table, the average age of 97 +members of royal houses was only 64·04, while that of 1,179 members of +the English aristocracy was 67·31, and that of 1,632 gentlemen commoners +70·22; the proportion between the total number of royal, and that of +noble and gentle, personages who died within the period specified, being +apparently supposed to be as 97 to 2811, or as 1 to about 29. Except +upon this supposition, Mr. Galton could not with any consistency have +appealed to these figures, for he had previously announced his intention +to be 'guided solely by broad averages and not to deal with isolated +instances.' He seems, however, to forget this judicious rule when he +comes to treat of the clergy, of whom 945 are compared in the table with +294 lawyers and 244 medical men. Here, he says, 'the clergy as a whole +show a life value of 69·49 against 68·14 for lawyers, and 67·31 for +medical men;' but then, he adds 'this difference is reversed' when the +comparison is made between members of the three classes sufficiently +distinguished to have had their lives recorded in Chalmers' +Biographical Dictionary or the Annual Register, the value of life among +clergy, lawyers, and medical men then appearing as 66·42, 66·51 and +67·34 respectively. Whether, of the distinguished professional men +concerned in this second comparison, the parsons were distinguished for +their prayerfulness and the lawyers and doctors for their +prayerlessness, Mr. Galton omits to state; and still more serious +omissions on his part are those of not mentioning in what part of our +Liturgy we are accustomed to pray that it may be granted to the Queen, +not simply long to live, but also to live longer than other people; +likewise in which of 'the numerous published collections of family +prayers' that have undergone his scrutiny, is to be found a petition +that parsons may live longer than lawyers or doctors; and, yet again, +since an _average_, falling short of threescore years and ten by little +more than three and a half, is so contemptuously rejected by him, what +is the precise number of years that would be accepted by him as a +liberal compliance with prayer for long life? + +While deducing his argument from clergymen, Mr. Galton makes repeated +and particular reference to the clerical _sub-genus_, missionaries, +treating it as the more remarkable that these should not enjoy +comparative immunity from disease, because, as he suggests, it would +have been so easy for God to have made them a favoured class in respect +of health: to wit, by the notable expedient of dissuading them from +exposing themselves to any of the risks peculiarly attendant on +missionary enterprise. 'Tropical fever, for example, is due to many +subtle causes which are partly under man's control. A single hour's +exposure to sun, or wet, or fatigue, or mental agitation will determine +an attack.' What more simple than for God so to 'act on the minds of +the missionaries as to disincline them to take those courses which might +result in mischance, such as the forced march, the wetting, the +abstinence from food, or the night exposure?' What more simple, either, +it may be added, than for God to save prayerful soldiers from ever being +killed in battle by merely putting it into their minds to desert +whenever they are ordered upon active service? + +That 'the distribution of still-births is wholly unaffected by piety' +Mr. Galton has satisfied himself by finding, 'on examination of a +particular period, that the proportion of such births published in the +'Record' newspaper and in the 'Times' bore an identical relation to the +total number of deaths.' He had previously, we must suppose, satisfied +himself that advertisers in the 'Times' never say their prayers. + +For the asserted commonness of religious madness Mr. Galton cites no +evidence whatever, and, to judge from the sympathies and antipathies of +which one of his avowed opinions may be supposed to be the subject and +the object, speaks probably on this point solely from hearsay. Very +possibly, however, his assurance of the extraordinary prevalence of +insanity among British noblemen may be based on personal observation, +as, of course, is that regarding the prayerlessness of his own ducal +acquaintances. Birds of a feather, proverbially, flock together, and the +same touch of irreligion may quite possibly suffice to make certain +dukes and certain commoners kin. + +Against the inefficiency, however notorious, of the clerical element in +business committees, ought in fairness to be set the equally notorious +efficiency of Jesuits in whatever they undertake, the signal statecraft +displayed by the Wolseys, the Richelieus, and the Ximenes's of the days +in which cardinals and archbishops were permitted to take a leading +part in executive politics, and the very respectable figure still +presented by the lords spiritual, beside the lords temporal of the +British House of Peers. As for 'the common week-day opinion that praying +people are not practical,' those by whom it is entertained, of course, +mentally except praying Quakers. + +The fact that insurance offices do not attempt to distinguish between +the prayerful and the prayerless, but, treating both classes as liable +to the same risks, exact from both the same premiums, proves, I submit, +nothing against the efficacy of prayer, not even that the managers of +insurance offices do not believe in it. The statement that prayerful and +prayerless, when placing their money in the same dishonest keeping, or +engaging in the same bad speculations, suffer losses, bearing exactly +the same proportion to their respective ventures, although most probably +quite true, is also one which Mr. Galton has neglected to verify by the +application to it of any test, scientific or other. Finally, if the +disasters of the Royal British Bank are to be ascribed to its custom of +opening business with prayer, not only ought the cackle of Convocation +to be attributed to a similar cause, but also all the legislative +botchery of the House of Commons, and the abolition of prayer before +debate should be treated as the most urgently needed of those further +parliamentary reforms with which the fertile brains of certain eminent +statesmen are suspected to be teeming. + +Thus much by way of intimation that there would be no excessive temerity +in encountering Mr. Galton even on the ground of his own choosing, were +that ground really worth contending for. But baseless and exorbitant as +all Mr. Galton's postulates are, there is not one of them to which he +might not be made heartily welcome, for any effect its surrender could +have upon the real issue, the true nature whereof both Mr. Galton and +his principal coadjutor have, with marvellous sleight of eye, contrived +completely to overlook. Such Pharisees in science, such sticklers for +rigorously scientific method, might have been expected to begin by +authenticating the materials they proposed to operate upon, and, when +professing to experiment upon pure metal, at least to see that it was +not mere dross they were casting into the crucible. Plainly, however, +they despise any such nice distinctions. The most earnest prayer and the +emptiest ceremonial prate are both alike to them. What sort of a process +they imagine prayer to be may be at once perceived from the sort of +trials to which they desire to subject it. + +'After much thought and examination,' the coadjutor aforesaid--a bashful +Teucer, over whom Professor Tyndall has, like a second Ajax Telamon, +extended, with chivalrous haste, the shelter of his shield--does 'not +hesitate to propose that one single ward or hospital under the care of +first-rate physicians or surgeons, containing a number of patients +afflicted with those diseases which have been best studied, and of which +the mortality rates are best known, should be, during a period of not +less than three to five years, made the object of special prayer by the +whole body of the faithful, and that, at the end of that time, the +mortality rates should be compared with the past rates, and also with +those of other leading hospitals similarly well managed during the same +period.'[53] In suggesting this experiment, termed by himself +'exhaustive and complete,' its propounder imagines himself to be +offering to the faithful 'an occasion of demonstrating to the faithless +an imperishable record of the real power of prayer.' If, however, he +were himself petitioning for the reprieve of a condemned criminal, he +would scarcely expect to succeed, even with so tender-hearted a minister +as Mr. Bruce, if he were to let out in the course of his supplications, +that he did not care whether he succeeded or not, and was asking for the +reprieve solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the head of the +Home Office is really invested with the prerogative of mercy. Yet no +suspicion crosses his mind that the Searcher of Hearts may possibly be +displeased with prayers addressed to Him by the lips of those who were, +all the while, saying in their hearts that they did not want their +prayers to be granted, but only wanted to satisfy their curiosity to +know whether they would be granted or not. Equally remarkable is the +trustfulness of Mr. Galton, in opining that 'it would be perfectly +practicable to select out of the patients at different hospitals under +treatment for fractures, or amputations, or other common maladies, whose +course is so well understood as to admit of accurate tables being +constructed for their duration and result, two considerable groups, the +one consisting of markedly religious and piously befriended individuals, +the other of those who were remarkably cold-hearted and neglected; and +that, then, an honest comparison of their respective periods of +treatment, and the result, would manifest a distinct proof of the +efficacy of prayer, if it existed to even a minute fraction of the +amount that religious teachers exhort us to believe.' Evidently, he +imagines that it would be sufficient for the hospital authorities to +advertise--not of course, in the 'Times,' but in the 'Record'--and +that, thereupon, whoever, having entered into his closet and shut the +door, had, on behalf of any of the patients experimented upon, prayed to +the Father who seeth in secret, would at once come forth and proclaim +openly how he had been engaged. Not by 'arguments' of no greater +'cogency' than that of any based upon results thus obtainable, need +either of the two experimentalists expect to persuade praying people +that prayer is, 'in the natural course of events,' doomed to become +'obsolete, just as the Waters of Jealousy and the Urim and Thummin of +the Mosaic Law did in the times of the later Jewish Kings.' Not quite so +easily will they cause it to be 'abandoned to the domain of recognised +superstition,' just as belief in witches and in the Sovereign's touch as +a cure for scrofula, and 'many other items of ancient faith have already +successively been.' Both of them have, it seems, yet to learn that the +only prayer which is believed by people of some little enlightenment to +be of any avail, is the 'fervent, effectual prayer of a righteous man,' +prayer that cometh from 'a pure heart fervently,' prayer that is made +'with the spirit and with the understanding also.' Prayer of this sort +is not to be discredited by any abundance of statistical testimony to +the futility of cold lip-worship, or by any number of fresh examples of +the generally recognised fact that the children of this world are wiser +in their generation than the children of light. The recovery from the +very jaws of death of King Hezekiah, of Louis XV. of France, while as +yet undetected and _bien-aimé_, and of the present Prince of Wales, may, +none the less probably, have been in part due to the prayers offered up +for the first by himself, for the second, according to President Hénault +and Mr. Carlyle, by all Paris, and, for the third, by the whole British +empire, because _lessons_ appointed to be regularly said or _sung_ in +churches for the prolongation of the Sovereign's life, and said and sung +by the congregations to whom they are set, with equal regularity, +whether the Sovereign be well or ill, detested or beloved, are to all +appearance disregarded. Modern believers in prayer are well aware that, +although they ask, they may not receive if they ask amiss, and would +accept this as fully adequate explanation of the disappointment of +anyone, who had the face to pray that he might grow as rich as the late +Mr. Brassey, or be created a duke, or appointed Lord Chancellor, or +supplant Mr. Gladstone in the premiership, or Mr. D'Israeli in the +leadership of Her Majesty's Opposition. Moreover, the spirit, duly +seasoned with understanding, in which alone true prayer can be made, is +one, not of presumptuous dictation to a Heavenly Father, but of sincere +and grateful recognition that 'He knoweth better than ourselves what is +for our good.' Far from praying for selfish aggrandisement, we cannot, +if we pray aright, pray that, whether from ourselves or others, the cup +of affliction may pass away, without adding, 'Nevertheless, not as I +will, but as Thou wilt.' The only gifts that can with propriety be +prayed for unconditionally are gifts spiritual--cleansing of the +thoughts of the heart, strength to resist temptation, strength to endure +trials, strength to perform our appointed work; and whoever may think +fit to make these the subjects of statistical inquiry, may depend upon +being assured by everyone experimentally qualified to reply, that they +are never asked for faithfully without being obtained effectually; +together with large measure, if not of the cheerfulness, at least of the +patience, of hope. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[50] 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' pp. 25-8. + +[51] 'Fortnightly Review' for June 1868, 'Mr. Darwin's Hypotheses.' + +[52] 'Statistical Enquiries into the Efficacy of Prayer,' by Francis +Galton, in Fornightly Review,' for August 1872. + +[53] 'Contemporary Review,' July 1872. 'The Prayer for the Sick. Hints +towards a serious attempt to estimate its value.' Communicated by Prof. +Tyndall. + + + + +_EPILOGUE._ + + + If with rash step, or with presumptuous word + I have transgressed, or with unshrinking eye + Have sought to pierce the awful mystery + That veils thy Godhead, yet forgive me, Lord! + Thou knowest that I sought not to draw nigh + Thy Throne, save that my witness might record + More truly of Thine attributes, whereby + On Earth, e'en as in Heaven, might be adored + The fulness of Thy glory. Not in wrath + His trespass wilt Thou judge, whom, licence, bred + Of zeal, though blinded, yet devout, betrays, + Nor scorn the unconscious wanderer from Thy path, + Nor leave me hopeless, if indeed misled + By thirst for truth, more deep in error's maze. + + + + + LONDON: PRINTED BY + SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE + AND PARLIAMENT STREET + + + + +_BY THE SAME AUTHOR._ + + +ON LABOUR: + +ITS WRONGFUL CLAIMS AND RIGHTFUL DUES; + +ITS ACTUAL PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE. + +SECOND EDITION. + +8vo. cloth, price 14_s._ + +'This is a book which all true economists should welcome.' + + ECONOMIST.. + + + +'It may be doubted whether any considerable economic work of equal merit +has appeared since the first publication of Mr. Mill's "Political +Economy."' + + ATHENÆUM. + + +MACMILLAN & CO., London. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND +COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS*** + + +******* This file should be named 29917-8.txt or 29917-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/9/9/1/29917 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre> +<p>Title: Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics</p> +<p> With Some of Their Applications</p> +<p>Author: William Thomas Thornton</p> +<p>Release Date: September 6, 2009 [eBook #29917]</p> +<p>Language: English</p> +<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> +<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS***</p> +<p> </p> +<h3>E-text prepared by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier,<br /> + and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> + (http://www.pgdp.net)</h3> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> + + + + + + + <h1>OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS</h1> + + <h3>AND</h3> + + <h1>COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS</h1> + + <h3><i>WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS</i></h3> + + + <h4>BY</h4> + + <h2>WILLIAM THOMAS THORNTON</h2> + + <h4>AUTHOR OF A TREATISE 'ON LABOUR'</h4> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + <p class="center">London<br /> + MACMILLAN AND CO.<br /> + 1873<br /><br /> + + <i>All rights reserved</i></p> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> + +<div class="centerbox"><p>'I entirely agree with you as to the ill tendency of the affected +doubts of some philosophers and the fantastical conceits of others. +I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have +quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools +for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word, that since this +revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature +and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so +that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before +were all mystery and riddle.'—<span class="smcap">Berkeley's Hylas and Philonous.</span> </p></div><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE.</h2> + + +<p>The book was all but finished, and only the Preface remained, over which +I was hesitating, apprehensive equally of putting into it too much and +too little, when one of the most frequent 'companions of my solitude' +came to my aid, shewing me, in fragments, a preface already nearly +written, and needing only a little piecing to become forthwith +presentable. Here it is.</p> + +<p>'In these sick days, in a world such as ours, richer than usual in +Truths grown obsolete, what can the fool think but that it is all a Den +of Lies wherein whoso will not speak and act Lies must stand idle and +despair?' Whereby it happens that for the artist who would fain minister +medicinally to the relief of folly, 'the publishing of a Work of Art,' +designed, like this, to redeem Truth from premature obsolescence, +'becomes almost a necessity.' For, albeit, 'in the heart of the speaker +there ought to be some kind of gospel tidings burning until it be +uttered, so that otherwise it were better for him that he altogether +held his peace,' still, than to have fire burning within, and not to put +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span>it forth, not many worse things are readily imaginable.</p> + +<p>'Has the word Duty no meaning? Is what we call Duty no divine messenger +and guide, but a false, earthly fantasm, made up of Desire and Fear?' In +that' Logic-mill of thine' hast thou 'an earthly mechanism for the +Godlike itself, and for grinding out Virtue from the husks of Pleasure? +I tell thee, Nay! Otherwise, not on Morality, but on Cookery, let us +build our stronghold. There, brandishing our frying-pan as censer, let +us offer up sweet incense to the Devil, and live at ease on the fat +things <i>he</i> has provided for his elect,' seeing that 'with stupidity and +sound digestion, man may front much.'</p> + +<p>Or, 'is there no God? or, at best, an absentee God, sitting idle ever +since the first Sabbath, at the outside of His universe, and <i>seeing</i> it +go?' Know that for man's well-being, whatever else be needed, 'Faith is +one thing needful.' Mark, 'how, with it, Martyrs, otherwise weak, can +cheerfully endure the shame and the cross; how, without it, worldlings +puke up their sick existence, by suicide, in the midst of luxury.' Of +how much else, 'for a pure moral nature, is not the loss of Religious +Belief the loss?' 'All wounds, the crush of long-continued Destitution, +the stab of false Friendship and of false Love, all wounds in the so +genial heart would have healed again had not the life-warmth of Faith +been withdrawn.' But this once lost, how recoverable? how, rather, ever +acquirable? 'First must the dead Letter of Religion own itself dead, and +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span>drop piecemeal into dust, if the living Spirit of Religion, freed from +this, its charnel house, is to arise on us, new born of Heaven, and with +new healing under its wings.'</p> + +<p>Beside these burning words of Mr. Carlyle any additional words of mine +would stand only as superfluous foils, and are, therefore, considerately +pretermitted.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap" style="margin-left: 2em;">Cadogan Place:</span> <i>December 1872.</i></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS.</h2> + + + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" width="65%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><td> </td><td align='left'>CHAPTER</td><td align='right'>PAGE</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>I.</td><td align='left'>ANTI-UTILITARIANISM</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_1'><b>1</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>II.</td><td align='left'>HISTORY'S SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_84'><b>84</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>III.</td><td align='left'>DAVID HUME AS A METAPHYSICIAN</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_113'><b>113</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>IV.</td><td align='left'>HUXLEYISM</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_158'><b>158</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>V.</td><td align='left'>RECENT PHASES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_199'><b>199</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>VI.</td><td align='left'>LIMITS OF DEMONSTRABLE THEISM</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_266'><b>266</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td><td align='left'>EPILOGUE</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_298'><b>298</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span><br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><br /><br /><a name="OLD-FASHIONED_ETHICS" id="OLD-FASHIONED_ETHICS"></a>OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS<br /> + +AND<br /> + +COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS<br /><br /></h2> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I.</h2> + +<h3><i>ANTI-UTILITARIANISM.</i></h3> + + +<h3>I.</h3> + +<p>Having, by the heading of this essay, announced that it is intended to +be partly controversial, I can scarcely begin better than by furnishing +the reader with the means of judging whether I myself correctly +apprehend the doctrine which I am about to criticise. If, then, I were +myself an Utilitarian, and, for the sake either of vindicating my own +belief, or of making converts of other people, had undertaken to explain +what Utilitarianism is, I should set about the task somewhat in this +wise:—</p> + +<p>The sole use and sole object of existence is enjoyment or pleasure, +which two words will here be treated as synonymous; happiness, also, +though not quite identical in meaning, being occasionally substituted +for them. Enjoyment, it must be observed, is of very various kinds, +measures, and degrees. It may be sensual, or emotional, or imaginative, +or intellectual, or moral. It may be momentary or eternal; intoxicating +delight or sober satisfaction. It may be unmixed and undisturbed, in +which case, however short of duration or coarse in quality, it may in +strictness be called happiness; or it may be troubled and alloyed, +although of a flavour which would be exquisite if pure, and if there +were nothing to interfere with the per<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span>ception of it. Understood, +however, in a sufficiently comprehensive sense, enjoyment or pleasure +may be clearly perceived to be the sole object of existence. The whole +value of life plainly consists of the enjoyment, present or future, +which life affords, or is capable of affording or securing. Now, the +excellence of all rules depends on their conduciveness to the object +they have in view. The excellence of all rules of life must, therefore, +depend on their conduciveness to the sole object which life has in view, +viz., enjoyment. But the excellence of rules of life, or of conduct or +modes of acting, would seem to be but another name for their morality, +and the morality of actions obviously depends on their conformity to +moral rules. Whence, if so much be admitted, it necessarily follows that +the test of the morality of actions is their conduciveness to enjoyment.</p> + +<p>But the enjoyment thus referred to is not that of the agent alone, for +if it were, no action whatever could possibly be immoral. Whatever any +one does, he does either because to do it gives him or promises him +pleasure, or because he believes that the not doing it would subject him +to more pain than he will suffer from doing it. Besides, one person's +enjoyment may be obtained at the expense of other people's suffering, so +that an act in which the actor takes pleasure may destroy or prevent +more pleasure altogether than it creates. The enjoyment or happiness, +therefore, which Utilitarianism regards, is not individual, but general +happiness; not that of one or of a few, but of the many, nor even of the +many only. It is often declared to be the greatest happiness of the +greatest number, but it may with more accuracy be described as the +largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> +concerned.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Again, an action which, in some particular instance, +causes more pleasure than pain to those affected by it, may yet belong +to a class of actions which, in the generality of cases, causes more +pain than pleasure, and may thus involve a violation of a moral rule, +and, consequently, be itself immoral. Wherefore the enjoyment which +Utilitarianism adopts as its moral test is not simply the greatest sum +of enjoyment for all concerned, but that greatest sum in the greatest +number of cases. In its widest signification it is the greatest +happiness of society at large and in the long run. From these premises a +decisive criterion of right and wrong may be deduced. Every action +belonging to a class calculated to promote the permanent happiness of +society is right. Every action belonging to a class opposed to the +permanent happiness of society is wrong.</p> + +<p>In the foregoing exposition I have, I trust, evinced a sincere desire to +give Utilitarianism its full due, and I shall at least be admitted to +have shown myself entirely free from most of those more vulgar +misconceptions of its nature which have given its professors such just +offence. Many of its assailants have not scrupled to stigmatise as +worthy only of swine a doctrine which represents life as having no +better and nobler object of desire and pursuit than pleasure. To these, +however, it has, by the great apostle of Utilitarianism,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> been +triumphantly replied that it is really they themselves who insult human +nature by using language that assumes human beings to be capable of no +higher pleasures than those of which swine are capable; and that, +moreover, if the assumption were correct, and if the capacities of men +and of swine were identical, whatever rule of life were good enough for +the latter would likewise be good enough for the former. But I am not an +assailant of this description. Inasmuch as there undeniably are very +many and very various kinds of pleasure, I of course allow +Utilitarianism credit for common sense enough to acknowledge that those +kinds are most worthy of pursuit which, from whatever cause, possess +most value—that those which are most precious are those most to be +prized. But whoever allows thus much will have no alternative but to +concede a great deal more. The most precious of pleasures is that which +arises from the practice of virtue, as may be proved conclusively in the +only way of which the case admits, viz., by reference to the fact that, +whoever is equally acquainted with that and with other pleasures, +deliberately prefers it to all the rest, will, if necessary, forego all +others for its sake, and values no others obtainable only at its +expense. By necessary implication it follows that, as being more +valuable than any other, the pleasure arising from the practice of +virtue must be that which Utilitarianism recommends above all others as +an object of pursuit. But the pursuit of this particular pleasure and +the practice of virtue are synonymous terms. What, therefore, +Utilitarianism above all other things recommends and insists upon is the +practice of virtue. Now, the practice of virtue commonly involves +subordination of one's own interest to that of other people; indeed, +virtue would not be virtue in the utilitarian<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> sense of the word unless +it did involve such subordination. Wherefore the pleasure arising from +the practice of virtue, the pleasure which occupies the highest place on +the utilitarian scale, and that which Utilitarianism exhorts its +disciples chiefly to seek after, is nothing else than the pleasure +derived from attending to other people's pleasure instead of to our own.</p> + +<p>Nor is this all. In order adequately to appreciate the loftiness of +utilitarian teaching, and its utter exemption from the sordidness with +which it is ignorantly charged, we must devote a few moments to +examination of those distinctive peculiarities of different kinds of +pleasure which entitle them to different places in our esteem.</p> + +<p>All pleasures may be arranged under five heads, and in regularly +ascending series, as follows:—</p> + +<p>1. Sensual pleasures:—To wit, those of eating and drinking, and +whatever others are altogether of the flesh, fleshly.</p> + +<p>2. Emotional, by which are to be understood agreeable moods of the mind, +such as, irrespectively of any agreeable idea brought forward +simultaneously by association, are produced by music ('for,' as Milton +says, 'eloquence the soul, song charms the sense'), by beauty of form or +colour, by genial sunshine, by balmy or invigorating air.</p> + +<p>3. Imaginative, or pleasures derived from the contemplation of mental +pictures.</p> + +<p>4. Intellectual, or those consequent on exercise of the reasoning +powers.</p> + +<p>5. Moral, or those which are alluded to when virtue is spoken of as +being its own reward.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span></p> + +<p>That of these several kinds, each of the last four is preferable to any +preceding it on the list will, it is to be hoped, be allowed to pass as +an unquestioned truth, for to any one perverse enough to deny it, the +only answer that can be made is an appeal to observation in proof that +all persons who are equally acquainted with the several kinds do exhibit +the preferences indicated. Neither, so far as the two kinds first-named +alone are concerned, is it possible to go much more deeply into the +reasons why emotional pleasures are to be preferred to sensual, than by +pointing to the fact that all competent judges of both are observed to +like the former best. If all those who are endowed with equal +sensitiveness of ear and of palate prefer music to feasting, and would +any day give up a dinner at Francatelli's for the sake of hearing a +rejuvenescent Persiani as Zerlina, or Patti as Dinorah, the one thing +presumable is, that all such persons derive more enjoyment from perfect +melody than from perfect cookery, and little else remains to be said on +the subject. The same ultimate fact need not, however, limit our inquiry +as to the preferableness of imaginative or intellectual to emotional +pleasures, and of moral to any of the other three. This admits of, and +demands, a more subtle explanation, from which we may learn, not merely +that certain preferences are shown, but also why they are shown. The +preferences in question are demonstrably not due to the greater +poignancy of the pleasures preferred. It is simply not true that the +keenest of imaginative pleasures is keener than the keenest of +emotional, and still less that the keenest of intellectual is so. The +very reverse is the truth. The supremest delight attainable in fancy's +most romantic flight is, I suspect, faint in comparison with the sort of +ecstasy into which a child of freshly-strung nerves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> is sometimes thrown +by the mere brilliance or balminess of a summer's day, and with which +even we, dulled adults, provided we be in the right humour, and that all +things are in a concatenation accordingly, are now and then momentarily +affected while listening to the wood-notes wild of a nightingale, or a +Jenny Lind, or while gazing on star-lit sky or moon-lit sea, or on the +snowy or dolomite peaks of a mountain range fulgent with the violet and +purple glories of the setting sun. And yet the choicest snatches of such +beatitude with which—at least, after the fine edge of our +susceptibilities has been worn away by the world's friction—we +creatures of coarse human mould are ever indulged, are but poor in +comparison with the rich abundance of the same in which some more +delicately-constituted organisms habitually revel. If we would +understand of what development emotional delight is capable, we should +watch the skylark. As that 'blithe spirit' now at heaven's gate 'poureth +its full heart,' and anon can</p> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 4em;">Scarce get out his notes for joy,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">But shakes his song together as he nears</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">His happy home, the ground,</span><br /> +</p> + +<p>what poet but must needs confess with Shelley, that in his most +rapturous dream, his transport never came nigh the bird's? And yet what +poet would change conditions with the lark? Nay, what student or +philosopher would? albeit the utmost gratification ever earned by either +of these in the prosecution of his special calling—in acquiring +knowledge, in solving knotty problems, or in scaling the heights of +abstract contemplation—is probably as inferior in keenness of zest to +that which the poet knows, as the best prose is inferior in charm to the +best poetry. It may even be that both poet and philosopher owe, on the +whole, more<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> unhappiness than happiness—the one to his superior +sensibility, the other to his superior enlightenment, and yet neither +would exchange his own lesser happiness for the greater happiness of the +lark. Why would he not? It is no sufficient answer to say that in the +lark's happiness there are few, if any, imaginative or intellectual +ingredients; that it is almost utterly unideal, almost purely emotional, +exactly the same in kind, and only higher in degree, than the glee of +puppies or kittens at play. The question recurs as forcibly as ever, +why—seeing that enjoyment is the one thing desirable, the only thing +either valuable in itself, or that gives value to other things—why is +it that no intelligent man would accept, in lieu of his own, another +mode of existence, in which, although debarred from the joys of thought +and fancy, he nevertheless has reason to believe that the share of +enjoyment falling to his lot would be greater, both in quantity and +sapidity, than it is at present? The following seems to me to be the +explanation of the mystery.</p> + +<p>It might be too much to say that nothing can please a person who is not +pleased with himself, but it is at any rate clear that nothing can +greatly please him which interferes with his self-satisfaction. Now +imaginative and intellectual enjoyment, each of them, involves the +exercise of a special and superior faculty, mere consciousness of the +possession of which helps to make the possessor satisfied with himself. +It exalts what Mr. Mill aptly terms his sense of dignity, a sense +possessed in some form or other by every human being, and one so +essential to that self-satisfaction without which all pleasure would be +tasteless, that nothing which conflicts with it can be an object of +serious desire. In virtue of this special faculty, the most<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> wretched of +men holds himself to be superior to the most joyous of larks. To divest +himself of it would be to lower himself towards the level of the bird, +and to commit such an act of self-degradation would occasion to him an +amount of pain which he is not disposed to incur for the sake of any +amount of pleasure obtainable at its expense. It is, then, the fear of +pain which prevents his wishing to be turned into a lark. He is not +ignorant that he would be happier for the metamorphosis, but he dreads +the pain that must precede the increase of happiness, more than he +desires the increase of happiness that would follow the pain.</p> + +<p>The force of these considerations will be equally, or more apparent, on +their being applied to analysis of moral pleasures. That these are the +most truly precious of all pleasures, is proved by their being +habitually more highly prized than any others by all who are qualified +to make the comparison. But why are they so prized? Not, as I am +constrained, however reluctantly, to admit, on account of their greater +keenness as pleasures. It would be at best but well-meaning cant to +pretend that the self-approval, the sympathetic participation in other +people's augmented welfare, the grateful consciousness of having done +that which is pleasing in our Heavenly Father's sight, together with +whatever else helps to compose the internal reward of virtue, constitute +a sum total of delight nearly as exquisite as that which may be obtained +in a variety of other ways. The mere circumstance of there being +invariably included in a just or generous action more or less of +self-denial, self-restraint, or self-sacrifice, must always sober down +the gratification by which virtue is rewarded, and make it appear tame +beside the delirium of gladness caused by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> many things with which virtue +has nothing to do. We will charitably suppose that the occupant of a +dukedom, who should secretly light upon conclusive proof that it was not +his by right, would at once abandon it to the legal heir, and we need +not doubt that he would subsequently be, on the whole, well content to +have so acted, but we cannot suppose that he would make the surrender +with anything like the elation with which he entered on the estate and +title. If there were really no pleasure equal to that with which virtue +recompenses its votaries, the performance of a virtuous act would always +make a man happier than previously; moreover, the greater the virtue, +the greater would be the consequent pleasure. But any one may see that +an act of the most exalted virtue, far from increasing, often utterly +destroys the agent's happiness. Imagine an affectionate father, some +second Brutus or second Fitzstephen of Galway, constrained by +overwhelming sense of duty to sentence a beloved son to death, or a +bankrupt beggaring himself and his family by honestly making over to his +creditors property with which he might have safely absconded. Plainly, +such virtuous achievement, far from adding to the happiness of its +author, has plunged him in an abyss of misery, his only comfort being +that in the lowest deep there is, as we shall presently see, a lower +deep still. Far from being happier than he was before acting as he has +done, he would be much happier if, being vicious instead of virtuous, he +had not felt bound so to act. Unquestionably, what either upright judge +or honest bankrupt has incurred—the one by becoming a saticide, the +other by making himself a beggar—is pure and simple pain, unmitigated +by one particle of positive pleasure. Yet it is at the same time certain +that the virtue of each has in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> some form or other given full +compensation for the pain it has occasioned, for not only was that pain +deliberately incurred in lieu of the pleasure which it has supplanted, +but restoration of the pleasure would now be refused, if reversal of the +virtuous conduct were made a condition of the restoration. In what, +then, does the compensation consist? In nothing else than this, in judge +or bankrupt having been saved from pain still greater than that which he +is actually suffering. Wretched as he is, infinitely more wretched than +he was before there was any call upon him to act as he has done, he is +less wretched than he would be if, recognising the obligation so to act, +he had not so acted. He has escaped the stings of conscience, the sense +of having wronged his neighbour and offended his God; he has escaped, in +short, self-condemnation—a torment so intolerable to those so +constituted as to be susceptible of it, that hell itself has been known +to be, in imagination at least, preferred to it. Mr. Mill's splendid +outburst that, rather than worship a fiend that could send him to hell +for refusing, he would go to hell as he was bid, will doubtless occur to +every reader.</p> + +<p>This, however, is all. In both the supposed cases, as in every one in +which virtue consists of compliance with a painful duty, the pleasure +arising from the practice of virtue cannot in strictness be called +pleasure at all. At best it is but a partial negation of pain; more +properly, indeed, the substitution of one pain for another more acute. +Yet this mere negation, this ethereal inanity, is pronounced by +Utilitarianism to be preferable to aught that can come into competition +with it. Truly it is somewhat hard upon those who attend to such +teaching, to be reproached with their grossness of taste and likened to +hogs, for no better<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> reason than their predilection for the lightest of +all conceivable diets. Still harder will this seem, when we recollect +that Utilitarians are exhorted to be virtuous, less for their own than +for other people's sakes. If, indeed, virtue were practised by all +mankind, the utilitarian idea of the greatest possible happiness, or, at +least, of the greatest possible exemption from unhappiness, would be +universally realised. Still, it is in order that they may afford +pleasure to the community at large, rather than that they may obtain it +for themselves; it is that they may save, not so much themselves, as the +community, from pain, that individual Utilitarians are charged to be +virtuous. Among those pleasures, whether positive or negative, which it +is allowable to them to seek for themselves, the first place is assigned +to the pleasure arising from the sense of giving pleasure to others. +Thus, not only is it the purest of pleasures that Utilitarianism chiefly +recommends for pursuit: even that pleasure is to be pursued only from +the purest and most disinterested motives.</p> + +<p>All this I frankly acknowledge; and I own, too, that, far from deserving +to be stigmatised as irreligious, Utilitarianism is literally nothing +else than an amplification of one moiety of Christianity; that it not +adopts merely, but expands, 'the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth,' +exhorting us to love our neighbour, not simply as well, but better than +ourselves; to do for others, not simply what we would have them do for +us, but much more than we could have the face to ask them to do; not +merely not to pursue our interests at the expense of theirs, but to +regard as our own chief interest the promotion of theirs. That on +account of these exhortations Utilitarianism is godless can be supposed +by those only who suppose that love to one's neigh<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span>bour is contrary to +the will of God. By those who believe that works are the best signs of +faith, and that love to God is best evinced by doing good to man, +Utilitarianism might rather seem to be but another name for practical +religion.</p> + +<p>So I say in all sincerity, though not without some misgiving, as while +so speaking I involuntarily bethink myself of Balaam, son of Beor, who +having been called forth to curse, caught himself blessing altogether. +Mine eyes, too, have been opened to the good of that which I was +purposed to condemn, and behold I have as yet done nothing but eulogise. +No warmest partisan of Utilitarianism, not Mr. Mill himself, ever spoke +more highly of it than I have just been doing. What censures, then, can +I have in reserve to countervail such praises? What grounds of quarrel +can I have with a system of ethics which I have described as ever +seeking the noblest ends from the purest motives; whose precepts I own +to be as elevating as its aims are exalted? On reflection, I am +reassured by recollecting several, which I proceed to bring forward one +at a time, beginning with a sin enormous enough to cover any multitude +of merits.</p> + +<p>My first charge against Utilitarianism is that it is not true. I do not +say that there is no truth in it. That I have found much to admire in +its premises has been frankly avowed; and in one, at least, of the +leading deductions from those premises I partially concur. I admit that +acts utterly without utility must likewise be utterly without worth; +that conduct which subserves the enjoyment neither of oneself nor of any +one else, cannot, except in a very restricted sense, be termed right; +that conduct which interferes with the enjoyment both of oneself and of +all others,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> which injuring oneself injures others also, and benefits no +one, cannot be otherwise than wrong; that purely objectless asceticism +which has not even self-discipline in view, is not virtue, but folly; +that misdirected charity which, engendering improvidence, creates more +distress than it relieves, is not virtue, but criminal weakness. But +though admitting that there can be no virtue without utility, I do not +admit either that virtue must be absent unless utility preponderate, or +that if utility preponderate virtue must be present. I deny that any +amount of utility can of itself constitute virtue. I deny that whatever +adds to the general happiness must be right. Equally do I deny that +whatever diminishes the general happiness or prevents its increasing +must be wrong. An action, be it observed, may be right in three +different senses. It may be right as being meritorious, and deserving of +commendation. It may be right as being that which one is bound to do, +for the doing of which, therefore, one deserves no praise, and for +neglecting to do which one would justly incur blame. It may be right +simply as not being wrong—as being allowable—something which one has a +right to do, though to refrain from doing it might perhaps be +praiseworthy. There will be little difficulty in adducing examples of +conduct which, though calculated to diminish the sum total of happiness, +would be right in the first of these senses. Nothing can be easier than +to multiply examples of such conduct that would be right in the third +sense. I proceed to cite cases which will answer both these purposes, +and likewise the converse one of showing that conduct calculated to +increase the general happiness may nevertheless be wrong.</p> + +<p>When the Grecian chiefs, assembled at Aulis, were<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> waiting for a fair +wind to convey them to Ilium, they were, we are told, warned by what was +to them as a voice from heaven, that their enterprise would make no +progress unless Agamemnon's daughter were sacrificed to Diana. In order +to place the details of the story in a light as little favourable as +possible to my argument, we will deviate somewhat from the accepted +version, and will suppose that the arrested enterprise was one of even +greater pith and moment than tradition ascribes to it. We will suppose +that upon its successful prosecution depended the national existence of +Greece; that its failure would have involved the extermination of +one-half of the people, and the slavery of the other half. We will +suppose, too, that of all this Iphigenia was as firmly persuaded as +every one else. In these circumstances, had her countrymen a right to +insist on her immolation? If so, on what was that right founded? Is it +sufficient to say in reply that her death was essential to the national +happiness, to the extent even of being indispensable to prevent that +happiness from being converted into national woe? Manifestly, according +to the hypothesis, it was expedient for all concerned, with the single +exception of herself, that she should die; but were the others thereby +entitled to take her life? Did the fact of its being for their advantage +to do this warrant their doing it? Simply because it was their interest, +was it also their right? Right, we must recollect, invariably implies +corresponding duty. Right, it is clear, can never be rightfully +resisted. If it be the right of certain persons to do a certain thing, +it must be the duty of all other persons to let that thing be done. +Where there is no such duty, there can be no such right. Wherefore, if +the 'stern, black-bearded<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> kings, with wolfish eyes,' who sate 'waiting +to see her die,' had a right to kill Iphigenia, it must have been +Iphigenia's duty to let herself be killed. Was this then her duty? +'Duty,' as I have elsewhere observed,<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> 'signifies something due, a +debt, indebtedness, and a debt cannot have been incurred for nothing, or +without some antecedent step on the part either of debtor or creditor.' +But it is not pretended that in any way whatever, by any antecedent act +of hers or theirs, Iphigenia had incurred or had been subjected to a +debt to her countrymen which could be paid off only with her life. It +could not, then, be incumbent on her to let her life be taken in +payment. If it had been in her power to burst her bonds, and break +through the wolves in human shape that girdled her in, she would have +been guilty of no wrong by escaping. But if not, then, however +meritorious it might have been on her part to consent to die for her +countrymen, it was not her duty so to die, nor, consequently, had they a +right to put her to death. She would have been at least negatively right +in refusing to die, while they were guilty of a very positive and a very +grievous wrong in killing her, notwithstanding that both she and they +were perfectly agreed that for her to be killed would be for the +incalculably greater happiness of a greater number, exceeding the lesser +number in the proportion of several hundreds of thousands to one.</p> + +<p>It is true that throughout this affair every one concerned was labouring +under a gross delusion—that there was no real use in putting Iphigenia +to death, and that nothing but superstition made anybody suppose there +was. I do not think the case is one less to our purpose on that account, +for Utilitarians, like other fallible mortals, are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> liable to deceive +themselves. They never can be quite secure of the genuineness of the +utility on which they rely, and in default of positive knowledge they +will always be reduced to act, as the Grecian chiefs did, according to +the best of their convictions. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of +those who distrust romance and insist upon reality, we will leave fable +for fact, and take as our next illustration an incident that may any day +occur.</p> + +<p>Imagine three shipwrecked mariners to have leapt from their sinking +vessel into a cockboat scarce big enough to hold them, and the two +slimmer of the three to have presently discovered that there was little +or no chance of either of them reaching land unless their over-weighted +craft were lightened of their comparatively corpulent companion. Next, +imagine yourself in the fat sailor's place, and then consider whether +you would feel it incumbent on you to submit quietly to be drowned in +order that the residuum of happiness might be greater than if either you +all three went to the bottom, or than if you alone were saved. Would you +not, far from recognising any such moral obligation, hold yourself +morally justified in throwing the other two overboard, if you were +strong enough, and if need were, to prevent their similarly ousting you? +But if it were not your duty to allow yourself to be cast into the sea, +the others could have no right to cast you out; so that, if they did +cast you out, they would clearly be doing not right but wrong. And yet, +as clearly, their wrong-doing would have conduced to the greater +happiness of the greater number, inasmuch as, while only one life could +otherwise have been saved, it would save two, and inasmuch as, +<i>cœteris paribus</i>, two persons would necessarily derive twice as much +enjoyment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> from continued existence as one would. Moreover, their +wrong-doing would be of a kind calculated always to produce similarly +useful results. It cannot, I suppose, be denied that a rule to the +effect that whenever forfeiture of one life would save two, one life +should be sacrificed, would—not exceptionally only, but at large and in +the long run—conduce to the saving of life, and therefore to the +conservation of happiness connected with life.</p> + +<p>The foregoing cases are no doubt both of them extreme, involving +exaction of the largest possible private sacrifice for the general good; +but in all cases of the kind, whether the exaction be small or great, +the same governing principle equally applies. If you, a foot-sore, +homeward-bound pedestrian, on a sweltering July day, were to see your +next-door neighbour driving in the same direction in solitary state, +would you have a right to stop his carriage and force yourself in? Nay, +even though you had just before fallen down and broken your leg, would +the compassionating by-standers be justified in forcing him to take you +in? Or, again, if you were outside a coach during a pelting shower, and +saw a fellow-passenger with a spare umbrella between his legs, while an +unprotected female close beside was being drenched with the rain, would +you have a right to wrest the second umbrella from him, and hold it over +her? That, very likely, is what you would do in the circumstances, and +few would be disposed greatly to blame the indignant ebullition. Still, +unless you are a disciple of Proudhon, you will scarcely pretend that +you can have a right to take possession of another's carriage or +umbrella against the owner's will. You can scarcely suppose that it is +not for him but for you to decide what use shall be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> made of articles +belonging not to you but to him. Yet there can be no doubt that the +happiness of society would be vastly promoted if everyone felt himself +under an irresistible obligation to assist his neighbour whenever he +could do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, or, +consequently, if external force were always at hand to constrain anyone +so to assist who was unwilling to do so of his own accord.</p> + +<p>So much in proof that among things of the highest and most extensive +utility there are several which it would be decidedly the reverse of +right to do, and several others which it would be perfectly right to +leave undone. I proceed to show that there are many other things not +simply not of preponderating utility, but calculated, on the contrary, +to do more harm than good, to destroy more happiness than they are +capable of creating, which, nevertheless, it would be not simply +allowable to do, but the doing of which would be highly meritorious, +acts possibly of the most exalted virtue.</p> + +<p>Let no one distrust the doctrine of development by reason of its +supposed extravagance of pretension who has not duly considered to what +a sublime of moral beauty the united hideousness and absurdity of +Calvinism may give birth. In that Puritan society of New England of +which Mrs. Beecher Stowe has given so singularly interesting an account +in her 'Minister's Wooing,' and among whose members it was an universal +article of belief that the bulk of mankind are created for the express +purpose of being consigned to everlasting flames, there are said to have +been not a few enthusiasts in whom a self-concentrating creed begat the +very quintessence of self-devotion. 'As a gallant soldier renounces life +and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> personal aims in the cause of his king and country, and holds +himself ready to be drafted for a forlorn hope, to be shot down, or help +to make a bridge of his mangled body, over which the more fortunate +shall pass to victory and glory,' so among the early descendants of the +Pilgrim Fathers many an one 'regarded himself as devoted to the King +Eternal, ready in his hands to be used to illustrate and build up an +eternal commonwealth, either by being sacrificed as a lost spirit, or +glorified as a redeemed one; ready to throw, not merely his mortal life, +but his immortality even, into the forlorn hope, to bridge, with a +never-dying soul, the chasm over which white-robed victors should pass +to a commonwealth of glory and splendour, whose vastness should dwarf +the misery of all the lost to an infinitesimal.' And while by many the +idea of suffering everlasting pains for the glory of God, and the good +of being in general, was thus contemplated with equanimity, there were +some few for whom the idea of so suffering for the good of others dearer +than themselves would have been greeted with positive exultation. 'And +don't I care for your soul, James?' exclaims Mary Scudder to her lover. +'If I could take my hopes of heaven out of my own heart and give them to +you, I would. Dr. H. preached last Sunday on the text, "I could wish +myself accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen," and he went on +to show how we must be willing to give up even our own salvation, if +necessary, for the good of others. People said it was a hard doctrine, +but I could feel my way through it. Yes, I would give my soul for yours. +I wish I could.' Now we must on no account permit admiration of Miss +Scudder's transcendent generosity in desiring to make this exchange +blind us to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> the fatal effect on social happiness which, if such +exchange were possible, the prevalence of a disposition to make it could +not fail to have. If Calvinism were true instead of blasphemous, if God +were really the Moloch it represents Him, and if, moreover, Moloch were +indifferent as to which of his offspring were cast into the fire, caring +only that the prescribed number of victims should be forthcoming in full +tale, nothing can be conceived more likely to prove an encouragement to +evil-doers, and a terror to them that did well, than observation that +well-doing not infrequently led to eternal misery, and evil-doing to +eternal bliss. Again, if in China, where criminals under sentence of +death are permitted, if they can, by purchase or otherwise, to procure +substitutes to die in their stead, a son were to propose to die for a +parent base enough to take advantage of the offer, could any arrangement +be more plainly repugnant to the common-weal than that by which society +would thus lose one of its noblest, instead of getting rid of one of its +vilest members? Or, when in England, a thrifty son, by consenting to cut +the entail of an estate to which he is heir-apparent, enables a prodigal +father to consume in riotous living substance which would otherwise have +eventually become his, is he not clearly taking the worse course for the +public by permitting the property to be wasted, instead of causing it to +be husbanded?</p> + +<p>Beyond all question, American Puritan, Chinese or English devotee to +filial affection, would thus, each in her or his degree, have, in the +circumstances supposed, acted in a manner opposed to the general +interest, and would therefore be condemned by Utilitarianism as having +acted immorally. Nor could this verdict be gainsaid if utility<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> and +morality were, as Utilitarianism assumes them to be, one and the same +thing. Clearly, that the just should suffer for the unjust, the innocent +for the guilty, is diametrically opposed to the welfare of society; +wherefore, according to utilitarian principles, by consenting so to +suffer, the just becomes unjust, the innocent renders himself guilty. +But can there be a better proof that utilitarian principles are unsound +than that this should be a legitimate deduction from them? Can there be +better proof that utility and morality are not identical, but two +absolutely distinct things? Plainly, there can be no meritorious or +commendable immorality; neither can there be any virtue which is not +meritorious and commendable. Is there, then, no merit, nothing +commendable, in accepting ruin or in volunteering to die temporarily, or +to perish everlastingly, in order to save a fellow-creature from ruin, +or death, or perdition? Does not such conduct, considered independently +and without reference either to its utility or its hurtfulness, command +our instantaneous and enthusiastic admiration? But how, being so +admirable, can it be immoral? how other than virtuous? What else is it, +indeed, but the very perfection of that purest virtue which, content to +be its own reward, deliberately cuts itself off from all other +recompense? Without changing the immemorial meaning of the most familiar +words, there is no avoiding the obvious answers to these questions. If +virtue and morality, right and wrong, are to continue to mean anything +like that which, except by Utilitarians, has always been considered to +be their only meaning, it is not simply not wrong, it is not simply +right, it is among the highest achievements of virtue and morality to +sacrifice your own in order to secure another's happiness, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> the +disinterestedness, and therefore the virtue, is surely the greater, +rather than less, if you sacrifice more happiness of your own than you +secure to another. So much follows necessarily from what has been said, +and something more besides. It follows further that Utilitarianism is +not less in error in declaring that actions calculated to diminish the +total sum of happiness must necessarily be wrong, cannot possibly be +allowable, still less meritorious, than it had previously been shown to +be in declaring that actions calculated to augment the sum total of +happiness must necessarily be meritorious.</p> + +<p>There is but one way in which Utilitarianism can even temporarily rebut +the charge of fallacy, of which otherwise it must here stand convicted, +and that is by renouncing all claim to be a new system of ethics, and +not pretending to be more than a new system of nomenclature. And even +so, it could not help contradicting, and thereby refuting itself. That +nothing is right but what is of preponderating utility; that whatever is +of preponderating utility is right; these are propositions perfectly +intelligible, indeed, but which will be found to be tenable only on +condition that the very same things may be both right and wrong. The +confusion, thrice confounded, inseparable from the substitution of such +novel definitions for those which had previously been universally in +vogue, is but the smaller of two evils which must thence arise. It would +be bad enough that the word 'right' could not be used without raising +doubt whether what people had previously understood by the 'just' or the +'generous,' or only the 'expedient' were meant; but a still worse +consequence would be that, even if no doubt of the sort were +entertained, and if all men were agreed to take the word in none but its +utilitarian<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> sense, the landmarks of right and wrong would thereby be +well nigh obliterated. Due credit has already been given to +Utilitarianism for its exemplary zeal in inculcating the practice of +virtue, but its merit in that respect is more than neutralised by its +equally zealous inculcation of principles, according to which it is +impossible to decide beforehand whether any particular practice will be +virtuous or not.</p> + +<p>This is my second charge against Utilitarianism. I maintain it to be a +doctrine in most of its essentials erroneous; but I maintain, further, +that, even if it were correct, instead of furnishing us with an +infallible criterion of right and wrong, it would deprive us of the +means of clearly distinguishing between right and wrong at all times at +which the power of so distinguishing is of practical value. Bluntly +enough, I have pronounced it to be false. With equal bluntness, I now +add that, even if it were true, it would, all the same, be practically +mischievous, and directly opposed to the very utility from which it +takes its name. The argument in support of this charge shall now be +stated.</p> + +<p>According to utilitarian ethics, the morality of actions depends wholly +and solely on their consequences. On this point the language of +authority is distinct, emphatic, unanimous, and self-contradictory. +'Utilitarian moralists,' says the chief amongst them, 'have gone beyond +all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the +morality of an action.... He who saves a fellow-creature from drowning +does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of +being paid for his trouble.' Upon which I would observe, in passing, +that to save a fellow-creature from drowning can be deemed to be +necessarily right by none but uncompro<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span>mising opponents of capital +punishment. Most others will be disposed to doubt its having been a +sufficient reason for commuting the sentence of death passed upon the +murderer of Dhuleep Sing's gamekeeper, that, owing to physical +malformation, hanging might perhaps have given him more than ordinary +pain in the neck, or perhaps have prolonged the pleasure which, +according to the select few qualified to speak from experience, is +attendant on that mode of strangulation. Neither, without sacrificing +his judgment to his feelings, could one of these doubters, if Rutherford +had been sentenced to be drowned instead of hanged, have stretched out a +hand to save the miscreant from the watery grave he so richly deserved. +That there are no actions which by reason of their beneficial +consequences are always and invariably moral, might be too much to +affirm; but I have no hesitation in saying that there are thousands, the +morality or immorality of which—their results remaining the +same—depends absolutely on their motives. Thus, if two doctors—of +whom, for distinction's sake, we will call one Smethurst and the other +Smith—in attendance on patients afflicted with precisely the same +disease, were by the administration of overdoses of strychnine each to +kill his man, the only difference between them being that whereas one +intended and expected to kill, the other hoped to cure—would the act of +killing be equally immoral in both cases? Would it not in the one case +be murder, in the other mere error of judgment; and would both be +equally crimes, or would the latter be in any degree criminal? And if it +had been Smethurst instead of Smith who committed the error of +judgment—if the overdoses by which he had meant to kill had happened to +cure—would his error of judgment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> have thereby been rendered moral, +notwithstanding that his motive was murder?</p> + +<p>The same great teacher, who so strenuously insists that the motive has +nothing to do with the morality of an action, does indeed go on to say +that it has 'much to do with the worth of the agent.' Here, however, I +confess myself unable to follow him. That an act may possess morality +independent of the agent, may be intelligible on the assumption that +morality means simply utility, and nothing more; but how, even then, +worth can be evinced by the performance of an immoral action, is beyond +my comprehension, except upon the further assumption that there may be +worth in immorality.</p> + +<p>Waiving, however, these and all other objections, let us for the moment, +and for the sake of argument, assume that morality and utility are +really one and the same thing, that the right or wrong of an act depends +entirely on its results, and then let us observe how utterly without +rudder or compass to assist him in steering correctly will be the +best-intentioned navigator of the ocean of life.</p> + +<p>We can seldom, if ever, be quite sure what will be the result of our +conduct. Meaning to cure, we may only too probably kill; meaning to +kill, we may not impossibly cure. Until a thing is done, we cannot +determine as to its utility; nor, consequently, in an utilitarian sense, +as to the morality of doing it. We must trust implicitly to our skill in +calculating events, and if that skill happen to fail us, our conduct may +become culpable. With the most earnest desire to act righteously, we can +only guess beforehand whether what we propose doing will turn out to be +righteous, and can never be sure, therefore, that we are not going to do +something wicked.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p> + +<p>Here I shall, of course, and very properly, be reminded that what +Utilitarianism requires to be taken into account, are not merely the +probable consequences of some proposed act, but the usual consequences +of all acts of the same description; so that its disciples, instead of +being left to their conjectures about the future, may be said to have +all past experience to refer to. And undeniably Utilitarianism does +require this; thereby, however, contradicting itself as, I just now +hinted, it would presently be found doing. It does indeed declare those +actions only to be moral which in the long run are conducive to, or at +least not opposed to, the general happiness; but it also says that the +morality of each particular action depends on its own particular +consequences. So that the docile disciple who should do something which, +though useful in the long run, happened to be otherwise in his +particular case—who, for instance, should save the life of a +fellow-creature of whom it would have been well for the world to be rid, +would, to his disgust and bewilderment, find that while, with no desire +but that of acting rightly, he had been obeying one utilitarian law, he +had nevertheless been infringing another law of the same code, and +thereby acting wrongly.</p> + +<p>Overlooking, however, this incongruity of two equally authoritative +rules, let us proceed to consider what dangerous latitude of +interpretation is allowed to the followers of either of them. Those who +believe that the merit or demerit of each separate action depends on +that action's separate consequences, need seldom be at a loss for a +pretext for committing the most heinous of crimes. A husband who, hating +his wife, had his hate returned, and loving another woman, had his love +returned, might plausibly reason thus within himself: The prescribed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> +objects of life are the multiplication of happiness and the diminution +of misery; here are three of us, all doomed to be miserable as long as +we all three live; but the wretchedness of two of us might be at once +converted into happiness, if the third were put out of the way. By some +such logical process, Queen Mary and Bothwell may have satisfied +themselves of the propriety of blowing up Darnley: Mr. and Mrs. Manning, +as they sate at meat with their destined victim over his ready-made +grave, may have argued themselves into self-approval of the crowning +rite with which their hospitalities were to terminate: any scampish +apprentice with designs upon his master's till, any burglar plotting an +entry into a goldsmith's shop, may become convinced of his rectitude of +purpose, and even take credit for public-spirited zeal, in seeking to +appropriate to his own use part of another's wealth, which he may fairly +suppose would be productive of more enjoyment if divided between two or +more than if left in the hands of one, and that one already perhaps the +possessor of more than he knows what to do with.</p> + +<p>Precisely the same sophistry will not indeed suffice for those disciples +who, adopting the alternative law of the utilitarian code, feel bound to +attend to the consequences not of individual actions, but of classes of +actions. The cleverest self-deceiver can scarcely bring himself to +believe that, because it might suit his personal convenience to kill or +steal, killing and stealing would not be prejudicial to society if +generally practised. Still, it is only necessary to have, or to fancy +one has, public instead of private objects in view, in order to be able +to look with approbation, from an utilitarian point of view, on any +amount of homicide or robbery. It was the very same Robespierre that, +while as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> yet diocesan judge at Arras, felt constrained to abdicate +because, 'behold, one day comes a culprit whose crime merits hanging, +and strict-minded, strait-laced Max's conscience will not permit the +dooming of any son of Adam to die,' who, shortly after, when +sufficiently imbued with the utilitarian spirit, was fully prepared to +wade through floods of slaughter towards the enthronisation of his +principles—one of those principles evidently being that, if the +decimation of mankind would conduce to the greater happiness of the +residue, adding more to the happiness of the nine-tenths whom it spared +than it took from the tenth whom it destroyed, the said decimation would +be a duty incumbent on any one possessed of power to perpetrate it.</p> + +<p>Nor are principles like these appealed to only by those who have +recourse to them for the vindication of their own procedure. At those +<i>petits-soupers</i>—bachelors' dinners is their modern English name, +<i>noctes cœnæque deûm</i> their ancient classical—for which some of our +London clubs are deservedly celebrated, and with which the Garrick in +especial is, in my mind, gratefully associated—at those choice +gatherings of congenial spirits, conversation, changing from gay to +grave, turns not unfrequently, among other lofty topics, on that which +we are here discussing. Then, even at such divine symposium, one at +least of the guests is pretty sure to take the part of devil's advocate, +and to exercise his forensic skill in showing how easily interchangeable +are the names of virtue and iniquity, crime and well-doing. September +massacres then find, not their apologist, but their eulogist. <i>Noyades</i> +of Carrier, <i>fusilades</i> of Collot d'Herbois, are cited as examples very +suitable for imitation in adequate emergencies. Prussia's seizure, on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> +behalf of Germany, of Schleswig and Holstein, on pretence of their being +not Danish, but German, and her subsequent retention of them for herself +on the plea of their having always been not German, but Danish, are +applauded as acts perfectly consistent with each other and with the +eternal fitness of things. And all this is urged in the best possible +faith. Of the recited enormities, were not some, steps to the +regeneration of France—others, to the unifaction of Germany? And what +are myriads of lives in comparison with a regenerate—what violation of +the most solemn engagements in comparison with a united, people? Did not +the millions of Frenchmen who survived the Reign of Terror gain more +than was lost by the thousands who were guillotined at Paris, or drowned +at Nantes, or shot down at Lyons? Is not Germany likely to turn Kiel to +far better account than Denmark ever did or could have done? and will +not German ascendency be abundant compensation for Danish decadence? How +culpably misplaced, then, were conscientious scruples that would have +impeded the march of events in such directions! Ends need but to be +great enough to justify any means. Let but the good promise to exceed +the evil, and there is no evil which ought not to be done in order that +good may come of it. Thus slightly qualified, the Satanic adage, 'Evil, +be thou my good,' is, without more ado, accepted as the utilitarian +watchword.</p> + +<p>And what though it be only the most thorough-paced Utilitarians who go +these extreme lengths? These lengths, extreme as they are, are +legitimate deductions from tenets held in common by the most moderate +and cautious as well as by the most reckless of the sect. Crime in the +abstract is condemned not less vehemently by the latter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> than by the +former; but by both equally it is condemned on account, not of its +inherent vileness, but solely of its observed results. If the results +were different, the agency to which they are due would be fitted with a +different epithet. If a world could be conceived to be so organised, or, +if this world of ours could be conceived to be so changed as that the +practice of killing, stealing, or telling lies would be conducive to the +general good, the practice in question would obtain a new name in the +Utilitarian vocabulary. Crime would become beneficence; and to kill, to +steal, or to tell lies would be not wrong, but right. These are +propositions which, without abjuring the prime articles of his creed, +the most timid Utilitarian has no alternative but to endorse; but how, +then, can he shut his eyes to their obvious application? How presume to +rebuke those earnest philanthropists, who, to judge from their habitual +language, are firmly of opinion that annihilation of one half of mankind +would be a small price to pay for conversion of the other moiety into +citizens of a world-wide Red Republic; or those admirers of Prince +Bismarck, who, holding national aggrandisement to be the national +<i>summum bonum</i>, deem the most solemn treaties that might impede it to be +obstacles which it is obligatory on a patriot to set aside? Will not the +effects of any given cause vary with the changes in the circumstances in +which the cause acts? May it not easily happen that the direct effect of +some private crime shall be to augment, instead of to diminish the total +happiness of all the persons affected by it? And is it not, then, +conceivable that a public crime, provided it be of sufficient magnitude, +may more than counterpoise, by the good it is calculated to do, all the +harm that all crimes of the same description either have done or are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> +likely to do hereafter? It is idle to reply that such a comparison +between public good and evil must needs be mistaken: that the harm, for +instance, which violation of treaties does to mankind by sapping the +foundations of international confidence, rendering impossible +international co-operation, and bringing the very name of international +morality into contempt, is infinitely beyond any good it can do in the +shape of national aggrandisement. Whether this be so or not is matter of +opinion, on which every one may fairly insist on forming his own, and if +that opinion be in the negative, a utilitarian agent, in Prince +Bismarck's circumstances, would be bound in duty to imitate Prince +Bismarck's high-handed policy. In all circumstances of international +import, in all cases bearing upon the general interests of society, a +Utilitarian, after deciding according to his lights which of the various +courses open to him would best promote the general welfare, either +immediately by its direct effects, or subsequently and indirectly by the +example it would set, would be bound in duty to adopt that course. That +course, however wrong it might have appeared in all previous cases, +would now become right, as being apparently the one most conducive to +the future welfare of mankind. Utilitarianism's standard of morality +thus turns out to be, not any fixed and definite notion of expediency, +but one liable to change with every change in individual judgment. Its +boasted criterion of the right or wrong of an action is the best +conjecture which the agent, with or without extrinsic advice, is able to +form of the future consequences of the action. Utilitarian law, in +short, resolves itself into this—that every man shall be a law unto +himself. Of course no Utilitarians will acknowledge this to be their +law, not even those who shape their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> conduct in exact conformity to it. +Nevertheless, that such is the law follows necessarily from their own +premises. For does not Utilitarianism sometimes—a little heedlessly, +perhaps, but not the less positively—declare that the morality of an +action depends not at all upon its motives, but exclusively upon its +consequences? Does it not, when most guarded in its language, affirm the +morality of actions to depend upon their tendencies, that is to say, on +their consequences at large, and in the long run? But there can never be +perfect certainty as to consequences. With regard to the future, +plausible conjecture is the utmost possible; and by differing judgments +different conjectures will needs be made. So that the value of the rule +of conduct furnished by Utilitarianism to any individual depends upon +the latter's ability, supplemented by that of any counsellors whom he +may consult, to forecast events. He cannot proceed correctly, except in +so far as he or they have the gift of prophecy. However dull his vision +may be, he must content himself with his own blind guidance, unless he +prefer as guide some one who, for aught he can tell, may be as blind as +himself. And it is always for himself to judge whether he will follow +advice: so that in effect every Utilitarian is his own moral law-giver; +and, certainly, a worse assignment of legislative functions cannot be +imagined.</p> + +<p>But the mischievousness of Utilitarianism does not stop here. We have +seen how one of its principles destroys the landmarks between right and +wrong, between virtue and vice, causing each to take continually the +place of its opposite. We have now to see how another of its principles +obliterates all distinctions between different kinds of virtue, +confounding them in one indiscriminate mass, and imparting to them a +sort of general oneness not more lucid than that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> which, according to +Mr. Curdle, is the essence of the dramatic unities.</p> + +<p>The object which it insists upon as conduct's end and aim is the general +good—the greatest possible aggregate of good or happiness for all. As +the Scriptures enjoin us, whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, +to do all to the glory of God, so Utilitarianism exhorts us to do all +for the welfare of mankind. Now, far be it from me to caricature this +soul-inspiring rule by forcing it, under a strained construction, to an +unnatural extreme. Fairly examined, it will be seen to make no +extravagant demands on our self-denial. As Christianity, even while +bidding us to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, +promises that all other things shall be added unto us, so +Utilitarianism, even while insisting on our seeking first to please +others, permits, nay, directs, us to take as much pleasure for ourselves +as we can lay hold of without depriving others, since the aggregate of +happiness which it is incumbent upon us to augment to the best of our +ability would otherwise be less. Nay, for the same reason, it +disapproves of our foregoing any pleasure of our own, the full +equivalent of which is not transferred to others. The happiness which it +requires us to attend to is that of a society of which each of us is a +component member, and no member of which can deny himself any pleasure +within his reach, and beyond the reach of others, without diminishing +the total of happiness which the whole society might enjoy. 'As between +his own happiness and that of others,' says Mr. Mill, 'Utilitarianism +requires an agent to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and +benevolent spectator.' Thus qualified, the prescribed subordination of +one's own to the general good is no such extravagantly self-denying<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> +ordinance. If for anything, it might rather be reproached for its cold, +calculating equity. With reference quite as much to individual as to +communal happiness it is an excellent rule of conduct, against which not +a word could be said, provided only it were left to be adopted +voluntarily, and were not authoritatively imposed.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, however, Utilitarianism allows no option in the matter. +Unless we do our very utmost to promote the general weal, at whatever +sacrifice to ourselves, it charges us with sin of omission. In the words +of one of the ablest among able Editors, 'justice is the social idea in +its highest, widest, and most binding expression.... It signifies the +moral principle which obliges each so to shape his conduct and +relations, his claims and his achievements, that they harmonise with the +highest good of all.'<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> To which doctrine of Mr. Morley's, if other +Utilitarians do not subscribe, it can only be because they are less +resolutely logical. Mr. Mill, indeed, though dissenting in appearance on +this point from Mr. Morley, agrees with him in substance. Even when on +one occasion, distinguishing between duty and virtue, he says that there +are innumerable acts and forbearances of human beings which, though +either causes or hindrances of good to their fellow-creatures, lie +beyond the domain of duty, and within that of virtue or merit, he goes +on to assign as the sole reason for placing them in the domain of the +latter that, in respect to them, it is, on the whole, for the general +interest that people should be left free, thereby plainly intimating +that society would be equitably entitled to insist on them if it thought +proper. But conduct that can be equitably insisted on is clearly, in the +strictest sense, duty; and it would be pre<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>posterous to claim merit for +doing that which it would be a breach of duty to leave undone. Duties do +not cease to be duties because he on whom they are incumbent is not +compelled under penalty to perform them, any more than debts cease to be +debts because creditors do not choose to ask for payment. All consistent +utilitarian teaching points inflexibly towards Mr. Morley's conclusion, +according to which justice and social virtue are absolutely identical, +and according to which, also, whoever does not shape his 'conduct, &c., +in harmony with the highest good of all,' does less than is due from +him, while it is impossible for him to do more. For whatever he propose +to do must either be or not be in the prescribed harmony. If it be, he +is bound to do it. If not, he is bound not to do it. The very utmost he +can do is no more than is incumbent upon him. Less than his very utmost +is less than is incumbent. No action of his, therefore, can possess any +merit; for mere fulfilment of obligations is reckoned not of grace, but +of debt. Having done everything, he is still but an unprofitable +servant; he has but done that which was his duty to do. Where, then, is +the boast of virtue? It is excluded. By what law? By that of +Utilitarianism, set forth in its full amplitude. Honesty and generosity, +faith, truth, charity, patient endurance, and chivalrous self-devotion, +all are mingled together under the name of justice, and justice itself +only remains just as long as it remains identical with the largest +expediency.</p> + +<p>At this rate we cannot possibly have any virtue to plume ourselves upon. +The best we can do being no more than our duly, the only reward we can +claim is exemption from the punishment we should have deserved if we had +not done it. Whether it be that we have abstained from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> killing or +robbing our fellow-citizens for our own advantage, or have impoverished +or half-killed ourselves in the service of the State, our meed is the +same. <i>Loris non ureris. Non pasces in cruce corvos</i>, is what we are +told. We may congratulate ourselves on having escaped the +cat-o'-nine-tails and the gallows. Well, we have, most of us, so much +self-sufficiency, that to deprive us of all ground for it might be a +fault on the right side. But now comes a second and more awkward +reflection. If you will not of your own accord do your duty, those to +whom performance of the duty is owing have a right to use means to make +you—foul means if fair means will not avail. If, then, you hesitate to +do your utmost for the interests of society, society is warranted in +taking measures to accelerate your movement. If you are not, or what is +practically the same thing, if a numerical majority of your +fellow-citizens think you are not, making the most beneficial use of +your property; if it be generally considered that it would be for the +greater good of the greater number to divide your park and garden into +peasant properties and cottage allotments, to double the wages of the +workmen in your employment, or to subject you and the likes of you to a +graduated income tax for the purpose of setting up national workshops to +compete with you in your own trade; and, if you do not readily enter +into the same views, then the said numerical majority are not simply +warranted in taking the law into their own hands and doing, in spite of +you, what they think ought to be done with your property, but would be +culpably remiss if they neglected so to act.</p> + +<p>Now it is needless to dwell on the extent to which that large numerical +majority of our fellow-citizens which consists of the working classes is +imbued with this notion, nor,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> except to those who are similarly imbued, +can it be necessary to insist that there is no notion of which it is +more indispensable to disabuse the working-class mind. This, +accordingly, I strove to do throughout a recent work of mine, 'On +Labour,' particularly in the chapter which treats of the claims and +rights thereof. I there earnestly pleaded that there may be, and are, +private rights independent of utility which no public needs can cancel; +that all which any man, or set of men, is entitled to exact from another +is payment or fulfilment of what is due to him or them from that other; +that unless the poverty of the many has been caused by the few, the many +are not warranted in extorting relief of their wants from the few; that +the mere circumstance of their being without food or work does not +entitle the poor to be fed or employed by the rich, for that there is +likewise a justice independent of and superior to utility, consisting +simply of respect for rights, while injustice consists simply of +violation of rights.</p> + +<p>In so arguing, I ran directly counter to Utilitarianism, provoking +thereby a retaliatory assault from Utilitarianism's tutelary champion, +who, as readers of the 'Fortnightly Review'<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> are aware, bore down upon +me with an energy no whit the less effective for being tempered with all +knightly courtesy. Yet, not to say it vaingloriously, I am not conscious +of having been shaken in the saddle, and I now return to the encounter +with modest assurance, firmly believing mine to be the better cause, and +recollecting too that in a contest with Mr. Mill, let the issue be what +it may, I may at least comfort myself with the reflection</p> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Minus turpe vinci quam contendisse decorum.</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span></p> + +<p>I must at the outset be permitted to remark that one or two of Mr. +Mill's objections to my statements are based upon misconception of their +meaning. I never questioned, but, on the contrary, have always in the +distinctest terms admitted that society is perfectly at liberty to put +an end to the institution of property in land. No extremest Socialist +ever went beyond me in proclaiming that the 'earth was bestowed by the +Creator, not on any privileged class or classes, but on all mankind and +on all successive generations of men, so that no one generation can have +more than a life interest in the soil, or be entitled to alienate the +birthright of succeeding generations.'<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> No one more fully recognises +that property in land exists only on sufferance and by concession, and +that society, which made the concession, may at any moment take it back +on giving full compensation to the concessioners.</p> + +<p>Again, when asserting the inviolability of moveable, as distinguished +from landed, property, I was careful to limit the assertion to property +honestly acquired. I never supposed it possible to acquire by +prescription 'a fee simple in an injustice.' Only, if in any particular +instance it be suspected that property has been acquired by force, +fraud, or robbery, I contend that the <i>onus probandi</i> lies on him who +raises the question. It is for him to show, if he can, that a commercial +fortune has, as Mr. Mill suggests, been built up by 'jobbing contracts, +profligate loans, or other reprehensible practices.' But if this cannot +be shown, the validity of the actual possessor's title must not be +impugned. Property must be treated as of innocent acquisition and +derivation until proved to be of guilty. And that not merely because +there could otherwise be no rights<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> of property at all, since it must +always be impossible for any owner to demonstrate that neither he nor +any one of those from whom he derives ever either overreached in a +bargain or failed in a contract; but also, and much more, because +whether a person be or be not the rightful owner of the wealth in his +possession, no one can possibly be entitled to despoil him unless the +wealth can be shown to have been ill-gotten. That right must be held to +be complete with which no one can show a right to interfere.</p> + +<p>The gravest, however, of Mr. Mill's criticisms is that mine is 'a +doctrine <i>à priori</i>, claiming to command assent by its own light, and to +be evident by simple intuition.' This is an imputation to which I am so +unaware of having laid myself open that I can account for its having +been made only on the supposition that Mr. Mill, in common with most +other Utilitarians, imagines that their only opponents are +Intuitionists, and that it is only necessary to set aside the tenets of +these in order to get their own established instead. If this were really +the case, utilitarian advocacy would be a comparatively easy task. +Intuitionism, whether capable or not of being disproved, is by its +nature unsusceptible of decisive proof. If I, in support of the +proposition that there is in the human mind an intuitive sense of any +sort, were to assert that I had such a sense while you denied that you +had, it would be impossible for me to prove you to be mistaken, while, +unless you were mistaken as to your individual experience, I should +clearly be mistaken as to the generalisation which I had based upon +mine. But I never said a word about an intuitive sense of right and +wrong. How could I, seeing, as no one who chooses to look can fail to +see, that the instincts of untutored children prompt them to disregard +all rights but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> their own, to spit cockchafers, rob birds' nests, and +confiscate younger children's cakes and apples? All I say is that there +may be and are rights independent of and even opposed to utility, and +these, for reasons which shall immediately be stated, I call natural +rights; but I do not say that they are intuitively perceived. As for +sense of justice or of duty, or moral sense or faculty, what I +understand by that is not recognition of certain rights or duties as +such, but recognition of the obligation to respect whatever rights and +to fulfil whatever duties are recognised, according to which definition +it is mere tautology to add that the sense or faculty in question +originates simultaneously with the recognition of any rights or duties. +For inasmuch as rights invariably imply corresponding +obligations—inasmuch as if a thing be rightfully claimed, that same +thing must needs be due or owing, it is of course impossible to perceive +that a thing is <i>owing</i> without perceiving at the same moment that it +<i>ought</i> to be paid. On this account, and with this explanation, I should +not scruple to speak of the moral sense as intuitive; but if for that +reason I am to be called an Intuitionist, so equally must Mr. Mill, for +he has said precisely the same thing. He likewise has said that 'the +moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural out-growth from +it, capable, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously.'</p> + + +<h3>II.</h3> + +<p>By my avowal of a belief in 'Natural Rights,' I feel that I must have +incurred in philosophic quarters a sort of civil contempt, which I am +very desirous of removing, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> which will, I trust, be somewhat +diminished on my proceeding to explain how few and elementary are the +rights that I propose for naturalisation. They are but two in number, +and they are these:—(1) Absolute right, except in so far as the same +may have been forfeited by misconduct or modified by consent, to deal in +any way one pleases, not noxious to other people, with one's own self or +person; (2) right equally absolute to dispose similarly of the produce +either of one's own honest industry, or of that of others whose rights +in connection with it have been honestly acquired by oneself. I call +these 'rights,' because there cannot possibly anywhere exist either the +right to prevent their being exercised, or any rights with which they +can clash, and because, therefore, by their freest exercise, no one can +possibly be wronged, while to interfere with their exercise would be to +wrong their possessor. And I call them 'natural,' because they are not +artificially created, and have no need of external ratification. Whoever +thinks proper to deny this—whoever, as all Utilitarians do, contends +that society is entitled to interfere with the rights which I have +called natural, is bound to attempt to show how society became so +entitled; when for the claim he puts forward on society's behalf he will +find it impossible to produce any plausible pretext, without crediting +society with possession of a right belonging to that same 'natural' +class, the existence of which he denies. For, as there can be no rights +without corresponding obligations or duties, if it be really the right +of society to deal at its discretion with the persons or effects of +individuals, it must be incumbent on individuals to permit themselves +and whatever is theirs to be so dealt with. Have, then, individuals +incurred any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> such obligation? No obligation, be it remembered, can +arise, except through some antecedent act of one or other or both of the +parties concerned. Either a pledge of some sort must have been given or +a benefit of some sort must have been received. Now undoubtedly there +are no limits to the extent to which society and its individual members +might have reciprocally pledged themselves. It might have been +stipulated by their articles of association that society at large should +do its utmost for the welfare of each of its members, and that each of +its members should do his utmost for the welfare of society at large. +But it is certain, either that no such compact ever was made, or that, +if made, it has always been systematically set at nought. Society has +never made much pretence of troubling itself about the welfare of +individuals, except in certain specified particulars; so that, even if +individuals had, on condition of being treated with reciprocal +solicitude, accepted the obligation of attending to the welfare of +society in other than the same particulars, that conditional obligation +would from the commencement have been null and void. The one thing which +society invariably pledges itself to do is to protect person and +property, and by implication to enforce performance of contracts; and +the two things which individual associates in turn pledge themselves to +do are to abstain from molesting each other's persons and property, and +to assist society in protecting both. In so abstaining and so assisting +consist all those 'many acts and the still greater number of +forbearances, the perpetual practice of which by all is,' as Mr. Mill +says, 'universally deemed to be so necessary to the general well-being, +that people must be held to it compulsorily, either by law or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> by social +pressure.'<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Under one or other of these two heads may be ranged +everything that individuals owe to society in return for the mere +protection which they receive from it.</p> + +<p>True, there is an universal understanding that individuals shall be +subject to any laws, whether wise or foolish, provided only they be of +equal and impartial operation, which may be enacted by a numerical +majority of the community to which the individuals belong; and in this +manner individuals may become bound by any number of miscellaneous +pledges, society acquiring simultaneously the right to hold individuals +to the performance of those pledges. Thus, if by the vote of an +unimpeachably representative House of Commons it were declared to be for +the general good, and agreed to accordingly, that every one should be +vaccinated or circumcised, it would be incumbent on every one to submit +quietly to vaccination or circumcision, however deleterious the +operation might be deemed by some. Or if, improving upon a hypothetical +suggestion of Mr. Mill, a parliament elected by constituencies in which +the labouring-class element greatly predominated, should prospectively +forbid the accumulation by any individual of property beyond a specified +amount, then, though the almost certain consequence would be that the +prescribed limit of accumulation would not be exceeded, still if it were +exceeded, the accumulator could not justly complain when the surplus was +forfeited according to law. Yet even thus the obligations or duties +created will correspond exactly with the pledges given; none will be +incurred except such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> as have been imposed by special legislation—nor +even those, unless the legislation have been impartial. A law requiring +people to pay poor's-rates would not suffice as a pretext for requiring +them to pay education rates likewise. Neither if, instead of passing the +prospective law just now supposed, a governing majority which had +previously always permitted the indefinite accumulation of wealth, were +retrospectively to decree the forfeiture of all past accumulations +beyond a defined amount, would individuals be morally bound to submit to +such a decree if they could contrive to evade it, any more than +sexquipedalians would be bound to lay their heads on the block in +obedience to a law directing everybody six feet high to be decapitated. +All such partial legislation would be tyrannical, and circumstances must +be very peculiar indeed to make submission to tyranny a duty. But of all +conceivable legislation, none could possibly be more partial, or +therefore more tyrannical, than such as should give to society a general +power of dealing at its pleasure with its associates, and of arbitrarily +subjecting separate classes or individuals to exceptional treatment. +Even, therefore, if a law to such monstrous effect were enacted, it +could have no morally binding force. It would be no one's duty to +acquiesce in it.</p> + +<p>I will not here stop to dispute, though I am not sure that I could +without some slight reservation admit, that the receipt of unasked-for +benefits places the recipient under precisely the same obligation to +benefit his benefactor, as if the good received by him had been +conferred on express condition of his availing himself of the first +opportunity to render equal good. I will not stop to dispute, for +instance, that a person saved from drown<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>ing at the risk of his own +rescuer's life, would be bound, on occasion arising, to risk his own +life in order to save his former rescuer's. For my immediate purpose, it +may suffice to remark that society has never been in the habit of +showing such parental solicitude for its component members as would +warrant its claiming filial devotion from them. In the matter of +philanthropy its practice has never been in advance of its very moderate +professions. It has invariably contented itself with rendering certain +specific services, never failing to exact in return fully equivalent +services of each species.</p> + +<p>In candour, however, there must be admitted to be innumerable blessings +not yet adverted to, including indeed most of those by the possession of +which man is distinguished from brutes, for which he is in so far +indebted to society that, but for the instrumentality of society, they +would never have been his. Unless individuals had formed themselves into +communities, civilization could have made no sensible progress: there +could have been no considerable advances, material, intellectual, moral, +or æsthetic. Not only should we have been destitute of all the comforts +and luxuries that now surround us, we should have lacked also whatever +cerebral development we have attained, together with all its +concomitants and consequences; whatever of intelligence, or moral +perceptiveness, or artistic taste we have to boast of. Still, though +none of these faculties could have made much approach to maturity except +under the shelter of society, they are not gifts of society. Without the +help of a plough, land cannot be ploughed; but we do not therefore +credit the ploughmaker with the achievements of the ploughman. Neither +is society to take to itself<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> praise because its members have made good +use of the protection which, in consideration of stipulated services on +their part, it has afforded them. Besides, whatever we inherit from +society, we inherit from a society of members no longer in being. Let +the dead come to life again, and it may then become us to examine their +claims upon our gratitude, but we need not meanwhile confound past and +present generations, nor our forefathers with our contemporaries. To the +mass of these latter, at any rate, we are none of us indebted for our +brains or our aptitudes of thought and feeling, and the circumstance of +our being joint sharers with them in patrimony bequeathed by a common +ancestry, affords no very obvious reason why our share of the +inheritance, together with whatever else we possess, should be at their +absolute disposal.</p> + +<p>Thus it appears that in no one of the ways in which alone can originate +the obligations which must always precede or accompany +artificially-created rights, has that particular obligation arisen +without which it is impossible for society to obtain artificially the +right of preventing individuals from doing as they will with their own. +No sufficient pledge has been given by one side, no sufficient benefit +conferred by the other. Individuals never agreed to place their all at +the disposal of society; society never rendered to individuals any +services entitling it to claim such boundless gratitude. One service +which it invariably undertakes is that of protecting person and +property. This is its chief and primary duty, the fulfilment of which is +always the first object of its institution, often the only one it +acknowledges. But clearly it cannot by performance of a duty acquire the +right of doing the exact reverse of that duty. It cannot by protecting +acquire the right<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> of molesting. It cannot by preventing person and +property from being meddled with, acquire in its corporate capacity the +right of itself meddling. Since then this right of meddling, this right +of disposing of what is exclusively some individual's own, otherwise +than the owner wishes, has not been acquired by society artificially, it +must, if it do actually belong to society, have been come by naturally; +and this accordingly is what Utilitarians really, though perhaps +unconsciously, assume, treating moreover this gratuitous assumption of +theirs as a self-evident truth.</p> + +<p>For, as Utilitarians themselves cannot fail on reflection to perceive, +they offer no shadow of argument in support of that 'greatest happiness +principle' on which their whole system rests. Commencing with the +undeniable postulate that happiness is the sole object of existence, and +perceiving that individual happiness alone would be a very misleading +object, they proceed to take quietly for granted that the only happiness +at which life ought to aim is social happiness. Now, undoubtedly social +happiness is of more importance than individual happiness—the happiness +of many than that of one or a few; neither can there be any worthier +object of pursuit than the greatest happiness of the greatest number. +All this is seen without being said, but what is by no means so easily +seen is how it can be incumbent on any one to pursue that object to his +own detriment—how it can be imperative on one or on a few to sacrifice +his or their happiness in order to promote that of the many. Plainly +such self-devotion cannot be for their personal advantage, and +Utilitarianism does not even attempt to show how it can have become +their duty. Meritorious, magnanimous, heroic in the highest degree it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> +would certainly be, but does not that very circumstance prove +conclusively that it cannot be due, inasmuch as there is nothing +meritorious in merely doing one's duty and paying one's debts? But of +that which is not due, how can payment be rightfully insisted upon? What +the few are under no obligation to yield, how can the many be entitled +to extort, or how can the worthiness of the latter's object excuse their +doing that which they have no right to do? Is any object, however +worthy, to be pursued regardless of all collateral considerations? To +these objections Utilitarians have no answer to make. All they can do is +tacitly to take for granted the disputed duty and right. That the less +ought to give way to the greater, and the few to the many, and that the +many may rightfully therefore, if need be, use force to compel the less +or the few to give way—these are treated by them as incontestable +propositions, even as 'doctrines <i>à priori</i>, claiming assent by their +own light, evident by simple intuition.' And although thus from their +own inner consciousness evolving the very first principles of their own +philosophy, the premises of their deduction that social happiness is the +proper aim in life, and that conduciveness to such happiness is the test +of morality—'Intuitionists,' strange to say, is the distinctive +appellation which they propose to affix to all those who hesitate to +accept as ethical foundation stones the results of their intuitional +evolution.</p> + +<p>Scarcely by a taunt so readily rebuttable will anti-Utilitarians be +excited to speedier apprehension of the nature of the lien which +corporate self-interest is presumed to have upon individual +self-devotion. Not the less tenaciously may they cling to their belief +in the right of every<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> one to do as he will with whatever has come by +fair means into his exclusive and complete possession. Neither, I +venture to think, need less store be set by that right in consequence of +an objection very adroitly taken to it by Mr. Mill, which, on account +both of its inherent ingenuity and of its having been addressed more +immediately to myself, it would be inexcusable in me to leave +unexamined. In Mr. Mill's opinion, the right in question, even if valid, +would be valueless, because it would be neutralised by precisely similar +rights belonging to society. If, he argues, individuals are at liberty +to do as they will with their own, so likewise must society be. But +'existing social arrangements and law itself exist in virtue not only of +the forbearance, but of the active support of the labouring classes' who +in every community constitute a numerical majority. This working-class +majority might then if they pleased withdraw their support from existing +arrangements, thereby depriving person and property of social +protection; and by merely threatening such withdrawal they could compel +individuals to acquiesce in their most extravagant demands. 'They might +bind the rich to take the whole burden of taxation upon themselves. They +might bind them to give employment, at liberal wages, to a number of +labourers in a direct ratio to the amount of their incomes. They might +enforce on them a total abolition of inheritance and bequest.' Mr. Mill +maintains that these things, although exceedingly foolish, might +according to my principles, with perfect equity be done; nay, if I +understand him correctly, that according neither to mine nor to any one +else's principles can any adequate reason be assigned why they should +not be done, except that their practical results would be baneful +instead of beneficial.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> And taking this view, he is fully warranted in +asking what it can matter that according to my theory 'an employer does +no wrong in making the use he does of his capital, if the same theory +would justify the employed in compelling him by law to make a different +use—if the labourers would in no way infringe the definition of justice +by taking the matter into their own hands and establishing by law any +modification of the rights of property which in their opinion would +increase the remuneration of their labour.'<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> + +<p>My reply to this and to the whole argument is the following. So long as +society continues to exist, society cannot divest itself of the primary +function for the discharge of which it was originally constituted. +Society, having come together in the first instance, tacitly pledged to +extend protection to each individual associate, cannot, without breach +of contract, withdraw that protection. It may, indeed, make any +impartial laws it pleases, and attach any penalty it pleases to +violation of any impartial law, but it cannot in equity, whatever it may +in practice, place any of its members outside the law; neither, most +certainly, even if its competence did extend thus far, could it go the +farther length of conferring on any one the right of doing wrong to an +outlaw. It may even be doubted whether, if an outlaw were to injure any +one still belonging to the society, any but the injured person himself +would be warranted in retaliating. The sole reason that I can perceive +why even he would is, that his rights had been infringed, and that +reparation was due to him for any damage sustained by him in +consequence, while, on the other hand, the aggressor had forfeited those +rights of his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> which might otherwise have forbidden the injured person +from taking the reparation due. But society had had none of its rights +infringed. By society no injury had been sustained. To society, +therefore, no reparation was due; and society, it seems to me, would +have no right to insist on exacting reparation not due to itself from +one whom it had forcibly extruded from its communion, and who, +therefore, was no longer amenable to its jurisdiction. Society might, +indeed, dissolve itself, proclaiming that 'every man for himself, and +God for all,' should thenceforward be the rule. But although it might +thus leave individual rights without other defence than that of the +owner, it could not annihilate individual rights. It might cancel the +right to mutual protection, but it could not, in place of that, create a +right of mutual molestation. One's own person and property would still +be as much one's own as before, and whoever outraged either would not be +the less a wrong doer because society permitted his wrong doing to +remain unpunished. In all ethical investigations it is impossible to +guard too watchfully against the smallest approach to confusion of might +with right.</p> + +<p>Instead of being valueless, the particular rights of which Mr. Mill +speaks so disparagingly, appear to me to possess a value which can +scarcely be exaggerated. They are, as may be readily perceived, +identical with the two which I have termed 'natural,' and of which I +began by saying that they are exceedingly elementary, but of which I +have now to add that they are also all-comprehensive, for that there are +no genuine rights whatever, however numerous or complex, which neither +are included within, nor branch out from, them. This will be manifest on +comparison of them with the items enumerated in any other catalogue<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> of +rights; as, for instance, with the one drawn up by Mr. Mill, according +to whom all rights may be classified as follows:—(1) Legal rights; (2) +moral rights; (3) the right of every one to that which he deserves; (4) +the right to fulfilment of engagements; (5) right to impartiality of +treatment; (6) right to equality of treatment.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Each of these +varieties will repay a brief examination.</p> + +<p>Under the head of 'legal' rights are commonly placed, not those only +which are conferred, but those also which are confirmed, by law. Such as +law has merely confirmed, however, are of course not the creatures of +law. But it is admitted on all hands that a law may be unjust—that is +to say, it may without consent from the parties concerned, infringe some +previously existing right—and as the right so violated cannot have been +created by law, inasmuch as what law had been competent to create, law +would be equally competent to cancel—it is clear that there must be +rights other than those created by law, rights whose origin was +independent of, and anterior to, law. It is apparently to rights of this +description that Mr. Mill applies the name of 'moral' rights. Examples +of them are a man's rights to personal liberty and to property in +whatever belongs to him as having become his by honest means, to both of +which, unless he had forfeited them by misconduct, he would be equally +entitled, whether his title to them were or were not recognised by law. +The only genuine rights which law can create, or consequently can have +to confer, are privileges in respect of person or property other than +one's own. But such legalised privileges are not necessarily rights. +Whether they are so actually or not depends mainly on the character of +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> legislative authority. A right to interfere with rights not based +upon law cannot be conferred without the consent of the parties in whom +the independent rights are vested, given either directly by themselves +or indirectly through their representatives. If a legislative body be +truly and thoroughly representative of the community which it controls, +then every one of its enactments, however bad or foolish, is virtually +an engagement to which every member of the community is a party, and any +privilege arising out of it becomes to all intents and purposes a right. +If, on the other hand, the legislative authority be autocratic, or if it +represent only certain favoured sections of the community, then none of +its enactments, however wise and good, of which a majority of the public +disapprove, and which interfere with the rights termed by Mr. Mill +'moral,' are morally binding, except on the legislators themselves and +their immediate constituents. Any one else may quite blamelessly break +the law, and resist any privilege thereby created, though he must, of +course, be prepared, in case of detection, to take the legal +consequences of his disobedience. For example, protective duties, +however impolitic, if imposed because a majority of the nation were of +opinion that a certain branch of domestic industry had better be +fostered by protection, could not be evaded without injustice to those +engaged in the protected industry, though there would be no injustice in +smuggling, if they had been imposed in opposition to the general sense +of the public by a packed Parliament or an absolute monarch. The same +legal monopoly, which in the one case could not be justly evaded, could +not in the other be justly enforced. A legal privilege, in short, +becomes a right only when a majority of those at whose expense it is to +be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> exercised, have formally consented either directly or indirectly to +its being exercised; and it then becomes a right solely because an +engagement has been entered into, in virtue of which, whatever is +requisite for its satisfaction has become due. Thus it appears that, +whatever legal rights are genuine, and are not at the same time 'moral' +rights also, resolve themselves into specimens of the right to +fulfilment of engagements, and belong not more to the first than to the +fourth of Mr. Mill's categories, to which latter, therefore, we may at +once transfer our attention.</p> + +<p>Why is it, then, that every one has a right to fulfilment of +engagements, to have faith kept with him, to have promises observed? +Solely, as it seems to me, because whatever has been promised to any one +becomes eventually his due, and because whatever is due or owing ought +to be paid. A promise is nothing less than a prospective transfer of +property in some thing, or in the advantage derivable from some action, +and when the time appointed for making the transfer arrives, whatever +has been promised, whether actually transferred or not, becomes the +complete property of, and in the fullest sense of the word belongs to +him to whom it has been promised; so that the right to fulfilment of +engagements resolves itself into the moral right of every one to have +that which belongs to him, and we have already seen that every legal +right which cannot on other grounds be shown to be a moral right +resolves itself into a right to fulfilment of an engagement. Whence it +follows that there are no legal rights whatever which are not likewise +moral rights, and which might not therefore be equally rights, even +though they had never been legalised. Whence, and from what has just +been observed with respect to the right to fulfilment of engagements, it +further<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> follows that of the five branches of Mr. Mill's classification, +the first and fourth may without inconvenience be dispensed with, and +that the second will suffice to do duty for itself and for the other +two.</p> + +<p>We have next to consider a person's right to that which he deserves, +with reference to which, and to my assertion that there is no necessary +correspondence between the remuneration which a labourer ought to +receive and either his merits or his needs, Mr. Mill inquires as +follows:—'If justice be an affair of intuition, if we are guided to it +by the immediate and spontaneous perceptions of the moral sense, what +doctrines of justice are there on which the human race would more +instantaneously and with one accord put the stamp of its recognition +than these—that it is just that each should have what he deserves, and +that, in the dispensation of good things, those whose wants are the most +urgent should have the preference?' But surely however just it be that +each should have what he deserves, it is so only on condition that he +have it from those from whom it is due, and do not take it from those +from whom it is not due. The latter, surely, at least as much deserve to +be allowed to keep what they have already by honest means got, as others +to get what they have not yet got. But if so, then that these should be +deprived of their deserts, in order that those may get theirs, is surely +about the very last doctrine that ought to be put forward as +self-evident and intuitive. 'But,' Mr. Mill proceeds to ask, 'if there +be in the natural constitution of things something patently unjust, +something contrary to sentiments of justice, which sentiments, being +intuitive, are supposed to have been implanted in us by the same Creator +who made the order of things that they protest against—do not these +senti<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span>ments impose upon us the duty of striving by all human means to +repair the injustice? And if, on the contrary, we avail ourselves of it +for our own personal advantage, do we not make ourselves participators +in injustice, allies and auxiliaries of the Evil Principle?'<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Now, as +I have already said, I am myself no intuitionist, but if I were, I +should not the less feel warranted in here replying that by no theory of +justice, intuitive or other, can the passive spectator of an injustice +to which he is no party be bound to assist in repairing the injustice, +simply because he has the means. A creditor denied payment of his fair +debts does not get what he deserves; but upon whom, except the +defaulting debtor, does it therefore become incumbent to repair the +latter's injustice by paying his debts? And if there be in the general +order of mundane affairs, as—provided I may attribute the existence of +it, as of all other evil, not to God, but to the devil—I don't mind +admitting there may be—something which prevents many of our +fellow-creatures from getting their desserts, something contrary, +therefore, to our sentiments of justice whether those sentiments have +been implanted in us by the Creator or not, I still maintain that those +sentiments do not impose upon us the duty of striving to correct the +injustice. They necessarily stimulate us more or less powerfully, +according to their own intrinsic strength, to undertake that noblest of +all tasks, but they do not render it imperative upon us. Whether, if we +actively avail ourselves of the injustice for our own profit—though +this, by the way, is no more than every one of us does who takes +advantage of competition among labourers to obtain labour for a less +price than he perceives it to be worth—we are not making ourselves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +auxiliaries of the Evil Principle, may be matter of opinion; but, at all +events, we do not even then become participators in an injustice which +we did not create, and do not uphold or help to perpetuate, but merely +accommodate ourselves to. At worst, we are but accessories to it after +the fact. In simply accepting the situation and striving to make the +best of it for ourselves, without trying to make it better and only +abstaining from making it worse for others, our conduct may be +contemptible, mean, base, disgusting, or what you will, only not +iniquitous; for whatever, short of their deserts, may, from the cause +supposed, be received by our fellow-creatures, although in one sense +plainly due to them, is as plainly not due from us, and we cannot, +without palpable injustice, as well as palpable abuse of words, be +charged with injustice for merely declining to pay debts that we do not +owe.</p> + +<p>The rights to impartial and to equal treatment need not detain us long. +There is no right to impartiality except where impartiality is due, and +it is only in a small minority of cases that impartiality is due. There +is nothing iniquitous in showing favour to the extent of giving one +person more than his due, provided no other person be prevented from +having as much as his due. The lord of the vineyard who gave unto all +his labourers alike, the same to those who had wrought for him but one +hour as to those with whom he had agreed that for a penny they should +bear the burden and heat of the day, did the latter no wrong; his eye +was not the less good because theirs was evil. A judge, or an +arbitrator, or the conductor of a competitive examination, is bound to +make his award without respect of persons, because he cannot favour one +without withholding from some other what that other<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> ought to have. On +every distributor of Government patronage, likewise, it is morally +incumbent to select for the public for whom he is trustee, the best +servants he can find. An English Prime Minister has no right to make his +son a Lord of the Treasury or of the Admiralty, if he know of any one +better fitted for the post and willing to accept it; and if he name any +but the fittest candidate, he fails in his duty to the community on +whose behalf he acts. But a private employer, acting for himself alone, +is under no similar obligation, and may take whom he pleases into his +service, and assign to him whatever position therein he pleases, without +affording any cause for reasonable complaint to those more capable +members of his establishment whom he places under one less capable. In +short, except in those rare cases in which impartiality means rendering +what is due, in which cases it is but another name for justice, there is +nothing unjust in disregarding it.</p> + +<p>As for equality, although its 'idea,' as Mr. Mill says, 'often enters as +a component part both into the conception and into the practice of +justice, and in the eyes of many persons constitutes its essence,'<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> I +can think of no single case in which, unless by reason of some special +agreement, it can possibly be due, or in which, consequently, there can +be any right to it. Even that equal protection for whatever is +indisputably one's own, the claim of all to which is commonly admitted +almost as a matter of course, is really due from those only by whom the +obligation to afford it has been tacitly or formally accepted. On this +ground it is due from the public at large, and from those individuals to +whom the public has delegated certain of its tutelary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> functions, but +from no other individuals whatever. No one else is bound to take, for +the protection of all other people, whatever pains or trouble he takes +for his own security—to watch, for instance, as vigilantly that his +neighbour's house as that his own is not broken into. And while the one +solitary claim of any plausibility to universal equality of treatment +requires to be largely qualified before it can be conceded, there is no +other claim of the kind which does not carry with it its own refutation; +there is no other which does not partake of the absurdity patent in the +communistic notion that all the members of a society are entitled to +share equally in the aggregate produce of the society's labour. How is +it possible that an equal share can be everybody's due, if different +persons may have different deserts, and everyone's deserts be likewise +his due?</p> + +<p>We have now gone completely through the list of artificially created +rights, without finding one that does not derive all its validity from +connection with some pre-existing right. We have seen that among +so-called rights none whatever are genuine by reason merely of any +extrinsic sanction they may have received, but that all real rights +either are such intrinsically, or are based upon, or embody within them, +some right purely intrinsic. We have seen that there are two rights +endued with this intrinsic character—viz., that of absolute control +over one's own self or person, and that of similar control over whatever +else has by honest means come into one's exclusive possession, or become +due or owing to him exclusively; and, because these rights, wherever the +conditions necessary for their exercise occur, of necessity exist, +springing up at once and full grown, in the necessary absence of any +antagonistic rights that could prevent their existing, I have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> not +scrupled to call them 'natural;' nor do I think that further apology can +be needed for such application of the epithet. To maintain, moreover, +that these natural rights constitute the essence of all artificial +rights, was simply equivalent to saying that no so-called right can be +genuine unless requiring for its satisfaction no more than already +actually belongs or is due to its claimant; while every right which does +require no more must be genuine, because there can nowhere exist the +right to withdraw or to withhold from any one anything that is +exclusively his. These seeming truisms are indeed diametrically opposed +to a theory which enters on its list of friends names no less +illustrious than those of Plato, Sir Thomas More, Bentham, and Mill. +Still, whoever, undeterred by so formidable an array of adverse +authorities, is prepared to accept the description of rights of which +they form part, will have no difficulty in framing a theory of justice +perfectly conformable thereunto.</p> + +<p>The justice of an action consists in its being one, abstinence from +which is due to nobody. The justice of inaction—for just or unjust +behaviour may be either active or passive—consists in there being +nobody to whom action, the reverse of the inaction, is due. 'Justice, +like many other moral attributes, may be best defined by its opposite,' +and all examples of injustice have this one point in common, that they +withhold or withdraw from some person something belonging or due to him, +or in some other way infringe his rights, and consequently wrong him. +Conversely, a point common to and characteristic of all just acts and +omissions, is that they neither prevent anybody from having that which +is due to him, nor in any other way infringe any one's rights, and that +they consequently<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> do no one any wrong. It is not essential to the +justice of conduct that anything due be thereby rendered. It suffices +that nothing due be withheld. All conduct is just by which nobody is +wronged.</p> + +<p>It is further to be noted that all just conduct is of one of three +kinds—that which justice peremptorily exacts; that which she merely +permits, and may even be said barely to tolerate; and that which she +approves of and applauds, without, however, presuming to enjoin it. +Conduct of this last sort is just in that it leaves nothing undone which +justice requires, but it is also more than just in that it does more +than justice requires. To speak of it as simply just, is therefore +somewhat disparaging. It is just in the sense in which the less is +comprehended by the greater. He who faithfully fulfils an engagement +that has provided for his making a reasonable return for whatever +advantage he might obtain under it, shows himself simply just in the +matter, and nothing either more or less. He who, having driven a hard +bargain, insists rigorously upon it, giving nothing less, and taking +nothing more than had been mutually stipulated, is likewise strictly +just, but is also shabby, and deserves to be told so plainly. He who, +besides making full return, according to contract, for value received, +does something more, at some inconvenience to himself, out of regard for +another's need, is not a whit more just than either of the other two, +but he is generous into the bargain, and deserves thanks in proportion.</p> + +<p>Rising out of these considerations are two others equally meriting +attention.</p> + +<p>In the first place, we may see additional cause for distrusting the +testimony which etymology has been supposed to record in favour of 'an +origin of justice connected with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> the ordinances of law.'<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> That +'<i>justum</i> is a form of <i>jussum</i>, that which has been ordered:' that +'δἱκαιον comes directly from δἱκη, a suit of law:' +that '<i>recht</i>, from which came right and righteous, is synonymous with +law,' is obvious enough; and it may not be out of place to add that in +French the word <i>droit</i> has, with almost savage irony, been selected as +the technical name, not of law simply, but of legal procedure with all +its crookedness.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Still it seems more in the ordinary course of +things to explain this linguistic identification of law with justice, by +supposing conformity to justice to have been the primitive element in +the formation of the notion of law, than by supposing 'conformity to law +to have been the primitive element in the formation of the notion of +justice.' It seems more probable that certain things were commanded +because they were deemed just, than that they were deemed just because +they were commanded. Even the ancient Hebrews, who 'believed their laws +to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being,' although, if asked why +it was wrong to kill or steal, they might very likely have replied, +'Because theft and murder have been forbidden by God,' would still have +acknowledged that it would be wrong to kill or steal, even if there had +been no divine prohibition of the practices. And when we recollect that +among 'other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who, +knowing that their laws had been made by men, were not afraid to admit +that men might make bad laws, ... the sentiment of justice came to be +attached, not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> +laws as ought to exist,' what had previously appeared probable is +converted into certainty. Principles of justice to which law ought to +conform cannot but have been anterior to law, and cannot have originated +in law. And certainty on this point grows still more certain, assurance +becomes doubly sure, when we reflect that, as was pointed out above, +many things are just which, not only does not law command, but which +justice barely tolerates, permitting them, indeed, to be done, but +permitting them also to be reprobated.</p> + +<p>Secondly, we may perceive that in mere justice there can be nothing +praiseworthy. Justice is nothing more than abstinence from injustice, +and no commendation can be due for not doing that the doing of which +would deserve censure. Justice, if entitled to be ranked among the +virtues at all, is at best only a negative virtue, as being the reverse +of a vice. It is distinguished from all other moral qualities, as being +the single and solitary one, compliance with whose behests is a duty +which we owe to others. Of meekness, patience, temperance, fortitude, +courtesy, whatever display it may for any reason be our duty to make, +precisely that display justice requires us to make. Whatever of any one +of these qualities justice does not exact from us, we may, without +wronging any one, omit. We must not, indeed, incapacitate ourselves by +tippling for our proper work, nor offend the eyes or ears of decenter +folk by reeling obstreperously through the streets; but, if we take the +precaution of retiring during an interval of leisure to our privy +chamber, our making beasts of ourselves then and there to our heart's +content, is our own concern, and nobody else's. No doubt, in doing this +we should be doing very wrong, but still there is no con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>tradiction in +saying that we should have perfect right to do it, inasmuch as we should +thereby be wronging no one but ourselves. Of another class of +virtues—of all those which admit of being directly contrasted with +justice, and which may for shortness' sake be without much inaccuracy +comprehended under the general designation of generosity—it may, with +literal truth, be said that the practice of them is no part of our duty +to our neighbour. Provided we are careful to let every one have what, +between him and us, are his bare dues, we may be selfish, mean, sordid +to excess, without infringing any one else's rights, without the +smallest dereliction of our duty to others. True, ethical writers are in +the habit of speaking of 'duties of perfect and imperfect obligation,' +but of these 'ill-chosen expressions,' as Mr. Mill,<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> with abundant +reason, styles them, the latter, more particularly, is of a slovenliness +which ought to have prevented its being used by any 'philosophic +jurists.' What some of these mean by it is stated to be 'duties in +which, though the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of +performing it are left to our choice; as in the case of charity or +beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practise, but not towards any +defined person, or at any prescribed time.' But, according to this +explanation, there are duties of which performance may not only be +indefinitely postponed, even until a morrow that may never come, but of +which performance at one time will warrant non-performance of them +subsequently; so that, for instance, he who has behaved charitably on +past occasions, may be uncharitable afterwards. 'In the more precise +language' of other writers, we are told that while 'duties of perfect +obligation are those duties in virtue<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> of which a correlative right +resides in some person or persons, duties of imperfect obligation are +those which do not give birth to any right.' But, as where there is no +right nothing can be due, it would seem from this that by duties of +imperfect obligation are to be understood duties performance of which is +not due. I hope to be pardoned for declining to accept these illusive +distinctions as the boundaries which separate justice from the other +components of morality. I neither understand how any obligation can be +otherwise than perfect, nor do I recognise any duties whatever except +those of justice. The main distinction between justice and all positive +virtues I take to be that, whereas compliance with its behests is always +imperative, compliance with theirs never is, but is always optional and +discretionary. Of whatsoever is, for whatsoever reason, due, it is +invariably justice, and justice alone, that demands payment or +performance. Justice claims, and claims peremptorily, whatever is owing, +but never puts forward the smallest pretension to anything that is not +owing. But since whatever is <i>owing</i> plainly <i>ought</i> to be paid, and +since justice never claims anything but what is owing, it is clear that +there cannot be any merit in satisfying the claims of justice. Merit is +possible only in actions which justice does not enjoin, but to which +some other virtue exhorts.</p> + +<p>From the main difference here pointed out, a minor collateral difference +ramifies. Of whatever ought to be paid or done, payment or performance +may be righteously enforced. Here I have the satisfaction of proceeding +for a few steps side by side with Mr. Mill, although only, I am sorry to +say, to part company again immediately. 'It is a part,' he says, 'of the +notion of duty in every one of its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> forms that a person may rightfully +be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be <i>exacted</i> from a +person as one exacts a debt. Unless we think it may be exacted from him, +we do not call it his duty.'<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Now, since justice never asks for +anything but what is due, never makes a requisition compliance with +which is not a duty, it follows that all those persons to whom its +requisitions are addressed may be rightfully compelled to comply with +them, whereas, since what every other virtue requires is always +something not due, compliance with its requisitions is never a duty, and +cannot, except unrighteously, be enforced. This—viz., the rightfulness +of using compulsion in aid of justice, as contrasted with the +wrongfulness of resorting to it in aid of generosity, rather than the +rightfulness of punishing breaches of the one and not of the other, +seems to me the 'real turning-point of the distinction' between the two. +For gross disregard of generosity, and indeed of any other virtue, may +rightfully be punished, justice fully sanctioning the punishment +although indicating also the nature of the penalty to be inflicted in +each case, and restricting it within certain limits. Whoever plays the +dog in the manger in a manger of his own, or makes an exclusively +selfish use of his wealth or other advantages, refusing to do good to +his neighbour at however little sacrifice on his own part it might be +done, is not thereby infringing anybody else's rights, or thereby +wronging any one else. He is only exercising his own undoubted rights. +Still he is exercising them in a manner deserving of severe reprobation, +and which witnesses of his conduct may justly punish by testifying to +him the scorn, disgust, or indignation he has excited. It is no more +than just that he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> should have his deserts and receive the punishment +which has become his due. But justice, although permitting him to be +punished for acting ungenerously, does not sanction his being compelled +to make a show of acting generously. If his conduct had been unjust +instead of simply ungenerous, no punishment would be adequate that did +not force him to repair the evil he had done, or to do the good he had +left undone. But the most flagrant breach of generosity, neither keeping +nor taking away anything to which any one has a right, does nothing for +which reparation can be due. It consists simply in a man's making an +exclusively selfish use of what is exclusively his, and to make such use +is one of the rights of property. Whoever exercises that odious right is +justly punished by being shown how hateful we think him, but we must +not, on pretence of justice, commit the injustice of depriving him of a +right which is confessedly his.</p> + +<p>It is not, then, by being rightfully liable to punishment that unjust +differs from ungenerous conduct. The latter also ofttimes deserves and +incurs punishment. But since there can be no merit in doing that the not +doing of which would merit punishment, it may seem that, as in justice +so likewise in generosity there cannot be anything positively +meritorious. Neither in truth would there be if conduct were entitled to +be styled generous simply as being the reverse of ungenerous. Generosity +would then, like justice, be a virtue in no higher sense than that of +not being a vice—a negative virtue if a virtue at all. But an action +does not really deserve to be called generous unless what justice +requires be exceeded by it in a degree more than sufficient to prevent +the agent from deserving the imputation of meanness, nor even then +unless the excess have been done<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> from a purer motive than that of the +hope of praise or other reward. An action is generous only in the +proportion in which it involves self-sacrifice, voluntarily undergone +for the benefit of others, without any view on the agent's part to +further compensation than that derivable from the consciousness of +making other people happy. In such voluntary and disinterested +self-sacrifice consists the merit which is one chief characteristic of +generosity as of most positive virtue, distinguishing it from justice, +in which there is never a surrender of anything which one would be +warranted in keeping, but merely a rendering of what belongs or is due +to others. All conduct, not immoral, admits, as already more than once +intimated, of a tripartite division, into that which may be rightfully +enforced; that of which, though it be not due nor rightfully enforcible, +neglect deserves to be and may justly be punished by reproaches; that +which is neither due nor reasonably to be looked for, but which involves +a voluntary surrender for the good of others of some good which one +might without reproach keep for oneself. Of this last description is the +only conduct in which there is any proper or positive virtue.</p> + +<p>So much and such complex argumentation may not impossibly be deemed a +good deal in excess of what is requisite to establish the conclusion to +which it points, and which may be summed up in the following very simple +propositions:—That, by a person's rights being understood the privilege +of having or doing whatever no other person has a right to prevent his +having or doing, justice consists of abstinence from conduct that would +interfere with that privilege; that justice, therefore, is not dependent +on extrinsic sanction, but arises spontaneously from the nature of +things, and may almost indeed be said to spring<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> necessarily from the +meaning of words; and that its sole merit is exemption from the demerit +that would attach to the withholding or withdrawing from any person +anything belonging or due to that person. With all possible confidence, +however, in the innate vigour of these propositions, I cannot suppose +that they do not require all possible adventitious strengthening to be +qualified to displace the doctrine to which they are opposed. I proceed, +therefore, to test somewhat further the adequacy of the description of +justice which they involve by confronting it with certain intricate +problems, in presence of which the rival utilitarian definition will be +found to be hopelessly at fault.</p> + +<p>There are few subjects on which casuists have differed more widely than +those of the legitimacy, and the proper measure of punishment. One +thinks it unjust that anybody should be punished for the sake of example +to others, or for any purpose except his own amelioration. A second +replies that it is only for the sake of other people's good that an +offender ought to be punished; for that, as for his own good, he himself +should be left to decide what that is, and he is pretty sure not to +decide that it is punishment. A third pronounces all punishment unjust, +seeing that a man does not make himself criminal, but is made so by +circumstances beyond his control—by his birth, parentage, education, +and the temptations he meets with. Then, for the apportionment of +punishment, some persons think there is no principle like that of the +<i>lex talionis</i>—an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Others that +the penalty should be accurately proportioned to the immorality of the +offence, by whatever standard that immorality be measured. Others, +again, that punishment should be limited to the minimum necessary to +deter from crime, quite irrespectively<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> of the heinousness of the +particular crime punished. Of the first three of these opinions, Mr. +Mill observes that 'they are all extremely plausible, and that so long +as the question is argued as one of justice simply, without going down +to the principles that lie under justice, and are the source of its +authority, he is unable to see how any one of the reasoners can be +refuted. For every one of them builds upon rules of justice confessedly +true—each is triumphant so long as he is not obliged to take into +consideration any other maxims of justice than those he has selected, +but that as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face, each +disputant seems to have as much to say for himself as the others. No one +can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another +equally binding.'<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> This view of the matter, however, can scarcely be +regarded as satisfactory. If utilitarian notions of justice cannot be +carried out without trampling each other down, they plainly should not +be suffered to go at large, but should be relegated forthwith to the +limbo of oblivion. But right cannot really be opposed to right; justice +cannot really be inconsistent with itself: it never can be unjust to do +what is just. Anti-utilitarian justice tolerates no such intestine +disorder. The sole ground on which she sanctions punishment is the +indispensableness of punishment for the reparation of injury. Whoever +has suffered wrong has been subjected to invasion of some right, +personal or proprietary, and is entitled to amends for the outrage; +while the aggressor from whom the amends are due, ought to render them +because he owes them, and because he ought, may, if necessary, be +compelled, to render them. By the breach of right which he has +committed, he has forfeited his own corresponding<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> right, which may now +be equitably set aside to whatever extent may be requisite for +reparation of the evil he has done, one essential part of such +reparation being adequate security against repetition of the wrong. So +far as may be necessary for this purpose, punishment may equitably go, +but no further. Genuine justice does not permit penal laws of human +enactment to take into account the abstract turpitude of crime. That she +reserves for divine cognisance, recollecting that 'Vengeance is mine, I +will repay,' saith the Lord. Nor does she permit the smallest +aggravation of punishment for the sake either of the offender's own +mental improvement, or to discourage others from evil doing; neither, on +the other hand, does she recognise any claim to abatement on the plea of +an offender not having been able to help acting as he did. She would +not, indeed, punish with death or with stripes an outrage committed by a +lunatic or an idiot, partly because an outrage may be really less +offensive for being committed unwittingly, inasmuch as it does not, at +any rate, add insult to injury, and also because the corporal +chastisement of a lunatic or an idiot could afford no reparation to the +wounded feelings of a healthy mind. But so far as even an idiot or a +lunatic was capable of making good the evil he had done by rendering +what had in consequence become due, Anti-utilitarianism would require +him equally with an erring saint or sage to make it, and equally, too, +would subject him to whatever restraint might be deemed not more than +sufficient to prevent his doing the same evil again. And of course she +does not treat an offender of ordinary intelligence with indulgence +which she would not show even to a lunatic, but exacts inexorably full +reparation for what he has done, requiring him commonly to pay in kind +so far as he can,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> and to make up with his person for any deficiency. +Within the limits thus marked out she is well content that, with the one +object which alone justifies punishment, other secondary objects with +which justice has no concern, should be combined. She is well content +that the same penal measures as are called for in order to compensate +the injured party, should also subserve the reform of the criminal, and +serve as general deterrents from crime. But she protests against the +notion that these, or any other objects, can ever excuse the +infringement of any ordinance of justice, or of any of even a criminal's +rights which the criminal has not forfeited by crime. Justice, in short, +in her penal, as in all her other arrangements, has but to adhere +closely to the anti-utilitarian principles of rendering what is due, and +of taking nothing that is not due, in order to steer clear of all the +difficulties by which the ablest and most accomplished Utilitarians +confess themselves staggered.</p> + +<p>A second greatly vexed question is, 'whether, in a co-operative +industrial association, it is just or not that talent or skill should +give a title to superior remuneration? On the one side it is argued that +all who do the best they can deserve equally well; ... that superior +abilities have already advantages more than enough in the admiration +they excite, the personal influence they command, and the internal +satisfaction attending them; and that society is bound in justice rather +to make compensation to the less favoured for this unmerited inequality +of advantages, than to aggravate it. On the contrary side, that society, +receiving more from the more efficient labourer, owes him a larger +return; that a larger share of the joint result being actually his work, +not to allow his claim to it is a sort<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> of robbery; that if he is only +to receive as much as others he can only be required to produce as +much.'<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> 'Between these appeals to conflicting principles of justice,' +Mr. Mill considers it impossible to decide. 'Justice,' he says, 'has in +this case two sides to it, which it is impossible to bring into harmony, +and the two disputants have chosen opposite sides; the one looks to what +it is just that the individual should receive, the other to what it is +just that the community should give. Each from his own point of view is +unanswerable, and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must +be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the +preference.'<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> The form of justice depicted with this Janus-like +aspect can scarcely be the utilitarian, since, whoever, on utilitarian +grounds, selects one of its sides, must perforce, on the same grounds, +reject the other. Still, it is spoken of as genuine justice, wherefore +that there is a justice independent of utility, would seem, after all, +to be admitted by Utilitarians themselves. It is for them, however, to +deal with the dilemma which their own ingenuity has thus devised. My +only concern with the two-headed monster they have imagined is to +protest against its being mistaken for the one sole species of justice +which Anti-utilitarianism recognises, and which never presents any such +double-faced appearance. In the case before us anti-utilitarian justice +would decide with her accustomed ease between the two appellants. What +she would look to would simply be that each co-operator should have his +due. But how much soever she might declare an inferior workman to +deserve for doing his best, she certainly would not allow his deserts to +extend to participation in the fruits of the toil of those of his +fellows who had done<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> better than he. His having produced as much as he +was able could not render due to him a share in the larger produce of +others of superior capacity. Very possibly the superior workmen might +agree that all should participate equally in the aggregate results of +their joint labour. If so, well and good. For so liberal a concession +they would deserve credit, and thanks would be due to them from those in +whose favour it was made; but this of itself would be a conclusive +proof, if any were wanting, that the concession was an act, not of +justice, but of generosity, not of debt, but of grace.</p> + +<p>Again, what discordance is there not as to the most equitable +repartition of taxation! That all should be taxed in equal proportion to +their pecuniary means; that taxation should be a graduated percentage on +income, rising as income rose; that all, whether rich or poor, should be +taxed alike; that all should pay equal capitation, but unequal +property-tax—these are some out of many divergencies of opinion, and +'from these confusions' there is, Mr. Mill considers, 'no other mode of +extrication than the utilitarian.'<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> But if there were really no +other, there would, in fact, be none at all. For opinions differ +scarcely less as to the utility, than as to the justice of each +specified mode of taxation. There are quite as many persons who think it +expedient as who think it equitable that people should be taxed either +equally, or according to any of the suggested schemes of inequality. All +the help that Utilitarianism here affords is, as usual, to leave every +one to judge for himself which plan is the most advisable, and then to +pronounce that to be the only moral plan. Anti-utilitarianism offers +guidance of a very different sort. It<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> wastes no time in seeking for an +escape from confusion, for it allows no confusion to exist. It spurns +equally the idea of different persons being required to pay different +prices for equal quantities of the same thing, merely because some of +them can afford to pay more, and that of their being all required to pay +the same price for different quantities, merely because all are equally +in need of the quantities they respectively obtain. It recognises only +an imperfect analogy between a club or a mess to which no one need +subscribe unless he likes, and a national community to whose funds every +resident within its territory has no choice but to contribute; and while +quite content that members of the one should be assessed at any rates to +which they have spontaneously consented, it protests against the +imposition on members of the other of burdens disproportioned to their +several abilities. It denies that the shilling of a man who has but one +in the world is of the same value to him because it is his all, as is to +another an estate bringing him in 100,000<i>l.</i> a year, seeing that, if +the former had his pocket picked, he might presently beg, borrow, or +earn a second coin, whereas if the latter were dispossessed of his +estate he might live to the age of Methusaleh without acquiring its +equivalent. It perceives that a rich man, by receiving public protection +for his property as well as his person, is relieved from an expense in +maintaining private watchmen, which a poor man, with nothing but his +carcass to defend, would have as little occasion as ability to incur; +and it concludes that more being thus in effect given to the rich, more +is due from him in return, and more, consequently, may be rightfully +exacted.</p> + +<p>We come, now, to a case that may well give to both<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> Utilitarians and +Anti-utilitarians pause—with this difference, however, that whereas it +brings the former to an everlasting standstill, the latter may, after a +while, go on complacently meditative, at least, if not rejoicing.</p> + +<p>There are certain situations in which justice loses its authority. +'Thus, to save a life, it may be allowable ... to steal or take by force +the necessary food or medicine, or kidnap and compel to officiate the +only qualified medical practitioner.'<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Wherefore, since to steal or +to kidnap is essentially wrong, it may sometimes be allowable to do +wrong. Mr. Mill's explanation of the paradox is, that 'there are +particular cases in which some other social duty is so important as to +overrule any one of the general maxims of justice; but that in such +cases we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral +principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that +other principle, not just in the particular case.'<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> I submit, +however, that there is no real occasion to resort to any such 'useful +accommodation of language,' in order to be 'saved from the necessity of +admitting that there may be laudable injustice.' Let us never shrink +from looking error in the face, for fear that, after she has slunk away +abashed, some insoluble mystery may remain behind. It is better, at any +rate, to be puzzled than deceived. There can be no doubt about theft +being essentially unjust, and no skill in the arrangement of words can +convert injustice into justice, or prevent injustice from being wrong. +But when, as occasionally happens, the only choice open to us is between +two immoral courses, it is morally incumbent on us to select the less +immoral of the two. The wrong we decide upon does not, however, itself +become smaller<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> because it prevents a larger. A sworn bravo, who had +taken in advance the wages of assassination, would sin less by breaking +than by keeping faith with his employer; but, in either case, would sin. +Abstinence from murder would not absolve him from the guilt of perjury. +If, unless a loaf were stolen, a life would be lost, Anti-utilitarianism +might pardon, but would scarcely applaud the theft. At all events it +would not, like the rival doctrine in a similar strait, be reduced to +double on itself, declaring that wrong had become right and black white, +that the Ethiopian had changed his skin and the leopard his spots. It +would still insist as positively as ever that to steal another man's +bread cannot be just, however benevolent the purpose for which it is +stolen.</p> + +<p>One more illustration and I have done. Whoever believes as I do in the +indefeasible sanctity of honestly acquired <i>moveable</i> property, is +logically bound to hold equally sacred the rights of bequest and +inheritance. With whatever is exclusively your own, you may surely do +anything you please except harm; nor need even harm be excepted if it be +done to yourself alone. If, indeed, you go the length of playing ducks +and drakes with gold pieces, or of lighting cigars with bank-notes, you +are likely enough to be stopped and placed under restraint as a lunatic, +but it is clear that this will be done solely because you are presumed +not to understand what you are doing, and not from any question as to +your right to do it if you do understand, for there are plenty of things +far more objectionable in themselves, only not implying a want of +sanity, which you will be left perfectly at liberty to do. If you +choose, in imitation of Cleopatra, to spoil your fish-sauce by mixing +powdered pearls with it, or, in imitation of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> a certain Peruvian +viceroy, to shoe your carriage horses with silver, no one will dream of +interfering with you; any more than of preventing courtesans and other +fine ladies from befouling their nether limbs by sweeping the dusty road +with flounces of Brussels lace; or of preventing members of the Cobden +Club from gorging themselves annually, at a cost of five guineas per +paunch, in honour of the prince of practical economists. But property, +which, however great the good it is capable of doing, you are at liberty +to employ solely for your own hurt, you are, of course, at liberty to +destroy, thereby preventing it, at least, from doing any more harm. The +lesser right of abuse is plainly comprehended in the larger. And of that +which is so absolutely your own that you may, if you please, wantonly +waste or destroy it, you may, of course, transfer the ownership, thereby +conveying to another person all your rights in it, and rendering it as +unjust to interfere with the new owner's disposal of the property, as it +would previously have been to interfere with yours. Moreover, since the +gift is a purely voluntary act, you may, if you please, without +impairing its validity, arrange that it shall begin to take effect from +some future date instead of immediately; so that, by naming some date +subsequent to your own decease, you will be converting the gift into an +equally valid bequest. This, I submit, is decisive as to the iniquity of +any legal limitation of testamentary power. The right of bequest is +comprehended within and rests upon the same basis as the right of +possession, so that, unless it would be just to pass a law depriving all +persons of any property possessed by them in excess of a given amount, +it would not be just to deprive them by law of the power of bequeathing +the surplus.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span></p> + +<p>The rights of inheritance obviously coincide precisely with those of +bequest. Just so much as the testator parts with the legatee obtains. +When the bequest is unconditional, the new owner whom it creates steps +into the precise position which the previous owner has vacated. Often, +however, a legacy is qualified by conditions, and, among others, by +this, that the property bequeathed shall be held in trust for certain +purposes. Now, if these purposes be socially noxious, society need not +hesitate to set aside the will that has provided for them. Quite +justifiably, society might annul the testamentary endowment of a +hospital for fleas and lice, such as Bishop Heber, in his Indian tour, +found existing at Baroach and at Surat, because those particular insect +pests could scarcely be retained within the walls of their infirmary. +Perhaps, too, society might be justified in similarly preventing the +endowment of a hospital for superannuated dogs and cats; whether it +would or not depending mainly on the awkward question whether such +inferior animals have any rights inconsistent with human interests. Be +this as it may, however, where human interests alone are concerned, the +rights of conditional heirship present no ethical difficulty. When it is +for purposes socially innocuous and affecting human beings alone that +property is left in trust, it cannot be equitably diverted from those +purposes without the consent of all the individuals whom the +testamentary arrangements were intended to affect. It matters not how +whimsical or preposterous the object enjoined may be; not even though it +be a periodical dinner, cooked after the manner of the ancients, like +the nauseous one at which Peregrine Pickle assisted; or instruction in +alchemy or in Hindoo astronomy, or in the art of walking on one's head. +Not until<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> there remain no persons at once entitled under the will, and +also wishing to partake of the banquet or the instruction, can one or +the other be equitably discontinued? As long as there are any such +persons left, to stop, without their consent and without adequately +compensating them, arrangements, rights in which have been vested in +them by bequest, would be as palpable a violation of justice as to pick +their pockets of sums equivalent to their several interests, real or +supposed, in the arrangements.</p> + +<p>If scrupulous adherence to the principle thus laid down would heavily +shackle the activity and seriously impair the immediate usefulness of +Mr. Forster and his coadjutors in the Endowed School Commission, I am +exceedingly sorry, but not in the least shaken in my conviction that the +principle ought to be rigidly adhered to. If parochial or other +communities are too stupid or too selfish to consent that school +endowments under their charge shall be applied to purposes of more +extensive utility than the founders contemplated, every effort should be +made to persuade or to shame them into consenting, but without their +consent the thing should on no account be done. On this point +Utilitarianism and Anti-utilitarianism would, I apprehend, give +identical counsel, the former condemning as impolitic what the latter +denounced as unjust. The cause of national education would be ill served +by any course calculated to discourage its future endowment by private +testators, and nothing would be more likely to have that effect than +arbitrary interference with the endowments of former testators.</p> + +<p>The courteous reader may now be temporarily released, with fitting +acknowledgment of his exemplary patience. It would be cruel to detain +him with a recapitulation, with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span>out which he may readily trace for +himself, in what has gone before, the outlines of a consistent body of +anti-utilitarian ethics. In these there is little new, little that has +not been anticipated by many an old-fashioned saw and antiquated +apothegm—such as, <i>Fiat justitia ruat cælum</i>, 'Be just before you are +generous,' and, I would fain add, 'Honesty is the best policy'—save +that to that Utilitarianism may fairly lay equal claim. My modest +ambition throughout this essay has been to vindicate some of the most +momentous of primeval truths from the slights to which philosophy—not +modern, indeed, but modernised and refurbished—is continually +subjecting them, and I will not deny that I have modest assurance enough +to believe that I have at least partially succeeded. I think I have +shown that there are such things as abstract right and wrong, resting +not on fancied intuition, but on a solidly rational basis, and +supporting in turn abstract justice, whose guidance, whoever accepts it, +will find to be as sure and as adequate as any that unassisted reason is +capable of supplying. Anti-utilitarian justice never tries to look +half-a-dozen different ways at once, never points at the same time in +opposite directions, never issues contradictory mandates, never halts +between two opinions. Her votaries, like other mortals, may often be in +doubt as to accomplished facts; but, provided these be clear, their +course is in general equally clear; there seldom remains aught to +embarrass them. If they sincerely desire to ascertain what is due from +them, they can seldom err, except on the right side, and they will never +dream of disputing that whatever is due from them it must be their duty +to do, without respect of consequences. These they will leave to the +supreme controller of events, if they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> believe in one, and will leave to +take their chance, if they do not so believe, feeling all the more +certain in the latter case that to control events cannot, at any rate, +be within their power. They never stop to calculate how much good may +perhaps ensue if evil be done. Simple arithmetic, apart from faith, +satisfies them that to add wrong to wrong cannot possibly augment the +sum total of right. The prime article of their creed is the absolute +obligation of paying debts—a piece of unworldly wisdom more than ever +now to Jews a stumbling-block, and to Greeks foolishness, but not the +less to all, whether Jews or Gentiles, who will accept it, a light to +show through the mazes of life, a path so plainly marked that the +foolishest of wayfaring men cannot greatly err therein.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II.</h2> + +<h3><i>HISTORY'S SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS</i>.</h3> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>Warwick.</i> There is a history in all men's lives,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Figuring the nature of the times deceased;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The which observed, a man may prophesy,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">With a near aim, of the main chance of things</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">As yet not come to life, which in their seeds,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And weak beginnings, lie intreasured.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Such things become the hatch and brood of time;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And, by the necessary form of this,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">King Richard might create a perfect guess,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">That great Northumberland, then false to him,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Would, of that seed, grow to a greater falseness,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Which should not find a ground to root upon,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Unless on you.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>King Henry.</i> Are these things, then, necessities?</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 11em;"><i>King Henry IV.</i> Part II. Act. 3, Sc. I.</span><br /> +</p> + + +<p>When equally competent thinkers appear to take directly opposite views +of a matter of purely speculative interest, it will commonly be found +that their differences arise from their using the same words in +different senses, or from their being, by some other cause, prevented +from thoroughly apprehending each other's meaning. An illustration is +afforded by the controversy regarding the possibility of constructing a +Science of History, which could scarcely have been so much prolonged if +all who have taken part in it had begun by defining their terms, had +agreed to and adhered to the same definitions, and had always kept +steadily in view the points really in debate. If the word 'science' had +been used only in the restricted, though rather inaccurate sense in +which it is sometimes employed by some of the most distinguished of the +disputants, there would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> have been less question as to its applicability +to history. No one doubts that from an extensive historical survey may +be drawn large general deductions on which reasonable expectations may +be founded. No one denies that the experience of the past may teach +lessons of political wisdom for the guidance of the future. If it were +not so, history would be as uninstructive as fairy lore; its chief use +would be to amuse the fancy; and little more practical advantage could +result from investigating the causes of the failure of James II.'s +designs on civil and religious liberty, than from an inquiry into the +artifices by which Jack-the-Giant-killer contrived to escape the maw of +the monsters against whom he had pitted himself. What is commonly +understood, however, by a Science of History is something far beyond the +idea entertained of it by such temperate reasoners as Mr. John Stuart +Mill and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. The science, for the reality of which M. +Comte in France and Mr. Buckle in England have been the foremost +champions, would bear the same relation to political events as Optics +and Astronomy do to the phenomena of light and of the solar and sidereal +systems. It would deal less with the conjectural and probable than with +the predicable and positive. 'In the moral as in the physical world,' +say its leading advocates, 'are invariable rule, inevitable sequence, +undeviating regularity,' constituting 'one vast scheme of universal +order.' 'The actions of men, and therefore of societies, are governed by +fixed eternal laws,' which 'assign to every man his place in the +necessary chain of being,' and 'allow him no choice as to what that +place shall be.' One such law is that, 'in a given state of society, a +certain number of persons must put an end to their own lives:' another, +that a certain number of persons must commit<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> murder; a third, that when +wages and prices are at certain points, a certain number of marriages +must annually take place, 'the number being determined not by the temper +and wishes of individuals, but by large general facts, over which +individuals can exercise no authority.' These are general laws; but the +special question as to who shall commit the crimes or the indiscretion +enjoined by them, 'depends upon special laws, which, however, in their +total action must obey the large social law to which they are all +subordinate.' A Science of History would consist of a collection of +'social laws,' duly systematised and codified, by the application of +which to given states of society the historical student might predict +the future course of political events, with a confidence similar to that +with which he could foretell the results of familiar chemical +combinations, or the movement of the planets.<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> + +<p>This is the theory which a few years ago was so much discussed, and +against which, notwithstanding the singular fascination it evidently +possesses for some minds, the moral sense of a much larger number +indignantly revolts, rightly apprehending that its establishment would +be subversive of all morality. For, if the actions of men are governed +by 'eternal and immutable laws,' men cannot be free agents; and where +there is not free agency there cannot be moral responsibility. Nor are +the apprehensions entertained on this score to be allayed by the answer, +ingenious as it is, which has been given to them<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> by one of the +ablest and most judicious apologists for the new creed. It is true that +human actions can be said to be 'governed' only in the same metaphorical +sense as that in which we speak of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> the laws of nature, which do not +really govern anything, but merely describe the invariable order in +which natural phenomena have been observed to occur. It is true that the +discovery of invariable regularity in human affairs, supposing such a +discovery to have been made, would not prove that there was any +necessity for such regularity. It is conceivable that the orbs of heaven +may be intelligent beings, possessing full power to change or to arrest +their own course, and moving constantly in the same orbits merely +because it pleases them to do so. Invariable regularity, therefore, +would be perfectly consistent with free agency. All this is perfectly +just, but it is also altogether beside the question. The offence given +by the writers on whose behalf the apology is set up consists not so +much in their asserting that there are, as in their insisting that there +must be, uniformity and regularity in human affairs; or, as Mr. Buckle +expresses it, that social phenomena 'are the results of large and +general causes which, working on the aggregate of society, <i>must</i> +produce certain consequences, without regard to the volition of the +particular men of whom the society is composed.' Now, though free agency +may co-exist with <i>invariable</i> regularity, it obviously cannot co-exist +with <i>necessary</i> regularity, which, consequently, is incompatible +likewise with moral responsibility. If men are compelled by the force of +circumstances, or by any force, to move only in one direction, they +cannot be responsible for not moving in a different direction. Nor is it +more to the purpose to undertake a subtle analysis of the nature of +causation, and to explain that it does not, properly speaking, involve +compulsion, but simply means invariable antecedence. Let it be that a +cannon-ball does not really knock down the wall against which it +strikes,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> and that it would be more correct to say that the ball +impinges and the wall falls; though, seeing that the wall would not have +fallen unless the ball had impinged, the distinction is too nice for +ordinary apprehension. As understood, at any rate, by the joint +headmasters of the new school, causation does involve compulsion. 'Men's +actions,' say they, 'are the product not of their volition, but of their +antecedents,' and 'result from large and general causes which must +produce certain consequences.' Neither, if this be so, is it of any +avail to suggest that, possibly, the large and general causes in +question may be of only temporary operation. 'It may be that the rules,' +in accordance with which the sun has hitherto risen every morning since +the creation of the world, 'will hold good only for a time.' It may be +that the springs, whatever they are, by which the universe is kept in +motion, may require to be periodically wound up like the works of a +clock, and that, unless this be done, 'on some particular day out of +many billions,' the sun may fail to rise, just as the clock, if suffered +to run down, would stop on the eighth day. The conjecture would, of +course, be not less applicable to social than to natural laws. It is +conceivable that the large general causes assumed to regulate human +actions might lose their efficacy at the end of a certain cycle, when +mankind might either have to recommence a social revolution similar to +the one just completed, or might have to begin an entirely different +revolution under entirely different laws. Be it so. Still, if the +causes, as long as they remained in operation, possessed a compulsory +character—if, during the continuance of the supposed cycle, men were +bound to act in a certain way in accordance with certain laws, and +irrespectively of their own volition—what would it matter that those +laws were<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> not eternal and immutable? For the time being men would no +more be free agents than the hands of a clock, while the clock was wound +up. Both would be constrained to move in a prescribed direction, whether +they would or no. Men in such circumstances might well be likened, as by +Mr. Buckle they are likened, to links in a chain, but few would be +prevented from joining in Mr. Goldwin Smith's eloquent protest against +the comparison, by being told that the chain perhaps was not an endless +one.</p> + +<p>It is clear, then, that the principles to which we have been adverting +would, if established, be really subversive of morality, inasmuch as +they are incompatible with free agency, without which there can be no +responsibility. The soundness of a doctrine does not, however, depend +upon its tendencies; and Mr. Buckle was fully warranted in demanding +that his views should be examined with reference, not at all to their +consequences, but solely and exclusively to their truth. They certainly +ought to be so examined, if examined at all; but morality is so +indispensable to the happiness of mankind, that if there were reason for +apprehending it to be based upon error, there would be equal reason for +avoiding an enquiry which might demonstrate the weakness of its +foundations, by bringing forward an antagonistic truth. The only +adequate excuse, therefore, for enquiring, as I now proceed to do, into +the validity of Mr. Buckle's theory, is the confidence I feel that it +will be found to contain not recondite, newly-discovered truth, but, at +best, only skilfully and curiously-compounded fallacies, which, being +dispelled, will leave the foundations of morality as firm and +unimpeachable as before.</p> + +<p>In order that he might be able to prove the possibility of a Science of +History, Mr. Buckle asked no more than<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> the following concessions: +'That, when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some +motive or motives; that those motives are the results of some +antecedents, and that therefore, if we were acquainted with the whole of +the antecedents and with all the laws of their movements, we could with +unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results.' Now, +there is certainly nothing in these demands which may not be +unhesitatingly conceded. As there can be no effect without a cause, so +there can be no action without a motive: the motive or motives of an +action are the product of all the conditions and circumstances among +which the agent is placed—which conditions and circumstances, again, +must have been brought about by antecedent events. The same +circumstances would indeed differently affect persons of different +mental constitutions and characters; but the original constitution of a +man's mind is itself the product of antecedent events, as is also any +subsequent modification of character which it may have undergone. It +cannot be denied, then, that men's motives are the results of +antecedents. Equally undeniable is it that a knowledge of all the +antecedents and of all the laws of their movements would enable us to +foresee their results, for this, supposing the laws referred to to have +any real existence, is merely equivalent to the self-evident +proposition, that if we perceived certain causes and knew exactly how +they would act, we should know beforehand what would be their effects. +But what if there be no such laws? What if, on the showing of Mr. Buckle +himself and of his associates, there neither are nor can be?</p> + +<p>The true nature of a scientific law has never been better explained than +by the writer already quoted as Mr. Buckle's dexterous apologist. A +scientific law is not an ordinance,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> but a record. It simply professes +to describe the order in which certain phenomena have been observed +uniformly to recur. It differs from a legislative enactment, in that the +one would be a law although it were never obeyed, whereas the other +would cease to be a law if one single exception to its statement could +be pointed out. Thus the Act of Parliament enjoining the registration of +births, would be equally a law although no births were ever registered; +whereas the law, that in a body moving in consequence of pressure the +momentum generated is in proportion to the pressure, would entirely +forfeit its legal character if, on any one occasion or in any +circumstances, momentum were generated in any other proportion. It is +essential, then, to the existence of a scientific law that there should +be uniformity of phenomena. But in human affairs uniformity is +impossible. No doubt, in exactly the same circumstances exactly the same +events must happen; but exactly the same aggregation of circumstances +cannot possibly be repeated. Such repetition is inconsistent with the +very theory, which is based on the assumption that the repetition is +continually happening.</p> + +<p>'In the moral as well as the physical world' there are, say the +exponents of the new theory, not only 'invariable rule' and 'inevitable +sequence,' but 'irresistible growth' and 'continual advance.' In other +words, things can never be twice in precisely the same condition—never, +at least, within the same cycle. It has, indeed, been suggested that +there may be in human affairs the same sort of regularity as is observed +by the hands of a clock; and that, as the latter, at the end of every +twenty-four hours, recommence the movement which they have just +concluded, so at the end of, say 'every ten thousand years,' all the +same events which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> have been happening throughout the period may begin +to happen over again in the same order as before. Such a succession, +however, would involve quite as much of retrogression as of progression, +and the continual advance so boastfully spoken of would be nothing else +than a tendency of society to return to the condition from which it had +originally emerged. But, even on this uncomfortable hypothesis, there +could be no regularity of occurrences within the same cycle; no clue as +to the future could be obtained from investigation of the past. On the +contrary, the only certainty would then, as now, be that no combination +of events which had happened once could happen again, as long as the +existing order of things continued. The inference here follows +necessarily from the premises. If there be continual advance—if things +are constantly moving forward—they cannot remain in the same state; and +if not in the same state, they cannot produce the same effects. For, if +it be obvious, on the one hand, that precisely the same causes must +invariably produce the same results, it is equally evident, on the +other, that the same results cannot be reproduced except by the same +causes. If causes calculated to bring about certain phenomena undergo +either augmentation or diminution, there must be a corresponding change +in the phenomena. Now, effects cannot be identical with their causes, +and, in the moral world, effects once produced become in turn causes, +acting either independently or in conjunction with pre-existing causes. +They become in turn the antecedents spoken of by Mr. Buckle, from which +spring the motives of human conduct. But, as all such antecedents must +necessarily differ from all former antecedents, they must also give rise +to motives, must be followed by actions, and must bring about +combinations of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> circumstances, differing from any previously +experienced. Thus, in human affairs, there can be no recurrence either +of antecedents or of consequences; and, as a scientific law is simply a +record of the uniform recurrence of consequences, it follows that in +human affairs there can be no scientific laws.</p> + +<p>It will be understood that human conduct, and the circumstances or +causes which influence it, are here spoken of in the aggregate. It is +not pretended that particular causes or circumstances may not continue +permanently in operation, though with an influence modified by the +concomitance of fresh circumstances; or that they may not continue to +produce consequences differing from their former consequences not more +than in proportion to the modification undergone by the causes. Still +less is it pretended that certain human phenomena, with which human +motives have little or nothing to do, may not be repeated once and +again, notwithstanding the important changes constantly going on in +every human society. It is not denied that marriages may continue for +years together to bear much the same annual proportion to the +population, provided that during those years there be no material change +in the amount of the economical obstacles which commonly interfere, more +than anything else, with men's natural inclination to marry. Still less +is it denied that, in a given number of births, the number of girls may +always preserve nearly the same superiority over that of boys, or that +the proportion between red-haired and flaxen-haired children may +generally be about the same, or that the percentage of letters +misdirected in a given country may vary little during long periods. But, +in the first of these cases, men do not get married, as Mr. Buckle<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> +imagined, irrespectively of their volition. If, for several years +together, marriages continue to bear about the same proportion to +population, it is because during that period circumstances continue to +present a certain amount, and no more, of opposition to men's connubial +proclivities. In the other cases, it is not at all because the parents +wish it that a girl is born instead of a boy, or with flaxen hair +instead of carrots; neither is it from any motive or intention that +letters are often misdirected, but, on the contrary, from want of +thought, and from the carelessness and haste with which letter-writing, +like most other human actions, is unfortunately too often performed. +But, before assuming that this carelessness and haste bear an invariable +proportion to numbers, we should inquire whether the proportion of +misdirected letters is the same in all human societies—the same, for +instance, in France and Spain as in England. If not—if varying +circumstances produce different results in this respect in different +countries—it may be inferred that a variation of circumstances may +produce a difference of result in the same country. It will, at any +rate, be clear that there is no 'necessary and invariable order' in +which letters are misdirected. In one sense, indeed, it may be said that +the proportion of misdirected letters depends upon 'the state of +society,' if by that expression be meant, among other things, the +numerical proportion which individuals of different characters and +habits bear to each other. In that sense, we may accept some far more +startling propositions. We may partly admit that the state of society +determines the number of murders and suicides, if by this be simply +meant that the number of murders and suicides committed will depend upon +the number of persons whose characters<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> have been so moulded by +circumstances as to dispose them to put an end to their own or other +people's lives. But Mr. Buckle, by whom the assertion was made, was +careful to explain that his meaning was the very reverse of what is here +supposed. Speaking of suicide, he declares it to be 'a general law that, +in a given state of society, a certain number of persons must put an end +to their own lives;' adding that 'the question as to who shall commit +the crime depends upon special laws,' and that 'the individual felon +only carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding +circumstances.' In other words, it is not the amount of crime that +depends upon the number of persons prepared to commit it; it is the +number of criminals which depends upon the amount of crime that must +needs be committed. 'Murder,' he elsewhere says, 'is committed with as +much regularity, and bears as uniform a relation to certain known +circumstances, as do the movements of the tides and the relations of the +seasons.' 'The uniform reproduction of crime is more clearly marked, and +more capable of being predicted, than are the physical laws connected +with the disease and destruction of our bodies. The offences of men are +the result not so much of the vices of individual offenders, as of the +state of society into which the individuals are thrown.'</p> + +<p>There is here so much looseness and inconsistency of language, that what +is most offensive in it may easily bear more than one interpretation: +and the shocking dogma that, in a given state of society, the force of +circumstances constrains the commission of a certain amount of crime, +may possibly admit of being explained away and softened down into the +comparatively harmless proposition<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> that, where all the circumstances, +conditions or causes required for the commission of a certain amount of +crime are present, that amount of crime will certainly be committed. But +what is most provoking in Mr. Buckle is the heedlessness or wantonness +with which he is constantly insisting that the causes in question are +necessarily present and uniformly acting. What he calls the uniform +reproduction of crime is likened by him to the uniform recurrence of the +tides. According to him, it is a law that a certain number of suicides +shall take place annually, just as it is a law that there shall be high +and low water twice in every twenty-four hours. Now a law, as the word +is here used, means a record of invariable repetitions of phenomena. Has +it been observed, then, that suicides bear, we will not say an +invariable, but anything like a definite proportion to population? Mr. +Buckle thinks it has, and he adduces some facts in support of the +opinion; but his facts, properly understood, disprove instead of proving +what he asserts; and, even if they proved it, they would yet afford no +support to his main theory.</p> + +<p>In London, for some years past—how many is not stated—about 240 +persons annually have made away with themselves—sometimes a few more, +sometimes a few less—the highest number having been 266 in 1846, and +the lowest 213 in 1849. But, while the number of suicides has thus been +nearly stationary, population has been anything but stationary in the +metropolitan district, but has advanced with vast and unremitting +strides at an average rate of nearly 43,000 a year. In 1841 it was +1,948,369; in 1851, 2,361,640; and in 1861, 2,803,989. The proportion of +suicide to population has consequently been by no means uniform, but has +varied exceedingly, and on the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> whole has shown a constant tendency to +decrease. But even if it had continued uniform, it would simply have +shown that, during a certain number of years, the general character of +Londoners had, in certain particulars, undergone no material change. It +would not have proved that the regularity of suicide observable among +Londoners was in accordance with any general law. To prove this it would +have been necessary to show that the proportion had been uniform, not +only in the same but in all societies; in Paris as well as in London, +among the Esquimaux of Labrador, and among the Negroes of Soudan. For, +if the proportion were found to vary by reason of the differing +circumstances of different societies, it would plainly be seen to be at +least susceptible of variation in the same society, inasmuch as in no +society do circumstances remain the same from generation to generation. +So equally with murders. Even if there were no doubt that the percentage +of such crimes in England had long continued the same, still that fact +would prove nothing as to the uniform reproduction of crime, if it could +be shown that the percentage had ever varied anywhere else—in France or +Italy, for example, or in Dahomey. For it would be mere childishness to +point to the different conditions of England and Dahomey, and to plead +that no more was intended to be said than that, with uniformity of +circumstances there would also be uniformity of results. So much no one, +in the least competent to discuss the subject, would for a moment dream +of disputing. But in political affairs there cannot be uniformity of +circumstances. The aggregate of circumstances from which spring human +motives cannot, from the nature of things, ever be repeated; and, though +a few general causes may continue permanently in operation,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> they cannot +continue to produce the same identical results; for even though they +could themselves remain stationary, it would be impossible that their +operation should not be affected by the constant change going on around, +or should not partake of an otherwise universal forward movement. In +political affairs there cannot possibly be any recurrence of identical +phenomena; nor can there, except within a very limited period, be any +occurrence of very similar phenomena. But recurrence (and not merely +recurrence, but complete and invariable recurrence) is the very +foundation of science. Without it there can be no scientific laws, and +without such laws—<i>i.e.</i>, without records of past recurrences—there +can be no sure predictions as to the future. It is only because certain +motions of certain bodies have hitherto been observed to take place with +invariable regularity, that they are expected to continue to do so, and +it is upon that assumption only that we venture to predict that the sun +will rise to-morrow morning, or that an eclipse will take place next +year. But if no event recorded in history has ever yet been known to +occur twice under precisely the same conditions, and as a consequence of +the same causes, what ground can there be for predicting whether or when +any such event will occur again? What possibility is there of +constructing a science of history, when history supplies no materials +for either foundation or superstructure?</p> + +<p>There is nothing in this conclusion in the slightest degree opposed to +the most approved doctrine of causation. No effect can be without a +cause. No doubt, then, the regency of invariable causation holds good of +human volitions. No doubt the volitions and consequently the actions of +men are the joint results of the external circumstances amid which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> men +are placed, and of their own characters; which again are the results of +circumstances, natural and artificial. So much must needs be admitted, +and something more besides. Certain causes will infallibly be succeeded +by certain effects. From any particular combination of circumstances, +certain determinate consequences and no others will result; those again +will give rise to consequences equally determinate, and those in turn to +others, and so on in an infinite series. It follows, then, from the +regency of causation, that there is a determinate course already, as it +were, traced out, which human events will certainly follow to the end of +time; every step of which course, however remote, might now be foreseen +and predicted by adequate, that is to say by infinite, intelligence. +Infinite intelligence would do this, however, not by the aid of law, but +by virtue of its own intrinsic and unassisted strength, wherewith it +would perceive how each succeeding combination of causes would operate. +For, as cannot be too often repeated, a law is merely a record of +recurrences; and in human affairs there can be no recurrences of the +same aggregate either of causes or results. There being then no historic +laws, there can be no Science of History, for science cannot exist +without laws. The historic prescience, which is an attribute of Infinite +Intelligence, not being regulated by law, or at any rate not by any law +except that of causation, is not, technically speaking, a science, and +even if it were, would be utterly beyond the reach of human intellect +and attainable only by Infinite Wisdom.</p> + +<p>The admission made in the last paragraph has cleared the way for the +introduction of a question, from which the subject under discussion +derives its principal interest, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> which it is indispensable therefore +carefully, though briefly, to examine. If there be certain determinate +lines of conduct which men will infallibly pursue throughout all +succeeding generations, how can men be free agents? How—for it is +merely the old puzzle over again—how can foreknowledge be reconciled +with freewill? The difficulty is not to be got rid of by discrediting +the reality of freewill, and treating it as a thing for which there is +no evidence. When Johnson silenced Boswell's chatter with the words, +'Sir, we know our will is free and there's an end on't,' he expressed a +great truth in language not the less philosophically accurate on account +of its colloquial curtness. The consciousness possessed by an agent +about to perform an act, that he is at liberty to perform it or not, is +really conclusive evidence that the act is free. For it matters not a +jot whether consciousness be 'an independent faculty,' or whether—as, +Mr. Buckle reminds us, 'is the opinion of some of the ablest +thinkers'—it be not merely 'a state or condition of the mind.' If +consciousness be a condition of the mind, so also is perception; but +perception, whatever else it be, is also that which makes us acquainted +with external phenomena, just as consciousness is that which makes us +acquainted with internal emotions. The two informants, it is true, are +not equally trustworthy. Perception often deceives us, but +consciousness, never. We often fancy we perceive what we do not +perceive. We may fancy we see a ghost, when we are merely mocked by an +optical illusion, or we may mistake the impalpable imagery of the Fata +Morgana for solid objects, or the rumbling of a cart for thunder. But +consciousness is infallible. We cannot fancy we experience an emotion +which we do not experience. We cannot fancy we are glad when we are not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> +glad, or sorry when we are not sorry, or hopeful when in despair; and to +pretend that we can possibly be conscious of willing when we are not +willing, would be as absurd as to meet the <i>cogito, ergo sum</i> of +Descartes, with the reply that, perhaps, we do not really think, but +only think we think.</p> + +<p>Freewill, then, being an indisputable reality, how can it be reconciled +with foreknowledge? There can be no more conclusive way of showing that +the two things are capable of co-existing than to point to an example of +their actual co-existence, and such an example is afforded by the idea +of Infinite Power. Omnipotence, which by its nature implies freewill, +comprehends also Omniscience. Omnipotence can do anything whatsoever +which does not involve a contradiction; but even Omnipotence can do +nothing which Omniscience does not foresee. It can, indeed, do +whatsoever it pleases; but Omniscience foresees precisely what it will +be pleased to do. With unbounded liberty to choose any course of action, +it can yet choose no course which has not been foreseen; but its freedom +of choice is evidently not affected by the fact that the choice which it +will make is known before hand. Neither is that of man. An eager +aspirant to ecclesiastical preferment is not the less at liberty to +refuse a proffered mitre, because all his acquaintances have a well +founded assurance that he will accept. A wayfarer, with a yawning +precipice before his eyes, may or may not, as he pleases, cast himself +down headlong. Whether he will do so or not must always have been +positively foreknown to Omniscience; but that fact in no degree affects +his power of deciding for himself. If arguing on the notion that what is +to be must be, he decide on moving forward to his destruction, then what +has<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> been foreseen is simply that he will so argue and be self-deceived, +and will consequently perish. But the foreknowledge which simply +perceives what direction will be taken by the will is a very different +thing from an over-ruling destiny, which should compel the will to take +some special direction. Still it is obvious that, in this instance also, +foreknowledge is based entirely on causation. It is solely because human +volitions take place as inevitable effects of antecedent causes that +Omniscience itself can be conceived as capable of foreseeing them.</p> + +<p>But on such conditions, how can human volitions really be free? How can +man be really at liberty to will of his good pleasure, if what he is +prompted to will depends on the influence which the circumstances that +happen to surround him may exercise on the constitution and character, +which he has derived from pre-existing circumstances? How can his will +be free, if that will be moulded and shaped by circumstances over which +he has no control? I have, I am aware, by the mode I have adopted of +reconciling free-will with foreknowledge, incurred the obligation of +reconciling it with another co-existence of yet greater apparent +incompatibility. By admitting that 'human volitions take place as +inevitable effects of antecedent causes,' that they must be such, and +cannot be other than such, as antecedent causes make them, I have +admitted that the will, though independent of law, is absolutely subject +to, and <i>must</i> implicitly obey, causes. Freewill, then, must be shown to +be compatible not with foreknowledge only, but with necessity also. For +there is no use in attempting to ignore necessity; no use in exclaiming +with Professor Huxley: 'Fact I know, and Law I know; but what is +Necessity but an empty shadow of the mind's own<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> throwing?'<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> A shadow +it most certainly is not, though it is a bugbear, and the veriest that +was ever suffered to torment a morbid imagination. It is an indisputable +reality, a substantial, but at the same time perfectly harmless, or +rather salutary reality, whose terrors need only to be boldly confronted +in order to disappear and to transform themselves into highly attractive +recommendations. For what, after all, does it imply? What but that +effects must follow their causes, and causes precede their effects, as +plainly they must, unless cause and effect be utterly unmeaning +expletives. Of course we must on all occasions be affected by +surrounding circumstances, in modes exactly accordant with our +idiosyncracies, moral and physical. Of course, too, our volitions must +exactly correspond with our contemporaneous affections. When we are +empty, we must, if in health, feel hungry, and desire to eat; when full, +we must, unless we are hogs, be satisfied, and prefer to ruminate. Most +men are so organised that when tickled they must laugh; when wronged, +must frown or sigh. The sight of distress makes them pity, and desire to +see it relieved. That of virtue makes them admire, and desire to see it +rewarded. That of vice makes them angry, and desire to see it punished. +Would we have all these things reversed? Would it be well for us that +our being starved or surfeited should make no difference in our wish to +feed, or our willingness to fast? Should we like the chances to be equal +whether we should desire distress to be alleviated or aggravated? If +not, what is the bondage under which we groan? What the liberty +wherewith we long to be made free? Our sole grievance is that, according +to actual arrangements, there must be reasons for our wishes, and that +on those<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> reasons our wishes must depend. Should we then prefer that +there were no such reasons? Would we have our wishes to be independent +of reason, and adrift before irrational caprice? Probably we may, on +second thoughts, be content to forego an enfranchisement like this; but, +if not, we may at least console ourselves for its indefinite +postponement, by reflecting that Omnipotence itself is, equally with +ourselves, subject to the sort of necessity under which we are groaning; +equally destitute of the sort of free-will to which we aspire. It is +manifest that, since there cannot be omnipotence without boundless +liberty, omnipotence must possess completest freedom of will. Yet even +the Will of Omnipotence is subject to the despotism of causation. Divine +perfection cannot but be at all times affected in modes as exactly +corresponding with its own excellence as human imperfection is in modes +corresponding with its deficiencies, and the movements of the Divine +Mind cannot but correspond with the affections of the Divine Mind. Those +movements are not unmeaning, purposeless, wayward. They, too, have their +appropriate springs, and proceed by regular process from legitimate +causes, the chief of those causes being the infinite perfection of the +Divine Nature. Divine Power cannot then, any more than human, be +directed by its owner's will to purposes against which its owner's +nature revolts. But is this inability a matter to lament over? Those +must be greatly at a loss for a grievance who make one of its being +impossible for them to will things which they have over-ruling reasons +for not willing. Besides, does man, in order to believe himself free, +require more freedom than his Maker? The disciple is not above his +master, nor the servant above<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> his lord. Surely it is sufficient that +the disciple be as his master, and the servant as his lord.<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> + +<p>The fact, then, that human conduct is subject to causation, and may by +adequate intelligence be predicted in its minutest details until the end +of time, no more proves that it is governed by invariable laws, which +act irrespectively of human volitions, than the corresponding fact with +reference to Divine conduct impairs the freedom of the Divine Will. +There is no one living to whom such a doctrine—degrading man, as it +does, into a helpless puppet, robbing him of all moral responsibility +and of every motive for either exertion or self-control—can be more +utterly repugnant than to Mr. Mill, who nevertheless, although +dissenting from Mr. Buckle's more extreme opinions, makes use of some +expressions which may be construed into a qualified approval of his +general views. Even Mr. Mill speaks of 'human volitions as depending on +scientific laws,' thereby implying that the circumstances from which +human motives and, consequently, human actions result are continually +recurring with a certain regularity. He speaks of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> 'general laws +affecting communities, which are indeed modified in their action by +special causes affecting individuals, but which, if their effects could +be observed over a field sufficiently wide and for a period sufficiently +long to embrace all possible combinations of the special causes, would +be found to produce constant results.'<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> This proposition seems to +proceed on the assumption that general causes are either of uniform +operation, or that, if they vary in their effects, their variations, and +also those of special causes, occur with a certain regularity, and +constantly recur within a certain definite period. But this is precisely +what cannot possibly happen. Among the general causes referred to, some +few are continuous—those, namely, which are inherent in human nature; +but even these are continually modified in their action by changes +continually taking place in those other general causes which constitute +the existing state of society, and which are not merely continually +changing, but are continually becoming more and more different from what +they were originally. So much is fully admitted by Mr. Mill himself, and +indeed can be scarcely more strongly enforced than by his own words. +'There is a progressive change,' he says, 'both in the character of the +human race, and in their outward circumstances, so far as moulded by +themselves; in each successive age the principal phenomena of society +are different from what they were in the age preceding, and still more +different from any previous age.'<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> It is admitted, then, that there +can be no recurrence of social phenomena; and it is obvious that, the +longer the period of observation, the less possibility can there be of +their recurring, since the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> greater is the certainty that new causes +will come into operation. But, even though it were possible that all the +external circumstances which have once influenced either communities or +individuals could be repeated, the same circumstances could not a second +time produce the same effects. Men of different characters are affected +in very different ways by the same influences, and the characters of any +particular generation of men are always very different from those of +every preceding generation. Let it be supposed, for the sake of +argument, that the French of the present day could be placed in +precisely the same social condition in which their fathers were towards +the close of the last century; still they would act very differently +from their fathers. Nay, even though they should, with one single +exception, have inherited the dispositions of their fathers, the +difference of character in one single individual might suffice to give +an entirely new turn to the course of events. If every other antecedent +of the first French Revolution were again present, still there might be +no second revolution, provided only that, instead of another Louis the +Sixteenth, a Leopold of Belgium, or a Frederick the Great were king.<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> +With the last mentioned on the throne, there would assuredly be no +repetition of that vacillation of purpose which rocked the cradle and +fostered the growth of popular fury till it culminated in a Reign of +Terror. Since, then, there cannot be either a repetition of the same +circumstances to act upon men, or a reproduction<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> of the same sort of +men to be acted upon by circumstances, human conduct can never exhibit a +repetition of the same phenomena; experience of the past can never, in +social or political affairs, furnish a formula for predictions as to the +future. Accordingly Mr. Mill, in common with Mr. Stephen, disclaims the +idea of positive, and pleads only for conditional, predictions. But the +very term 'conditional predictions' involves a contradiction, since it +is obviously impossible to see beforehand what perhaps may never come to +pass. What is meant by the phrase is really nothing more than +conjectures; and conjectures, however ingenious and reasonable, cannot +be admitted within the pale of science. They cannot be accepted as +fruits of a tree which has by the quality of its fruits proved its right +to be entitled the Science of History.</p> + +<p>With the view of enhancing the value of conditional predictions, it has +been urged that they are of precisely the same description as those +which we are in the habit of hazarding with respect to our familiar +acquaintance. There are, it is said, 'general maxims regarding human +conduct, by the application of which to given states of fact, +predictions may be made as to what will happen;' and all that is +necessary for the construction of historical science, is the employment +of these maxims on a larger scale. If the premiss here be sound, the +inference may be owned to be sufficiently legitimate. If there be any +formula with which the actions of individuals are observed to +correspond, there is every likelihood that the same formula may, by +extension and amplification, be adapted to the actions of communities. +But, although there are plenty of maxims telling men what they <i>ought</i> +to do, there is not one—except that which declares that they must all +die—which affords any positive<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> information as to what they <i>will</i> do. +'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt not kill,' 'thou shalt not commit +adultery;'—all these and many more are moral laws; but of not one of +them—the more's the pity—is the observance sufficiently regular, to +give it the smallest pretension to be styled a scientific law. General +propositions, too, there are in abundance, representing with more or +less accuracy the probable results of particular lines of conduct. Such +are the proverbial sayings, that 'Honesty is the best policy,' that 'A +rolling stone gathers no moss,' that 'The racecourse is the road to +ruin.' But adages like these were never supposed to afford any basis for +prophecy. It may be that an honest man more commonly gets on in the +world than a knave, though there is also much to be said on behalf of +the counter-proposition, that 'The children of darkness are wiser in +their generation than the children of light;' but, at any rate, there is +no doubt that a man may be honest without being prosperous, and that he +is often all the poorer for his probity. But, indeed, is there any one +conceivable situation in life in which a positive rule can be laid down +as to the course which men will follow? Can it even—to make use of an +illustration which has been very effectively employed on the other +side—can it even be said that a man will certainly marry a woman with +whom he is deeply in love, who returns his affection, whom he can marry +if he likes, and whom he has the means of maintaining in a suitable +manner? Nine times out of ten he probably will; but in the tenth +instance a Brahmin's passion may be checked by fear of contamination +with a Pariah, or a King Cophetua's pride may prevent his wedding a +beggar-maid, or the titled owner of an entailed estate may decline to +illegitimatise his offspring by espousing his deceased wife's sister, or +betrothed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> lovers may be parted by some such mysterious barrier as +sprang up between Talbot Bulstrode and Aurora Floyd, or an Adam Bede, in +spite of the example set by George Eliot's hero, may refrain from +marrying Dinah for fear of breaking his brother Seth's heart.</p> + +<p>Equally vain would be the search for any rule invariably applicable to +political affairs. Even general propositions which sound like truisms +are not universally true. It cannot even be said that misgovernment +always produces discontent, or that the combination of superior strength +and superior strategy is always successful in war; for examples might be +cited of nations remaining patient under an iron despotism, and perhaps +also of campaigns lost by armies with every advantage of skill, numbers, +and discipline on their side. No better specimen can be given of what +are popularly spoken of as historical laws than one propounded by Mr. C. +Merivale, whose careful study of Roman annals has taught him to regard +it as 'a condition of permanent dominion that conquerors should absorb +the conquered gradually into their own body, by extending, as +circumstances arise, a share in their own exclusive privileges to the +masses from whom they have torn their original independence.' The +principle thus laid down is of great value, but it must not be mistaken +for an index pointing unerringly to a goal which will certainly be +obtained by following its direction. At least the offer of Austrian +citizenship had no perceptible effect in overcoming the exclusiveness of +Hungarian nationality; nor in inducing Venetia to become a willing +member of a Teutonic Federation, and to lend the same assistance to the +House of Hapsburg, as Gaul and Spain did to the Cæsars, in suppressing +insurrection on the banks of the Danube. History supplies many +principles similar to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> one evolved by Mr. Merivale, all more or less +useful for the guidance of the statesman. So far as they are just, they +indicate the results which would spring from the adoption of certain +lines of policy, unless something unforeseen should happen. It is true +that something unforeseen is almost sure to happen and to divert or +impede the course which events would otherwise take; but still, it is +most important to be able to perceive clearly the influence exerted by +certain causes, how much soever that influence may be disturbed by other +causes; since, if it does nothing else, it will at least prevent the +disturbing causes from producing what would otherwise have been their +full effect. On principles which indicate only a few out of many causes +in simultaneous operation, it is evident that nothing deserving to be +called predictions can be founded; but from them, nevertheless—inasmuch +as they teach that some causes act for good and others for evil, as far +as their action extends—practical rules of government may be deduced. +Such rules, however, which at best can only furnish a loose and shifting +basis for doubtful conjectures, stand without the confines of positive +knowledge; they occupy a middle-ground between science and nescience, +and constitute what, until very lately, was thought to be designated +with sufficient distinctness as the 'Philosophy of History.' By that +term, Mr. Stephen in one place says, is really meant all that he ever +meant by the Science of History; and the observation, were it not +apparently inconsistent with his general reasoning, might seem to imply +that the only question between him and his opponents is whether a thing, +the existence of which is not disputed, ought or ought not to receive a +new appellation. But it is otherwise, at any rate, with Mr. Mill. The +language used by him on this as on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> all other subjects, is too clear and +precise to admit of its being supposed that he has used a new phrase +without attaching to it a new signification, or to permit the present +writer to believe, as he fain would do, that a point of nomenclature is +the only point of difference between himself and one from whom it is so +difficult to differ without diffidence and self-distrust.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span></p> + + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III.</h2> + +<h3><i>DAVID HUME AS A METAPHYSICIAN.</i></h3> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>But the mischief lieth here; that when men of less leisure see them +who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuit of +knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or +advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly +received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions +concerning the most important truths which they had hitherto held +sacred and unquestionable.—Berkeley's <i>Hylas and Philonous</i>. </p></div> + + +<p>In no department of science is it possible for an enquirer to advance +considerably beyond all his predecessors without serving as a light by +whose aid his successors may advance somewhat beyond him. This is the +only apology that I feel disposed to offer for the freedom with which I +am about to criticize one who, having been, by judges so competent as +Adam Smith and Professor Huxley, pronounced to be 'by far the greatest +philosopher' and 'acutest thinker' of his own age, would, doubtless, be +at least on a level with the greatest philosophers of the present age if +he were living now. The veriest cripple that can manage to sit on +horseback may contrive to crawl some few steps beyond the utmost point +to which his steed has borne him, and, if those steps be uphill, may, by +looking back on the course he has come, perceive where the animal has +deviated from the right road. Yet he does not on that account suppose +that his own locomotive power is in any respect to be compared to his +horse's; neither need an annotator on Hume, when pointing to holes in +his author's metaphysical coat, be supposed not to be perfectly aware +that it is the strength,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> not of his own eyes, but of the spectacles +furnished to him by his author, that enables him to perceive them.</p> + +<p>The concentrated essence of Hume's metaphysics is to be found in 'An +Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,' forming part of a volume of +Essays which Hume published somewhat late in life, and which he desired +might 'alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and +principles.' To a formal, though necessarily rapid, examination of the +results of this 'Enquiry,' the present chapter will be almost +exclusively devoted. Often as the operation has been performed already, +there are two reasons why its repetition here may not be without +utility: for, first, its subject is a treatise containing the germs of +much subsequent and still current speculation which, in so far as it is +merely a development of those germs, cannot but be infected by whatever +unsoundness may be inherent in them; and, secondly, because the subject, +hackneyed as it may seem, is so far from being exhausted, that there is +scarcely one among the doctrines embodied in it to which, as I proceed +at once to show, fresh objection, more or less grave, may not be taken +by a fresh investigator.</p> + +<p>To begin very near indeed to the beginning, let us take, first, the +section of the 'Enquiry' which treats of the 'Origin of Ideas.' All the +perceptions of the mind may, according to Hume, be divided into two +classes, whereof the one consists of all those 'more lively +perceptions,' termed by him indifferently Impressions or Sensations, +which we experience when we 'hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or +desire, or will:' the other, of those 'less lively perceptions of which +we are conscious when we reflect on any of the sensations +above-mentioned,' and which are commonly denominated<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> thoughts or ideas. +'All our ideas or more feeble perceptions,' he continues, 'are copies of +our impressions or more lively ones,' the 'entire creative power of the +mind amounting to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, +augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded by the senses and +experience.' So confident is he of the literal accuracy of this +statement, as to proceed to intimate that whenever we find in +conversation or argument 'a philosophical term employed seemingly +without any idea or meaning,' we have only to enquire from what +impression its idea, if it have one, is derived, when, if no impression +can be adduced, we may be sure that no idea is present either. The only +phenomenon opposed to this rule, which he professes himself able to +think of, is that of a person who, of a colour—as, for instance, +blue—with which he is familiar, is able to conceive a shade somewhat +different from any of the shades which he has actually seen; but this +instance he disregards as too singular to affect the general maxim, to +which, as he might have added, it is not really an exception, any more +than would be the power of a person who had never seen a mountain higher +than Snowdon or Mont Blanc to conceive one as high as Chimborazo or +Mount Everest, for, equally in both cases, the ideas are copies of +sensible impressions, although of complex, not simple, ones—of colour +and graduation in the first case, of size and increase in the second. +Still, there is at least one genuine exception, which it is the more +remarkable that Hume should have overlooked, as it may be said to have +stared him in the face from the very subject-matter he was considering. +Our idea of idea itself, from what sensible impression is that derived? +We have just been told that the difference between an idea and a +sensation is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> that the first is a copy of the second, a feeble copy of a +lively original. The idea therefore is not itself a sensation; the copy +is not itself an original. Neither consequently can the idea or notion +which the mind proceeds to form of any of its previous ideas be derived +from or be a copy of a sensation: it cannot have entered the mind 'in +the only manner by which,' according to Hume, 'an idea can have access +to the mind, to wit, by actual feeling and sensation.'</p> + +<p>Let me not be misunderstood. Let me not be supposed to be courting +collision with the Berkleian thesis of the non-existence of abstract +ideas. I do not for one moment doubt that all our general or class +notions of sensible objects or events are merely concrete ideas of +individual objects or events—that, for instance, whenever we talk of +man or motion in general, we are really thinking of some particular man +or motion, which, as possessing all properties common to all men or +motions, serves as a representative of the entire <i>genus</i>. Neither am I +prepared to deny, although scarcely either prepared to admit, that even +of abstract qualities all our general or class notions are equally ideas +of particular specimens of those qualities; that, when we speak, for +instance, of virtue or vice in general, we are thinking of some +particular exhibition of some particular kind of virtue or vice. Nay, I +am not even concerned to deny that our idea of idea in general may +possibly be a copy of some particular one of our previous ideas which, +for the nonce, serves to represent all our other previous ideas. I limit +myself to saying that our idea of idea in general, whether it be or be +not itself an abstraction, is, at all events, not a copy of sensation. I +admit that it thereby differs essentially from most, if not all, other +general ideas. Possibly it may be only through my having<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> myself felt +the promptings of some particular virtue or vice, that I am able to form +an idea of that particular virtue or vice. If so, I admit that my idea +of that particular virtue or vice is but, as Hume would say, a copy of +my feeling. And since, undoubtedly, I can feel myself thinking, or +perceiving, or performing any other mental operation, I am bound to +admit, further, that my idea of any such operation may equally be +described as a copy of a sensation which I have experienced. All I +contend for is that if, after having formed my idea, either of a mental +operation or of anything else whatever, I proceed to ask myself what +sort of an entity that idea is, the answer which I give myself, or, in +other words, the idea which I form of my previous idea, being a copy of +idea, cannot be a copy of sensation.</p> + +<p>So much must surely be conceded to me, for that white, being white, +cannot be also black is not nearly so certain as that idea and +sensation, being two distinct things, idea of idea cannot be idea of +sensation. The concession, indeed, is likely enough to be accompanied by +an exclamation of wonder that so microscopic a flaw in an elaborate +exposition should be thought worth pointing out; but Hume himself would +certainly not have so retorted. Of the doctrine which I am impugning, +viz., that every <i>idea</i> is copied from some preceding <i>sensation</i>, he +had spoken as follows:—'Those who would assert that this position is +not universally true, nor without exception, have only one, and that an +easy, method of refuting it, by producing the idea which, in their +opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on +us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression or +lively perception which corresponds to it.' He was much too candid not +to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> have acknowledged that this challenge of his had been fairly and +fully met. He was not a man to refuse to own himself refuted when, after +distinctly intimating that the production of one single idea, having no +perception correspondent to it amongst those which we experience 'when +we see, or hear, or feel, or love, or hate, or will, or desire,' would +suffice for his entire refutation, he found such an idea produced. He +knew too well also to what enormous errors of thought minute errors of +expression may lead, to disregard any speck of inaccuracy in any one of +his definitions. The apparently slight oversight committed by him on +this occasion will, indeed, be presently seen to have sensibly +contributed to lead him subsequently into a mistake of no small +practical moment.</p> + +<p>We come next to the 'Association of Ideas,' the influence of which +almost all of Hume's successors, as well as himself, seem to me to have +greatly over-rated. That there is a 'principle of connection between the +different thoughts or ideas of the mind' is, as he says, sufficiently +evident; and that this principle is, as he was apparently the first to +remark, threefold, deriving its efficacy from resemblance, contiguity in +time or place, and cause or effect, may also be admitted with little +qualification. But I presume to think that he is quite incorrect in +adding that, in virtue of the aforesaid principle, ideas 'introduce each +other with a certain degree of method or regularity.' You are walking, +let us suppose, through Hyde Park, thinking of nothing more particular +than that the morning is a pleasant one, when you suddenly find yourself +in imagination pacing the shore of the Dead Sea, and, pausing to ask +yourself how you got there, you discover, perhaps, that it was by the +following steps. Remarking some landscape effect in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> distance, you +were reminded of a similar one which you had remarked years before while +taking a walk fifty miles off in Sussex. Here resemblance operated. Then +you recollected how during that walk you were thinking about Mr. Buckle, +whose lucubrations you had been conning over before starting. Here +entered contiguity both of time and space. The name of Buckle reminded +you how that promising writer ended his travels abroad by dying of a +fever which he caught while sailing over the sites of the engulphed +cities of the plain. Here cause and effect came into action; and, so +far, everything accords with Hume's theory. But if you repeat the same +walk to-morrow, the same landscape effect will almost certainly suggest +a train of ideas quite different from that of to-day. Perhaps it may +begin by reminding you of landscape effects in general; then of Mr. +Ruskin, who has discoursed so eloquently on that topic, and next of Mr. +Ruskin's 'Stones of Venice,' from whence it is equal chances whether +your thoughts radiate, on one side of the compass, to stone china, or +Stoney Stratford, or Stonewall Jackson, or, on the other, to the +'Venetian Bracelet,' L. E. L. and Fernando Po, or to that effective +adaptation of the Venetian style of architecture, the Railway Station at +St. Pancras, and thence to some town or other on the Midland Line.</p> + +<p>These examples will be readily recognized as fair average specimens of +those unpremeditated trains of thought with which we are all familiar. +Is there, then, in the arrangement of the consecutive thoughts of which +the several trains are composed, any method or regularity common, I will +not say to all, but to any two of them? According to Hume and to most of +his successors in the same path of enquiry, there ought to be. Thus the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> +illustrious author of the 'Analysis of the Human Mind' affirms, without +rebuke or protest from any one of his not less illustrious commentators, +that 'our ideas spring up or exist in the order in which the sensations +existed of which they are the copies: that of those sensations which +occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically, and +that of the sensations which occurred successively, the ideas rise +successively.' And he adds, 'this is the general law of the Association +of Ideas,' remarking, by way of illustration, that, as 'I have seen the +sun, and the sky in which it is placed, synchronically, if I think of +the one I think of the other at the same time'; and that, as when +committing to memory a passage of words, as, for instance, the Lord's +Prayer, we pronounce the words in successive order, and have +consequently the sensation of the words in successive order, so when we +proceed to repeat the passage, 'the ideas of the words also rise in +succession, <i>Our</i> suggesting <i>Father, Father</i> suggesting <i>which, which</i> +suggesting <i>art</i>, and so on to the end.'<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> + +<p>Oh Law! Law! most abused of scientific terms, what an infinity of +dogmatic illegalities are committed in thy name! The one thing which +scientific law implies is regularity of occurrence, but what regulation +is it that is obeyed in common by a number of sequences commencing at +the same point in Hyde Park, yet terminating, one in Africa, another in +America, a third in Palestine, and a fourth in the centre of England? +Can it have been seriously said that it is impossible for us to think of +the sky without thinking simultaneously of the sun which illu<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span>minates +the sky? Is it impossible for us to think instead of the ether which +constitutes it, or peradventure even of the resemblance between its +celestial azure and what Moore calls the 'most unholy blue' of some +frolicsome Cynthia's eyes? And is it not notorious that when saying the +Lord's Prayer—a prayer which, in spite of the injunction by which its +original dictation was accompanied, to 'avoid vain repetitions, as the +heathen do,' many Anglican clergymen insist on repeating half-a-dozen +times in a single service—is it not notorious that, so far from the +idea of one word suggesting to us the idea of the next, no small effort +of attention is requisite to enable us to have any idea at all of what +we are saying?</p> + +<p>It would seem that the author of the 'Analysis' either could not help +asking himself questions like these, or, without asking the questions, +could not help seeing the commonplace truths involved in the inevitable +replies to them. It would seem to have been semi-consciousness of the +utter inability of the evidence first cited by him to justify belief in +the necessarily simultaneous or successive occurrence of the ideas of +simultaneously or successively experienced sensations, which made him +have recourse for help to <i>complex</i> ideas. 'If,' he says, 'from a stone +I have had synchronically the sensation of colour, the sensation of +hardness, the sensations of shape and size, the sensation of +weight,—when the idea of one of these sensations occurs, the ideas of +all of them occur.' Because, then, I may have ascertained by experience +that a stone is white, hard, and round, two feet in diameter, and twenty +pounds in weight, am I really incapable, if I happen to break my shin +against it, of thinking how hard it is, without thinking also how heavy; +or, when trying to lift it, of thinking how<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> heavy it is without +thinking likewise of its shape and colour? Elsewhere the same writer +speaks of 'ideas which have been so often conjoined that whenever one +exists in the mind, the others immediately exist along with it, seem to +run into one another, to coalesce, as it were, and out of many to form +one idea.' But which are the ideas whereof this can be said? The writer +instances those simple ideas, colour, hardness, extension, weight, +which, he says, make up our complex ideas of gold or iron. He instances, +too, the ideas of resistance, muscular contractility, direction, +extension, place, and motion, of which he says our apparently simple +idea, weight, is compounded. Does he mean, then, that we cannot +entertain the idea of yellowness without entertaining at the same time +all the other ideas necessary for composing the idea of gold, and +entertaining, too, that idea in addition to all the rest? Does he mean +that a train of thought cannot commence with place without terminating +with weight? Of course he means nothing of the kind, although so he +distinctly says. Rather, he appears to mean the direct converse, viz., +that we cannot have the idea of gold or of weight present to the mind, +without having present also all the simple ideas of which those complex +ideas are compounded—in other words, not that the occurrence of any one +component necessarily calls up all the other components, and forms with +them the compound, but that the appearance of the compound brings with +it all its separate components.</p> + +<p>But neither does this seem to be a strictly correct representation. I am +not sure that I can think of gold without thinking of yellowness, but I +am positive that I can without thinking of hardness. Nor is there any +doubt that the youngest child knows perfectly well what it means when,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> +trying to lift a stone, it calls the stone heavy, although it might not +be more difficult to make the stone itself than the child understand +what is meant by muscular contractility. I own that if it be here +demanded of me how a compound can be present unless every one of its +components be present also, I may under pressure be constrained to +suggest that possibly, after all, the very term <i>compound</i> or <i>complex +idea</i> may be somewhat of a misnomer, or at any rate that the +constituents of such an idea are much fewer than is commonly supposed. +Be it admitted that the idea, so styled, could not have been formed +without the instrumentality of other and previously-formed ideas, still +it does not follow that the instruments of production should for ever +after accompany the product. The rackful of dry toast which is brought +to you for breakfast could scarcely have been so neatly sliced without +the help of a knife, but the toast is not the less in bodily presence on +the breakfast-table because the knife that cut it has been left behind +in the kitchen. Neither, although you may probably be aware that salt, +suet, sugar, and spice enter into the composition of a Christmas +pudding, do you necessarily think of those separate ingredients when you +think of the pudding, any more than you would see them separately if you +saw the pudding. The only qualities which you apparently cannot help +thinking of when you think of the pudding are its size, shape, and +colour.</p> + +<p>One word more about the assumed regularity in the succession of ideas. +That when you are repeating a familiar form of words or playing a +familiar piece of music, every word uttered or note struck, by reason of +connexion of some sort between itself and the word or note next in +order, enables you without the smallest mental effort to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> utter that +word or strike that note, is too notorious to be questioned. But I do +very earnestly question whether the connexion that thus operates is an +association of ideas. How can it be, when, as frequently happens, you +have not the smallest idea of what it is you are saying or playing? Have +you not often, after reverently saying grace, like the decent +paterfamilias you probably are, occasioned a giggle round the table by +saying it again a minute or two afterwards, in utter unconsciousness +that you had said it just before? Or, if I may so far flatter myself as +to fancy my reader a fair daughter of the house instead of the staid +house father—has it never happened to you, Miss, while executing a +brilliant performance on the piano, to have been so entirely engrossed +by an animated flirtation carried on simultaneously, that, if at the +conclusion of the piece you had been asked what you had been playing, +you could not have replied whether it was <i>Là ci darem la mano</i> or <i>Non +mi voglio maritar</i>? And is it not evident that non-existent ideas cannot +have called real ideas into existence?</p> + +<p>My own modest contribution towards explanation of these mysterious +phenomena is as follows. Apart from association of <i>ideas</i>, there is a +separate and independent association—to wit, association of +<i>volitions</i>. While committing to memory a form of words, or trying a new +piece of music, every separate movement of your tongue or of your +fingers is consequent on some separate volition. Each series of +movements is consequent on a series of volitions. By being repeatedly +made to follow each other in the same order, the several volitions +become connected with each other, so that whenever the mind desires to +marshal them in the aforesaid order, each one, as it presents itself,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> +brings with it the next in succession, until the whole series is +completed; while, as each volition has consequent upon it a +corresponding movement, a series of corresponding movements +simultaneously takes place. The mind meanwhile is quite unconscious of +the muscular movements that are going on. What it is conscious of are +the volitions without which no voluntary movements of the muscles could +have been made, and of which the mind must needs be conscious, because a +volition of which the mind was not conscious would be an involuntary +volition, a birth too monstrous for even metaphysics to be equal to. But +although necessarily conscious of these volitions, the mind is only +momentarily conscious. It pays them barely an instant's attention, and +therefore instantaneously forgets them, retaining no more trace of them +than if they had never been.</p> + +<p>The doctrine of Hume's which next confronts us is his famous one +concerning Cause and Effect. He commences it by explaining that all +objects of human enquiry are divisible into two kinds—1. Relations of +Ideas, like those of which geometry, algebra, and arithmetic treat, and +which are either intuitively certain, or 'discoverable by the mere +operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in +the universe,' as, for example, the truths demonstrated by Euclid, which +would be equally incontestable even 'though there were never a circle or +a triangle in nature:' 2. Matters of Fact, as, for example, the sun's +rising and setting, or the emission of light and heat by fire, which are +never discoverable by unassisted reason, because of no one of them would +the opposite imply a contradiction or be consequently inconceivable; and +in our knowledge of any one of which we can never<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> 'go beyond the +evidence of our memory and senses,' except by means of reasons derived +from experience of some fact or facts connected in some way or other +with the particular matter of fact we are considering.</p> + +<p>So far, all is comparatively plain sailing, but Hume now propounds a +difficulty which he at first presents as seemingly insurmountable, but +which I cannot help thinking to be mainly of his own creation, and which +he himself, almost immediately afterwards, suggests a mode, though a +very inadequate mode, of overcoming. His language here is not marked by +his usual perspicuity, or rather—to speak without respect of +persons—it contradicts itself in most astounding fashion; but his +meaning is not the less certainly the following, for there is no other +construction which his words will bear.</p> + +<p>'What,' he asks, 'is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?' +Why is it that, having found that such an object has always been +attended with such an effect, we infer that similar objects will always +be attended with similar effects? The proposition that a certain +antecedent has always been followed by a certain consequent, and the +proposition that the same antecedent will be followed by the same +consequent, are not identical. What, then, is the connexion between them +which causes one to be inferred from the other? The connexion is +unhesitatingly pronounced by him to be neither intuitively perceived, +nor yet to be 'founded on any process of the understanding.' If you +insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, he challenges +you to produce that reasoning, and taking for granted that you have none +to produce, he proceeds to indicate what principle it is which, in his +opinion, does determine us to form the inference. That principle<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> he +declares to be custom or habit, by which alone, he asserts, we are, +after the constant conjunction of two objects, determined to expect the +one from the appearance of the other; adding that all inferences from +experience are effects of custom, not of reasoning.</p> + +<p>What is the correct answer to this question of Hume's I shall be rash +enough to endeavour to indicate a little further on; meanwhile there can +be no temerity in saying that whatever be the right answer, Hume's is +certainly a wrong one. Habit plainly cannot be its own parent. It +enables us to repeat more easily what we have already repeatedly done, +but it cannot be the cause of our doing or being able to do anything for +the first time. An infant that has once burnt its fingers by touching +the flame of a candle, expects that if it touch the flame again it will +burn its fingers again, but it does not expect this because it has been +in the habit of expecting it. Neither, if we be here bidden to +understand that the habit referred to is not any mental habit of our +own, but a habit which we have observed certain phenomena to have of +following each other, shall we thereby be brought one whit nearer the +truth. Our infant with the burnt finger has not observed that flame is +in the habit of burning. It only knows that flame did burn on the one +occasion on which it tried the experiment, which experiment it +consequently declines to repeat. Besides, no one needs to be told that +inferences, though thus capable of being drawn from single occurrences, +are drawn with increased confidence from observation of habit. We all +know already that, having always found that fire burns, we infer that it +always will burn. What we want to know is, why we draw this inference. +This is the question which Hume puts, and respect<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span>ing which he gives +very positively the negative reply that the inference is not drawn +either intuitively, nor yet by any process of the understanding. Yet +that a body when not moving must needs be at rest, is not more certainly +demonstrable than that inferences cannot possibly be drawn except in one +or other of these two ways. Is not every inference a species of belief, +and must not every belief be either innate within us, or have been +acquired artificially; and, as in the latter case, it is a mental +acquisition, must it not in that case have been acquired by an operation +of the mind or understanding? Is it not clear, then, that inferences +must always be either intuitive or ratiocinative; and is it not strange +that Hume should deny that they ever are so? Yet stranger still is it, +that even while denying them to be either one or the other, he, almost +in the same breath, pronounces them to be both. For, after having on one +page denied that they are founded on reason, or any process of the +understanding, he describes them on the next page as being not simply +founded on, but as being themselves 'processes of the mind,' 'processes +of thought,' and immediately afterwards 'arguments,' nay, '<i>reasonings</i> +from experience;' and, yet again, after as short a pause, these very +same 'reasonings,' and 'arguments,' and 'processes of the mind and +thought,' he concludes by styling 'natural instincts which no reason or +process of the thought or understanding is able either to produce or to +prevent'—'operations of the soul as unavoidable' when the mind is +placed in certain circumstances, as it is 'to feel the passion of love +when we receive benefits, or hatred when we meet with injuries.'</p> + +<p>What are we to say to a description of mental operations which are and +are not 'arguments' and 'reasonings,' which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> are and are not 'processes +of thought,' which are not 'intuitive,' and which yet are 'instincts?' +How are we to account for such amazing inconsistencies in an exposition +of one of the greatest of philosophers? With all humility, I submit the +following as a possible solution of the enigma.</p> + +<p>The one solitary ground on which Hume denies the argumentative and +ratiocinative character of what he nevertheless terms arguments and +reasonings, is the impossibility of producing the <i>chains</i> of argument +or reasoning of which they are composed. But this impossibility can at +most only prove that the reasonings are elementary, and have, +consequently, no component parts into which they can be resolved. But +reasoning is not the less reasoning for being elementary, or for being +only a single link in a chain, instead of being itself a chain composed +of many links. Still, being elementary, it may occur to, and pass +through, the mind with extreme rapidity—with not less rapidity than an +intuition or instinct, for which therefore it may easily be mistaken, as +accordingly it has actually been by Hume. But that a reasoning from +experience is not really an instinct is certain, firstly, because +intuitive or instinctive reasoning, if not a phrase absolutely devoid of +meaning, is a contradiction in terms; and, secondly, because, if it were +instinctive, it would precede instead of following experience, and a +baby, instead of finding out that flame burns by touching it, would know +beforehand that flame burns, and would therefore not touch it.</p> + +<p>From the species of Belief constituted by an inference from experience, +Hume, by an easy transition, passes on to Belief in general, which he +defines to be 'nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady +conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able +to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> attain,' referring, by way of illustration, to an animal with the +head of a man and the body of a horse, which anyone can imagine, but no +one can believe in, and desiring us apparently to suppose that if our +groom were to come and tell us that he had found a centaur feeding in +the paddock beside our favourite saddle-horse, our sole reason for +believing in the horse and for not believing in the centaur would be our +greater ability to conceive the one than the other. That such a +definition should for a moment have satisfied its author's curiosity, is +itself a psychological curiosity which must not, however, be suffered to +detain us. Whoever, not content with knowing perfectly well what belief +is, desires to have his knowledge of it set down in writing, should read +the admirable notes on the subject, with which Mr. John Mill and Mr. +Bain have enriched the last edition of Mr. James Mill's 'Analysis of the +Human Mind.' Most readers, however, will probably be disposed to avail +themselves here of a rather favourite phrase of Hume himself, and to +plead that, 'if we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute +about terms;' and it is not unlikely that such of them as may have +formed their notion of metaphysical discussions in general from the +specimens given above, may go so far as to hint a doubt whether any of +the nice verbal distinctions which metaphysicians so much affect, are +really worth the trouble required to understand them. Nor would anyone, +perhaps, be much the worse for acting upon this suspicion, provided +that, in accordance with it, he kept altogether aloof from the studies +which it disparages. His ideas need not be the less clear because he +neither knows nor cares of what they are copies, nor whether they are +copies of anything; nor will the order of their occurrence be at all +affected in con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span>sequence of his being similarly careless, whether that +order is or is not governed by a <i>law</i> of association; neither need his +inferences from experience be the less sound in consequence of his never +having enquired how or why they are deduced. But although the most +absolute ignorance and corresponding indifference about these and +kindred topics may not tend in the least to disqualify him for +performance of the whole duty of man, it is not the less important that, +if he do care to know aught about them, his knowledge should be exact, +for there is no knowing beforehand how luxuriantly the minutest germ of +theoretical error may ramify in practice, or into what substantive +quagmire trust in deceitful shadows may lead. These respectable +aphorisms may be beneficially borne in mind during perusal of what is +about to be said.</p> + +<p>If the fact were really, as Hume supposed, that we have <i>no</i> reason for +our inferences from experience, and draw them only because either we +have been in the habit of drawing them, or because we are so constituted +as to be unable to help drawing them, the reason of our drawing them +plainly could not be that we perceive any necessary connection between +antecedent and consequent events, or any force or power binding these +together as cause and effect. Accordingly, Hume does not scruple to +affirm that 'we have no idea of connection or power at all, and that +these words are absolutely without meaning when employed either in +philosophical reasoning or in common life.' Every idea, he argues, +referring to a rule which he somewhat hastily supposes himself to have +already proved to be without exception, must needs have been copied from +some preceding sensible impression, but neither from within nor from +without can we have received an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> impression from which this particular +idea can have been copied. No keenest scrutiny of any portion of matter, +no study of its external configuration or internal structure could, +previously to experience, enable us to conjecture that it could produce +any effect whatever, still less any particular effect: could enable us +to guess, for instance, that flame would burn, or ice would chill, if +touched. Nor even though on once touching flame we get our fingers +burnt, are mature philosophers like us to conclude, as if we had no more +intelligence than so many babies, that if we touch again we shall be +burnt again. All we have as yet learnt from the experiment is that the +sensation of touching fire has once been followed by the sensation of +burning, but nothing has occurred to suggest that in the first sensation +lurked any secret power of producing the second. And what a single +experiment does not prove, no number of repetitions of precisely the +same experiment with precisely the same results can prove. Even though +on a lengthened course of experience we have found that in every case of +our touching flame our fingers have been burnt, we are still as far as +ever from perceiving any bond of connection between the two events. We +do indeed believe that as flame when touched has hitherto invariably +burnt, so, whenever touched hereafter, it will hereafter invariably +burn; but this, according to Hume, we believe simply because by long +practice we have contracted such a habit of associating the idea of +touched flame with burnt fingers, that whenever we witness the one we +cannot help expecting the other.</p> + +<p>Neither, if, withdrawing our eyes from the outward world, we cast them +inwardly upon the operations of our own minds, shall we, according to +Hume, any the more discover<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> what we are in search of. What though we +know by experience that whatever, within certain limits, our will +appoints, our bodily organs or mental faculties will ordinarily perform; +that our limbs will move as we wish them, and our memory, reason, or +imagination bring forward ideas which we desire to contemplate, what +knowledge have we here beyond that of certain volitions and certain +other acts taking place in succession? What smallest evidence have we of +any connection between the volitions and the other acts? A volition is +an operation of the mind, is it not? and body is matter, is it not? And +do you pretend to know—can you form the smallest approach to a +guess—how mind is united with body, and how it is possible therefore +for the refined spiritual essence to actuate the gross material +substance. If you 'were empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains +or to control the planets in their orbit,' would such extensive +authority be one whit more inexplicable than the supposed ability of +your will to raise your hand to your head or to cause your foot to make +one forward step?</p> + +<p>If, nevertheless, you fancy you understand in what manner the will has +some of the bodily organs under its government, how, pray, do you +account for its not having all equally—the heart and liver as well as +the tongue and fingers? Without trying, you never would have discovered +that your bowels <i>will not</i>, any more than without trying you could have +known that your limbs <i>will</i>, ordinarily move in conformity with your +wishes. Neither, if one of your limbs were to be suddenly paralysed, +would you, until you tried, become aware that it would no longer move as +you wished. If there be, then, a power attached to the will, it is +plainly experience alone which apprises<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> you of its existence; whereas +if you were independently conscious of it, you would know beforehand +precisely what it can and what it cannot effect, and would, moreover, +when you lost it, become instantly aware of your loss.</p> + +<p>Again, and above all, does not anatomy teach us that when the mind wills +the movement of any bodily member, it 'is not the member itself which is +immediately moved, but certain intervening nerves, muscles, and animal +spirits, or possibly something still more minute and more unknown,' +through which the motion is successively propagated until it reach the +member? So that when the mind wills one event, a series of other events, +quite different and quite unthought of, take place instead; and it is +only by their means that the will's purpose is finally achieved. But how +can the mind be conscious, how can it form the remotest conception, of a +power which not only never does what the mind desires, but never does +aught of which the mind is cognisant?</p> + +<p>And as we are thus utterly unable to perceive any power that the mind +has over the body, so are we equally unconscious of any power of the +mind over itself. We know as little of its internal nature and +constitution as we do of its mode of connection with the body. We know +by experience that at the bidding of the will ideas are continually +brought forward; but by what means they are brought forward we are +absolutely ignorant, as we are also of the reasons of the fluctuation of +mental activity, and why mental operations are more vigorous in health +than in sickness, before breakfast than after a heavy dinner or deep +carouse.</p> + +<p>Such, on the issue immediately before us, is Hume's reasoning, to +which—though necessarily very greatly condensing it—I shall, I am +sure, be acknowledged to have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> conscientiously striven to do full +justice, by bringing all its points into the strongest light, and +arranging them in the most effective order. Still, with its utmost +strength thus displayed before us, we are fully warranted in asserting +<i>à priori</i> that its whole utmost strength is weakness. If, by following +a leader who has engaged to conduct us to a certain spot, we find +ourselves at our journey's end in a quite different place, no appeal +that the guide can make to maps or finger-posts will persuade us that he +has not mistaken the way. Nor need our judgment be otherwise, even +though our guide be Hume, if, having started with him in pursuit of +truth, we are finally landed in a patent absurdity. With all due respect +for logic, we protest with Tony Lumpkin against being argufied out of +our senses, as we plainly should be if we allowed ourselves to be +persuaded that whenever we use the words <i>power</i> or <i>connection</i> we have +no idea thereto correspondent. Since, then, Hume tells us this, we may +be quite sure that he has been deluded by some fallacy which may be +detected by adequate search; and being, moreover, sensible that we +really have the idea our possession of which is denied by him, we may be +equally sure that the original of which the idea is a copy is similarly +discoverable. In sooth, neither the one nor the other is far to seek. +The fallacy consists simply in confusion of the definite with the +indefinite article. The original of our idea of power Hume himself +indicates even while rejecting it. Although constrained by Hume's +demonstration to confess that we cannot even conjecture of what kind is +<i>the</i> authority which the will exercises over the limbs, we are not the +less sensible that it does exercise <i>an</i> authority of some sort or +other, which they are unable to disobey. We know that in ordinary +circumstances our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> limbs will move when we wish them to move, and will +remain quiet when we wish them not to move. Nor this only. We moreover +know, or at any rate fancy we know, that they would not have moved +unless we had wished them. In examples like these of volitions followed, +as the case may be, by <i>premeditated</i> motion or rest, we have something +more than the simple sequence observable in the succession of external +events. We do not perceive simply that, as when fire is lighted, heat is +emitted, so when the mind wills the body moves. We perceive clearly that +there must be a connection of some sort between antecedent and +consequent, without which the first certainly <i>would not</i> and, we fancy, +<i>could not</i> have followed the first. We perceive, in short, that the +second followed <i>because</i> the first preceded. If fire were an animated +being, capable of forming and manifesting volitions; and if we observed +that whenever it wished to emit heat, heat was emitted; and that +whenever it wished to withhold heat, heat was withheld; and if we were +thereupon to say that fire has the power of emitting or withholding heat +at its pleasure, our words surely would not be destitute of +signification; they would certainly possess some meaning, and that a +very obvious one. And so they as certainly do when we say that the mind +has power over those bodily movements which we observe to take place and +to cease in constant conformity with its will. I am not saying that what +they mean is necessarily truth—we will come to that presently—all I +say as yet is, that they mean something, and that that something, +whether it be a real or only an imaginary perception, is perfectly +fitted to be the original of that idea of 'power' <i>connecting</i> cause and +effect, or of 'connection' <i>between</i> cause and effect, which Hume +maintains does not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> exist, because there is no original from which it +can have been copied. It matters not that we are quite ignorant of what +nature is the something from which our idea of power possessed by the +mind over the body is derived, and which, for aught we know, may reside, +not in the mind, but in the body, and may consist, not of any strength +inherent in the former, but of loyalty and docility inherent in the +latter. Just as the authority of a popular general over a +well-disciplined army is not the less real because the soldiers, every +one of whose lives is at the general's disposal, might, if so inclined, +mutiny <i>en masse</i>, so it can make no difference in the mind's power over +the body whether the mind be intrinsically able to enforce obedience, or +the limbs be so constituted as to be unable to disobey. As little does +it matter that we are also ignorant of the mode in which the mind's +behests are communicated to the members. It is not the less certain that +in some mode or other they are communicated. Neither does it signify +more that the mind does not communicate directly with the part of the +body which it desires to influence, and acts upon that part only by +means of action propagated through a series of intervening parts; or +that it is able to direct only some organs, and not others, or cannot +direct even those, if by some accident they have become seriously +deranged. A strong-armed blockhead is not the less obviously able to +pump up water because the terms 'muscular contractility' and +'atmospheric pressure' are as heathen Greek to him; or because the +pump-handle, which alone is directly moved by him, touches, not the +water itself, but only the first link in a chain of mechanism connecting +it with the water; or because, if the sucker of the pump got choked, or +the well were to dry up, it would be vain for him to go<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> on moving the +pump-handle. Blockhead as he is, nothing of all this in the least +diminishes his conviction that as long as the pump continues in order +and there remains water in the well, he can oblige the water to rise by +moving the pump-handle; nor can anything analogous prevent the mind from +feeling that whenever, in ordinary circumstances, it wills that the +limbs be moved, the limbs not only will be moved, but cannot help being +moved accordingly. But it is simply impossible that, from the exercise +of volitions which it knows will be obeyed, the mind should not receive +the sensation of exercising causal power; and having thus got the +sensation, it has nothing to do but to copy the sensation in order to +get the idea of causal power. <i>Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte</i>; +the first step being taken the others cost nothing. The mind having, by +introspection of its own operations, discovered what Hume, though +professing to look in the same direction, unaccountably contrived to +overlook—the idea, namely, of causal power—proceeds to apply that idea +to the connection of external phenomena. Not only do we, whenever we see +a horse or an ox walking of its own accord, infer that the animal walks +<i>because</i> it wishes to walk; but having observed that, when a stone is +thrown into the air it invariably falls presently afterwards towards the +ground; that a magnet invariably attracts any light piece of iron placed +near it; that red-hot coals always burn; and that water always moistens, +we infer that the second constituent of each brace of phenomena takes +place <i>because</i> of the first, meaning thereby that there is some strong +bond <i>connecting</i> the two and <i>compelling</i> one to follow the other. If +called upon to justify this inference, we may do so by reducing to +absurdity its only possible alternative. If there be supposed to be no +connection<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> between two phenomena constituting one of those invariable +sequences which we are accustomed to denominate cause and effect, the +sequence which they constitute must needs be an unconnected sequence, +and the only reason for styling one of the phenomena a cause is, that it +is an antecedent which the other invariably follows. But according to +this, as has been pointed out over and over again, day would be the +cause of night, and night the cause of day, and tidal flux and reflux +likewise would be each other's causes; and Mr. J. S. Mill has therefore +proposed to interpolate a word, and to define the cause of a phenomenon +as 'the antecedent on which it (the phenomenon) is invariably and +<i>unconditionally</i> consequent.'<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> I must, however, confess myself +unable to perceive how the definition is improved by this emendation. +There is not, and cannot possibly be, such a thing as <i>unconditionally</i> +invariable sequence, as, indeed, Mr. Mill himself virtually admits by +expressly assuming as an indispensable condition of all causation that +'the present constitution of things endure.' But if, notwithstanding the +presence of this indispensable condition, it be permissible to call any +sequence unconditionally invariable, then the sequences of night upon +day and of day upon night are such sequences, and day and night continue +consequently entitled to be styled each other's causes as much under the +amended as under the original definition. For as long as 'the present +constitution of things endures,' that is, as long as the earth continues +to revolve on its axis, and the sun continues to shine, and no opaque +substance intervenes between earth and sun, day and night will continue +to be as invariably and unconditionally each other's antecedents as +sunlight will continue to be the antecedent or concomi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span>tant of day. +True, Mr. Mill denies that the earth's diurnal motion is part of the +present constitution of things, because, according to him, 'nothing can +be so called which might possibly be terminated or altered by natural +causes:' but, if so, then neither ought sunlight to be so called, for it +too quite possibly may, nay, in the opinion of many philosophers, most +certainly will, be extinguished eventually by natural causes. If day +ought not to be called the unconditionally invariable consequent of +night merely because it would cease to be so if the earth were to cease +turning on its axis, then neither ought it to be called the +unconditionally invariable consequent of the unshrouded proximity of the +sun, inasmuch as it would cease to be thereupon consequent if the sun +were to become burnt out. If night be not, and if sunlight be, the cause +of day, the reason is not that sunlight always hitherto has been, and, +on one indispensable condition, always will be followed by day, for so +equally has hitherto been, and on the same condition will hereafter be, +night. The real reason is, that sunlight not only always has been and +will be, but also always <i>must</i> be followed by day; that unless the +constitution of nature very materially change, wherever is sunlight day +<i>must</i> be; whereas not only might day be, although night had never +preceded, but unless night had preceded, day must have been from the +beginning. In short, to constitute cause, invariability, however +unconditional, will not suffice. Another quality must be added, and that +quality I contend to be obligatoriness. A cause, I maintain, would not +be a cause unless its effect not only do or will, but <i>must</i> necessarily +follow it. In common with the great unphilosophic mass of mankind, I +hold that between cause and effect there is a binding power which +constrains the one to follow the other.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> If asked whence we suppose that +power can have been derived, such of us, as conscious that we are 'no +very great wits,' don't mind confessing that we 'believe in a God,' will +not mind either suggesting that the power, wherever not exerted by an +animated creature, may possibly be directly from God. One thing certain +is, that inanimate matter cannot possibly possess or exercise any force +or power whatever, so that, unless matter, although apparently dead, be +really alive, attraction, cohesion, gravitation, and all its other so +called forces, being incompatible with dead inertness, must needs be +manifestations of some living, and possibly divine, power. Far from +there being any difficulty in conceiving Omnipresent Deity to be +exhibiting its might in every speck of universal space in every instant +of never-ending time, it is, on the contrary, impossible to conceive +otherwise. We cannot conceive one single minutest point in limitless +extension to be for one moment exempt from the immediate control of a +divine nature assumed to be</p> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Diffused throughout infinity's expanse</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And co-existent with eternity.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p>Here, indeed, we hasten to acknowledge with Hume that 'our line is too +short to fathom the immense abyss' which we have now reached. But we +need not, therefore, follow Hume to the lengths to which his insidious +mock-modesty would fain entice us. We may concede to him that 'we have +no idea of a Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own +faculties,' but we need not imitate him by perversely shutting our eyes +to the evidences of an energy inherent in our own faculties, and thereby +entitle him to insist on our joining him in denying that there is any +evidence of energy in the Supreme Being.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> We need not, because +constrained to admit that we know no more of the essence of divine, than +we do of human, power, pretend that we cannot even conceive such a thing +as divine power. Hume's affectation of profound ignorance on the subject +must have occasioned unusual amusement in a certain quarter. The Devil +can seldom have had a more hearty grin at his darling sin than when +witnessing this peculiar exhibition of the pride that apes humility.</p> + +<p>That Hume's ignorance was nothing but affectation is proved by his +veering completely round immediately afterwards, and in his very next +chapter, and almost in his very next page, pronouncing it to be +'universally allowed that matter in all its operations is actuated by a +necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely +determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect in such +particular circumstances could possibly have resulted from it.' +Throughout the same chapter he argues in the same sense, and quite +forgetting how obstinately he had just before contended that there are +absolutely no such things as connection or power at all, he defies any +one to 'define a cause without comprehending, as part of the definition, +<i>necessary</i> connection with its effect.' So highly, indeed, does he now +rate that connecting power, whose very existence he had previously so +vehemently denied, that he professes himself unable to set any limit to +its efficacy. Even for those who should undertake to deduce from it the +impossibility of any liberty of human will, and consequently of any +human responsibility, pleading that, inasmuch as with a continued chain +of necessary causes, reaching from the first great cause of all to every +separate volition of every single human creature, it must needs be the +Creator of the world who is the ultimate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> author of all volitions, and +consequently solely accountable for every crime which man commits, he +affects, with exceedingly ill-sitting sanctimoniousness, to have no +better answer than that such belief, being impious, must be absurd and +cannot be true. It did not suit his purpose to point out that the +volitions of Omnipotence itself, equally with human volitions, are +necessary effects of causes—the causes in their case being the other +attributes with which Omnipotence is conjoined—and that as it is +nevertheless impossible for the volitions of Omnipotence to be otherwise +than absolutely free and uncontrolled, so there is no reason why human +volitions likewise should not, in spite of the same objection, be as +thoroughly free as our own feelings assure us they are.</p> + +<p>Hume's sudden conversion, so amazing at first sight, from flattest +denial to positivest assertion of causal power, becomes intelligible +when he is seen immediately afterwards using his newly adopted creed as +a fulcrum whereon to rest his argumentative lever in his assault upon +Miracles. About that celebrated piece of reasoning, startling as the +avowal may sound, there is, to my mind, nothing more remarkable than its +celebrity, for, on close inspection, it will be found to be entirely +made up of (1) the demonstration of a truism, and (2) the inculcation of +a confessedly misleading rule. Not far from its commencement will be +found a definition which, if correct, would leave nothing to dispute +about. A miracle, we are told, is 'a violation of the laws of nature,' +of laws which a firm and unalterable experience has established. But if +so, <i>cadit quæstio</i>. Of course, there can be no alteration of the +unalterable. No need, of course, of further words to prove that a +miracle thus defined is an impossibility.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span></p> + +<p>Let us suppose, however, the word <i>unalterable</i> to have been used here +by a slip of the pen instead of <i>unaltered</i>, and that Hume really meant +by a miracle any alteration of what had previously appeared to be the +constant course of nature. Even so, we shall have him contending that no +amount, however great, of testimony however unimpeachable, ought to be +accepted as adequate proof of such an alteration. Of what he urges in +support of this position much may be at once dismissed as altogether +irrelevant. That the most honest witness may be the dupe of optical or +auricular illusion, or of a distorting or magnifying imagination; that +there is in many minds a natural predisposition to believe in the +marvellous, and that the love of astonishing often gives exaggerated +expression to the exaggerations of the fancy; that self-interest and +religious zeal often furnish additional motives for mendacity, and that +testimony, even when sincere at first, is apt to become corrupted at +every stage as it passes from hand to hand, or is committed to +paper—all this, together with any further enumeration of circumstances +calculated to invalidate testimony, is quite beside the real question. +It merely proves what no one needs to have proved, the propriety, viz., +of weighing evidence and balancing adverse probabilities; and even +though it proved in addition that of all the so-styled miracles on +record, there is not a single one the evidence for which is sufficient, +it would still prove nothing to the purpose. For Hume is arguing against +the credibility, not of any miracles in particular, but of all miracles +in general, those included the witnesses for which are of indisputable +intelligence and undisputed veracity. Be the quality of the testimony +what it may, no quantity of it, according to him, can be sufficient. +This is the essence of his thesis, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> only part of it in which there +is any novelty, and in behalf of this part all that he has to say may be +resolved into a sophism, followed by a repetition of the same begging of +the question, as is involved in his afore-cited definition of a miracle. +In substance it runs as follows. All testimony is at best but a +description of the results of sensible experience—of observations of +the senses—but the most faithful description must needs be a less vivid +presentation of truth than the reality described. A single original is +better evidence than any number of copies. Your own personal experience +is more trustworthy than any number of mere records of the experience of +other people, and where the two conflict, the former always deserves +preference. Now the personal experience of each one of us assures us +that many sets of natural phenomena take place in perfectly invariable +sequences, in sequences so invariable as to appear to be, and to be +familiarly spoken of as, manifestations or operations of certain +inflexible laws of nature. Within our experience there has never been a +single deviation from any such law. Wherefore, though all the rest of +mankind should unite in asserting that they have observed such a +deviation, we ought not to believe them. Even though, for example—the +example, however, being not Hume's, but my own—we were, on leaving home +some morning, to hear on all sides that, while we were yet in bed, the +sun was seen to rise in the west instead of the east, and though we +found the statement repeated in the 'Times' and 'Daily News,' and +presently afterwards saw it posted up at the Exchange as having been +flashed by electric wire from New York and Kurrachee, we are not for a +moment to doubt that these reiterated and mutually corroborative +statements are utterly false. For, numerous and consistent<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> as they may +be, they are but copies of the experience of other people, while, +although we may have to oppose to them only our own single experience, +still that single experience is original, and therefore of more worth. +The value, moreover, of any experience is, irrespective of originality, +determined by the difference in number between the results of opposite +kinds which it has discovered. The smaller number is deducted from the +larger, and the balance represents the probability that the results +which have most frequently occurred hitherto will continue to occur +henceforward. The larger the deduction thus to be made, the smaller the +probability, and <i>vice versâ</i>; and when the deduction is <i>nil</i>, or when +there has hitherto been complete uniformity, the probability becomes +virtual certainty. When two original experiences are opposed to each +other, their respective values, ascertained in the same manner, are +compared, and trust is reposed in one or the other accordingly. Now, +according to these principles, difficult as it might be in the case +supposed for any one to conceive what motive all the rest of the world +could have for lying, it would be still more difficult to believe them +to be speaking truth. For why do we ever believe anything that anyone +says? Why but because we have learnt by experience that, when people +have no apparent motive for lying, they commonly do speak the truth? But +the same experience which has taught us this has taught us likewise that +people do now and then lie without apparent motive. At best, therefore, +there is never more than a probability that people are speaking the +truth, while in this instance, the supposition that they might be +speaking the truth would imply that there may be a truth against which +there is proof amounting to certainty. For what they affirm is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> that +something has happened the very reverse of what has invariably happened +before in the same circumstances. Is it not infinitely more likely that +people should be lying as they have often done before, than that the +invariable course of nature should have undergone a variation? With +evidence on the one side that has never yet deceived, with no evidence +on the other save what has often proved deceptive, how can we hesitate +which to accept? Even though the unanimity of testimony be such as might +otherwise be deemed complete proof, it is here met by absolutely +complete proof in the shape of a law of nature. The greater probability +overwhelms the lesser. The stronger proof annihilates the weaker, +leaving none of it behind, so that whoever still persists in believing +that a law of nature has been violated, must be content to do so without +one particle of proof. No quantity of testimony can furnish the smallest +proof of a miracle unless the falsehood of the testimony would be a +greater departure from antecedent uniformity—in other words, would be a +greater miracle—than the miracle which it attests. Unfortunately it is +but too notorious that there is not, and never has been, such a thing as +uniform truthfulness of testimony to depart from.</p> + +<p>Such, unless most unintentionally injured by compression, is Hume's +famous argument against miracles, of which the author was sufficiently +proud to boast openly that in it he had discovered what 'will be useful, +as long as the world endures,' as 'an everlasting check to all kinds of +superstitious delusion,' but which, as I nevertheless venture to repeat, +is compounded in about equal moieties of transparent sophism and +baseless assumption. For is it not the veriest juggle of words to insist +on the necessary inferiority of copies to an original, without adverting +to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> indispensable proviso that the original with which the copies +are compared should be the original from which the copies have been +taken? May not a copy of Leonardo Da Vinci's 'Last Supper' quite +possibly be equal in force and vividness of expression to the original +painting by Benjamin West bearing the same name? Might it not be wise to +trust rather to an Airy, or a De la Rue, or a Lockyer's account of what +he had observed during a solar eclipse than to your own immediate +observations on the same occasion? Besides, this first branch of Hume's +argument, if sound, would tell quite as much for, as against, miracles, +rendering it equally incumbent on actual witnesses to believe, as on all +but actual witnesses to disbelieve. If you are always to prefer your own +original experience to mere descriptions given by other people of +theirs, then should it happen to be yourself to whom the sun appeared in +the west at an hour when, according to custom, he ought to have been in +the east, you are not to allow the protestations of any number of +persons who, happening at the time to have been looking the other way, +saw the sun in his usual place, to persuade you that what you saw was a +mock sun or an <i>ignis fatuus</i>. Rather than imagine that your own senses +can have deceived you, you are to suppose that all about you are in a +league to deceive you. For precisely the same reason for which you +should reject even universal testimony in favour of a miracle which you +have not witnessed, you are equally to reject universal testimony in +opposition to a miracle the similitude of which you have witnessed.</p> + +<p>Or is it possible for a question to be more distinctly begged than when, +to the question whether a miracle has occurred, it is answered that a +miracle is not a miracle<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> unless there be uniform experience against it; +that uniformly adverse experience is direct and full proof against +anything; and that therefore there must always be full proof against +miracles? What is here taken for granted to be full proof is the very +thing requiring to be proved. If past uniformity really be a pledge for +continued uniformity, of course there can be no departure from +uniformity. If the whole question does not at once fall to the ground, +it is because no question has ever really arisen. But what shadow of +pretext is there for treating an hitherto unvaried course of events as +necessarily invariable? From past experience we have deduced what we are +pleased to call <i>laws</i> of nature, but it is morally impossible that we +can seriously think, whatever we are in the habit of saying, that these +laws are self-denying ordinances whereby nature's God has voluntarily +abdicated part of His inalienable prerogative. The utmost efficacy we +are warranted in ascribing to them is that of lines marking certain of +the courses within which God's providence is pleased to move. But how +can we pretend to know for how long a season such may continue to be the +divine pleasure? How do we know that the present season may not be the +first of an alternating series, and that it may not at any moment +terminate, and be succeeded by one of an opposite character? What though +we have some shadow of historical evidence that most physical phenomena +have been going on in much the same order for some six thousand years, +is that a basis whereon to theorise with regard to the proceedings of +Him in whose sight one day is as a thousand years and a thousand years +as one day? Might not as well some scientific member of an insect tribe +of ephemera, whom ancestral tradition, confirmed by personal experience, +had assured that an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> eight-day clock had already gone on for six days, +pronounce it to be a law of the clock's nature that it should go on for +ever without being again wound up? Would the insect philosopher's +dogmatism be one whit less absurd than that of those human ephemera who +so positively lay down the law about the clockwork of the universe? +Those laws of nature to which unerring regularity and perpetuity of +operation are so confidently attributed, may they not, perchance, be but +single clauses of much farther reaching laws, according to whose other +provisions the force of these isolated clauses may, in novel +combinations of circumstances, be counteracted by some latent and +hitherto unsuspected force? Or is it not, at all events, open to their +divine promulgator to suspend their operation at his pleasure? May it +not conceivably have been preordained that the globe of our earth, after +revolving for a given number of ages, in one direction, shall then, like +a meat-jack, or like an Ascidian's heart,<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> reverse its order of +procedure, and commence a contrary series of revolutions? Or might not +He who prescribed to the earth its rotatory movement, will that the +rotation should for some hours cease, and that the sun should in +consequence seem to stand still, as it is recorded to have done at the +command of Joshua? Improbable as these suppositions may be, who that has +not been taken into counsel by his Creator can<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> presume to say that they +may not be correct? The events which they involve are not inconceivable, +and whatever is not utterly inconceivable may possibly occur, however +numerous the chances against its occurrence. It is not then the fact +that 'past experience,' however unvaried, affords full proof of the +future existence of any event, or constitutes certainty against the +future existence of the reverse of that event. Completest uniformity of +experience cannot create a certainty by which any opposite probability +would be completely annihilated. It only creates a probability which, +however great, is still only a probability, and which would become a +smaller probability by deduction from it of any opposite probability. +But mere probability, however great, always includes some doubt as to +its own correctness, some suspicion that its opposite may possibly be +correct. How much soever, therefore, uniform experience may vouch for +the inviolability of natural laws, it always remains possible for those +laws to be violated, and, as miracles are nothing else but violations of +natural laws, it always remains possible for miracles to happen. But +since miracles are possible, testimony to their occurrence may, with +equal possibility, be true, and no further refutation can, I submit, be +needed for an argument which insists that all such testimony should be +set aside without enquiry as self-evidently false.</p> + +<p>Had Hume been content to insist that testimony in favour of miracles +should never be received without extreme doubt and hesitation, his +lesson might well have passed without further objection than that of its +being superfluous for any one with sense enough to profit by it. Nor +might it have been easy to discover a flaw in his logic, although he had +gone so far as to maintain that no one of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> the miracles as yet on record +is either adequately attested, or would, even if it had undoubtedly +occurred, afford sufficient evidence of any religious truth. The best +and only adequate evidence for any religious creed is the satisfaction +which it affords to the soul's cravings and promises to the soul's +aspirations; and no rational Christian would be at all the more disposed +to turn Mussulman, even though it should be demonstrated to his entire +conviction that Christ did not raise Lazarus from the dead, and that +Mahomet did turn the hill Safa into gold, instead of prudently confining +himself to boasting that he could have effected the transmutation if he +had thought proper. But for the purpose which Hume had in view, it was +necessary to establish, not merely the doubtfulness, but the absolute +falsehood of the miracular testimony on which, in his opinion, 'our holy +religion' rests, in order that the character of the superstructure being +inferred from that of the foundation, both might be condemned together. +There is, however, an irreligious as well as a religious fanaticism, +and, though it is difficult, while looking at Hume's portrait, to credit +the owner of that plump, good-humoured face with feeling of any sort +warm enough to be termed fanatical, it is humiliating to note from his +example into what strange inconsistency the coolest and calmest judgment +may be warped by irreligious prejudice. Having not long before, in order +to disparage <i>natural</i> religion, emphatically denied the existence of +any causal connection between successive events, he now, in order +equally to discredit the very possibility of <i>revealed</i> religion, +tacitly assumes that same connection, not simply to exist, but to be of +an efficacy which no disturbing forces can impair. Admitting that 'the +Indian prince who refused to believe the first<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> relations concerning the +effects of frost' was wrong in his belief, Hume will have it that the +prince nevertheless 'reasoned justly.' Although recognising truth to be +the sole worthy object of quest, he yet enjoins rigid adherence to a +rule which he is aware must inevitably lead to frequent error.</p> + +<p>Rather strikingly contrasted, in respect of execution, with Hume's +chapter on Miracles, comes the one next in order on a Providence and a +Future State, which, for the skill with which the fallacy involved in it +is disguised, may be regarded as quite a masterpiece of false reasoning. +Among its leading propositions there is but one which does not command +immediate assent. That we can argue but from what we know; that of +causes, known to us only by their effects, our estimate ought to be +exactly proportioned to the effects; that of a Creator manifested only +by His works, no higher qualities, no greater degrees of power, +intelligence, justice, or benevolence, can be confidently +predicated—whatever be conjectured—than are apparent in his +workmanship: all this, on one moment's reflection, is perceived to be +indisputable. Needs must it be, however reluctantly, admitted that +nothing can be more illogical than to return back to the cause, and +infer from it other effects beyond those by which alone it is known to +us, or to infer from creative attributes, distinctly manifested, the +existence of other and not apparent attributes, endowed with some +efficacy additional to that possessed by the former. But does it hence +follow that faith in a superintending Providence is so mere a matter of +'conceit and imagination,' a faith so absolutely irrational as Hume +considered it? A candid examination of God's works will warrant us in +coming to a widely different con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span>clusion. Among those works is man—a +being who, in spite of the utter insignificance of his greatest +<i>performances</i>, is capable of forming most exalted <i>conceptions</i> of +justice, benevolence, and goodness in general, and of feeling the most +eager desire to act up to his own ideal. If the divine notions of +goodness in its several varieties be not identical with the human, it +can only be because they are superior; and so, too, of the divine love +of, and zeal for, goodness. It cannot be that the Creator is inferior to +the creature in virtues which the creature derives from Him alone. +Demonstrably, therefore, God is good and just in the very highest degree +in which those qualities can be conceived by man. Demonstrably, too, +since the universe is the work of His hands, He must be possessed of +power which, if not necessarily unbounded, is at least as boundless as +the universe. Thus, rigidly arguing from effects to causes, and +scrupulously proportioning the one to the other, man sees imaged on the +face of creation a creator, both realising his highest conception of +goodness, and wielding measureless might. Is not such a being worthy to +be looked up to, and confided in, and adored and loved as a +superintending providence? Is not faith in such a providence not simply +not irrational, but the direct result of a strictly inductive process? +And would it be an irrational stretch of faith sanguinely to hope, if +not implicitly to believe, that an union of infinite justice with +measureless might may, in some future stage of existence, afford +compensation for the apparently inequitable distribution of good and +evil which, according to all experience, has hitherto taken place among +human beings?</p> + +<p>Were it desirable to amplify the apology with which this paper +commenced, some additional justification of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> freedom of the +foregoing criticisms might be found in hints thrown out by Hume in +various parts of the treatise which we have been examining, and +particularly in its concluding chapter, that in many of his most +startling doctrines he was but half in earnest. Hume's temperament, too +cool for fanaticism, had yet in it enough of a certain tepid geniality +to save him from becoming a scoffer. The character which he claims for +himself, and somewhat ostentatiously parades, is that of a sceptic or +general doubter—a character in which, when rightly understood, there is +nothing to be ashamed of. To take nothing on trust, to believe nothing +without proof, to show no greater respect for authority than may consist +in attentive and candid examination of its statements, to accept only +verified facts as bases for reasoning on matters of fact and +existence—these are golden rules of philosophical research, principles +in which lies the secret of all real progress in any of the higher +departments of science. By Hume they were adopted <i>con amore</i>, and with +keen appreciation, not more of their practical utility, than of the +sport which he perceived them to be capable of yielding. His serious +purpose was to unmask the numberless pretences which in politics, +political economy, metaphysics, morals, and theology he found +universally current as gospel truths; to expose the ambiguity and +contradictions latent in popular thought, and in the popular forms of +expression which are so apt to be mistaken for thought, and to indicate +the only safe mode of investigation and the only trustworthy tests of +genuine knowledge; his favourite amusement to put time-honoured +commonplaces on the rack, and demanding their <i>raison d'être</i>, to pass +on them summary sentence of extinction if they failed to account +satisfactorily for their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> existence. Unfortunately, in his keen +enjoyment of the fun of the thing, he not unfrequently overlooked the +solid interests at stake. Like a huntsman who, for the sake of a better +run, should outrace his quarry, or who, seeing that the dogs were close +upon the hare, should, in order to prolong the chase, start a fresh +hare, kept till then snug at his saddle-bow, so Hume, in the excitement +of metaphysical pursuit, instead of stopping to gather up whatever +verified affirmations came in his way, would prefer to follow any new +negation that he espied, or, if momentarily accepting any affirmation as +established, would proceed forthwith to affirm its direct opposite with +the view of neutralising both. In this, his practice resembled that of +metaphysicians in general, who take a singular delight in setting +themselves riddle after riddle, which they either assume to be +hopelessly insoluble, or which they no sooner solve than they use the +solution as the subject of another riddle involving its predecessor in +redoubled perplexity. Now, little harm, and little, perhaps, of anything +but good, might thereby be done if the lovers of this game were content +to play it by themselves, without inviting others to join who are +constitutionally unfit for such intellectual wrestling. But mental +exercises may to philosophers be health and invigorating sport, and yet +be death to the multitude; and Hume, as an Utilitarian, stands +self-condemned for making ordinary people uncomfortable by challenging +them to disputations confessedly leading no whither, and bewildering +them with confessedly 'vain and profane babblings, and strivings after +words to no profit, but to subverting of the hearers, and overthrow of +the faith of some.' And it is as poor an excuse for this wanton +tampering with other people's creeds, as it is poor amends<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> for its +mischievous consequences, that Hume offers when, after watching for a +while his puzzled disciples blown about by the winds of adverse doctrine +that he has let loose upon them, he proceeds to rally them on their +'whimsical condition,' which he speaks of as a mere laughing matter got +up chiefly for amusement. It is only an aggravation of offence that, +while, on the one hand, he solemnly pronounces everything to be 'a +riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery,' he, on the other hand, +cheerily exhorts us not to suffer the 'doubts raised by philosophy to +affect our actions.' 'Nature,' he says, 'is always too strong for +principles, will always maintain her rights, and prevail, in the end, +against all reasoning whatever.' 'The great subverter of Pyrrhonism,' he +continues, 'is actual employment and the occupations of common life,' in +presence of which its overstrained scruples 'vanish like smoke.' +Although real knowledge consists solely in knowing that we know nothing, +and in doubting everything, and although sceptics may 'justly triumph' +in principles which lead them to deny even the attraction of +gravitation, still they had better beware how they act on these +principles, lest by stepping unconcernedly out of window they come +fatally to grief on the stones below, and so the sect and its tenets be +annihilated together. So, or to such effect, Hume: but how can there be +just ground for pride in speculations which, as their own professors +admit, would, on the first attempt to reduce them to practice, be +shattered to pieces by hard facts? That cannot possibly, even on Hume's +recommendation, be accepted as metaphysical truth, which flatly +contradicts common sense, nor can there be any unbecoming +self-confidence in seeking, even though Hume pronounce the search +hopeless, for metaphysical truth, with which common sense may be +reconciled.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span></p> + + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV.</h2> + +<h3><i>HUXLEYISM.</i></h3> + +<p class="center"> +'<i>À force d'esprit tout lui paroît matière.</i>' +</p> + + +<p>In one of his interesting 'Lay Sermons,' the most interesting perhaps of +the whole interesting series, Professor Huxley, taking for his theme the +'Physical Basis of Life,' combats 'the widely-spread conception of life +as a something which works through matter, but is independent of it;' +affirming, on the contrary, 'that matter and life are inseparably +connected, and that there is one kind of matter which is common to all +living beings.' The preacher may be safely allowed to have +satisfactorily made out the second portion of this affirmation. With his +own singular felicity of illustration, he shows how all vegetable and +animal tissues, without exception, from that of the brightly coloured +lichen looking so like a mere mineral incrustation on the rock that +bears it, to that of the painter who admires or the botanist who +dissects it, are, however diverse in aspect, essentially one in +composition and structure. He explains how the microscopic fungi +clustering by millions within the body of a single fly, the giant pine +of California towering to the height of a cathedral spire, the Indian +fig-tree covering acres with its profound shadow, the animalcules of +ocean's lowest deep, minute enough to dance in myriads on the point of a +needle, and the Finner whale, hugest of beasts, that disports its ninety +feet of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> bone and blubber on ocean's billowy heights, the flower that a +girl wears in her hair, and the blood that courses through her veins, +are, each and all, smaller or larger multiples or aggregates of one and +the same structural unit, which, again, is invariably resolvable into +the same identical elements. That unit, he tells us, is an atom or +corpuscle composed of oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, and carbon, which, and +which alone, seem to be required by nature for laying withal the +foundations of vitality, inasmuch as no substance from which any one of +these ingredients is totally absent, ever exhibits any sign of life, +while, on the other hand, not only are these four ingredients sufficient +of themselves to form a substance capable of living, but they actually +do with very little (when any) foreign admixture, form all substances +whatsoever that are ever found vivified. All such substances, he informs +us, are but varieties of <i>protoplasm</i>, differing indeed from each other +in texture, colour, and general appearance, even as a diamond differs +from granite, yet all being equally protoplasm, just as a diamond and a +block of granite are equally stones, or as heart of oak and the outer +case of a nettle's sting are equally wood. The human ovum, he gives us +to understand, is in its earliest stage but a single particle of +protoplasm; the human fœtus but an aggregation of such particles, +variously modified; the human body perfectly matured, but a larger +aggregation of such particles still further modified.</p> + +<p>He proceeds to point out, as following from these premises, that a +solution of smelling salts, together with an infinitesimal quantity of +certain other salts, contains all the elements that enter into the +composition of protoplasm, and consequently of whatever substance the +very highest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> animal requires for sustenance. He does not, however, +leave us to suppose that any abundance of the fluid in question would +avail aught to save a hungry creature of any sort from starving, but +continues his exposition to the following effect. Not only is there no +animal, there is not even any vegetable organism, to which the elements +of food can serve as food, as long as they remain elementary. It is +indispensable that hydrogen and oxygen should combine to form water, +nitrogen and hydrogen to form ammonia, carbon and oxygen to form +carbonic acid; and even then, even at a table groaning under whole +hogsheads of these primitive compounds, there is no single animal that +would not find itself at a Barmecide feast. There are many plants +likewise, which in the midst of such uncongenial plenty would be equally +without a drop to drink; but there are also multitudes of others which, +without the aid of any more elaborated nutriment, would be able to grow +into a million, nay million million fold of their original bulk. +Provided there be in the seed or germ of any of these latter one single +particle of living protoplasm to begin with, that single particle may +convert into animated protoplasm an indefinite quantity of inanimate +ammonia, carbonic acid, and water. The protoplasm thus created in the +first instance, and created, let us suppose, in the form of a lichen or +a fungus, is converted by decay into vegetable mould, in which grass may +take root and grow, and which, in that case, will be converted into +herbaceous protoplasm; which, being eaten by sheep or oxen, becomes +ovine or bovine protoplasm, commonly called mutton or beef; which, +again, being eaten by man, becomes human protoplasm, and, if eaten by a +philosopher, becomes part of a mass of protoplasm capable of +investigating and of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> expounding in lectures or lay sermons, the changes +which itself and its several components have undergone.</p> + +<p>So far we advance with willing steps like dutiful disciples along the +path of knowledge indicated by our distinguished biological teacher, who +here, however, pulls us up short by suddenly intimating that he sees no +break in the series of transubstantiations whereby precisely such +oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon as he is lecturing upon, have +become metamorphosed into him, the lecturer, and us, the lectured +audience, and cannot 'understand why the language which is applicable to +any one term of the series should not be used in regard to any of the +others.' Oxygen and hydrogen, he reminds us, are gases, whose particles, +at and also much below 32° Fahrenheit, tend to rush away from each other +with great force; and this tendency we call a property of each gas. Let +oxygen and hydrogen be mixed in certain proportions, and an electric +spark passed through them, and they will disappear, and a quantity of +water equal in weight to the sum of their weights will appear in their +place. But amongst the properties of the water will be some, the direct +opposites of those of its components; watery particles, for example, at +any temperature not higher than 32° Fahrenheit, tending not to rush +asunder, but to cohere into definite geometrical shapes or to build up +frosty imitations of vegetable foliage. And let the water be brought +into conjunction with ammonia and carbonic acid, and the three will, +under certain conditions, give rise to protoplasm, which again, if +subjected to a certain succession of processes, will rise by successive +stages from protoplasm that gives no other signs of life than those of +feeding and reproducing its kind, to protoplasm endowed with the power +of spontaneous<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> motion, and finally to protoplasm that thinks and +reasons, speculates and philosophises. Now why should any of the various +phenomena of life exhibited by these varieties of protoplasm be supposed +to be of a different class from the appearances of activity exhibited by +any of the varieties of lifeless matter? What reason is there why, for +instance, thought should not be termed a property of thinking +protoplasm, just as congelation is a property of water, and +centrifugience of gas? Professor Huxley protests that he is aware of no +reason. We call, he says, the several strange phenomena which are +peculiar to water, 'the properties of water, and do not hesitate to +believe that in some way or other they result from the properties of the +component elements of water. We do not assume that something called +<i>aquosity</i> entered into and took possession of the oxide of hydrogen as +soon as it was formed, and then guided the aqueous particles to their +places in the facets of the crystal or among the leaflets of the hoar +frost. On the contrary, we live in the hope and faith that, by the +advance of molecular physics, we shall by-and-by be able to see our way +as clearly from the constituents of water to the properties of water, as +we are now able to deduce the operations of a watch from the form of its +parts or the manner in which they are put together.' Why, then, when +carbonic acid, water, and ammonia disappear, and an equivalent weight of +the matter of life makes its appearance in their place, should we assume +the existence in the living matter of a something which has no +representative or correlative in the unliving matter that gave rise to +it? Why imagine that into the newly formed hydro-nitrogenised oxide of +carbon a something called vitality entered and took possession? 'What +better philo<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span>sophical status has vitality than aquosity?' 'If scientific +language is to possess a definite and constant signification, we are,' +he considers, 'logically bound to apply to protoplasm or the physical +basis of life the same conceptions as those which are held to be +legitimate elsewhere.' Wherefore, he concludes, that 'if the phenomena +exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by +protoplasm <i>its</i> properties,' and that if it be correct to describe 'the +properties of water as resulting from the nature and disposition of its +component molecules,' there can be no 'intelligible ground for refusing +to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and +disposition of its molecules.'</p> + +<p>Here, however, our lay preacher candidly warns us that by the vast +majority of his clerical brethren this doctrine would be denounced as +rankest heresy, and that whoever accepts it is placing his foot on the +first rung of a ladder which, in most people's estimation, is the +'reverse of Jacob's, and leads to the antipodes of heaven.' He frankly +owns that the terms of his propositions are distinctly materialistic: +nay, that whoever commits himself to them will be temporarily landed in +'gross materialism.' Not the less, however, does he, mingling +consolation with admonition, recommend us to plunge boldly into the +materialistic slough, promising to point out a way of escape from it, +and insisting, indeed, that through it lies the only path to genuine +spiritualistic truth.</p> + +<p>In pronouncing this to be exceedingly evil counsel, as with the most +unfeigned respect for its author I feel bound at once to do, it might +not be necessary for me to undertake a detailed topographical survey of +the path alluded to. It might, perhaps, suffice to specify the +conclusions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> to which the path is represented as leading, in order to +show that those conclusions cannot possibly be reached by any such +route. By Professor Huxley himself they are thus described:—We know +nothing of matter 'except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical +cause of states of our own consciousness,' nor of spirit, except that +'it also is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause of states of +consciousness. In other words matter and spirit are but names for the +imaginary <i>substrata</i> of groups of natural phenomena.'</p> + +<p>But if matter be not a thing, but a name, and a name too not for a real, +but only an imaginary thing, one perfect certainty is that matter cannot +possibly be composed either wholly or in part of molecules, and, by +necessary consequence, that life cannot possibly be 'the product of any +disposition of material molecules,' nor the phenomena of life be +'expressions of molecular changes in the matter of life.' Of the +particular Huxleian doctrine which we are considering, the two moieties +are absolutely irreconcileable; so that on the assumption that either +moiety were true, the truth of that moiety would be decisive against the +other. If matter have no real, and only a nominal existence, life, which +is undeniably a reality, cannot be a property of matter. If life, being +an undisputed reality, be a property of matter, matter must needs be a +reality also, and not merely a name. Any one, however, who, like myself, +is thoroughly convinced that both halves of the doctrine are equally and +utterly erroneous, is precluded from employing one for the refutation of +the other, and in order to prove, as I shall now attempt to do, that +life is in no sense either a product or a property of matter, must +resort for the purpose to independent reasoning.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span></p> + +<p>I commence by defining one of the principal terms occurring in the +debate. When in scientific discourse we speak of anything as a property +of an object, we mean thereby not simply that it is a thing belonging to +the object, but also that it is a thing without which the object could +not subsist. We mean that it is one of the constituents inherent in and +inseparable from the object, whose union gives to the object its +distinctive character. When we call fluidity at one temperature, +solidity at another, and vaporisation at a third, properties of water, +we mean that matter which did not liquefy, congeal, and evaporate at +different temperatures would not be water. The habits of exhibiting +these phenomena, in conjunction with certain other habits, make up the +aquosity or wateriness of water. They are parts of water's nature, and, +in the absence of any one of them, water would not be its own self, and +could not exist. But in no such sense, nor in any sense whatever, is the +life or vitality whereby what we are accustomed to call animated are +distinguished from inanimate objects, essential to the existence of the +species of matter termed matter of life or protoplasm. Take from water +its aquosity, and water ceases to be water; but you may take away +vitality from protoplasm, and yet leave protoplasm as much protoplasm as +before. Vitality, therefore, evidently bears to protoplasm a quite +different relation from that which aquosity bears to water. Protoplasm +can do perfectly well without the one, but water cannot for a moment +dispense with the other. Protoplasm, whether living or lifeless, is +equally itself; but unaqueous water is unmitigated gibberish. But if +protoplasm, although deprived of its vitality, still remains protoplasm, +vitality plainly is not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> indispensable to protoplasm, is not therefore a +<i>property</i> of protoplasm.</p> + +<p>And that it is not a <i>product</i> of protoplasm, or a result of any +particular arrangement of protoplasmic particles or molecules, is not +less easily or unanswerably demonstrable. For if it were, as long as the +particular molecular arrangement remained unaltered, life would +necessarily be in attendance; an amputated joint would, until +decomposition set in, be as much alive as the trunk from which it had +been lopped, even as water poured from a jug into a glass is quite as +much liquid as the water remaining in the jug. There would be no such +thing as dead meat, which was not putrid as well as dead, any more than +water can freeze without changing from a fluid to a solid; and there +would moreover be production antecedent in origin to its own producer. +The force of the last at least of these objections is not to be +resisted. Water, ammonia, and carbonic acid cannot, it is admitted, +combine to form protoplasm, unless a principle of life preside over the +operation. Unless under those auspices the combination never takes +place. At present, whenever assuming its presidential functions, the +principle of life seems to be invariably embodied in a portion of +pre-existing protoplasm; but there certainly was a time when the fact +was otherwise. Time was, as geology places beyond all doubt, when our +globe and its appurtenances consisted wholly of inorganic matter, and +possessed not one single animal or vegetable inhabitant. In order, then, +that any protoplasm or the substance of any organism should have been +brought into existence in the first instance, life plainly must have +been already existent. It must at one time have been possible for life, +without being previously embodied, to mould and vivify inert matter;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> +and it must needs have been by unembodied life that inorganic matter was +first organised and animated. There is no possible alternative to this +conclusion, except that of supposing that death may have given birth to +life—that absolutely lifeless and inert matter may have spontaneously +exerted itself with all the marvellous energy requisite for its +conversion into living matter, exerting for the purpose powers which, +under the conditions of the case, it could not have acquired without +exercising before it acquired them. Whoever declines to swallow such +absurdity has no choice but to admit that unembodied life must have been +the original manufacturer of protoplasm: but to admit this, and yet to +suppose that when now-a-days embodied life is observed to give birth to +new embodied life, the credit of the operation belongs not to the life +itself but to its protoplasmic embodiment, is much the same as to +suppose that when a tailor, dressed in clothes of his own making, makes +a second suit of clothes, this latter is the product not of the tailor +himself but of the clothes he is wearing.</p> + +<p>Thus, irrespectively of whatever grounds there may be for believing that +life still <i>does</i>, it is incontestable that life once <i>did</i>, exist apart +from protoplasm; and that protoplasm both may and continually does exist +apart from what is commonly understood by life, must be obvious to every +one who is aware that protoplasm is the substance of which all plants +and all animals are composed, and has observed also that plants and +animals are in the habit of dying. That matter and life are inseparably +connected cannot, therefore, it would seem, be asserted except in total +disregard of the teachings both of reason and observation, and 'the +popular conception of life as a something which works through matter but +is independent of it,' would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> seem to be as true as it is popular. If +the only choice allowed to us be between 'the old notion of an Archæus +governing and directing blind matter,' and the new conception of life as +the product of a certain disposition of material molecules, the absolute +certainty that the latter conception is wrong, may be fairly urged as +equivalent to certainty, equally absolute, that the former notion is +right.</p> + +<p>How far soever it may be true that, as Professor Huxley says, 'the +progress of physical science means, and has in all ages meant, the +extension of the province of matter and causation,' it is certainly not +true that, as he proceeds to predict, the same province will ever be +extended sufficiently to banish from the region of human thought not +'spontaneity' simply, but likewise 'spirit.' In one direction at least, +limits are clearly discernible which scientific investigation need not +hope to overleap. How much soever we may eventually discover of the +changes whereby inorganic matter becomes gradually adapted for the +reception of life, physical science can never teach us what or whence is +the life that eventually takes possession of the finished receptacle. +Possibly we at length may, as Professor Huxley doubts not that we +by-and-by shall, see how it is that the properties peculiar to water +have resulted from the properties peculiar to the gases whose junction +constitutes water; and similarly how the characteristic properties of +protoplasm have sprung from properties in the water, ammonia, and +carbonic acid that have united to form protoplasm; but knowing all this, +we shall not be a hair's breadth nearer to the more recondite knowledge +up to which it is expected to lead. To extract the genesis of life from +any data that completest acquaintance with the stages and processes of +protoplasmic growth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> can furnish, is a truly hopeless problem. Given +the plan of a house, with samples of its brick and mortar, to find the +name and nationality of the householder, would be child's play in +comparison. Life, as we have seen, is not the offspring of protoplasm, +but something which has been superinduced upon, and may be separated +from, the protoplasm that serves as its material basis. It is, +therefore, distinct from the matter which it animates, and, being thus +immaterial, cannot possibly become better known by any analysis of +matter.</p> + +<p>Of this emphatically vital question Professor Huxley, as has been +already intimated, takes a diametrically opposite view. He does not +merely, in sufficiently explicit terms, deny that there is any intrinsic +difference between matter and spirit, and affirm the two to be, in spite +of appearances, essentially identical. If this were all, I at any rate +should not be entitled to object, for I shall myself presently have +occasion to use very similar language, although attaching to it a widely +different meaning from that with which it is used by Professor Huxley. +But the latter goes on to avow his belief that the human body, like +every other living body, is a machine, all the operations of which will +sooner or later be explained on physical principles, insomuch that we +shall eventually arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, +even as we have already arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat. He +considers that with the same propriety with which the amount of heat +which a pound weight produces by falling through the distance of a foot, +may be called its equivalent in one sense, may the amount of feeling +which the pound produces by falling through a foot of distance on a +gouty big toe, be called its equivalent in another<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> sense, to wit, that +of consciousness. Yet he protests against these tenets being deemed +materialistic, which, he declares, they certainly neither are nor can +be, for that while he himself certainly holds them, he as certainly is +not himself a materialist. Professor Huxley is among the last to be +suspected of talking anything, as Monsieur Jourdain did prose, without +knowing it. He knows perfectly well that he has here been talking +materialism, but he insists that his materialism is only another form of +idealism. He seeks to evade the seemingly inevitable deduction from his +premises by representing both matter and spirit as mere names, and +names, too, not for real things, but for fanciful hypotheses which may +be spoken of indifferently in materialistic or in spiritualistic terms, +thought in the one case being treated as a form of matter, and matter in +the other as a form of thought. The identity of matter and spirit is, in +short, represented by him as consisting in this: that the existence of +both is merely nominal, or at best merely ideal.</p> + +<p>Ordinary folk may perhaps be somewhat slow to derive from this +compromising theory all the comfort which its author deems it capable of +affording. Most of us may, probably, be inclined to think that we might +as well have been left to fret in the frying-pan of materialism as be +cast headlong into idealistic fire, to no better end than that of being +there fused body and soul together, and sublimated into inapprehensible +nothingness. Our immediate concern, however, is not with the +pleasantness of the theory, but with its truth; in proceeding to test +which we shall probably find that there is as little warrant for +idealising matter after this fashion as we have already seen that there +is for materialising mind.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p> + +<p>The originator of the theory about to be examined, or rather, perhaps, +of a somewhat different theory out of which this has been developed—not +to say perverted—may, without much inaccuracy, be pronounced to be +Descartes. He it was who, perceiving that we are surrounded on all sides +by illusions of all sorts, that not only is there no authority or +testimony implicitly to be depended on, but that our senses likewise +often play the traitor, and that we can never be perfectly sure whether +we are really seeing, hearing, or feeling, or merely thinking or +dreaming that we see, hear, or feel, and looking anxiously around for +one single point at least on which complete confidence might be placed, +discovered such a point in thought. Whatever else we may doubt about, we +cannot, he justly argued, doubt that there are thoughts. If it were +possible to doubt this, our very doubt would be thought, constituting +and presenting as evidence the very existence doubted of. Our thoughts, +then, are unquestionably real existences. They may be delusive, but they +cannot possibly be fictitious.</p> + +<p>We may perhaps hereafter have occasion to note how Descartes, having +thus secured one firm foothold and solid resting-place, outwent the +farthest stretch of Archimedean ambition by using it, not as a fulcrum +from whence to move the world, but as a site for logical foundations +whereon he might, if he had persevered, have raised the superstructure +of an universe at once mental and material.<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Intermediately, however, +we have to observe how two pre-<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span>eminent disciples of the Cartesian +school have perverted the fundamental proposition of their great master +by treating its converse as its synonyme. Descartes having demonstrated +that all thought is existence, Bishop Berkeley and Professor Huxley +infer that all existence is thought. So says the Professor in so many +words, and to precisely the same effect is the more diffuse language of +the Bishop, where, speaking of 'all the choir of heaven and furniture of +earth, of all the bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world,' +he declares that their <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>, that their 'being' consists +in their being 'perceived or known,' and that unless they were actually +perceived by, or existed in, some created or uncreate mind, they could +not possibly exist at all.</p> + +<p>The reasoning in support of these assertions is in substance as +follows:—We know nothing of any material object except by the +sensations which it produces in our minds. What we are accustomed to +call the <i>qualities</i> of an object are nothing else but the mental +sensations of various kinds which the object produces within us. Some of +these qualities, such as extension, figure, solidity, motion, and +number, are classed as primary; others, as, for instance, smell, taste, +colour, sound, as secondary. Now that these latter have no existence +apart from mind can readily be shown thus. If I prick my finger with a +needle, the pain I suffer in consequence is surely in myself, not in the +needle, nor anywhere else but in myself. If an orange be placed on my +open hand, my sensation of touching it is in myself, not in the orange. +If the orange could feel, what it would feel would be a hand, while what +I am feeling is an orange. Nor are my sensations of pain and touch +merely confined to myself; they are also confined to a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> particular part +of myself, viz., to the brain, the seat of my consciousness, which it +is, and not the finger or hand, that really feels when the one is hurt, +or when anything comes in harmless contact with the other. To prove +this, let the fine nervous threads, which, running up the whole length +of the arm, connect the skin of the finger with the spinal marrow and +brain, be cut through close to the spinal cord, and no pain will be +felt, whatever injury be done: while if the ends which remain in +connection with the cord be pricked, the sensation of pricking in the +finger will arise just as distinctly as before. Or let a walking-stick +be held firmly by the handle, and its other end be touched, and the +tactile sensation will be experienced as if at the end of the stick, +where, however, it plainly cannot be. It is the mind alone which feels, +but which, by a peculiar faculty of localisation or extradition, seems +to remove a feeling exclusively its own, not only to the outside of +itself, but to the outside also of the walls of its fleshly tenement. +And as it is with pain or touch, so it is with every sensation with +which any of the so-called secondary qualities of matter are identical. +If I look at, or smell, or taste a blood orange, the sensation of +colour, or scent, or flavour I receive is entirely and exclusively my +own, the orange remaining quite unconscious of its own redness, or +fragrance, or sweetness, and not, indeed, possessing in itself any real +qualities of the kind. For to take redness as an example; how does the +sensation of it or of any other colour arise? The waves of a certain +very attenuated medium, the particles of which are vibrating with vast +rapidity but with very different velocities, strike upon an object and +are thrown off in all directions. Of the particles which vibrate with +any particular velocity, some are gathered by the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> optical apparatus of +the eye, and deflected so as to impinge on the retina and on the fibres +of the optic nerve therewith connected, producing in these fibres a +change which is followed by other changes in the brain, which, again, by +virtue of some inscrutable union between the brain and the mind, create +a feeling or consciousness of colour. What the particular colour shall +be, depends either on the rate of motion in the vibrating medium or on +the character of the retina; and if, while the former remained the same, +the other were to be altered, or if two persons, with differently formed +retinas, and one of the two colour-blind, were to be looking, what had +first seemed red might now seem green, or what seemed red to one +spectator might seem green to the other. But as the same object cannot +itself be both red and green at the same time, it follows that what are +called its redness and greenness are not in it, but in the spectator. +Similarly, the sounds which an object appears to give forth neither are +nor ever were in it: they originate in the mind of the hearer, and have +not, and never have had any existence elsewhere. 'If the whole body were +an eye, where,' asks St. Paul, 'were the hearing? If the whole were +hearing, where were the smelling?' and Professor Huxley more than meets +the drift of the Apostle's questions by pronouncing it 'impossible to +imagine but that if the universe contained only blind and deaf beings, +darkness and silence would reign everywhere.'</p> + +<p>And as with the secondary qualities of matter, so, on the same showing, +must it be with the primary. If colour, taste, scent, and the like, +exist nowhere but in the mind, so neither do extension, solidity, and +the like. If the former could not exist unless there were intelligent +minds to perceive them, then neither could the latter. For, by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> +extension and its cognates, we understand simply relations which we +conceive to exist between certain qualities of objects identical with +certain of our own visual and tactile sensations, or between these and +our consciousness of muscular effort; but inasmuch as all sensations and +all consciousness are purely mental, and exist nowhere but in the mind, +it follows necessarily that ideas of relation between different +sensations, or between sensations and consciousness, must also be purely +mental, and non-existent save in the mind. All the qualities of matter, +therefore, primary as well as secondary, are alike conceptions of the +mind, and consequently could not exist without a mind for them to be +conceived by and to exist in. But if the qualities did not exist, then +matter, which cannot be conceived otherwise than as an assemblage of +qualities, could not exist either. Wherefore in respect of matter +itself, as well as of the qualities of matter, <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>, +essence is perception, to be is to be perceived. Wherefore, finally, if +there were no mind to perceive matter, matter could not exist. Q. E. +D.<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p> + +<p>Although in the foregoing summary of an argument to which not Berkeley +and Huxley alone, but others of the deepest and acutest thinkers that +this country has produced, have contributed, I have strenuously laboured +to state all its points as convincingly as the obligations of brevity +would permit, I am not myself by any means convinced by it. On the +contrary, although to say so may seem to imply a considerable overstock +of modest assurance, still I do say that whatever portion of it is +sound<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> is irrelevant, and that whatever portion is relevant is not +sound. So much of it as relates to the nature of the qualities of +matter, is, however interesting or otherwise important, very little, if +at all, to the purpose. No doubt if I prick my finger with a needle, +or—to take in preference an illustration employed by Locke—if my +fingers ache in consequence of my handling snow, it would be supremely +ridiculous to talk of the pain I feel being in the snow; yet not a whit +more ridiculous than to call the snow itself white or cold, if, by so +speaking, I mean that anything in the slightest degree resembling my +sensation of either snowy whiteness or snowy coldness resides in the +snow itself. And as of coldness and whiteness, so of all the other +so-styled secondary qualities. If I smell a rose, or listen to a piano, +the rose or the piano is quite insensible to the scent or sounds by +which my sense is ravished. And of primary qualities, also, precisely +the same thing may with equal confidence be alleged. A stone which I +perceive to be large, round, hard, and either rotating or motionless, +has no more perception of its own extension, figure, solidity, motion, +or rest than a snowball has of its colour or temperature. But all this, +though perfectly true, has nothing to do with the question, which is not +<i>what</i> qualities of matter are, but <i>where</i> they are, and whether they +can exist anywhere but in mind; and this question, I submit, is +distinctly begged by those who assume, as is done throughout the +reasoning under examination, that our <i>sensations</i> with regard to +material objects, and the <i>qualities</i> of those objects, are synonymous +and convertible terms. Incontestably, sensations are affections of the +mind which neither have nor can have any existence outside the mind. If, +then, the qualities of objects are identical with the sensations which +arise in the mind con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span>cerning those objects, why, of course, the +qualities likewise can exist nowhere but in the mind. On narrowly +scrutinising, however, the supposed identity, we shall find that it +involves somewhat reckless confusion of diametrical opposites. When I +look at or smell a rose, or eat a beefsteak, or listen to a piano, the +sensations which thereupon arise within me, whether immediately or +subsequently, either are the results of my seeing, smelling, eating, or +hearing, or they are not. To say that they are not is equivalent to +saying that an object need not be within reach of the perceptive +faculties in order to be perceived; that I may see or smell a rose, +though there be no rose to be seen or smelt; may dine sumptuously off +empty dishes, and be raised to the seventh heaven of delight by the +audible strains of a music which is not being executed. <i>Fortunati +nimium</i>—only too lucky would mankind be, did this turn out to be a +correct theory, affording as it would a solution of every social +problem, and serving as a panacea for every social evil. Psychology +would then be the only science worth attention, for of whatever things +proficiency in that branch of study had qualified any one to form mental +images, of those same things would he simultaneously become possessor in +full property. Whoever had succeeded in training himself to imagine +vigorously might at once have, do, or be whatever it pleased him to +imagine, becoming <i>ipso facto</i>, as the Stoics used to say an acquirer of +virtue does, 'rich, beautiful, a king.' Woe betide any one, however, +who, as long as the cosmical constitution remains what it is, shall +attempt to put the theory into practice, and desisting from all those +animal functions, involving intercourse with a real or imaginary +external world, which are vulgarly supposed essential to animal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> +existence, shall obstinately restrict himself to the sensations which he +believes the mind to be, without any such intercourse, capable of +creating for the body's sustenance and delectation. The physical +extinction inevitably consequent on such devotion to principle would +speedily render all the devotees physically incapable of testifying in +behalf of their peculiar opinion, and, clearing them away, would leave +no witnesses surviving but such as were signifying by deeds if not in +words their hearty adherence to the popular belief. Practically, then, +there may be assumed to be entire unanimity of assent to the truism that +for our senses to be affected by the presence of external objects, the +objects must needs be present to affect them. On all hands it is in +effect admitted that in some mode or other external objects exist, but +if so, and if the sensations resulting from operations performed by the +bodily organs with external objects would not have resulted unless the +objects had been present to operate or to be operated upon, clearly +there must be resident in, or inseparably bound up with, the objects a +power or powers of producing sensation in conscious mind. But the power +of producing sensation, and sensation itself, are not one and the same +thing, but two separate and distinct things, intrinsically distinct and +locally separate. The feeling, agreeable or painful, according to its +intensity, which heat occasions, is not the same thing as the heat by +which it is occasioned. The twofold taste, sweet to a healthy, bitter to +a distempered palate, of one and the same aliment, cannot be identical +with the single property of the aliment whereby the taste is produced. +In the sense of seeming red to a spectator with normally constructed +eyes, and green to one who is colour-blind, a ruby or a Siberian crab is +at once<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> both red and green, but the two colours which it causes to be +perceived cannot be identical with the peculiar structure, or whatever +else it be, whereby the ruby or Siberian crab communicates to +circumambient ether the one self-same motion that terminates in +different impressions on differently constructed eyes. In these and in +all cases of the kind the feeling is in the mind, the source of the +feeling in matter. The one is a perception, the other a quality, and to +mistake the quality, not merely for a perception, but for the very +perception to which the quality gives rise; and to infer thence that the +quality must likewise be in the mind, is an instance as glaring as can +well be imagined of that most heinous of logical offences, the +confounding of cause with effect.</p> + +<p>By what steps Berkeley was led, and has since led so many after him, +into so grave an error, he has himself acquainted us. Thus it is that he +argues: By sensible things can be meant only such as can be perceived +immediately by sense: and sensible <i>qualities</i> are of course sensible +<i>things</i>. But the only perceptions of sense are sensations, and all +perceptions are purely mental. Wherefore, sensible qualities being, as +such, perceptible immediately by the senses, must be sensations, and +being sensations must be perceptions, and being perceptions they are of +course purely mental, and existent nowhere save in the mind. Carefully, +however, as Berkeley fancied he was picking his way, he really had +tripped, and that fatally, at the second step. He calls the qualities of +objects <i>sensible</i> things; but sensible they are not according to his +definition, for they are not capable of being immediately perceived by +the senses. It is not sense which perceives, but reason which infers +them. The senses, as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> Berkeley elsewhere repeatedly and earnestly +insists, receive nothing from objects but sensations, and these they +communicate to the mind without accompanying them by the slightest hint +as to whence they originally came. The senses suggest nothing as to any +qualities resident in or appertaining to an object corresponding with +the sensations derived from the object. The existence of such qualities +is an inference of reason which, taking for granted that sensations, in +common with all other occurrences, must have causes, and observing that +certain of them commonly occur in the presence of certain objects, and +never occur in the absence of those objects, infers that the causes of +the sensations must exist in the objects. To the causes thus inferred +the name of qualities is given, to distinguish them from the sensations +whereof they are causes; and the Berkeleian transgression consists in +overlooking the distinction between things so diametrically opposite.</p> + +<p>By the commission of such a sin the most powerful intellect becomes +inevitably committed to further enormities. Except by neglecting to +distinguish between sight and hearing, the effects, and light and sound, +their respective causes, it would surely have been impossible for +Professor Huxley to come to the strange conclusion that if all living +beings were blind and deaf, 'darkness and silence would everywhere +reign.' Had he not himself previously explained that light and sound are +peculiar motions communicated to the vibrating particles of an +universally diffused ether, which motions, on reaching the eye or ear, +produce impressions, which, after various modifications, result +eventually in seeing or hearing? How these motions are communicated to +the ether matters not. Only it is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> indispensable to note that they are +not communicated by the percipient owner of the eye or ear, so that the +fact of there being no percipient present cannot possibly furnish any +reason why the motions should not go on all the same. But as long as +they did go on there would necessarily be light and sound; for the +motions are themselves light and sound. If, on returning to his study in +which, an hour before, he had left a candle burning and a clock ticking, +Professor Huxley should perceive from the appearance of candle and clock +that they had gone on burning and ticking during his absence, would he +doubt that they had likewise gone on producing the motions constituting +and termed light and sound, notwithstanding that no eyes or ears had +been present to see or hear? But if he did not doubt this, how could he +any more doubt that, although all sentient creatures suddenly became +eyeless and earless, the sun might go on shining, and the wind roaring, +and the sea bellowing as before?</p> + +<p>Akin to the inadvertence which, as I presume to think, has led Professor +Huxley thus to misconceive <i>secondary</i> qualities, is an inattention to +the differences between our ideas, or mental pictures, and the originals +whereof those pictures are copies, which seems to me seriously to +vitiate his reasoning with regard to <i>primary</i> qualities. With admirable +perspicuity he shows<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> how it is that our notions of primary qualities +are formed; how the mind, by <i>localising</i> on distinct points of the +sensory surface of the body its various, tactile sensations, obtains the +idea of extension, or space in two dimensions, of figure, number, and +motion: how the power, combined with consciousness of the power,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> of +moving the hand in all directions over any substance it is in contact +with, adds the idea of geometrical solidity, or of space in three +dimensions: how the ideas thus formed with the aid of the sense of touch +are confirmed by, and blended with, others derived from visual +sensations and muscular movements of the eye: and, finally, how the idea +of mechanical solidity, or impenetrability, arises from experience of +resistance to our muscular exertions. All these details, however, +interesting as they are, are nevertheless quite out of place. What we +are at present concerned with is the nature of the things themselves, +not the nature of our knowledge of them. No question that this latter is +purely mental. If figure, motion, and solidity were really, as Professor +Huxley says, each of them nothing but a perception of the relation of +two or more sensations to one another, no question but that, since the +mind is the sole seat of perception, they could exist nowhere else. But +if all these suppositions be incorrect, if, as we have seen, there be in +matter and apart from mind, potentialities of producing sensations, it +follows that, in matter, and outside of mind, there must be relations +between different potentialities, and there must, moreover, be limits +to, and there may be changes in, those relations. Wherefore, since there +is in matter a potentiality of imparting to the mind those sensations +whence it derives its ideas of place and distance, and since figure is +but a 'limitation of distance,' and motion but a 'change of place,' it +necessarily follows that there is in matter a potentiality of conveying +to the mind those sensations whence it derives its ideas of figure and +motion. And a similar remark applies equally to solidity, and to every +other so-called quality of matter. All of them are sub<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span>stantive +potentialities of producing in the mind those sensations whence our +ideas of themselves (the qualities) are derived. No doubt all these +qualities would be <i>inconceivable</i> in the absence of a mind by which +they might be <i>conceived</i>, but it is not necessary that, in order to +<i>be</i>, they should be <i>conceived</i>. In discussions of any abstruseness we +cannot be too precise in our use of words, and we shall inevitably be +going astray here if we allow ourselves for a moment to forget that a +quality and the conception of that quality are not one single thing, but +two things. Can it be seriously supposed that if all the conscious +creatures, of every description, by which the universe is peopled, were +to fall temporarily into complete stupor, the material universe would, +at the commencement of the trance, be deprived of its extension, +solidity, figure, and all its other constituent properties, recovering +them again as soon as its inhabitants woke up again? Can it be doubted +that, on the contrary, all potentialities resident in its material +composition would pursue the even tenor of their way just as if nothing +had happened; performing, during the temporary absence of external +percipient minds, precisely those operations which, as soon as +consciousness returned to those minds, would be followed by the +perceptions of sight, hearing, and touch? But if so, then plainly it is +exceedingly derogatory to matter to charge it with such absolute +dependence on external support that its very being consists in being +perceived from without. That matter cannot exist without mind I +cheerfully admit, or rather most earnestly affirm, proposing presently +to explain in what sense I make the affirmation. Meanwhile let it +suffice to have ascertained that the mental service with which matter +cannot dispense, whatever else it be, is at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> any rate not, as the whole +Berkeleian school so positively insist, that of mental testimony to its +existence.</p> + +<p>Let us pause here for a moment to report progress. We have seen, on the +one hand, that unless mind and matter have been eternally coexistent, +mind must have preceded matter, and that it is idle, therefore, to +expect, by any researches into matter, to discover how mind (or life) +originated. We have seen that from a materialism which represents mind +as in any sense a property or product of matter there is no possible +outlet to an idealism which represents matter as owing its being to +mind. To see this is simply to see that the builder of a house cannot +possibly have been born in the house he has himself built. On the other +hand, we have seen that the idealism which represents being or existence +as consisting of perception is utterly incompatible with materialism of +any sort or kind, unless, indeed, with a materialistic nihilism wherein +would be no room for a solitary molecule, still less for any molecular +structure, and least of all for that motion of molecular structures into +which consistent materialists are logically bound to attempt to resolve +all natural phenomena. We have, in short, seen that materialism and +idealism, in the senses in which those terms are commonly used, are +utterly incapable of amalgamation, or indeed of even being harmoniously +approximated, without being first deprived of all the characteristic +traits which at present entitle them to their distinguishing +appellations.</p> + +<p>To which of the two belongs the larger share of blame for this +implacable hostility is easily determined. Materialism, in dealing with +mental phenomena, begins by setting chronology at defiance; but between +idealism and the phenomena of matter there is no such aboriginal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> +incongruity. From principles common to every form of idealism a theory +is deducible which, while frankly acknowledging the reality of matter, +may, with perfect consistency, maintain that reality to be +mental—although mental in the sense of being, not a perception by, but +a metamorphosis of, mind. Of such a theory the outlines seem to me to +have been sketched, and the foundations partly laid, by Descartes, and +it cannot be otherwise than interesting to inquire in what manner and +how far so consummate an artificer advanced in the work, and where and +wherefore he suddenly stopped short in it.</p> + +<p>When Descartes, after convincing himself of the hollow pretentiousness +of most human knowledge, proceeded to dig away the accumulated drift and +sand of ages in quest of any clay or rock there might be below, the +first indubitable verity he came to was thought, about whose reality +there could, as already explained, be no possibility of doubt, inasmuch +as any doubt concerning it, being itself thought, would be but an +additional proof of it. On the bit of firm ground thus thoroughly +tested, he proceeded to place a formula not less carefully verified, his +famous 'Cogito, ergo sum'—'I think, therefore I am.' By many of his +followers, however, this second verification of his is deemed to be by +no means so satisfactory as it was by himself, Professor Huxley more +especially taking vehement, though, as I make bold to add, somewhat +gratuitous, exception to every single word of the most celebrated of +Cartesian formulæ. No doubt the premiss of the formula assumes the +conclusion, but it likewise includes as well as assumes it. No doubt, +since 'I think' is but another way of saying 'I am thinking,' to say +that 'I think' is to assume that 'I am;' nay, the same thing is equally +assumed by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> the mere introduction of the pronoun 'I.' But Descartes was +fully warranted in taking for granted the truth of his conclusion. For +by previously showing incontestably that thought and consciousness are +real existences, he had completely proved the premiss wherein his +conclusion is included. What though, as Professor Huxley suggests, +'thought' may possibly 'be self-existent,' 'or a given thought the +result of its antecedent thought, or of some external power'? Be thought +what else it may, it must needs be, also, either an affection or an +operation; if not performed, it must be felt; there must needs be, +therefore, something by which it is either performed or felt, and that +something cannot possibly be other than a thinking and conscious thing. +As surely as thought is, so surely must there be a thinker. This is, in +substance, affirmed even by many who deny it in terms, and Hume, in +particular, when saying, as he somewhere does, that 'all we are +conscious of is a series of perceptions,' denies and affirms it at one +and the same time. For how can there be perception without a percipient? +or how consciousness without a conscious entity? or how can that entity +be conscious of feeling without being simultaneously conscious that it +is itself which feels, without knowing, consequently, that it has a +self, or without being warranted, if it possess the gift of speech, in +declaring, in words even more emphatic than those of Descartes, 'I +<i>myself</i> am'? And how, if these questions do not admit of reply, can +Professor Huxley be warranted in declaring self and non-self to be mere +'hypotheses by which we account for the facts of consciousness,' and +adding that of their existence we 'neither have, nor by any possibility +can have' the same 'unquestionable and immediate certainty as we have of +the states of consciousness which we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> consider to be their effects'? +Surely the existence of self is one of the most direct and immediate +subjects of consciousness; yet it does not depend for evidence on +consciousness alone, but is as unanswerably demonstrable as that two +straight lines cannot enclose space or that parallel lines cannot meet, +or as any other mathematical negation. No ratiocinative deduction can be +more incontestable than that, since <i>I</i> have thoughts, there must be an +<i>I</i> to have them.</p> + +<p>Whoever thus assures himself of the existence of self obtains +simultaneously equal assurance of the existence of non-self; for feeling +that his conscious self is not boundless, but is confined within limits, +he cannot doubt that beyond those limits there must be space, and, +receiving continual sensations from without, he perceives that there +are, in external space, potentialities of imparting sensations. Thus, I +repeat, Descartes in laying down the first principles of his philosophy +created an intellectual basis for the external universe. Unfortunately, +however, instead of proceeding to place its proper superstructure on the +foundation thus laid, he wilfully stepped aside from what he had just +pronounced the only firm ground in existence, and undertook to raise a +rival edifice on part of the formless void beyond. Deeply struck by the +grand discoveries of his illustrious contemporaries, Galileo and Harvey, +and thence discovering for himself that the phenomena of remotest worlds +and also the involuntary phenomena of our own bodily frames take place +in accordance with forces of uniform operation, he leaped suddenly to +the conclusion that those forces are purely mechanical. The circulation +of the blood, he says, 'is as much the necessary result of the structure +of the parts one can see in the heart, and of the heat which one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> may +feel there, and of the nature of the blood which may be experimentally +ascertained, as is the motion of a clock the result of the force, +situation, and figure of its wheels and of its weight.' Nor, in his +view, does the heart, by virtue of its structure and composition, merely +cause the blood to circulate. 'It also generates animal spirits,' which, +'ascending like a very subtle fluid, or very pure and vivid flame, into +the brain as into a reservoir, pass thence into the nerves, where, +according as they more or less enter, or tend to enter, they have the +power of altering the figures of the muscles into which the nerves are +inserted, and of so causing all the organs and limbs to move.' He puts +the case thus: Even as the ordinary movements of a water-clock or of a +mill are kept up by the ordinary flow of the water, and even as 'in the +grottoes and fountains of royal gardens, the force wherewith the water +issues from its reservoirs suffices to move various machines, and even +to make them play instruments or pronounce words according to the +different disposition of the pipes which lead the water'—even so do +pulsation, respiration, digestion, nutrition, and growth, and 'other +such actions as are natural and usual in the body,' result naturally +from the usual course of the animal spirits. Moreover, even as intruders +upon the waterworks aforesaid unconsciously by their mere presence cause +special movements to take place, even as, for example, 'if they approach +a bathing Diana, they tread on certain planks so arranged as to make her +hide among the reeds, and, if they attempt to follow her, see +approaching a Neptune who threatens with his trident, or rouse some +other monster who vomits water into their faces'—even so do external +objects, by their mere presence, act upon the organs of sense; even so +do 'the reception of light,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> sounds, odours, flavours, heat, and such +like qualities in the organs of the external senses, the impression of +the ideas of these in the intellect, the imagination, and the memory, +the internal movements of the appetites and passions, and the external +movements which follow so aptly on the presentation of objects to the +senses, or on the resuscitation of impressions by the memory,' yea, even +so do all these 'functions proceed naturally from the arrangement of the +bodily organs, neither more nor less than do the movements of a clock or +other automaton from that of its weights and its wheels, without the aid +of any other vegetative or sensitive soul or any other principle of +motion or of life than the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire +which burns continually within the heart, and which differs in no wise +from the fire existing in inanimate bodies.'<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p> + +<p>Quite fairly it may be urged that the writer of passages like these +would, if writing in modern language, and with the aid of modern +conceptions, have expressed himself much as Professor Huxley does when, +declaring that the circulation of the blood and the regular movements of +the respiratory, alimentary, and other internal organs are simply +'affairs of mechanism, resulting from the structure and arrangement' of +the bodily organs concerned, from 'the contractility of those organs, +and from the regulation of that contractility by an automatically acting +nervous apparatus;' that muscular contractility and the automatic +activity or irritability of the nerves are 'purely the results of +molecular mechanism;' and that 'the modes of motion which constitute the +physical bases of light, sound, and heat are transmuted by the sensory +organs into affections of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> nervous matter,' which affections become 'a +kind of physical ideas constituting a physical memory,' and may be +combined in a manner answering to association and imagination, or may +give rise to muscular contractions in those reflex actions which are the +mechanical representatives of volition.' Quite fairly may a doctrine, +capable of being thus translated, be described as leading 'straight to +materialism.' Quite justly may its author be claimed by Huxley as joint +professor of a materialistic creed. True, Descartes lodges within his +human mechanism a <i>chose pensante</i> or rational soul, whose principal +seat is in the brain, and who is treated as corresponding to a hydraulic +engineer stationed in the centre of waterworks for the purpose of +increasing, slackening, or otherwise altering their movements. But this +rational soul is a very needless appendage to either the Cartesian or +the Huxleian system, wherein, if its post be not a literal sinecure, +there is, at any rate, little or nothing for it to do which might not +quite as well be done without it. The hydraulic engineer, sitting in his +central office, has to wind up the whole machinery from time to time, +and to turn now this tap, now that, when he wishes to set this or that +particular machine in motion. But, as no one need be told, our <i>chose +pensante</i> has nothing to do with the winding up of our digestive, +circulatory, or respiratory apparatus; and so far from internally +arranging those other internal organs from the mere arrangement of whose +parts, according to Descartes, the reception, conversion, and retention +of sensations, and the movements, whether internal or external, +thereupon consequent, naturally proceed, or from regulating the +molecular mechanism, whence, according to Professor Huxley, results the +automatic nervous activity which, in his opinion, governs<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> the movements +of the limbs not less absolutely than those of the intestines, it, nine +times out of ten, neither knows nor suspects that any such organs or +mechanism exist. If the functions above attributed to the human frame +could be shown really to belong to it, pure, not to say crass, +materialism, would require no further proof. Those particular functions +undoubtedly take place without the cognisance of that particular +sensitive soul which we call ourself, so that if no other sensitive soul +take cognisance of them, they must needs be, not simply automatic +performances, but performances of an automaton of such marvellous powers +as to be quite equal to the performance likewise of whatever human +operations are vulgarly classed as mental. Assume, however illogically, +that motion is a function of matter, and from that premiss, whether true +or false, the conclusion that thought likewise is a function of matter +may be quite logically deduced. 'That thought is as much a function of +matter as motion is' must needs be conceded to Professor Huxley, who, +therefore, if he could show that motion is really such a function, would +be fully justified in adding, that 'the distinction between spirit and +matter vanishes,' that 'we lose spirit in matter.'</p> + +<p>Undeniably, then, of the Cartesian philosophy one moiety is, as +Professor Huxley says, materialistic; but from the self-contradictions +inseparable from every species of materialism the Cartesian variety is, +of course, no more exempt than any other, and it has besides one +self-contradiction peculiar to itself. A clock's pendulum vibrates, and +its hands move, not simply by reason of the situation and figure of its +weight and wheels, but also because some intelligent person, by winding +up the clock, has communicated an impulsive force to the weight and +wheels.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> Waterworks perform all sorts of antics, not solely because the +pipes are skilfully constructed and arranged with a view to such end, +but because also an intelligent engineer has turned running water into +the pipes. But the only intelligent agent to whom Descartes allows +access to his corporeal machinery is one who not only has no notion how +to apply a moving force except to some few portions of the machinery, +but with regard to the other portions has most likely no suspicion that +they even exist. But how in the absence of some other intelligence, of +some other 'vegetative or sensitive soul or principle of motion or of +life,' is it possible for the inert and inanimate heart to generate +animal spirits?—how is it possible for death thus to give birth to +life?—or, if the generative faculty be supposed to be the necessary +result of a particular molecular structure, how is it that when the +animal spirits become from any cause extinct, they are not immediately +regenerated by the same molecular structure? or rather, how is it +possible for animal spirits to become extinct as long as the molecular +structure of which they are necessary concomitants remains unaltered? In +these questions the old insuperable difficulties reappear in new forms, +but on these we need not dwell. Apart from anti-materialistic arguments +of general applicability, there is a mode of refutation specially +adapted to the Cartesian form of materialism, which, besides flatly +contradicting itself, contradicts not less flatly a twin system of +unimpeachable veracity. Truth cannot be opposed to truth:—a doctrine +cannot be true, even though propounded by Descartes and Huxley, if it +conflict irreconcileably with doctrines which Descartes and Huxley have +unanswerably demonstrated. Now one-half of Cartesian philosophy shows +conclusively that amidst the countless infinity of human notions, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> +one single and solitary certainty of independent and self-evident +authority is the existence of thought, and nothing else whatever, +therefore, can be entitled to be regarded as absolutely certain which +cannot be shown to rest mediately or immediately upon this. One thing +which can, by strictest logical process, be shown so to rest, is the +existence of a thinking self; and another is the existence of a non-self +or external universe; but of this external universe we know scarcely +anything beyond the bare fact that it exists. We know that outside the +thinking self there are potentialities capable of somehow or other +communicating sensations to the thinking self; but of the nature of +these potentialities our senses teach us absolutely nothing, and the few +particulars that reason is able to discover, are, with one single though +very momentous exception, to which we are rapidly approaching, purely +negative. We do know to a certain extent what qualities of objects are +not. We know that they are not and cannot be in the least like the +sensations which we call by the same names. We know that what we call +the whiteness and coldness of snow or the hardness and weight of marble, +can no more resemble the feelings we receive from looking at or handling +snow or marble than the mental exaltation produced within us on hearing +one of Bach's fugues is like the organ on which, or the organist by +whom, it is played. We know that of the pictures which our senses form +for us not one can possibly be a correct likeness. We know that what we +fancy we see in matter we do not see; that what we seem to feel we do +not feel; that the apparent structure and composition of matter cannot +therefore possibly be real. To this conviction we are irresistibly drawn +by a chain of idealistic reasoning of which Descartes forged the first<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> +link, and every link of which will stand the severest strain. But if +this be the teaching of an idealism occupying as its base the only +morsel of solid ground to be found in the mental universe, what scrap of +footing is there left for an antagonistic materialism purporting to rest +on what we can see and feel of a structure and composition which, as we +have just satisfied ourselves, we cannot see or feel at all?</p> + +<p>As plainly then as one half of Descartes' philosophy is materialistic, +so plainly, that half, instead of a necessary outgrowth and exact +correlative of the other or idealistic moiety is, on the contrary, the +latter's diametrical and implacable opponent. As plainly, therefore, as +the one is true, must the other be false, and Cartesian idealism, in so +far as its character has been exhibited above, has, I submit, been +demonstrated to be true. The greater the pity that it was not brought to +maturity by its author. In enumerating its first principles, Descartes, +as I must once again observe, was forming a logical basis whereon a +comprehensive and consistent conception of an external universe might +forthwith have been securely deposited, had he not unluckily, instead of +himself proceeding to build on his own foundations, with congruous +materials, left them free for others to build upon with gold, silver, +precious stones, wood, hay, or stubble, as chance might determine. May +I, without presumption, hazard a conjecture as to the sort of fabric +that might have arisen, if he had steadily prosecuted his original +design?</p> + +<p>At the stage which we are supposing him to have reached, very little +remained to complete the work. Around man, around every individual man, +or other conscious intelligence, as its centre, is ranged infinitely +extended space, filled with, or, as it were, composed of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> various kinds +of matter, every kind and every separate portion of which is endowed +with special qualities capable of communicating corresponding sensations +to the central intelligence. So far all that can be predicated of any +material object or portion of matter is that it is a collection of +qualities; but from hence we may advance boldly to the further negative +discovery that it is nothing else; that there is not and cannot be, in +addition to those qualities, any substance in or to which the qualities +inhere, or are in any way attached.</p> + +<p>The absence from matter of any such substance is evidenced by the +absurdity involved in the idea of its presence. Suppose the substance to +exist: the qualities inherent in it must needs be as completely distinct +from itself as pins are from a pincushion; the extension and solidity of +an extended, solid substance can no more be identical with the substance +than the nominative is identical with the genitive case. The substance, +therefore, although deprived of all its qualities will still retain its +essence unimpaired, will still be equally a substance, just as a +pincushion continues equally a pincushion after its last pin has been +abstracted. Conceive, then, all the qualities of matter to be +abstracted, and consider what remains—a substance without qualities of +any sort. But a substance neither solid, nor fluid, nor yet gaseous; +neither coloured nor colourless; neither singular nor plural; without +form and void, without even extension—what is it? not something, but +nothing; a nonentity or non-existence. The qualities of matter in being +removed from the substance have therefore left nothing behind, and, +consequently, although carrying with them nothing but themselves, have +yet carried with them all the constituents of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> matter, which is thus +seen to be composed exclusively of qualities without a single particle +of foreign admixture. And since, moreover, the qualities of matter are +clearly not themselves substances, that is to say do not themselves +<i>stand under</i> or uphold anything, it follows that their compound, +matter, must likewise be purely unsubstantial.</p> + +<p>The edifice begun by Descartes has now been raised high and strong +enough to have its layer of negations crowned with an affirmation of +pre-eminent importance. The qualities of matter, being known only by +their effects, are evidently causes: and, being causes, must necessarily +be either themselves forces, or, at the least, manifestations of force; +and inasmuch as force involves exertion, it cannot be inert; and +inasmuch as deadness must be incapable of exertion, all force must be +alive; and life without substance cannot be conceived otherwise than as +some species of spirit or mind. Such therefore must be matter. Matter +can be nothing else than pure spirit of some kind.</p> + +<p>And may we not with good reason congratulate ourselves on this result of +our investigations? Instead of the vision we were threatened with, of +mind losing itself in matter, our eyes are gladdened with that of the +converse operation, of the transmutation of matter into mind. And on no +account is this metamorphosis to be mistaken for annihilation of matter, +whose stolid grossness has vanished, not in order to give place to empty +nominalism or to a thin mist of mere mental perceptions existing only in +virtue of being perceived, but in order to reappear gloriously +etherealised into living energy. By the change that has taken place, +corruption has put on incorruption; the natural body has become a +quickening spirit; death is swallowed up in victory. Matter reappears<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> +converted, not into a perception of percipient mind, but into percipient +mind itself; yet although thus presumably percipient of its own +existence, it not the less has an existence perfectly independent of +perception, either by itself or by any other intelligence.</p> + +<p>Under what head the mind, or combination of living forces, thus +constituting all matter, ought to be classed, is a question, which the +imperfection of human faculties may as well be content to leave +unanswered, though to its being supposed to emanate directly from the +mind of Omnipresent Deity, one insuperable objection may be mentioned, +which should be kept steadily in view. There are few of us who will not +shrink with horror from a notion, according to which man, whenever doing +as he pleases with any material object, applying it, as likely as not, +to some base or criminal purpose, is disposing at his pleasure of a +portion of the Divine essence: few who will not greatly prefer to +believe that the vital principle which manifests itself in the form of a +dunghill or of a poisoned dagger, may be, for the time, as completely +individualised and separate from all other life or mind, as every human +being perceives his own conscious mind or self to be. At all events, we +have now reached a point beyond which it would be rash to rush hastily +on. For a while we may be well content to rest where we are. That matter +is nothing else but a peculiar manifestation, or avatar, of some species +of mind, whatever that species be, is a proposition as demonstrably true +as its converse is demonstrably false. Unless it be possible for death +to give birth to life, it is impossible for living mind to be the +offspring of inanimate matter; but so surely as mind is mind, and that +living force alone can act either on mind or aught else, so surely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> must +all matter that imparts sensation to mind, be itself a species of living +force and consequently a species of mind.</p> + +<p>An unexpected conclusion this, and widely different, I confess, from +that to which I was myself looking forward at the outset of the +discussion; yet, at the same time, one of which there is the best +possible proof in the impossibility of conceiving its contrary. It is +besides a conclusion to which not only ought Descartes in consistency to +have come, but at which both Locke and Berkeley, though advancing from +opposite points of the compass, did very nearly arrive; nay, which the +latter did almost touch, and must apparently have grasped, had not his +hands been already full of other things. It is, moreover, one from which +I do not apprehend that Professor Huxley himself will seriously dissent. +Indeed, I almost hope that he may object chiefly to its having been +moved by me as an amendment on his original motion, and that he may be +disposed to claim it for himself as a portion of genuine Huxleyism. If +so, I shall readily recognise the claim so far as to admit that things +very similar to many of those said by me above had already been said by +Professor Huxley; though, in justice to myself, I must add that their +complete opposites had likewise been said by him. But the office which I +here proposed to myself was mainly that of an eclectic, who, going over +a field which another husbandman has tilled, separates the wheat from +the tares, and binds up the former into shapely and easily portable +sheaves; and no more satisfactory assurance can be given of my having +been usefully employed in such subordinate capacity than that Professor +Huxley, who, amongst all his numerous admirers, has not one sincerer +than myself, should welcome me as a coadjutor, instead of repelling me +as an antagonist.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span></p> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V.</h2> + +<h3><i>RECENT PHASES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM.</i></h3> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>'Wonder is the basis of worship. That progress of science which is +to destroy wonder, and in its stead substitute mensuration and +numeration, finds small favour with Teufelsdröckh, much as he +otherwise venerates those two latter processes.'—<i>Sartor +Resartus.</i> </p></div> + + +<h3>I.</h3> + +<p>By the train of thought pursued in the last chapter, we were led to the +conclusion, not, indeed, that matter has no existence, but that its +nature or constitution is altogether different from what is commonly +supposed. The difference thus discovered does not, however, imply any +corresponding difference with respect to the properties—<i>sensible</i> +properties, as they are commonly called—whereby matter affects the +senses. Equally, whether matter be, in all and each of its various +species, inanimate, inert, passive substance, or a combination of +self-acting forces—equally whether it be the author or merely the +subject of whatever activity it manifests, that activity is equally +manifested in certain sequences which are as unvarying as if they were +prescribed by inexorable and irresistible laws, and which, indeed, by a +convenient, though exceedingly treacherous metaphor, are usually styled +laws—laws of Nature when spoken of collectively, laws of attraction, +repulsion, gravitation, motion, heat, light, and the like, when +separately referred to. Whithersoever we turn our eyes, however<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> closely +we pry, into whatever depths of infinity we peer, we observe the most +perfect harmony between structure and law, law moulding structure and +structure utilising law. Afar off we descry systems upon systems, solar +and sidereal, like sand upon the sea-shore for multitude, and every +individual orb thereof rotating or revolving in strictest accordance +with inflexible mathematical principles, and evidently owing to the +previous influence of those same principles its characteristic +configuration. Near at hand we discern organic forms innumerable, each +with its own special arrangement of component parts admirably apt for +the performance in ordinary circumstances of special functions, +admirably, as circumstances change, accommodating itself by +corresponding changes for continuing the same or undertaking other and +equally appropriate functions, nor merely performing them all in despite +of the restraints imposed by law, but availing itself of those very +restraints as means and aids for their performance. Where so much +aptness is, adaptation surely must have been: where arrangement is so +plainly conducive to ends, the ends must surely have been foreseen, and +the arrangement effected by design and according to preconceived plan. +And there cannot have been design without a designer or designers: the +plan cannot but have had its author or authors: nor could the plan have +been executed without an artificer or artificers. Author or authors, +too, artificer or artificers, be the same singular or plural, must have +possessed, individually or collectively, not less of wisdom, power, and +goodness than are displayed by the finished work. Now of each of these +attributes, the amount to which the aspect of the universe bears +witness, albeit not infinite, inasmuch as the universe<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> is not without +imperfections, is yet indefinite; as plainly without measure as the +universe is without bounds. Wherefore, not only must the universe have +had an author or authors, an artificer or artificers, but his or their +wisdom, power, and goodness, must, whether infinite or not, have been at +least illimitable.</p> + +<p>Such is the argument from design, and such, to my thinking, the only +absolute certainties legitimately deducible from it; and although these, +in comparison with the numerous probabilities ordinarily associated with +them, may appear somewhat meagre, yet are they intrinsically of +exceeding moment. They constitute the only basis on which any rational +religion, any that appeals to the intellect as well as to the feelings, +can rest securely. Whoever accepts them, by whatever other name he +prefer to call himself, is essentially a theist. He only who denies or +ignores them can justly be stigmatised as an atheist. Yet, although an +inquiry into their soundness is thus plainly second in interest to none, +it is not that in which I propose to engage at present, unless +indirectly. My immediate concern is not with the strength of theism, but +with the weakness of atheism, and the hollowness of the latter's +dialectical pretensions. What in every form of piety is most provocative +of philosophic scorn, is its forwardness of faith, its eagerness of +acquiescence; but to this sort of reproach I expect to be able to show +that none are more obnoxious than those very philosophers by whom it is +most freely cast. That nothing is more unphilosophical than +uncompromising irreligion, nothing more credulous than its credulity, no +other beliefs more monstrous than those by which it strives to fill up +the void created by its own unbelief: this is my present thesis, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> +this I propound, not unaware what formidable antagonists I am thereby +challenging, but not without something of the same confidence, and +something withal of the same ground for it, as David had when, in equal +strait, exclaiming, 'The Lord is on my side; I will not fear; what can +man do unto me?'</p> + +<p>Let us at the outset consider what denial of plan in the structure of +the universe implies, and note, among other things signified, the +following. The exact conformity on matter's part to Nature's laws, +everywhere observable, and even more striking perhaps in minute details +than in grandiose generalities, is purely accidental. The laws were not +enacted in order to be obeyed; matter's various shapes were not given to +or assumed by it in order that its obedience might serve any particular +purpose. All appearances of ingenious contrivance in the collocation of +elementary particles, or in the co-operation of elementary forces, are +mere appearances. It was not designed that under the influence of the +laws of motion, chaos should resolve itself into systems, and time +divide itself into years and seasons and days and nights. It is quite +unintentionally that the countless varieties of mechanism appertaining +to different vegetable and animal fabrics have been rendered fit for +performing those special processes which, by reason in each case of some +special arrangement of parts, they actually do perform with such +marvellous precision. It is a total mistake to suppose that the eye was +meant for seeing, or the ear for hearing, or the heart for initiating +and regulating the circulation of the blood, or nervous ramifications +for receiving and disseminating sensible impressions. These various +organs have been discovered to be useful, and are used accordingly; but +they were not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> intended to be so used, or contrived with any such view, +or, indeed, contrived at all. The forces, whatever they be, and whether +identical with or totally distinct from itself, whereby matter, on one +supposition, acts, and, on the other, is acted upon, and by whose +operation the universe and all its contents have been fashioned and are +sustained, are in either case perfectly heedless and reckless forces, +operating always without the slightest reference to result.</p> + +<p>Language like this was much in vogue among the French encyclopædists of +the last century. By opposing it, even Voltaire incurred the reputation +of bigotry, and Hume probably had to listen to a good deal of it on that +memorable occasion when, dining with Baron D'Holbach, and intimating to +his host his disbelief in the existence of atheists, he was informed by +way of reply that he was actually at table with seventeen members of the +sect.<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> That in England, too, it was a good deal talked at about the +same and a somewhat later period, may be inferred from the fact that +against its teaching one of Paley's most celebrated treatises was +expressly directed. Doctrine which was once so fashionable, and which +even now cannot be said to be obsolete, was not, of course, without some +show of reason to support it, and somewhat in this wise the chief +arguments in its behalf were usually marshalled:—In order to account +for actual result, there is no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> need to imagine previous purpose. All +things that exist, all events that occur, must bear to each other some +relations in situation and time, which relations are not less likely to +be orderly than disorderly, or, rather, indeed, are more likely to be +the former than the latter. For necessarily the rarer rises above the +denser; the stronger compels the weaker; that which is pushed hardest +runs fastest. And even though, among organic forms, orderly and +disorderly had been, by the purely fortuitous concurrence of atoms, +originally produced in equal numbers, the former would be sure in the +course of ages to become the more numerous, and that in proportion to +the orderliness of their composition, and to their consequent +suitableness for the reception and maintenance of organic life, by which +they in turn would be maintained and multiplied, while less aptly +organised forms, succumbing in the struggle for existence, perished and +vanished away. Thus everything arranges itself—<i>everything</i>, however, +being here another name for Nature, which alone does or can exist, which +is all and does all; yet, though doing all things in general, does +whatever it does quite unintelligently, and without the least desire of +doing any one thing in particular more than another.</p> + +<p>Though speaking of this as a show of reasoning, I would by no means be +understood to consider it as merely a show. On the contrary, I must +admit that it contains a modicum of reality sufficient, in my opinion, +to secure the position taken up from being utterly overthrown by any +direct attack not followed up by reference to a certain palpable +absurdity which we shall presently perceive to be inseparably connected +with the position. To so much of real reasoning as we have before us, +let then all due<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> respect be shown. No doubt all existences must +necessarily dispose themselves or be disposed somehow. No doubt all +occurrences must succeed each other somehow. No doubt, either, that if +the disposing or otherwise originating forces operated quite +regardlessly of plan, no one disposition or succession would be a whit +less possible than any other—the most symmetric or evenly graduated +than the most disjointed or confused. Now although, since exertion is +utterly inconceivable without volition, and since volition is equally +inconceivable without consciousness, it must be impossible for any +forces ever to exert themselves altogether unintentionally, it is yet +perfectly possible for their exertion to have no ulterior intention +beyond that of gratifying an unprospective will. This is all that one +fidgetting about, as the phrase is, intends, when he has no special +motive for fidgetting in any particular direction more than in any +other, and similarly it may by possibility be the mere fidgettiness of +Nature that gives rise to all natural phenomena. Nature, indeed, cannot, +any more than any other force or combination of forces, be utterly +destitute of intelligence, but its intelligence may not inconceivably be +of no higher sort than that which the sensitive plant exhibits or +mimics. Nature cannot exert itself quite unconsciously, nor consequently +quite unintentionally, but its exertions, though not unintended, may +possibly not be intended for any result. It must be admitted, then, +that, so far, no reason has appeared why the force or forces by which +the universe was originally moulded, may not, as contended, have been +perfectly heedless and reckless; may not, without the least +premeditation or the slightest view to any ulterior object, have +produced certain phenomena in those particular sequences to which the +name of natural<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> laws has been given; and may not, with the same total +absence of purpose, have adopted certain other courses of action which, +very fortunately, though quite undesignedly, have resulted in the +production of endless varieties of mechanism, most of them of +marvellously intricate and complex structure, and all and each of them +of structure marvellously suitable for performing, in co-operation with +Nature's laws, functions of an utility as varied as their structure. And +what any forces have been equal to do once, those same forces, if +remaining unimpaired, must be equal to repeat times without number. +Although, if you found your opponent at dice invariably throwing +double-sixes, you might feel confident that his dice were loaded, your +confidence, unless otherwise corroborated, would not amount to entire +certainty. With unloaded dice there would be nothing strange in +double-six being thrown once; but, if once, why not twice running? and +if twice, why not three, four, or a million times running, provided that +the thrower's strength held out so long? No one of the separate throws, +from the first to the millionth, would be attended with more difficulty +than any other. Whoever made the first might with no greater effort make +any one, and therefore every one, of the rest. In the fact of his having +commenced the series there would be proof of the possibility of his +completing it. In like manner, if it be not inconceivable that Nature's +forces may once, by a single unpremeditated exertion, have bestowed on +the universe its actual constitution, it is not inconceivable that by +continual repetition of similarly unpremeditated exertions, they may +have ever since maintained that constitution. In this supposition there +is nothing patently absurd. It is perfectly legitimate to suppose that +any event or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> combination of events, not demonstrably impossible, may +have occurred in the absence of complete certainty that they have not +occurred. It may not be illegitimate, therefore, to suppose that all +phenomena of the description termed physical, and all repeated sequences +of such phenomena, may have occurred, not causally, but casually—that +it may have been a fortuitous concourse of atoms which originally +established the existing economy of the universe, and an uninterrupted +succession of similar fortuitous concourses that has ever since +maintained that economy. That supposition, I repeat, involves no +absolute absurdity. What however is, if not absurd, at any rate +egregiously unscientific and most unphilosophically credulous, is to +treat the supposition as a certainty, notwithstanding that the chances +against its representing real facts are as infinity to infinitesimality; +for not less is the preponderance of improbability that the laws of +nature were not intentionally prescribed, and that the wondrously +complex and wondrously useful harmony that has been established between +organic structure and natural law was not designedly established. In +considering this point, it will be convenient to take law first.</p> + +<p>Inasmuch as, on the assumption that all phenomena of inorganic matter +are effects, purely unpremeditated, of Nature's capricious restlessness, +there would of course be no more reason why any one such phenomenon than +any other should not at any time occur, there would equally of course on +the same assumption, be no more reason why it should. An infinity of +phenomena being at all times equally possible, the chances against any +one being, on any occasion, preferred to all the rest, would be infinity +less one. Against any particular sequence of phe<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span>nomena they would be as +infinity less one multiplied by the number of phenomena composing the +sequence, and against one or more repetitions of the same sequence they +would be the same multiple of virtual infinity multiplied by the number +of repetitions. Against perpetual repetition, they would, as it were, be +virtual infinity multiplied by infinity. On the assumption stated, an +apple loosened from the parent stem, might quite possibly fall to the +ground, but quite as possibly might remain suspended in mid air, or rise +straight upwards, or take any one of the innumerable directions +intervening between zenith and nadir, travelling too, unless +interrupted, in the direction selected for any period, from a single +moment to endless ages. Experience, however, teaches that an apple or +any other body of greater specific gravity than air, does invariably, +when deprived of support, fall straight downward, such downward movement +being part of one of those sequences of phenomena which are classed +under the head of gravitation. Now, to assert that this, or any other, +and consequently every other, specimen of gravitation, cannot possibly +have been unpremeditated would no doubt be unwarrantable. No doubt there +is one solitary, one infinitesimal chance that the force whose action +results in gravitation may, when producing that result, be acting with +as little choice of direction as a fidgetty man makes when moving his +arms or legs about for no better reason than that he will not take the +trouble to keep them quiet. Only, as on the supposition that the force +did not select its course, the chances against its always taking the +same course would be infinity less one indefinitely multiplied, the +probability that it does select must needs be the same indefinite +multiple of virtual infinity. Not less than<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> this is the preponderance +of probability that the invariably recurrent sequences of phenomena +which we are in the habit of referring to gravitation, are premeditated, +and that the law of gravitation has, so to speak, been wittingly +ordained. And in this respect all invariable sequences of phenomena, +otherwise termed laws of nature, stand plainly in the same category. One +solitary and infinitesimal unit is the sole deduction to be made from +what would otherwise be infinite certainty, that the assumption we +started with is false, and that all invariable sequences are +premeditated, all the laws of nature enacted by a law-giver who intended +what he was enacting.</p> + +<p>Intention, however, is not quite the same thing as design. It is +possible for action to be at once intentional and purposeless. If a man, +taking regularly a constitutional walk, is observed always to take the +same road, and to stop exactly at the same point, there can be no +reasonable doubt as to his intention to walk just so far and no farther; +but it does not follow that he has any object in walking which he +supposes would not be equally served by his walking a few paces more or +less. Similarly whatever be the certainty that the laws of nature have +been intentionally established, there is in that certainty no proof of +their having been established for any purpose beyond that of gratifying +some whim or humour of the lawgiver. For indications of design in the +universe we must look rather to organic than to inorganic nature, rather +to structure than to law. We shall find applying to the former the same +reasoning as to the latter, and likewise some more besides.</p> + +<p>Inasmuch as, of the innumerable combinations of which the elements or +elementary forces are susceptible, each and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> every one, in the absence +of any preference for one over another on the part of the volition on +which the occurrence of all depends, would have equal chances of +occurring, the chances against the occurrence at any particular time of +any particular combination would be as the number, or rather as the +innumerosity, of all the rest to one. Such, in the absence of any +intentional action on Nature's part, would be the odds against any one +single occurrence of any one elemental combination. Against the +perpetual repetition of the same combination the odds would be the same +innumerosity innumerable times multiplied. Nevertheless there actually +is everlastingly recurring, not simply one single specimen, but an +innumerable multitude of the same elemental combinations. Whatever were +the combinations necessary for producing all the existing organisms, +vegetable and animal, with which our earth swarms, the constant +recurrence of those same or nearly the same combinations is +indispensable both for the maintenance of the organisms during life and +for the production of successors to them; and such constant recurrence +is plainly going on. The chances then against its being unintended must +be the aforesaid multiple of innumerosity. But this is not all. The +multiple in question represents the chances against perpetual repetition +of any set whatever of elemental combinations, but about the actually +recurrent set there is this peculiarity, that it produces and maintains +innumerable organisms or machines, which—inasmuch as all of them are +marvellously fit, by reason of their respective specialities of +structure, for performing different obviously useful purposes—have all +the appearance of having been expressly constructed for the performance +of those purposes. If these appearances of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> adaptation were fallacious, +if the apparent utility were undesigned, the chances against the +perpetual recurrence of so singularly useful, rather than of some +totally useless, set of combinations would be a multiple of innumerosity +similar to that which has clearly been shown to represent the +preponderance of probability against the constant repetition of any set +of combinations whatever, whether useful or useless. If, then, it were +permissible to use so extravagant an hyperbole to indicate an idea of +multitude to which it is not in the power of words to give adequate +expression, it might be said that while the chances against Nature's +habitual action being <i>unintentional</i>, or the result as it were of mere +fidgettiness or restlessness, are an indefinite multiple of infinity, +the chances against its being <i>purposeless</i> and <i>undesigned</i>, without +view to end or object, is the same multiple doubled.</p> + +<p>Still, in order to give the solitary and infinitesimal chance on the +other side its full due, let us confess it to be as yet not quite +conclusively demonstrated that the actual order of inorganic, and the +actual constitution of organic, nature are results of uninterrupted +repetition of one and the same purposeless volition, and of the same +purely fortuitous concourses of atoms. Let us admit it to be not +absolutely impossible, not utterly inconceivable, that vegetable and +animal organisms were not contrived such as they are with any view to +their becoming habitations of vegetable and animal life, but that having +been accidentally discovered to be fit to be lived in, they have been +taken possession of by life and inhabited accordingly; that, similarly, +the wondrously complex and varied mechanisms of which most organisms are +composed were not made to be used, but are used because certain uses +have been acci<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span>dentally discovered for them—the eye, for instance, to +take one example out of myriads not less remarkable, not having been +meant to be seen with, but being employed for seeing because, by a happy +coincidence, the particles composing it have got to be collocated in +such wise that a picture of whatever is opposite to it is formed upon +the retina, and is thence by a nervous concatenation transmitted to the +brain. Although, if the most consummate skill, in comparison with which +that displayed in the fabrication of Mr. Newall's telescope were +downright clumsiness, had striven to devise a seeing apparatus, capable +of exact self-adjustment to all degrees of light, all gradations of +distance, all varieties of refrangibility, it could not have adopted a +contrivance more exquisitely ingenious, or evincing more minutely +accurate knowledge of the most secret laws of optics, than the mechanism +of the eye apparently betokens, let it still be admitted to be not quite +beyond the bounds of possibility, that not skill but the blindest and +densest ignorance may have presided over the whole operation. But even +though the modes of procedure involved in these admissions were not +quite impossible or inconceivable, belief in them would, I repeat, be +palpably irrational, and that almost to the last degree. The nearest +approach to a reason that can be imagined for it is the <i>Credo quia +incredibile est</i> to which philosophers in despair have occasionally been +known to resort. <i>Dudum in scholis audiveram</i>, says Descartes, <i>nihil +tam absurdè dici posse quod non dicatur ab aliquo Philosophorum</i>. In his +early college days he had heard that nothing so absurd can possibly be +said, but that some philosopher or other may say it. Such words are too +hard for me. I make as yet no charges of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> absurdity, contenting myself +for the moment with saying that no notion can be too unscientific to be +adopted by those scientific men who, gratuitously running counter to the +strongest possible presumption, set the science of probabilities so +utterly at naught as to adopt as reality an hypothesis the chances +against which are but one single iota short of infinite.</p> + +<p>What, however, is unequivocally absurd, is a certain notion which I +hinted would be found to be inevitably consequent on the foregoing +premisses, and whose self-evident falsity carries with it condemnation +of the premisses. To say that the creative agency denominated Nature, or +by whatever other name known, neither had any ends in view when +originally adopting certain sequences of action, and originally +fabricating innumerable organisms exactly suitable for the performance, +in concert with those sequences, of innumerable useful functions; nor, +although ever since repeating the sequences, and maintaining or +reproducing the organisms, has so done with any reference to the +purposes which the sequences and organisms serve, is equivalent to +saying that the agency in question is not even aware that any purposes +are served. He who planted the eye doth not then see. He who fashioned +the ear doth not hear. He who teacheth man knowledge doth not, it seems, +know. Yet what, according to this, creative agency, whether God or +Nature, Creator or Creatress, can not perceive, the creature can. Even +an ass knows that thistles are good to eat, and that certain movements +of his tongue and larynx will result in a bray; while man not only daily +discovers fresh uses for things, but imagines that if he had had the +fashioning of them, he might have materially increased their utility; +King Alfonso of Castile, for in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span>stance, boasting of the valuable +cosmogonical advice he could have given had he been taken into council; +and one of Kaiser Wilhelm's predecessors on the throne of Prussia +intimating that he, in like case, would have proved conclusively that +pounded quartz and silex may easily be in excess in arable soil. The +creature, then, has intelligence of which the Creator has always been +destitute. Yet the creature can have nothing save what, either directly +or indirectly, he derives from a creator. Wherefore that, in becoming +endowed with intelligence, man must have received from the Creator that +which the Creator had not to give, is an article inseparable from the +profession of faith of those moderate Atheists who are content to regard +man as a creature.</p> + +<p>There are, however, others of a more uncompromising temper, who do not +hesitate to pronounce creation, in the sense of formation of something +out of nothing, to be an incomprehensible myth; and it cannot be denied +to these that, however difficult it be to conceive an uncreated universe +existing from all eternity, the conception of an eternally existent +Creator is not one whit easier. Fairly enough, therefore, these may +proceed to argue that in the production of that compound, man, the share +of the agency usually styled creative must have been limited to +combining and arranging the elemental particles of his corporeal moiety. +Quite fairly, advancing still farther, they may hazard a conjecture that +it is from the union of the corporeal constituents of man that the +generation of his spiritual moiety has resulted. But for such generation +it is plainly indispensable that the corporeal constituents should have +been not inert particles but self-acting forces, and that, as such, they +must have been in possession of more or less<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> intelligence, which +intelligence again either was or was not equal in amount to that of the +human spirit or mind generated by them. If it were not equal, then the +forces must have given to their offspring more than they had themselves +got to give—which is sheer nonsense. If it were equal, then, inasmuch +as the human mind is quite clever enough to discover uses for the +various parts of the human body and of other organisms, the forces to +which the human mind owes its origin must be at least equally clever. +The elementary forces by whose action the human and other organic bodies +have been constructed, must have been perfectly aware what they were +constructing, and what services the resulting structures would be fitted +to render. In other words, they must in their constructive operations +have worked towards specific ends, according to preconceived plan and +set design, wittingly contriving various machines for various purposes. +The advanced Atheists, with whose speculations we are here especially +concerned, are thus at liberty to choose between two horns of a dilemma, +but must not hope to escape both. Either they stand self-refuted by +assuming something to have been made out of nothing—a process which +they began by pronouncing impossible—or they must imagine intelligence, +competent to devise all organisms, to be diffused throughout the +universe, thereby showing themselves to have assumed their sectarian +appellation without sufficient warrant, and to be in reality rather +Pantheists than Atheists.</p> + +<p>A third hypothesis indeed remains for any who are content to believe +that Nature's elementary forces having, without knowing what they were +about, constructed the human body, the human mind, until then a +houseless<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> wanderer, lit upon it by chance, and, observing it to be a +habitation suitably swept and garnished, entered in and dwelt there. +Upon this supposition there must be, within the limits of our terrene +sphere, two distinct species of intelligence, a greater and a +lesser—the one competent to construct all sorts of marvellously complex +and marvellously serviceable machines, yet incompetent to understand +their utility, the other fully perceiving the utility of the machines, +yet utterly incompetent to fabricate them. But there are probably few +adventurers on the ocean of speculation who would not prefer total +shipwreck to the shelter of such a harbour of refuge as this.</p> + +<p>Atheism must in fairness be acknowledged to have much mended its manners +within the last two or three generations. Its tone and language are no +longer of the rude, scoffing sort at which Voltaire may be readily +pictured as breaking into voluble protest, or Hume as contemptuously +opening his eyes and shrugging his shoulders. Though grown more civil, +however, it cannot be complimented on having grown more rational. At +most may it be credited with being more elaborately irrational than of +old. It now no longer denies, it only ignores. It does not pronounce God +non-existent. It only insists that there is not complete proof that God +exists; thereupon, however, proceeding to argue as if He did not exist, +and thereby, not simply confounding deficiency of proof on one side with +sufficiency of proof on the other, but overlooking an amount of proof +that on any other subject would, provisionally at least, be deemed +conclusive, and perversely rejecting an hypothesis which, whether +correct, or not, is at least a good working hypothesis, coinciding +exactly with most of the facts, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> inconsistent with none of them, in +favour of an hypothesis which, even in the hands of a Huxley or a +Darwin, cannot be made to work at all.</p> + + +<h3>II.</h3> + +<p>To my mind there is a genuine pleasure in giving expression to +admiration of any great intellectual achievement; and it is much rather +for that reason than on account of any value which I imagine my opinion +on such a subject can possess, that, having had occasion to name the +illustrious author of the 'Origin of Species,' I desire to preface my +criticism on what appears to me to be a grave defect in his theory, by +intimating my hearty concurrence in its leading principles. That +inasmuch as, owing to the exceeding fecundity of the generality of +organic beings, more individuals of almost every species are born than +can possibly survive, and that consequently a desperate struggle for +existence must take place amongst them; that in such a struggle the +smallest grain may turn the scale, the minutest advantage possessed by +some individuals over others determine which shall live and which shall +die; that, as the circumstances in which life is to be maintained +change, the character and structure of organisms must change also in +order to be accommodated thereto, but that the changes which +consequently take place in some individuals are better suited to the +altered circumstances than those which take place in other individuals; +that individual offspring, moreover, although always strongly resembling +their parents in the majority of particulars, always exhibit some slight +differences from them; that of these differences such as do not render +the offspring less fit<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> will almost of necessity render them more fit +for coping with their rivals; and that superior fitness, however +acquired, is as likely as any other quality to be transmitted to +succeeding generations—all these are indisputable facts, and from +these, as premisses, it seems to me not so much to be legitimately +deducible that most existing species may have been produced 'by descent, +with modification, through natural selection,' or 'survival of the +fittest,' as necessarily to follow that they cannot have originated in +any other way. For <i>all</i> species to have been created such as they now +are, is simply inconsistent with the premisses. Whatever beings may at +any remote epoch have been created, there must, according to the +conditions involved, have been amongst their descendants some better +fitted, by reason of divergence from the parent type, for engaging in +internecine strife than those, if any such there were, which adhered +closely to that type. Whether, then, among the survivors from the first +engagement in that never-ending struggle for life which must have +commenced soon after the creation, there were or were not any exact +representatives of the parent type, there must have been some exhibiting +more or less of divergence from that type. Among the descendants of +these, again, there must have been some who, together with the +structural or other advantages inherited from their immediate ancestors, +possessed, moreover, some advantages first nascent in themselves, and +who were similarly enabled thereby to prevail over their less gifted +competitors, and similarly to transmit all their advantages to a +posterity, some members of which would similarly be born with certain +new advantages in addition. By continual repetition of these processes, +and the consequent accumulation of divergencies from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> original +pattern, however slight those divergencies might separately be, there +could not but eventually become formed breeds so distinct from each +other as to be to all intents and purposes distinct species, in +whichsoever of its many vague senses the term 'species' be understood. +Now these species, instead of having been created, would be the result +of divergence from their created progenitor. Whether, therefore, any +created species do or do not still exist, it is certain that among +existing species there are some that were not created, but which have +been gradually evolved, and evolved, too, through survival of the +fittest. Mr. Darwin, then, is fairly entitled to the praise of having +placed beyond dispute that a process called by himself 'Natural +Selection,' and by Mr. Herbert Spencer 'Survival of the Fittest,' has +almost from the commencement of organic life been, and still is, in +active operation; that it is a cause which must needs have originated +some species, and is quite competent to have originated all that still +exist; whereas creation, the only other suggested cause, cannot be +conceived to have done this latter unless every minutest shade of +difference between offspring and parent be regarded as the effect of a +separate creative act. Unless creation have originated every one of +those divergencies the accumulation of which constitutes a species, +clearly it cannot have originated that species. With some of the +phenomena connected with species the theory of creation cannot be +reconciled unless this novel interpretation be placed upon the word +creation, whereas there are none of the phenomena with which the +evolutionary hypothesis conflicts, and few, if any, which, when +restricted to its proper office of auxiliary, it will not help to +explain.</p> + +<p>To what we might thus be assured of, even if we had<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> only general +principles to guide us, all obtainable evidence unanimously testifies. +Geology distinctly proclaims that every portion of our globe's surface +has undergone vast changes, and that its organic inhabitants have +changed simultaneously and proportionately. The proof absolute, which it +furnishes, that at a period when few, if any, existing species had made +their appearance, many species now extinct already existed, is proof +equally absolute that if all species extinct and extant were created, +they cannot, at any rate, have been created at the same time. Of so much +at least we must be satisfied, unless we are prepared to accept the +ingenious conjecture of an orthodox divine, that, while our earth was +being formed out of chaos, Satan, to confound the faith of remote +generations, brought over bones of monsters from other worlds and +embedded them in the soil of ours, or that, as the same idea has been +otherwise expressed, while the earth's crust was a baking the devil had +a finger in the pie. Moreover, on the supposition that there was a break +of ages between the creations of extinct and of extant species, as +geology positively declares there must have been if both were separately +created, how passing strange is the 'grand fact that all extinct beings +can be classed with all recent beings'! The strangeness disappears, +however, when both are regarded as descendants of common progenitors. +The wonder would then be if they could not be so classed. Again, how +astonishing on the creative, how natural on the evolutionary hypothesis, +that the arrangement of bones in the hand of a man, the wing of a bat, +the fin of a porpoise, the leg of a horse, should be precisely the same; +the number of vertebræ in the neck of a giraffe, and in that of an +elephant the same; the primitive germs from which a man, a dog, a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> frog, +and a lobster are gradually evolved, to all appearance the same—the +same microscopic atom of homogeneous matter, undistinguishable by any +known test from an animalcule almost at the bottom of the organic scale! +Above all, that the courses by which animals of all degrees of +complexity are gradually developed from apparently equally simple germs +should, whenever traceable, be found to consist of progressive +ramifications, so that every higher animal, before arriving at maturity, +passes through several stages at the end of each of which lower animals +have stopped! How impossible, or how easy, to understand, according as +the one or the other hypothesis is adopted, is the phenomenon of what in +the one case will be treated as rudimentary, in the other as obsolete, +organs! No one need scruple to regard these as apparatus which the +creature has outgrown and allowed to fall into decay through neglect; +but whatever there is in us of real nobleness of feeling revolts against +the notion of their being apparatus which a divine Creator began to +build but was not able to finish. And yet again, how insultingly +irreconcilable with any rational estimate of Divine nature is the +possibility of any existing type of mammals having been created, seeing +that if so, it must have been created with <i>false</i> marks of nourishment +from the womb of a mother that never existed!</p> + +<p>These are some of the main grounds on which the Darwinian theory rests. +Of the abundance of detailed illustrations from which it may derive +additional support no adequate idea can be formed, except by careful +perusal of its author's own writings, and these fortunately may without +much exaggeration be said to be in everybody's hands. Of the arguments +that have been brought forward<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> in opposition to it, all seem to me to +be susceptible of very complete answers, and one or two of the +strongest, of answers more complete than they have yet received. True, +there is no disputing the testimony borne by the paintings and +sculptures of Egyptian tombs, and of Ninevite palaces, that the basement +floors in Thebes and Memphis were infested by much the same sort of +beetles as those which are such nuisances in London kitchens; that +Sardanapalus, if ever he exchanged indoor for outdoor sports, may have +hunted with dogs and horses that might pass muster at an English meet, +and that the Pharaohs were served by negro slaves as like as two peas in +all externals to those who in the United States have recently and +prematurely been metamorphosed into free and independent electors. But +all this only proves that certain species which existed 4,000 years ago +are still represented by unchanged descendants. It does not prove that +other descendants and groups of descendants from the same species have +not within the same period undergone changes sufficiently great to +convert them into distinct races; neither, if it did prove thus much, +would it do more than afford a presumption, and a very deceptive one, +that 4,000 years are too short a time for the formation of a new race, +affording besides, at the same time, much stronger presumption that, +within the remotest limits to which Mosaic chronology can be pushed +back, the various races of mankind, white, black, and intermediately +tinted, can not possibly have descended from one pair of ancestors.</p> + +<p>That domesticated animals, when suffered to run wild, always return to +the primitive wild type—this, instead of an argument against, is one of +the strongest arguments for the evolution theory, from which it is +indeed, as Mr. G. H.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> Lewes says, a necessary deduction. It is simply +because, as the conditions of life change, structure must, for +adaptation's sake, change likewise, that wild animals are capable of +being domesticated, of being, that is, made to undergo modifications by +being brought from the conditions of wildness to those of domesticity. +How, then, should they possibly retain those modifications, how escape +return to their previous shape and habits, when retransferred from +domesticity to wildness?</p> + +<p>The question, Why are not new species continually produced? may be aptly +met by another. How, consistently with the theory, is it possible they +should? Natural Selection is represented as acting 'solely by +accumulating slight successive favourable variations,' as taking only +short and slow steps. By what possibility, then, can it suddenly produce +modifications sufficiently conspicuous to mark off a new species? New +species may be, and indeed are, constantly in process of formation on +all sides, under our very eyes, without our being aware; for since the +process requires ages for its accomplishment, it must needs be +imperceptible by the keenest observation. So that even when a new +species is completed, it is not recognised as new, so minute is the +difference between the perfection to which it has attained, and the +imperfect state in which we and our fathers before us had long known it.</p> + +<p>'Why, however, since, according to the theory of Natural Selection, an +interminable number of intermediate forms must have existed, linking +together all the species in each group by gradations as fine as are our +present varieties—why do we not see these linking forms all around us?' +To this objection the very theory against which it is urged affords a +partial and almost adequate reply, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> deficiencies of which are +besides to some extent supplied by embryology and geology, and to a +farther extent accounted for by the meagreness of the geological record. +Natural selection for survival necessarily implies extinction of all +that are not selected to survive, so that fossil remains are now the +only procurable evidence that any of these latter that have long been +extinct ever existed. But very many organic beings are incapable of +being preserved in a fossil condition, while of those which can be so +preserved 'the number of specimens in all our museums is absolutely as +nothing compared with the countless generations of countless species +that must have existed.' It should be recollected, too, that among still +existing forms are to be included several which result from uterine +transformation, and are never found alive except <i>in utero</i>.</p> + +<p>Another objection, notwithstanding the great stress often laid on it, +seems to me to be altogether beside the real issue. It is the one +derived from the invariable sterility, real or supposed, of hybrids. A +fact cited by Mr. Lewes,<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> that of the fecundity of a cross called +<i>Leporides</i>, bred by M. Rouy of Angoulême, between the hare and rabbit, +of which a thousand on an average were for many years, and probably are +still, sent annually to market, would seem to be decisive against the +assumed sterility; but, however this be, matters not the least in regard +to the efficacy of Natural Selection, which, be it once again observed, +is represented as producing new species, not suddenly by the copulation +of two old and utterly distinct ones, but very gradually and slowly, by +the accumulation of minute differences occurring in successive +individuals of the same species.</p> + +<p>The chief if not the only serious obstacles to accept<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span>ance of Darwinism +seem to me to be of the author's own creation. Now and then he appears +somewhat needlessly to overstrain his principles, as for instance when +he intimates his conviction that 'all individuals of the same species, +and all the closely allied species of most genera,' will hereafter be +discovered to 'have descended from one parent and to have migrated from +some one birthplace.' This, to my mind, is much more unlikely than his +further suggestion that 'all animals and plants are descended from some +one prototype.' Startling as this second proposition may be on first +hearing, it may not very improbably express the real fact, provided by +'some one prototype' be signified, not a single individual, but several +individuals of one and the same type. Beyond all doubt there was a time +when on and about our earth all matter was as yet inorganic, and when +whatever spirit,<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> of the sort so termed in contradistinction to +matter, either permeated the earth's substance or moved about its +surface, must have been as yet unembodied. Mr. Darwin demands whether +any one can 'really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's +history, elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into +living tissues.' I for one certainly am far from believing this. I see +no reason for believing that, whatever other phenomenon, at all similar, +may at any stage of the world's progress have occurred, it has at +innumerable subsequent stages been repeated; neither do I consider that +the phenomenon is likely to have worn the guise of a sudden flash. But I +do firmly believe, and am quite unable to substitute any equally +plausible substitute<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> for the belief, that when the crust of the earth +had sufficiently cooled, and when other physical conditions had become +such as to admit of the manifestation of that life which we are +accustomed to distinguish by attaching to it the epithet 'organic,' +certain of those forces<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> which, in my opinion, constitute matter, +did, either of their own accord or under superior direction—not +suddenly flash, but—slowly elaborate themselves into organic structures +of some exceedingly simple type; that in the course of ages these simple +structures either developed themselves or were developed into structures +rendered by slow degrees more and more complex, until the degree of +complexity attained, being such as to fit them for being inhabited by +spirit previously unembodied, they were, by individualised portions of +such spirit, appropriated and inhabited accordingly. Beyond all doubt, +at some period or other, what had always previously been unorganised +matter must have become organised. Of two things one, then. Either this +matter must, whether under superior direction or not, have organised +itself, or it must have been organised by some other agency. Mr. Darwin, +together with all thorough-going Darwinians, inclines, I suspect, to the +opinion that matter organised itself; but if so, it cannot possibly have +been inert or lifeless, but must have been active and animate, and +capable of volition; and on that condition, there is no great stretch of +fancy in imagining it to have spontaneously adopted the series of +arrangements indicated. If, on the other hand, we are content to admit +that some external superior intelligence may have performed, or +conducted, or presided over operations, all room for wonder vanishes.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span></p> + +<p>In regard to the character of the structural prototype, that, of course, +would depend in part on surrounding physical conditions, and if these +have ever been the same in all parts of the globe, there is no apparent +reason why any number of specimens of the prototype may not anywhere +have been independently elaborated. It is not possible, however, that, +since the earth began to revolve round the sun, physical conditions can +have been <i>simultaneously</i> the same in all latitudes; while, on the +other hand, it seems probable that, although the same set of conditions +might perhaps admit of the production of only one organic type, there +might be other sets of conditions favourable to the production of other +types. On the whole, then, it seems more probable that inorganic matter +combined (or <i>was</i> combined) in the first instance in several modes, +than in one single mode, in order to become organic. But whatever may +have been the organic form or forms it first took, to assume that only a +single individual of each form was independently elaborated, and that +all other individuals, both of the same form and of all the more complex +forms, gradually evolved from that one—are descendants from the same +first individual, the same first parent—surely very gratuitously +increases the difficulties of the subject. Especially it complicates the +problem of the distribution of the same plants and animals over +countries immemorially separated by gulfs apparently impassable by +natural means.</p> + +<p>The obstruction which Mr. Darwin has created to the progress of his +opinions by the exaggerated shape in which some of them have been +presented is, however, as nothing in comparison with the injury he does +to his theory by obstinately rejecting certain materials indispensable +for its satisfactory completion. What an ad<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span>mirable theory it is so far +as it goes! How nicely it fits into all the facts it comes in contact +with, even into those which it is, of itself and unassisted, incompetent +to explain! How elevating too and ennobling, when rightly conceived! for +who can fail to rejoice in the view it presents of 'Natural selection +working solely by and for the good of each being' that it spares, and +causing 'all corporal and mental endowments to tend towards perfection'? +or who need mind suspecting himself to be descended, through an ape, +from a triton or a hydra, if he may compensate himself by hoping to have +a distant posterity of angels? How well, moreover, would it, if +permitted, chime in with any rational religion, besides being, as +already hinted, absolutely essential to that part of the Mosaic creed +which represents all the variously coloured and variously featured races +of men as springing from one single couple. By what perversity then is +it that Mr. Darwin takes such pains, if not to render his theory +irreligious, at least to exclude from it the assistance which religion +alone can afford, and which it so greatly needs, that whoever, without +that assistance, attempts to apply the theory to the complete +elucidation of phenomena, will be found inevitably committing himself to +the most astounding hypotheses? Here I picture to myself a curl on the +lip of some advanced Darwinian who, having accompanied me so far, cannot +altogether suppress his compassionate scorn at the proposed recurrence +now-a-days to a mode of thought so obsolete in the treatment of +scientific subjects as the theological. 'Positive biology,' he will +perhaps superbly exclaim, repeating the words of Mr. G. H. Lewes, +'declines theological explanations altogether.' Yes, but positive +biology is therein very unwise,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> for as, if the same reader will +accompany me a little further, I pledge myself to show, it is the +untheological or atheistical, not the theistical, mode of treatment +which is here utterly out of place and flagrantly unscientific. Be it, +without the slightest reserve, admitted that the formation of almost +all, and probably of quite all, existing species is due, and cannot be +otherwise than due, to survival of the fittest, the superior fitness of +these, moreover, being due to the gradual accumulation of innumerable +and, for the most part, exceedingly slight divergencies from the parent +stock. But whence and why these divergencies? It cannot be without a +cause that even one more feather than the parent possessed appears in +the offspring's wing, or a novel tint on its coat, or that the curve of +beak or talons is not precisely the same in each. What then is the +cause? Unphilosophic people will most likely call it 'all chance,' +getting sneered at for their pains, and justly too, as using words +without meaning. But are not philosophers themselves doing much the same +thing, and merely restating facts which they profess to explain, when, +like Mr. Lewes,<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> they talk of the 'specific shape' assumed by an +'organic plasma' being 'always dependent on the polarity of its +molecules,' 'or due to the operation of immanent properties;' or declare +that, in the process of organic evolution, 'each stage determines its +successor,' 'consensus of the whole impressing a peculiar direction on +the development of parts, and the law of Epigenesis necessitating a +serial development,' insomuch that, 'every part being the effect of a +pre-existing, and in turn the cause of a succeeding part,' the reason +why, when a crab loses its claw, the member is reproduced, is that the +group of cells remaining at the stump 'is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> necessary condition of +the genesis' of precisely that new group which the reproductive process +imperatively requires to follow next in order, this second group equally +the necessary condition for genesis of the one required third, the third +for the fourth, and so on; and that the reason why the thorns of a +blackberry admit of somewhat close comparison with the hooks and spines +of certain crustaceæ, is that portions of the integument of both plant +and crawfish '<i>tend</i> under similar external forces to develop' into +similar forms?</p> + +<p>I pass rapidly over one or two minor difficulties that here present +themselves. I will not stop to ask how—if reproduction of lost limbs be +due to polarity of the molecules, in other words to the direction which +in the circumstances of the case the molecules are bound to take, and if +the polarity of each particular set of molecules be impressed upon them +by the group formed immediately previously—how it is that the group +terminating the docked stump of a limb, which group is represented as +commencing the work of reproduction, imparts a different direction or +tendency to the fresh molecules of nourishment that are supplied to it, +from that which it has been accustomed to communicate to previous +molecular supplies. Hitherto it has used such molecules solely for the +repair of its own waste; now it employs a large portion of them to build +up an entirely new fabric. It seems then that molecular polarity is not +a fixed but a variable property, and, being such, cannot be inherent or +originate in the molecular nature. But I will not linger over this point +nor yet over the fact, absolutely unintelligible on the polar +hypothesis, that it is comparatively only few animals that are capable +of reproducing severed parts. Although the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> process required, no doubt, +is, as Mr. Lewes says, 'in all essential respects the same as that which +originally produced' the parts, the last layer of cells left at the +place of excision after a human leg or arm has been cut off, lacks the +skill to repeat an operation, which according to the hypothesis it has +once before performed. It cannot so determine the polarity of the +molecules with which it is supplied by the arteries as to constrain them +to group themselves into a new layer, instead of merely repairing an old +one. A crab or a lobster, or a polype's molecules are clever enough for +this, a man's not. Without pressing these objections, but on the +contrary, conceding for the nonce and for argument's sake, to molecular +polarity, to immanent properties, to Epigenetic evolution, all the +efficacy claimed for them, I limit myself to inquiring what causes the +various tendencies and directions which these imply. Tendency +pre-supposes impulse; direction control. What is it that here imparts +the impulse and exercises the control? Whatever else it be, it must, for +reasons stated at length on a previous page, be something possessing at +least enough of intelligence to exercise volition, and which at least +intends that the movements which it originates shall take place, whether +it further intends or not the ends which eventually result from the +movements. To myself it seems barely conceivable that even the least +marvellous of these ends should have been undesigned. Take, for +instance, half a dozen <i>infusoria</i> of some exceedingly low type, all +individually single cells or sacs of matter perfectly transparent and +destitute of any approach to structure that can be detected with a +magnifying power of five thousand diameters. Observe how, after feeding +for a while, and increasing proportionately in size, one will divide +itself in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> half, each half becoming a separate and complete animalcule, +another line itself internally and clothe itself externally with +clustered cells, which, by a series of differentiations, traceable +through a number of animalcular varieties, eventually exhibit the +outlines of respiratory and circulatory systems. To me, I repeat, it +seems all but inconceivable, and altogether incredible, that the +intelligence which willed these cellular divisions, multiplications, and +differentiations to take place, did not foresee what would be their +results, and did not will them for the sake of those results. And if I +do not deem it still more incredible that there should be <i>natural</i> +selection separating the fittest for survival by accumulating upon them +slight advantages which qualify them to survive, without there being at +the same time a <i>nature</i>, or other exalted intelligence, however +designated, which selects, and which accumulates advantages upon the +objects of its selection, <i>in order</i> that they may survive, it is only +because I consider the extremest limits of credibility to have been +already passed. But I forget. On reflection I perceive that I am doing +scant justice to the elasticity of philosophic belief. How far this is +capable of stretching on occasion, let one or two notable Darwinian +specimens show.</p> + +<p>No single piece of organic mechanism is oftener or more confidently +appealed to by Theists as rendering conclusive evidence on their side +than the eye, nor would they run much risk by allowing sentence to go +for or against them according as Mr. Darwin has or has not succeeded in +his attempt to explain that evidence away. Possibly he may disclaim +having made any attempt of the kind, and I must admit that it is less by +what he says than by what he leaves unsaid, that he lays himself open to +the charge.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> Indeed, in almost all he says on the subject, I myself +cordially agree, embracing even some of his views with less of +hesitation than he seems to have felt in putting them forward. He seems +to me, for instance, to have somewhat gratuitously admitted it to be +apparently 'in the highest degree absurd to suppose that the eye, with +all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different +distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the +correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed +by natural selection.' For since, as he proceeds unanswerably to argue, +'numerous gradations, from an imperfect and simple eye to one perfect +and complex, each grade being useful to its possessor, can certainly be +shown to exist;' since, as certainly, slight variations of the eye do +occur, and are inherited, and since of these variations there cannot but +be some which are useful to the animal exhibiting them under changing +conditions of life, the difficulty of believing in the formation of a +perfect and complex eye by natural selection can be little else than a +prejudice of the imagination. He proceeds to indicate some probable +stages in the assumed process. Some of the lowest organisms, in which no +trace of nerves can be detected, are known to be sensible to light, +owing, probably, to the presence in the <i>sarcode</i> of which they are +mainly composed, of certain elements which, in organisms somewhat higher +in the scale, become aggregated and developed into nerves specially +endowed with the same sensibility. An optic nerve thus formed, +surrounded by pigment cells, and covered by translucent skin, is the +simplest organ that can be called an eye, but it is an eye incapable of +distinct vision, and serving only to distinguish light from darkness. In +certain star-fishes, small<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> depressions in the layer of pigment-cells +are filled with transparent gelatinous matter projecting with a convex +surface like a rudimentary cornea, and this, it has been suggested, may +serve, not only to form an image, but to concentrate the luminous rays. +In insects, the numerous facets in the cornea of their great compound +eyes have now been ascertained to form true lenses, the cones, moreover, +having been discovered to include curiously modified nervous filaments. +It is impossible not, in this series of changes, to perceive the +appearance of graduation, nor ought there to be much difficulty in +believing the apparent graduation to be real, when we consider how few +comparatively are the still living forms in which the changes cited have +been observed, and how far more numerous the extinct forms by which +intermediate changes may have been presented. If there be no +extravagance in supposing that natural selection may have occasioned +these early steps, neither is there any in supposing that, by continued +progress in the same direction, it may at length have fabricated the +most perfect optical instrument possessed by any member of the +<i>articulata</i>. And, if credited so far, why not still further? why not +with competence to form a man's or an eagle's eye? So far I am as +completely at one with Mr. Darwin in respect to the eye as in respect to +any other of the subjects taken by him for illustration. The fact is, +however, that in this, as in every similar instance, he has completely +evaded the real difficulties of the case. It is not a whit more +startling to be told that the most complex eye, with all the latest +improvements, than to be told that the earliest rudiment of an optic +nerve, may have been formed by the gradual accumulation of minute +differences. Only allow time enough<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> for the requisite accumulation, and +neither operation is one whit more unintelligible than the other. The +difficulty, equally and utterly insuperable in both cases, is to +understand how the difference can have been undesigned. 'How a nerve +comes to be sensitive to light,' says Mr. Darwin, 'hardly concerns us +more than how life itself originated.' Perhaps not; nor, indeed, very +well could it, for the second question of the two is surely one of +almost unsurpassed concernment; but, at any rate, when either of the two +is asked, nothing can be more reprehensible than, by studiously ignoring +the only alternative reply, to leave it to be inferred that the nerve +made itself, or that life caused itself to live, that both are in short +examples of what Mr. Darwin strangely calls '<i>variation causing +alterations</i>.'<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> Let us briefly consider a few of the results supposed +to be attributable to this singular process. The eye, as every reader of +course knows, though here and there one perhaps may not be the worse for +being reminded, consists of four coats—the <i>sclerotic</i>, outermost and +strongest, which constitutes the white of the eye; the circular, tough, +and coloured, yet pellucid, <i>cornea</i>, in the centre of which is seen the +pupil; the <i>choroid</i>, full charged with black pigment, and lining the +sclerotic; the <i>retina</i>, an expansion of the optic nerve, lining in its +turn the choroid; of the <i>iris</i>, a flat membrane, dividing the eye into +two very unequally-sized chambers; of a lens termed the <i>crystalline</i>, +suspended in the posterior chamber immediately behind the iris; and of +two humours (also virtual lenses), whereof one, the <i>aqueous</i>, is +enclosed in the anterior chamber formed by the iris and the cornea, +while the other, the <i>vitreous</i>, fills the whole of the posterior +chamber save<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> what is occupied by the crystalline lens. By what nice +interlacement of filaments the fibrous ring that margins the pupil, or +aperture through the iris, regulates the admission of light, contracting +or expanding, yet always preserving its circular form, according as the +brilliance is excessive or deficient; how the humours or lenses are +continually varying in figure and relative position so as to concentrate +every pencil of light admitted on that point exactly where the retina is +spread out to receive it; how, according as the object looked at is near +at hand or far off, certain muscles perform quite opposite services, +rendering the cornea more or less prominent, pushing the crystalline +lens forward or backward, and thereby lengthening or shortening the axis +of vision, so that, whether the rays enter divergently from a near +object, or parallel from a remote one, they equally fall into focus at +the same distance beyond, and equally form on the retina a picture of +the object from which they come, perhaps compressing a landscape of five +or six square leagues into a space of half an inch diameter, and anon +allowing the page of a book or a dinner-plate to occupy the entire field +of vision—to these and to any kindred marvels it would be superfluous +more than momentarily to refer. Suffice it to note how measureless the +superiority, as a mere piece of mechanism, of an average eye to the +finest of telescopes, and how just, nevertheless, is the +telescope-maker's claim to praise for skilful adaptation to the laws of +optics, when he has succeeded in a faint and feeble imitation of some +minor part of nature's visual apparatus. Yet nature's original and +infinitely more beautiful aptitudes we are forbidden to deem +adaptations, being required instead to regard them as self-produced, or, +at any rate, as having been un<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span>designed. Now I unreservedly admit that, +among all conceivable forms, among the most exquisitely beautiful and +most usefully intricate and complex, there is not one which may not +possibly have been produced without aim or purpose by the mere +restlessness of elemental forces; the amount of probability of their +having been so produced being, however, according to the formula already +set forth in its proper place, as one to infinity multiplied more or +less frequently by itself. But what adequate superlative shall we invent +to express the credulity, the credulosity run mad, of those who, in a +matter of scientific belief, deliberately accept such odds. Observe how +at once extravagantly gratuitous and painfully elaborate such +credulosity is; how easily, on the one hand, all its ends could be +served by the simple expedient of supposing a superintending +intelligence; how, on the other, it compels ingenuity like Mr. Darwin's +to entrench itself behind a phrase of utterly unmeaning gibberish.</p> + +<p>If you see a man moving slowly, with head down, over an extensive plain, +you may fairly suspect that he does not know where he is going, and +possibly does not mean to go anywhere in particular. But if you perceive +that on reaching a ditch he takes a leap over, you are quite sure that, +when leaping, he meant to get to the other side. To that extent his +saltatory movement is unequivocal evidence of design. It is perhaps to +escape the necessity of a similar inference that Mr. Darwin so +frequently quotes the proverb <i>Natura non facit saltum</i>; but, if so, he +leans on a broken reed—on a bit of proverbial philosophy as weak as the +weakest of Mr. Tupper's. That Nature does sometimes make a leap, and a +pretty long one, must be obvious to any visitor to the Museum of the +London College of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> Surgeons, who has examined the two-headed and +four-legged human fœti there preserved in spirits. It may be said +that these are leaps in the wrong direction. Be it so. Still, whoever +can leap backward can make an equal leap forward, and most people will +find the latter the easier feat of the two. The power, whatever it be, +that coupled together the Siamese Twins, and gave to those respected +brothers, the late William and Robert Chambers of Edinburgh, twelve +fingers and twelve toes apiece, would not have gone at all more out of +the way by doing, suddenly and at once, several of those things which +Mr. Darwin doubts not that it does slowly and by degrees—by single +acts, for instance, instead of by a succession of acts, aggregating into +the semblance of an optic nerve certain elements in the <i>sarcode</i> of +certain low organisms, spreading out the nerve thus formed into a +network or retina, forming a number of separate pigment-cells into a +homogeneous cornea, and following up these first steps by others which, +how much soever more apparently complex, would cost comparatively little +after the earlier and simpler ones had been taken. Now let but the power +competent to do these things be credited with sense enough to be aware +of its competence, and it may then be regarded as not unlikely to have +done some of them on purpose. Whereupon, the genesis of the eye ceases +to be a mystery. All the appearances of contrivance that have resulted +from the operation find their obvious and complete explanation in the +assumption of a contriver, and all such hazy films as that of +variability producing variation cease to be capable of serving as +excuses for wilful blindness. And why should not the power in question +be so credited? Here is Mr. Darwin's solitary reason why. He doubts +whether<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> the inference implied may not be 'presumptuous.' He apprehends +that we have no 'right to assume that the Creator works by intellectual +powers like those of a man.' Truly, of all suggested modes of marking +respect for creative power, that of assuming it to have worked +unintelligently is the most original.</p> + +<p>The hypothesis offered by Mr. Darwin in explanation of the most perfect +of organic structures, is deemed by him to be equally explanatory of the +most marvellous of animal instincts. Parenthetically, here, never having +as yet met with a definition of instinct which I am able to accept as +satisfactory, I make bold to offer a description of my own. Instinct is +innate knowledge how to perform any useful actions, accompanied by a +tendency or propensity to perform those actions, but wholly +unaccompanied by knowledge of any purpose which they can serve. This is +pure instinct, an example whereof is afforded by the beaver, of which +animal I have somewhere read that one caught when newly born, and +brought up by itself in a room in its captor's house, proceeded after a +while to build up across the apartment the semblance of a dam, composed +of brushes, rugs, billets of wood, and other litter. Pure instinct +differs essentially, not in degree only, but in kind, from reason, which +is not knowledge, but an instrument for acquiring knowledge. Instinct, +however, is rarely if ever found pure, being apparently always +accompanied by more or less of reason. Even a polype makes some show of +reason by moving its <i>cilia</i> in one mode when it desires to suck in +food, and in another when it merely wishes to move on; while it is +scarcely possible for an unprejudiced spectator to doubt of its being by +a rational deduction from experience that a dog knows that it will get +kicked<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> if it presume to snatch at the meat on its master's plate, +instead of waiting for the scraps he may be pleased to throw to it when +he has done. Instinct by necessary implication involves habit; habit as +necessarily always more or less modifies structure; structural +modification always may be, and often is, inherited, carrying with it a +tendency to the habit out of which itself arose; therefore habit and +instinct are likewise heritable. Some instincts are originated +artificially. The reason why, on the very first opportunity, a young +pointer has been known to point at game, and a young sheep-dog to run +round, instead of at, a flock of sheep, is that some of their respective +ancestors had been carefully trained so to point and to wheel. These, +however, are exceptions to the general rule. Most instincts are of what +every one would call natural, and Mr. Darwin calls 'spontaneous' origin, +he explaining the meaning of the latter term to be that the slight +variations from a primordial type, the accumulation of which is +considered by him to constitute actual instinct, are 'variations +produced by the same unknown causes as those which produce slight +deviations of bodily structure.' But here I am once more compelled to +join issue with him. Of the causes which he styles unknown, I maintain +that we know at least thus much—either they are themselves intelligent +forces, or they are forces acting under intelligent direction; and in +support of this proposition I need not perhaps do more than show from +Mr. Darwin's example what infinitely harder things must be accepted by +those who decline to accept this.</p> + +<p>Mr. Darwin, like every really truth-loving controversialist, far from +desiring to shroud, invites special attention to any seeming weaknesses +in his position; and, therefore,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> when contending that all the faculties +commonly classed as instincts, are exclusively due to natural selection, +of course takes care to particularise the cellmaking faculty of the hive +bee. And here, again, I gladly bear my humble testimony to the partial +success he has achieved. Although bound to protest against the claim set +up by him, on behalf of natural selection, to the entire credit of +producing the hive bee's most remarkable characteristic, I cannot but +think he has succeeded in removing all the apparent difficulties of +believing that natural selection's share may have been not less +important in that than in any other productive operation in which it +takes part.</p> + +<p>In popular estimation the hive bee is a heaven-born mathematician which, +having been set the problem how to fill a given space with waxen cells +with the least loss of room and expenditure of material, arrives by +intuition and instantaneously at a solution which Newton himself was +ignorant of, and to which, but for his discovery of the fluxional +calculus, it would have been impossible for his follower, Maclaurin, to +attain. And, doubtless, it may excusably be deemed supernatural that the +insect should adopt off-hand precisely that six-sided figure, and +precisely that inclination of the angles of the same figure's pyramidal +roof or floor, which, only by very refined and recondite investigation, +can be scientifically shown to be those best fitted for the purpose. Mr. +Darwin has, however, adduced strong grounds for supposing the amazing +architectural skill thus displayed to have been acquired, not suddenly, +but by the same slow degrees as those which are so clearly traceable +throughout organic progress in general. At the lower end of a short +apiary series, he observed humble bees using their old cocoons<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> for +honey pots, sometimes adding to them short tubes of wax, and likewise +making separate and very irregular cells entirely of wax. At the higher +end of the series, he saw hive bees making double layers of cells, each +cell an hexagonal prism with the basal ends of its six sides bevelled so +as to fit on to a pyramid formed of three rhombs, and each of the three +rhombs which compose the pyramidal base of a single cell on one side of +the comb entering into the composition of one of the three adjoining +cells on the opposite side. Intermediately, he found the Mexican +<i>meliponæ domesticæ</i> depositing their honey in cells nearly spherical, +and of nearly equal sizes. 'These cells, although aggregated into a mass +otherwise irregular, are always at such a degree of nearness to each +other that they would have intersected or broken into each other if the +spheres had been completed. But this is never permitted, the bees +building perfectly flat walls of wax between the spheres which thus tend +to intersect. Hence, each cell consists of an outer spherical portion, +and of two, three, or more, perfectly flat surfaces, according as the +cell adjoins two, three, or more cells; and when one cell rests on three +others, as from the spheres being nearly of the same size is very +frequently and necessarily the case, the three flat surfaces are united +into a pyramid rudely resembling the three-sided pyramidal base of the +hive bee's cell, and necessarily enter, like the three rhombs of the +latter, into the construction of three adjoining cells.' Reflecting on +these remarkable gradations, it occurred to Mr. Darwin that if the +melipona were to make its spheres of precisely equal sizes, and to +arrange them symmetrically in double layers, and were further so to +dispose them as that the centre of each should be at the distance of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> +radius × √2 or radius × 1.41421 from the +centres of the six surrounding spheres in the same layer, and at the +same distance from the centres of the adjoining spheres in the other and +parallel layer—then 'if planes of intersection between the several +spheres on both layers were formed, there would result a double layer of +hexagonal prisms united together by pyramidal bases formed of three +rhombs; and the rhombs and the sides of the hexagonal prisms would have +every angle identically the same with the best measurements that have +been made of the cells of the hive bee.' Then, submitting this view to +Professor Miller of Cambridge, he had the gratification of being assured +by that distinguished geometer that it was strictly correct. Certainly a +very happy example of an ingenious conjecture verified by a species of +demonstration hardly inferior to the experimental. Certainly a very +valuable testimony to the soundness of all the main and really essential +principles of Darwinism. Good cause, certainly, is hereby shown for +believing that the cell-making faculty of the hive bee may be nothing +more than the aggregate of many minute and successive improvements upon +that of the melipona, and this, again, than a similar aggregate of +improvements on that of the humble bee; and for believing further that +hive bee and melipona may both be either descendants from the humble +bee, or joint-descendants with it from some still earlier common +progenitor. In order to believe this it suffices to believe that a bee +which at one period made, like the humble bee, cells very unequally +sized and irregularly rounded, came gradually, in the course of time, to +make them as nearly equal in size and as nearly spherical as those of +the melipona; and subsequently, during a further lapse of time, came to +arrange them<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> at the same distances from each other, and in double +layers like those of the humble bee. To assume thus much requires no +inordinate stretch of faith; and thus much being assumed, it is seen at +once that the hive bee, requiring for its cells only about half as much +wax as the humble bee does, and consequently only about half as much +honey for the secretion of the requisite wax, would, in a struggle for +existence, leave the humble bee so little chance that in all probability +the two species would nowhere coexist, were it not for the special +resource derived by the humble bee from possession of a trunk long +enough to enter the nectaries of certain flowers, which the shorter +trunk of the hive bee is unable to tap. But though there be no +difficulty in assuming the improvements in question to have gradually +taken place, and to have become aggregated in the manner supposed, there +is, to my mind, an insuperable objection to supposing that successive +generations of bees should have successively adopted the improvements +without either having the sense to know what they were doing, or being +prompted by some superior intelligence that did know. I will not be so +superfluous as to exaggerate the difficulty. Passing over the earlier +stages of the process, and confining myself to one or two of the later, +I will content myself with showing how infinitesimally small, when +magnified to the utmost, are the chances in favour of these having been +passed through blindly. I will admit it to be possible that in a society +of purely meliponish habits, there might, in virtue of one or other of +those inscrutable causes classed under the general name of spontaneous +variation, arise some two or three individuals with an innate propensity +to make accurately spherical and equally sized cells; that these<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> +individuals, if either males or fertile females, and not sterile +neuters, might help to generate others with the same propensity, these +again generating others, and so on, until the greater part or the whole +of the community became possessed of the same constructive aptitude. I +will admit further that, in virtue of the same inscrutable causes, +individuals, at first few, but gradually increasing in number, might +similarly be born with the additional tendency to make cells at the +same, and that the most appropriate, distance from all adjoining cells; +and will freely acknowledge that the bees, modifying their previous mode +of construction, as meliponæ necessarily would do under these altered +circumstances, would construct a layer of cells similar in all respects +to those on one side of the hive bee's comb, except that their bases +would be flat instead of pyramidal. Further, I admit that the bases +would become pyramidal in case the bees should set about constructing +double instead of single layers of cells on the same principle. Not a +little liberality is required for these admissions. For, in the first +place, the fact of the bees having acquired the habit of making perfect +and equally sized spheres would not of itself be of any obvious benefit +either to individual bees or to the society at large: in order that it +should enable material and labour to be saved it would have to be +accompanied by the habit of making the cells at special distances from +each other. And, in the second place, though some few individuals should +present themselves with an innate tendency to choose these special +distances, whatever advantage might result therefrom, whatever saving of +material or labour, would be shared in equally by the whole community, +the particular individuals to whom it was due benefiting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> by it no more +than any of the rest, and not being, in consequence, more likely than +they to survive in any struggle for existence, or to leave behind them +offspring inheriting their special characteristics. No help, therefore, +can be derived from Mr. Darwin's principles towards conjecturing why a +small minority of such specially endowed bees should be gradually +converted into a majority, and should eventually constitute the whole +community, thereupon becoming in fact converted into a new species. Let +us, however, liberally waive this and all similar objections, and assume +a community of hive bees to have been, in the utterly unaccountable +manner indicated by the term spontaneous variation, developed from a +meliponish stock. Unfortunately, all our liberality will be found to +have been thrown away without perceptibly simplifying the problem to be +solved. For, whatever be among meliponæ the distribution of the +generative capacities, among hive bees, at any rate, all workers are +sterile neuters, which never have any offspring to whom to bequeath +their cellmaking skill, while the queen bee and drones, which alone can +become parents, have no such skill to bequeath. Clearly the formula of +'descent with modification by natural selection,' is, in its literal +sense, utterly inapplicable here. In whatever manner the cell-making +faculty might have been acquired by the first homogeneous swarm of hive +bees, it must inevitably have terminated with the generation with which +it commenced, if transmission by direct descent had been necessary for +its continuance. The only resource open to Mr. Darwin is to suppose, not +merely (what is, indeed, obviously the fact) that queen bee after queen +bee, besides generating each in turn a progeny of workers endowed with +instincts which their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> parents did not possess and could not therefore +impart, generated also princess bees destined in due season to generate +a working progeny similarly endowed with instincts underived from their +parents; but to suppose further that all this has happened in the total +absence of aim, object, intention, or design. Now that all this should +have so happened, although not absolutely inconceivable, nor, therefore, +absolutely impossible, is surely too incredible to be believed except in +despair of some other hypothesis a trifle less preposterous. It is +surely not worth while to set the doctrine of probabilities so +completely at naught, for the sake of an explanation which avowedly +leaves every difficulty unexplained, referring them all to causes not +simply unknown but unconjecturable. What excuse, then, have +philosophers, of all people, for doing this in preference to the simple +expedient of supposing that, although the parturient bee, queen or +other, cannot intend that any of her progeny should be more bounteously +endowed than herself, there is an independent intelligence that does so +intend? To content oneself with pronouncing such preference to be +eminently unscientific is tenderness of language nearly akin, I fear, to +literary bathos.</p> + + +<h3>III.</h3> + +<p>I have said that the form of unbelief to which, on the principle of +calling a spade a spade, I have taken the liberty of giving the name of +Scientific Atheism, manifests itself now-a-days rather by ignoration +than by formal denial of God. This, however, is not a new feature in any +atheism really worthy of being styled scientific. Even as Mr. Darwin +verbally recognises a Creator, although<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> without assigning to Him any +share in creation, even so Kant, when more than a century ago +undertaking, in his 'General Natural History and Theory of the Celestial +Bodies,'<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> to account for the constitution and mechanical origin of +the universe on Newtonian principles, spoke of the elements as deriving +their essential qualities from the 'eternal thought of the Divine +Intelligence,' without, however, crediting the said Intelligence with +having interposed in order to carry out His thoughts. 'Give me matter,' +he says, 'and I will build the world;' and without other data than +diffused atoms of matter endowed with simple attractive and repulsive +forces, he proceeds to expound a complete cosmogony.</p> + +<p>He pictures to himself the universe as originally an infinite expansion +of minutely subdivided matter, and supposing a single centre of +attraction to be somewhere therein set up, he endeavours to show that +the result must be a prodigious central body surrounded by systems of +solar and planetary worlds in all stages of development. 'In vivid +language,' says Professor Huxley,<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> 'he describes the great +world-maelstrom widening the margin of its prodigious eddy in the slow +progress of millions of ages, gradually reclaiming more and more of the +molecular waste, and converting chaos into cosmos.' Then, fixing his +attention more particularly on our own system, he accounts for the +relation between the masses and densities of the planets and their +distances from the sun, for the eccentricity of their orbits, for their +rotation, for their satel<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span>lites, for the general agreement in the +direction of rotation among the celestial bodies, for Saturn's ring, and +for the zodiacal light. All this he does, according to Professor Huxley, +by 'strict deduction from admitted dynamical principles,' and I, well +aware of my own inability to form an independent judgment on the point, +gladly take so high an authority's word for it. For aught that I know, +Kant's attractive and repulsive forces being admitted, the establishment +of centres of attraction, and of circle within circle of revolutions +round them, and all his other details, would follow naturally and of +course. I limit myself to asking, Whence these simple forces?—and when +Kant replies, 'From the Eternal Thought of the Divine Understanding,' I +should be the last to criticise if his answer stopped there. +Unfortunately, he adds that the forces were 'evolved without purpose'; +in other words, that the Intelligence which thought them into existence +failed to think of any purpose for them. 'Matter,' he proceeds, 'is +purely <i>passive</i>, yet, nevertheless, has in its simplest state a +<i>determination</i> towards the assumption of a more perfect constitution in +the way of natural development, whereby it <i>breaks up</i> rest, <i>stirs</i> up +nature, gives to chaos shape.' For the elements whereof this passively +stirring up matter is composed 'have native powers of setting each other +in motion, and are to themselves a spring of life;' and when, having of +course being previously dead, they have given themselves life, they +forthwith begin to attract each other with a strength varying with their +varying degrees of specific gravity. The scattered elements of the +denser sort collect by attraction all particles of less specific gravity +out of their immediate neighbourhood, and are themselves similarly +collected by particles of still denser<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> sort, these again by others +denser yet, and so on, until, as results of this particular action, +several masses are formed which in like manner would converge towards +and be united with the largest and densest of their number, were it not +that the counter principle of repulsion now comes into play. This +principle—familiarly exemplified in the elasticity of vapours, the +emanations from strong smelling substances, and the expansion of all +spirituous substances—causes the vertical movements of the converging +masses to be deflected laterally, so as ultimately to enclose the +central mass within circles which, at first intersecting each other in +all directions, are at length, by dint of mutual collision, made all to +revolve in the same direction, and nearly the same plane.</p> + +<p>Now I most earnestly protest against being suspected of what in me would +be the intolerable impertinence of desiring to cast ridicule on these +magnificent speculations, the grandeur of which I thoroughly appreciate +so far as my scant mathematics enable me to follow them. I take +exception to them only because the language in which they are couched +seems to imply that operations, of whose nature one of the most powerful +of human intellects could, at its utmost stretch, catch only a faint +hazy inkling, may yet have been initiated and perfected without the +intervention of any intellect at all. This is a falsism against which my +respect for philosophy and philosophers makes me only all the more +indignant when I find any of the latter falling into it, as those of +them inevitably must who, busying themselves, early or late,</p> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 7em;">With a mighty debate,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">A profound speculation about the creation</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And organical life, and chaotical strife,</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">With various notions of heavenly motions,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And rivers and oceans, and valleys and mountains,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And sources of fountains, and meteors on high,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And stars in the sky,—propose by and bye,</span><br /> +</p> + +<p>like John Hookham Frere's Aristophanic Birds,</p> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">If we'll listen and hear,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">To make perfectly clear</span><br /> +</p> + +<p>how creation took place without a conscious Creator. All their fancied +solutions of this hopeless puzzle have one feature in common—a family +likeness which the wickedest wit finds it difficult to caricature. There +is a note to Frere and Canning's 'Loves of the Triangles' which the +reader will be grateful to me for transcribing here, the more frequently +he may have laughed at it already, laughing now all the more, and +laughing heartily at it now though he may never have before.</p> + +<p>It begins by tracing the genesis or original formation of <i>Space</i> to a +single point, in the same manner as the elder Darwin had, in his +'Zoonomia,' traced the whole organized universe to his six Filaments. It +represents this primeval Point or <i>Pinctum saliens</i> of the universe, +after '<i>evolving itself by its own energies</i>, to have moved forwards in +a right line <i>ad infinitum</i> till it grew tired.' Whereupon, 'the right +line which it had generated would begin to put itself in motion in a +lateral direction, describing an area of infinite extent. This area, as +soon as it became conscious of its own existence, would begin to ascend +or descend, according as its specific weight might determine, forming an +immense solid space filled with vacuum, and capable of containing the +present existing universe.'</p> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thus slow progressive points protract the line,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">As pendant spiders spin the filmy twine:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thus lengthened lines impetuous sweeping round,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Spread the wide plane, and mark its circling bound;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thus planes, their substance with their motion grown,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Form the huge cube, the cylinder, the cone.</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span></p> + +<p>It then proceeds as follows:—</p> + +<p>'<span class="smcap">Space</span> being thus obtained, and presenting a suitable <i>nidus</i> or +receptacle for the <i>generation</i> of <i>chaotic matter</i>, an immense deposit +of it would gradually be accumulated; after which the filament of fire +being produced in the chaotic mass by an <i>idiosyncrasy</i> or <i>self-formed +habit</i> analogous to fermentation, explosion would take place, suns would +be shot from the central chaos, planets from suns, and satellites from +planets. In this state of things, the filament of organization would +begin to exert itself in those independent masses which, in proportion +to their bulk, exposed the greatest surface to the action of light and +heat. This filament, after an infinite series of ages, would begin to +ramify, and its viviparous offspring would diversify their forms and +habits so as to accommodate themselves to the various <i>incunabula</i> which +nature had prepared for them. Upon this view of things, it seems highly +probable that the first effort of Nature terminated in the production of +vegetables, and that these being abandoned to their own energies, by +degrees detached themselves from the surface of the earth, and supplied +themselves with wings and feet, according as their different +propensities determined them in favour of aerial or terrestrial +existence. Others, by an inherent disposition to society and +civilisation, and by a stronger effort of volition, would become men. +These in time would restrict themselves to the use of their hind feet; +their tails would gradually rub off by sitting in their caves or huts as +soon as they arrived at a domesticated state; they would invent language +and the use of fire, with our present and hitherto imperfect system of +society. In the meantime, the <i>Fuci</i> and <i>Algæ</i>, with the Corallines and +Madrepores, would transform themselves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> into fish, and gradually +populate all the submarine portions of the globe.'<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p> + +<p>Although the writers of this delicious drollery seem to have had Dr. +Erasmus Darwin only in view, they could not, we thus see, parody his +peculiar crotchets without hitting off not less neatly some of the +corresponding extravagances of both earlier and later expounders of +Nature. Nature is a phrase which, greatly to the confusion of those who +so employ it, is habitually used simultaneously in two quite opposite +senses, so as to denote at the same time both the agency in virtue of +whose action the universe exists, and likewise the universe itself which +results from that action. Nature, in either signification, becomes to a +great extent interpretable when the agency so designated is credited +with sufficient sense to foresee and to intend the results of its own +action. On that condition, although among the many unsolved problems she +may continue to present there will be some evidently lying beyond the +limits of human comprehension, there will be none running counter to +human reason. Except on that condition, the universe is not simply +uninterpretable, it is a bewildering assemblage of irreconcilable +certainties. Philosophy's choice lies between such patent truisms as +that there can be no force but living force, no <i>vis</i> but <i>vis vivida</i>, +no <i>vis inertiæ</i> otherwise than metaphorically, and such blatant +falsisms as that inertness and exertion may coincide, unintelligence +generate intelligence, agency of whatsoever sort produce, merely by its +own act, and merely out of its own essence, other agency capable of +higher action than its own. Philosophy, when with these sets of +alternatives before her she deliberately chooses the latter, becomes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> +Scientific Atheism, all the varieties of which have one point in common, +resembling each other in their proneness to rush upon and embrace +demonstrable impossibilities for the sake of avoiding a few things hard +to be understood. One variety, however, the Comtist, far exceeds all the +rest in the lengths to which it is carried by this propensity.</p> + + +<h3>IV.</h3> + +<p>If, in speaking as I am about to do of Comtism, I commit—heedless of +Mr. Lewes' solemn warning—the grave offence of speaking confidently +about a writer whom I have never read, I may at least plead in +extenuation of my fault, that, although my knowledge of that writer be +confessedly merely an echo of what others have said of him, those +others, at any rate, far from being his antagonists, are two of the most +ardent of his not undiscriminating admirers. It is from Mr. Mill<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> and +from Mr. Lewes<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> himself that I have derived the notions of Comtist +philosophy that suggest to me the following notes.</p> + +<p>I lay no stress on certain flaws in the fundamental propositions that +'we have no knowledge of anything but phenomena, and that our knowledge +of phenomena is only relative, not absolute; that we know not the +essence nor the real mode of production of any fact, but only its +relations to other facts in the way of succession or similitude; that +the constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the +constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are +all we know about them, and that their causes, whether efficient or +final, are un<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span>known and inscrutable.' I will only suggest that our mere +consciousness of possessing some knowledge of phenomena is itself a +knowledge distinct from the knowledge which constitutes its +subject—distinct, that is, from the knowledge of phenomena; that if it +were possible for us to be aware of only one single fact, we should know +something about that fact, notwithstanding that there were no other +facts which it could be perceived to have preceded or followed, or to +which it could be likened, even as a polype with a stomach-ache would +know something about a stomach-ache, although ignorant that it had a +stomach, and oblivious of any former sensation, whether painful or +pleasurable; and that if the causes of phenomena be utterly unknown, our +ignorance of them ought not to be so signified as to sound like +knowledge, as it does when resemblances are said to link, and sequences +to unite, phenomena together, thereby warranting the inference that one +phenomenon succeeds another <i>because</i> the two are so linked and united.</p> + +<p>These, however, are trifles—mere spots on the sun one might say, were +but the surface on which they appear altogether sunlike—and I leave +them without additional remark except that, although it may perhaps have +been hypercritical to point them out, still the language of a new +philosophy, claiming to supersede all old ones, ought to be proof even +against hypercriticism. I pass on to a generalisation, termed by Mr. +Mill 'the key to Comte's other generalisations: one on which all the +others are dependent, and which forms the back-bone, so to speak, of his +philosophy,' insomuch that 'unless it be true he has accomplished +little.' This is the so much vaunted discovery that all human thought +passes necessarily through<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> three stages, beginning with the +theological, and proceeding through the metaphysical to the positive. +These three terms, however, in the novel sense in which they are used by +Comte, stand very urgently in need of definition. By the theological is +to be understood that stage of the mind in which the facts of the +universe are regarded as governed by single and direct volitions of a +being or beings possessed of life and intelligence. It is the stage in +which winds are supposed to blow, seas to rage, trees to grow, and +mountains to tower aloft, either because winds, seas, trees, and +mountains are themselves alive and so act of their own accord; or +because there is a spirit dwelling in each of them which desires that it +shall so act; or because each separate class of objects is superintended +by an out-dwelling divinity, which similarly desires; or, finally, +because one single divinity, supreme over all things, initiates and +maintains all the apparently spontaneous movements of inanimate bodies. +In the metaphysical stage, phenomena are ascribed not to volitions, +either sublunary or celestial, but to realised abstractions—to +properties, qualities, propensities, tendencies, forces, regarded as +real existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in +which they reside; while the characteristic of the positive stage is the +universal recognition that all phenomena without exception are governed +by invariable laws, with which no volitions, natural or supernatural, +interfere. These being the three stages, the discovery of which as a +series necessarily passed through by human thought in its progress +towards maturity, constitutes one of Comte's chief glories, I almost +tremble at my own audacity, shrinking from the sound myself am making, +when by inexorable sense of duty constrained to declare that the grand +discovery is after all merely that of a distinction without a +difference.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> + +<p>What Comte chiefly condemned in the metaphysical mode of thought, are +the conception of mental abstractions as real entities which exert power +and produce phenomena, and the enunciation of these entities as +explanations of the phenomena; and certainly 'it is,' as Mr. Mill says, +or rather was, previously to his own ingenious solution of it, 'one of +the puzzles of philosophy, how mankind, after inventing a set of mere +names to keep together certain combinations of ideas and images, could +have so far forgotten their own act as to invest these creations of +their will with objective reality, and mistake the name of a phenomenon +for its efficient cause.' Those natural laws, however, on which +Positivism relies—are not they as purely mental abstractions as the +essences, virtues, properties, forces, and what not, for which it is +proposed to substitute them? Yet since Positivism regards these laws as +'governing' phenomena, and having phenomena 'subject' to them, must it +not necessarily regard them likewise as realised abstractions, as real +entities? Plainly, if its language be taken literally, its professors +must acknowledge that it does, unless they prefer to stultify themselves +by propounding such unmitigated nonsense as that power may be exercised, +and phenomena produced, by <i>non</i>-entities. But if so, what else is +Positivism than another form of that very metaphysicism which it +condemns? and a form, too, peculiarly obnoxious to Mr. Mill's caustic +remark that 'as in religion, so in philosophy, men marvel at the +absurdity of other people's tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities +remain in their own, and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that +words can be mistaken for things, who is treating other words as if they +were things every time he opens his mouth.'<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span></p> + +<p>Possibly, however, it may be replied that 'government by natural laws' +is a phrase which Positivists never use except metaphorically, and by +which they never mean more than certain successions of events.<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> Very +well. Either, then, they acknowledge no real government of phenomena at +all, in which case to speak of phenomena as governed by law is, if not a +purely gratuitous mystification, as glaring an instance as can well be +conceived of a 'bare enunciation of facts, put forward as a theory or +explanation of them:' or, if they do recognise real government, then +they must suppose that, behind those mere mental abstractions, laws or +order of Nature, there must be some lawgiver or other being that +originally issued the laws, or ordained the order, and still enforces +them, or maintains it. But if this be the positivist faith, then, that +we may discover its other self, we have only to go still further back; +as far back, however, as to the theological stage, supposed to have been +so early left behind, yes, even unto the deities or deity that the +metaphysical entities had displaced. Positivism, in short, is in this +dilemma: either the mode of thought claimed by it as peculiarly its own +is simply that process so justly ridiculed by Comte himself as the 'naïf +reproduction of phenomena as the reason for themselves,' and by Mr. +Lewes as 'a restatement' (by way of explanation) 'of the facts to be +explained;' or it is at any rate nothing more than a return, either to +the metaphysical or to the theological mode of thought, according as one +or the other is adopted of the only two interpretations that can +possibly be placed on its own nomenclature. A new mode<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> it certainly is +not. It is either no mode of thought at all, but merely an empty form of +words; or it is at best only a new name for one or other of two +old-fashioned modes, both of which its author denounces as false from +the beginning, and now worn out and obsolete into the bargain.</p> + +<p>Of other features of Comtist philosophy it would be out of place to +speak here,<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> where, indeed, that philosophy would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> not have been +mentioned at all but for its having been transformed by its author into +a religion, and that, too, an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> atheistical religion—the 'Religion of +Humanity.' To myself, as to most people, a religion without a God is a +contradiction in terms. To constitute what is almost universally +understood by religion it does not suffice that there be a 'creed or +conviction claiming authority over the whole of human life: a belief or +set of beliefs deliberately adopted respecting human destiny and duty, +to which the believer inwardly acknowledges that all his actions ought +to be subordinate:' nor that there be in addition 'a sentiment connected +with this creed or capable of being invoked by it, sufficiently powerful +to give it, in fact, the authority over human conduct to which it lays +claim in theory:' nor yet that there be, moreover, 'an ideal object, the +believer's attachment and sense of duty towards which are able to +control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities, and +prescribe to him a rule of life.'<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> That such an object is fully +capable of gathering round it feelings sufficiently strong to enforce +the most rigid rule of life, will certainly not be denied by me, +privileged as I am to count among my friends more than one whose whole +life is little else than a life of devotion to an object, 'the general<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> +interest of the human race,' plainly incapable of affording them in +exchange that 'eternity of personal enjoyment' to which ordinary +devotees look forward as their reward, and whose virtue I honour as +approaching the sublime, on account of its independence of all the props +and stimulants which ordinary virtue finds indispensable. But the +sublimest virtue does not of itself constitute religion. For, besides +the 'creed,' 'conviction,' and 'sentiment' indicated above, there is +needed some suitable object of worship to which the soul may alternately +bow down in humble reverence, and look up in fervent love—some being to +whom its prayer, praise, and thanksgiving may be fittingly addressed. +This want, recognised—as one of the few who do not recognise it +admits—by nine out of every ten persons, was distinctly recognised by +Comte, who, however, attempted to supply it by pointing, not to God, but +to Man. His reason for this was not a conviction that there is no God. +On the contrary, he habitually disclaimed, not without acrimony, +dogmatic atheism; and once even condescended so far as to declare that +'the hypothesis of design has much greater verisimilitude than that of a +blind mechanism.' But in the 'mature state of intelligence' at which his +mind had arrived, 'conjecture founded on analogy did not seem to him a +basis to rest a theory upon.' He preferred a religious theory without a +basis, and therefore adopted one as destitute of support as the tortoise +on which stands the earth-upholding elephant of Hindoo mythology; +selecting, as the 'Grand Être' to be worshipped, 'the entire Human Race, +conceived as a continuous whole, past, present, and future.' For this +great collective <i>non</i>-existence, this compound of that which is, that +which has been but has ceased to be, and that which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> is not yet, he +elaborated a minute ritual of devotional observances, and would, if he +had had the chance, have consecrated a complete sacerdotal hierarchy, +subordinated to himself as supreme pontiff. Having, for fear of +recognising what possibly might not be, begun by, wilfully and with his +eyes open, recognising what could not possibly be, he proceeded to +invest this sanctified non-existence with precisely those attributes +best calculated to render it unfit to receive the admiration he +prescribed for it. That feeble Humanity—the actually living portion +thereof, that is—may need and be the better for our services, which +Divine Omnipotence of course cannot be, was distinctly urged by him as a +reason why <i>prayers</i>, or at least those outpourings of feeling which he +so designated, should be addressed to the former and not to the latter. +That Humanity is in a constant state of progress, so that both the +collective mass and choice specimens of each successive generation of +men must always be superior to the corresponding masses and specimens of +all previous generations, is a prime article of the Comtist creed; but +not the less is it an imperative injunction of the Comtist rubrick that +religious homage shall be paid, not only to the collective 'Grand Être' +of Humanity, but also to individual worthies of past ages—that +superiors shall consequently fall down before, and worship, and take as +models, their intellectual and moral inferiors. The fact of a religion +made up of tenets like these having been thought out by one of the +profoundest of reasoners does not prevent its being the very perfection +of unreason. Even though on the one side there were nothing more than +some doubt whether Deity might not exist, still with complete certainty +on the other of the non-existence of 'Humanity,' Deity ought in fairness +to have at least the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> benefit of the doubt. In selection for adoration, +that which only perhaps may be, at any rate deserves to be, preferred to +that which positively is not. The excess of superstition with which St. +Paul reproached the Athenians, for raising an altar to the 'Unknown +God,' looks like excessive circumspection, beside the solemn dedication +of temples to a chimera known not to be. Nay, even Isaiah's maker of +graven images is at length outdone. Even he who, having hewn down a +tree, 'burneth part thereof in the fire, with part thereof eateth flesh, +roasteth roast, and is satisfied, warmeth himself, and saith, Aha, I am +warm, I have seen the fire; and with the residue maketh a god, yea, his +graven image, and falleth down unto it and worshippeth it, and prayeth +unto it, and saith, Deliver me, for thou art my god'—even he has at +last found more than his match in irrationality. For he has at least +before him a visible tangible block of wood, not the mere memory of one +that has long ago rotted, nor the dream of one that is yet to grow, +whereas that mental figment, Consecrated Humanity, is not even a real +shadow, but only a fancied one, a shadow cast by no substance. And it is +to Comtists of all people—intellectual salt of the earth as they +are—that this figment is recommended for adoration—yes, to those who, +pharisaically standing aloof from the common herd, thank their imaginary +substitute for God, or whatever else it is they deem thankworthy, that +they are not blind as other men are, and least of all as those dazed +metaphysicians who actually personify their own mental abstractions. No +wonder that such extreme provocation should try the patience of all but +the stanchest disciples. No wonder that Mr. Lewes himself should seem +half inclined to apostrophise his quondam master in words<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> resembling +those once addressed to Robespierre, 'Avec ton Grand Être, tu commences +à m'embêter.'</p> + +<p>Here make we one more pause. This chapter's theme is, as was betimes +premised, not the strength of theism, but the weakness of atheism. I +have in it attempted to execute a design which, according to Boswell, +was conceived by Lord Hailes, and approved by Dr. Johnson, that of +writing an essay, <i>Sur la crédulité des incrédules</i>, and I think I have +succeeded so far as to show that, if any one who can swallow atheism +affects to strain at theism, it cannot, at any rate, be for want of a +sufficiently capacious gullet.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span></p> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI.</h2> + +<h3><i>LIMITS OF DEMONSTRABLE THEISM.</i></h3> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Thought without Reverence is barren. The man who cannot wonder, who +does not habitually wonder (and worship), were he president of +innumerable Royal Societies, and carried the whole <i>Mécanique +Céleste</i> and Hegel's <i>Philosophy</i>, and the epitome of all +laboratories and observatories with their results, in his single +head, is but a pair of spectacles, behind which there is no eye. +Let those who have eyes look through him; then he may be +useful.—<i>Sartor Resartus.</i> </p></div> + + +<p>'I wouldn't mind,' said once a representative of extreme heterodoxy, in +debate with a champion of its diametrical opposite—'I wouldn't mind +conceding the Deity you contend for, were it not for the use commonly +made of him after he is conceded.' And no doubt that use is such as +might well provoke a saint, provided the saint were likewise a +philosopher. To whatever extent it be true that man was created in the +image of God, it is certain that in all ages and countries God has been +created in the image of man, invested with all human propensities, +appetites, and passions, and expected to demean himself on all occasions +as men would do in like circumstances. As popularly conceived, so long +as sensual gratification was esteemed to be the <i>summum bonum</i>, he +wallowed in all manner of sensual lust; when some of his more fervent +worshippers turned ascetics out of disgust with fleshly surfeit, he +became ascetism personified: at every stage his great delight has been +flattery, and his still greater, revenge; in the exercise of power he +has always been capricious and often wanton—ruthlessly vindictive +against impugners of his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> honour and dignity, unspeakably barbarous to +unbelievers in his reality. Now, as knowledge advanced, unbelief in a +God so much below the level of ordinarily virtuous men advanced equally, +quickening its pace, too, as the particular branch of knowledge styled +'physics' spread, and, spreading, exposed the utter impossibility of +many of the fables in which theological views had been expressed. +Wherefore, theological oracles have in every age and country been apt to +confound scientific inquisitiveness with unbelief, and to denounce +<i>physical</i> science especially as a delusion and a snare, and its +cultivators as impostors none the less mischievous for being at the same +time dupes. Of course, the latter have not been slow to return the +compliment. Hearing the truths discovered by them stigmatised as +falsehoods, they naturally enough retorted the charge of falsity against +the divine authorities in whose name it was made. Finding war waged +against them by every religion with which they were acquainted, they +naturally enough in turn declared war against all religion, even with +that form thereof which underlies every other except when sufficing to +itself for superstructure as well as base. Natural enough this, for +<i>humanum est errare</i>; but very humanly erroneous withal, for to include +Deity itself in the same denial with pseudo-divine attributes is about +as sagacious a proceeding as to refuse to recognise the sun at midday on +account of his not appearing in Phœbus's chariot and four.</p> + +<p>When religion on the defensive declares herself opposed to reason, so +much the worse for religion. She is thereby virtually surrendering at +discretion, since to appeal to her only other resource—revelation—is +to beg the whole subject in dispute. Similarly, the worse and still less +excusable is it for science to declare herself irreconcileable with +religion, for she, too, is thereby slighting reason. It is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> only by +forsaking the single guide in whom she professes to trust, and blindly +giving herself up to angry prejudice, that she can fail to discover the +rational solidity of so much of every religion as consists of theism.</p> + +<p>For this, as we have seen, the argument from design abundantly suffices, +although the only absolute certainty thence deducible be that the +universe must have an author or authors fully equal to its original +construction, its subsequent development, and its continued maintenance. +Even if it be not inconceivable, notwithstanding that the chances to the +contrary be many times infinity to one, that the mere restlessness of +some utterly unintelligent force may have fabricated all material +structures, and imparted to all their movements certain orderly +successions, it is still manifestly impossible for unintelligence to +have brought forth intelligence—for the speculative, critical, carping +spirit of man to have been generated by that which has no speculation in +its eyes, nor any eyes, to have speculation in; impossible, in short, +for the creature to be more richly endowed than its creator. Since +numerous embodied intelligences actually exist, they must have been +preceded by intelligence capable of creating them and all other existing +intelligences that have not eternally existed; and it is simply +impossible that creative intelligence, whose creatures owe to it +whatever intelligence they possess, should on any occasion have +exhibited a want of intelligence which they are competent to detect.</p> + +<p>But although it be thus demonstrably certain that an author of the +universe exists, it does not follow that there is only one. As to this +no proof positive, only probabilities, can be adduced; but the +probabilities are of an amount all but equivalent to certainty. They are +forcibly urged<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> by Mr. Mill. Many exactly uniform occurrences, he +observes, are more naturally referred to 'a single, than to a number of +wills precisely accordant.' But the classes of uniform occurrences being +exceedingly numerous, if there were a separate will for each class, +there would be equally numerous wills, and 'unless all these wills were +in complete harmony (which would itself be the most difficult to credit +of all cases of invariability, and would require beyond anything else +the ascendancy of a supreme Deity),' it would be 'impossible that the +course of phenomena under their government should be invariable.' Every +fresh appearance of resemblance extending through all nature 'affords +fresh presumption that the whole is the work, not of many, but of the +same hand, and renders it vastly more probable that there should be one +indefinitely foreseeing Intelligence and immoveable Will than that there +should be hundreds and thousands of such.'<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> I will not run the risk +of weakening this reasoning by expansion. Its obvious inference that, +there being a God, there cannot be more than one, could not be set forth +more irresistibly.</p> + +<p>That the wisdom of the Creator cannot be less than the amount thereof +manifested in His works is a self-evident proposition, which none will +be hardy enough directly to dispute. There is, however, one critic, of +great ability and yet greater daring, who appears to doubt whether the +wisdom manifested in the universe is anything to speak of. Mr. Lewes' +faculty of veneration is, I suspect, but imperfectly developed, since +'the succession of phases which each (animal) embryo is forced to pass +through,' is sufficient to give its action pause. 'None of these +phases,' he remarks, 'have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> any adaptation to the future state of the +animal, but are in positive contradiction to it, or are simply +purposeless; <i>many</i> of them have no adaptation even to its embryonic +state; whereas <i>all</i> show stamped on them the unmistakable characters of +<i>ancestral</i> adaptations and the progressions of organic evolution.' +'What,' he asks, 'does this fact imply?' 'There is not,' he continues, +'a single known example of an organism which is not developed out of +simpler forms. Before it can attain the complex structure which +distinguishes it, there must be an evolution of forms which distinguish +the structures of organisms lower in the series.... On the hypothesis of +a plan that pre-arranged the organic world' (by no means, however, +necessarily in types that could not change, but rather in types adapted +and calculated to change), 'nothing,' he considers, 'could be more +unworthy of a supreme intelligence than this <i>inability</i> to construct an +organism at once without making several <i>tentative</i> efforts, undoing +to-day what was so carefully done yesterday, and repeating for centuries +the same <i>tentatives</i> and the same <i>corrections</i> in the same +succession.' 'Anthropomorphists,' he says, 'talk of "The Great +Architect," emphasising the name with capitals,' but 'what should we say +to an architect who was unable, or, being able, was obstinately +unwilling, to erect a palace except by first using his materials in the +shape of a hut, then pulling it down and rebuilding them as a cottage, +then adding storey to storey and room to room, not with any reference to +the ultimate purposes of the palace, but wholly with reference to the +way in which houses were constructed in ancient times? What should we +say to the architect who could not form a museum out of bricks and +mortar, but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> was forced to begin as if going to build a mansion, and, +after proceeding some way in this direction, altered his plan into a +palace, and that again into a museum? Would there be a chorus of +applause from the Institute of Architects, and favourable notices in the +newspapers of this profound wisdom?'<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a></p> + +<p>Notwithstanding the exulting tone in which these questions are put, and +which seems to imply that in their proposer's opinion they are +unanswerable, they may, I think, be very summarily disposed of. Whatever +other comments might be made on the conduct of an architect who should +build in the complex manner suggested, surely the very last thing said +would be that he did not know how to build in simpler wise. His having +actually built a palace would be decisive proof of his knowing how to +build a palace; and of all queer reasons for questioning his possession +of that much architectural knowledge, about the queerest would be the +fact of his having built, not a palace only, but a hut and cottage in +addition. And if, adopting a still more complicated style, he should +begin by so constructing a hut that, if left to itself, it would draw up +brick and mortar from the earth, and grow into a cottage, and then go on +growing and adding storey to storey till it became a palace, this surely +would be a proof not of less, but of infinitely more, architectural +knowledge than if he had commenced and completed the palace with his own +hands. Not unwarrantably, perhaps, may Mr. Lewes, reflecting that his +own and every other human organism's genesis has consisted of at least +three stages, oval, fœtal, and infantine, wonder why he was not +formed all at once, 'as Eve was mythically affirmed to be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> taken from +Adam's rib, and Minerva from Jupiter's head,' and why he was not brought +forth full dressed in an indefinitely expansible suit of clothes. Not +quite inexcusably, perhaps, might he conceive the reason to be some mere +whim or humour of his Maker, though there might be more gratitude in +conjecturing that the triple process was adopted for the purpose of +assisting biological enquirers like himself in their special researches. +From so practised a logician, however, about the very last thing to have +been here expected was that he should suggest creative 'ignorance and +incompetence' as the only apparent alternative to denying a Creator +altogether, as if incapacity for a comparatively easy process were a +likely reason for choosing one greatly more difficult. It might have +occurred to Mr. Lewes that, if there were any absurdity in the choice, +the Being who made him and bestowed on him the faculty of perceiving the +absurdity, could not have failed himself likewise to perceive it and +consequently to avoid it.</p> + +<p>Of divine power, the measure or measurelessness is obviously identical +with that of divine wisdom. Both attributes must be at least +co-extensive with the universe; both consequently illimitable. Divine +goodness, moreover, inasmuch as the creature's moral ideal cannot be +superior to his Creator's, must be at least as vast as human +imagination: God must be at least as good as man can conceive Him. But +how, by goodness so transcending, conjoined with immeasurable might, can +the co-existence of evil be tolerated? To this last, and perhaps +greatest, among the many great questions brought forward for renewed +discussion in these pages, I have long had by me an attempt at a reply, +which, finding myself unable either to strengthen or shorten it by +turning it into prose, I venture to submit in its original rhythmical +form.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span></p> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">A Voice came to me as I sate apart,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Pondering the burthen of life's mystery,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In dim perplexity, with troubled heart.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">With whisper weak and faint it came to me,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Like feeble glimmer of the struggling moon</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">To wildered mariner on midnight sea:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">With whisper weak at first, but strengthening soon,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Like the moon's beam when filmy clouds disperse,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And through my scattered doubts, with quiet tune,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Uttering in clear, apocalyptic verse,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Truth, which for comfort and monition sent,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">E'en as the voice revealed, do I rehearse.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'What art thou? Whence derived? With what intent</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Placed where perpetual hindrances exhaust</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thy wasted strength, in baffled effort spent?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Where in blind maze, with crafty windings crossed,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">With stumbling-blocks beset, with pitfalls strewed,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thou wanderest, in endless error lost;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Athirst beside glad rivers that elude,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">With mocking lapse, thy tantalized pursuit,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And hungering where gilded husks delude</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">With bitter ashes as of Dead Sea fruit,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Ashes of Hope, but seed of Discontent,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That rears its upas growth from blighted root?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Around, thou hear'st Creation eloquent,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hymning creative attributes, and seest</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The starry marvels of the firmament,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And marvels of the nearer earth, released</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">By impulse from within, not dimly shown,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor plainlier in the greatest than the least:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And, through the known discovering the unknown,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Acknowledgest thy Maker, power supreme,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Might, and dominion, deeming His alone.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nor His the lax dominion mayst thou deem</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That builds up empire, and when built, neglects.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Lo! where, afar, sidereal orbits gleam,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">What first impelled, impelling still, directs:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Urges and guides each solar chariot,</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">The mundane mass of every globe connects,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">By its own energy cohering not,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">E'en as dead leaves, decaying languidly,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Not from themselves derive the force to rot.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'All-strengthening, all-sustaining Deity,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Diffused throughout the infinite, abides,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Dwells and upholds:—then, haply, dwells in thee?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yea, verily. Within thy frame resides</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">What, by its movement only mayst thou know.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The circling blood, thy being's ambient tides,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Is't thine own will that bids them ebb and flow,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And from their inundating flood depose</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Organic germs, whence health and vigour grow?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yet though such witness serve thee to disclose</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In human tenement divine abode,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Not thine be the material creed that shows</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The spirit's birthplace in the moulded clod;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Not thine the pantheist raving, that because</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">God dwelleth with thee, thou thyself art God.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bethink thee—is't self-reverence that o'erawes</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thy prostrate soul, and from thy faltering tongue,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Subdued, involuntary homage draws?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And when by harrowing pang thine heart is wrung,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Is't for self-aid thy wandering eyes inquire,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Heavenward, at length, in fervid suppliance flung?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And from thy native slough of sensual mire,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Is't to the mark of thine own purity</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thy loftier aims and holier hopes aspire?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Harshly thy fleshly fetters bear on thee,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In dark and dreary prison-house confined,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Cramped and diseased with long captivity,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And hath divine Intelligence designed</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That noisome dungeon for her own restraint—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">By her own act to galling bonds consigned,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Self-doomed, with wilful purpose, to acquaint</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Herself with sin and sorrow, and pollute</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Æthereal essence with corporeal taint?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">How doth thy helpless misery confute</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That frantic boast of vain conceit, untaugh</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">The paltriest of its plans to execute!</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hast thou the art to add, by taking thought,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One cubit to thy stature? and hast thou,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Or such as thou, Nature's whole fabric wrought?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Not thine such vaunt—not thine to disavow</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The lustre of thy genuine origin.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">To the Most Highest, as thine author, bow</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">With rapture of exulting faith, wherein</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Devotion's cravings their desire achieve,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The bright ideal that they imaged, win.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rejoice that thus 'tis given thee to believe,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">To recognise transcending majesty,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Worthy all praise—all honour to receive:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rejoice in that high presence, gratefully</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Offering the vows that thy full heart dilate:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Rejoice that thence there floweth light, whereby</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thy emulative quest to elevate</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thitherward, where unblemished holiness</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Irradiates sovereignty, benign as great.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'But here thou pausest, scrupling to confess</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A providence of aspect all benign.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Fear not that sceptic scruple to express.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Of truth, Almighty Goodness could assign</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Good only to the work of His own hand,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Warmed into life by His own breath divine:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And, where unchecked Beneficence had planned</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A home for creatures of a fragile race,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Evoked from nothingness at His command,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nor care, nor want, nor anguish should have place,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor fraud betray, nor violence oppress,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor hate inflame, nor wallowing lust debase,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nor aught be found, save what conspired to bless</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The sentient clay, wrought surely for that end,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">For wherefore wrought, if not for happiness?</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'Not, as some teach, for mastery to contend</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">With fate,—in doubtful conflict to engage,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Struggling, in pain and peril, to ascend</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Slowly, through this probationary stage,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sore let, but tried and chastened, and thereby</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Earning on earth a heavenly heritage.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Was there then need that prescience should try,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">By ordeal pitiless, assured event,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Disclosed beforehand to prophetic eye?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Need was there, by austere experiment,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">To test the frailty and the fall foreknown</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of man, beneath o'erwhelming burthen bent?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">In this was tutelar prevision shown?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hardly may he, in such belief confide,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Who sees his fellow myriads left to groan</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">In barren penance, without light or guide,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">E'en from their birth by fostering vice controlled,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Doomed as they cross life's threshold—doomed untried.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'As hardly, too, may he the dogma hold</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That fetters reason with a graduate chain</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of beings, linked in order manifold,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Where, to each link, 'tis given to sustain</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A part subservient to the general weal,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Duly to share the mutual burthen's strain:—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Though who from such allotment would appeal,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Could it be truth that wisdom's masterpiece</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Such aid could lack, such feebleness conceal,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Suing its own constituents for release</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From wrong innate, throughout its texture wove,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">By hard necessity, not light caprice?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">But to what purport could premonished Love</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A system twined with mutual suffering weave,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">When but a word all suffering would remove?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And wherefore yet delayeth the reprieve</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of Love, that doth not willingly afflict</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Its children, neither wantonly aggrieve?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Can aught the gracious purpose interdict</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of Him, whose piercing eye, whose boundless sway,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">No cloud can dim, no barrier restrict?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Say'st thou, "By path inscrutable, and way</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Past finding out, perchance, may mercy bend</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">To its own use, whate'er its course would stay,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And through the labouring world high mandate send</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That all things work together unto good,</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Work, though by means corrupt, to righteous end?"</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Beware how such conjectures must conclude.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Can means impure Omnipotence befit,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And clog the range of its solicitude?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Can finite bonds confine the Infinite?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Though man, by choice of ill, must needs offend,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Need God do ill that good may come of it?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Must havoc's mad typhoon perforce descend?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">May naught else serve to fan the stagnant air?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Must captive flame earth's quaking surface rend,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Or seek escape in lava flood? and ere</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Effete society new structure raise,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Must dearth or pestilence the ground prepare?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thus is it that a parent's care purveys</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">His bounty, and, exacting rigorously</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The price in tears, each boon's full cost defrays?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thus, with vain thrift withholding the decree,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That from his treasury's exhaustless store</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">To all could grant unbought felicity?</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'But haply still 'tis reasoned (and with more</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of reason's semblance were the plea maintained),</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That higher yet would life's ambition soar,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Not for mere scheme of happiness ordained,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">But for advance in virtue,—for the growth</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">By patient zeal and meek endurance gained:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">That, at the table of voluptuous sloth,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Though banqueted on sweets without alloy,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Unsated were a generous nature, loth</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">To feast where unearned lusciousness would cloy,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Faint with the tedium of unbroken rest,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sick with the sameness of unruffled joy:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">That for more poignant pleasure, and of zest</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Heightened and edged by healthful exercise,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">For scope wherein her conscious strength to test</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">In keen pursuit and venturous enterprise,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">For dear exemplars, in whose course serene</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Affection's tearful warmth might sympathise,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">For these the yearning mind would languish, e'en</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Though with all else that wish could name endued,</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">While, in her striving for self-discipline,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Foiled, and with fervid impulses imbued</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Vainly, where neither aught could valour dare</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor aught confront and challenge fortitude:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And where no outward token could declare</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The hidden worth congenial heart would hail,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hail with each kindred chord vibrating there;d</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Since virtue wakes not but when griefs assail,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Or travail burthens, or temptations try,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Slumbering supine, till roused by adverse gale,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">In the deep sleep of moral lethargy,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Joy's fullest cup, by hope or doubt unstirred,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Curdling the while to dull satiety.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'Thus haply some have reasoned, undeterred</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">By reasoning, with equal emphasis</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">But counter aim, as readily preferred:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Since Heaven's perfection striveth not, nor is</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In peril lest it lapse to apathy,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Or lassitude invade its tranquil bliss.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And were it as they deem, and righteously</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Were man adjudged with his brow's sweat to eat</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Bread leavened with embittering misery,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">E'en then affliction's measure to complete,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Amply might pain, and want, and death suffice,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And feeling's blight, and baffled love's defeat,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And, on the altar of self-sacrifice,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hope's withered blooms by resignation laid:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor were it needed that incarnate vice,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">In human mould, in the same image made,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Trampled with iron hoof his fellow man,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Virtue's chastised development to aid.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">For whence was Vice derived? Ere life began,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">For His own offspring could their Maker trace</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Their loathsome office, and beneath his ban</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Place them, accurst (creating to debase),</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And doom as fuel for the flames that test</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A favoured few, elect by partial grace?</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Elect or outcast—if alike confessed</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of the same parent, sons—brethren who bear</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">No differing lineaments, save those imprest</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">By his prevision—in their parent's care</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Should not all be partakers? Should not all</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Freely, alike, his nurturing guidance share?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Are any worthier? 'Tis that warning's call</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Extends to them alone—'tis that to them</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Alone is given vigour, wherewithal</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Temptation's fraudful violence to stem—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And how shall He, who needful strength denies,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Weakness for its predestined fall condemn?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">How, when the creature of His wrath replies</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">With feeble wail and inarticulate moan,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The sighing of that contrite heart despise?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">What man amongst thy fellows hast thou known</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Who, if his son ask fish, will jeeringly</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Give him a serpent, or for bread a stone?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">If ye, being evil, at your children's cry</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Know how to give good gifts, should not much more</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Your heavenly Father His good things supply</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">To them who ask Him? Should He not restore</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A cleansed heart within them, and renew</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">An upright spirit? not, what they implore</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Reversing, and restraining, lest they do</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The good they would,—constraining them withal</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">To do the evil they would fain eschew?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">How wilt thou to the same original</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Whence all just thoughts and pure desires proceed,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Impute corrupt imaginings, whose thrall</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enslaves anew the soul but newly freed</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From their pollution? Can a hybrid growth</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Arise spontaneous from unmingled seed?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Are grapes upon the bramble borne, or doth</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The fig bear olive berries? Canst thou show</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Twin waters, sweet and bitter, issuing both</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">From the same fountain? Neither should there flow</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Blessing and cursing from one mouth, nor yet</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From the same Providence both weal and woe.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'Vile as thou art, ofttimes in thee have met</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Mercy and Truth—and Peace and Righteousness</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Have kissed each other; and thine heart is set</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ofttimes to follow what is just, redress</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Where thou hast trespassed, rendering; ofttimes, too,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Forgiving other's trespass: to distress</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thou grudgest not its sympathetic due</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of kindly deed, or word, or mutual tears,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor in vain wholly labourest to subdue</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The hydra host whose foul miasm blears</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thy vision, and the distant gleam obscures</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That dimly through thy prison casement peers.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">E'en to the darkened dungeon that immures</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thy soul, some feeble glimmer finds its way.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Crushed beneath earthly durance, still endures</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Some lingering fire below that weight of clay,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Some generous zeal, some honest hardihood,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Some faith—some charity.—And whence are they?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">If not of Him whose quickening breath endued</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">All things with life,—and, when he looked upon</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">What He had made, beheld that all was good:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">All good,—but chiefly man, in whom alone</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Some likeness of Himself—some clouded light,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From His own countenance reflected, shone.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Doth not the sun outshine the satellite?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And shall not He who in the murkiest hour</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of sin's defilement, streaks thy dreary night</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">With beams that bid thee, lower yet and lower</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Descending, hope, perchance, to rise again,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Say—shall not He in holiness as power</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Transcend the creature whom His gifts sustain!</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And here, if sneering casuist blaspheme,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And to divided nature's sovereign,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ascribe, in nature's opposite extreme</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Like eminence, and nature's God aver</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In evil, even as in good, supreme,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Heed not, or ask if man's Artificer</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">With His own work, in virtue matched, can prove</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">At once more holy and unholier?</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'Yet since all good is fruit of love, and love</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Worketh no ill, how still doth ill abound?</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Is't haply that with love a rival strove?</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mark well this parable. In chosen ground</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Only good seed a husbandman had sown,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Yet when the blade sprang up, therewith he found</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tares that amid the stifled wheat had grown.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Then knew he well, how, entering unawares,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">This, while men slept, an enemy had done.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And 'tis an enemy who, scattering tares</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Amid the corn sown in Creation's field,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">With deadly coil the growing plant ensnares.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And no mean enemy, nor one unsteeled</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">For bold defiance, nor reduced to cower</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Ever in covert ambuscade concealed,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">But at whose hest the ravening hell-hounds scour</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A wasted world, while himself prowls to seek,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Like roaring lion, whom he may devour,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And upon whom his rancorous wrath to wreak,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sniffing the tainted steam of slaughter's breath,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And lulled by agony's despairing shriek.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">For it is he who hath the power of death,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Even the devil, by whom entereth sin</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Into the world, and death engendereth:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yea! by whom entereth whatsoe'er within</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Warreth against the spirit,—sordid greed,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Pride, carnal lust, envy to lust akin,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And malice, and deceit, whose treacheries breed</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Strife between brethren, and the faith o'erthrow</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Of many, and the duped deserters lead,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Beneath the banner of their deadliest foe,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In rebel arms a Parent to defy,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Whom, by His gifts alone, His children know.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'Not less that Parent marks with pitying eye</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The blinded rage that rivets its own chain:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Not less to His own glorious liberty</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Seeks, from corruption's bondage, to regain</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">His erring children,—by device, or lewd,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Or threatening, lured, or goaded to their bane:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Not less to overcome evil with good</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Labours, and shall therewith all things subdue</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Unto Himself—but hath not yet subdued.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And wherefore? wherefore tarrieth He, while through</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Eden, by daring foray oft defaced,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Marauding fiends malignant raid pursue,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Winging the turbid whirlwind's frantic haste,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Pointing the levin's arrowy effluence,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Over the mildewed harvest's hungry waste,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Breathing the fetid breath of pestilence,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And crying havoc to the dogs of war,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Let slip on unresisting innocence?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Why suffereth He that thus a rival mar</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">His cherished work—through devastated fields</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Borne on triumphant in ensanguined car?—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Him, who with power to rescue, tamely yields</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">His helpless charge to persecuting hate,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor His own offspring from the torturer shields,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">But sits aloof, callously obdurate,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">While but the will is lacking to redeem,—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Him, how shall fitting stigma designate?</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'But 'tis not thus thy calmer doubts esteem</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The loving-kindness that with open hand</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Dispenses bounty in perennial stream.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Oft hast thou proved, while in a foreign land</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A sojourner, as all thy fathers were,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thou pacest painfully the barren sand,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">How o'er thy path watches a Comforter,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And scatters manna daily for thy food,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And bids the smitten rocks that barrier</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The arid track, well out with gurgling flood,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And oft to shade of green oasis leads,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And, from pursuer thirsting for thy blood,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Such scanty shelter as is thine provides:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And though full oft that shelter fails, and though</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Its torn defence demoniac glee derides,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yet not for this the cheerful faith forego,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That memory of uncounted benefits</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And conscious instinct's still, small tones bestow.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Charge not thy God with aught that unbefits</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Tenderest compassion, nor believe that He</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">With hardened apathetic scorn commits</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">A favoured people throughout life to be</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Subject to bondage. Doubt not of His will</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">To rescue from that galling tyranny.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yet, if in His despite creation still</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In thraldom groan and travail—what remains?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">What but that strength is wanting to fulfil</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">His scheme of mercy? What but that He reigns,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Not as sole wielder of omnipotence,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">But, o'er a world unconquered yet, maintains</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Encounter with opposing influence,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Which He shall surely quell, but which can stay,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Awhile unquelled, His mightier providence.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'And doth this sadden only, or dismay?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Grieves it that He, whose follower thou art,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Rules not supreme with unresisted sway?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Or that, the progress of His grace to thwart,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Satanic might the host of hell arrays?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And doth it not a thrill of joy impart</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">That not alone need barren prayer and praise</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thine homage be,—thy choicest offering</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The formal dues prescribed obedience pays?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Henceforth with firmer step approach thy King.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Some puny succour, thou, in thy degree,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Some feeble aid, thou, even thou, mayst bring!</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">In the fell conflict raging ceaselessly</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Around, thou, too, mayst join—thou, too, engage</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In that dread feud, twin with eternity,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Which faithful angels and archangels wage</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Against the powers of darkness, to extend,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">O'er realms retained in demon vassalage,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Their sovereign's pure dominion,—and to blend</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">All worlds beneath one righteous governance,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Into one kingdom which shall have no end.</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'Wouldst thou, if haply so thou mayst, advance</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">That blessed consummation? Wouldst thou speed</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The lingering hour of Earth's deliverance?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Arise—the naked clothe, the hungry feed,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The sick and wounded tend,—soothe the distressed.</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">If thy weak arm cannot protect, yet plead</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">With bold rebuke the cause of the oppressed,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Kindling hot shame in Mammon's votaries,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Abashed, at least, in lucre's grovelling quest;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And, in the toil-worn serf, a glad surprise</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Awakening—when, from brute despondency,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Taught to look up to heaven with dazzled eyes.—</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thus mayst thou do God service,—thus apply</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thyself, within thy limit, to abate</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">What wickedness thou seest, or misery:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thus, in a Sacred Band, associate</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">New levies, from the adverse ranks of Sin</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Converted,—against Sin confederate.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Or—if by outward act to serve, or win</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Joint followers to the standard of thy Lord,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thy lot forbid,—turn, then, thy thought within:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Be each recess of thine own breast explored:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">There, o'er thy passions be thy victories won:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">There, be the altar of thy faith restored,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And thou, a living sacrifice, thereon</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Present thyself.—This ever mayst thou do,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor, doing this, wilt aught have left undone.'</span><br /> +<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Here ceased the Voice, commissioned to renew</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Truth, which, of old, when Bactrian sage began</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nature's dim maze to thread with slenderest clue,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Its doubtful scope and dark design to scan,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">With inward whisper, hopeful witness bare,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And justified the ways of God to man.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And suddenly its warning ceased, but ere</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">It ceased, the scales had fallen from my eyes,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And I beheld, and shall I not declare</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">What my uncurtained vision testifies?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Shall coward lips the word of life suppress?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The oracle vouchsafed from Heaven disguise?</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nay, as one crying in the wilderness,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Where none else hearken, to the vacant air</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And stolid mountains utters his distress,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">E'en so will I too cry aloud, 'Prepare</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Before Him the Lord's way. Make His path straight,'</span><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Nor heed though none regard me, nor forbear</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Though all revile, but patiently await</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Till, like light breath that panting meads exhale,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And scornful zephyrs lightly dissipate,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">But which, full surely, down the echoing vale,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Shall roll with sounding current, swift and loud,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">My slighted message likewise shall prevail,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Entering the heart of many a mourner, bowed</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Beneath despair, and with inspiring voice</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Calling to hope to cleave her midnight cloud,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And bidding grief, in hope's new dawn, rejoice.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p>This is a creed which long since came to me after earnest inward +communings, and which, though subsequent reflection has in some few +particulars modified it, I still in substance hold, clinging to it with +a grateful consciousness of ever-multiplying obligations. For in it the +soul has free scope for its loftiest aspirations and its widest and +deepest sympathies, strongest incentives to zeal, surest guidance for +activity, solace in every distress, support under every difficulty, +added cause for exultation in every success, renewed resolution in every +defeat. Still, it is here offered, not as ascertained truth, but merely +as a sample of those guesses at truth by which alone ordinary mortals +need hope to promote the common cause of humanity in any of its higher +bearings. Such guesses, however, when harmonising with all the +conditions of their subject-matter, may fairly claim to be provisionally +regarded as truths—nay, to be adopted as working hypotheses until +superseded by new hypotheses capable of doing the same work better; in +which supercession none ought to rejoice, nor, if sincere truth-seekers, +will rejoice, more cordially than the propounders of the discredited +doctrines. It is in this spirit and with these reservations that the +articles of faith above recited are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> submitted for consideration. How +much soever they may fall short of the truth, they are, I feel, in the +absence of any nearer approach to the truth, capable of rendering +excellent service. However faintly and hazily the outlines of Deity be +shown in them, the Deity whom they so imperfectly delineate is yet one +to whom may justly be ascribed glory in the highest, one worthy of all +trust, love, and adoration—of an adoration, too, inclusive not more of +praise than prayer.</p> + +<p>If the divine claim to the last-named tribute be disputed, it had better +be by arguments other than those on which certain writers, with Mr. +Galton for their leader and Professor Tyndall for their backer, have +been recently expending much misapplied ingenuity. If the efficacy of +prayer be, as the foremost of these declares it to be, 'a perfectly +appropriate and legitimate subject of scientific enquiry,' the enquiry +ought at least to be conducted according to scientific rules. On this +point Mr. Galton himself lays much stress, intimating that whereas an +unscientific reasoner may be expected to be 'guided by a confused +recollection of crude experience, a scientific reasoner will scrutinise +each separate experience before he admits it as evidence, and will +compare all the cases he has selected on a methodical system.' +Nevertheless, a brief examination of the experiences on which he and his +principal associate rely, may suggest some doubt as to which of the two +specified classes of reasoners it is that they themselves belong.</p> + +<p>The facts or fancies cited by Mr. Galton in proof that praying is of no +use are the following: 1. 'Sick people who pray or are prayed for do not +on the average recover more rapidly than others.' 2. Although 'the +public prayer<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> for the sovereign of every state, Protestant or +Catholic, is and has been in the spirit of our own—"Grant her in health +long to live"—sovereigns are literally the shortest-lived of all +persons who have the advantage of affluence.' 3. The 'clergy are a far +more prayerful class' than either lawyers or medical men, it being +'their profession to pray,' and 'their practice that of offering morning +and evening family prayers in addition to their private devotions,' yet +'we do not find that the clergy are in any way more long-lived in +consequence;' rather, there is room for believing their class to be the +'shortest-lived of the three.' Nay, even missionaries, eminently +prayerful as they are themselves, and prayed for as they are with +especial earnestness by others, 'are not supernaturally endowed with +health,' and 'do not live longer than other people.' 4. 'The proportion +of deaths at the time of birth is identical among the children of the +praying and the non-praying classes.' 5. Though 'we pray in our Liturgy +that "the nobility may be endowed with grace, wisdom, and +understanding,"' our 'nobility are peculiarly subject to insanity;' as +are likewise, indeed, 'very religious people of all denominations,' +'religious madness being very common indeed.' 6. So far from 'religious +influences' appearing to have 'clustered in any remarkable degree round +the youth of those who, whether by their talents or their social +position, have left a mark upon English history,' 'remarkable devotional +tendencies' have been conspicuous chiefly by their absence from 'the +lives either of our Lord Chancellors or of the leaders of our great +political parties;' while, out of our twenty-three extant dukes, four at +least, if not five, are descended from mistresses of Charles II., not a +single one of them, on the other hand, being<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> known to Mr. Galton to be +of 'eminently prayerful qualities.' 7. In respect of those +'institutions, societies, commercial adventures, political meetings and +combinations of all sorts' with which England so much abounds, and of +which 'some are exclusively clerical, some lay, and others mixed,' Mr. +Galton 'for his own part never heard a favourable opinion of the value +of the preponderating clerical element in their business committees.' +'The procedure of Convocation which, like all exclusively clerical +meetings, is opened with prayer, has not inspired the outer world with +much respect.' Nay, 'it is a common week-day opinion of the world that +praying people are not practical.' 8. In those numerous instances in +which an enterprise is executed by the agency of the profane on behalf +not of the profane themselves but of pious clients, 'the enterprises are +not observed to prosper beyond the average.' Underwriters recognise no +difference in the risks run by missionary ships and by ordinary traders, +nor do life insurance companies, before they accept a life, introduce +into their 'confidential enquiries into the antecedents of the +applicant' any 'such question as "Does he habitually use family prayers +and private devotions?"' Neither are the funds of devout shareholders +and depositors at all safer than those of the profane when entrusted to +the custody of untrustworthy directors, not even though the day's work +of the undertaking commence, as that of the disastrous Royal British +Bank used to do, with solemn prayer.<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a></p> + +<p>Two or three minutes' attention to the grounds for, and the +circumstances connected with, these statements, may assist us in +appreciating Mr. Galton's notion of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> difference between confusedly +recollected experiences and experiences properly scrutinised and +methodically selected.</p> + +<p>For the statement first on the list, some negative evidence is +considered to be afforded by the absence of any 'single instance in +which papers read before Statistical Societies have recognised the +agency of prayer either in disease or in anything else.' The chief +authority for it, however, is the eloquent silence of medical men 'who, +had prayers for the sick any notable effect, would be sure to have +observed it,' seeing that they are 'always on the watch for such +things.' But are they really, in every case of recovery from illness +that comes under their notice, so particular and so successful in their +enquiries whether any, and, if so, how much, prayer has been offered on +behalf of the patient, as to be qualified to judge whether prayer has +had anything to do with the cure? If not, although they may be showing +their discretion by not speaking on the point, the 'eloquence of their +silence' must not be too hastily interpreted. For doctors, of all men, +should be the last to deny, as an abstract proposition, the efficacy of +prayer in disease, knowing, as they do, how great is the curative +influence of prayer when addressed to themselves. How, they may +naturally ask, is it to be expected that sickness should be cured unless +properly treated? and how can it be properly treated without a doctor? +and how can a doctor be expected to attend unless he be asked? Upon +which very natural queries others naturally follow. What would be the +good of the doctor's coming unless he prescribed judiciously? and will +he not more certainly prescribe judiciously if his judgment be guided by +special interposition of divine grace? and if prayer to himself has +plainly been one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> condition of his coming, why may not prayer to God +have been one condition of his judgment having been rightly guided? Will +it be pretended that God's proceedings are abjectly submissive to +inexorable laws from which those of the doctor are exempt, and that +though the latter would certainly not have attended unless he had been +asked, the grace of God, if given at all, must have been given equally +whether asked for or not?</p> + +<p>Statements 2 and 3 are founded on a memoir by Dr. Guy, purporting to +show the 'Mean Age attained by males of various classes who had survived +their 30th year from 1758 to 1843,' and whose deaths were not caused by +violence or accident. According to this table, the average age of 97 +members of royal houses was only 64·04, while that of 1,179 members of +the English aristocracy was 67·31, and that of 1,632 gentlemen commoners +70·22; the proportion between the total number of royal, and that of +noble and gentle, personages who died within the period specified, being +apparently supposed to be as 97 to 2811, or as 1 to about 29. Except +upon this supposition, Mr. Galton could not with any consistency have +appealed to these figures, for he had previously announced his intention +to be 'guided solely by broad averages and not to deal with isolated +instances.' He seems, however, to forget this judicious rule when he +comes to treat of the clergy, of whom 945 are compared in the table with +294 lawyers and 244 medical men. Here, he says, 'the clergy as a whole +show a life value of 69·49 against 68·14 for lawyers, and 67·31 for +medical men;' but then, he adds 'this difference is reversed' when the +comparison is made between members of the three classes sufficiently +distinguished to have had their lives recorded in Chalmers'<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> +Biographical Dictionary or the Annual Register, the value of life among +clergy, lawyers, and medical men then appearing as 66·42, 66·51 and +67·34 respectively. Whether, of the distinguished professional men +concerned in this second comparison, the parsons were distinguished for +their prayerfulness and the lawyers and doctors for their +prayerlessness, Mr. Galton omits to state; and still more serious +omissions on his part are those of not mentioning in what part of our +Liturgy we are accustomed to pray that it may be granted to the Queen, +not simply long to live, but also to live longer than other people; +likewise in which of 'the numerous published collections of family +prayers' that have undergone his scrutiny, is to be found a petition +that parsons may live longer than lawyers or doctors; and, yet again, +since an <i>average</i>, falling short of threescore years and ten by little +more than three and a half, is so contemptuously rejected by him, what +is the precise number of years that would be accepted by him as a +liberal compliance with prayer for long life?</p> + +<p>While deducing his argument from clergymen, Mr. Galton makes repeated +and particular reference to the clerical <i>sub-genus</i>, missionaries, +treating it as the more remarkable that these should not enjoy +comparative immunity from disease, because, as he suggests, it would +have been so easy for God to have made them a favoured class in respect +of health: to wit, by the notable expedient of dissuading them from +exposing themselves to any of the risks peculiarly attendant on +missionary enterprise. 'Tropical fever, for example, is due to many +subtle causes which are partly under man's control. A single hour's +exposure to sun, or wet, or fatigue, or mental agitation will determine +an attack.' What more simple than for God so to 'act<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> on the minds of +the missionaries as to disincline them to take those courses which might +result in mischance, such as the forced march, the wetting, the +abstinence from food, or the night exposure?' What more simple, either, +it may be added, than for God to save prayerful soldiers from ever being +killed in battle by merely putting it into their minds to desert +whenever they are ordered upon active service?</p> + +<p>That 'the distribution of still-births is wholly unaffected by piety' +Mr. Galton has satisfied himself by finding, 'on examination of a +particular period, that the proportion of such births published in the +'Record' newspaper and in the 'Times' bore an identical relation to the +total number of deaths.' He had previously, we must suppose, satisfied +himself that advertisers in the 'Times' never say their prayers.</p> + +<p>For the asserted commonness of religious madness Mr. Galton cites no +evidence whatever, and, to judge from the sympathies and antipathies of +which one of his avowed opinions may be supposed to be the subject and +the object, speaks probably on this point solely from hearsay. Very +possibly, however, his assurance of the extraordinary prevalence of +insanity among British noblemen may be based on personal observation, +as, of course, is that regarding the prayerlessness of his own ducal +acquaintances. Birds of a feather, proverbially, flock together, and the +same touch of irreligion may quite possibly suffice to make certain +dukes and certain commoners kin.</p> + +<p>Against the inefficiency, however notorious, of the clerical element in +business committees, ought in fairness to be set the equally notorious +efficiency of Jesuits in whatever they undertake, the signal statecraft +displayed by the Wolseys, the Richelieus, and the Ximenes's of the days +in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> which cardinals and archbishops were permitted to take a leading +part in executive politics, and the very respectable figure still +presented by the lords spiritual, beside the lords temporal of the +British House of Peers. As for 'the common week-day opinion that praying +people are not practical,' those by whom it is entertained, of course, +mentally except praying Quakers.</p> + +<p>The fact that insurance offices do not attempt to distinguish between +the prayerful and the prayerless, but, treating both classes as liable +to the same risks, exact from both the same premiums, proves, I submit, +nothing against the efficacy of prayer, not even that the managers of +insurance offices do not believe in it. The statement that prayerful and +prayerless, when placing their money in the same dishonest keeping, or +engaging in the same bad speculations, suffer losses, bearing exactly +the same proportion to their respective ventures, although most probably +quite true, is also one which Mr. Galton has neglected to verify by the +application to it of any test, scientific or other. Finally, if the +disasters of the Royal British Bank are to be ascribed to its custom of +opening business with prayer, not only ought the cackle of Convocation +to be attributed to a similar cause, but also all the legislative +botchery of the House of Commons, and the abolition of prayer before +debate should be treated as the most urgently needed of those further +parliamentary reforms with which the fertile brains of certain eminent +statesmen are suspected to be teeming.</p> + +<p>Thus much by way of intimation that there would be no excessive temerity +in encountering Mr. Galton even on the ground of his own choosing, were +that ground really worth contending for. But baseless and exorbitant as +all Mr.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> Galton's postulates are, there is not one of them to which he +might not be made heartily welcome, for any effect its surrender could +have upon the real issue, the true nature whereof both Mr. Galton and +his principal coadjutor have, with marvellous sleight of eye, contrived +completely to overlook. Such Pharisees in science, such sticklers for +rigorously scientific method, might have been expected to begin by +authenticating the materials they proposed to operate upon, and, when +professing to experiment upon pure metal, at least to see that it was +not mere dross they were casting into the crucible. Plainly, however, +they despise any such nice distinctions. The most earnest prayer and the +emptiest ceremonial prate are both alike to them. What sort of a process +they imagine prayer to be may be at once perceived from the sort of +trials to which they desire to subject it.</p> + +<p>'After much thought and examination,' the coadjutor aforesaid—a bashful +Teucer, over whom Professor Tyndall has, like a second Ajax Telamon, +extended, with chivalrous haste, the shelter of his shield—does 'not +hesitate to propose that one single ward or hospital under the care of +first-rate physicians or surgeons, containing a number of patients +afflicted with those diseases which have been best studied, and of which +the mortality rates are best known, should be, during a period of not +less than three to five years, made the object of special prayer by the +whole body of the faithful, and that, at the end of that time, the +mortality rates should be compared with the past rates, and also with +those of other leading hospitals similarly well managed during the same +period.'<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> In suggesting this experiment, termed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> by himself +'exhaustive and complete,' its propounder imagines himself to be +offering to the faithful 'an occasion of demonstrating to the faithless +an imperishable record of the real power of prayer.' If, however, he +were himself petitioning for the reprieve of a condemned criminal, he +would scarcely expect to succeed, even with so tender-hearted a minister +as Mr. Bruce, if he were to let out in the course of his supplications, +that he did not care whether he succeeded or not, and was asking for the +reprieve solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the head of the +Home Office is really invested with the prerogative of mercy. Yet no +suspicion crosses his mind that the Searcher of Hearts may possibly be +displeased with prayers addressed to Him by the lips of those who were, +all the while, saying in their hearts that they did not want their +prayers to be granted, but only wanted to satisfy their curiosity to +know whether they would be granted or not. Equally remarkable is the +trustfulness of Mr. Galton, in opining that 'it would be perfectly +practicable to select out of the patients at different hospitals under +treatment for fractures, or amputations, or other common maladies, whose +course is so well understood as to admit of accurate tables being +constructed for their duration and result, two considerable groups, the +one consisting of markedly religious and piously befriended individuals, +the other of those who were remarkably cold-hearted and neglected; and +that, then, an honest comparison of their respective periods of +treatment, and the result, would manifest a distinct proof of the +efficacy of prayer, if it existed to even a minute fraction of the +amount that religious teachers exhort us to believe.' Evidently, he +imagines that it would be sufficient for the hospital authorities to +advertise—not of course, in the 'Times,' but in the 'Record'—and +that,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> thereupon, whoever, having entered into his closet and shut the +door, had, on behalf of any of the patients experimented upon, prayed to +the Father who seeth in secret, would at once come forth and proclaim +openly how he had been engaged. Not by 'arguments' of no greater +'cogency' than that of any based upon results thus obtainable, need +either of the two experimentalists expect to persuade praying people +that prayer is, 'in the natural course of events,' doomed to become +'obsolete, just as the Waters of Jealousy and the Urim and Thummin of +the Mosaic Law did in the times of the later Jewish Kings.' Not quite so +easily will they cause it to be 'abandoned to the domain of recognised +superstition,' just as belief in witches and in the Sovereign's touch as +a cure for scrofula, and 'many other items of ancient faith have already +successively been.' Both of them have, it seems, yet to learn that the +only prayer which is believed by people of some little enlightenment to +be of any avail, is the 'fervent, effectual prayer of a righteous man,' +prayer that cometh from 'a pure heart fervently,' prayer that is made +'with the spirit and with the understanding also.' Prayer of this sort +is not to be discredited by any abundance of statistical testimony to +the futility of cold lip-worship, or by any number of fresh examples of +the generally recognised fact that the children of this world are wiser +in their generation than the children of light. The recovery from the +very jaws of death of King Hezekiah, of Louis XV. of France, while as +yet undetected and <i>bien-aimé</i>, and of the present Prince of Wales, may, +none the less probably, have been in part due to the prayers offered up +for the first by himself, for the second, according to President Hénault +and Mr. Carlyle, by all Paris, and, for the third, by the whole British +empire,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> because <i>lessons</i> appointed to be regularly said or <i>sung</i> in +churches for the prolongation of the Sovereign's life, and said and sung +by the congregations to whom they are set, with equal regularity, +whether the Sovereign be well or ill, detested or beloved, are to all +appearance disregarded. Modern believers in prayer are well aware that, +although they ask, they may not receive if they ask amiss, and would +accept this as fully adequate explanation of the disappointment of +anyone, who had the face to pray that he might grow as rich as the late +Mr. Brassey, or be created a duke, or appointed Lord Chancellor, or +supplant Mr. Gladstone in the premiership, or Mr. D'Israeli in the +leadership of Her Majesty's Opposition. Moreover, the spirit, duly +seasoned with understanding, in which alone true prayer can be made, is +one, not of presumptuous dictation to a Heavenly Father, but of sincere +and grateful recognition that 'He knoweth better than ourselves what is +for our good.' Far from praying for selfish aggrandisement, we cannot, +if we pray aright, pray that, whether from ourselves or others, the cup +of affliction may pass away, without adding, 'Nevertheless, not as I +will, but as Thou wilt.' The only gifts that can with propriety be +prayed for unconditionally are gifts spiritual—cleansing of the +thoughts of the heart, strength to resist temptation, strength to endure +trials, strength to perform our appointed work; and whoever may think +fit to make these the subjects of statistical inquiry, may depend upon +being assured by everyone experimentally qualified to reply, that they +are never asked for faithfully without being obtained effectually; +together with large measure, if not of the cheerfulness, at least of the +patience, of hope.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="EPILOGUE" id="EPILOGUE"></a><i>EPILOGUE.</i></h2> + + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">If with rash step, or with presumptuous word</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">I have transgressed, or with unshrinking eye</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Have sought to pierce the awful mystery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">That veils thy Godhead, yet forgive me, Lord!</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thou knowest that I sought not to draw nigh</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thy Throne, save that my witness might record</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">More truly of Thine attributes, whereby</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">On Earth, e'en as in Heaven, might be adored</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The fulness of Thy glory. Not in wrath</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">His trespass wilt Thou judge, whom, licence, bred</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Of zeal, though blinded, yet devout, betrays,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nor scorn the unconscious wanderer from Thy path,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nor leave me hopeless, if indeed misled</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">By thirst for truth, more deep in error's maze.</span><br /> +</p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The distinction here drawn is not merely verbal. The +greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean either the largest +total of happiness in which the largest possible number of those +concerned can participate, or a still larger total, which, if some of +the possible participants were excluded, would be divisible among the +remainder. The largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by +all concerned, means the largest sum total absolutely, without reference +to the number of participants. Writers on Utilitarianism seem to have +sometimes the first, sometimes the second of these totals in view, but +more frequently the second than the first.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> I do not form a separate class of pleasures of the +affections, because these seem to me not to be elementary, but to be +always compounded of two or more of the other five kinds.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> 'On Labour,' p. 135.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> 'Fortnightly Review,' June, 1868.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> See the No. for June, 1869.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> 'On Labour,' p. 93.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, p. 683.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> See 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, pp. 687-8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' by J. S. Mill, pp. 64-8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, pp. 684-5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' p. 267.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 69, 70.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> 'Les légistes leur fournirent au besoin l'appui du droit +contre le droit même.'—De Tocqueville, 'L'Ancien Régime,' p. 567.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 72, 73.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' p. 71.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 81, 82.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 84, 85.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Ibid. p. 85.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 86, 87.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> 'Utilitarianism,' p. 94.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Ibid. pp. 94, 95.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Mr. Buckle's first chapter, <i>passim</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> 'Cornhill Magazine,' for June and July, 1861.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> 'Lay Sermons,' p. 158.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> A highly esteemed literary friend, who has done me the +favour of looking over these pages in manuscript, considers that what I +have proved is, not that Omnipotence involves the co-existence of +Freewill and Necessity, but that Omnipotence itself, although capable of +possessing all things, could not possess Freewill, and that consequently +Freewill cannot possibly exist—that there cannot possibly be any such +thing. +</p><p> +Although, for reasons stated four pages back, not myself prepared to +accept this view of the matter, I should cheerfully accept it if I +could. The argument in the text proceeds upon the assumption that people +mean something when they talk about Freewill. If, however, they have no +meaning, if the phrase be a simple sound signifying nothing, of course +all controversy regarding the possible co-existence of that nothing with +Necessity is settled at once and for ever, while no great amount of +philosophy will be requisite to induce mankind to resign themselves very +placidly to the absence of that same nothing.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Mill's 'Logic.' Fifth edition. Vol. ii. p. 527.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Mill's 'Logic,' vol. ii. p. 504.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> 'S'il se fût trouvé alors (vers 1750) sur le trône un +prince de la taille et de l'humeur du Grand Frédéric, je ne doute point +qu'il n'eût accompli dans la société et dans le gouvernement plusieurs +des plus grands changements que la Révolution y a faits, non-seulement +sans perdre sa couronne, mais en augmentant beaucoup son pouvoir.'—De +Tocqueville, <i>L'Ancien Régime</i>, p. 274.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. By James +Mill. Edition of 1869, with Notes by Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater, +George Grote, and John Stuart Mill, vol. i. pp. 78 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Mill's 'Logic.' 5th Edition. Vol. i. p. 377.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> 'There is a class of animals called Ascidians, which +possess a heart and a circulation, and up to the year 1824 no one would +have dreamt of questioning the propriety of the deduction, that these +creatures have a circulation in one definite and invariable direction; +nor would any one have thought it worth while to verify the point. But +in that year M. von Hasselt, happening to examine a transparent animal +of this class, found to his infinite surprise that after the heart had +beat a certain number of times, it stopped, and then began beating the +opposite way, so as to reverse the course of the current, which returned +by-and-by to its original direction.'—<i>Huxley's Lay Sermons</i>, p. 95.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Archimède, pour tirer le globe terrestre de sa place et le +transporter en un autre lieu, ne demandait rien qu'un point qui fût +ferme et immobile: ainsi j'aurai droit de concevoir de hautes espérances +si je suis assez heureux pour trouver seulement une chose qui soit +certaine et indubitable.—Descartes, <i>Méditation Deuxième</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Lay Sermons, xiv. 'On Descartes' Discourse;' also an +article by Professor Huxley, on 'Berkeley and the Metaphysics of +Sensation,' in 'Macmillan's Magazine' for June, 1871.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Article on 'Berkeley and the Metaphysics of Sensation,' in +'Macmillan's Magazine' for 1871, pp. 152 et seq.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> The quotations, of which those in the text are +abridgments, will be found in 'Lay Sermons,' xiv. pp. 364-7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> The story was thus told by Diderot, to Sir Samuel Romilly, +when a young man:—'Je vous dirai un trait de lui, mais il vous sera un +peu scandaleux peut-être, car vous autres Anglais, vous croyez <i>un peu</i> +en Dieu; pour nous autres, nous n'y croyons guères. Hume dîna dans une +grande compagnie avec le baron D'Holbach. Il était assis à côté du +baron; on parla de la religion naturelle. "Pour les athées," disait +Hume, "je ne crois pas qu'il en existe; je n'en ai jamais vu!" "Vous +avez été un peu malheureux," répondit l'autre, "vous voici à table avec +dix-sept pour la première fois."'—<i>Edinburgh Review</i> for January 1847.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> 'Studies in Animal Life,' chap. v.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> The reader who, having skipped some of the earlier +chapters, may find this language obscure, is requested to turn back to +the essay on 'Huxleyism,' pp. 194-6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> See again, pp. 194-6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> 'Mr. Darwin's Hypotheses.' Part II. 'Fortnightly Review' +for June 1868.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> 'Origin of Species,' p. 226.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Of this treatise, no English or French translation has, I +believe, been published. For my own very limited acquaintance with it, I +am indebted to the extreme kindness of my friend, Professor Croom +Robertson, who has most obligingly favoured me with a manuscript version +of the portion referred to in the text.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> 'Lay Sermons,' p. 240.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> 'Beauties of the Anti-Jacobin,' 1799, pp. 214-6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' <i>passim</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> 'History of Philosophy,' 4th edition, vol. ii. pp. +654-735.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Not that so restricted a meaning can, with any propriety, +be placed on positivist definitions of law. See, for instance, that of +Mr. Lewes ('History of Philosophy,' vol. ii. p. 701), who defines law to +be 'the invariable relation between two distinct phenomena, according to +which one depends on the other.'</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> Some few additional random remarks, however, though not +permissible in the text may, perhaps, be less inappropriate in a note. +</p><p> +My scientific deficiencies do not prevent my understanding or, at least, +fancying I understand, that Comte's famous 'Classification of the +Sciences' may be extremely serviceable as indicating in what order the +sciences may most profitably be studied. That a student's general +progress would be swifter and surer if, before entering on physics or +chemistry, he had already made considerable progress in algebra, +geometry, and mechanics, than if he commenced all five sciences +simultaneously, seems probable enough. If, however, the classification +be intended also to indicate historically the order in which the +sciences have actually been studied, I cannot but suspect it to be +misleading. Certainly, if knowledge of number was the earliest knowledge +acquired by man, those savage races which have not even yet learnt how +to count beyond four, must have been content with very few lessons in +arithmetic when turning off to other branches of learning. +</p><p> +As to the measure of success that attended Comte's scheme of creating a +Philosophy of General Science, I presume not to utter one syllable of my +own, preferring to cite what Mr. Mill says of that 'wonderful +systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences from +mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would +have stamped him on all minds competent to appreciate it as one of the +principal thinkers of the age.' In all sincerity, I say that the mere +conception of the enterprise, whose vastness is so luminously expounded +by Mr. Lewes, in the last edition of his 'History of Philosophy,' seems +to me to betoken superior genius. I feel, as it were, simply awe-struck +in the presence of an intellectual ambition, that within the brief span +of one human life could aspire to a mastery over all the sciences, +sufficient, first for co-ordinating the fundamental truths and special +methods, and so obtaining the philosophy of each, and then for +co-ordinating the manifold philosophies so obtained, and—by condensing +them all into one homogeneous doctrine, and blending them into one +organic whole, whereof each part would be seen to depend on all that +preceded, and to determine all that succeeded—transforming all science +into philosophy. +</p><p> +One point however remains on which I shall speak with some confidence, +that, namely, of the inclusion among 'Comte's titles to immortal fame' +of the creation of a Science of Sociology. 'What the law of gravitation +is to astronomy, what the elementary properties of tissues are to +physiology,' that, says Mr. Lewes, in the opinion of Comte's disciples, +'is the law of the three stages to sociology.' But if, as I have shown, +there are not really three but only two stages, the so-called third +stage being simply a return to either the second or the first, the law +of the three stages cannot be much of a law, nor the science of which it +is the essence much of a science. +</p><p> +Mr. Lewes, nevertheless, maintains that M. Comte created Social Science. +Mr. Mill considers that he did not create it, but only proved its +creation to be possible. With all possible deference, I submit that what +he really did was to prove its creation to be impossible. +</p><p> +In a passage of Mr. Mill's 'Positivism,' quoted with approval in Mr. +Lewes's 'History of Philosophy,' and presumably, therefore, expressing +the sentiments of both writers, Comte is described as pronouncing +inappropriate to the Science of Society, the method universally admitted +to be proper to all other sciences—that, namely, of obtaining by +induction the laws of the elementary phenomena, then, from these laws +thinking out deductively those of the complex phenomena, and, finally, +of verifying by specific observation the laws obtained by deduction. +Among social phenomena, he is described as arguing, the elementary ones +are human feelings and actions, the laws of which are the laws of +universal human nature. But the human beings, on the laws of whose +nature social facts depend, are not abstract or universal, but +historical human beings, already shaped and made what they are, not by +the simple tendencies of universal human nature, but by the accumulated +influence of past generations of human society. This being the case, the +laws of universal human nature evidently cannot serve as materials, +whence it would be possible for any powers of deduction, starting from +the bare conception of the Being Man, to predict beforehand how +successive generations of men would feel and act. Wherefore, in order to +get at social laws, we must reverse the ordinary method, seizing upon +any generalizations which the facts of history, empirically considered, +will supply, and then using the universal laws of human nature for the +verification of these generalizations. +</p><p> +I will not linger over the glaring inconsistency involved in the +conclusion thus arrived at, of appealing, for the verification of +empirical generalizations, to a species of deduction confessed to be +impracticable for want of the requisite materials. I prefer to show that +from Comte's own premises, as rendered by Mr. Mill, necessarily results +a separate conclusion, absolutely fatal to his sociologically creative +pretensions. According to him, as we have seen, the laws of elementary +social facts, or of human actions and feelings, are the laws of +universal human nature, which latter can, of course, be no other than +whatever habits of invariably, in given circumstances, feeling and +acting in given modes, may be common to all mankind. But it is admitted +that the particular generation of human beings at any time existing +must, by the accumulated influence of preceding generations, have been +rendered very different from every preceding generation: and nothing is +more certain than that two generations differing widely from each other +in character, would, in many given circumstances, not only not feel and +act in precisely the same, but would inevitably feel and act in widely +different, manners. Nor is this all. The circumstances by which any +generation is surrounded have been partly shaped for it by preceding +generations, partly modified by itself—so that it is not possible for +any two generations ever to find themselves in the same circumstances. +Wherefore, as there never can be a repetition of either men or of +circumstances precisely the same, it is manifestly impossible for any +habits of feeling and thinking, in given modes in given circumstances, +to be common to any two generations of men, still less to universal +mankind. In other words, there cannot possibly be any laws of human +nature: and if no laws of human nature, then no laws of elementary +social facts; and if no laws of elementary social facts, then no laws of +complex social facts; and if no laws of social facts, elementary or +complex, then no single particle of material wherewith to build up the +Science of Society or Sociology.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' pp. 133-4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' pp. 25-8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> 'Fortnightly Review' for June 1868, 'Mr. Darwin's +Hypotheses.'</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> 'Statistical Enquiries into the Efficacy of Prayer,' by +Francis Galton, in Fornightly Review,' for August 1872.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> 'Contemporary Review,' July 1872. 'The Prayer for the +Sick. Hints towards a serious attempt to estimate its value.' +Communicated by Prof. Tyndall.</p></div> + +</div> + + + + +<p class="center"> + LONDON: PRINTED BY<br /> + SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE<br /> + AND PARLIAMENT STREET</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<div class="centerbox"> +<h2><a name="BY_THE_SAME_AUTHOR" id="BY_THE_SAME_AUTHOR"></a><i>BY THE SAME AUTHOR.</i></h2> +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> + +<h3>ON LABOUR:</h3> + +<h4>ITS WRONGFUL CLAIMS AND RIGHTFUL DUES;<br /> + +ITS ACTUAL PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE.</h4> + +<h4>SECOND EDITION.</h4> + +<p class="center">8vo. cloth, price 14<i>s.</i></p> + +<blockquote><p>'This is a book which all true economists should welcome.'</p> + +<p class="author"> +<span class="smcap">Economist.</span>. +<br /> +</p> + + +<p>'It may be doubted whether any considerable economic work of equal merit +has appeared since the first publication of Mr. Mill's "Political +Economy."'</p> + +<p class="author"> +<span class="smcap">Athenæum.</span> +</p> +</blockquote></div> + +<p class="center">MACMILLAN & CO., London.</p> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS***</p> +<p>******* This file should be named 29917-h.txt or 29917-h.zip *******</p> +<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> +<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/9/9/1/29917">http://www.gutenberg.org/2/9/9/1/29917</a></p> +<p>Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed.</p> + +<p>Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics + With Some of Their Applications + + +Author: William Thomas Thornton + + + +Release Date: September 6, 2009 [eBook #29917] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND +COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS*** + + +E-text prepared by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, and the Project Gutenberg +Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) + + + +OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS + +With Some of Their Applications + +by + +WILLIAM THOMAS THORNTON + +Author of a Treatise 'On Labour' + + + + + + + +London +Macmillan and Co. +1873 + +_All rights reserved_ + + + + 'I entirely agree with you as to the ill tendency of the affected + doubts of some philosophers and the fantastical conceits of others. + I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have + quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools + for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word, that since this + revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature + and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so + that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before + were all mystery and riddle.'--BERKELEY'S HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +The book was all but finished, and only the Preface remained, over which +I was hesitating, apprehensive equally of putting into it too much and +too little, when one of the most frequent 'companions of my solitude' +came to my aid, shewing me, in fragments, a preface already nearly +written, and needing only a little piecing to become forthwith +presentable. Here it is. + +'In these sick days, in a world such as ours, richer than usual in +Truths grown obsolete, what can the fool think but that it is all a Den +of Lies wherein whoso will not speak and act Lies must stand idle and +despair?' Whereby it happens that for the artist who would fain minister +medicinally to the relief of folly, 'the publishing of a Work of Art,' +designed, like this, to redeem Truth from premature obsolescence, +'becomes almost a necessity.' For, albeit, 'in the heart of the speaker +there ought to be some kind of gospel tidings burning until it be +uttered, so that otherwise it were better for him that he altogether +held his peace,' still, than to have fire burning within, and not to put +it forth, not many worse things are readily imaginable. + +'Has the word Duty no meaning? Is what we call Duty no divine messenger +and guide, but a false, earthly fantasm, made up of Desire and Fear?' In +that' Logic-mill of thine' hast thou 'an earthly mechanism for the +Godlike itself, and for grinding out Virtue from the husks of Pleasure? +I tell thee, Nay! Otherwise, not on Morality, but on Cookery, let us +build our stronghold. There, brandishing our frying-pan as censer, let +us offer up sweet incense to the Devil, and live at ease on the fat +things _he_ has provided for his elect,' seeing that 'with stupidity and +sound digestion, man may front much.' + +Or, 'is there no God? or, at best, an absentee God, sitting idle ever +since the first Sabbath, at the outside of His universe, and _seeing_ it +go?' Know that for man's well-being, whatever else be needed, 'Faith is +one thing needful.' Mark, 'how, with it, Martyrs, otherwise weak, can +cheerfully endure the shame and the cross; how, without it, worldlings +puke up their sick existence, by suicide, in the midst of luxury.' Of +how much else, 'for a pure moral nature, is not the loss of Religious +Belief the loss?' 'All wounds, the crush of long-continued Destitution, +the stab of false Friendship and of false Love, all wounds in the so +genial heart would have healed again had not the life-warmth of Faith +been withdrawn.' But this once lost, how recoverable? how, rather, ever +acquirable? 'First must the dead Letter of Religion own itself dead, and +drop piecemeal into dust, if the living Spirit of Religion, freed from +this, its charnel house, is to arise on us, new born of Heaven, and with +new healing under its wings.' + +Beside these burning words of Mr. Carlyle any additional words of mine +would stand only as superfluous foils, and are, therefore, considerately +pretermitted. + +CADOGAN PLACE: _December 1872._ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I. ANTI-UTILITARIANISM 1 + + II. HISTORY'S SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS 84 + + III. DAVID HUME AS A METAPHYSICIAN 113 + + IV. HUXLEYISM 158 + + V. RECENT PHASES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM 199 + + VI. LIMITS OF DEMONSTRABLE THEISM 266 + + + EPILOGUE 298 + + + + +OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS + +AND + +COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +_ANTI-UTILITARIANISM._ + + +I. + +Having, by the heading of this essay, announced that it is intended to +be partly controversial, I can scarcely begin better than by furnishing +the reader with the means of judging whether I myself correctly +apprehend the doctrine which I am about to criticise. If, then, I were +myself an Utilitarian, and, for the sake either of vindicating my own +belief, or of making converts of other people, had undertaken to explain +what Utilitarianism is, I should set about the task somewhat in this +wise:-- + +The sole use and sole object of existence is enjoyment or pleasure, +which two words will here be treated as synonymous; happiness, also, +though not quite identical in meaning, being occasionally substituted +for them. Enjoyment, it must be observed, is of very various kinds, +measures, and degrees. It may be sensual, or emotional, or imaginative, +or intellectual, or moral. It may be momentary or eternal; intoxicating +delight or sober satisfaction. It may be unmixed and undisturbed, in +which case, however short of duration or coarse in quality, it may in +strictness be called happiness; or it may be troubled and alloyed, +although of a flavour which would be exquisite if pure, and if there +were nothing to interfere with the perception of it. Understood, +however, in a sufficiently comprehensive sense, enjoyment or pleasure +may be clearly perceived to be the sole object of existence. The whole +value of life plainly consists of the enjoyment, present or future, +which life affords, or is capable of affording or securing. Now, the +excellence of all rules depends on their conduciveness to the object +they have in view. The excellence of all rules of life must, therefore, +depend on their conduciveness to the sole object which life has in view, +viz., enjoyment. But the excellence of rules of life, or of conduct or +modes of acting, would seem to be but another name for their morality, +and the morality of actions obviously depends on their conformity to +moral rules. Whence, if so much be admitted, it necessarily follows that +the test of the morality of actions is their conduciveness to enjoyment. + +But the enjoyment thus referred to is not that of the agent alone, for +if it were, no action whatever could possibly be immoral. Whatever any +one does, he does either because to do it gives him or promises him +pleasure, or because he believes that the not doing it would subject him +to more pain than he will suffer from doing it. Besides, one person's +enjoyment may be obtained at the expense of other people's suffering, so +that an act in which the actor takes pleasure may destroy or prevent +more pleasure altogether than it creates. The enjoyment or happiness, +therefore, which Utilitarianism regards, is not individual, but general +happiness; not that of one or of a few, but of the many, nor even of the +many only. It is often declared to be the greatest happiness of the +greatest number, but it may with more accuracy be described as the +largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all +concerned.[1] Again, an action which, in some particular instance, +causes more pleasure than pain to those affected by it, may yet belong +to a class of actions which, in the generality of cases, causes more +pain than pleasure, and may thus involve a violation of a moral rule, +and, consequently, be itself immoral. Wherefore the enjoyment which +Utilitarianism adopts as its moral test is not simply the greatest sum +of enjoyment for all concerned, but that greatest sum in the greatest +number of cases. In its widest signification it is the greatest +happiness of society at large and in the long run. From these premises a +decisive criterion of right and wrong may be deduced. Every action +belonging to a class calculated to promote the permanent happiness of +society is right. Every action belonging to a class opposed to the +permanent happiness of society is wrong. + +In the foregoing exposition I have, I trust, evinced a sincere desire to +give Utilitarianism its full due, and I shall at least be admitted to +have shown myself entirely free from most of those more vulgar +misconceptions of its nature which have given its professors such just +offence. Many of its assailants have not scrupled to stigmatise as +worthy only of swine a doctrine which represents life as having no +better and nobler object of desire and pursuit than pleasure. To these, +however, it has, by the great apostle of Utilitarianism, been +triumphantly replied that it is really they themselves who insult human +nature by using language that assumes human beings to be capable of no +higher pleasures than those of which swine are capable; and that, +moreover, if the assumption were correct, and if the capacities of men +and of swine were identical, whatever rule of life were good enough for +the latter would likewise be good enough for the former. But I am not an +assailant of this description. Inasmuch as there undeniably are very +many and very various kinds of pleasure, I of course allow +Utilitarianism credit for common sense enough to acknowledge that those +kinds are most worthy of pursuit which, from whatever cause, possess +most value--that those which are most precious are those most to be +prized. But whoever allows thus much will have no alternative but to +concede a great deal more. The most precious of pleasures is that which +arises from the practice of virtue, as may be proved conclusively in the +only way of which the case admits, viz., by reference to the fact that, +whoever is equally acquainted with that and with other pleasures, +deliberately prefers it to all the rest, will, if necessary, forego all +others for its sake, and values no others obtainable only at its +expense. By necessary implication it follows that, as being more +valuable than any other, the pleasure arising from the practice of +virtue must be that which Utilitarianism recommends above all others as +an object of pursuit. But the pursuit of this particular pleasure and +the practice of virtue are synonymous terms. What, therefore, +Utilitarianism above all other things recommends and insists upon is the +practice of virtue. Now, the practice of virtue commonly involves +subordination of one's own interest to that of other people; indeed, +virtue would not be virtue in the utilitarian sense of the word unless +it did involve such subordination. Wherefore the pleasure arising from +the practice of virtue, the pleasure which occupies the highest place on +the utilitarian scale, and that which Utilitarianism exhorts its +disciples chiefly to seek after, is nothing else than the pleasure +derived from attending to other people's pleasure instead of to our own. + +Nor is this all. In order adequately to appreciate the loftiness of +utilitarian teaching, and its utter exemption from the sordidness with +which it is ignorantly charged, we must devote a few moments to +examination of those distinctive peculiarities of different kinds of +pleasure which entitle them to different places in our esteem. + +All pleasures may be arranged under five heads, and in regularly +ascending series, as follows:-- + +1. Sensual pleasures:--To wit, those of eating and drinking, and +whatever others are altogether of the flesh, fleshly. + +2. Emotional, by which are to be understood agreeable moods of the mind, +such as, irrespectively of any agreeable idea brought forward +simultaneously by association, are produced by music ('for,' as Milton +says, 'eloquence the soul, song charms the sense'), by beauty of form or +colour, by genial sunshine, by balmy or invigorating air. + +3. Imaginative, or pleasures derived from the contemplation of mental +pictures. + +4. Intellectual, or those consequent on exercise of the reasoning +powers. + +5. Moral, or those which are alluded to when virtue is spoken of as +being its own reward.[2] + +That of these several kinds, each of the last four is preferable to any +preceding it on the list will, it is to be hoped, be allowed to pass as +an unquestioned truth, for to any one perverse enough to deny it, the +only answer that can be made is an appeal to observation in proof that +all persons who are equally acquainted with the several kinds do exhibit +the preferences indicated. Neither, so far as the two kinds first-named +alone are concerned, is it possible to go much more deeply into the +reasons why emotional pleasures are to be preferred to sensual, than by +pointing to the fact that all competent judges of both are observed to +like the former best. If all those who are endowed with equal +sensitiveness of ear and of palate prefer music to feasting, and would +any day give up a dinner at Francatelli's for the sake of hearing a +rejuvenescent Persiani as Zerlina, or Patti as Dinorah, the one thing +presumable is, that all such persons derive more enjoyment from perfect +melody than from perfect cookery, and little else remains to be said on +the subject. The same ultimate fact need not, however, limit our inquiry +as to the preferableness of imaginative or intellectual to emotional +pleasures, and of moral to any of the other three. This admits of, and +demands, a more subtle explanation, from which we may learn, not merely +that certain preferences are shown, but also why they are shown. The +preferences in question are demonstrably not due to the greater +poignancy of the pleasures preferred. It is simply not true that the +keenest of imaginative pleasures is keener than the keenest of +emotional, and still less that the keenest of intellectual is so. The +very reverse is the truth. The supremest delight attainable in fancy's +most romantic flight is, I suspect, faint in comparison with the sort of +ecstasy into which a child of freshly-strung nerves is sometimes thrown +by the mere brilliance or balminess of a summer's day, and with which +even we, dulled adults, provided we be in the right humour, and that all +things are in a concatenation accordingly, are now and then momentarily +affected while listening to the wood-notes wild of a nightingale, or a +Jenny Lind, or while gazing on star-lit sky or moon-lit sea, or on the +snowy or dolomite peaks of a mountain range fulgent with the violet and +purple glories of the setting sun. And yet the choicest snatches of such +beatitude with which--at least, after the fine edge of our +susceptibilities has been worn away by the world's friction--we +creatures of coarse human mould are ever indulged, are but poor in +comparison with the rich abundance of the same in which some more +delicately-constituted organisms habitually revel. If we would +understand of what development emotional delight is capable, we should +watch the skylark. As that 'blithe spirit' now at heaven's gate 'poureth +its full heart,' and anon can + + Scarce get out his notes for joy, + But shakes his song together as he nears + His happy home, the ground, + +what poet but must needs confess with Shelley, that in his most +rapturous dream, his transport never came nigh the bird's? And yet what +poet would change conditions with the lark? Nay, what student or +philosopher would? albeit the utmost gratification ever earned by either +of these in the prosecution of his special calling--in acquiring +knowledge, in solving knotty problems, or in scaling the heights of +abstract contemplation--is probably as inferior in keenness of zest to +that which the poet knows, as the best prose is inferior in charm to the +best poetry. It may even be that both poet and philosopher owe, on the +whole, more unhappiness than happiness--the one to his superior +sensibility, the other to his superior enlightenment, and yet neither +would exchange his own lesser happiness for the greater happiness of the +lark. Why would he not? It is no sufficient answer to say that in the +lark's happiness there are few, if any, imaginative or intellectual +ingredients; that it is almost utterly unideal, almost purely emotional, +exactly the same in kind, and only higher in degree, than the glee of +puppies or kittens at play. The question recurs as forcibly as ever, +why--seeing that enjoyment is the one thing desirable, the only thing +either valuable in itself, or that gives value to other things--why is +it that no intelligent man would accept, in lieu of his own, another +mode of existence, in which, although debarred from the joys of thought +and fancy, he nevertheless has reason to believe that the share of +enjoyment falling to his lot would be greater, both in quantity and +sapidity, than it is at present? The following seems to me to be the +explanation of the mystery. + +It might be too much to say that nothing can please a person who is not +pleased with himself, but it is at any rate clear that nothing can +greatly please him which interferes with his self-satisfaction. Now +imaginative and intellectual enjoyment, each of them, involves the +exercise of a special and superior faculty, mere consciousness of the +possession of which helps to make the possessor satisfied with himself. +It exalts what Mr. Mill aptly terms his sense of dignity, a sense +possessed in some form or other by every human being, and one so +essential to that self-satisfaction without which all pleasure would be +tasteless, that nothing which conflicts with it can be an object of +serious desire. In virtue of this special faculty, the most wretched of +men holds himself to be superior to the most joyous of larks. To divest +himself of it would be to lower himself towards the level of the bird, +and to commit such an act of self-degradation would occasion to him an +amount of pain which he is not disposed to incur for the sake of any +amount of pleasure obtainable at its expense. It is, then, the fear of +pain which prevents his wishing to be turned into a lark. He is not +ignorant that he would be happier for the metamorphosis, but he dreads +the pain that must precede the increase of happiness, more than he +desires the increase of happiness that would follow the pain. + +The force of these considerations will be equally, or more apparent, on +their being applied to analysis of moral pleasures. That these are the +most truly precious of all pleasures, is proved by their being +habitually more highly prized than any others by all who are qualified +to make the comparison. But why are they so prized? Not, as I am +constrained, however reluctantly, to admit, on account of their greater +keenness as pleasures. It would be at best but well-meaning cant to +pretend that the self-approval, the sympathetic participation in other +people's augmented welfare, the grateful consciousness of having done +that which is pleasing in our Heavenly Father's sight, together with +whatever else helps to compose the internal reward of virtue, constitute +a sum total of delight nearly as exquisite as that which may be obtained +in a variety of other ways. The mere circumstance of there being +invariably included in a just or generous action more or less of +self-denial, self-restraint, or self-sacrifice, must always sober down +the gratification by which virtue is rewarded, and make it appear tame +beside the delirium of gladness caused by many things with which virtue +has nothing to do. We will charitably suppose that the occupant of a +dukedom, who should secretly light upon conclusive proof that it was not +his by right, would at once abandon it to the legal heir, and we need +not doubt that he would subsequently be, on the whole, well content to +have so acted, but we cannot suppose that he would make the surrender +with anything like the elation with which he entered on the estate and +title. If there were really no pleasure equal to that with which virtue +recompenses its votaries, the performance of a virtuous act would always +make a man happier than previously; moreover, the greater the virtue, +the greater would be the consequent pleasure. But any one may see that +an act of the most exalted virtue, far from increasing, often utterly +destroys the agent's happiness. Imagine an affectionate father, some +second Brutus or second Fitzstephen of Galway, constrained by +overwhelming sense of duty to sentence a beloved son to death, or a +bankrupt beggaring himself and his family by honestly making over to his +creditors property with which he might have safely absconded. Plainly, +such virtuous achievement, far from adding to the happiness of its +author, has plunged him in an abyss of misery, his only comfort being +that in the lowest deep there is, as we shall presently see, a lower +deep still. Far from being happier than he was before acting as he has +done, he would be much happier if, being vicious instead of virtuous, he +had not felt bound so to act. Unquestionably, what either upright judge +or honest bankrupt has incurred--the one by becoming a saticide, the +other by making himself a beggar--is pure and simple pain, unmitigated +by one particle of positive pleasure. Yet it is at the same time certain +that the virtue of each has in some form or other given full +compensation for the pain it has occasioned, for not only was that pain +deliberately incurred in lieu of the pleasure which it has supplanted, +but restoration of the pleasure would now be refused, if reversal of the +virtuous conduct were made a condition of the restoration. In what, +then, does the compensation consist? In nothing else than this, in judge +or bankrupt having been saved from pain still greater than that which he +is actually suffering. Wretched as he is, infinitely more wretched than +he was before there was any call upon him to act as he has done, he is +less wretched than he would be if, recognising the obligation so to act, +he had not so acted. He has escaped the stings of conscience, the sense +of having wronged his neighbour and offended his God; he has escaped, in +short, self-condemnation--a torment so intolerable to those so +constituted as to be susceptible of it, that hell itself has been known +to be, in imagination at least, preferred to it. Mr. Mill's splendid +outburst that, rather than worship a fiend that could send him to hell +for refusing, he would go to hell as he was bid, will doubtless occur to +every reader. + +This, however, is all. In both the supposed cases, as in every one in +which virtue consists of compliance with a painful duty, the pleasure +arising from the practice of virtue cannot in strictness be called +pleasure at all. At best it is but a partial negation of pain; more +properly, indeed, the substitution of one pain for another more acute. +Yet this mere negation, this ethereal inanity, is pronounced by +Utilitarianism to be preferable to aught that can come into competition +with it. Truly it is somewhat hard upon those who attend to such +teaching, to be reproached with their grossness of taste and likened to +hogs, for no better reason than their predilection for the lightest of +all conceivable diets. Still harder will this seem, when we recollect +that Utilitarians are exhorted to be virtuous, less for their own than +for other people's sakes. If, indeed, virtue were practised by all +mankind, the utilitarian idea of the greatest possible happiness, or, at +least, of the greatest possible exemption from unhappiness, would be +universally realised. Still, it is in order that they may afford +pleasure to the community at large, rather than that they may obtain it +for themselves; it is that they may save, not so much themselves, as the +community, from pain, that individual Utilitarians are charged to be +virtuous. Among those pleasures, whether positive or negative, which it +is allowable to them to seek for themselves, the first place is assigned +to the pleasure arising from the sense of giving pleasure to others. +Thus, not only is it the purest of pleasures that Utilitarianism chiefly +recommends for pursuit: even that pleasure is to be pursued only from +the purest and most disinterested motives. + +All this I frankly acknowledge; and I own, too, that, far from deserving +to be stigmatised as irreligious, Utilitarianism is literally nothing +else than an amplification of one moiety of Christianity; that it not +adopts merely, but expands, 'the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth,' +exhorting us to love our neighbour, not simply as well, but better than +ourselves; to do for others, not simply what we would have them do for +us, but much more than we could have the face to ask them to do; not +merely not to pursue our interests at the expense of theirs, but to +regard as our own chief interest the promotion of theirs. That on +account of these exhortations Utilitarianism is godless can be supposed +by those only who suppose that love to one's neighbour is contrary to +the will of God. By those who believe that works are the best signs of +faith, and that love to God is best evinced by doing good to man, +Utilitarianism might rather seem to be but another name for practical +religion. + +So I say in all sincerity, though not without some misgiving, as while +so speaking I involuntarily bethink myself of Balaam, son of Beor, who +having been called forth to curse, caught himself blessing altogether. +Mine eyes, too, have been opened to the good of that which I was +purposed to condemn, and behold I have as yet done nothing but eulogise. +No warmest partisan of Utilitarianism, not Mr. Mill himself, ever spoke +more highly of it than I have just been doing. What censures, then, can +I have in reserve to countervail such praises? What grounds of quarrel +can I have with a system of ethics which I have described as ever +seeking the noblest ends from the purest motives; whose precepts I own +to be as elevating as its aims are exalted? On reflection, I am +reassured by recollecting several, which I proceed to bring forward one +at a time, beginning with a sin enormous enough to cover any multitude +of merits. + +My first charge against Utilitarianism is that it is not true. I do not +say that there is no truth in it. That I have found much to admire in +its premises has been frankly avowed; and in one, at least, of the +leading deductions from those premises I partially concur. I admit that +acts utterly without utility must likewise be utterly without worth; +that conduct which subserves the enjoyment neither of oneself nor of any +one else, cannot, except in a very restricted sense, be termed right; +that conduct which interferes with the enjoyment both of oneself and of +all others, which injuring oneself injures others also, and benefits no +one, cannot be otherwise than wrong; that purely objectless asceticism +which has not even self-discipline in view, is not virtue, but folly; +that misdirected charity which, engendering improvidence, creates more +distress than it relieves, is not virtue, but criminal weakness. But +though admitting that there can be no virtue without utility, I do not +admit either that virtue must be absent unless utility preponderate, or +that if utility preponderate virtue must be present. I deny that any +amount of utility can of itself constitute virtue. I deny that whatever +adds to the general happiness must be right. Equally do I deny that +whatever diminishes the general happiness or prevents its increasing +must be wrong. An action, be it observed, may be right in three +different senses. It may be right as being meritorious, and deserving of +commendation. It may be right as being that which one is bound to do, +for the doing of which, therefore, one deserves no praise, and for +neglecting to do which one would justly incur blame. It may be right +simply as not being wrong--as being allowable--something which one has a +right to do, though to refrain from doing it might perhaps be +praiseworthy. There will be little difficulty in adducing examples of +conduct which, though calculated to diminish the sum total of happiness, +would be right in the first of these senses. Nothing can be easier than +to multiply examples of such conduct that would be right in the third +sense. I proceed to cite cases which will answer both these purposes, +and likewise the converse one of showing that conduct calculated to +increase the general happiness may nevertheless be wrong. + +When the Grecian chiefs, assembled at Aulis, were waiting for a fair +wind to convey them to Ilium, they were, we are told, warned by what was +to them as a voice from heaven, that their enterprise would make no +progress unless Agamemnon's daughter were sacrificed to Diana. In order +to place the details of the story in a light as little favourable as +possible to my argument, we will deviate somewhat from the accepted +version, and will suppose that the arrested enterprise was one of even +greater pith and moment than tradition ascribes to it. We will suppose +that upon its successful prosecution depended the national existence of +Greece; that its failure would have involved the extermination of +one-half of the people, and the slavery of the other half. We will +suppose, too, that of all this Iphigenia was as firmly persuaded as +every one else. In these circumstances, had her countrymen a right to +insist on her immolation? If so, on what was that right founded? Is it +sufficient to say in reply that her death was essential to the national +happiness, to the extent even of being indispensable to prevent that +happiness from being converted into national woe? Manifestly, according +to the hypothesis, it was expedient for all concerned, with the single +exception of herself, that she should die; but were the others thereby +entitled to take her life? Did the fact of its being for their advantage +to do this warrant their doing it? Simply because it was their interest, +was it also their right? Right, we must recollect, invariably implies +corresponding duty. Right, it is clear, can never be rightfully +resisted. If it be the right of certain persons to do a certain thing, +it must be the duty of all other persons to let that thing be done. +Where there is no such duty, there can be no such right. Wherefore, if +the 'stern, black-bearded kings, with wolfish eyes,' who sate 'waiting +to see her die,' had a right to kill Iphigenia, it must have been +Iphigenia's duty to let herself be killed. Was this then her duty? +'Duty,' as I have elsewhere observed,[3] 'signifies something due, a +debt, indebtedness, and a debt cannot have been incurred for nothing, or +without some antecedent step on the part either of debtor or creditor.' +But it is not pretended that in any way whatever, by any antecedent act +of hers or theirs, Iphigenia had incurred or had been subjected to a +debt to her countrymen which could be paid off only with her life. It +could not, then, be incumbent on her to let her life be taken in +payment. If it had been in her power to burst her bonds, and break +through the wolves in human shape that girdled her in, she would have +been guilty of no wrong by escaping. But if not, then, however +meritorious it might have been on her part to consent to die for her +countrymen, it was not her duty so to die, nor, consequently, had they a +right to put her to death. She would have been at least negatively right +in refusing to die, while they were guilty of a very positive and a very +grievous wrong in killing her, notwithstanding that both she and they +were perfectly agreed that for her to be killed would be for the +incalculably greater happiness of a greater number, exceeding the lesser +number in the proportion of several hundreds of thousands to one. + +It is true that throughout this affair every one concerned was labouring +under a gross delusion--that there was no real use in putting Iphigenia +to death, and that nothing but superstition made anybody suppose there +was. I do not think the case is one less to our purpose on that account, +for Utilitarians, like other fallible mortals, are liable to deceive +themselves. They never can be quite secure of the genuineness of the +utility on which they rely, and in default of positive knowledge they +will always be reduced to act, as the Grecian chiefs did, according to +the best of their convictions. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of +those who distrust romance and insist upon reality, we will leave fable +for fact, and take as our next illustration an incident that may any day +occur. + +Imagine three shipwrecked mariners to have leapt from their sinking +vessel into a cockboat scarce big enough to hold them, and the two +slimmer of the three to have presently discovered that there was little +or no chance of either of them reaching land unless their over-weighted +craft were lightened of their comparatively corpulent companion. Next, +imagine yourself in the fat sailor's place, and then consider whether +you would feel it incumbent on you to submit quietly to be drowned in +order that the residuum of happiness might be greater than if either you +all three went to the bottom, or than if you alone were saved. Would you +not, far from recognising any such moral obligation, hold yourself +morally justified in throwing the other two overboard, if you were +strong enough, and if need were, to prevent their similarly ousting you? +But if it were not your duty to allow yourself to be cast into the sea, +the others could have no right to cast you out; so that, if they did +cast you out, they would clearly be doing not right but wrong. And yet, +as clearly, their wrong-doing would have conduced to the greater +happiness of the greater number, inasmuch as, while only one life could +otherwise have been saved, it would save two, and inasmuch as, +_coeteris paribus_, two persons would necessarily derive twice as much +enjoyment from continued existence as one would. Moreover, their +wrong-doing would be of a kind calculated always to produce similarly +useful results. It cannot, I suppose, be denied that a rule to the +effect that whenever forfeiture of one life would save two, one life +should be sacrificed, would--not exceptionally only, but at large and in +the long run--conduce to the saving of life, and therefore to the +conservation of happiness connected with life. + +The foregoing cases are no doubt both of them extreme, involving +exaction of the largest possible private sacrifice for the general good; +but in all cases of the kind, whether the exaction be small or great, +the same governing principle equally applies. If you, a foot-sore, +homeward-bound pedestrian, on a sweltering July day, were to see your +next-door neighbour driving in the same direction in solitary state, +would you have a right to stop his carriage and force yourself in? Nay, +even though you had just before fallen down and broken your leg, would +the compassionating by-standers be justified in forcing him to take you +in? Or, again, if you were outside a coach during a pelting shower, and +saw a fellow-passenger with a spare umbrella between his legs, while an +unprotected female close beside was being drenched with the rain, would +you have a right to wrest the second umbrella from him, and hold it over +her? That, very likely, is what you would do in the circumstances, and +few would be disposed greatly to blame the indignant ebullition. Still, +unless you are a disciple of Proudhon, you will scarcely pretend that +you can have a right to take possession of another's carriage or +umbrella against the owner's will. You can scarcely suppose that it is +not for him but for you to decide what use shall be made of articles +belonging not to you but to him. Yet there can be no doubt that the +happiness of society would be vastly promoted if everyone felt himself +under an irresistible obligation to assist his neighbour whenever he +could do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, or, +consequently, if external force were always at hand to constrain anyone +so to assist who was unwilling to do so of his own accord. + +So much in proof that among things of the highest and most extensive +utility there are several which it would be decidedly the reverse of +right to do, and several others which it would be perfectly right to +leave undone. I proceed to show that there are many other things not +simply not of preponderating utility, but calculated, on the contrary, +to do more harm than good, to destroy more happiness than they are +capable of creating, which, nevertheless, it would be not simply +allowable to do, but the doing of which would be highly meritorious, +acts possibly of the most exalted virtue. + +Let no one distrust the doctrine of development by reason of its +supposed extravagance of pretension who has not duly considered to what +a sublime of moral beauty the united hideousness and absurdity of +Calvinism may give birth. In that Puritan society of New England of +which Mrs. Beecher Stowe has given so singularly interesting an account +in her 'Minister's Wooing,' and among whose members it was an universal +article of belief that the bulk of mankind are created for the express +purpose of being consigned to everlasting flames, there are said to have +been not a few enthusiasts in whom a self-concentrating creed begat the +very quintessence of self-devotion. 'As a gallant soldier renounces life +and personal aims in the cause of his king and country, and holds +himself ready to be drafted for a forlorn hope, to be shot down, or help +to make a bridge of his mangled body, over which the more fortunate +shall pass to victory and glory,' so among the early descendants of the +Pilgrim Fathers many an one 'regarded himself as devoted to the King +Eternal, ready in his hands to be used to illustrate and build up an +eternal commonwealth, either by being sacrificed as a lost spirit, or +glorified as a redeemed one; ready to throw, not merely his mortal life, +but his immortality even, into the forlorn hope, to bridge, with a +never-dying soul, the chasm over which white-robed victors should pass +to a commonwealth of glory and splendour, whose vastness should dwarf +the misery of all the lost to an infinitesimal.' And while by many the +idea of suffering everlasting pains for the glory of God, and the good +of being in general, was thus contemplated with equanimity, there were +some few for whom the idea of so suffering for the good of others dearer +than themselves would have been greeted with positive exultation. 'And +don't I care for your soul, James?' exclaims Mary Scudder to her lover. +'If I could take my hopes of heaven out of my own heart and give them to +you, I would. Dr. H. preached last Sunday on the text, "I could wish +myself accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen," and he went on +to show how we must be willing to give up even our own salvation, if +necessary, for the good of others. People said it was a hard doctrine, +but I could feel my way through it. Yes, I would give my soul for yours. +I wish I could.' Now we must on no account permit admiration of Miss +Scudder's transcendent generosity in desiring to make this exchange +blind us to the fatal effect on social happiness which, if such +exchange were possible, the prevalence of a disposition to make it could +not fail to have. If Calvinism were true instead of blasphemous, if God +were really the Moloch it represents Him, and if, moreover, Moloch were +indifferent as to which of his offspring were cast into the fire, caring +only that the prescribed number of victims should be forthcoming in full +tale, nothing can be conceived more likely to prove an encouragement to +evil-doers, and a terror to them that did well, than observation that +well-doing not infrequently led to eternal misery, and evil-doing to +eternal bliss. Again, if in China, where criminals under sentence of +death are permitted, if they can, by purchase or otherwise, to procure +substitutes to die in their stead, a son were to propose to die for a +parent base enough to take advantage of the offer, could any arrangement +be more plainly repugnant to the common-weal than that by which society +would thus lose one of its noblest, instead of getting rid of one of its +vilest members? Or, when in England, a thrifty son, by consenting to cut +the entail of an estate to which he is heir-apparent, enables a prodigal +father to consume in riotous living substance which would otherwise have +eventually become his, is he not clearly taking the worse course for the +public by permitting the property to be wasted, instead of causing it to +be husbanded? + +Beyond all question, American Puritan, Chinese or English devotee to +filial affection, would thus, each in her or his degree, have, in the +circumstances supposed, acted in a manner opposed to the general +interest, and would therefore be condemned by Utilitarianism as having +acted immorally. Nor could this verdict be gainsaid if utility and +morality were, as Utilitarianism assumes them to be, one and the same +thing. Clearly, that the just should suffer for the unjust, the innocent +for the guilty, is diametrically opposed to the welfare of society; +wherefore, according to utilitarian principles, by consenting so to +suffer, the just becomes unjust, the innocent renders himself guilty. +But can there be a better proof that utilitarian principles are unsound +than that this should be a legitimate deduction from them? Can there be +better proof that utility and morality are not identical, but two +absolutely distinct things? Plainly, there can be no meritorious or +commendable immorality; neither can there be any virtue which is not +meritorious and commendable. Is there, then, no merit, nothing +commendable, in accepting ruin or in volunteering to die temporarily, or +to perish everlastingly, in order to save a fellow-creature from ruin, +or death, or perdition? Does not such conduct, considered independently +and without reference either to its utility or its hurtfulness, command +our instantaneous and enthusiastic admiration? But how, being so +admirable, can it be immoral? how other than virtuous? What else is it, +indeed, but the very perfection of that purest virtue which, content to +be its own reward, deliberately cuts itself off from all other +recompense? Without changing the immemorial meaning of the most familiar +words, there is no avoiding the obvious answers to these questions. If +virtue and morality, right and wrong, are to continue to mean anything +like that which, except by Utilitarians, has always been considered to +be their only meaning, it is not simply not wrong, it is not simply +right, it is among the highest achievements of virtue and morality to +sacrifice your own in order to secure another's happiness, and the +disinterestedness, and therefore the virtue, is surely the greater, +rather than less, if you sacrifice more happiness of your own than you +secure to another. So much follows necessarily from what has been said, +and something more besides. It follows further that Utilitarianism is +not less in error in declaring that actions calculated to diminish the +total sum of happiness must necessarily be wrong, cannot possibly be +allowable, still less meritorious, than it had previously been shown to +be in declaring that actions calculated to augment the sum total of +happiness must necessarily be meritorious. + +There is but one way in which Utilitarianism can even temporarily rebut +the charge of fallacy, of which otherwise it must here stand convicted, +and that is by renouncing all claim to be a new system of ethics, and +not pretending to be more than a new system of nomenclature. And even +so, it could not help contradicting, and thereby refuting itself. That +nothing is right but what is of preponderating utility; that whatever is +of preponderating utility is right; these are propositions perfectly +intelligible, indeed, but which will be found to be tenable only on +condition that the very same things may be both right and wrong. The +confusion, thrice confounded, inseparable from the substitution of such +novel definitions for those which had previously been universally in +vogue, is but the smaller of two evils which must thence arise. It would +be bad enough that the word 'right' could not be used without raising +doubt whether what people had previously understood by the 'just' or the +'generous,' or only the 'expedient' were meant; but a still worse +consequence would be that, even if no doubt of the sort were +entertained, and if all men were agreed to take the word in none but its +utilitarian sense, the landmarks of right and wrong would thereby be +well nigh obliterated. Due credit has already been given to +Utilitarianism for its exemplary zeal in inculcating the practice of +virtue, but its merit in that respect is more than neutralised by its +equally zealous inculcation of principles, according to which it is +impossible to decide beforehand whether any particular practice will be +virtuous or not. + +This is my second charge against Utilitarianism. I maintain it to be a +doctrine in most of its essentials erroneous; but I maintain, further, +that, even if it were correct, instead of furnishing us with an +infallible criterion of right and wrong, it would deprive us of the +means of clearly distinguishing between right and wrong at all times at +which the power of so distinguishing is of practical value. Bluntly +enough, I have pronounced it to be false. With equal bluntness, I now +add that, even if it were true, it would, all the same, be practically +mischievous, and directly opposed to the very utility from which it +takes its name. The argument in support of this charge shall now be +stated. + +According to utilitarian ethics, the morality of actions depends wholly +and solely on their consequences. On this point the language of +authority is distinct, emphatic, unanimous, and self-contradictory. +'Utilitarian moralists,' says the chief amongst them, 'have gone beyond +all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the +morality of an action.... He who saves a fellow-creature from drowning +does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of +being paid for his trouble.' Upon which I would observe, in passing, +that to save a fellow-creature from drowning can be deemed to be +necessarily right by none but uncompromising opponents of capital +punishment. Most others will be disposed to doubt its having been a +sufficient reason for commuting the sentence of death passed upon the +murderer of Dhuleep Sing's gamekeeper, that, owing to physical +malformation, hanging might perhaps have given him more than ordinary +pain in the neck, or perhaps have prolonged the pleasure which, +according to the select few qualified to speak from experience, is +attendant on that mode of strangulation. Neither, without sacrificing +his judgment to his feelings, could one of these doubters, if Rutherford +had been sentenced to be drowned instead of hanged, have stretched out a +hand to save the miscreant from the watery grave he so richly deserved. +That there are no actions which by reason of their beneficial +consequences are always and invariably moral, might be too much to +affirm; but I have no hesitation in saying that there are thousands, the +morality or immorality of which--their results remaining the +same--depends absolutely on their motives. Thus, if two doctors--of +whom, for distinction's sake, we will call one Smethurst and the other +Smith--in attendance on patients afflicted with precisely the same +disease, were by the administration of overdoses of strychnine each to +kill his man, the only difference between them being that whereas one +intended and expected to kill, the other hoped to cure--would the act of +killing be equally immoral in both cases? Would it not in the one case +be murder, in the other mere error of judgment; and would both be +equally crimes, or would the latter be in any degree criminal? And if it +had been Smethurst instead of Smith who committed the error of +judgment--if the overdoses by which he had meant to kill had happened to +cure--would his error of judgment have thereby been rendered moral, +notwithstanding that his motive was murder? + +The same great teacher, who so strenuously insists that the motive has +nothing to do with the morality of an action, does indeed go on to say +that it has 'much to do with the worth of the agent.' Here, however, I +confess myself unable to follow him. That an act may possess morality +independent of the agent, may be intelligible on the assumption that +morality means simply utility, and nothing more; but how, even then, +worth can be evinced by the performance of an immoral action, is beyond +my comprehension, except upon the further assumption that there may be +worth in immorality. + +Waiving, however, these and all other objections, let us for the moment, +and for the sake of argument, assume that morality and utility are +really one and the same thing, that the right or wrong of an act depends +entirely on its results, and then let us observe how utterly without +rudder or compass to assist him in steering correctly will be the +best-intentioned navigator of the ocean of life. + +We can seldom, if ever, be quite sure what will be the result of our +conduct. Meaning to cure, we may only too probably kill; meaning to +kill, we may not impossibly cure. Until a thing is done, we cannot +determine as to its utility; nor, consequently, in an utilitarian sense, +as to the morality of doing it. We must trust implicitly to our skill in +calculating events, and if that skill happen to fail us, our conduct may +become culpable. With the most earnest desire to act righteously, we can +only guess beforehand whether what we propose doing will turn out to be +righteous, and can never be sure, therefore, that we are not going to do +something wicked. + +Here I shall, of course, and very properly, be reminded that what +Utilitarianism requires to be taken into account, are not merely the +probable consequences of some proposed act, but the usual consequences +of all acts of the same description; so that its disciples, instead of +being left to their conjectures about the future, may be said to have +all past experience to refer to. And undeniably Utilitarianism does +require this; thereby, however, contradicting itself as, I just now +hinted, it would presently be found doing. It does indeed declare those +actions only to be moral which in the long run are conducive to, or at +least not opposed to, the general happiness; but it also says that the +morality of each particular action depends on its own particular +consequences. So that the docile disciple who should do something which, +though useful in the long run, happened to be otherwise in his +particular case--who, for instance, should save the life of a +fellow-creature of whom it would have been well for the world to be rid, +would, to his disgust and bewilderment, find that while, with no desire +but that of acting rightly, he had been obeying one utilitarian law, he +had nevertheless been infringing another law of the same code, and +thereby acting wrongly. + +Overlooking, however, this incongruity of two equally authoritative +rules, let us proceed to consider what dangerous latitude of +interpretation is allowed to the followers of either of them. Those who +believe that the merit or demerit of each separate action depends on +that action's separate consequences, need seldom be at a loss for a +pretext for committing the most heinous of crimes. A husband who, hating +his wife, had his hate returned, and loving another woman, had his love +returned, might plausibly reason thus within himself: The prescribed +objects of life are the multiplication of happiness and the diminution +of misery; here are three of us, all doomed to be miserable as long as +we all three live; but the wretchedness of two of us might be at once +converted into happiness, if the third were put out of the way. By some +such logical process, Queen Mary and Bothwell may have satisfied +themselves of the propriety of blowing up Darnley: Mr. and Mrs. Manning, +as they sate at meat with their destined victim over his ready-made +grave, may have argued themselves into self-approval of the crowning +rite with which their hospitalities were to terminate: any scampish +apprentice with designs upon his master's till, any burglar plotting an +entry into a goldsmith's shop, may become convinced of his rectitude of +purpose, and even take credit for public-spirited zeal, in seeking to +appropriate to his own use part of another's wealth, which he may fairly +suppose would be productive of more enjoyment if divided between two or +more than if left in the hands of one, and that one already perhaps the +possessor of more than he knows what to do with. + +Precisely the same sophistry will not indeed suffice for those disciples +who, adopting the alternative law of the utilitarian code, feel bound to +attend to the consequences not of individual actions, but of classes of +actions. The cleverest self-deceiver can scarcely bring himself to +believe that, because it might suit his personal convenience to kill or +steal, killing and stealing would not be prejudicial to society if +generally practised. Still, it is only necessary to have, or to fancy +one has, public instead of private objects in view, in order to be able +to look with approbation, from an utilitarian point of view, on any +amount of homicide or robbery. It was the very same Robespierre that, +while as yet diocesan judge at Arras, felt constrained to abdicate +because, 'behold, one day comes a culprit whose crime merits hanging, +and strict-minded, strait-laced Max's conscience will not permit the +dooming of any son of Adam to die,' who, shortly after, when +sufficiently imbued with the utilitarian spirit, was fully prepared to +wade through floods of slaughter towards the enthronisation of his +principles--one of those principles evidently being that, if the +decimation of mankind would conduce to the greater happiness of the +residue, adding more to the happiness of the nine-tenths whom it spared +than it took from the tenth whom it destroyed, the said decimation would +be a duty incumbent on any one possessed of power to perpetrate it. + +Nor are principles like these appealed to only by those who have +recourse to them for the vindication of their own procedure. At those +_petits-soupers_--bachelors' dinners is their modern English name, +_noctes coenaeque deum_ their ancient classical--for which some of our +London clubs are deservedly celebrated, and with which the Garrick in +especial is, in my mind, gratefully associated--at those choice +gatherings of congenial spirits, conversation, changing from gay to +grave, turns not unfrequently, among other lofty topics, on that which +we are here discussing. Then, even at such divine symposium, one at +least of the guests is pretty sure to take the part of devil's advocate, +and to exercise his forensic skill in showing how easily interchangeable +are the names of virtue and iniquity, crime and well-doing. September +massacres then find, not their apologist, but their eulogist. _Noyades_ +of Carrier, _fusilades_ of Collot d'Herbois, are cited as examples very +suitable for imitation in adequate emergencies. Prussia's seizure, on +behalf of Germany, of Schleswig and Holstein, on pretence of their being +not Danish, but German, and her subsequent retention of them for herself +on the plea of their having always been not German, but Danish, are +applauded as acts perfectly consistent with each other and with the +eternal fitness of things. And all this is urged in the best possible +faith. Of the recited enormities, were not some, steps to the +regeneration of France--others, to the unifaction of Germany? And what +are myriads of lives in comparison with a regenerate--what violation of +the most solemn engagements in comparison with a united, people? Did not +the millions of Frenchmen who survived the Reign of Terror gain more +than was lost by the thousands who were guillotined at Paris, or drowned +at Nantes, or shot down at Lyons? Is not Germany likely to turn Kiel to +far better account than Denmark ever did or could have done? and will +not German ascendency be abundant compensation for Danish decadence? How +culpably misplaced, then, were conscientious scruples that would have +impeded the march of events in such directions! Ends need but to be +great enough to justify any means. Let but the good promise to exceed +the evil, and there is no evil which ought not to be done in order that +good may come of it. Thus slightly qualified, the Satanic adage, 'Evil, +be thou my good,' is, without more ado, accepted as the utilitarian +watchword. + +And what though it be only the most thorough-paced Utilitarians who go +these extreme lengths? These lengths, extreme as they are, are +legitimate deductions from tenets held in common by the most moderate +and cautious as well as by the most reckless of the sect. Crime in the +abstract is condemned not less vehemently by the latter than by the +former; but by both equally it is condemned on account, not of its +inherent vileness, but solely of its observed results. If the results +were different, the agency to which they are due would be fitted with a +different epithet. If a world could be conceived to be so organised, or, +if this world of ours could be conceived to be so changed as that the +practice of killing, stealing, or telling lies would be conducive to the +general good, the practice in question would obtain a new name in the +Utilitarian vocabulary. Crime would become beneficence; and to kill, to +steal, or to tell lies would be not wrong, but right. These are +propositions which, without abjuring the prime articles of his creed, +the most timid Utilitarian has no alternative but to endorse; but how, +then, can he shut his eyes to their obvious application? How presume to +rebuke those earnest philanthropists, who, to judge from their habitual +language, are firmly of opinion that annihilation of one half of mankind +would be a small price to pay for conversion of the other moiety into +citizens of a world-wide Red Republic; or those admirers of Prince +Bismarck, who, holding national aggrandisement to be the national +_summum bonum_, deem the most solemn treaties that might impede it to be +obstacles which it is obligatory on a patriot to set aside? Will not the +effects of any given cause vary with the changes in the circumstances in +which the cause acts? May it not easily happen that the direct effect of +some private crime shall be to augment, instead of to diminish the total +happiness of all the persons affected by it? And is it not, then, +conceivable that a public crime, provided it be of sufficient magnitude, +may more than counterpoise, by the good it is calculated to do, all the +harm that all crimes of the same description either have done or are +likely to do hereafter? It is idle to reply that such a comparison +between public good and evil must needs be mistaken: that the harm, for +instance, which violation of treaties does to mankind by sapping the +foundations of international confidence, rendering impossible +international co-operation, and bringing the very name of international +morality into contempt, is infinitely beyond any good it can do in the +shape of national aggrandisement. Whether this be so or not is matter of +opinion, on which every one may fairly insist on forming his own, and if +that opinion be in the negative, a utilitarian agent, in Prince +Bismarck's circumstances, would be bound in duty to imitate Prince +Bismarck's high-handed policy. In all circumstances of international +import, in all cases bearing upon the general interests of society, a +Utilitarian, after deciding according to his lights which of the various +courses open to him would best promote the general welfare, either +immediately by its direct effects, or subsequently and indirectly by the +example it would set, would be bound in duty to adopt that course. That +course, however wrong it might have appeared in all previous cases, +would now become right, as being apparently the one most conducive to +the future welfare of mankind. Utilitarianism's standard of morality +thus turns out to be, not any fixed and definite notion of expediency, +but one liable to change with every change in individual judgment. Its +boasted criterion of the right or wrong of an action is the best +conjecture which the agent, with or without extrinsic advice, is able to +form of the future consequences of the action. Utilitarian law, in +short, resolves itself into this--that every man shall be a law unto +himself. Of course no Utilitarians will acknowledge this to be their +law, not even those who shape their conduct in exact conformity to it. +Nevertheless, that such is the law follows necessarily from their own +premises. For does not Utilitarianism sometimes--a little heedlessly, +perhaps, but not the less positively--declare that the morality of an +action depends not at all upon its motives, but exclusively upon its +consequences? Does it not, when most guarded in its language, affirm the +morality of actions to depend upon their tendencies, that is to say, on +their consequences at large, and in the long run? But there can never be +perfect certainty as to consequences. With regard to the future, +plausible conjecture is the utmost possible; and by differing judgments +different conjectures will needs be made. So that the value of the rule +of conduct furnished by Utilitarianism to any individual depends upon +the latter's ability, supplemented by that of any counsellors whom he +may consult, to forecast events. He cannot proceed correctly, except in +so far as he or they have the gift of prophecy. However dull his vision +may be, he must content himself with his own blind guidance, unless he +prefer as guide some one who, for aught he can tell, may be as blind as +himself. And it is always for himself to judge whether he will follow +advice: so that in effect every Utilitarian is his own moral law-giver; +and, certainly, a worse assignment of legislative functions cannot be +imagined. + +But the mischievousness of Utilitarianism does not stop here. We have +seen how one of its principles destroys the landmarks between right and +wrong, between virtue and vice, causing each to take continually the +place of its opposite. We have now to see how another of its principles +obliterates all distinctions between different kinds of virtue, +confounding them in one indiscriminate mass, and imparting to them a +sort of general oneness not more lucid than that which, according to +Mr. Curdle, is the essence of the dramatic unities. + +The object which it insists upon as conduct's end and aim is the general +good--the greatest possible aggregate of good or happiness for all. As +the Scriptures enjoin us, whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, +to do all to the glory of God, so Utilitarianism exhorts us to do all +for the welfare of mankind. Now, far be it from me to caricature this +soul-inspiring rule by forcing it, under a strained construction, to an +unnatural extreme. Fairly examined, it will be seen to make no +extravagant demands on our self-denial. As Christianity, even while +bidding us to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, +promises that all other things shall be added unto us, so +Utilitarianism, even while insisting on our seeking first to please +others, permits, nay, directs, us to take as much pleasure for ourselves +as we can lay hold of without depriving others, since the aggregate of +happiness which it is incumbent upon us to augment to the best of our +ability would otherwise be less. Nay, for the same reason, it +disapproves of our foregoing any pleasure of our own, the full +equivalent of which is not transferred to others. The happiness which it +requires us to attend to is that of a society of which each of us is a +component member, and no member of which can deny himself any pleasure +within his reach, and beyond the reach of others, without diminishing +the total of happiness which the whole society might enjoy. 'As between +his own happiness and that of others,' says Mr. Mill, 'Utilitarianism +requires an agent to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and +benevolent spectator.' Thus qualified, the prescribed subordination of +one's own to the general good is no such extravagantly self-denying +ordinance. If for anything, it might rather be reproached for its cold, +calculating equity. With reference quite as much to individual as to +communal happiness it is an excellent rule of conduct, against which not +a word could be said, provided only it were left to be adopted +voluntarily, and were not authoritatively imposed. + +Unfortunately, however, Utilitarianism allows no option in the matter. +Unless we do our very utmost to promote the general weal, at whatever +sacrifice to ourselves, it charges us with sin of omission. In the words +of one of the ablest among able Editors, 'justice is the social idea in +its highest, widest, and most binding expression.... It signifies the +moral principle which obliges each so to shape his conduct and +relations, his claims and his achievements, that they harmonise with the +highest good of all.'[4] To which doctrine of Mr. Morley's, if other +Utilitarians do not subscribe, it can only be because they are less +resolutely logical. Mr. Mill, indeed, though dissenting in appearance on +this point from Mr. Morley, agrees with him in substance. Even when on +one occasion, distinguishing between duty and virtue, he says that there +are innumerable acts and forbearances of human beings which, though +either causes or hindrances of good to their fellow-creatures, lie +beyond the domain of duty, and within that of virtue or merit, he goes +on to assign as the sole reason for placing them in the domain of the +latter that, in respect to them, it is, on the whole, for the general +interest that people should be left free, thereby plainly intimating +that society would be equitably entitled to insist on them if it thought +proper. But conduct that can be equitably insisted on is clearly, in the +strictest sense, duty; and it would be preposterous to claim merit for +doing that which it would be a breach of duty to leave undone. Duties do +not cease to be duties because he on whom they are incumbent is not +compelled under penalty to perform them, any more than debts cease to be +debts because creditors do not choose to ask for payment. All consistent +utilitarian teaching points inflexibly towards Mr. Morley's conclusion, +according to which justice and social virtue are absolutely identical, +and according to which, also, whoever does not shape his 'conduct, &c., +in harmony with the highest good of all,' does less than is due from +him, while it is impossible for him to do more. For whatever he propose +to do must either be or not be in the prescribed harmony. If it be, he +is bound to do it. If not, he is bound not to do it. The very utmost he +can do is no more than is incumbent upon him. Less than his very utmost +is less than is incumbent. No action of his, therefore, can possess any +merit; for mere fulfilment of obligations is reckoned not of grace, but +of debt. Having done everything, he is still but an unprofitable +servant; he has but done that which was his duty to do. Where, then, is +the boast of virtue? It is excluded. By what law? By that of +Utilitarianism, set forth in its full amplitude. Honesty and generosity, +faith, truth, charity, patient endurance, and chivalrous self-devotion, +all are mingled together under the name of justice, and justice itself +only remains just as long as it remains identical with the largest +expediency. + +At this rate we cannot possibly have any virtue to plume ourselves upon. +The best we can do being no more than our duly, the only reward we can +claim is exemption from the punishment we should have deserved if we had +not done it. Whether it be that we have abstained from killing or +robbing our fellow-citizens for our own advantage, or have impoverished +or half-killed ourselves in the service of the State, our meed is the +same. _Loris non ureris. Non pasces in cruce corvos_, is what we are +told. We may congratulate ourselves on having escaped the +cat-o'-nine-tails and the gallows. Well, we have, most of us, so much +self-sufficiency, that to deprive us of all ground for it might be a +fault on the right side. But now comes a second and more awkward +reflection. If you will not of your own accord do your duty, those to +whom performance of the duty is owing have a right to use means to make +you--foul means if fair means will not avail. If, then, you hesitate to +do your utmost for the interests of society, society is warranted in +taking measures to accelerate your movement. If you are not, or what is +practically the same thing, if a numerical majority of your +fellow-citizens think you are not, making the most beneficial use of +your property; if it be generally considered that it would be for the +greater good of the greater number to divide your park and garden into +peasant properties and cottage allotments, to double the wages of the +workmen in your employment, or to subject you and the likes of you to a +graduated income tax for the purpose of setting up national workshops to +compete with you in your own trade; and, if you do not readily enter +into the same views, then the said numerical majority are not simply +warranted in taking the law into their own hands and doing, in spite of +you, what they think ought to be done with your property, but would be +culpably remiss if they neglected so to act. + +Now it is needless to dwell on the extent to which that large numerical +majority of our fellow-citizens which consists of the working classes is +imbued with this notion, nor, except to those who are similarly imbued, +can it be necessary to insist that there is no notion of which it is +more indispensable to disabuse the working-class mind. This, +accordingly, I strove to do throughout a recent work of mine, 'On +Labour,' particularly in the chapter which treats of the claims and +rights thereof. I there earnestly pleaded that there may be, and are, +private rights independent of utility which no public needs can cancel; +that all which any man, or set of men, is entitled to exact from another +is payment or fulfilment of what is due to him or them from that other; +that unless the poverty of the many has been caused by the few, the many +are not warranted in extorting relief of their wants from the few; that +the mere circumstance of their being without food or work does not +entitle the poor to be fed or employed by the rich, for that there is +likewise a justice independent of and superior to utility, consisting +simply of respect for rights, while injustice consists simply of +violation of rights. + +In so arguing, I ran directly counter to Utilitarianism, provoking +thereby a retaliatory assault from Utilitarianism's tutelary champion, +who, as readers of the 'Fortnightly Review'[5] are aware, bore down upon +me with an energy no whit the less effective for being tempered with all +knightly courtesy. Yet, not to say it vaingloriously, I am not conscious +of having been shaken in the saddle, and I now return to the encounter +with modest assurance, firmly believing mine to be the better cause, and +recollecting too that in a contest with Mr. Mill, let the issue be what +it may, I may at least comfort myself with the reflection + + Minus turpe vinci quam contendisse decorum. + +I must at the outset be permitted to remark that one or two of Mr. +Mill's objections to my statements are based upon misconception of their +meaning. I never questioned, but, on the contrary, have always in the +distinctest terms admitted that society is perfectly at liberty to put +an end to the institution of property in land. No extremest Socialist +ever went beyond me in proclaiming that the 'earth was bestowed by the +Creator, not on any privileged class or classes, but on all mankind and +on all successive generations of men, so that no one generation can have +more than a life interest in the soil, or be entitled to alienate the +birthright of succeeding generations.'[6] No one more fully recognises +that property in land exists only on sufferance and by concession, and +that society, which made the concession, may at any moment take it back +on giving full compensation to the concessioners. + +Again, when asserting the inviolability of moveable, as distinguished +from landed, property, I was careful to limit the assertion to property +honestly acquired. I never supposed it possible to acquire by +prescription 'a fee simple in an injustice.' Only, if in any particular +instance it be suspected that property has been acquired by force, +fraud, or robbery, I contend that the _onus probandi_ lies on him who +raises the question. It is for him to show, if he can, that a commercial +fortune has, as Mr. Mill suggests, been built up by 'jobbing contracts, +profligate loans, or other reprehensible practices.' But if this cannot +be shown, the validity of the actual possessor's title must not be +impugned. Property must be treated as of innocent acquisition and +derivation until proved to be of guilty. And that not merely because +there could otherwise be no rights of property at all, since it must +always be impossible for any owner to demonstrate that neither he nor +any one of those from whom he derives ever either overreached in a +bargain or failed in a contract; but also, and much more, because +whether a person be or be not the rightful owner of the wealth in his +possession, no one can possibly be entitled to despoil him unless the +wealth can be shown to have been ill-gotten. That right must be held to +be complete with which no one can show a right to interfere. + +The gravest, however, of Mr. Mill's criticisms is that mine is 'a +doctrine _a priori_, claiming to command assent by its own light, and to +be evident by simple intuition.' This is an imputation to which I am so +unaware of having laid myself open that I can account for its having +been made only on the supposition that Mr. Mill, in common with most +other Utilitarians, imagines that their only opponents are +Intuitionists, and that it is only necessary to set aside the tenets of +these in order to get their own established instead. If this were really +the case, utilitarian advocacy would be a comparatively easy task. +Intuitionism, whether capable or not of being disproved, is by its +nature unsusceptible of decisive proof. If I, in support of the +proposition that there is in the human mind an intuitive sense of any +sort, were to assert that I had such a sense while you denied that you +had, it would be impossible for me to prove you to be mistaken, while, +unless you were mistaken as to your individual experience, I should +clearly be mistaken as to the generalisation which I had based upon +mine. But I never said a word about an intuitive sense of right and +wrong. How could I, seeing, as no one who chooses to look can fail to +see, that the instincts of untutored children prompt them to disregard +all rights but their own, to spit cockchafers, rob birds' nests, and +confiscate younger children's cakes and apples? All I say is that there +may be and are rights independent of and even opposed to utility, and +these, for reasons which shall immediately be stated, I call natural +rights; but I do not say that they are intuitively perceived. As for +sense of justice or of duty, or moral sense or faculty, what I +understand by that is not recognition of certain rights or duties as +such, but recognition of the obligation to respect whatever rights +and to fulfil whatever duties are recognised, according to which +definition it is mere tautology to add that the sense or faculty in +question originates simultaneously with the recognition of any rights +or duties. For inasmuch as rights invariably imply corresponding +obligations--inasmuch as if a thing be rightfully claimed, that same +thing must needs be due or owing, it is of course impossible to perceive +that a thing is _owing_ without perceiving at the same moment that it +_ought_ to be paid. On this account, and with this explanation, I should +not scruple to speak of the moral sense as intuitive; but if for that +reason I am to be called an Intuitionist, so equally must Mr. Mill, for +he has said precisely the same thing. He likewise has said that 'the +moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural out-growth from +it, capable, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously.' + + +II. + +By my avowal of a belief in 'Natural Rights,' I feel that I must have +incurred in philosophic quarters a sort of civil contempt, which I am +very desirous of removing, and which will, I trust, be somewhat +diminished on my proceeding to explain how few and elementary are the +rights that I propose for naturalisation. They are but two in number, +and they are these:--(1) Absolute right, except in so far as the same +may have been forfeited by misconduct or modified by consent, to deal in +any way one pleases, not noxious to other people, with one's own self or +person; (2) right equally absolute to dispose similarly of the produce +either of one's own honest industry, or of that of others whose rights +in connection with it have been honestly acquired by oneself. I call +these 'rights,' because there cannot possibly anywhere exist either the +right to prevent their being exercised, or any rights with which they +can clash, and because, therefore, by their freest exercise, no one can +possibly be wronged, while to interfere with their exercise would be to +wrong their possessor. And I call them 'natural,' because they are not +artificially created, and have no need of external ratification. Whoever +thinks proper to deny this--whoever, as all Utilitarians do, contends +that society is entitled to interfere with the rights which I have +called natural, is bound to attempt to show how society became so +entitled; when for the claim he puts forward on society's behalf he will +find it impossible to produce any plausible pretext, without crediting +society with possession of a right belonging to that same 'natural' +class, the existence of which he denies. For, as there can be no rights +without corresponding obligations or duties, if it be really the right +of society to deal at its discretion with the persons or effects of +individuals, it must be incumbent on individuals to permit themselves +and whatever is theirs to be so dealt with. Have, then, individuals +incurred any such obligation? No obligation, be it remembered, can +arise, except through some antecedent act of one or other or both of the +parties concerned. Either a pledge of some sort must have been given or +a benefit of some sort must have been received. Now undoubtedly there +are no limits to the extent to which society and its individual members +might have reciprocally pledged themselves. It might have been +stipulated by their articles of association that society at large should +do its utmost for the welfare of each of its members, and that each of +its members should do his utmost for the welfare of society at large. +But it is certain, either that no such compact ever was made, or that, +if made, it has always been systematically set at nought. Society has +never made much pretence of troubling itself about the welfare of +individuals, except in certain specified particulars; so that, even if +individuals had, on condition of being treated with reciprocal +solicitude, accepted the obligation of attending to the welfare of +society in other than the same particulars, that conditional obligation +would from the commencement have been null and void. The one thing which +society invariably pledges itself to do is to protect person and +property, and by implication to enforce performance of contracts; and +the two things which individual associates in turn pledge themselves to +do are to abstain from molesting each other's persons and property, and +to assist society in protecting both. In so abstaining and so assisting +consist all those 'many acts and the still greater number of +forbearances, the perpetual practice of which by all is,' as Mr. Mill +says, 'universally deemed to be so necessary to the general well-being, +that people must be held to it compulsorily, either by law or by social +pressure.'[7] Under one or other of these two heads may be ranged +everything that individuals owe to society in return for the mere +protection which they receive from it. + +True, there is an universal understanding that individuals shall be +subject to any laws, whether wise or foolish, provided only they be of +equal and impartial operation, which may be enacted by a numerical +majority of the community to which the individuals belong; and in this +manner individuals may become bound by any number of miscellaneous +pledges, society acquiring simultaneously the right to hold individuals +to the performance of those pledges. Thus, if by the vote of an +unimpeachably representative House of Commons it were declared to be for +the general good, and agreed to accordingly, that every one should be +vaccinated or circumcised, it would be incumbent on every one to submit +quietly to vaccination or circumcision, however deleterious the +operation might be deemed by some. Or if, improving upon a hypothetical +suggestion of Mr. Mill, a parliament elected by constituencies in which +the labouring-class element greatly predominated, should prospectively +forbid the accumulation by any individual of property beyond a specified +amount, then, though the almost certain consequence would be that the +prescribed limit of accumulation would not be exceeded, still if it were +exceeded, the accumulator could not justly complain when the surplus was +forfeited according to law. Yet even thus the obligations or duties +created will correspond exactly with the pledges given; none will be +incurred except such as have been imposed by special legislation--nor +even those, unless the legislation have been impartial. A law requiring +people to pay poor's-rates would not suffice as a pretext for requiring +them to pay education rates likewise. Neither if, instead of passing the +prospective law just now supposed, a governing majority which had +previously always permitted the indefinite accumulation of wealth, were +retrospectively to decree the forfeiture of all past accumulations +beyond a defined amount, would individuals be morally bound to submit to +such a decree if they could contrive to evade it, any more than +sexquipedalians would be bound to lay their heads on the block in +obedience to a law directing everybody six feet high to be decapitated. +All such partial legislation would be tyrannical, and circumstances must +be very peculiar indeed to make submission to tyranny a duty. But of all +conceivable legislation, none could possibly be more partial, or +therefore more tyrannical, than such as should give to society a general +power of dealing at its pleasure with its associates, and of arbitrarily +subjecting separate classes or individuals to exceptional treatment. +Even, therefore, if a law to such monstrous effect were enacted, it +could have no morally binding force. It would be no one's duty to +acquiesce in it. + +I will not here stop to dispute, though I am not sure that I could +without some slight reservation admit, that the receipt of unasked-for +benefits places the recipient under precisely the same obligation to +benefit his benefactor, as if the good received by him had been +conferred on express condition of his availing himself of the first +opportunity to render equal good. I will not stop to dispute, for +instance, that a person saved from drowning at the risk of his own +rescuer's life, would be bound, on occasion arising, to risk his own +life in order to save his former rescuer's. For my immediate purpose, it +may suffice to remark that society has never been in the habit of +showing such parental solicitude for its component members as would +warrant its claiming filial devotion from them. In the matter of +philanthropy its practice has never been in advance of its very moderate +professions. It has invariably contented itself with rendering certain +specific services, never failing to exact in return fully equivalent +services of each species. + +In candour, however, there must be admitted to be innumerable blessings +not yet adverted to, including indeed most of those by the possession of +which man is distinguished from brutes, for which he is in so far +indebted to society that, but for the instrumentality of society, they +would never have been his. Unless individuals had formed themselves into +communities, civilization could have made no sensible progress: there +could have been no considerable advances, material, intellectual, moral, +or aesthetic. Not only should we have been destitute of all the comforts +and luxuries that now surround us, we should have lacked also whatever +cerebral development we have attained, together with all its +concomitants and consequences; whatever of intelligence, or moral +perceptiveness, or artistic taste we have to boast of. Still, though +none of these faculties could have made much approach to maturity except +under the shelter of society, they are not gifts of society. Without the +help of a plough, land cannot be ploughed; but we do not therefore +credit the ploughmaker with the achievements of the ploughman. Neither +is society to take to itself praise because its members have made good +use of the protection which, in consideration of stipulated services on +their part, it has afforded them. Besides, whatever we inherit from +society, we inherit from a society of members no longer in being. Let +the dead come to life again, and it may then become us to examine their +claims upon our gratitude, but we need not meanwhile confound past and +present generations, nor our forefathers with our contemporaries. To the +mass of these latter, at any rate, we are none of us indebted for our +brains or our aptitudes of thought and feeling, and the circumstance of +our being joint sharers with them in patrimony bequeathed by a common +ancestry, affords no very obvious reason why our share of the +inheritance, together with whatever else we possess, should be at their +absolute disposal. + +Thus it appears that in no one of the ways in which alone can +originate the obligations which must always precede or accompany +artificially-created rights, has that particular obligation arisen +without which it is impossible for society to obtain artificially the +right of preventing individuals from doing as they will with their own. +No sufficient pledge has been given by one side, no sufficient benefit +conferred by the other. Individuals never agreed to place their all at +the disposal of society; society never rendered to individuals any +services entitling it to claim such boundless gratitude. One service +which it invariably undertakes is that of protecting person and +property. This is its chief and primary duty, the fulfilment of which is +always the first object of its institution, often the only one it +acknowledges. But clearly it cannot by performance of a duty acquire the +right of doing the exact reverse of that duty. It cannot by protecting +acquire the right of molesting. It cannot by preventing person and +property from being meddled with, acquire in its corporate capacity the +right of itself meddling. Since then this right of meddling, this right +of disposing of what is exclusively some individual's own, otherwise +than the owner wishes, has not been acquired by society artificially, it +must, if it do actually belong to society, have been come by naturally; +and this accordingly is what Utilitarians really, though perhaps +unconsciously, assume, treating moreover this gratuitous assumption of +theirs as a self-evident truth. + +For, as Utilitarians themselves cannot fail on reflection to perceive, +they offer no shadow of argument in support of that 'greatest happiness +principle' on which their whole system rests. Commencing with the +undeniable postulate that happiness is the sole object of existence, and +perceiving that individual happiness alone would be a very misleading +object, they proceed to take quietly for granted that the only happiness +at which life ought to aim is social happiness. Now, undoubtedly social +happiness is of more importance than individual happiness--the happiness +of many than that of one or a few; neither can there be any worthier +object of pursuit than the greatest happiness of the greatest number. +All this is seen without being said, but what is by no means so easily +seen is how it can be incumbent on any one to pursue that object to his +own detriment--how it can be imperative on one or on a few to sacrifice +his or their happiness in order to promote that of the many. Plainly +such self-devotion cannot be for their personal advantage, and +Utilitarianism does not even attempt to show how it can have become +their duty. Meritorious, magnanimous, heroic in the highest degree it +would certainly be, but does not that very circumstance prove +conclusively that it cannot be due, inasmuch as there is nothing +meritorious in merely doing one's duty and paying one's debts? But of +that which is not due, how can payment be rightfully insisted upon? What +the few are under no obligation to yield, how can the many be entitled +to extort, or how can the worthiness of the latter's object excuse their +doing that which they have no right to do? Is any object, however +worthy, to be pursued regardless of all collateral considerations? To +these objections Utilitarians have no answer to make. All they can do is +tacitly to take for granted the disputed duty and right. That the less +ought to give way to the greater, and the few to the many, and that the +many may rightfully therefore, if need be, use force to compel the less +or the few to give way--these are treated by them as incontestable +propositions, even as 'doctrines _a priori_, claiming assent by their +own light, evident by simple intuition.' And although thus from their +own inner consciousness evolving the very first principles of their own +philosophy, the premises of their deduction that social happiness is the +proper aim in life, and that conduciveness to such happiness is the test +of morality--'Intuitionists,' strange to say, is the distinctive +appellation which they propose to affix to all those who hesitate to +accept as ethical foundation stones the results of their intuitional +evolution. + +Scarcely by a taunt so readily rebuttable will anti-Utilitarians be +excited to speedier apprehension of the nature of the lien which +corporate self-interest is presumed to have upon individual +self-devotion. Not the less tenaciously may they cling to their belief +in the right of every one to do as he will with whatever has come by +fair means into his exclusive and complete possession. Neither, I +venture to think, need less store be set by that right in consequence of +an objection very adroitly taken to it by Mr. Mill, which, on account +both of its inherent ingenuity and of its having been addressed more +immediately to myself, it would be inexcusable in me to leave +unexamined. In Mr. Mill's opinion, the right in question, even if valid, +would be valueless, because it would be neutralised by precisely similar +rights belonging to society. If, he argues, individuals are at liberty +to do as they will with their own, so likewise must society be. But +'existing social arrangements and law itself exist in virtue not only of +the forbearance, but of the active support of the labouring classes' who +in every community constitute a numerical majority. This working-class +majority might then if they pleased withdraw their support from existing +arrangements, thereby depriving person and property of social +protection; and by merely threatening such withdrawal they could compel +individuals to acquiesce in their most extravagant demands. 'They might +bind the rich to take the whole burden of taxation upon themselves. They +might bind them to give employment, at liberal wages, to a number of +labourers in a direct ratio to the amount of their incomes. They might +enforce on them a total abolition of inheritance and bequest.' Mr. Mill +maintains that these things, although exceedingly foolish, might +according to my principles, with perfect equity be done; nay, if I +understand him correctly, that according neither to mine nor to any one +else's principles can any adequate reason be assigned why they should +not be done, except that their practical results would be baneful +instead of beneficial. And taking this view, he is fully warranted in +asking what it can matter that according to my theory 'an employer does +no wrong in making the use he does of his capital, if the same theory +would justify the employed in compelling him by law to make a different +use--if the labourers would in no way infringe the definition of justice +by taking the matter into their own hands and establishing by law any +modification of the rights of property which in their opinion would +increase the remuneration of their labour.'[8] + +My reply to this and to the whole argument is the following. So long as +society continues to exist, society cannot divest itself of the primary +function for the discharge of which it was originally constituted. +Society, having come together in the first instance, tacitly pledged to +extend protection to each individual associate, cannot, without breach +of contract, withdraw that protection. It may, indeed, make any +impartial laws it pleases, and attach any penalty it pleases to +violation of any impartial law, but it cannot in equity, whatever it may +in practice, place any of its members outside the law; neither, most +certainly, even if its competence did extend thus far, could it go the +farther length of conferring on any one the right of doing wrong to an +outlaw. It may even be doubted whether, if an outlaw were to injure any +one still belonging to the society, any but the injured person himself +would be warranted in retaliating. The sole reason that I can perceive +why even he would is, that his rights had been infringed, and that +reparation was due to him for any damage sustained by him in +consequence, while, on the other hand, the aggressor had forfeited those +rights of his which might otherwise have forbidden the injured person +from taking the reparation due. But society had had none of its rights +infringed. By society no injury had been sustained. To society, +therefore, no reparation was due; and society, it seems to me, would +have no right to insist on exacting reparation not due to itself from +one whom it had forcibly extruded from its communion, and who, +therefore, was no longer amenable to its jurisdiction. Society might, +indeed, dissolve itself, proclaiming that 'every man for himself, and +God for all,' should thenceforward be the rule. But although it might +thus leave individual rights without other defence than that of the +owner, it could not annihilate individual rights. It might cancel the +right to mutual protection, but it could not, in place of that, create a +right of mutual molestation. One's own person and property would still +be as much one's own as before, and whoever outraged either would not be +the less a wrong doer because society permitted his wrong doing to +remain unpunished. In all ethical investigations it is impossible to +guard too watchfully against the smallest approach to confusion of might +with right. + +Instead of being valueless, the particular rights of which Mr. Mill +speaks so disparagingly, appear to me to possess a value which can +scarcely be exaggerated. They are, as may be readily perceived, +identical with the two which I have termed 'natural,' and of which I +began by saying that they are exceedingly elementary, but of which I +have now to add that they are also all-comprehensive, for that there are +no genuine rights whatever, however numerous or complex, which neither +are included within, nor branch out from, them. This will be manifest on +comparison of them with the items enumerated in any other catalogue of +rights; as, for instance, with the one drawn up by Mr. Mill, according +to whom all rights may be classified as follows:--(1) Legal rights; (2) +moral rights; (3) the right of every one to that which he deserves; (4) +the right to fulfilment of engagements; (5) right to impartiality of +treatment; (6) right to equality of treatment.[9] Each of these +varieties will repay a brief examination. + +Under the head of 'legal' rights are commonly placed, not those only +which are conferred, but those also which are confirmed, by law. Such as +law has merely confirmed, however, are of course not the creatures of +law. But it is admitted on all hands that a law may be unjust--that is +to say, it may without consent from the parties concerned, infringe some +previously existing right--and as the right so violated cannot have been +created by law, inasmuch as what law had been competent to create, law +would be equally competent to cancel--it is clear that there must be +rights other than those created by law, rights whose origin was +independent of, and anterior to, law. It is apparently to rights of this +description that Mr. Mill applies the name of 'moral' rights. Examples +of them are a man's rights to personal liberty and to property in +whatever belongs to him as having become his by honest means, to both of +which, unless he had forfeited them by misconduct, he would be equally +entitled, whether his title to them were or were not recognised by law. +The only genuine rights which law can create, or consequently can have +to confer, are privileges in respect of person or property other than +one's own. But such legalised privileges are not necessarily rights. +Whether they are so actually or not depends mainly on the character of +the legislative authority. A right to interfere with rights not based +upon law cannot be conferred without the consent of the parties in whom +the independent rights are vested, given either directly by themselves +or indirectly through their representatives. If a legislative body be +truly and thoroughly representative of the community which it controls, +then every one of its enactments, however bad or foolish, is virtually +an engagement to which every member of the community is a party, and any +privilege arising out of it becomes to all intents and purposes a right. +If, on the other hand, the legislative authority be autocratic, or if it +represent only certain favoured sections of the community, then none of +its enactments, however wise and good, of which a majority of the public +disapprove, and which interfere with the rights termed by Mr. Mill +'moral,' are morally binding, except on the legislators themselves and +their immediate constituents. Any one else may quite blamelessly break +the law, and resist any privilege thereby created, though he must, of +course, be prepared, in case of detection, to take the legal +consequences of his disobedience. For example, protective duties, +however impolitic, if imposed because a majority of the nation were of +opinion that a certain branch of domestic industry had better be +fostered by protection, could not be evaded without injustice to those +engaged in the protected industry, though there would be no injustice in +smuggling, if they had been imposed in opposition to the general sense +of the public by a packed Parliament or an absolute monarch. The same +legal monopoly, which in the one case could not be justly evaded, could +not in the other be justly enforced. A legal privilege, in short, +becomes a right only when a majority of those at whose expense it is to +be exercised, have formally consented either directly or indirectly to +its being exercised; and it then becomes a right solely because an +engagement has been entered into, in virtue of which, whatever is +requisite for its satisfaction has become due. Thus it appears that, +whatever legal rights are genuine, and are not at the same time 'moral' +rights also, resolve themselves into specimens of the right to +fulfilment of engagements, and belong not more to the first than to the +fourth of Mr. Mill's categories, to which latter, therefore, we may at +once transfer our attention. + +Why is it, then, that every one has a right to fulfilment of +engagements, to have faith kept with him, to have promises observed? +Solely, as it seems to me, because whatever has been promised to any one +becomes eventually his due, and because whatever is due or owing ought +to be paid. A promise is nothing less than a prospective transfer of +property in some thing, or in the advantage derivable from some action, +and when the time appointed for making the transfer arrives, whatever +has been promised, whether actually transferred or not, becomes the +complete property of, and in the fullest sense of the word belongs to +him to whom it has been promised; so that the right to fulfilment of +engagements resolves itself into the moral right of every one to have +that which belongs to him, and we have already seen that every legal +right which cannot on other grounds be shown to be a moral right +resolves itself into a right to fulfilment of an engagement. Whence it +follows that there are no legal rights whatever which are not likewise +moral rights, and which might not therefore be equally rights, even +though they had never been legalised. Whence, and from what has just +been observed with respect to the right to fulfilment of engagements, it +further follows that of the five branches of Mr. Mill's classification, +the first and fourth may without inconvenience be dispensed with, and +that the second will suffice to do duty for itself and for the other +two. + +We have next to consider a person's right to that which he deserves, +with reference to which, and to my assertion that there is no necessary +correspondence between the remuneration which a labourer ought to +receive and either his merits or his needs, Mr. Mill inquires as +follows:--'If justice be an affair of intuition, if we are guided to it +by the immediate and spontaneous perceptions of the moral sense, what +doctrines of justice are there on which the human race would more +instantaneously and with one accord put the stamp of its recognition +than these--that it is just that each should have what he deserves, and +that, in the dispensation of good things, those whose wants are the most +urgent should have the preference?' But surely however just it be that +each should have what he deserves, it is so only on condition that he +have it from those from whom it is due, and do not take it from those +from whom it is not due. The latter, surely, at least as much deserve to +be allowed to keep what they have already by honest means got, as others +to get what they have not yet got. But if so, then that these should be +deprived of their deserts, in order that those may get theirs, is surely +about the very last doctrine that ought to be put forward as +self-evident and intuitive. 'But,' Mr. Mill proceeds to ask, 'if there +be in the natural constitution of things something patently unjust, +something contrary to sentiments of justice, which sentiments, being +intuitive, are supposed to have been implanted in us by the same Creator +who made the order of things that they protest against--do not these +sentiments impose upon us the duty of striving by all human means to +repair the injustice? And if, on the contrary, we avail ourselves of it +for our own personal advantage, do we not make ourselves participators +in injustice, allies and auxiliaries of the Evil Principle?'[10] Now, as +I have already said, I am myself no intuitionist, but if I were, I +should not the less feel warranted in here replying that by no theory of +justice, intuitive or other, can the passive spectator of an injustice +to which he is no party be bound to assist in repairing the injustice, +simply because he has the means. A creditor denied payment of his fair +debts does not get what he deserves; but upon whom, except the +defaulting debtor, does it therefore become incumbent to repair the +latter's injustice by paying his debts? And if there be in the general +order of mundane affairs, as--provided I may attribute the existence of +it, as of all other evil, not to God, but to the devil--I don't mind +admitting there may be--something which prevents many of our +fellow-creatures from getting their desserts, something contrary, +therefore, to our sentiments of justice whether those sentiments have +been implanted in us by the Creator or not, I still maintain that those +sentiments do not impose upon us the duty of striving to correct the +injustice. They necessarily stimulate us more or less powerfully, +according to their own intrinsic strength, to undertake that noblest of +all tasks, but they do not render it imperative upon us. Whether, if we +actively avail ourselves of the injustice for our own profit--though +this, by the way, is no more than every one of us does who takes +advantage of competition among labourers to obtain labour for a less +price than he perceives it to be worth--we are not making ourselves +auxiliaries of the Evil Principle, may be matter of opinion; but, at all +events, we do not even then become participators in an injustice which +we did not create, and do not uphold or help to perpetuate, but merely +accommodate ourselves to. At worst, we are but accessories to it after +the fact. In simply accepting the situation and striving to make the +best of it for ourselves, without trying to make it better and only +abstaining from making it worse for others, our conduct may be +contemptible, mean, base, disgusting, or what you will, only not +iniquitous; for whatever, short of their deserts, may, from the cause +supposed, be received by our fellow-creatures, although in one sense +plainly due to them, is as plainly not due from us, and we cannot, +without palpable injustice, as well as palpable abuse of words, be +charged with injustice for merely declining to pay debts that we do not +owe. + +The rights to impartial and to equal treatment need not detain us long. +There is no right to impartiality except where impartiality is due, and +it is only in a small minority of cases that impartiality is due. There +is nothing iniquitous in showing favour to the extent of giving one +person more than his due, provided no other person be prevented from +having as much as his due. The lord of the vineyard who gave unto all +his labourers alike, the same to those who had wrought for him but one +hour as to those with whom he had agreed that for a penny they should +bear the burden and heat of the day, did the latter no wrong; his eye +was not the less good because theirs was evil. A judge, or an +arbitrator, or the conductor of a competitive examination, is bound to +make his award without respect of persons, because he cannot favour one +without withholding from some other what that other ought to have. On +every distributor of Government patronage, likewise, it is morally +incumbent to select for the public for whom he is trustee, the best +servants he can find. An English Prime Minister has no right to make his +son a Lord of the Treasury or of the Admiralty, if he know of any one +better fitted for the post and willing to accept it; and if he name any +but the fittest candidate, he fails in his duty to the community on +whose behalf he acts. But a private employer, acting for himself alone, +is under no similar obligation, and may take whom he pleases into his +service, and assign to him whatever position therein he pleases, without +affording any cause for reasonable complaint to those more capable +members of his establishment whom he places under one less capable. In +short, except in those rare cases in which impartiality means rendering +what is due, in which cases it is but another name for justice, there is +nothing unjust in disregarding it. + +As for equality, although its 'idea,' as Mr. Mill says, 'often enters as +a component part both into the conception and into the practice of +justice, and in the eyes of many persons constitutes its essence,'[11] I +can think of no single case in which, unless by reason of some special +agreement, it can possibly be due, or in which, consequently, there can +be any right to it. Even that equal protection for whatever is +indisputably one's own, the claim of all to which is commonly admitted +almost as a matter of course, is really due from those only by whom the +obligation to afford it has been tacitly or formally accepted. On this +ground it is due from the public at large, and from those individuals to +whom the public has delegated certain of its tutelary functions, but +from no other individuals whatever. No one else is bound to take, for +the protection of all other people, whatever pains or trouble he takes +for his own security--to watch, for instance, as vigilantly that his +neighbour's house as that his own is not broken into. And while the one +solitary claim of any plausibility to universal equality of treatment +requires to be largely qualified before it can be conceded, there is no +other claim of the kind which does not carry with it its own refutation; +there is no other which does not partake of the absurdity patent in the +communistic notion that all the members of a society are entitled to +share equally in the aggregate produce of the society's labour. How is +it possible that an equal share can be everybody's due, if different +persons may have different deserts, and everyone's deserts be likewise +his due? + +We have now gone completely through the list of artificially created +rights, without finding one that does not derive all its validity from +connection with some pre-existing right. We have seen that among +so-called rights none whatever are genuine by reason merely of any +extrinsic sanction they may have received, but that all real rights +either are such intrinsically, or are based upon, or embody within them, +some right purely intrinsic. We have seen that there are two rights +endued with this intrinsic character--viz., that of absolute control +over one's own self or person, and that of similar control over whatever +else has by honest means come into one's exclusive possession, or become +due or owing to him exclusively; and, because these rights, wherever the +conditions necessary for their exercise occur, of necessity exist, +springing up at once and full grown, in the necessary absence of any +antagonistic rights that could prevent their existing, I have not +scrupled to call them 'natural;' nor do I think that further apology can +be needed for such application of the epithet. To maintain, moreover, +that these natural rights constitute the essence of all artificial +rights, was simply equivalent to saying that no so-called right can be +genuine unless requiring for its satisfaction no more than already +actually belongs or is due to its claimant; while every right which does +require no more must be genuine, because there can nowhere exist the +right to withdraw or to withhold from any one anything that is +exclusively his. These seeming truisms are indeed diametrically opposed +to a theory which enters on its list of friends names no less +illustrious than those of Plato, Sir Thomas More, Bentham, and Mill. +Still, whoever, undeterred by so formidable an array of adverse +authorities, is prepared to accept the description of rights of which +they form part, will have no difficulty in framing a theory of justice +perfectly conformable thereunto. + +The justice of an action consists in its being one, abstinence from +which is due to nobody. The justice of inaction--for just or unjust +behaviour may be either active or passive--consists in there being +nobody to whom action, the reverse of the inaction, is due. 'Justice, +like many other moral attributes, may be best defined by its opposite,' +and all examples of injustice have this one point in common, that they +withhold or withdraw from some person something belonging or due to him, +or in some other way infringe his rights, and consequently wrong him. +Conversely, a point common to and characteristic of all just acts and +omissions, is that they neither prevent anybody from having that which +is due to him, nor in any other way infringe any one's rights, and that +they consequently do no one any wrong. It is not essential to the +justice of conduct that anything due be thereby rendered. It suffices +that nothing due be withheld. All conduct is just by which nobody is +wronged. + +It is further to be noted that all just conduct is of one of three +kinds--that which justice peremptorily exacts; that which she merely +permits, and may even be said barely to tolerate; and that which she +approves of and applauds, without, however, presuming to enjoin it. +Conduct of this last sort is just in that it leaves nothing undone which +justice requires, but it is also more than just in that it does more +than justice requires. To speak of it as simply just, is therefore +somewhat disparaging. It is just in the sense in which the less is +comprehended by the greater. He who faithfully fulfils an engagement +that has provided for his making a reasonable return for whatever +advantage he might obtain under it, shows himself simply just in the +matter, and nothing either more or less. He who, having driven a hard +bargain, insists rigorously upon it, giving nothing less, and taking +nothing more than had been mutually stipulated, is likewise strictly +just, but is also shabby, and deserves to be told so plainly. He who, +besides making full return, according to contract, for value received, +does something more, at some inconvenience to himself, out of regard for +another's need, is not a whit more just than either of the other two, +but he is generous into the bargain, and deserves thanks in proportion. + +Rising out of these considerations are two others equally meriting +attention. + +In the first place, we may see additional cause for distrusting the +testimony which etymology has been supposed to record in favour of 'an +origin of justice connected with the ordinances of law.'[12] That +'_justum_ is a form of _jussum_, that which has been ordered:' that +'[Greek: dikaion] comes directly from [Greek: dike], a suit of law:' +that '_recht_, from which came right and righteous, is synonymous with +law,' is obvious enough; and it may not be out of place to add that in +French the word _droit_ has, with almost savage irony, been selected as +the technical name, not of law simply, but of legal procedure with all +its crookedness.[13] Still it seems more in the ordinary course of +things to explain this linguistic identification of law with justice, by +supposing conformity to justice to have been the primitive element in +the formation of the notion of law, than by supposing 'conformity to law +to have been the primitive element in the formation of the notion of +justice.' It seems more probable that certain things were commanded +because they were deemed just, than that they were deemed just because +they were commanded. Even the ancient Hebrews, who 'believed their laws +to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being,' although, if asked why +it was wrong to kill or steal, they might very likely have replied, +'Because theft and murder have been forbidden by God,' would still have +acknowledged that it would be wrong to kill or steal, even if there had +been no divine prohibition of the practices. And when we recollect that +among 'other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who, +knowing that their laws had been made by men, were not afraid to admit +that men might make bad laws, ... the sentiment of justice came to be +attached, not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such +laws as ought to exist,' what had previously appeared probable is +converted into certainty. Principles of justice to which law ought to +conform cannot but have been anterior to law, and cannot have originated +in law. And certainty on this point grows still more certain, assurance +becomes doubly sure, when we reflect that, as was pointed out above, +many things are just which, not only does not law command, but which +justice barely tolerates, permitting them, indeed, to be done, but +permitting them also to be reprobated. + +Secondly, we may perceive that in mere justice there can be nothing +praiseworthy. Justice is nothing more than abstinence from injustice, +and no commendation can be due for not doing that the doing of which +would deserve censure. Justice, if entitled to be ranked among the +virtues at all, is at best only a negative virtue, as being the reverse +of a vice. It is distinguished from all other moral qualities, as being +the single and solitary one, compliance with whose behests is a duty +which we owe to others. Of meekness, patience, temperance, fortitude, +courtesy, whatever display it may for any reason be our duty to make, +precisely that display justice requires us to make. Whatever of any one +of these qualities justice does not exact from us, we may, without +wronging any one, omit. We must not, indeed, incapacitate ourselves by +tippling for our proper work, nor offend the eyes or ears of decenter +folk by reeling obstreperously through the streets; but, if we take the +precaution of retiring during an interval of leisure to our privy +chamber, our making beasts of ourselves then and there to our heart's +content, is our own concern, and nobody else's. No doubt, in doing this +we should be doing very wrong, but still there is no contradiction in +saying that we should have perfect right to do it, inasmuch as we should +thereby be wronging no one but ourselves. Of another class of +virtues--of all those which admit of being directly contrasted with +justice, and which may for shortness' sake be without much inaccuracy +comprehended under the general designation of generosity--it may, with +literal truth, be said that the practice of them is no part of our duty +to our neighbour. Provided we are careful to let every one have what, +between him and us, are his bare dues, we may be selfish, mean, sordid +to excess, without infringing any one else's rights, without the +smallest dereliction of our duty to others. True, ethical writers are in +the habit of speaking of 'duties of perfect and imperfect obligation,' +but of these 'ill-chosen expressions,' as Mr. Mill,[14] with abundant +reason, styles them, the latter, more particularly, is of a slovenliness +which ought to have prevented its being used by any 'philosophic +jurists.' What some of these mean by it is stated to be 'duties in +which, though the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of +performing it are left to our choice; as in the case of charity or +beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practise, but not towards any +defined person, or at any prescribed time.' But, according to this +explanation, there are duties of which performance may not only be +indefinitely postponed, even until a morrow that may never come, but of +which performance at one time will warrant non-performance of them +subsequently; so that, for instance, he who has behaved charitably on +past occasions, may be uncharitable afterwards. 'In the more precise +language' of other writers, we are told that while 'duties of perfect +obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right +resides in some person or persons, duties of imperfect obligation are +those which do not give birth to any right.' But, as where there is no +right nothing can be due, it would seem from this that by duties of +imperfect obligation are to be understood duties performance of which is +not due. I hope to be pardoned for declining to accept these illusive +distinctions as the boundaries which separate justice from the other +components of morality. I neither understand how any obligation can be +otherwise than perfect, nor do I recognise any duties whatever except +those of justice. The main distinction between justice and all positive +virtues I take to be that, whereas compliance with its behests is always +imperative, compliance with theirs never is, but is always optional and +discretionary. Of whatsoever is, for whatsoever reason, due, it is +invariably justice, and justice alone, that demands payment or +performance. Justice claims, and claims peremptorily, whatever is owing, +but never puts forward the smallest pretension to anything that is not +owing. But since whatever is _owing_ plainly _ought_ to be paid, and +since justice never claims anything but what is owing, it is clear that +there cannot be any merit in satisfying the claims of justice. Merit is +possible only in actions which justice does not enjoin, but to which +some other virtue exhorts. + +From the main difference here pointed out, a minor collateral difference +ramifies. Of whatever ought to be paid or done, payment or performance +may be righteously enforced. Here I have the satisfaction of proceeding +for a few steps side by side with Mr. Mill, although only, I am sorry to +say, to part company again immediately. 'It is a part,' he says, 'of the +notion of duty in every one of its forms that a person may rightfully +be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be _exacted_ from a +person as one exacts a debt. Unless we think it may be exacted from him, +we do not call it his duty.'[15] Now, since justice never asks for +anything but what is due, never makes a requisition compliance with +which is not a duty, it follows that all those persons to whom its +requisitions are addressed may be rightfully compelled to comply with +them, whereas, since what every other virtue requires is always +something not due, compliance with its requisitions is never a duty, and +cannot, except unrighteously, be enforced. This--viz., the rightfulness +of using compulsion in aid of justice, as contrasted with the +wrongfulness of resorting to it in aid of generosity, rather than the +rightfulness of punishing breaches of the one and not of the other, +seems to me the 'real turning-point of the distinction' between the two. +For gross disregard of generosity, and indeed of any other virtue, may +rightfully be punished, justice fully sanctioning the punishment +although indicating also the nature of the penalty to be inflicted in +each case, and restricting it within certain limits. Whoever plays the +dog in the manger in a manger of his own, or makes an exclusively +selfish use of his wealth or other advantages, refusing to do good to +his neighbour at however little sacrifice on his own part it might be +done, is not thereby infringing anybody else's rights, or thereby +wronging any one else. He is only exercising his own undoubted rights. +Still he is exercising them in a manner deserving of severe reprobation, +and which witnesses of his conduct may justly punish by testifying to +him the scorn, disgust, or indignation he has excited. It is no more +than just that he should have his deserts and receive the punishment +which has become his due. But justice, although permitting him to be +punished for acting ungenerously, does not sanction his being compelled +to make a show of acting generously. If his conduct had been unjust +instead of simply ungenerous, no punishment would be adequate that did +not force him to repair the evil he had done, or to do the good he had +left undone. But the most flagrant breach of generosity, neither keeping +nor taking away anything to which any one has a right, does nothing for +which reparation can be due. It consists simply in a man's making an +exclusively selfish use of what is exclusively his, and to make such use +is one of the rights of property. Whoever exercises that odious right is +justly punished by being shown how hateful we think him, but we must +not, on pretence of justice, commit the injustice of depriving him of a +right which is confessedly his. + +It is not, then, by being rightfully liable to punishment that unjust +differs from ungenerous conduct. The latter also ofttimes deserves and +incurs punishment. But since there can be no merit in doing that the not +doing of which would merit punishment, it may seem that, as in justice +so likewise in generosity there cannot be anything positively +meritorious. Neither in truth would there be if conduct were entitled to +be styled generous simply as being the reverse of ungenerous. Generosity +would then, like justice, be a virtue in no higher sense than that of +not being a vice--a negative virtue if a virtue at all. But an action +does not really deserve to be called generous unless what justice +requires be exceeded by it in a degree more than sufficient to prevent +the agent from deserving the imputation of meanness, nor even then +unless the excess have been done from a purer motive than that of the +hope of praise or other reward. An action is generous only in the +proportion in which it involves self-sacrifice, voluntarily undergone +for the benefit of others, without any view on the agent's part to +further compensation than that derivable from the consciousness of +making other people happy. In such voluntary and disinterested +self-sacrifice consists the merit which is one chief characteristic of +generosity as of most positive virtue, distinguishing it from justice, +in which there is never a surrender of anything which one would be +warranted in keeping, but merely a rendering of what belongs or is due +to others. All conduct, not immoral, admits, as already more than once +intimated, of a tripartite division, into that which may be rightfully +enforced; that of which, though it be not due nor rightfully enforcible, +neglect deserves to be and may justly be punished by reproaches; that +which is neither due nor reasonably to be looked for, but which involves +a voluntary surrender for the good of others of some good which one +might without reproach keep for oneself. Of this last description is the +only conduct in which there is any proper or positive virtue. + +So much and such complex argumentation may not impossibly be deemed a +good deal in excess of what is requisite to establish the conclusion to +which it points, and which may be summed up in the following very simple +propositions:--That, by a person's rights being understood the privilege +of having or doing whatever no other person has a right to prevent his +having or doing, justice consists of abstinence from conduct that would +interfere with that privilege; that justice, therefore, is not dependent +on extrinsic sanction, but arises spontaneously from the nature of +things, and may almost indeed be said to spring necessarily from the +meaning of words; and that its sole merit is exemption from the demerit +that would attach to the withholding or withdrawing from any person +anything belonging or due to that person. With all possible confidence, +however, in the innate vigour of these propositions, I cannot suppose +that they do not require all possible adventitious strengthening to be +qualified to displace the doctrine to which they are opposed. I proceed, +therefore, to test somewhat further the adequacy of the description of +justice which they involve by confronting it with certain intricate +problems, in presence of which the rival utilitarian definition will be +found to be hopelessly at fault. + +There are few subjects on which casuists have differed more widely than +those of the legitimacy, and the proper measure of punishment. One +thinks it unjust that anybody should be punished for the sake of example +to others, or for any purpose except his own amelioration. A second +replies that it is only for the sake of other people's good that an +offender ought to be punished; for that, as for his own good, he himself +should be left to decide what that is, and he is pretty sure not to +decide that it is punishment. A third pronounces all punishment unjust, +seeing that a man does not make himself criminal, but is made so by +circumstances beyond his control--by his birth, parentage, education, +and the temptations he meets with. Then, for the apportionment of +punishment, some persons think there is no principle like that of the +_lex talionis_--an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Others that +the penalty should be accurately proportioned to the immorality of the +offence, by whatever standard that immorality be measured. Others, +again, that punishment should be limited to the minimum necessary to +deter from crime, quite irrespectively of the heinousness of the +particular crime punished. Of the first three of these opinions, Mr. +Mill observes that 'they are all extremely plausible, and that so long +as the question is argued as one of justice simply, without going down +to the principles that lie under justice, and are the source of its +authority, he is unable to see how any one of the reasoners can be +refuted. For every one of them builds upon rules of justice confessedly +true--each is triumphant so long as he is not obliged to take into +consideration any other maxims of justice than those he has selected, +but that as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face, each +disputant seems to have as much to say for himself as the others. No one +can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another +equally binding.'[16] This view of the matter, however, can scarcely be +regarded as satisfactory. If utilitarian notions of justice cannot be +carried out without trampling each other down, they plainly should not +be suffered to go at large, but should be relegated forthwith to the +limbo of oblivion. But right cannot really be opposed to right; justice +cannot really be inconsistent with itself: it never can be unjust to do +what is just. Anti-utilitarian justice tolerates no such intestine +disorder. The sole ground on which she sanctions punishment is the +indispensableness of punishment for the reparation of injury. Whoever +has suffered wrong has been subjected to invasion of some right, +personal or proprietary, and is entitled to amends for the outrage; +while the aggressor from whom the amends are due, ought to render them +because he owes them, and because he ought, may, if necessary, be +compelled, to render them. By the breach of right which he has +committed, he has forfeited his own corresponding right, which may now +be equitably set aside to whatever extent may be requisite for +reparation of the evil he has done, one essential part of such +reparation being adequate security against repetition of the wrong. So +far as may be necessary for this purpose, punishment may equitably go, +but no further. Genuine justice does not permit penal laws of human +enactment to take into account the abstract turpitude of crime. That she +reserves for divine cognisance, recollecting that 'Vengeance is mine, I +will repay,' saith the Lord. Nor does she permit the smallest +aggravation of punishment for the sake either of the offender's own +mental improvement, or to discourage others from evil doing; neither, on +the other hand, does she recognise any claim to abatement on the plea of +an offender not having been able to help acting as he did. She would +not, indeed, punish with death or with stripes an outrage committed by a +lunatic or an idiot, partly because an outrage may be really less +offensive for being committed unwittingly, inasmuch as it does not, at +any rate, add insult to injury, and also because the corporal +chastisement of a lunatic or an idiot could afford no reparation to the +wounded feelings of a healthy mind. But so far as even an idiot or a +lunatic was capable of making good the evil he had done by rendering +what had in consequence become due, Anti-utilitarianism would require +him equally with an erring saint or sage to make it, and equally, too, +would subject him to whatever restraint might be deemed not more than +sufficient to prevent his doing the same evil again. And of course she +does not treat an offender of ordinary intelligence with indulgence +which she would not show even to a lunatic, but exacts inexorably full +reparation for what he has done, requiring him commonly to pay in kind +so far as he can, and to make up with his person for any deficiency. +Within the limits thus marked out she is well content that, with the one +object which alone justifies punishment, other secondary objects with +which justice has no concern, should be combined. She is well content +that the same penal measures as are called for in order to compensate +the injured party, should also subserve the reform of the criminal, and +serve as general deterrents from crime. But she protests against the +notion that these, or any other objects, can ever excuse the +infringement of any ordinance of justice, or of any of even a criminal's +rights which the criminal has not forfeited by crime. Justice, in short, +in her penal, as in all her other arrangements, has but to adhere +closely to the anti-utilitarian principles of rendering what is due, and +of taking nothing that is not due, in order to steer clear of all the +difficulties by which the ablest and most accomplished Utilitarians +confess themselves staggered. + +A second greatly vexed question is, 'whether, in a co-operative +industrial association, it is just or not that talent or skill should +give a title to superior remuneration? On the one side it is argued that +all who do the best they can deserve equally well; ... that superior +abilities have already advantages more than enough in the admiration +they excite, the personal influence they command, and the internal +satisfaction attending them; and that society is bound in justice rather +to make compensation to the less favoured for this unmerited inequality +of advantages, than to aggravate it. On the contrary side, that society, +receiving more from the more efficient labourer, owes him a larger +return; that a larger share of the joint result being actually his work, +not to allow his claim to it is a sort of robbery; that if he is only +to receive as much as others he can only be required to produce as +much.'[17] 'Between these appeals to conflicting principles of justice,' +Mr. Mill considers it impossible to decide. 'Justice,' he says, 'has in +this case two sides to it, which it is impossible to bring into harmony, +and the two disputants have chosen opposite sides; the one looks to what +it is just that the individual should receive, the other to what it is +just that the community should give. Each from his own point of view is +unanswerable, and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must +be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the +preference.'[18] The form of justice depicted with this Janus-like +aspect can scarcely be the utilitarian, since, whoever, on utilitarian +grounds, selects one of its sides, must perforce, on the same grounds, +reject the other. Still, it is spoken of as genuine justice, wherefore +that there is a justice independent of utility, would seem, after all, +to be admitted by Utilitarians themselves. It is for them, however, to +deal with the dilemma which their own ingenuity has thus devised. My +only concern with the two-headed monster they have imagined is to +protest against its being mistaken for the one sole species of justice +which Anti-utilitarianism recognises, and which never presents any such +double-faced appearance. In the case before us anti-utilitarian justice +would decide with her accustomed ease between the two appellants. What +she would look to would simply be that each co-operator should have his +due. But how much soever she might declare an inferior workman to +deserve for doing his best, she certainly would not allow his deserts to +extend to participation in the fruits of the toil of those of his +fellows who had done better than he. His having produced as much as he +was able could not render due to him a share in the larger produce of +others of superior capacity. Very possibly the superior workmen might +agree that all should participate equally in the aggregate results of +their joint labour. If so, well and good. For so liberal a concession +they would deserve credit, and thanks would be due to them from those in +whose favour it was made; but this of itself would be a conclusive +proof, if any were wanting, that the concession was an act, not of +justice, but of generosity, not of debt, but of grace. + +Again, what discordance is there not as to the most equitable +repartition of taxation! That all should be taxed in equal proportion to +their pecuniary means; that taxation should be a graduated percentage on +income, rising as income rose; that all, whether rich or poor, should be +taxed alike; that all should pay equal capitation, but unequal +property-tax--these are some out of many divergencies of opinion, and +'from these confusions' there is, Mr. Mill considers, 'no other mode of +extrication than the utilitarian.'[19] But if there were really no +other, there would, in fact, be none at all. For opinions differ +scarcely less as to the utility, than as to the justice of each +specified mode of taxation. There are quite as many persons who think it +expedient as who think it equitable that people should be taxed either +equally, or according to any of the suggested schemes of inequality. All +the help that Utilitarianism here affords is, as usual, to leave every +one to judge for himself which plan is the most advisable, and then to +pronounce that to be the only moral plan. Anti-utilitarianism offers +guidance of a very different sort. It wastes no time in seeking for an +escape from confusion, for it allows no confusion to exist. It spurns +equally the idea of different persons being required to pay different +prices for equal quantities of the same thing, merely because some of +them can afford to pay more, and that of their being all required to pay +the same price for different quantities, merely because all are equally +in need of the quantities they respectively obtain. It recognises only +an imperfect analogy between a club or a mess to which no one need +subscribe unless he likes, and a national community to whose funds every +resident within its territory has no choice but to contribute; and while +quite content that members of the one should be assessed at any rates to +which they have spontaneously consented, it protests against the +imposition on members of the other of burdens disproportioned to their +several abilities. It denies that the shilling of a man who has but one +in the world is of the same value to him because it is his all, as is to +another an estate bringing him in 100,000_l._ a year, seeing that, if +the former had his pocket picked, he might presently beg, borrow, or +earn a second coin, whereas if the latter were dispossessed of his +estate he might live to the age of Methusaleh without acquiring its +equivalent. It perceives that a rich man, by receiving public protection +for his property as well as his person, is relieved from an expense in +maintaining private watchmen, which a poor man, with nothing but his +carcass to defend, would have as little occasion as ability to incur; +and it concludes that more being thus in effect given to the rich, more +is due from him in return, and more, consequently, may be rightfully +exacted. + +We come, now, to a case that may well give to both Utilitarians and +Anti-utilitarians pause--with this difference, however, that whereas it +brings the former to an everlasting standstill, the latter may, after a +while, go on complacently meditative, at least, if not rejoicing. + +There are certain situations in which justice loses its authority. +'Thus, to save a life, it may be allowable ... to steal or take by force +the necessary food or medicine, or kidnap and compel to officiate the +only qualified medical practitioner.'[20] Wherefore, since to steal or +to kidnap is essentially wrong, it may sometimes be allowable to do +wrong. Mr. Mill's explanation of the paradox is, that 'there are +particular cases in which some other social duty is so important as to +overrule any one of the general maxims of justice; but that in such +cases we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral +principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that +other principle, not just in the particular case.'[21] I submit, +however, that there is no real occasion to resort to any such 'useful +accommodation of language,' in order to be 'saved from the necessity of +admitting that there may be laudable injustice.' Let us never shrink +from looking error in the face, for fear that, after she has slunk away +abashed, some insoluble mystery may remain behind. It is better, at any +rate, to be puzzled than deceived. There can be no doubt about theft +being essentially unjust, and no skill in the arrangement of words can +convert injustice into justice, or prevent injustice from being wrong. +But when, as occasionally happens, the only choice open to us is between +two immoral courses, it is morally incumbent on us to select the less +immoral of the two. The wrong we decide upon does not, however, itself +become smaller because it prevents a larger. A sworn bravo, who had +taken in advance the wages of assassination, would sin less by breaking +than by keeping faith with his employer; but, in either case, would sin. +Abstinence from murder would not absolve him from the guilt of perjury. +If, unless a loaf were stolen, a life would be lost, Anti-utilitarianism +might pardon, but would scarcely applaud the theft. At all events it +would not, like the rival doctrine in a similar strait, be reduced to +double on itself, declaring that wrong had become right and black white, +that the Ethiopian had changed his skin and the leopard his spots. It +would still insist as positively as ever that to steal another man's +bread cannot be just, however benevolent the purpose for which it is +stolen. + +One more illustration and I have done. Whoever believes as I do in the +indefeasible sanctity of honestly acquired _moveable_ property, is +logically bound to hold equally sacred the rights of bequest and +inheritance. With whatever is exclusively your own, you may surely do +anything you please except harm; nor need even harm be excepted if it be +done to yourself alone. If, indeed, you go the length of playing ducks +and drakes with gold pieces, or of lighting cigars with bank-notes, you +are likely enough to be stopped and placed under restraint as a lunatic, +but it is clear that this will be done solely because you are presumed +not to understand what you are doing, and not from any question as to +your right to do it if you do understand, for there are plenty of things +far more objectionable in themselves, only not implying a want of +sanity, which you will be left perfectly at liberty to do. If you +choose, in imitation of Cleopatra, to spoil your fish-sauce by mixing +powdered pearls with it, or, in imitation of a certain Peruvian +viceroy, to shoe your carriage horses with silver, no one will dream of +interfering with you; any more than of preventing courtesans and other +fine ladies from befouling their nether limbs by sweeping the dusty road +with flounces of Brussels lace; or of preventing members of the Cobden +Club from gorging themselves annually, at a cost of five guineas per +paunch, in honour of the prince of practical economists. But property, +which, however great the good it is capable of doing, you are at liberty +to employ solely for your own hurt, you are, of course, at liberty to +destroy, thereby preventing it, at least, from doing any more harm. The +lesser right of abuse is plainly comprehended in the larger. And of that +which is so absolutely your own that you may, if you please, wantonly +waste or destroy it, you may, of course, transfer the ownership, thereby +conveying to another person all your rights in it, and rendering it as +unjust to interfere with the new owner's disposal of the property, as it +would previously have been to interfere with yours. Moreover, since the +gift is a purely voluntary act, you may, if you please, without +impairing its validity, arrange that it shall begin to take effect from +some future date instead of immediately; so that, by naming some date +subsequent to your own decease, you will be converting the gift into an +equally valid bequest. This, I submit, is decisive as to the iniquity of +any legal limitation of testamentary power. The right of bequest is +comprehended within and rests upon the same basis as the right of +possession, so that, unless it would be just to pass a law depriving all +persons of any property possessed by them in excess of a given amount, +it would not be just to deprive them by law of the power of bequeathing +the surplus. + +The rights of inheritance obviously coincide precisely with those of +bequest. Just so much as the testator parts with the legatee obtains. +When the bequest is unconditional, the new owner whom it creates steps +into the precise position which the previous owner has vacated. Often, +however, a legacy is qualified by conditions, and, among others, by +this, that the property bequeathed shall be held in trust for certain +purposes. Now, if these purposes be socially noxious, society need not +hesitate to set aside the will that has provided for them. Quite +justifiably, society might annul the testamentary endowment of a +hospital for fleas and lice, such as Bishop Heber, in his Indian tour, +found existing at Baroach and at Surat, because those particular insect +pests could scarcely be retained within the walls of their infirmary. +Perhaps, too, society might be justified in similarly preventing the +endowment of a hospital for superannuated dogs and cats; whether it +would or not depending mainly on the awkward question whether such +inferior animals have any rights inconsistent with human interests. Be +this as it may, however, where human interests alone are concerned, the +rights of conditional heirship present no ethical difficulty. When it is +for purposes socially innocuous and affecting human beings alone that +property is left in trust, it cannot be equitably diverted from those +purposes without the consent of all the individuals whom the +testamentary arrangements were intended to affect. It matters not how +whimsical or preposterous the object enjoined may be; not even though it +be a periodical dinner, cooked after the manner of the ancients, like +the nauseous one at which Peregrine Pickle assisted; or instruction in +alchemy or in Hindoo astronomy, or in the art of walking on one's head. +Not until there remain no persons at once entitled under the will, and +also wishing to partake of the banquet or the instruction, can one or +the other be equitably discontinued? As long as there are any such +persons left, to stop, without their consent and without adequately +compensating them, arrangements, rights in which have been vested in +them by bequest, would be as palpable a violation of justice as to pick +their pockets of sums equivalent to their several interests, real or +supposed, in the arrangements. + +If scrupulous adherence to the principle thus laid down would heavily +shackle the activity and seriously impair the immediate usefulness of +Mr. Forster and his coadjutors in the Endowed School Commission, I am +exceedingly sorry, but not in the least shaken in my conviction that the +principle ought to be rigidly adhered to. If parochial or other +communities are too stupid or too selfish to consent that school +endowments under their charge shall be applied to purposes of more +extensive utility than the founders contemplated, every effort should be +made to persuade or to shame them into consenting, but without their +consent the thing should on no account be done. On this point +Utilitarianism and Anti-utilitarianism would, I apprehend, give +identical counsel, the former condemning as impolitic what the latter +denounced as unjust. The cause of national education would be ill served +by any course calculated to discourage its future endowment by private +testators, and nothing would be more likely to have that effect than +arbitrary interference with the endowments of former testators. + +The courteous reader may now be temporarily released, with fitting +acknowledgment of his exemplary patience. It would be cruel to detain +him with a recapitulation, without which he may readily trace for +himself, in what has gone before, the outlines of a consistent body of +anti-utilitarian ethics. In these there is little new, little that has +not been anticipated by many an old-fashioned saw and antiquated +apothegm--such as, _Fiat justitia ruat caelum_, 'Be just before you are +generous,' and, I would fain add, 'Honesty is the best policy'--save +that to that Utilitarianism may fairly lay equal claim. My modest +ambition throughout this essay has been to vindicate some of the most +momentous of primeval truths from the slights to which philosophy--not +modern, indeed, but modernised and refurbished--is continually +subjecting them, and I will not deny that I have modest assurance enough +to believe that I have at least partially succeeded. I think I have +shown that there are such things as abstract right and wrong, resting +not on fancied intuition, but on a solidly rational basis, and +supporting in turn abstract justice, whose guidance, whoever accepts it, +will find to be as sure and as adequate as any that unassisted reason is +capable of supplying. Anti-utilitarian justice never tries to look +half-a-dozen different ways at once, never points at the same time in +opposite directions, never issues contradictory mandates, never halts +between two opinions. Her votaries, like other mortals, may often be in +doubt as to accomplished facts; but, provided these be clear, their +course is in general equally clear; there seldom remains aught to +embarrass them. If they sincerely desire to ascertain what is due from +them, they can seldom err, except on the right side, and they will never +dream of disputing that whatever is due from them it must be their duty +to do, without respect of consequences. These they will leave to the +supreme controller of events, if they believe in one, and will leave to +take their chance, if they do not so believe, feeling all the more +certain in the latter case that to control events cannot, at any rate, +be within their power. They never stop to calculate how much good may +perhaps ensue if evil be done. Simple arithmetic, apart from faith, +satisfies them that to add wrong to wrong cannot possibly augment the +sum total of right. The prime article of their creed is the absolute +obligation of paying debts--a piece of unworldly wisdom more than ever +now to Jews a stumbling-block, and to Greeks foolishness, but not the +less to all, whether Jews or Gentiles, who will accept it, a light to +show through the mazes of life, a path so plainly marked that the +foolishest of wayfaring men cannot greatly err therein. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The distinction here drawn is not merely verbal. The greatest +happiness of the greatest number may mean either the largest total of +happiness in which the largest possible number of those concerned can +participate, or a still larger total, which, if some of the possible +participants were excluded, would be divisible among the remainder. The +largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all concerned, +means the largest sum total absolutely, without reference to the number +of participants. Writers on Utilitarianism seem to have sometimes the +first, sometimes the second of these totals in view, but more frequently +the second than the first. + +[2] I do not form a separate class of pleasures of the affections, +because these seem to me not to be elementary, but to be always +compounded of two or more of the other five kinds. + +[3] 'On Labour,' p. 135. + +[4] 'Fortnightly Review,' June, 1868. + +[5] See the No. for June, 1869. + +[6] 'On Labour,' p. 93. + +[7] 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, p. 683. + +[8] See 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, pp. 687-8. + +[9] 'Utilitarianism,' by J. S. Mill, pp. 64-8. + +[10] 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, pp. 684-5. + +[11] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 267. + +[12] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 69, 70. + +[13] 'Les legistes leur fournirent au besoin l'appui du droit contre le +droit meme.'--De Tocqueville, 'L'Ancien Regime,' p. 567. + +[14] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 72, 73. + +[15] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 71. + +[16] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 81, 82. + +[17] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 84, 85. + +[18] Ibid. p. 85. + +[19] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 86, 87. + +[20] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 94. + +[21] Ibid. pp. 94, 95. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +_HISTORY'S SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS_. + + _Warwick._ There is a history in all men's lives, + Figuring the nature of the times deceased; + The which observed, a man may prophesy, + With a near aim, of the main chance of things + As yet not come to life, which in their seeds, + And weak beginnings, lie intreasured. + Such things become the hatch and brood of time; + And, by the necessary form of this, + King Richard might create a perfect guess, + That great Northumberland, then false to him, + Would, of that seed, grow to a greater falseness, + Which should not find a ground to root upon, + Unless on you. + + _King Henry._ Are these things, then, necessities? + + _King Henry IV._ Part II. Act. 3, Sc. I. + + +When equally competent thinkers appear to take directly opposite views +of a matter of purely speculative interest, it will commonly be found +that their differences arise from their using the same words in +different senses, or from their being, by some other cause, prevented +from thoroughly apprehending each other's meaning. An illustration is +afforded by the controversy regarding the possibility of constructing a +Science of History, which could scarcely have been so much prolonged if +all who have taken part in it had begun by defining their terms, had +agreed to and adhered to the same definitions, and had always kept +steadily in view the points really in debate. If the word 'science' had +been used only in the restricted, though rather inaccurate sense in +which it is sometimes employed by some of the most distinguished of the +disputants, there would have been less question as to its applicability +to history. No one doubts that from an extensive historical survey may +be drawn large general deductions on which reasonable expectations may +be founded. No one denies that the experience of the past may teach +lessons of political wisdom for the guidance of the future. If it were +not so, history would be as uninstructive as fairy lore; its chief use +would be to amuse the fancy; and little more practical advantage could +result from investigating the causes of the failure of James II.'s +designs on civil and religious liberty, than from an inquiry into the +artifices by which Jack-the-Giant-killer contrived to escape the maw of +the monsters against whom he had pitted himself. What is commonly +understood, however, by a Science of History is something far beyond the +idea entertained of it by such temperate reasoners as Mr. John Stuart +Mill and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. The science, for the reality of which M. +Comte in France and Mr. Buckle in England have been the foremost +champions, would bear the same relation to political events as Optics +and Astronomy do to the phenomena of light and of the solar and sidereal +systems. It would deal less with the conjectural and probable than with +the predicable and positive. 'In the moral as in the physical world,' +say its leading advocates, 'are invariable rule, inevitable sequence, +undeviating regularity,' constituting 'one vast scheme of universal +order.' 'The actions of men, and therefore of societies, are governed by +fixed eternal laws,' which 'assign to every man his place in the +necessary chain of being,' and 'allow him no choice as to what that +place shall be.' One such law is that, 'in a given state of society, a +certain number of persons must put an end to their own lives:' another, +that a certain number of persons must commit murder; a third, that when +wages and prices are at certain points, a certain number of marriages +must annually take place, 'the number being determined not by the temper +and wishes of individuals, but by large general facts, over which +individuals can exercise no authority.' These are general laws; but the +special question as to who shall commit the crimes or the indiscretion +enjoined by them, 'depends upon special laws, which, however, in their +total action must obey the large social law to which they are all +subordinate.' A Science of History would consist of a collection of +'social laws,' duly systematised and codified, by the application of +which to given states of society the historical student might predict +the future course of political events, with a confidence similar to that +with which he could foretell the results of familiar chemical +combinations, or the movement of the planets.[22] + +This is the theory which a few years ago was so much discussed, and +against which, notwithstanding the singular fascination it evidently +possesses for some minds, the moral sense of a much larger number +indignantly revolts, rightly apprehending that its establishment would +be subversive of all morality. For, if the actions of men are governed +by 'eternal and immutable laws,' men cannot be free agents; and where +there is not free agency there cannot be moral responsibility. Nor are +the apprehensions entertained on this score to be allayed by the answer, +ingenious as it is, which has been given to them[23] by one of the +ablest and most judicious apologists for the new creed. It is true that +human actions can be said to be 'governed' only in the same metaphorical +sense as that in which we speak of the laws of nature, which do not +really govern anything, but merely describe the invariable order in +which natural phenomena have been observed to occur. It is true that the +discovery of invariable regularity in human affairs, supposing such a +discovery to have been made, would not prove that there was any +necessity for such regularity. It is conceivable that the orbs of heaven +may be intelligent beings, possessing full power to change or to arrest +their own course, and moving constantly in the same orbits merely +because it pleases them to do so. Invariable regularity, therefore, +would be perfectly consistent with free agency. All this is perfectly +just, but it is also altogether beside the question. The offence given +by the writers on whose behalf the apology is set up consists not so +much in their asserting that there are, as in their insisting that there +must be, uniformity and regularity in human affairs; or, as Mr. Buckle +expresses it, that social phenomena 'are the results of large and +general causes which, working on the aggregate of society, _must_ +produce certain consequences, without regard to the volition of the +particular men of whom the society is composed.' Now, though free agency +may co-exist with _invariable_ regularity, it obviously cannot co-exist +with _necessary_ regularity, which, consequently, is incompatible +likewise with moral responsibility. If men are compelled by the force of +circumstances, or by any force, to move only in one direction, they +cannot be responsible for not moving in a different direction. Nor is it +more to the purpose to undertake a subtle analysis of the nature of +causation, and to explain that it does not, properly speaking, involve +compulsion, but simply means invariable antecedence. Let it be that a +cannon-ball does not really knock down the wall against which it +strikes, and that it would be more correct to say that the ball +impinges and the wall falls; though, seeing that the wall would not have +fallen unless the ball had impinged, the distinction is too nice for +ordinary apprehension. As understood, at any rate, by the joint +headmasters of the new school, causation does involve compulsion. 'Men's +actions,' say they, 'are the product not of their volition, but of their +antecedents,' and 'result from large and general causes which must +produce certain consequences.' Neither, if this be so, is it of any +avail to suggest that, possibly, the large and general causes in +question may be of only temporary operation. 'It may be that the rules,' +in accordance with which the sun has hitherto risen every morning since +the creation of the world, 'will hold good only for a time.' It may be +that the springs, whatever they are, by which the universe is kept in +motion, may require to be periodically wound up like the works of a +clock, and that, unless this be done, 'on some particular day out of +many billions,' the sun may fail to rise, just as the clock, if suffered +to run down, would stop on the eighth day. The conjecture would, of +course, be not less applicable to social than to natural laws. It is +conceivable that the large general causes assumed to regulate human +actions might lose their efficacy at the end of a certain cycle, when +mankind might either have to recommence a social revolution similar to +the one just completed, or might have to begin an entirely different +revolution under entirely different laws. Be it so. Still, if the +causes, as long as they remained in operation, possessed a compulsory +character--if, during the continuance of the supposed cycle, men were +bound to act in a certain way in accordance with certain laws, and +irrespectively of their own volition--what would it matter that those +laws were not eternal and immutable? For the time being men would no +more be free agents than the hands of a clock, while the clock was wound +up. Both would be constrained to move in a prescribed direction, whether +they would or no. Men in such circumstances might well be likened, as by +Mr. Buckle they are likened, to links in a chain, but few would be +prevented from joining in Mr. Goldwin Smith's eloquent protest against +the comparison, by being told that the chain perhaps was not an endless +one. + +It is clear, then, that the principles to which we have been adverting +would, if established, be really subversive of morality, inasmuch as +they are incompatible with free agency, without which there can be no +responsibility. The soundness of a doctrine does not, however, depend +upon its tendencies; and Mr. Buckle was fully warranted in demanding +that his views should be examined with reference, not at all to their +consequences, but solely and exclusively to their truth. They certainly +ought to be so examined, if examined at all; but morality is so +indispensable to the happiness of mankind, that if there were reason for +apprehending it to be based upon error, there would be equal reason for +avoiding an enquiry which might demonstrate the weakness of its +foundations, by bringing forward an antagonistic truth. The only +adequate excuse, therefore, for enquiring, as I now proceed to do, into +the validity of Mr. Buckle's theory, is the confidence I feel that it +will be found to contain not recondite, newly-discovered truth, but, at +best, only skilfully and curiously-compounded fallacies, which, being +dispelled, will leave the foundations of morality as firm and +unimpeachable as before. + +In order that he might be able to prove the possibility of a Science of +History, Mr. Buckle asked no more than the following concessions: +'That, when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some +motive or motives; that those motives are the results of some +antecedents, and that therefore, if we were acquainted with the whole of +the antecedents and with all the laws of their movements, we could with +unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results.' Now, +there is certainly nothing in these demands which may not be +unhesitatingly conceded. As there can be no effect without a cause, so +there can be no action without a motive: the motive or motives of an +action are the product of all the conditions and circumstances among +which the agent is placed--which conditions and circumstances, again, +must have been brought about by antecedent events. The same +circumstances would indeed differently affect persons of different +mental constitutions and characters; but the original constitution of a +man's mind is itself the product of antecedent events, as is also any +subsequent modification of character which it may have undergone. It +cannot be denied, then, that men's motives are the results of +antecedents. Equally undeniable is it that a knowledge of all the +antecedents and of all the laws of their movements would enable us to +foresee their results, for this, supposing the laws referred to to have +any real existence, is merely equivalent to the self-evident +proposition, that if we perceived certain causes and knew exactly how +they would act, we should know beforehand what would be their effects. +But what if there be no such laws? What if, on the showing of Mr. Buckle +himself and of his associates, there neither are nor can be? + +The true nature of a scientific law has never been better explained than +by the writer already quoted as Mr. Buckle's dexterous apologist. A +scientific law is not an ordinance, but a record. It simply professes +to describe the order in which certain phenomena have been observed +uniformly to recur. It differs from a legislative enactment, in that the +one would be a law although it were never obeyed, whereas the other +would cease to be a law if one single exception to its statement could +be pointed out. Thus the Act of Parliament enjoining the registration of +births, would be equally a law although no births were ever registered; +whereas the law, that in a body moving in consequence of pressure the +momentum generated is in proportion to the pressure, would entirely +forfeit its legal character if, on any one occasion or in any +circumstances, momentum were generated in any other proportion. It is +essential, then, to the existence of a scientific law that there should +be uniformity of phenomena. But in human affairs uniformity is +impossible. No doubt, in exactly the same circumstances exactly the same +events must happen; but exactly the same aggregation of circumstances +cannot possibly be repeated. Such repetition is inconsistent with the +very theory, which is based on the assumption that the repetition is +continually happening. + +'In the moral as well as the physical world' there are, say the +exponents of the new theory, not only 'invariable rule' and 'inevitable +sequence,' but 'irresistible growth' and 'continual advance.' In other +words, things can never be twice in precisely the same condition--never, +at least, within the same cycle. It has, indeed, been suggested that +there may be in human affairs the same sort of regularity as is observed +by the hands of a clock; and that, as the latter, at the end of every +twenty-four hours, recommence the movement which they have just +concluded, so at the end of, say 'every ten thousand years,' all the +same events which have been happening throughout the period may begin +to happen over again in the same order as before. Such a succession, +however, would involve quite as much of retrogression as of progression, +and the continual advance so boastfully spoken of would be nothing else +than a tendency of society to return to the condition from which it had +originally emerged. But, even on this uncomfortable hypothesis, there +could be no regularity of occurrences within the same cycle; no clue as +to the future could be obtained from investigation of the past. On the +contrary, the only certainty would then, as now, be that no combination +of events which had happened once could happen again, as long as the +existing order of things continued. The inference here follows +necessarily from the premises. If there be continual advance--if things +are constantly moving forward--they cannot remain in the same state; and +if not in the same state, they cannot produce the same effects. For, if +it be obvious, on the one hand, that precisely the same causes must +invariably produce the same results, it is equally evident, on the +other, that the same results cannot be reproduced except by the same +causes. If causes calculated to bring about certain phenomena undergo +either augmentation or diminution, there must be a corresponding change +in the phenomena. Now, effects cannot be identical with their causes, +and, in the moral world, effects once produced become in turn causes, +acting either independently or in conjunction with pre-existing causes. +They become in turn the antecedents spoken of by Mr. Buckle, from which +spring the motives of human conduct. But, as all such antecedents must +necessarily differ from all former antecedents, they must also give rise +to motives, must be followed by actions, and must bring about +combinations of circumstances, differing from any previously +experienced. Thus, in human affairs, there can be no recurrence either +of antecedents or of consequences; and, as a scientific law is simply a +record of the uniform recurrence of consequences, it follows that in +human affairs there can be no scientific laws. + +It will be understood that human conduct, and the circumstances or +causes which influence it, are here spoken of in the aggregate. It is +not pretended that particular causes or circumstances may not continue +permanently in operation, though with an influence modified by the +concomitance of fresh circumstances; or that they may not continue to +produce consequences differing from their former consequences not more +than in proportion to the modification undergone by the causes. Still +less is it pretended that certain human phenomena, with which human +motives have little or nothing to do, may not be repeated once and +again, notwithstanding the important changes constantly going on in +every human society. It is not denied that marriages may continue for +years together to bear much the same annual proportion to the +population, provided that during those years there be no material change +in the amount of the economical obstacles which commonly interfere, more +than anything else, with men's natural inclination to marry. Still less +is it denied that, in a given number of births, the number of girls may +always preserve nearly the same superiority over that of boys, or that +the proportion between red-haired and flaxen-haired children may +generally be about the same, or that the percentage of letters +misdirected in a given country may vary little during long periods. But, +in the first of these cases, men do not get married, as Mr. Buckle +imagined, irrespectively of their volition. If, for several years +together, marriages continue to bear about the same proportion to +population, it is because during that period circumstances continue to +present a certain amount, and no more, of opposition to men's connubial +proclivities. In the other cases, it is not at all because the parents +wish it that a girl is born instead of a boy, or with flaxen hair +instead of carrots; neither is it from any motive or intention that +letters are often misdirected, but, on the contrary, from want of +thought, and from the carelessness and haste with which letter-writing, +like most other human actions, is unfortunately too often performed. +But, before assuming that this carelessness and haste bear an invariable +proportion to numbers, we should inquire whether the proportion of +misdirected letters is the same in all human societies--the same, for +instance, in France and Spain as in England. If not--if varying +circumstances produce different results in this respect in different +countries--it may be inferred that a variation of circumstances may +produce a difference of result in the same country. It will, at any +rate, be clear that there is no 'necessary and invariable order' in +which letters are misdirected. In one sense, indeed, it may be said that +the proportion of misdirected letters depends upon 'the state of +society,' if by that expression be meant, among other things, the +numerical proportion which individuals of different characters and +habits bear to each other. In that sense, we may accept some far more +startling propositions. We may partly admit that the state of society +determines the number of murders and suicides, if by this be simply +meant that the number of murders and suicides committed will depend upon +the number of persons whose characters have been so moulded by +circumstances as to dispose them to put an end to their own or other +people's lives. But Mr. Buckle, by whom the assertion was made, was +careful to explain that his meaning was the very reverse of what is here +supposed. Speaking of suicide, he declares it to be 'a general law that, +in a given state of society, a certain number of persons must put an end +to their own lives;' adding that 'the question as to who shall commit +the crime depends upon special laws,' and that 'the individual felon +only carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding +circumstances.' In other words, it is not the amount of crime that +depends upon the number of persons prepared to commit it; it is the +number of criminals which depends upon the amount of crime that must +needs be committed. 'Murder,' he elsewhere says, 'is committed with as +much regularity, and bears as uniform a relation to certain known +circumstances, as do the movements of the tides and the relations of the +seasons.' 'The uniform reproduction of crime is more clearly marked, and +more capable of being predicted, than are the physical laws connected +with the disease and destruction of our bodies. The offences of men are +the result not so much of the vices of individual offenders, as of the +state of society into which the individuals are thrown.' + +There is here so much looseness and inconsistency of language, that what +is most offensive in it may easily bear more than one interpretation: +and the shocking dogma that, in a given state of society, the force of +circumstances constrains the commission of a certain amount of crime, +may possibly admit of being explained away and softened down into the +comparatively harmless proposition that, where all the circumstances, +conditions or causes required for the commission of a certain amount of +crime are present, that amount of crime will certainly be committed. But +what is most provoking in Mr. Buckle is the heedlessness or wantonness +with which he is constantly insisting that the causes in question are +necessarily present and uniformly acting. What he calls the uniform +reproduction of crime is likened by him to the uniform recurrence of the +tides. According to him, it is a law that a certain number of suicides +shall take place annually, just as it is a law that there shall be high +and low water twice in every twenty-four hours. Now a law, as the word +is here used, means a record of invariable repetitions of phenomena. Has +it been observed, then, that suicides bear, we will not say an +invariable, but anything like a definite proportion to population? Mr. +Buckle thinks it has, and he adduces some facts in support of the +opinion; but his facts, properly understood, disprove instead of proving +what he asserts; and, even if they proved it, they would yet afford no +support to his main theory. + +In London, for some years past--how many is not stated--about 240 +persons annually have made away with themselves--sometimes a few more, +sometimes a few less--the highest number having been 266 in 1846, and +the lowest 213 in 1849. But, while the number of suicides has thus been +nearly stationary, population has been anything but stationary in the +metropolitan district, but has advanced with vast and unremitting +strides at an average rate of nearly 43,000 a year. In 1841 it was +1,948,369; in 1851, 2,361,640; and in 1861, 2,803,989. The proportion of +suicide to population has consequently been by no means uniform, but has +varied exceedingly, and on the whole has shown a constant tendency to +decrease. But even if it had continued uniform, it would simply have +shown that, during a certain number of years, the general character of +Londoners had, in certain particulars, undergone no material change. It +would not have proved that the regularity of suicide observable among +Londoners was in accordance with any general law. To prove this it would +have been necessary to show that the proportion had been uniform, not +only in the same but in all societies; in Paris as well as in London, +among the Esquimaux of Labrador, and among the Negroes of Soudan. For, +if the proportion were found to vary by reason of the differing +circumstances of different societies, it would plainly be seen to be at +least susceptible of variation in the same society, inasmuch as in no +society do circumstances remain the same from generation to generation. +So equally with murders. Even if there were no doubt that the percentage +of such crimes in England had long continued the same, still that fact +would prove nothing as to the uniform reproduction of crime, if it could +be shown that the percentage had ever varied anywhere else--in France or +Italy, for example, or in Dahomey. For it would be mere childishness to +point to the different conditions of England and Dahomey, and to plead +that no more was intended to be said than that, with uniformity of +circumstances there would also be uniformity of results. So much no one, +in the least competent to discuss the subject, would for a moment dream +of disputing. But in political affairs there cannot be uniformity of +circumstances. The aggregate of circumstances from which spring human +motives cannot, from the nature of things, ever be repeated; and, though +a few general causes may continue permanently in operation, they cannot +continue to produce the same identical results; for even though they +could themselves remain stationary, it would be impossible that their +operation should not be affected by the constant change going on around, +or should not partake of an otherwise universal forward movement. In +political affairs there cannot possibly be any recurrence of identical +phenomena; nor can there, except within a very limited period, be any +occurrence of very similar phenomena. But recurrence (and not merely +recurrence, but complete and invariable recurrence) is the very +foundation of science. Without it there can be no scientific laws, and +without such laws--_i.e._, without records of past recurrences--there +can be no sure predictions as to the future. It is only because certain +motions of certain bodies have hitherto been observed to take place with +invariable regularity, that they are expected to continue to do so, and +it is upon that assumption only that we venture to predict that the sun +will rise to-morrow morning, or that an eclipse will take place next +year. But if no event recorded in history has ever yet been known to +occur twice under precisely the same conditions, and as a consequence of +the same causes, what ground can there be for predicting whether or when +any such event will occur again? What possibility is there of +constructing a science of history, when history supplies no materials +for either foundation or superstructure? + +There is nothing in this conclusion in the slightest degree opposed to +the most approved doctrine of causation. No effect can be without a +cause. No doubt, then, the regency of invariable causation holds good of +human volitions. No doubt the volitions and consequently the actions of +men are the joint results of the external circumstances amid which men +are placed, and of their own characters; which again are the results of +circumstances, natural and artificial. So much must needs be admitted, +and something more besides. Certain causes will infallibly be succeeded +by certain effects. From any particular combination of circumstances, +certain determinate consequences and no others will result; those again +will give rise to consequences equally determinate, and those in turn to +others, and so on in an infinite series. It follows, then, from the +regency of causation, that there is a determinate course already, as it +were, traced out, which human events will certainly follow to the end of +time; every step of which course, however remote, might now be foreseen +and predicted by adequate, that is to say by infinite, intelligence. +Infinite intelligence would do this, however, not by the aid of law, but +by virtue of its own intrinsic and unassisted strength, wherewith it +would perceive how each succeeding combination of causes would operate. +For, as cannot be too often repeated, a law is merely a record of +recurrences; and in human affairs there can be no recurrences of the +same aggregate either of causes or results. There being then no historic +laws, there can be no Science of History, for science cannot exist +without laws. The historic prescience, which is an attribute of Infinite +Intelligence, not being regulated by law, or at any rate not by any law +except that of causation, is not, technically speaking, a science, and +even if it were, would be utterly beyond the reach of human intellect +and attainable only by Infinite Wisdom. + +The admission made in the last paragraph has cleared the way for the +introduction of a question, from which the subject under discussion +derives its principal interest, and which it is indispensable therefore +carefully, though briefly, to examine. If there be certain determinate +lines of conduct which men will infallibly pursue throughout all +succeeding generations, how can men be free agents? How--for it is +merely the old puzzle over again--how can foreknowledge be reconciled +with freewill? The difficulty is not to be got rid of by discrediting +the reality of freewill, and treating it as a thing for which there is +no evidence. When Johnson silenced Boswell's chatter with the words, +'Sir, we know our will is free and there's an end on't,' he expressed a +great truth in language not the less philosophically accurate on account +of its colloquial curtness. The consciousness possessed by an agent +about to perform an act, that he is at liberty to perform it or not, is +really conclusive evidence that the act is free. For it matters not a +jot whether consciousness be 'an independent faculty,' or whether--as, +Mr. Buckle reminds us, 'is the opinion of some of the ablest +thinkers'--it be not merely 'a state or condition of the mind.' If +consciousness be a condition of the mind, so also is perception; but +perception, whatever else it be, is also that which makes us acquainted +with external phenomena, just as consciousness is that which makes us +acquainted with internal emotions. The two informants, it is true, are +not equally trustworthy. Perception often deceives us, but +consciousness, never. We often fancy we perceive what we do not +perceive. We may fancy we see a ghost, when we are merely mocked by an +optical illusion, or we may mistake the impalpable imagery of the Fata +Morgana for solid objects, or the rumbling of a cart for thunder. But +consciousness is infallible. We cannot fancy we experience an emotion +which we do not experience. We cannot fancy we are glad when we are not +glad, or sorry when we are not sorry, or hopeful when in despair; and to +pretend that we can possibly be conscious of willing when we are not +willing, would be as absurd as to meet the _cogito, ergo sum_ of +Descartes, with the reply that, perhaps, we do not really think, but +only think we think. + +Freewill, then, being an indisputable reality, how can it be reconciled +with foreknowledge? There can be no more conclusive way of showing that +the two things are capable of co-existing than to point to an example of +their actual co-existence, and such an example is afforded by the idea +of Infinite Power. Omnipotence, which by its nature implies freewill, +comprehends also Omniscience. Omnipotence can do anything whatsoever +which does not involve a contradiction; but even Omnipotence can do +nothing which Omniscience does not foresee. It can, indeed, do +whatsoever it pleases; but Omniscience foresees precisely what it will +be pleased to do. With unbounded liberty to choose any course of action, +it can yet choose no course which has not been foreseen; but its freedom +of choice is evidently not affected by the fact that the choice which it +will make is known before hand. Neither is that of man. An eager +aspirant to ecclesiastical preferment is not the less at liberty to +refuse a proffered mitre, because all his acquaintances have a well +founded assurance that he will accept. A wayfarer, with a yawning +precipice before his eyes, may or may not, as he pleases, cast himself +down headlong. Whether he will do so or not must always have been +positively foreknown to Omniscience; but that fact in no degree affects +his power of deciding for himself. If arguing on the notion that what is +to be must be, he decide on moving forward to his destruction, then what +has been foreseen is simply that he will so argue and be self-deceived, +and will consequently perish. But the foreknowledge which simply +perceives what direction will be taken by the will is a very different +thing from an over-ruling destiny, which should compel the will to take +some special direction. Still it is obvious that, in this instance also, +foreknowledge is based entirely on causation. It is solely because human +volitions take place as inevitable effects of antecedent causes that +Omniscience itself can be conceived as capable of foreseeing them. + +But on such conditions, how can human volitions really be free? How can +man be really at liberty to will of his good pleasure, if what he is +prompted to will depends on the influence which the circumstances that +happen to surround him may exercise on the constitution and character, +which he has derived from pre-existing circumstances? How can his will +be free, if that will be moulded and shaped by circumstances over which +he has no control? I have, I am aware, by the mode I have adopted of +reconciling free-will with foreknowledge, incurred the obligation of +reconciling it with another co-existence of yet greater apparent +incompatibility. By admitting that 'human volitions take place as +inevitable effects of antecedent causes,' that they must be such, and +cannot be other than such, as antecedent causes make them, I have +admitted that the will, though independent of law, is absolutely subject +to, and _must_ implicitly obey, causes. Freewill, then, must be shown to +be compatible not with foreknowledge only, but with necessity also. For +there is no use in attempting to ignore necessity; no use in exclaiming +with Professor Huxley: 'Fact I know, and Law I know; but what is +Necessity but an empty shadow of the mind's own throwing?'[24] A shadow +it most certainly is not, though it is a bugbear, and the veriest that +was ever suffered to torment a morbid imagination. It is an indisputable +reality, a substantial, but at the same time perfectly harmless, or +rather salutary reality, whose terrors need only to be boldly confronted +in order to disappear and to transform themselves into highly attractive +recommendations. For what, after all, does it imply? What but that +effects must follow their causes, and causes precede their effects, as +plainly they must, unless cause and effect be utterly unmeaning +expletives. Of course we must on all occasions be affected by +surrounding circumstances, in modes exactly accordant with our +idiosyncracies, moral and physical. Of course, too, our volitions must +exactly correspond with our contemporaneous affections. When we are +empty, we must, if in health, feel hungry, and desire to eat; when full, +we must, unless we are hogs, be satisfied, and prefer to ruminate. Most +men are so organised that when tickled they must laugh; when wronged, +must frown or sigh. The sight of distress makes them pity, and desire to +see it relieved. That of virtue makes them admire, and desire to see it +rewarded. That of vice makes them angry, and desire to see it punished. +Would we have all these things reversed? Would it be well for us that +our being starved or surfeited should make no difference in our wish to +feed, or our willingness to fast? Should we like the chances to be equal +whether we should desire distress to be alleviated or aggravated? If +not, what is the bondage under which we groan? What the liberty +wherewith we long to be made free? Our sole grievance is that, according +to actual arrangements, there must be reasons for our wishes, and that +on those reasons our wishes must depend. Should we then prefer that +there were no such reasons? Would we have our wishes to be independent +of reason, and adrift before irrational caprice? Probably we may, on +second thoughts, be content to forego an enfranchisement like this; but, +if not, we may at least console ourselves for its indefinite +postponement, by reflecting that Omnipotence itself is, equally with +ourselves, subject to the sort of necessity under which we are groaning; +equally destitute of the sort of free-will to which we aspire. It is +manifest that, since there cannot be omnipotence without boundless +liberty, omnipotence must possess completest freedom of will. Yet even +the Will of Omnipotence is subject to the despotism of causation. Divine +perfection cannot but be at all times affected in modes as exactly +corresponding with its own excellence as human imperfection is in modes +corresponding with its deficiencies, and the movements of the Divine +Mind cannot but correspond with the affections of the Divine Mind. Those +movements are not unmeaning, purposeless, wayward. They, too, have their +appropriate springs, and proceed by regular process from legitimate +causes, the chief of those causes being the infinite perfection of the +Divine Nature. Divine Power cannot then, any more than human, be +directed by its owner's will to purposes against which its owner's +nature revolts. But is this inability a matter to lament over? Those +must be greatly at a loss for a grievance who make one of its being +impossible for them to will things which they have over-ruling reasons +for not willing. Besides, does man, in order to believe himself free, +require more freedom than his Maker? The disciple is not above his +master, nor the servant above his lord. Surely it is sufficient that +the disciple be as his master, and the servant as his lord.[25] + +The fact, then, that human conduct is subject to causation, and may by +adequate intelligence be predicted in its minutest details until the end +of time, no more proves that it is governed by invariable laws, which +act irrespectively of human volitions, than the corresponding fact with +reference to Divine conduct impairs the freedom of the Divine Will. +There is no one living to whom such a doctrine--degrading man, as it +does, into a helpless puppet, robbing him of all moral responsibility +and of every motive for either exertion or self-control--can be more +utterly repugnant than to Mr. Mill, who nevertheless, although +dissenting from Mr. Buckle's more extreme opinions, makes use of some +expressions which may be construed into a qualified approval of his +general views. Even Mr. Mill speaks of 'human volitions as depending on +scientific laws,' thereby implying that the circumstances from which +human motives and, consequently, human actions result are continually +recurring with a certain regularity. He speaks of 'general laws +affecting communities, which are indeed modified in their action by +special causes affecting individuals, but which, if their effects could +be observed over a field sufficiently wide and for a period sufficiently +long to embrace all possible combinations of the special causes, would +be found to produce constant results.'[26] This proposition seems to +proceed on the assumption that general causes are either of uniform +operation, or that, if they vary in their effects, their variations, and +also those of special causes, occur with a certain regularity, and +constantly recur within a certain definite period. But this is precisely +what cannot possibly happen. Among the general causes referred to, some +few are continuous--those, namely, which are inherent in human nature; +but even these are continually modified in their action by changes +continually taking place in those other general causes which constitute +the existing state of society, and which are not merely continually +changing, but are continually becoming more and more different from what +they were originally. So much is fully admitted by Mr. Mill himself, and +indeed can be scarcely more strongly enforced than by his own words. +'There is a progressive change,' he says, 'both in the character of the +human race, and in their outward circumstances, so far as moulded by +themselves; in each successive age the principal phenomena of society +are different from what they were in the age preceding, and still more +different from any previous age.'[27] It is admitted, then, that there +can be no recurrence of social phenomena; and it is obvious that, the +longer the period of observation, the less possibility can there be of +their recurring, since the greater is the certainty that new causes +will come into operation. But, even though it were possible that all the +external circumstances which have once influenced either communities or +individuals could be repeated, the same circumstances could not a second +time produce the same effects. Men of different characters are affected +in very different ways by the same influences, and the characters of any +particular generation of men are always very different from those of +every preceding generation. Let it be supposed, for the sake of +argument, that the French of the present day could be placed in +precisely the same social condition in which their fathers were towards +the close of the last century; still they would act very differently +from their fathers. Nay, even though they should, with one single +exception, have inherited the dispositions of their fathers, the +difference of character in one single individual might suffice to give +an entirely new turn to the course of events. If every other antecedent +of the first French Revolution were again present, still there might be +no second revolution, provided only that, instead of another Louis the +Sixteenth, a Leopold of Belgium, or a Frederick the Great were king.[28] +With the last mentioned on the throne, there would assuredly be no +repetition of that vacillation of purpose which rocked the cradle and +fostered the growth of popular fury till it culminated in a Reign of +Terror. Since, then, there cannot be either a repetition of the same +circumstances to act upon men, or a reproduction of the same sort of +men to be acted upon by circumstances, human conduct can never exhibit a +repetition of the same phenomena; experience of the past can never, in +social or political affairs, furnish a formula for predictions as to the +future. Accordingly Mr. Mill, in common with Mr. Stephen, disclaims the +idea of positive, and pleads only for conditional, predictions. But the +very term 'conditional predictions' involves a contradiction, since it +is obviously impossible to see beforehand what perhaps may never come to +pass. What is meant by the phrase is really nothing more than +conjectures; and conjectures, however ingenious and reasonable, cannot +be admitted within the pale of science. They cannot be accepted as +fruits of a tree which has by the quality of its fruits proved its right +to be entitled the Science of History. + +With the view of enhancing the value of conditional predictions, it has +been urged that they are of precisely the same description as those +which we are in the habit of hazarding with respect to our familiar +acquaintance. There are, it is said, 'general maxims regarding human +conduct, by the application of which to given states of fact, +predictions may be made as to what will happen;' and all that is +necessary for the construction of historical science, is the employment +of these maxims on a larger scale. If the premiss here be sound, the +inference may be owned to be sufficiently legitimate. If there be any +formula with which the actions of individuals are observed to +correspond, there is every likelihood that the same formula may, by +extension and amplification, be adapted to the actions of communities. +But, although there are plenty of maxims telling men what they _ought_ +to do, there is not one--except that which declares that they must all +die--which affords any positive information as to what they _will_ do. +'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt not kill,' 'thou shalt not commit +adultery;'--all these and many more are moral laws; but of not one of +them--the more's the pity--is the observance sufficiently regular, to +give it the smallest pretension to be styled a scientific law. General +propositions, too, there are in abundance, representing with more or +less accuracy the probable results of particular lines of conduct. Such +are the proverbial sayings, that 'Honesty is the best policy,' that 'A +rolling stone gathers no moss,' that 'The racecourse is the road to +ruin.' But adages like these were never supposed to afford any basis for +prophecy. It may be that an honest man more commonly gets on in the +world than a knave, though there is also much to be said on behalf of +the counter-proposition, that 'The children of darkness are wiser in +their generation than the children of light;' but, at any rate, there is +no doubt that a man may be honest without being prosperous, and that he +is often all the poorer for his probity. But, indeed, is there any one +conceivable situation in life in which a positive rule can be laid down +as to the course which men will follow? Can it even--to make use of an +illustration which has been very effectively employed on the other +side--can it even be said that a man will certainly marry a woman with +whom he is deeply in love, who returns his affection, whom he can marry +if he likes, and whom he has the means of maintaining in a suitable +manner? Nine times out of ten he probably will; but in the tenth +instance a Brahmin's passion may be checked by fear of contamination +with a Pariah, or a King Cophetua's pride may prevent his wedding a +beggar-maid, or the titled owner of an entailed estate may decline to +illegitimatise his offspring by espousing his deceased wife's sister, or +betrothed lovers may be parted by some such mysterious barrier as +sprang up between Talbot Bulstrode and Aurora Floyd, or an Adam Bede, in +spite of the example set by George Eliot's hero, may refrain from +marrying Dinah for fear of breaking his brother Seth's heart. + +Equally vain would be the search for any rule invariably applicable to +political affairs. Even general propositions which sound like truisms +are not universally true. It cannot even be said that misgovernment +always produces discontent, or that the combination of superior strength +and superior strategy is always successful in war; for examples might be +cited of nations remaining patient under an iron despotism, and perhaps +also of campaigns lost by armies with every advantage of skill, numbers, +and discipline on their side. No better specimen can be given of what +are popularly spoken of as historical laws than one propounded by Mr. C. +Merivale, whose careful study of Roman annals has taught him to regard +it as 'a condition of permanent dominion that conquerors should absorb +the conquered gradually into their own body, by extending, as +circumstances arise, a share in their own exclusive privileges to the +masses from whom they have torn their original independence.' The +principle thus laid down is of great value, but it must not be mistaken +for an index pointing unerringly to a goal which will certainly be +obtained by following its direction. At least the offer of Austrian +citizenship had no perceptible effect in overcoming the exclusiveness of +Hungarian nationality; nor in inducing Venetia to become a willing +member of a Teutonic Federation, and to lend the same assistance to the +House of Hapsburg, as Gaul and Spain did to the Caesars, in suppressing +insurrection on the banks of the Danube. History supplies many +principles similar to the one evolved by Mr. Merivale, all more or less +useful for the guidance of the statesman. So far as they are just, they +indicate the results which would spring from the adoption of certain +lines of policy, unless something unforeseen should happen. It is true +that something unforeseen is almost sure to happen and to divert or +impede the course which events would otherwise take; but still, it is +most important to be able to perceive clearly the influence exerted by +certain causes, how much soever that influence may be disturbed by other +causes; since, if it does nothing else, it will at least prevent the +disturbing causes from producing what would otherwise have been their +full effect. On principles which indicate only a few out of many causes +in simultaneous operation, it is evident that nothing deserving to be +called predictions can be founded; but from them, nevertheless--inasmuch +as they teach that some causes act for good and others for evil, as far +as their action extends--practical rules of government may be deduced. +Such rules, however, which at best can only furnish a loose and shifting +basis for doubtful conjectures, stand without the confines of positive +knowledge; they occupy a middle-ground between science and nescience, +and constitute what, until very lately, was thought to be designated +with sufficient distinctness as the 'Philosophy of History.' By that +term, Mr. Stephen in one place says, is really meant all that he ever +meant by the Science of History; and the observation, were it not +apparently inconsistent with his general reasoning, might seem to imply +that the only question between him and his opponents is whether a thing, +the existence of which is not disputed, ought or ought not to receive a +new appellation. But it is otherwise, at any rate, with Mr. Mill. The +language used by him on this as on all other subjects, is too clear and +precise to admit of its being supposed that he has used a new phrase +without attaching to it a new signification, or to permit the present +writer to believe, as he fain would do, that a point of nomenclature is +the only point of difference between himself and one from whom it is so +difficult to differ without diffidence and self-distrust. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[22] Mr. Buckle's first chapter, _passim_. + +[23] 'Cornhill Magazine,' for June and July, 1861. + +[24] 'Lay Sermons,' p. 158. + +[25] A highly esteemed literary friend, who has done me the favour of +looking over these pages in manuscript, considers that what I have +proved is, not that Omnipotence involves the co-existence of Freewill +and Necessity, but that Omnipotence itself, although capable of +possessing all things, could not possess Freewill, and that consequently +Freewill cannot possibly exist--that there cannot possibly be any such +thing. + +Although, for reasons stated four pages back, not myself prepared to +accept this view of the matter, I should cheerfully accept it if I +could. The argument in the text proceeds upon the assumption that people +mean something when they talk about Freewill. If, however, they have no +meaning, if the phrase be a simple sound signifying nothing, of course +all controversy regarding the possible co-existence of that nothing with +Necessity is settled at once and for ever, while no great amount of +philosophy will be requisite to induce mankind to resign themselves very +placidly to the absence of that same nothing. + +[26] Mill's 'Logic.' Fifth edition. Vol. ii. p. 527. + +[27] Mill's 'Logic,' vol. ii. p. 504. + +[28] 'S'il se fut trouve alors (vers 1750) sur le trone un prince de la +taille et de l'humeur du Grand Frederic, je ne doute point qu'il n'eut +accompli dans la societe et dans le gouvernement plusieurs des plus +grands changements que la Revolution y a faits, non-seulement sans +perdre sa couronne, mais en augmentant beaucoup son pouvoir.'--De +Tocqueville, _L'Ancien Regime_, p. 274. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +_DAVID HUME AS A METAPHYSICIAN._ + + But the mischief lieth here; that when men of less leisure see them + who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuit of + knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or + advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly + received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions + concerning the most important truths which they had hitherto held + sacred and unquestionable.--Berkeley's _Hylas and Philonous_. + + +In no department of science is it possible for an enquirer to advance +considerably beyond all his predecessors without serving as a light by +whose aid his successors may advance somewhat beyond him. This is the +only apology that I feel disposed to offer for the freedom with which I +am about to criticize one who, having been, by judges so competent as +Adam Smith and Professor Huxley, pronounced to be 'by far the greatest +philosopher' and 'acutest thinker' of his own age, would, doubtless, be +at least on a level with the greatest philosophers of the present age if +he were living now. The veriest cripple that can manage to sit on +horseback may contrive to crawl some few steps beyond the utmost point +to which his steed has borne him, and, if those steps be uphill, may, by +looking back on the course he has come, perceive where the animal has +deviated from the right road. Yet he does not on that account suppose +that his own locomotive power is in any respect to be compared to his +horse's; neither need an annotator on Hume, when pointing to holes in +his author's metaphysical coat, be supposed not to be perfectly aware +that it is the strength, not of his own eyes, but of the spectacles +furnished to him by his author, that enables him to perceive them. + +The concentrated essence of Hume's metaphysics is to be found in 'An +Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,' forming part of a volume of +Essays which Hume published somewhat late in life, and which he desired +might 'alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and +principles.' To a formal, though necessarily rapid, examination of the +results of this 'Enquiry,' the present chapter will be almost +exclusively devoted. Often as the operation has been performed already, +there are two reasons why its repetition here may not be without +utility: for, first, its subject is a treatise containing the germs of +much subsequent and still current speculation which, in so far as it is +merely a development of those germs, cannot but be infected by whatever +unsoundness may be inherent in them; and, secondly, because the subject, +hackneyed as it may seem, is so far from being exhausted, that there is +scarcely one among the doctrines embodied in it to which, as I proceed +at once to show, fresh objection, more or less grave, may not be taken +by a fresh investigator. + +To begin very near indeed to the beginning, let us take, first, the +section of the 'Enquiry' which treats of the 'Origin of Ideas.' All the +perceptions of the mind may, according to Hume, be divided into two +classes, whereof the one consists of all those 'more lively +perceptions,' termed by him indifferently Impressions or Sensations, +which we experience when we 'hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or +desire, or will:' the other, of those 'less lively perceptions of which +we are conscious when we reflect on any of the sensations +above-mentioned,' and which are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. +'All our ideas or more feeble perceptions,' he continues, 'are copies of +our impressions or more lively ones,' the 'entire creative power of the +mind amounting to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, +augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded by the senses and +experience.' So confident is he of the literal accuracy of this +statement, as to proceed to intimate that whenever we find in +conversation or argument 'a philosophical term employed seemingly +without any idea or meaning,' we have only to enquire from what +impression its idea, if it have one, is derived, when, if no impression +can be adduced, we may be sure that no idea is present either. The only +phenomenon opposed to this rule, which he professes himself able to +think of, is that of a person who, of a colour--as, for instance, +blue--with which he is familiar, is able to conceive a shade somewhat +different from any of the shades which he has actually seen; but this +instance he disregards as too singular to affect the general maxim, to +which, as he might have added, it is not really an exception, any more +than would be the power of a person who had never seen a mountain higher +than Snowdon or Mont Blanc to conceive one as high as Chimborazo or +Mount Everest, for, equally in both cases, the ideas are copies of +sensible impressions, although of complex, not simple, ones--of colour +and graduation in the first case, of size and increase in the second. +Still, there is at least one genuine exception, which it is the more +remarkable that Hume should have overlooked, as it may be said to have +stared him in the face from the very subject-matter he was considering. +Our idea of idea itself, from what sensible impression is that derived? +We have just been told that the difference between an idea and a +sensation is that the first is a copy of the second, a feeble copy of a +lively original. The idea therefore is not itself a sensation; the copy +is not itself an original. Neither consequently can the idea or notion +which the mind proceeds to form of any of its previous ideas be derived +from or be a copy of a sensation: it cannot have entered the mind 'in +the only manner by which,' according to Hume, 'an idea can have access +to the mind, to wit, by actual feeling and sensation.' + +Let me not be misunderstood. Let me not be supposed to be courting +collision with the Berkleian thesis of the non-existence of abstract +ideas. I do not for one moment doubt that all our general or class +notions of sensible objects or events are merely concrete ideas of +individual objects or events--that, for instance, whenever we talk of +man or motion in general, we are really thinking of some particular man +or motion, which, as possessing all properties common to all men or +motions, serves as a representative of the entire _genus_. Neither am I +prepared to deny, although scarcely either prepared to admit, that even +of abstract qualities all our general or class notions are equally ideas +of particular specimens of those qualities; that, when we speak, for +instance, of virtue or vice in general, we are thinking of some +particular exhibition of some particular kind of virtue or vice. Nay, I +am not even concerned to deny that our idea of idea in general may +possibly be a copy of some particular one of our previous ideas which, +for the nonce, serves to represent all our other previous ideas. I limit +myself to saying that our idea of idea in general, whether it be or be +not itself an abstraction, is, at all events, not a copy of sensation. I +admit that it thereby differs essentially from most, if not all, other +general ideas. Possibly it may be only through my having myself felt +the promptings of some particular virtue or vice, that I am able to form +an idea of that particular virtue or vice. If so, I admit that my idea +of that particular virtue or vice is but, as Hume would say, a copy of +my feeling. And since, undoubtedly, I can feel myself thinking, or +perceiving, or performing any other mental operation, I am bound to +admit, further, that my idea of any such operation may equally be +described as a copy of a sensation which I have experienced. All I +contend for is that if, after having formed my idea, either of a mental +operation or of anything else whatever, I proceed to ask myself what +sort of an entity that idea is, the answer which I give myself, or, in +other words, the idea which I form of my previous idea, being a copy of +idea, cannot be a copy of sensation. + +So much must surely be conceded to me, for that white, being white, +cannot be also black is not nearly so certain as that idea and +sensation, being two distinct things, idea of idea cannot be idea of +sensation. The concession, indeed, is likely enough to be accompanied by +an exclamation of wonder that so microscopic a flaw in an elaborate +exposition should be thought worth pointing out; but Hume himself would +certainly not have so retorted. Of the doctrine which I am impugning, +viz., that every _idea_ is copied from some preceding _sensation_, he +had spoken as follows:--'Those who would assert that this position is +not universally true, nor without exception, have only one, and that an +easy, method of refuting it, by producing the idea which, in their +opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on +us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression or +lively perception which corresponds to it.' He was much too candid not +to have acknowledged that this challenge of his had been fairly and +fully met. He was not a man to refuse to own himself refuted when, after +distinctly intimating that the production of one single idea, having no +perception correspondent to it amongst those which we experience 'when +we see, or hear, or feel, or love, or hate, or will, or desire,' would +suffice for his entire refutation, he found such an idea produced. He +knew too well also to what enormous errors of thought minute errors of +expression may lead, to disregard any speck of inaccuracy in any one of +his definitions. The apparently slight oversight committed by him on +this occasion will, indeed, be presently seen to have sensibly +contributed to lead him subsequently into a mistake of no small +practical moment. + +We come next to the 'Association of Ideas,' the influence of which +almost all of Hume's successors, as well as himself, seem to me to have +greatly over-rated. That there is a 'principle of connection between the +different thoughts or ideas of the mind' is, as he says, sufficiently +evident; and that this principle is, as he was apparently the first to +remark, threefold, deriving its efficacy from resemblance, contiguity in +time or place, and cause or effect, may also be admitted with little +qualification. But I presume to think that he is quite incorrect in +adding that, in virtue of the aforesaid principle, ideas 'introduce each +other with a certain degree of method or regularity.' You are walking, +let us suppose, through Hyde Park, thinking of nothing more particular +than that the morning is a pleasant one, when you suddenly find yourself +in imagination pacing the shore of the Dead Sea, and, pausing to ask +yourself how you got there, you discover, perhaps, that it was by the +following steps. Remarking some landscape effect in the distance, you +were reminded of a similar one which you had remarked years before while +taking a walk fifty miles off in Sussex. Here resemblance operated. Then +you recollected how during that walk you were thinking about Mr. Buckle, +whose lucubrations you had been conning over before starting. Here +entered contiguity both of time and space. The name of Buckle reminded +you how that promising writer ended his travels abroad by dying of a +fever which he caught while sailing over the sites of the engulphed +cities of the plain. Here cause and effect came into action; and, so +far, everything accords with Hume's theory. But if you repeat the same +walk to-morrow, the same landscape effect will almost certainly suggest +a train of ideas quite different from that of to-day. Perhaps it may +begin by reminding you of landscape effects in general; then of Mr. +Ruskin, who has discoursed so eloquently on that topic, and next of Mr. +Ruskin's 'Stones of Venice,' from whence it is equal chances whether +your thoughts radiate, on one side of the compass, to stone china, or +Stoney Stratford, or Stonewall Jackson, or, on the other, to the +'Venetian Bracelet,' L. E. L. and Fernando Po, or to that effective +adaptation of the Venetian style of architecture, the Railway Station at +St. Pancras, and thence to some town or other on the Midland Line. + +These examples will be readily recognized as fair average specimens of +those unpremeditated trains of thought with which we are all familiar. +Is there, then, in the arrangement of the consecutive thoughts of which +the several trains are composed, any method or regularity common, I will +not say to all, but to any two of them? According to Hume and to most of +his successors in the same path of enquiry, there ought to be. Thus the +illustrious author of the 'Analysis of the Human Mind' affirms, without +rebuke or protest from any one of his not less illustrious commentators, +that 'our ideas spring up or exist in the order in which the sensations +existed of which they are the copies: that of those sensations which +occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically, and +that of the sensations which occurred successively, the ideas rise +successively.' And he adds, 'this is the general law of the Association +of Ideas,' remarking, by way of illustration, that, as 'I have seen the +sun, and the sky in which it is placed, synchronically, if I think of +the one I think of the other at the same time'; and that, as when +committing to memory a passage of words, as, for instance, the Lord's +Prayer, we pronounce the words in successive order, and have +consequently the sensation of the words in successive order, so when we +proceed to repeat the passage, 'the ideas of the words also rise in +succession, _Our_ suggesting _Father, Father_ suggesting _which, which_ +suggesting _art_, and so on to the end.'[29] + +Oh Law! Law! most abused of scientific terms, what an infinity of +dogmatic illegalities are committed in thy name! The one thing which +scientific law implies is regularity of occurrence, but what regulation +is it that is obeyed in common by a number of sequences commencing at +the same point in Hyde Park, yet terminating, one in Africa, another in +America, a third in Palestine, and a fourth in the centre of England? +Can it have been seriously said that it is impossible for us to think of +the sky without thinking simultaneously of the sun which illuminates +the sky? Is it impossible for us to think instead of the ether which +constitutes it, or peradventure even of the resemblance between its +celestial azure and what Moore calls the 'most unholy blue' of some +frolicsome Cynthia's eyes? And is it not notorious that when saying the +Lord's Prayer--a prayer which, in spite of the injunction by which its +original dictation was accompanied, to 'avoid vain repetitions, as the +heathen do,' many Anglican clergymen insist on repeating half-a-dozen +times in a single service--is it not notorious that, so far from the +idea of one word suggesting to us the idea of the next, no small effort +of attention is requisite to enable us to have any idea at all of what +we are saying? + +It would seem that the author of the 'Analysis' either could not help +asking himself questions like these, or, without asking the questions, +could not help seeing the commonplace truths involved in the inevitable +replies to them. It would seem to have been semi-consciousness of the +utter inability of the evidence first cited by him to justify belief in +the necessarily simultaneous or successive occurrence of the ideas of +simultaneously or successively experienced sensations, which made him +have recourse for help to _complex_ ideas. 'If,' he says, 'from a stone +I have had synchronically the sensation of colour, the sensation of +hardness, the sensations of shape and size, the sensation of +weight,--when the idea of one of these sensations occurs, the ideas of +all of them occur.' Because, then, I may have ascertained by experience +that a stone is white, hard, and round, two feet in diameter, and twenty +pounds in weight, am I really incapable, if I happen to break my shin +against it, of thinking how hard it is, without thinking also how heavy; +or, when trying to lift it, of thinking how heavy it is without +thinking likewise of its shape and colour? Elsewhere the same writer +speaks of 'ideas which have been so often conjoined that whenever one +exists in the mind, the others immediately exist along with it, seem to +run into one another, to coalesce, as it were, and out of many to form +one idea.' But which are the ideas whereof this can be said? The writer +instances those simple ideas, colour, hardness, extension, weight, +which, he says, make up our complex ideas of gold or iron. He instances, +too, the ideas of resistance, muscular contractility, direction, +extension, place, and motion, of which he says our apparently simple +idea, weight, is compounded. Does he mean, then, that we cannot +entertain the idea of yellowness without entertaining at the same time +all the other ideas necessary for composing the idea of gold, and +entertaining, too, that idea in addition to all the rest? Does he mean +that a train of thought cannot commence with place without terminating +with weight? Of course he means nothing of the kind, although so he +distinctly says. Rather, he appears to mean the direct converse, viz., +that we cannot have the idea of gold or of weight present to the mind, +without having present also all the simple ideas of which those complex +ideas are compounded--in other words, not that the occurrence of any one +component necessarily calls up all the other components, and forms with +them the compound, but that the appearance of the compound brings with +it all its separate components. + +But neither does this seem to be a strictly correct representation. I am +not sure that I can think of gold without thinking of yellowness, but I +am positive that I can without thinking of hardness. Nor is there any +doubt that the youngest child knows perfectly well what it means when, +trying to lift a stone, it calls the stone heavy, although it might not +be more difficult to make the stone itself than the child understand +what is meant by muscular contractility. I own that if it be here +demanded of me how a compound can be present unless every one of its +components be present also, I may under pressure be constrained to +suggest that possibly, after all, the very term _compound_ or _complex +idea_ may be somewhat of a misnomer, or at any rate that the +constituents of such an idea are much fewer than is commonly supposed. +Be it admitted that the idea, so styled, could not have been formed +without the instrumentality of other and previously-formed ideas, still +it does not follow that the instruments of production should for ever +after accompany the product. The rackful of dry toast which is brought +to you for breakfast could scarcely have been so neatly sliced without +the help of a knife, but the toast is not the less in bodily presence on +the breakfast-table because the knife that cut it has been left behind +in the kitchen. Neither, although you may probably be aware that salt, +suet, sugar, and spice enter into the composition of a Christmas +pudding, do you necessarily think of those separate ingredients when you +think of the pudding, any more than you would see them separately if you +saw the pudding. The only qualities which you apparently cannot help +thinking of when you think of the pudding are its size, shape, and +colour. + +One word more about the assumed regularity in the succession of ideas. +That when you are repeating a familiar form of words or playing a +familiar piece of music, every word uttered or note struck, by reason of +connexion of some sort between itself and the word or note next in +order, enables you without the smallest mental effort to utter that +word or strike that note, is too notorious to be questioned. But I do +very earnestly question whether the connexion that thus operates is an +association of ideas. How can it be, when, as frequently happens, you +have not the smallest idea of what it is you are saying or playing? Have +you not often, after reverently saying grace, like the decent +paterfamilias you probably are, occasioned a giggle round the table by +saying it again a minute or two afterwards, in utter unconsciousness +that you had said it just before? Or, if I may so far flatter myself as +to fancy my reader a fair daughter of the house instead of the staid +house father--has it never happened to you, Miss, while executing a +brilliant performance on the piano, to have been so entirely engrossed +by an animated flirtation carried on simultaneously, that, if at the +conclusion of the piece you had been asked what you had been playing, +you could not have replied whether it was _La ci darem la mano_ or _Non +mi voglio maritar_? And is it not evident that non-existent ideas cannot +have called real ideas into existence? + +My own modest contribution towards explanation of these mysterious +phenomena is as follows. Apart from association of _ideas_, there is a +separate and independent association--to wit, association of +_volitions_. While committing to memory a form of words, or trying a new +piece of music, every separate movement of your tongue or of your +fingers is consequent on some separate volition. Each series of +movements is consequent on a series of volitions. By being repeatedly +made to follow each other in the same order, the several volitions +become connected with each other, so that whenever the mind desires to +marshal them in the aforesaid order, each one, as it presents itself, +brings with it the next in succession, until the whole series is +completed; while, as each volition has consequent upon it a +corresponding movement, a series of corresponding movements +simultaneously takes place. The mind meanwhile is quite unconscious of +the muscular movements that are going on. What it is conscious of are +the volitions without which no voluntary movements of the muscles could +have been made, and of which the mind must needs be conscious, because a +volition of which the mind was not conscious would be an involuntary +volition, a birth too monstrous for even metaphysics to be equal to. But +although necessarily conscious of these volitions, the mind is only +momentarily conscious. It pays them barely an instant's attention, and +therefore instantaneously forgets them, retaining no more trace of them +than if they had never been. + +The doctrine of Hume's which next confronts us is his famous one +concerning Cause and Effect. He commences it by explaining that all +objects of human enquiry are divisible into two kinds--1. Relations of +Ideas, like those of which geometry, algebra, and arithmetic treat, and +which are either intuitively certain, or 'discoverable by the mere +operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in +the universe,' as, for example, the truths demonstrated by Euclid, which +would be equally incontestable even 'though there were never a circle or +a triangle in nature:' 2. Matters of Fact, as, for example, the sun's +rising and setting, or the emission of light and heat by fire, which are +never discoverable by unassisted reason, because of no one of them would +the opposite imply a contradiction or be consequently inconceivable; and +in our knowledge of any one of which we can never 'go beyond the +evidence of our memory and senses,' except by means of reasons derived +from experience of some fact or facts connected in some way or other +with the particular matter of fact we are considering. + +So far, all is comparatively plain sailing, but Hume now propounds a +difficulty which he at first presents as seemingly insurmountable, but +which I cannot help thinking to be mainly of his own creation, and which +he himself, almost immediately afterwards, suggests a mode, though a +very inadequate mode, of overcoming. His language here is not marked by +his usual perspicuity, or rather--to speak without respect of +persons--it contradicts itself in most astounding fashion; but his +meaning is not the less certainly the following, for there is no other +construction which his words will bear. + +'What,' he asks, 'is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?' +Why is it that, having found that such an object has always been +attended with such an effect, we infer that similar objects will always +be attended with similar effects? The proposition that a certain +antecedent has always been followed by a certain consequent, and the +proposition that the same antecedent will be followed by the same +consequent, are not identical. What, then, is the connexion between them +which causes one to be inferred from the other? The connexion is +unhesitatingly pronounced by him to be neither intuitively perceived, +nor yet to be 'founded on any process of the understanding.' If you +insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, he challenges +you to produce that reasoning, and taking for granted that you have none +to produce, he proceeds to indicate what principle it is which, in his +opinion, does determine us to form the inference. That principle he +declares to be custom or habit, by which alone, he asserts, we are, +after the constant conjunction of two objects, determined to expect the +one from the appearance of the other; adding that all inferences from +experience are effects of custom, not of reasoning. + +What is the correct answer to this question of Hume's I shall be rash +enough to endeavour to indicate a little further on; meanwhile there can +be no temerity in saying that whatever be the right answer, Hume's is +certainly a wrong one. Habit plainly cannot be its own parent. It +enables us to repeat more easily what we have already repeatedly done, +but it cannot be the cause of our doing or being able to do anything for +the first time. An infant that has once burnt its fingers by touching +the flame of a candle, expects that if it touch the flame again it will +burn its fingers again, but it does not expect this because it has been +in the habit of expecting it. Neither, if we be here bidden to +understand that the habit referred to is not any mental habit of our +own, but a habit which we have observed certain phenomena to have of +following each other, shall we thereby be brought one whit nearer the +truth. Our infant with the burnt finger has not observed that flame is +in the habit of burning. It only knows that flame did burn on the one +occasion on which it tried the experiment, which experiment it +consequently declines to repeat. Besides, no one needs to be told that +inferences, though thus capable of being drawn from single occurrences, +are drawn with increased confidence from observation of habit. We all +know already that, having always found that fire burns, we infer that it +always will burn. What we want to know is, why we draw this inference. +This is the question which Hume puts, and respecting which he gives +very positively the negative reply that the inference is not drawn +either intuitively, nor yet by any process of the understanding. Yet +that a body when not moving must needs be at rest, is not more certainly +demonstrable than that inferences cannot possibly be drawn except in one +or other of these two ways. Is not every inference a species of belief, +and must not every belief be either innate within us, or have been +acquired artificially; and, as in the latter case, it is a mental +acquisition, must it not in that case have been acquired by an operation +of the mind or understanding? Is it not clear, then, that inferences +must always be either intuitive or ratiocinative; and is it not strange +that Hume should deny that they ever are so? Yet stranger still is it, +that even while denying them to be either one or the other, he, almost +in the same breath, pronounces them to be both. For, after having on one +page denied that they are founded on reason, or any process of the +understanding, he describes them on the next page as being not simply +founded on, but as being themselves 'processes of the mind,' 'processes +of thought,' and immediately afterwards 'arguments,' nay, '_reasonings_ +from experience;' and, yet again, after as short a pause, these very +same 'reasonings,' and 'arguments,' and 'processes of the mind and +thought,' he concludes by styling 'natural instincts which no reason or +process of the thought or understanding is able either to produce or to +prevent'--'operations of the soul as unavoidable' when the mind is +placed in certain circumstances, as it is 'to feel the passion of love +when we receive benefits, or hatred when we meet with injuries.' + +What are we to say to a description of mental operations which are and +are not 'arguments' and 'reasonings,' which are and are not 'processes +of thought,' which are not 'intuitive,' and which yet are 'instincts?' +How are we to account for such amazing inconsistencies in an exposition +of one of the greatest of philosophers? With all humility, I submit the +following as a possible solution of the enigma. + +The one solitary ground on which Hume denies the argumentative and +ratiocinative character of what he nevertheless terms arguments and +reasonings, is the impossibility of producing the _chains_ of argument +or reasoning of which they are composed. But this impossibility can at +most only prove that the reasonings are elementary, and have, +consequently, no component parts into which they can be resolved. But +reasoning is not the less reasoning for being elementary, or for being +only a single link in a chain, instead of being itself a chain composed +of many links. Still, being elementary, it may occur to, and pass +through, the mind with extreme rapidity--with not less rapidity than an +intuition or instinct, for which therefore it may easily be mistaken, as +accordingly it has actually been by Hume. But that a reasoning from +experience is not really an instinct is certain, firstly, because +intuitive or instinctive reasoning, if not a phrase absolutely devoid of +meaning, is a contradiction in terms; and, secondly, because, if it were +instinctive, it would precede instead of following experience, and a +baby, instead of finding out that flame burns by touching it, would know +beforehand that flame burns, and would therefore not touch it. + +From the species of Belief constituted by an inference from experience, +Hume, by an easy transition, passes on to Belief in general, which he +defines to be 'nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady +conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able +to attain,' referring, by way of illustration, to an animal with the +head of a man and the body of a horse, which anyone can imagine, but no +one can believe in, and desiring us apparently to suppose that if our +groom were to come and tell us that he had found a centaur feeding in +the paddock beside our favourite saddle-horse, our sole reason for +believing in the horse and for not believing in the centaur would be our +greater ability to conceive the one than the other. That such a +definition should for a moment have satisfied its author's curiosity, is +itself a psychological curiosity which must not, however, be suffered to +detain us. Whoever, not content with knowing perfectly well what belief +is, desires to have his knowledge of it set down in writing, should read +the admirable notes on the subject, with which Mr. John Mill and Mr. +Bain have enriched the last edition of Mr. James Mill's 'Analysis of the +Human Mind.' Most readers, however, will probably be disposed to avail +themselves here of a rather favourite phrase of Hume himself, and to +plead that, 'if we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute +about terms;' and it is not unlikely that such of them as may have +formed their notion of metaphysical discussions in general from the +specimens given above, may go so far as to hint a doubt whether any of +the nice verbal distinctions which metaphysicians so much affect, are +really worth the trouble required to understand them. Nor would anyone, +perhaps, be much the worse for acting upon this suspicion, provided +that, in accordance with it, he kept altogether aloof from the studies +which it disparages. His ideas need not be the less clear because he +neither knows nor cares of what they are copies, nor whether they are +copies of anything; nor will the order of their occurrence be at all +affected in consequence of his being similarly careless, whether that +order is or is not governed by a _law_ of association; neither need his +inferences from experience be the less sound in consequence of his never +having enquired how or why they are deduced. But although the most +absolute ignorance and corresponding indifference about these and +kindred topics may not tend in the least to disqualify him for +performance of the whole duty of man, it is not the less important that, +if he do care to know aught about them, his knowledge should be exact, +for there is no knowing beforehand how luxuriantly the minutest germ of +theoretical error may ramify in practice, or into what substantive +quagmire trust in deceitful shadows may lead. These respectable +aphorisms may be beneficially borne in mind during perusal of what is +about to be said. + +If the fact were really, as Hume supposed, that we have _no_ reason for +our inferences from experience, and draw them only because either we +have been in the habit of drawing them, or because we are so constituted +as to be unable to help drawing them, the reason of our drawing them +plainly could not be that we perceive any necessary connection between +antecedent and consequent events, or any force or power binding these +together as cause and effect. Accordingly, Hume does not scruple to +affirm that 'we have no idea of connection or power at all, and that +these words are absolutely without meaning when employed either in +philosophical reasoning or in common life.' Every idea, he argues, +referring to a rule which he somewhat hastily supposes himself to have +already proved to be without exception, must needs have been copied from +some preceding sensible impression, but neither from within nor from +without can we have received an impression from which this particular +idea can have been copied. No keenest scrutiny of any portion of matter, +no study of its external configuration or internal structure could, +previously to experience, enable us to conjecture that it could produce +any effect whatever, still less any particular effect: could enable us +to guess, for instance, that flame would burn, or ice would chill, if +touched. Nor even though on once touching flame we get our fingers +burnt, are mature philosophers like us to conclude, as if we had no more +intelligence than so many babies, that if we touch again we shall be +burnt again. All we have as yet learnt from the experiment is that the +sensation of touching fire has once been followed by the sensation of +burning, but nothing has occurred to suggest that in the first sensation +lurked any secret power of producing the second. And what a single +experiment does not prove, no number of repetitions of precisely the +same experiment with precisely the same results can prove. Even though +on a lengthened course of experience we have found that in every case of +our touching flame our fingers have been burnt, we are still as far as +ever from perceiving any bond of connection between the two events. We +do indeed believe that as flame when touched has hitherto invariably +burnt, so, whenever touched hereafter, it will hereafter invariably +burn; but this, according to Hume, we believe simply because by long +practice we have contracted such a habit of associating the idea of +touched flame with burnt fingers, that whenever we witness the one we +cannot help expecting the other. + +Neither, if, withdrawing our eyes from the outward world, we cast them +inwardly upon the operations of our own minds, shall we, according to +Hume, any the more discover what we are in search of. What though we +know by experience that whatever, within certain limits, our will +appoints, our bodily organs or mental faculties will ordinarily perform; +that our limbs will move as we wish them, and our memory, reason, or +imagination bring forward ideas which we desire to contemplate, what +knowledge have we here beyond that of certain volitions and certain +other acts taking place in succession? What smallest evidence have we of +any connection between the volitions and the other acts? A volition is +an operation of the mind, is it not? and body is matter, is it not? And +do you pretend to know--can you form the smallest approach to a +guess--how mind is united with body, and how it is possible therefore +for the refined spiritual essence to actuate the gross material +substance. If you 'were empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains +or to control the planets in their orbit,' would such extensive +authority be one whit more inexplicable than the supposed ability of +your will to raise your hand to your head or to cause your foot to make +one forward step? + +If, nevertheless, you fancy you understand in what manner the will has +some of the bodily organs under its government, how, pray, do you +account for its not having all equally--the heart and liver as well as +the tongue and fingers? Without trying, you never would have discovered +that your bowels _will not_, any more than without trying you could have +known that your limbs _will_, ordinarily move in conformity with your +wishes. Neither, if one of your limbs were to be suddenly paralysed, +would you, until you tried, become aware that it would no longer move as +you wished. If there be, then, a power attached to the will, it is +plainly experience alone which apprises you of its existence; whereas +if you were independently conscious of it, you would know beforehand +precisely what it can and what it cannot effect, and would, moreover, +when you lost it, become instantly aware of your loss. + +Again, and above all, does not anatomy teach us that when the mind wills +the movement of any bodily member, it 'is not the member itself which is +immediately moved, but certain intervening nerves, muscles, and animal +spirits, or possibly something still more minute and more unknown,' +through which the motion is successively propagated until it reach the +member? So that when the mind wills one event, a series of other events, +quite different and quite unthought of, take place instead; and it is +only by their means that the will's purpose is finally achieved. But how +can the mind be conscious, how can it form the remotest conception, of a +power which not only never does what the mind desires, but never does +aught of which the mind is cognisant? + +And as we are thus utterly unable to perceive any power that the mind +has over the body, so are we equally unconscious of any power of the +mind over itself. We know as little of its internal nature and +constitution as we do of its mode of connection with the body. We know +by experience that at the bidding of the will ideas are continually +brought forward; but by what means they are brought forward we are +absolutely ignorant, as we are also of the reasons of the fluctuation of +mental activity, and why mental operations are more vigorous in health +than in sickness, before breakfast than after a heavy dinner or deep +carouse. + +Such, on the issue immediately before us, is Hume's reasoning, to +which--though necessarily very greatly condensing it--I shall, I am +sure, be acknowledged to have conscientiously striven to do full +justice, by bringing all its points into the strongest light, and +arranging them in the most effective order. Still, with its utmost +strength thus displayed before us, we are fully warranted in asserting +_a priori_ that its whole utmost strength is weakness. If, by following +a leader who has engaged to conduct us to a certain spot, we find +ourselves at our journey's end in a quite different place, no appeal +that the guide can make to maps or finger-posts will persuade us that he +has not mistaken the way. Nor need our judgment be otherwise, even +though our guide be Hume, if, having started with him in pursuit of +truth, we are finally landed in a patent absurdity. With all due respect +for logic, we protest with Tony Lumpkin against being argufied out of +our senses, as we plainly should be if we allowed ourselves to be +persuaded that whenever we use the words _power_ or _connection_ we have +no idea thereto correspondent. Since, then, Hume tells us this, we may +be quite sure that he has been deluded by some fallacy which may be +detected by adequate search; and being, moreover, sensible that we +really have the idea our possession of which is denied by him, we may be +equally sure that the original of which the idea is a copy is similarly +discoverable. In sooth, neither the one nor the other is far to seek. +The fallacy consists simply in confusion of the definite with the +indefinite article. The original of our idea of power Hume himself +indicates even while rejecting it. Although constrained by Hume's +demonstration to confess that we cannot even conjecture of what kind is +_the_ authority which the will exercises over the limbs, we are not the +less sensible that it does exercise _an_ authority of some sort or +other, which they are unable to disobey. We know that in ordinary +circumstances our limbs will move when we wish them to move, and will +remain quiet when we wish them not to move. Nor this only. We moreover +know, or at any rate fancy we know, that they would not have moved +unless we had wished them. In examples like these of volitions followed, +as the case may be, by _premeditated_ motion or rest, we have something +more than the simple sequence observable in the succession of external +events. We do not perceive simply that, as when fire is lighted, heat is +emitted, so when the mind wills the body moves. We perceive clearly that +there must be a connection of some sort between antecedent and +consequent, without which the first certainly _would not_ and, we fancy, +_could not_ have followed the first. We perceive, in short, that the +second followed _because_ the first preceded. If fire were an animated +being, capable of forming and manifesting volitions; and if we observed +that whenever it wished to emit heat, heat was emitted; and that +whenever it wished to withhold heat, heat was withheld; and if we were +thereupon to say that fire has the power of emitting or withholding heat +at its pleasure, our words surely would not be destitute of +signification; they would certainly possess some meaning, and that a +very obvious one. And so they as certainly do when we say that the mind +has power over those bodily movements which we observe to take place and +to cease in constant conformity with its will. I am not saying that what +they mean is necessarily truth--we will come to that presently--all I +say as yet is, that they mean something, and that that something, +whether it be a real or only an imaginary perception, is perfectly +fitted to be the original of that idea of 'power' _connecting_ cause and +effect, or of 'connection' _between_ cause and effect, which Hume +maintains does not exist, because there is no original from which it +can have been copied. It matters not that we are quite ignorant of what +nature is the something from which our idea of power possessed by the +mind over the body is derived, and which, for aught we know, may reside, +not in the mind, but in the body, and may consist, not of any strength +inherent in the former, but of loyalty and docility inherent in the +latter. Just as the authority of a popular general over a +well-disciplined army is not the less real because the soldiers, every +one of whose lives is at the general's disposal, might, if so inclined, +mutiny _en masse_, so it can make no difference in the mind's power over +the body whether the mind be intrinsically able to enforce obedience, or +the limbs be so constituted as to be unable to disobey. As little does +it matter that we are also ignorant of the mode in which the mind's +behests are communicated to the members. It is not the less certain that +in some mode or other they are communicated. Neither does it signify +more that the mind does not communicate directly with the part of the +body which it desires to influence, and acts upon that part only by +means of action propagated through a series of intervening parts; or +that it is able to direct only some organs, and not others, or cannot +direct even those, if by some accident they have become seriously +deranged. A strong-armed blockhead is not the less obviously able to +pump up water because the terms 'muscular contractility' and +'atmospheric pressure' are as heathen Greek to him; or because the +pump-handle, which alone is directly moved by him, touches, not the +water itself, but only the first link in a chain of mechanism connecting +it with the water; or because, if the sucker of the pump got choked, or +the well were to dry up, it would be vain for him to go on moving the +pump-handle. Blockhead as he is, nothing of all this in the least +diminishes his conviction that as long as the pump continues in order +and there remains water in the well, he can oblige the water to rise by +moving the pump-handle; nor can anything analogous prevent the mind from +feeling that whenever, in ordinary circumstances, it wills that the +limbs be moved, the limbs not only will be moved, but cannot help being +moved accordingly. But it is simply impossible that, from the exercise +of volitions which it knows will be obeyed, the mind should not receive +the sensation of exercising causal power; and having thus got the +sensation, it has nothing to do but to copy the sensation in order to +get the idea of causal power. _Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coute_; +the first step being taken the others cost nothing. The mind having, by +introspection of its own operations, discovered what Hume, though +professing to look in the same direction, unaccountably contrived to +overlook--the idea, namely, of causal power--proceeds to apply that idea +to the connection of external phenomena. Not only do we, whenever we see +a horse or an ox walking of its own accord, infer that the animal walks +_because_ it wishes to walk; but having observed that, when a stone is +thrown into the air it invariably falls presently afterwards towards the +ground; that a magnet invariably attracts any light piece of iron placed +near it; that red-hot coals always burn; and that water always moistens, +we infer that the second constituent of each brace of phenomena takes +place _because_ of the first, meaning thereby that there is some strong +bond _connecting_ the two and _compelling_ one to follow the other. If +called upon to justify this inference, we may do so by reducing to +absurdity its only possible alternative. If there be supposed to be no +connection between two phenomena constituting one of those invariable +sequences which we are accustomed to denominate cause and effect, the +sequence which they constitute must needs be an unconnected sequence, +and the only reason for styling one of the phenomena a cause is, that it +is an antecedent which the other invariably follows. But according to +this, as has been pointed out over and over again, day would be the +cause of night, and night the cause of day, and tidal flux and reflux +likewise would be each other's causes; and Mr. J. S. Mill has therefore +proposed to interpolate a word, and to define the cause of a phenomenon +as 'the antecedent on which it (the phenomenon) is invariably and +_unconditionally_ consequent.'[30] I must, however, confess myself +unable to perceive how the definition is improved by this emendation. +There is not, and cannot possibly be, such a thing as _unconditionally_ +invariable sequence, as, indeed, Mr. Mill himself virtually admits by +expressly assuming as an indispensable condition of all causation that +'the present constitution of things endure.' But if, notwithstanding the +presence of this indispensable condition, it be permissible to call any +sequence unconditionally invariable, then the sequences of night upon +day and of day upon night are such sequences, and day and night continue +consequently entitled to be styled each other's causes as much under the +amended as under the original definition. For as long as 'the present +constitution of things endures,' that is, as long as the earth continues +to revolve on its axis, and the sun continues to shine, and no opaque +substance intervenes between earth and sun, day and night will continue +to be as invariably and unconditionally each other's antecedents as +sunlight will continue to be the antecedent or concomitant of day. +True, Mr. Mill denies that the earth's diurnal motion is part of the +present constitution of things, because, according to him, 'nothing can +be so called which might possibly be terminated or altered by natural +causes:' but, if so, then neither ought sunlight to be so called, for it +too quite possibly may, nay, in the opinion of many philosophers, most +certainly will, be extinguished eventually by natural causes. If day +ought not to be called the unconditionally invariable consequent of +night merely because it would cease to be so if the earth were to cease +turning on its axis, then neither ought it to be called the +unconditionally invariable consequent of the unshrouded proximity of the +sun, inasmuch as it would cease to be thereupon consequent if the sun +were to become burnt out. If night be not, and if sunlight be, the cause +of day, the reason is not that sunlight always hitherto has been, and, +on one indispensable condition, always will be followed by day, for so +equally has hitherto been, and on the same condition will hereafter be, +night. The real reason is, that sunlight not only always has been and +will be, but also always _must_ be followed by day; that unless the +constitution of nature very materially change, wherever is sunlight day +_must_ be; whereas not only might day be, although night had never +preceded, but unless night had preceded, day must have been from the +beginning. In short, to constitute cause, invariability, however +unconditional, will not suffice. Another quality must be added, and that +quality I contend to be obligatoriness. A cause, I maintain, would not +be a cause unless its effect not only do or will, but _must_ necessarily +follow it. In common with the great unphilosophic mass of mankind, I +hold that between cause and effect there is a binding power which +constrains the one to follow the other. If asked whence we suppose that +power can have been derived, such of us, as conscious that we are 'no +very great wits,' don't mind confessing that we 'believe in a God,' will +not mind either suggesting that the power, wherever not exerted by an +animated creature, may possibly be directly from God. One thing certain +is, that inanimate matter cannot possibly possess or exercise any force +or power whatever, so that, unless matter, although apparently dead, be +really alive, attraction, cohesion, gravitation, and all its other so +called forces, being incompatible with dead inertness, must needs be +manifestations of some living, and possibly divine, power. Far from +there being any difficulty in conceiving Omnipresent Deity to be +exhibiting its might in every speck of universal space in every instant +of never-ending time, it is, on the contrary, impossible to conceive +otherwise. We cannot conceive one single minutest point in limitless +extension to be for one moment exempt from the immediate control of a +divine nature assumed to be + + Diffused throughout infinity's expanse + And co-existent with eternity. + +Here, indeed, we hasten to acknowledge with Hume that 'our line is too +short to fathom the immense abyss' which we have now reached. But we +need not, therefore, follow Hume to the lengths to which his insidious +mock-modesty would fain entice us. We may concede to him that 'we have +no idea of a Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own +faculties,' but we need not imitate him by perversely shutting our eyes +to the evidences of an energy inherent in our own faculties, and thereby +entitle him to insist on our joining him in denying that there is any +evidence of energy in the Supreme Being. We need not, because +constrained to admit that we know no more of the essence of divine, than +we do of human, power, pretend that we cannot even conceive such a thing +as divine power. Hume's affectation of profound ignorance on the subject +must have occasioned unusual amusement in a certain quarter. The Devil +can seldom have had a more hearty grin at his darling sin than when +witnessing this peculiar exhibition of the pride that apes humility. + +That Hume's ignorance was nothing but affectation is proved by his +veering completely round immediately afterwards, and in his very next +chapter, and almost in his very next page, pronouncing it to be +'universally allowed that matter in all its operations is actuated by a +necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely +determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect in such +particular circumstances could possibly have resulted from it.' +Throughout the same chapter he argues in the same sense, and quite +forgetting how obstinately he had just before contended that there are +absolutely no such things as connection or power at all, he defies any +one to 'define a cause without comprehending, as part of the definition, +_necessary_ connection with its effect.' So highly, indeed, does he now +rate that connecting power, whose very existence he had previously so +vehemently denied, that he professes himself unable to set any limit to +its efficacy. Even for those who should undertake to deduce from it the +impossibility of any liberty of human will, and consequently of any +human responsibility, pleading that, inasmuch as with a continued chain +of necessary causes, reaching from the first great cause of all to every +separate volition of every single human creature, it must needs be the +Creator of the world who is the ultimate author of all volitions, and +consequently solely accountable for every crime which man commits, he +affects, with exceedingly ill-sitting sanctimoniousness, to have no +better answer than that such belief, being impious, must be absurd and +cannot be true. It did not suit his purpose to point out that the +volitions of Omnipotence itself, equally with human volitions, are +necessary effects of causes--the causes in their case being the other +attributes with which Omnipotence is conjoined--and that as it is +nevertheless impossible for the volitions of Omnipotence to be otherwise +than absolutely free and uncontrolled, so there is no reason why human +volitions likewise should not, in spite of the same objection, be as +thoroughly free as our own feelings assure us they are. + +Hume's sudden conversion, so amazing at first sight, from flattest +denial to positivest assertion of causal power, becomes intelligible +when he is seen immediately afterwards using his newly adopted creed as +a fulcrum whereon to rest his argumentative lever in his assault upon +Miracles. About that celebrated piece of reasoning, startling as the +avowal may sound, there is, to my mind, nothing more remarkable than its +celebrity, for, on close inspection, it will be found to be entirely +made up of (1) the demonstration of a truism, and (2) the inculcation of +a confessedly misleading rule. Not far from its commencement will be +found a definition which, if correct, would leave nothing to dispute +about. A miracle, we are told, is 'a violation of the laws of nature,' +of laws which a firm and unalterable experience has established. But if +so, _cadit quaestio_. Of course, there can be no alteration of the +unalterable. No need, of course, of further words to prove that a +miracle thus defined is an impossibility. + +Let us suppose, however, the word _unalterable_ to have been used here +by a slip of the pen instead of _unaltered_, and that Hume really meant +by a miracle any alteration of what had previously appeared to be the +constant course of nature. Even so, we shall have him contending that no +amount, however great, of testimony however unimpeachable, ought to be +accepted as adequate proof of such an alteration. Of what he urges in +support of this position much may be at once dismissed as altogether +irrelevant. That the most honest witness may be the dupe of optical or +auricular illusion, or of a distorting or magnifying imagination; that +there is in many minds a natural predisposition to believe in the +marvellous, and that the love of astonishing often gives exaggerated +expression to the exaggerations of the fancy; that self-interest and +religious zeal often furnish additional motives for mendacity, and that +testimony, even when sincere at first, is apt to become corrupted at +every stage as it passes from hand to hand, or is committed to +paper--all this, together with any further enumeration of circumstances +calculated to invalidate testimony, is quite beside the real question. +It merely proves what no one needs to have proved, the propriety, viz., +of weighing evidence and balancing adverse probabilities; and even +though it proved in addition that of all the so-styled miracles on +record, there is not a single one the evidence for which is sufficient, +it would still prove nothing to the purpose. For Hume is arguing against +the credibility, not of any miracles in particular, but of all miracles +in general, those included the witnesses for which are of indisputable +intelligence and undisputed veracity. Be the quality of the testimony +what it may, no quantity of it, according to him, can be sufficient. +This is the essence of his thesis, the only part of it in which there +is any novelty, and in behalf of this part all that he has to say may be +resolved into a sophism, followed by a repetition of the same begging of +the question, as is involved in his afore-cited definition of a miracle. +In substance it runs as follows. All testimony is at best but a +description of the results of sensible experience--of observations of +the senses--but the most faithful description must needs be a less vivid +presentation of truth than the reality described. A single original is +better evidence than any number of copies. Your own personal experience +is more trustworthy than any number of mere records of the experience of +other people, and where the two conflict, the former always deserves +preference. Now the personal experience of each one of us assures us +that many sets of natural phenomena take place in perfectly invariable +sequences, in sequences so invariable as to appear to be, and to be +familiarly spoken of as, manifestations or operations of certain +inflexible laws of nature. Within our experience there has never been a +single deviation from any such law. Wherefore, though all the rest of +mankind should unite in asserting that they have observed such a +deviation, we ought not to believe them. Even though, for example--the +example, however, being not Hume's, but my own--we were, on leaving home +some morning, to hear on all sides that, while we were yet in bed, the +sun was seen to rise in the west instead of the east, and though we +found the statement repeated in the 'Times' and 'Daily News,' and +presently afterwards saw it posted up at the Exchange as having been +flashed by electric wire from New York and Kurrachee, we are not for a +moment to doubt that these reiterated and mutually corroborative +statements are utterly false. For, numerous and consistent as they may +be, they are but copies of the experience of other people, while, +although we may have to oppose to them only our own single experience, +still that single experience is original, and therefore of more worth. +The value, moreover, of any experience is, irrespective of originality, +determined by the difference in number between the results of opposite +kinds which it has discovered. The smaller number is deducted from the +larger, and the balance represents the probability that the results +which have most frequently occurred hitherto will continue to occur +henceforward. The larger the deduction thus to be made, the smaller the +probability, and _vice versa_; and when the deduction is _nil_, or when +there has hitherto been complete uniformity, the probability becomes +virtual certainty. When two original experiences are opposed to each +other, their respective values, ascertained in the same manner, are +compared, and trust is reposed in one or the other accordingly. Now, +according to these principles, difficult as it might be in the case +supposed for any one to conceive what motive all the rest of the world +could have for lying, it would be still more difficult to believe them +to be speaking truth. For why do we ever believe anything that anyone +says? Why but because we have learnt by experience that, when people +have no apparent motive for lying, they commonly do speak the truth? But +the same experience which has taught us this has taught us likewise that +people do now and then lie without apparent motive. At best, therefore, +there is never more than a probability that people are speaking the +truth, while in this instance, the supposition that they might be +speaking the truth would imply that there may be a truth against which +there is proof amounting to certainty. For what they affirm is that +something has happened the very reverse of what has invariably happened +before in the same circumstances. Is it not infinitely more likely that +people should be lying as they have often done before, than that the +invariable course of nature should have undergone a variation? With +evidence on the one side that has never yet deceived, with no evidence +on the other save what has often proved deceptive, how can we hesitate +which to accept? Even though the unanimity of testimony be such as might +otherwise be deemed complete proof, it is here met by absolutely +complete proof in the shape of a law of nature. The greater probability +overwhelms the lesser. The stronger proof annihilates the weaker, +leaving none of it behind, so that whoever still persists in believing +that a law of nature has been violated, must be content to do so without +one particle of proof. No quantity of testimony can furnish the smallest +proof of a miracle unless the falsehood of the testimony would be a +greater departure from antecedent uniformity--in other words, would be a +greater miracle--than the miracle which it attests. Unfortunately it is +but too notorious that there is not, and never has been, such a thing as +uniform truthfulness of testimony to depart from. + +Such, unless most unintentionally injured by compression, is Hume's +famous argument against miracles, of which the author was sufficiently +proud to boast openly that in it he had discovered what 'will be useful, +as long as the world endures,' as 'an everlasting check to all kinds of +superstitious delusion,' but which, as I nevertheless venture to repeat, +is compounded in about equal moieties of transparent sophism and +baseless assumption. For is it not the veriest juggle of words to insist +on the necessary inferiority of copies to an original, without adverting +to the indispensable proviso that the original with which the copies +are compared should be the original from which the copies have been +taken? May not a copy of Leonardo Da Vinci's 'Last Supper' quite +possibly be equal in force and vividness of expression to the original +painting by Benjamin West bearing the same name? Might it not be wise to +trust rather to an Airy, or a De la Rue, or a Lockyer's account of what +he had observed during a solar eclipse than to your own immediate +observations on the same occasion? Besides, this first branch of Hume's +argument, if sound, would tell quite as much for, as against, miracles, +rendering it equally incumbent on actual witnesses to believe, as on all +but actual witnesses to disbelieve. If you are always to prefer your own +original experience to mere descriptions given by other people of +theirs, then should it happen to be yourself to whom the sun appeared in +the west at an hour when, according to custom, he ought to have been in +the east, you are not to allow the protestations of any number of +persons who, happening at the time to have been looking the other way, +saw the sun in his usual place, to persuade you that what you saw was a +mock sun or an _ignis fatuus_. Rather than imagine that your own senses +can have deceived you, you are to suppose that all about you are in a +league to deceive you. For precisely the same reason for which you +should reject even universal testimony in favour of a miracle which you +have not witnessed, you are equally to reject universal testimony in +opposition to a miracle the similitude of which you have witnessed. + +Or is it possible for a question to be more distinctly begged than when, +to the question whether a miracle has occurred, it is answered that a +miracle is not a miracle unless there be uniform experience against it; +that uniformly adverse experience is direct and full proof against +anything; and that therefore there must always be full proof against +miracles? What is here taken for granted to be full proof is the very +thing requiring to be proved. If past uniformity really be a pledge for +continued uniformity, of course there can be no departure from +uniformity. If the whole question does not at once fall to the ground, +it is because no question has ever really arisen. But what shadow of +pretext is there for treating an hitherto unvaried course of events as +necessarily invariable? From past experience we have deduced what we are +pleased to call _laws_ of nature, but it is morally impossible that we +can seriously think, whatever we are in the habit of saying, that these +laws are self-denying ordinances whereby nature's God has voluntarily +abdicated part of His inalienable prerogative. The utmost efficacy we +are warranted in ascribing to them is that of lines marking certain of +the courses within which God's providence is pleased to move. But how +can we pretend to know for how long a season such may continue to be the +divine pleasure? How do we know that the present season may not be the +first of an alternating series, and that it may not at any moment +terminate, and be succeeded by one of an opposite character? What though +we have some shadow of historical evidence that most physical phenomena +have been going on in much the same order for some six thousand years, +is that a basis whereon to theorise with regard to the proceedings of +Him in whose sight one day is as a thousand years and a thousand years +as one day? Might not as well some scientific member of an insect tribe +of ephemera, whom ancestral tradition, confirmed by personal experience, +had assured that an eight-day clock had already gone on for six days, +pronounce it to be a law of the clock's nature that it should go on for +ever without being again wound up? Would the insect philosopher's +dogmatism be one whit less absurd than that of those human ephemera who +so positively lay down the law about the clockwork of the universe? +Those laws of nature to which unerring regularity and perpetuity of +operation are so confidently attributed, may they not, perchance, be but +single clauses of much farther reaching laws, according to whose other +provisions the force of these isolated clauses may, in novel +combinations of circumstances, be counteracted by some latent and +hitherto unsuspected force? Or is it not, at all events, open to their +divine promulgator to suspend their operation at his pleasure? May it +not conceivably have been preordained that the globe of our earth, after +revolving for a given number of ages, in one direction, shall then, like +a meat-jack, or like an Ascidian's heart,[31] reverse its order of +procedure, and commence a contrary series of revolutions? Or might not +He who prescribed to the earth its rotatory movement, will that the +rotation should for some hours cease, and that the sun should in +consequence seem to stand still, as it is recorded to have done at the +command of Joshua? Improbable as these suppositions may be, who that has +not been taken into counsel by his Creator can presume to say that they +may not be correct? The events which they involve are not inconceivable, +and whatever is not utterly inconceivable may possibly occur, however +numerous the chances against its occurrence. It is not then the fact +that 'past experience,' however unvaried, affords full proof of the +future existence of any event, or constitutes certainty against the +future existence of the reverse of that event. Completest uniformity of +experience cannot create a certainty by which any opposite probability +would be completely annihilated. It only creates a probability which, +however great, is still only a probability, and which would become a +smaller probability by deduction from it of any opposite probability. +But mere probability, however great, always includes some doubt as to +its own correctness, some suspicion that its opposite may possibly be +correct. How much soever, therefore, uniform experience may vouch for +the inviolability of natural laws, it always remains possible for those +laws to be violated, and, as miracles are nothing else but violations of +natural laws, it always remains possible for miracles to happen. But +since miracles are possible, testimony to their occurrence may, with +equal possibility, be true, and no further refutation can, I submit, be +needed for an argument which insists that all such testimony should be +set aside without enquiry as self-evidently false. + +Had Hume been content to insist that testimony in favour of miracles +should never be received without extreme doubt and hesitation, his +lesson might well have passed without further objection than that of its +being superfluous for any one with sense enough to profit by it. Nor +might it have been easy to discover a flaw in his logic, although he had +gone so far as to maintain that no one of the miracles as yet on record +is either adequately attested, or would, even if it had undoubtedly +occurred, afford sufficient evidence of any religious truth. The best +and only adequate evidence for any religious creed is the satisfaction +which it affords to the soul's cravings and promises to the soul's +aspirations; and no rational Christian would be at all the more disposed +to turn Mussulman, even though it should be demonstrated to his entire +conviction that Christ did not raise Lazarus from the dead, and that +Mahomet did turn the hill Safa into gold, instead of prudently confining +himself to boasting that he could have effected the transmutation if he +had thought proper. But for the purpose which Hume had in view, it was +necessary to establish, not merely the doubtfulness, but the absolute +falsehood of the miracular testimony on which, in his opinion, 'our holy +religion' rests, in order that the character of the superstructure being +inferred from that of the foundation, both might be condemned together. +There is, however, an irreligious as well as a religious fanaticism, +and, though it is difficult, while looking at Hume's portrait, to credit +the owner of that plump, good-humoured face with feeling of any sort +warm enough to be termed fanatical, it is humiliating to note from his +example into what strange inconsistency the coolest and calmest judgment +may be warped by irreligious prejudice. Having not long before, in order +to disparage _natural_ religion, emphatically denied the existence of +any causal connection between successive events, he now, in order +equally to discredit the very possibility of _revealed_ religion, +tacitly assumes that same connection, not simply to exist, but to be of +an efficacy which no disturbing forces can impair. Admitting that 'the +Indian prince who refused to believe the first relations concerning the +effects of frost' was wrong in his belief, Hume will have it that the +prince nevertheless 'reasoned justly.' Although recognising truth to be +the sole worthy object of quest, he yet enjoins rigid adherence to a +rule which he is aware must inevitably lead to frequent error. + +Rather strikingly contrasted, in respect of execution, with Hume's +chapter on Miracles, comes the one next in order on a Providence and a +Future State, which, for the skill with which the fallacy involved in it +is disguised, may be regarded as quite a masterpiece of false reasoning. +Among its leading propositions there is but one which does not command +immediate assent. That we can argue but from what we know; that of +causes, known to us only by their effects, our estimate ought to be +exactly proportioned to the effects; that of a Creator manifested only +by His works, no higher qualities, no greater degrees of power, +intelligence, justice, or benevolence, can be confidently +predicated--whatever be conjectured--than are apparent in his +workmanship: all this, on one moment's reflection, is perceived to be +indisputable. Needs must it be, however reluctantly, admitted that +nothing can be more illogical than to return back to the cause, and +infer from it other effects beyond those by which alone it is known to +us, or to infer from creative attributes, distinctly manifested, the +existence of other and not apparent attributes, endowed with some +efficacy additional to that possessed by the former. But does it hence +follow that faith in a superintending Providence is so mere a matter of +'conceit and imagination,' a faith so absolutely irrational as Hume +considered it? A candid examination of God's works will warrant us in +coming to a widely different conclusion. Among those works is man--a +being who, in spite of the utter insignificance of his greatest +_performances_, is capable of forming most exalted _conceptions_ of +justice, benevolence, and goodness in general, and of feeling the most +eager desire to act up to his own ideal. If the divine notions of +goodness in its several varieties be not identical with the human, it +can only be because they are superior; and so, too, of the divine love +of, and zeal for, goodness. It cannot be that the Creator is inferior to +the creature in virtues which the creature derives from Him alone. +Demonstrably, therefore, God is good and just in the very highest degree +in which those qualities can be conceived by man. Demonstrably, too, +since the universe is the work of His hands, He must be possessed of +power which, if not necessarily unbounded, is at least as boundless as +the universe. Thus, rigidly arguing from effects to causes, and +scrupulously proportioning the one to the other, man sees imaged on the +face of creation a creator, both realising his highest conception of +goodness, and wielding measureless might. Is not such a being worthy to +be looked up to, and confided in, and adored and loved as a +superintending providence? Is not faith in such a providence not simply +not irrational, but the direct result of a strictly inductive process? +And would it be an irrational stretch of faith sanguinely to hope, if +not implicitly to believe, that an union of infinite justice with +measureless might may, in some future stage of existence, afford +compensation for the apparently inequitable distribution of good and +evil which, according to all experience, has hitherto taken place among +human beings? + +Were it desirable to amplify the apology with which this paper +commenced, some additional justification of the freedom of the +foregoing criticisms might be found in hints thrown out by Hume in +various parts of the treatise which we have been examining, and +particularly in its concluding chapter, that in many of his most +startling doctrines he was but half in earnest. Hume's temperament, too +cool for fanaticism, had yet in it enough of a certain tepid geniality +to save him from becoming a scoffer. The character which he claims for +himself, and somewhat ostentatiously parades, is that of a sceptic or +general doubter--a character in which, when rightly understood, there is +nothing to be ashamed of. To take nothing on trust, to believe nothing +without proof, to show no greater respect for authority than may consist +in attentive and candid examination of its statements, to accept only +verified facts as bases for reasoning on matters of fact and +existence--these are golden rules of philosophical research, principles +in which lies the secret of all real progress in any of the higher +departments of science. By Hume they were adopted _con amore_, and with +keen appreciation, not more of their practical utility, than of the +sport which he perceived them to be capable of yielding. His serious +purpose was to unmask the numberless pretences which in politics, +political economy, metaphysics, morals, and theology he found +universally current as gospel truths; to expose the ambiguity and +contradictions latent in popular thought, and in the popular forms of +expression which are so apt to be mistaken for thought, and to indicate +the only safe mode of investigation and the only trustworthy tests of +genuine knowledge; his favourite amusement to put time-honoured +commonplaces on the rack, and demanding their _raison d'etre_, to pass +on them summary sentence of extinction if they failed to account +satisfactorily for their existence. Unfortunately, in his keen +enjoyment of the fun of the thing, he not unfrequently overlooked the +solid interests at stake. Like a huntsman who, for the sake of a better +run, should outrace his quarry, or who, seeing that the dogs were close +upon the hare, should, in order to prolong the chase, start a fresh +hare, kept till then snug at his saddle-bow, so Hume, in the excitement +of metaphysical pursuit, instead of stopping to gather up whatever +verified affirmations came in his way, would prefer to follow any new +negation that he espied, or, if momentarily accepting any affirmation as +established, would proceed forthwith to affirm its direct opposite with +the view of neutralising both. In this, his practice resembled that of +metaphysicians in general, who take a singular delight in setting +themselves riddle after riddle, which they either assume to be +hopelessly insoluble, or which they no sooner solve than they use the +solution as the subject of another riddle involving its predecessor in +redoubled perplexity. Now, little harm, and little, perhaps, of anything +but good, might thereby be done if the lovers of this game were content +to play it by themselves, without inviting others to join who are +constitutionally unfit for such intellectual wrestling. But mental +exercises may to philosophers be health and invigorating sport, and yet +be death to the multitude; and Hume, as an Utilitarian, stands +self-condemned for making ordinary people uncomfortable by challenging +them to disputations confessedly leading no whither, and bewildering +them with confessedly 'vain and profane babblings, and strivings after +words to no profit, but to subverting of the hearers, and overthrow of +the faith of some.' And it is as poor an excuse for this wanton +tampering with other people's creeds, as it is poor amends for its +mischievous consequences, that Hume offers when, after watching for a +while his puzzled disciples blown about by the winds of adverse doctrine +that he has let loose upon them, he proceeds to rally them on their +'whimsical condition,' which he speaks of as a mere laughing matter got +up chiefly for amusement. It is only an aggravation of offence that, +while, on the one hand, he solemnly pronounces everything to be 'a +riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery,' he, on the other hand, +cheerily exhorts us not to suffer the 'doubts raised by philosophy to +affect our actions.' 'Nature,' he says, 'is always too strong for +principles, will always maintain her rights, and prevail, in the end, +against all reasoning whatever.' 'The great subverter of Pyrrhonism,' he +continues, 'is actual employment and the occupations of common life,' in +presence of which its overstrained scruples 'vanish like smoke.' +Although real knowledge consists solely in knowing that we know nothing, +and in doubting everything, and although sceptics may 'justly triumph' +in principles which lead them to deny even the attraction of +gravitation, still they had better beware how they act on these +principles, lest by stepping unconcernedly out of window they come +fatally to grief on the stones below, and so the sect and its tenets be +annihilated together. So, or to such effect, Hume: but how can there be +just ground for pride in speculations which, as their own professors +admit, would, on the first attempt to reduce them to practice, be +shattered to pieces by hard facts? That cannot possibly, even on Hume's +recommendation, be accepted as metaphysical truth, which flatly +contradicts common sense, nor can there be any unbecoming +self-confidence in seeking, even though Hume pronounce the search +hopeless, for metaphysical truth, with which common sense may be +reconciled. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[29] Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. By James Mill. Edition +of 1869, with Notes by Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater, George Grote, +and John Stuart Mill, vol. i. pp. 78 _et seq._ + +[30] Mill's 'Logic.' 5th Edition. Vol. i. p. 377. + +[31] 'There is a class of animals called Ascidians, which possess a +heart and a circulation, and up to the year 1824 no one would have +dreamt of questioning the propriety of the deduction, that these +creatures have a circulation in one definite and invariable direction; +nor would any one have thought it worth while to verify the point. But +in that year M. von Hasselt, happening to examine a transparent animal +of this class, found to his infinite surprise that after the heart had +beat a certain number of times, it stopped, and then began beating the +opposite way, so as to reverse the course of the current, which returned +by-and-by to its original direction.'--_Huxley's Lay Sermons_, p. 95. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +_HUXLEYISM._ + + '_A force d'esprit tout lui paroit matiere._' + + +In one of his interesting 'Lay Sermons,' the most interesting perhaps of +the whole interesting series, Professor Huxley, taking for his theme the +'Physical Basis of Life,' combats 'the widely-spread conception of life +as a something which works through matter, but is independent of it;' +affirming, on the contrary, 'that matter and life are inseparably +connected, and that there is one kind of matter which is common to all +living beings.' The preacher may be safely allowed to have +satisfactorily made out the second portion of this affirmation. With his +own singular felicity of illustration, he shows how all vegetable and +animal tissues, without exception, from that of the brightly coloured +lichen looking so like a mere mineral incrustation on the rock that +bears it, to that of the painter who admires or the botanist who +dissects it, are, however diverse in aspect, essentially one in +composition and structure. He explains how the microscopic fungi +clustering by millions within the body of a single fly, the giant pine +of California towering to the height of a cathedral spire, the Indian +fig-tree covering acres with its profound shadow, the animalcules of +ocean's lowest deep, minute enough to dance in myriads on the point of a +needle, and the Finner whale, hugest of beasts, that disports its ninety +feet of bone and blubber on ocean's billowy heights, the flower that a +girl wears in her hair, and the blood that courses through her veins, +are, each and all, smaller or larger multiples or aggregates of one and +the same structural unit, which, again, is invariably resolvable into +the same identical elements. That unit, he tells us, is an atom or +corpuscle composed of oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, and carbon, which, and +which alone, seem to be required by nature for laying withal the +foundations of vitality, inasmuch as no substance from which any one of +these ingredients is totally absent, ever exhibits any sign of life, +while, on the other hand, not only are these four ingredients sufficient +of themselves to form a substance capable of living, but they actually +do with very little (when any) foreign admixture, form all substances +whatsoever that are ever found vivified. All such substances, he informs +us, are but varieties of _protoplasm_, differing indeed from each other +in texture, colour, and general appearance, even as a diamond differs +from granite, yet all being equally protoplasm, just as a diamond and a +block of granite are equally stones, or as heart of oak and the outer +case of a nettle's sting are equally wood. The human ovum, he gives us +to understand, is in its earliest stage but a single particle of +protoplasm; the human foetus but an aggregation of such particles, +variously modified; the human body perfectly matured, but a larger +aggregation of such particles still further modified. + +He proceeds to point out, as following from these premises, that a +solution of smelling salts, together with an infinitesimal quantity of +certain other salts, contains all the elements that enter into the +composition of protoplasm, and consequently of whatever substance the +very highest animal requires for sustenance. He does not, however, +leave us to suppose that any abundance of the fluid in question would +avail aught to save a hungry creature of any sort from starving, but +continues his exposition to the following effect. Not only is there no +animal, there is not even any vegetable organism, to which the elements +of food can serve as food, as long as they remain elementary. It is +indispensable that hydrogen and oxygen should combine to form water, +nitrogen and hydrogen to form ammonia, carbon and oxygen to form +carbonic acid; and even then, even at a table groaning under whole +hogsheads of these primitive compounds, there is no single animal that +would not find itself at a Barmecide feast. There are many plants +likewise, which in the midst of such uncongenial plenty would be equally +without a drop to drink; but there are also multitudes of others which, +without the aid of any more elaborated nutriment, would be able to grow +into a million, nay million million fold of their original bulk. +Provided there be in the seed or germ of any of these latter one single +particle of living protoplasm to begin with, that single particle may +convert into animated protoplasm an indefinite quantity of inanimate +ammonia, carbonic acid, and water. The protoplasm thus created in the +first instance, and created, let us suppose, in the form of a lichen or +a fungus, is converted by decay into vegetable mould, in which grass may +take root and grow, and which, in that case, will be converted into +herbaceous protoplasm; which, being eaten by sheep or oxen, becomes +ovine or bovine protoplasm, commonly called mutton or beef; which, +again, being eaten by man, becomes human protoplasm, and, if eaten by a +philosopher, becomes part of a mass of protoplasm capable of +investigating and of expounding in lectures or lay sermons, the changes +which itself and its several components have undergone. + +So far we advance with willing steps like dutiful disciples along the +path of knowledge indicated by our distinguished biological teacher, who +here, however, pulls us up short by suddenly intimating that he sees no +break in the series of transubstantiations whereby precisely such +oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon as he is lecturing upon, have +become metamorphosed into him, the lecturer, and us, the lectured +audience, and cannot 'understand why the language which is applicable to +any one term of the series should not be used in regard to any of the +others.' Oxygen and hydrogen, he reminds us, are gases, whose particles, +at and also much below 32 deg. Fahrenheit, tend to rush away from each other +with great force; and this tendency we call a property of each gas. Let +oxygen and hydrogen be mixed in certain proportions, and an electric +spark passed through them, and they will disappear, and a quantity of +water equal in weight to the sum of their weights will appear in their +place. But amongst the properties of the water will be some, the direct +opposites of those of its components; watery particles, for example, at +any temperature not higher than 32 deg. Fahrenheit, tending not to rush +asunder, but to cohere into definite geometrical shapes or to build up +frosty imitations of vegetable foliage. And let the water be brought +into conjunction with ammonia and carbonic acid, and the three will, +under certain conditions, give rise to protoplasm, which again, if +subjected to a certain succession of processes, will rise by successive +stages from protoplasm that gives no other signs of life than those of +feeding and reproducing its kind, to protoplasm endowed with the power +of spontaneous motion, and finally to protoplasm that thinks and +reasons, speculates and philosophises. Now why should any of the various +phenomena of life exhibited by these varieties of protoplasm be supposed +to be of a different class from the appearances of activity exhibited by +any of the varieties of lifeless matter? What reason is there why, for +instance, thought should not be termed a property of thinking +protoplasm, just as congelation is a property of water, and +centrifugience of gas? Professor Huxley protests that he is aware of no +reason. We call, he says, the several strange phenomena which are +peculiar to water, 'the properties of water, and do not hesitate to +believe that in some way or other they result from the properties of the +component elements of water. We do not assume that something called +_aquosity_ entered into and took possession of the oxide of hydrogen as +soon as it was formed, and then guided the aqueous particles to their +places in the facets of the crystal or among the leaflets of the hoar +frost. On the contrary, we live in the hope and faith that, by the +advance of molecular physics, we shall by-and-by be able to see our way +as clearly from the constituents of water to the properties of water, as +we are now able to deduce the operations of a watch from the form of its +parts or the manner in which they are put together.' Why, then, when +carbonic acid, water, and ammonia disappear, and an equivalent weight of +the matter of life makes its appearance in their place, should we assume +the existence in the living matter of a something which has no +representative or correlative in the unliving matter that gave rise to +it? Why imagine that into the newly formed hydro-nitrogenised oxide of +carbon a something called vitality entered and took possession? 'What +better philosophical status has vitality than aquosity?' 'If scientific +language is to possess a definite and constant signification, we are,' +he considers, 'logically bound to apply to protoplasm or the physical +basis of life the same conceptions as those which are held to be +legitimate elsewhere.' Wherefore, he concludes, that 'if the phenomena +exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by +protoplasm _its_ properties,' and that if it be correct to describe 'the +properties of water as resulting from the nature and disposition of its +component molecules,' there can be no 'intelligible ground for refusing +to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and +disposition of its molecules.' + +Here, however, our lay preacher candidly warns us that by the vast +majority of his clerical brethren this doctrine would be denounced as +rankest heresy, and that whoever accepts it is placing his foot on the +first rung of a ladder which, in most people's estimation, is the +'reverse of Jacob's, and leads to the antipodes of heaven.' He frankly +owns that the terms of his propositions are distinctly materialistic: +nay, that whoever commits himself to them will be temporarily landed in +'gross materialism.' Not the less, however, does he, mingling +consolation with admonition, recommend us to plunge boldly into the +materialistic slough, promising to point out a way of escape from it, +and insisting, indeed, that through it lies the only path to genuine +spiritualistic truth. + +In pronouncing this to be exceedingly evil counsel, as with the most +unfeigned respect for its author I feel bound at once to do, it might +not be necessary for me to undertake a detailed topographical survey of +the path alluded to. It might, perhaps, suffice to specify the +conclusions to which the path is represented as leading, in order to +show that those conclusions cannot possibly be reached by any such +route. By Professor Huxley himself they are thus described:--We know +nothing of matter 'except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical +cause of states of our own consciousness,' nor of spirit, except that +'it also is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause of states of +consciousness. In other words matter and spirit are but names for the +imaginary _substrata_ of groups of natural phenomena.' + +But if matter be not a thing, but a name, and a name too not for a real, +but only an imaginary thing, one perfect certainty is that matter cannot +possibly be composed either wholly or in part of molecules, and, by +necessary consequence, that life cannot possibly be 'the product of any +disposition of material molecules,' nor the phenomena of life be +'expressions of molecular changes in the matter of life.' Of the +particular Huxleian doctrine which we are considering, the two moieties +are absolutely irreconcileable; so that on the assumption that either +moiety were true, the truth of that moiety would be decisive against the +other. If matter have no real, and only a nominal existence, life, which +is undeniably a reality, cannot be a property of matter. If life, being +an undisputed reality, be a property of matter, matter must needs be a +reality also, and not merely a name. Any one, however, who, like myself, +is thoroughly convinced that both halves of the doctrine are equally and +utterly erroneous, is precluded from employing one for the refutation of +the other, and in order to prove, as I shall now attempt to do, that +life is in no sense either a product or a property of matter, must +resort for the purpose to independent reasoning. + +I commence by defining one of the principal terms occurring in the +debate. When in scientific discourse we speak of anything as a property +of an object, we mean thereby not simply that it is a thing belonging to +the object, but also that it is a thing without which the object could +not subsist. We mean that it is one of the constituents inherent in and +inseparable from the object, whose union gives to the object its +distinctive character. When we call fluidity at one temperature, +solidity at another, and vaporisation at a third, properties of water, +we mean that matter which did not liquefy, congeal, and evaporate at +different temperatures would not be water. The habits of exhibiting +these phenomena, in conjunction with certain other habits, make up the +aquosity or wateriness of water. They are parts of water's nature, and, +in the absence of any one of them, water would not be its own self, and +could not exist. But in no such sense, nor in any sense whatever, is the +life or vitality whereby what we are accustomed to call animated are +distinguished from inanimate objects, essential to the existence of the +species of matter termed matter of life or protoplasm. Take from water +its aquosity, and water ceases to be water; but you may take away +vitality from protoplasm, and yet leave protoplasm as much protoplasm as +before. Vitality, therefore, evidently bears to protoplasm a quite +different relation from that which aquosity bears to water. Protoplasm +can do perfectly well without the one, but water cannot for a moment +dispense with the other. Protoplasm, whether living or lifeless, is +equally itself; but unaqueous water is unmitigated gibberish. But if +protoplasm, although deprived of its vitality, still remains protoplasm, +vitality plainly is not indispensable to protoplasm, is not therefore a +_property_ of protoplasm. + +And that it is not a _product_ of protoplasm, or a result of any +particular arrangement of protoplasmic particles or molecules, is not +less easily or unanswerably demonstrable. For if it were, as long as the +particular molecular arrangement remained unaltered, life would +necessarily be in attendance; an amputated joint would, until +decomposition set in, be as much alive as the trunk from which it had +been lopped, even as water poured from a jug into a glass is quite as +much liquid as the water remaining in the jug. There would be no such +thing as dead meat, which was not putrid as well as dead, any more than +water can freeze without changing from a fluid to a solid; and there +would moreover be production antecedent in origin to its own producer. +The force of the last at least of these objections is not to be +resisted. Water, ammonia, and carbonic acid cannot, it is admitted, +combine to form protoplasm, unless a principle of life preside over the +operation. Unless under those auspices the combination never takes +place. At present, whenever assuming its presidential functions, the +principle of life seems to be invariably embodied in a portion of +pre-existing protoplasm; but there certainly was a time when the fact +was otherwise. Time was, as geology places beyond all doubt, when our +globe and its appurtenances consisted wholly of inorganic matter, and +possessed not one single animal or vegetable inhabitant. In order, then, +that any protoplasm or the substance of any organism should have been +brought into existence in the first instance, life plainly must have +been already existent. It must at one time have been possible for life, +without being previously embodied, to mould and vivify inert matter; +and it must needs have been by unembodied life that inorganic matter was +first organised and animated. There is no possible alternative to this +conclusion, except that of supposing that death may have given birth to +life--that absolutely lifeless and inert matter may have spontaneously +exerted itself with all the marvellous energy requisite for its +conversion into living matter, exerting for the purpose powers which, +under the conditions of the case, it could not have acquired without +exercising before it acquired them. Whoever declines to swallow such +absurdity has no choice but to admit that unembodied life must have been +the original manufacturer of protoplasm: but to admit this, and yet to +suppose that when now-a-days embodied life is observed to give birth to +new embodied life, the credit of the operation belongs not to the life +itself but to its protoplasmic embodiment, is much the same as to +suppose that when a tailor, dressed in clothes of his own making, makes +a second suit of clothes, this latter is the product not of the tailor +himself but of the clothes he is wearing. + +Thus, irrespectively of whatever grounds there may be for believing that +life still _does_, it is incontestable that life once _did_, exist apart +from protoplasm; and that protoplasm both may and continually does exist +apart from what is commonly understood by life, must be obvious to every +one who is aware that protoplasm is the substance of which all plants +and all animals are composed, and has observed also that plants and +animals are in the habit of dying. That matter and life are inseparably +connected cannot, therefore, it would seem, be asserted except in total +disregard of the teachings both of reason and observation, and 'the +popular conception of life as a something which works through matter but +is independent of it,' would seem to be as true as it is popular. If +the only choice allowed to us be between 'the old notion of an Archaeus +governing and directing blind matter,' and the new conception of life as +the product of a certain disposition of material molecules, the absolute +certainty that the latter conception is wrong, may be fairly urged as +equivalent to certainty, equally absolute, that the former notion is +right. + +How far soever it may be true that, as Professor Huxley says, 'the +progress of physical science means, and has in all ages meant, the +extension of the province of matter and causation,' it is certainly not +true that, as he proceeds to predict, the same province will ever be +extended sufficiently to banish from the region of human thought not +'spontaneity' simply, but likewise 'spirit.' In one direction at least, +limits are clearly discernible which scientific investigation need not +hope to overleap. How much soever we may eventually discover of the +changes whereby inorganic matter becomes gradually adapted for the +reception of life, physical science can never teach us what or whence is +the life that eventually takes possession of the finished receptacle. +Possibly we at length may, as Professor Huxley doubts not that we +by-and-by shall, see how it is that the properties peculiar to water +have resulted from the properties peculiar to the gases whose junction +constitutes water; and similarly how the characteristic properties of +protoplasm have sprung from properties in the water, ammonia, and +carbonic acid that have united to form protoplasm; but knowing all this, +we shall not be a hair's breadth nearer to the more recondite knowledge +up to which it is expected to lead. To extract the genesis of life from +any data that completest acquaintance with the stages and processes of +protoplasmic growth can furnish, is a truly hopeless problem. Given +the plan of a house, with samples of its brick and mortar, to find the +name and nationality of the householder, would be child's play in +comparison. Life, as we have seen, is not the offspring of protoplasm, +but something which has been superinduced upon, and may be separated +from, the protoplasm that serves as its material basis. It is, +therefore, distinct from the matter which it animates, and, being thus +immaterial, cannot possibly become better known by any analysis of +matter. + +Of this emphatically vital question Professor Huxley, as has been +already intimated, takes a diametrically opposite view. He does not +merely, in sufficiently explicit terms, deny that there is any intrinsic +difference between matter and spirit, and affirm the two to be, in spite +of appearances, essentially identical. If this were all, I at any rate +should not be entitled to object, for I shall myself presently have +occasion to use very similar language, although attaching to it a widely +different meaning from that with which it is used by Professor Huxley. +But the latter goes on to avow his belief that the human body, like +every other living body, is a machine, all the operations of which will +sooner or later be explained on physical principles, insomuch that we +shall eventually arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, +even as we have already arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat. He +considers that with the same propriety with which the amount of heat +which a pound weight produces by falling through the distance of a foot, +may be called its equivalent in one sense, may the amount of feeling +which the pound produces by falling through a foot of distance on a +gouty big toe, be called its equivalent in another sense, to wit, that +of consciousness. Yet he protests against these tenets being deemed +materialistic, which, he declares, they certainly neither are nor can +be, for that while he himself certainly holds them, he as certainly is +not himself a materialist. Professor Huxley is among the last to be +suspected of talking anything, as Monsieur Jourdain did prose, without +knowing it. He knows perfectly well that he has here been talking +materialism, but he insists that his materialism is only another form of +idealism. He seeks to evade the seemingly inevitable deduction from his +premises by representing both matter and spirit as mere names, and +names, too, not for real things, but for fanciful hypotheses which may +be spoken of indifferently in materialistic or in spiritualistic terms, +thought in the one case being treated as a form of matter, and matter in +the other as a form of thought. The identity of matter and spirit is, in +short, represented by him as consisting in this: that the existence of +both is merely nominal, or at best merely ideal. + +Ordinary folk may perhaps be somewhat slow to derive from this +compromising theory all the comfort which its author deems it capable of +affording. Most of us may, probably, be inclined to think that we might +as well have been left to fret in the frying-pan of materialism as be +cast headlong into idealistic fire, to no better end than that of being +there fused body and soul together, and sublimated into inapprehensible +nothingness. Our immediate concern, however, is not with the +pleasantness of the theory, but with its truth; in proceeding to test +which we shall probably find that there is as little warrant for +idealising matter after this fashion as we have already seen that there +is for materialising mind. + +The originator of the theory about to be examined, or rather, perhaps, +of a somewhat different theory out of which this has been developed--not +to say perverted--may, without much inaccuracy, be pronounced to be +Descartes. He it was who, perceiving that we are surrounded on all sides +by illusions of all sorts, that not only is there no authority or +testimony implicitly to be depended on, but that our senses likewise +often play the traitor, and that we can never be perfectly sure whether +we are really seeing, hearing, or feeling, or merely thinking or +dreaming that we see, hear, or feel, and looking anxiously around for +one single point at least on which complete confidence might be placed, +discovered such a point in thought. Whatever else we may doubt about, we +cannot, he justly argued, doubt that there are thoughts. If it were +possible to doubt this, our very doubt would be thought, constituting +and presenting as evidence the very existence doubted of. Our thoughts, +then, are unquestionably real existences. They may be delusive, but they +cannot possibly be fictitious. + +We may perhaps hereafter have occasion to note how Descartes, having +thus secured one firm foothold and solid resting-place, outwent the +farthest stretch of Archimedean ambition by using it, not as a fulcrum +from whence to move the world, but as a site for logical foundations +whereon he might, if he had persevered, have raised the superstructure +of an universe at once mental and material.[32] Intermediately, however, +we have to observe how two pre-eminent disciples of the Cartesian +school have perverted the fundamental proposition of their great master +by treating its converse as its synonyme. Descartes having demonstrated +that all thought is existence, Bishop Berkeley and Professor Huxley +infer that all existence is thought. So says the Professor in so many +words, and to precisely the same effect is the more diffuse language of +the Bishop, where, speaking of 'all the choir of heaven and furniture of +earth, of all the bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world,' +he declares that their _esse_ is _percipi_, that their 'being' consists +in their being 'perceived or known,' and that unless they were actually +perceived by, or existed in, some created or uncreate mind, they could +not possibly exist at all. + +The reasoning in support of these assertions is in substance as +follows:--We know nothing of any material object except by the +sensations which it produces in our minds. What we are accustomed to +call the _qualities_ of an object are nothing else but the mental +sensations of various kinds which the object produces within us. Some of +these qualities, such as extension, figure, solidity, motion, and +number, are classed as primary; others, as, for instance, smell, taste, +colour, sound, as secondary. Now that these latter have no existence +apart from mind can readily be shown thus. If I prick my finger with a +needle, the pain I suffer in consequence is surely in myself, not in the +needle, nor anywhere else but in myself. If an orange be placed on my +open hand, my sensation of touching it is in myself, not in the orange. +If the orange could feel, what it would feel would be a hand, while what +I am feeling is an orange. Nor are my sensations of pain and touch +merely confined to myself; they are also confined to a particular part +of myself, viz., to the brain, the seat of my consciousness, which it +is, and not the finger or hand, that really feels when the one is hurt, +or when anything comes in harmless contact with the other. To prove +this, let the fine nervous threads, which, running up the whole length +of the arm, connect the skin of the finger with the spinal marrow and +brain, be cut through close to the spinal cord, and no pain will be +felt, whatever injury be done: while if the ends which remain in +connection with the cord be pricked, the sensation of pricking in the +finger will arise just as distinctly as before. Or let a walking-stick +be held firmly by the handle, and its other end be touched, and the +tactile sensation will be experienced as if at the end of the stick, +where, however, it plainly cannot be. It is the mind alone which feels, +but which, by a peculiar faculty of localisation or extradition, seems +to remove a feeling exclusively its own, not only to the outside of +itself, but to the outside also of the walls of its fleshly tenement. +And as it is with pain or touch, so it is with every sensation with +which any of the so-called secondary qualities of matter are identical. +If I look at, or smell, or taste a blood orange, the sensation of +colour, or scent, or flavour I receive is entirely and exclusively my +own, the orange remaining quite unconscious of its own redness, or +fragrance, or sweetness, and not, indeed, possessing in itself any real +qualities of the kind. For to take redness as an example; how does the +sensation of it or of any other colour arise? The waves of a certain +very attenuated medium, the particles of which are vibrating with vast +rapidity but with very different velocities, strike upon an object and +are thrown off in all directions. Of the particles which vibrate with +any particular velocity, some are gathered by the optical apparatus of +the eye, and deflected so as to impinge on the retina and on the fibres +of the optic nerve therewith connected, producing in these fibres a +change which is followed by other changes in the brain, which, again, by +virtue of some inscrutable union between the brain and the mind, create +a feeling or consciousness of colour. What the particular colour shall +be, depends either on the rate of motion in the vibrating medium or on +the character of the retina; and if, while the former remained the same, +the other were to be altered, or if two persons, with differently formed +retinas, and one of the two colour-blind, were to be looking, what had +first seemed red might now seem green, or what seemed red to one +spectator might seem green to the other. But as the same object cannot +itself be both red and green at the same time, it follows that what are +called its redness and greenness are not in it, but in the spectator. +Similarly, the sounds which an object appears to give forth neither are +nor ever were in it: they originate in the mind of the hearer, and have +not, and never have had any existence elsewhere. 'If the whole body were +an eye, where,' asks St. Paul, 'were the hearing? If the whole were +hearing, where were the smelling?' and Professor Huxley more than meets +the drift of the Apostle's questions by pronouncing it 'impossible to +imagine but that if the universe contained only blind and deaf beings, +darkness and silence would reign everywhere.' + +And as with the secondary qualities of matter, so, on the same showing, +must it be with the primary. If colour, taste, scent, and the like, +exist nowhere but in the mind, so neither do extension, solidity, and +the like. If the former could not exist unless there were intelligent +minds to perceive them, then neither could the latter. For, by +extension and its cognates, we understand simply relations which we +conceive to exist between certain qualities of objects identical with +certain of our own visual and tactile sensations, or between these and +our consciousness of muscular effort; but inasmuch as all sensations and +all consciousness are purely mental, and exist nowhere but in the mind, +it follows necessarily that ideas of relation between different +sensations, or between sensations and consciousness, must also be purely +mental, and non-existent save in the mind. All the qualities of matter, +therefore, primary as well as secondary, are alike conceptions of the +mind, and consequently could not exist without a mind for them to be +conceived by and to exist in. But if the qualities did not exist, then +matter, which cannot be conceived otherwise than as an assemblage of +qualities, could not exist either. Wherefore in respect of matter +itself, as well as of the qualities of matter, _esse_ is _percipi_, +essence is perception, to be is to be perceived. Wherefore, finally, if +there were no mind to perceive matter, matter could not exist. Q. E. +D.[33] + +Although in the foregoing summary of an argument to which not Berkeley +and Huxley alone, but others of the deepest and acutest thinkers that +this country has produced, have contributed, I have strenuously laboured +to state all its points as convincingly as the obligations of brevity +would permit, I am not myself by any means convinced by it. On the +contrary, although to say so may seem to imply a considerable overstock +of modest assurance, still I do say that whatever portion of it is +sound is irrelevant, and that whatever portion is relevant is not +sound. So much of it as relates to the nature of the qualities of +matter, is, however interesting or otherwise important, very little, if +at all, to the purpose. No doubt if I prick my finger with a needle, +or--to take in preference an illustration employed by Locke--if my +fingers ache in consequence of my handling snow, it would be supremely +ridiculous to talk of the pain I feel being in the snow; yet not a whit +more ridiculous than to call the snow itself white or cold, if, by so +speaking, I mean that anything in the slightest degree resembling my +sensation of either snowy whiteness or snowy coldness resides in the +snow itself. And as of coldness and whiteness, so of all the other +so-styled secondary qualities. If I smell a rose, or listen to a piano, +the rose or the piano is quite insensible to the scent or sounds by +which my sense is ravished. And of primary qualities, also, precisely +the same thing may with equal confidence be alleged. A stone which I +perceive to be large, round, hard, and either rotating or motionless, +has no more perception of its own extension, figure, solidity, motion, +or rest than a snowball has of its colour or temperature. But all this, +though perfectly true, has nothing to do with the question, which is not +_what_ qualities of matter are, but _where_ they are, and whether they +can exist anywhere but in mind; and this question, I submit, is +distinctly begged by those who assume, as is done throughout the +reasoning under examination, that our _sensations_ with regard to +material objects, and the _qualities_ of those objects, are synonymous +and convertible terms. Incontestably, sensations are affections of the +mind which neither have nor can have any existence outside the mind. If, +then, the qualities of objects are identical with the sensations which +arise in the mind concerning those objects, why, of course, the +qualities likewise can exist nowhere but in the mind. On narrowly +scrutinising, however, the supposed identity, we shall find that it +involves somewhat reckless confusion of diametrical opposites. When I +look at or smell a rose, or eat a beefsteak, or listen to a piano, the +sensations which thereupon arise within me, whether immediately or +subsequently, either are the results of my seeing, smelling, eating, or +hearing, or they are not. To say that they are not is equivalent to +saying that an object need not be within reach of the perceptive +faculties in order to be perceived; that I may see or smell a rose, +though there be no rose to be seen or smelt; may dine sumptuously off +empty dishes, and be raised to the seventh heaven of delight by the +audible strains of a music which is not being executed. _Fortunati +nimium_--only too lucky would mankind be, did this turn out to be a +correct theory, affording as it would a solution of every social +problem, and serving as a panacea for every social evil. Psychology +would then be the only science worth attention, for of whatever things +proficiency in that branch of study had qualified any one to form mental +images, of those same things would he simultaneously become possessor in +full property. Whoever had succeeded in training himself to imagine +vigorously might at once have, do, or be whatever it pleased him to +imagine, becoming _ipso facto_, as the Stoics used to say an acquirer of +virtue does, 'rich, beautiful, a king.' Woe betide any one, however, +who, as long as the cosmical constitution remains what it is, shall +attempt to put the theory into practice, and desisting from all those +animal functions, involving intercourse with a real or imaginary +external world, which are vulgarly supposed essential to animal +existence, shall obstinately restrict himself to the sensations which he +believes the mind to be, without any such intercourse, capable of +creating for the body's sustenance and delectation. The physical +extinction inevitably consequent on such devotion to principle would +speedily render all the devotees physically incapable of testifying in +behalf of their peculiar opinion, and, clearing them away, would leave +no witnesses surviving but such as were signifying by deeds if not in +words their hearty adherence to the popular belief. Practically, then, +there may be assumed to be entire unanimity of assent to the truism that +for our senses to be affected by the presence of external objects, the +objects must needs be present to affect them. On all hands it is in +effect admitted that in some mode or other external objects exist, but +if so, and if the sensations resulting from operations performed by the +bodily organs with external objects would not have resulted unless the +objects had been present to operate or to be operated upon, clearly +there must be resident in, or inseparably bound up with, the objects a +power or powers of producing sensation in conscious mind. But the power +of producing sensation, and sensation itself, are not one and the same +thing, but two separate and distinct things, intrinsically distinct and +locally separate. The feeling, agreeable or painful, according to its +intensity, which heat occasions, is not the same thing as the heat by +which it is occasioned. The twofold taste, sweet to a healthy, bitter to +a distempered palate, of one and the same aliment, cannot be identical +with the single property of the aliment whereby the taste is produced. +In the sense of seeming red to a spectator with normally constructed +eyes, and green to one who is colour-blind, a ruby or a Siberian crab is +at once both red and green, but the two colours which it causes to be +perceived cannot be identical with the peculiar structure, or whatever +else it be, whereby the ruby or Siberian crab communicates to +circumambient ether the one self-same motion that terminates in +different impressions on differently constructed eyes. In these and in +all cases of the kind the feeling is in the mind, the source of the +feeling in matter. The one is a perception, the other a quality, and to +mistake the quality, not merely for a perception, but for the very +perception to which the quality gives rise; and to infer thence that the +quality must likewise be in the mind, is an instance as glaring as can +well be imagined of that most heinous of logical offences, the +confounding of cause with effect. + +By what steps Berkeley was led, and has since led so many after him, +into so grave an error, he has himself acquainted us. Thus it is that he +argues: By sensible things can be meant only such as can be perceived +immediately by sense: and sensible _qualities_ are of course sensible +_things_. But the only perceptions of sense are sensations, and all +perceptions are purely mental. Wherefore, sensible qualities being, as +such, perceptible immediately by the senses, must be sensations, and +being sensations must be perceptions, and being perceptions they are of +course purely mental, and existent nowhere save in the mind. Carefully, +however, as Berkeley fancied he was picking his way, he really had +tripped, and that fatally, at the second step. He calls the qualities of +objects _sensible_ things; but sensible they are not according to his +definition, for they are not capable of being immediately perceived by +the senses. It is not sense which perceives, but reason which infers +them. The senses, as Berkeley elsewhere repeatedly and earnestly +insists, receive nothing from objects but sensations, and these they +communicate to the mind without accompanying them by the slightest hint +as to whence they originally came. The senses suggest nothing as to any +qualities resident in or appertaining to an object corresponding with +the sensations derived from the object. The existence of such qualities +is an inference of reason which, taking for granted that sensations, in +common with all other occurrences, must have causes, and observing that +certain of them commonly occur in the presence of certain objects, and +never occur in the absence of those objects, infers that the causes of +the sensations must exist in the objects. To the causes thus inferred +the name of qualities is given, to distinguish them from the sensations +whereof they are causes; and the Berkeleian transgression consists in +overlooking the distinction between things so diametrically opposite. + +By the commission of such a sin the most powerful intellect becomes +inevitably committed to further enormities. Except by neglecting to +distinguish between sight and hearing, the effects, and light and sound, +their respective causes, it would surely have been impossible for +Professor Huxley to come to the strange conclusion that if all living +beings were blind and deaf, 'darkness and silence would everywhere +reign.' Had he not himself previously explained that light and sound are +peculiar motions communicated to the vibrating particles of an +universally diffused ether, which motions, on reaching the eye or ear, +produce impressions, which, after various modifications, result +eventually in seeing or hearing? How these motions are communicated to +the ether matters not. Only it is indispensable to note that they are +not communicated by the percipient owner of the eye or ear, so that the +fact of there being no percipient present cannot possibly furnish any +reason why the motions should not go on all the same. But as long as +they did go on there would necessarily be light and sound; for the +motions are themselves light and sound. If, on returning to his study in +which, an hour before, he had left a candle burning and a clock ticking, +Professor Huxley should perceive from the appearance of candle and clock +that they had gone on burning and ticking during his absence, would he +doubt that they had likewise gone on producing the motions constituting +and termed light and sound, notwithstanding that no eyes or ears had +been present to see or hear? But if he did not doubt this, how could he +any more doubt that, although all sentient creatures suddenly became +eyeless and earless, the sun might go on shining, and the wind roaring, +and the sea bellowing as before? + +Akin to the inadvertence which, as I presume to think, has led Professor +Huxley thus to misconceive _secondary_ qualities, is an inattention to +the differences between our ideas, or mental pictures, and the originals +whereof those pictures are copies, which seems to me seriously to +vitiate his reasoning with regard to _primary_ qualities. With admirable +perspicuity he shows[34] how it is that our notions of primary qualities +are formed; how the mind, by _localising_ on distinct points of the +sensory surface of the body its various, tactile sensations, obtains the +idea of extension, or space in two dimensions, of figure, number, and +motion: how the power, combined with consciousness of the power, of +moving the hand in all directions over any substance it is in contact +with, adds the idea of geometrical solidity, or of space in three +dimensions: how the ideas thus formed with the aid of the sense of touch +are confirmed by, and blended with, others derived from visual +sensations and muscular movements of the eye: and, finally, how the idea +of mechanical solidity, or impenetrability, arises from experience of +resistance to our muscular exertions. All these details, however, +interesting as they are, are nevertheless quite out of place. What we +are at present concerned with is the nature of the things themselves, +not the nature of our knowledge of them. No question that this latter is +purely mental. If figure, motion, and solidity were really, as Professor +Huxley says, each of them nothing but a perception of the relation of +two or more sensations to one another, no question but that, since the +mind is the sole seat of perception, they could exist nowhere else. But +if all these suppositions be incorrect, if, as we have seen, there be in +matter and apart from mind, potentialities of producing sensations, it +follows that, in matter, and outside of mind, there must be relations +between different potentialities, and there must, moreover, be limits +to, and there may be changes in, those relations. Wherefore, since there +is in matter a potentiality of imparting to the mind those sensations +whence it derives its ideas of place and distance, and since figure is +but a 'limitation of distance,' and motion but a 'change of place,' it +necessarily follows that there is in matter a potentiality of conveying +to the mind those sensations whence it derives its ideas of figure and +motion. And a similar remark applies equally to solidity, and to every +other so-called quality of matter. All of them are substantive +potentialities of producing in the mind those sensations whence our +ideas of themselves (the qualities) are derived. No doubt all these +qualities would be _inconceivable_ in the absence of a mind by which +they might be _conceived_, but it is not necessary that, in order to +_be_, they should be _conceived_. In discussions of any abstruseness we +cannot be too precise in our use of words, and we shall inevitably be +going astray here if we allow ourselves for a moment to forget that a +quality and the conception of that quality are not one single thing, but +two things. Can it be seriously supposed that if all the conscious +creatures, of every description, by which the universe is peopled, were +to fall temporarily into complete stupor, the material universe would, +at the commencement of the trance, be deprived of its extension, +solidity, figure, and all its other constituent properties, recovering +them again as soon as its inhabitants woke up again? Can it be doubted +that, on the contrary, all potentialities resident in its material +composition would pursue the even tenor of their way just as if nothing +had happened; performing, during the temporary absence of external +percipient minds, precisely those operations which, as soon as +consciousness returned to those minds, would be followed by the +perceptions of sight, hearing, and touch? But if so, then plainly it is +exceedingly derogatory to matter to charge it with such absolute +dependence on external support that its very being consists in being +perceived from without. That matter cannot exist without mind I +cheerfully admit, or rather most earnestly affirm, proposing presently +to explain in what sense I make the affirmation. Meanwhile let it +suffice to have ascertained that the mental service with which matter +cannot dispense, whatever else it be, is at any rate not, as the whole +Berkeleian school so positively insist, that of mental testimony to its +existence. + +Let us pause here for a moment to report progress. We have seen, on the +one hand, that unless mind and matter have been eternally coexistent, +mind must have preceded matter, and that it is idle, therefore, to +expect, by any researches into matter, to discover how mind (or life) +originated. We have seen that from a materialism which represents mind +as in any sense a property or product of matter there is no possible +outlet to an idealism which represents matter as owing its being to +mind. To see this is simply to see that the builder of a house cannot +possibly have been born in the house he has himself built. On the other +hand, we have seen that the idealism which represents being or existence +as consisting of perception is utterly incompatible with materialism of +any sort or kind, unless, indeed, with a materialistic nihilism wherein +would be no room for a solitary molecule, still less for any molecular +structure, and least of all for that motion of molecular structures into +which consistent materialists are logically bound to attempt to resolve +all natural phenomena. We have, in short, seen that materialism and +idealism, in the senses in which those terms are commonly used, are +utterly incapable of amalgamation, or indeed of even being harmoniously +approximated, without being first deprived of all the characteristic +traits which at present entitle them to their distinguishing +appellations. + +To which of the two belongs the larger share of blame for this +implacable hostility is easily determined. Materialism, in dealing with +mental phenomena, begins by setting chronology at defiance; but between +idealism and the phenomena of matter there is no such aboriginal +incongruity. From principles common to every form of idealism a theory +is deducible which, while frankly acknowledging the reality of matter, +may, with perfect consistency, maintain that reality to be +mental--although mental in the sense of being, not a perception by, but +a metamorphosis of, mind. Of such a theory the outlines seem to me to +have been sketched, and the foundations partly laid, by Descartes, and +it cannot be otherwise than interesting to inquire in what manner and +how far so consummate an artificer advanced in the work, and where and +wherefore he suddenly stopped short in it. + +When Descartes, after convincing himself of the hollow pretentiousness +of most human knowledge, proceeded to dig away the accumulated drift and +sand of ages in quest of any clay or rock there might be below, the +first indubitable verity he came to was thought, about whose reality +there could, as already explained, be no possibility of doubt, inasmuch +as any doubt concerning it, being itself thought, would be but an +additional proof of it. On the bit of firm ground thus thoroughly +tested, he proceeded to place a formula not less carefully verified, his +famous 'Cogito, ergo sum'--'I think, therefore I am.' By many of his +followers, however, this second verification of his is deemed to be by +no means so satisfactory as it was by himself, Professor Huxley more +especially taking vehement, though, as I make bold to add, somewhat +gratuitous, exception to every single word of the most celebrated of +Cartesian formulae. No doubt the premiss of the formula assumes the +conclusion, but it likewise includes as well as assumes it. No doubt, +since 'I think' is but another way of saying 'I am thinking,' to say +that 'I think' is to assume that 'I am;' nay, the same thing is equally +assumed by the mere introduction of the pronoun 'I.' But Descartes was +fully warranted in taking for granted the truth of his conclusion. For +by previously showing incontestably that thought and consciousness are +real existences, he had completely proved the premiss wherein his +conclusion is included. What though, as Professor Huxley suggests, +'thought' may possibly 'be self-existent,' 'or a given thought the +result of its antecedent thought, or of some external power'? Be thought +what else it may, it must needs be, also, either an affection or an +operation; if not performed, it must be felt; there must needs be, +therefore, something by which it is either performed or felt, and that +something cannot possibly be other than a thinking and conscious thing. +As surely as thought is, so surely must there be a thinker. This is, in +substance, affirmed even by many who deny it in terms, and Hume, in +particular, when saying, as he somewhere does, that 'all we are +conscious of is a series of perceptions,' denies and affirms it at one +and the same time. For how can there be perception without a percipient? +or how consciousness without a conscious entity? or how can that entity +be conscious of feeling without being simultaneously conscious that it +is itself which feels, without knowing, consequently, that it has a +self, or without being warranted, if it possess the gift of speech, in +declaring, in words even more emphatic than those of Descartes, 'I +_myself_ am'? And how, if these questions do not admit of reply, can +Professor Huxley be warranted in declaring self and non-self to be mere +'hypotheses by which we account for the facts of consciousness,' and +adding that of their existence we 'neither have, nor by any possibility +can have' the same 'unquestionable and immediate certainty as we have of +the states of consciousness which we consider to be their effects'? +Surely the existence of self is one of the most direct and immediate +subjects of consciousness; yet it does not depend for evidence on +consciousness alone, but is as unanswerably demonstrable as that two +straight lines cannot enclose space or that parallel lines cannot meet, +or as any other mathematical negation. No ratiocinative deduction can be +more incontestable than that, since _I_ have thoughts, there must be an +_I_ to have them. + +Whoever thus assures himself of the existence of self obtains +simultaneously equal assurance of the existence of non-self; for feeling +that his conscious self is not boundless, but is confined within limits, +he cannot doubt that beyond those limits there must be space, and, +receiving continual sensations from without, he perceives that there +are, in external space, potentialities of imparting sensations. Thus, I +repeat, Descartes in laying down the first principles of his philosophy +created an intellectual basis for the external universe. Unfortunately, +however, instead of proceeding to place its proper superstructure on the +foundation thus laid, he wilfully stepped aside from what he had just +pronounced the only firm ground in existence, and undertook to raise a +rival edifice on part of the formless void beyond. Deeply struck by the +grand discoveries of his illustrious contemporaries, Galileo and Harvey, +and thence discovering for himself that the phenomena of remotest worlds +and also the involuntary phenomena of our own bodily frames take place +in accordance with forces of uniform operation, he leaped suddenly to +the conclusion that those forces are purely mechanical. The circulation +of the blood, he says, 'is as much the necessary result of the structure +of the parts one can see in the heart, and of the heat which one may +feel there, and of the nature of the blood which may be experimentally +ascertained, as is the motion of a clock the result of the force, +situation, and figure of its wheels and of its weight.' Nor, in his +view, does the heart, by virtue of its structure and composition, merely +cause the blood to circulate. 'It also generates animal spirits,' which, +'ascending like a very subtle fluid, or very pure and vivid flame, into +the brain as into a reservoir, pass thence into the nerves, where, +according as they more or less enter, or tend to enter, they have the +power of altering the figures of the muscles into which the nerves are +inserted, and of so causing all the organs and limbs to move.' He puts +the case thus: Even as the ordinary movements of a water-clock or of a +mill are kept up by the ordinary flow of the water, and even as 'in the +grottoes and fountains of royal gardens, the force wherewith the water +issues from its reservoirs suffices to move various machines, and even +to make them play instruments or pronounce words according to the +different disposition of the pipes which lead the water'--even so do +pulsation, respiration, digestion, nutrition, and growth, and 'other +such actions as are natural and usual in the body,' result naturally +from the usual course of the animal spirits. Moreover, even as intruders +upon the waterworks aforesaid unconsciously by their mere presence cause +special movements to take place, even as, for example, 'if they approach +a bathing Diana, they tread on certain planks so arranged as to make her +hide among the reeds, and, if they attempt to follow her, see +approaching a Neptune who threatens with his trident, or rouse some +other monster who vomits water into their faces'--even so do external +objects, by their mere presence, act upon the organs of sense; even so +do 'the reception of light, sounds, odours, flavours, heat, and such +like qualities in the organs of the external senses, the impression of +the ideas of these in the intellect, the imagination, and the memory, +the internal movements of the appetites and passions, and the external +movements which follow so aptly on the presentation of objects to the +senses, or on the resuscitation of impressions by the memory,' yea, even +so do all these 'functions proceed naturally from the arrangement of the +bodily organs, neither more nor less than do the movements of a clock or +other automaton from that of its weights and its wheels, without the aid +of any other vegetative or sensitive soul or any other principle of +motion or of life than the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire +which burns continually within the heart, and which differs in no wise +from the fire existing in inanimate bodies.'[35] + +Quite fairly it may be urged that the writer of passages like these +would, if writing in modern language, and with the aid of modern +conceptions, have expressed himself much as Professor Huxley does when, +declaring that the circulation of the blood and the regular movements of +the respiratory, alimentary, and other internal organs are simply +'affairs of mechanism, resulting from the structure and arrangement' of +the bodily organs concerned, from 'the contractility of those organs, +and from the regulation of that contractility by an automatically acting +nervous apparatus;' that muscular contractility and the automatic +activity or irritability of the nerves are 'purely the results of +molecular mechanism;' and that 'the modes of motion which constitute the +physical bases of light, sound, and heat are transmuted by the sensory +organs into affections of nervous matter,' which affections become 'a +kind of physical ideas constituting a physical memory,' and may be +combined in a manner answering to association and imagination, or may +give rise to muscular contractions in those reflex actions which are the +mechanical representatives of volition.' Quite fairly may a doctrine, +capable of being thus translated, be described as leading 'straight to +materialism.' Quite justly may its author be claimed by Huxley as joint +professor of a materialistic creed. True, Descartes lodges within his +human mechanism a _chose pensante_ or rational soul, whose principal +seat is in the brain, and who is treated as corresponding to a hydraulic +engineer stationed in the centre of waterworks for the purpose of +increasing, slackening, or otherwise altering their movements. But this +rational soul is a very needless appendage to either the Cartesian or +the Huxleian system, wherein, if its post be not a literal sinecure, +there is, at any rate, little or nothing for it to do which might not +quite as well be done without it. The hydraulic engineer, sitting in his +central office, has to wind up the whole machinery from time to time, +and to turn now this tap, now that, when he wishes to set this or that +particular machine in motion. But, as no one need be told, our _chose +pensante_ has nothing to do with the winding up of our digestive, +circulatory, or respiratory apparatus; and so far from internally +arranging those other internal organs from the mere arrangement of whose +parts, according to Descartes, the reception, conversion, and retention +of sensations, and the movements, whether internal or external, +thereupon consequent, naturally proceed, or from regulating the +molecular mechanism, whence, according to Professor Huxley, results the +automatic nervous activity which, in his opinion, governs the movements +of the limbs not less absolutely than those of the intestines, it, nine +times out of ten, neither knows nor suspects that any such organs or +mechanism exist. If the functions above attributed to the human frame +could be shown really to belong to it, pure, not to say crass, +materialism, would require no further proof. Those particular functions +undoubtedly take place without the cognisance of that particular +sensitive soul which we call ourself, so that if no other sensitive soul +take cognisance of them, they must needs be, not simply automatic +performances, but performances of an automaton of such marvellous powers +as to be quite equal to the performance likewise of whatever human +operations are vulgarly classed as mental. Assume, however illogically, +that motion is a function of matter, and from that premiss, whether true +or false, the conclusion that thought likewise is a function of matter +may be quite logically deduced. 'That thought is as much a function of +matter as motion is' must needs be conceded to Professor Huxley, who, +therefore, if he could show that motion is really such a function, would +be fully justified in adding, that 'the distinction between spirit and +matter vanishes,' that 'we lose spirit in matter.' + +Undeniably, then, of the Cartesian philosophy one moiety is, as +Professor Huxley says, materialistic; but from the self-contradictions +inseparable from every species of materialism the Cartesian variety is, +of course, no more exempt than any other, and it has besides one +self-contradiction peculiar to itself. A clock's pendulum vibrates, and +its hands move, not simply by reason of the situation and figure of its +weight and wheels, but also because some intelligent person, by winding +up the clock, has communicated an impulsive force to the weight and +wheels. Waterworks perform all sorts of antics, not solely because the +pipes are skilfully constructed and arranged with a view to such end, +but because also an intelligent engineer has turned running water into +the pipes. But the only intelligent agent to whom Descartes allows +access to his corporeal machinery is one who not only has no notion how +to apply a moving force except to some few portions of the machinery, +but with regard to the other portions has most likely no suspicion that +they even exist. But how in the absence of some other intelligence, of +some other 'vegetative or sensitive soul or principle of motion or of +life,' is it possible for the inert and inanimate heart to generate +animal spirits?--how is it possible for death thus to give birth to +life?--or, if the generative faculty be supposed to be the necessary +result of a particular molecular structure, how is it that when the +animal spirits become from any cause extinct, they are not immediately +regenerated by the same molecular structure? or rather, how is it +possible for animal spirits to become extinct as long as the molecular +structure of which they are necessary concomitants remains unaltered? In +these questions the old insuperable difficulties reappear in new forms, +but on these we need not dwell. Apart from anti-materialistic arguments +of general applicability, there is a mode of refutation specially +adapted to the Cartesian form of materialism, which, besides flatly +contradicting itself, contradicts not less flatly a twin system of +unimpeachable veracity. Truth cannot be opposed to truth:--a doctrine +cannot be true, even though propounded by Descartes and Huxley, if it +conflict irreconcileably with doctrines which Descartes and Huxley have +unanswerably demonstrated. Now one-half of Cartesian philosophy shows +conclusively that amidst the countless infinity of human notions, the +one single and solitary certainty of independent and self-evident +authority is the existence of thought, and nothing else whatever, +therefore, can be entitled to be regarded as absolutely certain which +cannot be shown to rest mediately or immediately upon this. One thing +which can, by strictest logical process, be shown so to rest, is the +existence of a thinking self; and another is the existence of a non-self +or external universe; but of this external universe we know scarcely +anything beyond the bare fact that it exists. We know that outside the +thinking self there are potentialities capable of somehow or other +communicating sensations to the thinking self; but of the nature of +these potentialities our senses teach us absolutely nothing, and the few +particulars that reason is able to discover, are, with one single though +very momentous exception, to which we are rapidly approaching, purely +negative. We do know to a certain extent what qualities of objects are +not. We know that they are not and cannot be in the least like the +sensations which we call by the same names. We know that what we call +the whiteness and coldness of snow or the hardness and weight of marble, +can no more resemble the feelings we receive from looking at or handling +snow or marble than the mental exaltation produced within us on hearing +one of Bach's fugues is like the organ on which, or the organist by +whom, it is played. We know that of the pictures which our senses form +for us not one can possibly be a correct likeness. We know that what we +fancy we see in matter we do not see; that what we seem to feel we do +not feel; that the apparent structure and composition of matter cannot +therefore possibly be real. To this conviction we are irresistibly drawn +by a chain of idealistic reasoning of which Descartes forged the first +link, and every link of which will stand the severest strain. But if +this be the teaching of an idealism occupying as its base the only +morsel of solid ground to be found in the mental universe, what scrap of +footing is there left for an antagonistic materialism purporting to rest +on what we can see and feel of a structure and composition which, as we +have just satisfied ourselves, we cannot see or feel at all? + +As plainly then as one half of Descartes' philosophy is materialistic, +so plainly, that half, instead of a necessary outgrowth and exact +correlative of the other or idealistic moiety is, on the contrary, the +latter's diametrical and implacable opponent. As plainly, therefore, as +the one is true, must the other be false, and Cartesian idealism, in so +far as its character has been exhibited above, has, I submit, been +demonstrated to be true. The greater the pity that it was not brought to +maturity by its author. In enumerating its first principles, Descartes, +as I must once again observe, was forming a logical basis whereon a +comprehensive and consistent conception of an external universe might +forthwith have been securely deposited, had he not unluckily, instead of +himself proceeding to build on his own foundations, with congruous +materials, left them free for others to build upon with gold, silver, +precious stones, wood, hay, or stubble, as chance might determine. May +I, without presumption, hazard a conjecture as to the sort of fabric +that might have arisen, if he had steadily prosecuted his original +design? + +At the stage which we are supposing him to have reached, very little +remained to complete the work. Around man, around every individual man, +or other conscious intelligence, as its centre, is ranged infinitely +extended space, filled with, or, as it were, composed of various kinds +of matter, every kind and every separate portion of which is endowed +with special qualities capable of communicating corresponding sensations +to the central intelligence. So far all that can be predicated of any +material object or portion of matter is that it is a collection of +qualities; but from hence we may advance boldly to the further negative +discovery that it is nothing else; that there is not and cannot be, in +addition to those qualities, any substance in or to which the qualities +inhere, or are in any way attached. + +The absence from matter of any such substance is evidenced by the +absurdity involved in the idea of its presence. Suppose the substance to +exist: the qualities inherent in it must needs be as completely distinct +from itself as pins are from a pincushion; the extension and solidity of +an extended, solid substance can no more be identical with the substance +than the nominative is identical with the genitive case. The substance, +therefore, although deprived of all its qualities will still retain its +essence unimpaired, will still be equally a substance, just as a +pincushion continues equally a pincushion after its last pin has been +abstracted. Conceive, then, all the qualities of matter to be +abstracted, and consider what remains--a substance without qualities of +any sort. But a substance neither solid, nor fluid, nor yet gaseous; +neither coloured nor colourless; neither singular nor plural; without +form and void, without even extension--what is it? not something, but +nothing; a nonentity or non-existence. The qualities of matter in being +removed from the substance have therefore left nothing behind, and, +consequently, although carrying with them nothing but themselves, have +yet carried with them all the constituents of matter, which is thus +seen to be composed exclusively of qualities without a single particle +of foreign admixture. And since, moreover, the qualities of matter are +clearly not themselves substances, that is to say do not themselves +_stand under_ or uphold anything, it follows that their compound, +matter, must likewise be purely unsubstantial. + +The edifice begun by Descartes has now been raised high and strong +enough to have its layer of negations crowned with an affirmation of +pre-eminent importance. The qualities of matter, being known only by +their effects, are evidently causes: and, being causes, must necessarily +be either themselves forces, or, at the least, manifestations of force; +and inasmuch as force involves exertion, it cannot be inert; and +inasmuch as deadness must be incapable of exertion, all force must be +alive; and life without substance cannot be conceived otherwise than as +some species of spirit or mind. Such therefore must be matter. Matter +can be nothing else than pure spirit of some kind. + +And may we not with good reason congratulate ourselves on this result of +our investigations? Instead of the vision we were threatened with, of +mind losing itself in matter, our eyes are gladdened with that of the +converse operation, of the transmutation of matter into mind. And on no +account is this metamorphosis to be mistaken for annihilation of matter, +whose stolid grossness has vanished, not in order to give place to empty +nominalism or to a thin mist of mere mental perceptions existing only in +virtue of being perceived, but in order to reappear gloriously +etherealised into living energy. By the change that has taken place, +corruption has put on incorruption; the natural body has become a +quickening spirit; death is swallowed up in victory. Matter reappears +converted, not into a perception of percipient mind, but into percipient +mind itself; yet although thus presumably percipient of its own +existence, it not the less has an existence perfectly independent of +perception, either by itself or by any other intelligence. + +Under what head the mind, or combination of living forces, thus +constituting all matter, ought to be classed, is a question, which the +imperfection of human faculties may as well be content to leave +unanswered, though to its being supposed to emanate directly from the +mind of Omnipresent Deity, one insuperable objection may be mentioned, +which should be kept steadily in view. There are few of us who will not +shrink with horror from a notion, according to which man, whenever doing +as he pleases with any material object, applying it, as likely as not, +to some base or criminal purpose, is disposing at his pleasure of a +portion of the Divine essence: few who will not greatly prefer to +believe that the vital principle which manifests itself in the form of a +dunghill or of a poisoned dagger, may be, for the time, as completely +individualised and separate from all other life or mind, as every human +being perceives his own conscious mind or self to be. At all events, we +have now reached a point beyond which it would be rash to rush hastily +on. For a while we may be well content to rest where we are. That matter +is nothing else but a peculiar manifestation, or avatar, of some species +of mind, whatever that species be, is a proposition as demonstrably true +as its converse is demonstrably false. Unless it be possible for death +to give birth to life, it is impossible for living mind to be the +offspring of inanimate matter; but so surely as mind is mind, and that +living force alone can act either on mind or aught else, so surely must +all matter that imparts sensation to mind, be itself a species of living +force and consequently a species of mind. + +An unexpected conclusion this, and widely different, I confess, from +that to which I was myself looking forward at the outset of the +discussion; yet, at the same time, one of which there is the best +possible proof in the impossibility of conceiving its contrary. It is +besides a conclusion to which not only ought Descartes in consistency to +have come, but at which both Locke and Berkeley, though advancing from +opposite points of the compass, did very nearly arrive; nay, which the +latter did almost touch, and must apparently have grasped, had not his +hands been already full of other things. It is, moreover, one from which +I do not apprehend that Professor Huxley himself will seriously dissent. +Indeed, I almost hope that he may object chiefly to its having been +moved by me as an amendment on his original motion, and that he may be +disposed to claim it for himself as a portion of genuine Huxleyism. If +so, I shall readily recognise the claim so far as to admit that things +very similar to many of those said by me above had already been said by +Professor Huxley; though, in justice to myself, I must add that their +complete opposites had likewise been said by him. But the office which I +here proposed to myself was mainly that of an eclectic, who, going over +a field which another husbandman has tilled, separates the wheat from +the tares, and binds up the former into shapely and easily portable +sheaves; and no more satisfactory assurance can be given of my having +been usefully employed in such subordinate capacity than that Professor +Huxley, who, amongst all his numerous admirers, has not one sincerer +than myself, should welcome me as a coadjutor, instead of repelling me +as an antagonist. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[32] Archimede, pour tirer le globe terrestre de sa place et le +transporter en un autre lieu, ne demandait rien qu'un point qui fut +ferme et immobile: ainsi j'aurai droit de concevoir de hautes esperances +si je suis assez heureux pour trouver seulement une chose qui soit +certaine et indubitable.--Descartes, _Meditation Deuxieme_. + +[33] Lay Sermons, xiv. 'On Descartes' Discourse;' also an article by +Professor Huxley, on 'Berkeley and the Metaphysics of Sensation,' in +'Macmillan's Magazine' for June, 1871. + +[34] Article on 'Berkeley and the Metaphysics of Sensation,' in +'Macmillan's Magazine' for 1871, pp. 152 et seq. + +[35] The quotations, of which those in the text are abridgments, will be +found in 'Lay Sermons,' xiv. pp. 364-7. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +_RECENT PHASES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM._ + + 'Wonder is the basis of worship. That progress of science which is + to destroy wonder, and in its stead substitute mensuration and + numeration, finds small favour with Teufelsdroeckh, much as he + otherwise venerates those two latter processes.'--_Sartor + Resartus._ + + +I. + +By the train of thought pursued in the last chapter, we were led to the +conclusion, not, indeed, that matter has no existence, but that its +nature or constitution is altogether different from what is commonly +supposed. The difference thus discovered does not, however, imply any +corresponding difference with respect to the properties--_sensible_ +properties, as they are commonly called--whereby matter affects the +senses. Equally, whether matter be, in all and each of its various +species, inanimate, inert, passive substance, or a combination of +self-acting forces--equally whether it be the author or merely the +subject of whatever activity it manifests, that activity is equally +manifested in certain sequences which are as unvarying as if they were +prescribed by inexorable and irresistible laws, and which, indeed, by a +convenient, though exceedingly treacherous metaphor, are usually styled +laws--laws of Nature when spoken of collectively, laws of attraction, +repulsion, gravitation, motion, heat, light, and the like, when +separately referred to. Whithersoever we turn our eyes, however closely +we pry, into whatever depths of infinity we peer, we observe the most +perfect harmony between structure and law, law moulding structure and +structure utilising law. Afar off we descry systems upon systems, solar +and sidereal, like sand upon the sea-shore for multitude, and every +individual orb thereof rotating or revolving in strictest accordance +with inflexible mathematical principles, and evidently owing to the +previous influence of those same principles its characteristic +configuration. Near at hand we discern organic forms innumerable, each +with its own special arrangement of component parts admirably apt for +the performance in ordinary circumstances of special functions, +admirably, as circumstances change, accommodating itself by +corresponding changes for continuing the same or undertaking other and +equally appropriate functions, nor merely performing them all in despite +of the restraints imposed by law, but availing itself of those very +restraints as means and aids for their performance. Where so much +aptness is, adaptation surely must have been: where arrangement is so +plainly conducive to ends, the ends must surely have been foreseen, and +the arrangement effected by design and according to preconceived plan. +And there cannot have been design without a designer or designers: the +plan cannot but have had its author or authors: nor could the plan have +been executed without an artificer or artificers. Author or authors, +too, artificer or artificers, be the same singular or plural, must have +possessed, individually or collectively, not less of wisdom, power, and +goodness than are displayed by the finished work. Now of each of these +attributes, the amount to which the aspect of the universe bears +witness, albeit not infinite, inasmuch as the universe is not without +imperfections, is yet indefinite; as plainly without measure as the +universe is without bounds. Wherefore, not only must the universe have +had an author or authors, an artificer or artificers, but his or their +wisdom, power, and goodness, must, whether infinite or not, have been at +least illimitable. + +Such is the argument from design, and such, to my thinking, the only +absolute certainties legitimately deducible from it; and although these, +in comparison with the numerous probabilities ordinarily associated with +them, may appear somewhat meagre, yet are they intrinsically of +exceeding moment. They constitute the only basis on which any rational +religion, any that appeals to the intellect as well as to the feelings, +can rest securely. Whoever accepts them, by whatever other name he +prefer to call himself, is essentially a theist. He only who denies or +ignores them can justly be stigmatised as an atheist. Yet, although an +inquiry into their soundness is thus plainly second in interest to none, +it is not that in which I propose to engage at present, unless +indirectly. My immediate concern is not with the strength of theism, but +with the weakness of atheism, and the hollowness of the latter's +dialectical pretensions. What in every form of piety is most provocative +of philosophic scorn, is its forwardness of faith, its eagerness of +acquiescence; but to this sort of reproach I expect to be able to show +that none are more obnoxious than those very philosophers by whom it is +most freely cast. That nothing is more unphilosophical than +uncompromising irreligion, nothing more credulous than its credulity, no +other beliefs more monstrous than those by which it strives to fill up +the void created by its own unbelief: this is my present thesis, and +this I propound, not unaware what formidable antagonists I am thereby +challenging, but not without something of the same confidence, and +something withal of the same ground for it, as David had when, in equal +strait, exclaiming, 'The Lord is on my side; I will not fear; what can +man do unto me?' + +Let us at the outset consider what denial of plan in the structure of +the universe implies, and note, among other things signified, the +following. The exact conformity on matter's part to Nature's laws, +everywhere observable, and even more striking perhaps in minute details +than in grandiose generalities, is purely accidental. The laws were not +enacted in order to be obeyed; matter's various shapes were not given to +or assumed by it in order that its obedience might serve any particular +purpose. All appearances of ingenious contrivance in the collocation of +elementary particles, or in the co-operation of elementary forces, are +mere appearances. It was not designed that under the influence of the +laws of motion, chaos should resolve itself into systems, and time +divide itself into years and seasons and days and nights. It is quite +unintentionally that the countless varieties of mechanism appertaining +to different vegetable and animal fabrics have been rendered fit for +performing those special processes which, by reason in each case of some +special arrangement of parts, they actually do perform with such +marvellous precision. It is a total mistake to suppose that the eye was +meant for seeing, or the ear for hearing, or the heart for initiating +and regulating the circulation of the blood, or nervous ramifications +for receiving and disseminating sensible impressions. These various +organs have been discovered to be useful, and are used accordingly; but +they were not intended to be so used, or contrived with any such view, +or, indeed, contrived at all. The forces, whatever they be, and whether +identical with or totally distinct from itself, whereby matter, on one +supposition, acts, and, on the other, is acted upon, and by whose +operation the universe and all its contents have been fashioned and are +sustained, are in either case perfectly heedless and reckless forces, +operating always without the slightest reference to result. + +Language like this was much in vogue among the French encyclopaedists of +the last century. By opposing it, even Voltaire incurred the reputation +of bigotry, and Hume probably had to listen to a good deal of it on that +memorable occasion when, dining with Baron D'Holbach, and intimating to +his host his disbelief in the existence of atheists, he was informed by +way of reply that he was actually at table with seventeen members of the +sect.[36] That in England, too, it was a good deal talked at about the +same and a somewhat later period, may be inferred from the fact that +against its teaching one of Paley's most celebrated treatises was +expressly directed. Doctrine which was once so fashionable, and which +even now cannot be said to be obsolete, was not, of course, without some +show of reason to support it, and somewhat in this wise the chief +arguments in its behalf were usually marshalled:--In order to account +for actual result, there is no need to imagine previous purpose. All +things that exist, all events that occur, must bear to each other some +relations in situation and time, which relations are not less likely to +be orderly than disorderly, or, rather, indeed, are more likely to be +the former than the latter. For necessarily the rarer rises above the +denser; the stronger compels the weaker; that which is pushed hardest +runs fastest. And even though, among organic forms, orderly and +disorderly had been, by the purely fortuitous concurrence of atoms, +originally produced in equal numbers, the former would be sure in the +course of ages to become the more numerous, and that in proportion to +the orderliness of their composition, and to their consequent +suitableness for the reception and maintenance of organic life, by which +they in turn would be maintained and multiplied, while less aptly +organised forms, succumbing in the struggle for existence, perished and +vanished away. Thus everything arranges itself--_everything_, however, +being here another name for Nature, which alone does or can exist, which +is all and does all; yet, though doing all things in general, does +whatever it does quite unintelligently, and without the least desire of +doing any one thing in particular more than another. + +Though speaking of this as a show of reasoning, I would by no means be +understood to consider it as merely a show. On the contrary, I must +admit that it contains a modicum of reality sufficient, in my opinion, +to secure the position taken up from being utterly overthrown by any +direct attack not followed up by reference to a certain palpable +absurdity which we shall presently perceive to be inseparably connected +with the position. To so much of real reasoning as we have before us, +let then all due respect be shown. No doubt all existences must +necessarily dispose themselves or be disposed somehow. No doubt all +occurrences must succeed each other somehow. No doubt, either, that if +the disposing or otherwise originating forces operated quite +regardlessly of plan, no one disposition or succession would be a whit +less possible than any other--the most symmetric or evenly graduated +than the most disjointed or confused. Now although, since exertion is +utterly inconceivable without volition, and since volition is equally +inconceivable without consciousness, it must be impossible for any +forces ever to exert themselves altogether unintentionally, it is yet +perfectly possible for their exertion to have no ulterior intention +beyond that of gratifying an unprospective will. This is all that one +fidgetting about, as the phrase is, intends, when he has no special +motive for fidgetting in any particular direction more than in any +other, and similarly it may by possibility be the mere fidgettiness of +Nature that gives rise to all natural phenomena. Nature, indeed, cannot, +any more than any other force or combination of forces, be utterly +destitute of intelligence, but its intelligence may not inconceivably be +of no higher sort than that which the sensitive plant exhibits or +mimics. Nature cannot exert itself quite unconsciously, nor consequently +quite unintentionally, but its exertions, though not unintended, may +possibly not be intended for any result. It must be admitted, then, +that, so far, no reason has appeared why the force or forces by which +the universe was originally moulded, may not, as contended, have been +perfectly heedless and reckless; may not, without the least +premeditation or the slightest view to any ulterior object, have +produced certain phenomena in those particular sequences to which the +name of natural laws has been given; and may not, with the same total +absence of purpose, have adopted certain other courses of action which, +very fortunately, though quite undesignedly, have resulted in the +production of endless varieties of mechanism, most of them of +marvellously intricate and complex structure, and all and each of them +of structure marvellously suitable for performing, in co-operation with +Nature's laws, functions of an utility as varied as their structure. And +what any forces have been equal to do once, those same forces, if +remaining unimpaired, must be equal to repeat times without number. +Although, if you found your opponent at dice invariably throwing +double-sixes, you might feel confident that his dice were loaded, your +confidence, unless otherwise corroborated, would not amount to entire +certainty. With unloaded dice there would be nothing strange in +double-six being thrown once; but, if once, why not twice running? and +if twice, why not three, four, or a million times running, provided that +the thrower's strength held out so long? No one of the separate throws, +from the first to the millionth, would be attended with more difficulty +than any other. Whoever made the first might with no greater effort make +any one, and therefore every one, of the rest. In the fact of his having +commenced the series there would be proof of the possibility of his +completing it. In like manner, if it be not inconceivable that Nature's +forces may once, by a single unpremeditated exertion, have bestowed on +the universe its actual constitution, it is not inconceivable that by +continual repetition of similarly unpremeditated exertions, they may +have ever since maintained that constitution. In this supposition there +is nothing patently absurd. It is perfectly legitimate to suppose that +any event or combination of events, not demonstrably impossible, may +have occurred in the absence of complete certainty that they have not +occurred. It may not be illegitimate, therefore, to suppose that all +phenomena of the description termed physical, and all repeated sequences +of such phenomena, may have occurred, not causally, but casually--that +it may have been a fortuitous concourse of atoms which originally +established the existing economy of the universe, and an uninterrupted +succession of similar fortuitous concourses that has ever since +maintained that economy. That supposition, I repeat, involves no +absolute absurdity. What however is, if not absurd, at any rate +egregiously unscientific and most unphilosophically credulous, is to +treat the supposition as a certainty, notwithstanding that the chances +against its representing real facts are as infinity to infinitesimality; +for not less is the preponderance of improbability that the laws of +nature were not intentionally prescribed, and that the wondrously +complex and wondrously useful harmony that has been established between +organic structure and natural law was not designedly established. In +considering this point, it will be convenient to take law first. + +Inasmuch as, on the assumption that all phenomena of inorganic matter +are effects, purely unpremeditated, of Nature's capricious restlessness, +there would of course be no more reason why any one such phenomenon than +any other should not at any time occur, there would equally of course on +the same assumption, be no more reason why it should. An infinity of +phenomena being at all times equally possible, the chances against any +one being, on any occasion, preferred to all the rest, would be infinity +less one. Against any particular sequence of phenomena they would be as +infinity less one multiplied by the number of phenomena composing the +sequence, and against one or more repetitions of the same sequence they +would be the same multiple of virtual infinity multiplied by the number +of repetitions. Against perpetual repetition, they would, as it were, be +virtual infinity multiplied by infinity. On the assumption stated, an +apple loosened from the parent stem, might quite possibly fall to the +ground, but quite as possibly might remain suspended in mid air, or rise +straight upwards, or take any one of the innumerable directions +intervening between zenith and nadir, travelling too, unless +interrupted, in the direction selected for any period, from a single +moment to endless ages. Experience, however, teaches that an apple or +any other body of greater specific gravity than air, does invariably, +when deprived of support, fall straight downward, such downward movement +being part of one of those sequences of phenomena which are classed +under the head of gravitation. Now, to assert that this, or any other, +and consequently every other, specimen of gravitation, cannot possibly +have been unpremeditated would no doubt be unwarrantable. No doubt there +is one solitary, one infinitesimal chance that the force whose action +results in gravitation may, when producing that result, be acting with +as little choice of direction as a fidgetty man makes when moving his +arms or legs about for no better reason than that he will not take the +trouble to keep them quiet. Only, as on the supposition that the force +did not select its course, the chances against its always taking the +same course would be infinity less one indefinitely multiplied, the +probability that it does select must needs be the same indefinite +multiple of virtual infinity. Not less than this is the preponderance +of probability that the invariably recurrent sequences of phenomena +which we are in the habit of referring to gravitation, are premeditated, +and that the law of gravitation has, so to speak, been wittingly +ordained. And in this respect all invariable sequences of phenomena, +otherwise termed laws of nature, stand plainly in the same category. One +solitary and infinitesimal unit is the sole deduction to be made from +what would otherwise be infinite certainty, that the assumption we +started with is false, and that all invariable sequences are +premeditated, all the laws of nature enacted by a law-giver who intended +what he was enacting. + +Intention, however, is not quite the same thing as design. It is +possible for action to be at once intentional and purposeless. If a man, +taking regularly a constitutional walk, is observed always to take the +same road, and to stop exactly at the same point, there can be no +reasonable doubt as to his intention to walk just so far and no farther; +but it does not follow that he has any object in walking which he +supposes would not be equally served by his walking a few paces more or +less. Similarly whatever be the certainty that the laws of nature have +been intentionally established, there is in that certainty no proof of +their having been established for any purpose beyond that of gratifying +some whim or humour of the lawgiver. For indications of design in the +universe we must look rather to organic than to inorganic nature, rather +to structure than to law. We shall find applying to the former the same +reasoning as to the latter, and likewise some more besides. + +Inasmuch as, of the innumerable combinations of which the elements or +elementary forces are susceptible, each and every one, in the absence +of any preference for one over another on the part of the volition on +which the occurrence of all depends, would have equal chances of +occurring, the chances against the occurrence at any particular time of +any particular combination would be as the number, or rather as the +innumerosity, of all the rest to one. Such, in the absence of any +intentional action on Nature's part, would be the odds against any one +single occurrence of any one elemental combination. Against the +perpetual repetition of the same combination the odds would be the same +innumerosity innumerable times multiplied. Nevertheless there actually +is everlastingly recurring, not simply one single specimen, but an +innumerable multitude of the same elemental combinations. Whatever were +the combinations necessary for producing all the existing organisms, +vegetable and animal, with which our earth swarms, the constant +recurrence of those same or nearly the same combinations is +indispensable both for the maintenance of the organisms during life and +for the production of successors to them; and such constant recurrence +is plainly going on. The chances then against its being unintended must +be the aforesaid multiple of innumerosity. But this is not all. The +multiple in question represents the chances against perpetual repetition +of any set whatever of elemental combinations, but about the actually +recurrent set there is this peculiarity, that it produces and maintains +innumerable organisms or machines, which--inasmuch as all of them are +marvellously fit, by reason of their respective specialities of +structure, for performing different obviously useful purposes--have all +the appearance of having been expressly constructed for the performance +of those purposes. If these appearances of adaptation were fallacious, +if the apparent utility were undesigned, the chances against the +perpetual recurrence of so singularly useful, rather than of some +totally useless, set of combinations would be a multiple of innumerosity +similar to that which has clearly been shown to represent the +preponderance of probability against the constant repetition of any set +of combinations whatever, whether useful or useless. If, then, it were +permissible to use so extravagant an hyperbole to indicate an idea of +multitude to which it is not in the power of words to give adequate +expression, it might be said that while the chances against Nature's +habitual action being _unintentional_, or the result as it were of mere +fidgettiness or restlessness, are an indefinite multiple of infinity, +the chances against its being _purposeless_ and _undesigned_, without +view to end or object, is the same multiple doubled. + +Still, in order to give the solitary and infinitesimal chance on the +other side its full due, let us confess it to be as yet not quite +conclusively demonstrated that the actual order of inorganic, and the +actual constitution of organic, nature are results of uninterrupted +repetition of one and the same purposeless volition, and of the same +purely fortuitous concourses of atoms. Let us admit it to be not +absolutely impossible, not utterly inconceivable, that vegetable and +animal organisms were not contrived such as they are with any view to +their becoming habitations of vegetable and animal life, but that having +been accidentally discovered to be fit to be lived in, they have been +taken possession of by life and inhabited accordingly; that, similarly, +the wondrously complex and varied mechanisms of which most organisms are +composed were not made to be used, but are used because certain uses +have been accidentally discovered for them--the eye, for instance, to +take one example out of myriads not less remarkable, not having been +meant to be seen with, but being employed for seeing because, by a happy +coincidence, the particles composing it have got to be collocated in +such wise that a picture of whatever is opposite to it is formed upon +the retina, and is thence by a nervous concatenation transmitted to the +brain. Although, if the most consummate skill, in comparison with which +that displayed in the fabrication of Mr. Newall's telescope were +downright clumsiness, had striven to devise a seeing apparatus, capable +of exact self-adjustment to all degrees of light, all gradations of +distance, all varieties of refrangibility, it could not have adopted a +contrivance more exquisitely ingenious, or evincing more minutely +accurate knowledge of the most secret laws of optics, than the mechanism +of the eye apparently betokens, let it still be admitted to be not quite +beyond the bounds of possibility, that not skill but the blindest and +densest ignorance may have presided over the whole operation. But even +though the modes of procedure involved in these admissions were not +quite impossible or inconceivable, belief in them would, I repeat, be +palpably irrational, and that almost to the last degree. The nearest +approach to a reason that can be imagined for it is the _Credo quia +incredibile est_ to which philosophers in despair have occasionally been +known to resort. _Dudum in scholis audiveram_, says Descartes, _nihil +tam absurde dici posse quod non dicatur ab aliquo Philosophorum_. In his +early college days he had heard that nothing so absurd can possibly be +said, but that some philosopher or other may say it. Such words are too +hard for me. I make as yet no charges of absurdity, contenting myself +for the moment with saying that no notion can be too unscientific to be +adopted by those scientific men who, gratuitously running counter to the +strongest possible presumption, set the science of probabilities so +utterly at naught as to adopt as reality an hypothesis the chances +against which are but one single iota short of infinite. + +What, however, is unequivocally absurd, is a certain notion which I +hinted would be found to be inevitably consequent on the foregoing +premisses, and whose self-evident falsity carries with it condemnation +of the premisses. To say that the creative agency denominated Nature, or +by whatever other name known, neither had any ends in view when +originally adopting certain sequences of action, and originally +fabricating innumerable organisms exactly suitable for the performance, +in concert with those sequences, of innumerable useful functions; nor, +although ever since repeating the sequences, and maintaining or +reproducing the organisms, has so done with any reference to the +purposes which the sequences and organisms serve, is equivalent to +saying that the agency in question is not even aware that any purposes +are served. He who planted the eye doth not then see. He who fashioned +the ear doth not hear. He who teacheth man knowledge doth not, it seems, +know. Yet what, according to this, creative agency, whether God or +Nature, Creator or Creatress, can not perceive, the creature can. Even +an ass knows that thistles are good to eat, and that certain movements +of his tongue and larynx will result in a bray; while man not only daily +discovers fresh uses for things, but imagines that if he had had the +fashioning of them, he might have materially increased their utility; +King Alfonso of Castile, for instance, boasting of the valuable +cosmogonical advice he could have given had he been taken into council; +and one of Kaiser Wilhelm's predecessors on the throne of Prussia +intimating that he, in like case, would have proved conclusively that +pounded quartz and silex may easily be in excess in arable soil. The +creature, then, has intelligence of which the Creator has always been +destitute. Yet the creature can have nothing save what, either directly +or indirectly, he derives from a creator. Wherefore that, in becoming +endowed with intelligence, man must have received from the Creator that +which the Creator had not to give, is an article inseparable from the +profession of faith of those moderate Atheists who are content to regard +man as a creature. + +There are, however, others of a more uncompromising temper, who do not +hesitate to pronounce creation, in the sense of formation of something +out of nothing, to be an incomprehensible myth; and it cannot be denied +to these that, however difficult it be to conceive an uncreated universe +existing from all eternity, the conception of an eternally existent +Creator is not one whit easier. Fairly enough, therefore, these may +proceed to argue that in the production of that compound, man, the share +of the agency usually styled creative must have been limited to +combining and arranging the elemental particles of his corporeal moiety. +Quite fairly, advancing still farther, they may hazard a conjecture that +it is from the union of the corporeal constituents of man that the +generation of his spiritual moiety has resulted. But for such generation +it is plainly indispensable that the corporeal constituents should have +been not inert particles but self-acting forces, and that, as such, they +must have been in possession of more or less intelligence, which +intelligence again either was or was not equal in amount to that of the +human spirit or mind generated by them. If it were not equal, then the +forces must have given to their offspring more than they had themselves +got to give--which is sheer nonsense. If it were equal, then, inasmuch +as the human mind is quite clever enough to discover uses for the +various parts of the human body and of other organisms, the forces to +which the human mind owes its origin must be at least equally clever. +The elementary forces by whose action the human and other organic bodies +have been constructed, must have been perfectly aware what they were +constructing, and what services the resulting structures would be fitted +to render. In other words, they must in their constructive operations +have worked towards specific ends, according to preconceived plan and +set design, wittingly contriving various machines for various purposes. +The advanced Atheists, with whose speculations we are here especially +concerned, are thus at liberty to choose between two horns of a dilemma, +but must not hope to escape both. Either they stand self-refuted by +assuming something to have been made out of nothing--a process which +they began by pronouncing impossible--or they must imagine intelligence, +competent to devise all organisms, to be diffused throughout the +universe, thereby showing themselves to have assumed their sectarian +appellation without sufficient warrant, and to be in reality rather +Pantheists than Atheists. + +A third hypothesis indeed remains for any who are content to believe +that Nature's elementary forces having, without knowing what they were +about, constructed the human body, the human mind, until then a +houseless wanderer, lit upon it by chance, and, observing it to be a +habitation suitably swept and garnished, entered in and dwelt there. +Upon this supposition there must be, within the limits of our terrene +sphere, two distinct species of intelligence, a greater and a +lesser--the one competent to construct all sorts of marvellously complex +and marvellously serviceable machines, yet incompetent to understand +their utility, the other fully perceiving the utility of the machines, +yet utterly incompetent to fabricate them. But there are probably few +adventurers on the ocean of speculation who would not prefer total +shipwreck to the shelter of such a harbour of refuge as this. + +Atheism must in fairness be acknowledged to have much mended its manners +within the last two or three generations. Its tone and language are no +longer of the rude, scoffing sort at which Voltaire may be readily +pictured as breaking into voluble protest, or Hume as contemptuously +opening his eyes and shrugging his shoulders. Though grown more civil, +however, it cannot be complimented on having grown more rational. At +most may it be credited with being more elaborately irrational than of +old. It now no longer denies, it only ignores. It does not pronounce God +non-existent. It only insists that there is not complete proof that God +exists; thereupon, however, proceeding to argue as if He did not exist, +and thereby, not simply confounding deficiency of proof on one side with +sufficiency of proof on the other, but overlooking an amount of proof +that on any other subject would, provisionally at least, be deemed +conclusive, and perversely rejecting an hypothesis which, whether +correct, or not, is at least a good working hypothesis, coinciding +exactly with most of the facts, and inconsistent with none of them, in +favour of an hypothesis which, even in the hands of a Huxley or a +Darwin, cannot be made to work at all. + + +II. + +To my mind there is a genuine pleasure in giving expression to +admiration of any great intellectual achievement; and it is much rather +for that reason than on account of any value which I imagine my opinion +on such a subject can possess, that, having had occasion to name the +illustrious author of the 'Origin of Species,' I desire to preface my +criticism on what appears to me to be a grave defect in his theory, by +intimating my hearty concurrence in its leading principles. That +inasmuch as, owing to the exceeding fecundity of the generality of +organic beings, more individuals of almost every species are born than +can possibly survive, and that consequently a desperate struggle for +existence must take place amongst them; that in such a struggle the +smallest grain may turn the scale, the minutest advantage possessed by +some individuals over others determine which shall live and which shall +die; that, as the circumstances in which life is to be maintained +change, the character and structure of organisms must change also in +order to be accommodated thereto, but that the changes which +consequently take place in some individuals are better suited to the +altered circumstances than those which take place in other individuals; +that individual offspring, moreover, although always strongly resembling +their parents in the majority of particulars, always exhibit some slight +differences from them; that of these differences such as do not render +the offspring less fit will almost of necessity render them more fit +for coping with their rivals; and that superior fitness, however +acquired, is as likely as any other quality to be transmitted to +succeeding generations--all these are indisputable facts, and from +these, as premisses, it seems to me not so much to be legitimately +deducible that most existing species may have been produced 'by descent, +with modification, through natural selection,' or 'survival of the +fittest,' as necessarily to follow that they cannot have originated in +any other way. For _all_ species to have been created such as they now +are, is simply inconsistent with the premisses. Whatever beings may at +any remote epoch have been created, there must, according to the +conditions involved, have been amongst their descendants some better +fitted, by reason of divergence from the parent type, for engaging in +internecine strife than those, if any such there were, which adhered +closely to that type. Whether, then, among the survivors from the first +engagement in that never-ending struggle for life which must have +commenced soon after the creation, there were or were not any exact +representatives of the parent type, there must have been some exhibiting +more or less of divergence from that type. Among the descendants of +these, again, there must have been some who, together with the +structural or other advantages inherited from their immediate ancestors, +possessed, moreover, some advantages first nascent in themselves, and +who were similarly enabled thereby to prevail over their less gifted +competitors, and similarly to transmit all their advantages to a +posterity, some members of which would similarly be born with certain +new advantages in addition. By continual repetition of these processes, +and the consequent accumulation of divergencies from the original +pattern, however slight those divergencies might separately be, there +could not but eventually become formed breeds so distinct from each +other as to be to all intents and purposes distinct species, in +whichsoever of its many vague senses the term 'species' be understood. +Now these species, instead of having been created, would be the result +of divergence from their created progenitor. Whether, therefore, any +created species do or do not still exist, it is certain that among +existing species there are some that were not created, but which have +been gradually evolved, and evolved, too, through survival of the +fittest. Mr. Darwin, then, is fairly entitled to the praise of having +placed beyond dispute that a process called by himself 'Natural +Selection,' and by Mr. Herbert Spencer 'Survival of the Fittest,' has +almost from the commencement of organic life been, and still is, in +active operation; that it is a cause which must needs have originated +some species, and is quite competent to have originated all that still +exist; whereas creation, the only other suggested cause, cannot be +conceived to have done this latter unless every minutest shade of +difference between offspring and parent be regarded as the effect of a +separate creative act. Unless creation have originated every one of +those divergencies the accumulation of which constitutes a species, +clearly it cannot have originated that species. With some of the +phenomena connected with species the theory of creation cannot be +reconciled unless this novel interpretation be placed upon the word +creation, whereas there are none of the phenomena with which the +evolutionary hypothesis conflicts, and few, if any, which, when +restricted to its proper office of auxiliary, it will not help to +explain. + +To what we might thus be assured of, even if we had only general +principles to guide us, all obtainable evidence unanimously testifies. +Geology distinctly proclaims that every portion of our globe's surface +has undergone vast changes, and that its organic inhabitants have +changed simultaneously and proportionately. The proof absolute, which it +furnishes, that at a period when few, if any, existing species had made +their appearance, many species now extinct already existed, is proof +equally absolute that if all species extinct and extant were created, +they cannot, at any rate, have been created at the same time. Of so much +at least we must be satisfied, unless we are prepared to accept the +ingenious conjecture of an orthodox divine, that, while our earth was +being formed out of chaos, Satan, to confound the faith of remote +generations, brought over bones of monsters from other worlds and +embedded them in the soil of ours, or that, as the same idea has been +otherwise expressed, while the earth's crust was a baking the devil had +a finger in the pie. Moreover, on the supposition that there was a break +of ages between the creations of extinct and of extant species, as +geology positively declares there must have been if both were separately +created, how passing strange is the 'grand fact that all extinct beings +can be classed with all recent beings'! The strangeness disappears, +however, when both are regarded as descendants of common progenitors. +The wonder would then be if they could not be so classed. Again, how +astonishing on the creative, how natural on the evolutionary hypothesis, +that the arrangement of bones in the hand of a man, the wing of a bat, +the fin of a porpoise, the leg of a horse, should be precisely the same; +the number of vertebrae in the neck of a giraffe, and in that of an +elephant the same; the primitive germs from which a man, a dog, a frog, +and a lobster are gradually evolved, to all appearance the same--the +same microscopic atom of homogeneous matter, undistinguishable by any +known test from an animalcule almost at the bottom of the organic scale! +Above all, that the courses by which animals of all degrees of +complexity are gradually developed from apparently equally simple germs +should, whenever traceable, be found to consist of progressive +ramifications, so that every higher animal, before arriving at maturity, +passes through several stages at the end of each of which lower animals +have stopped! How impossible, or how easy, to understand, according as +the one or the other hypothesis is adopted, is the phenomenon of what in +the one case will be treated as rudimentary, in the other as obsolete, +organs! No one need scruple to regard these as apparatus which the +creature has outgrown and allowed to fall into decay through neglect; +but whatever there is in us of real nobleness of feeling revolts against +the notion of their being apparatus which a divine Creator began to +build but was not able to finish. And yet again, how insultingly +irreconcilable with any rational estimate of Divine nature is the +possibility of any existing type of mammals having been created, seeing +that if so, it must have been created with _false_ marks of nourishment +from the womb of a mother that never existed! + +These are some of the main grounds on which the Darwinian theory rests. +Of the abundance of detailed illustrations from which it may derive +additional support no adequate idea can be formed, except by careful +perusal of its author's own writings, and these fortunately may without +much exaggeration be said to be in everybody's hands. Of the arguments +that have been brought forward in opposition to it, all seem to me to +be susceptible of very complete answers, and one or two of the +strongest, of answers more complete than they have yet received. True, +there is no disputing the testimony borne by the paintings and +sculptures of Egyptian tombs, and of Ninevite palaces, that the basement +floors in Thebes and Memphis were infested by much the same sort of +beetles as those which are such nuisances in London kitchens; that +Sardanapalus, if ever he exchanged indoor for outdoor sports, may have +hunted with dogs and horses that might pass muster at an English meet, +and that the Pharaohs were served by negro slaves as like as two peas in +all externals to those who in the United States have recently and +prematurely been metamorphosed into free and independent electors. But +all this only proves that certain species which existed 4,000 years ago +are still represented by unchanged descendants. It does not prove that +other descendants and groups of descendants from the same species have +not within the same period undergone changes sufficiently great to +convert them into distinct races; neither, if it did prove thus much, +would it do more than afford a presumption, and a very deceptive one, +that 4,000 years are too short a time for the formation of a new race, +affording besides, at the same time, much stronger presumption that, +within the remotest limits to which Mosaic chronology can be pushed +back, the various races of mankind, white, black, and intermediately +tinted, can not possibly have descended from one pair of ancestors. + +That domesticated animals, when suffered to run wild, always return to +the primitive wild type--this, instead of an argument against, is one of +the strongest arguments for the evolution theory, from which it is +indeed, as Mr. G. H. Lewes says, a necessary deduction. It is simply +because, as the conditions of life change, structure must, for +adaptation's sake, change likewise, that wild animals are capable of +being domesticated, of being, that is, made to undergo modifications by +being brought from the conditions of wildness to those of domesticity. +How, then, should they possibly retain those modifications, how escape +return to their previous shape and habits, when retransferred from +domesticity to wildness? + +The question, Why are not new species continually produced? may be aptly +met by another. How, consistently with the theory, is it possible they +should? Natural Selection is represented as acting 'solely by +accumulating slight successive favourable variations,' as taking only +short and slow steps. By what possibility, then, can it suddenly produce +modifications sufficiently conspicuous to mark off a new species? New +species may be, and indeed are, constantly in process of formation on +all sides, under our very eyes, without our being aware; for since the +process requires ages for its accomplishment, it must needs be +imperceptible by the keenest observation. So that even when a new +species is completed, it is not recognised as new, so minute is the +difference between the perfection to which it has attained, and the +imperfect state in which we and our fathers before us had long known it. + +'Why, however, since, according to the theory of Natural Selection, an +interminable number of intermediate forms must have existed, linking +together all the species in each group by gradations as fine as are our +present varieties--why do we not see these linking forms all around us?' +To this objection the very theory against which it is urged affords a +partial and almost adequate reply, the deficiencies of which are +besides to some extent supplied by embryology and geology, and to a +farther extent accounted for by the meagreness of the geological record. +Natural selection for survival necessarily implies extinction of all +that are not selected to survive, so that fossil remains are now the +only procurable evidence that any of these latter that have long been +extinct ever existed. But very many organic beings are incapable of +being preserved in a fossil condition, while of those which can be so +preserved 'the number of specimens in all our museums is absolutely as +nothing compared with the countless generations of countless species +that must have existed.' It should be recollected, too, that among still +existing forms are to be included several which result from uterine +transformation, and are never found alive except _in utero_. + +Another objection, notwithstanding the great stress often laid on it, +seems to me to be altogether beside the real issue. It is the one +derived from the invariable sterility, real or supposed, of hybrids. A +fact cited by Mr. Lewes,[37] that of the fecundity of a cross called +_Leporides_, bred by M. Rouy of Angouleme, between the hare and rabbit, +of which a thousand on an average were for many years, and probably are +still, sent annually to market, would seem to be decisive against the +assumed sterility; but, however this be, matters not the least in regard +to the efficacy of Natural Selection, which, be it once again observed, +is represented as producing new species, not suddenly by the copulation +of two old and utterly distinct ones, but very gradually and slowly, by +the accumulation of minute differences occurring in successive +individuals of the same species. + +The chief if not the only serious obstacles to acceptance of Darwinism +seem to me to be of the author's own creation. Now and then he appears +somewhat needlessly to overstrain his principles, as for instance when +he intimates his conviction that 'all individuals of the same species, +and all the closely allied species of most genera,' will hereafter be +discovered to 'have descended from one parent and to have migrated from +some one birthplace.' This, to my mind, is much more unlikely than his +further suggestion that 'all animals and plants are descended from some +one prototype.' Startling as this second proposition may be on first +hearing, it may not very improbably express the real fact, provided by +'some one prototype' be signified, not a single individual, but several +individuals of one and the same type. Beyond all doubt there was a time +when on and about our earth all matter was as yet inorganic, and when +whatever spirit,[38] of the sort so termed in contradistinction to +matter, either permeated the earth's substance or moved about its +surface, must have been as yet unembodied. Mr. Darwin demands whether +any one can 'really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's +history, elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into +living tissues.' I for one certainly am far from believing this. I see +no reason for believing that, whatever other phenomenon, at all similar, +may at any stage of the world's progress have occurred, it has at +innumerable subsequent stages been repeated; neither do I consider that +the phenomenon is likely to have worn the guise of a sudden flash. But I +do firmly believe, and am quite unable to substitute any equally +plausible substitute for the belief, that when the crust of the earth +had sufficiently cooled, and when other physical conditions had become +such as to admit of the manifestation of that life which we are +accustomed to distinguish by attaching to it the epithet 'organic,' +certain of those forces[39] which, in my opinion, constitute matter, +did, either of their own accord or under superior direction--not +suddenly flash, but--slowly elaborate themselves into organic structures +of some exceedingly simple type; that in the course of ages these simple +structures either developed themselves or were developed into structures +rendered by slow degrees more and more complex, until the degree of +complexity attained, being such as to fit them for being inhabited by +spirit previously unembodied, they were, by individualised portions of +such spirit, appropriated and inhabited accordingly. Beyond all doubt, +at some period or other, what had always previously been unorganised +matter must have become organised. Of two things one, then. Either this +matter must, whether under superior direction or not, have organised +itself, or it must have been organised by some other agency. Mr. Darwin, +together with all thorough-going Darwinians, inclines, I suspect, to the +opinion that matter organised itself; but if so, it cannot possibly have +been inert or lifeless, but must have been active and animate, and +capable of volition; and on that condition, there is no great stretch of +fancy in imagining it to have spontaneously adopted the series of +arrangements indicated. If, on the other hand, we are content to admit +that some external superior intelligence may have performed, or +conducted, or presided over operations, all room for wonder vanishes. + +In regard to the character of the structural prototype, that, of course, +would depend in part on surrounding physical conditions, and if these +have ever been the same in all parts of the globe, there is no apparent +reason why any number of specimens of the prototype may not anywhere +have been independently elaborated. It is not possible, however, that, +since the earth began to revolve round the sun, physical conditions can +have been _simultaneously_ the same in all latitudes; while, on the +other hand, it seems probable that, although the same set of conditions +might perhaps admit of the production of only one organic type, there +might be other sets of conditions favourable to the production of other +types. On the whole, then, it seems more probable that inorganic matter +combined (or _was_ combined) in the first instance in several modes, +than in one single mode, in order to become organic. But whatever may +have been the organic form or forms it first took, to assume that only a +single individual of each form was independently elaborated, and that +all other individuals, both of the same form and of all the more complex +forms, gradually evolved from that one--are descendants from the same +first individual, the same first parent--surely very gratuitously +increases the difficulties of the subject. Especially it complicates the +problem of the distribution of the same plants and animals over +countries immemorially separated by gulfs apparently impassable by +natural means. + +The obstruction which Mr. Darwin has created to the progress of his +opinions by the exaggerated shape in which some of them have been +presented is, however, as nothing in comparison with the injury he does +to his theory by obstinately rejecting certain materials indispensable +for its satisfactory completion. What an admirable theory it is so far +as it goes! How nicely it fits into all the facts it comes in contact +with, even into those which it is, of itself and unassisted, incompetent +to explain! How elevating too and ennobling, when rightly conceived! for +who can fail to rejoice in the view it presents of 'Natural selection +working solely by and for the good of each being' that it spares, and +causing 'all corporal and mental endowments to tend towards perfection'? +or who need mind suspecting himself to be descended, through an ape, +from a triton or a hydra, if he may compensate himself by hoping to have +a distant posterity of angels? How well, moreover, would it, if +permitted, chime in with any rational religion, besides being, as +already hinted, absolutely essential to that part of the Mosaic creed +which represents all the variously coloured and variously featured races +of men as springing from one single couple. By what perversity then is +it that Mr. Darwin takes such pains, if not to render his theory +irreligious, at least to exclude from it the assistance which religion +alone can afford, and which it so greatly needs, that whoever, without +that assistance, attempts to apply the theory to the complete +elucidation of phenomena, will be found inevitably committing himself to +the most astounding hypotheses? Here I picture to myself a curl on the +lip of some advanced Darwinian who, having accompanied me so far, cannot +altogether suppress his compassionate scorn at the proposed recurrence +now-a-days to a mode of thought so obsolete in the treatment of +scientific subjects as the theological. 'Positive biology,' he will +perhaps superbly exclaim, repeating the words of Mr. G. H. Lewes, +'declines theological explanations altogether.' Yes, but positive +biology is therein very unwise, for as, if the same reader will +accompany me a little further, I pledge myself to show, it is the +untheological or atheistical, not the theistical, mode of treatment +which is here utterly out of place and flagrantly unscientific. Be it, +without the slightest reserve, admitted that the formation of almost +all, and probably of quite all, existing species is due, and cannot be +otherwise than due, to survival of the fittest, the superior fitness of +these, moreover, being due to the gradual accumulation of innumerable +and, for the most part, exceedingly slight divergencies from the parent +stock. But whence and why these divergencies? It cannot be without a +cause that even one more feather than the parent possessed appears in +the offspring's wing, or a novel tint on its coat, or that the curve of +beak or talons is not precisely the same in each. What then is the +cause? Unphilosophic people will most likely call it 'all chance,' +getting sneered at for their pains, and justly too, as using words +without meaning. But are not philosophers themselves doing much the same +thing, and merely restating facts which they profess to explain, when, +like Mr. Lewes,[40] they talk of the 'specific shape' assumed by an +'organic plasma' being 'always dependent on the polarity of its +molecules,' 'or due to the operation of immanent properties;' or declare +that, in the process of organic evolution, 'each stage determines its +successor,' 'consensus of the whole impressing a peculiar direction on +the development of parts, and the law of Epigenesis necessitating a +serial development,' insomuch that, 'every part being the effect of a +pre-existing, and in turn the cause of a succeeding part,' the reason +why, when a crab loses its claw, the member is reproduced, is that the +group of cells remaining at the stump 'is the necessary condition of +the genesis' of precisely that new group which the reproductive process +imperatively requires to follow next in order, this second group equally +the necessary condition for genesis of the one required third, the third +for the fourth, and so on; and that the reason why the thorns of a +blackberry admit of somewhat close comparison with the hooks and spines +of certain crustaceae, is that portions of the integument of both plant +and crawfish '_tend_ under similar external forces to develop' into +similar forms? + +I pass rapidly over one or two minor difficulties that here present +themselves. I will not stop to ask how--if reproduction of lost limbs be +due to polarity of the molecules, in other words to the direction which +in the circumstances of the case the molecules are bound to take, and if +the polarity of each particular set of molecules be impressed upon them +by the group formed immediately previously--how it is that the group +terminating the docked stump of a limb, which group is represented as +commencing the work of reproduction, imparts a different direction or +tendency to the fresh molecules of nourishment that are supplied to it, +from that which it has been accustomed to communicate to previous +molecular supplies. Hitherto it has used such molecules solely for the +repair of its own waste; now it employs a large portion of them to build +up an entirely new fabric. It seems then that molecular polarity is not +a fixed but a variable property, and, being such, cannot be inherent or +originate in the molecular nature. But I will not linger over this point +nor yet over the fact, absolutely unintelligible on the polar +hypothesis, that it is comparatively only few animals that are capable +of reproducing severed parts. Although the process required, no doubt, +is, as Mr. Lewes says, 'in all essential respects the same as that which +originally produced' the parts, the last layer of cells left at the +place of excision after a human leg or arm has been cut off, lacks the +skill to repeat an operation, which according to the hypothesis it has +once before performed. It cannot so determine the polarity of the +molecules with which it is supplied by the arteries as to constrain them +to group themselves into a new layer, instead of merely repairing an old +one. A crab or a lobster, or a polype's molecules are clever enough for +this, a man's not. Without pressing these objections, but on the +contrary, conceding for the nonce and for argument's sake, to molecular +polarity, to immanent properties, to Epigenetic evolution, all the +efficacy claimed for them, I limit myself to inquiring what causes the +various tendencies and directions which these imply. Tendency +pre-supposes impulse; direction control. What is it that here imparts +the impulse and exercises the control? Whatever else it be, it must, for +reasons stated at length on a previous page, be something possessing at +least enough of intelligence to exercise volition, and which at least +intends that the movements which it originates shall take place, whether +it further intends or not the ends which eventually result from the +movements. To myself it seems barely conceivable that even the least +marvellous of these ends should have been undesigned. Take, for +instance, half a dozen _infusoria_ of some exceedingly low type, all +individually single cells or sacs of matter perfectly transparent and +destitute of any approach to structure that can be detected with a +magnifying power of five thousand diameters. Observe how, after feeding +for a while, and increasing proportionately in size, one will divide +itself in half, each half becoming a separate and complete animalcule, +another line itself internally and clothe itself externally with +clustered cells, which, by a series of differentiations, traceable +through a number of animalcular varieties, eventually exhibit the +outlines of respiratory and circulatory systems. To me, I repeat, it +seems all but inconceivable, and altogether incredible, that the +intelligence which willed these cellular divisions, multiplications, and +differentiations to take place, did not foresee what would be their +results, and did not will them for the sake of those results. And if I +do not deem it still more incredible that there should be _natural_ +selection separating the fittest for survival by accumulating upon them +slight advantages which qualify them to survive, without there being at +the same time a _nature_, or other exalted intelligence, however +designated, which selects, and which accumulates advantages upon the +objects of its selection, _in order_ that they may survive, it is only +because I consider the extremest limits of credibility to have been +already passed. But I forget. On reflection I perceive that I am doing +scant justice to the elasticity of philosophic belief. How far this is +capable of stretching on occasion, let one or two notable Darwinian +specimens show. + +No single piece of organic mechanism is oftener or more confidently +appealed to by Theists as rendering conclusive evidence on their side +than the eye, nor would they run much risk by allowing sentence to go +for or against them according as Mr. Darwin has or has not succeeded in +his attempt to explain that evidence away. Possibly he may disclaim +having made any attempt of the kind, and I must admit that it is less by +what he says than by what he leaves unsaid, that he lays himself open to +the charge. Indeed, in almost all he says on the subject, I myself +cordially agree, embracing even some of his views with less of +hesitation than he seems to have felt in putting them forward. He seems +to me, for instance, to have somewhat gratuitously admitted it to be +apparently 'in the highest degree absurd to suppose that the eye, with +all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different +distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the +correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed +by natural selection.' For since, as he proceeds unanswerably to argue, +'numerous gradations, from an imperfect and simple eye to one perfect +and complex, each grade being useful to its possessor, can certainly be +shown to exist;' since, as certainly, slight variations of the eye do +occur, and are inherited, and since of these variations there cannot but +be some which are useful to the animal exhibiting them under changing +conditions of life, the difficulty of believing in the formation of a +perfect and complex eye by natural selection can be little else than a +prejudice of the imagination. He proceeds to indicate some probable +stages in the assumed process. Some of the lowest organisms, in which no +trace of nerves can be detected, are known to be sensible to light, +owing, probably, to the presence in the _sarcode_ of which they are +mainly composed, of certain elements which, in organisms somewhat higher +in the scale, become aggregated and developed into nerves specially +endowed with the same sensibility. An optic nerve thus formed, +surrounded by pigment cells, and covered by translucent skin, is the +simplest organ that can be called an eye, but it is an eye incapable of +distinct vision, and serving only to distinguish light from darkness. In +certain star-fishes, small depressions in the layer of pigment-cells +are filled with transparent gelatinous matter projecting with a convex +surface like a rudimentary cornea, and this, it has been suggested, may +serve, not only to form an image, but to concentrate the luminous rays. +In insects, the numerous facets in the cornea of their great compound +eyes have now been ascertained to form true lenses, the cones, moreover, +having been discovered to include curiously modified nervous filaments. +It is impossible not, in this series of changes, to perceive the +appearance of graduation, nor ought there to be much difficulty in +believing the apparent graduation to be real, when we consider how few +comparatively are the still living forms in which the changes cited have +been observed, and how far more numerous the extinct forms by which +intermediate changes may have been presented. If there be no +extravagance in supposing that natural selection may have occasioned +these early steps, neither is there any in supposing that, by continued +progress in the same direction, it may at length have fabricated the +most perfect optical instrument possessed by any member of the +_articulata_. And, if credited so far, why not still further? why not +with competence to form a man's or an eagle's eye? So far I am as +completely at one with Mr. Darwin in respect to the eye as in respect to +any other of the subjects taken by him for illustration. The fact is, +however, that in this, as in every similar instance, he has completely +evaded the real difficulties of the case. It is not a whit more +startling to be told that the most complex eye, with all the latest +improvements, than to be told that the earliest rudiment of an optic +nerve, may have been formed by the gradual accumulation of minute +differences. Only allow time enough for the requisite accumulation, and +neither operation is one whit more unintelligible than the other. The +difficulty, equally and utterly insuperable in both cases, is to +understand how the difference can have been undesigned. 'How a nerve +comes to be sensitive to light,' says Mr. Darwin, 'hardly concerns us +more than how life itself originated.' Perhaps not; nor, indeed, very +well could it, for the second question of the two is surely one of +almost unsurpassed concernment; but, at any rate, when either of the two +is asked, nothing can be more reprehensible than, by studiously ignoring +the only alternative reply, to leave it to be inferred that the nerve +made itself, or that life caused itself to live, that both are in short +examples of what Mr. Darwin strangely calls '_variation causing +alterations_.'[41] Let us briefly consider a few of the results supposed +to be attributable to this singular process. The eye, as every reader of +course knows, though here and there one perhaps may not be the worse for +being reminded, consists of four coats--the _sclerotic_, outermost and +strongest, which constitutes the white of the eye; the circular, tough, +and coloured, yet pellucid, _cornea_, in the centre of which is seen the +pupil; the _choroid_, full charged with black pigment, and lining the +sclerotic; the _retina_, an expansion of the optic nerve, lining in its +turn the choroid; of the _iris_, a flat membrane, dividing the eye into +two very unequally-sized chambers; of a lens termed the _crystalline_, +suspended in the posterior chamber immediately behind the iris; and of +two humours (also virtual lenses), whereof one, the _aqueous_, is +enclosed in the anterior chamber formed by the iris and the cornea, +while the other, the _vitreous_, fills the whole of the posterior +chamber save what is occupied by the crystalline lens. By what nice +interlacement of filaments the fibrous ring that margins the pupil, or +aperture through the iris, regulates the admission of light, contracting +or expanding, yet always preserving its circular form, according as the +brilliance is excessive or deficient; how the humours or lenses are +continually varying in figure and relative position so as to concentrate +every pencil of light admitted on that point exactly where the retina is +spread out to receive it; how, according as the object looked at is near +at hand or far off, certain muscles perform quite opposite services, +rendering the cornea more or less prominent, pushing the crystalline +lens forward or backward, and thereby lengthening or shortening the axis +of vision, so that, whether the rays enter divergently from a near +object, or parallel from a remote one, they equally fall into focus at +the same distance beyond, and equally form on the retina a picture of +the object from which they come, perhaps compressing a landscape of five +or six square leagues into a space of half an inch diameter, and anon +allowing the page of a book or a dinner-plate to occupy the entire field +of vision--to these and to any kindred marvels it would be superfluous +more than momentarily to refer. Suffice it to note how measureless the +superiority, as a mere piece of mechanism, of an average eye to the +finest of telescopes, and how just, nevertheless, is the +telescope-maker's claim to praise for skilful adaptation to the laws of +optics, when he has succeeded in a faint and feeble imitation of some +minor part of nature's visual apparatus. Yet nature's original and +infinitely more beautiful aptitudes we are forbidden to deem +adaptations, being required instead to regard them as self-produced, or, +at any rate, as having been undesigned. Now I unreservedly admit that, +among all conceivable forms, among the most exquisitely beautiful and +most usefully intricate and complex, there is not one which may not +possibly have been produced without aim or purpose by the mere +restlessness of elemental forces; the amount of probability of their +having been so produced being, however, according to the formula already +set forth in its proper place, as one to infinity multiplied more or +less frequently by itself. But what adequate superlative shall we invent +to express the credulity, the credulosity run mad, of those who, in a +matter of scientific belief, deliberately accept such odds. Observe how +at once extravagantly gratuitous and painfully elaborate such +credulosity is; how easily, on the one hand, all its ends could be +served by the simple expedient of supposing a superintending +intelligence; how, on the other, it compels ingenuity like Mr. Darwin's +to entrench itself behind a phrase of utterly unmeaning gibberish. + +If you see a man moving slowly, with head down, over an extensive plain, +you may fairly suspect that he does not know where he is going, and +possibly does not mean to go anywhere in particular. But if you perceive +that on reaching a ditch he takes a leap over, you are quite sure that, +when leaping, he meant to get to the other side. To that extent his +saltatory movement is unequivocal evidence of design. It is perhaps to +escape the necessity of a similar inference that Mr. Darwin so +frequently quotes the proverb _Natura non facit saltum_; but, if so, he +leans on a broken reed--on a bit of proverbial philosophy as weak as the +weakest of Mr. Tupper's. That Nature does sometimes make a leap, and a +pretty long one, must be obvious to any visitor to the Museum of the +London College of Surgeons, who has examined the two-headed and +four-legged human foeti there preserved in spirits. It may be said +that these are leaps in the wrong direction. Be it so. Still, whoever +can leap backward can make an equal leap forward, and most people will +find the latter the easier feat of the two. The power, whatever it be, +that coupled together the Siamese Twins, and gave to those respected +brothers, the late William and Robert Chambers of Edinburgh, twelve +fingers and twelve toes apiece, would not have gone at all more out of +the way by doing, suddenly and at once, several of those things which +Mr. Darwin doubts not that it does slowly and by degrees--by single +acts, for instance, instead of by a succession of acts, aggregating into +the semblance of an optic nerve certain elements in the _sarcode_ of +certain low organisms, spreading out the nerve thus formed into a +network or retina, forming a number of separate pigment-cells into a +homogeneous cornea, and following up these first steps by others which, +how much soever more apparently complex, would cost comparatively little +after the earlier and simpler ones had been taken. Now let but the power +competent to do these things be credited with sense enough to be aware +of its competence, and it may then be regarded as not unlikely to have +done some of them on purpose. Whereupon, the genesis of the eye ceases +to be a mystery. All the appearances of contrivance that have resulted +from the operation find their obvious and complete explanation in the +assumption of a contriver, and all such hazy films as that of +variability producing variation cease to be capable of serving as +excuses for wilful blindness. And why should not the power in question +be so credited? Here is Mr. Darwin's solitary reason why. He doubts +whether the inference implied may not be 'presumptuous.' He apprehends +that we have no 'right to assume that the Creator works by intellectual +powers like those of a man.' Truly, of all suggested modes of marking +respect for creative power, that of assuming it to have worked +unintelligently is the most original. + +The hypothesis offered by Mr. Darwin in explanation of the most perfect +of organic structures, is deemed by him to be equally explanatory of the +most marvellous of animal instincts. Parenthetically, here, never having +as yet met with a definition of instinct which I am able to accept as +satisfactory, I make bold to offer a description of my own. Instinct is +innate knowledge how to perform any useful actions, accompanied by a +tendency or propensity to perform those actions, but wholly +unaccompanied by knowledge of any purpose which they can serve. This is +pure instinct, an example whereof is afforded by the beaver, of which +animal I have somewhere read that one caught when newly born, and +brought up by itself in a room in its captor's house, proceeded after a +while to build up across the apartment the semblance of a dam, composed +of brushes, rugs, billets of wood, and other litter. Pure instinct +differs essentially, not in degree only, but in kind, from reason, which +is not knowledge, but an instrument for acquiring knowledge. Instinct, +however, is rarely if ever found pure, being apparently always +accompanied by more or less of reason. Even a polype makes some show of +reason by moving its _cilia_ in one mode when it desires to suck in +food, and in another when it merely wishes to move on; while it is +scarcely possible for an unprejudiced spectator to doubt of its being by +a rational deduction from experience that a dog knows that it will get +kicked if it presume to snatch at the meat on its master's plate, +instead of waiting for the scraps he may be pleased to throw to it when +he has done. Instinct by necessary implication involves habit; habit as +necessarily always more or less modifies structure; structural +modification always may be, and often is, inherited, carrying with it a +tendency to the habit out of which itself arose; therefore habit and +instinct are likewise heritable. Some instincts are originated +artificially. The reason why, on the very first opportunity, a young +pointer has been known to point at game, and a young sheep-dog to run +round, instead of at, a flock of sheep, is that some of their respective +ancestors had been carefully trained so to point and to wheel. These, +however, are exceptions to the general rule. Most instincts are of what +every one would call natural, and Mr. Darwin calls 'spontaneous' origin, +he explaining the meaning of the latter term to be that the slight +variations from a primordial type, the accumulation of which is +considered by him to constitute actual instinct, are 'variations +produced by the same unknown causes as those which produce slight +deviations of bodily structure.' But here I am once more compelled to +join issue with him. Of the causes which he styles unknown, I maintain +that we know at least thus much--either they are themselves intelligent +forces, or they are forces acting under intelligent direction; and in +support of this proposition I need not perhaps do more than show from +Mr. Darwin's example what infinitely harder things must be accepted by +those who decline to accept this. + +Mr. Darwin, like every really truth-loving controversialist, far from +desiring to shroud, invites special attention to any seeming weaknesses +in his position; and, therefore, when contending that all the faculties +commonly classed as instincts, are exclusively due to natural selection, +of course takes care to particularise the cellmaking faculty of the hive +bee. And here, again, I gladly bear my humble testimony to the partial +success he has achieved. Although bound to protest against the claim set +up by him, on behalf of natural selection, to the entire credit of +producing the hive bee's most remarkable characteristic, I cannot but +think he has succeeded in removing all the apparent difficulties of +believing that natural selection's share may have been not less +important in that than in any other productive operation in which it +takes part. + +In popular estimation the hive bee is a heaven-born mathematician which, +having been set the problem how to fill a given space with waxen cells +with the least loss of room and expenditure of material, arrives by +intuition and instantaneously at a solution which Newton himself was +ignorant of, and to which, but for his discovery of the fluxional +calculus, it would have been impossible for his follower, Maclaurin, to +attain. And, doubtless, it may excusably be deemed supernatural that the +insect should adopt off-hand precisely that six-sided figure, and +precisely that inclination of the angles of the same figure's pyramidal +roof or floor, which, only by very refined and recondite investigation, +can be scientifically shown to be those best fitted for the purpose. Mr. +Darwin has, however, adduced strong grounds for supposing the amazing +architectural skill thus displayed to have been acquired, not suddenly, +but by the same slow degrees as those which are so clearly traceable +throughout organic progress in general. At the lower end of a short +apiary series, he observed humble bees using their old cocoons for +honey pots, sometimes adding to them short tubes of wax, and likewise +making separate and very irregular cells entirely of wax. At the higher +end of the series, he saw hive bees making double layers of cells, each +cell an hexagonal prism with the basal ends of its six sides bevelled so +as to fit on to a pyramid formed of three rhombs, and each of the three +rhombs which compose the pyramidal base of a single cell on one side of +the comb entering into the composition of one of the three adjoining +cells on the opposite side. Intermediately, he found the Mexican +_meliponae domesticae_ depositing their honey in cells nearly spherical, +and of nearly equal sizes. 'These cells, although aggregated into a mass +otherwise irregular, are always at such a degree of nearness to each +other that they would have intersected or broken into each other if the +spheres had been completed. But this is never permitted, the bees +building perfectly flat walls of wax between the spheres which thus tend +to intersect. Hence, each cell consists of an outer spherical portion, +and of two, three, or more, perfectly flat surfaces, according as the +cell adjoins two, three, or more cells; and when one cell rests on three +others, as from the spheres being nearly of the same size is very +frequently and necessarily the case, the three flat surfaces are united +into a pyramid rudely resembling the three-sided pyramidal base of the +hive bee's cell, and necessarily enter, like the three rhombs of the +latter, into the construction of three adjoining cells.' Reflecting on +these remarkable gradations, it occurred to Mr. Darwin that if the +melipona were to make its spheres of precisely equal sizes, and to +arrange them symmetrically in double layers, and were further so to +dispose them as that the centre of each should be at the distance of +radius x [mathematical symbol 'square root']2 or radius x 1.41421 from the +centres of the six surrounding spheres in the same layer, and at the +same distance from the centres of the adjoining spheres in the other and +parallel layer--then 'if planes of intersection between the several +spheres on both layers were formed, there would result a double layer of +hexagonal prisms united together by pyramidal bases formed of three +rhombs; and the rhombs and the sides of the hexagonal prisms would have +every angle identically the same with the best measurements that have +been made of the cells of the hive bee.' Then, submitting this view to +Professor Miller of Cambridge, he had the gratification of being assured +by that distinguished geometer that it was strictly correct. Certainly a +very happy example of an ingenious conjecture verified by a species of +demonstration hardly inferior to the experimental. Certainly a very +valuable testimony to the soundness of all the main and really essential +principles of Darwinism. Good cause, certainly, is hereby shown for +believing that the cell-making faculty of the hive bee may be nothing +more than the aggregate of many minute and successive improvements upon +that of the melipona, and this, again, than a similar aggregate of +improvements on that of the humble bee; and for believing further that +hive bee and melipona may both be either descendants from the humble +bee, or joint-descendants with it from some still earlier common +progenitor. In order to believe this it suffices to believe that a bee +which at one period made, like the humble bee, cells very unequally +sized and irregularly rounded, came gradually, in the course of time, to +make them as nearly equal in size and as nearly spherical as those of +the melipona; and subsequently, during a further lapse of time, came to +arrange them at the same distances from each other, and in double +layers like those of the humble bee. To assume thus much requires no +inordinate stretch of faith; and thus much being assumed, it is seen at +once that the hive bee, requiring for its cells only about half as much +wax as the humble bee does, and consequently only about half as much +honey for the secretion of the requisite wax, would, in a struggle for +existence, leave the humble bee so little chance that in all probability +the two species would nowhere coexist, were it not for the special +resource derived by the humble bee from possession of a trunk long +enough to enter the nectaries of certain flowers, which the shorter +trunk of the hive bee is unable to tap. But though there be no +difficulty in assuming the improvements in question to have gradually +taken place, and to have become aggregated in the manner supposed, there +is, to my mind, an insuperable objection to supposing that successive +generations of bees should have successively adopted the improvements +without either having the sense to know what they were doing, or being +prompted by some superior intelligence that did know. I will not be so +superfluous as to exaggerate the difficulty. Passing over the earlier +stages of the process, and confining myself to one or two of the later, +I will content myself with showing how infinitesimally small, when +magnified to the utmost, are the chances in favour of these having been +passed through blindly. I will admit it to be possible that in a society +of purely meliponish habits, there might, in virtue of one or other of +those inscrutable causes classed under the general name of spontaneous +variation, arise some two or three individuals with an innate propensity +to make accurately spherical and equally sized cells; that these +individuals, if either males or fertile females, and not sterile +neuters, might help to generate others with the same propensity, these +again generating others, and so on, until the greater part or the whole +of the community became possessed of the same constructive aptitude. I +will admit further that, in virtue of the same inscrutable causes, +individuals, at first few, but gradually increasing in number, might +similarly be born with the additional tendency to make cells at the +same, and that the most appropriate, distance from all adjoining cells; +and will freely acknowledge that the bees, modifying their previous mode +of construction, as meliponae necessarily would do under these altered +circumstances, would construct a layer of cells similar in all respects +to those on one side of the hive bee's comb, except that their bases +would be flat instead of pyramidal. Further, I admit that the bases +would become pyramidal in case the bees should set about constructing +double instead of single layers of cells on the same principle. Not a +little liberality is required for these admissions. For, in the first +place, the fact of the bees having acquired the habit of making perfect +and equally sized spheres would not of itself be of any obvious benefit +either to individual bees or to the society at large: in order that it +should enable material and labour to be saved it would have to be +accompanied by the habit of making the cells at special distances from +each other. And, in the second place, though some few individuals should +present themselves with an innate tendency to choose these special +distances, whatever advantage might result therefrom, whatever saving of +material or labour, would be shared in equally by the whole community, +the particular individuals to whom it was due benefiting by it no more +than any of the rest, and not being, in consequence, more likely than +they to survive in any struggle for existence, or to leave behind them +offspring inheriting their special characteristics. No help, therefore, +can be derived from Mr. Darwin's principles towards conjecturing why a +small minority of such specially endowed bees should be gradually +converted into a majority, and should eventually constitute the whole +community, thereupon becoming in fact converted into a new species. Let +us, however, liberally waive this and all similar objections, and assume +a community of hive bees to have been, in the utterly unaccountable +manner indicated by the term spontaneous variation, developed from a +meliponish stock. Unfortunately, all our liberality will be found to +have been thrown away without perceptibly simplifying the problem to be +solved. For, whatever be among meliponae the distribution of the +generative capacities, among hive bees, at any rate, all workers are +sterile neuters, which never have any offspring to whom to bequeath +their cellmaking skill, while the queen bee and drones, which alone can +become parents, have no such skill to bequeath. Clearly the formula of +'descent with modification by natural selection,' is, in its literal +sense, utterly inapplicable here. In whatever manner the cell-making +faculty might have been acquired by the first homogeneous swarm of hive +bees, it must inevitably have terminated with the generation with which +it commenced, if transmission by direct descent had been necessary for +its continuance. The only resource open to Mr. Darwin is to suppose, not +merely (what is, indeed, obviously the fact) that queen bee after queen +bee, besides generating each in turn a progeny of workers endowed with +instincts which their parents did not possess and could not therefore +impart, generated also princess bees destined in due season to generate +a working progeny similarly endowed with instincts underived from their +parents; but to suppose further that all this has happened in the total +absence of aim, object, intention, or design. Now that all this should +have so happened, although not absolutely inconceivable, nor, therefore, +absolutely impossible, is surely too incredible to be believed except in +despair of some other hypothesis a trifle less preposterous. It is +surely not worth while to set the doctrine of probabilities so +completely at naught, for the sake of an explanation which avowedly +leaves every difficulty unexplained, referring them all to causes not +simply unknown but unconjecturable. What excuse, then, have +philosophers, of all people, for doing this in preference to the simple +expedient of supposing that, although the parturient bee, queen or +other, cannot intend that any of her progeny should be more bounteously +endowed than herself, there is an independent intelligence that does so +intend? To content oneself with pronouncing such preference to be +eminently unscientific is tenderness of language nearly akin, I fear, to +literary bathos. + + +III. + +I have said that the form of unbelief to which, on the principle of +calling a spade a spade, I have taken the liberty of giving the name of +Scientific Atheism, manifests itself now-a-days rather by ignoration +than by formal denial of God. This, however, is not a new feature in any +atheism really worthy of being styled scientific. Even as Mr. Darwin +verbally recognises a Creator, although without assigning to Him any +share in creation, even so Kant, when more than a century ago +undertaking, in his 'General Natural History and Theory of the Celestial +Bodies,'[42] to account for the constitution and mechanical origin of +the universe on Newtonian principles, spoke of the elements as deriving +their essential qualities from the 'eternal thought of the Divine +Intelligence,' without, however, crediting the said Intelligence with +having interposed in order to carry out His thoughts. 'Give me matter,' +he says, 'and I will build the world;' and without other data than +diffused atoms of matter endowed with simple attractive and repulsive +forces, he proceeds to expound a complete cosmogony. + +He pictures to himself the universe as originally an infinite expansion +of minutely subdivided matter, and supposing a single centre of +attraction to be somewhere therein set up, he endeavours to show that +the result must be a prodigious central body surrounded by systems of +solar and planetary worlds in all stages of development. 'In vivid +language,' says Professor Huxley,[43] 'he describes the great +world-maelstrom widening the margin of its prodigious eddy in the slow +progress of millions of ages, gradually reclaiming more and more of the +molecular waste, and converting chaos into cosmos.' Then, fixing his +attention more particularly on our own system, he accounts for the +relation between the masses and densities of the planets and their +distances from the sun, for the eccentricity of their orbits, for their +rotation, for their satellites, for the general agreement in the +direction of rotation among the celestial bodies, for Saturn's ring, and +for the zodiacal light. All this he does, according to Professor Huxley, +by 'strict deduction from admitted dynamical principles,' and I, well +aware of my own inability to form an independent judgment on the point, +gladly take so high an authority's word for it. For aught that I know, +Kant's attractive and repulsive forces being admitted, the establishment +of centres of attraction, and of circle within circle of revolutions +round them, and all his other details, would follow naturally and of +course. I limit myself to asking, Whence these simple forces?--and when +Kant replies, 'From the Eternal Thought of the Divine Understanding,' I +should be the last to criticise if his answer stopped there. +Unfortunately, he adds that the forces were 'evolved without purpose'; +in other words, that the Intelligence which thought them into existence +failed to think of any purpose for them. 'Matter,' he proceeds, 'is +purely _passive_, yet, nevertheless, has in its simplest state a +_determination_ towards the assumption of a more perfect constitution in +the way of natural development, whereby it _breaks up_ rest, _stirs_ up +nature, gives to chaos shape.' For the elements whereof this passively +stirring up matter is composed 'have native powers of setting each other +in motion, and are to themselves a spring of life;' and when, having of +course being previously dead, they have given themselves life, they +forthwith begin to attract each other with a strength varying with their +varying degrees of specific gravity. The scattered elements of the +denser sort collect by attraction all particles of less specific gravity +out of their immediate neighbourhood, and are themselves similarly +collected by particles of still denser sort, these again by others +denser yet, and so on, until, as results of this particular action, +several masses are formed which in like manner would converge towards +and be united with the largest and densest of their number, were it not +that the counter principle of repulsion now comes into play. This +principle--familiarly exemplified in the elasticity of vapours, the +emanations from strong smelling substances, and the expansion of all +spirituous substances--causes the vertical movements of the converging +masses to be deflected laterally, so as ultimately to enclose the +central mass within circles which, at first intersecting each other in +all directions, are at length, by dint of mutual collision, made all to +revolve in the same direction, and nearly the same plane. + +Now I most earnestly protest against being suspected of what in me would +be the intolerable impertinence of desiring to cast ridicule on these +magnificent speculations, the grandeur of which I thoroughly appreciate +so far as my scant mathematics enable me to follow them. I take +exception to them only because the language in which they are couched +seems to imply that operations, of whose nature one of the most powerful +of human intellects could, at its utmost stretch, catch only a faint +hazy inkling, may yet have been initiated and perfected without the +intervention of any intellect at all. This is a falsism against which my +respect for philosophy and philosophers makes me only all the more +indignant when I find any of the latter falling into it, as those of +them inevitably must who, busying themselves, early or late, + + With a mighty debate, + A profound speculation about the creation + And organical life, and chaotical strife, + With various notions of heavenly motions, + And rivers and oceans, and valleys and mountains, + And sources of fountains, and meteors on high, + And stars in the sky,--propose by and bye, + +like John Hookham Frere's Aristophanic Birds, + + If we'll listen and hear, + To make perfectly clear + +how creation took place without a conscious Creator. All their fancied +solutions of this hopeless puzzle have one feature in common--a family +likeness which the wickedest wit finds it difficult to caricature. There +is a note to Frere and Canning's 'Loves of the Triangles' which the +reader will be grateful to me for transcribing here, the more frequently +he may have laughed at it already, laughing now all the more, and +laughing heartily at it now though he may never have before. + +It begins by tracing the genesis or original formation of _Space_ to a +single point, in the same manner as the elder Darwin had, in his +'Zoonomia,' traced the whole organized universe to his six Filaments. It +represents this primeval Point or _Pinctum saliens_ of the universe, +after '_evolving itself by its own energies_, to have moved forwards in +a right line _ad infinitum_ till it grew tired.' Whereupon, 'the right +line which it had generated would begin to put itself in motion in a +lateral direction, describing an area of infinite extent. This area, as +soon as it became conscious of its own existence, would begin to ascend +or descend, according as its specific weight might determine, forming an +immense solid space filled with vacuum, and capable of containing the +present existing universe.' + + Thus slow progressive points protract the line, + As pendant spiders spin the filmy twine: + Thus lengthened lines impetuous sweeping round, + Spread the wide plane, and mark its circling bound; + Thus planes, their substance with their motion grown, + Form the huge cube, the cylinder, the cone. + +It then proceeds as follows:-- + +'SPACE being thus obtained, and presenting a suitable _nidus_ or +receptacle for the _generation_ of _chaotic matter_, an immense deposit +of it would gradually be accumulated; after which the filament of fire +being produced in the chaotic mass by an _idiosyncrasy_ or _self-formed +habit_ analogous to fermentation, explosion would take place, suns would +be shot from the central chaos, planets from suns, and satellites from +planets. In this state of things, the filament of organization would +begin to exert itself in those independent masses which, in proportion +to their bulk, exposed the greatest surface to the action of light and +heat. This filament, after an infinite series of ages, would begin to +ramify, and its viviparous offspring would diversify their forms and +habits so as to accommodate themselves to the various _incunabula_ which +nature had prepared for them. Upon this view of things, it seems highly +probable that the first effort of Nature terminated in the production of +vegetables, and that these being abandoned to their own energies, by +degrees detached themselves from the surface of the earth, and supplied +themselves with wings and feet, according as their different +propensities determined them in favour of aerial or terrestrial +existence. Others, by an inherent disposition to society and +civilisation, and by a stronger effort of volition, would become men. +These in time would restrict themselves to the use of their hind feet; +their tails would gradually rub off by sitting in their caves or huts as +soon as they arrived at a domesticated state; they would invent language +and the use of fire, with our present and hitherto imperfect system of +society. In the meantime, the _Fuci_ and _Algae_, with the Corallines and +Madrepores, would transform themselves into fish, and gradually +populate all the submarine portions of the globe.'[44] + +Although the writers of this delicious drollery seem to have had Dr. +Erasmus Darwin only in view, they could not, we thus see, parody his +peculiar crotchets without hitting off not less neatly some of the +corresponding extravagances of both earlier and later expounders of +Nature. Nature is a phrase which, greatly to the confusion of those who +so employ it, is habitually used simultaneously in two quite opposite +senses, so as to denote at the same time both the agency in virtue of +whose action the universe exists, and likewise the universe itself which +results from that action. Nature, in either signification, becomes to a +great extent interpretable when the agency so designated is credited +with sufficient sense to foresee and to intend the results of its own +action. On that condition, although among the many unsolved problems she +may continue to present there will be some evidently lying beyond the +limits of human comprehension, there will be none running counter to +human reason. Except on that condition, the universe is not simply +uninterpretable, it is a bewildering assemblage of irreconcilable +certainties. Philosophy's choice lies between such patent truisms as +that there can be no force but living force, no _vis_ but _vis vivida_, +no _vis inertiae_ otherwise than metaphorically, and such blatant +falsisms as that inertness and exertion may coincide, unintelligence +generate intelligence, agency of whatsoever sort produce, merely by its +own act, and merely out of its own essence, other agency capable of +higher action than its own. Philosophy, when with these sets of +alternatives before her she deliberately chooses the latter, becomes +Scientific Atheism, all the varieties of which have one point in common, +resembling each other in their proneness to rush upon and embrace +demonstrable impossibilities for the sake of avoiding a few things hard +to be understood. One variety, however, the Comtist, far exceeds all the +rest in the lengths to which it is carried by this propensity. + + +IV. + +If, in speaking as I am about to do of Comtism, I commit--heedless of +Mr. Lewes' solemn warning--the grave offence of speaking confidently +about a writer whom I have never read, I may at least plead in +extenuation of my fault, that, although my knowledge of that writer be +confessedly merely an echo of what others have said of him, those +others, at any rate, far from being his antagonists, are two of the most +ardent of his not undiscriminating admirers. It is from Mr. Mill[45] and +from Mr. Lewes[46] himself that I have derived the notions of Comtist +philosophy that suggest to me the following notes. + +I lay no stress on certain flaws in the fundamental propositions that +'we have no knowledge of anything but phenomena, and that our knowledge +of phenomena is only relative, not absolute; that we know not the +essence nor the real mode of production of any fact, but only its +relations to other facts in the way of succession or similitude; that +the constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the +constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are +all we know about them, and that their causes, whether efficient or +final, are unknown and inscrutable.' I will only suggest that our mere +consciousness of possessing some knowledge of phenomena is itself a +knowledge distinct from the knowledge which constitutes its +subject--distinct, that is, from the knowledge of phenomena; that if it +were possible for us to be aware of only one single fact, we should know +something about that fact, notwithstanding that there were no other +facts which it could be perceived to have preceded or followed, or to +which it could be likened, even as a polype with a stomach-ache would +know something about a stomach-ache, although ignorant that it had a +stomach, and oblivious of any former sensation, whether painful or +pleasurable; and that if the causes of phenomena be utterly unknown, our +ignorance of them ought not to be so signified as to sound like +knowledge, as it does when resemblances are said to link, and sequences +to unite, phenomena together, thereby warranting the inference that one +phenomenon succeeds another _because_ the two are so linked and united. + +These, however, are trifles--mere spots on the sun one might say, were +but the surface on which they appear altogether sunlike--and I leave +them without additional remark except that, although it may perhaps have +been hypercritical to point them out, still the language of a new +philosophy, claiming to supersede all old ones, ought to be proof even +against hypercriticism. I pass on to a generalisation, termed by Mr. +Mill 'the key to Comte's other generalisations: one on which all the +others are dependent, and which forms the back-bone, so to speak, of his +philosophy,' insomuch that 'unless it be true he has accomplished +little.' This is the so much vaunted discovery that all human thought +passes necessarily through three stages, beginning with the +theological, and proceeding through the metaphysical to the positive. +These three terms, however, in the novel sense in which they are used by +Comte, stand very urgently in need of definition. By the theological is +to be understood that stage of the mind in which the facts of the +universe are regarded as governed by single and direct volitions of a +being or beings possessed of life and intelligence. It is the stage in +which winds are supposed to blow, seas to rage, trees to grow, and +mountains to tower aloft, either because winds, seas, trees, and +mountains are themselves alive and so act of their own accord; or +because there is a spirit dwelling in each of them which desires that it +shall so act; or because each separate class of objects is superintended +by an out-dwelling divinity, which similarly desires; or, finally, +because one single divinity, supreme over all things, initiates and +maintains all the apparently spontaneous movements of inanimate bodies. +In the metaphysical stage, phenomena are ascribed not to volitions, +either sublunary or celestial, but to realised abstractions--to +properties, qualities, propensities, tendencies, forces, regarded as +real existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in +which they reside; while the characteristic of the positive stage is the +universal recognition that all phenomena without exception are governed +by invariable laws, with which no volitions, natural or supernatural, +interfere. These being the three stages, the discovery of which as a +series necessarily passed through by human thought in its progress +towards maturity, constitutes one of Comte's chief glories, I almost +tremble at my own audacity, shrinking from the sound myself am making, +when by inexorable sense of duty constrained to declare that the grand +discovery is after all merely that of a distinction without a +difference. + +What Comte chiefly condemned in the metaphysical mode of thought, are +the conception of mental abstractions as real entities which exert power +and produce phenomena, and the enunciation of these entities as +explanations of the phenomena; and certainly 'it is,' as Mr. Mill says, +or rather was, previously to his own ingenious solution of it, 'one of +the puzzles of philosophy, how mankind, after inventing a set of mere +names to keep together certain combinations of ideas and images, could +have so far forgotten their own act as to invest these creations of +their will with objective reality, and mistake the name of a phenomenon +for its efficient cause.' Those natural laws, however, on which +Positivism relies--are not they as purely mental abstractions as the +essences, virtues, properties, forces, and what not, for which it is +proposed to substitute them? Yet since Positivism regards these laws as +'governing' phenomena, and having phenomena 'subject' to them, must it +not necessarily regard them likewise as realised abstractions, as real +entities? Plainly, if its language be taken literally, its professors +must acknowledge that it does, unless they prefer to stultify themselves +by propounding such unmitigated nonsense as that power may be exercised, +and phenomena produced, by _non_-entities. But if so, what else is +Positivism than another form of that very metaphysicism which it +condemns? and a form, too, peculiarly obnoxious to Mr. Mill's caustic +remark that 'as in religion, so in philosophy, men marvel at the +absurdity of other people's tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities +remain in their own, and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that +words can be mistaken for things, who is treating other words as if they +were things every time he opens his mouth.' + +Possibly, however, it may be replied that 'government by natural laws' +is a phrase which Positivists never use except metaphorically, and by +which they never mean more than certain successions of events.[47] Very +well. Either, then, they acknowledge no real government of phenomena at +all, in which case to speak of phenomena as governed by law is, if not a +purely gratuitous mystification, as glaring an instance as can well be +conceived of a 'bare enunciation of facts, put forward as a theory or +explanation of them:' or, if they do recognise real government, then +they must suppose that, behind those mere mental abstractions, laws or +order of Nature, there must be some lawgiver or other being that +originally issued the laws, or ordained the order, and still enforces +them, or maintains it. But if this be the positivist faith, then, that +we may discover its other self, we have only to go still further back; +as far back, however, as to the theological stage, supposed to have been +so early left behind, yes, even unto the deities or deity that the +metaphysical entities had displaced. Positivism, in short, is in this +dilemma: either the mode of thought claimed by it as peculiarly its own +is simply that process so justly ridiculed by Comte himself as the 'naif +reproduction of phenomena as the reason for themselves,' and by Mr. +Lewes as 'a restatement' (by way of explanation) 'of the facts to be +explained;' or it is at any rate nothing more than a return, either to +the metaphysical or to the theological mode of thought, according as one +or the other is adopted of the only two interpretations that can +possibly be placed on its own nomenclature. A new mode it certainly is +not. It is either no mode of thought at all, but merely an empty form of +words; or it is at best only a new name for one or other of two +old-fashioned modes, both of which its author denounces as false from +the beginning, and now worn out and obsolete into the bargain. + +Of other features of Comtist philosophy it would be out of place to +speak here,[48] where, indeed, that philosophy would not have been +mentioned at all but for its having been transformed by its author into +a religion, and that, too, an atheistical religion--the 'Religion of +Humanity.' To myself, as to most people, a religion without a God is a +contradiction in terms. To constitute what is almost universally +understood by religion it does not suffice that there be a 'creed or +conviction claiming authority over the whole of human life: a belief or +set of beliefs deliberately adopted respecting human destiny and duty, +to which the believer inwardly acknowledges that all his actions ought +to be subordinate:' nor that there be in addition 'a sentiment connected +with this creed or capable of being invoked by it, sufficiently powerful +to give it, in fact, the authority over human conduct to which it lays +claim in theory:' nor yet that there be, moreover, 'an ideal object, the +believer's attachment and sense of duty towards which are able to +control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities, and +prescribe to him a rule of life.'[49] That such an object is fully +capable of gathering round it feelings sufficiently strong to enforce +the most rigid rule of life, will certainly not be denied by me, +privileged as I am to count among my friends more than one whose whole +life is little else than a life of devotion to an object, 'the general +interest of the human race,' plainly incapable of affording them in +exchange that 'eternity of personal enjoyment' to which ordinary +devotees look forward as their reward, and whose virtue I honour as +approaching the sublime, on account of its independence of all the props +and stimulants which ordinary virtue finds indispensable. But the +sublimest virtue does not of itself constitute religion. For, besides +the 'creed,' 'conviction,' and 'sentiment' indicated above, there is +needed some suitable object of worship to which the soul may alternately +bow down in humble reverence, and look up in fervent love--some being to +whom its prayer, praise, and thanksgiving may be fittingly addressed. +This want, recognised--as one of the few who do not recognise it +admits--by nine out of every ten persons, was distinctly recognised by +Comte, who, however, attempted to supply it by pointing, not to God, but +to Man. His reason for this was not a conviction that there is no God. +On the contrary, he habitually disclaimed, not without acrimony, +dogmatic atheism; and once even condescended so far as to declare that +'the hypothesis of design has much greater verisimilitude than that of a +blind mechanism.' But in the 'mature state of intelligence' at which his +mind had arrived, 'conjecture founded on analogy did not seem to him a +basis to rest a theory upon.' He preferred a religious theory without a +basis, and therefore adopted one as destitute of support as the tortoise +on which stands the earth-upholding elephant of Hindoo mythology; +selecting, as the 'Grand Etre' to be worshipped, 'the entire Human Race, +conceived as a continuous whole, past, present, and future.' For this +great collective _non_-existence, this compound of that which is, that +which has been but has ceased to be, and that which is not yet, he +elaborated a minute ritual of devotional observances, and would, if he +had had the chance, have consecrated a complete sacerdotal hierarchy, +subordinated to himself as supreme pontiff. Having, for fear of +recognising what possibly might not be, begun by, wilfully and with his +eyes open, recognising what could not possibly be, he proceeded to +invest this sanctified non-existence with precisely those attributes +best calculated to render it unfit to receive the admiration he +prescribed for it. That feeble Humanity--the actually living portion +thereof, that is--may need and be the better for our services, which +Divine Omnipotence of course cannot be, was distinctly urged by him as a +reason why _prayers_, or at least those outpourings of feeling which he +so designated, should be addressed to the former and not to the latter. +That Humanity is in a constant state of progress, so that both the +collective mass and choice specimens of each successive generation of +men must always be superior to the corresponding masses and specimens of +all previous generations, is a prime article of the Comtist creed; but +not the less is it an imperative injunction of the Comtist rubrick that +religious homage shall be paid, not only to the collective 'Grand Etre' +of Humanity, but also to individual worthies of past ages--that +superiors shall consequently fall down before, and worship, and take as +models, their intellectual and moral inferiors. The fact of a religion +made up of tenets like these having been thought out by one of the +profoundest of reasoners does not prevent its being the very perfection +of unreason. Even though on the one side there were nothing more than +some doubt whether Deity might not exist, still with complete certainty +on the other of the non-existence of 'Humanity,' Deity ought in fairness +to have at least the benefit of the doubt. In selection for adoration, +that which only perhaps may be, at any rate deserves to be, preferred to +that which positively is not. The excess of superstition with which St. +Paul reproached the Athenians, for raising an altar to the 'Unknown +God,' looks like excessive circumspection, beside the solemn dedication +of temples to a chimera known not to be. Nay, even Isaiah's maker of +graven images is at length outdone. Even he who, having hewn down a +tree, 'burneth part thereof in the fire, with part thereof eateth flesh, +roasteth roast, and is satisfied, warmeth himself, and saith, Aha, I am +warm, I have seen the fire; and with the residue maketh a god, yea, his +graven image, and falleth down unto it and worshippeth it, and prayeth +unto it, and saith, Deliver me, for thou art my god'--even he has at +last found more than his match in irrationality. For he has at least +before him a visible tangible block of wood, not the mere memory of one +that has long ago rotted, nor the dream of one that is yet to grow, +whereas that mental figment, Consecrated Humanity, is not even a real +shadow, but only a fancied one, a shadow cast by no substance. And it is +to Comtists of all people--intellectual salt of the earth as they +are--that this figment is recommended for adoration--yes, to those who, +pharisaically standing aloof from the common herd, thank their imaginary +substitute for God, or whatever else it is they deem thankworthy, that +they are not blind as other men are, and least of all as those dazed +metaphysicians who actually personify their own mental abstractions. No +wonder that such extreme provocation should try the patience of all but +the stanchest disciples. No wonder that Mr. Lewes himself should seem +half inclined to apostrophise his quondam master in words resembling +those once addressed to Robespierre, 'Avec ton Grand Etre, tu commences +a m'embeter.' + +Here make we one more pause. This chapter's theme is, as was betimes +premised, not the strength of theism, but the weakness of atheism. I +have in it attempted to execute a design which, according to Boswell, +was conceived by Lord Hailes, and approved by Dr. Johnson, that of +writing an essay, _Sur la credulite des incredules_, and I think I have +succeeded so far as to show that, if any one who can swallow atheism +affects to strain at theism, it cannot, at any rate, be for want of a +sufficiently capacious gullet. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[36] The story was thus told by Diderot, to Sir Samuel Romilly, when a +young man:--'Je vous dirai un trait de lui, mais il vous sera un peu +scandaleux peut-etre, car vous autres Anglais, vous croyez _un peu_ en +Dieu; pour nous autres, nous n'y croyons gueres. Hume dina dans une +grande compagnie avec le baron D'Holbach. Il etait assis a cote du +baron; on parla de la religion naturelle. "Pour les athees," disait +Hume, "je ne crois pas qu'il en existe; je n'en ai jamais vu!" "Vous +avez ete un peu malheureux," repondit l'autre, "vous voici a table avec +dix-sept pour la premiere fois."'--_Edinburgh Review_ for January 1847. + +[37] 'Studies in Animal Life,' chap. v. + +[38] The reader who, having skipped some of the earlier chapters, may +find this language obscure, is requested to turn back to the essay on +'Huxleyism,' pp. 194-6. + +[39] See again, pp. 194-6. + +[40] 'Mr. Darwin's Hypotheses.' Part II. 'Fortnightly Review' for June +1868. + +[41] 'Origin of Species,' p. 226. + +[42] Of this treatise, no English or French translation has, I believe, +been published. For my own very limited acquaintance with it, I am +indebted to the extreme kindness of my friend, Professor Croom +Robertson, who has most obligingly favoured me with a manuscript version +of the portion referred to in the text. + +[43] 'Lay Sermons,' p. 240. + +[44] 'Beauties of the Anti-Jacobin,' 1799, pp. 214-6. + +[45] 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' _passim_. + +[46] 'History of Philosophy,' 4th edition, vol. ii. pp. 654-735. + +[47] Not that so restricted a meaning can, with any propriety, be placed +on positivist definitions of law. See, for instance, that of Mr. Lewes +('History of Philosophy,' vol. ii. p. 701), who defines law to be 'the +invariable relation between two distinct phenomena, according to which +one depends on the other.' + +[48] Some few additional random remarks, however, though not permissible +in the text may, perhaps, be less inappropriate in a note. + +My scientific deficiencies do not prevent my understanding or, at least, +fancying I understand, that Comte's famous 'Classification of the +Sciences' may be extremely serviceable as indicating in what order the +sciences may most profitably be studied. That a student's general +progress would be swifter and surer if, before entering on physics or +chemistry, he had already made considerable progress in algebra, +geometry, and mechanics, than if he commenced all five sciences +simultaneously, seems probable enough. If, however, the classification +be intended also to indicate historically the order in which the +sciences have actually been studied, I cannot but suspect it to be +misleading. Certainly, if knowledge of number was the earliest knowledge +acquired by man, those savage races which have not even yet learnt how +to count beyond four, must have been content with very few lessons in +arithmetic when turning off to other branches of learning. + +As to the measure of success that attended Comte's scheme of creating a +Philosophy of General Science, I presume not to utter one syllable of my +own, preferring to cite what Mr. Mill says of that 'wonderful +systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences from +mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would +have stamped him on all minds competent to appreciate it as one of the +principal thinkers of the age.' In all sincerity, I say that the mere +conception of the enterprise, whose vastness is so luminously expounded +by Mr. Lewes, in the last edition of his 'History of Philosophy,' seems +to me to betoken superior genius. I feel, as it were, simply awe-struck +in the presence of an intellectual ambition, that within the brief span +of one human life could aspire to a mastery over all the sciences, +sufficient, first for co-ordinating the fundamental truths and special +methods, and so obtaining the philosophy of each, and then for +co-ordinating the manifold philosophies so obtained, and--by condensing +them all into one homogeneous doctrine, and blending them into one +organic whole, whereof each part would be seen to depend on all that +preceded, and to determine all that succeeded--transforming all science +into philosophy. + +One point however remains on which I shall speak with some confidence, +that, namely, of the inclusion among 'Comte's titles to immortal fame' +of the creation of a Science of Sociology. 'What the law of gravitation +is to astronomy, what the elementary properties of tissues are to +physiology,' that, says Mr. Lewes, in the opinion of Comte's disciples, +'is the law of the three stages to sociology.' But if, as I have shown, +there are not really three but only two stages, the so-called third +stage being simply a return to either the second or the first, the law +of the three stages cannot be much of a law, nor the science of which it +is the essence much of a science. + +Mr. Lewes, nevertheless, maintains that M. Comte created Social Science. +Mr. Mill considers that he did not create it, but only proved its +creation to be possible. With all possible deference, I submit that what +he really did was to prove its creation to be impossible. + +In a passage of Mr. Mill's 'Positivism,' quoted with approval in Mr. +Lewes's 'History of Philosophy,' and presumably, therefore, expressing +the sentiments of both writers, Comte is described as pronouncing +inappropriate to the Science of Society, the method universally admitted +to be proper to all other sciences--that, namely, of obtaining by +induction the laws of the elementary phenomena, then, from these laws +thinking out deductively those of the complex phenomena, and, finally, +of verifying by specific observation the laws obtained by deduction. +Among social phenomena, he is described as arguing, the elementary ones +are human feelings and actions, the laws of which are the laws of +universal human nature. But the human beings, on the laws of whose +nature social facts depend, are not abstract or universal, but +historical human beings, already shaped and made what they are, not by +the simple tendencies of universal human nature, but by the accumulated +influence of past generations of human society. This being the case, the +laws of universal human nature evidently cannot serve as materials, +whence it would be possible for any powers of deduction, starting from +the bare conception of the Being Man, to predict beforehand how +successive generations of men would feel and act. Wherefore, in order to +get at social laws, we must reverse the ordinary method, seizing upon +any generalizations which the facts of history, empirically considered, +will supply, and then using the universal laws of human nature for the +verification of these generalizations. + +I will not linger over the glaring inconsistency involved in the +conclusion thus arrived at, of appealing, for the verification of +empirical generalizations, to a species of deduction confessed to be +impracticable for want of the requisite materials. I prefer to show that +from Comte's own premises, as rendered by Mr. Mill, necessarily results +a separate conclusion, absolutely fatal to his sociologically creative +pretensions. According to him, as we have seen, the laws of elementary +social facts, or of human actions and feelings, are the laws of +universal human nature, which latter can, of course, be no other than +whatever habits of invariably, in given circumstances, feeling and +acting in given modes, may be common to all mankind. But it is admitted +that the particular generation of human beings at any time existing +must, by the accumulated influence of preceding generations, have been +rendered very different from every preceding generation: and nothing is +more certain than that two generations differing widely from each other +in character, would, in many given circumstances, not only not feel and +act in precisely the same, but would inevitably feel and act in widely +different, manners. Nor is this all. The circumstances by which any +generation is surrounded have been partly shaped for it by preceding +generations, partly modified by itself--so that it is not possible for +any two generations ever to find themselves in the same circumstances. +Wherefore, as there never can be a repetition of either men or of +circumstances precisely the same, it is manifestly impossible for any +habits of feeling and thinking, in given modes in given circumstances, +to be common to any two generations of men, still less to universal +mankind. In other words, there cannot possibly be any laws of human +nature: and if no laws of human nature, then no laws of elementary +social facts; and if no laws of elementary social facts, then no laws of +complex social facts; and if no laws of social facts, elementary or +complex, then no single particle of material wherewith to build up the +Science of Society or Sociology. + +[49] 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' pp. 133-4. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +_LIMITS OF DEMONSTRABLE THEISM._ + + Thought without Reverence is barren. The man who cannot wonder, who + does not habitually wonder (and worship), were he president of + innumerable Royal Societies, and carried the whole _Mecanique + Celeste_ and Hegel's _Philosophy_, and the epitome of all + laboratories and observatories with their results, in his single + head, is but a pair of spectacles, behind which there is no eye. + Let those who have eyes look through him; then he may be + useful.--_Sartor Resartus._ + + +'I wouldn't mind,' said once a representative of extreme heterodoxy, in +debate with a champion of its diametrical opposite--'I wouldn't mind +conceding the Deity you contend for, were it not for the use commonly +made of him after he is conceded.' And no doubt that use is such as +might well provoke a saint, provided the saint were likewise a +philosopher. To whatever extent it be true that man was created in the +image of God, it is certain that in all ages and countries God has been +created in the image of man, invested with all human propensities, +appetites, and passions, and expected to demean himself on all occasions +as men would do in like circumstances. As popularly conceived, so long +as sensual gratification was esteemed to be the _summum bonum_, he +wallowed in all manner of sensual lust; when some of his more fervent +worshippers turned ascetics out of disgust with fleshly surfeit, he +became ascetism personified: at every stage his great delight has been +flattery, and his still greater, revenge; in the exercise of power he +has always been capricious and often wanton--ruthlessly vindictive +against impugners of his honour and dignity, unspeakably barbarous to +unbelievers in his reality. Now, as knowledge advanced, unbelief in a +God so much below the level of ordinarily virtuous men advanced equally, +quickening its pace, too, as the particular branch of knowledge styled +'physics' spread, and, spreading, exposed the utter impossibility of +many of the fables in which theological views had been expressed. +Wherefore, theological oracles have in every age and country been apt to +confound scientific inquisitiveness with unbelief, and to denounce +_physical_ science especially as a delusion and a snare, and its +cultivators as impostors none the less mischievous for being at the same +time dupes. Of course, the latter have not been slow to return the +compliment. Hearing the truths discovered by them stigmatised as +falsehoods, they naturally enough retorted the charge of falsity against +the divine authorities in whose name it was made. Finding war waged +against them by every religion with which they were acquainted, they +naturally enough in turn declared war against all religion, even with +that form thereof which underlies every other except when sufficing to +itself for superstructure as well as base. Natural enough this, for +_humanum est errare_; but very humanly erroneous withal, for to include +Deity itself in the same denial with pseudo-divine attributes is about +as sagacious a proceeding as to refuse to recognise the sun at midday on +account of his not appearing in Phoebus's chariot and four. + +When religion on the defensive declares herself opposed to reason, so +much the worse for religion. She is thereby virtually surrendering at +discretion, since to appeal to her only other resource--revelation--is +to beg the whole subject in dispute. Similarly, the worse and still less +excusable is it for science to declare herself irreconcileable with +religion, for she, too, is thereby slighting reason. It is only by +forsaking the single guide in whom she professes to trust, and blindly +giving herself up to angry prejudice, that she can fail to discover the +rational solidity of so much of every religion as consists of theism. + +For this, as we have seen, the argument from design abundantly suffices, +although the only absolute certainty thence deducible be that the +universe must have an author or authors fully equal to its original +construction, its subsequent development, and its continued maintenance. +Even if it be not inconceivable, notwithstanding that the chances to the +contrary be many times infinity to one, that the mere restlessness of +some utterly unintelligent force may have fabricated all material +structures, and imparted to all their movements certain orderly +successions, it is still manifestly impossible for unintelligence to +have brought forth intelligence--for the speculative, critical, carping +spirit of man to have been generated by that which has no speculation in +its eyes, nor any eyes, to have speculation in; impossible, in short, +for the creature to be more richly endowed than its creator. Since +numerous embodied intelligences actually exist, they must have been +preceded by intelligence capable of creating them and all other existing +intelligences that have not eternally existed; and it is simply +impossible that creative intelligence, whose creatures owe to it +whatever intelligence they possess, should on any occasion have +exhibited a want of intelligence which they are competent to detect. + +But although it be thus demonstrably certain that an author of the +universe exists, it does not follow that there is only one. As to this +no proof positive, only probabilities, can be adduced; but the +probabilities are of an amount all but equivalent to certainty. They are +forcibly urged by Mr. Mill. Many exactly uniform occurrences, he +observes, are more naturally referred to 'a single, than to a number of +wills precisely accordant.' But the classes of uniform occurrences being +exceedingly numerous, if there were a separate will for each class, +there would be equally numerous wills, and 'unless all these wills were +in complete harmony (which would itself be the most difficult to credit +of all cases of invariability, and would require beyond anything else +the ascendancy of a supreme Deity),' it would be 'impossible that the +course of phenomena under their government should be invariable.' Every +fresh appearance of resemblance extending through all nature 'affords +fresh presumption that the whole is the work, not of many, but of the +same hand, and renders it vastly more probable that there should be one +indefinitely foreseeing Intelligence and immoveable Will than that there +should be hundreds and thousands of such.'[50] I will not run the risk +of weakening this reasoning by expansion. Its obvious inference that, +there being a God, there cannot be more than one, could not be set forth +more irresistibly. + +That the wisdom of the Creator cannot be less than the amount thereof +manifested in His works is a self-evident proposition, which none will +be hardy enough directly to dispute. There is, however, one critic, of +great ability and yet greater daring, who appears to doubt whether the +wisdom manifested in the universe is anything to speak of. Mr. Lewes' +faculty of veneration is, I suspect, but imperfectly developed, since +'the succession of phases which each (animal) embryo is forced to pass +through,' is sufficient to give its action pause. 'None of these +phases,' he remarks, 'have any adaptation to the future state of the +animal, but are in positive contradiction to it, or are simply +purposeless; _many_ of them have no adaptation even to its embryonic +state; whereas _all_ show stamped on them the unmistakable characters of +_ancestral_ adaptations and the progressions of organic evolution.' +'What,' he asks, 'does this fact imply?' 'There is not,' he continues, +'a single known example of an organism which is not developed out of +simpler forms. Before it can attain the complex structure which +distinguishes it, there must be an evolution of forms which distinguish +the structures of organisms lower in the series.... On the hypothesis of +a plan that pre-arranged the organic world' (by no means, however, +necessarily in types that could not change, but rather in types adapted +and calculated to change), 'nothing,' he considers, 'could be more +unworthy of a supreme intelligence than this _inability_ to construct an +organism at once without making several _tentative_ efforts, undoing +to-day what was so carefully done yesterday, and repeating for centuries +the same _tentatives_ and the same _corrections_ in the same +succession.' 'Anthropomorphists,' he says, 'talk of "The Great +Architect," emphasising the name with capitals,' but 'what should we say +to an architect who was unable, or, being able, was obstinately +unwilling, to erect a palace except by first using his materials in the +shape of a hut, then pulling it down and rebuilding them as a cottage, +then adding storey to storey and room to room, not with any reference to +the ultimate purposes of the palace, but wholly with reference to the +way in which houses were constructed in ancient times? What should we +say to the architect who could not form a museum out of bricks and +mortar, but was forced to begin as if going to build a mansion, and, +after proceeding some way in this direction, altered his plan into a +palace, and that again into a museum? Would there be a chorus of +applause from the Institute of Architects, and favourable notices in the +newspapers of this profound wisdom?'[51] + +Notwithstanding the exulting tone in which these questions are put, and +which seems to imply that in their proposer's opinion they are +unanswerable, they may, I think, be very summarily disposed of. Whatever +other comments might be made on the conduct of an architect who should +build in the complex manner suggested, surely the very last thing said +would be that he did not know how to build in simpler wise. His having +actually built a palace would be decisive proof of his knowing how to +build a palace; and of all queer reasons for questioning his possession +of that much architectural knowledge, about the queerest would be the +fact of his having built, not a palace only, but a hut and cottage in +addition. And if, adopting a still more complicated style, he should +begin by so constructing a hut that, if left to itself, it would draw up +brick and mortar from the earth, and grow into a cottage, and then go on +growing and adding storey to storey till it became a palace, this surely +would be a proof not of less, but of infinitely more, architectural +knowledge than if he had commenced and completed the palace with his own +hands. Not unwarrantably, perhaps, may Mr. Lewes, reflecting that his +own and every other human organism's genesis has consisted of at least +three stages, oval, foetal, and infantine, wonder why he was not +formed all at once, 'as Eve was mythically affirmed to be taken from +Adam's rib, and Minerva from Jupiter's head,' and why he was not brought +forth full dressed in an indefinitely expansible suit of clothes. Not +quite inexcusably, perhaps, might he conceive the reason to be some mere +whim or humour of his Maker, though there might be more gratitude in +conjecturing that the triple process was adopted for the purpose of +assisting biological enquirers like himself in their special researches. +From so practised a logician, however, about the very last thing to have +been here expected was that he should suggest creative 'ignorance and +incompetence' as the only apparent alternative to denying a Creator +altogether, as if incapacity for a comparatively easy process were a +likely reason for choosing one greatly more difficult. It might have +occurred to Mr. Lewes that, if there were any absurdity in the choice, +the Being who made him and bestowed on him the faculty of perceiving the +absurdity, could not have failed himself likewise to perceive it and +consequently to avoid it. + +Of divine power, the measure or measurelessness is obviously identical +with that of divine wisdom. Both attributes must be at least +co-extensive with the universe; both consequently illimitable. Divine +goodness, moreover, inasmuch as the creature's moral ideal cannot be +superior to his Creator's, must be at least as vast as human +imagination: God must be at least as good as man can conceive Him. But +how, by goodness so transcending, conjoined with immeasurable might, can +the co-existence of evil be tolerated? To this last, and perhaps +greatest, among the many great questions brought forward for renewed +discussion in these pages, I have long had by me an attempt at a reply, +which, finding myself unable either to strengthen or shorten it by +turning it into prose, I venture to submit in its original rhythmical +form. + + A Voice came to me as I sate apart, + Pondering the burthen of life's mystery, + In dim perplexity, with troubled heart. + With whisper weak and faint it came to me, + Like feeble glimmer of the struggling moon + To wildered mariner on midnight sea: + With whisper weak at first, but strengthening soon, + Like the moon's beam when filmy clouds disperse, + And through my scattered doubts, with quiet tune, + Uttering in clear, apocalyptic verse, + Truth, which for comfort and monition sent, + E'en as the voice revealed, do I rehearse. + + 'What art thou? Whence derived? With what intent + Placed where perpetual hindrances exhaust + Thy wasted strength, in baffled effort spent? + Where in blind maze, with crafty windings crossed, + With stumbling-blocks beset, with pitfalls strewed, + Thou wanderest, in endless error lost; + Athirst beside glad rivers that elude, + With mocking lapse, thy tantalized pursuit, + And hungering where gilded husks delude + With bitter ashes as of Dead Sea fruit, + Ashes of Hope, but seed of Discontent, + That rears its upas growth from blighted root? + Around, thou hear'st Creation eloquent, + Hymning creative attributes, and seest + The starry marvels of the firmament, + And marvels of the nearer earth, released + By impulse from within, not dimly shown, + Nor plainlier in the greatest than the least: + And, through the known discovering the unknown, + Acknowledgest thy Maker, power supreme, + Might, and dominion, deeming His alone. + Nor His the lax dominion mayst thou deem + That builds up empire, and when built, neglects. + Lo! where, afar, sidereal orbits gleam, + What first impelled, impelling still, directs: + Urges and guides each solar chariot, + The mundane mass of every globe connects, + By its own energy cohering not, + E'en as dead leaves, decaying languidly, + Not from themselves derive the force to rot. + + 'All-strengthening, all-sustaining Deity, + Diffused throughout the infinite, abides, + Dwells and upholds:--then, haply, dwells in thee? + Yea, verily. Within thy frame resides + What, by its movement only mayst thou know. + The circling blood, thy being's ambient tides, + Is't thine own will that bids them ebb and flow, + And from their inundating flood depose + Organic germs, whence health and vigour grow? + Yet though such witness serve thee to disclose + In human tenement divine abode, + Not thine be the material creed that shows + The spirit's birthplace in the moulded clod; + Not thine the pantheist raving, that because + God dwelleth with thee, thou thyself art God. + Bethink thee--is't self-reverence that o'erawes + Thy prostrate soul, and from thy faltering tongue, + Subdued, involuntary homage draws? + And when by harrowing pang thine heart is wrung, + Is't for self-aid thy wandering eyes inquire, + Heavenward, at length, in fervid suppliance flung? + And from thy native slough of sensual mire, + Is't to the mark of thine own purity + Thy loftier aims and holier hopes aspire? + Harshly thy fleshly fetters bear on thee, + In dark and dreary prison-house confined, + Cramped and diseased with long captivity, + And hath divine Intelligence designed + That noisome dungeon for her own restraint-- + By her own act to galling bonds consigned,-- + Self-doomed, with wilful purpose, to acquaint + Herself with sin and sorrow, and pollute + Aethereal essence with corporeal taint? + How doth thy helpless misery confute + That frantic boast of vain conceit, untaugh + The paltriest of its plans to execute! + + Hast thou the art to add, by taking thought, + One cubit to thy stature? and hast thou, + Or such as thou, Nature's whole fabric wrought? + Not thine such vaunt--not thine to disavow + The lustre of thy genuine origin. + To the Most Highest, as thine author, bow + With rapture of exulting faith, wherein + Devotion's cravings their desire achieve, + The bright ideal that they imaged, win. + Rejoice that thus 'tis given thee to believe,-- + To recognise transcending majesty, + Worthy all praise--all honour to receive: + Rejoice in that high presence, gratefully + Offering the vows that thy full heart dilate: + Rejoice that thence there floweth light, whereby + Thy emulative quest to elevate + Thitherward, where unblemished holiness + Irradiates sovereignty, benign as great. + + 'But here thou pausest, scrupling to confess + A providence of aspect all benign. + Fear not that sceptic scruple to express. + Of truth, Almighty Goodness could assign + Good only to the work of His own hand, + Warmed into life by His own breath divine: + And, where unchecked Beneficence had planned + A home for creatures of a fragile race, + Evoked from nothingness at His command, + Nor care, nor want, nor anguish should have place, + Nor fraud betray, nor violence oppress, + Nor hate inflame, nor wallowing lust debase, + Nor aught be found, save what conspired to bless + The sentient clay, wrought surely for that end,-- + For wherefore wrought, if not for happiness? + + 'Not, as some teach, for mastery to contend + With fate,--in doubtful conflict to engage,-- + Struggling, in pain and peril, to ascend + Slowly, through this probationary stage, + Sore let, but tried and chastened, and thereby + Earning on earth a heavenly heritage. + + Was there then need that prescience should try, + By ordeal pitiless, assured event, + Disclosed beforehand to prophetic eye? + Need was there, by austere experiment, + To test the frailty and the fall foreknown + Of man, beneath o'erwhelming burthen bent? + In this was tutelar prevision shown? + Hardly may he, in such belief confide, + Who sees his fellow myriads left to groan + In barren penance, without light or guide, + E'en from their birth by fostering vice controlled, + Doomed as they cross life's threshold--doomed untried. + + 'As hardly, too, may he the dogma hold + That fetters reason with a graduate chain + Of beings, linked in order manifold, + Where, to each link, 'tis given to sustain + A part subservient to the general weal,-- + Duly to share the mutual burthen's strain:-- + Though who from such allotment would appeal, + Could it be truth that wisdom's masterpiece + Such aid could lack, such feebleness conceal, + Suing its own constituents for release + From wrong innate, throughout its texture wove, + By hard necessity, not light caprice? + But to what purport could premonished Love + A system twined with mutual suffering weave, + When but a word all suffering would remove? + And wherefore yet delayeth the reprieve + Of Love, that doth not willingly afflict + Its children, neither wantonly aggrieve? + Can aught the gracious purpose interdict + Of Him, whose piercing eye, whose boundless sway, + No cloud can dim, no barrier restrict? + Say'st thou, "By path inscrutable, and way + Past finding out, perchance, may mercy bend + To its own use, whate'er its course would stay, + And through the labouring world high mandate send + That all things work together unto good, + Work, though by means corrupt, to righteous end?" + + Beware how such conjectures must conclude. + Can means impure Omnipotence befit, + And clog the range of its solicitude? + Can finite bonds confine the Infinite? + Though man, by choice of ill, must needs offend, + Need God do ill that good may come of it? + Must havoc's mad typhoon perforce descend? + May naught else serve to fan the stagnant air? + Must captive flame earth's quaking surface rend, + Or seek escape in lava flood? and ere + Effete society new structure raise, + Must dearth or pestilence the ground prepare? + Thus is it that a parent's care purveys + His bounty, and, exacting rigorously + The price in tears, each boon's full cost defrays? + Thus, with vain thrift withholding the decree, + That from his treasury's exhaustless store + To all could grant unbought felicity? + + 'But haply still 'tis reasoned (and with more + Of reason's semblance were the plea maintained), + That higher yet would life's ambition soar, + Not for mere scheme of happiness ordained, + But for advance in virtue,--for the growth + By patient zeal and meek endurance gained: + That, at the table of voluptuous sloth, + Though banqueted on sweets without alloy, + Unsated were a generous nature, loth + To feast where unearned lusciousness would cloy, + Faint with the tedium of unbroken rest, + Sick with the sameness of unruffled joy: + That for more poignant pleasure, and of zest + Heightened and edged by healthful exercise,-- + For scope wherein her conscious strength to test + In keen pursuit and venturous enterprise, + For dear exemplars, in whose course serene + Affection's tearful warmth might sympathise, + For these the yearning mind would languish, e'en + Though with all else that wish could name endued, + While, in her striving for self-discipline, + Foiled, and with fervid impulses imbued + Vainly, where neither aught could valour dare + Nor aught confront and challenge fortitude: + And where no outward token could declare + The hidden worth congenial heart would hail, + Hail with each kindred chord vibrating there;d + Since virtue wakes not but when griefs assail, + Or travail burthens, or temptations try, + Slumbering supine, till roused by adverse gale, + In the deep sleep of moral lethargy, + Joy's fullest cup, by hope or doubt unstirred, + Curdling the while to dull satiety. + + 'Thus haply some have reasoned, undeterred + By reasoning, with equal emphasis + But counter aim, as readily preferred: + Since Heaven's perfection striveth not, nor is + In peril lest it lapse to apathy, + Or lassitude invade its tranquil bliss. + And were it as they deem, and righteously + Were man adjudged with his brow's sweat to eat + Bread leavened with embittering misery, + E'en then affliction's measure to complete, + Amply might pain, and want, and death suffice, + And feeling's blight, and baffled love's defeat, + And, on the altar of self-sacrifice, + Hope's withered blooms by resignation laid: + Nor were it needed that incarnate vice, + In human mould, in the same image made, + Trampled with iron hoof his fellow man, + Virtue's chastised development to aid. + For whence was Vice derived? Ere life began, + For His own offspring could their Maker trace + Their loathsome office, and beneath his ban + Place them, accurst (creating to debase), + And doom as fuel for the flames that test + A favoured few, elect by partial grace? + + Elect or outcast--if alike confessed + Of the same parent, sons--brethren who bear + No differing lineaments, save those imprest + By his prevision--in their parent's care + Should not all be partakers? Should not all + Freely, alike, his nurturing guidance share? + Are any worthier? 'Tis that warning's call + Extends to them alone--'tis that to them + Alone is given vigour, wherewithal + Temptation's fraudful violence to stem-- + And how shall He, who needful strength denies, + Weakness for its predestined fall condemn? + How, when the creature of His wrath replies + With feeble wail and inarticulate moan, + The sighing of that contrite heart despise? + What man amongst thy fellows hast thou known + Who, if his son ask fish, will jeeringly + Give him a serpent, or for bread a stone? + If ye, being evil, at your children's cry + Know how to give good gifts, should not much more + Your heavenly Father His good things supply + To them who ask Him? Should He not restore + A cleansed heart within them, and renew + An upright spirit? not, what they implore + Reversing, and restraining, lest they do + The good they would,--constraining them withal + To do the evil they would fain eschew? + How wilt thou to the same original + Whence all just thoughts and pure desires proceed, + Impute corrupt imaginings, whose thrall + Enslaves anew the soul but newly freed + From their pollution? Can a hybrid growth + Arise spontaneous from unmingled seed? + Are grapes upon the bramble borne, or doth + The fig bear olive berries? Canst thou show + Twin waters, sweet and bitter, issuing both + From the same fountain? Neither should there flow + Blessing and cursing from one mouth, nor yet + From the same Providence both weal and woe. + + 'Vile as thou art, ofttimes in thee have met + Mercy and Truth--and Peace and Righteousness + Have kissed each other; and thine heart is set + Ofttimes to follow what is just, redress + Where thou hast trespassed, rendering; ofttimes, too, + Forgiving other's trespass: to distress + Thou grudgest not its sympathetic due + Of kindly deed, or word, or mutual tears, + Nor in vain wholly labourest to subdue + The hydra host whose foul miasm blears + Thy vision, and the distant gleam obscures + That dimly through thy prison casement peers. + E'en to the darkened dungeon that immures + Thy soul, some feeble glimmer finds its way. + Crushed beneath earthly durance, still endures + Some lingering fire below that weight of clay, + Some generous zeal, some honest hardihood, + Some faith--some charity.--And whence are they? + If not of Him whose quickening breath endued + All things with life,--and, when he looked upon + What He had made, beheld that all was good: + All good,--but chiefly man, in whom alone + Some likeness of Himself--some clouded light, + From His own countenance reflected, shone. + Doth not the sun outshine the satellite? + And shall not He who in the murkiest hour + Of sin's defilement, streaks thy dreary night + With beams that bid thee, lower yet and lower + Descending, hope, perchance, to rise again,-- + Say--shall not He in holiness as power + Transcend the creature whom His gifts sustain! + And here, if sneering casuist blaspheme, + And to divided nature's sovereign, + Ascribe, in nature's opposite extreme + Like eminence, and nature's God aver + In evil, even as in good, supreme,-- + Heed not, or ask if man's Artificer + With His own work, in virtue matched, can prove + At once more holy and unholier? + + 'Yet since all good is fruit of love, and love + Worketh no ill, how still doth ill abound? + Is't haply that with love a rival strove? + + Mark well this parable. In chosen ground + Only good seed a husbandman had sown, + Yet when the blade sprang up, therewith he found + Tares that amid the stifled wheat had grown. + Then knew he well, how, entering unawares, + This, while men slept, an enemy had done. + And 'tis an enemy who, scattering tares + Amid the corn sown in Creation's field, + With deadly coil the growing plant ensnares. + And no mean enemy, nor one unsteeled + For bold defiance, nor reduced to cower + Ever in covert ambuscade concealed, + But at whose hest the ravening hell-hounds scour + A wasted world, while himself prowls to seek, + Like roaring lion, whom he may devour, + And upon whom his rancorous wrath to wreak, + Sniffing the tainted steam of slaughter's breath, + And lulled by agony's despairing shriek. + For it is he who hath the power of death, + Even the devil, by whom entereth sin + Into the world, and death engendereth: + Yea! by whom entereth whatsoe'er within + Warreth against the spirit,--sordid greed, + Pride, carnal lust, envy to lust akin, + And malice, and deceit, whose treacheries breed + Strife between brethren, and the faith o'erthrow + Of many, and the duped deserters lead, + Beneath the banner of their deadliest foe, + In rebel arms a Parent to defy, + Whom, by His gifts alone, His children know. + + 'Not less that Parent marks with pitying eye + The blinded rage that rivets its own chain: + Not less to His own glorious liberty + Seeks, from corruption's bondage, to regain + His erring children,--by device, or lewd, + Or threatening, lured, or goaded to their bane: + Not less to overcome evil with good + Labours, and shall therewith all things subdue + Unto Himself--but hath not yet subdued. + + And wherefore? wherefore tarrieth He, while through + Eden, by daring foray oft defaced, + Marauding fiends malignant raid pursue, + Winging the turbid whirlwind's frantic haste, + Pointing the levin's arrowy effluence, + Over the mildewed harvest's hungry waste, + Breathing the fetid breath of pestilence, + And crying havoc to the dogs of war, + Let slip on unresisting innocence? + Why suffereth He that thus a rival mar + His cherished work--through devastated fields + Borne on triumphant in ensanguined car?-- + Him, who with power to rescue, tamely yields + His helpless charge to persecuting hate, + Nor His own offspring from the torturer shields, + But sits aloof, callously obdurate, + While but the will is lacking to redeem,-- + Him, how shall fitting stigma designate? + + 'But 'tis not thus thy calmer doubts esteem + The loving-kindness that with open hand + Dispenses bounty in perennial stream. + Oft hast thou proved, while in a foreign land + A sojourner, as all thy fathers were, + Thou pacest painfully the barren sand, + How o'er thy path watches a Comforter, + And scatters manna daily for thy food, + And bids the smitten rocks that barrier + The arid track, well out with gurgling flood, + And oft to shade of green oasis leads, + And, from pursuer thirsting for thy blood, + Such scanty shelter as is thine provides: + And though full oft that shelter fails, and though + Its torn defence demoniac glee derides, + Yet not for this the cheerful faith forego, + That memory of uncounted benefits + And conscious instinct's still, small tones bestow. + Charge not thy God with aught that unbefits + Tenderest compassion, nor believe that He + With hardened apathetic scorn commits + A favoured people throughout life to be + Subject to bondage. Doubt not of His will + To rescue from that galling tyranny. + Yet, if in His despite creation still + In thraldom groan and travail--what remains? + What but that strength is wanting to fulfil + His scheme of mercy? What but that He reigns, + Not as sole wielder of omnipotence, + But, o'er a world unconquered yet, maintains + Encounter with opposing influence, + Which He shall surely quell, but which can stay, + Awhile unquelled, His mightier providence. + + 'And doth this sadden only, or dismay? + Grieves it that He, whose follower thou art, + Rules not supreme with unresisted sway? + Or that, the progress of His grace to thwart, + Satanic might the host of hell arrays? + And doth it not a thrill of joy impart + That not alone need barren prayer and praise + Thine homage be,--thy choicest offering + The formal dues prescribed obedience pays? + Henceforth with firmer step approach thy King. + Some puny succour, thou, in thy degree, + Some feeble aid, thou, even thou, mayst bring! + In the fell conflict raging ceaselessly + Around, thou, too, mayst join--thou, too, engage + In that dread feud, twin with eternity, + Which faithful angels and archangels wage + Against the powers of darkness, to extend, + O'er realms retained in demon vassalage, + Their sovereign's pure dominion,--and to blend + All worlds beneath one righteous governance, + Into one kingdom which shall have no end. + + 'Wouldst thou, if haply so thou mayst, advance + That blessed consummation? Wouldst thou speed + The lingering hour of Earth's deliverance? + Arise--the naked clothe, the hungry feed, + The sick and wounded tend,--soothe the distressed. + If thy weak arm cannot protect, yet plead + With bold rebuke the cause of the oppressed, + Kindling hot shame in Mammon's votaries, + Abashed, at least, in lucre's grovelling quest; + And, in the toil-worn serf, a glad surprise + Awakening--when, from brute despondency, + Taught to look up to heaven with dazzled eyes.-- + Thus mayst thou do God service,--thus apply + Thyself, within thy limit, to abate + What wickedness thou seest, or misery: + Thus, in a Sacred Band, associate + New levies, from the adverse ranks of Sin + Converted,--against Sin confederate. + Or--if by outward act to serve, or win + Joint followers to the standard of thy Lord, + Thy lot forbid,--turn, then, thy thought within: + Be each recess of thine own breast explored: + There, o'er thy passions be thy victories won: + There, be the altar of thy faith restored, + And thou, a living sacrifice, thereon + Present thyself.--This ever mayst thou do, + Nor, doing this, wilt aught have left undone.' + + Here ceased the Voice, commissioned to renew + Truth, which, of old, when Bactrian sage began + Nature's dim maze to thread with slenderest clue, + Its doubtful scope and dark design to scan, + With inward whisper, hopeful witness bare, + And justified the ways of God to man. + And suddenly its warning ceased, but ere + It ceased, the scales had fallen from my eyes, + And I beheld, and shall I not declare + What my uncurtained vision testifies? + Shall coward lips the word of life suppress? + The oracle vouchsafed from Heaven disguise? + Nay, as one crying in the wilderness, + Where none else hearken, to the vacant air + And stolid mountains utters his distress, + E'en so will I too cry aloud, 'Prepare + Before Him the Lord's way. Make His path straight,' + Nor heed though none regard me, nor forbear + Though all revile, but patiently await + Till, like light breath that panting meads exhale, + And scornful zephyrs lightly dissipate, + But which, full surely, down the echoing vale, + Shall roll with sounding current, swift and loud, + My slighted message likewise shall prevail, + Entering the heart of many a mourner, bowed + Beneath despair, and with inspiring voice + Calling to hope to cleave her midnight cloud, + And bidding grief, in hope's new dawn, rejoice. + +This is a creed which long since came to me after earnest inward +communings, and which, though subsequent reflection has in some few +particulars modified it, I still in substance hold, clinging to it with +a grateful consciousness of ever-multiplying obligations. For in it the +soul has free scope for its loftiest aspirations and its widest and +deepest sympathies, strongest incentives to zeal, surest guidance for +activity, solace in every distress, support under every difficulty, +added cause for exultation in every success, renewed resolution in every +defeat. Still, it is here offered, not as ascertained truth, but merely +as a sample of those guesses at truth by which alone ordinary mortals +need hope to promote the common cause of humanity in any of its higher +bearings. Such guesses, however, when harmonising with all the +conditions of their subject-matter, may fairly claim to be provisionally +regarded as truths--nay, to be adopted as working hypotheses until +superseded by new hypotheses capable of doing the same work better; in +which supercession none ought to rejoice, nor, if sincere truth-seekers, +will rejoice, more cordially than the propounders of the discredited +doctrines. It is in this spirit and with these reservations that the +articles of faith above recited are submitted for consideration. How +much soever they may fall short of the truth, they are, I feel, in the +absence of any nearer approach to the truth, capable of rendering +excellent service. However faintly and hazily the outlines of Deity be +shown in them, the Deity whom they so imperfectly delineate is yet one +to whom may justly be ascribed glory in the highest, one worthy of all +trust, love, and adoration--of an adoration, too, inclusive not more of +praise than prayer. + +If the divine claim to the last-named tribute be disputed, it had better +be by arguments other than those on which certain writers, with Mr. +Galton for their leader and Professor Tyndall for their backer, have +been recently expending much misapplied ingenuity. If the efficacy of +prayer be, as the foremost of these declares it to be, 'a perfectly +appropriate and legitimate subject of scientific enquiry,' the enquiry +ought at least to be conducted according to scientific rules. On this +point Mr. Galton himself lays much stress, intimating that whereas an +unscientific reasoner may be expected to be 'guided by a confused +recollection of crude experience, a scientific reasoner will scrutinise +each separate experience before he admits it as evidence, and will +compare all the cases he has selected on a methodical system.' +Nevertheless, a brief examination of the experiences on which he and his +principal associate rely, may suggest some doubt as to which of the two +specified classes of reasoners it is that they themselves belong. + +The facts or fancies cited by Mr. Galton in proof that praying is of no +use are the following: 1. 'Sick people who pray or are prayed for do not +on the average recover more rapidly than others.' 2. Although 'the +public prayer for the sovereign of every state, Protestant or +Catholic, is and has been in the spirit of our own--"Grant her in health +long to live"--sovereigns are literally the shortest-lived of all +persons who have the advantage of affluence.' 3. The 'clergy are a far +more prayerful class' than either lawyers or medical men, it being +'their profession to pray,' and 'their practice that of offering morning +and evening family prayers in addition to their private devotions,' yet +'we do not find that the clergy are in any way more long-lived in +consequence;' rather, there is room for believing their class to be the +'shortest-lived of the three.' Nay, even missionaries, eminently +prayerful as they are themselves, and prayed for as they are with +especial earnestness by others, 'are not supernaturally endowed with +health,' and 'do not live longer than other people.' 4. 'The proportion +of deaths at the time of birth is identical among the children of the +praying and the non-praying classes.' 5. Though 'we pray in our Liturgy +that "the nobility may be endowed with grace, wisdom, and +understanding,"' our 'nobility are peculiarly subject to insanity;' as +are likewise, indeed, 'very religious people of all denominations,' +'religious madness being very common indeed.' 6. So far from 'religious +influences' appearing to have 'clustered in any remarkable degree round +the youth of those who, whether by their talents or their social +position, have left a mark upon English history,' 'remarkable devotional +tendencies' have been conspicuous chiefly by their absence from 'the +lives either of our Lord Chancellors or of the leaders of our great +political parties;' while, out of our twenty-three extant dukes, four at +least, if not five, are descended from mistresses of Charles II., not a +single one of them, on the other hand, being known to Mr. Galton to be +of 'eminently prayerful qualities.' 7. In respect of those +'institutions, societies, commercial adventures, political meetings and +combinations of all sorts' with which England so much abounds, and of +which 'some are exclusively clerical, some lay, and others mixed,' Mr. +Galton 'for his own part never heard a favourable opinion of the value +of the preponderating clerical element in their business committees.' +'The procedure of Convocation which, like all exclusively clerical +meetings, is opened with prayer, has not inspired the outer world with +much respect.' Nay, 'it is a common week-day opinion of the world that +praying people are not practical.' 8. In those numerous instances in +which an enterprise is executed by the agency of the profane on behalf +not of the profane themselves but of pious clients, 'the enterprises are +not observed to prosper beyond the average.' Underwriters recognise no +difference in the risks run by missionary ships and by ordinary traders, +nor do life insurance companies, before they accept a life, introduce +into their 'confidential enquiries into the antecedents of the +applicant' any 'such question as "Does he habitually use family prayers +and private devotions?"' Neither are the funds of devout shareholders +and depositors at all safer than those of the profane when entrusted to +the custody of untrustworthy directors, not even though the day's work +of the undertaking commence, as that of the disastrous Royal British +Bank used to do, with solemn prayer.[52] + +Two or three minutes' attention to the grounds for, and the +circumstances connected with, these statements, may assist us in +appreciating Mr. Galton's notion of the difference between confusedly +recollected experiences and experiences properly scrutinised and +methodically selected. + +For the statement first on the list, some negative evidence is +considered to be afforded by the absence of any 'single instance in +which papers read before Statistical Societies have recognised the +agency of prayer either in disease or in anything else.' The chief +authority for it, however, is the eloquent silence of medical men 'who, +had prayers for the sick any notable effect, would be sure to have +observed it,' seeing that they are 'always on the watch for such +things.' But are they really, in every case of recovery from illness +that comes under their notice, so particular and so successful in their +enquiries whether any, and, if so, how much, prayer has been offered on +behalf of the patient, as to be qualified to judge whether prayer has +had anything to do with the cure? If not, although they may be showing +their discretion by not speaking on the point, the 'eloquence of their +silence' must not be too hastily interpreted. For doctors, of all men, +should be the last to deny, as an abstract proposition, the efficacy of +prayer in disease, knowing, as they do, how great is the curative +influence of prayer when addressed to themselves. How, they may +naturally ask, is it to be expected that sickness should be cured unless +properly treated? and how can it be properly treated without a doctor? +and how can a doctor be expected to attend unless he be asked? Upon +which very natural queries others naturally follow. What would be the +good of the doctor's coming unless he prescribed judiciously? and will +he not more certainly prescribe judiciously if his judgment be guided by +special interposition of divine grace? and if prayer to himself has +plainly been one condition of his coming, why may not prayer to God +have been one condition of his judgment having been rightly guided? Will +it be pretended that God's proceedings are abjectly submissive to +inexorable laws from which those of the doctor are exempt, and that +though the latter would certainly not have attended unless he had been +asked, the grace of God, if given at all, must have been given equally +whether asked for or not? + +Statements 2 and 3 are founded on a memoir by Dr. Guy, purporting to +show the 'Mean Age attained by males of various classes who had survived +their 30th year from 1758 to 1843,' and whose deaths were not caused by +violence or accident. According to this table, the average age of 97 +members of royal houses was only 64.04, while that of 1,179 members of +the English aristocracy was 67.31, and that of 1,632 gentlemen commoners +70.22; the proportion between the total number of royal, and that of +noble and gentle, personages who died within the period specified, being +apparently supposed to be as 97 to 2811, or as 1 to about 29. Except +upon this supposition, Mr. Galton could not with any consistency have +appealed to these figures, for he had previously announced his intention +to be 'guided solely by broad averages and not to deal with isolated +instances.' He seems, however, to forget this judicious rule when he +comes to treat of the clergy, of whom 945 are compared in the table with +294 lawyers and 244 medical men. Here, he says, 'the clergy as a whole +show a life value of 69.49 against 68.14 for lawyers, and 67.31 for +medical men;' but then, he adds 'this difference is reversed' when the +comparison is made between members of the three classes sufficiently +distinguished to have had their lives recorded in Chalmers' +Biographical Dictionary or the Annual Register, the value of life among +clergy, lawyers, and medical men then appearing as 66.42, 66.51 and +67.34 respectively. Whether, of the distinguished professional men +concerned in this second comparison, the parsons were distinguished for +their prayerfulness and the lawyers and doctors for their +prayerlessness, Mr. Galton omits to state; and still more serious +omissions on his part are those of not mentioning in what part of our +Liturgy we are accustomed to pray that it may be granted to the Queen, +not simply long to live, but also to live longer than other people; +likewise in which of 'the numerous published collections of family +prayers' that have undergone his scrutiny, is to be found a petition +that parsons may live longer than lawyers or doctors; and, yet again, +since an _average_, falling short of threescore years and ten by little +more than three and a half, is so contemptuously rejected by him, what +is the precise number of years that would be accepted by him as a +liberal compliance with prayer for long life? + +While deducing his argument from clergymen, Mr. Galton makes repeated +and particular reference to the clerical _sub-genus_, missionaries, +treating it as the more remarkable that these should not enjoy +comparative immunity from disease, because, as he suggests, it would +have been so easy for God to have made them a favoured class in respect +of health: to wit, by the notable expedient of dissuading them from +exposing themselves to any of the risks peculiarly attendant on +missionary enterprise. 'Tropical fever, for example, is due to many +subtle causes which are partly under man's control. A single hour's +exposure to sun, or wet, or fatigue, or mental agitation will determine +an attack.' What more simple than for God so to 'act on the minds of +the missionaries as to disincline them to take those courses which might +result in mischance, such as the forced march, the wetting, the +abstinence from food, or the night exposure?' What more simple, either, +it may be added, than for God to save prayerful soldiers from ever being +killed in battle by merely putting it into their minds to desert +whenever they are ordered upon active service? + +That 'the distribution of still-births is wholly unaffected by piety' +Mr. Galton has satisfied himself by finding, 'on examination of a +particular period, that the proportion of such births published in the +'Record' newspaper and in the 'Times' bore an identical relation to the +total number of deaths.' He had previously, we must suppose, satisfied +himself that advertisers in the 'Times' never say their prayers. + +For the asserted commonness of religious madness Mr. Galton cites no +evidence whatever, and, to judge from the sympathies and antipathies of +which one of his avowed opinions may be supposed to be the subject and +the object, speaks probably on this point solely from hearsay. Very +possibly, however, his assurance of the extraordinary prevalence of +insanity among British noblemen may be based on personal observation, +as, of course, is that regarding the prayerlessness of his own ducal +acquaintances. Birds of a feather, proverbially, flock together, and the +same touch of irreligion may quite possibly suffice to make certain +dukes and certain commoners kin. + +Against the inefficiency, however notorious, of the clerical element in +business committees, ought in fairness to be set the equally notorious +efficiency of Jesuits in whatever they undertake, the signal statecraft +displayed by the Wolseys, the Richelieus, and the Ximenes's of the days +in which cardinals and archbishops were permitted to take a leading +part in executive politics, and the very respectable figure still +presented by the lords spiritual, beside the lords temporal of the +British House of Peers. As for 'the common week-day opinion that praying +people are not practical,' those by whom it is entertained, of course, +mentally except praying Quakers. + +The fact that insurance offices do not attempt to distinguish between +the prayerful and the prayerless, but, treating both classes as liable +to the same risks, exact from both the same premiums, proves, I submit, +nothing against the efficacy of prayer, not even that the managers of +insurance offices do not believe in it. The statement that prayerful and +prayerless, when placing their money in the same dishonest keeping, or +engaging in the same bad speculations, suffer losses, bearing exactly +the same proportion to their respective ventures, although most probably +quite true, is also one which Mr. Galton has neglected to verify by the +application to it of any test, scientific or other. Finally, if the +disasters of the Royal British Bank are to be ascribed to its custom of +opening business with prayer, not only ought the cackle of Convocation +to be attributed to a similar cause, but also all the legislative +botchery of the House of Commons, and the abolition of prayer before +debate should be treated as the most urgently needed of those further +parliamentary reforms with which the fertile brains of certain eminent +statesmen are suspected to be teeming. + +Thus much by way of intimation that there would be no excessive temerity +in encountering Mr. Galton even on the ground of his own choosing, were +that ground really worth contending for. But baseless and exorbitant as +all Mr. Galton's postulates are, there is not one of them to which he +might not be made heartily welcome, for any effect its surrender could +have upon the real issue, the true nature whereof both Mr. Galton and +his principal coadjutor have, with marvellous sleight of eye, contrived +completely to overlook. Such Pharisees in science, such sticklers for +rigorously scientific method, might have been expected to begin by +authenticating the materials they proposed to operate upon, and, when +professing to experiment upon pure metal, at least to see that it was +not mere dross they were casting into the crucible. Plainly, however, +they despise any such nice distinctions. The most earnest prayer and the +emptiest ceremonial prate are both alike to them. What sort of a process +they imagine prayer to be may be at once perceived from the sort of +trials to which they desire to subject it. + +'After much thought and examination,' the coadjutor aforesaid--a bashful +Teucer, over whom Professor Tyndall has, like a second Ajax Telamon, +extended, with chivalrous haste, the shelter of his shield--does 'not +hesitate to propose that one single ward or hospital under the care of +first-rate physicians or surgeons, containing a number of patients +afflicted with those diseases which have been best studied, and of which +the mortality rates are best known, should be, during a period of not +less than three to five years, made the object of special prayer by the +whole body of the faithful, and that, at the end of that time, the +mortality rates should be compared with the past rates, and also with +those of other leading hospitals similarly well managed during the same +period.'[53] In suggesting this experiment, termed by himself +'exhaustive and complete,' its propounder imagines himself to be +offering to the faithful 'an occasion of demonstrating to the faithless +an imperishable record of the real power of prayer.' If, however, he +were himself petitioning for the reprieve of a condemned criminal, he +would scarcely expect to succeed, even with so tender-hearted a minister +as Mr. Bruce, if he were to let out in the course of his supplications, +that he did not care whether he succeeded or not, and was asking for the +reprieve solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the head of the +Home Office is really invested with the prerogative of mercy. Yet no +suspicion crosses his mind that the Searcher of Hearts may possibly be +displeased with prayers addressed to Him by the lips of those who were, +all the while, saying in their hearts that they did not want their +prayers to be granted, but only wanted to satisfy their curiosity to +know whether they would be granted or not. Equally remarkable is the +trustfulness of Mr. Galton, in opining that 'it would be perfectly +practicable to select out of the patients at different hospitals under +treatment for fractures, or amputations, or other common maladies, whose +course is so well understood as to admit of accurate tables being +constructed for their duration and result, two considerable groups, the +one consisting of markedly religious and piously befriended individuals, +the other of those who were remarkably cold-hearted and neglected; and +that, then, an honest comparison of their respective periods of +treatment, and the result, would manifest a distinct proof of the +efficacy of prayer, if it existed to even a minute fraction of the +amount that religious teachers exhort us to believe.' Evidently, he +imagines that it would be sufficient for the hospital authorities to +advertise--not of course, in the 'Times,' but in the 'Record'--and +that, thereupon, whoever, having entered into his closet and shut the +door, had, on behalf of any of the patients experimented upon, prayed to +the Father who seeth in secret, would at once come forth and proclaim +openly how he had been engaged. Not by 'arguments' of no greater +'cogency' than that of any based upon results thus obtainable, need +either of the two experimentalists expect to persuade praying people +that prayer is, 'in the natural course of events,' doomed to become +'obsolete, just as the Waters of Jealousy and the Urim and Thummin of +the Mosaic Law did in the times of the later Jewish Kings.' Not quite so +easily will they cause it to be 'abandoned to the domain of recognised +superstition,' just as belief in witches and in the Sovereign's touch as +a cure for scrofula, and 'many other items of ancient faith have already +successively been.' Both of them have, it seems, yet to learn that the +only prayer which is believed by people of some little enlightenment to +be of any avail, is the 'fervent, effectual prayer of a righteous man,' +prayer that cometh from 'a pure heart fervently,' prayer that is made +'with the spirit and with the understanding also.' Prayer of this sort +is not to be discredited by any abundance of statistical testimony to +the futility of cold lip-worship, or by any number of fresh examples of +the generally recognised fact that the children of this world are wiser +in their generation than the children of light. The recovery from the +very jaws of death of King Hezekiah, of Louis XV. of France, while as +yet undetected and _bien-aime_, and of the present Prince of Wales, may, +none the less probably, have been in part due to the prayers offered up +for the first by himself, for the second, according to President Henault +and Mr. Carlyle, by all Paris, and, for the third, by the whole British +empire, because _lessons_ appointed to be regularly said or _sung_ in +churches for the prolongation of the Sovereign's life, and said and sung +by the congregations to whom they are set, with equal regularity, +whether the Sovereign be well or ill, detested or beloved, are to all +appearance disregarded. Modern believers in prayer are well aware that, +although they ask, they may not receive if they ask amiss, and would +accept this as fully adequate explanation of the disappointment of +anyone, who had the face to pray that he might grow as rich as the late +Mr. Brassey, or be created a duke, or appointed Lord Chancellor, or +supplant Mr. Gladstone in the premiership, or Mr. D'Israeli in the +leadership of Her Majesty's Opposition. Moreover, the spirit, duly +seasoned with understanding, in which alone true prayer can be made, is +one, not of presumptuous dictation to a Heavenly Father, but of sincere +and grateful recognition that 'He knoweth better than ourselves what is +for our good.' Far from praying for selfish aggrandisement, we cannot, +if we pray aright, pray that, whether from ourselves or others, the cup +of affliction may pass away, without adding, 'Nevertheless, not as I +will, but as Thou wilt.' The only gifts that can with propriety be +prayed for unconditionally are gifts spiritual--cleansing of the +thoughts of the heart, strength to resist temptation, strength to endure +trials, strength to perform our appointed work; and whoever may think +fit to make these the subjects of statistical inquiry, may depend upon +being assured by everyone experimentally qualified to reply, that they +are never asked for faithfully without being obtained effectually; +together with large measure, if not of the cheerfulness, at least of the +patience, of hope. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[50] 'Auguste Comte and Positivism,' pp. 25-8. + +[51] 'Fortnightly Review' for June 1868, 'Mr. Darwin's Hypotheses.' + +[52] 'Statistical Enquiries into the Efficacy of Prayer,' by Francis +Galton, in Fornightly Review,' for August 1872. + +[53] 'Contemporary Review,' July 1872. 'The Prayer for the Sick. Hints +towards a serious attempt to estimate its value.' Communicated by Prof. +Tyndall. + + + + +_EPILOGUE._ + + + If with rash step, or with presumptuous word + I have transgressed, or with unshrinking eye + Have sought to pierce the awful mystery + That veils thy Godhead, yet forgive me, Lord! + Thou knowest that I sought not to draw nigh + Thy Throne, save that my witness might record + More truly of Thine attributes, whereby + On Earth, e'en as in Heaven, might be adored + The fulness of Thy glory. Not in wrath + His trespass wilt Thou judge, whom, licence, bred + Of zeal, though blinded, yet devout, betrays, + Nor scorn the unconscious wanderer from Thy path, + Nor leave me hopeless, if indeed misled + By thirst for truth, more deep in error's maze. + + + + + LONDON: PRINTED BY + SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE + AND PARLIAMENT STREET + + + + +_BY THE SAME AUTHOR._ + + +ON LABOUR: + +ITS WRONGFUL CLAIMS AND RIGHTFUL DUES; + +ITS ACTUAL PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE. + +SECOND EDITION. + +8vo. cloth, price 14_s._ + +'This is a book which all true economists should welcome.' + + ECONOMIST.. + + + +'It may be doubted whether any considerable economic work of equal merit +has appeared since the first publication of Mr. Mill's "Political +Economy."' + + ATHENAEUM. + + +MACMILLAN & CO., London. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND +COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS*** + + +******* This file should be named 29917.txt or 29917.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/9/9/1/29917 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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