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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/29637-8.txt b/29637-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..481ec70 --- /dev/null +++ b/29637-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11270 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Study of History, by +Charles V. Langlois and Charles Seignobos + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Introduction to the Study of History + +Author: Charles V. Langlois + Charles Seignobos + +Translator: G. G. Berry + +Release Date: August 8, 2009 [EBook #29637] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRODUCTION--STUDY OF HISTORY *** + + + + +Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was +produced from scanned images of public domain material +from the Google Print project.) + + + + + + + + + +INTRODUCTION + +TO THE + +STUDY OF HISTORY + +BY + +CH. V. LANGLOIS & CH. SEIGNOBOS + +OF THE SORBONNE + +AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION BY G. G. BERRY + +WITH A PREFACE BY F. YORK POWELL + +NEW YORK + +HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY + +1904 + + + + +TO THE READER + + +It is a pleasure to recommend this useful and well-written little book +to English readers. It will both interest and help. There are, for +instance, a few pages devoted to the question of evidence that will be +an aid to every one desirous of getting at the truth respecting any +series of facts, as well as to the student of history. No one can read +it without finding out that to the historian history is not merely a +pretty but rather difficult branch of literature, and that a history +book is not necessarily good if it appears to the literary critic +'readable and interesting,' nor bad because it seems to him 'hard or +heavy reading.' The literary critic, in fact, is beginning to find out +that he reads a history as he might read a treatise on mathematics or +linguistics, at his peril, and that he is no judge of its value or lack +of value. Only the expert can judge that. It will probably surprise some +people to find that in the opinion of our authors (who agree with Mr. +Morse Stephens and with the majority of scholars here) the formation and +expression of ethical judgments, the approval or condemnation of Caius +Julius Cæsar, or of Cæsar Borgia, is not a thing within the historian's +province. His business is to find out what can be known about the +characters and situations with which he is engaged, to put what he can +ascertain before his readers in a clear form, and lastly to consider and +attempt to ascertain what scientific use can be made of these facts he +has ascertained. Ethic on its didactic side is outside his business +altogether. In fact MM. Langlois and Seignobos write for those "who +propose to deal with documents [especially written documents] with a +view to preparing or accomplishing historic work in a scientific way." +They have the temerity to view history as a scientific pursuit, and they +are endeavouring to explain to the student who intends to pursue this +branch of anthropologic science the best and safest methods of +observation open to him, hence they modestly term their little book "an +essay on the method of historic sciences." They are bold enough to look +forward to a day, as not far distant, when a sensible or honest man will +no more dare to write history unscientifically than he would to-day be +willing to waste his time and that of others on observing the heavens +unscientifically, and registering as trustworthy his unchecked and +untimed observations. + +Whether we like it or not, history has got to be scientifically studied, +and it is not a question of style but of accuracy, of fulness of +observation, and correctness of reasoning, that is before the student. +Huxley and Darwin and Clifford have shown that a book may be good +science and yet good reading. Truth has not always been found repulsive +although she was not bedizened with rhetorical adornments; indeed, the +very pursuit of her has long been recognised as arduous but extremely +fascinating. _Toute trouvaille_, as our authors aptly remark, _procure +une jouissance_. + +It will be a positive gain to have the road cleared of a mass of +rubbish, that has hindered the advance of knowledge. History must be +worked at in a scientific spirit, as biology or chemistry is worked at. +As M. Seignobos says, "On ne s'arrête plus guère aujourd'hui à discuter, +sous sa forme théologique la théorie de la Providence dans l'Histoire. +Mais la tendence à expliquer les faits historiques par les causes +transcendantes persiste dans des théories plus modernes où la +metaphysique se déguise sous des formes scientifiques." We should +certainly get rid in time of those curious Hegelianisms "under which in +lay disguise lurks the old theologic theory of final causes"; or the +pseudo-patriotic supposition of the "historic mission (Beruf) attributed +to certain people or persons." The study of historic facts does not even +make for the popular newspaper theory of the continuous and necessary +progress of humanity, it shows only "partial and intermittent advances, +and gives us no reason to attribute them to a permanent cause inherent +in collective humanity rather than to a series of local accidents." But +the historian's path is still like that of Bunyan's hero, bordered by +pitfalls and haunted by hobgoblins, though certain of his giant +adversaries are crippled and one or two slain. He has also his own +faults to master, or at least to check, as MM. Langlois and Seignobos +not infrequently hint, _e.g._ "Nearly all beginners have a vexatious +tendency to go off into superfluous digressions, heaping up reflexion +and information that have no bearing on the main subject. They will +recognise, if they think over it, that the causes of this leaning are +bad taste, a kind of naïve vanity, sometimes a disordered mind." Again: +"The faults of historic works intended for the general public ... are +the results of the insufficient preparation of the bad literary training +of the popularisers." What an admirable criticism there is too of that +peculiarly German shortcoming (one not, however, unknown elsewhere), +which results in men "whose learning is ample, whose monographs destined +for scholars are highly praiseworthy, showing themselves capable, when +they write for the public, of sinning heavily against scientific +methods," so that, in their determination to stir their public, "they +who are so scrupulous and particular when it is a question of dealing +with minutiæ, abandon themselves like the mass of mankind to their +natural inclinations when they come to set forth general questions. They +take sides, they blame, they praise, they colour, they embellish, they +allow themselves to take account of personal, patriotic, ethical, or +metaphysical considerations. Above all, they apply themselves with what +talent has fallen to their lot to the task of creating a work of art, +and, so applying themselves, those of them who lack talent become +ridiculous, and the talent of those who possess it is spoilt by their +anxiety for effect." + +On the other hand, while the student is rejoicing at the smart raps +bestowed upon the Teutonic offender, he is warned against the error of +thinking that "provided he can make himself understood, the historian +has the right to use a faulty, low, careless, or clogged style.... +Seeing the extreme complexity of the phenomena he must endeavour to +describe, he has not the privilege of writing badly. But he ought +_always_ to write well, and not to bedizen his prose with extra finery +once a week." + +Of course much that is said in this book has been said before, but I do +not know any book wherein the student of history will find such an +organised collection of practical and helpful instructions. There are +several points on which one is unable to find oneself in agreement with +MM. Langlois and Seignobos, but these occur mainly where they are +dealing with theory; as far as practical work goes, one finds oneself in +almost perfect concurrence with them. That they know little of the way +in which history is taught and studied in England or Canada or the +United States is not at all an hindrance to the use of their book. The +student may enjoy the pleasure of making his own examples out of English +books to the rules they lay down. He may compare their cautions against +false reasoning and instances of fallacy with those set forth in that +excellent and concise essay of Bentham's, which is apparently unknown to +them. He will not fail to see that we in England have much to learn in +this subject of history from the French. The French archives are not so +fine as ours, but they take care to preserve their local and provincial +documents, as well as their national and central records; they give +their archivists a regular training, they calendar and make accessible +all that time and fate have spared of pre-revolutionary documents. We +have not got farther than the provision of a fine central Record Office +furnished with very inadequate means for calendaring the masses of +documents already stored and monthly accumulating there, though we have +lately set up at Oxford, Cambridge, and London the regular courses of +palæography, diplomatic, and bibliography, that constitute the +preliminary training of the archivist or historical researcher. We want +more: we must have county archives, kept by trained archivists. We must +have more trained archivists at the disposal of the Deputy Keeper of the +Rolls, we must have such means as the _Bibliothèque de l'École des +Chartes_ for full reports of special and minute investigations and +discoveries, for hand-lists and the like, before we can be considered as +doing as much for history as the heavily taxed French nation does +cheerfully, and with a sound confidence that the money it spends wisely +in science is in the truest sense money saved. + +For those interested in the teaching of history, this book is one of the +most suggestive helps that has yet appeared. With a blackboard, a text +(such as are now cheap), or a text-book (such as Stubbs or Prothero or +Gardiner), an atlas, and access to a decent public library and an +average local museum, the teacher who has mastered its intent should +never be at a loss for an interesting catechetical lecture or exposition +to a class, whether of adults or of younger folk. + +Not the least practical part of the work of MM. Langlois and Seignobos +has been the consideration they have given to such every-day issues as +the teacher is constantly called upon to face. History cannot safely be +neglected in schools, though it is by no means necessary that the +Universities should turn out large bodies of trained historians. It is +possible indeed that the serious study of history might gain were there +fewer external inducements at the Universities to lead to the popularity +of the History Schools. But in this very popularity there lies a great +opportunity for concerted efforts, not only to better the processes of +study, but also to clear off the vast arrears of classification and +examination of the erroneous historic material at our disposition in +this country. + +The historian has been (as our authors hint) too much the ally of the +politician; he has used his knowledge as material for preaching +democracy in the United States, absolutism in Prussia, Orleanist +opposition in France, and so on (English readers will easily recall +examples from their own countrymen's work): in the century to come he +will have to ally himself with the students of physical science, with +whose methods his own have so much in common. It is not patriotism, nor +religion, nor art, but the attainment of truth that is and must be the +historian's single aim. + +But it is also to be borne in mind that history is an excellent +instrument of culture, for, as our authors point out, "the practice and +method of historic investigation is a pursuit extremely healthful for +the mind, freeing it from the disease of credulity," and fortifying it +in other ways as a discipline, though precisely how to best use history +for this purpose is still in some ways uncertain, and after all it is a +matter which concerns Pædagogic and Ethic more than the student of +history, though it is plain that MM. Langlois and Seignobos have not +neglected to consider it. + +One can hardly help thinking, too, that, in schools and places where the +young are trained, something might be gained by treating such books as +Plutarch's Lives not as history (for which they were never intended) but +as text-books of ethic, as examples of conduct, public or private. The +historian very properly furnishes the ethical student with material, +though it is not right to reckon the ethical student's judgment upon the +historian's facts as history in any sense. It is not an historian's +question, for instance, whether Napoleon was right or wrong in his +conduct at Jaffa, or Nelson in his behaviour at Naples; that is a matter +for the student of ethic or the religious dogmatist to decide: all that +the historian has to do is to get what conclusion he can out of the +conflict of evidence, and to decide whether Napoleon or Nelson actually +did that of which their enemies accused them, or, if he cannot arrive at +fact, to state probability, and the reasons that incline him to lean to +the affirmative or negative. + +As to the possibility of a "philosophy of history," a real one, not the +mockeries that have long been discredited by scientific students, the +reader will find some pregnant remarks here in the epilogue and the +chapters that precede it. There is an absence of unreasonable optimism +in our authors' views. "It is probable that hereditary differences have +contributed to determine events; so that in part historic evolution is +produced by physiological and anthropologic causes. But history +furnishes no trustworthy process by which it may be possible to +determine the action of those hereditary differences between man and +man," _i.e._ she starts with races 'endowed' each with peculiarities +that make them 'disposed to act' somewhat differently under similar +pressure. "History is only able to grasp the conditions of their +existence." And what M. Seignobos calls the final problem--_Is evolution +produced merely by changed conditions?_--must according to him remain +insoluble by the legitimate processes of history. The student may accept +or reject this view as his notions of evidence prompt him to do. M. +Seignobos has at all events laid down a basis for discussion in +sufficiently clear terms. + +As to the composition of the joint work we are told that M. Seignobos +has been especially concerned with the chapters that touch theory, and +M. Langlois with those that deal with practice. Both authors have +already proved their competence--M. Seignobos' labours on Modern History +have been widely appreciated, while M. Langlois' "Hand-book of Historic +Bibliography" is already a standard text-book, and bids fair to remain +so. We are grateful to both of them for the pains they have taken to be +clear and definite, and for their determination to shirk none of the +difficulties that have met them. They have produced a hand-book that +students will use and value in proportion to their use of it, a book +that will save much muddle of thought and much loss of time, a book +written in the right spirit to inspire its readers. We are not bound to +agree with all M. Seignobos' dogmas, and can hardly accept, for +instance, M. Langlois' apology for the brutal methods of controversy +that are an evil legacy from the theologian and the grammarian, and are +apt to darken truth and to cripple the powers of those who engage in +them. For though it is possible that the secondary effect of these +barbarous scuffles may sometimes have been salutary in deterring +impostors from 'taking up' history, I am not aware of any positive +examples to justify this opinion. There is this, however, to be said, +that fully conscious of their own fallibility, M. Langlois and his +excellent collaborator have supplied in their canons of criticism and +maxims the best corrections of any mistakes into which they may have +fallen by the way. Is not the House of Fame, as the poet tells us, a +more wonderful and quaintly wrought habitation than _Domus Dedali_ +itself? And may not honest historians be pardoned if they are sometimes +confused for a brief moment by the never-ending noise and marvellous +motion of that deceptive mint and treasury, and fatigued by the +continual trial and examination of the material that issues therefrom? +The student will, at least, learn from MM. Langlois and Seignobos to +have no mercy on his own shortcomings, to spare no pains, to grudge no +expenditure of time or energy in the investigation of a carefully chosen +and important historical problem, to aim at doing the bit of work in +hand so thoroughly that it will not need to be done again. + +It would be unjust to omit here to mention Dr. Bernheim's "Exposition of +Historic Method," or _Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_, so justly +praised and used by our authors, but I believe that as an introduction +to the subject, intended for the use of English or North American +students, this little volume will be found the handier and more +practical work. Of its value to English workers I can speak from +experience, and I know many teachers to whom it will be welcome in its +present form. + +It would have been easy to 'adapt' this book by altering its examples, +by modifying its excellent plan, by cutting here and carving there to +the supposed convenience of an imaginary public, but the better part has +been chosen of giving English readers this manual precisely as it +appeared in French. And surely one would rather read what M. Langlois, +an experienced teacher and a tried scholar, thought on a moot point, +than be presented with the views of some English 'adaptor' who had read +his book, as to what he would have said had he been an Englishman +lecturing to English students. That the present translator has taken +much pains to faithfully report his authors, I know (though I have not +compared English and French throughout every page), so that I can +commend his honest work to the reader as I have already commended the +excellent matter that he has been concerned in preparing for a wider +public than the French original could command. + +F. YORK POWELL. + +ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD, _July 1898_. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +PAGE + +TO THE READER v + + +AUTHORS' PREFACE + +What this work is _not_ meant to be--Works on the Philosophy +of History 1 + +What it _is_ meant to be 2 + +Existing works on Historical Methods--Droysen, Freeman, +Daunou, &c. 3 + +Reasons why the study of method is useful 7 + +Bernheim's _Lehrbuch_--In what way it leaves room for another +book 10 + +Need of warning to students 11 + +The general public 13 + +Distribution of the work between the two authors 13 + + +BOOK I + +PRELIMINARY STUDIES + +CHAPTER I + +THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS + +Documents: their nature, use, necessity 17 + +Utility of _Heuristic_, or the art of discovering documents 18 + +The difficulties of Heuristic--Ancient times--H. H. Bancroft--State +of things at the Renaissance 19 + +Growth of libraries--Collectors--Effects of revolutionary +confiscation in promoting the concentration and the +accessibility of documents 20 + +Possible future progress--Need for the cataloguing and indexing +of documents 27 + +Students and bibliographical knowledge--Effect of present +conditions in deterring men from historical work 32 + +The remedies--Official cataloguing of libraries--Activity of +learned societies--of governments 34 + +Different kinds of bibliographical works needed by students 37 + +Different degrees of difficulty of Heuristic in different parts of +History--to be kept in view when choosing a subject of +research 38 + + +CHAPTER II + +"AUXILIARY SCIENCES" + +Documents are raw material, and need a preliminary elaboration 42 + +Obsolete views on the historian's apprenticeship--Mably, +Daunou 43 + +Commonplace and exaggeration on this subject--Freeman--Various +futilities 45 + +The scientific conception of the historian's +apprenticeship--Palæography--Epigraphy--Philology--Diplomatic 48 + +History of Literature--Archæology 51 + +Criticism of phrase "auxiliary sciences"--The subjects not all +_sciences_--None of them auxiliary to the _whole_ of History 52 + +This scientific conception is of recent growth--The École des +Chartes--Modern manuals of Palæography, Epigraphy, +&c.--List of the chief of them 55 + + +BOOK II + + +_ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS_ + +CHAPTER I + +GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE + +Direct and indirect knowledge of facts 63 + +History not a science of direct observation--Its data obtained +by chains of reasoning 64 + +Twofold division of Historical Criticism: _External_, investigating +the transmission and origin of documents and the +statements in them; _Internal_, dealing with the content +of the statements and their probability 66 + +Complexity of Historical Criticism 67 + +Necessity of Criticism--The human mind naturally uncritical 68 + + +SECTION I.--EXTERNAL CRITICISM + + +CHAPTER II + +TEXTUAL CRITICISM + +Errors in the reproduction of documents: their frequency +under the most favourable conditions--Mistakes of +copyists--"Sound" and "corrupt" texts 71 + +Necessity of emendation--The method subject to fixed rules 73 + +Methods of textual criticism: (_a_) original preserved; (_b_) a +single copy preserved, conjectural emendation; (_c_) several +copies preserved, comparison of errors, families of manuscripts 75 + +Different degrees of difficulty of textual criticism: its results +negative--The "emendation game"--What still remains +to be done 83 + + +CHAPTER III + +CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP + PAGE +Natural tendency to accept indications of authorship--Examples +of false attributions--Necessity of verification--Application +of internal criticism 87 + +Interpolations and continuations--Evidence of style 92 + +Plagiarism and borrowings by authors from each other--The +filiation of statements--The investigation of sources 93 + +Importance of investigations of authorship--The extreme of +distrust to be avoided--Criticism only a means to an end 98 + +CHAPTER IV + +CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES + +Importance of classification--The first impulse wrong--The +note-book system not the best--Nor the ledger-system--Nor +the "system" of trusting the memory 101 + +The system of slips the best--Its drawbacks--Means of +obviating them--The advantage of good "private librarianship" 103 + +Methods of work vary according to the object aimed at--The +compiling of _Regesta_ or of a _Corpus_--Classification by +time, place, species, and form 105 + +Chronological arrangement to be used when possible--Geographical +arrangement best for inscriptions--When these +fail, alphabetical order of "incipit"--Logical order useful +for some special purposes--Not for a _Corpus_ or for _Regesta_ 107 + +CHAPTER V + +CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS + +Different opinions on the importance and dignity of external +criticism--It is justified by its necessity--But is only +preliminary to the higher part of historical work 112 + + +Distinction between "historians" and "critical scholars" [Fr. +"_érudite_"]--Expediency, within limits, of the division of +labour in this respect--The exceptional skill acquired by +specialists--Difference of work the corollary of difference +of natural aptitudes 115 + +The natural aptitudes required for external criticism--Fondness +for the work, which is distasteful to the creative +genius--The puzzle-solving instinct--Accuracy and its +opposite--"Froude's Disease"--Patience, order, perseverance 121 + +The mental defects produced by devotion to external +criticism--Its paralysing effect on the +over-scrupulous--Hypercriticism--Dilettantism 128 + +The "organisation of scientific labour" 135 + +The harshness of judgment attributed to scholars, not always +rightly--Much of it a proper jealousy for historic truth--Bad +work nowadays soon detected 136 + + +SECTION II.--INTERNAL CRITICISM + +CHAPTER VI + +INTERPRETATIVE CRITICISM (HERMENEUTIC) + +Internal criticism deals with the mental operations which +begin with the observation of a fact and end with the +writing of words in a document--It is divided into two +stages: the first concerned with what the author meant, +the second with the value of his statements 141 + +Necessity of separating the two operations--Danger of reading +opinions into a text 143 + +The analysis of documents--The method of slips--Completeness +necessary 145 + +Necessity of linguistic study--General knowledge of a language +not enough--Particular variety of a language as used at a +given time, in a given country, by a given author--The +rule of context 146 + +Different degrees of difficulty in interpretation 149 + +Oblique senses: allegory, metaphor, &c.--How to detect them--Former +tendency to find symbolism everywhere--Modern +tendency to find allusion everywhere 151 + +Results of interpretation--Subjective inquiries 153 + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE GOOD FAITH +AND ACCURACY OF AUTHORS + +Natural tendency to trust documents--Criticism originally due +to contradictions--The rule of methodical doubt--Defective +modes of criticism 155 + +Documents to be analysed, and the irreducible elements +criticised separately 159 + +The "accent of sincerity"--No trust to be placed in impressions +produced by the form of statements 161 + +Criticism examines the conditions affecting (1) the composition +of the document as a whole; (2) the making of each particular +statement--In both cases using a previously made +list of possible reasons for distrust or confidence 162 + +Reasons for doubting good faith: (1) the author's interest; +(2) the force of circumstances, official reports; (3) sympathy +and antipathy; (4) vanity; (5) deference to public +opinion; (6) literary distortion 166 + +Reasons for doubting accuracy: (1) the author a bad observer, +hallucinations, illusions, prejudices; (2) the author not +well situated for observing; (3) negligence and indifference; +(4) fact not of nature to be directly observed 172 + +Cases where the author is not the original observer of the +fact--Tradition, written and oral--Legend--Anecdotes--Anonymous +statements 177 + +Special reasons without which anonymous statements are not +to be accepted: (1) falsehood improbable because (_a_) the +fact is opposed to interest or vanity of author, (_b_) the fact +was generally known, (_c_) the fact was indifferent to the +author; (2) error improbable because the fact was too big +to mistake; (3) the fact seemed improbable or unintelligible +to the author 185 + +How critical operations are shortened in practice 189 + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR FACTS + +The conceptions of authors, whether well or ill founded, are +the subject-matter of certain studies--They necessarily +contain elements of truth, which, under certain restrictions, +may sometimes be inferred from them 191 + +The statements of authors, taken singly, do not rise above +probability--The only _sure_ results of criticism are _negative_--To +establish facts it is necessary to compare different +statements 194 + +Contradictions between statements, real and apparent 198 + +Agreement of statements--Necessity of proving them to be +independent--Perfect agreement not so conclusive as +occasional coincidence--Cases where different observations +of the same fact are not independent--General facts +the easiest to prove 199 + +Different facts, each imperfectly proved, corroborate each +other when they harmonise 204 + +Disagreement between documents and other sources of +knowledge--Improbable statements--Miracles--When science +and history conflict, history should give way 205 + + +BOOK III + +_SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS_ + + +CHAPTER I + +GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION + +The materials of Historical Construction are isolated facts, +of very different kinds, of very different degrees of +generality, each belonging to a definite time and place, +of different degrees of certainty 211 + +Subjectivity of History 214 + +The facts learnt from documents relate to (1) living beings +and material objects; (2) actions, individual and collective; +(3) motives and conceptions 217 + +The facts of the past must be imagined on the model of those +of the present--Danger of error especially in regard to +mental facts 219 + +Some of the conditions of human life are permanent--The +study of these provides a framework into which details +taken from documents are to be fitted--For this purpose +systematic lists of questions are to be used, drawn up +beforehand, and relating to the universal conditions of life 224 + +Outline of Historical Construction--The division of +labour--Historians must use the works of their colleagues and +predecessors, but not without critical precautions 228 + +CHAPTER II + +THE GROUPING OF FACTS + +Historical facts may be classified and arranged either according +to their time and place, or according to their nature--Scheme +for the _logical_ classification of general historical +facts 232 + +The selection of facts for treatment--The history of civilisation +and "battle-history"--Both needed 236 + +The determination of groups of men--Precautions to be +observed--The notion of "race" 238 + +The study of institutions--Danger of being misled by metaphors--The +questions which should be asked 241 + +Evolutions: operations involved in the study of them--The +place of particular facts (events) in evolution--Important +and unimportant facts 244 + +Periods--How they should be defined 249 + +CHAPTER III + +CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING + +Incompleteness of the facts yielded by documents--Cautions +to be observed in filling up the gaps by reasoning 252 + +The argument from silence--When admissible 254 + +Positive reasoning based on documents--The general principles +employed must enter into details, and the particular +facts to which they are applied must not be taken in +isolation 256 + +CHAPTER IV + +THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULÆ + +History, like every science, needs formulæ by which the facts +acquired may be condensed into manageable form 262 + +Descriptive formulæ--Should retain characteristic features--Should +be as concrete as possible 264 + +Formulæ describing general facts--How constructed--Conventional +forms and realities--Mode of formulating an +evolution 266 + +Formulæ describing unique facts--Principle of choice--"Character" +of persons--Precautions in formulating +them--Formulæ describing events 270 + +Quantitative formulæ--Operations by which they may be +obtained: measurement, enumeration, valuation, sampling, +generalisation--Precautions to be observed in generalising 274 + +Formulæ expressing relations--General conclusions--Estimation +of the extent and value of the knowledge acquired--Imperfection +of data not to be forgotten in construction 279 + +Groups and their classification 282 + +The "solidarity" of social phenomena--Necessity of studying +causes--Metaphysical hypothesis--Providence--Conception +of events as "rational"--The Hegelian "ideas"--The +historical "mission"--The theory of the general +progress of humanity 285 + +The conception of society as an organism--The comparative +method--Statistics--Causes cannot be investigated +directly, as in other sciences--Causation as exhibited in +the sequence of particular events 288 + +The study of the causes of social evolution must look beyond +abstractions to the concrete, acting and thinking men--The +place of hereditary characteristics in determining +evolution 292 + + +CHAPTER V + +EXPOSITION + +Former conceptions of history-writing--The ancient and +mediæval ideal--The "history of civilisation"--The +modern historical "manual"--The romantic ideal at the +beginning of the century--History regarded as a branch +of literature up to 1850 296 + +The modern scientific ideal--Monographs--Right choice of +subject--References--Chronological order--Unambiguous +titles--Economy of erudition 303 + +General works--_A._ meant for students and specialists--Works +of reference or "repertories" and scientific manuals of +special branches of history--Their form and style--Collaboration +in their production--Scientific general +histories 307 + +_B._ Works intended for the public--The best kind of +popularisation--The inferior kind--Specialists who lower their +standard when they write for the public--The literary +style suitable for history 311 + + +CONCLUSION + +Summary description of the methods of history--The future +of history 316 + +The utility of history--Not directly applicable to present +conditions--Affords an explanation of the present--Helps +(and is helped by) the social sciences--A means of intellectual +culture 319 + + +APPENDIX I + +THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE + +Late introduction of history as a subject of secondary +instruction--Defective methods employed up to the end of the +Second Empire 325 + +The reform movement--Questions involved relating to general +organisation--Choice of subjects--Order of teaching--Methods +of instruction--These questions to be answered +in the way that will make history most useful as a means +of social culture 328 + +Material aids--Engravings--Books--Methods of teaching 332 + + +APPENDIX II + +THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE + +The different institutions--The Collège de France--The +Faculties of Letters--The École Normale--The École des +Chartes--The École pratique des hautes Études 335 + +Reform of the Faculties--Preparation for degrees--The +Examination question--Principles on which it is to be +solved--The _Diplôme d'études supérieures_ 340 + +Influence of the movement on the other institutions--Co-operation +of the institutions 345 + + +INDEX OF PROPER NAMES 347 + + + + +AUTHORS' PREFACE + + +The title of this work is clear. However, it is necessary to state +succinctly both what our intention has, and what it has not been; for +under this same title, "Introduction to the Study of History," very +different books have already been published. + +It has not been our intention to give, as Mr. W. B. Boyce[1] has done, a +summary of universal history for the use of beginners and readers of +scanty leisure. + +Nor has it been our intention to add a new item to the abundant +literature of what is ordinarily called the "Philosophy of History." +Thinkers, for the most part not professed historians, have made history +the subject of their meditations; they have sought for its "analogies" +and its "laws." Some have supposed themselves to have discovered "the +laws which have governed the development of humanity," and thus to have +"raised history to the rank of a positive science."[2] These vast +abstract constructions inspire with an invincible _a priori_ mistrust, +not the general public only, but superior minds as well. Fustel de +Coulanges, as his latest biographer tells us, was severe on the +Philosophy of History; these systems were as repugnant to him as +metaphysics to the positivists. Rightly or wrongly (without doubt +wrongly), the Philosophy of History, not having been cultivated +exclusively by well-informed, cautious men of vigorous and sound +judgment, has fallen into disrepute. The reader will be reassured--or +disappointed, as the case may be--to learn that this subject will find +no place in the present work.[3] + +We propose to examine the conditions and the methods, to indicate the +character and the limits, of historical knowledge. How do we ascertain, +in respect of the past, what part of it it is possible, what part of it +it is important, to know? What is a document? How are documents to be +treated with a view to historical work? What are historical facts? How +are they to be grouped to make history? Whoever occupies himself with +history performs, more or less unconsciously, complicated operations of +criticism and construction, of analysis and synthesis. But beginners, +and the majority of those who have never reflected on the principles of +historical methodology, make use, in the performance of these +operations, of instinctive methods which, not being, in general, +rational methods, do not usually lead to scientific truth. It is, +therefore, useful to make known and logically justify the theory of the +truly rational methods--a theory which is now settled in some parts, +though still incomplete in some points of capital importance. + +The present "Introduction to the Study of History" is thus intended, not +as a summary of ascertained facts or a system of general ideas on +universal history, but as an essay on the method of the historical +sciences. + +We proceed to state the reasons why we have thought such a work +opportune, and to explain the spirit in which we have undertaken to +write it. + + +I + +The books which treat of the methodology of the historical sciences are +scarcely less numerous, and at the same time not in much better favour, +than the books on the Philosophy of History. Specialists despise them. A +widespread opinion is expressed in the words attributed to a certain +scholar: "You wish to write a book on philology; you will do much better +to produce a book with some good philology in it. When I am asked to +define philology, I always answer that it is what I work at."[4] Again, +in reference to J. G. Droysen's _Précis of the Science of History_, a +certain critic expressed an opinion which was meant to be, and was, a +commonplace: "Generally speaking, treatises of this kind are of +necessity both obscure and useless: obscure, because there is nothing +more vague than their object; useless, because it is possible to be an +historian without troubling oneself about the principles of historical +methodology which they claim to exhibit."[5] The arguments used by these +despisers of methodology are strong enough in all appearance. They +reduce to the following. As a matter of fact, there are men who +manifestly follow good methods, and are universally recognised as +scholars or historians of the first order, without having ever studied +the principles of method; conversely, it does not appear that those who +have written on historical method from the logical point of view have in +consequence attained any marked superiority as scholars or historians: +some, indeed, have been known for their incompetence or mediocrity in +these capacities. In this there is nothing that need surprise us. Who +would think of postponing original research in chemistry, mathematics, +the sciences proper, until he had studied the methods employed in those +sciences? Historical criticism! Yes, but the best way to learn it is to +apply it; practice teaches all that is wanted.[6] Take, too, the extant +works on historical method, even the most recent of them, those of J. G. +Droysen, E. A. Freeman, A. Tardif, U. Chevalier, and others; the utmost +diligence will extract from them nothing in the way of clear ideas +beyond the most obvious and commonplace truisms.[7] + +We willingly recognise that this manner of thinking is not entirely +wrong. The great majority of works on the method of pursuing historical +investigations and of writing history--what is called _Historic_ in +Germany and England--are superficial, insipid, unreadable, sometimes +ridiculous.[8] To begin with, those prior to the nineteenth century, a +full analysis of which is given by P. C. F. Daunou in the seventh volume +of his _Cours d'études historiques_,[9] are nearly all of them mere +treatises on rhetoric, in which the rhetoric is antiquated, and the +problems discussed are the oddest imaginable.[10] Daunou makes merry +over them, but he himself has shown good sense and nothing more in his +monumental work, which at the present time seems little better, and +certainly not more useful, than the earlier treatises.[11] As to the +modern ones, it is true that not all have been able to escape the two +dangers to which works of this character are exposed--that of being +obscure on the one hand, or commonplace on the other. J. G. Droysen's +_Grundriss der Historik_ is heavy, pedantic, and confused beyond all +imagination.[12] Freeman, Tardif, and Chevalier tell us nothing but what +is elementary and obvious. Their followers may still be observed +discussing at interminable length idle questions, such as: whether +history is a science or an art; what are the duties of history; what is +the use of history; and so on. On the other hand, there is incontestable +truth in the remark that nearly all the specialists and historians of +to-day are, as far as method goes, self-taught, with no training except +what they have gained by practice, or by imitating and associating with +the older masters of the craft. + +But though many works on the principles of method justify the distrust +with which such works are generally regarded, and though most professed +historians have been able, apparently with no ill results, to dispense +with reflection upon historical method, it would, in our opinion, be a +strained inference to conclude that specialists and historians +(especially those of the future) have no need to make themselves +acquainted with the processes of historical work. The literature of +methodology is, in fact, not without its value: gradually there has been +formed a treasury of subtle observations and precise rules, suggested by +experience, which are something more than mere common sense.[13] And, +admitting the existence of those who, without having ever learnt to +reason, always reason well, by a gift of nature, it would be easy to set +against these exceptions innumerable cases in which ignorance of logic, +the use of irrational methods, want of reflection on the conditions of +historical analysis and synthesis, have robbed the work of specialists +and historians of much of its value. + +The truth is, that, of all branches of study, history is without a doubt +the one in which it is most necessary for students to have a clear +consciousness of the methods they use. The reason is, that in history +instinctive methods are, as we cannot too often repeat, irrational +methods; some preparation is therefore required to counteract the first +impulse. Besides, the rational methods of obtaining historical knowledge +differ so widely from the methods of all other sciences, that some +perception of their distinctive features is necessary to avoid the +temptation of applying to history the methods of those sciences which +have already been systematised. This explains why mathematicians and +chemists can, more easily than historians, dispense with an +"introduction" to their subject. There is no need to insist at greater +length on the utility of historical methodology, for there is evidently +nothing very serious in the attacks which have been made on it. But it +behooves us to explain the reasons which have led to the composition of +the present work. For the last fifty years a great number of intelligent +and open-minded men have meditated on the methods of the historical +sciences. Naturally we find among them many historians, university +professors, whose position enables them to understand better than others +the intellectual needs of the young; but at the same time professed +logicians, and even novelists. In this connection, Fustel de Coulanges +left a tradition behind him at the University of Paris. "He +endeavoured," we are told,[14] "to reduce the rules of method to very +precise formulæ ...; in his view no task was more urgent than that of +teaching students how to attain truth." Among these men, some, like +Renan,[15] have been content to insert scattered observations in their +general works or their occasional writings;[16] others, as Fustel de +Coulanges, Freeman, Droysen, Laurence, Stubbs, De Smedt, Von +Pflugk-Harttung, and so on, have taken the trouble to express their +thoughts on the subject in special treatises. There are many books, +"inaugural lectures," "academic orations," and review-articles, +published in all countries, but especially in France, Germany, England, +the United States, and Italy, both on the whole subject of methodology +and on the different parts of it. It will occur to the reader that it +would be a far from useless labour to collect and arrange the +observations which are scattered, and, one might say, lost, in these +numerous books and minor writings. But it is too late to undertake this +pleasant task; it has been recently performed, and in the most +painstaking manner. Professor Ernst Bernheim, of the University of +Greifswald, has worked through nearly all the modern works on historical +method, and the fruit of his labours is an arrangement under appropriate +headings, most of them invented by himself, of a great number of +reflections and selected references. His _Lehrbuch der historischen +Methode_[17] (Leipzig, 1894, 8vo) condenses, in the manner of German +_Lehrbücher_, the special literature of the subject of which it treats. +It is not our intention to do over again what has already been done so +well. But we are of opinion that even after this laborious and +well-planned compilation something still remains to be said. In the +first place, Professor Bernheim deals largely with metaphysical problems +which we consider devoid of interest; while, conversely, he entirely +ignores certain considerations which appear to us to be, both +theoretically and practically, of the greatest importance. In the second +place, the teaching of the _Lehrbuch_ is sound enough, but lacks vigour +and originality. Lastly, the _Lehrbuch_ is not addressed to the general +public; both the language in which it is written and the form in which +it is composed render it inaccessible to the great majority of French +readers. This is enough to justify our undertaking to write a book of +our own, instead of simply recommending the book of Professor +Bernheim.[18] + + +II + +This "Introduction to the Study of History" does not claim, like the +_Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_, to be a treatise on historical +methodology.[19] It is a sketch in outline. We undertook its +composition, at the beginning of the scholastic year 1896-97, in order +that the new students at the Sorbonne might be warned what the study of +history is and ought to be. + +Long experience has taught us the necessity of such warnings. The +greater part of those who enter upon a career of historical study do so, +as a matter of fact, without knowing why, without having ever asked +themselves whether they are fitted for historical work, of the true +nature of which they are often ignorant. Generally their motives for +choosing an historical career are of the most futile character. One has +been successful in history at college;[20] another feels himself drawn +towards the past by the same kind of romantic attraction which, we are +told, determined the vocation of Augustin Thierry; some are misled by +the fancy that history is a comparatively easy subject. It is certainly +important that these irrational votaries should be enlightened and put +to the test as soon as possible. + +Having given a course of lectures, to novices, by way of "Introduction +to the Study of History," we thought that, with a little revision, these +lectures might be made useful to others besides novices. Scholars and +professed historians will doubtless have nothing to learn from this +work; but if they should find in it a stimulus to personal reflection on +the craft which some of them practise in a mechanical fashion, that +would be something gained. As for the public, which reads the works of +historians, is it not desirable that it should know how these works are +produced, in order to be able to judge them better? + +We do not, therefore, like Professor Bernheim, write exclusively for +present and future specialists, but also for the public interested in +history. We thus lay ourselves under an obligation to be as concise, as +clear, and as little technical as possible. But to be concise and clear +on subjects of this kind often means to appear superficial. Commonplace +on the one hand, obscurity on the other: these, as we have already seen, +are the evils between which we have the sorry privilege of choosing. We +admit the difficulty. But we do not think it insurmountable, and our +endeavour has been to say what we had to say in the clearest possible +manner. + +The first half of the book has been written by M. Langlois, the second +by M. Seignobos; but the two collaborators have constantly aided, +consulted, and checked each other.[21] + +PARIS, _August 1897_. + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HISTORY + +BOOK I + +PRELIMINARY STUDIES + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS (HEURISTIC) + + +The historian works with documents. Documents are the traces which have +been left by the thoughts and actions of men of former times. Of these +thoughts and actions, however, very few leave any visible traces, and +these traces, when there are any, are seldom durable; an accident is +enough to efface them. Now every thought and every action that has left +no visible traces, or none but what have since disappeared, is lost for +history; is as though it had never been. For want of documents the +history of immense periods in the past of humanity is destined to remain +for ever unknown. For there is no substitute for documents: no +documents, no history. + +In order to draw legitimate inferences from a document to the fact of +which it is the trace, numerous precautions are requisite which will be +indicated in the sequel. But it is clear that, prior to any critical +examination or interpretation of documents, the question presents itself +whether there are any documents at all, how many there are, and where +they are. If I undertake to deal with a point of history,[22] of +whatever nature, my first step will be to ascertain the place or places +where the documents necessary for its treatment, if any such exist, are +to be found. The search for and the collection of documents is thus a +part, logically the first and most important part, of the historian's +craft. In Germany it has received the convenient, because short, name of +_Heuristik_. Is there any need to prove the capital importance of +Heuristic? Assuredly not. It is obvious that if it is neglected, if the +student does not, before he sets to work on a point of history, place +himself in a position to command all accessible sources of information, +his risk (no small one at the best) of working upon insufficient data is +quite unnecessarily increased: works of erudition or history constructed +in accordance with the rules of the most exact method have been +vitiated, or even rendered worthless, by the accidental circumstance +that the author was unacquainted with the documents by which those which +he had within reach, and with which he was content, might have been +illustrated, supplemented, or discredited. The scholars and historians +of to-day, standing, as they do, in other respects on an equality with +their predecessors of the last few centuries, are only enabled to +surpass them by their possession of more abundant means of +information.[23] Heuristic is, in fact, easier to-day than it used to +be, although the honest Wagner has still good grounds for saying: + + "Wie schwer sind nicht die Mittel zu erwerben, + Durch die man zu den Quellen steigt!"[24] + +Let us endeavour to explain why the collection of documents, once so +laborious, is still no easy matter, in spite of the progress made in the +last century; and how this essential operation may, in the course of +continued progress, be still further simplified. + + +I. Those who first endeavoured to write history from the sources found +themselves in an embarrassing situation. Were the events they proposed +to relate recent, so that all the witnesses of them were not yet dead? +They had the resource of interviewing the witnesses who survived. +Thucydides, Froissart, and many others have followed this procedure. +When Mr. H. H. Bancroft, the historian of the Pacific Coast of +California, resolved to collect materials for the history of events many +of the actors in which were still alive, he mobilised a whole army of +reporters charged to extract conversations from them.[25] But when the +events to be related were ancient, so that no man then living could have +witnessed them, and no account of them had been preserved by oral +tradition, what then? Nothing was left but to collect documents of every +kind, principally written ones, relating to the distant past which was +to be studied. This was a difficult task at a time when libraries were +rare, archives secret, and documents scattered. About the year 1860, Mr. +Bancroft, in California, was in a situation analogous to that of the +earlier researchers in our part of the world. His plan was as follows: +He was rich; he cleared the market of all documents, printed or +manuscript; he negotiated with financially embarrassed families and +corporations for the purchase of their archives, or the permission to +have them copied by his paid agents. This done, he housed his collection +in premises built for the purpose, and classified it. Theoretically +there could not be a more rational procedure. But this rapid, American +method has only once been employed with sufficient resources and +sufficient consistency to ensure its success; at any other time, and in +any other place, it would have been out of the question. Nowhere else +have the circumstances been so favourable for it. + +At the epoch of the Renaissance the documents of ancient and modern +history were scattered in innumerable private libraries and in +innumerable depositories of archives, almost all of them inaccessible, +not to mention those which lay hidden beneath the soil, their very +existence as yet unsuspected. It was at that time a physical +impossibility to procure a list of all the documents serving for the +elucidation of a question (for example, a list of all the manuscripts +still preserved of an ancient work); and if, by a miracle, such a list +was to be had, it was another impossibility to consult all these +documents except at the cost of journeys, expenses, and negotiations +without end. Consequences easy to foresee did, as a matter of fact, +ensue. Firstly, the difficulties of Heuristic being insurmountable, the +earliest scholars and historians--employing, as they did, not all the +documents, nor the best documents, but those documents on which they +could lay their hands--were nearly always ill-informed; and their works +are now without interest except so far as they are founded on documents +which have since been lost. Secondly, the first scholars and historians +to be relatively well-informed were those who, in virtue of their +profession, had access to rich storehouses of documents--librarians, +keepers of archives, monks, magistrates, whose order or whose +corporation possessed libraries or archives of considerable extent.[26] + +It is true that collectors soon arose who, by money payments, or by more +questionable expedients, such as theft, formed, with more or less regard +for the interests of scientific study, "cabinets" of collections of +original documents, and of copies. But these European collectors, of +whom there has been a great number since the fifteenth century, differ +very noticeably from Mr. Bancroft. The Californian, in fact, only +collected documents relating to a particular subject (the history of +certain Pacific states), and his ambition was to make his collection +complete; most European collectors have acquired waifs and strays and +fragments of every description, forming, when combined, totals which +appear insignificant by the side of the huge mass of historical +documents which existed at the time. Besides, it was not, in general, +with any purpose of making them generally accessible that collectors +like Peiresc, Gaignières, Clairambault, Colbert, and many others, +withdrew from circulation documents which were in danger of being lost; +they were content (and it was creditable to do as much as this) to share +them, more or less freely, with their friends. But collectors (and their +heirs) are fickle people, and sometimes eccentric in their notions. +Certainly it is better that documents should be preserved in private +collections, than that they should be entirely unprotected and +absolutely inaccessible to the scientific worker; but in order that +Heuristic should be made really easier, the first condition is that all +collections of documents should be _public_.[27] + +Now the finest private collections of documents--libraries and museums +combined--were naturally, in the Europe of the Renaissance, those +possessed by kings. And while other private collections were often +dispersed upon the death of their founders, these, on the contrary, +never ceased to grow; they were enriched, indeed, by the wreckage of all +the others. The _Cabinet des manuscrits de France_, for example, formed +by the French kings, and by them thrown open to the public, had, at the +end of the eighteenth century, absorbed the best part of the collections +which had been the personal work of the amateurs and scholars of the two +preceding centuries.[28] Similarly in other countries. The concentration +of a great number of historical documents in vast public (or +semi-public) establishments was the fortunate result of this spontaneous +evolution. + +The arbitrary proceedings of the Revolution were still more favourable, +and still more effective in securing the amelioration of the material +conditions of historical research. The Revolution of 1789 in France, +analogous movements in other countries, led to the violent confiscation, +for the profit of the state (that is, of everybody), of a host of +private archives and collections--the archives, libraries, and museums +of the crown, the archives and libraries of monasteries and suppressed +corporations, and so on. In France, in 1790, the Constituent Assembly +thus placed the state in possession of a great number of depositories of +historical documents, previously scattered, and guarded more or less +jealously from the curiosity of scholars; these treasures have since +been divided among four different national institutions. The same +phenomenon has been more recently observed, on a smaller scale, in +Germany, Spain, and Italy. + +The confiscations of the revolutionary period, as well as the +collections of the period which preceded it, have both been productive +of serious damage. The collector is, or rather often was, a barbarian +who did not hesitate, when he saw a chance of adding to his collection +of specimens and rare remains, to mutilate monuments, to dissect +manuscripts, to break up whole archives, in order to possess himself of +the fragments. On this score many acts of vandalism were perpetrated +before the Revolution. Naturally, the revolutionary procedure of +confiscation and transference was also productive of lamentable +consequences; besides the destruction which was the result of negligence +and that which was due to the mere pleasure of destroying, the +unfortunate idea arose that collections might be systematically +_weeded_, those documents only to be preserved which were "interesting" +or "useful," the rest to be got rid of. The task of weeding was +entrusted to well-meaning but incompetent and overworked men, who were +thus led to commit irreparable havoc in our ancient archives. At the +present day there are workers engaged in the task, one requiring an +extraordinary amount of time, patience, and care, of restoring the +dismembered collections, and replacing the fragments which were then +isolated in so brutal a manner by these zealous but unreflecting +manipulators of historical documents. It must be recognised, moreover, +that the mutilations due to revolutionary activity and the +pre-revolutionary collectors are insignificant in comparison with those +which are the result of accident and the destructive work of time. But +had they been ten times as serious, they would have been amply +compensated by two advantages of the first importance, on which we +cannot lay too much stress: (1) the concentration, in a relatively small +number of depositories, of documents which were formerly scattered, and, +as it were, lost, in a hundred different places; (2) the opening of +these depositories to the public. The remnant of historical documents +which has survived the destructive effects of accident and vandalism is +now at last safely housed, classified, made accessible, and treated as +public property. + +Ancient historical documents are now, as we have seen, collected and +preserved chiefly in those public institutions which are called +archives, libraries, and museums. It is true that this does not apply to +_all_ existing documents; in spite of the unceasing acquisitions by +purchase and gift which archives, libraries, and museums all over the +world have been making every year for a long time past, there still +exist private collections, dealers who supply them, and documents in +circulation. But the exceptions, which in this case are negligeable, do +not affect the general rule. Besides, all the ancient documents which, +in limited quantity, still range at large, are destined sooner or later +to find their way into the state institutions, whose doors are always +open to let in, but never to let out.[29] + +It is to be desired, as a matter of principle, that the depositories of +documents (archives, libraries, and museums) should not be too numerous; +and we have pointed out that, fortunately, they are now beyond +comparison less numerous than they were a hundred years ago. Could not +the centralisation of documents, with its evident advantages for +researchers, be carried still further? Are there not still collections +of documents of which it would be hard to justify the separate +existence? Perhaps;[30] but the problem of the centralisation of +documents is no longer urgent, now that the processes of reproduction +have been perfected, especially as the inconveniences arising from a +multitude of depositories are met by the expedient, now in general use, +of allowing the documents to travel: it is now possible for the student +to consult, without expense, in the public library of the city where he +resides, documents belonging, say, to the libraries of St. Petersburg, +Brussels, and Florence; we now rarely meet with institutions like the +Archives Nationales at Paris, the British Museum at London, and the +Méjanes Library at Aix-en-Provence, whose statutes absolutely prohibit +all lending-out of their contents.[31] + + +II. It being granted that the majority of historical documents are now +preserved in public institutions (archives, libraries, and museums), +Heuristic would be very easy if only good descriptive catalogues had +been drawn up of all the existing collections of documents, if these +catalogues were furnished with indexes, or if general repertories +(alphabetical, systematic, &c.) had been made relating to them; lastly, +if there were some place where it was possible to consult the complete +collection of all these catalogues and their indexes. But Heuristic is +still difficult, because these conditions are, unfortunately, still very +far from being adequately realised. + +Firstly, there are depositories of documents (archives, libraries, and +museums) whose contents have never been even partially catalogued, so +that no one knows what is in them. The depositories of which we possess +complete descriptive catalogues are rare; there are many collections +preserved in celebrated institutions which have only been catalogued in +part, and the bulk of which still remains to be described.[32] In the +second place, what a variety there is among existing catalogues! There +are some old ones which do not now correspond to the present +classification of documents, and which cannot be used without +reference-tables; there are new ones which are equally based on obsolete +systems, too detailed or too summary; some are printed, others in +manuscript, on registers or slips; some are carefully executed and +clear, many are scamped, inadequate, and provisional. Taking printed +catalogues alone, it requires a whole apprenticeship to learn to +distinguish, in this enormous mass of confusion, between what is +trustworthy and what is not; in other words, to make any use of them at +all. Lastly, where are the existing catalogues to be consulted? Most of +the great libraries only possess incomplete collections of them; there +is no general guide to them anywhere. + +This is a deplorable state of things. In fact, the documents contained +in uncatalogued depositories and collections are practically +non-existent for researchers who have no leisure to work through the +whole of their contents for themselves. We have said before: no +documents, no history. But to have no good descriptive catalogues of +collections of documents means, in practice, to be unable to ascertain +the existence of documents otherwise than by chance. We infer that the +progress of history depends in great measure on the progress of the +general catalogue of historical documents which is still fragmentary and +imperfect. On this point there is general agreement. Père Bernard de +Montfaucon considered his _Bibliotheca bibliothecarum manuscriptarum +nova_, a collection of library catalogues, as "the most useful and most +interesting work he had produced in his whole life."[33] "In the present +state of science," wrote Renan in 1848,[34] "nothing is wanted more +urgently than a critical catalogue of the manuscripts in the different +libraries ... a humble task to all appearance; ... and yet the +researches of scholars are hampered and incomplete pending its +definitive completion." "We should have better books on our ancient +literature," says M. P. Meyer,[35] "if the predecessors of M. Delisle +[in his capacity of administrator of the Bibliothèque Nationale at +Paris] had applied themselves with equal ardour and diligence to the +cataloguing of the treasures committed to their care." + +It will be well to indicate briefly the causes and state the exact +consequences of a state of things which has been deplored as long as +scholars have existed, and which is improving, though slowly. "I assure +you," said Renan,[36] "that the few hundred thousand francs a Minister +of Public Instruction might apply to the purpose [of preparing +catalogues] would be better employed than three-quarters of the sum now +devoted to literature." It is rare to find a minister, in France or +elsewhere, convinced of this truth, and resolute enough to act +accordingly. Besides, it has not always been true that, in order to +obtain good catalogues, it is sufficient, as well as necessary, to make +a pecuniary sacrifice: it is only recently that the best methods of +describing documents have been authoritatively fixed; the task of +recruiting competent workers--no great difficulty nowadays--would have +been neither easy nor free from anxiety at an epoch when competent +workers were rarer than they are now. So much for the material +obstacles--want of money and want of men. A cause of another kind has +not been without its influence. The functionaries charged with the +administration of depositories of documents have not always displayed +the zeal which they now display for making their collections accessible +by means of accurate catalogues. To prepare a catalogue (in the exact +and at the same time summary form which is now used) is a laborious +task, a task without joy and without reward. It has often happened that +such a functionary, living, in virtue of his office, in the midst of +documents which he is at liberty to consult at any moment, and placed in +a much more favourable position than the general public for utilising +the collection without the aid of a catalogue, and making discoveries in +the process, has preferred to work for himself rather than for others, +and made the tedious construction of a catalogue a secondary matter +compared with his personal researches. + +Who are the persons that in our own day have discovered, published, and +annotated the greatest number of documents? The functionaries attached +to the depositories of documents. Without a doubt this circumstance has +retarded the progress of the general catalogue of historical documents. +The situation has been this: the persons who were the best able to +dispense with catalogues were precisely the persons whose duty it was to +make them. + +The imperfection of descriptive catalogues has consequences which +deserve our attention. On the one hand, we can never be sure that we +have exhausted all the sources of information; who knows what may be +held in reserve by the uncatalogued collections?[37] On the other hand, +in order to obtain the maximum amount of information, it is necessary to +be thoroughly acquainted with the resources furnished by the existing +literature of Heuristic, and to devote a great deal of time to +preliminary researches. In point of fact, every one who proposes to +collect documents for the treatment of a point of history begins by +consulting indexes and catalogues.[38] Novices set about this important +operation so slowly, with so little skill, and with so much effort, as +to move more experienced workers to mirth or pity, according to their +disposition. Those who find amusement in watching novices stumble and +strain and waste their time in the labyrinth of catalogues, neglecting +those which are valuable, and thoroughly exploring those which are +useless, remember that they also have passed through similar +experiences: let every one have his turn. Those who observe with regret +this waste of time and strength consider that, while inevitable up to a +certain point, it serves no good purpose; they ask whether something +might not be done to mitigate the severity of this apprenticeship to +Heuristic, which at one time cost them so dear. Besides, is not +research, in the present condition of its material aids, difficult +enough whatever the experience of the researcher? There are scholars and +historians who devote the best part of their powers to material +searches. Certain branches of historical work, relating chiefly to +mediæval and modern subjects (the documents of ancient history are +fewer, have been more studied, and are better catalogued than the +others), imply not merely the assiduous use of catalogues, not all +furnished with indexes, but also the personal inspection of the whole +contents of immense collections which are either badly catalogued or not +catalogued at all. Experience proves beyond a doubt that the prospect of +these long searches, which must be performed before the more +intellectual part of the work can be begun, has deterred, and continues +to deter, men of excellent abilities from undertaking historical work. +They are, in fact, confronted with a dilemma: either they must work on a +supply of documents which is in all probability incomplete, or they must +spend themselves in unlimited searches, often fruitless, the results of +which seldom appear worth the time they have cost. It goes against the +grain to spend a great part of one's life in turning over catalogues +without indexes, or in passing under review, one after another, all the +items which go to form accumulations of uncatalogued _miscellanea_, in +order to obtain information (positive or negative) which might have been +obtained easily and instantaneously if the collections had been +catalogued and if the catalogues had been indexed. The most serious +consequence of the present imperfection of the material aids to +Heuristic is the discouragement which is sure to be felt by many able +men who know their worth, and have some sense of the due proportion of +effort and reward.[39] + +If it lay in the nature of things that the search for historical +documents, in public depositories, must necessarily be as laborious as +it still is, we might resign ourselves to the inconvenience: no one +thinks of regretting the inevitable expenditure of time and labour which +is demanded by archæological research, whatever the results may prove to +be. But the imperfection of the modern instruments of Heuristic is quite +unnecessary. The state of things which existed for some centuries has +now been reformed indifferently; there is no valid reason why it should +not some day be reformed altogether. We are thus led, after treating of +the causes and the effects, to say a few words about the remedies. + +The instruments of Heuristic are being continually perfected, before our +eyes, in two ways. Every year witnesses an increase in the number of +descriptive catalogues of archives, libraries, and museums, prepared by +the functionaries attached to these institutions. In addition to this, +powerful learned societies employ experts to pass from one depository +to another cataloguing the documents there, in order to pick out all the +documents of a particular class, or relating to a special subject: thus +the society of Bollandists caused a general catalogue of hagiographical +documents to be prepared by its emissaries, and the Imperial Academy of +Vienna catalogued in a similar manner the monuments of patristic +literature. The society of the _Monumenta Germanioe Historica_ has for +a long time been conducting vast searches of the same kind; and it was +by the same process of exploring the museums and libraries of the whole +of Europe that the construction of the _Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum_ +was lately rendered possible. Lastly, several governments have taken the +initiative in sending abroad persons charged to catalogue, on their +behalf, documents in which they are interested: thus England, the +Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, and other governments, +grant regular subsidies to agents of theirs occupied in cataloguing and +transcribing, in the great depositories of Europe, the documents which +relate to the history of England, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the +United States, and the rest.[40] With what rapidity and with what +perfection these useful labours can be conducted, provided that a +competent staff, suitably directed, can be had as well as the money to +pay it, is shown by the history of the _general catalogue of the +manuscripts in the public libraries of France_. This excellent +descriptive catalogue was begun in 1885, and now, in 1897, it extends to +nearly fifty volumes, and will soon be completed. The _Corpus +Inscriptionum Latinarum_ will have been produced in less than fifty +years. The results obtained by the Bollandists and the Imperial Academy +of Vienna are not less conclusive. Assuredly nothing is now lacking, +except funds, to secure the speedy endowment of historical study with +the indispensable instruments of research. The methods employed in the +construction of these instruments are now permanently fixed, and it is +an easy matter to recruit a trained staff. Such a staff must evidently +be largely composed of keepers of archives and professional librarians, +but it would also contain unattached workers with a decided vocation for +the construction of catalogues and indexes. Such workers are more +numerous than one would at first be inclined to think. Not that +cataloguing is easy: it requires patience, the most scrupulous +attention, and the most varied learning; but many minds are attracted by +tasks which, like this, are at once determinate, capable of being +definitely completed, and of manifest utility. In the large and +heterogeneous family of those who labour to promote the progress of +historical study, the makers of descriptive catalogues and indexes form +a section to themselves. When they devote themselves exclusively to +their art they acquire by practice, as one might expect, a high degree +of dexterity. + +While waiting for the fact to be clearly recognised that the time is +opportune for pushing vigorously in every country the construction of a +general catalogue of historical documents, we may indicate a palliative: +it is important that scholars and historians, especially novices, should +be accurately informed of the state of the instruments of research which +are at their disposal, and be regularly apprised of any improvements +that from time to time may be made in them. Experience and accident have +been for a long time trusted to supply this information; but empirical +knowledge, besides being costly, as we have already pointed out, is +almost always imperfect. Recently the task has been undertaken of +constructing catalogues of catalogues--critical and systematic lists of +all the catalogues in existence. There can be no doubt that few +bibliographical enterprises have possessed, in so great a degree, the +character of general utility. + +But scholars and historians often need, in respect of documents, +information not usually supplied by descriptive catalogues; they wish, +for example, to know whether such and such a document is known or not, +whether it has already been critically dealt with, annotated, or +utilised.[41] This information can only be found in the works of former +scholars and historians. In order to become acquainted with these +works, recourse must be had to those "bibliographical repertories," +properly so called, of all kinds, compiled from very different points of +view, which have already been published. Among the indispensable +instruments of Heuristic must thus be reckoned bibliographical +repertories of historical literature, as well as repertories of +catalogues of original documents. + +To supply the classified list of all those repertories (repertories of +catalogues, bibliographical repertories, properly so called), together +with other appropriate information, in order to save students from +mistakes and waste of time, is the object of what we are at liberty to +call the "science of repertories," or "historical bibliography." +Professor Bernheim has published a preliminary sketch[42] of it, which +we have endeavoured to expand.[43] The expanded sketch bears date April +1896: numerous additions, not to speak of revision, would already be +necessary, for the bibliographical apparatus of the historical sciences +is being renewed, at the present time, with astonishing rapidity. A book +on the repertories for the use of scholars and historians is, as a +general rule, out of date the day after it has been completed. + + +III. The knowledge of repertories is useful to all; the preliminary +search for documents is laborious to all; but not in the same degree. +Certain parts of history, which have been long cultivated, now enjoy +the advantage of having all their documents described, collected, and +classified in large publications devoted to the purpose, so that, in +dealing with these subjects, the historian can do all that need be done +at his desk. The study of local history does not generally require more +than local search. Some important monographs are based on a small number +of documents, all belonging to the same collection, and of such a nature +that it would be superfluous to look for others elsewhere. On the other +hand, a humble piece of work, such as a modest edition of a text of +which the ancient copies are not rare, and are to be found scattered in +several libraries of Europe, may have involved inquiries, negotiations, +and journeys without end. Since the majority of the documents of +mediæval and modern history are still unedited, or badly edited, it may +be laid down as a general principle that, in order to write a really new +chapter of mediæval or modern history, it is necessary to have long +haunted the great depositories of original documents, and to have, if we +may use the expression, worried their catalogues. + +It is thus incumbent on every one to choose the subject of his labours +with the greatest care, instead of leaving it to be determined by pure +chance. There are some subjects which, in the present state of the +instruments of research, cannot be treated except at the cost of +enormous searches in which life and intellect are consumed without +profit. These subjects are not necessarily more interesting than others, +and some day, perhaps to-morrow, improvements in the aids to research +will make them easily manageable. It is necessary for the student +consciously and deliberately to make his choice between different +historical subjects depend on the existence or non-existence of +particular catalogues of documents and bibliographical repertories; on +his relative inclination for desk work on the one hand, and the labour +of exploring depositories on the other; even on the facilities he has +for making use of particular collections. "Is it possible to do work in +the provinces?" Renan asked at the congress of learned societies at the +Sorbonne in 1889; and gave a very good answer to his own question: "At +least half one's scientific work can be done at one's own desk ... Take +comparative philology, for example: with an initial outlay of some +thousands of francs, and subscriptions to three or four special +publications, a student would command all the tools of his trade ... The +same applies to universal philosophy ... Many branches of study can thus +be prosecuted quite privately, and in the closest retirement."[44] +Doubtless, but there are "rarities, specialities, researches which +require the aid of powerful machinery." One half of historical work may +now be done in private, with limited resources, but only half; the other +half still presupposes the employment of such resources, in the way of +repertories and documents, as can only be found in the great centres of +study; often, indeed, it is necessary to visit several of these centres +in succession. In short, the case stands with history much as it does +with geography: in respect of some portions of the globe, we possess +documents published in manageable form sufficiently complete and +sufficiently well classified to enable us to reason about them to good +purpose without leaving our fireside; while in the case of an unexplored +or badly explored region, the slightest monograph implies a considerable +expenditure of time and physical strength. It is dangerous to choose a +subject of study, as many do, without having first realised the nature +and extent of the preliminary researches which it demands; there are +instances of men struggling for years with such researches, who might +have been occupied to better advantage in work of another character. As +precautions against this danger, which is the more formidable to novices +the more active and zealous they are, an examination of the present +conditions of Heuristic in general, and positive notions of Historical +Bibliography, are certainly to be warmly recommended. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +"AUXILIARY SCIENCES" + + +Let us suppose that the preliminary searches, treated of in the +preceding chapter, have been made methodically and successfully; the +greater part, if not the whole, of the documents bearing on a given +subject have been discovered and made available. Of two things one: +either these documents have been already subjected to critical +elaboration, or they are in the condition of raw material; this is a +point which must be settled by "bibliographical" researches, which also, +as we have already observed, form part of the inquiries which precede +the logical part of the work. In the first case, where the documents +have already gone through a process of elaboration, it is necessary to +be in a position to verify the accuracy of the critical work; in the +second case, where the documents are still raw material, the student +must do the critical work himself. In both cases certain antecedent and +auxiliary knowledge of a positive kind, _Vor-und Hülfskenntnisse_, as +they are called, are every whit as indispensable as the habit of +accurate reasoning; for if, in the course of critical work, it is +possible to go wrong through reasoning badly, it is also possible to go +wrong out of pure ignorance. The profession of a scholar or historian +is, moreover, similar in this respect to all other professions; it is +impossible to follow it without possessing a certain equipment of +technical notions, whose absence neither natural aptitude nor even +method can make good. In what, then, does the technical _apprenticeship_ +of the scholar or the historian consist? Or, to employ language which, +though inappropriate, as we shall endeavour to show, is in more common +use: what, in addition to the knowledge of repertories, are the +"auxiliary sciences" of history? + +Daunou, in his _Cours d'études historiques_,[45] has proposed a question +of the same kind. "What studies," says he, "will the intending historian +need to have gone through, what kinds of knowledge ought he to have +acquired, in order to begin writing a work with any hope of success?" +Before him, Mably, in his _Traité de l'étude de l'histoire_, had also +recognised that "there are preparatory studies with which no historian +can dispense." But on this subject Mably and Daunou entertained views +which nowadays seem singular enough. It is instructive to mark the exact +distance which separates their point of view from ours. "First of all," +said Mably, "study the law of nature, public law, moral and political +science." Daunou, a man of great judgment, permanent secretary to the +Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, writing about 1820, divides +the studies which, in his opinion, constitute "the apprenticeship of the +historian," into three classes--literary, philosophical, historical. On +the "literary" studies he expatiates at great length: to begin with, +the historian must "have read with attention the great models." Which +great models? Daunou "does not hesitate" to place in the front rank "the +masterpieces of epic poetry;" for "it is the poets who have created the +art of narrative, and whoever has not learnt it from them cannot have +more than an imperfect knowledge of it." He further recommends the +reading of modern novels; "they will teach the method of giving an +artistic pose to persons and events, of distributing details, of +skilfully carrying on the thread of the narrative, of interrupting it, +of resuming it, of sustaining the attention and provoking the curiosity +of the reader." Finally, good historical works should be read: +"Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Plutarch among the +Greeks; Cæsar, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus among the Latins; and among +the moderns, Macchiavelli, Guicciardini, Giannone, Hume, Robertson, +Gibbon, the Cardinal de Retz, Vertot, Voltaire, Raynal, and Rulhière. +Not that I would exclude the others, but these will suffice to provide +all the styles which are suitable for history; for a great diversity of +form is to be met with in the works of these writers." In the second +place come philosophical studies; a thorough mastery of "ideology, +morals, and politics" is required. "As to the works from which knowledge +of this kind is to be obtained, Daguesseau has instanced Aristotle, +Cicero, Grotius: I should add the best ancient and modern moralists, +treatises on political economy published since the middle of the last +century, the writings on political science in general, and on its +details and application, of Macchiavelli, Bodin, Locke, Montesquieu, +Rousseau, Mably, and the most enlightened of their disciples and +commentators." In the third place, before writing history, "it is +evidently necessary to know it." "A writer will not give the world new +information on a subject like this unless he begins by making himself +master of what is already known of it." The future historian has already +made the acquaintance of the best historical works, and studied them as +models of style; "it will be to his advantage to read them a second +time, but endeavouring more particularly to grasp all the facts which +they contain, and to let them make so deep an impression on his mind +that they may be permanently fixed in his memory." + +These are the "positive" notions which, eighty years ago, were +considered indispensable to the general historian. At the same time +there was a confused idea that "in order to acquire a profound knowledge +of particular subjects" there were yet other useful branches of study. +"The subjects of which historians treat," says Daunou, "the details +which they occasionally light upon, require very extensive and varied +attainments." He goes on to particularise, observe in what terms: "very +often a knowledge of several languages, sometimes too some notion of +physics and mathematics." And he adds: "On these subjects, however, the +general education which we may assume to be common to all men of letters +is sufficient for the writer who devotes himself to historical +composition...." + +All the authors who, like Daunou, have attempted to enumerate the +preliminary attainments, as well as the moral or intellectual aptitudes, +necessary for "writing history," have either fallen into commonplace or +pitched their requirements ridiculously high. According to Freeman, the +historian ought to know everything--philosophy, law, finance, +ethnography, geography, anthropology, natural science, and what not; is +not an historian, in point of fact, likely enough in the course of his +study of the past to meet with questions of philosophy, law, finance, +and the rest of the series? And if financial science, for example, is +necessary to a writer who treats of contemporary finance, is it less so +to the writer who claims to express an opinion on the financial +questions of the past? "The historian," Freeman declares, "may have +incidentally to deal with any subject whatever, and the more branches of +knowledge he is master of, the better prepared he is for his own work." +True, all branches of human knowledge are not equally useful; some of +them are only serviceable on rare occasions, and accidentally: "We could +hardly make it even a counsel of perfection to the historian to make +himself an accomplished chemist, on the chance of an occasion in which +chemistry might be of use to him in his study;" but other special +subjects are more closely related to history: "for example, geology and +a whole group of sciences which have a close connection with geology.... +The historian will clearly do his own regular work better for being +master of them...."[46] The question has also been asked whether +"history is one of those studies anciently called _umbratiles_, for +which all that is wanted is a quiet mind and habits of industry," or +whether it is a good thing for the historian to have mingled in the +turmoil of active life, and to have helped to make the history of his +own time before sitting down to write that of the past. Indeed, what +questions have not been asked? Floods of ink have been poured out over +these uninteresting and unanswerable questions, the long and fruitless +debating of which has done not a little to discredit works on +methodology. Our opinion is that nothing relevant can be added to the +dictates of mere common sense on the subject of the apprenticeship to +the "art of writing history," unless perhaps that this apprenticeship +should consist, above everything, in the study, hitherto so generally +neglected, of the principles of historical method. + +Besides, it is not the "literary historian," the moralising and +quill-driving "historians," as conceived by Daunou and his school, that +we have had in view; we are here only concerned with those scholars and +historians who intend to deal with documents in order to facilitate or +actually perform the scientific work of history. These stand in need of +a _technical apprenticeship_. What meaning are we to attach to this +term? + +Let us suppose we have before us a written document. What use can we +make of it if we cannot read it? Up to the time of François Champollion, +Egyptian documents, being written in hieroglyphics, were, without +metaphor, a dead-letter. It will be readily admitted that in order to +deal with ancient Assyrian history it is necessary to have learnt to +decipher cuneiform inscriptions. Similarly, whoever desires to do +original work from the sources, in ancient or mediæval history, will, if +he is prudent, learn to decipher inscriptions and manuscripts. We thus +see why Greek and Latin epigraphy and mediæval palæography--that is, the +sum of the various kinds of knowledge required for the deciphering of +ancient and mediæval manuscripts and inscriptions--are considered as +"auxiliary sciences" to history, or rather, the historical study of +antiquity and the middle ages. It is evident that mediæval Latin +palæography forms part of the necessary outfit of the mediævalist, just +as the palæography of hieroglyphics is essential to the Egyptologist. +There is, however, a difference to be observed. No one will ever think +of devoting himself to Egyptology without having first studied the +appropriate palæography. On the other hand, it is not very rare for a +man to undertake the study of local documents of the middle ages without +having learnt to date their forms approximately, and to decipher their +abbreviations correctly. The resemblance which most mediæval writing +bears to modern writing is sufficiently close to foster the illusion +that ingenuity and practice will be enough to carry him through. This +illusion is dangerous. Scholars who have received no regular +palæographical initiation can almost always be recognised by the gross +errors which they commit from time to time in deciphering--errors which +are sometimes enough to completely ruin the subsequent operations of +criticism and interpretation. As for the self-taught experts who acquire +their skill by dint of practice, the orthodox palæographic initiation +which they have missed would at least have saved them much groping in +the dark, long hours of labour, and many a disappointment. + +Suppose a document has been deciphered. How is it to be turned to +account, unless it be first understood? Inscriptions in Etruscan and the +ancient language of Cambodia have been read, but no one understands +them. As long as this is the case they must remain useless. It is clear +that in order to deal with Greek history it is necessary to consult +documents in the Greek language, and therefore necessary to know Greek. +Rank truism, the reader will say. Yes, but many proceed as if it had +never occurred to them. Young students attack ancient history with only +a superficial tincture of Greek and Latin. Many who have never studied +mediæval French and Latin think they know them because they understand +classical Latin and modern French, and they attempt the interpretation +of texts whose literal meaning escapes them, or appears to be obscure +when in reality perfectly plain. Innumerable historical errors owe their +origin to false or inexact interpretations of quite straightforward +texts, perpetrated by men who were insufficiently acquainted with the +grammar, the vocabulary, or the niceties of ancient languages. Solid +philological study ought logically to precede historical research in +every instance where the documents to be employed are not to be had in a +modern language, and in a form in which they can be easily understood. + +Suppose a document is intelligible. It would not be legitimate to take +it into consideration without having verified its authenticity, if its +authenticity has not been already settled beyond a doubt. Now in order +to verify the authenticity or ascertain the origin of a document two +things are required--reasoning power and knowledge. In other words, it +is necessary to reason from certain positive data which represent the +condensed results of previous research, which cannot be improvised, and +must, therefore, be learnt. To distinguish a genuine from a spurious +charter would, in fact, be often an impossible task for the best trained +logician, if he were unacquainted with the practice of such and such a +chancery, at such and such a date, or with the features common to all +the admittedly genuine charters of a particular class. He would be +obliged to do what the first scholars did--ascertain for himself, by the +comparison of a great number of similar documents, what features +distinguish the admittedly genuine documents from the others, before +allowing himself to pronounce judgment in any special instance. Will not +his task be enormously simplified if there is in existence a body of +doctrine, a treasury of accumulated observations, a system of results +obtained by workers who have already made, repeated, and checked the +minute comparisons he would otherwise have been obliged to make for +himself? This body of doctrines, observations, and results, calculated +to assist the criticism of diplomas and charters, does exist; it is +called Diplomatic. We shall, therefore, assign to Diplomatic, along with +Epigraphy, Palæography, and Philology, the character of a subject +auxiliary to historical research. + +Epigraphy and Palæography, Philology, and Diplomatic with its adjuncts +(technical Chronology and Sphragistic) are not the only subjects of +study which subserve historical research. It would be extremely +injudicious to undertake to deal critically with literary documents on +which no critical work has as yet been done without making oneself +familiar with the results obtained by those who have already dealt +critically with documents of the same class: the sum of these results +forms a department to itself, which has a name--the History of +Literature.[47] The critical treatment of illustrative documents, such +as the productions of architecture, sculpture, and painting, objects of +all kinds (arms, dress, utensils, coins, medals, armorial bearings, and +so forth), presupposes a thorough acquaintance with the rules and +observations which constitute Archæology properly so called and its +detached branches--Numismatic and Heraldry. + +We are now in a position to examine to some purpose the hazy notion +expressed by the phrase, "the sciences auxiliary to history." We also +read of "ancillary sciences," and, in French, "sciences satellites." +None of these expressions is really satisfactory. + +First of all, the so-called "auxiliary sciences" are not all of them +_sciences_. Diplomatic, for example, and the History of Literature are +only systematised accumulations of facts, acquired by criticism, which +are of a nature to facilitate the application of critical methods to +documents hitherto untouched. On the other hand, Philology is an +organised science, and has its own laws. + +In the second place, among the branches of knowledge auxiliary--properly +speaking, not to history, but to historical research--we must +distinguish between those which every worker in the field ought to +master, and those in respect of which he needs only to know where to +look when he has occasion to make use of them; between knowledge which +ought to become part of a man's self, and information which he may be +content to possess only in potentiality. A mediævalist should _know_ how +to read and understand mediæval texts; he would gain no advantage by +accumulating in his memory the mass of particular facts pertaining to +the History of Literature and Diplomatic which are to be found, in their +proper place, in well-constructed works of reference. + +Lastly, there are no branches of knowledge which are auxiliary to +History (or even historical research) in general--that is, which are +useful to all students irrespectively of the particular part of history +on which they are engaged.[48] It appears, then, that there is no +general answer possible to the question raised at the beginning of this +chapter: in what should the technical apprenticeship of the scholar or +historian consist? In what does it consist? That depends. It depends on +the part of history he proposes to study. A knowledge of palæography is +quite useless for the purpose of investigating the history of the +French Revolution, and a knowledge of Greek is equally useless for the +treatment of a question in mediæval French history.[49] But we may go so +far as to say that the preliminary outfit of every one who wishes to do +original work in history should consist (in addition to the "common +education," that is, general culture, of which Daunou writes) in the +knowledge calculated to aid in the discovery, the understanding, and +the criticism of documents. The exact nature of this knowledge varies +from case to case according as the student specialises in one or another +part of universal history. The technical apprenticeship is relatively +short and easy for those who occupy themselves with modern or +contemporary history, long and laborious for those who occupy themselves +with ancient and mediæval history. + +This reform of the historian's technical apprenticeship which consists +in substituting the acquisition of positive knowledge, truly auxiliary +to historical research, for the study of the "great models," literary +and philosophical, is of quite recent date. In France, for the greater +part of the present century, students of history received none but a +literary education, after Daunou's pattern. Almost all of them were +contented with such a preparation, and did not look beyond it; some few +perceived and regretted, when it was too late for a remedy, the +insufficiency of their early training; with a few illustrious +exceptions, the best of them never rose to be more than distinguished +men of letters, incapable of scientific work. There was at that time no +organisation for teaching the "auxiliary sciences" and the technique of +research except in the case of French mediæval history, and that in a +special school, the École des chartes. This simple fact, moreover, +secured for this school during a period of fifty years a marked +superiority over all the other French (or even foreign) institutions of +higher education; excellent workers were there trained who contributed +many new results, while elsewhere people were idly discussing +problems.[50] To-day it is still at the École des chartes that the +mediævalist has the opportunity of going through his technical +apprenticeship in the best and most complete manner, thanks to the +combined and progressive three-years courses of Romance philology, +palæography, archæology, historiography, and mediæval law. But the +"auxiliary sciences" are now taught everywhere more or less adequately; +they have been introduced into the university curricula. On the other +hand, students' handbooks of epigraphy, palæography, diplomatic, and so +forth, have multiplied during the last twenty-five years. Twenty-five +years ago it would have been vain to look for a good book which should +supply the want of oral instruction on these subjects; since the +establishment of professorships "manuals" have appeared[51] which would +almost make them superfluous were it not that oral instruction, based on +practical exercises, has here an exceptional value. Whether a student +does or does not enjoy the advantage of a regular drilling in an +institution for higher education, he has henceforth no excuse for +remaining in ignorance of those things which he ought to know before +entering upon historical work. There is, in fact, less of this kind of +neglect than there used to be. On this head, the success of the +above-mentioned "manuals," with their rapid succession of editions, is +very significant.[52] + +Here, then, we have the future historian armed with the preliminary +knowledge, the neglect of which would have condemned him to +powerlessness or to continual mistakes. We suppose him protected from +the errors without number which have their origin in an imperfect +knowledge of the writing and the language of documents, in ignorance of +previous work and the results obtained by textual criticism; he has an +irreproachable _cognitio cogniti et cognoscendi_. A very optimistic +supposition, by the way, as we are bound to admit. We know but too well +that to have gone through a regular course of "auxiliary sciences," or +to have read attentively the best treatises on bibliography, +palæography, philology, and so on, or even to have acquired some +personal experience by practical exercises, is not enough to ensure that +a man shall always be well informed, still less to make him infallible. +In the first place, those who have for a long time studied documents of +a given class or of a given period possess, in regard to these, +incommunicable knowledge in virtue of which they are able to deal better +than others with new documents which they may meet with of the same +class or period; nothing can replace the "special erudition" which is +the specialist's reward for hard work.[53] And secondly, specialists +themselves make mistakes: palæographers must be perpetually on their +guard not to decipher falsely; is there a philologist who has not some +faults of construing on his conscience? Scholars usually well informed +have printed as unedited texts which had already been published, and +have neglected documents it was their business to know. Scholars spend +their lives in incessantly perfecting their "auxiliary" knowledge, which +they rightly regard as never perfect. But all this does not prevent us +from maintaining our hypothesis. Only let it be understood that in +practice we do not postpone work upon documents till we shall have +gained a serene and absolute mastery over all the "auxiliary branches of +knowledge:" we should never dare to begin. + +It remains to know how to treat documents supposing one has successfully +passed through the preliminary apprenticeship. + + + + +BOOK II + +ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS + + + + +CHAPTER I + +GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE + + +We have already stated that history is studied from documents, and that +documents are the traces of past events.[54] This is the place to +indicate the consequences involved in this statement and this +definition. + +Events can be empirically known in two ways only: by direct observation +while they are in progress; and indirectly, by the study of the traces +which they leave behind them. Take an earthquake, for example. I have a +direct knowledge of it if I am present when the phenomenon occurs; an +indirect knowledge if, without having been thus present, I observe its +physical effects (crevices, ruins), or if, after these effects have +disappeared, I read a description written by some one who has himself +witnessed the phenomenon or its effects. Now, the peculiarity of +"historical facts"[55] is this, that they are only known indirectly by +the help of their traces. Historical knowledge is essentially indirect +knowledge. The methods of historical science ought, therefore, to be +radically different from those of the direct sciences; that is to say, +of all the other sciences, except geology, which are founded on direct +observation. Historical science, whatever may be said,[56] is not a +science of observation at all. + +The facts of the past are only known to us by the traces of them which +have been preserved. These traces, it is true, are directly observed by +the historian, but, after that, he has nothing more to observe; what +remains is the work of reasoning, in which he endeavours to infer, with +the greatest possible exactness, the facts from the traces. The document +is his starting-point, the fact his goal.[57] Between this +starting-point and this goal he has to pass through a complicated series +of inferences, closely interwoven with each other, in which there are +innumerable chances of error; while the least error, whether committed +at the beginning, middle, or end of the work, may vitiate all his +conclusions. The "historical," or indirect, method is thus obviously +inferior to the method of direct observation; but historians have no +choice: it is the _only_ method of arriving at past facts, and we shall +see later on[58] how, in spite of these disadvantages, it is possible +for this method to lead to scientific knowledge. + +The detailed analysis of the reasonings which lead from the inspection +of documents to the knowledge of facts is one of the chief parts of +Historical Methodology. It is the domain of criticism. The seven +following chapters will be devoted to it. We shall endeavour, first of +all, to give a very summary sketch of the general lines and main +divisions of the subject. + +I. We may distinguish two species of documents. Sometimes the past event +has left a material trace (a monument, a fabricated article). Sometimes, +and more commonly, the trace is of the psychological order--a written +description or narrative. The first case is much simpler than the +second. For there is a fixed relation between certain physical +appearances and the causes which produced them; and this relation, +governed by physical laws, is known to us.[59] But a psychological +trace, on the other hand, is purely symbolic: it is not the fact itself; +it is not even the immediate impression made by the fact upon the +witness's mind, but only a conventional symbol of that impression. +Written documents, then, are not, as material documents are, valuable +by themselves; they are only valuable as signs of psychological +operations, which are often complicated and hard to unravel. The immense +majority of the documents which furnish the historian with +starting-points for his reasonings are nothing else than traces of +psychological operations. + +This granted, in order to conclude from a written document to the fact +which was its remote cause--that is, in order to ascertain the relation +which connects the document with the fact--it is necessary to reproduce +the whole series of intermediate causes which have given rise to the +document. It is necessary to revive in imagination the whole of that +series of acts performed by the author of the document which begins with +the fact observed by him and ends with the manuscript (or printed +volume), in order to arrive at the original event. Such is the aim and +such the process of critical analysis.[60] + +First of all we observe the document. Is it now in the same state as +when it was produced? Has it deteriorated since? We endeavour to find +out how it was made in order to restore it, if need be, to its original +form, and to ascertain its origin. The first group of preliminary +investigations, bearing upon the writing, the language, the form, the +source, constitutes the special domain of EXTERNAL CRITICISM, or +critical scholarship. Next comes INTERNAL CRITICISM: it endeavours, by +the help of analogies mostly borrowed from general psychology, to +reproduce the mental states through which the author of the document +passed. Knowing what the author of the document has said, we ask (1) +What did he mean? (2) Did he believe what he said? (3) Was he justified +in believing whatever he did believe? This last step brings the document +to a point where it resembles the data of the objective sciences: it +becomes an observation; it only remains to treat it by the methods of +the objective sciences. Every document is valuable precisely to the +extent to which, by the study of its origin, it has been reduced to a +well-made observation. + +II. Two conclusions may be drawn from what we have just said: the +extreme complexity and the absolute necessity of Historical Criticism. + +Compared with other students the historian is in a very disagreeable +situation. It is not merely that he cannot, as the chemist does, observe +his facts directly; it very rarely happens that the documents which he +is obliged to use represent precise observations. He has at his disposal +none of those systematic records of observations which, in the +established sciences, can and do replace direct observation. He is in +the situation of a chemist who should know a series of experiments only +from the report of his laboratory-boy. The historian is compelled to +turn to account rough and ready reports, such as no man of science +would be content with.[61] All the more necessary are the precautions to +be taken in utilising these documents, the only materials of historical +science. It is evidently most important to eliminate those which are +worthless, and to ascertain the amount of correct observation +represented by those which are left. + +All the more necessary, too, are cautions on this subject, because the +natural inclination of the human mind is to take no precautions at all, +and to treat these matters, which really demand the utmost obtainable +precision, with careless laxity. It is true that every one admits the +utility of criticism in theory; but this is just one of those principles +which are more easily admitted than put into practice. Many centuries +and whole eras of brilliant civilisation had to pass away before the +first dawn of criticism was visible among the most intellectual peoples +in the world. Neither the orientals nor the middle ages ever formed a +definite conception of it.[62] Up to our own day there have been +enlightened men who, in employing documents for the purpose of writing +history, have neglected the most elementary precautions, and +unconsciously assumed false generalisations. Even now most young +students would, if left to themselves, fall into the old errors. For +criticism is antagonistic to the normal bent of the mind. The +spontaneous tendency of man is to yield assent to affirmations, and to +reproduce them, without even clearly distinguishing them from the +results of his own observation. In every-day life do we not accept +indiscriminately, without any kind of verification, hearsay reports, +anonymous and unguaranteed statements, "documents" of indifferent or +inferior authority? It takes a special reason to induce us to take the +trouble to examine into the origin and value of a document on the +history of yesterday; otherwise, if there is no outrageous improbability +in it, and as long as it is not contradicted, we swallow it whole, we +pin our faith to it, we hawk it about, and, if need be, embellish it in +the process. Every candid man must admit that it requires a violent +effort to shake off _ignavia critica_, that common form of intellectual +sloth, that this effort must be continually repeated, and is often +accompanied by real pain. + +The natural instinct of a man in the water is to do precisely that which +will infallibly cause him to be drowned; learning to swim means +acquiring the habit of suppressing spontaneous movements and performing +others instead. Similarly, criticism is not a natural habit; it must be +inculcated, and only becomes organic by dint of continued practice. + +Historical work is, then, pre-eminently critical; whoever enters upon it +without having first been put on his guard against his instinct is sure +to be drowned in it. In order to appreciate the danger it is well to +examine one's conscience and analyse the causes of that _ignavia_ which +must be fought against till it is replaced by a critical attitude of +mind.[63] It is also very salutary to familiarise oneself with the +principles of historical method, and to analyse the theory of them, one +by one, as we propose to do in the present volume. "History, like every +other study, is chiefly subject to errors of fact arising from +inattention, but it is more exposed than any other study to errors due +to that mental confusion which produces incomplete analyses and +fallacious reasonings.... Historians would advance fewer affirmations +without proof if they had to analyse each one of their affirmations; +they would commit themselves to fewer false principles if they made it a +rule to formulate all their principles; they would be guilty of fewer +fallacies if they were obliged to set out all their arguments in logical +form."[64] + + + + +_SECTION I.--EXTERNAL CRITICISM_ + + + + +CHAPTER II + +TEXTUAL CRITICISM + + +Let us suppose that an author of our own day has written a book: he +sends his manuscript to the printer; with his own hand he corrects the +proofs, and marks them "Press." A book which is printed under these +conditions comes into our hands in what is, for a document, a very good +condition. Whoever the author may be, and whatever his sentiments and +intentions, we can be certain--and this is the only point that concerns +us at present--that we have before us a fairly accurate reproduction of +the text which he wrote. We are obliged to say "fairly accurate," for if +the author has corrected his proofs badly, or if the printers have not +paid proper attention to his corrections, the reproduction of the +original text is imperfect, even in this specially favourable case. +Printers not unfrequently make a man say something which he never meant +to say, and which he does not notice till too late. + +Sometimes it is required to reproduce a work the author of which is +dead, and the autograph manuscript of which cannot be sent to the +printer. This was the case with the _Mémoires d'outre-tombe_ of +Chateaubriand, for example; it is of daily occurrence in regard to the +familiar correspondence of well-known persons which is printed in haste +to satisfy the curiosity of the public, and of which the original +manuscript is very fragile. First the text is copied; it is then set up +by the compositor from the copy, which comes to the same thing as +copying it again; this second copy is lastly, or ought to be, collated +(in the proofs) with the first copy, or, better still, with the +original, by some one who takes the place of the deceased author. The +guarantees of accuracy are fewer in this case than in the first; for +between the original and the ultimate reproduction there is one +intermediary the more (the manuscript copy), and it may be that the +original is hard for anybody but the author to decipher. And, in fact, +the text of memoirs and posthumous correspondence is often disfigured by +errors of transcription and punctuation occurring in editions which at +first sight give the impression of having been carefully executed.[65] + +Turning now to ancient documents, let us ask in what state they have +been preserved. In nearly every case the originals have been lost, and +we have nothing but copies. Have these copies been made directly from +the originals? No; they are copies of copies. The scribes who executed +them were not by any means all of them capable and conscientious men; +they often transcribed texts which they did not understand at all, or +which they understood incorrectly, and it was not always the fashion, as +it was in the time of the Carlovingian Renaissance, to compare the +copies with the originals.[66] + +If our printed books, after the successive revisions of author and +printer's reader, are still but imperfect reproductions, it is only to +be expected that ancient documents, copied and recopied as they have +been for centuries with very little care, and exposed at every fresh +transcription to new risk of alteration, should have reached us full of +inaccuracies. + +There is thus an obvious precaution to be taken. Before using a document +we must find out whether its text is "sound"--that is, in as close +agreement as possible with the original manuscript of the author; and +when the text is "corrupt" we must emend it. In using a text which has +been corrupted in transmission, we run the risk of attributing to the +author what really comes from the copyists. There are actual cases of +theories which were based on passages falsified in transmission, and +which collapsed as soon as the true readings were discovered or +restored. Printers' errors and mistakes in copying are not always +innocuous or merely diverting; they are sometimes insidious and capable +of misleading the reader.[67] + +One would naturally suppose that historians of repute would always make +it a rule to procure "sound" texts, properly emended and restored, of +the texts they have to consult. That is a mistake. For a long time +historians simply used the texts which they had within easy reach, +without verifying their accuracy. And, what is more, the very scholars +whose business it is to edit texts did not discover the art of restoring +them all at once; not so very long ago, documents were commonly edited +from the first copies, good or bad, that came to hand, combined and +corrected at random. Editions of ancient texts are nowadays mostly +"critical;" but it is not yet thirty years since the publication of the +first "critical editions" of the great works of the middle ages, and the +critical text of some ancient classics (Pausanias, for example) has +still to be constructed. + +Not all historical documents have as yet been published in a form +calculated to give historians the security they need, and some +historians still act as if they had not realised that an unsettled text, +as such, requires cautious handling. Still, considerable progress has +been made. From the experience accumulated by several generations of +scholars there has been evolved a recognised method of purifying and +restoring texts. No part of historical method has a more solid +foundation, or is more generally known. It is clearly explained in +several works of popular philology.[68] For this reason we shall here be +content to give a general view of its essential principles, and to +indicate its results. + +I. We will suppose a document has not been edited in conformity with +critical rules. How are we to proceed in order to construct the best +possible text? Three cases present themselves. + +(_a_) The most simple case is that in which we possess the original, the +author's autograph itself. There is then nothing to do but to reproduce +the text of it with absolute fidelity.[69] Theoretically nothing can be +easier; in practice this elementary operation demands a sustained +attention of which not every one is capable. If any one doubts it, let +him try. Copyists who never make mistakes and never allow their +attention to be distracted are rare even among scholars. + +(_b_) Second case. The original has been lost; only a single copy of it +is known. It is necessary to be cautious, for the probability is that +this copy contains errors. + +Texts degenerate in accordance with certain laws. A great deal of pains +has been taken to discover and classify the causes and the ordinary +forms of the differences which are observed between originals and +copies; and hence rules have been deduced which may be applied to the +conjectural restoration of those passages in a unique copy of a lost +original which are certainly corrupt (because unintelligible), or are so +in all probability. + +Alterations of an original occurring in a copy--"traditional variants," +as they are called--are due either to fraud or to error. Some copyists +have deliberately modified or suppressed passages.[70] Nearly all +copyists have committed errors of judgment or accidental errors. Errors +of judgment when half-educated and not wholly intelligent copyists have +thought it their duty to correct passages and words in the original +which they could not understand.[71] Accidental errors when they misread +while copying, or misheard while writing from dictation, or when they +involuntarily made slips of the pen. + +Modifications arising from fraud or errors of judgment are often very +difficult to rectify, or even to discover. Some accidental errors (the +omission of several lines, for example) are irreparable in the case we +are considering, that of a unique copy. But most accidental errors can +be detected by any one who knows the ordinary forms: confusions of +sense, letters, and words, transpositions of words, letters, and +syllables, dittography (unmeaning repetition of letters or syllables), +haplography (syllables or words written once only where they should have +been written twice), false divisions between words, badly punctuated +sentences, and other mistakes of the same kind. Errors of these various +types have been made by the scribes of every country and every age, +irrespectively of the handwriting and language of the originals. But +some confusions of letters occur frequently in copies of uncial +originals, and others in copies of minuscule originals. Confusions of +sense and of words are explained by analogies of vocabulary or +pronunciation, which naturally vary from language to language and from +epoch to epoch. The general theory of conjectural emendation reduces to +the sketch we have just given; there is no general apprenticeship to the +art. What a man learns is not to restore any text that may be put before +him, but Greek texts, Latin texts, French texts, and so on, as the case +may be; for the conjectural emendation of a text presupposes, besides +general notions on the processes by which texts degenerate, a profound +knowledge of (1) a special language; (2) a special handwriting; (3) _the +confusions (of sense, letters, and words) which were habitual to those +who copied texts of that language written in that style of handwriting_. +To aid in the apprenticeship to the conjectural emendation of Greek and +Latin texts, tabulated lists (alphabetical and systematic) of various +readings, frequent confusions, and probable corrections, have been +drawn up.[72] It is true that they cannot take the place of practical +work, done under the guidance of experts, but they are of very great use +to the experts themselves.[73] + +It would be easy to give a list of happy emendations. The most +satisfactory are those whose correctness is obvious palæographically, as +is the case with the classical emendation by Madvig of the text of +Seneca's Letters (89, 4). The old reading was: "Philosophia unde dicta +sit, apparet; ipso enim nomine fatetur. Quidam et sapientiam ita quidam +finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum sapientiam ..."--which +does not make sense. It used to be supposed that words had dropped out +between _ita_ and _quidam_. Madvig pictured to himself the text of the +lost archetype, which was written in capitals, and in which, as was +usual before the eighth century, the words were not separated (_scriptio +continua_), nor the sentences punctuated; he asked himself whether the +copyist, with such an archetype before him, had not divided the words at +random, and he had no difficulty in reading: "...ipso enim nomine +fatetur quid amet. Sapientiam ita quidam finierunt...." Blass, Reinach, +and Lindsay, in the works referred to in the note, mention several other +masterly and elegant emendations. Nor have the Hellenists and Latinists +any monopoly; equally brilliant emendations might be culled from the +works of Orientalists, Romancists, and Germanists, now that texts of +Oriental, Romance, and Germanic languages have been subjected to verbal +criticism. We have already stated that scholarly corrections are +possible even in the text of quite modern documents, reproduced +typographically under the most favourable conditions. + +Perhaps no one, in our day, has equalled Madvig in the art of +conjectural emendation. But Madvig himself had no high opinion of the +work of modern scholarship. He thought that the humanists of the +sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were, in this respect, better +trained than modern scholars. The conjectural emendation of Greek and +Latin texts is, in fact, a branch of sport, success in which is +proportionate not only to a man's ingenuity and palæographical instinct, +but also to the correctness, rapidity, and delicacy of his appreciation +of the niceties of the classical languages. Now, the early scholars were +undoubtedly too bold, but they were more intimately familiar with the +classical languages than our modern scholars are. + +However that may be, there can be no doubt that numerous texts which +have been preserved, in corrupt form, in unique copies, have resisted, +and will continue to resist, the efforts of criticism. Very often +criticism ascertains the fact of the text having been altered, states +what the sense requires, and then prudently stops, every trace of the +original reading having been obscured by a confused tangle of successive +corrections and errors which it is hopeless to attempt to unravel. The +scholars who devote themselves to the fascinating pursuit of conjectural +criticism are liable, in their ardour, to suspect perfectly innocent +readings, and, in desperate passages, to propose adventurous hypotheses. +They are well aware of this, and therefore make it a rule to draw a very +clear distinction, in their editions, between readings found in +manuscripts and their own restorations of the text. + +(_c_) Third case. We possess several copies, which differ from each +other, of a document whose original is lost. Here modern scholars have a +marked advantage over their predecessors: besides being better informed, +they set about the comparison of copies more methodically. The object +is, as in the preceding case, to reconstruct the archetype as exactly as +possible. + +The scholars of earlier days had to struggle, as novices have to +struggle now, in a case of this kind, against a very natural and a very +reprehensible impulse--to use the first copy that comes to hand, +whatever its character may happen to be. The second impulse is not much +better--to use the oldest copy out of several of different date. In +theory, and very often in practice, the relative age of the copies is of +no importance; a sixteenth-century manuscript which reproduces a good +lost copy of the eleventh century is much more valuable than a faulty +and retouched copy made in the twelfth or thirteenth century. The third +impulse is still far from being good; it is to count the attested +readings and decide by the majority. Suppose there are twenty copies of +a text; the reading A is attested eighteen times, the reading B twice. +To make this a reason for choosing A is to make the gratuitous +assumption that all the manuscripts have the same authority. This is an +error of judgment; for if seventeen of the eighteen manuscripts which +give the reading A have been copied from the eighteenth, the reading A +is in reality attested only once; and the only question is whether it is +intrinsically better or worse than the reading B. + +It has been recognised that the only rational procedure is to begin by +determining in what relation the copies stand to each other. For this +purpose we adopt as our starting-point the incontrovertible axiom that +all the copies which contain the same mistakes in the same passages must +have been either copied from each other or all derived from a copy +containing those mistakes. It is inconceivable that several copyists, +independently reproducing an original free from errors, should all +introduce exactly the same errors; identity of errors attests community +of origin. We shall cast aside without scruple all the copies derived +from a single manuscript which has been preserved. Evidently they can +have no value beyond what is possessed by their common source; if they +differ from it, it can only be in virtue of new errors; it would be +waste of time to study their variations. Having eliminated these, we +have before us none but independent copies, which have been made +directly from the archetype, or secondary copies whose source (a copy +taken directly from the archetype) has been lost. In order to group the +secondary copies into _families_, each of which shall represent what is +substantially the same tradition, we again have recourse to the +comparison of errors. By this method we can generally draw up without +too much trouble a complete genealogical table (_stemma codicum_) of the +preserved copies, which will bring out very clearly their relative +importance. This is not the place to discuss the difficult cases where, +in consequence of too great a number of intermediaries having been lost, +or from ancient copyists having arbitrarily blended the texts of +different traditions, the operation becomes extremely laborious or +impracticable. Besides, in these extreme cases there is no new method +involved: the comparison of corresponding passages is a powerful +instrument, but it is the only one which criticism has at its disposal +for this task. + +When the genealogical tree of the manuscripts has been drawn up, we +endeavour to restore the text of the archetype by comparing the +different traditions. If these agree and give a satisfactory text, there +is no difficulty. If they differ, we decide between them. If they +accidentally agree in giving a defective text, we have recourse to +conjectural emendation, as if there were only one copy. + +It is, theoretically, much more advantageous to have several independent +copies of a lost original than to have only one, for the mere mechanical +comparison of the different readings is often enough to remove +obscurities which the uncertain light of conjectural criticism would +never have illuminated. However, an abundance of manuscripts is an +embarrassment rather than a help when the work of grouping them has been +left undone or done badly; nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the +arbitrary and hybrid restorations which are founded on copies whose +relations to each other and to the archetype have not been ascertained +beforehand. On the other hand, the application of rational methods +requires, in some cases, a formidable expenditure of time and labour. +Some works are preserved in hundreds of copies all differing from each +other; sometimes (as in the case of the Gospels) the variants of a text +of quite moderate extent are to be counted by thousands; several years +of assiduous labour are necessary for the preparation of a critical +edition of some mediæval romances. And after all this labour, all these +collations and comparisons, can we be sure that the text of the romance +is sensibly better than it would have been if there had been only two or +three manuscripts to work upon? No. Some critical editions, owing to the +apparent wealth of material applicable to the work, demand a mechanical +effort which is altogether out of proportion to the positive results +which are its reward. + +"Critical editions" founded on several copies of a lost original ought +to supply the public with the means of verifying the "_stemma codicum_" +which the editor has drawn up, and should give the rejected variants in +the notes. By this means competent readers are, at the worst, put in +possession, if not of the best possible text, at least of the materials +for constructing it.[74] + +II. The results of textual criticism--a kind of cleaning and +mending--are purely negative. By the aid of conjecture, or by the aid of +conjecture and comparison combined, we are enabled to construct, not +necessarily a good text, but the best text possible, of documents whose +original is lost. What we thus effect is the elimination of corrupt and +adventitious readings likely to cause error, and the recognition of +suspected passages as such. But it is obvious that no new information is +supplied by this process. The text of a document which has been restored +at the cost of infinite pains is not worth more than that of a document +whose original has been preserved; on the contrary, it is worth less. If +the autograph manuscript of the Æneid had not been destroyed, centuries +of collation and conjecture would have been saved, and the text of the +Æneid would have been better than it is. This is intended for those who +excel at the "emendation game,"[75] who are in consequence fond of it, +and would really be sorry to have no occasion to play it. + +III. There will, however, be abundant scope for textual criticism as +long as we do not possess the exact text of every historical document. +In the present state of science few labours are more useful than those +which bring new texts to light or improve texts already known. It is a +real service to the study of history to publish unedited or badly edited +texts in a manner conformable to the rules of criticism. In every +country learned societies without number are devoting the greater part +of their resources and activity to this important work. But the immense +number of the texts to be criticised,[76] and the minute care required +by the operations of verbal criticism,[77] prevent the work of +publication and restoration from advancing at any but a slow pace. +Before all the texts which are of interest for mediæval and modern +history shall have been edited or re-edited _secundum artem_, a long +period must elapse, even supposing that the relatively rapid pace of the +last few years should be still further accelerated.[78] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP + + +It would be absurd to look for information about a fact in the papers of +some one who knew nothing, and could know nothing, about it. The first +questions, then, which we ask when we are confronted with a document is: +Where does it come from? who is the author of it? what is its date? A +document in respect of which we necessarily are in total ignorance of +the author, the place, and the date is good for nothing. + +This truth, which seems elementary, has only been adequately recognised +in our own day. Such is the natural [Greek: hakrishia] of man, that those +who were the first to make a habit of inquiring into the authorship of +documents prided themselves, and justly, on the advance they had made. + +Most modern documents contain a precise indication of their authorship: +in our days, books, newspaper articles, official papers, and even +private writings, are, in general, dated and signed. Many ancient +documents, on the other hand, are anonymous, without date, and have no +sufficient indication of their place of origin. + +The spontaneous tendency of the human mind is to place confidence in the +indications of authorship, when there are any. On the cover and in the +preface of the _Châtiments_, Victor Hugo is named as the author; +therefore Victor Hugo is the author of the _Châtiments_. In such and +such a picture gallery we see an unsigned picture whose frame has been +furnished by the management with a tablet bearing the name of Leonardo +da Vinci; therefore Leonardo da Vinci painted this picture. A poem with +the title _Philomena_ is found under the name of Saint Bonaventura in M. +Clément's _Extraits des poètes chrétiens_, in most editions of Saint +Bonaventura's "works," and in a great number of mediæval manuscripts; +therefore _Philomena_ was written by Saint Bonaventura, and "we may +gather thence much precious knowledge of the very soul" of this holy +man.[79] Vrain-Lucas offered to M. Chasles autographs of Vercingetorix, +Cleopatra, and Saint Mary Magdalene, duly signed, and with the +flourishes complete:[80] here, thought M. Chasles, are autographs of +Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Saint Mary Magdalene. This is one of the +most universal, and at the same time indestructible, forms of public +credulity. + +Experience and reflection have shown the necessity of methodically +checking these instinctive impulses of confiding trust. The autographs +of Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Mary Magdalene had been manufactured by +Vrain-Lucas. The _Philomena_, attributed by mediæval scribes now to +Saint Bonaventura, now to Louis of Granada, now to John Hoveden, now to +John Peckham, is perhaps by none of these authors, and certainly not by +the first-named. Paintings in which there is not the least gleam of +talent have, in the most celebrated galleries of Italy, been tricked +out, without the least shadow of proof, with the glorious name of +Leonardo. On the other hand, it is perfectly true that Victor Hugo is +the author of the _Châtiments_. The conclusion is, that the most precise +indications of authorship are never sufficient _by themselves_. They +only afford a presumption, strong or weak--very strong, in general, +where modern documents are concerned, often very weak in the case of +ancient documents. False indications of authorship exist, some foisted +upon insignificant works in order to enhance their value, some appended +to works of merit in order to serve the reputation of a particular +person, or to mystify posterity; and there are a hundred other motives +which may easily be imagined, and of which a list has been drawn up:[81] +the "pseudepigraphic" literature of antiquity and the middle ages is +enormous. There are, in addition, documents which are forged from +beginning to end; the forgers have naturally furnished them with very +precise indications of their alleged authorship. Verification is +therefore necessary. But how is it to be had? When the apparent +authorship of a document is suspected, we use for its verification the +same method which serves to fix, as far as possible, the origin of +documents which are furnished with no indications at all on this head. +As the procedure is the same in both cases, it is not necessary to +distinguish further between them. + + +I. The chief instrument used in the investigation of authorship is the +_internal analysis_ of the document under consideration, performed with +a view to bring out any indications it may contain of a nature to supply +information about the author, and the time and place in which he lived. + +First of all we examine the handwriting of the document. Saint +Bonaventura was born in 1221; if poems attributed to him are contained +in manuscripts executed in the eleventh century, we have in this +circumstance an excellent proof that the attribution is ill-founded: no +document of which there exists a copy in eleventh-century handwriting +can be posterior in date to the eleventh century. Then we examine the +language. It is known that certain forms have only been used in certain +places and at certain dates. Most forgers have betrayed themselves by +ignorance of facts of this kind; they let slip modern words or phrases. +It has been possible to establish the fact that certain Phoenician +inscriptions, found in South America, were earlier than a certain German +dissertation on a point of Phoenician syntax. In the case of official +instruments we examine the formulæ. If a document which purports to be a +Merovingian charter does not exhibit the ordinary formulæ of genuine +Merovingian charters it must be spurious. Lastly, we note all the +positive data which occur in the document--the facts which are mentioned +or alluded to. When these facts are otherwise known, from sources which +a forger could not have had at his disposal, the _bonâ fides_ of the +document is established, and the date fixed approximately between the +most recent event of which the author shows knowledge, and the next +following event which he does not mention but would have done if he had +known of it. Arguments may also be founded on the circumstance that +particular facts are mentioned with approval, or particular opinions +expressed, and help us to make a conjectural estimate of the status, the +environment, and the character of the author. + +When the internal analysis of a document is carefully performed, it +generally gives us a tolerably accurate notion of its authorship. By +means of a methodical comparison, instituted between the various +elements of the documents analysed and the corresponding elements of +similar documents whose authorship was known with certainty, the +detection of many a forgery[82] has been rendered possible, and +additional information acquired about the circumstances under which most +genuine documents have been produced. + +The results obtained by internal analysis are supplemented and verified +by collecting all the external evidence relative to the document under +criticism which can be found scattered over the documents of the same or +later epochs--quotations, biographical details about the author, and so +on. Sometimes there is a significant absence of any such information: +the fact that an alleged Merovingian charter has not been quoted by +anybody before the seventeenth century, and has only been seen by a +seventeenth-century scholar who has been convicted of fraud, suggests +the thought that it is modern. + + +II. Hitherto we have considered only the simplest case, in which the +document under examination is the work of a single author. But many +documents have, at different times, received additions which it is +important to distinguish from the original text, in order that we may +not attribute to X, the author of the text, what really belongs to Y or +Z, his unforeseen collaborators.[83] There are two kinds of +additions--interpolations and continuations. To interpolate is to insert +into the text words or sentences which were not in the author's +manuscript.[84] Usually interpolations are accidental, due to the +negligence of the copyist, and explicable as the introduction into the +text of interlinear glosses or marginal notes; but there are cases where +some one has deliberately added to (or substituted for) the author's +text words or sentences out of his own head, for the sake of +completeness, ornament, or emphasis. If we had before us the manuscript +in which the deliberate interpolation was made, the appearance of the +added matter and the traces of erasure would make the case clear at +once. But the first interpolated copy has nearly always been lost, and +in the copies derived from it every trace of addition or substitution +has disappeared. There is no need to define "continuations." It is well +known that many chronicles of the middle ages have been "continued" by +various writers, none of whom took the trouble to indicate where his own +work began or ended. + +Sometimes interpolations and continuations can be very readily +distinguished in the course of the operations for restoring a text of +which there are several copies, when it so happens that some of these +copies reproduce the primitive text as it was before any addition was +made to it. But if all the copies are founded on previous copies which +already contained the interpolations or continuations, recourse must be +had to internal analysis. Is the style uniform throughout the document? +Does the book breathe one and the same spirit from cover to cover? Are +there no contradictions, no gaps in the sequence of ideas? In practice, +when the continuators or interpolators have been men of well-marked +personality and decided views, analysis will separate the original from +the additions as cleanly as a pair of scissors. When the whole is +written in a level, colourless style, the lines of division are not so +easy to see; it is then better to confess the fact than to multiply +hypotheses. + + +III. The critical investigation of authorship is not finished as soon as +a document has been accurately or approximately localised in space and +time, and as much information as possible obtained about the author or +authors.[85] Here is a book: we wish to ascertain the origin of the +information contained in it, that is, to be in a position to appreciate +its value; is it enough to know that it was written in 1890, at Paris, +by So-and-so? Perhaps So-and-so copied slavishly, without mentioning the +fact, an earlier work, written in 1850. The responsible guarantor of the +borrowed parts is not So-and-so, but the author of 1850. Plagiarism, it +is true, is now rare, forbidden by the law, and considered +dishonourable; formerly it was common, tolerated, and unpunished. Many +historical documents, with every appearance of originality, are nothing +but unavowed repetitions of earlier documents, and historians +occasionally experience, in this connection, remarkable disillusions. +Certain passages in Eginhard, a ninth-century chronicler, are borrowed +from Suetonius: they have nothing to do with the history of the ninth +century; how if the fact had not been discovered? An event is attested +three times, by three chroniclers; but these three attestations, which +agree so admirably, are really only one if it is ascertained that two of +the three chroniclers copied the third, or that the three parallel +accounts have been drawn from one and the same source. Pontifical +letters and Imperial charters of the middle ages contain eloquent +passages which must not be taken seriously; they are part of the +official style, and were copied word for word from chancery formularies. + +It belongs to the investigation of authorship to discover, as far as +possible, the _sources_ utilised by the authors of documents. + +The problem thus presented to us has some resemblance to that of the +restoration of texts of which we have already spoken. In both cases we +proceed on the assumption that identical readings have a common source: +a number of different scribes, in transcribing a text, will not make +exactly the same mistakes in exactly the same places; a number of +different writers, relating the same facts, will not have viewed them +from exactly the same standpoint, nor will they say the same things in +exactly the same language. The great complexity of historical events +makes it extremely improbable that two independent observers should +narrate them in the same manner. We endeavour to group the documents +into families in the same way as we make families of manuscripts. +Similarly, we are enabled in the result to draw up genealogical tables. +The examiners who correct the compositions of candidates for the +bachelor's degree sometimes notice that the papers of two candidates who +sat next each other bear a family likeness. If they have a mind to find +out which is derived from the other, they have no difficulty in doing +so, in spite of the petty artifices (slight modifications, expansions, +abstracts, additions, suppressions, transpositions) which the plagiarist +multiplies in order to throw suspicion off the scent The two guilty ones +are sufficiently betrayed by their common errors; the more culpable of +the two is detected by the slips he will have made, and especially by +the errors in his own papers which are due to peculiarities in those of +his accommodating friend. Similarly when two ancient documents are in +question: when the author of one has copied directly from the other, the +filiation is generally easy to establish; the plagiarist, whether he +abridges or expands, nearly always betrays himself sooner or later.[86] + +When there are three documents in a family their mutual relationships +are sometimes harder to specify. Let A, B, and C be the documents. +Suppose A is the common source: perhaps B and C copied it independently; +perhaps C only knew A through the medium of B, or B knew it only through +C. If B and C have abridged the common source in different ways, they +are evidently independent. When B depends on C, or _vice versâ_, we have +the simplest case, treated in the preceding paragraph. But suppose the +author of C combined A and B, while B had already used A: the genealogy +begins to get complicated. It is more complicated still when there are +four, five, or more documents in a family, for the number of possible +combinations increases with great rapidity. However, if too many +intermediate links have not been lost, criticism succeeds in +disentangling the relationships by persistent and ingenious applications +of the method of repeated comparisons. Modern scholars (Krusch, for +example, who has made a speciality of Merovingian hagiography) have +recently constructed, by the use of this method, precise genealogies of +the utmost solidity.[87] The results of the critical investigation of +authorship, as applied to the filiation of documents, are of two kinds. +Firstly, lost documents are reconstructed. Suppose two chroniclers, B +and C, have used, each in his own way, a common source X, which has now +disappeared. We may form an idea of X by piecing together the fragments +of it which occur imbedded in B and C, just as we form an idea of a lost +manuscript by comparing the partial copies of it which have been +preserved. On the other hand, criticism destroys the authority of a host +of "authentic" documents--that is, documents which no one suspects of +having been falsified--by showing that they are derivative, that they +are worth whatever their sources may be worth, and that, when they +embellish their sources with imaginary details and rhetorical +flourishes, they are worth just nothing at all. In Germany and England +editors of documents have introduced the excellent system of printing +borrowed passages in small characters, and original passages whose +source is unknown in larger characters. Thanks to this system it is +possible to see at a glance that celebrated chronicles, which are often +(very wrongly) quoted, are mere compilations, of no value in themselves: +thus the _Flores historiarum_ of the self-styled Matthew of Westminster, +perhaps the most popular of the English mediæval chronicles, are almost +entirely taken from original works by Wendover and Matthew of Paris.[88] + + +IV. The critical investigation of authorship saves historians from huge +blunders. Its results are striking. By eliminating spurious documents, +by detecting false ascriptions, by determining the conditions of +production of documents which had been defaced by time, and by +connecting them with their sources,[89] it has rendered services of such +magnitude that to-day it is regarded as having a special right to the +name of "criticism." It is usual to say of an historian that he "fails +in criticism" when he neglects to distinguish between documents, when he +never mistrusts traditional ascriptions, and when he accepts, as if +afraid to lose a single one, all the pieces of information, ancient or +modern, good or bad, which come to him, from whatever quarter.[90] + +This view is perfectly just. We must not, however, be satisfied with +this form of criticism, and we must not abuse it. + +We must not abuse it. The extreme of distrust, in these matters, is +almost as mischievous as the extreme of credulity. Père Hardouin, who +attributed the works of Vergil and Horace to mediæval monks, was every +whit as ridiculous as the victim of Vrain-Lucas. It is an abuse of the +methods of this species of criticism to apply them, as has been done, +indiscriminately, for the mere pleasure of it. The bunglers who have +used this species of criticism to brand as spurious perfectly genuine +documents, such as the writings of Hroswitha, the _Ligurinus_, and the +bull _Unam Sanctam_,[91] or to establish imaginary filiations between +certain annals, on the strength of superficial indications, would have +discredited criticism before now if that had been possible. It is +praiseworthy, certainly, to react against those who never raise a doubt +about the authorship of a document; but it is carrying the reaction too +far to take an exclusive interest in periods of history which depend on +documents of uncertain authorship. The only reason why the documents of +modern and contemporary history are found less interesting than those of +antiquity and the early middle ages, is that the identity which nearly +always obtains between their apparent and their real authorship leaves +no room for those knotty problems of attribution in which the _virtuosi_ +of criticism are accustomed to display their skill.[92] + +Nor must we be content with it. The critical investigation of +authorship, like textual criticism, is preparatory, and its results +negative. Its final aim and crowning achievement is to get rid of +documents which are not documents, and which would have misled us; that +is all. "It teaches us not to use bad documents; it does not teach us +how to turn good ones to account."[93] It is not the whole of +"historical criticism;" it is only one stone in the edifice.[94] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES + + +By the help of the preceding operations the documents, all the +documents, let us suppose, of a given class, or relating to a given +subject, have been found. We know where they are; the text of each has +been restored, if necessary, and each has been critically examined in +respect of authorship. We know where they have come from. It remains to +combine and classify the materials thus verified. This is the last of +the operations which may be called preparatory to the work of higher (or +internal) criticism and construction. + +Whoever studies a point of history is obliged, first of all, to classify +his sources. To arrange, in a rational and convenient manner, the +verified materials before making use of them, is an apparently humble, +but really very important, part of the historian's profession. Those who +have learnt how to do it possess, on that account alone, a marked +advantage: they give themselves less trouble, and they obtain better +results; the others waste their time and labour; they are smothered +sometimes under the disorderly mass of notes, extracts, copies, scraps, +which they themselves have accumulated. Who was it spoke of those busy +people who spend their lives lifting building-stones without knowing +where to place them, raising as they do so clouds of blinding dust? + + +I. Here, again, we have to confess that the first, the natural impulse, +is not the right one. The first impulse of most men who have to utilise +a number of texts is to make notes from them, one after another, in the +order in which they study them. Many of the early scholars (whose papers +we possess) worked on this system, and so do most beginners who are not +warned beforehand; the latter keep, as the former kept, note-books, +which they fill continuously and progressively with notes on the texts +they are interested in. This method is utterly wrong. The materials +collected must be classified sooner or later; otherwise it would be +necessary, when occasion arose, to deal separately with the materials +bearing on a given point, to read right through the whole series of +note-books, and this laborious process would have to be repeated every +time a new detail was wanted. If this method seems attractive at first, +it is because it appears to save time. But this is false economy; the +ultimate result is, an enormous addition to the labour of search, and +great difficulty in combining the materials. + +Others, well understanding the advantages of systematic classification, +have proposed to fit their materials, as fast as collected, into their +appropriate places in a prearranged scheme. For this purpose they use +note-books of which every page has first been provided with a heading. +Thus all the entries of the same kind are close to one another. This +system leaves something to be desired; for additions will not always +fit without inconvenience into their proper place; and the scheme of +classification, once adopted, is rigid, and can only be modified with +difficulty. Many librarians used to draw up their catalogues on this +plan, which is now universally condemned. + +There is a still more barbarous method, which need not receive more than +passing mention. This is simply to register documents in the memory +without taking written notes. This method has been used. Historians +endowed with excellent memories, and lazy to boot, have indulged this +whim, with the result that their quotations and references are mostly +inexact. The human memory is a delicate piece of registering apparatus, +but it is so little an instrument of precision that such presumption is +inexcusable. + +Every one admits nowadays that it is advisable to collect materials on +separate cards or slips of paper. The notes from each document are +entered upon a loose leaf furnished with the precisest possible +indications of origin. The advantages of this artifice are obvious: the +detachability of the slips enables us to group them at will in a host of +different combinations; if necessary, to change their places: it is easy +to bring texts of the same kind together, and to incorporate additions, +as they are acquired, in the interior of the groups to which they +belong. As for documents which are interesting from several points of +view, and which ought to appear in several groups, it is sufficient to +enter them several times over on different slips; or they may be +represented, as often as may be required, on reference-slips. Moreover, +the method of slips is the only one mechanically possible for the +purpose of forming, classifying, and utilising a collection of documents +of any great extent. Statisticians, financiers, and men of letters who +observe, have now discovered this as well as scholars. + +The method of slips is not without its drawbacks. Each slip ought to be +furnished with precise references to the source from which its contents +have been derived; consequently, if a document has been analysed upon +fifty different slips, the same references must be repeated fifty times. +Hence a slight increase in the amount of writing to be done. It is +certainly on account of this trivial complication that some obstinately +cling to the inferior note-book system. Again, in virtue of their very +detachability, the slips, or loose leaves, are liable to go astray; and +when a slip is lost how is it to be replaced? To begin with, its +disappearance is not perceived, and, if it were, the only remedy would +be to go right through all the work already done from beginning to end. +But the truth is, experience has suggested a variety of very simple +precautions, which we need not here explain in detail, by which the +drawbacks of the system are reduced to a minimum. It is recommended to +use slips of uniform size and tough material, and to arrange them at the +earliest opportunity in covers or drawers or otherwise. Every one is +free to form his own habits in these matters. But it is well to realise +beforehand that these habits, according as they are more or less +rational and practical, have a direct influence on the results of +scientific work. Renan speaks of "these points of private librarianship +which make up the half of scientific work."[95] This is not too strong. +One scholar will owe a good part of his well-deserved reputation to his +method of collecting, while another will be, so to speak, paralysed by +his clumsiness in that particular.[96] + +After having collected the documents, whether copied _in extenso_ or +abridged, on slips or loose leaves, we classify them. On what scheme? In +what order? Clearly different cases must be treated differently, and it +would not be reasonable to lay down precise formulæ to govern them all. +However, we may give a few general considerations. + + +II. We distinguish between the historian who classifies verified +documents for the purposes of historical work, and the scholar who +compiles "_Regesta_." By the words "_Regesta_" and "_Corpus_" we +understand methodically classified collections of historical documents. +In a "_Corpus_" documents are reproduced _in extenso_; in "_Regesta_" +they are analysed and described. + +The use of these compilations is to assist researchers in collecting +documents. Scholars set themselves to perform, once for all, tasks of +search and classification from which, thanks to them, the public will +henceforth be free. + +Documents may be grouped according to their date, according to their +place of origin, according to their contents, according to their +form.[97] Here we have the four categories of time, place, species, and +form; by superposing, then, we obtain divisions of smaller extent. We +may undertake, for example, to make a group of all the documents having +a given form, of a given country, and lying between two given dates +(French royal charters of the reign of Philip Augustus); or of all the +documents of a given form (Latin inscriptions); or of a given species +(Latin hymns); of a given epoch (antiquity, the middle ages). We may +recall, by way of illustration, the existence of a _Corpus Inscriptionum +Græcarum_, of a _Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum_, of a _Corpus +Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum_, the _Regesta Imperii_ of J. F. +Böhmer and his continuators, the _Regesta Pontificum Romanorum_ of P. +Jaffé and A. Potthast. + +Whatever the division chosen, there are two alternatives: either the +documents to be placed in this division are dated or they are not. + +If they are dated, as is the case, for example, with the charters issued +from the chancery of a prince, care will have been taken to place at the +head of each slip the date (expressed in modern reckoning) of the +document entered upon it. Nothing is then easier than to group in +chronological order all the slips, that is, all the documents, which +have been collected. The rule is to use chronological classification +whenever possible. There is only one difficulty, and that is of a +practical order. Even in the most favourable circumstances some of the +documents will have accidentally lost their dates; these dates the +compiler is bound to restore, or at least to attempt to restore; long +and patient research is necessary for the purpose. + +If the documents are not dated, a choice must be made between the +alphabetical, the geographical, and the systematic order. The history of +the _Corpus_ of Latin inscriptions bears witness to the difficulty of +this choice. "The arrangement according to date was impossible, seeing +that most of the inscriptions are not dated. From the time of Smetius it +was usual to divide them into classes, that is, a distinction was made, +resting solely on the contents of the inscription, and having no regard +to their place of origin, between religious, sepulchral, military, and +poetical inscriptions, those which have a public character, and those +which only concern private persons, and so on. Boeckh, although he had +preferred the geographical arrangement for his _Corpus Inscriptionum +Græcarum_, was of opinion that the arrangement by subjects, which had +been hitherto employed, was the only possible one for a Latin +_Corpus_...." [Even those who, in France, proposed the geographical +arrangement] "wished to make an exception of texts relating to the +general history of a country, certainly, at any rate, in the case of the +Empire; in 1845 Zumpt defended a very complicated eclectic system of +this kind. In 1847 Mommsen still rejected the geographical arrangement +except for municipal inscriptions, and in 1852, when he published the +Inscriptions of the Kingdom of Naples, he had not entirely changed his +opinion. It was only on being charged by the Academy of Berlin with the +publication of the _Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum_, that, grown wise by +experience, he rejected even the exceptions proposed by Egger in the +case of the general history of a province, and thought it his duty to +keep to the geographical arrangement pure and simple."[98] And yet, +considering the nature of epigraphic documents, the arrangement +according to place was the only rational one. This has been amply +demonstrated for more than fifty years; but collectors of inscriptions +did not come to an agreement on the subject till after two centuries of +tentative efforts in different directions. For two centuries collections +of Latin inscriptions have been made without any perception of the fact +that "to group inscriptions according to their subjects is much the same +thing as to publish an edition of Cicero in which his speeches, +treatises, and letters should be cut up and the fragments arranged +according to their subject-matter;" that "epigraphic monuments belonging +to the same territory mutually explain each other when placed side by +side;" and, lastly, that "while it is all but impossible to range in +order of subject-matter a hundred thousand inscriptions nearly all of +which belong to several categories; on the other hand, each monument has +but one place, and a very definite place, in the geographical +order."[99] + +The alphabetical arrangement is very convenient when the chronological +and geographical arrangements are unsuitable. There are documents, such +as the sermons, the hymns, and the secular songs of the middle ages, +which are not precisely dated or localised. They are arranged in the +alphabetical order of their _incipit_--that is, the words with which +they begin.[100] + +The systematic order, or arrangement by subjects, is not to be +recommended for the compilation of a _Corpus_ or of _regesta_. It is +always arbitrary, and leads to inevitable repetition and confusion. +Besides, given collections arranged in chronological, geographical, or +alphabetical order, nothing more than the addition of a good table of +contents is needed to make them available for all the purposes which +would be served by a systematic arrangement. One of the chief rules of +the art of _Corpus_ and _regesta_-making, that great art which has been +carried to such perfection in the second half of the nineteenth +century,[101] is to provide these collections, whatever the grouping +adopted, with a variety of tables and indexes of a kind to facilitate +the use of them: _incipit_ tables in chronological _regesta_ which lend +themselves to such treatment, indexes of names and dates in _regesta_ +arranged by order of _incipit_, and so on. + +_Corpus_ and _regesta_-makers collect and classify for the use of others +documents in which, at any rate in _all_ of which, they have no direct +interest, and are absorbed in this labour. Ordinary workers, on the +other hand, only collect and classify materials useful for their +individual studies. Hence certain differences arise. For example, the +arrangement by subjects, on a predetermined system, which is so little +to be recommended for great collections, often provides those who are +composing monographs on their own account with a scheme of +classification preferable to any other. But it will always be well to +cultivate the mechanical habits of which professional compilers have +learnt the value by experience: to write at the head of every slip its +date, if there is occasion for it, and a heading[102] in any case; to +multiply cross-references and indices; to keep a record, on a separate +set of slips, of all the sources utilised, in order to avoid the danger +of having to work a second time through materials already dealt with. +The regular observance of these maxims goes a great way towards making +scientific historical work easier and more solid. The possession of a +well-arranged, though incomplete, collection of slips has enabled M. B. +Hauréau to exhibit to the end of his life an undeniable mastery over the +very special class of historical problems which he studied.[103] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS + + +The sum of the operations described in the preceding chapters +(restoration of texts, investigation of authorship, collection and +classification of verified documents) constitutes the vast domain of +external criticism, or critical scholarship. + +The public at large, with its vulgar and superficial standards, has +nothing but disdain for the whole of critical scholarship. Some of its +votaries, on the other hand, are inclined to exalt it unduly. But there +is a happy medium between these extremes of over-appreciation and +contempt. + +The crude opinion of those who pity and despise the minute analysis of +external criticism hardly deserves refutation. There is only one +argument for the legitimacy and honourable character of the obscure +labours of erudition, but it is a decisive argument: it rests on their +indispensability. No erudition, no history. "_Non sunt contemnenda quasi +parva_," says St. Jerome, "_sine quibus magna constare non +possunt_."[104] + +On the other hand, scholars by profession, in their zeal to justify +their pride in their work, are not content with maintaining its +necessity; they allow themselves to be carried away into an exaggeration +of its merit and importance. It has been said that the sure methods of +external criticism have raised history to the dignity of a science, "of +an exact science;" that critical investigations of authorship "enable +us, better than any other study, to gain a profound insight into past +ages;" that the habit of criticising texts refines or even confers the +"historical sense." It has been tacitly assumed that external criticism +is the whole of historical criticism, and that beyond the purgation, +emendation, and classification of documents there is nothing left to do. +This illusion, common enough among specialists, is too crude to need +express refutation; the fact is, that it is the psychological criticism +which deals with interpretation and examines into the good faith and +accuracy of authors that has, better than any other study, enabled us to +gain a profound insight into past ages, not external criticism.[105] An +historian who should be fortunate enough to find all the documents +bearing on his studies already edited correctly, classified, and +critically examined as to authorship, would be in just as good a +position to use them for writing history as if he had performed all the +preliminary operations himself. It is quite possible, whatever may be +said, to have the historical sense in full measure without having ever, +both literally and figuratively, wiped away the dust from original +documents--that is, without having discovered and restored them for +oneself. We need not interpret in the Jewish or etymological sense the +dictum of Renan: "I do not think it possible for any one to acquire a +clear notion of history, its limits, and the amount of confidence to be +placed in the different categories of historical investigation, unless +he is in the habit of _handling_ original documents."[106] This is to be +understood as simply referring to the habit of going direct to the +sources, and treating definite problems.[107] Without doubt a day will +come when all the documents relating to the history of classical +antiquity shall have been edited and treated critically. There will then +be no more room, in this department of study, for textual criticism or +the investigation of sources; but, for all that, the conditions for the +treatment of general ancient history, or special parts of it, will be +then eminently favourable. External criticism, as we cannot too often +repeat, is entirely preparatory; it is a means, not an end; the ideal +state of things would be that it should have been already sufficiently +practised that we might dispense with it for the future; it is only a +temporary necessity. Theoretically, not only is it unnecessary for those +who wish to make historical syntheses to do for themselves the +preparatory work on the materials which they use, but we have a right to +ask, as has been often asked, whether there is any advantage in their +doing it.[108] Would it not be preferable that workers in the field of +history should specialise? On the one class--the specialists--would +devolve the absorbing tasks of external or erudite criticism; the +others, relieved of the weight of these tasks, would have greater +liberty to devote themselves to the work of higher criticism, of +combination and construction. Such was the opinion of Mark Pattison, who +said, _History cannot be written from manuscripts_, which is as much as +to say: "It is impossible for a man to write history from documents +which he is obliged to put for himself into a condition in which they +can be used." + +Formerly the professions of "critical scholar" and "historian" were, in +fact, clearly distinguished. The "historians" cultivated the empty and +pompous species of literature which then was known as "history," without +considering themselves bound to keep in touch with the work of the +scholars. The latter, for their part, determined by their critical +researches the conditions under which history must be written, but were +at no pains to write it themselves. Content to collect, emend, and +classify historical documents, they took no interest in history, and +understood the past no better than did the mass of their contemporaries. +The scholars acted as though erudition were an end in itself, and the +historians as if they had been able to reconstruct vanished realities by +the mere force of reflection and ingenuity applied to the inferior +documents, which were common property. So complete a divorce between +erudition and history seems to-day almost inexplicable, and it was in +truth mischievous enough. We need not say that the present advocates of +the division of labour in history have nothing of the kind in view. It +is admittedly necessary that close relations should obtain between the +world of historians and that of critical scholars, for the work of the +latter has no reason for existence beyond its utility to the former. All +that is meant is, that certain analytical and all synthetic operations +are not necessarily better performed when they are performed by the same +person; that though the characters of historian and scholar may be +combined, there is nothing illegitimate in their separation; and that +perhaps this separation is desirable in theory, as, in practice, it is +often a necessity. + +In practice, what happens is as follows. Whatever part of history a man +undertakes to study, there are only three possible cases. In the first +the sources have already been emended and classified; in the second the +preliminary work on the sources, which has been only partially done, or +not at all, offers no great difficulty; in the third the sources are in +a very bad state, and require a great deal of labour to fit them for +use. We may observe, in passing, that there is naturally no proportion +between the intrinsic importance of the subject and the amount of +preliminary work which must be done before it can be treated: there are +some subjects of the highest interest, for example the history of the +origin and early development of Christianity, which could not be +properly attacked till after the completion of investigations which +occupied several generations of scholars; but the material criticism of +the sources of the history of the French Revolution, another subject of +the first rank, gave much less trouble; and there are comparatively +unimportant problems in mediæval history which will not be solved till +after an immense amount of external criticism shall have been performed. + +In the two first cases the expediency of a division of labour does not +come in question. But take the third case. A man of ability discovers +that the documents which are necessary for the treatment of a point of +history are in a very bad condition; they are scattered, corrupt, and +untrustworthy. He must take his choice; either he must abandon the +subject, having no taste for the mechanical operations which he knows to +be necessary, but which, as he foresees, would absorb the whole of his +energy; or else he resolves to enter upon the preparatory critical work, +without concealing from himself that in all probability he will never +have time to utilise the materials he has verified, and that he will +therefore be working for those who will come after him. If he adopts the +second alternative he becomes a critical scholar by profession, as it +were in spite of himself. _A priori_, it is true, there is nothing to +prevent those who make great collections of texts and publish critical +editions from using their own compilations and editions for the writing +of history; and we see, as a matter of fact, that several men have +divided themselves between the preparatory tasks of external criticism +and the more exalted labours of historical construction: it is enough to +mention the names of Waitz, Mommsen, and Hauréau. But this combination +is very rare, for several reasons. The first is the shortness of life; +there are catalogues, editions, _regesta_ on a great scale, the +construction of which entails so much mechanical labour as to exhaust +the strength of the most zealous worker. The second is the fact that, +for many persons, the tasks of critical scholarship are not without +their charm; nearly every one finds in them a singular satisfaction in +the long run; and some have confined themselves to these tasks who +might, strictly speaking, have aspired to higher things. + +Is it a good thing in itself that some workers should, voluntarily or +not, confine themselves to the researches of critical scholarship? Yes, +without a doubt. In the study of history, the results of the division of +labour are the same as in the industrial arts, and highly +satisfactory--more abundant, more successful, better regulated +production. Critics who have been long habituated to the restoration of +texts restore them with incomparable dexterity and sureness; those who +devote themselves exclusively to investigations of authorship and +sources have intuitions which would not occur to others less versed in +this difficult and highly specialised branch; those who have spent +their lives in the construction of catalogues and the compilation of +_regesta_ construct and compile them more easily, more quickly, and +better than the man in the street. Thus, not only is there no special +reason for requiring every "historian" to be at the same time an active +worker in the field of critical scholarship, but even those scholars who +are engaged in the operations of external criticism come under different +categories. Similarly, in a stoneyard there is no point in the architect +being at the same time a workman, nor have all the workmen the same +functions. Although most critical scholars have not rigorously +specialised so far, and although they vary their pleasures by +voluntarily executing different kinds of critical work, it would be easy +to name some who are specialists in descriptive catalogues and indexes +(archivists, librarians, and the like), others who are more particularly +"critics" (purifiers, restorers, and editors of texts), and others who +are pre-eminently compilers of _regesta_. "The moment it is admitted +that erudition is only valuable for the sake of its results, it becomes +impossible to carry the division of scientific labour too far;"[109] and +the progress of the historical sciences corresponds to the narrower and +narrower specialisation of the workers. It was possible, not very long +ago, for the same man to devote himself successively to all the +operations of historical inquiry, but that was because he appealed to a +not very exacting public: nowadays we require of those who criticise +documents a minute accuracy and an absolute perfection which presuppose +real professional skill. The historical sciences have now reached a +stage in their evolution at which the main lines have been traced, the +great discoveries made, and nothing remains but a more precise treatment +of details. We feel instinctively that any further advance must be by +dint of investigations of such extent, and analyses of such depth, as +none but specialists are capable of. + +But the best justification of the division of workers into "scholars" +and "historians" (and of the distribution of the former among the +various branches of external criticism) is to be found in the fact that +different persons have a natural vocation for different tasks. One of +the chief justifications of the institution of higher historical +teaching is, in our opinion, the opportunity afforded the teachers +(presumably men of experience) of discerning in the students, in the +course of their university career, either the germ of a vocation for +critical scholarship, or fundamental unfitness for critical work, as the +case may be.[110] _Criticus non fit, sed nascitur._ For one who is not +endowed by nature with certain aptitudes, a career of technical +erudition has nothing but disappointments in store: the greatest service +that can be rendered to young men hesitating whether to adopt such a +career or not is to warn them of the fact. Those who hitherto have +devoted themselves to the preparatory tasks of criticism have either +chosen them in preference to others because they had a taste for them, +or else have submitted to them because they knew they were necessary; +those who engaged in them by choice have less merit, from the ethical +point of view, than those who submitted to them, but, for all that, they +have mostly obtained better results, because they have worked, not as a +matter of duty, but joyfully and whole-heartedly. It is important that +every one should realise the situation, and, in his own as well as the +general interest, embrace the special work which suits him best. + +We now propose to examine the natural aptitudes which fit, and the truly +prohibitory defects which disqualify, for the labours of external +criticism. We shall, then, devote a few words to the effects produced on +the character by professional habituation to the labours of critical +scholarship. + +The chief condition of success in these labours is to like them. Those +who are exceptionally gifted as poets or thinkers--that is, those who +are endowed with creative power--have much difficulty in adapting +themselves to the technical drudgery of preparatory criticism: they are +far from despising it; on the contrary, they hold it in honour, if they +are clear-sighted; but they shrink from devoting themselves to it, for +fear of using a razor, as is said, to cut stones. "I have no mind," +wrote Leibnitz to Basnage, who had exhorted him to compile an immense +_Corpus_ of unpublished and printed documents relating to the history of +the law of nations; "I have no mind to turn transcriber.... Does it not +occur to you that the advice you give me resembles that of a man who +should wish to marry his friend to a shrew? For to engage a man in a +lifelong work is much the same as to find him a wife."[111] And Renan, +speaking of those immense preliminary labours "which have rendered +possible the researches of the higher criticism" and attempts at +historical construction, says: "The man who, with livelier intellectual +needs [than those of the men who performed these labours], should now +accomplish such an act of abnegation, would be a hero...."[112] Although +Renan directed the publication of the _Corpus Inscriptionum +Semiticarum_, and Leibnitz was the editor of the _Scriptores rerum +Brunsvicensium_, neither Leibnitz, nor Renan, nor their peers have, +fortunately, had the heroism to sacrifice their higher faculties to +purely critical learning. + +Outside the class of superior men (and the infinitely more numerous +class of those who wrongly think themselves such), nearly every one, as +we have already said, finds in the long run a kind of satisfaction in +the minutiæ of preparatory criticism. The reason is, that the practice +of this criticism appeals to and develops two very widespread +tastes--the taste for collecting and the taste for puzzles. The pleasure +of collecting is one which is felt not by children only, but by adults +as well, no matter whether the collection be one of various readings or +of postage-stamps. The deciphering of rebuses, the solution of small +problems of strictly definite scope, are occupations which attract many +able minds. Every find brings pleasure, and in the field of erudition +there are innumerable finds--some lying exposed and obvious, some +guarded by all but impenetrable barriers--to reward both those who do +and those who do not delight in surmounting difficulties. All the +scholars of any distinction have possessed in an eminent degree the +instincts of the collector and the puzzle-solver, and some of them have +been quite conscious of the fact. "The more difficulties we encountered +in our chosen path," says M. Hauréau, "the more the enterprise pleased +us. This species of labour, which is called bibliography [investigations +of authorship, principally from the point of view of pseudepigraphy], +could not aspire to the homage of the public, but it has a great +attraction for those who devote themselves to it. Yes, it is doubtless a +humble study, but how many others are there which so often compensate +the trouble they give by affording us opportunity to cry Eureka."[113] +Julien Havet, when he was "already known to the learned men of Europe," +used to divert himself "by apparently frivolous amusements, such as +guessing square words or deciphering cryptograms."[114] Profound +instincts, and, for all the childish or ridiculous perversions which +they may exhibit in certain individuals, of the highest utility! After +all, these are forms, the most rudimentary forms, of the scientific +spirit. Those who are devoid of them have no place in the world of +critical scholarship. But those who aspire to be critical scholars will +always be numerous; for the labours of interpretation, construction, and +exposition require the rarest gifts: all those whom chance has thrown +into the study of history, who desire to do useful work in that +department, but are wanting in psychological tact, or find composition +irksome, will always allow themselves to be fascinated by the simple and +calm pleasures of the preliminary tasks. + +But in order to succeed in critical labours it is not enough to like +them. It is necessary to possess qualifications "for which zeal is no +substitute." What qualifications? Those who have asked this question +have answered vaguely: "Qualifications of the moral rather than the +intellectual order, patience, intellectual honesty...." Is it not +possible to be more precise? + +There are young students with no _a priori_ repugnance for the labours +of external criticism, who perhaps are even disposed to like them, who +yet are--experience has shown it--totally incapable of performing them. +There would be nothing perplexing in this if these persons were +intellectually feeble; this incapacity would then be but one +manifestation of their general weakness; nor yet if they had gone +through no technical apprenticeship. But we are concerned with men of +education and intelligence, sometimes of exceptional ability, who do not +labour under the above disadvantages. These are the people of whom we +hear: "He works badly, he has the genius of inaccuracy." Their +catalogues, their editions, their _regesta_, their monographs swarm with +imperfections, and never inspire confidence; try as they may, they +never attain, I do not say absolute accuracy, but any decent degree of +accuracy. They are subject to "chronic inaccuracy," a disease of which +the English historian Froude is a typical and celebrated case. Froude +was a gifted writer, but destined never to advance any statement that +was not disfigured by error; it has been said of him that he was +constitutionally inaccurate. For example, he had visited the city of +Adelaide in Australia: "We saw," says he, "below us, in a basin with a +river winding through it, a city of 150,000 inhabitants, none of whom +has ever known or will ever know one moment's anxiety as to the +recurring regularity of his three meals a day." Thus Froude, now for the +facts: Adelaide is built on an eminence; no river runs through it; when +Froude visited it the population did not exceed 75,000, and it was +suffering from a famine at the time. And more of the same kind.[115] +Froude was perfectly aware of the utility of criticism, and he was even +one of the first in England to base the study of history on that of +original documents, as well unpublished as published; but his mental +conformation rendered him altogether unfit for the emendation of texts; +indeed, he murdered them, unintentionally, whenever he touched them. +Just as Daltonism (an affection of the organs of sight which prevents a +man from distinguishing correctly between red and green signals) +incapacitates for employment on a railway, so chronic inaccuracy, or +"Froude's Disease" (a malady not very difficult to diagnose) ought to be +regarded as incompatible with the professional practice of critical +scholarship. + +Froude's Disease does not appear to have ever been studied by the +psychologists, nor, indeed, is it to be considered as a separate +pathological entity. Every one makes mistakes "out of carelessness," +"through inadvertence," and in many other ways. What is abnormal is to +make many mistakes, to be always making them, in spite of the most +persevering efforts to be exact. Probably this phenomenon is connected +with weakness of the attention and excessive activity of the involuntary +(or subconscious) imagination which the will of the patient, lacking +strength and stability, is unable sufficiently to control. The +involuntary imagination intrudes upon intellectual operations only to +vitiate them; its part is to fill up the gaps of memory by conjecture, +to magnify and attenuate realities, and to confuse them with the +products of pure invention. Most children distort everything by +inexactitude of this kind, and it is only after a hard struggle that +they ever attain to a scrupulous accuracy--that is, learn to master +their imagination. Many men remain children, in this respect, the whole +of their lives. + +But, let the psychological causes of Froude's Disease be what they may, +another point claims our attention. The man of the sanest and +best-balanced mind is liable to bungle the simplest kinds of critical +work if he does not allow them the necessary time. In these matters +precipitancy is the source of innumerable errors. It is rightly said +that patience is the cardinal virtue of the scholar. Do not work too +fast, act as if there were always something to be gained by waiting, +leave work undone rather than spoil it: these are maxims easy enough to +pronounce, but not to be followed in practice by any but persons of +calm temperament. There are nervous, excitable persons, who are always +in a hurry to get to the end, always seeking variety in their +occupations, and always anxious to dazzle and astonish: these may +possibly find honourable employment in other careers; but if they +embrace erudition, they are doomed to pile up a mass of provisional +work, which is likely to do more harm than good, and is sure in the long +run to cause them many a vexation. The true scholar is cool, reserved, +circumspect. In the midst of the turmoil of life, which flows past him +like a torrent, he never hurries. Why should he hurry? The important +thing is, that the work he does should be solid, definitive, +imperishable. Better "spend weeks polishing a masterpiece of a score of +pages" in order to convince two or three among the scholars of Europe +that a particular charter is spurious, or take ten years to construct +the best possible text of a corrupt document, than give to the press in +the same interval volumes of moderately accurate _anecdota_ which future +scholars will some day have to put through the mill again from beginning +to end. + +Whatever special branch of critical scholarship a man may choose, he +ought to be gifted with prudence, an exceptionally powerful attention +and will, and, moreover, to combine a speculative turn of mind with +complete disinterestedness and little taste for action; for he must make +up his mind to work for distant and uncertain results, and, in nearly +every case, for the benefit of others. For textual criticism and the +investigation of sources, it is, moreover, very useful to have the +puzzle-solving instinct--that is, a nimble, ingenious mind, fertile in +hypotheses, prompt to seize and even to guess the relations of things. +For tasks of description and compilation (the preparation of inventories +and catalogues, _corpus_ and _regesta_-making) it is absolutely +necessary to possess the collector's instinct, together with an +exceptional appetite for work, and the qualities of order, industry, and +perseverance.[116] These are the aptitudes required. The labours of +external criticism are so distasteful to those who lack these aptitudes, +and the results obtained are, in their case, so small in comparison with +the time expended, that it is impossible for a man to make too sure of +his vocation before entering upon a career of critical scholarship. It +is pitiful to see those who, for want of a wise word spoken in due +season, lose their way and vainly exhaust themselves in such a career, +especially when they have good reason for believing that they might have +employed their talents to better advantage in other directions.[117] + +II. As critical and preparatory tasks are remarkably well suited to the +temperament of a very large number of Germans, and as the activity of +German erudition during the present century has been enormous, it is to +Germany that we must go for the best cases of those mental deformations +which are produced, in the long run, by the habitual practice of +external criticism. Hardly a year passes but complaints are heard, in +and about the German universities, of the ill effects produced on +scholars by the tasks of criticism. + +In 1890, Herr Philippi, as Rector of the University of Giessen, forcibly +deplored the chasm which, as he said, is opening between preparatory +criticism and general culture: textual criticism loses itself in +insignificant minutiæ; scholars collate for the mere pleasure of +collating; infinite precautions are employed in the restoration of +worthless documents; it is thus evident that "more importance is +attached to the materials of study than to its intellectual results." +The Rector of Giessen sees in the diffuse style of German scholars and +in the bitterness of their polemical writings an effect of the habit +they have contracted of "excessive preoccupation with little +things."[118] In the same year the same note was sounded, at the +University of Bâle, by Herr J. v. Pflugk-Harttung. "The highest branches +of historical science are despised," says this author in his +_Geschichtsbetrachtungen_[119]: "all that is valued is microscopic +observations and absolute accuracy in unimportant details. The criticism +of texts and sources has become a branch of sport: the least breach of +the rules of the game is considered unpardonable, while conformity to +them is enough to assure the approval of connoisseurs, irrespectively of +the intrinsic value of the results obtained. Scholars are mostly +malevolent and discourteous towards each other; they make molehills and +call them mountains; their vanity is as comic as that of the citizen of +Frankfort who used complacently to observe, 'All that you can see +through yonder archway is Frankfort territory.'"[120] We, for our part, +are inclined to draw a distinction between three professional risks to +which scholars are subject: dilettantism, hypercriticism, and loss of +the power to work. + +To take the last first: the habit of critical analysis has a relaxing +and paralysing action on certain intelligences. Men, of naturally timid +dispositions, discover that whatever pains they take with their critical +work, their editing or classifying of documents, they are very apt to +make slight mistakes, and these slight mistakes, as a result of their +critical education, fill them with horror and dread. To discover +blunders in their signed work when the time for correction is past, +causes them acute suffering. They reach at length a state of morbid +anxiety and scrupulosity which prevents them from doing anything at +all, for fear of possible imperfections. The _examen rigorosum_ to which +they are continually subjecting themselves brings them to a standstill. +They give the same measure to the productions of others, and in the end +they see in historical works nothing but the authorities and the notes, +the _apparatus criticus_, and in the _apparatus criticus_ they see +nothing but the faults in it which require correction. + +_Hypercriticism._--The excess of criticism, just as much as the crudest +ignorance, leads to error. It consists in the application of critical +canons to cases outside their jurisdiction. It is related to criticism +as logic-chopping is to logic. There are persons who scent enigmas +everywhere, even where there are none. They take perfectly clear texts +and subtilise on them till they make them doubtful, under the pretext of +freeing them from imaginary corruptions. They discover traces of forgery +in authentic documents. A strange state of mind! By constantly guarding +against the instinct of credulity they come to suspect everything.[121] +It is to be observed that in proportion as the criticism of texts and +sources makes positive progress, the danger of hypercriticism increases. +When all the sources of history have been properly criticised (for +certain parts of ancient history this is no distant prospect), good +sense will call a halt. But scholars will refuse to halt; they will +refine, as they do already on the best established texts, and those who +refine will inevitably fall into hypercriticism. "The peculiarity of the +study of history and its auxiliary philological sciences," says Renan, +"is that as soon as they have attained their relative perfection they +begin to destroy themselves."[122] Hypercriticism is the cause of this. + +_Dilettantism._--Scholars by profession and vocation have a tendency to +treat the external criticism of documents as a game of skill, difficult, +but deriving an interest, much as chess does, from the very complication +of its rules. Some of them are indifferent to the larger questions--to +history itself, in fact. They criticise for the sake of criticism, and, +in their view, the elegance of the method of investigation is much more +important than the results, whatever they may be. These _virtuosi_ are +not concerned to connect their labours with some general idea--to +criticise systematically, for example, all the documents relating to a +question, in order to understand it; they criticise indiscriminately +texts relating to all manner of subjects, on the one condition of being +sufficiently corrupt. Armed with their critical skill, they range over +the whole of the domain of history, and stop wherever a knotty problem +invites their services; this problem solved, or at least discussed, they +go elsewhere to look for others. They leave behind them no coherent +work, but a heterogeneous collection of memoirs on every conceivable +subject, which resembles, as Carlyle says, a curiosity shop or an +archipelago of small islands. + +Dilettanti defend their dilettantism by sufficiently plausible +arguments. To begin with, say they, everything is important; in history +there is no document which has not its value: "No scientific work is +barren, no truth is without its use for science ...; in history there is +no such thing as a trivial subject;" consequently, "it is not the nature +of the subject which makes work valuable, but the method employed."[123] +The important thing in history is not "the ideas one accumulates; it is +the mental gymnastics, the intellectual training--in short, the +scientific spirit." Even supposing that there are degrees of importance +among the data of history, no one has a right to maintain _a priori_ +that a document is "useless." What, pray, is the criterion of utility in +these matters? How many documents are there not which, after being long +despised, have been suddenly placed in the foreground by a change of +standpoint or by new discoveries? "All exclusion is rash; there is no +research which it is possible to brand beforehand as necessarily +sterile. That which has no value in itself may become valuable as a +necessary means." Perhaps a day may come when, science being in a sense +complete, indifferent documents and facts may be safely thrown +overboard; but we are not at present in a position to distinguish the +superfluous from the necessary, and in all probability the line of +demarcation will never be easy to trace. This justifies the most special +researches and the most futile in all appearance. And, if it come to the +worst, what does it matter if there is a certain amount of work wasted? +"It is a law in science, as in all human effort," and indeed in all the +operations of nature, "to work in broad outlines, with a wide margin of +what is superfluous." + +We shall not undertake to refute these arguments to the full extent in +which this is possible. Besides, Renan, who has put the case for both +sides of the question with equal vigour, definitively closed the debate +in the following words: "It may be said that some researches are useless +in the sense of taking up time which would have been better spent on +more serious questions.... Although it is not necessary for an artisan +to have a complete knowledge of the work he is employed to execute, it +is still to be desired that those who devote themselves to special +labours should have some notion of the more general considerations which +alone give value to their researches. If all the industrious workers to +whom modern science owes its progress had had a philosophical +comprehension of what they were doing, how much precious time would have +been saved!... It is deeply to be regretted that there should be such an +immense waste of human effort, merely for want of guidance, and a clear +consciousness of the end to be pursued."[124] + +Dilettantism is incompatible with a certain elevation of mind, and with +a certain degree of "moral perfection," but not with technical +proficiency. Some of the most accomplished critics merely make a trade +of their skill, and have never reflected on the ends to which their art +is a means. It would, however, be wrong to infer that science itself has +nothing to fear from dilettantism. The dilettanti of criticism who work +as fancy or curiosity bids them, who are attracted to problems not by +their intrinsic importance, but by their difficulty, do not supply +historians (those whose work it is to combine materials and use them for +the main purposes of history) with the materials of which the latter +have the most pressing need, but with others which might have waited. If +the activity of specialists in external criticism were exclusively +directed to questions whose solution is important, and if it were +regulated and guided from above, it would be more fruitful. + +The idea of providing against the dangers of dilettantism by a rational +"organisation of labour" is already ancient. Fifty years ago it was +common to hear people talking of "supervision," of "concentrating +scattered forces;" dreams were rife of "vast workshops" organised on the +model of those of modern industry, in which the preparatory labours of +critical scholarship were to be performed on a great scale, in the +interests of science. In nearly all countries, in fact, governments +(through the medium of historical committees and commissions), +academies, and learned societies have endeavoured in our day, much as +monastic congregations did of old, to group professed scholars for the +purposes of vast collective enterprises, and to co-ordinate their +efforts. But this banding of specialists in external criticism for the +service and under the supervision of competent men presents great +mechanical difficulties. The problem of the "organisation of scientific +labour" is still the order of the day.[125] + + +III. Scholars are often censured for pride and excessive harshness in +the judgments which they pass on the labours of their colleagues; and +these faults, as we have seen, are often attributed to their excessive +"preoccupation with little things," especially by persons whose attempts +have been severely judged. In reality there do exist modest and kindly +scholars: it is a question of character; professional "preoccupation +with little things" is not enough to change natural disposition in this +respect. "Ce bon monsieur Du Cange," as the Benedictines said, was +modest to excess. "Nothing more is required," says he, in speaking of +his labours, "but eyes and fingers in order to do as much and more;" he +never blamed any one, on principle. "If I study it is for the pleasure +of studying, and not to give pain to any one else, any more than to +myself."[126] It is, however, true that most scholars have no +compunction in exposing each other's mistakes, and that their austere +zeal sometimes finds expression in harsh and overbearing language. +Barring the harshness they are quite right. Like physicians, chemists, +and other members of learned and scientific professions, they have a +keen appreciation of the value of scientific truth, and it is for this +reason that they make a point of calling offenders to account. They are +thus enabled to bar the door against the tribe of incapables and +charlatans who once infested their profession. + +Among the youths who propose to devote themselves to the study of +history there are some in whom the commercial spirit and vulgar ambition +are stronger than the love of science. These are apt to say to +themselves: "Historical work, if it is to be done according to the rules +of method, requires an infinite amount of labour and caution. But do we +not see historical writings whose authors have more or less seriously +violated the rules? Are these authors thought any the less of on this +account? Is it always the most conscientious writer who enjoys the +highest consideration? Cannot tact supply the place of knowledge?" If +tact really could supply the place of knowledge, then, as it is easier +to do bad work than good, and as the important thing with these people +is success, they might be tempted to conclude that it does not matter +how badly they work as long as they succeed. Why should not things go in +these matters as they do in life, where it is not necessarily the best +men that get on best? Well, it is due to the pitiless severity of the +critics that calculations of this kind would be as disastrous as they +are despicable. + +Towards the end of the Second Empire there was in France no enlightened +public opinion on the subject of historical work. Bad books of +historical erudition were published with impunity, and sometimes even +procured undeserved rewards for their authors. It was then that the +founders of the _Revue Critique d'histoire et de littérature_ undertook +to combat a state of things which they lightly deemed demoralising. +With this object they administered public chastisement to those scholars +who showed lack of conscience or method, in a manner calculated to +disgust them with erudition for ever. They performed sundry notable +executions, not for the pleasure of it, but with the firm resolve to +establish a censorship and a wholesome dread of justice, in the domain +of historical study. Bad workers henceforth received no quarter, and +though the _Revue_ did not exert any great influence on the public at +large, its police-operations covered a wide enough radius to impress +most of those concerned with the necessity of sincerity and respect for +method. During the last twenty-five years the impulse thus given has +spread beyond all expectation. + +It is now a matter of great difficulty to impose on the world of +scholars, in matters connected with their studies, or at least to keep +up the deception for any length of time. In the case of the historical +sciences, as well as the sciences proper, it is now too late to found a +new error or to discredit an old truth. It may be a few months, possibly +a few years, before a bungled experiment in chemistry or a scamped +edition is recognised as such; but inexact results, though temporarily +accepted under reserve, are always sooner or later, and generally very +soon, discovered, denounced, and eliminated. The theory of the +operations of external criticism is now so well established, the number +of specialists thoroughly versed in them is now so great in every +country, that, with rare exceptions, descriptive catalogues of +documents, editions, _regesta_, monographs, are scrutinised, dissected, +and judged as soon as they appear. It is well to be warned. It will for +the future be the height of imprudence to risk publishing a work of +erudition without having first done everything possible to make it +unassailable; otherwise it will immediately, or after brief delay, be +attacked and demolished. Not knowing this, certain well-meaning persons +still show themselves, from time to time, simple enough to enter the +lists of critical scholarship insufficiently prepared; they are filled +with a desire to be useful, and are apparently convinced that here, as +in politics and elsewhere, it is possible to work by extemporised and +approximate methods without any "special knowledge." They are sorry +afterwards. The knowing ones do not take the risk; the tasks of critical +scholarship have no seductions for them, for they are aware that the +labour is great and the glory moderate, and that the field is engrossed +by clever specialists not too well disposed towards intruders. They see +plainly there is no room for them here. The blunt uncompromising honesty +of the scholars thus delivers them from undesirable company of a kind +which the "historians" proper have still occasionally to put up with. + +Bad workers, in fact, on the hunt for a public less closely critical +than the scholars, are very ready to take refuge in historical +exposition. The rules of method are here less obvious, or, rather, not +so well known. While the criticism of texts and sources has been placed +on a scientific basis, historical synthesis is still performed +haphazard. Mental confusion, ignorance, negligence--faults which stand +out so clearly in works of critical scholarship--may in historical +works be disguised up to a certain point by literary artifices, and the +public at large, which is not well educated in this respect, is not +shocked.[127] In short, there is still, in this department, a certain +chance of impunity. This chance, however, is diminishing, and a day will +come, before so very long, when the superficial writers who make +incorrect syntheses will be treated with as little consideration as is +now received by those who show themselves unscrupulous or unskilful in +the technique of preparatory criticism. The works of the most celebrated +historians of the nineteenth century, those who died but yesterday, +Augustin Thierry, Ranke, Fustel de Coulanges, Taine, and others, are +already battered and riddled with criticism. The faults of their methods +have already been seen, defined, and condemned. + +Those who are insensible to other considerations ought to be moved to +honesty in historical work by the reflection that the time is now past, +or nearly so, when it was possible to do bad work without having to +suffer for it. + + + + +_SECTION II.--INTERNAL CRITICISM_ + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +INTERPRETATIVE CRITICISM (HERMENEUTIC) + + +I. When a zoologist describes the form and situation of a muscle, when a +physiologist gives the curve of a movement, we are able to accept their +results without reserve, because we know by what method, by what +instruments, by what system of notation they have obtained them.[128] +But when Tacitus says of the Germans, _Arva per annos mutant_, we do not +know beforehand whether he took the right method to inform himself, nor +even in what sense he used the words _arva_ and _mutant_; to ascertain +this a preliminary operation is required.[129] This operation is +internal criticism. + +The object of criticism is to discover what in a document may be +accepted as true. Now the document is only the final result of a long +series of operations, on the details of which the author gives us no +information. He had to observe or collect facts, to frame sentences, to +write down words; and these operations, which are perfectly distinct one +from another, may not all have been performed with the same accuracy. It +is therefore necessary to _analyse_ the product of the author's labour +in order to distinguish which operations have been incorrectly +performed, and reject their _results_. _Analysis_ is thus necessary to +criticism; all criticism begins with analysis. + +In order to be logically complete, the analysis ought to reconstruct +_all_ the operations which the author must have performed, and to +examine them _one by one_, to see whether each has been performed +correctly. It would be necessary to pass in review all the successive +acts by which the document was produced, from the moment when the author +observed the fact which is its subject up to the movements of his hand +by which he traced the letters of the document; or, rather, it would be +necessary to proceed in the opposite direction, step by step, from the +movements of the hand back to the observation. This method would be so +long and so tedious that no one would ever have the time or the patience +to apply it. + +Internal criticism is not, like external criticism, an instrument used +for the mere pleasure of using it;[130] it yields no immediate +satisfaction, because it does not definitively solve any problem. It is +only applied because it is necessary, and its use is restricted to a +bare minimum. The most exacting historian is satisfied with an abridged +method which concentrates all the operations into two groups: (1) the +analysis of the contents of the document, and the positive +interpretative criticism which is necessary for ascertaining what the +author meant; (2) the analysis of the conditions under which the +document was produced, and its negative criticism, necessary for the +verification of the author's statements. This twofold division of the +labour of criticism is, moreover, only employed by a select few. The +natural tendency, even of historians who work methodically, is to read +the text with the object of extracting information directly from it, +without any thought of first ascertaining what exactly was in the +author's mind.[131] This procedure is excusable at most in the case of +nineteenth-century documents, written by men whose language and mode of +thought are familiar to us, and then only when there is not more than +one possible interpretation. It becomes dangerous as soon as the +author's habits of language or thought begin to differ from those of the +historian who reads him, or when the meaning of the text is not obvious +and indisputable. Whoever, in reading a text, is not exclusively +occupied with the effort to understand it, is sure to read impressions +of his own into it; he is struck by phrases or words in the document +which correspond to his own ideas, or agree with his own _a priori_ +notion of the facts; unconsciously he detaches these phrases or words, +and forms out of them an imaginary text which he puts in the place of +the real text of the author.[132] + + +II. Here, as always in history, method consists in repressing the first +impulse. It is necessary to be penetrated by the principle, sufficiently +obvious but often forgotten, that a document only contains the ideas of +the man who wrote it, and to make it a rule to begin by understanding +the text by itself, _before_ asking what can be extracted from it for +the purposes of history. We thus arrive at this general rule of method: +the study of every document should begin with an analysis of its +contents, made with the sole aim of determining the real meaning of the +author. + +This analysis is a preliminary operation, distinct and independent. +Experience here, as in the tasks of critical scholarship,[133] has +decided in favour of the system of slips. Each slip will contain the +analysis of a document, of a separate part of a document, or of an +episode in a narrative; the analysis ought to indicate not only the +general sense of the text, but also, as far as possible, the object and +views of the author. It will be well to reproduce verbally any +expressions which may seem characteristic of the author's thought. +Sometimes it will be enough to have analysed the text mentally: it is +not always necessary to put down in black and white the whole contents +of a document; in such cases we simply enter the points of which we +intend to make use. But against the ever-present danger of substituting +one's personal impressions for the text there is only one real +safeguard; it should be made an invariable rule never on any account to +make an extract from a document, or a partial analysis of it, without +having _first_ made a comprehensive analysis[134] of it mentally, if not +on paper. + +To analyse a document is to discern and isolate all the ideas expressed +by the author. Analysis thus reduces to _interpretative criticism_. + +Interpretation passes through two stages: the first is concerned with +the literal, the second with the real meaning. + + +III. The determination of the literal meaning of a document is a +linguistic operation; accordingly, Philology (in the narrow sense) has +been reckoned among the auxiliary sciences of history. To understand a +text it is first necessary to know the language. But a _general_ +knowledge of the language is not enough. In order to interpret Gregory +of Tours, it is not enough to know Latin in a general way; it is +necessary to add a special study of the particular kind of Latin written +by Gregory of Tours. + +The natural tendency is to attribute the same meaning to the same word +wherever it occurs. We instinctively treat a language as if it were a +fixed system of signs. Fixity, indeed, is a characteristic of the signs +which have been expressly invented for scientific use, such as +algebraical notation or the nomenclature of chemistry. Here every +expression has a single precise meaning, which is absolute and +invariable; it expresses an accurately analysed and defined idea, only +one such idea, and that always the same in whatever context the +expression may occur, and by whatever author it may be used. But +ordinary language, in which documents are written, fluctuates: each word +expresses a complex and ill-defined idea; its meanings are manifold, +relative, and variable; the same word may stand for several different +things, and is used in different senses by the same author according to +the context; lastly, the meaning of a word varies from author to author, +and is modified in the course of time. _Vel_, which in classical Latin +only has the meanings _or_ and _even_, means _and_ in certain epochs of +the middle ages; _suffragium_, which is classical Latin for _suffrage_, +takes in mediæval Latin the sense of _help_. We have, then, to learn to +resist the instinct which leads us to explain all the expressions of a +text by their classical or ordinary meanings. The grammatical +interpretation, based on the general rules of the language, must be +supplemented by an historical interpretation founded on an examination +of the particular case. + +The method consists in determining the special meaning of the words in +the document; it rests on a few very simple principles. + +(1) Language changes by continuous evolution. Each epoch has a language +of its own, which must be treated as a separate system of signs. In +order to understand a document we must know the _language of the +time_--that is, the meanings of words and forms of expression in use at +the time when the text was written. The meaning of a word is to be +determined by bringing together the passages where it is employed: it +will generally be found that in one or other of these the remainder of +the sentence leaves no doubt as to the meaning of the word in +question.[135] Information of this kind is given in historical +dictionaries, such as the _Thesaurus Linguæ Latinæ_; or the glossaries +of Du Cange. In these compilations the article devoted to each word is a +collection of the passages in which the word occurs, accompanied by +indications of authorship which fix the epoch. + +When the author wrote in a dead language which he had learnt out of +books--this is the case with the Latin texts of the earlier middle +ages--we must be on our guard against words used in an arbitrary sense, +or selected for the sake of elegance: for example, _consul_ (count, +earl), _capite census_ (censitary), _agellus_ (grand domain). + +(2) Linguistic usage may vary from one region to another; we have, then, +to know the _language of the country_ where the document was +written--that is, the peculiar meanings current in the country. + +(3) Each author has his own manner of writing; we have, then, to study +the _language of the author_, the peculiar senses in which he used +words.[136] This purpose is served by lexicons to a single author, as +Meusel's _Lexicon Cæsarianum_, in which are brought together all the +passages in which the author used each word. + +(4) An expression changes its meaning according to the passage in which +it occurs; we must therefore interpret each word and sentence not as if +it stood isolated, but with an eye to the general sense of the context. +This is the _rule of context_,[137] a fundamental rule of +interpretation. Its meaning is that, before making use of a phrase taken +from a text, we must have read the text in its entirety; it prohibits +the stuffing of a modern work with _quotations_--that is, shreds of +phrases torn from passages without regard to the special sense given to +them by the context.[138] + +These rules, if rigorously applied, would constitute an exact method of +interpretation which would hardly leave any chance of error, but would +require an enormous expenditure of time. What an immense amount of +labour would be necessary if, in the case of _each_ word, we had to +determine by a special operation its meaning in the language of the +time, of the country, of the author, and in the context! Yet this is the +labour demanded by a well-made translation: in the case of some ancient +works of great literary value it has been submitted to; for the mass of +historical documents we content ourselves, in practice, with an abridged +method. + +All words are not equally subject to variations of meaning; most of them +keep a fairly uniform meaning in all authors and in all periods. We may +therefore be satisfied to study specially those expressions which, from +their nature, are liable to take different meanings: first, ready-made +expressions which, being fixed, do not follow the evolution of the words +of which they are composed; secondly, and chiefly, words denoting things +which are in their nature subject to evolution; classes of men (_miles_, +_colonus_, _servus_); institutions (_conventus_, _justitia_, _judex_); +usages (_alleu_, _bénéfice_, _élection_); feelings, common objects. In +the case of all words of such classes it would be imprudent to assume a +fixed meaning; it is an absolutely necessary precaution to ascertain +what is the sense in which they are used in the text to be interpreted. +"These studies of words," said Fustel de Coulanges, "have a great +importance in historical science. A badly interpreted term may be the +source of serious error."[139] And, in fact, simply by a methodical +application of interpretative criticism to a hundred words or so, he +succeeded in revolutionising the study of the Merovingian epoch. + + +IV. When we have analysed the document and determined the literal +meaning of its phrases, we cannot even yet be sure that we have reached +the real thoughts of the author. It is possible that he may have used +some expressions in an oblique sense; there are several kinds of cases +where this occurs: allegory and symbolism, jests and hoaxes, allusion +and implication, even the ordinary figures of speech, metaphor, +hyperbole, litotes.[140] In all these cases it is necessary to pierce +through the literal meaning to the real meaning, which the author has +purposely disguised under an inexact form. + +Logically the problem is very embarrassing: there is no fixed external +criterion by which we can make sure of detecting an oblique sense; in +the case of the hoax, which in the present century has become a branch +of literature, it is an essential part of the author's plan to leave no +indication which would betray the jest. In practice we may be morally +certain that an author is not using an oblique sense wherever his prime +object is to be understood; we are therefore not likely to meet with +difficulties of this kind in official documents, in charters, and in +historical narratives. In all these cases the general form of the +document permits us to assume that it is written in the literal sense of +the words. + +On the other hand, we must be prepared for oblique senses when the +author had other interests than that of being understood, or when he +wrote for a public which could understand his allusions and read between +the lines, or when his readers, in virtue of a religious or literary +initiation, might be expected to understand his symbolisms and figures +of speech. This is the case with religious texts, private letters, and +all those literary works which form so large a part of the documents on +antiquity. Thus the art of recognising and determining hidden meanings +in texts has always occupied a large space in the theory of +_hermeneutic_[141] (which is Greek for interpretative criticism), and in +the _exegesis_ of the sacred texts and of classical authors. + +The different modes of introducing an oblique sense behind the literal +sense are too varied, and depend too much on special circumstances, for +it to be possible to reduce the art of detecting them to definite rules. +Only one general principle can be laid down, and that is, that when the +literal sense is absurd, incoherent, or obscure, or in contradiction +with the ideas of the author or the facts known to him, then we ought to +presume an oblique sense. + +In order to determine this sense, the procedure is the same as for +studying the language of an author: we compare the passages in which the +expressions occur in which we suspect an oblique sense, and look to see +whether there is not one where the meaning may be guessed from the +context. A celebrated instance of this procedure is the discovery of the +allegorical meaning of the Beast in the Apocalypse. But as there is no +certain method of solving these problems, we never have a right to say +we have discovered all the hidden meanings or seized all the allusions +contained in a text; and even when we think we have found the sense, we +shall do well to draw no inferences from a necessarily conjectural +interpretation. + +On the other hand, it is necessary to guard against the temptation to +look for allegorical meanings everywhere, as the neo-Platonists did in +Plato's works and the Swedenborgians in the Bible. This attack of +_hyper-hermeneutic_ is now over, but we are not yet safe from the +analogous tendency to look for allusions everywhere. Investigations of +this kind are always conjectural, and are better calculated to flatter +the vanity of the interpreter than to furnish results of which history +can make use. + +V. When we have at length reached the real sense of the text, the +operation of positive analysis is concluded. Its result is to make us +acquainted with the author's conceptions, the images he had in his mind, +the general notions in terms of which he represented the world to +himself. This information belongs to a very important branch of +knowledge, out of which is constituted a whole group of historical +sciences:[142] the history of the illustrative arts and of literature, +the history of science, the history of philosophical and moral +doctrine, mythology and the history of dogmas (wrongly called religious +beliefs, because here we are studying official doctrines without +inquiring whether they are believed), the history of law, the history of +official institutions (so far as we do not inquire how they were applied +in practice), the assemblage of popular legends, traditions, opinions, +conceptions (inexactly called beliefs) which are comprised under the +name of folk-lore. + +All these studies need only the external criticism which investigates +authorship and origin and interpretative criticism; they require one +degree less elaboration than the history of objective facts, and +accordingly they have been earlier established on a methodical basis. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE GOOD FAITH AND ACCURACY OF +AUTHORS + + +I. Analysis and positive interpretative criticism only penetrate as far +as the inward workings of the mind of the author of a document, and only +help us to know his ideas. They give no direct information about +external facts. Even when the author was able to observe them, his text +only indicates how he wished to represent them, not how he really saw +them, still less how they really happened. What an author expresses is +not always what he believed, for he may have lied; what he believed is +not necessarily what happened, for he may have been mistaken. These +propositions are obvious. And yet a first and natural impulse leads us +to accept as true every statement contained in a document, which is +equivalent to assuming that no author ever lied or was deceived; and +this spontaneous credulity seems to possess a high degree of vitality, +for it persists in spite of the innumerable instances of error and +mendacity which daily experience brings before us. + +Reflection has been forced on historians in the course of their work by +the circumstance of their finding documents which contradicted each +other; in such cases they have been obliged to doubt, and, after +examination, to admit the existence of error or mendacity; thus negative +criticism has appeared as a practical necessity for the purpose of +eliminating statements which are obviously false or erroneous. But the +instinct of confidence is so indestructible that it has hitherto +prevented even those professionally concerned from systematising the +internal criticism of statements in the same way as the external +criticism which deals with the origin of documents has been +systematised. Historians, in their works, and even theoretical writers +on historical method,[143] have been satisfied with common notions and +vague formulæ in striking contrast with the precise terminology of the +critical investigation of sources. They are content to examine whether +the author was roughly _contemporary_ with the events, whether he was an +ocular _witness_, whether he was _sincere_ and _well-informed_, whether +he knew the truth and desired to tell it, or even--summing up the whole +question in a single formula--whether he was _trustworthy_. + +This superficial criticism is certainly better than no criticism at all, +and has sufficed to give those who have applied it the consciousness of +incontestable superiority. But it is only a halfway-house between common +credulity and scientific method. Here, as in every science, the +starting-point must be methodical doubt.[144] All that has not been +proved must be temporarily regarded as doubtful; no proposition is to +be affirmed unless reasons can be adduced in favour of its truth. +Applied to the statements contained in documents, methodical doubt +becomes _methodical distrust_. + +The historian ought to distrust _a priori_ every statement of an author, +for he cannot be sure that it is not mendacious or mistaken. At the best +it affords a presumption. For the historian to adopt it and affirm it +afresh on his own account implies that he regards it as a scientific +truth. To take this decisive step is what he has no right to do without +good reasons. But the human mind is so constituted that this step is +often taken unconsciously (cf. book ii. chap. i.). Against this +dangerous tendency criticism has only one means of defence. We must not +postpone doubt till it is forced upon us by conflicting statements in +documents; we must _begin_ by doubting. We must never forget the +interval which separates a statement made by any author whatsoever from +a scientifically established truth, so that we may continually keep in +mind the responsibility which we assume when we reproduce a statement. + +Even after we have accepted the principle and resolved to apply this +unnatural distrust in practice, we tend instinctively to free ourselves +from it as soon as possible. The natural impulse is to perform the +criticism of the whole of an author, or at least of the whole of a +document, in the lump; to divide authorities into two categories, the +sheep on the right, the goats on the left; on the one side trustworthy +authors and good documents, on the other suspected authors and bad +documents. Having thus exhausted our powers of distrust, we proceed to +reproduce without discussion all the statements contained in the "good +document." We consent to distrust suspected authors such as Suidas or +Aimo, but we affirm as established truth everything that has been said +by Thucydides or Gregory of Tours.[145] We apply to authors that +judicial procedure which divides witnesses into admissible and +inadmissible: having once accepted a witness, we feel ourselves bound to +admit all his testimony; we dare not doubt any of his statements without +a special reason. Instinctively we take sides with the author on whom we +have bestowed our approval, and we go so far as to say, as in the law +courts, that the burden of proof rests with those who reject valid +testimony.[146] + +The confusion is still further increased by the use of the word +_authentic_, borrowed from judicial language. It has reference to the +origin only, not to the contents; to say that a document is authentic is +merely to say that its origin is certain, not that its contents are free +from error. But authenticity inspires a degree of respect which disposes +us to accept the contents without discussion. To doubt the statements of +an authentic document would seem presumptuous, or at least we think +ourselves bound to wait for overwhelming proof before we impeach the +testimony of the author. + + +II. These natural instincts must be methodically resisted. A document +(still more a literary work) is not all of a piece; it is composed of a +great number of independent statements, any one of which may be +intentionally or unintentionally false, while the others are _bonâ fide_ +and accurate, or conversely, since each statement is the outcome of a +mental operation which may have been incorrectly performed, while others +were performed correctly. It is not, therefore, enough to examine a +document as a whole; each of the statements in it must be examined +separately; _criticism_ is impossible without _analysis_. + +Thus internal criticism conducts us to two general rules. + +(1) A scientific truth is not established by _testimony_. In order to +affirm a proposition we must have special reasons for believing it +true. It may happen in certain cases that an author's statement is a +sufficient reason for belief; but we cannot know that beforehand. The +rule, then, will be to examine each separate statement in order to make +sure whether it is of a nature to constitute a sufficient reason for +belief. + +(2) The criticism of a document is not to be performed _en bloc_. The +rule will be to _analyse_ the document into its elements, in order to +isolate the different statements of which it is composed and to examine +each of them separately. Sometimes a single sentence contains several +statements; they must be separated and criticised one by one. In a sale, +for example, we distinguish the date, the place, the vendor, the +purchaser, the object, the price, and each one of the conditions. + +In practice, criticism and analysis are performed simultaneously, and, +except in the case of texts in a difficult language, may proceed _pari +passu_ with interpretative analysis and criticism. As soon as we +understand a phrase we analyse it and criticise each of its elements. + +It thus appears that _logically_ criticism comprises an enormous number +of operations. In describing them, with all the details necessary for +the understanding of their mechanism and the reasons for their +employment, we are likely to give the impression of a procedure too slow +to be practicable. Such an impression is inevitably produced by every +verbal description of a complicated process. Compare the time occupied +in describing a movement in fencing with that required to execute it; +compare the tedium of the grammar and dictionary with the rapidity of +reading. Like every practical art, criticism consists in the habit of +performing certain acts. In the period of apprenticeship, before the +habit is acquired, we are obliged to think of each act separately before +performing it, and to analyse the movements; accordingly we perform them +all slowly and with difficulty; but the habit once acquired, the acts, +which have now become instinctive and unconscious, are performed with +ease and rapidity. The reader must therefore not be uneasy about the +slowness of the critical processes; he will see later on how they are +abridged in practice. + + +III. The problem of criticism may be stated as follows. Given a +statement made by a man of whose mental operations we have no +experience, and the value of the statement depending exclusively on the +manner in which these operations were performed; to ascertain whether +these operations were performed correctly. The mere statement of the +problem shows that we cannot hope for any direct or definitive solution +of it; we lack the essential datum, namely, the manner in which the +author performed the mental operations concerned. Criticism therefore +does not advance beyond indirect and provisional solutions, and does no +more than furnish data which require a final elaboration. + +A natural instinct leads us to judge of the value of statements by their +form. We think we can tell at a glance whether an author is sincere or a +narrative accurate. We seek for what is called "the accent of +sincerity," or "an impression of truth." This impression is almost +irresistible, but it is none the less an illusion. There is no external +criterion either of good faith or of accuracy. "The accent of sincerity" +is the appearance of conviction; an orator, an actor, an habitual liar +will put more of it into his lies than an undecided man into his +statement of what he believes to be the truth. Energy of affirmation +does not always mean strength of conviction, but sometimes only +cleverness or effrontery.[147] Similarly, abundance and precision of +detail, though they produce a vivid impression on unexperienced readers, +do not guarantee the accuracy of the facts;[148] they give us no +information about anything but the imagination of the author when he is +sincere, or his impudence when he is the reverse. We are apt to say of a +circumstantial narrative: "Things of this kind are not invented." They +are not invented, but they are very easy to transfer from one person, +country, or time to another. There is thus no external characteristic of +a document which can relieve us of the obligation to criticise it. + +The value of an author's statement depends solely on the conditions +under which he performed certain mental operations. Criticism has no +other resource than the examination of these conditions. But it is not +a case of reconstructing all of them; it is enough to answer a single +question: did the author perform these operations correctly or not? The +question may be approached on two sides. + +(1) The critical investigation of authorship has often taught us the +_general_ conditions under which the author operated. It is probable +that some of these influenced each one of the operations. We ought +therefore to begin by studying the information we possess about the +author and the composition of the document, taking particular pains to +look in the habits, sentiments, and personal situation of the author, or +in the circumstances in which he composed, for all the reasons which +could have existed for incorrectness on the one hand, or exceptional +accuracy on the other. In order to perceive these reasons it is +necessary to be on the lookout for them beforehand. The only method, +therefore, is to draw up a general set of questions having reference to +the possible causes of inaccuracy. We shall then apply it to the general +conditions under which the document was composed, in order to discover +those causes which may have rendered the author's mental operations +incorrect and vitiated the results. But all that we shall thus +obtain--even in the exceptionally favourable cases in which the +conditions of origin are well known--will be _general_ indications, +which will be insufficient for the purposes of criticism, for criticism +must always deal with each separate statement. + +(2) The criticism of particular statements is confined to the use of a +single method, which, by a curious paradox, is the study of the +_universal_ conditions under which documents are composed. The +information which is not furnished by the general study of the author +may be sought for by a consideration of the necessary processes of the +human mind; for, since these are universal, they must appear in each +particular case. We know what are the cases in which men in general are +inclined to alter or distort facts. What we have to do in the case of +each statement is to examine whether it was made under such +circumstances as to lead us to suspect, from our knowledge of the habits +of normal humanity, that the operations implied in the making of it were +incorrectly performed. The practical procedure will be to draw up a set +of questions relating to the habitual causes of inaccuracy. + +The whole of criticism thus reduces to the drawing up and answering of +two sets of questions: one for the purpose of bringing before our minds +those general conditions affecting the composition of the document, from +which we may deduce general motives for distrust or confidence; the +other for the purpose of realising the special conditions of each +statement, from which special motives may be drawn for distrust or +confidence. These two sets of questions ought to be drawn up beforehand +in such a form as may enable us to examine methodically both the +document in general and each statement in particular; and as they are +the same for all documents, it is useful to formulate them once for all. + + +IV. The critical process comprises two series of questions, which +correspond to the two series of operations by which the document was +produced. All that interpretative criticism tells us is what the author +meant; it remains to determine (1) what he really believed, for he may +not have been sincere; (2) what he really knew, for he may have been +mistaken. We may therefore distinguish a _critical examination of the +author's good faith_, by which we seek to determine whether the author +of the document lied or not, and a _critical examination_ of his +_accuracy_, by which we seek to determine whether he was or was not +mistaken. + +In practice we rarely need to know what an author believed, unless we +are making a special study of his character. We have no direct interest +in the author; he is merely the medium through which we reach the +external facts he reports. The aim of criticism is to determine whether +the author has reported the facts correctly. If he has given inexact +information, it is indifferent whether he did so intentionally or not; +to draw a distinction would complicate matters unnecessarily. There is +thus little occasion to make a separate examination of an author's good +faith, and we may shorten our labours by including in a single set of +questions all the causes which lead to misstatement. But for the sake of +clearness it will be well to discuss the questions to be asked in two +separate series. + +The questions in the first series will help us to inquire whether we +have any reason to distrust the sincerity of a statement. We ask whether +the author was in any of those situations which normally incline a man +to be insincere. We must ask what these situations are, both as +affecting the general composition of a document, and as affecting each +particular statement. Experience supplies the answer. Every violation of +truth, small or great, is due to a wish on the part of the author to +produce a particular impression upon the reader. Our set of questions +thus reduces to a list of the motives which may, in the general case, +lead an author to violate truth. The following are the most important +cases:-- + +(1) The author seeks to gain a practical advantage for himself; he +wishes to deceive the reader of the document, in order to persuade him +to an action, or to dissuade him from it; he knowingly gives false +information: we then say the author has an interest in deceiving. This +is the case with most official documents. Even in documents which have +not been composed for a practical purpose, every interested statement +has a chance of being mendacious. In order to determine which statements +are to be suspected, we are to ask what _can_ have been the general aim +of the author in writing the document as a whole; and again, what can +have been his particular purpose in making each of the separate +statements which compose the document. But there are two natural +tendencies to be resisted. The first is, to ask what interest the author +could have _had_ in lying, meaning what interest should _we_ have had in +his place; we must ask instead what interest can he have _thought_ he +had in lying, and we must look for the answer in his tastes and ideals. +The other tendency is to take sole account of the _individual_ interest +of the author; we ought, however, to remember that the author may have +given false information in order to serve a _collective_ interest. This +is one of the difficulties of criticism. An author is a member at one +and the same time of several different groups, a family, a province, a +country, a religious denomination, a political party, a class in +society, whose interests often conflict; we have to discover the group +in which he took most interest, and for which he worked. + +(2) The author was placed in a situation which compelled him to violate +truth. This happens whenever he has to draw up a document in conformity +with rule or custom, while the actual circumstances are in some point or +other in conflict with rule or custom; he is then obliged to state that +the conditions were normal, and thus make a false declaration in respect +of all the irregularities. In nearly every report of proceedings there +is some slight deviation from truth as to the day, the hour, the place, +the number or the names of those present. Most of us have observed, if +not taken part in, some of these petty fictions. But we are too apt to +forget them when we come to criticise documents relating to the past. +The _authentic_ character of the documents contributes to the illusion; +we instinctively make _authentic_ a synonym of _sincere_. The rigid +rules which govern the composition of every authentic document seem to +guarantee sincerity; they are, on the contrary, an incentive to falsify, +not the main facts, but the accessory circumstances. From the fact of a +person having signed a report we may infer that he agreed to it, but not +that he was actually present at the time when the report mentions him as +having been present. + +(3) The author viewed with sympathy or antipathy a group of men (nation, +party, denomination, province, city, family), or an assemblage of +doctrines or institutions (religion, school of philosophy, political +theory), and was led to distort facts in such a manner as to represent +his friends in a favourable and his opponents in an unfavourable light. +These are instances of a general bias which affects all the statements +of an author, and they are so obvious that the ancients perceived them +and gave them names (_studium_ and _odium_); from ancient times it has +been a literary commonplace for historians to protest that they have +steered clear of both. + +(4) The author was induced by private or collective vanity to violate +truth for the purpose of exalting himself or his group. He made such +statements as he thought likely to give the reader the impression that +he and his possessed qualities deserving of esteem. We have therefore to +inquire whether a given statement may not be influenced by vanity. But +we must take care not to represent the author's vanity to ourselves as +being exactly like our own vanity or that of our contemporaries. +Different people are vain for different reasons; we must inquire what +was our author's particular vanity; he may have lied in order to +attribute to himself or his friends actions which we should consider +dishonourable. Charles IX. falsely boasted of having organised the +Massacre of St. Bartholomew. There is, however, a kind of vanity which +is universal, and that is, the desire to appear to be a person of +exalted rank playing an important part in affairs. We must, therefore, +always distrust a statement which attributes to the author or his group +a high place in the world.[149] + +(5) The author desired to please the public, or at least to avoid +shocking it. He has expressed sentiments and ideas in harmony with the +morality or the fashion of his public; he has distorted facts in order +to adapt them to the passions and prejudices of his time, even those +which he did not share. The purest types of this kind of falsehood are +found in ceremonial forms, official formulæ, declarations prescribed by +etiquette, set speeches, polite phrases. The statements which come under +this head are so open to suspicion that we are unable to derive from +them any information about the facts stated. We are all aware of this so +far as relates to the contemporary formulæ of which we see instances +every day, but we often forget it in the criticism of documents, +especially those belonging to an age from which few documents have come +down to us. No one would think of looking for the real sentiments of a +man in the assurances of respect with which he ends his letters. But +people believed for a long time in the humility of certain +ecclesiastical dignitaries of the middle ages, because, on the day of +their election, they began by refusing an office of which they declared +themselves unworthy, till at last comparison showed that this refusal +was a mere conventional form. And there are still scholars who, like the +Benedictines of the eighteenth century, look in the chancery-formulæ of +a prince for information as to his piety or his liberality.[150] + +In order to recognise these conventional declarations there are two +lines of general study to be pursued: the one is directed to the author, +and seeks to discover what was the public he addressed, for in one and +the same country there are usually several different publics, each of +which has its own code of morals or propriety; the other is directed +towards the public, and seeks to determine its morals or its manners. + +(6) The author endeavoured to please the public by literary artifices. +He distorted facts in order to embellish them according to his own +æsthetic notions. We have therefore to look for the ideal of the author +or of his time, in order to be on our guard against passages distorted +to suit that ideal. But without special study we may calculate on the +common kinds of literary distortion. Rhetorical distortion consists in +attributing to persons noble attitudes, acts, sentiments, and, above +all, words: this is a natural tendency in young boys who are beginning +to practise the art of composition, and in writers still in a +semi-barbarous stage; it is the common defect of the mediæval +chroniclers.[151] Epic distortion embellishes the narrative by adding +picturesque details, speeches delivered by the persons concerned, +numbers, sometimes names of persons; it is dangerous, because the +precision of the details produces an illusive appearance of truth.[152] +Dramatic distortion consists in grouping the facts in such a way as to +enhance the dramatic effect by concentrating facts, which in reality +were separate, upon a single moment, a single person, or a single group. +Writing of this kind is what we call "truer than the truth." It is the +most dangerous form of distortion, the form employed by artistic +historians, by Herodotus, Tacitus, the Italians of the Renaissance. +Lyrical distortion exaggerates the intensity of the sentiments and the +emotions of the author and his friends: we should remember this when we +attempt to reconstruct "the psychology" of a person. + +Literary distortion does not much affect archives (though instances of +it are found in most charters of the eleventh century); but it +profoundly modifies all literary texts, including the narratives of +historians. Now, the natural tendency is to trust writers more readily +when they have talent, and to admit statements with less difficulty when +they are presented in good literary form. Criticism must counteract this +tendency by the application of the paradoxical rule, that the more +interesting a statement is from the artistic point of view,[153] the +more it ought to be suspected. We must distrust every narrative which +is very picturesque or very dramatic, in which the personages assume +noble attitudes or manifest great intensity of feeling. + +This first series of questions will yield the _provisional_ result of +enabling us to note the statements which have a _chance_ of being +mendacious. + + +V. The second series of questions will be of use in determining whether +there is any reason to distrust the accuracy of a statement. Was the +author in one of those situations which cause a man to make mistakes? As +in dealing with good faith, we must look for these conditions both as +affecting the document as a whole, and as affecting each of the +particular statements in it. + +The practice of the established sciences teaches us the conditions of an +exact knowledge of facts. There is only one scientific procedure for +gaining knowledge of a fact, namely, _observation_; every statement, +therefore, must rest, directly or indirectly, upon an observation, and +this observation must have been made correctly. + +The set of questions by the aid of which we investigate the +probabilities of error may be drawn up in the light of experience, which +brings before us the most common cases of error. + +(1) The author was in a situation to observe the fact, and supposed he +really had observed it; he was, however, prevented from doing so by some +interior force of which he was unconscious, an hallucination, an +illusion, or a mere prejudice. It would be useless, as well as +impossible, to determine which of these agencies was at work; it is +enough to ascertain whether the author had a tendency to observe badly. +It is scarcely possible in the case of a particular statement to +recognise that it was the result of an hallucination or an illusion. At +the most we may learn, either from information derived from other +sources or by comparison, that an author had a _general_ propensity to +this kind of error. + +There is a better chance of recognising whether a statement was due to +prejudice. In the life or the works of an author we may find the traces +of his dominant prejudices. With reference to each of his particular +statements, we ought to ask whether it is not the result of a +preconceived idea of the author on a class of men or a kind of facts. +This inquiry partly coincides with the search for motives of falsehood: +interest, vanity, sympathy, and antipathy give rise to prejudices which +alter the truth in the same manner as wilful falsehood. We therefore +employ the questions already formulated for the purpose of testing good +faith. But there is one to be added. In putting forward a statement has +the author been led to distort it unconsciously by the circumstance that +he was answering a question? This is the case of all statements obtained +by interrogating witnesses. Even apart from the cases where the person +interrogated seeks to please the proposer of the question by giving an +answer which he thinks will be agreeable to him, every question suggests +its own answer, or at least its form, and this form is dictated +beforehand by some one unacquainted with the facts. It is therefore +necessary to apply a special criticism to every statement obtained by +interrogation; we must ask what was the question put, and what were the +preconceptions to which it may have given rise in the mind of the person +interrogated. + +(2) The author was badly situated for observing. The practice of the +sciences teaches us what are the conditions for correct observation. The +observer ought to be placed where he can see correctly, and should have +no practical interest, no desire to obtain a particular result, no +preconceived idea about the result. He ought to record the observation +immediately, in a precise system of notation; he ought to give a precise +indication of his method. These conditions, which are insisted on in the +sciences of observation, are never completely fulfilled by the authors +of documents. + +It would be useless, therefore, to ask whether there have been chances +of inaccuracy; _there always have been_, and it is just this that +distinguishes a _document_ from an _observation_. It only remains to +look for the obvious causes of error in the conditions of observation: +to inquire whether the observer was in a place where he could not see or +hear well, as would be the case, for example, with a subordinate who +should presume to narrate the secret deliberations of a council of +dignitaries; whether his attention was greatly distracted by the +necessity for action, as it would be on the field of battle, for +example; whether he was inattentive because the facts had little +interest for him; whether he lacked the special experience or general +intelligence necessary for understanding the facts; whether he analysed +his impressions badly, or confused different events. Above all, we must +ask when he _wrote down_ what he saw or heard. This is the most +important point: the only exact observation is the one which is +recorded immediately it is made; such is the constant procedure in the +established sciences; an impression committed to writing later on is +only a recollection, liable to be confused in the memory with other +recollections. _Memoirs_ written several years after the facts, often at +the very end of the author's career, have introduced innumerable errors +into history. It must be made a rule to treat _memoirs_ with special +distrust as second-hand documents, in spite of their appearance of being +contemporary testimony. + +(3) The author states facts which he could have observed, but to which +he did not take the trouble to attend. From idleness or negligence he +reported details which he has merely inferred, or even imagined at +random, and which turn out to be false. This is a common source of +error, though it does not readily occur to one, and is to be suspected +wherever the author was obliged to procure information in which he took +little interest, in order to fill up a blank form. Of this kind are +answers to questions put by an authority (it is enough to observe how +most official inquiries are conducted in our own day), and detailed +accounts of ceremonies or public functions. There is too strong a +temptation to write the account from the programme, or in agreement with +the usual order of the proceedings. How many accounts of meetings of all +kinds have been published by reporters who were not present at them! +Similar efforts of imagination are suspected--sometimes, it is thought, +clearly recognised--in the writings of mediæval chroniclers.[154] The +rule, then, will be to distrust all narratives conforming too closely to +a set formula. + +(4) The fact stated is of such a nature that it could not have been +learnt by observation alone. It may be a hidden fact--a private secret, +for example. It may be a fact relating to a collectivity, and applying +to an extensive area or a long period of time; for example, the common +act of a whole army, a custom common to a whole people or a whole age, a +statistical total obtained by the addition of numerous items. It may be +a comprehensive judgment on the character of a man, a group, a custom, +an event. Here we have to do with propositions derived from observations +by synthesis or inference: the author can only have arrived at them +indirectly; he began with data furnished by observation, and elaborated +them by the logical processes of abstraction, generalisation, reasoning, +calculation. Two questions arise. Does it appear that the author had +sufficient data to work upon? Was he accurate, or the reverse, in his +use of the data he had? + +On the probable inaccuracies of an author, general indications may be +obtained from an examination of his writings. This examination will show +us how he worked: whether he was capable of abstraction, reasoning, +generalisation, and what were the mistakes he was in the habit of +making. In order to determine the value of the data, we must criticise +each statement separately; we must imagine the conditions under which +the author observed, and ask ourselves whether he was able to procure +the necessary data for his statement. This is an indispensable +precaution in dealing with large totals in statistics and descriptions +of popular usages; for it is possible that the author may have obtained +the total he gives by a process of conjectural valuation (this is the +ordinary practice in stating the number of combatants or killed in a +battle), or by combining subsidiary totals, all of which were not +accurate; it is possible that he may have extended to a whole people, a +whole country, a whole period, that which was true only of a small group +known to him.[155] + + +VI. These two first series of questions bearing on the good faith and +the accuracy of the statements in the document are based on the +supposition that the author has observed the fact himself. This is a +feature common to all reports of observations in the established +sciences. But in history there is so great a dearth of direct +_observations_, of even moderate value, that we are obliged to turn to +account documents which every other science would reject.[156] Take any +narrative at random, even if it be the work of a contemporary, it will +be found that the facts observed by the author are never more than a +part of the whole number. In nearly every document the majority of the +statements do not come from the author at first hand, but are +reproductions of the statements of others. Even where a general relates +a battle in which he commanded, he does not communicate his own +observations, but those of his officers; his narrative is in a large +measure a "second-hand document."[157] + +In order to criticise a second-hand statement it is no longer enough to +examine the conditions under which the author of the document worked: +this author is, in such a case, a mere agent of transmission; the true +author is the person who supplied him the information. The critic, +therefore, must change his ground, and ask whether the informant +observed and reported correctly; and if he too had the information from +some one else (the commonest case), the chase must be pursued from one +intermediary to another, till the person is found who first launched the +statement on its career, and with regard to him the question must be +asked: Was he an accurate observer? + +Logically such a search is not inconceivable; ancient collections of +Arab traditions give lists of their successive guarantors. But, in +practice, lack of documents nearly always prevents us from getting as +far as the observer of a fact; the observation remains anonymous. A +general question then presents itself: How are we to criticise an +anonymous statement? It is not only "anonymous documents" with which we +are concerned, where the composition as a whole is the work of an +unknown author; even when the author is known, this question arises with +respect to each statement of his drawn from an unknown source. + +Criticism works by reproducing the conditions under which an author +wrote, and has hardly anything to take hold of where a statement is +anonymous. The only method left is to examine the general conditions of +the document. We may inquire whether there is any feature common to all +the statements of a document indicating that they all proceed from +persons having the same prejudices or passions: in this case the +tradition followed by the author is biassed; the tradition followed by +Herodotus has both an Athenian bias and a Delphic bias. In respect of +each fact derived from such a tradition we must ask whether it has not +been distorted by the interest, the vanity, or the prejudices of the +group concerned. We may even ignore the author, and ask whether there +was anything likely to make for or against correct observation, common +to all the men of the time and country in which the observation must +have been made: for example, what means of information, and what +prejudices, had the Greeks of Herodotus' time with respect to the +Scythians. + +The most useful of all these general inquiries has reference to that +mode of transmitting anonymous statements which is called _tradition_. +No second-hand statement has any value except in so far as it reproduces +its source; every addition is an alteration, and ought to be eliminated. +Similarly, all the intermediary sources are valueless except as copies +of the original statement founded directly on observation. The critic +needs to know whether this transmission from hand to hand has preserved +or distorted the original statement; above all, whether the tradition +embodied in the document was _written_ or _oral_. Writing fixes a +statement, and ensures its being transmitted faithfully; when a +statement is communicated orally, the impression in the mind of the +hearer is apt to be modified by confusion with other impressions; in +passing from one intermediary to another the statement is modified at +every step,[158] and as these modifications arise from different causes, +there is no possibility of measuring or correcting them. + +Oral tradition is by its nature a process of continual alteration; hence +in the established sciences only written transmission is accepted. +Historians have no avowable motive for proceeding differently, at any +rate when it is a case of establishing a particular fact. We must +therefore search documents for statements derived from oral tradition in +order that we may suspect them. We rarely have direct information as to +statements being thus derived; authors who borrow from oral tradition +are not anxious to proclaim the fact.[159] There is thus only an +indirect method, and that is to ascertain that written transmission was +impossible; we may then be sure that the fact reached the author only by +oral tradition. We have therefore to ask the question: In this period +and in this group of men was it customary to commit to writing facts of +this kind? If the answer is negative, the fact considered rests on oral +tradition alone. + +The most striking form of oral tradition is _legend_. It arises among +groups of men with whom the spoken word is the only means of +transmission, in barbarous societies, or in classes of little culture, +such as peasants or soldiers. In this case it is the whole group of +facts which is transmitted orally and assumes the legendary form. There +is a legendary period in the early history of every people: in Greece, +at Rome, among the Germanic and Slavonic races, the most ancient +memories of the people form a stratum of legend. In periods of +civilisation popular legends continue to exist in reference to events +which strike the imagination of the people.[160] Legend is exclusively +oral tradition. + +When a people has emerged from the legendary period and begun to commit +its history to writing, oral tradition does not come to an end, but only +applies to a narrower sphere; it is now restricted to facts which are +not registered, whether because they are by their nature secret, or +because no one takes the trouble to record them, such as private +actions, words, the details of events. Thus arise _anecdotes_, which +have been named "the legends of civilised society." Like legends they +have their origin in confused recollections, allusions, mistaken +interpretations, imaginings of all kinds which fasten upon particular +persons and events. + +Legends and anecdotes are at bottom mere popular beliefs, arbitrarily +attached to historical personages; they belong to folk-lore, not to +history.[161] We must therefore guard against the temptation to treat +legend as an alloy of accurate facts and errors out of which it is +possible by analysis to extract grains of historical truth. A legend is +a conglomerate in which there may be some grains of truth, and which may +even be capable of being analysed into its elements; but there is no +means of distinguishing the elements taken from reality from those which +are the work of imagination. To use Niebuhr's expression, a legend is "a +mirage produced by an invisible object according to an unknown law of +refraction." + +The crudest analytical procedure consists in rejecting those details in +the legendary narrative which appear impossible, miraculous, +contradictory, or absurd, and retaining the rational residue as +historical. This is how the Protestant rationalists of the eighteenth +century treated biblical narratives. One might as well amputate the +marvellous part of a fairy tale, suppress Puss in Boots, and keep the +Marquis of Carabas as an historical character. A more refined but no +less dangerous method is to compare different legends in order to deduce +their common historical basis. Grote[162] has shown, with reference to +Greek tradition, that it is impossible to extract any trustworthy +information from legend by any process whatever.[163] We must make up +our minds to treat legend as a product of imagination; we may look in it +for a people's conceptions, not for the external facts in that people's +history. The rule will be to reject every statement of legendary origin; +nor does this apply only to narratives in legendary form: a narrative +which has an historical appearance, but is founded on the data of +legend, the opening chapters of Thucydides for example, ought equally to +be discarded. + +In the case of written transmission it remains to inquire whether the +author reproduced his source without altering it. This inquiry forms +part of the critical investigation of the sources,[164] so far as it can +be pursued by a comparison of texts. But when the source has disappeared +we are reduced to internal criticism. We ask, first of all, whether the +author can have had exact information, otherwise his statement is +valueless. We next put to ourselves the general question: Was the author +in the habit of altering his sources, and in what manner? And in regard +to each separate second-hand statement we ask whether it has the +appearance of being an exact reproduction or an arrangement. We judge by +the form: when we meet with a passage whose style is out of harmony with +the main body of the composition, we have before us a fragment of an +earlier document; the more servile the reproduction the more valuable is +the passage, for it can contain no exact information beyond what was +already in the source. + +VII. In spite of all these investigations, criticism never succeeds in +determining the parentage of all the statements to the extent of finding +out who it was that observed, or even recorded, each fact. In most cases +the inquiry ends in leaving the statement anonymous. + +We are thus confronted with a fact, observed we know not by whom nor +how, recorded we know not when nor how. No other science accepts facts +which come in such a condition, without possibility of verification, +subject to incalculable chances of error. But history can turn them to +account, because it does not, like the other sciences, need a supply of +facts which are difficult to ascertain. + +The notion of a _fact_, when we come to examine it precisely, reduces to +an affirmative judgment having reference to external reality. The +operations by which we arrive at such a judgment are more or less +difficult, and the risk of error is greater or smaller according to the +nature of the realities investigated and the degree of precision with +which we wish to formulate them. Chemistry and biology need to discern +facts of a delicate order, rapid movements, transient states, and to +measure them in exact figures. History can work with facts of a much +coarser kind, spread over a large extent of space or time, such as the +existence of a custom, of a man, of a group, even of a people; and these +facts may be roughly expressed in vague words conveying no idea of +accurate measurement. With such easily observed facts as these to deal +with, history can afford to be much less exacting with regard to the +conditions of observation. The imperfection of the means of information +is compensated by a natural faculty of being satisfied with information +which can easily be obtained. + +Documents supply little else besides ill-verified facts, subject to many +risks of falsehood or error. But there are some facts in respect of +which it is very difficult to lie or be mistaken. The last series of +questions which the critic should ask is intended to distinguish, in the +mass of alleged facts, those which by their nature are little subject to +the risk of alteration, and which are therefore very probably correct. +We know what, in general, are the classes of facts which enjoy this +privilege; we are thus enabled to draw up a list of questions for +general use, and in applying them to any particular case we ask whether +the fact in question comes under any of the heads specified in advance. + +(1) The fact is of a nature to render falsehood improbable. A man lies +in order to produce an impression, and has no motive to lie in a case +where he believes that the false impression would be of no use, or that +the falsehood would be ineffectual. In order to determine whether the +author was in such a situation there are several questions to be asked. + +(_a_) Is the fact stated manifestly prejudicial to the effect which the +author wished to produce? Does it run counter to the interest, the +vanity, the sentiments, the literary tastes of the author and his group; +or to the opinions which he made a point of not offending? In such a +case there is a probability of good faith. But in the application of +this criterion there is danger; it has often been wrongly used, and in +two ways. One of these is to take for a confession what was meant for a +boast, as the declaration of Charles IX. that he was responsible for the +Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Or again, we trust without examination an +Athenian who speaks ill of the Athenians, or a Protestant who accuses +other Protestants. But it is quite possible the author's notions of his +interest or honour were very different from ours;[165] or he may have +wished to calumniate fellow-citizens who did not belong to his own +party, or co-religionists who did not belong to his own sect. This +criterion must therefore be restricted to cases where we know exactly +what _effect_ he wished to produce, and in what _group_ he was mainly +interested. + +(_b_) Was the fact stated so obviously known to the public that the +author, even if tempted to falsehood, would have been restrained by the +certainty of being detected? This is the case with facts which are easy +to verify, which are not remote in point of time or space, which apply +to a wide area or a long period, especially if the public had any +interest in verifying them. But the fear of detection is only an +intermittent check, opposed by interest whenever the author has any +motive for deceiving. It acts unequally on different minds--strongly on +men of culture and self-control who understand their public, feebly in +barbarous ages and on passionate men.[166] This criterion, therefore, is +to be restricted to cases where we know what idea the author had of his +readers, and whether he was dispassionate enough to keep them in mind. + +(_c_) Was the fact stated _indifferent_ to the author, so that he had no +temptation to misrepresent it? This is the case with facts of a general +kind, usages, institutions, objects, persons, which the author mentions +incidentally. A narrative, even a false one, cannot be composed +exclusively of falsehoods; the author must localise his facts, and needs +to surround them with a framework of truth. The facts which form this +framework had no interest for him; at that time every one knew them. But +for us they are instructive, and we can depend on them, for the author +had no intention of deceiving us. + +(2) The fact was of a kind to render error improbable. Numerous as the +chances of error are, still there are facts so "big" it is hard to be +mistaken about them. We have, then, to ask whether the alleged fact was +easy to ascertain: (_a_) Did it cover a long period of time, so that it +must have been frequently observed? Take, for example, the case of a +monument, a man, a custom, an event which was in progress for a +considerable time. (_b_) Did it cover a wide area, so that many people +observed it?--as, for example, a battle, a war, a custom common to a +whole people. (_c_) Is it expressed in such general terms that +superficial observation was enough to discover it?--as the mere +existence of a man, a city, a people, a custom. Facts of this large and +general kind make up the bulk of historical knowledge. + +(3) The fact was of such a nature that it would not have been stated +unless it was true. A man does not declare that he has seen something +contrary to his expectations and habits of mind unless observation has +compelled him to admit it. A fact which seems very improbable to the man +who relates it has a good chance of being true. We have, then, to ask +whether the fact stated was in contradiction with the author's opinions, +whether it is a phenomenon of a kind unknown to him, an action or a +custom which seems unintelligible to him; whether it is a saying whose +import transcends his intelligence, such as the sayings of Christ +reported in the Gospels, or the answers made by Joan of Arc to questions +put to her in the course of her trial. But we must guard against judging +of the author's ideas by our own standards: when men who are accustomed +to believe in the marvellous speak of monsters, of miracles, of wizards, +there is nothing in these to contradict their expectations, and the +criterion does not apply. + +VIII. We have at last reached the end of this description of the +critical operations; its length is due to the necessity of describing +successively operations which are performed simultaneously. We will now +consider how these methods are applied in practice. + +If the text be one whose interpretation is debatable, the examination is +divided into two stages: the first comprises the reading of the text +with a view to the determination of the meaning, without attempting to +draw any information from it; the second comprises the critical study of +the facts contained in the document. In the case of documents whose +meaning is clear, we may begin the critical examination on the first +reading, reserving for separate study any individual passages of +doubtful meaning. + +We begin by collecting the _general_ information we possess about the +document and the author, with the special purpose of discovering the +conditions which may have influenced the production of the document--the +epoch, the place, the purpose, the circumstances of its composition; the +author's social status, country, party, sect, family, interests, +passions, prejudices, linguistic habits, methods of work, means of +information, culture, abilities, and mental defects; the nature of the +facts and the mode of their transmission. Information on all these +points is supplied by the preparatory critical investigation of +authorship and sources. We now combine the different heads, mentally +applying the set of general critical questions; this should be done at +the outset, and the results impressed on the memory, for they will need +to be present to the mind during the remainder of the operations. + +Thus prepared, we attack the document. As we read we mentally analyse +it, destroying all the author's combinations, discarding all his +literary devices, in order to arrive at the facts, which we formulate in +simple and precise language. We thus free ourselves from the deference +imposed by artistic form, and from all submission to the author's +ideas--an emancipation without which criticism is impossible. + +The document thus analysed resolves into a long series of the author's +conceptions and statements as to facts. + +With regard to each statement, we ask ourselves whether there is a +probability of their being false or erroneous, or whether, on the other +hand, there are exceptional chances in favour of good faith and +accuracy, working through the list of critical questions prepared for +particular cases. This list of questions must be always present to the +mind. At first it may seem cumbersome, perhaps pedantic; but as it will +be applied more than a hundred times in each page of the document, it +will in the end be used unconsciously. As we read a text, all the +reasons for distrust or confidence will occur to the mind +simultaneously, combined into a single impression. + +Analysis and critical questioning will then have become a matter of +instinct, and we shall have acquired for ever that methodically +analytical, distrustful, not too respectful turn of mind which is often +mystically called "the critical sense," but which is nothing else than +an unconscious _habit_ of criticism. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR FACTS + + +Critical analysis yields in the result a number of conceptions and +statements, accompanied by comments on the probability of the facts +stated being accurate. It remains to examine how we can deduce from +these materials those particular historical facts which are to form the +basis of scientific knowledge. Conceptions and statements are two +different kinds of results, and must be treated by different methods. + + +I. Every conception which is expressed in writing or by any illustrative +representation is in itself a definite, unimpeachable fact That which is +expressed must have first been present in the mind of some one--if not +in that of the author, who may have reproduced a formula he did not +understand, then in the mind of the man who originated the formula. The +existence of a conception may be learnt from a single instance and +proved from a single document. Analysis and interpretation are thus +sufficient for the purpose of drawing up the complete list of those +facts which form the basis of the history of the arts, the sciences, or +of doctrines.[167] It is the task of external criticism to localise +these facts by determining the epoch, the country, the author of each +conception. The duration, geographical distribution, origin, and +filiation of conceptions belong to historical synthesis. Internal +criticism has nothing to do here; the fact is taken directly from the +document. + +We may advance a step farther. In themselves conceptions are nothing but +facts in psychology; but imagination does not create its objects, it +takes the elements of them from reality. Descriptions of imaginary facts +are constructed out of the real facts which the author has observed in +his experience. These elements of knowledge, the raw material of the +imaginary description, may be sought for and isolated. In dealing with +periods and with classes of facts for which documents are +rare--antiquity, for example, and the usages of private life--the +attempt has been made to lay under contribution works of literature, +epic poems, novels, plays.[168] The method is legitimate, but only +within the limits of certain restrictions which one is very apt to +forget. + +(1) It does not apply to social facts of a psychological order, the +moral or artistic standards of a society; the moral and æsthetic +conceptions in a document give at most the individual standards of the +author; we have no right to conclude from these to the morals or the +æsthetic tastes of the age. We must at least wait till we have compared +several different authors of the same period. + +(2) Descriptions even of physical facts and objects may be products of +the author's imagination. It is only the _elements_ of them which we +know to be certainly real; all that we can assert is the separate +existence of the irreducible elements, form, material, colour, number. +When the poet speaks of golden gates or silver bucklers, we cannot infer +that golden gates and silver bucklers ever existed in reality; nothing +is certain beyond the separate existence of gates, bucklers, gold, and +silver. The analysis must therefore be carried to the point of +distinguishing those elements which the author must necessarily have +taken from experience: objects, their purpose, ordinary actions. + +(3) The conception of an object or an action proves that it existed, but +not that it was common; the object or action may have been unique, or +restricted to a very small circle; poets and novelists are fond of +taking their models from an exceptional world. + +(4) The facts yielded by this method are not localised in space or time; +the author may have taken them from a time or country not his own. + +All these restrictions may be summarised as follows: before drawing any +inference from a work of literature as to the state of the society in +which the author lived, we should ask ourselves what would be the worth +of a similar inference as to contemporary manners drawn from a modern +novel. + +With the facts yielded by conceptions we may join those indifferent +facts of an obvious and elementary character which the author has +stated almost without thinking. Logically we have no right to call them +certain, for we do sometimes meet with men who make mistakes about +obvious and elementary facts, and others who lie even on indifferent +matters. But such cases are so rare that there is not much danger in +admitting as certain facts of this kind which are supported by a single +document, and this is how we deal, in practice, with periods of which +little is known. The institutions of the Gauls and Germans are described +from the unique texts of Cæsar and Tacitus. Facts so easy to discover +are forced upon the authors of descriptions much as realities are forced +upon poets. + + +II. On the other hand, a statement in a document as to an objective fact +is never enough to establish that fact. The chances of falsehood or +error are so many, the conditions which gave rise to the statement are +so little known, that we cannot be sure that none of these chances has +taken effect. The critical examination provides no definitive solution; +it is indispensable if we are to avoid error, but it is insufficient to +conduct us to truth. + +Criticism can _prove_ no fact; it only yields probabilities. Its end and +result is to decompose documents into statements, each labelled with an +estimate of its value--worthless statement, statement open to suspicion +(strong or weak), statement probably (or, very probably) true, statement +of unknown value. + +Of all these different kinds of results one only is definitive--_the +statement of an author who can have had no information on the fact he +states is null and void_; it is to be rejected as we reject an +apocryphal document.[169] But criticism here merely destroys illusory +sources of information; it supplies nothing certain to take their place. +The only sure results of criticism are _negative_. All the positive +results are subject to doubt; they reduce to propositions of the form: +"There are chances for or against the truth of such and such a +statement." Chances only. A statement open to suspicion may turn out to +be true; a statement whose truth is probable may, after all, be false. +Instances occur continually, and we are never sufficiently well +acquainted with the conditions under which the observation was made to +_know_ whether it was made ill or well. + +In order to obtain a definitive result we require a final operation. +After passing through the ordeal of criticism, statements present +themselves as probable or improbable. But even the most probable of +them, taken by themselves, remain mere probabilities: to pass from them +to categorical propositions in scientific form is a step we have no +right to take; a proposition in a science is an assertion not open to +debate, and that is what the statements we have before us are not. It is +a principle common to all sciences of observation not to base a +scientific conclusion on a single observation; the fact must have been +corroborated by several independent observations before it is affirmed +categorically. History, with its imperfect modes of acquiring +information, has less right than any other science to claim exemption +from this principle. An historical statement is, in the most favourable +case, but an indifferently made observation, and needs other +observations to corroborate it. + +It is by combining observations that every science is built up: a +scientific fact is a centre on which several different observations +converge.[170] Each observation is subject to chances of error which +cannot be entirely eliminated; but if several observations agree, this +can hardly be in virtue of a common error: the more probable explanation +of the agreement is that the observers have all seen the same reality +and have all described it correctly. Errors are personal and tend to +diverge; it is the correct observations that agree. + +Applied to history, this principle leads to a last series of operations, +intermediate between purely analytical criticism and the synthetic +operations--the comparison of statements. + +We begin by classifying the results yielded by critical analysis in such +a way as to bring together those statements which relate to the same +fact. The operation is facilitated mechanically by the method of slips. +Either each statement has been entered on a separate slip, or else a +single slip has been assigned for each fact, and the different +statements relating to it entered upon the slip as met with in the +course of reading. By bringing the statements together we learn the +extent of our information on the fact; the definitive conclusion depends +on the relation between the statements. We have, then, to study +separately the different cases which may occur. + + +III. Most frequently, except in contemporary history, the documents only +supply a single statement on a given fact. In such a case all the other +sciences follow an invariable rule: an isolated observation is not +admitted into science; it is quoted (with the observer's name), but no +conclusions are drawn from it. Historians have no avowable motive for +proceeding otherwise. When a fact is supported by no more than the +statement of a single man, however honest he may be, historians ought +not to assert it, but to do as men of science do--give the reference +(Thucydides states, Cæsar says that ...); this is all they have a right +to affirm. In reality they all retain the habit of stating facts, as was +done in the middle ages, on the _authority_ of Thucydides or of Cæsar; +many are simple enough to do so in express terms. Thus, allowing +themselves to be guided by natural credulity, unchecked by science, +historians end by admitting, on the insufficient presumption afforded by +a unique document, any statement which does not happen to be +contradicted by another document. Hence the absurd consequence that +history is more positive, and seems better established in regard to +those little known periods which are represented by a single writer than +in regard to facts known from thousands of documents which contradict +each other. The wars of the Medes known to Herodotus alone, the +adventures of Fredegonda related by none but Gregory of Tours, are less +subject to discussion than the events of the French Revolution, which +have been described by hundreds of contemporaries. This is a +discreditable state of things which cannot be ended except by a +revolution in the minds of historians. + + +IV. When we have several statements relating to the same fact, they may +contradict each other or they may agree. In order to be certain that +they really do contradict each other, we have to make sure that they do +actually relate to the same fact. Two apparently contradictory +statements may be merely parallel; they may not relate exactly to the +same moment, the same place, the same persons, the same episodes of an +event, and they may be both correct.[171] We must not, however, infer +that they confirm each other; each comes under the category of unique +statements. + +If the contradiction is real, at least one of the statements is false. +In such cases it is a natural tendency to seek to reconcile them by a +compromise--to split the difference. This peace-making spirit is the +reverse of scientific. A says two and two make four; B says they make +five. We are not to conclude that two and two make four and a half; we +must examine and see which is right. This examination is the work of +criticism. Of two contradictory statements, it nearly always happens +that one is open to suspicion; this should be rejected if the competing +statement has been judged very probably true. If both are open to +suspicion, we abstain from drawing any conclusion. We do the same if +several statements open to suspicion agree together as against a single +statement which is not suspected.[172] + + +V. When several statements agree, it is still necessary to resist the +natural tendency to believe that the fact has been demonstrated. The +first impulse is to count each document as one source of information. We +are well aware in matters of every-day life that men are apt to copy +each other, that a single narrative often serves the turn of several +narrators, that several newspapers sometimes happen to publish the same +correspondence, that several reporters sometimes agree to let one of +their number do the work for all. We have, in such a case, several +documents, several statements--have we the same number of observations? +Obviously not. When one statement reproduces another, it does not +constitute a new observation, and even if an observation were to be +reproduced by a hundred different authors, these hundred copies would +amount to no more than one observation. To count them as a hundred would +be the same thing as to count a hundred printed copies of the same book +as a hundred different documents. But the respect paid to "historical +documents" is sometimes stronger than obvious truth. The same statement +occurring in several different documents by different authors has an +illusory appearance of multiplicity; an identical fact related in ten +different documents at once gives the impression of being established by +ten agreeing observations. This impression is to be distrusted. An +agreement is only conclusive when the agreeing statements represent +_observations_ which are independent of each other. Before we draw any +conclusion from an agreement we must examine whether it is an agreement +between _independent_ observations. Two operations are thus required. + +(1) We begin by inquiring whether the statements are independent, or are +reproductions of one and the same observation. This inquiry is partly +the work of that part of external criticism which deals with the +investigation of sources;[173] but that investigation only touches the +relations between written documents, and stops short when it has +determined which passages of an author are borrowed from other authors. +Borrowed passages are to be rejected without discussion. But the same +work remains to be done in reference to statements which were not +committed to writing. We have to compare the statements which relate to +the same fact, in order to find out whether they proceeded originally +from different observers, or at least from different observations. + +The principle is analogous to that employed in the investigation of +sources. The details of a social fact are so manifold, and there are so +many different ways of looking at the same fact, that two independent +observers cannot possibly give completely coincident accounts; if two +statements present the same details in the same order, they must be +derived from a common observation; different observations are bound to +diverge somewhere. We may often apply an _a priori_ principle: if the +fact was of such a nature that it could only be observed or reported by +a single observer, then all the accounts of it must be derived from a +single observation. These principles[174] enable us to recognise many +cases of different observations, and still more numerous cases of +observations being reproduced. + +There remains a great number of doubtful cases. The natural tendency is +to treat them as if they were cases of independent observation. But the +scientific procedure would be the exact reverse of this: as long as the +statements are not proved to be independent we have no right to assume +that their agreement is conclusive. + +It is only after we have determined the relations between the different +statements that we can begin to count them and examine into their +agreement. Here again we have to distrust the first impulse; the kind of +agreement which is really conclusive is not, as one would naturally +imagine, a perfect similarity between two narratives, but an occasional +coincidence between two narratives which only partially resemble each +other. The natural tendency is to think that the closer the agreement +is, the greater is its demonstrative power; we ought, on the contrary, +to adopt as a rule the paradox that an agreement proves more when it is +confined to a small number of circumstances. It is at such points of +coincidence between diverging statements that we are to look for +scientifically established historical facts. + +(2) Before drawing any conclusions it remains to make sure whether the +_different_ observations of the same fact are entirely _independent_; +for it is possible that one may have influenced another to such a degree +that their agreement is inconclusive. We have to guard against the +following cases:-- + +(_a_) The different observations have been made by the same author, who +has recorded them either in the same or in different documents; special +reasons must then be had before it can be assumed that the author really +made the observation afresh, and did not content himself with merely +repeating a single observation. + +(_b_) There were several observers, but they commissioned one of their +number to write a single document. We have to ascertain whether the +document merely gives the statements of the writer, or whether the other +observers checked his work. + +(_c_) Several observers recorded their observations in different +documents, but under similar conditions. We must apply the list of +critical questions in order to ascertain whether they were not all +subject to the same influences, predisposing to falsehood or error; +whether, for example, they had a common interest, a common vanity, or +common prejudices. + +The only observations which are certainly independent are those which +are contained in different documents, written by different authors, who +belonged to different groups, and worked under different conditions. +Cases of perfectly conclusive agreement are thus rare, except in +reference to modern periods. + +The possibility of proving an historical fact depends on the number of +independent documents relating to it which have been preserved, and the +preservation of the documents is a matter of chance; this explains the +share which chance has in the formation of historical science. + +The facts which it is possible to establish are chiefly those which +cover a large extent of space or time (sometimes called _general_ +facts), customs, doctrines, institutions, great events; they were easier +to observe than the others, and are now easier to prove. Historical +method is not, however, essentially powerless to establish facts of +short duration and limited extent (those which are called _particular +facts_), such as a saying, a momentary act. It is enough that several +persons should have been present when the fact occurred, that they +should have recorded it, and that their writings should have come down +to us. We know what were the words which Luther uttered at the Diet of +Worms; we know that he did not say what tradition puts in his mouth. +This concurrence of favourable conditions becomes more and more frequent +with the organisation of newspapers, of shorthand writers, and of +depositories of documents. + +In the case of antiquity and the middle ages historical knowledge is +limited to general facts by the scarcity of documents. In dealing with +contemporary history it is possible to include more and more particular +facts. The general public supposes the opposite of this; it is +suspicious about contemporary facts, with reference to which it sees +contradictory narratives circulating, and believes without hesitation +ancient facts, which it does not see contradicted anywhere. Its +confidence is at its greatest in respect of that history which we have +not the means of knowing, and its scepticism increases with the means of +knowledge. + + +VI. _Agreement between documents_ leads to conclusions which are not all +of them definitive. In order to complete and rectify our conclusions we +have still to study _the harmony of the facts_. + +Several facts which, taken in isolation, are only imperfectly proved, +may confirm each other in such a manner as to produce a collective +certainty. The facts which the documents present in isolation have +sometimes been in reality sufficiently near each other to be connected. +Of this kind are the successive actions of the same man or of the same +group of men, the habits of the same group at different epochs separated +by short intervals, or of similar groups at the same epoch. It is no +doubt possible that one of several analogous facts may be true and +another false; the certainty of the first does not justify the +categorical assertion of the second. But yet the harmony of several such +facts, each proved imperfectly, yields a kind of certainty; the facts do +not, in the strict sense of the word, prove, but they _confirm_[175] +each other. The doubt which attached to each one of them disappears; we +obtain that species of certainty which is produced by the +interconnection of facts. Thus the comparison of conclusions which are +separately doubtful yields a whole which is morally certain. In an +itinerary of a sovereign, the days and the places confirm each other +when they harmonize so as to form a coherent whole. An institution or a +popular usage is established by the harmony of accounts, each of which +is no more than probable, relating to different times and places. + +This method is a difficult one to apply. The notion of harmony is a much +vaguer one than that of agreement. We cannot assign any precise general +rules for distinguishing facts which are sufficiently connected to form +a whole, the harmony of whose parts would be conclusive; nor can we +determine beforehand the duration and extent of that which may be taken +to form a whole. Facts separated by half a century of time and a hundred +leagues of space may confirm each other in such a way as to establish a +popular usage (for example, among the ancient Germans); but they would +prove nothing if they were taken from a heterogeneous society subject to +rapid evolution (take, for example, French society in 1750, and again in +1800, in Alsace and in Provence). Here we have to study the relation +between the facts. This brings us to the beginnings of historical +construction; here is the transition from analytical to synthetic +operations. + + +VII. But it remains to consider cases of discordance between facts +established by documents and other facts established by other methods. +It happens sometimes that a fact obtained as an historical conclusion is +in contradiction with a body of known historical facts, or with the sum +of our knowledge of humanity founded on direct observation, or with a +scientific law established by the regular method of an established +science. In the first two cases the fact is only in conflict with +history, psychology, or sociology, all imperfectly established sciences; +we then simply call the fact _improbable_. If it is in conflict with a +true science it becomes a _miracle_. What are we to do with an +improbable or miraculous fact? Are we to admit it after examination of +the documents, or are we to pass on and shelve the question? + +_Improbability_ is not a scientific notion; it varies with the +individual. Each person finds improbable what he is not accustomed to +see: a peasant would think the telephone much more improbable than a +ghost; a king of Siam refused to believe in the existence of ice. It is +important to know who precisely it is to whom the fact appears to be +improbable. Is it to the mass who have no scientific culture? For these, +science is more improbable than miracle, physiology than spiritualism; +their notions of improbability are worthless. Is it to the man who +possesses scientific culture? If so, we have to deal with that which +seems improbable to a scientific mind, and it would be more accurate to +say that the fact is contrary to the results of science--that there is +disagreement between the direct observations of men of science and the +indirect testimony of the documents. + +How is this conflict to be decided? The question has no great practical +interest; nearly all the documents which relate miraculous facts are +already open to suspicion on other grounds, and would be discarded by a +sound criticism. But the question of miracles has raised such passions +that it may be well to indicate how it affects the historian.[176] + +The general tendency to believe in the marvellous has filled with +miraculous facts the documents of nearly every people. Historically the +existence of the devil is much better proved than that of Pisistratus: +there has not been preserved a single word of a contemporary of +Pisistratus saying that he has seen him; thousands of "ocular witnesses" +declare they have seen the devil; few historical facts have been +established by so great a number of independent testimonies. However, we +do not hesitate to reject the devil and to accept Pisistratus. For the +existence of the devil would be irreconcilable with the laws of all the +established sciences. + +For the historian the solution of the problem is obvious.[177] The +observations whose results are contained in historical documents are +never of equal value with those of contemporary scientists; we have +already shown why. The indirect method of history is always inferior to +the direct methods of the sciences of observation. If its results do not +harmonise with theirs, it is history which must give way; historical +science, with its imperfect means of information, cannot claim to check, +contradict, or correct the results of other sciences, but must rather +use their results to correct its own. The progress of the direct +sciences sometimes modifies the results of historical interpretation; a +fact established by direct observation aids in the comprehension and +criticism of documents. Cases of stigmata and nervous anæsthesia which +have been scientifically observed have led to the admission as true of +historical narratives of analogous facts, as in the case of the stigmata +of certain saints and the possessed nuns of Loudun. But history cannot +aid the progress of the direct sciences. It is kept at a distance from +reality by its indirect means of information, and must accept the laws +that are established by those sciences which come into immediate contact +with reality. In order to reject one of these laws new direct +observations are necessary. Such revolutions are possible, but they must +be brought about from within. History has no power to take the +initiative in them. + +The solution is not so clear in the case of facts which do not harmonise +with a body of historical knowledge or with the sciences, still in the +embryonic stage, which deal with man. It depends on the opinion we form +as to the value of such knowledge. We can at least lay down the +practical rule that in order to contradict history, psychology, or +sociology, we must have very strong documents, and this is a case which +hardly ever occurs. + + + + +BOOK III + +_SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS_ + + + + +CHAPTER I + +GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION + + +The criticism of documents only yields isolated facts. In order to +organise them into a body of science it is necessary to perform a series +of synthetic operations. The study of these processes of historical +construction forms the second half of Methodology. + +The mode of construction cannot be regulated by the ideal plan of the +science we desire to construct; it depends on the materials we have at +our disposal. It would be chimerical to formulate a scheme which the +materials would not allow us to carry out; it would be like proposing to +construct an Eiffel tower with building-stones. The fundamental defect +of philosophies of history is that they forget this practical necessity. + + +I. Let us begin by considering the materials of history. What is their +form and their nature? How do they differ from the materials of other +sciences? + +Historical facts are derived from the critical analysis of the +documents. They issue from this process in the form to which analysis +has reduced them, chopped small into individual statements; for a +single sentence contains several statements: we have often accepted some +and rejected others; each of these statements represents a fact. + +Historical facts have the common characteristic of having been taken +from documents; but they differ greatly among themselves. + +(1) They represent phenomena of very different nature. From the same +document we derive facts bearing on handwriting, language, style, +doctrines, customs, events. The Mesha inscription furnishes facts +bearing on Moabite handwriting and language, the belief in the god +Chemosh, the practices belonging to his cult, the war between the +Moabites and Israel. Thus the facts reach us pell-mell, without +distinction of nature. This mixture of heterogeneous facts is one of the +characteristics which differentiate history from the other sciences. The +sciences of direct observation choose the facts to be studied, and +systematically limit themselves to the observation of facts of a single +species. The documentary sciences receive the facts, already observed, +at the hands of authors of documents, who supply them in disorder. For +the purpose of remedying this disorder it is necessary to sort the facts +and group them by species. But, for the purpose of sorting them, it is +necessary to know precisely what it is that constitutes a _species_ of +historical facts; in order to group them we need a principle of +classification applicable to them. But on these two questions of capital +importance historians have not as yet succeeded in formulating precise +rules. + +(2) Historical facts present themselves in very different degrees of +generality, from the highly general facts which apply to a whole people +and which lasted for centuries (institutions, customs, beliefs), down to +the most transient actions of a single man (a word, a movement). Here +again history differs from the sciences of direct observation, which +regularly start from particular facts and labour methodically to +condense them into general facts. In order to form groups the facts must +be reduced to a common degree of generality, which makes it necessary to +inquire to what degree of generality we can and ought to reduce the +different species of facts. And this is what historians do not agree +about among themselves. + +(3) Historical facts are localised; each belongs to a given time and a +given country. If we suppress the time and place to which they belong, +they lose their historical character; they now contribute only to the +knowledge of universal humanity, as is the case with facts of folk-lore +whose origin is unknown. This necessity of localisation is also foreign +to the general sciences; it is confined to the descriptive sciences, +which deal with the geographical distribution and with the evolution of +phenomena. It obliges the historian to study separately the facts +belonging to different countries and different epochs. + +(4) The facts which have been extracted from documents by critical +analysis present themselves accompanied by a critical estimate of their +probability.[178] In every case where we have not reached complete +certainty, whenever the fact is merely probable--still more when it is +open to suspicion--criticism supplies the fact to the historian +accompanied by a label which he has no right to remove, and which +prevents the fact from being definitively admitted into the science. +Even those facts which, after comparison with others, end by being +established, are subject to temporary exclusion, like the clinical cases +which accumulate in the medical reviews before they are considered +sufficiently proved to be received as scientific facts. + +Historical construction has thus to be performed with an incoherent mass +of minute facts, with detail-knowledge reduced as it were to a powder. +It must utilise a heterogeneous medley of materials, relating to +different subjects and places, differing in their degree of generality +and certainty. No method of classifying them is provided by the practice +of historians; history, which began by being a form of literature, has +remained the least methodical of the sciences. + + +II. In every science the next step after observing the facts is to +formulate a series of questions according to some methodical +system;[179] every science is composed of the answers to such a series +of questions. In all the sciences of direct observation, even if the +questions to be answered have not been put down in advance, the facts +which are observed suggest questions, and require them to be formulated +precisely. But historians have no discipline of this kind; many of them +are accustomed to imitate artists, and do not even think of asking +themselves what they are looking for. They take from their documents +those parts which strike them, often for purely personal reasons, and +reproduce them, changing the language and adding any miscellaneous +reflections which come into their minds. + +If history is not to be lost in the confusion of its materials, it must +be made a rule to proceed here, as in the other sciences, by way of +question and answer.[180] But how are the questions to be chosen in a +science so different from the others? This is the fundamental problem of +method. The only way to solve it is to begin by determining the +essential characteristic of historical facts by which they are +differentiated from the facts of the other sciences. + +The sciences of direct observation deal with _realities_, taken in their +entirety. The science which borders most closely on history in respect +of its subject-matter, descriptive zoology, proceeds by the examination +of a real and complete animal. This animal is first observed, as a +whole, by actual vision; it is then dissected into its parts; this +dissection is _analysis_ in the original sense of the word ([Greek: +hanalhyein], to break up into parts). It is then possible to put the parts +together again in such a way as to exhibit the structure of the whole; +this is _real_ synthesis. It is possible to watch the _real_ movements +which are the functions of the organs in such a way as to observe the +mutual actions and reactions of the different parts of the organism. It +is possible to compare _real_ wholes and see what are the parts in +which they resemble each other, so as to be able to classify them +according to real points of resemblance. The science is a body of +objective knowledge founded on _real_ analysis, synthesis, and +comparison; actual sight of the things studied guides the scientific +researcher and dictates the questions he is to ask himself. + +In history there is nothing like this. One is apt to say that history is +the "vision" of past events, and that it proceeds by "analysis": these +are two metaphors, dangerous if we suffer ourselves to be misled by +them.[181] In history we see nothing real except paper with writing on +it--and sometimes monuments or the products of art or industry. The +historian has nothing before him which he can analyse physically, +nothing which he can destroy and reconstruct. "Historical analysis" is +no more real than is the vision of historical facts; it is an abstract +process, a purely intellectual operation. The analysis of a document +consists in a _mental_ search for the items of information it contains, +with the object of criticising them one by one. The analysis of a fact +consists in the process of distinguishing _mentally_ between its +different details (the various episodes of an event, the characteristics +of an institution), with the object of paying special attention to each +detail in turn; that is what is called examining the different "aspects" +of a fact,--another metaphor. The human mind is vague by nature, and +spontaneously revives only vague collective impressions; to impart +clearness to these it is necessary to ask what individual impressions go +to form a given collective impression, in order that precision may be +attained by a successive consideration of them. This is an indispensable +operation but we must not exaggerate its scope. It is not an objective +method which yields a knowledge of real objects; it is only a subjective +method which aims at detecting those abstract elements which compose our +impressions.[182] From the very nature of its materials history is +necessarily a subjective science. It would be illegitimate to extend to +this intellectual analysis of subjective impressions the rules which +govern the real analysis of real objects. + +History, then, must guard against the temptation to imitate the method +of the biological sciences. Historical facts are so different from the +facts of the other sciences that their study requires a different +method. + + +III. Documents, the sole source of historical knowledge, give +information on three categories of facts: + +(1) _Living beings and material objects._ Documents make us acquainted +with the existence of human beings, physical conditions, products of art +and industry. In all these cases physical facts have been brought +before the author by physical perception. But we have before us nothing +but intellectual phenomena, facts seen "through the author's +imagination," or, to speak accurately, mental images representative of +the author's impressions--images which we form on the _analogy_ of the +images which were in his mind. The Temple at Jerusalem was a material +object which men saw, but we cannot see it now; all we can now do is to +form a mental image of it, analogous to that which existed in the minds +of those who saw and described it. + +(2) _Actions of men._ Documents relate the actions (and words) of men of +former times. Here, too, are physical facts which were known to the +authors by sight and hearing, but which are now for us no more than the +author's recollections, subjective images which are reproduced in our +minds. When Cæsar was stabbed the dagger-thrusts were seen, the words of +the murderers were heard; we have nothing but mental images. Actions and +words all have this characteristic, that each was the action or the word +of an individual; the imagination can only represent to itself +_individual_ acts, copied from those which are brought before us by +direct physical observation. As these are the actions of men living in a +society, most of them are performed simultaneously by several +individuals, or are directed to some common end. These are collective +acts; but, in the imagination as in direct observation, they always +reduce to a sum of individual actions. The "social fact," as recognised +by certain sociologists, is a philosophical construction, not an +historical fact. + +(3) Motives and conceptions. Human actions do not contain their own +cause within themselves; they have _motives_. This vague word denotes +both the stimulus which occasions the performance of an action, and the +_representation_ of the action which is in the mind of a man at the +moment when he performs it. We can imagine motives only as existing in a +man's mind, and in the form of vague interior representations, analogous +to those which we have of our own inward states; we can express them +only by words, generally metaphorical. Here we have _psychic_ facts, +generally called feelings and ideas. Documents exhibit three kinds of +such facts: (_a_) motives and conceptions in the authors' minds and +expressed by them; (_b_) motives and ideas attributed by the authors to +contemporaries of theirs whose actions they have seen; (_c_) motives +which we ourselves may suppose to have influenced the actions related in +the documents, and which we represent to ourselves on the model of our +own motives. + +Physical facts, human actions (both individual and collective), psychic +facts--these form the objects of historical knowledge; they are none of +them observed directly, they are all _imagined_. Historians--nearly all +of them unconsciously and under the impression that they are observing +realities--are occupied solely with images. + + +IV. How, then, is it possible to imagine facts without their being +wholly imaginary? The facts, as they exist in the historian's mind, are +necessarily subjective; that is one of the reasons given for refusing to +recognise history as a science. But subjective is not a synonym of +unreal. A recollection is only an image; but it is not therefore a +chimera, it is the representation of a vanished reality. It is true that +the historian who works with documents has no personal recollections of +which he can make direct use; but he forms mental images on the model of +his own recollections. He assumes that realities (objects, actions, +motives), which have now disappeared, but were formerly observed by the +authors of the documents, resembled the realities of his own day which +he has himself seen and which he retains in his memory. This is the +postulate of all the documentary sciences. If former humanity did not +resemble the humanity of to-day, documents would be unintelligible. +Starting from this assumed resemblance, the historian forms a mental +representation of the bygone facts of history similar to his own +recollection of the facts he has witnessed. + +This operation, which is performed unconsciously, is one of the +principal sources of error in history. The things of the past which are +to be pictured in imagination were not wholly similar to the things of +the present which we have seen; we have never seen a man like Cæsar or +Clovis, and we have never experienced the same mental states as they. In +the established sciences it is equally true that one man will work on +facts which another has observed, and which he must therefore represent +to himself by analogy; but these facts are defined by precise terms +which indicate what invariable elements ought to appear in the image. +Even in physiology the notions which occur are sufficiently clear and +fixed for the same word to evoke in the minds of all naturalists similar +images of an organ or a movement. The reason is that each notion which +has a name has been formed by a method of observation and abstraction in +the course of which all the characteristics which belong to the notion +have been precisely determined and described. + +But in proportion as a body of knowledge is more nearly concerned with +the invisible facts of the mind, its notions become more confused and +its language less precise. Even the most ordinary facts of human life, +social conditions, actions, motives, feelings, can only be expressed by +vague terms (_king_, _warrior_, _to fight_, _to elect_). In the case of +more complex phenomena, language is so indefinite that there is no +agreement even as to the essential elements of the phenomena. What are +we to understand by a tribe, an army, an industry, a market, a +revolution? Here history shares the vagueness common to all the sciences +of humanity, psychological or social. But its indirect method of +representation by mental images renders this vagueness still more +dangerous. The historical images in our minds ought, then, to reproduce +at least the essential features of the images which were in the minds of +the direct observers of past facts; but the terms in which they +expressed their mental images never tell us exactly what these essential +elements were. + +Facts which we did not see, described in language which does not permit +us to represent them in our minds with exactness, form the data of +history. The historian, however, is obliged to picture the facts in his +imagination, and he should make it his constant endeavour to construct +his mental images out of none but correct elements, so that he may +imagine the facts as he would have seen them if he had been able to +observe them personally.[183] But the formation of a mental image +requires more elements than the documents supply. Let any one endeavour +to form a mental representation of a battle or a ceremony out of the +data of a narrative, however detailed; he will see how many features he +is compelled to add. This necessity becomes physically perceptible in +attempts to restore monuments in accordance with descriptions (for +example, the Temple at Jerusalem), in pictures which claim to be +representations of historical scenes, in the drawings of illustrated +newspapers. + +Every historical image contains a large part of fancy. The historian +cannot get rid of it, but he can take stock of the real elements which +enter into his images and confine his constructions to these; they are +the elements which he has derived from the documents. If, in order to +understand the battle between Cæsar and Ariovistus, he finds it +necessary to make a mental picture of the two opposing armies, he will +be careful to draw no conclusions from the general aspect under which he +imagines them; he will base his reasonings exclusively on the real +details furnished by the documents. + + +V. The problem of historical method may be finally stated as follows. +Out of the different elements we find in documents we form mental +images. Some of these, relating entirely to physical objects, are +furnished to us by illustrative monuments, and they directly represent +some of the physical aspects of the things of the past. Most of them, +however, including all the images we form of psychic facts, are +constructed on the model either of ancient representations, or, more +frequently, of the facts we have observed in our own experience. Now, +the things of the past were only partially similar to the things of the +present, and it is precisely the points of difference which make history +interesting. How are we to represent to ourselves these elements of +difference for which we have no model? We have never seen a company of +men resembling the Frankish warriors, and we have never personally +experienced the feelings which Clovis had when setting out to fight +against the Visigoths. How are we to make our imagination of facts of +this kind harmonise with the reality? + +Practically, what happens is as follows. Immediately on the reading of a +sentence in a document an image is formed in our minds by a spontaneous +operation beyond our control. This image is based on a superficial +analogy, and is, as a rule, grossly inaccurate. Any one who searches his +memory may recall the absurd manner in which he first represented to +himself the persons and scenes of the past. It is the task of history to +rectify these images gradually, by eliminating the false elements one by +one, and replacing them by true ones. We have seen red-haired people, +bucklers, and Frankish battle-axes (or at least drawings of these +objects); we bring these elements together, in order to correct our +first mental image of the Frankish warriors. The historical image thus +ends by becoming a combination of features borrowed from different +experiences. + +It is not enough to represent to oneself isolated persons, objects, and +actions. Men and their actions form part of a whole, of a society and of +a process of evolution. It is, therefore, further necessary to represent +to oneself the relations between different men and different actions +(nations, governments, laws, wars). + +But in order to imagine relations it is necessary to have a conception +of collectivities or wholes, and the documents only give isolated +elements. Here again the historian is obliged to use a subjective +method. He imagines a society or a process of evolution, and in this +imaginary framework he disposes the elements furnished by the documents. +Thus, whereas biological classification is guided by the objective +observation of physical units, historical classification can only be +effected upon subjective units existing in the imagination. + +The realities of the past are things which we do not observe, and which +we can only know in virtue of their resemblance to the realities of the +present. In order to realise the conditions under which past events +happened, we must observe the humanity of to-day, and look for the +conditions under which analogous events happen now. History thus becomes +an application of the descriptive sciences which deal with humanity, +descriptive psychology, sociology or social science; but all these +sciences are still but imperfectly established, and their defects retard +the establishment of a science of history. + +Some of the conditions of human life are, however, so necessary and so +obvious that the most superficial observation is enough to establish +them. These are the conditions common to all humanity; they have their +origin either in the physiological organisation which determines the +material needs of men, or in the psychological organisation which +determines their habits in matters of conduct. These conditions can +therefore be provided for by the use of a set of general questions +applicable to all the cases that may occur. It is with historical +construction as with historical criticism--the impossibility of direct +observation compels the use of prearranged sets of questions. + +The human actions which form the subject-matter of history differ from +age to age and from country to country, just as men and societies have +differed from each other; and, indeed, it is the special aim of history +to study these differences. If men had always had the same form of +government or spoken the same language, there would be no occasion to +write the history of forms of government or the history of languages. +But these differences are comprised within limits imposed by the general +conditions of human life; they are but varieties of certain modes of +being and doing which are common to the whole of humanity, or at least +to the great majority of men. We cannot know _a priori_ what was the +mode of government or the language of an historical people; it is the +business of history to tell us. But that a given people had a language +and had a form of government is something which we are entitled to +assume, before examination, in every possible case. + +By drawing up the list of the fundamental phenomena which we may expect +to find in the life of every individual and every people, we shall have +suggested to us a set of general questions which will be summary, but +still sufficient to enable us to arrange the bulk of historical facts in +a certain number of natural groups, each of which will form a special +branch of history. This scheme of general classification will supply the +scaffolding of historical construction. + +The set of general questions will only apply to phenomena of constant +occurrence: it cannot anticipate the thousands of local or accidental +events which enter into the life of an individual or a nation; it will, +therefore, not contain all the questions which the historian must answer +before he can give a complete picture of the past. The detailed study of +the facts will require the use of lists of questions entering more into +detail, and differing according to the nature of the events, the men, or +the societies studied. In order to frame these lists, we begin by +setting down those questions or matters of detail which are suggested by +the mere reading of the documents; but for the purpose of arranging +these questions, often indeed for the purpose of making the list +complete, recourse must be had to the systematic _a priori_ method. +Among the classes of facts, the persons, and the societies with which we +are well acquainted (either from direct observation or from history), we +look for those which resemble the facts, the persons, or the societies +which we wish to study. By analysing the scheme of arrangement used in +the scientific treatment of these familiar cases we shall learn what +questions ought to be asked in reference to the analogous cases which we +propose to investigate. Of course the model must be chosen +intelligently; we must not apply to a barbarous society a list of +questions framed on the study of a civilised nation, and ask with regard +to a feudal domain what agents corresponded to each of our ministers of +state--as Boutaric did in his study of the administration of Alphonse of +Poitiers. + +This method of drawing up lists of questions which bases all historical +construction on an _a priori_ procedure, would be objectionable if +history really were a science of observation; and perhaps some will +think it compares very unfavourably with the _a posteriori_ methods of +the natural sciences. But its justification is simple: it is the only +method which it is possible to employ, and the only method which, as a +matter of fact, ever has been employed. The moment an historian attempts +to put in order the facts contained in documents, he constructs out of +the knowledge he has (or thinks he has) of human affairs a scheme of +arrangement which is the equivalent of a list of questions--unless, +perhaps, he adopts a scheme which one of his predecessors has +constructed in a similar manner. But when this work has been performed +unconsciously, the scheme of arrangement remains incomplete and +confused. Thus it is not a case of deciding whether to work with or +without an _a priori_ set of questions--we must work with such a set in +any case--the choice merely lies between the unconscious use of an +incomplete and confused set of questions and the conscious use of a +precise and complete set. + + +VI. We can now sketch the plan of historical construction in a way which +will determine the series of synthetic operations necessary to raise the +edifice. + +The critical analysis of the documents has supplied the +materials--historical facts still in a state of dispersion. We begin by +_imagining_ these facts on the model of what we suppose to be the +analogous facts of the present; by combining elements taken from reality +at different points, we endeavour to form a mental image which shall +resemble as nearly as possible that which would have been produced by +direct observation of the past event. This is the first operation, +inseparable in practice from the reading of the documents. Considering +that it will be enough to have indicated its nature here,[184] we have +refrained from devoting a special chapter to it. + +The facts having been thus imagined, we _group_ them according to +schemes of classification devised on the model of a body of facts which +we have observed directly, and which we suppose analogous to the body of +past facts under consideration. This is the second operation; it is +performed by the aid of systematic questions, and its result is to +divide the mass of historical facts into homogeneous portions which we +afterwards form into groups until the entire history of the past has +been systematically arranged according to a general scheme. + +When we have arranged in this scheme the facts taken from the documents, +there remain gaps whose extent is always considerable, and is enormous +for those parts of history in regard to which documents are scanty. We +endeavour to fill some of these gaps by _reasoning_ based on the facts +which are known. This is (or should be) the third operation; it +increases the sum of historical knowledge by an application of logic. + +We still possess nothing but a mass of facts placed side by side in a +scheme of classification. We have to condense them into _formulæ_, in +order to deduce their general characteristics and their relation to each +other. This is the fourth operation; it leads to the final conclusions +of history, and crowns the work of historical construction from the +scientific point of view. + +But as historical knowledge, which is by nature complex and unwieldy, is +exceptionally difficult to communicate, we still have to look for the +methods of expounding historical results in appropriate form. + + +VII. This series of operations, easy to conceive in the mind, has never +been more than imperfectly performed. It is beset by material +difficulties which theories of methodology do not take into account, but +which it would be better to face, with the purpose of discovering +whether they are after all insurmountable. + +The operations of history are so numerous, from the first discovery of +the document to the final formula of the conclusion, they require such +minute precautions, so great a variety of natural gifts and acquired +habits, that there is no man who can perform _by himself_ all the work +on any one point. History is less able than any other science to +dispense with the division of labour; but there is no other science in +which labour is so imperfectly divided. We find specialists in critical +scholarship writing general histories in which they let their +imagination guide them in the work of construction;[185] and, on the +other hand, there are constructive historians who use for their work +materials whose value they have not tested.[186] The reason is that the +division of labour implies a common understanding among the workers, and +in history no such understanding exists. Except in the preparatory +operations of external criticism, each worker follows the guidance of +his own private inspiration; he is at no pains to work on the same lines +as the others, nor does he pay any regard to the whole of which his own +work is to form a part. Thus no historian can feel perfectly safe in +adopting the results of another's work, as may be done in the +established sciences, for he does not know whether these results have +been obtained by trustworthy methods. The most scrupulous go so far as +to admit nothing until they have done the work on the documents over +again for themselves. This was the attitude adopted by Fustel de +Coulanges. It is barely possible to satisfy this exacting standard in +the case of little-known periods, the documents relating to which are +confined to a few volumes; and yet some have gone so far as to maintain +the dogma that no historian should ever work at second hand.[187] This, +indeed, is what an historian is compelled to do when the documents are +too numerous for him to be able to read them all; but he does not say +so, to avoid scandal. + +It would be better to acknowledge the truth frankly. So complex a +science as history, where facts must ordinarily be accumulated by the +million before it is possible to formulate conclusions, cannot be built +up on this principle of continually beginning afresh. Historical +construction is not work that can be done with documents, any more than +history can be "written from manuscripts," and for the same reason--the +shortness of time. In order that science may advance it is necessary to +combine the results of thousands of detail-researches. + +But how are we to proceed in view of the fact that most researches have +been conducted upon methods which, if not defective, are at least open +to suspicion? Universal confidence would lead to error as surely as +universal distrust would make progress impossible. One useful rule, at +any rate, may be stated, as follows: The works of historians should be +read with the same critical precautions which are observed in the +reading of documents. A natural instinct impels us to look principally +for the conclusions, and to accept them as so much established truth; we +ought, on the contrary, to be continually applying analysis, we ought to +look for the facts, the _proofs_, the fragments of documents--in short, +the materials. We shall be doing the author's work over again, but we +shall do it very much faster than he did, for that which takes up time +is the collection and combination of the materials; and we shall accept +no conclusions but those we consider to have been proved. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE GROUPING OF FACTS + + +I. The prime necessity for the historian, when confronted with the chaos +of historical facts, is to limit the field of his researches. In the +ocean of universal history what facts is he to choose for collection? +Secondly, in the mass of facts so chosen he will have to distinguish +between different groups and make subdivisions. Lastly, within each of +these subdivisions he will have to arrange the facts one by one. Thus +all historical construction should begin with the search for a principle +to guide in the selection, the grouping, and the arrangement of facts. +This principle may be sought either in the external conditions of the +facts or in their intrinsic nature. + +The simplest and easiest mode of classification is that which is founded +on external conditions. Every historical fact belongs to a definite time +and a definite place, and relates to a definite man or group of men: a +convenient basis is thus afforded for the division and arrangement of +facts. We have the history of a period, of a country, of a nation, of a +man (biography); the ancient historians and those of the Renaissance +used no other type. Within this general scheme the subdivisions are +formed on the same principle, and facts are arranged in chronological +and geographical order, or according to the groups to which they +relate. As to the selection of facts to be arranged in this scheme, for +a long time it was made on no fixed principle; historians followed their +individual fancy, and chose from among the facts relating to a given +period, country, or nation all that they deemed interesting or curious. +Livy and Tacitus mingle accounts of floods, epidemics, and the birth of +monsters with their narratives of wars and revolutions. + +Classification of facts by their intrinsic nature was introduced very +late, and has made way but slowly and imperfectly. It took its rise +outside the domain of history, in certain branches of study dealing with +special human phenomena--language, literature, art, law, political +economy, religion; studies which began by being dogmatic, but gradually +assumed an historical character. The principle of this mode of +classification is to select and group together those facts which relate +to the same species of actions; each of these groups becomes the +subject-matter of a special branch of history. The totality of facts +thus comes to be arranged in compartments which may be constructed _a +priori_ by the study of the totality of human activities; these +correspond to the set of general questions of which we have spoken in +the preceding chapter. + +In the following table we have attempted to provide a general scheme for +the classification[188] of historical facts, founded on the nature of +the _conditions_ and of the _manifestations_ of activity. + + +I. MATERIAL CONDITIONS. (1) _Study of the body_: _A._ Anthropology +(ethnology), anatomy, and physiology, anomalies and pathological +peculiarities. _B._ Demography (number, sex, age, births, deaths, +diseases). (2) _Study of the environment_: _A._ Natural geographical +environment (orographic configuration, climate, water, soil, flora, and +fauna). _B._ Artificial environment, forestry (cultivation, buildings, +roads, implements, &c.). + +II. INTELLECTUAL HABITS (not obligatory). (1) _Language_ (vocabulary, +syntax, phonetics, semasiology). Handwriting. (2) _Arts_: _A._ Plastic +arts (conditions of production, conceptions, methods, works). _B._ Arts +of expression, music, dance, literature. (3) _Sciences_ (conditions of +production, methods, results). (4) _Philosophy and Morals_ (conceptions, +precepts, actual practice). (5) _Religion_ (beliefs, practices).[189] + +III. MATERIAL CUSTOMS (not obligatory). (1) _Material life_: _A._ Food +(materials, modes of preparing, stimulants). _B._ Clothes and personal +adornment. _C._ Dwellings and furniture. (2) _Private life_: _A._ +Employment of time (toilette, care of the person, meals). _B._ Social +ceremonies (funerals and marriages, festivals, etiquette). _C._ +Amusements (modes of exercise and hunting, games and spectacles, social +meetings, travelling). + +IV. ECONOMIC CUSTOMS. (1) _Production_: _A._ Agriculture and +stock-breeding. _B._ Exploitation of minerals. (2) _Transformation, +Transport and industries_:[190] technical processes, division of labour, +means of communication. (3) _Commerce_: exchange and sale, credit. (4) +_Distribution_: system of property, transmission, contracts, +profit-sharing. + +V. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS. (1) _The family_: _A._ Constitution, authority, +condition of women and children. _B._ Economic organisation.[191] Family +property, succession. (2) _Education and instruction_ (aim, methods, +_personnel_). (3) _Social classes_ (principle of division, rules +regulating intercourse). + +VI. PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (obligatory). (1) _Political institutions_: _A._ +Sovereign (_personnel_, procedure). _B._ Administration, services (war, +justice, finance, &c.). _C._ Elected authorities, assemblies, electoral +bodies (powers, procedure). (2) _Ecclesiastical institutions_ (the same +divisions). (3) _International institutions_: _A._ Diplomacy. _B._ War +(usages of war and military arts). _C._ Private law and commerce. + + +This grouping of facts according to their nature is combined with the +system of grouping by time and place; we thus obtain chronological, +geographical, or, national sections in each branch. The history of a +species of activity (language, painting, government) subdivides into the +history of periods, countries, and nations (history of the ancient Greek +language, history of the government of France in the nineteenth +century). + +The same principles aid in determining the order in which the facts are +to be arranged. The necessity of presenting facts one after another +obliges us to adopt some methodical rule of succession. We may describe +successively either all the facts which relate to a given place, or +those which relate to a given country, or all the facts of a given +species. All historical matter can be distributed in three different +kinds of order: _chronological_ order, _geographical_ order, that kind +of order which is governed by the nature of actions and is generally +called _logical_ order. It is impossible to use any of these orders +exclusively: in every chronological exposition there necessarily occur +geographical or logical cross-divisions, transitions from one country to +another, or from one species of facts to a different species, and +conversely. But it is always necessary to decide which shall be the main +order into which the others enter as subdivisions. + +It is a delicate matter to choose between these three orders; our choice +will be decided by different reasons according to the subject, and +according to the public for whom we are working. That is to say, it will +depend on the method of exposition; it would take up too much space to +give the theory of it. + + +II. When we come to the selection of historical facts for classification +and arrangement, a question is raised which has been disputed with +considerable warmth. + +Every human action is by its nature an individual transient phenomenon +which is confined to a definite time and a definite place. Strictly +speaking, every fact is unique. But every action of a man resembles +other actions of the same man, or of other members of the same group, +and often to so great a degree that the whole group of actions receives +a common name, in which their individuality is lost. These groups of +similar actions, which the human mind is irresistibly impelled to form, +are called habits, usages, institutions. These are merely constructions +of the mind, but they are imposed so forcibly on our intellect that many +of them must be recognised and constantly employed; habits are +collective facts, possessing extension in time and space. Historical +facts may therefore be considered under two different aspects: we may +regard either the individual, particular, and transient elements in +them, or we may look for what is collective, general, and durable. +According to the first conception, history is a continuous narrative of +the incidents which have happened among men in the past; according to +the second, it is the picture of the successive habits of humanity. + +On this subject there has been a contest, especially in Germany, between +the partisans of the history of civilisation (_Kulturgeschichte_)[192] +and the historians who remain faithful to ancient tradition; in France +we have had the struggle between the history of institutions, manners, +and ideas, and political history, contemptuously nicknamed +"battle-history" by its opponents. + +This opposition is explained by the difference between the documents +which the workers on either side were accustomed to deal with. The +historians, principally occupied with political history, read of +individual and transient acts of rulers in which it was difficult to +detect any common feature. In the special histories, on the contrary +(except that of literature), the documents exhibit none but general +facts, a linguistic form, a religious rite, a rule of law; an effort of +imagination is required to picture the man who pronounced the word, who +performed the rite, or who applied the rule in practice. + +There is no need to take sides in this controversy. Historical +construction in its completeness implies the study of facts under both +aspects. The representation of men's habits of thought, life, and action +is obviously an important part of history. And yet, supposing we had +brought together all the acts of all individuals for the purpose of +extracting what is common to them, there would still remain a residue +which we should have no right to reject, for it is the distinctively +historical element--the circumstance that a particular action was the +action of a given man, or group of men, at a given moment. In a scheme +of classification which should only recognise the general facts of +political life there would be no place for the victory of Pharsalia or +the taking of the Bastille--accidental and transient facts, but without +which the history of Roman and French institutions would be +unintelligible. + +History is thus obliged to combine with the study of general facts the +study of certain particular facts. It has a mixed character, fluctuating +between a science of generalities and a narrative of adventures. The +difficulty of classing this hybrid under one of the categories of human +thought has often been expressed by the childish question: Is history a +science or an art? + + +III. The general table given above may be used for the determination of +all the species of habits (usages or institutions) of which the history +may be written. But before applying this general scheme to the study of +any particular group of habits, language, religion, private usages, or +political institutions, there is always a preliminary question to be +answered: Whose were the habits we are about to study? They were common +to a great number of individuals; and a collection of individuals with +the same habits is what we call a _group_. The first condition, then, +for the study of a habit is the determination of the group which has +practised it. At this point we must beware of the first impulse; it +leads to a negligence which may ruin the whole of our historical +construction. + +The natural tendency is to conceive the human group on the model of the +zoological species--as a body of men who all resemble each other. We +take a group united by a very obvious common characteristic, a nation +united by a common official government (Romans, English, French), a +people speaking the same language (Greeks, ancient Germans), and we +proceed as if all the members of this group resembled each other at +every point and had the same usages. + +As a matter of fact, no real group, not even a centralised society, is a +homogeneous whole. For a great part of human activity--language, art, +science, religion, economic interests--the group is constantly +fluctuating. What are we to understand by the group of those who speak +Greek, the Christian group, the group of modern science? And even those +groups to which some precision is given by an official organisation, +States and Churches, are but superficial unities composed of +heterogeneous elements. The English nation comprises Welsh, Scotch, and +Irish; the Catholic Church is composed of adherents scattered over the +whole world, and differing in everything but religion. There is no +group whose members have the same habits in every respect. The same man +is at the same time a member of several groups, and in each group he has +companions who differ from those he has in the others. A French Canadian +belongs to the British Empire, the Catholic Church, the group of +French-speaking people. Thus the different groups overlap each other in +a way that makes it impossible to divide humanity into sharply distinct +societies existing side by side. + +In historical documents we find the contemporary names of groups, many +of them resting on mere superficial resemblances. It must be made a rule +not to adopt popular notions of this kind without criticising them. We +must accurately determine the nature and extent of the group, asking: Of +what men was it composed? What bond united them? What habits had they in +common? In what species of activity did they differ? Not till after such +criticism shall we be able to tell what are the habits in respect of +which the group in question may be used as a basis of study. In order to +study intellectual habits (language, religion, art, science) we shall +not take a political unit, the nation, but the group consisting of those +who shared the habit in question. In order to study economic facts we +shall choose a group united by a common economic interest; we shall +reserve the political group for the study of social and political facts, +and we shall discard _race_[193] altogether. + +Even in those points in which a group is homogeneous it is not entirely +so; it is divided into sub-groups, the members of which differ in +secondary habits; a language is divided into dialects, a religion into +sects, a nation into provinces. Conversely, one group resembles other +groups in a way that justifies its being regarded as contiguous with +them; in a general classification we may recognise "families" of +languages, arts, and peoples. We have, then, to ask: How was a given +group sub-divided? Of what larger group did it form a part? + +It then becomes possible to study methodically a given habit, or even +the totality of the habits belonging to a given time and place, by +following the table given above. The operation presents no difficulties +of method in the case of those species of facts which appear as +individual and voluntary habits--language, art, sciences, conceptions, +private usages; here it is enough to ascertain in what each habit +consisted. It is merely necessary to distinguish carefully between those +who originated or maintained habits (artists, the learned, philosophers, +introducers of fashions) and the mass who accepted them. + +But when we come to social or political habits (what we call +institutions), we meet with new conditions which produce an inevitable +illusion. The members of the same social or political group do not +merely habitually perform _similar_ actions; they influence each other +by _reciprocal_ actions, they command, coerce, pay each other. Habits +here take the form of _relations_ between the different members; when +they are of old standing, formulated in official rules, imposed by a +visible authority, maintained by a special set of persons, they occupy +so important a place in life, that, to the persons under their +influence, they appear as external realities. The men, too, who +specialise in an occupation or a function which becomes the dominating +habit of their lives, appear as grouped in distinct categories (classes, +corporations, churches, governments); and these categories are taken for +real existences, or at least for organs of various functions in a real +existence, namely, society. We follow the analogy of an animal's body so +far as to describe the "structure" and the "functions" of a society, +even its "anatomy" and "physiology." These are pure metaphors. By the +structure of a society we mean the rules and the customs by which +occupations and enjoyments are distributed among its members; by its +functions we mean the habitual actions by which each man enters into +relations with the others. It may be convenient to use these terms, but +it should be remembered that the underlying reality is composed entirely +of habits and customs. + +The study of institutions, however, obliges us to ask special questions +about persons and their functions. In respect of social and economic +institutions we have to ask what was the principle of the division of +labour and of the division into classes, what were the professions and +classes, how were they recruited, what were the relations between the +members of the different professions and classes. In respect of +political institutions, which are sanctioned by obligatory rules and a +visible authority, two new series of questions arise. (1) Who were the +persons invested with authority? When authority is divided we have to +study the division of functions, to analyse the _personnel_ of +government into its different groups (supreme and subordinate, central +and local), and to distinguish each of the special bodies. In respect of +each class of men concerned in the government we shall ask: How were +they recruited? What was their official authority? What were their real +powers? (2) What were the official rules? What was their form (custom, +orders, law, precedent)? What was their content (rules of law)? What was +the mode of application (procedure)? And, above all, how did the rules +differ from the practice (abuse of power, exploitation, conflicts +between executive agents, non-observance of rules)? + +After the determination of all the facts which constitute a society, it +remains to find the place which this society occupies among the total +number of the societies contemporary with it. Here we enter upon the +study of international institutions, intellectual, economic, and +political (diplomacy and the usages of war); the same questions apply as +in the study of political institutions. A study should also be made of +the habits common to several societies, and of those relations which do +not assume an official form. This is one of the least advanced parts of +historical construction. + + +IV. The outcome of all this labour is a tabulated view of human life at +a given moment; it gives us the knowledge of a _state_ of society (in +German, _Zustand_). But history is not limited to the study of +simultaneous facts, taken in a state of rest, to what we may call the +_statics_ of society. It also studies the states of society at different +moments, and discovers the differences between these states. The habits +of men and the material conditions under which they live change from +epoch to epoch; even when they appear to be constant they do not remain +unaltered in every respect. There is therefore occasion to investigate +these changes; thus arises the study of successive facts. + +Of these changes the most interesting for the work of historical +construction are those which tend in a common direction,[194] so that in +virtue of a series of gradual differentiations a usage or a state of +society is transformed into a different usage or state, or, to speak +without metaphor, cases where the men of a given period practise a habit +very different from that of their predecessors without any abrupt change +having taken place. This is _evolution_. + +Evolution occurs in all human habits. In order to investigate it, +therefore, it is enough to turn once more to the series of questions +which we used in constructing a tabulated view of society. In respect of +each of the facts, conditions, usages, persons invested with authority, +official rules, the question is to be asked: What was the evolution of +this fact? + +This study will involve several operations: (1) the determination of the +fact whose evolution is to be studied; (2) the fixing of the duration of +the time during which the evolution took place (the period should be so +chosen that while the transformation is obvious, there yet remains a +connecting link between the initial and the final condition); (3) the +establishing of the different stages of the evolution; (4) the +investigation of the means by which it was brought about. + + +V. A series, even a complete series, of all the states of all societies +and of all their evolutions would not be enough to exhaust the +subject-matter of history. There remains a number of unique facts which +we cannot pass over, because they explain the origin of certain states +of society, and form the starting-points of evolutions. How could we +study the institutions or the evolution of France if we ignored the +conquest of Gaul by Cæsar and the invasion of the Barbarians? + +This necessity of studying unique facts has caused it to be said that +history cannot be a science, for every science has for its object that +which is general. History is here in the same situation as cosmography, +geology, the science of animal species: it is not the abstract knowledge +of the general relations between facts, it is a study which aims at +_explaining_ reality. Now, reality exists but once. There has been but a +single evolution of the world, of animal life, of humanity. In each of +these evolutions the successive facts have not been the product of +abstract laws, but of the concurrence, at each moment, of several +circumstances of different nature. This concurrence, sometimes called +chance, has produced a series of accidents which have determined the +particular course taken by evolution.[195] Evolution can only be +understood by the study of these accidents; history is here on the same +footing as geology or palæontology. + +Thus scientific history may go back to the accidents, or events, which +traditional history collected for literary reasons, because they struck +the imagination, and employ them for the study of evolution. We may thus +look for the facts which have influenced the evolution of each one of +the habits of humanity. Each event will be arranged under its date in +the evolution which it is supposed to have influenced. It will then +suffice to bring together the events of every kind, and to arrange them +in chronological and geographical order, to have a representation of +historical evolution as a whole. + +Then, over and above the _special_ histories in which the facts are +arranged under purely abstract categories (art, religion, private life, +political institutions), we shall have constructed a concrete _general_ +history, which will connect together the various special histories by +exhibiting the main stream of evolution which has dominated all the +special evolutions. None of the species of facts which we study apart +(religion, art, law, constitutions) forms a closed world within which +evolution takes place in obedience to a kind of internal impulse, as +specialists are prone to imagine. The evolution of a usage or of an +institution (language, religion, church, state) is only a metaphor; a +usage is an abstraction, abstractions do not evolve; it is only +_existences_ that evolve, in the strict sense of the word.[196] When a +change takes place in a usage, this means that the men who practise it +have changed. Now, men are not built in water-tight compartments +(religious, juridical, economic) within which phenomena can occur in +isolation; an event which modifies the condition of a man changes his +habits in a great variety of respects. The invasion of the Barbarians +influenced alike language, private life, and political institutions. We +cannot, therefore, understand evolution by confining ourselves to a +special branch of history; the specialist, even for the purpose of +writing the complete history of his own branch, must look beyond the +confines of his own subject into the field of general events. It is the +merit of Taine to have asserted, with reference to English literature, +that literary evolution depends, not on literary events, but on facts of +a general character. + +The general history of individual facts was developed before the special +histories. It contains the residue of facts which have not found a place +in the special histories, and has been reduced in extent by the +formation and detachment of special branches. As general facts are +principally of a political nature, and as it is more difficult to +organise these into a special branch, general history has in practice +been confounded with political history (_Staatengeschichte_).[197] Thus +political historians have been led to make themselves the champions of +general history, and to retain in their constructions all the general +facts (migrations of peoples, religious reforms, inventions, and +discoveries) necessary for the understanding of political evolution. + +In order to construct general history it is necessary to look for all +the facts which, because they have produced changes, can explain either +the state of a society or one of its evolutions. We must search for them +among all classes of facts, displacements of population, artistic, +scientific, religious, technical innovations, changes in the _personnel_ +of government, revolutions, wars, discoveries of countries. + +That which is important is that the fact should have had a decisive +influence. We must therefore resist the natural temptation to divide +facts into great and small. It goes against the grain to admit that +great effects may have had small causes, that Cleopatra's nose may have +made a difference to the Roman Empire. This repugnance is of a +metaphysical order; it springs from a preconceived opinion on the +government of the world. In all the sciences which deal with an +evolution we find individual facts which serve as starting-points for +series of vast transformations. A drove of horses brought by the +Spanish has stocked the whole of South America. In a flood a branch of +a tree may dam a current and transform the aspect of a valley. + +In human evolution we meet with great transformations which have no +intelligible cause beyond an individual accident.[198] In the sixteenth +century England changed its religion three times on the death of a +sovereign (Henry VIII., Edward VI., Mary). Importance not to be measured +by the initial fact, but by the facts which resulted from it. We must +not, therefore, deny _a priori_ the action of individuals and discard +individual facts. We must examine whether a given individual was in a +position to make his influence strongly felt. There are two cases in +which we may assume that he was: (1) when his action served as an +example to a mass of men and created a tradition, a case frequent in +art, science, religion, and technical matters; (2) when he had power to +issue commands and direct the actions of a mass of men, as is the case +with the heads of a state, an army, or a church. The episodes in a man's +life may thus become important facts. + +Accordingly, in the scheme of historical classification a place should +be assigned for persons and events. + + +VI. In every study of successive facts it is necessary to provide a +number of halting-places, to distinguish beginnings and ends, in order +that chronological divisions may be made in the enormous mass of facts. +These divisions are _periods_; the use of them is as old as history. We +need them, not only in general history, but in the special branches of +history as well, whenever we study an extent of time long enough for an +evolution to be sensible. It is by means of events that we fix their +limits. + +In the special branches of history, after having decided what changes of +habits are to be considered as reaching deepest, we adopt them as +marking _dates_ in the evolution; we then inquire what event produced +them. The event which led to the formation or the change of a habit +becomes the beginning or the end of a period. Sometimes these boundary +events are of the same species as the facts whose evolution we are +studying--literary facts in the history of literature, political facts +in political history. But more often they belong to a different species, +and the special historian is obliged to borrow them from general +history. + +In general history the periods should be divided according to the +evolution of several species of phenomena; we look for events which mark +an epoch simultaneously in several branches (the Invasion of the +Barbarians, the Reformation, the French Revolution). We may thus +construct periods which are common to several branches of evolution, +whose beginning and whose end are each marked by a single event. It is +thus that the traditional division of universal history into periods has +been effected. The sub-periods are obtained by the same process, by +taking for limits events which have produced consequences of secondary +importance. + +The periods which are thus constructed according to the events are of +unequal duration. We must not be troubled by this want of symmetry; a +period ought not to be a fixed number of years, but the time occupied by +a distinct phase of evolution. Now, evolution is not a regular movement; +sometimes a long series of years passes without notable change, then +come moments of rapid transformation. On this difference Saint-Simon has +founded a distinction between _organic_ periods (of slow change) and +_critical_ periods (of rapid change). + + + + +CHAPTER III + +CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING + + +I. The historical facts supplied by documents are never enough to fill +all the blanks in such schemes of classification and arrangement as we +have been considering. There are many questions to which no direct +answer is given by the documents; many features are lacking without +which the complete picture of the various states of society, of +evolutions and events, cannot be given. We are irresistibly impelled to +endeavour to fill up these gaps. + +In the sciences of direct observation, when a fact is missing from a +series, it is sought for by a new observation. In history, where we have +not this resource, we seek to extend our knowledge by the help of +reasoning. Starting from facts known to us from the documents, we +endeavour to reach new facts by inference. If the reasoning be correct, +this method of acquiring knowledge is legitimate. + +But experience shows that of all the methods of acquiring historical +knowledge, reasoning is the most difficult to employ correctly, and the +one which has introduced the most serious errors. It should not be used +without the safeguard of a number of precautions calculated to keep the +danger continually before the mind. + +(1) Reasoning should never be combined with the analysis of a document. +The reader who allows himself to introduce into a text what the author +has not expressly put there ends by making him say what he never +intended to say.[199] + +(2) Facts obtained by the direct examination of documents should never +be confused with the results obtained by reasoning. When we state a fact +known to us by reasoning only, we must not allow it to be supposed that +we have found it in the documents; we must disclose the method by which +we have obtained it. + +(3) Unconscious reasoning must never be allowed; there are too many +chances of error. It will be enough to make a point of putting every +argument into logical form; in the case of bad reasoning the major +premiss is generally monstrous to an appalling degree. + +(4) If the reasoning leaves the least doubt, no attempt must be made to +draw a conclusion; the point treated must be left in the conjectural +stage, clearly distinguished from the definitively established results. + +(5) It is not permissible to return to a conjecture and endeavour to +transform it into a certainty. Here the first impression is most likely +to be right. By reflection upon a conjecture we familiarise ourselves +with it, and end by thinking it better established; while the truth is, +we are merely more accustomed to it. This is a frequent mishap with +those who devote themselves to long meditation on a small number of +texts. + +There are two ways of employing reasoning, one negative, the other +positive; we shall examine them separately. + + +II. The negative mode of reasoning, called also the "argument from +silence," is based on the absence of indications with regard to a +fact.[200] From the circumstance of the fact not being mentioned in any +document it is inferred that there was no such fact; the argument is +applied to all kinds of subjects, usages of every description, +evolutions, events. It rests on a feeling which in ordinary life is +expressed by saying: "If it were true, we should have heard of it;" it +implies a general proposition which may be formulated thus: "If an +alleged event really had occurred, there would be some document in +existence in which it would be referred to." + +In order that such reasoning should be justified it would be necessary +that every fact should have been observed and recorded in writing, and +that all the records should have been preserved. Now, the greater part +of the documents which have been written have been lost, and the greater +part of the events which happen are not recorded in writing. In the +majority of cases the argument would be invalid. It must therefore be +restricted to the cases where the conditions implied in it have been +fulfilled. + +(1) It is necessary not only that there should be now no documents in +existence which mention the fact in question, but that there should +never have been any. If the documents are lost we can conclude nothing. +The argument from silence ought, therefore, to be employed the more +rarely the greater the number of documents that have been lost; it is of +much less use in ancient history than in dealing with the nineteenth +century. Some, desiring to free themselves from this restriction, are +tempted to assume that the lost documents contained nothing interesting; +if they were lost, say they, the reason was that they were not worth +preserving. But the truth is, every manuscript is at the mercy of the +least accident; its preservation or destruction is a matter of pure +chance. + +(2) The fact must have been of such a kind that it could not fail to be +observed and recorded. Because a fact has not been recorded it does not +follow that it has not been observed. Any one who is concerned in an +organisation for the collection of a particular species of facts knows +how much commoner those facts are than people think, and how many cases +pass unnoticed or without leaving any written trace. It is so with +earthquakes, cases of hydrophobia, whales stranded on the shore. +Besides, many facts, even those which are well known to those who are +contemporary with them, are not recorded, because the official +authorities prevent their publication; this is what happens to the +secret acts of governments and the complaints of the lower classes. This +silence, which proves nothing, greatly impresses unreflecting +historians; it is the origin of the widespread sophism of the "good old +times." No document relates any abuse of power by officials or any +complaints made by peasants; therefore, everything was regular and +nobody was suffering. Before we argue from silence we should ask: Might +not this fact have failed to be recorded in any of the documents we +possess? That which is conclusive is not the absence of any document on +a given fact, but silence as to the fact in a document in which it would +naturally be mentioned. + +The negative argument is thus limited to a few clearly defined cases. +(1) The author of the document in which the fact is not mentioned had +the intention of systematically recording all the facts of the same +class, and must have been acquainted with all of them. (Tacitus sought +to enumerate the peoples of Germany; the _Notitia dignitatum_ mentioned +all the provinces of the Empire; the absence from these lists of a +people or a province proves that it did not then exist.) (2) The fact, +if it was such, must have affected the author's imagination so forcibly +as necessarily to enter into his conceptions. (If there had been regular +assemblies of the Frankish people, Gregory of Tours could not have +conceived and described the life of the Frankish kings without +mentioning them.) + + +III. The positive mode of reasoning begins with a fact established by +the documents, and infers some other fact which the documents do not +mention. It is an application of the fundamental principle of history, +the _analogy_ between present and past humanity. In the present we +observe that the facts of humanity are connected together. Given one +fact, another fact accompanies it, either because the first is the cause +of the second, or because the second is the cause of the first, or +because both are effects of a common cause. We assume that in the past +similar facts were connected in a similar manner, and this assumption is +corroborated by the direct study of the past in the documents. From a +given fact, therefore, which we find in the past, we may infer the +existence of the other facts which were connected with it. + +This reasoning applies to facts of all kinds, usages, transformations, +individual incidents. We may begin with any known fact and endeavour to +infer unknown facts from it. Now the facts of humanity, having a common +centre, man, are all connected together, not merely facts of the same +class, but facts belonging to the most widely different classes. There +are connections, not merely between the different facts relating to art, +to religion, to manners, to politics, but between the facts of religion +on the one hand and the facts of art, of politics, and of manners on the +other; thus from a fact of one species we may infer facts of all the +other species. + +To examine those connections between facts on which reasonings may be +founded would mean tabulating all the known relations between the facts +of humanity, that is, giving a full account of all the empirical laws of +social life. Such a labour would provide matter for a whole book.[201] +Here we shall content ourselves with indicating the general rules +governing this kind of reasoning, and the precautions to be taken +against the most common errors. + +The argument rests on two propositions: one is general, and is derived +from experience of human affairs; the other is particular, and is +derived from the documents. In practice, we begin with the particular +proposition, the historical fact: Salamis bears a Phoenician name. We +then look for a general proposition: the language of the name of a city +is the language of the people which founded it. And we conclude: +Salamis, bearing a Phoenician name, was founded by the Phoenicians. + +In order that the conclusion may be certain, two conditions are +necessary. + +(1) The general proposition must be accurately true; the two facts which +it declares to be connected must be connected in such a way that the one +is never found without the other. If this condition were completely +satisfied we should have a _law_, in the scientific sense of the word; +but in dealing with the facts of humanity--apart from those physical +conditions whose laws are established by the regular sciences--we can +only work with empirical laws obtained by rough determinations of +general facts which are not analysed in such a manner as to educe their +true causes. These empirical laws are approximately true only when they +relate to a numerous body of facts, for we can never quite know how far +each is necessary to produce the result. The proposition relating to the +language of the name of a city does not go enough into detail to be +always true. Petersburg is a German name, Syracuse in America bears a +Greek name. Other conditions must be fulfilled before we can be sure +that the name is connected with the nationality of the founders. We +should, therefore, only employ such propositions as go into detail. + +(2) In order to employ a general proposition which goes into detail, we +must have a detailed knowledge of the particular fact; for it is not +till after this fact has been established that we look for an empirical +general law on which to found an argument. We shall begin, then, by +studying the particular conditions of the case (the situation of +Salamis, the habits of the Greeks and Phoenicians); we shall not work +on a single detail, but on an assemblage of details. + +Thus, in historical reasoning it is necessary to have (1) an accurate +general proposition; (2) a detailed knowledge of a past fact. It is bad +workmanship to assume a false general proposition--to suppose, for +example, as Augustin Thierry did, that every aristocracy had its origin +in a conquest. It is bad workmanship, again, to found an argument on an +isolated detail (the name of a city). The nature of these errors +indicates the precautions to be taken. + +(1) The spontaneous tendency is to take as a basis of reasoning those +"common-sense truths" which form nearly the whole of our knowledge of +social life. Now, the greater part of these are to some extent false, +for the science of social life is still imperfect. And the chief danger +in them lies in the circumstance that we use them unconsciously. The +safest precaution will be always to formulate the supposed law on which +we propose to base an argument. In every instance where such and such a +fact occurs, it is certain that such and such another fact occurs also. +If this proposition is obviously false, we shall at once see it to be +so; if it is too general, we shall inquire what new conditions may be +introduced to make it accurate. + +(2) A second spontaneous impulse leads us to draw consequences from +isolated facts, even of the slightest kind (or rather, the idea of each +fact awakens in us, by association, the idea of other facts). This is +the natural procedure in the history of literature. Each circumstance in +the life of an author supplies material for reasoning; we construct by +conjecture all the influences which could have acted upon him, and we +assume that they did act upon him. All the branches of history which +study a single species of facts, isolated from every other species +(language, arts, private law, religion), are exposed to the same danger, +because they deal with fragments of human life, not with comprehensive +collections of phenomena. But few conclusions are firmly established +except those which rest on a comprehensive body of data. We do not make +a diagnosis from a single symptom, but from a number of concurrent +symptoms. The precaution to be taken will be to avoid working with an +isolated detail or an abstract fact. We must have before our minds +actual men, as affected by the principal conditions under which they +lived. + +We must be prepared to realise but rarely the conditions of a certain +inference; we are too little acquainted with the laws of social life, +and too seldom know the precise details of an historical fact. Thus most +of our reasonings will only afford presumptions, not certainties. But it +is with reasonings as with documents.[202] When several presumptions +all point in the same direction they confirm each other, and end by +producing a legitimate certitude. History fills up some of its gaps by +an accumulation of reasonings. Doubts remain as to the Phoenician +origin of various Greek cities, but there is no doubt about the presence +of the Phoenicians in Greece. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULÆ + + +I. Suppose we had methodically arranged all the historical facts +established by the analysis of documents, or by reasoning; we should +possess a systematised inventory of the whole of history, and the work +of construction would be complete. Ought history to stop at this point? +The question is warmly debated, and we cannot avoid giving an answer, +for it is a question with a practical bearing. + +Critical scholars, who are accustomed to collect all the facts relating +to their speciality, without any personal preference, are inclined to +regard a complete, accurate, and objective collection of facts as the +prime requisite. All historical facts have an equal right to a place in +history; to retain some as being of greater importance, and reject the +rest as comparatively unimportant, would be to introduce the subjective +element of choice, variable according to individual fancy; history +cannot sacrifice a single fact. + +Against this very reasonable view there is nothing to be urged except a +material difficulty; this, however, is enough, for it is the practical +motive of all the sciences: we mean the impossibility of acquiring or +communicating complete knowledge. A body of history in which no fact +was sacrificed would have to contain all the actions, all the thoughts, +all the adventures of all men at all times. It would form a total which +no one could possibly make himself master of, not for want of materials, +but for want of time. This, indeed, applies, as things are, to certain +voluminous collections of documents: the collected reports of +parliamentary debates contain the whole history of the various +assemblies, but to learn their history from these sources would require +more than a lifetime. + +Every science must take into consideration the practical conditions of +life, at least so far as it claims to be a real science, a science which +it is possible to know. Any ideal which ends by making knowledge +impossible impedes the establishment of the science. + +Science is a saving of time and labour, effected by a process which +provides a rapid means of learning and understanding facts; it consists +in the slow collection of a quantity of details and their condensation +into portable and incontrovertible formulæ. History, which is more +encumbered with details than any other science, has the choice between +two alternatives: to be complete and unknowable, or to be knowable and +incomplete. All the other sciences have chosen the second alternative; +they abridge and they condense, preferring to take the risk of +mutilating and arbitrarily combining the facts to the certainty of being +unable either to understand or communicate them. Scholars have preferred +to confine themselves to the periods of ancient history, where chance, +which has destroyed nearly all the sources of information, has freed +them from the responsibility of choosing between facts by depriving them +of nearly all the means of knowing them. + +History, in order to constitute itself a science, must elaborate the raw +material of facts. It must condense them into manageable form by means +of descriptive formulæ, qualitative and quantitative. It must search for +those connections between facts which form the ultimate conclusions of +every science. + + +II. The facts of humanity, with their complex and varied character, +cannot be reduced like chemical facts to a few simple formulæ. Like the +other sciences which deal with life, history needs descriptive formulæ +in order to express the nature of the different phenomena. + +In order to be manageable, a formula must be short; in order to give an +exact idea of the facts, it must be precise. Now, in the knowledge of +human affairs, precision can only be obtained by attention to +characteristic details, for these alone enable us to understand how one +fact differed from others, and what there was in it peculiar to itself. +There is thus a conflict between the need of brevity, which leads us to +look for concrete formulæ, and the necessity of being precise, which +requires us to adopt detailed formulæ. Formulæ which are too short make +science vague and illusory, formulæ which are too long encumber it and +make it useless. This dilemma can only be evaded by a perpetual +compromise, the principle of which is to compress the facts by omitting +all that is not necessary for the purpose of representing them to the +mind, and to stop at the point where omission would suppress some +characteristic feature. + +This operation, which is difficult in itself, is still further +complicated by the state in which the facts which are to be condensed +into formulæ present themselves. According to the nature of the +documents from which they are derived, they come to us in all the +different degrees of precision: from the detailed narrative which +relates the smallest episodes (the battle of Waterloo) down to the +barest mention in a couple of words (the victory of the Austrasians at +Testry). On different facts of the same kind we possess an amount of +details which is infinitely variable according as the documents give us +a complete description or a mere mention. How are we to organise into a +common whole, items of knowledge which differ so widely in point of +precision? When facts are known to us from a vague word of general +import, we cannot reduce them to a less degree of generality and a +greater degree of precision; we do not know the details. If we add them +conjecturally we shall produce an historical novel. This is what +Augustin Thierry did in the case of his _Récits mérovingiens_. When +facts are known in detail, it is always easy to reduce them to a greater +degree of generality by suppressing characteristic details; this is what +is done by the authors of abridgements. But the result of this procedure +would be to reduce history to a mass of vague generalities, uniform for +the whole of time except for the proper names and the dates. It would be +a dangerous method of introducing symmetry, to bring all facts to a +common degree of generality by levelling them all to the condition of +those which are the most imperfectly known. In those cases, therefore, +where the documents give details, our descriptive formulæ should always +retain the characteristic features of the facts. + +In order to construct these formulæ we must return to the set of +questions which we employed in grouping the facts, we must answer each +question, and compare the answers. We shall then combine them into as +condensed and as precise a formula as possible, taking care to keep a +fixed sense for every word. This may appear to be a matter of style, but +what we have in view here is not merely a principle of exposition, +necessary for the sake of being intelligible to the reader, it is a +precaution which the author ought to take on his own account. The facts +of society are of an elusive nature, and for the purpose of seizing and +expressing them, fixed and precise language is an indispensable +instrument; no historian is complete without good language. + +It will be well to make the greatest possible use of concrete and +descriptive terms: their meaning is always clear. It will be prudent to +designate collective groups only by collective, not by abstract names +(royalty, State, democracy, Reformation, Revolution), and to avoid +personifying abstractions. We think we are simply using metaphors, and +then we are carried away by the force of the words. Certainly abstract +terms have something very seductive about them, they give a scientific +appearance to a proposition. But it is only an appearance, behind which +scholasticism is apt to be concealed; the word, having no concrete +meaning, becomes a purely verbal notion (like the soporific virtue of +which Molière speaks). As long as our notions on social phenomena have +not been reduced to truly scientific formulæ, the most scientific course +will be to express them in terms of every-day experience. + +In order to construct a formula, we should know beforehand what elements +ought to enter into it. We must here make a distinction between general +facts (habits and evolutions) and unique facts (events). + + +III. General facts consist in actions which are often repeated, and are +common to a number of men. We have to determine their _character_, +_extent_, and _duration_. + +In order to formulate their character, we combine all the features which +constitute a fact (habit, institution) and distinguish it from all +others. We unite under the same formula all the individual cases which +greatly resemble each other, by neglecting the individual differences. + +This concentration is performed without effort in the case of habits +which have to do with forms (language, handwriting), and in the case of +all intellectual habits; those who practised these habits have already +given them expression in formulæ, which we have only to collect. The +same holds of these institutions which are sanctioned by expressly +formulated rules (regulations, laws, private statutes). Accordingly the +special branches of history were the first to yield methodical formulæ. +On the other hand, these special branches do not go beyond superficial +and conventional facts, they do not reach the real actions and thoughts +of men: in language they deal with written words, not the real +pronunciation; in religion with official dogmas and rites, not with the +real beliefs of the mass of the people; in morals with avowed precepts, +not with the effective ideals; in institutions with official rules, not +with the real practice. On all these subjects the knowledge of +conventional forms must some day be supplemented by a parallel study of +the real habits. + +It is much more difficult to embrace in a single formula a habit which +is composed of real actions, as is the case with economic phenomena, +private life, politics; for we have to find in the different actions +those common characteristics which constitute the habit; or, if this +work has already been done in the documents, and condensed into a +formula (the most common case), we must criticise this formula in order +to make sure that it really represents a homogeneous habit. + +The same difficulty occurs in constructing the formula for a group; we +have to describe the characteristic common to all the members of the +group and to find a collective name which shall exactly designate it. In +documents there is no lack of names of groups; but, as they have their +origin in usage, many of them correspond but ill to the real groups; we +have to criticise these names to fix their precise meaning, sometimes to +correct their application. + +This first operation should yield formulæ expressive of the conventional +and real characteristics of all the habits of the different groups. + +In order to fix the precise _extent_ of a habit we shall seek the most +distant points where it appears (this will give the area of +distribution), and the region where it is most common (the centre). +Sometimes the operation takes the form of a map (for example the map of +the _tumuli_ and the _dolmens_ of France). It will also be necessary to +indicate the groups of men who practised each habit, and the sub-groups +in which it was most pronounced. + +The formula should also indicate the _duration_ of the habit. We shall +look for the extreme cases, the first and the last appearance of the +form, the doctrine, the usage, the institution, the group. But it will +not be enough to note the two isolated cases, the earliest and the most +recent; we must ascertain the period in which it was really active. + +The formula of an evolution ought to indicate the successive variations +in the habit, giving in each case precise limits of extent and duration. +Then, by comparing all the variations, it will be possible to determine +the general course of the evolution. The general formula will indicate +when and where the evolution began and ended, and the nature of the +change which it effected. All evolutions present common features which +enable them to be divided into stages. Every habit (usage or +institution) begins by being the spontaneous act of several individuals; +when others imitate them it becomes a usage. Similarly social functions +are in the first instance performed by persons who undertake them +spontaneously, when these persons are recognised by others they acquire +an official status. This is the first stage; individual initiative +followed by general imitation and recognition. The usage becomes +traditional and is transformed into an obligatory custom or rule; the +persons acquire a permanent status and are invested with powers of +material or moral constraint. This is the stage of tradition and +authority; very often it is the last stage, and continues till the +society is destroyed. The usage is relaxed, the rules are violated, the +persons in authority cease to be obeyed; this is the stage of revolt and +decomposition. Finally, in certain civilised societies, the rule is +criticised, the persons in authority are censured, by the action of a +part of the subjects a rational change is effected in the composition of +the governing body, which is subjected to supervision; this is the stage +of reform and of checks. + + +IV. In the case of unique facts we cannot expect to bring several +together under a common formula, for the nature of these facts is to +occur but once. However, it is imperatively necessary to abridge, we +cannot preserve all the acts of all the members of an assembly or of all +the officers of a state. Many individuals and many facts must be +sacrificed. + +How are we to choose? Personal tastes and patriotism give rise to +preferences for congenial characters and for local events; but the only +principle of selection which can be employed by all historians in common +is that which is based on the part played in the evolution of human +affairs. We ought to retain those persons and those events which have +visibly influenced the course of an evolution. We may recognise them by +our inability to describe the evolution without mentioning them. The men +are those who have modified the state of a society either by the +creation or the introduction of a habit (artists, men of science, +inventors, founders, apostles), or as directors of a movement, heads of +states, of parties, of armies. The events are those which have brought +about changes in the habits or the state of societies. + +In order to construct a formula descriptive of an historical person, we +must take particulars from his biography and his habits. From his +biography we shall take those facts which determined his career, formed +his habits, and occasioned the actions by which he influenced society. +These comprise physiological conditions (physique, temperament, state of +health),[203] the educational influences, the social conditions to which +he was subject. The history of literature has accustomed us to +researches of this kind. + +Among the habits of a man it is necessary to determine his fundamental +conceptions relating to the class of facts in which his influence was +felt, his conception of life, his knowledge, his predominating tastes, +his habitual occupations, his principles of conduct. From these details, +in which there is infinite variety, an impression is formed of the man's +"character," and the collection of these characteristic features +constitutes his "portrait," or, to use a favourite phrase of the day, +his "psychology." This exercise, which is still held in great esteem, +dates from the time when history was still a branch of literature; it is +doubtful whether it can ever become a scientific process. There is +perhaps no sure method of summing up the character of a man, even in his +lifetime, still less when we can only know him indirectly through the +medium of documents. The controversies relative to the interpretation of +the conduct of Alexander are a good example of this uncertainty. + +If, however, we take the risk of seeking a formula to describe a +character, there are two natural temptations against which we must +guard: (I) We must not construct the formula out of the person's +assertions in regard to himself. (2) The study of imaginary personages +(dramas and novels) has accustomed us to seek a logical connection +between the various sentiments and the various acts of a man; a +character, in literature, is constructed logically. This search for +coherency must not be transferred to the study of real men. We are less +likely to do so in the case of those whom we observe in their lifetime, +because we see too many characteristics in them which could not enter +into a coherent formula. But the absence of documents, by suppressing +those characteristics which would have checked us, encourages us to +arrange the very small number of those which remain in the form of a +stage-character. This is why the great men of antiquity seem to us to +have been much more logical than our contemporaries are. + +How are we to construct a formula for an event? The imperative need of +simplification causes us to combine under a single name an enormous mass +of minute facts which are perceived in the lump, and between which we +vaguely feel that there is a connection (a battle, a war, a reform). +The facts which are thus combined are such facts as have conduced to a +common result. That is how the common notion of an event arises, and +there is no more scientific conception to put in its place. Facts, then, +are to be grouped according to their consequences; those which have had +no visible consequences disappear, the others are fused into a certain +number of aggregates which we call events. + +In order to describe an event, it is necessary to give precise +indications (I) of its character, (2) of its extent. + +(I) By the character of an event we mean the features which distinguish +it from every other event, not merely the external conditions of date +and place, but the manner in which it occurred, and its immediate +causes. The following are the items of information which the formula +should contain. One or more men, in such and such mental states +(conceptions, motives of the action), working under such and such +material conditions (locality, instrument), performed such and such +actions, which had for their result such and such a modification. For +the determination of the motives of the actions, the only method is to +compare the actions, firstly, with the declarations of those who +performed them; secondly, with the interpretation of those who witnessed +their performance. There is often a doubt remaining: this is the field +of party polemics; every one attributes noble motives to the actions of +his own party and discreditable motives to those of the opposite party. +But actions described without any indication of motive would be +unintelligible. + +(2) The extension of the event will be indicated both in space (the +place where it happened, and the region in which its immediate effects +were felt) and in time, the moment when its realisation began, and the +moment when the result was brought about. + +V. Descriptive formulæ relating to characters, being merely qualitative, +only give an abstract idea of the facts; in order to realise the place +they occupied in reality, quantity is necessary. It is not a matter of +indifference whether a given usage was practised by a hundred men or by +millions. + +For the purpose of introducing quantity into formulæ we have at our +disposal several methods, of various degrees of imperfection, which help +us to attain the end in view with various degrees of precision. Arranged +in descending order of precision they are as follows:-- + +(1) _Measurement_ is a perfectly scientific procedure, for equal numbers +represent absolutely identical values. But a common unit is necessary, +and that can only be had for time and for physical phenomena (lengths, +surfaces, weights). Figures relating to production and sums of money are +the essential elements in the statement of economic and financial facts. +But facts of the psychological order remain inaccessible to measurement. + +(2) _Enumeration_, which is the process employed in statistics,[204] is +applicable to all the facts which have in common a definite +characteristic which can be made use of for counting them. The facts +which are thus comprehended under a single number do not all belong to +the same species, they may have in common but a single characteristic, +abstract (crime, lawsuit) or conventional (workman, lodging); the +figures merely indicate the number of cases in which a given +characteristic is met with; they do not represent a homogeneous whole. A +natural tendency is to confuse number with measurement, and to suppose +that facts are known with scientific precision because it has been +possible to apply number to them; this is an illusion to be guarded +against, we must not take the figures which give the number of a +population or an army for the measure of its importance.[205] Still, +enumeration yields results which are necessary for the construction of +formulæ relating to groups. But the operation is restricted to those +cases in which it is possible to know all the units of a given species +lying within given limits, for it is performed by first ticking off, +then adding. Before undertaking a retrospective enumeration, therefore, +it will be well to make sure that the documents are complete enough to +exhibit all the units which are to be enumerated. As to figures given in +documents, they are to be distrusted. + +(3) _Valuation_ is a kind of incomplete enumeration applying to a +portion of the field, and made on the supposition that the same +proportions hold good through the whole of the field. It is an expedient +to which, in history, it is often necessary to have recourse when +documents are unequally abundant for the different divisions of the +subject. The result is open to doubt, unless we are sure that the +portion to which enumeration was applied was exactly similar to the +remainder. + +(4) _Sampling_ is a process of enumeration restricted to a few units +taken at different points in the field of investigation; we calculate +the proportion of cases (say 90 per cent.) where a given characteristic +occurs, we assume that the same proportion holds throughout, and if +there are several categories we obtain the proportion between them. In +history this procedure is applicable to facts of every kind, for the +purpose of determining either the proportion between the different forms +or usages which occur within a given region or period, or the proportion +which obtains, within a heterogeneous group, between members belonging +to different classes. This procedure gives us an approximate idea of the +frequency of facts and the proportion between the different elements of +a society; it can even show what species of facts are most commonly +found together, and are therefore probably connected. But in order that +the method may be employed correctly it is necessary that the samples +should be representative of the whole, and not of a part which might +possibly be exceptional in character. They should therefore be chosen at +very different points, and under very different conditions, in order +that the exceptions may compensate each other. It is not enough to take +them at points which are _distant_ from each other; for example, on the +different frontiers of a country, for the very circumstance of +situation on a frontier is an exceptional condition. Verification may be +had by following the methods by which anthropologists obtain averages. + +(5) _Generalisation_ is only an instinctive process of simplification. +As soon as we perceive a certain characteristic in an object, we extend +this characteristic to all other objects which at all resemble it. In +all human concerns, where the facts are always complex, we make +generalisations unconsciously; we attribute to a whole people the habits +of a few individuals, or those of the first group forming part of the +people which comes within our knowledge; we extend to a whole period +habits which are ascertained to have existed at a given moment. This is +the most active of all the causes of historical error, and one whose +influence is felt in every department, in the study of usages and of +institutions, even in the appreciation of the morality of a people.[206] +Generalisation rests on a vague idea that all facts which are contiguous +to each other, or which resemble each other in some point, are similar +at all points. It is an unconscious and ill-performed process of +sampling. It may therefore be made correct by being subjected to the +conditions of a well-performed process of sampling. We must examine the +cases on which we propose to found a generalisation and ask ourselves. +What right have we to generalise? That is, what reason have we for +assuming that the characteristic discovered in these cases will occur in +the remaining thousands of cases? that the cases chosen resemble the +average? The only valid reason would be that these cases are +representative of the whole. We are thus brought back to the process of +methodical sampling. + +The right method of conducting the operation is as follows: (1) We must +fix the precise limits of the field within which we intend to generalise +(that is, to assume the similarity of all the cases), we must determine +the country, the group, the class, the period as to which we are to +generalise. Care must be taken not to make the field too large by +confusing a part with the whole (a Greek or Germanic people with the +whole Greek or Germanic race). (2) We must make sure that the facts +lying within the field resemble each other in the points on which we +wish to generalise, and therefore we have to distrust those vague names +under which are comprehended groups of very different character +(Christians, French, Aryans, Romans). (3) We must make sure that the +facts from which we propose to generalise are representative samples, +that they really belong to the field of investigation, for it does +happen sometimes that men or facts are taken as specimens of one group +when they really belong to another. Nor must they be exceptional, as is +to be presumed in all cases when the conditions are exceptional; authors +of documents tend to record by preference those facts which surprise +them, hence exceptional cases occupy in documents a space which is out +of proportion to their real number; this is one of the chief sources of +error. (4) The number of samples necessary to support a generalisation +is the greater the less ground there is for supposing a resemblance +between all the cases occurring within the field of investigation. A +small number may suffice in treating of points in which men tend to bear +a strong resemblance to each other, either by imitation and convention +(language, rites, ceremonies), or from the influence of custom and +obligatory regulations (social institutions, political institutions in +countries where the authorities are obeyed). A large number is requisite +for facts where individual initiative plays a more important part (art, +science, morality), and sometimes, as in respect of private conduct, all +generalisation is as a rule impossible. + + +VI. Descriptive formulæ are in no science the final result of the work. +It still remains to group the facts in such a way as to bring out their +collective import, it still remains to search for their mutual +relations; these are the general conclusions. History, by reason of the +imperfection of its mode of acquiring knowledge, needs, in addition, a +preliminary operation for determining the bearing of the knowledge +acquired.[207] + +The work of criticism has supplied us with nothing but a number of +isolated remarks on the value of the knowledge which the documents have +permitted us to acquire. These must be combined. We shall therefore take +a whole group of facts entered under a common heading--a particular +class of facts, a country, a period, an event--and we shall summarise +the results yielded by the criticism of particular facts so as to obtain +a general formula. We shall have to take into consideration: (1) the +extent, (2) the value of our knowledge. + +(1) We shall ask ourselves what are the blanks left by the documents. By +working through the scheme used for the grouping of facts it is easy to +discover what are the classes of facts on which we lack information. In +the case of evolution, we notice which links are missing in the chain of +successive modifications; in the case of events, what episodes, what +groups of actors are still unknown to us; what facts enter or disappear +from the field of our knowledge without our being able to trace their +beginning or end. We ought to construct, mentally at any rate, a +tabulated scheme of the points on which we are ignorant, in order to +keep before our minds the distance separating the knowledge we have from +a perfect knowledge. + +(2) The value of our knowledge depends on the value of our documents. +Criticism has given us indications on this point in each separate case, +these indications, so far as relating to a given body of facts, must be +summarised under a few heads. Does our knowledge come originally from +direct observation, from written tradition, or from oral tradition? Do +we possess several traditions of different bias, or a single tradition? +Do we possess documents of different classes or of one single class? Is +our information vague or precise, detailed or summary, literary or +positive, official or confidential? + +The natural tendency is to forget, in construction, the results yielded +by criticism, to forget the incompleteness of our knowledge and the +elements of doubt in it. An eager desire to increase to the greatest +possible extent the amount of our information and the number of our +conclusions impels us to seek emancipation from all negative +restrictions. We thus run a great risk of using fragmentary and +suspicious sources of information for the purpose of forming general +impressions, just as if we were in possession of a complete record. It +is easy to forget the existence of those facts which the documents do +not describe (economic facts, slaves in antiquity), it is easy to +exaggerate the space occupied by facts which are known to us (Greek art, +Roman inscriptions, mediæval monasteries). We instinctively estimate the +importance of facts by the number of the documents which mention them. +We forget the peculiar character of the documents, and, when they all +have a common origin, we forget that they have all subjected the facts +to the same distortions, and that their community of origin renders +verification impossible; we submissively reproduce the bias of the +tradition (Roman, orthodox, aristocratic). + +In order to resist these natural tendencies, it is enough to pass in +review the whole body of facts and the whole body of tradition, before +attempting to draw any general conclusion. + + +VII. Descriptive formulæ give the particular character of each small +group of facts. In order to obtain a general conclusion, we must combine +these detailed results into a general formula. We must not compare +together isolated details or secondary characteristics,[208] but groups +of facts which resemble each other in a whole set of characteristics. + +We thus form an aggregate (of institutions, of groups of men, of +events). Following the method indicated above, we determine its +distinguishing characteristics, its extent, its duration, its quantity +or importance. + +As we form groups of greater and greater generality we drop, with each +new degree of generality, those characteristics which vary, and retain +those which are common to all the members of the new group. We must stop +at the point where nothing is left except the characteristics common to +the whole of humanity. The result is the condensation into a single +formula of the general character of an order of facts, of a language, a +religion, an art, an economic organisation, a society, a government, a +complex event (such as the Invasion or the Reformation). + +As long as these comprehensive formulæ remain isolated the conclusion is +incomplete. And as it is no longer possible to fuse them into higher +generalisations, we feel the need of comparing them for the purpose of +classification. This classification may be attempted by two methods. + +(1) We may compare together similar categories of special facts, +language, religions, arts, governments, taking them from the whole of +humanity, and classifying together those which most resemble each other. +We obtain families of languages, religions, and governments, which we +may again classify and arrange among themselves. This is an abstract +kind of classification; it isolates one species of facts from all the +others, and thus renounces all claim to exhibit causes. It has the +advantage of being rapidly performed and of yielding a technical +vocabulary which is useful for designating facts. + +(2) We may compare real groups of real individuals, we may take +societies which figure in history and classify them according to their +similarities. This is a concrete classification analogous to that of +zoology, in which, not functions, but whole animals are classified. It +is true that the groups are less clearly marked than in zoology; nor is +there a general agreement as to the characteristics in respect of which +we are to look for resemblances. Are we to choose the economic or the +political organisation of the groups, or their intellectual condition? +No principle of choice has as yet become obligatory. + +History has not yet succeeded in establishing a scientific system of +comprehensive classification. Possibly human groups are not sufficiently +homogeneous to furnish a solid basis of comparison, and not sharply +enough divided to be treated as comparable units. + + +VIII. The study of the relations between simultaneous facts consists in +a search for the connections between all the facts of different species +which occur in a given society. We have a vague consciousness that the +different habits which are separated by abstraction and ranged under +different categories (art, religion, political institutions), are not +isolated in reality, that they have common characteristics, and that +they are closely enough connected for a change in one of them to bring +about a change in another. This is a fundamental idea of the _Esprit des +Lois_ of Montesquieu. This bond of connection, sometimes called +_consensus_, has received the name of _Zusammenhang_ from the German +school. From this conception has arisen the theory of the _Volksgeist_ +(the mind of a people), a counterfeit of which has within the last few +years been introduced into France under the name of "âme nationale." +This conception is also at the bottom of the theory regarding the soul +of society which Lamprecht has expounded. + +After the rejection of these mystical conceptions there remains a vague +but incontrovertible fact, the "solidarity" which exists between the +different habits of one and the same people. In order to study it with +precision it would be necessary to analyse it, and a connecting bond +cannot be analysed. It is thus quite natural that this part of social +science should have remained a refuge for mystery and obscurity. + +By the comparison of different societies which resemble or differ from +each other in a given department (religion or government), with the +object of discovering in what other departments they resemble or differ +from each other, it is possible that interesting empirical results might +be obtained. But, in order to _explain_ the _consensus_, it is necessary +to work back to the facts which have produced it, the common causes of +the various habits. We are thus obliged to undertake the investigation +of causes, and we enter the province of what is called _philosophical_ +history, because it investigates what was formerly called the +_philosophy_ of facts--that is to say, their permanent relations. + + +IX. The necessity of rising above the simple determination of facts in +order to _explain_ them by their _causes_, a necessity which has +governed the development of all the sciences, has at length been felt +even in the study of history. Hence have arisen systematic philosophies +of history, and attempts to discover historical laws and causes. We +cannot here enter into a critical examination of these attempts, which +the nineteenth century has produced in so great number; we shall merely +indicate what are the ways in which the problem has been attacked, and +what obstacles have prevented a scientific solution from being reached. + +The most natural method of explanation consists in the assumption that a +transcendental cause, Providence, guides the whole course of events +towards an end which is known to God.[209] This explanation can be but a +metaphysical doctrine, crowning the work of science; for the +distinguishing feature of science is that it only studies efficient +causes. The historian is not called upon to investigate the first cause +or final causes any more than the chemist or the naturalist. And, in +fact, few writers on history nowadays stop to discuss the theory of +Providence in its theological form. + +But the tendency to explain historical facts by transcendental causes +survives in more modern theories in which metaphysic is disguised under +scientific forms. The historians of the nineteenth century have been so +strongly influenced by their philosophical education that most of them, +sometimes unconsciously, introduce metaphysical formulæ into the +construction of history. It will be enough to enumerate these systems, +and point out their metaphysical character, so that reflecting +historians may be warned to distrust them. + +The theory of the rational character of history rests on the notion that +every real historical fact is at the same time "rational"--that is, in +conformity with an intelligible comprehensive plan; ordinarily it is +tacitly assumed that every social fact has its _raison d'être_ in the +development of society--that is, that it ends by turning to the +advantage of society; hence the cause of every institution is sought for +in the social need it was originally meant to supply.[210] This is the +fundamental idea of Hegelianism, if not with Hegel, at least with the +historians who have been his disciples (Ranke, Mommsen, Droysen, in +France Cousin, Taine, and Michelet). This is a lay disguise of the old +theological theory of final causes which assumes the existence of a +Providence occupied in guiding humanity in the direction of its +interests. This is a consoling, but not a scientific _a priori_ +hypothesis; for the observation of historical facts does not indicate +that things have always happened in the most rational way, or in the way +most advantageous to men, nor that institutions have had any other cause +than the interest of those who established them; the facts, indeed, +point rather to the opposite conclusion. + +From the same metaphysical source has also sprung the Hegelian theory of +the _ideas_ which are successively realised in history through the +medium of successive peoples. This theory, which has been popularised in +France by Cousin and Michelet, has had its day, even in Germany, but it +has been revived, especially in Germany, in the form of the historical +mission (_Beruf_) which is attributed to peoples and persons. It will +here be enough to observe that the very metaphors of "idea" and +"mission" imply a transcendental anthropomorphic cause. + +From the same optimistic conception of a rational guidance of the world +is derived the theory of the continuous and necessary _progress_ of +humanity. Although it has been adopted by the positivists, this is +merely a metaphysical hypothesis. In the ordinary sense of the word, +"progress" is merely a subjective expression denoting those changes +which follow the direction of our preferences. But, even taking the word +in the objective sense given to it by Spencer (an increase in the +variety and coordination of social phenomena), the study of historical +facts does not point to a _single_ universal and continuous progress of +humanity, it brings before us a _number_ of partial and intermittent +progressive movements, and it gives us no reason to attribute them to a +permanent cause inherent in humanity as a whole rather than to a series +of local accidents.[211] + +Attempts at a more scientific form of explanation have had their origin +in the special branches of history (of languages, religion, law). By the +separate study of the succession of facts of a single species, +specialists have been enabled to ascertain the regular recurrence of the +same successions of facts, and these results have been expressed in +formulæ which are sometimes called laws (for example, the law of the +tonic accent); these are never more than empirical laws which merely +indicate successions of facts without explaining them, for they do not +reveal the efficient cause. But specialists, influenced by a natural +metaphor, and struck by the regularity of these successions, have +regarded the evolution of usages (of a word, a rite, a dogma, a rule of +law), as if it were an organic development analogous to the growth of a +plant; we hear of the "life of words," of the "death of dogmas," of the +"growth of myths." Then, in forgetfulness of the fact that all these +things are pure abstractions, it has been tacitly assumed that there is +a force inhering in the word, the rite, the rule, which produces its +evolution. This is the theory of the development (_Entwickelung_) of +usages and institutions; it was started in Germany by the "historical" +school, and has dominated all the special branches of history. The +history of languages alone has succeeded in shaking off its +influence.[212] Just as usages have been treated as if they were +existences possessing a separate life of their own, so the succession of +individuals composing the various bodies within a society (royalty, +church, senate, parliament) has been personified by the attribution to +it of a will, which is treated as an active cause. A world of imaginary +beings has thus been created behind the historical facts, and has +replaced Providence in the explanation of them. For our defence against +this deceptive mythology a single rule will suffice: Never seek the +causes of an historical fact without having first expressed it +concretely in terms of acting and thinking individuals. If abstractions +are used, every metaphor must be avoided which would make them play the +part of living beings. + +By a comparison of the evolutions of the different species of facts +which coexist in one and the same society, the "historical" school was +led to the discovery of solidarity (_Zusammenhang_).[213] But, before +attempting to discover its causes by analysis, the adherents of this +school assumed the existence of a permanent general cause residing in +the society itself. And, as it was customary to personify society, a +special temperament was attributed to it, the peculiar genius of the +nation or the race, manifesting itself in the different social +activities and explaining their solidarity.[214] This was simply an +hypothesis suggested by the animal world, in which each species has +permanent characteristics. It would have been inadequate, for in order +to explain how a given society comes to change its character from one +epoch to another (the Greeks between the seventh and the fourth +centuries, the English between the fifteenth and the nineteenth), it +would have been necessary to invoke the aid of external causes. And the +theory is untenable, for all the societies known to history are groups +of men without anthropological unity and without common hereditary +characteristics. + +In addition to these metaphysical or metaphorical explanations, attempts +have been made to apply to the investigation of causes in history the +classical procedure of the natural sciences: the comparison of parallel +series of successive phenomena in order to discover those which always +appear together. The "comparative method" has assumed several different +forms. Sometimes the subject of study has been a detail of social life +(a usage, an institution, a belief, a rule), defined in abstract terms; +its evolutions in different societies have been compared with a view to +determine the common evolution which is to be attributed to one and the +same general cause. Thus have arisen comparative philology, mythology, +and law. It has been proposed (in England) to give precision to the +comparative method by applying "statistics"; this would mean the +systematic comparison of all known societies and the enumeration of all +the cases where two usages are found together. This is the principle of +Bacon's tables of agreement; it is to be feared that it will be no more +fertile in results. The defect of all such methods is that they apply to +abstract and partly arbitrary notions, sometimes merely to verbal +resemblances, and do not rest on a knowledge of the whole of the +conditions under which the facts occur. + +We can conceive a more concrete method which, instead of comparing +fragments, should compare wholes, that is entire societies, either the +same society at different stages of its evolution (England in the +sixteenth, and again in the nineteenth century), or else the general +evolution of several societies, contemporary with each other (England +and France), or existing at different epochs (Rome and England). Such a +method might be useful negatively, for the purpose of ascertaining that +a given fact is not the necessary effect of another, since they are not +always found together (for example, the emancipation of women and +Christianity). But positive results are hardly to be expected of it, for +the concomitance of two facts in several series does not show whether +one is the cause of the other, or whether both are joint effects of a +single cause. + +The methodical investigation of the causes of a fact requires an +analysis of the conditions under which the fact occurs, performed so as +to isolate the necessary condition which is its cause; it presupposes, +therefore, the complete knowledge of these conditions. But this is +precisely what we never have in history. We must therefore renounce the +idea of arriving at causes by direct methods such as are used in the +other sciences. + +As a matter of fact, however, historians often do employ the notion of +cause, which, as we have shown above, is indispensable for the purpose +of formulating events and constructing periods. They know causes partly +from the authors of documents who observed the facts, partly from the +analogy of the causes which we all observe at the present day. The whole +history of events is a chain of obviously and incontrovertibly connected +incidents, each one of which is the determining cause of another. The +lance-thrust of Montgomery is the cause of the death of Henry II.; this +death is the cause of the accession to power of the Guises, which again +is the cause of the rising of the Protestants. + +The observation of causes by the authors of documents is limited to the +interconnection of the accidental facts observed by them; these are, in +truth, the causes which are known with the greatest certainty. Thus +history, unlike the other sciences, is better able to ascertain the +causes of particular incidents than those of general transformations, +for the work is found already done in the documents. + +In the investigation of the causes of general facts, historical +construction is reduced to the analogy between the past and the present. +Whatever chance there is of finding the causes which explain the +evolution of past societies must lie in the direct observation of the +transformations of present societies. + +This is a branch of study which is not yet firmly established; here we +can only state the principles of it. + +(1) In order to ascertain the causes of the solidarity between the +different habits of one and the same society, it is necessary to look +beyond the abstract and conventional form which the facts assume in +language (dogma, rule, rite, institution), and attend to the real +concrete centres, which are always thinking and acting men. Here only +are found together the different species of activity which language +separates by abstraction. Their solidarity is to be sought for in some +dominating feature in the character or the environment of the men which +influences all the different manifestations of their activity. We must +not expect the same degrees of solidarity in all the species of +activity; there will be most of it in those species where each +individual is in close dependence on the actions of the mass (economic, +social, political life); there will be less of it in the intellectual +activities (arts, sciences), where individual initiative has freer +play.[215] Documents mention most habits (beliefs, customs, +institutions) in the lump, without distinguishing individuals; and yet, +in one and the same society, habits vary considerably from one man to +another. It is necessary to take account of these differences, otherwise +there is a danger of explaining the actions of artists and men of +science by the beliefs and the habits of their prince or their +tradesmen. + +(2) In order to ascertain the causes of an evolution, it is necessary to +study the only beings which can evolve--men. Every evolution has for its +cause a change in the material conditions or in the habits of certain +men. Observation shows us two kinds of change. In the one case, the men +remain the same, but change their manner of acting or thinking, either +voluntarily through imitation, or by compulsion. In the other, the men +who practised the old usage disappear and are replaced by others who do +not practise it; these may be strangers, or they may be the descendants +of the first set of men, but educated in a different manner. This +renewing of the generations seems, in our day, to be the most active +cause of evolution. It is natural to suppose that the same holds good of +the past; evolution has been slower, the more exclusively each +generation has been formed by the imitation of its forerunners. + +There is still one more question to ask. Are men all alike, differing +merely in the _conditions_ under which they live (education, resources, +government), and is evolution produced solely by changes in these +_conditions_? Or are there groups of men with _hereditary differences_, +born with tendencies to different activities and with aptitudes leading +to different evolutions, so that evolution may be the product, in part +at least, of the increase, the diminution, and the displacement of these +groups? Taking the extreme cases, the white, black, and yellow races of +mankind, the differences in aptitude are obvious; no black people has +ever developed a civilisation. It is thus probable that smaller +hereditary differences may have had their share in the determination of +events. If so, historical evolution would be partly produced by +physiological and anthropological causes. But history provides us with +no sure means of determining the action of these hereditary differences +between men; it goes no further than the conditions of their existence. +The last question of history remains insoluble by historical methods. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +EXPOSITION + + +We have still to study a question whose practical interest is obvious: +What are the forms in which historical works present themselves? These +forms are, in fact, very numerous. Some of them are antiquated; not all +are legitimate; the best have their drawbacks. We should ask, therefore, +not only what are the forms in which historical works appear, but also +which of these represent truly rational types of exposition. + +By "historical works" we mean here all those which are intended to +communicate results obtained by the labour of historical construction, +whatever may be the nature, the extent, and the bearing of these +results. The critical elaboration of documents, which is treated of in +Book II., and which is preparatory to historical construction, is +naturally excluded. + +Historians may differ, and up to the present have differed, on several +essential points. They have not always had, nor have they all now, the +same conception of the end aimed at by historical work; hence arise +differences in the nature of the facts chosen, the manner of dividing +the subject, that is, of co-ordinating the facts, the manner of +presenting them, the manner of proving them. This would be the place to +indicate how "the mode of writing history" has evolved from the +beginning. But as the history of the modes of writing history has not +yet been written well,[216] we shall here content ourselves with some +very general remarks on the period prior to the second half of the +nineteenth century, confining ourselves to what is strictly necessary +for the understanding of the present situation. + + +I. History was first conceived as the narration of memorable events. To +preserve the memory and propagate the knowledge of glorious deeds, or of +events which were of importance to a man, a family, or a people; such +was the aim of history in the tune of Thucydides and Livy. In addition, +history was early considered as a collection of precedents, and the +knowledge of history as a practical preparation for life, especially +political life (military and civil). Polybius and Plutarch wrote to +instruct, they claimed to give recipes for action. Hence in classical +antiquity the subject-matter of history consisted chiefly of political +incidents, wars, and revolutions. The ordinary framework of historical +exposition (within which the facts were usually arranged in +chronological order) was the life of a person, the whole life of a +people, or a particular period in it; there were in antiquity but few +essays in general history. As the aim of the historian was to please or +to instruct, or to please and instruct at the same time, history was a +branch of literature: there were not too many scruples on the score of +proofs; those who worked from written documents took no care to +distinguish the text of such documents from their own text; in +reproducing the narratives of their predecessors they adorned them with +details, and sometimes (under pretext of being precise) with numbers, +with speeches, with reflections, and elegances. We can in a manner see +them at work in every instance where it is possible to compare Greek and +Roman historians, Ephorus and Livy, for example, with their sources. + +The writers of the Renaissance directly imitated the ancients. For them, +too, history was a literary art with apologetic aims or didactic +pretensions. In Italy it was too often a means of gaining the favour of +princes, or a theme for declamations. This state of affairs lasted a +long time. Even in the seventeenth century we find, in Mézeray, an +historian of the ancient classical pattern. + +However, in the historical literature of the Renaissance, two novelties +claim our attention, in which the mediæval influence is incontrovertibly +manifest. On the one hand we see the retention of a form of exposition +which was unusual in antiquity, which was created by the Catholic +historians of the later ages (Eusebius, Orosius), and which enjoyed +great favour in the Middle Ages,--that which, instead of embracing only +the history of a single man, family, or people, embraces universal +history. On the other hand there was introduced a mechanical artifice of +exposition, having its origin in a practice common in the mediæval +schools (the gloss), which had far-reaching consequences. The custom +arose of adding notes to printed books of history.[217] Notes have made +it possible to distinguish between the historical narrative and the +documents which support it, to give references to sources, to +disencumber and illustrate the text. It was in collections of documents, +and in critical dissertations, that the artifice of annotation was first +employed; thence it penetrated, slowly, into historical works of other +classes. + +A second period begins in the eighteenth century. The "philosophers" +then began to conceive history as the study, not of events for their own +sakes, but of the habits of men. They were thus led to take an interest, +not only in facts of a political order, but in the evolution of the +arts, the sciences, of industry, and in manners. Montesquieu and +Voltaire personified these tendencies. The _Essai sur les moeurs_ is +the first sketch, and, in some respects, the masterpiece of history thus +conceived. The detailed narration of political and military events was +still regarded as the main work of history, but to this it now became +customary to add, generally by way of supplement or appendix, a sketch +of the "progress of the human mind." The expression "history of +civilisation" appears before the end of the eighteenth century. At the +same time German university professors, especially at Göttingen, were +creating, in order to supply educational needs, the new form of the +historical "manual," a methodical collection of carefully justified +facts, with no literary or other pretensions. Collections of historical +facts, made with a view to aid in the interpretation of literary texts, +or out of mere curiosity in regard to the things of the past, had +existed from ancient times; but the medleys of Athenæus and Aulus +Gellius, or the vaster and better arranged compilations of the Middle +Ages and the Renaissance, are by no means to be compared with the +"scientific manuals" of which the German professors then gave the +models. These professors, moreover, contributed towards the clearing up +of the vague, general notion which the philosophers had of +"civilisation," for they applied themselves to the organisation of the +history of languages, of literatures, of the arts, of religions, of law, +of economic phenomena, and so on, as so many separate branches of study. +Thus the domain of history was greatly enlarged, and scientific, that +is, simple and objective, exposition began to compete with the +rhetorical or sententious, patriotic or philosophical ideals of +antiquity. + +This competition was at first timid and obscure, for the beginning of +the nineteenth century was marked by a literary renaissance which +renovated historical literature. Under the influence of the romantic +movement historians sought for more vivid methods of exposition than +those employed by their predecessors, methods better adapted to strike +the imagination and rouse the emotions of the public, by filling the +mind with poetical images of vanished realities. Some endeavoured to +preserve the peculiar colouring of the original documents, which they +adapted: "Charmed with the contemporary narratives," says Barante, "I +have endeavoured to write a consecutive account which should borrow from +them their animation and interest." This leads directly to the neglect +of criticism, and to the reproduction of whatever is effective from the +literary point of view. Others declared that the facts of the past ought +to be recounted with all the emotions of a spectator. "Thierry," says +Michelet, praising him, "in telling us the story of Klodowig, breathes +the spirit and shows the emotion of recently invaded France...." +Michelet "stated the problem of history as the resuscitation of integral +life in the inmost parts of the organism." With the romantic historians +the choice of subject, of plan, of the proofs, of the style, is +dominated by an engrossing desire to produce an effect--a literary, not +a scientific ambition. Some romantic historians have slid down this +inclined plane to the level of the "historical novel." We know the +nature of this species of literature, which flourished so vigorously +from the Abbé Barthélemy and Chateaubriand down to Mérimée and Ebers, +and which some are now vainly attempting to rejuvenate. The object is to +"make the scenes of the past live again" in dramatic pictures +artistically constructed with "true" colours and details. The obvious +object of the method is that it does not provide the reader with any +means of distinguishing between the elements borrowed from the +documents and the imaginary elements, not to mention the fact that +generally the documents used are not all of the same origin, so that +while the colour of each stone may be "true" that of the mosaic is +false. Dezobry's _Rome au siècle d'Auguste_, Augustin Thierry's _Récits +mérovingiens_, and other "pictures" produced at the same epoch were +constructed on the same principle, and are subject to the same drawbacks +as the historical novels properly so-called.[218] + +We may summarise what precedes by saying that, up to about 1850, history +continued to be, both for historians and the public, a branch of +literature. An excellent proof of this lies in the fact that up till +then historians were accustomed to publish new editions of their works, +at intervals of several years, without making any change in them, and +that the public tolerated the practice. Now every scientific work needs +to be continually recast, revised, brought up to date. Scientific +workers do not claim to give their works an immutable form, they do not +expect to be read by posterity or to achieve personal immortality; it is +enough for them if the results of their researches, corrected, it may +be, and possibly transformed by subsequent researches, should be +incorporated in the fund of knowledge which forms the scientific +heritage of mankind. No one reads Newton or Lavoisier; it is enough for +their glory that their labours should have contributed to the +production of works by which their own have been superseded, and which +will be, sooner or later, superseded in their turn. It is only works of +art that enjoy perpetual youth. And the public is well aware of the +fact; no one would ever think of studying natural history in Buffon, +whatever his opinion might be of the merits of this stylist. But the +same public is quite ready to study history in Augustin Thierry, in +Macaulay, in Carlyle, in Michelet, and the books of the great writers +who have treated historical subjects are reprinted, fifty years after +the author's death, in their original form, though they are manifestly +no longer on a level with current knowledge. It is clear that, for many, +form counts before matter in history, and that an historical work is +primarily, if not exclusively, a work of art.[219] + + +II. It is within the last fifty years that the scientific forms of +historical exposition have been evolved and settled, in accordance with +the general principle that the aim of history is not to please, nor to +give practical maxims of conduct, nor to arouse the emotions, but +knowledge pure and simple. + +We begin by distinguishing between (1) monographs and (2) works of a +general character. + +(1) A man writes a monograph when he proposes to elucidate a special +point, a single fact, or a limited body of facts, for example the whole +or a portion of the life of an individual, a single event or a series of +events between two dates lying near together. The types of possible +subjects of a monograph cannot be enumerated, for the subject-matter of +history can be divided indefinitely, and in an infinite number of ways. +But all modes of division are not equally judicious, and, though the +reverse has been maintained, there are, in history as in all the +sciences, subjects which it would be stupid to treat in monographs, and +monographs which, though well executed, represent so much useless +labour.[220] Persons of moderate ability and no great mental range, +devoted to what is called "curious" learning, are very ready to occupy +themselves with insignificant questions;[221] indeed, for the purpose of +making a first estimate of an historian's intellectual power, a fairly +good criterion may be had in the list of the monographs he has +written.[222] It is the gift of seeing the important problems, and the +taste for their treatment, as well as the power of solving them, which, +in all the sciences, raise men to the first rank. But let us suppose the +subject has been rationally chosen. Every monograph, in order to be +useful--that is, capable of being fully turned to account--should +conform to three rules: (1) in a monograph every historical fact derived +from documents should only be presented accompanied by a reference to +the documents from which it is taken, and an estimate of the value of +these documents;[223] (2) chronological order should be followed as far +as possible, because this is the order in which we know that the facts +occurred, and by which we are guided in searching for causes and +effects; (3) the title of the monograph must enable its subject to be +known with exactitude: we cannot protest too strongly against those +incomplete or fancy titles which so unnecessarily complicate +bibliographical searches. A fourth rule has been laid down; it has been +said "a monograph is useful only when it exhausts the subject"; but it +is quite legitimate to do temporary work with documents which one has at +one's disposal, even when there is reason to believe that others exist, +provided always that precise notice is given as to what documents have +been employed. + +Any one who has tact will see that, in a monograph, the apparatus of +demonstration, while needing to be complete, ought to be reduced to what +is strictly necessary. Sobriety is imperative; all parading of erudition +which might have been spared without inconvenience is odious.[224] In +history it often happens that the best executed monographs furnish no +other result than the proof that knowledge is impossible. It is +necessary to resist the desire which leads some to round off with +subjective, ambitious, and vague conclusions monographs which will not +bear them.[225] The proper conclusion of a good monograph is the +balance-sheet of the results obtained by it and the points left +doubtful. A monograph made on these principles may grow antiquated, but +it will not fall to pieces, and its author will never need to blush for +it. + +(2) Works of a general character are addressed either to students or to +the general public. + +_A._ General works intended principally for students and specialists now +appear in the form of "repertories," "manuals," and "scientific +histories." In a repertory a number of verified facts belonging to a +given class are collected and arranged in an order which makes it easy +to refer to them. If the facts thus collected have precise dates, +chronological order is adopted: thus the task has been undertaken of +compiling "Annals" of German history, in which the summary entry of the +events, arranged by dates, is accompanied by the texts from which the +events are known, with accurate references to the sources and the works +of critics; the collection of the _Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte_ +has for its object the elucidation, as far as is possible, of the facts +of German history, including all that is susceptible of scientific +discussion and proof, but omitting all that belongs to the domain of +appreciation and general views. When the facts are badly dated, or are +simultaneous, alphabetical arrangement must be employed; thus we have +Dictionaries: dictionaries of institutions, biographical dictionaries, +historical encyclopædias, such as the _Realencyclopædie_ of +Pauly-Wissowa. These alphabetical repertories are, in theory, just as +the _Jahrbücher_, collections of proved facts; if, in practice, the +references in them are less rigorous, if the apparatus of texts +supporting the statements is less complete, the difference is without +justification.[226] _Scientific manuals_ are also, properly speaking, +repertories, since they are collections in which established facts are +arranged in systematic order, and are exhibited objectively, with their +proofs, and without any literary adornment. The authors of these +"manuals," of which the most numerous and the most perfect specimens +have been composed in our days in the German universities, have no +object in view except to draw up minute inventories of the acquisitions +made by knowledge, in order that workers may be enabled to assimilate +the results of criticism with greater ease and rapidity, and may be +furnished with starting-points for new researches. Manuals of this kind +now exist for most of the special branches of the history of +civilisation (languages, literature, religion, law, _Alterthümer_, and +so on), for the history of institutions, for the different parts of +ecclesiastical history. It will suffice to mention the names of +Schoemann, of Marquardt and Mommsen, of Gilbert, of Krumbacher, of +Harnack, of Möller. These works are not marked by the dryness of the +majority of the primitive "manuals," which were published in Germany a +hundred years ago, and which were little more than tables of subjects, +with references to the books and documents to be consulted; in the +modern type the exposition and discussion are no doubt terse and +compact, but yet not abbreviated beyond a point at which they may be +tolerated, even preferred by cultivated readers. They take away the +taste for other books, as G. Paris very well says:[227] "When one has +feasted on these substantial pages, so full of facts, which, with all +their appearance of impersonality, yet contain, and above all suggest, +so many thoughts, it is difficult to read books, even books of +distinction, in which the subject is cut up symmetrically to fit in with +a preconceived system, is coloured by fancy, and is, so to speak, +presented to us in disguise, books in which the author continually comes +between us and the spectacle which he claims to make intelligible to us, +but which he never allows us to see." The great historical "manuals," +uniform with the treatises and manuals of the other sciences (with the +added complication of authorities and proofs), ought to be, and are, +continually improved, emended, corrected, brought up to date: they are, +by definition, works of science and not of art. + +The earliest repertories and the earliest scientific "manuals" were +composed by isolated individuals. But it was soon recognised that a +single man cannot correctly arrange, or have the proper mastery over a +vast collection of facts. The task has been divided. Repertories are +executed, in our days, by collaborators in association (who are +sometimes of different nationalities and write in different languages). +The great manuals (of I. von Müller, of G. Gröber, of H. Paul, and +others) are collections of special treatises each written by a +specialist. The principle of collaboration is excellent, but on +condition (1) that the collective work is of a nature to be resolved +into great independent, though co-ordinated, monographs; (2) that the +section entrusted to each collaborator has a certain extent; if the +number of collaborators is too great and the part of each too limited, +the liberty and the responsibility of each are diminished or disappear. + +_Histories_, intended to give a narrative of events which happened but +once, and to state the general facts which dominate the whole course of +special evolutions, still have a reason for existence, even after the +multiplication of methodical manuals. But scientific methods of +exposition have been introduced into them, as into monographs and +manuals, and that by imitation. The reform has consisted, in every case, +in the renunciation of literary ornaments and of statements without +proof. Grote produced the first model of a "history" thus defined. At +the same time certain forms which once had a vogue have now fallen into +disuse: this is the case with the "Universal Histories" with continuous +narrative, which were so much liked, for different reasons, in the +Middle Ages and in the eighteenth century; in the present century +Schlosser and Weber in Germany, Cantù in Italy, have produced the last +specimens of them. This type has been abandoned for historical reasons, +because we have ceased to regard humanity as a whole, bound together by +a single evolution; and for practical reasons, because we have +recognised the impossibility of collecting so overwhelming a mass of +facts in a single work. The Universal Histories which are still +published in collaboration (the Oncken collection is the best type of +them), are, like the great manuals, composed of independent sections, +each treated by a different author; they are publishers' combinations. +Historians have in our days been led to adopt the division by states +(national histories) and by epochs.[228] + +_B._ There is in theory no reason why historical works intended +principally for the public should not be conceived in the same spirit as +works designed for students and specialists, nor why they should not be +composed in the same manner, apart from simplifications and omissions +which readily suggest themselves. And, in fact, there are in existence +succinct, substantial, and readable summaries, in which no statement is +advanced which is not tacitly supported by solid references, in which +the acquisitions of science are precisely stated, judiciously +explained, their significance and value clearly brought out. The French, +thanks to their natural gifts of tact, dexterity, and accuracy of mind, +excel, as a rule, in this department. There have been published in our +country review-articles and works of higher popularisation in which the +results of a number of original works have been cleverly condensed, in a +way that has won the admiration of the very specialists who, by their +heavy monographs, have rendered these works possible. Nothing, however, +is more dangerous than popularisation. As a matter of fact, most works +of popularisation do not conform to the modern ideal of historical +exposition; we frequently find in them survivals of the ancient ideal, +that of antiquity, the Renaissance, and the romantic school. + +The explanation is easy. The defects of the historical works designed +for the general public--defects which are sometimes enormous, and have, +with many able minds, discredited popular works as a class--are the +consequences of the insufficient preparation or of the inferior literary +education of the "popularisers." + +A populariser is excused from original research; but he ought to know +everything of importance that has been published on his subject, he +ought to be up to date, and to have thought out for himself the +conclusions reached by the specialists. If he has not personally made a +special study of the subject he proposes to treat, he must obviously +read it up, and the task is long. For the professional populariser there +is a strong temptation to study superficially a few recent monographs, +to hastily string together or combine extracts from them, and, in order +to render this medley more attractive, to deck it out, as far as is +possible, with "general ideas" and external graces. The temptation is +all the stronger from the circumstance that most specialists take no +interest in works of popularisation, that these works are, in general, +lucrative, and that the public at large is not in a position to +distinguish clearly between honest and sham popularisation. In short, +there are some, absurd as it may seem, who do not hesitate to summarise +for others what they have not taken the trouble to learn for themselves, +and to teach that of which they are ignorant. Hence, in most works of +historical popularisation, there inevitably appear blemishes of every +kind, which the well-informed always note with pleasure, but with a +pleasure in which there is some touch of bitterness, because they alone +can see these faults: unacknowledged borrowings, inexact references, +mutilated names and texts, second-hand quotations, worthless hypotheses, +imprudent assertions, puerile generalisations, and, in the enunciation +of the most false or the most debatable opinions, an air of tranquil +authority.[229] + +On the other hand, men whose information is all that could be desired, +whose monographs intended for specialists are full of merit, sometimes +show themselves capable, when they write for the public, of grave +offences against scientific method. The Germans are habitual offenders: +consider Mommsen, Droysen, Curtius, and Lamprecht. The reason is that +these authors, when they address the public, wish to produce an effect +upon it. Their desire to make a strong impression leads them to a +certain relaxation of scientific rigour, and to the old rejected habits +of ancient historiography. These men, scrupulous and minute as they are +when they are engaged in establishing details, abandon themselves, in +their exposition of general questions, to their natural impulses, like +the common run of men. They take sides, they censure, they extol; they +colour, they embellish; they allow themselves to be influenced by +personal, patriotic, moral, or metaphysical considerations. And, over +and above all this, they apply themselves, with their several degrees of +talent, to the task of producing works of art; in this endeavour those +who have no talent make themselves ridiculous, and the talent of those +who have any is spoilt by their preoccupation with the effect they wish +to produce. + +Not, let it be well understood, that "form" is of no importance, or +that, provided he makes himself intelligible, the historian has a right +to employ incorrect, vulgar, slovenly, or clumsy language. A contempt +for rhetoric, for paste diamonds and paper flowers, does not exclude a +taste for a pure and strong, a terse and pregnant style. Fustel de +Coulanges was a good writer, although throughout his life he recommended +and practised the avoidance of metaphor. On the contrary we see no harm +in repeating[230] that the historian, considering the extreme complexity +of the phenomena he undertakes to describe, is under an obligation not +to write badly. But he should write _consistently_ well, and never +bedeck himself with finery. + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +I. History is only the utilisation of documents. But it is a matter of +chance whether documents are preserved or lost. Hence the predominant +part played by chance in the formation of history. + +The quantity of documents in existence, if not of known documents, is +given; time, in spite of all the precautions which are taken nowadays, +is continually diminishing it; it will never increase. History has at +its disposal a limited stock of documents; this very circumstance limits +the possible progress of historical science. When all the documents are +known, and have gone through the operations which fit them for use, the +work of critical scholarship will be finished. In the case of some +ancient periods, for which documents are rare, we can now see that in a +generation or two it will be time to stop. Historians will then be +obliged to take refuge more and more in modern periods. Thus history +will not fulfil the dream which, in the nineteenth century, inspired the +romantic school with so much enthusiasm for the study of history: it +will not penetrate the mystery of the origin of societies; and, for want +of documents, the beginnings of the evolution of humanity will always +remain obscure. + +The historian does not collect by his own observation the materials +necessary for history as is done in the other sciences: he works on +facts the knowledge of which has been transmitted by former observers. +In history knowledge is not obtained, as in the other sciences, by +direct methods, it is indirect. History is not, as has been said, a +science of observation, but a science of reasoning. + +In order to use facts which have been observed under unknown conditions, +it is necessary to apply criticism to them, and criticism consists in a +series of reasonings by analogy. The facts as furnished by criticism are +isolated and scattered; in order to organise them into a structure it is +necessary to imagine and group them in accordance with their +resemblances to facts of the present day, an operation which also +depends on the use of analogies. This necessity compels history to use +an exceptional method. In order to frame its arguments from analogy, it +must always combine the knowledge of the particular conditions under +which the facts of the past occurred with an understanding of the +general conditions under which the facts of humanity occur. Its method +is to draw up special _tables_ of the facts of an epoch in the past, and +to apply to them sets of _questions_ founded on the study of the +present. + +The operations which must necessarily be performed in order to pass from +the inspection of documents to the knowledge of the facts and evolutions +of the past are very numerous. Hence the necessity of the division and +organisation of labour in history. It is requisite, on the one hand, +that those specialists who occupy themselves with the search for +documents, their restoration and preliminary classification, should +co-ordinate their efforts, in order that the preparatory work of +critical scholarship may be finished as soon as possible, under the best +conditions as to accuracy and economy of labour. On the other hand, +authors of partial syntheses (monographs) designed to serve as materials +for more comprehensive syntheses ought to agree among themselves to work +on a common method, in order that the results of each may be used by the +others without preliminary investigations. Lastly, workers of experience +should be found to renounce personal research and devote their whole +time to the study of these partial syntheses, in order to combine them +scientifically in comprehensive works of historical construction. And if +the result of these labours were to bring out clear and certain +conclusions as to the nature and the causes of social evolution, a truly +scientific "philosophy of history" would have been created, which +historians might acknowledge as legitimately crowning historical +science. + +Conceivably a day may come when, thanks to the organisation of labour, +all existing documents will have been discovered, emended, arranged, and +all the facts established of which the traces have not been destroyed. +When that day comes, history will be established, but it will not be +fixed: it will continue to be gradually modified in proportion as the +direct study of existing societies becomes more scientific and permits a +better understanding of social phenomena and their evolution; for the +new ideas which will doubtless be acquired on the nature, the causes, +and the relative importance of social facts will continue to transform +the ideas which will be formed of the societies and events of the +past.[231] + + +II. It is an obsolete illusion to suppose that history supplies +information of practical utility in the conduct of life (_Historia +magistra vitæ_), lessons directly profitable to individuals and peoples; +the conditions under which human actions are performed are rarely +sufficiently similar at two different moments for the "lessons of +history" to be directly applicable. But it is an error to say, by way of +reaction, that "the distinguishing feature of history is to be good for +nothing."[232] It has an indirect utility. + +History enables us to understand the present in so far as it explains +the origin of the existing state of things. Here we must admit that +history does not offer an equal interest through the whole extent of +time which it covers; there are remote generations whose traces are no +longer visible in the world as it now is; for the purpose of explaining +the political constitution of contemporary England, for example, the +study of the Anglo-Saxon witangemot is without value, that of the events +of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is all-important. The +evolution of the civilised societies has within the last hundred years +been accelerated to such a degree that, for the understanding of their +present form, the history of these hundred years is more important than +that of the ten preceding centuries. As an explanation of the present, +history would almost reduce to the study of the contemporary period. + +History is also indispensable for the completion of the political and +social sciences, which are still in process of formation; for the direct +observation of social phenomena (in a state of rest) is not a sufficient +foundation for these sciences--there must be added a study of the +development of these phenomena in time, that is, their history.[233] +This is why all the sciences which deal with man (linguistic, law, +science of religions, political economy, and so on) have in this century +assumed the form of historical sciences. + +But the chief merit of history is that of being an instrument of +intellectual culture; it is so in several ways. Firstly, the practice +of the historical method of investigation, of which the principles have +been sketched in the present volume, is very hygienic for the mind, +which it cures of credulity. Secondly, history, by exhibiting to us a +great number of differing societies, prepares us to understand and +tolerate a variety of usages; by showing us that societies have often +been transformed, it familiarises us with variation in social forms, and +cures us of a morbid dread of change. Lastly, the contemplation of past +evolutions, which enables us to understand how the transformations of +humanity are brought about by changes of habits and the renewal of +generations, saves us from the temptation of applying biological +analogies (selection, struggle for existence, inherited habits, and so +on) to the explanation of social evolution, which is not produced by the +operation of the same causes as animal evolution. + + + + +APPENDICES + + + + +APPENDIX I + +THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE + + +I. The teaching of history is a recent addition to secondary education. +Formerly history was taught to the sons of kings and great persons, in +order to give them a preparation in the art of governing, according to +the ancient tradition, but it was a sacred science reserved for the +future rulers of states, a science for princes, not for subjects. The +secondary schools which have been organised since the sixteenth century, +ecclesiastical or secular, Catholic or Protestant, did not admit history +into their plan of study, or only admitted it as an appendage to the +study of the ancient languages. This was the tradition of the Jesuits in +France; it was adopted by the University of Napoleon. + +History was only introduced into secondary education in the nineteenth +century, under the pressure of public opinion; and although it has been +allotted more space in France than in England, or even in Germany, it +has continued to be a subsidiary subject, not taught in a special class +(as philosophy is), nor always by a special professor, and counting for +very little in examinations. + +Historical instruction has for a long time felt the effects of the +manner in which it was introduced. The subject was imposed by the +authorities on teachers trained exclusively in the study of literature, +and could find no suitable place in a system of classical education +based on the study of forms, and indifferent to the knowledge of social +phenomena. History was taught because it was prescribed by the +programme; but this programme, the sole motive and guide of the +instruction, was always an accident, and varied with the preferences, or +even the personal studies of those who framed it. History formed part of +the social conventions; there are, it was said, names and facts "of +which it is not permissible to be ignorant"; but the things of which +ignorance was not permitted varied greatly, from the names of the +Merovingian kings and the battles of the Seven Years' War to the Salic +Law and the work of Saint Vincent de Paul. + +The improvised staffs which, in order to carry out the programme, had to +furnish impromptu instruction in history, had no clear idea either of +the reasons for such instruction, or of its place in general education, +or of the technical methods necessary for giving it. With this lack of +tradition, of pedagogic preparation, and even of mechanical aids, the +professor of history found himself carried back to the ages before +printing, when the teacher had to supply the pupil with all the facts +which formed the subject-matter of instruction, and he adopted the +mediæval procedure. Armed with a note-book in which he had written down +the list of facts to be taught, he read it out to the pupils, sometimes +making a pretence of extemporising; this was the "lesson," the +corner-stone of historical instruction. The whole series of lessons, +determined by the programme, formed the "course." The pupil was expected +to write as he listened (this was called "taking notes") and to compose +a written account of what he had heard (this was the _rédaction_). But +as the pupils were not taught how to take notes, nearly all of them were +content to write very rapidly, from the professor's dictation, a rough +draft, which they copied out at home in the form of a _rédaction_, +without any endeavour to grasp the meaning either of what they heard or +what they transcribed. To this mechanical labour the most zealous added +extracts copied from books, generally with just as little reflection. + +In order to get the facts judged essential into the pupils' heads, the +professor used to make a very short version of the lesson, the "summary" +or "abstract," which he dictated openly, and caused to be learnt by +heart. Thus of the two written exercises which occupied nearly the whole +time of the class, one (the summary) was an overt dictation, the other +(the _rédaction_) an unavowed dictation. + +The only means adopted to check the pupils' work was to make them repeat +the summary word for word, and to question them on the _rédaction_, that +is to make them repeat approximately the words of the professor. Of the +two oral exercises one was an overt, the other an unavowed repetition. + +It is true the pupil was given a book, the _Précis d'histoire_,[234] but +this book had the same form as the professor's course, and instead of +serving as a basis for the oral instruction, merely duplicated it, and, +as a rule, duplicated it badly, for it was not intelligible to the +pupil. The authors of these text-books,[235] adopting the traditional +methods of "abridgments," endeavoured to accumulate the greatest +possible number of facts by omitting all their characteristic details +and summarising them in the most general, and therefore vague, +expressions. In the elementary books nothing was left but a residue of +proper names and dates connected by formulæ of a uniform type; history +appeared as a series of wars, treaties, reforms, revolutions, which only +differed in the names of peoples, sovereigns, fields of battle, and in +the figures giving the years.[236] + +Such, down to the end of the Second Empire, was historical instruction +in all French institutions, both secular and ecclesiastical--with a few +exceptions, whose merit is measured by their rarity, for in those days a +professor of history needed a more than common share of energy and +initiative to rise above the routine of _rédaction_ and summary. + + +II. In recent times the general movement of educational reform, which +began in the Department and the Faculties, has at last extended to +secondary instruction. The professors of history have been emancipated +from the jealous supervision which weighed on their teaching under the +government of the Empire, and have taken the opportunity to make trial +of new methods. A system of historical pedagogy has been devised. It has +been revealed with the approbation of the Department in the discussions +of the society for the study of questions of secondary education, in the +_Revue de l'enseignement secondaire_, and in the _Revue universitaire_. +It has received official sanction in the _Instructions_ appended to the +programme of 1890; the report on history, the work of M. Lavisse, has +become the charter which protects the professors who favour reform in +their struggle against tradition.[237] + +Historical instruction will no doubt issue from this crisis of +renovation organised and provided with a rational pedagogic and +technical system, such as is possessed by the older branches of +instruction in languages, literature, and philosophy. But it is only to +be expected that the reform should be much slower than in the case of +the higher instruction. The _personnel_ is much more numerous, and takes +longer to train or to renew; the pupils are less zealous and less +intelligent; the routine of the parents opposes to the new methods a +force of inertia which is unknown to the Faculties; and the +Baccalaureate, that general obstacle to all reform, is particularly +mischievous in its effect on historical instruction, which it reduces to +a set of questions and answers. + + +III. It is now possible, however, to indicate what is the direction in +which historical instruction is likely to develop in France[238] and the +questions which will need to be solved for the purpose of introducing a +rational technical system. Here we shall endeavour to formulate these +questions in a methodical table. + +(1) _General Organisation._--What object should historical instruction +aim at? What services can it render to the culture of the pupil? What +influence can it have upon his conduct? What facts ought it to enable +him to understand? And, consequently, what principles ought to guide the +choice of subjects and methods? Ought the instruction to be spread over +the whole duration of the classes, or should it be concentrated in a +special class? Should it be given in one-hour or two-hour classes? +Should history be distributed into several cycles, as in Germany, so as +to cause the pupil to return several times to the same subject at +different periods of his studies? Or should it be expounded in a single +continuous course, beginning with the commencement of study, as in +France? Should the professor give a complete course, or should he select +a few questions and leave the pupil to study the others by himself? +Should he expound the facts orally, or should he require the pupils to +learn them in the first instance from a book, so as to make the course a +series of explanations? + +(2) _Choice of Subjects._--What proportion should be observed between +home and foreign history? between ancient and contemporary history? +between the special branches of history (art, religion, customs, +economics) and general history? between institutions or usages, and +events? between the evolution of material usages, intellectual history, +social life, political life? between the study of particular incidents, +of biography, of dramatic episodes, and the study of the interconnection +of events and general evolutions? What place should be assigned to +proper names and dates? Should we profit by the opportunities afforded +by legends to arouse the critical spirit? or should we avoid legends? + +(3) _Order._--In what order should the subjects be attacked? Should +instruction begin with the most ancient periods and the countries with +the most ancient civilisations in order to follow chronological order +and the order of evolution? or should it begin with the periods and the +countries which are nearest to us so as to proceed from the better known +to the less known? In the exposition of each period, should the +chronological, geographical, or logical order be followed? Should the +teacher begin by describing conditions or by narrating events? + +(4) _Methods of Instruction._--Should the pupil be given general formulæ +first or particular images? Should the professor state the formulæ +himself or require the pupil to search for them? Should formulæ be +learnt by heart? In what cases? How are images of historical facts to be +produced in the pupils' minds? What use is to be made of engravings? of +reproductions and restorations? of imaginary scenes? What use is to be +made of narratives and descriptions? of authors' texts? of historical +novels? To what extent ought words and formulæ to be quoted? How are +facts to be localised? What use is to be made of chronological tables? +of synchronical tables? of geographical sketches? of statistical and +graphic tables? What is the way to make comprehensible the character of +events and customs? the motives of actions? the conditions of customs? +How are the episodes of an event to be chosen? and the examples of a +custom? How is the interconnection of facts and the process of evolution +to be made intelligible? What use is to be made of comparison? What +style of language is to be employed? To what extent should concrete, +abstract, and technical terms be used? How is it to be verified that the +pupil has understood the terms and assimilated the facts? Can exercises +be organised in which the pupil may do original work on the facts? What +instruments of study should the pupil have? How should school-books be +compiled, with a view to giving the pupil practice in original work? + +For the purpose of stating and justifying the solutions of all these +problems, a special treatise would not be too much.[239] Here we shall +merely indicate the general principles on which a tolerable agreement +seems to have been now reached in France. + +We no longer go to history for lessons in morals, nor for good examples +of conduct, nor yet for dramatic or picturesque scenes. We understand +that for all these purposes legend would be preferable to history, for +it presents a chain of causes and effects more in accordance with our +ideas of justice, more perfect and heroic characters, finer and more +affecting scenes. Nor do we seek to use history, as is done in Germany, +for the purpose of promoting patriotism and loyalty; we feel that it +would be illogical for different persons to draw opposite conclusions +from the same science according to their country or party; it would be +an invitation to every people to mutilate, if not to alter, history in +the direction of its preferences. We understand that the value of every +science consists in its being true, and we ask from history truth and +nothing more.[240] + +The function of history in education is perhaps not yet clearly apparent +to all those who teach it. But all those who reflect are agreed to +regard it as being principally an instrument of social culture. The +study of the societies of the past causes the pupil to understand, by +the help of actual instances, what a society is; it familiarises him +with the principal social phenomena and the different species of usages, +their variety and their resemblances. The study of events and evolutions +familiarises him with the idea of the continual transformation which +human affairs undergo, it secures him against an unreasoning dread of +social changes; it rectifies his notion of progress. All these +acquisitions render the pupil fitter for public life; history thus +appears as an indispensable branch of instruction in a democratic +society. + +The guiding principle of historical pedagogy will therefore be to seek +for those subjects and those methods which are best calculated to +exhibit social phenomena and give an understanding of their evolution. +Before admitting a fact into the plan of instruction, it should be asked +first of all what educational influence it can exercise; secondly, +whether there are adequate means of bringing the pupil to see and +understand it. Every fact should be discarded which is instructive only +in a low degree, or which is too complicated to be understood, or in +regard to which we do not possess details enough to make it +intelligible. + + +IV. To make rational instruction a reality it is not enough to develop a +theory of historical pedagogy. It is necessary to renew the material +aids and the methods. + +History necessarily involves the knowledge of a great number of facts. +The professor of history, with no resources but his voice, a blackboard, +and abridgments which are little better than chronological tables, is in +much the same situation as a professor of Latin without texts or +dictionary. The pupil in history needs a repertory of historical facts +as the Latin pupil needs a repertory of Latin words; he needs +collections of _facts_, and the school text-books are mostly collections +of _words_. + +There are two vehicles of facts, engravings and books. Engravings +exhibit material objects and external aspects, they are useful +principally for the study of material civilisation. It is some time +since the attempt was first made in Germany to put in the hands of the +pupil a collection of engravings arranged for the purposes of historical +instruction. The same need has, in France, produced the _Album +historique_, which is published under the direction of M. Lavisse. + +The book is the chief instrument. It ought to contain all the +characteristic features necessary for forming mental representations of +the events, the motives, the habits, the institutions studied; it will +consist principally in narratives and descriptions, to which +characteristic sayings and formulæ may be appended. For a long time it +was endeavoured to construct those books out of extracts selected from +ancient authors; they were compiled in the form of collections of +texts.[241] Experience seems to indicate that this method must be +abandoned; it has a scientific appearance, it is true, but is not +intelligible to children. It is better to address pupils in contemporary +language. It is in this spirit that, pursuant to the _Instructions_ of +1890,[242] collections of _Historical Readings_ have been compiled, of +which the most important has been published by the firm of Hachette. + +The pupils' methods of work still bear witness to the late introduction +of historical teaching. In most historical classes methods still prevail +which only exercise the pupils' receptivity: the course of lectures, the +summary, reading, questioning, the _rédaction_, the reproduction of +maps. It is as if a Latin pupil were to confine himself to repeating +grammar-lessons and extracts from authors, without ever doing +translation or composition. + +In order that the teaching may make an adequate impression, it is +necessary, if not to discard all these passive methods, at least to +supplement them by exercises which call out the activity of the pupil. +Some such exercises have already been experimented with, and others +might be devised.[243] The pupil may be set to analyse engravings, +narratives, and descriptions in such a way as to bring out the character +of the facts: the short written or oral analysis will guarantee that he +has seen and understood, it will be an opportunity to inculcate the +habit of using only precise terms. Or the pupil may be asked to furnish +a drawing, a geographical sketch, a synchronical table. He may be +required to draw up tables of comparison between different societies, +and tables showing the interconnection of facts. + +A book is needed to supply the pupil with the materials for these +exercises. Thus the reform of methods is connected with the reform of +the instruments of work. Both reforms will progress according as the +professors and the public perceive more clearly the part played by +historical instruction in social education. + + + + +APPENDIX II + +THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE + + +The higher teaching of history has been in a great measure transformed, +in our country, within the last thirty years. The process has been +gradual, as it ought to have been, and has consisted in a succession of +slight modifications. But although a rational continuity has been +observed in the steps taken, the great number of these steps has not +failed, in these last days, to astonish, and even to offend, the public. +Public opinion, to which appeal has been made in favour of reforms, has +been somewhat surprised by being appealed to so often, and perhaps it is +not superfluous to indicate here, once more, the general significance +and the inner logic of the movement which we are witnessing. + + +I. Before the last years of the Second Empire, the higher teaching of +the historical sciences was organised in France on no coherent +system.[244] + +There were chairs of history in different institutions, of different +types: at the Collège de France, in the Faculties of Letters, and in the +"special schools," such as the École normale supérieure and the École +des chartes. + +The Collège de France was a relic of the institutions of the _ancien +régime_. It was founded in the sixteenth century in opposition to the +scholastic Sorbonne, to be a refuge for the new sciences, and had the +glorious privilege of representing historically the higher speculative +studies, the spirit of free inquiry, and the interests of pure science. +Unfortunately, in the domain of the historical sciences, the Collège de +France had allowed its traditions to be obliterated up to a certain +point. The great men who taught history in this illustrious institution +(J. Michelet, for example), were not technical experts, nor even men of +learning, in the proper sense of the word. The audiences which they +swayed by their eloquence were not composed of students of history. + +The Faculties of Letters formed part of a system established by the +Napoleonic legislator. This legislator, in creating the Faculties, by no +means entertained the design of encouraging scientific research. He had +no great love for science. The Faculties of Law, of Medicine, and so on, +were intended by him to be professional schools supplying society with +the lawyers, physicians, and so on, which it needs. But three of the +five Faculties were unable, from the beginning, to perform the part +allotted them, while the other two, Law and Medicine, successfully +performed theirs. The Faculties of Catholic Theology did not train the +priests needed by society, because the State consented to the education +of the priests being conducted in the diocesan seminaries. The Faculties +of Sciences and of Letters did not train the professors for secondary +education, the engineers, and so on, needed by society, because they +were here met by the triumphant competition of "special schools" +previously instituted: the École normale, the École polytechnique. The +Faculties of Catholic Theology, of Sciences, and of Letters were +therefore obliged to justify their existence by other modes of activity. +In particular, the professors of history in the Faculties of Letters +could not undertake the instruction of the young men who were destined +to teach history in the _lycées_. Deprived of these special pupils, they +found themselves in a situation analogous to that of those charged with +historical instruction at the Collège de France. They too were not, as a +rule, technical experts. For half a century they carried on the work of +higher popularisation in lectures delivered to large audiences of +leisured persons (since much abused), who were attracted by the force, +the elegance, and the pleasing style of their diction. + +The function of training the future teachers for secondary education was +reserved for the École normale supérieure. Now at this epoch it was an +admitted principle that to be a good secondary teacher it is necessary +for a man to know, and sufficient to know perfectly, the subject he is +charged to teach. The one is certainly necessary, but the other is not +sufficient: knowledge of a different, of a higher, order is no less +indispensable than the regular "scholastic" equipment. At the École +there was never any question of such higher knowledge, but, in +accordance with the prevailing theory, preparation was made for +secondary teaching simply by imparting it. However, as the École normale +has always been excellently recruited, the system in vogue has not +prevented it from numbering among its former pupils men of the first +order, not only as professors, thinkers, or writers, but even as +critical scholars. But it must be recognised that they made their way +for themselves, in spite of the system, not thanks to it, after, not +during, their pupilage, and principally when they had the advantage, +during a stay at the French School at Athens, of the wholesome contact +with documents which they had not enjoyed at the Rue d'Ulm. "Does it not +seem strange," it has been said, "that so many generations of professors +should have been turned out by the École normale incapable of utilising +documents?... Formerly, in short, students of history, on leaving the +École, were not prepared either to teach history, which they had learned +in a great hurry, or to investigate difficult questions."[245] + +As for the École des chartes, which was founded under the Restoration, +it was, from a certain point of view, a special school like the others, +designed in theory to train those useful functionaries, archivists and +librarians. But professional instruction was early reduced to a strict +minimum, and the École des chartes was organised on a very original +plan, with a view to provide a rational and complete apprenticeship for +the young men who proposed to study mediæval French history. The pupils +of the École des chartes did not follow any course of "mediæval +history," but they learnt all that is necessary for doing work on the +solution of the still open questions of mediæval history. Here alone, in +virtue of an accidental anomaly, the subjects which are preliminary and +auxiliary to historical research were systematically taught. We have +already had occasion to note the effects of this circumstance.[246] + +This was the state of affairs when, towards the end of the Second +Empire, a vigorous reform movement set in. Some young Frenchmen had +visited Germany; they had been struck by the superiority of the German +university system over the Napoleonic system of Faculties and special +schools. Certainly France, with its defective organisation, had produced +many men and many works, but it now began to be held that "in all kinds +of enterprises the least possible part should be left to chance," and +that "when an institution proposes to train professors of history and +historians, it ought to supply them with the means of becoming what it +intends them to be." + +M. V. Duruy, minister of Public Education, supported the partisans of a +renaissance of the higher studies. But he did not think it practicable +to interfere, for the purpose either of remodelling, of fusing, or of +suppressing them, with the existing institutions,--the Collège de +France, the Faculties of Letters, the École normale supérieure, the +École des chartes, all of which were consecrated by the services they +had rendered, and by the lustre they received from the eminent men who +had been, or were, connected with them. He changed nothing, he added. He +crowned the somewhat heterogeneous edifice of existing institutions by +the creation of an "École pratique des hautes études," which was +established at the Sorbonne in 1868. + +The École pratique des hautes études (historical and philological +section) was intended by those who founded it to prepare young men for +research of a scientific character. It was not meant to be subservient +to the interests of the professions, and there was to be no +popularisation. Students were not to go there to learn the results +obtained by science, but, for the same purpose which takes the chemical +student to the laboratory, to be initiated into the technical methods by +which new results can be obtained. Thus the spirit of the new +institution was not without some analogy to that of the primitive +tradition of the Collège de France. It was endeavoured to do there, for +all the branches of universal history and philology, what had long been +done at the École des chartes for the limited domain of French mediæval +history. + + +II. As long as the Faculties of Letters were satisfied to be as they +were (that is, without students), and as long as their ambition did not +go beyond their traditional functions (the holding of public lectures, +the conferring of degrees), the organisation of the higher teaching of +the historical sciences in France remained in the condition which we +have described. When the Faculties of Letters began to seek a new +justification for their existence and new functions, changes became +inevitable. + +This is not the place to explain why and how the Faculties of Letters +were led to desire to work more actively, or rather in other ways than +in the past, for the promotion of the historical sciences. M. V. Duruy, +in inaugurating the École des hautes études at the Sorbonne, had +declared that this young and vigorous plant would thrust asunder the old +stones; and, without a doubt, the spectacle of the fruitful activity of +the École des hautes études has contributed not a little to awaken the +conscience of the Faculties. On the other hand the liberality of the +public authorities, which have increased the _personnel_ of the +Faculties, which have built palaces for them, and liberally endowed them +with the materials required by their work, has imposed new duties on +these privileged institutions. + +It is about twenty-five years since the Faculties of Letters began to +transform themselves, and during this period their progressive +transformation has occasioned changes in the whole fabric of the higher +teaching of historical science in France, which up to that time had +remained unshaken, even by the ingenious addition of 1868. + + +III. The first care of the Faculties was to provide themselves with +students. This was not, to be sure, the main difficulty, for the École +normale supérieurs (in which twenty pupils are admitted every year, +chosen from among hundreds of candidates) was no longer sufficient for +the recruiting of the now numerous body of professors engaged in +secondary education. Many young men who had been candidates (along with +the pupils of the École normale supérieure) for the degrees which give +access to the scholastic profession, were thrown on their own resources. +Here was an assured supply of students. At the same time the military +laws, by attaching much-prized immunities to the title of _licencié ès +lettres_, were calculated to attract to the Faculties, if they prepared +students for the licentiate, a large and very interesting class of young +men. Lastly, the foreigners (so numerous at the École des hautes +études), who come to France to complete their scientific education, and +who up to that time were surprised to have no opportunity of profiting +by the Faculties, were sure to go to them as soon as they found there +something analogous to what they had been accustomed to find in the +German universities, and the kind of instruction they wanted. + +Before students in any great number could be taught the way to the +Faculties, great efforts were necessary and several years passed; but it +was after the Faculties obtained the students they desired that the real +problems presented themselves for solution. + +The great majority of the students in the Faculties of Letters have been +originally candidates for degrees, for the licentiate, and for +_agrégation_, who entered with the avowed intention of "preparing" for +the licentiate and for _agrégation_. The Faculties have not been able to +escape the obligation of helping them in this "preparation." But, twenty +years ago, examinations were still conceived in accordance with ancient +formulæ. The licentiate was an attestation of advanced secondary study, +a kind of "higher baccalaureate"; for the _agrégation_ in the classes of +history and geography (which became the real _licentia docendi_), the +candidates were required to show that they "had a very good knowledge of +the subjects they would be charged to teach." Henceforth there was a +danger lest the teaching of the Faculties, which must, like that of the +École normale supérieure, be preparatory for the examinations for the +licentiate and for _agrégation_, should be compelled by the force of +circumstances to assume the same character. Note that a certain +emulation could not fail to arise between the pupils of the École +normale and those of the Faculties in the competitions for _agrégation_. +The _agrégation_ programmes being what they were, this emulation seemed +likely to have the result of engaging the rival teachers and students +more and more in school work, not of a scientific kind, equally devoid +of dignity and real utility. + +The danger was very serious. It was perceived from the first by those +clear-sighted promoters of the reform of the Faculties, MM. A. Dumont, +L. Liard, E. Lavisse. M. Lavisse wrote in 1884: "To maintain that the +Faculties have for their chief object the preparation for examinations +is to substitute drill for scientific culture: this is the serious +grievance which able men have against the partisans of innovation.... +The partisans of innovation reply that they have seen the drawbacks of +the new departure from the beginning, but that they are convinced that a +modification of the examination-system will follow the reform of higher +education; that a reconciliation will be found between scientific work +and the preparation for examinations; and that thus the only grievance +their opponents have against them will fall to the ground." It is only +doing justice to the foremost champion of reform to acknowledge that he +was never tired of insisting on the weak point; and in order to convince +oneself that the _examination question_ has always been considered the +key-stone of the problem of the organisation of higher education in +France, it is only necessary to look through the speeches and the +articles entitled "Education and Examinations," "Examinations and +Study," "Study and Examinations," &c., which M. Lavisse has collected in +his three volumes published at intervals of five years from 1885 +onwards: _Questions d'enseignement national, Études et étudiants, A +propos de nos écoles._ + +Thus the question of the reform of the examinations connected with +higher education (licentiate, _agrégation_, doctorate) has been placed +on the order of the day. It was then in 1884; it is still there in 1897. +But, during the interval, visible progress has been made in the +direction which we consider the right one, and now a solution seems +near. + + +IV. The old examination-system required candidates for degrees to show +that they had received an excellent secondary education. As it condemned +those candidates, students receiving higher instruction, to exercises of +the same kind as those of which they had already had their fill in the +_lycées_, it was a simple matter to attack it. It was defended feebly, +and has been demolished. + +But how was it to be replaced? The problem was very complex. Is it any +wonder that it was not solved at a stroke? + +First of all, it was important to come to an agreement on this +preliminary question: What are the capacities and what is the knowledge +students should be required to give proof of possessing? General +knowledge? Technical knowledge and the capacity of doing original +research (as at the École des chartes and the École des hautes études)? +Pedagogic capacity? It came gradually to be recognised that, considering +the great extent and variety of the class from which the students are +drawn, it is necessary to draw distinctions. + +From candidates for the licentiate it is enough to require that they +should give proof of good general culture, permitting them at the same +time, if they wish, to show that they have a taste for, and some +experience in, original research. + +From the candidates for _agrégation_ (_licentia docendi_) who have +already obtained the licentiate, there will be required (1) formal proof +that they know, by experience, what it is to study an historical +problem, and that they have the technical knowledge necessary for such +studies; (2) proof of pedagogic capacity, which is a professional +necessity for this class. + +The students who are not candidates for anything, neither for the +licentiate nor for _agrégation_, and who are simply seeking to obtain +scientific initiation--the old programmes did not contemplate the +existence of such a class of students--will merely be required to prove +that they have profited by the tuition and the advice they have +received. + +This settled, a great stride has been made. For programmes, as we know, +regulate study. By virtue of the authority of the programmes historical +studies in the Faculties will now have the threefold character which it +is desirable that they should have. General culture will not cease to be +held in honour. Technical exercises in criticism and research will have +their legitimate place. Lastly, pedagogy (theoretical and practical) +will not be neglected. + +The difficulties begin when it is attempted to determine the tests +which, in each department, are the best, that is, the most conclusive. +On this subject opinions differ. Though no one now contests the +principles, the modes of application which have hitherto been tried or +suggested do not meet with unanimous approval. The organisation of the +licentiate has been revised three times; the statute relating to the +_agrégation_ in history has been reformed or amended five times. And +this is not the end. New simplifications are imperative. But what is the +importance of this instability--of which, however, complaints begin to +be heard[247]--if it is established, as we believe it is, that progress +towards a better state of things has been continuous through all these +changes, without any notable retrogression? + +There is no need to explain here in detail the different transitory +systems which have been put into practice. We have had occasion to +criticise them elsewhere.[248] Now that most of what we objected to has +been abolished, what is the use of reviving old controversies? We shall +not even mention the points in which the present system seems to us to +be still capable of improvement, for there is reason to hope that it +will soon be modified, and in a very satisfactory manner. Let it suffice +to say that the Faculties now confer a new diploma, the _Diplôme +d'études supérieures_, which all the students have a right to seek, but +which the candidates for _agrégation_ are obliged to obtain. This +diploma of higher studies, analogous to that of the École des hautes +études, the _brevet_ of the École des chartes, and the doctorate in +philosophy at the German universities, is given to those students of +history who, qualified by a certain academical standing, have passed an +examination in which the principal tests are, besides questions on the +"sciences" auxiliary to historical research, the composition and the +defence of an original monograph. Every one now recognises that "the +examination for the diploma of studies will yield excellent fruit, if +the vigilance and conscientiousness of examiners maintain it at its +proper value."[249] + + +V. To sum up, the attractions of preparation for degrees have brought +the Faculties a host of students. But, under the old system of +examinations for the licentiate and for _agrégation_, preparation for +degrees was a task which did not harmonise very well with the work which +the Faculties deemed suitable for themselves, useful to their pupils, +and advantageous to science. The examination-system has therefore been +perseveringly reformed, not without difficulty, into conformity with a +certain ideal of what the higher teaching of history ought to be. The +result is that the Faculties have taken rank among the institutions +which contribute to the positive progress of the historical sciences. An +enumeration of the works which have appeared under their auspices during +the last few years would, if necessary, bear witness to the fact. + +This evolution has already produced satisfactory results, and will +produce more if it goes on as well as it has begun. To begin with, the +transformation of historical instruction in the Faculties has brought +about a corresponding transformation at the École normale supérieure. +The École normale has also, for two years, been awarding a "_Diplôme +d'études_"; original researches, pedagogic exercises, and general +culture are encouraged there in the same degree as by the new Faculties. +It now differs from the Faculties only in being a close institution, +recruited under certain precautions; practically it is a Faculty like +the others, but with a small number of select students. Secondly, the +École des hautes études and the École des chartes, both of which will be +installed at the end of 1897, in the renovated Sorbonne, have still +their justification for existence; for many specialists are represented +at the École des hautes études which are not, and doubtless never will +be, represented in the Faculties; and, in the case of the studies +bearing on mediæval history, the body of converging instruction given at +the École des chartes will always be incomparable. But the old +antagonism between the École des hautes études and the École des chartes +on the one hand, and the Faculties on the other, has disappeared. All +these institutions, lately so dissimilar, will henceforth co-operate for +the purpose of carrying on a common work in a common spirit. Each of +these retains its name, its autonomy, and its traditions; but together +they form a whole: the historical section of an ideal University of +Paris, much vaster than the one which was sanctioned by the law in 1896. +Of this "greater" University, the École des chartes, the École des +hautes études, the École normale supérieure, and the whole body of +historical instruction given by the Faculty of Letters, are now +practically so many independent "_instituts_." + + + + +INDEX OF PROPER NAMES + + +Abd-el-Kader, 282 + +Aimo, 158 + +Alexander the Great, 272 + +Alphonse of Poitiers, 227 + +Altamira, R., 328 + +Anselme, Père, 303 + +Ariovistus, 222 + +Aristophanes, 171 + +Aristotle, 44 + +Athenæus, 300 + + +Bacon, Francis, 291 + +Bancroft, H. H., 19, 20, 22, 31 + +Barthélemy, Abbé, 301 + +Bast, F. J., 78 + +Bédier, J., 85, 112 + +Bernheim, E., 6, 7, 10, 13, 38, 56, 74, 91, 99, 100, 156, 182, 198, +237, 297 + +Blanchère, R., de la, 319 + +Blass, F., 74, 78, 79, 89, 92 + +Bodin, Jean, 44 + +Boeckh, A., 107, 152 + +Böhmer, J. F., 106 + +Bollandists, Society of, 35 + +Bonaventura, St., 88, 90 + +Bouché-Leclercq, A., 158 + +Boucherie, A., 113 + +Bourdeau, L., 275 + +Boutaric, E., 227 + +Boyce, W. B., 1 + +Bréquigny, L. G. O. F. de, 106 + +Broglie, E. de, 29 + +Brugière de Barante, A. G. P., 301 + +Brunetière, F., 113 + +Buchez, P. J. B., 1 + +Bühler, G., 56 + + +Cæsar, Julius, 44, 194, 197, 218, 220, 222, 245 + +Cagnat, R., 57 + +Cantù, C., 311 + +Carlyle, Thomas, 132, 230, 303 + +Champollion, F., 48 + +Charles IX. of France, 168, 186 + +Chasles, M., 88 + +Chateaubriand, F. A. de, 72, 301 + +Chemosh, the god, 212 + +Chérot, H., 7 + +Chevalier, U., 5, 7 + +Chladenius, J. M., 6 + +Cicero, 44, 108 + +Cleopatra, 88, 248 + +Clovis, 158, 220, 223, 301 + +Cobet, C. C., 78 + +Coulanges, Fustel de, 1, 9, 10, 64, 140, 144, +148, 149, 150, 158, 170, 215, 216, 230 + +Cournot, A. A., 246, 249 + +Cousin, V., 286, 287 + +Curtius, G., 230, 314 + + +Daniel, Père, 303 + +Daremberg, C. V., 308 + +Darius Hystaspes, 151 + +Daunou, P. C. F., 5, 6, 43, 47, 54, 55 + +Delisle, L., 23, 97 + +Deloche, J. E. M., 148 + +Demosthenes, 171 + +Dezobry, C. L., 302 + +Droysen, J. G., 3, 5, 7, 10, 106, 156, 158, 286, 314 + +Du Cange, C. du F., 105, 136, 148 + +Dumont, A., 341 + +Duruy, V., 327, 338, 339 + + +Ebers, G., 301 + +Edward VI. of England, 249 + +Egger, E., 108 + +Eginhard, 94 + +Ephorus, 298 + +Eusebius, 298 + + +Feillet, A., 162 + +Feugère, L., 105, 136 + +Fisher, H. A. L., 125 + +Flaubert, G., 5, 32, 304, 319 + +Flint, R., 2, 6, 8, 285 + +France, A., 319 + +Fredegonda, 197 + +Freeman, E. A., 5, 7, 10, 46 + +Froissart, Jean, 19 + +Froude, J. A., 125, 126 + + +Geiger, W., 56 + +Gellius, Aulus, 300 + +Georgisch, P., 106 + +Giannone, Pietro, 104 + +Gibbon, E., 44 + +Gilbert, Gustav, 309 + +Giry, A., 57 + +Glasson, E., 149 + +Goethe, J. W. von, 19, 319 + +Gow, J., 75 + +Graux, C., 123 + +Gregory of Corinth, 78 + +Gregory of Tours, 144, 146, 158, 180, 198, 256 + +Gröber, G., 57, 310 + +Grote, G., 183, 310 + +Grotius, Hugo, 44 + +Guicciardini, Francesco, 44 + +Guiraud, P., 230 + + +Hagen, H., 78 + +Hardouin, Père, 99 + +Harnack, A., 309 + +Havet, Julien, 12, 56, 97, 123, 128 + +Havet, Louis, 12 + +Hauréau, B., 84, 111, 118, 123 + +Hegel, G. W. F., 286 + +Henry VIII. of England, 249 + +Henry II. of France, 292 + +Henry, V., 289 + +Herodotus, 44, 171, 179, 197 + +Horace, 99 + +Hoveden, John, 88 + +Hroswitha, 99 + +Hugo, Victor, 88, 89 + +Hume, D., 44 + + +Jaffé, P., 106 + +Jameson, J. F., 136 + +Jerome, St., 112 + +Jesus Christ, 188 + +Joan of Arc, 188 + +John, King of England, 187 + +Jullian, C., 297 + + +Krumbacher, K., 309 + +Kuhn, E., 56 + + +Lacombe, T., 2, 233, 241, 277, 288 + +Lamprecht, K., 230, 247, 284, 290, 314 + +Langlois, Ch. V., 19, 38, 111, 135, 192, 345 + +Lasch, B., 68 + +Laurent, F., 285 + +Lavisse, E., 134, 328, 333, 337, 341, 342 + +Lavoisier, A. L., 302 + +Leibnitz, G. W., 121, 122 + +Lee, Sidney, 308 + +Le Moyne, Père, 7 + +Lenglet de Fresnoy, N., 6 + +Leonardo da Vinci, 88, 89 + +Liard, L., 335, 341 + +Lindner, T., 81 + +Lindsay, W. M., 78, 79, 84 + +Livy, 44, 178, 180, 233, 297, 298 + +Locke, John, 44 + +Loebell, J. W., 180 + +Lorenz, O., 10 + +Loudun, the nuns of, 208 + +Louis VIII. of France, 187 + +Louis of Granada, 88 + +Luard, H. R., 98 + +Luther, Martin, 203 + + +Mably, G. B. De, 43, 44 + +Macaulay, Lord, 303 + +Macchiavelli, N., 44 + +Madvig, J. N., 78 + +Mariani, L., 4 + +Marquardt, J., 309 + +Marselli, N., 2 + +Mary Magdalene, St., 88 + +Mary, Queen, 249 + +Matthew of Paris, 98 + +Matthew of Westminster, 97 + +Mayr, J. von, 274 + +Mérimée, P., 301 + +Mesha Inscription, the, 212 + +Meusel, H., 148 + +Meyer, E., 158 + +Meyer, P., 29 + +Mézeray, F. E. de, 298 + +Michelet, J., 230, 271, 286, 287, 301, 303, 327, 336 + +Möller, W., 309 + +Mommsen, T., 108, 118, 230, 286, 309, 314 + +Monod, G., 100, 144, 297, 302 + +Montesquieu, C. de S., 44, 257, 284, 299 + +Montfaucon, Père Bernard de, 29 + +Montgomery, Gabriel de, 292 + +Mortet, Ch. and V., 11 + +Mourin, E., 302 + +Müller, I. von, 56, 74, 310 + +Mylaeus, 6 + + +Napoleon I., 26, 282 + +Newton, Isaac, 302 + +Niebuhr, B. G., 158, 182 + +Nietzsche, F., 319 + +Nitzsch, C. W., 180 + + +Oncken, W., 311 + +Orosius, 298 + +Ossian, 91 + +Otto I., 175 + + +Paris, G., 309 + +Patrizzi, Francesco, 6 + +Pattison, Mark, 115 + +Paul, H., 75, 310 + +Pauly, A., 308 + +Pausanias, 74 + +Peckham, John, 88 + +Peiresc, N. F. C. de, 22 + +Pflugk-Harttung, J. von, 10, 130 + +Philippi, A., 129 + +Piaget, A., 91 + +Pisistratus, 207 + +Plato, 153 + +Plutarch, 44, 297 + +Polybius, 44, 279, 297 + +Potthast, A., 106 + +Prou, M., 57 + + +Ranke, L., 140, 286 + +Raynal, J., 44 + +Reinach, S., 75, 79 + +Renan, E., 9, 29, 30, 40, 105, 114, 119, 122, 132, 134, 183 + +Retz, Cardinal de, 44, 162, 169 + +Rilliet, A., 162 + +Robertson, J. M., 115, 241 + +Robertson, W., 44 + +Rocholl, R., 285 + +Rousseau, J. J., 44 + +Rulhière, C. C. de, 44 + + +Saglio, E., 308 + +Saint-Simon, C. H. de, 251 + +Sallust, 44 + +Sanchoniathon, 91 + +Schiller, J. C. F. von, 162 + +Schlosser, F. C., 311 + +Schoemann, G. F., 309 + +Séguier, J. F., 109 + +Seignobos, Ch., 11, 66, 196, 257, 333, 334 + +Seneca, 78 + +Sforza, Ludovico, 282 + +Sickel, T. von, 56 + +Simmel, G., 217 + +Smedt, Père de, 10, 156, 207, 254 + +Spencer, Herbert, 287 + +Stephen, Leslie, 308 + +Stubbe, W., 10 + +Suetonius, 94 + +Suger, Abbot, 170 + +Suidas, 158 + +Sully, M., 169 + +Surville, Clotilde de, 91 + + +Tacitus, 44, 141, 144, 171, 177, 194, 233, 256 + +Taine, H. A., 140, 143, 247, 286 + +Tardif, A., 5, 7, 156 + +Taylor, J., 75 + +Thierry, Augustin, 98, 140, 230, 259, 265, 301, 302, 303 + +Thomas, A., 73 + +Thucydides, 19, 44, 158, 183, 197, 297 + +Tobler, A., 75 + +Tschudi, J. H., 162, 171 + +Turenne, H. de la T. d'A., 162 + + +Vercingetorix, 88 + +Vergil, 84, 99 + +Vertot, R. A. de, 44 + +Villemarqué, H. de, 181 + +Vincent de Paul, St. 326 + +Voltaire, F. M. A. de, 44, 299 + +Vrain-Lucas, 88 + + +Waitz, G., 110, 118 + +Wallace, A. R., 207 + +Waltzing, J. P., 108 + +Wattenbach, W., 73 + +Wauters, A. C., 106 + +Weber, G., 311 + +Wegele, F. X. von, 122, 297 + +Wendover, Roger de, 98 + +Wissowa, G., 308 + +Wittekind, 175 + +Wright, T., 84 + + +Xenophon, 44 + + +Zumpt, A. W., 108 + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] W. B. Boyce, "Introduction to the Study of History, Civil, +Ecclesiastical, and Literary," London, 1894, 8vo. + +[2] For example, P. J. B. Buches, in his _Introduction à la science de +l'histoire_, Paris, 1842, 2 vols. 8vo. + +[3] The history of the attempts which have been made to understand and +explain philosophically the history of humanity has been undertaken, as +is well known, by Robert Flint. Mr. Flint has already given the history +of the Philosophy of History in French-speaking countries: "Historical +Philosophy in France and French Belgium and Switzerland," Edinburgh and +London, 1893, 8vo. It is the first volume of the expanded re-edition of +his "History of the Philosophy of History in Europe," published +twenty-five years ago. Compare the retrospective (or historical) part of +the work of N. Marselli, _La scienza della storia_, i., Torino, 1873. + +The most important original work which has appeared in France since the +publication of the analytical repertory of R. Flint is that of P. +Lacombe, _De l'histoire considérée comme science_, Paris, 1894, 8vo. Cf. +_Revue Critique_, 1895, i. p. 132. + +[4] _Revue Critique d'histoire et de littérature_, 1892, i. p. 164. + +[5] _Revue Critique d'histoire et de littérature_, 1888, ii. p. 295. Cf. +_Le Moyen Age_, x. (1897), p. 91: "These books [treatises on historical +method] are seldom read by those to whom they might be useful, amateurs +who devote their leisure to historical research; and as to professed +scholars, it is from their masters' lessons that they have learnt to +know and handle the tools of their trade, leaving out of consideration +the fact that the method of history is the same as that of the other +sciences of observation, the gist of which can be stated in a few words. + +[6] In accordance with the principle that historical method can only be +taught by example, L. Mariani has given the humorous title _Corso +pratico di metodologia della storia_ to a dissertation on a detail in +the history of Fermo. See the _Archivio della Società romana di storia +patria_, xiii. (1890), p. 211. + +[7] See an account of Freeman's work, "The Methods of Historical Study," +in the _Revue Critique_, 1887, i. p. 376. This work, says the critic, is +empty and commonplace. We learn from it "that history is not so easy a +study as many fondly imagine, that it has points of contact with all the +sciences, and that the historian truly worthy of the name ought to know +everything; that historical certitude is unattainable, and that, in +order to make the nearest approach to it, it is necessary to have +constant recourse to the original sources; that it is necessary to know +and use the best modern historians, but never to take their word for +gospel. That is all." He concludes: Freeman "without a doubt taught +historical method far better by example than he ever succeeded in doing +by precept." + +Compare _Bouvard et Pécuchet_, by G. Flaubert. Here we have two +simpletons who, among other projects, propose to write history. In order +to help them, one of their friends sends them (p. 156) "rules of +criticism taken from the _Cours_ of Daunou," such as: "It is no proof to +appeal to rumour and common opinion; the witnesses cannot appear. Reject +impossibilities: Pausanias was shown the stone swallowed by Saturn. Keep +in mind the skill of forgers, the interest of apologists and +calumniators." Daunou's work contains a number of truisms quite as +obvious, and still more comic than the above. + +[8] Flint (ibid. p. 15) congratulates himself on not having to study the +literature of _Historic_, for "a very large portion of it is so trivial +and superficial that it can hardly ever have been of use even to persons +of the humblest capacity, and may certainly now be safely confined to +kindly oblivion." Nevertheless, Flint has given in his book a summary +list of the principal works of this kind published in French-speaking +countries from the earliest times. A more general and complete account +(though still a summary one) of the literature of this subject in all +countries is furnished by the _Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_ of E. +Bernheim (Leipzig, 1894, 8vo), pp. 143 _sqq._ Flint (who was acquainted +with several works unknown to Bernheim) stops at 1893, Bernheim at 1894. +Since 1889 the _Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft_ have +contained a periodical account of recent works on historical +methodology. + +[9] This seventh volume was published in 1844. But Daunou's celebrated +_Cours_ was delivered at the Collège de France in the years 1819-30. + +[10] The Italians of the Renaissance (Mylæns, Francesco Patrizzi, and +others), and after them the writers of the last two centuries, ask what +is the relation of history to dialectic and rhetoric; to how many laws +the historical branch of literature is subject; whether it is right for +the historian to relate treasons, acts of cowardice, crimes, disorders; +whether history is entitled to use any style other than the sublime; and +so on. The only books on _Historic_, published before the nineteenth +century, which give evidence of any original effort to attack the real +difficulties, are those of Lenglet de Fresnoy (_Méthode pour étudier +l'histoire_, Paris, 1713), and of J. M. Chladenius (_Allgemeine +Geschichtswissenschaft_, Leipzig, 1752). The work of Chladenius has been +noticed by Bernheim (ibid. p. 166). + +[11] He has not always shown even good sense, for, in the _Cours +d'études historiques_ (vii. p. 105), where he treats of a work, _De_ +_l'histoire_, published in 1670 by Père Le Moyne, a feeble production, +to say the least, bearing evident traces of senility, he expresses +himself as follows: "I cannot adopt all the maxims and precepts +contained in this treatise; but I believe that, after that of Lucian, it +is the best we have yet seen, and I greatly doubt whether any of those +whose acquaintance we have still to make has risen to the same height of +philosophy and originality." Père H. Chérot has given a sounder estimate +of the treatise _De l'histoire_ in his _Étude sur la vie et les +oeuvres du P. Le Moyne_ (Paris, 1887, 8vo), pp. 406 _sqq._ + +[12] Bernheim declares, however (ibid. p. 177), that this little work +is, in his opinion, the only one which stands at the present level of +science. + +[13] Flint says very well (ibid. p. 15): "The course of Historic has +been, on the whole, one of advance from commonplace reflection on +history towards a philosophical comprehension of the conditions and +processes on which the formation of historical science depends. + +[14] By P. Guiraud, in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, March 1896, p. 75. + +[15] Renan has said some of the truest and best things that have ever +been said on the historical sciences in _L'Avenir de la science_ (Paris, +1890, 8vo), written in 1848. + +[16] Some of the most ingenious, some of the most logical, and some of +the most widely applicable observations, on the method of the historical +sciences, have so far appeared, not in books on methodology, but in the +reviews--of which the _Revue Critique d'histoire et de littérature_ is +the type--devoted to the criticism of new works of history and +erudition. It is a very useful exercise to run through the file of the +_Revue Critique_, founded, at Paris, in 1867, "to enforce respect for +method, to execute justice upon bad books, to check misdirected and +superfluous work." + +[17] The first edition of the _Lehrbuch_ is dated 1889. + +[18] The best work that has hitherto been published (in French) on +historical method is a pamphlet by MM. Ch. and V. Mortet, _La Science de +l'histoire_ (Paris, 1894, 8vo), 88 pp., extracted from vol. xx. of the +_Grande Encyclopédie_. + +[19] One of us, M. Seignobos, proposes to publish later on a complete +treatise of Historical Methodology, if there appears to be a public for +this class of work. + +[20] It cannot be too often stated that the study of history, as it is +prosecuted at school, does not presuppose the same aptitudes as the same +study when prosecuted at the university or in after life. Julien Havet, +who afterwards devoted himself to the (critical) study of history, found +history wearisome at school. "I believe," says M. L. Havet, "that the +teaching of history [in schools] is not organised in such a manner as to +provide sufficient nourishment for the scientific spirit.... Of all the +studies comprised in our school curricula, history is the only one in +which the pupil is not being continually called upon to verify +something. When he is learning Latin or German, every sentence in a +translation requires him to verify a dozen different rules. In the +various branches of mathematics the results are never divorced from +their proofs; the _problems_, too, compel the pupil to think through the +whole for himself. Where are the _problems_ in history, and what +schoolboy is ever trained to gain by independent effort an insight into +the interconnection of events?" (_Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes_, +1896, p. 84). + +[21] M. Langlois wrote Book I., Book II. as far at Chapter VI., the +second Appendix, and this Preface; M. Seignobos the end of Book II., +Book III., and the first Appendix. Chapter I. in the second book, +Chapter V. of the third book, and the Conclusion, were written in +common. + +[22] In practice one does not as a rule resolve to treat a point of +history before knowing whether there are or are not documents in +existence which enable it to be studied. On the contrary, it is the +accidental discovery of a document which suggests the idea of thoroughly +elucidating the point of history to which it relates, and thus leads to +the collection, for this purpose, of other documents of the same class. + +[23] It is pitiable to see how the best of the early scholars struggled +bravely, but vainly, to solve problems which would not even have existed +for them if their collections had not been so incomplete. This lack of +material was a disadvantage for which the most brilliant ingenuity could +not compensate. + +[24] "How hard it is to gain the means whereby we mount to the sources" +(Goethe, _Faust_, i. 3). + +[25] See C. V. Langlois, _H. H. Bancroft et Cie._, in the _Revue +universitaire_, 1894, i. p. 233. + +[26] The earlier scholars were conscious of the unfavourable character +of the conditions under which they worked. They suffered keenly from the +insufficiency of the instruments of research and the means of +comparison. Most of them made great efforts to obtain information. Hence +these voluminous correspondences between scholars of the last few +centuries, of which our libraries preserve so many precious fragments, +and these accounts of scientific searches, of journeys undertaken for +the discovery of historical documents, which, under the name of _Iter_ +(_Iter Italicum_, _Iter Germanicum_, &c.), were formerly fashionable. + +[27] We may remark, in passing, a delusion which is childish enough but +very natural, and very common among collectors: they all tend to +exaggerate the intrinsic value of the documents they possess, simply +because they themselves are the possessors. Documents have been +published with a sumptuous array of commentaries by persons who had +accidentally acquired them, and who would, quite rightly, have attached +no importance to them if they had met with them in public collections. +This is, we may add, merely a manifestation, in a somewhat crude form, +of a general tendency against which it is always necessary to guard: a +man readily exaggerates the importance of the documents he possesses, +the documents he has discovered, the texts he has edited, the persons +and the questions he has studied. + +[28] See L. Delisle, _Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque +nationale_, Paris, 1868-81, 3 vols. 4to. The histories of ancient +depositories of documents, which have been recently published in +considerable number, have been modelled on this admirable work. + +[29] Many of the ancient documents still in circulation are the proceeds +of ancient thefts from state institutions. The precautions now taken +against a recurrence of such depredations are stringent, and, in nearly +every instance, as effective as could be desired. + +As to modern (printed) documents, the rule of legal deposit [compulsory +presentation of copies to specified libraries], which has now been +adopted by nearly all civilised countries, guarantees their preservation +in public institutions. + +[30] It is known that Napoleon I. entertained the chimerical design of +concentrating at Paris the archives of the whole of Europe, and that, +for a beginning, he conveyed to that city the archives of the Vatican, +the Holy Roman Empire, the crown of Castile, and others, which later on +the French were compelled to restore. Confiscation is now out of the +question. But the ancient archives of the notaries might be centralised +everywhere, as in some countries they are already, in public +institutions. It is not easy to explain why at Paris the departments of +Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Marine preserve ancient papers whose +natural place would be at the Archives Nationales. A great many more +anomalies of this kind might be mentioned, which in certain cases +impede, where they do not altogether preclude, research; for the small +collections, whose existence is not required, are precisely those whose +regulations are the most oppressive. + +[31] The international exchange of documents is worked in Europe +(without charge to the public) by the agency of the various Foreign +Offices. Besides this, most of the great institutions have agreements +with each other for mutual loans; this system is as sure and sometimes +more rapid in its operation than the diplomatic system. The question of +lending original documents for use outside the institution where they +are preserved has of late years been frequently mooted at congresses of +historians and librarians. The results so far obtained are eminently +satisfactory. + +[32] These are sometimes large collections of formidable bulk; it is +more natural to undertake the cataloguing of small accumulations which +demand less labor. It is for the same reason that many insignificant but +short cartularies have been published, while several cartularies of the +highest importance, being voluminous, have still to be edited. + +[33] See his autobibliography, published by E. de Broglie, _Bernard de +Montfaucon et les Bernardins_, ii. (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. 323. + +[34] E. Renan, _L'Avenir de la science_, p. 217. + +[35] _Romania_, xxi. (1892), p. 625. + +[36] In the passage quoted above. + +[37] Mr. H. H. Bancroft, in his Memoirs, entitled "Literary Industries" +(New York, 1891, 16mo), analyses with sufficient minuteness some +practical consequences of the imperfection of the methods of research. +He considers the case of an industrious writer proposing to write the +history of California. He easily procures a few books, reads them, takes +notes; these books refer him to others, which he consults in the public +libraries of the city where he resides. Several years are passed in this +manner, at the end of which he perceives that he has not a tenth part of +the resources in his hands; he travels, maintains correspondences, but, +finally despairing of exhausting the subject, he comforts his conscience +and pride with the reflection that he has done much, and that many of +the works he has not seen, like many of those he has, are probably of +very slight historic value. As to newspapers and the myriads of United +States government reports, all of them containing facts bearing on +Californian history; being a sane man, he has never dreamed of searching +them from beginning to end: he has turned over a few of them, that is +all; he knows that each of these fields of research would afford a +labour of several years, and that all of them would fill the better part +of his life with drudgery. As for oral testimony and manuscripts, he +will gather a few unpublished anecdotes in chance conversations; he will +obtain access to a few family papers; all this will appear in his book +as notes and authorities. Now and again he will get hold of a few +documentary curiosities among the state archives, but as it would take +fifteen years to master the whole collection, he will naturally be +content to glean a little here and there. Then he begins to write. He +does not feel called upon to inform the public that he has not seen +_all_ the documents; on the contrary, he makes the most of what he has +been able to procure in the course of twenty-five years of industrious +research. + +[38] Some dispense with personal search by invoking the assistance of +the functionaries charged with the administration of depositories of +documents; the indispensable search is, in these cases, conducted by the +functionaries instead of by the public. Cf. _Bouvard et Pécuchet_, p. +158. Bouvard and Pécuchet resolve to write the life of the Duke of +Angoulême; for this purpose "they determined to spend several days at +the municipal library of Caen to make researches. The librarian placed +general histories and pamphlets at their disposal...." + +[39] These considerations have already been presented and developed in +the _Revue universitaire_, 1894, i. p. 321 _sqq._ + +[40] It is well known that, since the opening of the Papal Archives, +several governments and learned societies have established Institutes at +Rome, the members of which are, for the most part, occupied in +cataloguing and making known the documents of these archives, in +co-operation with the functionaries of the Vatican. The French School at +Rome, the Austrian Institute, the Prussian Institute, the Polish +Mission, the Institute of the "Goerresgesellschaft," Belgian, Danish, +Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and other scholars, have performed, and +are performing, cataloguing work of considerable extent in the archives +of the Vatican. + +[41] Catalogues of documents sometimes, but not always, mention the fact +that such and such a document has been edited, dealt with critically, +utilised. The generally received rule is that the compiler mentions +circumstances of this kind when he is aware of them, without imposing on +himself the enormous task of ascertaining the truth on this head[sic] in +every instance where he is ignorant of it. + +[42] E. Bernheim, _Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_, 2nd ed., pp. +196-202. + +[43] C. V. Langlois, _Manuel de Bibliographie historique_: I. +_Instruments bibliographiques_, Paris, 1896, 16mo. + +[44] E. Renan, _Feuilles détachées_ (Paris, 1892, 8vo), pp. 96 _sqq._ + +[45] vii. p. 228 _sqq._ + +[46] E. A. Freeman, _The Methods of Historical Study_ (London, 1885, +8vo), p. 45. + +In France geography has long been regarded as a science closely related +to history. An _Agrégation_, which combines history and geography, +exists at the present day, and in the _lycées_ history and geography are +taught by the same professors. Many people persist in asserting the +legitimacy of this combination, and even take umbrage when it is +proposed to separate two branches of knowledge united, as they say, by +many essential connecting links. But it would be hard to find any good +reason, or any facts of experience, to prove that a professor of +history, or an historian, is so much the better the more he knows of +geology, oceanography, climatology, and the whole group of geographical +sciences. In fact, it is with some impatience, and to no immediate +advantage, that students of history work through the courses of +geography which their curricula force upon them; and those students who +have a real taste for geography would be very glad to throw history +overboard. The artificial union of history with geography dates back, in +France, to an epoch when geography was an ill-defined and ill-arranged +subject, regarded by all as a negligeable branch of study. It is a relic +of antiquity that we ought to get rid of at once. + +[47] "Historiography" is a branch of the "History of Literature;" it is +the sum of the results obtained by the critics who have hitherto studied +ancient historical writings, such as annals, memoirs, chronicles, +biographies, and so forth. + +[48] This is only true under reservation; there is an instrument of +research which is indispensable to all historians, to all students, +whatever be the subject of their special study. History, moreover, is +here in the same situation as the majority of the other sciences: all +who prosecute original research, of whatever kind, need to know several +living languages, those of countries where men think and work, of +countries which, from the point of view of science, stand in the +forefront of contemporary civilisation. + +In our days the cultivation of the sciences is not confined to any +single country, or even to Europe. It is international. All problems, +the same problems, are being studied everywhere simultaneously. It is +difficult to-day, and to-morrow it will be impossible, to find a subject +which can be treated without taking cognisance of works in a foreign +language. Henceforth, for ancient history, Greek and Roman, a knowledge +of German will be as imperative as a knowledge of Greek and Latin. +Questions of strictly local history are the only ones still accessible +to those who do not possess the key to foreign literatures. The great +problems are beyond their reach, for the wretched and ridiculous reason +that works on these problems in any language but their own are sealed +books to them. + +Total ignorance of the languages which have hitherto been the ordinary +vehicles of science (German, English, French, Italian) is a disease +which age renders incurable. It would not be exacting too much to +require every candidate for a scientific profession to be at least +_trilinguis_--that is, to be able to understand, fairly easily, two +languages besides his mother-tongue. This is a requirement to which +scholars were not subject formerly, when Latin was still the common +language of learned men, but which the conditions of modern scientific +work will henceforth cause to press with increasing weight upon the +scholars of every country.[*] + +[*] Perhaps a day will come when it will be necessary to know the most +important Slavonic language; there are already scholars who are setting +themselves to learn Russian. The idea of restoring Latin to its old +position of universal language is chimerical. See the file of the +_Phoenix, seu nuntius latinus universalis_ (London, 1891, 4to). + +The French scholars who are unable to read German and English are +thereby placed in a position of permanent inferiority as compared with +their better instructed colleagues in France and abroad; whatever their +merit, they are condemned to work with insufficient means of +information, to work badly. They know it. They do their best to hide +their infirmity, as something to be ashamed of, except when they make a +cynical parade of it and boast of it; but this boasting, as we can +easily see, is only shame showing itself in a different way. Too much +stress cannot be laid upon the fact that a practical knowledge of +foreign languages is auxiliary in the first degree to all historical +work, as indeed it is to scientific work in general. + +[49] When the "auxiliary sciences" were first inserted in the curricula +of French universities, it was observed that some students whose special +subject was the French Revolution, and who had no interest whatever in +the middle ages, took up palæography as an "auxiliary science," and that +some students of geography, who were in no way interested in antiquity, +took up epigraphy. Evidently they had failed to understand that the +study of the "auxiliary sciences" is recommended, not as an end in +itself, but because it is of practical utility to those who devote +themselves to certain special subjects. See the _Revue universitaire_, +1895, ii. p. 123. + +[50] On this point note the opinions of T. von Sickel and J. Havet, +quoted in the _Bibliothèque l'École des chartes_, 1896, p. 87. In 1854 +the Austrian Institute "für österreichische Geschichtsforschung" was +organised on the model of the French École des chartes. Another +institution of the same type has lately been created in the "Istituto di +studi superiori" at Florence. "We are accustomed," we read in England, +"to hear the complaint that there is not in this country any institution +resembling the École des chartes" (_Quarterly Review_, July 1896, p. +122). + +[51] This is a suitable place to enumerate the principal "manuals" +published in the last twenty-five years. But a list of them, ending at +1894, will be found in Bernheim's _Lehrbuch_, pp. 206 sqq. We will only +refer to the great "manuals" of "Philology" (in the comprehensive sense +of the German "Philologie," which includes the history of language and +literature, epigraphy, palæography, and all that pertains to textual +criticism) now in course of publication: the _Grundriss far +indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde_, edited by G. Bühler; the +_Grundriss der iranischen Philologie_, edited by W. Geiger and E. Kuhn; +the _Handbuch der classichen Altertumswissenschaft_, edited by I. von +Müller; the _Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, edited by H. Paul, +the second edition of which began to appear in 1896; the _Grundriss der +romanischen Philologie_, edited y G. Gröber. In these vast repertories +there will be found, along with a short presentment of the subject, +complete bibliographical references, direct as well as indirect. + +[52] The French "manuals" of MM. Prou (Palæography), Giry (Diplomatic), +Cagnat (Latin Epigraphy), and others, have diffused among the public the +idea and knowledge of the auxiliary subjects of study. New editions have +enabled, and will enable, them to be kept up to date--a very necessary +operation, for most of these subjects, though now settled in the main, +are being enriched and made more precise every day. Cf. _supra_, p. 38. + +[53] What exactly are we to understand by this "incommunicable +knowledge," of which we speak? When a specialist is very familiar with +the documents of a given class or period, associations of ideas are +formed in his brain; and when he examines a new document of the same +class or species, analogies suddenly dawn upon him which would escape +any one of less experience, however well furnished he might be with the +most perfect repertories. The fact is, that not all the peculiarities of +documents can be isolated; there are some which cannot be classified +under any intelligible head, and which, therefore, cannot be found in +any tabulated list. But the human memory, when it is good, retains the +impression of these peculiarities, and even a faint and distant stimulus +suffices to revive the apprehension of them. + +[54] _Supra_, p. 17. + +[55] This expression, which frequently occurs, needs explanation. It is +not to be taken to apply to a _species_ of facts. There are no +historical facts in the sense in which we speak of chemical facts. The +same fact is or is not historical according to the manner in which it is +known. It is only the mode of acquiring knowledge that is historical. A +sitting of the Senate is a fact of direct observation for one who takes +part in it; it becomes historical for the man who reads about it in a +report. The eruption of Vesuvius in the time of Pliny is a geological +fact which is known historically. The historical character is not in the +facts, but in the manner of knowing them. + +[56] Fustel de Coulanges has said it. Cf. _supra_, p. 4, note 1. + +[57] In the sciences of observation it is the fact itself, observed +directly, which is the starting-point. + +[58] _Infra_, ch. vii. + +[59] We shall not treat specially of the criticism of material documents +(objects, monuments, &c.) where it differs from the criticism of written +documents. + +[60] For the details and the logical justification of this method see +Seignobos, _Les Conditions psychologiques de la connaissance en +histoire_, in the _Revue philosophique_, 1887, ii. pp. 1, 168. + +[61] The most favourable case, that in which the document has been drawn +up by what is called an ocular "witness," is still far short of the +ideal required for scientific knowledge. The notion of _witness_ has +been borrowed from the procedure of the law-courts; reduced to +scientific terms, it becomes that of an _observer_. A testimony is an +observation. But, in point of fact, historical testimony differs +materially from scientific observation. The observer proceeds by fixed +rules, and clothes his report in language of rigorous precision. On the +other hand, the "witness" observes without method, and reports in +unprecise language; it is not known whether he has taken the necessary +precautions. It is an essential attribute of historical documents that +they come before us as the result of work which has been done without +method and without guarantee. + +[62] See B. Lasch, _Das Erwachen und die Entwickelung der historischen +Kritik im Mittelalter_ (Breslan, 1887, 8vo). + +[63] Natural credulity is deeply rooted in indolence. It is easier to +believe than to discuss, to admit than to criticise, to accumulate +documents than to weigh them. It is also pleasanter; he who criticises +documents must sacrifice some of them, and such a sacrifice seems a dead +loss to the man who has discovered or acquired the document. + +[64] _Revue philosophique_, l.c., p. 178. + +[65] A member of the _Société des humanistes français_ (founded at Paris +in 1894) amused himself by pointing out, in the _Bulletin_ of this +society, certain errors amenable to verbal criticism which occur in +various editions of posthumous works, especially the _Mémoires +d'outre-tombe_. He showed that it is possible to remove obscurities in +the most modern documents by the same methods which are used in +restoring ancient texts. + +[66] On the habits of the mediæval copyists, by whose intermediate +agency most of the literary works of antiquity have come down to us, see +the notices collected by W. Wattenbach, _Das Schriftwesen im +Mittelalter_, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1896, 8vo). + +[67] See, for example, the _Coquilles lexicographiques_ which have been +collected by A. Thomas, in _Romania_, xx. (1891), pp. 464 _sqq._ + +[68] See E. Bernheim, _Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_, 2nd ed., pp. +341-54. Also consult F. Blass, in the _Handbuch der klassischen +Altertumswissenschaft_, edited by I. von Müller, I., 2nd ed. (1892), pp. +249-89 (with a detailed bibliography); A. Tobler, in the _Grundriss der +romanischen Philologie_, I. (1888), pp. 253-63; H. Paul, in the +_Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, I., 2nd ed. (1896), pp. 184-96. + +In French read the section _Critique des textes, in Minerva, +Introduction à l'étude des classiques scolaires grecs et latins_, by J. +Gow and S. Reinach (Paris, 1890, 16mo), pp. 50-65. + +The work of J. Taylor, "History of the Transmission of Ancient Books to +Modern Times" (Liverpool, 1889, 16mo), is of no value. + +[69] This rule is not absolute. The editor is generally accorded the +right of unifying the spelling of an autograph document--provided that +he informs the public of the fact--wherever, as in most modern +documents, the orthographical vagaries of the author possess no +philological interest. See the _Instructions pour la publication des +textes historiques_, in the _Bulletin de la Commission royale d'histoire +de Belgique_, 5th series, vi. (1896); and the _Grundsätze für die +Herausgabe von Actenstücken zur neueren Geschichte_, laboriously +discussed by the second and third Congresses of German historians, in +1894 and 1895, in the Deutsche _Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft_, +xi. p. 200, xii. p. 364. The last Congresses of Italian historians, held +at Genoa (1893) and at Rome (1895), have also debated this question, but +without result. What are the liberties which it is legitimate to take in +reproducing autograph texts? The question is more difficult than is +imagined by those who are not professionally concerned with it. + +[70] Interpolations will be treated of in chapter iii p. 92. + +[71] The scribes of the Carlovingian Renaissance and of the Renaissance +proper of the fifteenth century endeavoured to furnish intelligible +texts. They therefore corrected everything they did not understand. +Several ancient works have been in this manner irretrievably ruined. + +[72] The principal of these are, for the classical languages, besides +the above-mentioned work of Blass (_supra_, p. 74, note), the +_Adversaria critica_ of Madvig (Copenhagen, 1871-74, 3 vols. 8vo). For +Greek, the celebrated _Commentatio palæographica_ of F. J. Bast, +published as an appendix to an edition of the grammarian Gregory of +Corinth (Leipzig, 1811, 8vo), and the _Variæ lectiones_ of Cobet +(Leiden, 1873, 8vo). For Latin, H. Hagen, _Gradus ad criticen_ (Leipzig, +1879, 8vo), and W. M. Lindsay, "An Introduction to Latin Textual +Emendation based on the Text of Plautus" (London, 1896, 16mo). A +contributor to the _Bulletin de la Société des humanistes français_ has +expressed, in this publication, a wish that a similar collection might +be compiled for modern French. + +[73] Cf. _Revue Critique_, 1895, ii. p. 358. + +[74] Quite recently our scholars used to neglect this elementary +precaution, in order, as they said, to avoid an "air of pedantry." M. B. +Hauréau has published, in his _Notices et extraits de quelques +manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque nationale_ (vi. p. 310), a piece of +rhythmic verse, "De presbytero et logico." "It is not unedited," says +he; "Thomas Wright has already published it.... But this edition is very +defective; the text is occasionally quite unintelligible. We have, +therefore, considerably amended it, making use, for this purpose, of two +copies, which, it most be conceded, are neither of them faultless...." +The edition follows, with no variants. Verification is impossible. + +[75] "Textual emendation too often misses the mark through want of +knowledge of what may be called _the rules of the game_" (W. M. Lindsay, +p.v. in the work referred to above). + +[76] It has often been asked whether _all_ texts are worth the trouble +of "establishing" and publishing them. "Among our ancient texts," says +M. J. Bédier, referring to French mediæval literature, "which ought we +to publish? Every one. But, it will be asked, are we not already +staggering under the weight of documents?... The following is the reason +why publication should be exhaustive. As long as we are confronted by +this mass of sealed and mysterious manuscripts, they will appeal to us +as if they contained the answer to every riddle; every candid mind will +be hampered by them in its flights of induction. It is desirable to +publish them, if only to get rid of them and to be able, for the future, +to work as if they did not exist...." (_Revue des Deux Mondes_, February +15, 1894, p. 910). All documents ought to be catalogued, as we have +already pointed out (p. 31), in order that researchers may be relieved +of the fear that there may be documents, useful for their purposes, of +which they know nothing. But in every case where a summary analysis of a +document can give a sufficient idea of its contents, and its form is of +no special interest, there is nothing gained by publishing it _in +extenso_. We need not overburden ourselves. Every document will be +analysed some day, but many documents will never be published. + +[77] Editors of texts often render their task still longer and more +difficult than it need be by undertaking the additional duty of +commentators, under the pretext of explaining the text. It would be to +their advantage to spare themselves this labour, and to dispense with +all annotation which does not belong to the "apparatus criticus" proper. +See, on this point, T. Lindner, _Ueber die Herausgabe von +geschichtlichen Quellen_, in the _Mittheilungen des Instituts für +österreichische Geschichtsforschung_, xvi., 1895, pp. 501 _sqq._ + +[78] To realise this it is enough to compare what has hitherto been done +by the most active societies, such as the Society of the _Monumenta +Germaniæ historica_ and the _Istituto storico italiano_, with what still +remains for them to do. The greater part of the most ancient documents +and the hardest to restore, which have long taxed the ingenuity of +scholars, have now been placed in a relatively satisfactory condition. +But an immense amount of mechanical work has still to be done. + +[79] R. de Gourmont, _Le Latin mystique_ (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. 258. + +[80] See these alleged autographs in the _Bibliothèque nationale_, nouv. +acq. fr., No. 709. + +[81] F. Blass has enumerated the chief of these motives with reference +to the pseudepigraphic literature of antiquity (pp. 269 _sqq._ in the +work already quoted). + +[82] E. Bernheim (_Lehrbuch_, pp. 243 _sqq._) gives a somewhat lengthy +list of spurious documents, now recognised as such. Here it will be +enough to recall a few famous hoaxes: Sarchoniathon, Clotilde de +Surville, Ossian. Since the publication of Bernheim's book several +celebrated documents, hitherto exempt from suspicion, have been struck +off the list of authorities. See especially A. Piaget, _La Chronique des +chanoines de Neuchâtel_ (Neuchâtel, 1896, 8vo). + +[83] When the modifications of the primitive text are the work of the +author himself, they are "alterations." Internal analysis, and the +comparison of different editions, bring them to light. + +[84] See F. Blass, ibid., pp. 254 _sqq._ + +[85] As a rule it matters little whether the _name_ of the author has or +has not been discovered. We read, however, in the _Histoire_ _littéraire +de la France_ (xxvi. p. 388): "We have ignored anonymous sermons: +writings of this facile character are of no importance for literary +history when their authors are unknown." Are they of any more importance +when we know the authors' names? + +[86] In very favourable cases the examination of the plagiarist's +mistakes has made it possible to determine even this style of +handwriting, the size, and the manner of arrangement of the manuscript +source. The deductions of the investigation of sources, like those of +textual criticism, are sometimes supported by obvious palæographical +considerations. + +[87] The Investigations of Julien Havet (_Questions mérovingiennes_, +Paris, 1896, 8vo) are regarded as models. Very difficult problems are +there solved with faultless elegance. It is also well worth while to +read the memoirs in which M. L. Delisle has discussed questions of +origin. It is in the treatment of these questions that the most +accomplished scholars win their triumphs. + +[88] See the edition of H. R. Luard (vol. i., London, 1890, 8vo) in the +_Rerum Britannicarum medii ævi scriptores_. Matthew of Westminster's +_Flores historiarum_ figure in the Roman "Index," because of the +passages borrowed from the _Chronica majora_ of Matthew of Paris, while +the _Chronica majora_ themselves have escaped censure. + +[89] It would be instructive to draw up a list of the celebrated +historical works, such as Augustin Thierry's _Histoire de la Conquête de +l'Angleterre par les Normands_, whose authority has been completely +destroyed after the authorship of their sources has been studied. +Nothing amuses the gallery more than to see an historian convicted of +having built a theory on falsified documents. Nothing is more calculated +to cover an historian with confusion than to find that he has fallen +into the error of treating seriously documents which are no documents at +all. + +[90] One of the crudest (and commonest) forms of "uncritical method" is +that which consists in employing as if they were documents, and placing +on the same footing as documents, the utterances of modern authors on +the subject of documents. Novices do not make a sufficient distinction, +in the works of modern authors, between what is added to the original +source and what is taken from it. + +[91] See a list of examples in Bernheim's _Handbuch_, pp. 283, 289. + +[92] It is because it is necessary to subject documents of mediæval and +ancient history to the most searching criticism in respect of authorship +that the study of antiquity and the middle ages passes for more +"scientific" than that of modern times. The truth is, that it is merely +hampered by more preliminary difficulties. + +[93] _Revue philosophique_, 1887, ii. p. 170. + +[94] The theory of the critical investigation of authorship is now +settled, _ne varietur_; it is given in detail in Bernheim's _Lehrbuch_, +pp. 242-340. For this reason we have had no scruple in dismissing it +with a short sketch. In French, the introduction of M. G. Monod to his +_Études critiques sur les sources de l'histoire mérovingienne_ (Paris, +1872, 8vo) contains elementary considerations on the subject. Cf. _Revue +Critique_, 1873, i. p. 308. + +[95] Renan, _Feuilles détachées_, p. 103. + +[96] It would be very interesting to have information on the methods of +work of the great scholars, particularly those who undertook long tasks +of collection and classification. Some information of this kind is to be +found in their papers, and occasionally in their correspondence. On the +methods of Du Cange, see L. Feugère, _Étude sur la vie et les ouvrages +de Du Cange_ (Paris, 1858, 8vo), pp. 62 _sqq._ + +[97] See J. G. Droysen, _Grundriss der Historik_, p. 19: "Critical +classification does not exclusively adopt the chronological point of +view.... The more varied the points of view which criticism uses to +group materials, the more solid are the results yielded by converging +lines of inquiry." + +The system has now been abandoned of grouping documents in a _Corpus_ or +in _regesta_, as was done formerly, because they have the common +characteristic of being unedited, or possibly for the exactly opposite +reason. At one time the compilers of _Analecta, Reliquiæ +manuscriptorum_, "treasuries of _anecdota_," _spicilegia_, and so on, +used to publish all the documents of a certain class which had the +common feature of being unedited and of appearing interesting to them; +on the other hand, Georgisch (_Regesta Chronologico-diplomatica_), +Bréquigny (_Table chronologique des diplômes, chartes et actes imprimés +concernant l'histoire de France_), Wauters (_Table chronologique des +chartes et diplômes imprimés concernant l'histoire de Belgique_), have +grouped together all the documents of a certain species which had the +common character of having been printed. + +[98] J. P. Waltzing, _Recueil général des inscriptions latines_ +(Louvain, 1892, 8vo), p. 41. + +[99] Ibid. When the geographical order is adopted, a difficulty arises +from the fact that the origin of certain documents is unknown; many +inscriptions preserved in museums have been brought there no one knows +whence. The difficulty is analogous to that which results, for +chronological _regesta_, from documents without date. + +[100] Here the only difficulty arises in the case of documents whose +_incipit_ has been lost. In the eighteenth century Séguier devoted a +great part of his life to the construction of a catalogue, in the +alphabetical order of the _incipit_, of the Latin inscriptions, to the +number of 50,000, which had at that time been published: he searched +through some twelve thousand works. This vast compilation has remained +unpublished and useless. Before undertaking work of such magnitude it is +well to make sure that it is on a rational plan, and that the +labour--the hard and thankless labour--will not be wasted. + +[101] See G. Waitz, _Ueber die Herausgabe und Bearbeitung von Regesten_, +in the _Historische Zeitschrift_, xl. (1878), pp. 280-95. + +[102] In the absence of a predetermined logical order, and when the +chronological order is not suitable, it is sometimes an advantage to +provisionally group the documents (that is, the slips) in the +alphabetical order of the words chosen as headings (_Schlagwörter_). +This is what is called the "dictionary system." + +[103] See Langlois, _Manuel de bibliographie historique_, i. p. 88. + +[104] This argument is easy to develop, and often has been, recently by +M. J. Bédier, in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, February 15, 1894, pp. 932 +_sqq._ + +There are some who willingly admit that the labours of erudition are +useful, but ask impatiently whether "the editing of a text" or "the +deciphering of a Gothic parchment" is "the supreme effort of the human +mind," and whether the intellectual ability implied by the practice of +external criticism does or does not justify "all the fuss made over +those who possess it." On this question, obviously devoid of importance, +a controversy was held between M. Brunetière, who recommended scholars +to be modest, and M. Boucherie, who insisted on their reasons for being +proud, in the pages of the _Revue des langues romanes_, 1880, vols. i +and ii. + +[105] There have been men who were critics of the first water where +external criticism alone was concerned, but who never rose to the +conception of higher criticism, or to a true understanding of history. + +[106] Renan, _Essais de morale et de critique_, p. 36. + +[107] "If it were only for the sake of the severe mental discipline, I +should not think very highly of the philosopher who had not, at least +once in his life, worked at the elucidation of some special point" +(_L'Avenir de la science_, p. 136). + +[108] On the question whether it is necessary for every one to do "all +the preliminary grubbing for himself," cf. J. M. Robertson, "Buckle and +His Critics" (London, 1895, 8vo), p. 299. + +[109] Renan, _L'Avenir de la science_, p. 230. + +[110] A university professor is in a very good position for discouraging +and encouraging vocations; but "it is by personal effort that the goal +(critical skill) must be attained by the students, as Waitz well said in +an academic oration; the teacher's part in this work is small...." +(_Revue Critique_, 1874, ii. p. 232). + +[111] Quoted by Fr. X. von Wegele, _Geschichte der deutschen +Historiographie_ (München, 1885, 8vo), p. 653. + +[112] Renan, ibid., p. 125. + +[113] B. Hauréau, _Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de +la Bibliothèque nationale_, i. (Paris, 1890, 8vo). p. v. + +[114] _Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes_, 1896, p. 88. Compare +analogous traits in the interesting intellectual biography of the +Hellenist, palæographer, and bibliographer, Charles Graux, by E. Lavisse +(_Questions d'enseignement national_, Paris, 1885, 18mo, pp. 265 +_sqq._). + +[115] See H. A. L. Fisher in the _Fortnightly Review_, Dec. 1894, p. +815. + +[116] Most of those who have a vocation for critical scholarship possess +both the power of solving problems and the taste for collecting. It is, +however, easy to divide them into two categories according as they show +a marked preference for textual criticism and investigation of +authorship on the one hand, or for the more absorbing and less +intellectual labours of collection on the other. J. Havet, a past-master +in the study of erudite problems, always declined to undertake a general +collection of Merovingian royal charters, a work which his admirers +expected from him. In this connection he readily admitted his "want of +taste for feats of endurance" (_Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes_, +1896, p. 222). + +[117] It is common to hear the opposite of this maintained, namely, that +the labours of critical scholarship (external criticism) have this +advantage over other labours in the field of history that they are +within the range of average ability, and that the most moderate +intellects, after a suitable preliminary drilling, may be usefully +employed in them. It is quite true that men with no elevation of soul or +power of thought can make themselves useful in the field of criticism, +but then they must have special qualities. The mistake is to think that +with good will and a special drilling every one without exception can be +fitted for the operations of external criticism. Among those who are +incapable of these operations, as well as among those who are fitted for +them, there are both men of sense and blockheads. + +[118] A. Philippi, _Einige Bemerkungen über den philologischen +Unterricht_, Giessen, 1890, 4to. Cf. _Revue Critique_, 1892, i. p. 25. + +[119] J. von Pflugk-Harttung, _Geschichtsbetrachtungen_, Gotha, 1890, +8vo. + +[120] Ibid., p. 21. + +[121] Cf. _supra_, p. 99. + +[122] Renan, _L'Avenir de la science_, p. xiv. + +[123] _Revue historique_, lxiii. (1897), p. 320. + +[124] Renan, ibid., pp. 122, 243. The same thought has been more than +once expressed, in different language, by E. Lavisse, in his addresses +to the students of Paris (_Questions d'enseignement national_, pp. 14, +86, &c.). + +[125] One of us (M. Langlois) proposes to give elsewhere a detailed +account of all that has been done in the last three hundred years, but +especially in the nineteenth century, for the organisation of historical +work in the principal countries of the world. Some information has +already been collected on this subject by J. Franklin Jameson, "The +Expenditures of Foreign Governments in behalf of History," in the +"Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1891," pp. +38-61. + +[126] L. Feugère, _Étude sur la vie et les ouvrages de Du Cange_, pp. +55, 58. + +[127] Even the specialists in external criticism themselves, when they +do not take the line of despising all synthesis _a priori_, are almost +as easily dazzled as anybody else by incorrect syntheses, by a show of +"general ideas," or by literary artifices, in spite of their +clear-sightedness where works of critical scholarship are concerned. + +[128] The sciences of observation do, however, need a species of +criticism. We do not accept without verification results obtained by +anybody, but only results obtained by those who know how to work. But +this criticism is made once for all, and applies to the author, not to +his works; historical criticism, on the contrary, is obliged to deal +separately with every part of a document. + +[129] Cf. _supra_, book ii. chap. i. p. 67. + +[130] Cf. _supra_, p. 122. + +[131] Taine appears to have proceeded thus in vol. ii, _La Révolution_, +of his _Origines de la France contemporaine_. He had made extracts from +unpublished documents and inserted a great number of them in his work, +but it would seem that he did not first methodically analyse them in +order to determine their meaning. + +[132] Fustel de Coulanges explains very clearly the danger of this +_method_: "Some students begin by forming an opinion ... and it is not +till afterwards that they begin to read the texts. They run a great risk +of not understanding them at all, or of understanding them wrongly. What +happens is that a kind of tacit contest goes on between the text and the +preconceived opinions of the reader; the mind refuses to grasp what is +contrary to its idea, and the issue of the contest commonly is, not that +the mind surrenders to the evidence of the text, but that the text +yields, bends, and accommodates itself to the preconceived opinion.... +To bring one's personal ideas into the study of texts is the subjective +method. A man thinks he is contemplating an object, and it is his own +idea that he is contemplating. He thinks he is observing a fact, and the +fact at once assumes the colour, and the significance his mind wishes it +to have. He thinks he is reading a text, and the words of the text take +a particular meaning to suit a ready-made opinion. It is this subjective +method which has done most harm to the history of the Merovingian +epoch.... To read the texts was not enough; what was required was to +read them before forming any convictions...." (_Monarchie franque_, p. +31). For the same reason Fustel de Coulanges deprecated the reading of +one document in the light of another; he protested against the custom of +explaining the _Germania_ of Tacitus by the barbaric laws. In the _Revue +des questions historiques_, 1897, vol. i, a lesson on method, _De +l'analyse des textes historiques_, is given apropos of a commentary by +M. Monod on Gregory of Tours: "The historian ought to begin his work +with an exact analysis of each document.... The analysis of a text ... +consists in determining the sense of each word and eliciting the true +meaning of the writer.... Instead of searching for the sense of each of +the historian's words, and for the thought he has expressed in them, he +[M. Monod] comments on each sentence in the light of what is found in +Tacitus or the Salic law.... We should understand what analysis really +is. Many talk about it, few use it.... The use of analysis is, by an +attentive study of every detail, to elicit from a text all that is in +it; not to introduce into the text what is not there." + +After reading this excellent advice it will be instructive to read M. +Monod's reply (in the _Revue historique_); it will be seen that Fustel +de Coulanges himself did not always practise the method he recommended. + +[133] Cf. _supra_, p. 103. + +[134] The work of analysis may be entrusted to a second person; this is +what happens in the case of _regesta_ and catalogues of records; if the +analysis has been correctly performed by the compiler of _regesta_, +there is no need to do it over again. + +[135] Practical examples of this procedure will be found in Deloche, _La +Trustis et l'antrustion royal_ (Paris, 1873, 8vo), and, above all, in +Fustel de Coulanges. See especially the study of the words _marca_ +(_Recherches sur quelques problêmes d'histoire_, pp. 322-56), _mallus_ +(ibid., 372-402), _alleu_ (_L'Alleu et le domaine rural_, pp. 149-70), +_portio_ (ibid., pp. 239-52). + +[136] The theory and an example of this procedure will be found in +Fustel de Coulanges, _Recherches sur quelques problêmes d'histoire_ (pp. +189-289), with reference to the statements of Tacitus about the Germans. +See especially pp. 263-89, the discussion of the celebrated passage on +the German mode of culture. + +[137] Fustel de Coulanges formulates it thus: "It is never safe to +separate two words from their context; this is just the way to mistake +their meaning" (_Monarchie franque_, p. 228, note I). + +[138] This is how Fustel de Coulanges condemns this practice: "I am not +speaking of pretenders to learning who quote second-hand, and at most +take the trouble to verify whether the phrase they have seen quoted +really occurs in the passage indicated. To verify quotations is one +thing and to read texts quite another, and the two often lead to +opposite results" (_Revue des questions historiques_, 1887, vol. i.). +See also (_L'Alleu et le domaine rural_, pp. 171-98) the lesson given to +M. Glasson on the theory of the community of land: forty-five quotations +are studied in the light of their context, with the object of proving +that none of them bears the meaning M. Glasson attributed to it. We may +also compare the reply: Glasson, _Les Communaux et le domaine rural a +l'époque franque_, Paris, 1890. + +[139] All that is original in Fustel de Coulanges rests on his +interpretative criticism; he never did personally any work in external +criticism, and his critical examination of authors' good faith and +accuracy was hampered by a respect for the statements of ancient authors +which amounted to credulity. + +[140] A parallel difficulty occurs in the interpretation of illustrative +monuments; the representations are not always to be taken literally. In +the Behistun monument Darius tramples the vanquished chiefs under foot: +this is a metaphor. Mediæval miniatures show us persons lying in bed +with crowns on their heads: this is to symbolise their royal rank; the +painter did not mean that they wore their crowns to sleep in. + +[141] A. Boeckh, in the _Encyclopædie und Methodologie der +philologischen Wissenschaften_, second edition (1886), has given a +theory of _hermeneutic_ to which Bernheim has been content to refer. + +[142] The method of extracting information on external facts from a +writer's conceptions forms part of the theory of constructive reasoning. +_See_ book iii. + +[143] For example, Père de Smedt, Tardif, Droysen, and even Bernheim. + +[144] Descartes, who came at a time when history still consisted in the +reproduction of pre-existing narratives, did not see how to apply +methodical doubt to the subject; he therefore refused to allow it a +place among the sciences. + +[145] Fustel de Coulanges himself did not rise above this kind of +timidity. With reference to a speech attributed to Clovis by Gregory of +Tours, he says: "Doubtless we are unable to affirm that these words were +ever pronounced. But, all the same, we ought not to affirm, in +contradiction to Gregory of Tours, that they were not.... The wisest +course is to accept Gregory's text" (_Monarchie franque_, p. 66). The +wisest, or rather the only scientific course, is to admit that we know +nothing about the words of Clovis, for Gregory himself had no knowledge +of them. + +[146] Quite recently, E. Meyer, one of the most critically expert +historians of antiquity, has in his work, _Die Entstehung des +Judenthums_ (Halle, 1896, 8vo), revived this strange juridical argument +in favour of the narrative of Nehemiah. M. Bouché-Leclercq, in a +remarkable study on "The Reign of Seleucus II. (Callinicus) and +Historical Criticism" (_Revue des Universités du Midi_, April-June +1897), seems, by way of reaction against the hypercriticism of Niebuhr +and Droysen, to incline towards an analogous theory: "Historical +criticism, if it is not to degenerate into agnosticism--which would be +suicidal--or into individual caprice, must place a certain amount of +trust in testimony which it cannot verify, as long as it is not flatly +contradicted by other testimony of equal value." M. Bouché-Leclercq is +right as against the historian who, "after having discredited all his +witnesses, claims to put himself in their place, and sees with their +eyes something quite different from what they themselves saw." But when +the "testimony" is insufficient to give us the scientific knowledge of a +fact, the only correct attitude is "agnosticism," that is, a confession +of ignorance; we have no right to shirk this confession because chance +has permitted the destruction of the documents which might have +contradicted the testimony. + +[147] The "Memoirs of Cardinal de Retz" furnish a conclusive instance: +the anecdote of the ghosts met by Retz and Turenne. A. Feillet, who +edited Retz in the _Collection des Grands Écrivains de la France_, has +shown (vol. i. p. 192) that this story, so vividly narrated, is false +from beginning to end. + +[148] A good example of the fascination exerted by a circumstantial +narrative is the legend respecting the origin of the League of the three +primitive Swiss cantons (Gessler and the Grütli conspirators), which was +_fabricated_ by Tschudi in the sixteenth century, became classical on +the production of Schiller's "William Tell," and has only been +extirpated with the greatest difficulty. (See Rilliet, _Origines de la +Conféderation suisse_, Geneva, 1869, 8vo.) + +[149] Striking example of falsehoods due to vanity are to be found in +abundance in the _Économies royales_ of Sully and the _Mémoires_ of +Retz. + +[150] Fustel de Coulanges himself went to the formulæ of the +inscriptions in honour of the emperors for a proof that the peoples +liked the imperial _régime_. "If we read the inscriptions, the sentiment +which they exhibit is always one of satisfaction and gratitude.... See +the collection of Orelli, the most frequent expressions are...." And the +enumeration of the titles of respect given to the emperors ends with +this strange aphorism: "It would show ignorance of human nature to see +nothing but flattery in all this." There is not even flattery here; +there is nothing but formulæ. + +[151] Suger, in his life of Louis VI., is a model of this type. + +[152] The _Chronicon Helveticum_ of Tschudi is a striking instance. + +[153] Aristophanes and Demosthenes are two striking examples of the +power great writers have of paralysing critics and obscuring facts. Not +till the close of the nineteenth century has any one ventured to +recognise frankly their lack of good faith. + +[154] For example, the account of the election of Otto I. in the _Gesta +Ottonis_ of Wittekind. + +[155] For example, the statistics on the population, the commerce, and +the wealth of European countries given by the Venetian ambassadors of +the sixteenth century, and the descriptions of the usages of the Germans +in the _Germania_ of Tacitus. + +[156] It would be interesting to examine how much of Roman or +Merovingian history would be left if we rejected all documents but those +which represent direct observation. + +[157] It will be seen why we have not separately defined and studied +"first-hand documents." The question has not been raised in the proper +manner in historical practice. The distinction ought to apply to +_statements_, not to documents. It is not the document which comes to us +at first, second, or third hand; it is the statement. What is called a +"first-hand document" is nearly always composed in part of second-hand +statements about facts of which the author had no personal knowledge. +The name "second-hand document" is given to those which, like the work +of Livy, contain nothing first-hand; but the distinction is too crude to +serve as a guide in the critical examination of statements. + +[158] There is much less modification where the oral tradition assumes a +regular or striking form, as is the case with verses, maxims, proverbs. + +[159] Sometimes the _form_ of the phrase tells its own tale, when, in +the midst of a detailed narrative, obviously of legendary origin, we +come across a curt, dry entry in annalistic style, obviously copied from +a written document. That is what we find in Livy (see Nitzsch, _Die +römische Annalistik_, Leipzig, 1873, 8vo), and in Gregory of Tours (see +Loebell, _Gregor von Tours_, Leipzig, 1868, 8vo). + +[160] The events which strike the popular imagination and are +transmitted by legend are not generally those which seem to us the most +important. The heroes of the _chansons de gestes_ are hardly known +historically. The Breton epic songs relate, not to the great historical +events, as Villemarqué's collection led people to believe, but to +obscure local episodes. The same holds of the Scandinavian sagas; for +the most part they relate to quarrels among the villagers of Iceland or +the Orkneys. + +[161] The theory of legend is one of the most advanced parts of +criticism. Bernheim (in his _Lehrbuch_, pp. 380-90) gives a good summary +and a bibliography of it. + +[162] "History of Greece," vols. i. and ii. Compare Renan, _Histoire du +peuple d'Israël_, vol. i. (Paris, 1887, 8vo), Introduction. + +[163] And yet Niebuhr made use of the Roman legends to construct a +theory, which it was afterwards necessary to demolish, of the struggle +between the patricians and the plebeians; and Curtius, twenty years +after Grote, looked for historical facts in the Greek legends. + +[164] See _supra_, pp. 93 _sqq._ + +[165] Cf. _supra_, p. 166. + +[166] It is often said, "The author would not have dared to write this +if it had not been true." This argument does not apply to societies in a +low state of civilisation. Louis VIII. dared to write that John Lackland +had been condemned by the verdict of his peers. + +[167] See above, p. 153. Similarly, the particular facts which compose +the history of forms (palæography, linguistic science) are directly +established by the analysis of the document. + +[168] Primitive Greece has been studied in the Homeric poems. Mediæval +private life has been reconstructed principally from the _chansons de +gestes_. (See C. V. Langlois, _Les Traditions sur l'histoire de la +société française au moyen âge d'après les sources littéraires_, in the +_Revue historique_, March-April, 1897.) + +[169] Most historians refrain from rejecting a legend till its falsity +has been proved, and if by chance no document has been preserved to +contradict it, they adopt it provisionally. This is how the first five +centuries of Rome are still dealt with. This method, unfortunately still +too general, helps to prevent history from being established as a +science. + +[170] For the logical justification of this principle in history see C. +Seignobos, _Revue Philosophique_, July-August 1887. Complete scientific +certitude is only produced by an agreement between observations made on +different _methods_; it is to be found at the junction of two different +paths of research. + +[171] This case is studied and a good example given by Bernheim, +_Lehrbuch_, p. 421. + +[172] It is hardly necessary to enter a caution against the childish +method of counting the documents on each side of a question and deciding +by the majority. The statement of a single author who was acquainted +with a fact is evidently worth more than a hundred statements made by +persons who knew nothing about it. The rule has been formulated long +ago: _Ne numerentur, sed ponderentur_. + +[173] Cf. _supra_, p. 94. + +[174] It is hardly possible to study here the special difficulties which +arise in the application of these principles, as when the author, +wishing to conceal his indebtedness, has introduced deviations in order +to put his readers off the scent, or when the author has combined +statements taken from different documents. + +[175] Here we merely indicate the principle of the method of +confirmation; its applications would require a very lengthy study. + +[176] Père de Smedt has devoted to this question a part of his +_Principes de la critique histoire_ (Paris, 1887, 12mo). + +[177] The solution of the question is different in the case of the +sciences of direct observation, especially the biological sciences. +Science knows nothing of the possible and the impossible; it only +recognises facts which have been correctly or incorrectly observed: +facts which had been declared impossible, as the existence of aerolites, +have been discovered to be genuine. The very notion of a miracle is +metaphysical; it implies a conception of the universe as a whole which +transcends the limits of observation. (See Wallace, "Miracles and Modern +Spiritualism.") + +[178] See above, p. 194. + +[179] In the experimental sciences an hypothesis is a form of question +accompanied by a provisional answer. + +[180] Fustel de Coulanges saw the necessity of this. In the preface to +his _Recherches sur quelques problêmes d'histoire_ (Paris, 1885, 8vo) he +announces his intention of presenting his researches "in the form which +all my works have, that is, in the form of questions which I ask myself, +and on which I endeavour to throw light." + +[181] Fustel de Coulanges himself seems to have been misled by them: +"History is a science; it does not imagine, it only sees" (_Monarchie +franque_, p. 1). "History, like every science, consists in a process of +discerning facts, analysing them, comparing them, and noting their +connections.... The historian ... seeks facts and attains them by the +minute observation of texts, as the chemist finds his in the course of +experiments conducted with minute precision" (Ibid., p. 39). + +[182] The subjective character of history has been brought out into +strong relief by the philosopher G. Simmel, _Die Probleme der +Geschichtsphilosophie_ (Leipzig, 1892, 8vo). + +[183] This has been eloquently put by Carlyle and Michelet. It is also +the substance of the famous expression of Ranke: "I wish to state how +that really was" (_wie es eigentlich gewesen_). + +[184] Cf. pp. 219-23. + +[185] Curtius in his "History of Greece," Mommsen in his "History of +Rome" (before the Empire), Lamprecht in his "History of Germany." + +[186] It will be enough to mention Augustin Thierry, Michelet, and +Carlyle. + +[187] See P. Guiraud, _Fustel de Coulanges_ (Paris, 1896, 12mo), p. 164, +for some very judicious observations on this subject. + +[188] The classification of M. Lacombe (_De l'histoire considérée comme +science_, chap. vi.), founded on the motives of actions and the wants +they are intended to satisfy, is very judicious from the philosophical +point of view, but does not meet the practical needs of historians; it +rests on abstract psychological categories (economic, reproductive, +sympathetic, ambitious, &c.), and ends by classing together very +different species of phenomena (military institutions along with +economics). + +[189] Ecclesiastical institutions form part of the government; in German +manuals of antiquities they are found among institutions, while religion +is classed with the arts. + +[190] Modes of transport, which are often put under commerce, form a +species of industry. + +[191] Property is an institution of mixed character, being at once +economic, social, and political. + +[192] For the history and biography of this movement see Bernheim, +_Lehrbuch_, pp. 45-55. + +[193] It is no longer necessary to demonstrate the nullity of the notion +of _race_. It used to be applied to vague groups, formed by a nation or +a language; for race as understood by historians (Greek, Roman, +Germanic, Celtic, Slavonic races) has nothing but the name in common +with race in the anthropological sense--that is, a group of men +possessing the same hereditary characteristics. It has been reduced to +an absurdity by the abuse Taine made of it. A very good criticism of it +will be found in Lacombe (ibid., chap. xviii.), and in Robertson ("The +Saxon and the Celt," London, 1897, 8vo). + +[194] There is no general agreement on the proper place in history of +retrograde changes, of those oscillations which bring things back to the +point from which they started. + +[195] The theory of chance as affecting history has been expounded in a +masterly manner by M. Cournot, _Considérations sur la marche des idées +et des événements dans les temps modernes_ (Paris, 1872, 2 vols. 8vo). + +[196] Lamprecht, in a long article, _Was ist Kulturgeschichte_, +published in the _Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft_, New +Series, vol. i., 1896, has attempted to base the history of civilisation +on the theory of a collective soul of society producing "social-psychic" +phenomena common to the whole society, and differing from period to +period. This is a metaphysical hypothesis. + +[197] The expression _national_ history, introduced in the interests of +patriotism, denotes the same thing. The history of the nation means +practically the history of the State. + +[198] See Cournot, ibid., i. p. iv. + +[199] We have already (p. 143) treated of this fault of method. + +[200] The discussion of this argument, which was formerly much used in +religious history, was a favourite subject with the earlier writers who +treated of methodology, and still occupies a considerable space in the +_Principes de la critique historique_ of Père de Smedt. + +[201] This is what Montesquieu attempted in his _Esprit des Lois_. In a +course of lectures at the Sorbonne, I have endeavoured to give a sketch +of such a comprehensive account.--[Ch. S.] + +[202] See p. 204. + +[203] Michelet has discredited the study of physiological influences by +the abuse which he has made of it in the last part of his "History of +France"; it is, however, indispensable for the understanding of a man's +career. + +[204] On the subject of statistics, a method which is now perfected, a +good summary with a bibliography will be found in the _Handwörterbuch +der Staatswissenschaften_, Jena, 1890-94, Ia. 8vo. and two good +methodical treatises, J. von. Mayr, _Theoretische Statistik_ and +_Bevölkerungsstatistik_, in the collection of Marquardsen and Seydel, +Freiburg, 1895 and 1897, Ia. 8vo. + +[205] As is done by Boardeau (_l'Histoire et les Historiens_, Paris, +1888, 8vo), who proposes to reduce the whole of history to a series of +statistics. + +[206] A good example will be found in Lacombe, _De l'Histoire Considérée +Comme Science_, p. 146. + +[207] We have thought it useless to discuss here the question whether +history ought, in accordance with the ancient tradition, to fulfil yet +another function, whether it ought to pass judgment on men and events, +that is to supplement the description of facts by expressions of +approbation or censure, either from the point of view of a moral ideal, +general or particular (the ideal of a sect, a party, or a nation), or +from the practical point of view, by examining, as Polybius did, whether +historical actions were well or ill adapted to their purpose. An +addition of this kind could be made to any descriptive study: the +naturalist might express his sympathy with or his admiration for an +animal, he might condemn the ferocity of the tiger, and praise the +devotion of the hen to her chickens. But it is obvious that in history, +as in every other subject, judgments of this kind are foreign to +science. + +[208] Comparison between two facts of detail belonging to very different +aggregates (for example the comparison of Abd-el-Kader with Jagurtha, of +Napoleon with Sforza) is a striking method of exposition, but not a +means of reaching a scientific conclusion. + +[209] This system is still followed by several contemporary authors, the +Belgian jurist Laurent in his _Études sur l'histoire de l'humanité_, the +German Rocholl, and even Flint, the English historian of the philosophy +of history. + +[210] Thus Taine, in _Les origines de la France Contemporaine_, explains +the origin of the privileges of the _ancien régime_ by the services +formerly rendered by the privileged classes. + +[211] A good criticism of the theory of progress will be found in P. +Lacombe, _De l'histoire Considérée Comme Science_. + +[212] See the very clear declarations of one of the principal +representatives of linguistic science in France, V. Henry, _Antinomies +linguistiques_, Paris, 1896, 8vo. + +[213] See above, p. 284. + +[214] Lamprecht, in the article quoted, p. 247, after having compared +the artistic, religious, and economic evolutions of mediæval Germany, +and after having shown that they can all be divided into periods of the +same duration, explains the simultaneous transformations of the +different usages and institutions of a given society by the +transformations of the collective "social soul." This is only another +form of the same hypothesis. + +[215] The historians of literature, who began by searching for the +connection between the arts and the rest of social life, thus gave the +first place to the most difficult question. + +[216] For the earlier epochs, consult good histories of Greek, Roman, +and mediæval literature which contain chapters devoted to "historians." +For the modern period, consult the Introduction of M. G. Monod to vol. +i. of the _Revue historique_; the work by F. X. v. Wegde, _Geschichte +der deutschen Historiographie_ (1885), relates only to Germany, and is +mediocre. Some "Notes on History in France in the Nineteenth Century" +have been published by C. Jullian as an Introduction to his _Extraits +des historiens français du xixe siècle_ (Paris, 1897, 12mo). The +history of modern historiography has still to be written. See the +partial attempt by E. Bernheim, _Lehrbuch_, pp. 13 _sqq._ + +[217] It would be interesting to find out what are the earliest printed +books furnished with notes in the modern fashion. Bibliophiles whom we +have consulted are unable to say, their attention never having been +drawn to the point. + +[218] It is clear that the romantic methods which are used for the +purpose of obtaining effects of local colour and "revising" the past, +often puerile in the hands of the ablest writers, are altogether +intolerable when they are employed by any others. See a good example +(criticism of a book of M. Mourin by M. Monod) in the _Revue Critique_, +1874, ii. pp. 163 _sqq._ + +[219] It is a commonplace, and an error all the same, to maintain the +exact opposite of the above, namely, that the works of critical scholars +live, while the works of historians grow antiquated, so that scholars +gain a more solid reputation than historians do: "Père Daniel is now +read no longer, and Père Anselme is always read." But the works of +scholars become antiquated too, and the fact that not all the parts of +the work of Père Anselme have yet been superseded (that is why he is +still read), ought not to deceive us: the great majority of the works +written by scholars, like those of researchers in the sciences proper, +are provisional and doomed to oblivion. + +[220] "It is in vain that those professionally concerned try to deceive +themselves on this point; not everything in the past is interesting." +"Supposing we were to write the Life of the Duke of Angoulême," says +Pécuchet. "But he was an imbecile!" answers Bouvard; "Never mind; +personages of the second order often have an enormous influence, and +perhaps he was able to control the march of events."--G. Flaubert, +_Bouvard et Pécuchet_, p. 157. + +[221] As persons of moderate ability have a tendency to prefer +insignificant subjects, there is active competition in the treatment of +such subjects. We often have occasion to note the simultaneous +appearance of several monographs on the same subject. It is not rare for +the subject to be altogether devoid of importance. + +[222] Interesting subjects for monographs are not always capable of +being treated: there are some which the state of the sources puts out of +the question. This is why beginners, even those who have ability, +experience so much embarrassment in choosing subjects for their first +monographs, when they are not aided by good advice or good fortune, and +often lose themselves in attempting the impossible. It would be very +severe, and very unjust, to judge any one from the list of his _first_ +monographs. + +[223] In practice it is proper to give at the beginning a list of the +sources used in the whole of the monograph (with appropriate +bibliographical information as to the printed works, and in the case of +manuscripts, a mention of the nature of the documents and their +shelf-marks); besides, each special statement should be accompanied by +its proof: the exact text of the supporting document should be quoted, +if possible, so that the reader may be in a position to verify the +interpretation; otherwise an analysis of it should be given in a note, +or, at the least, the title of the document, with its shelf-mark, or +with a precise indication of the place where it was published. The +general rule is to put the reader in a position to know the exact +reasons for which such and such conclusions have been adopted at each +stage of the analysis. + +Beginners, resembling ancient authors in this respect, naturally do not +observe all these rules. Frequently, instead of quoting the text or the +titles of documents, they refer to these by their shelf-mark, or by the +title of the general collection in which they are printed, from which +the reader can learn nothing as to the nature of the text adduced. The +following is another mistake of the crudest kind, and yet of frequent +occurrence: Beginners, and persons of little experience, do not always +understand why the custom has been introduced of inserting footnotes; at +the bottom of the pages of the books they have they see a fringe of +notes; they think themselves bound to fringe their own books in the same +way, but their notes are adventitious and purely ornamental; they do not +serve either to exhibit the proof or to enable the reader to verify the +statements. All these methods are inadmissible, and should be vigorously +denounced. + +[224] Almost all beginners have an unfortunate tendency to wander off +into superfluous digressions, to amass reflections and pieces of +information which have no relevance to the main subject; they would +recognise, if they reflected, that the causes of this tendency are bad +taste, a kind of naïve vanity, sometimes mental confusion. + +[225] We meet with declarations like the following: "I have been long +familiar with the documents of this period and this class. I have an +impression that such and such conclusions, which I cannot prove, are +true." Of two things one: either the author can give the reasons for his +impression, and then we can judge them, or he cannot give them, and we +may assume that he has none of serious value. + +[226] This difference has a tendency to disappear. The most recent +alphabetical collections of historical facts (the _Realencyclopædie der +classischen Altertumswissenschaft_ of Pauly-Wissowa, the _Dictionnaire +des antiquités_ of Daremberg and Saglio, the _Dictionary of National +Biography_ of Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee) are furnished with a +sufficiently ample apparatus. It is principally in biographical +dictionaries that the custom of giving no proofs tends to persist; see +the _Allgemeine deutsche Biographie_, &c. + +[227] _Revue Critique_, 1874, i. p. 327. + +[228] The custom of appending to "histories," that is to narratives of +political events, summaries of the results obtained by the special +historians of art, literature, &c., still persists. A "History of +France" would not be considered complete if it did not contain chapters +on the history of art, literature, manners, &c., in France. However, it +is not the summary account of special evolutions, described at second +hand from the works of specialists, which is in its proper place in a +scientific "History"; it is the study of those general facts which have +dominated the special evolutions in their entirety. + +[229] It is hard to imagine what it is possible for the most interesting +and best established results of modern criticism to become, in the hands +of negligent and unskilful popularisers. The persons who know most of +these possibilities are those who have occasion to read the improvised +"compositions" of candidates in history examinations: the ordinary +defects of inferior popularisation are here pushed sometimes to an +absurd length. + +[230] Cf. _supra_, p. 266. + +[231] We have spoken above of the element of subjectivity which it is +impossible to eliminate from historical construction, and which has been +misinterpreted to the extent of denying history the character of a +science: this element of subjectivity which troubled Pécuchet (G. +Flaubert, _Bouvard et Pécuchet_, p. 157) and Sylvestre Bonnard (A. +France, _Le crime de Silvestre Bonnard_, p. 310), and which causes Faust +to say: + + "Die Zeiten der Vergangenheit + Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln. + Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst, + Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist, + In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln." + +["Past times are to us a book with seven seals. What you call the spirit +of the times is at bottom your own spirit, in which the times are +mirrored."--Goethe, _Faust_, i. 3.] + +[232] A saying attributed to a "Sorbonne professor" by M. de la +Blanchère (_Revue Critique_, 1895, i. p. 176). Others have declaimed on +the theme that the knowledge of history is mischievous and paralyses. +See F. Nietzsche, _Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen_, II. _Nutzen und +Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben_, Leipzig, 1874, 8vo. + +[233] History and the social sciences are mutually dependent on each +other; they progress in parallel lines by a continual interchange of +services. The social sciences furnish a knowledge of the present, +required by history for the purpose of making representations of the +facts and reasoning from documents. History gives the information about +evolutions which is necessary in order to understand the present. + +[234] The same institution has been adopted in German-speaking countries +under the name of _Leitfaden_ (guiding-thread), and in English-speaking +countries under the name of _Text-book_. + +[235] We must make an exception of Michelet's _Précis de l'histoire +moderne_, and do Duruy the justice to acknowledge that in his +school-books, even in the first editions, he has endeavoured, often +successfully, to make his narratives both interesting and instructive. + +[236] For a criticism of this method, see above, p. 265. + +[237] The most complete, and probably the most accurate, account of the +state of the secondary teaching of history after the reforms has been +given by a Spaniard, R. Altamira, _La Enseñanza de la historia_, 2nd +edition, Madrid, 1895, 8vo. + +[238] We are here treating only of France. But, in order to dispel an +illusion of the French public, we may remark that historical pedagogy is +still less advanced in English-speaking countries, where the methods +used are still mechanical, and even in German-speaking countries, where +it is hampered by the conception of patriotic teaching. + +[239] I have endeavoured, in a course of lectures at the Sorbonne, to do +a part of this work.--[Ch. S.] + +[240] Let it be noted, however, that to the question put to the +candidates for the modern Baccalaureate in July 1897, "What purpose is +served by the teaching of history?" eighty per cent. of the candidates +answered, in effect, either because they believed it, or because they +thought it would please, "To promote patriotism."--[C. V. L.] + +[241] This is what has been produced in Germany under the name of +_Quellenbuch_. + +[242] The same pedagogic theory will be found in the preface to my +_Histoire narrative et descriptive des anciens peuples de l'Orient_, +Supplement for the use of professors, Paris, 1890, 8vo.--[Ch. S.] + +[243] I have treated this question in the _Revue universitaire_, 1896, +vol. i.--[Ch. S.] + +[244] On the organisation of higher education in France at this epoch +and on the first reforms, see the excellent work of M. L. Liard, +_l'Enseignement supérieur en France_, Paris, 1888-94, 2 vols. 8vo. + +[245] E. Lavisse, _Questions d'enseignement national_, p. 12. + +[246] Cf. _supra_, p. 55. + +[247] _Revue historique_, lxiii. (1897), p. 96. + +[248] See the _Revue internationale d'enseignement_, Feb. 1893; the +_Revue universitaire_, June 1892, Oct. and Nov. 1894, July 1895; and the +_Political Science Quarterly_, Sept 1894. + +[249] _Revue historique_, l.c. p. 98. I have developed elsewhere what I +have here contented myself with stating. See the _Revue internationale +de l'enseignement_, Nov. 1897.--[C. V. L.] + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Study of History, by +Charles V. 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Langlois and Charles Seignobos + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Introduction to the Study of History + +Author: Charles V. Langlois + Charles Seignobos + +Translator: G. G. Berry + +Release Date: August 8, 2009 [EBook #29637] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRODUCTION--STUDY OF HISTORY *** + + + + +Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was +produced from scanned images of public domain material +from the Google Print project.) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<hr /> + +<h1 class="top15">INTRODUCTION</h1> + +<p class="head">TO THE</p> + +<h1>STUDY OF HISTORY</h1> + +<p class="head top5">BY</p> + +<h2>CH. V. LANGLOIS & CH. SEIGNOBOS</h2> + +<p class="head">OF THE SORBONNE</p> + +<p class="head top5">Translated by G. G. BERRY</p> + +<p class="head">With a Preface by F. YORK POWELL</p> + +<p class="c top15"><b>NEW YORK</b></p> + +<p class="c"><b>HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY</b></p> + +<p class="c"><b>1904</b></p> + +<table summary="toc" +cellspacing="2" +cellpadding="2" +style="margin:7% auto 7% auto; +text-align:center;border:4px double gray;padding:3%;"> +<tr><td><a href="#TO_THE_READER">TO THE READER</a></td></tr> +<tr><td><a href="#CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></td></tr> +<tr><td><a href="#AUTHORS_PREFACE">AUTHORS' PREFACE</a></td></tr> +<tr><td><a href="#INDEX">INDEX OF PROPER NAMES</a></td></tr> +<tr><td><a href="#NOTES">FOOTNOTES</a></td></tr> +</table> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">v</a></span></p> +<h3><a name="TO_THE_READER" id="TO_THE_READER"></a>TO THE READER</h3> + + +<p>It is a pleasure to recommend this useful and well-written little book +to English readers. It will both interest and help. There are, for +instance, a few pages devoted to the question of evidence that will be +an aid to every one desirous of getting at the truth respecting any +series of facts, as well as to the student of history. No one can read +it without finding out that to the historian history is not merely a +pretty but rather difficult branch of literature, and that a history +book is not necessarily good if it appears to the literary critic +'readable and interesting,' nor bad because it seems to him 'hard or +heavy reading.' The literary critic, in fact, is beginning to find out +that he reads a history as he might read a treatise on mathematics or +linguistics, at his peril, and that he is no judge of its value or lack +of value. Only the expert can judge that. It will probably surprise some +people to find that in the opinion of our authors (who agree with Mr. +Morse Stephens and with the majority of scholars here) the formation and +expression of ethical judgments, the approval or condemnation of Caius +Julius Cæsar, or of Cæsar Borgia, is not a thing within the historian's +province. His business is to find out what can be known about the +characters and situations with which he is engaged,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">vi</a></span> to put what he can +ascertain before his readers in a clear form, and lastly to consider and +attempt to ascertain what scientific use can be made of these facts he +has ascertained. Ethic on its didactic side is outside his business +altogether. In fact MM. Langlois and Seignobos write for those "who +propose to deal with documents [especially written documents] with a +view to preparing or accomplishing historic work in a scientific way." +They have the temerity to view history as a scientific pursuit, and they +are endeavouring to explain to the student who intends to pursue this +branch of anthropologic science the best and safest methods of +observation open to him, hence they modestly term their little book "an +essay on the method of historic sciences." They are bold enough to look +forward to a day, as not far distant, when a sensible or honest man will +no more dare to write history unscientifically than he would to-day be +willing to waste his time and that of others on observing the heavens +unscientifically, and registering as trustworthy his unchecked and +untimed observations.</p> + +<p>Whether we like it or not, history has got to be scientifically studied, +and it is not a question of style but of accuracy, of fulness of +observation, and correctness of reasoning, that is before the student. +Huxley and Darwin and Clifford have shown that a book may be good +science and yet good reading. Truth has not always been found repulsive +although she was not bedizened with rhetorical adornments; indeed, the +very pursuit of her has long been recognised as arduous but extremely +fascinating. <i>Toute trouvaille</i>,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">vii</a></span> as our authors aptly remark, <i>procure +une jouissance</i>.</p> + +<p>It will be a positive gain to have the road cleared of a mass of +rubbish, that has hindered the advance of knowledge. History must be +worked at in a scientific spirit, as biology or chemistry is worked at. +As M. Seignobos says, "On ne s'arrête plus guère aujourd'hui à discuter, +sous sa forme théologique la théorie de la Providence dans l'Histoire. +Mais la tendence à expliquer les faits historiques par les causes +transcendantes persiste dans des théories plus modernes où la +metaphysique se déguise sous des formes scientifiques." We should +certainly get rid in time of those curious Hegelianisms "under which in +lay disguise lurks the old theologic theory of final causes"; or the +pseudo-patriotic supposition of the "historic mission (Beruf) attributed +to certain people or persons." The study of historic facts does not even +make for the popular newspaper theory of the continuous and necessary +progress of humanity, it shows only "partial and intermittent advances, +and gives us no reason to attribute them to a permanent cause inherent +in collective humanity rather than to a series of local accidents." But +the historian's path is still like that of Bunyan's hero, bordered by +pitfalls and haunted by hobgoblins, though certain of his giant +adversaries are crippled and one or two slain. He has also his own +faults to master, or at least to check, as MM. Langlois and Seignobos +not infrequently hint, <i>e.g.</i> "Nearly all beginners have a vexatious +tendency to go off into superfluous digressions, heaping up reflexion +and information that have no bearing on the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">viii</a></span> main subject. They will +recognise, if they think over it, that the causes of this leaning are +bad taste, a kind of naïve vanity, sometimes a disordered mind." Again: +"The faults of historic works intended for the general public ... are +the results of the insufficient preparation of the bad literary training +of the popularisers." What an admirable criticism there is too of that +peculiarly German shortcoming (one not, however, unknown elsewhere), +which results in men "whose learning is ample, whose monographs destined +for scholars are highly praiseworthy, showing themselves capable, when +they write for the public, of sinning heavily against scientific +methods," so that, in their determination to stir their public, "they +who are so scrupulous and particular when it is a question of dealing +with minutiæ, abandon themselves like the mass of mankind to their +natural inclinations when they come to set forth general questions. They +take sides, they blame, they praise, they colour, they embellish, they +allow themselves to take account of personal, patriotic, ethical, or +metaphysical considerations. Above all, they apply themselves with what +talent has fallen to their lot to the task of creating a work of art, +and, so applying themselves, those of them who lack talent become +ridiculous, and the talent of those who possess it is spoilt by their +anxiety for effect."</p> + +<p>On the other hand, while the student is rejoicing at the smart raps +bestowed upon the Teutonic offender, he is warned against the error of +thinking that "provided he can make himself understood, the historian +has the right to use a faulty, low, careless, or clogged style.... +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">ix</a></span>Seeing the extreme complexity of the phenomena he must endeavour to +describe, he has not the privilege of writing badly. But he ought +<i>always</i> to write well, and not to bedizen his prose with extra finery +once a week."</p> + +<p>Of course much that is said in this book has been said before, but I do +not know any book wherein the student of history will find such an +organised collection of practical and helpful instructions. There are +several points on which one is unable to find oneself in agreement with +MM. Langlois and Seignobos, but these occur mainly where they are +dealing with theory; as far as practical work goes, one finds oneself in +almost perfect concurrence with them. That they know little of the way +in which history is taught and studied in England or Canada or the +United States is not at all an hindrance to the use of their book. The +student may enjoy the pleasure of making his own examples out of English +books to the rules they lay down. He may compare their cautions against +false reasoning and instances of fallacy with those set forth in that +excellent and concise essay of Bentham's, which is apparently unknown to +them. He will not fail to see that we in England have much to learn in +this subject of history from the French. The French archives are not so +fine as ours, but they take care to preserve their local and provincial +documents, as well as their national and central records; they give +their archivists a regular training, they calendar and make accessible +all that time and fate have spared of pre-revolutionary documents. We +have not got farther than the provision<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">x</a></span> of a fine central Record Office +furnished with very inadequate means for calendaring the masses of +documents already stored and monthly accumulating there, though we have +lately set up at Oxford, Cambridge, and London the regular courses of +palæography, diplomatic, and bibliography, that constitute the +preliminary training of the archivist or historical researcher. We want +more: we must have county archives, kept by trained archivists. We must +have more trained archivists at the disposal of the Deputy Keeper of the +Rolls, we must have such means as the <i>Bibliothèque de l'École des +Chartes</i> for full reports of special and minute investigations and +discoveries, for hand-lists and the like, before we can be considered as +doing as much for history as the heavily taxed French nation does +cheerfully, and with a sound confidence that the money it spends wisely +in science is in the truest sense money saved.</p> + +<p>For those interested in the teaching of history, this book is one of the +most suggestive helps that has yet appeared. With a blackboard, a text +(such as are now cheap), or a text-book (such as Stubbs or Prothero or +Gardiner), an atlas, and access to a decent public library and an +average local museum, the teacher who has mastered its intent should +never be at a loss for an interesting catechetical lecture or exposition +to a class, whether of adults or of younger folk.</p> + +<p>Not the least practical part of the work of MM. Langlois and Seignobos +has been the consideration they have given to such every-day issues as +the teacher is constantly called upon to face. History<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">xi</a></span> cannot safely be +neglected in schools, though it is by no means necessary that the +Universities should turn out large bodies of trained historians. It is +possible indeed that the serious study of history might gain were there +fewer external inducements at the Universities to lead to the popularity +of the History Schools. But in this very popularity there lies a great +opportunity for concerted efforts, not only to better the processes of +study, but also to clear off the vast arrears of classification and +examination of the erroneous historic material at our disposition in +this country.</p> + +<p>The historian has been (as our authors hint) too much the ally of the +politician; he has used his knowledge as material for preaching +democracy in the United States, absolutism in Prussia, Orleanist +opposition in France, and so on (English readers will easily recall +examples from their own countrymen's work): in the century to come he +will have to ally himself with the students of physical science, with +whose methods his own have so much in common. It is not patriotism, nor +religion, nor art, but the attainment of truth that is and must be the +historian's single aim.</p> + +<p>But it is also to be borne in mind that history is an excellent +instrument of culture, for, as our authors point out, "the practice and +method of historic investigation is a pursuit extremely healthful for +the mind, freeing it from the disease of credulity," and fortifying it +in other ways as a discipline, though precisely how to best use history +for this purpose is still in some ways uncertain, and after all it is a +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">xii</a></span>matter which concerns Pædagogic and Ethic more than the student of +history, though it is plain that MM. Langlois and Seignobos have not +neglected to consider it.</p> + +<p>One can hardly help thinking, too, that, in schools and places where the +young are trained, something might be gained by treating such books as +Plutarch's Lives not as history (for which they were never intended) but +as text-books of ethic, as examples of conduct, public or private. The +historian very properly furnishes the ethical student with material, +though it is not right to reckon the ethical student's judgment upon the +historian's facts as history in any sense. It is not an historian's +question, for instance, whether Napoleon was right or wrong in his +conduct at Jaffa, or Nelson in his behaviour at Naples; that is a matter +for the student of ethic or the religious dogmatist to decide: all that +the historian has to do is to get what conclusion he can out of the +conflict of evidence, and to decide whether Napoleon or Nelson actually +did that of which their enemies accused them, or, if he cannot arrive at +fact, to state probability, and the reasons that incline him to lean to +the affirmative or negative.</p> + +<p>As to the possibility of a "philosophy of history," a real one, not the +mockeries that have long been discredited by scientific students, the +reader will find some pregnant remarks here in the epilogue and the +chapters that precede it. There is an absence of unreasonable optimism +in our authors' views. "It is probable that hereditary differences have +contributed to determine events; so that in part historic evolution is +produced by physiological and anthropologic causes.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">xiii</a></span> But history +furnishes no trustworthy process by which it may be possible to +determine the action of those hereditary differences between man and +man," <i>i.e.</i> she starts with races 'endowed' each with peculiarities +that make them 'disposed to act' somewhat differently under similar +pressure. "History is only able to grasp the conditions of their +existence." And what M. Seignobos calls the final problem—<i>Is evolution +produced merely by changed conditions?</i>—must according to him remain +insoluble by the legitimate processes of history. The student may accept +or reject this view as his notions of evidence prompt him to do. M. +Seignobos has at all events laid down a basis for discussion in +sufficiently clear terms.</p> + +<p>As to the composition of the joint work we are told that M. Seignobos +has been especially concerned with the chapters that touch theory, and +M. Langlois with those that deal with practice. Both authors have +already proved their competence—M. Seignobos' labours on Modern History +have been widely appreciated, while M. Langlois' "Hand-book of Historic +Bibliography" is already a standard text-book, and bids fair to remain +so. We are grateful to both of them for the pains they have taken to be +clear and definite, and for their determination to shirk none of the +difficulties that have met them. They have produced a hand-book that +students will use and value in proportion to their use of it, a book +that will save much muddle of thought and much loss of time, a book +written in the right spirit to inspire its readers. We are not bound to +agree with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">xiv</a></span> all M. Seignobos' dogmas, and can hardly accept, for +instance, M. Langlois' apology for the brutal methods of controversy +that are an evil legacy from the theologian and the grammarian, and are +apt to darken truth and to cripple the powers of those who engage in +them. For though it is possible that the secondary effect of these +barbarous scuffles may sometimes have been salutary in deterring +impostors from 'taking up' history, I am not aware of any positive +examples to justify this opinion. There is this, however, to be said, +that fully conscious of their own fallibility, M. Langlois and his +excellent collaborator have supplied in their canons of criticism and +maxims the best corrections of any mistakes into which they may have +fallen by the way. Is not the House of Fame, as the poet tells us, a +more wonderful and quaintly wrought habitation than <i>Domus Dedali</i> +itself? And may not honest historians be pardoned if they are sometimes +confused for a brief moment by the never-ending noise and marvellous +motion of that deceptive mint and treasury, and fatigued by the +continual trial and examination of the material that issues therefrom? +The student will, at least, learn from MM. Langlois and Seignobos to +have no mercy on his own shortcomings, to spare no pains, to grudge no +expenditure of time or energy in the investigation of a carefully chosen +and important historical problem, to aim at doing the bit of work in +hand so thoroughly that it will not need to be done again.</p> + +<p>It would be unjust to omit here to mention Dr. Bernheim's "Exposition of +Historic Method," or <i>Lehrbuch der historischen Methode</i>, so justly +praised <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">xv</a></span>and used by our authors, but I believe that as an introduction +to the subject, intended for the use of English or North American +students, this little volume will be found the handier and more +practical work. Of its value to English workers I can speak from +experience, and I know many teachers to whom it will be welcome in its +present form.</p> + +<p>It would have been easy to 'adapt' this book by altering its examples, +by modifying its excellent plan, by cutting here and carving there to +the supposed convenience of an imaginary public, but the better part has +been chosen of giving English readers this manual precisely as it +appeared in French. And surely one would rather read what M. Langlois, +an experienced teacher and a tried scholar, thought on a moot point, +than be presented with the views of some English 'adaptor' who had read +his book, as to what he would have said had he been an Englishman +lecturing to English students. That the present translator has taken +much pains to faithfully report his authors, I know (though I have not +compared English and French throughout every page), so that I can +commend his honest work to the reader as I have already commended the +excellent matter that he has been concerned in preparing for a wider +public than the French original could command.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">xvi</a></span></p> + +<p class="r">F. YORK POWELL.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Oriel College, Oxford</span>, <i>July 1898</i>.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">xvii</a></span></p> + +<hr /> + +<h3><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h3> + +<table summary="toc" +cellspacing="5" +cellpadding="2"> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td> </td><td align="right"><span class="smcap">Page</span></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td><span class="smcap">To the Reader</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_v">v</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#AUTHORS_PREFACE">AUTHORS' PREFACE</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>What this work is <i>not</i> meant to be—Works on the Philosophy +of History</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>What it <i>is</i> meant to be</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_2">2</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Existing works on Historical Methods—Droysen, Freeman, +Daunou, &c.</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Reasons why the study of method is useful</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_7">7</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Bernheim's <i>Lehrbuch</i>—In what way it leaves room for another +book</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_10">10</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Need of warning to students</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_11">11</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The general public</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_13">13</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Distribution of the work between the two authors</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_13">13</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#BOOK_I">BOOK I</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><i>PRELIMINARY STUDIES</i></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_Ia">CHAPTER I</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Documents: their nature, use, necessity</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_17">17</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Utility of <i>Heuristic</i>, or the art of discovering documents</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_18">18</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The difficulties of Heuristic—Ancient times—H. H. Bancroft—State +of things at the Renaissance</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_19">19</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">xviii</a></span>Growth of libraries—Collectors—Effects of revolutionary +confiscation in promoting the concentration and the +accessibility of documents</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_20">20</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Possible future progress—Need for the cataloguing and indexing +of documents</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_27">27</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Students and bibliographical knowledge—Effect of present +conditions in deterring men from historical work</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_32">32</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The remedies—Official cataloguing of libraries—Activity of +learned societies—of governments</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_34">34</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Different kinds of bibliographical works needed by students</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_37">37</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Different degrees of difficulty of Heuristic in different parts of +History—to be kept in view when choosing a subject of +research</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_38">38</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IIa">CHAPTER II</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">"AUXILIARY SCIENCES"</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Documents are raw material, and need a preliminary elaboration</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_42">42</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Obsolete views on the historian's apprenticeship—Mably, +Daunou</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_43">43</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Commonplace and exaggeration on this subject—Freeman—Various +futilities</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_45">45</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The scientific conception of the historian's apprenticeship—Palæography—Epigraphy—Philology—Diplomatic</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_48">48</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>History of Literature—Archæology</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_51">51</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Criticism of phrase "auxiliary sciences"—The subjects not all +<i>sciences</i>—None of them auxiliary to the <i>whole</i> of History</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>This scientific conception is of recent growth—The École des +Chartes—Modern manuals of Palæography, Epigraphy, +&c.—List of the chief of them</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_55">55</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">xix</a></span></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"> +<a href="#BOOK_II">BOOK II</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><i>ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS</i></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_Ib">CHAPTER I</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Direct and indirect knowledge of facts</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_63">63</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>History not a science of direct observation—Its data obtained +by chains of reasoning</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Twofold division of Historical Criticism: <i>External</i>, investigating +the transmission and origin of documents and the +statements in them; <i>Internal</i>, dealing with the content +of the statements and their probability</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_66">66</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Complexity of Historical Criticism</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_67">67</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Necessity of Criticism—The human mind naturally uncritical</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_68">68</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#SECTION_I">SECTION I.—EXTERNAL CRITICISM</a></td></tr> + + +<tr valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IIb">CHAPTER II</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">TEXTUAL CRITICISM</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Errors in the reproduction of documents: their frequency +under the most favourable conditions—Mistakes of +copyists—"Sound" and "corrupt" texts</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_71">71</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Necessity of emendation—The method subject to fixed rules</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_73">73</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Methods of textual criticism: (<i>a</i>) original preserved; (<i>b</i>) a +single copy preserved, conjectural emendation; (<i>c</i>) several +copies preserved, comparison of errors, families of manuscripts</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_75">75</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Different degrees of difficulty of textual criticism: its results +negative—The "emendation game"—What still remains +to be done</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_83">83</a><span class='pagenum'> +<a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">xx</a></span></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IIIa">CHAPTER III</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"> +CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Natural tendency to accept indications of authorship—Examples +of false attributions—Necessity of verification—Application +of internal criticism</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_87">87</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Interpolations and continuations—Evidence of style</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_92">92</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Plagiarism and borrowings by authors from each other—The +filiation of statements—The investigation of sources</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_93">93</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Importance of investigations of authorship—The extreme of +distrust to be avoided—Criticism only a means to an end</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_98">98</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IVa">CHAPTER IV</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Importance of classification—The first impulse wrong—The +note-book system not the best—Nor the ledger-system—Nor +the "system" of trusting the memory</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_101">101</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The system of slips the best—Its drawbacks—Means of +obviating them—The advantage of good "private librarianship"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Methods of work vary according to the object aimed at—The +compiling of <i>Regesta</i> or of a <i>Corpus</i>—Classification by +time, place, species, and form</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_105">105</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Chronological arrangement to be used when possible—Geographical +arrangement best for inscriptions—When these +fail, alphabetical order of "incipit"—Logical order useful +for some special purposes—Not for a <i>Corpus</i> or for <i>Regesta</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_107">107</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_Va">CHAPTER V</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Different opinions on the importance and dignity of external +criticism—It is justified by its necessity—But is only +preliminary to the higher part of historical work</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td></tr> + + +<tr valign="bottom"><td><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">xxi</a></span>Distinction between "historians" and "critical scholars" [Fr. +"<i>érudite</i>"]—Expediency, within limits, of the division of +labour in this respect—The exceptional skill acquired by +specialists—Difference of work the corollary of difference +of natural aptitudes</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_115">115</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The natural aptitudes required for external criticism—Fondness +for the work, which is distasteful to the creative +genius—The puzzle-solving instinct—Accuracy and its +opposite—"Froude's Disease"—Patience, order, perseverance</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_121">121</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The mental defects produced by devotion to external criticism—Its +paralysing effect on the over-scrupulous—Hypercriticism—Dilettantism</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The "organisation of scientific labour"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_135">135</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The harshness of judgment attributed to scholars, not always +rightly—Much of it a proper jealousy for historic truth—Bad +work nowadays soon detected</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#SECTION_II">SECTION II.—INTERNAL CRITICISM</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">INTERPRETATIVE CRITICISM (HERMENEUTIC)</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Internal criticism deals with the mental operations which +begin with the observation of a fact and end with the +writing of words in a document—It is divided into two +stages: the first concerned with what the author meant, +the second with the value of his statements</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_141">141</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Necessity of separating the two operations—Danger of reading +opinions into a text</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_143">143</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The analysis of documents—The method of slips—Completeness +necessary</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_145">145</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Necessity of linguistic study—General knowledge of a language +not enough—Particular variety of a language as used at a +given time, in a given country, by a given author—The +rule of context</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_146">146</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Different degrees of difficulty in interpretation</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">xxii</a></span>Oblique senses: allegory, metaphor, &c.—How to detect them—Former +tendency to find symbolism everywhere—Modern +tendency to find allusion everywhere</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_151">151</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Results of interpretation—Subjective inquiries</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_153">153</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE GOOD FAITH +AND ACCURACY OF AUTHORS</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Natural tendency to trust documents—Criticism originally due +to contradictions—The rule of methodical doubt—Defective +modes of criticism</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Documents to be analysed, and the irreducible elements +criticised separately</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The "accent of sincerity"—No trust to be placed in impressions +produced by the form of statements</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_161">161</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Criticism examines the conditions affecting (1) the composition +of the document as a whole; (2) the making of each particular +statement—In both cases using a previously made +list of possible reasons for distrust or confidence</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_162">162</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Reasons for doubting good faith: (1) the author's interest; +(2) the force of circumstances, official reports; (3) sympathy +and antipathy; (4) vanity; (5) deference to public +opinion; (6) literary distortion</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_166">166</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Reasons for doubting accuracy: (1) the author a bad observer, +hallucinations, illusions, prejudices; (2) the author not +well situated for observing; (3) negligence and indifference; +(4) fact not of nature to be directly observed</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_172">172</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Cases where the author is not the original observer of the +fact—Tradition, written and oral—Legend—Anecdotes—Anonymous +statements</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Special reasons without which anonymous statements are not +to be accepted: (1) falsehood improbable because (<i>a</i>) the +fact is opposed to interest or vanity of author, (<i>b</i>) the fact +was generally known, (<i>c</i>) the fact was indifferent to the +author; (2) error improbable because the fact was too big +to mistake; (3) the fact seemed improbable or unintelligible +to the author</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_185">185</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>How critical operations are shortened in practice</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_189">189</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">xxiii</a></span></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"> +THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR FACTS</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The conceptions of authors, whether well or ill founded, are +the subject-matter of certain studies—They necessarily +contain elements of truth, which, under certain restrictions, +may sometimes be inferred from them</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The statements of authors, taken singly, do not rise above +probability—The only <i>sure</i> results of criticism are <i>negative</i>—To +establish facts it is necessary to compare different +statements</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_194">194</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Contradictions between statements, real and apparent</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Agreement of statements—Necessity of proving them to be +independent—Perfect agreement not so conclusive as +occasional coincidence—Cases where different observations +of the same fact are not independent—General facts +the easiest to prove</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_199">199</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Different facts, each imperfectly proved, corroborate each +other when they harmonise</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_204">204</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Disagreement between documents and other sources of knowledge—Improbable +statements—Miracles—When science +and history conflict, history should give way</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_205">205</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#BOOK_III">BOOK III</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><i>SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS</i></td></tr> + + +<tr valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_Ic">CHAPTER I</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The materials of Historical Construction are isolated facts, +of very different kinds, of very different degrees of +generality, each belonging to a definite time and place, +of different degrees of certainty</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_211">211</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Subjectivity of History</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_214">214</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">xxiv</a></span>The facts learnt from documents relate to (1) living beings +and material objects; (2) actions, individual and collective; +(3) motives and conceptions</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The facts of the past must be imagined on the model of those +of the present—Danger of error especially in regard to +mental facts</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_219">219</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Some of the conditions of human life are permanent—The +study of these provides a framework into which details +taken from documents are to be fitted—For this purpose +systematic lists of questions are to be used, drawn up +beforehand, and relating to the universal conditions of life</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Outline of Historical Construction—The division of labour—Historians +must use the works of their colleagues and +predecessors, but not without critical precautions</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_228">228</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IIc">CHAPTER II</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">THE GROUPING OF FACTS</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Historical facts may be classified and arranged either according +to their time and place, or according to their nature—Scheme +for the <i>logical</i> classification of general historical +facts</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_232">232</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The selection of facts for treatment—The history of civilisation +and "battle-history"—Both needed</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The determination of groups of men—Precautions to be +observed—The notion of "race"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_238">238</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The study of institutions—Danger of being misled by metaphors—The +questions which should be asked</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_241">241</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Evolutions: operations involved in the study of them—The +place of particular facts (events) in evolution—Important +and unimportant facts</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Periods—How they should be defined</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_249">249</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IIIb">CHAPTER III</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Incompleteness of the facts yielded by documents—Cautions +to be observed in filling up the gaps by reasoning</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_252">252</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxv" id="Page_xxv">xxv</a></span>The argument from silence—When admissible</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_254">254</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Positive reasoning based on documents—The general principles +employed must enter into details, and the particular +facts to which they are applied must not be taken in +isolation</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_256">256</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IVb">CHAPTER IV</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULÆ</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>History, like every science, needs formulæ by which the facts +acquired may be condensed into manageable form</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_262">262</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Descriptive formulæ—Should retain characteristic features—Should +be as concrete as possible</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_264">264</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Formulæ describing general facts—How constructed—Conventional +forms and realities—Mode of formulating an +evolution</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Formulæ describing unique facts—Principle of choice—"Character" +of persons—Precautions in formulating +them—Formulæ describing events</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_270">270</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Quantitative formulæ—Operations by which they may be +obtained: measurement, enumeration, valuation, sampling, +generalisation—Precautions to be observed in generalising</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_274">274</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Formulæ expressing relations—General conclusions—Estimation +of the extent and value of the knowledge acquired—Imperfection +of data not to be forgotten in construction</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_279">279</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Groups and their classification</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_282">282</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The "solidarity" of social phenomena—Necessity of studying +causes—Metaphysical hypothesis—Providence—Conception +of events as "rational"—The Hegelian "ideas"—The +historical "mission"—The theory of the general +progress of humanity</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_285">285</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The conception of society as an organism—The comparative +method—Statistics—Causes cannot be investigated +directly, as in other sciences—Causation as exhibited in +the sequence of particular events</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_288">288</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The study of the causes of social evolution must look beyond +abstractions to the concrete, acting and thinking men—The +place of hereditary characteristics in determining +evolution</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_292">292</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xzvi" id="Page_xxvi">xxvi</a></span></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"> +<a href="#CHAPTER_Vb">CHAPTER V</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">EXPOSITION</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Former conceptions of history-writing—The ancient and +mediæval ideal—The "history of civilisation"—The +modern historical "manual"—The romantic ideal at the +beginning of the century—History regarded as a branch +of literature up to 1850</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_296">296</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The modern scientific ideal—Monographs—Right choice of +subject—References—Chronological order—Unambiguous +titles—Economy of erudition</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_303">303</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>General works—<i>A.</i> meant for students and specialists—Works +of reference or "repertories" and scientific manuals of +special branches of history—Their form and style—Collaboration +in their production—Scientific general +histories</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_307">307</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td><i>B.</i> Works intended for the public—The best kind of popularisation—The +inferior kind—Specialists who lower their +standard when they write for the public—The literary +style suitable for history</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_311">311</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#CONCLUSION">CONCLUSION</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Summary description of the methods of history—The future +of history</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_316">316</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The utility of history—Not directly applicable to present conditions—Affords +an explanation of the present—Helps +(and is helped by) the social sciences—A means of intellectual +culture</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_319">319</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#APPENDIX_I">APPENDIX I</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Late introduction of history as a subject of secondary instruction—Defective +methods employed up to the end of the +Second Empire</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_325">325</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxvii" id="Page_xxvii">xxvii</a></span>The reform movement—Questions involved relating to general +organisation—Choice of subjects—Order of teaching—Methods +of instruction—These questions to be answered +in the way that will make history most useful as a means +of social culture</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_328">328</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Material aids—Engravings—Books—Methods of teaching</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_332">332</a></td></tr> + + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center"><a href="#APPENDIX_II">APPENDIX II</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="bld" valign="bottom"><td colspan="2" align="center">THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE</td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>The different institutions—The Collège de France—The +Faculties of Letters—The École Normale—The École des +Chartes—The École pratique des hautes Études</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_335">335</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Reform of the Faculties—Preparation for degrees—The +Examination question—Principles on which it is to be +solved—The <i>Diplôme d'études supérieures</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td></tr> + +<tr valign="bottom"><td>Influence of the movement on the other institutions—Co-operation +of the institutions</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_345">345</a></td></tr> + +<tr class="hgt" valign="bottom"><td><a href="#INDEX">INDEX OF PROPER NAMES</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_347">347</a></td></tr> + + +<tr><td colspan="2"><a href="#NOTES">FOOTNOTES</a></td></tr> + +</table> + + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p> + +<h3><a name="AUTHORS_PREFACE" id="AUTHORS_PREFACE"></a>AUTHORS' PREFACE</h3> + + +<p>The title of this work is clear. However, it is necessary to state +succinctly both what our intention has, and what it has not been; for +under this same title, "Introduction to the Study of History," very +different books have already been published.</p> + +<p>It has not been our intention to give, as Mr. W. B. Boyce<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote-1" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 1.">[1]</a> has done, a +summary of universal history for the use of beginners and readers of +scanty leisure.</p> + +<p>Nor has it been our intention to add a new item to the abundant +literature of what is ordinarily called the "Philosophy of History." +Thinkers, for the most part not professed historians, have made history +the subject of their meditations; they have sought for its "analogies" +and its "laws." Some have supposed themselves to have discovered "the +laws which have governed the development of humanity," and thus to have +"raised history to the rank of a positive science."<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote-2" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 2.">[2]</a> These vast +abstract constructions inspire with an invincible <i>a priori</i> mistrust, +not the general public only, but superior minds as well. Fustel de +Coulanges, as his latest biographer tells us, was severe<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span> on the +Philosophy of History; these systems were as repugnant to him as +metaphysics to the positivists. Rightly or wrongly (without doubt +wrongly), the Philosophy of History, not having been cultivated +exclusively by well-informed, cautious men of vigorous and sound +judgment, has fallen into disrepute. The reader will be reassured—or +disappointed, as the case may be—to learn that this subject will find +no place in the present work.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote-3" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 3.">[3]</a></p> + +<p>We propose to examine the conditions and the methods, to indicate the +character and the limits, of historical knowledge. How do we ascertain, +in respect of the past, what part of it it is possible, what part of it +it is important, to know? What is a document? How are documents to be +treated with a view to historical work? What are historical facts? How +are they to be grouped to make history? Whoever occupies himself with +history performs, more or less unconsciously, complicated operations of +criticism and construction, of analysis and synthesis. But beginners, +and the majority of those who have never reflected on the principles of +historical methodology,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span> make use, in the performance of these +operations, of instinctive methods which, not being, in general, +rational methods, do not usually lead to scientific truth. It is, +therefore, useful to make known and logically justify the theory of the +truly rational methods—a theory which is now settled in some parts, +though still incomplete in some points of capital importance.</p> + +<p>The present "Introduction to the Study of History" is thus intended, not +as a summary of ascertained facts or a system of general ideas on +universal history, but as an essay on the method of the historical +sciences.</p> + +<p>We proceed to state the reasons why we have thought such a work +opportune, and to explain the spirit in which we have undertaken to +write it.</p> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>The books which treat of the methodology of the historical sciences are +scarcely less numerous, and at the same time not in much better favour, +than the books on the Philosophy of History. Specialists despise them. A +widespread opinion is expressed in the words attributed to a certain +scholar: "You wish to write a book on philology; you will do much better +to produce a book with some good philology in it. When I am asked to +define philology, I always answer that it is what I work at."<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote-4" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 4.">[4]</a> Again, +in reference to J. G. Droysen's <i>Précis of the Science of History</i>, a +certain critic expressed an opinion which was meant to be, and was, a +commonplace: "Generally speaking, treatises of this kind<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span> are of +necessity both obscure and useless: obscure, because there is nothing +more vague than their object; useless, because it is possible to be an +historian without troubling oneself about the principles of historical +methodology which they claim to exhibit."<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote-5" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 5.">[5]</a> The arguments used by these +despisers of methodology are strong enough in all appearance. They +reduce to the following. As a matter of fact, there are men who +manifestly follow good methods, and are universally recognised as +scholars or historians of the first order, without having ever studied +the principles of method; conversely, it does not appear that those who +have written on historical method from the logical point of view have in +consequence attained any marked superiority as scholars or historians: +some, indeed, have been known for their incompetence or mediocrity in +these capacities. In this there is nothing that need surprise us. Who +would think of postponing original research in chemistry, mathematics, +the sciences proper, until he had studied the methods employed in those +sciences? Historical criticism! Yes, but the best way to learn it is to +apply it; practice teaches all that is wanted.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote-6" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 6.">[6]</a> Take, too, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span> extant +works on historical method, even the most recent of them, those of J. G. +Droysen, E. A. Freeman, A. Tardif, U. Chevalier, and others; the utmost +diligence will extract from them nothing in the way of clear ideas +beyond the most obvious and commonplace truisms.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote-7" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 7.">[7]</a></p> + +<p>We willingly recognise that this manner of thinking is not entirely +wrong. The great majority of works on the method of pursuing historical +investigations and of writing history—what is called <i>Historic</i> in +Germany and England—are superficial, insipid, unreadable, sometimes +ridiculous.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote-8" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 8.">[8]</a> To begin<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span> with, those prior to the nineteenth century, a +full analysis of which is given by P. C. F. Daunou in the seventh volume +of his <i>Cours d'études historiques</i>,<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote-9" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 9.">[9]</a> are nearly all of them mere +treatises on rhetoric, in which the rhetoric is antiquated, and the +problems discussed are the oddest imaginable.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote-10" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 10.">[10]</a> Daunou makes merry +over them, but he himself has shown good sense and nothing more in his +monumental work, which at the present time seems little better, and +certainly not more useful, than the earlier treatises.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote-11" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 11.">[11]</a> As to the +modern ones, it is true<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span> that not all have been able to escape the two +dangers to which works of this character are exposed—that of being +obscure on the one hand, or commonplace on the other. J. G. Droysen's +<i>Grundriss der Historik</i> is heavy, pedantic, and confused beyond all +imagination.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote-12" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 12.">[12]</a> Freeman, Tardif, and Chevalier tell us nothing but what +is elementary and obvious. Their followers may still be observed +discussing at interminable length idle questions, such as: whether +history is a science or an art; what are the duties of history; what is +the use of history; and so on. On the other hand, there is incontestable +truth in the remark that nearly all the specialists and historians of +to-day are, as far as method goes, self-taught, with no training except +what they have gained by practice, or by imitating and associating with +the older masters of the craft.</p> + +<p>But though many works on the principles of method justify the distrust +with which such works are generally regarded, and though most professed +historians have been able, apparently with no ill results, to dispense +with reflection upon historical method, it would, in our opinion, be a +strained inference to conclude that specialists and historians +(especially<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span> those of the future) have no need to make themselves +acquainted with the processes of historical work. The literature of +methodology is, in fact, not without its value: gradually there has been +formed a treasury of subtle observations and precise rules, suggested by +experience, which are something more than mere common sense.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote-13" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 13.">[13]</a> And, +admitting the existence of those who, without having ever learnt to +reason, always reason well, by a gift of nature, it would be easy to set +against these exceptions innumerable cases in which ignorance of logic, +the use of irrational methods, want of reflection on the conditions of +historical analysis and synthesis, have robbed the work of specialists +and historians of much of its value.</p> + +<p>The truth is, that, of all branches of study, history is without a doubt +the one in which it is most necessary for students to have a clear +consciousness of the methods they use. The reason is, that in history +instinctive methods are, as we cannot too often repeat, irrational +methods; some preparation is therefore required to counteract the first +impulse. Besides, the rational methods of obtaining historical knowledge +differ so widely from the methods of all other sciences, that some +perception of their distinctive features is necessary to avoid the +temptation of applying to history the methods of those sciences which +have already been systematised. This explains why mathematicians and +chemists can, more easily than historians, dispense with an +"introduction" to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</a></span> their subject. There is no need to insist at greater +length on the utility of historical methodology, for there is evidently +nothing very serious in the attacks which have been made on it. But it +behooves us to explain the reasons which have led to the composition of +the present work. For the last fifty years a great number of intelligent +and open-minded men have meditated on the methods of the historical +sciences. Naturally we find among them many historians, university +professors, whose position enables them to understand better than others +the intellectual needs of the young; but at the same time professed +logicians, and even novelists. In this connection, Fustel de Coulanges +left a tradition behind him at the University of Paris. "He +endeavoured," we are told,<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote-14" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 14.">[14]</a> "to reduce the rules of method to very +precise formulæ ...; in his view no task was more urgent than that of +teaching students how to attain truth." Among these men, some, like +Renan,<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote-15" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 15.">[15]</a> have been content to insert scattered observations in their +general works or their occasional writings;<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote-16" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 16.">[16]</a> others, as Fustel de<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span> +Coulanges, Freeman, Droysen, Laurence, Stubbs, De Smedt, Von +Pflugk-Harttung, and so on, have taken the trouble to express their +thoughts on the subject in special treatises. There are many books, +"inaugural lectures," "academic orations," and review-articles, +published in all countries, but especially in France, Germany, England, +the United States, and Italy, both on the whole subject of methodology +and on the different parts of it. It will occur to the reader that it +would be a far from useless labour to collect and arrange the +observations which are scattered, and, one might say, lost, in these +numerous books and minor writings. But it is too late to undertake this +pleasant task; it has been recently performed, and in the most +painstaking manner. Professor Ernst Bernheim, of the University of +Greifswald, has worked through nearly all the modern works on historical +method, and the fruit of his labours is an arrangement under appropriate +headings, most of them invented by himself, of a great number of +reflections and selected references. His <i>Lehrbuch der historischen +Methode</i><a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote-17" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 17.">[17]</a> (Leipzig, 1894, 8vo) condenses, in the manner of German +<i>Lehrbücher</i>, the special literature of the subject of which it treats. +It is not our intention to do over again what has already been done so +well. But we are of opinion that even after this laborious and +well-planned compilation something still remains to be said. In the +first place, Professor Bernheim deals largely with metaphysical problems +which we consider devoid of interest; while, conversely, he entirely +ignores certain considerations which appear to us to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span> be, both +theoretically and practically, of the greatest importance. In the second +place, the teaching of the <i>Lehrbuch</i> is sound enough, but lacks vigour +and originality. Lastly, the <i>Lehrbuch</i> is not addressed to the general +public; both the language in which it is written and the form in which +it is composed render it inaccessible to the great majority of French +readers. This is enough to justify our undertaking to write a book of +our own, instead of simply recommending the book of Professor +Bernheim.<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote-18" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 18.">[18]</a></p> + + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>This "Introduction to the Study of History" does not claim, like the +<i>Lehrbuch der historischen Methode</i>, to be a treatise on historical +methodology.<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote-19" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 19.">[19]</a> It is a sketch in outline. We undertook its +composition, at the beginning of the scholastic year 1896-97, in order +that the new students at the Sorbonne might be warned what the study of +history is and ought to be.</p> + +<p>Long experience has taught us the necessity of such warnings. The +greater part of those who enter upon a career of historical study do so, +as a matter of fact, without knowing why, without having ever asked +themselves whether they are fitted for historical work, of the true +nature of which they are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span> often ignorant. Generally their motives for +choosing an historical career are of the most futile character. One has +been successful in history at college;<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote-20" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 20.">[20]</a> another feels himself drawn +towards the past by the same kind of romantic attraction which, we are +told, determined the vocation of Augustin Thierry; some are misled by +the fancy that history is a comparatively easy subject. It is certainly +important that these irrational votaries should be enlightened and put +to the test as soon as possible.</p> + +<p>Having given a course of lectures, to novices, by way of "Introduction +to the Study of History," we thought that, with a little revision, these +lectures might be made useful to others besides novices. Scholars and +professed historians will doubtless have nothing to learn from this +work; but if they should find in it a stimulus to personal reflection on +the craft which some of them practise in a mechanical fashion, that +would be something gained.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span> As for the public, which reads the works of +historians, is it not desirable that it should know how these works are +produced, in order to be able to judge them better?</p> + +<p>We do not, therefore, like Professor Bernheim, write exclusively for +present and future specialists, but also for the public interested in +history. We thus lay ourselves under an obligation to be as concise, as +clear, and as little technical as possible. But to be concise and clear +on subjects of this kind often means to appear superficial. Commonplace +on the one hand, obscurity on the other: these, as we have already seen, +are the evils between which we have the sorry privilege of choosing. We +admit the difficulty. But we do not think it insurmountable, and our +endeavour has been to say what we had to say in the clearest possible +manner.</p> + +<p>The first half of the book has been written by M. Langlois, the second +by M. Seignobos; but the two collaborators have constantly aided, +consulted, and checked each other.<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote-21" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 21.">[21]</a></p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap">Paris</span>, <i>August 1897</i>.<br /> + +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span></p> +<hr /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span></p> + +<h2 class="top15">INTRODUCTION TO<br /><br />THE STUDY OF HISTORY</h2> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span></p> + +<h3 class="top5"><a name="BOOK_I" id="BOOK_I"></a>BOOK I</h3> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span></p> + + +<p class="head2">PRELIMINARY STUDIES</p> + + +<h3 class="top5"><a name="CHAPTER_Ia" id="CHAPTER_Ia"></a>CHAPTER I</h3> + +<p class="head2">THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS (HEURISTIC)</p> + + +<p>The historian works with documents. Documents are the traces which have +been left by the thoughts and actions of men of former times. Of these +thoughts and actions, however, very few leave any visible traces, and +these traces, when there are any, are seldom durable; an accident is +enough to efface them. Now every thought and every action that has left +no visible traces, or none but what have since disappeared, is lost for +history; is as though it had never been. For want of documents the +history of immense periods in the past of humanity is destined to remain +for ever unknown. For there is no substitute for documents: no +documents, no history.</p> + +<p>In order to draw legitimate inferences from a document to the fact of +which it is the trace, numerous precautions are requisite which will be +indicated in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span> the sequel. But it is clear that, prior to any critical +examination or interpretation of documents, the question presents itself +whether there are any documents at all, how many there are, and where +they are. If I undertake to deal with a point of history,<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote-22" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 22.">[22]</a> of +whatever nature, my first step will be to ascertain the place or places +where the documents necessary for its treatment, if any such exist, are +to be found. The search for and the collection of documents is thus a +part, logically the first and most important part, of the historian's +craft. In Germany it has received the convenient, because short, name of +<i>Heuristik</i>. Is there any need to prove the capital importance of +Heuristic? Assuredly not. It is obvious that if it is neglected, if the +student does not, before he sets to work on a point of history, place +himself in a position to command all accessible sources of information, +his risk (no small one at the best) of working upon insufficient data is +quite unnecessarily increased: works of erudition or history constructed +in accordance with the rules of the most exact method have been +vitiated, or even rendered worthless, by the accidental circumstance +that the author was unacquainted with the documents by which those which +he had within reach, and with which he was content, might have been +illustrated, supplemented, or discredited. The scholars and historians +of to-day, standing, as they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></span> do, in other respects on an equality with +their predecessors of the last few centuries, are only enabled to +surpass them by their possession of more abundant means of +information.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote-23" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 23.">[23]</a> Heuristic is, in fact, easier to-day than it used to +be, although the honest Wagner has still good grounds for saying:</p> + +<p class="poem"> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"Wie schwer sind nicht die Mittel zu erwerben,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Durch die man zu den Quellen steigt!"<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote-24" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 24.">[24]</a></span><br /> +</p> + +<p>Let us endeavour to explain why the collection of documents, once so +laborious, is still no easy matter, in spite of the progress made in the +last century; and how this essential operation may, in the course of +continued progress, be still further simplified.</p> + + +<p class="top5">I. Those who first endeavoured to write history from the sources found +themselves in an embarrassing situation. Were the events they proposed +to relate recent, so that all the witnesses of them were not yet dead? +They had the resource of interviewing the witnesses who survived. +Thucydides, Froissart, and many others have followed this procedure. +When Mr. H. H. Bancroft, the historian of the Pacific Coast of +California, resolved to collect materials for the history of events many +of the actors in which were still alive, he mobilised a whole army of +reporters charged to extract conversations from them.<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote-25" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 25.">[25]</a> But<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span> when the +events to be related were ancient, so that no man then living could have +witnessed them, and no account of them had been preserved by oral +tradition, what then? Nothing was left but to collect documents of every +kind, principally written ones, relating to the distant past which was +to be studied. This was a difficult task at a time when libraries were +rare, archives secret, and documents scattered. About the year 1860, Mr. +Bancroft, in California, was in a situation analogous to that of the +earlier researchers in our part of the world. His plan was as follows: +He was rich; he cleared the market of all documents, printed or +manuscript; he negotiated with financially embarrassed families and +corporations for the purchase of their archives, or the permission to +have them copied by his paid agents. This done, he housed his collection +in premises built for the purpose, and classified it. Theoretically +there could not be a more rational procedure. But this rapid, American +method has only once been employed with sufficient resources and +sufficient consistency to ensure its success; at any other time, and in +any other place, it would have been out of the question. Nowhere else +have the circumstances been so favourable for it.</p> + +<p>At the epoch of the Renaissance the documents of ancient and modern +history were scattered in innumerable private libraries and in +innumerable depositories of archives, almost all of them inaccessible, +not to mention those which lay hidden beneath the soil, their very +existence as yet unsuspected. It was at that time a physical +impossibility to procure a list of all the documents serving for the +elucidation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span> of a question (for example, a list of all the manuscripts +still preserved of an ancient work); and if, by a miracle, such a list +was to be had, it was another impossibility to consult all these +documents except at the cost of journeys, expenses, and negotiations +without end. Consequences easy to foresee did, as a matter of fact, +ensue. Firstly, the difficulties of Heuristic being insurmountable, the +earliest scholars and historians—employing, as they did, not all the +documents, nor the best documents, but those documents on which they +could lay their hands—were nearly always ill-informed; and their works +are now without interest except so far as they are founded on documents +which have since been lost. Secondly, the first scholars and historians +to be relatively well-informed were those who, in virtue of their +profession, had access to rich storehouses of documents—librarians, +keepers of archives, monks, magistrates, whose order or whose +corporation possessed libraries or archives of considerable extent.<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote-26" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 26.">[26]</a></p> + +<p>It is true that collectors soon arose who, by money payments, or by more +questionable expedients, such as theft, formed, with more or less regard +for the interests of scientific study, "cabinets" of collections of +original documents, and of copies. But these<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span> European collectors, of +whom there has been a great number since the fifteenth century, differ +very noticeably from Mr. Bancroft. The Californian, in fact, only +collected documents relating to a particular subject (the history of +certain Pacific states), and his ambition was to make his collection +complete; most European collectors have acquired waifs and strays and +fragments of every description, forming, when combined, totals which +appear insignificant by the side of the huge mass of historical +documents which existed at the time. Besides, it was not, in general, +with any purpose of making them generally accessible that collectors +like Peiresc, Gaignières, Clairambault, Colbert, and many others, +withdrew from circulation documents which were in danger of being lost; +they were content (and it was creditable to do as much as this) to share +them, more or less freely, with their friends. But collectors (and their +heirs) are fickle people, and sometimes eccentric in their notions. +Certainly it is better that documents should be preserved in private +collections, than that they should be entirely unprotected and +absolutely inaccessible to the scientific worker; but in order that +Heuristic should be made really easier, the first condition is that all +collections of documents should be <i>public</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span><a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote-27" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 27.">[27]</a></p> + +<p>Now the finest private collections of documents—libraries and museums +combined—were naturally, in the Europe of the Renaissance, those +possessed by kings. And while other private collections were often +dispersed upon the death of their founders, these, on the contrary, +never ceased to grow; they were enriched, indeed, by the wreckage of all +the others. The <i>Cabinet des manuscrits de France</i>, for example, formed +by the French kings, and by them thrown open to the public, had, at the +end of the eighteenth century, absorbed the best part of the collections +which had been the personal work of the amateurs and scholars of the two +preceding centuries.<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote-28" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 28.">[28]</a> Similarly in other countries. The concentration +of a great number of historical documents in vast public (or +semi-public) establishments was the fortunate result of this spontaneous +evolution.</p> + +<p>The arbitrary proceedings of the Revolution were still more favourable, +and still more effective in securing the amelioration of the material +conditions of historical research. The Revolution of 1789 in France, +analogous movements in other countries, led to the violent confiscation, +for the profit of the state (that is, of everybody), of a host of +private archives and collections—the archives, libraries, and museums +of the crown, the archives and libraries of monasteries and suppressed +corporations, and so on. In<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span> France, in 1790, the Constituent Assembly +thus placed the state in possession of a great number of depositories of +historical documents, previously scattered, and guarded more or less +jealously from the curiosity of scholars; these treasures have since +been divided among four different national institutions. The same +phenomenon has been more recently observed, on a smaller scale, in +Germany, Spain, and Italy.</p> + +<p>The confiscations of the revolutionary period, as well as the +collections of the period which preceded it, have both been productive +of serious damage. The collector is, or rather often was, a barbarian +who did not hesitate, when he saw a chance of adding to his collection +of specimens and rare remains, to mutilate monuments, to dissect +manuscripts, to break up whole archives, in order to possess himself of +the fragments. On this score many acts of vandalism were perpetrated +before the Revolution. Naturally, the revolutionary procedure of +confiscation and transference was also productive of lamentable +consequences; besides the destruction which was the result of negligence +and that which was due to the mere pleasure of destroying, the +unfortunate idea arose that collections might be systematically +<i>weeded</i>, those documents only to be preserved which were "interesting" +or "useful," the rest to be got rid of. The task of weeding was +entrusted to well-meaning but incompetent and overworked men, who were +thus led to commit irreparable havoc in our ancient archives. At the +present day there are workers engaged in the task, one requiring an +extraordinary amount of time,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span> patience, and care, of restoring the +dismembered collections, and replacing the fragments which were then +isolated in so brutal a manner by these zealous but unreflecting +manipulators of historical documents. It must be recognised, moreover, +that the mutilations due to revolutionary activity and the +pre-revolutionary collectors are insignificant in comparison with those +which are the result of accident and the destructive work of time. But +had they been ten times as serious, they would have been amply +compensated by two advantages of the first importance, on which we +cannot lay too much stress: (1) the concentration, in a relatively small +number of depositories, of documents which were formerly scattered, and, +as it were, lost, in a hundred different places; (2) the opening of +these depositories to the public. The remnant of historical documents +which has survived the destructive effects of accident and vandalism is +now at last safely housed, classified, made accessible, and treated as +public property.</p> + +<p>Ancient historical documents are now, as we have seen, collected and +preserved chiefly in those public institutions which are called +archives, libraries, and museums. It is true that this does not apply to +<i>all</i> existing documents; in spite of the unceasing acquisitions by +purchase and gift which archives, libraries, and museums all over the +world have been making every year for a long time past, there still +exist private collections, dealers who supply them, and documents in +circulation. But the exceptions, which in this case are negligeable, do +not affect the general rule. Besides, all the ancient documents which, +in limited quantity, still range at large, are destined<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span> sooner or later +to find their way into the state institutions, whose doors are always +open to let in, but never to let out.<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote-29" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 29.">[29]</a></p> + +<p>It is to be desired, as a matter of principle, that the depositories of +documents (archives, libraries, and museums) should not be too numerous; +and we have pointed out that, fortunately, they are now beyond +comparison less numerous than they were a hundred years ago. Could not +the centralisation of documents, with its evident advantages for +researchers, be carried still further? Are there not still collections +of documents of which it would be hard to justify the separate +existence? Perhaps;<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote-30" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 30.">[30]</a> but the problem of the centralisation of +documents is no longer urgent, now that the processes of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span>reproduction +have been perfected, especially as the inconveniences arising from a +multitude of depositories are met by the expedient, now in general use, +of allowing the documents to travel: it is now possible for the student +to consult, without expense, in the public library of the city where he +resides, documents belonging, say, to the libraries of St. Petersburg, +Brussels, and Florence; we now rarely meet with institutions like the +Archives Nationales at Paris, the British Museum at London, and the +Méjanes Library at Aix-en-Provence, whose statutes absolutely prohibit +all lending-out of their contents.<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote-31" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 31.">[31]</a></p> + + +<p class="top5">II. It being granted that the majority of historical documents are now +preserved in public institutions (archives, libraries, and museums), +Heuristic would be very easy if only good descriptive catalogues had +been drawn up of all the existing collections of documents, if these +catalogues were furnished with indexes, or if general repertories +(alphabetical, systematic, &c.) had been made relating to them; lastly, +if there were some place where it was possible to consult the complete +collection of all these catalogues and their indexes. But Heuristic is +still difficult, because these conditions are, unfortunately, still very +far from being adequately realised.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span></p> + +<p>Firstly, there are depositories of documents (archives, libraries, and +museums) whose contents have never been even partially catalogued, so +that no one knows what is in them. The depositories of which we possess +complete descriptive catalogues are rare; there are many collections +preserved in celebrated institutions which have only been catalogued in +part, and the bulk of which still remains to be described.<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote-32" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 32.">[32]</a> In the +second place, what a variety there is among existing catalogues! There +are some old ones which do not now correspond to the present +classification of documents, and which cannot be used without +reference-tables; there are new ones which are equally based on obsolete +systems, too detailed or too summary; some are printed, others in +manuscript, on registers or slips; some are carefully executed and +clear, many are scamped, inadequate, and provisional. Taking printed +catalogues alone, it requires a whole apprenticeship to learn to +distinguish, in this enormous mass of confusion, between what is +trustworthy and what is not; in other words, to make any use of them at +all. Lastly, where are the existing catalogues to be consulted? Most of +the great libraries only possess incomplete collections of them; there +is no general guide to them anywhere.</p> + +<p>This is a deplorable state of things. In fact, the documents contained +in uncatalogued depositories<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span> and collections are practically +non-existent for researchers who have no leisure to work through the +whole of their contents for themselves. We have said before: no +documents, no history. But to have no good descriptive catalogues of +collections of documents means, in practice, to be unable to ascertain +the existence of documents otherwise than by chance. We infer that the +progress of history depends in great measure on the progress of the +general catalogue of historical documents which is still fragmentary and +imperfect. On this point there is general agreement. Père Bernard de +Montfaucon considered his <i>Bibliotheca bibliothecarum manuscriptarum +nova</i>, a collection of library catalogues, as "the most useful and most +interesting work he had produced in his whole life."<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote-33" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 33.">[33]</a> "In the present +state of science," wrote Renan in 1848,<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote-34" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 34.">[34]</a> "nothing is wanted more +urgently than a critical catalogue of the manuscripts in the different +libraries ... a humble task to all appearance; ... and yet the +researches of scholars are hampered and incomplete pending its +definitive completion." "We should have better books on our ancient +literature," says M. P. Meyer,<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote-35" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 35.">[35]</a> "if the predecessors of M. Delisle +[in his capacity of administrator of the Bibliothèque Nationale at +Paris] had applied themselves with equal ardour and diligence to the +cataloguing of the treasures committed to their care."</p> + +<p>It will be well to indicate briefly the causes and state the exact +consequences of a state of things<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span> which has been deplored as long as +scholars have existed, and which is improving, though slowly. "I assure +you," said Renan,<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote-36" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 36.">[36]</a> "that the few hundred thousand francs a Minister +of Public Instruction might apply to the purpose [of preparing +catalogues] would be better employed than three-quarters of the sum now +devoted to literature." It is rare to find a minister, in France or +elsewhere, convinced of this truth, and resolute enough to act +accordingly. Besides, it has not always been true that, in order to +obtain good catalogues, it is sufficient, as well as necessary, to make +a pecuniary sacrifice: it is only recently that the best methods of +describing documents have been authoritatively fixed; the task of +recruiting competent workers—no great difficulty nowadays—would have +been neither easy nor free from anxiety at an epoch when competent +workers were rarer than they are now. So much for the material +obstacles—want of money and want of men. A cause of another kind has +not been without its influence. The functionaries charged with the +administration of depositories of documents have not always displayed +the zeal which they now display for making their collections accessible +by means of accurate catalogues. To prepare a catalogue (in the exact +and at the same time summary form which is now used) is a laborious +task, a task without joy and without reward. It has often happened that +such a functionary, living, in virtue of his office, in the midst of +documents which he is at liberty to consult at any moment, and placed in +a much more favourable position than the general<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span> public for utilising +the collection without the aid of a catalogue, and making discoveries in +the process, has preferred to work for himself rather than for others, +and made the tedious construction of a catalogue a secondary matter +compared with his personal researches.</p> + +<p>Who are the persons that in our own day have discovered, published, and +annotated the greatest number of documents? The functionaries attached +to the depositories of documents. Without a doubt this circumstance has +retarded the progress of the general catalogue of historical documents. +The situation has been this: the persons who were the best able to +dispense with catalogues were precisely the persons whose duty it was to +make them.</p> + +<p>The imperfection of descriptive catalogues has consequences which +deserve our attention. On the one hand, we can never be sure that we +have exhausted all the sources of information; who knows what may be +held in reserve by the uncatalogued collections?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span><a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote-37" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 37.">[37]</a> On the other hand, +in order to obtain the maximum amount of information, it is necessary to +be thoroughly acquainted with the resources furnished by the existing +literature of Heuristic, and to devote a great deal of time to +preliminary researches. In point of fact, every one who proposes to +collect documents for the treatment of a point of history begins by +consulting indexes and catalogues.<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote-38" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 38.">[38]</a> Novices set about this important +operation so slowly, with so little skill, and with so much effort, as +to move more experienced workers to mirth or pity, according to their +disposition. Those who find amusement in watching novices stumble and +strain and waste their time in the labyrinth of catalogues, neglecting +those which are valuable, and thoroughly exploring those which are +useless, remember that they also have passed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span> through similar +experiences: let every one have his turn. Those who observe with regret +this waste of time and strength consider that, while inevitable up to a +certain point, it serves no good purpose; they ask whether something +might not be done to mitigate the severity of this apprenticeship to +Heuristic, which at one time cost them so dear. Besides, is not +research, in the present condition of its material aids, difficult +enough whatever the experience of the researcher? There are scholars and +historians who devote the best part of their powers to material +searches. Certain branches of historical work, relating chiefly to +mediæval and modern subjects (the documents of ancient history are +fewer, have been more studied, and are better catalogued than the +others), imply not merely the assiduous use of catalogues, not all +furnished with indexes, but also the personal inspection of the whole +contents of immense collections which are either badly catalogued or not +catalogued at all. Experience proves beyond a doubt that the prospect of +these long searches, which must be performed before the more +intellectual part of the work can be begun, has deterred, and continues +to deter, men of excellent abilities from undertaking historical work. +They are, in fact, confronted with a dilemma: either they must work on a +supply of documents which is in all probability incomplete, or they must +spend themselves in unlimited searches, often fruitless, the results of +which seldom appear worth the time they have cost. It goes against the +grain to spend a great part of one's life in turning over catalogues +without indexes, or in passing under review, one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span> after another, all the +items which go to form accumulations of uncatalogued <i>miscellanea</i>, in +order to obtain information (positive or negative) which might have been +obtained easily and instantaneously if the collections had been +catalogued and if the catalogues had been indexed. The most serious +consequence of the present imperfection of the material aids to +Heuristic is the discouragement which is sure to be felt by many able +men who know their worth, and have some sense of the due proportion of +effort and reward.<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote-39" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 39.">[39]</a></p> + +<p>If it lay in the nature of things that the search for historical +documents, in public depositories, must necessarily be as laborious as +it still is, we might resign ourselves to the inconvenience: no one +thinks of regretting the inevitable expenditure of time and labour which +is demanded by archæological research, whatever the results may prove to +be. But the imperfection of the modern instruments of Heuristic is quite +unnecessary. The state of things which existed for some centuries has +now been reformed indifferently; there is no valid reason why it should +not some day be reformed altogether. We are thus led, after treating of +the causes and the effects, to say a few words about the remedies.</p> + +<p>The instruments of Heuristic are being continually perfected, before our +eyes, in two ways. Every year witnesses an increase in the number of +descriptive catalogues of archives, libraries, and museums, prepared by +the functionaries attached to these institutions. In addition to this, +powerful<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span> learned societies employ experts to pass from one depository +to another cataloguing the documents there, in order to pick out all the +documents of a particular class, or relating to a special subject: thus +the society of Bollandists caused a general catalogue of hagiographical +documents to be prepared by its emissaries, and the Imperial Academy of +Vienna catalogued in a similar manner the monuments of patristic +literature. The society of the <i>Monumenta Germaniœ Historica</i> has for +a long time been conducting vast searches of the same kind; and it was +by the same process of exploring the museums and libraries of the whole +of Europe that the construction of the <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> +was lately rendered possible. Lastly, several governments have taken the +initiative in sending abroad persons charged to catalogue, on their +behalf, documents in which they are interested: thus England, the +Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, and other governments, +grant regular subsidies to agents of theirs occupied in cataloguing and +transcribing, in the great depositories of Europe, the documents which +relate to the history of England, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the +United States, and the rest.<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote-40" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 40.">[40]</a> With what rapidity and with what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span> +perfection these useful labours can be conducted, provided that a +competent staff, suitably directed, can be had as well as the money to +pay it, is shown by the history of the <i>general catalogue of the +manuscripts in the public libraries of France</i>. This excellent +descriptive catalogue was begun in 1885, and now, in 1897, it extends to +nearly fifty volumes, and will soon be completed. The <i>Corpus +Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> will have been produced in less than fifty +years. The results obtained by the Bollandists and the Imperial Academy +of Vienna are not less conclusive. Assuredly nothing is now lacking, +except funds, to secure the speedy endowment of historical study with +the indispensable instruments of research. The methods employed in the +construction of these instruments are now permanently fixed, and it is +an easy matter to recruit a trained staff. Such a staff must evidently +be largely composed of keepers of archives and professional librarians, +but it would also contain unattached workers with a decided vocation for +the construction of catalogues and indexes. Such workers are more +numerous than one would at first be inclined to think. Not that +cataloguing is easy: it requires patience, the most scrupulous +attention, and the most varied learning; but many minds are attracted by +tasks which, like this, are at once determinate, capable of being +definitely completed, and of manifest utility. In the large and +heterogeneous family of those who labour to promote the progress of +historical study, the makers of descriptive catalogues and indexes form +a section to themselves. When they devote themselves <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span>exclusively to +their art they acquire by practice, as one might expect, a high degree +of dexterity.</p> + +<p>While waiting for the fact to be clearly recognised that the time is +opportune for pushing vigorously in every country the construction of a +general catalogue of historical documents, we may indicate a palliative: +it is important that scholars and historians, especially novices, should +be accurately informed of the state of the instruments of research which +are at their disposal, and be regularly apprised of any improvements +that from time to time may be made in them. Experience and accident have +been for a long time trusted to supply this information; but empirical +knowledge, besides being costly, as we have already pointed out, is +almost always imperfect. Recently the task has been undertaken of +constructing catalogues of catalogues—critical and systematic lists of +all the catalogues in existence. There can be no doubt that few +bibliographical enterprises have possessed, in so great a degree, the +character of general utility.</p> + +<p>But scholars and historians often need, in respect of documents, +information not usually supplied by descriptive catalogues; they wish, +for example, to know whether such and such a document is known or not, +whether it has already been critically dealt with, annotated, or +utilised.<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote-41" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 41.">[41]</a> This information can only be found in the works of former +scholars and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span> historians. In order to become acquainted with these +works, recourse must be had to those "bibliographical repertories," +properly so called, of all kinds, compiled from very different points of +view, which have already been published. Among the indispensable +instruments of Heuristic must thus be reckoned bibliographical +repertories of historical literature, as well as repertories of +catalogues of original documents.</p> + +<p>To supply the classified list of all those repertories (repertories of +catalogues, bibliographical repertories, properly so called), together +with other appropriate information, in order to save students from +mistakes and waste of time, is the object of what we are at liberty to +call the "science of repertories," or "historical bibliography." +Professor Bernheim has published a preliminary sketch<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote-42" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 42.">[42]</a> of it, which +we have endeavoured to expand.<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote-43" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 43.">[43]</a> The expanded sketch bears date April +1896: numerous additions, not to speak of revision, would already be +necessary, for the bibliographical apparatus of the historical sciences +is being renewed, at the present time, with astonishing rapidity. A book +on the repertories for the use of scholars and historians is, as a +general rule, out of date the day after it has been completed.</p> + + +<p class="top5">III. The knowledge of repertories is useful to all; the preliminary +search for documents is laborious to all; but not in the same degree. +Certain parts of history, which have been long cultivated, now enjoy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span> +the advantage of having all their documents described, collected, and +classified in large publications devoted to the purpose, so that, in +dealing with these subjects, the historian can do all that need be done +at his desk. The study of local history does not generally require more +than local search. Some important monographs are based on a small number +of documents, all belonging to the same collection, and of such a nature +that it would be superfluous to look for others elsewhere. On the other +hand, a humble piece of work, such as a modest edition of a text of +which the ancient copies are not rare, and are to be found scattered in +several libraries of Europe, may have involved inquiries, negotiations, +and journeys without end. Since the majority of the documents of +mediæval and modern history are still unedited, or badly edited, it may +be laid down as a general principle that, in order to write a really new +chapter of mediæval or modern history, it is necessary to have long +haunted the great depositories of original documents, and to have, if we +may use the expression, worried their catalogues.</p> + +<p>It is thus incumbent on every one to choose the subject of his labours +with the greatest care, instead of leaving it to be determined by pure +chance. There are some subjects which, in the present state of the +instruments of research, cannot be treated except at the cost of +enormous searches in which life and intellect are consumed without +profit. These subjects are not necessarily more interesting than others, +and some day, perhaps to-morrow, improvements in the aids to research +will make them easily manageable. It is necessary for the student<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span> +consciously and deliberately to make his choice between different +historical subjects depend on the existence or non-existence of +particular catalogues of documents and bibliographical repertories; on +his relative inclination for desk work on the one hand, and the labour +of exploring depositories on the other; even on the facilities he has +for making use of particular collections. "Is it possible to do work in +the provinces?" Renan asked at the congress of learned societies at the +Sorbonne in 1889; and gave a very good answer to his own question: "At +least half one's scientific work can be done at one's own desk ... Take +comparative philology, for example: with an initial outlay of some +thousands of francs, and subscriptions to three or four special +publications, a student would command all the tools of his trade ... The +same applies to universal philosophy ... Many branches of study can thus +be prosecuted quite privately, and in the closest retirement."<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote-44" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 44.">[44]</a> +Doubtless, but there are "rarities, specialities, researches which +require the aid of powerful machinery." One half of historical work may +now be done in private, with limited resources, but only half; the other +half still presupposes the employment of such resources, in the way of +repertories and documents, as can only be found in the great centres of +study; often, indeed, it is necessary to visit several of these centres +in succession. In short, the case stands with history much as it does +with geography: in respect of some portions of the globe, we possess +documents published in manageable form sufficiently complete and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span> +sufficiently well classified to enable us to reason about them to good +purpose without leaving our fireside; while in the case of an unexplored +or badly explored region, the slightest monograph implies a considerable +expenditure of time and physical strength. It is dangerous to choose a +subject of study, as many do, without having first realised the nature +and extent of the preliminary researches which it demands; there are +instances of men struggling for years with such researches, who might +have been occupied to better advantage in work of another character. As +precautions against this danger, which is the more formidable to novices +the more active and zealous they are, an examination of the present +conditions of Heuristic in general, and positive notions of Historical +Bibliography, are certainly to be warmly recommended.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_IIa" id="CHAPTER_IIa"></a>CHAPTER II</h3> + +<p class="head2">"AUXILIARY SCIENCES"</p> + + +<p>Let us suppose that the preliminary searches, treated of in the +preceding chapter, have been made methodically and successfully; the +greater part, if not the whole, of the documents bearing on a given +subject have been discovered and made available. Of two things one: +either these documents have been already subjected to critical +elaboration, or they are in the condition of raw material; this is a +point which must be settled by "bibliographical" researches, which also, +as we have already observed, form part of the inquiries which precede +the logical part of the work. In the first case, where the documents +have already gone through a process of elaboration, it is necessary to +be in a position to verify the accuracy of the critical work; in the +second case, where the documents are still raw material, the student +must do the critical work himself. In both cases certain antecedent and +auxiliary knowledge of a positive kind, <i>Vor-und Hülfskenntnisse</i>, as +they are called, are every whit as indispensable as the habit of +accurate reasoning; for if, in the course of critical work, it is +possible to go wrong through reasoning badly, it is also possible to go +wrong out of pure ignorance.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span> The profession of a scholar or historian +is, moreover, similar in this respect to all other professions; it is +impossible to follow it without possessing a certain equipment of +technical notions, whose absence neither natural aptitude nor even +method can make good. In what, then, does the technical <i>apprenticeship</i> +of the scholar or the historian consist? Or, to employ language which, +though inappropriate, as we shall endeavour to show, is in more common +use: what, in addition to the knowledge of repertories, are the +"auxiliary sciences" of history?</p> + +<p>Daunou, in his <i>Cours d'études historiques</i>,<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote-45" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 45.">[45]</a> has proposed a question +of the same kind. "What studies," says he, "will the intending historian +need to have gone through, what kinds of knowledge ought he to have +acquired, in order to begin writing a work with any hope of success?" +Before him, Mably, in his <i>Traité de l'étude de l'histoire</i>, had also +recognised that "there are preparatory studies with which no historian +can dispense." But on this subject Mably and Daunou entertained views +which nowadays seem singular enough. It is instructive to mark the exact +distance which separates their point of view from ours. "First of all," +said Mably, "study the law of nature, public law, moral and political +science." Daunou, a man of great judgment, permanent secretary to the +Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, writing about 1820, divides +the studies which, in his opinion, constitute "the apprenticeship of the +historian," into three classes—literary, philosophical, historical. On +the "literary" studies he expatiates at great length: to begin with, +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span> historian must "have read with attention the great models." Which +great models? Daunou "does not hesitate" to place in the front rank "the +masterpieces of epic poetry;" for "it is the poets who have created the +art of narrative, and whoever has not learnt it from them cannot have +more than an imperfect knowledge of it." He further recommends the +reading of modern novels; "they will teach the method of giving an +artistic pose to persons and events, of distributing details, of +skilfully carrying on the thread of the narrative, of interrupting it, +of resuming it, of sustaining the attention and provoking the curiosity +of the reader." Finally, good historical works should be read: +"Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Plutarch among the +Greeks; Cæsar, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus among the Latins; and among +the moderns, Macchiavelli, Guicciardini, Giannone, Hume, Robertson, +Gibbon, the Cardinal de Retz, Vertot, Voltaire, Raynal, and Rulhière. +Not that I would exclude the others, but these will suffice to provide +all the styles which are suitable for history; for a great diversity of +form is to be met with in the works of these writers." In the second +place come philosophical studies; a thorough mastery of "ideology, +morals, and politics" is required. "As to the works from which knowledge +of this kind is to be obtained, Daguesseau has instanced Aristotle, +Cicero, Grotius: I should add the best ancient and modern moralists, +treatises on political economy published since the middle of the last +century, the writings on political science in general, and on its +details and application, of Macchiavelli, Bodin, Locke, Montesquieu, +Rousseau, Mably, and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span> most enlightened of their disciples and +commentators." In the third place, before writing history, "it is +evidently necessary to know it." "A writer will not give the world new +information on a subject like this unless he begins by making himself +master of what is already known of it." The future historian has already +made the acquaintance of the best historical works, and studied them as +models of style; "it will be to his advantage to read them a second +time, but endeavouring more particularly to grasp all the facts which +they contain, and to let them make so deep an impression on his mind +that they may be permanently fixed in his memory."</p> + +<p>These are the "positive" notions which, eighty years ago, were +considered indispensable to the general historian. At the same time +there was a confused idea that "in order to acquire a profound knowledge +of particular subjects" there were yet other useful branches of study. +"The subjects of which historians treat," says Daunou, "the details +which they occasionally light upon, require very extensive and varied +attainments." He goes on to particularise, observe in what terms: "very +often a knowledge of several languages, sometimes too some notion of +physics and mathematics." And he adds: "On these subjects, however, the +general education which we may assume to be common to all men of letters +is sufficient for the writer who devotes himself to historical +composition...."</p> + +<p>All the authors who, like Daunou, have attempted to enumerate the +preliminary attainments, as well as the moral or intellectual aptitudes, +necessary for "writing history," have either fallen into <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span>commonplace or +pitched their requirements ridiculously high. According to Freeman, the +historian ought to know everything—philosophy, law, finance, +ethnography, geography, anthropology, natural science, and what not; is +not an historian, in point of fact, likely enough in the course of his +study of the past to meet with questions of philosophy, law, finance, +and the rest of the series? And if financial science, for example, is +necessary to a writer who treats of contemporary finance, is it less so +to the writer who claims to express an opinion on the financial +questions of the past? "The historian," Freeman declares, "may have +incidentally to deal with any subject whatever, and the more branches of +knowledge he is master of, the better prepared he is for his own work." +True, all branches of human knowledge are not equally useful; some of +them are only serviceable on rare occasions, and accidentally: "We could +hardly make it even a counsel of perfection to the historian to make +himself an accomplished chemist, on the chance of an occasion in which +chemistry might be of use to him in his study;" but other special +subjects are more closely related to history: "for example, geology and +a whole group of sciences which have a close connection with geology.... +The historian will clearly do his own regular work better for being +master of them...."<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote-46" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 46.">[46]</a> The question has<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span> also been asked whether +"history is one of those studies anciently called <i>umbratiles</i>, for +which all that is wanted is a quiet mind and habits of industry," or +whether it is a good thing for the historian to have mingled in the +turmoil of active life, and to have helped to make the history of his +own time before sitting down to write that of the past. Indeed, what +questions have not been asked? Floods of ink have been poured out over +these uninteresting and unanswerable questions, the long and fruitless +debating of which has done not a little to discredit works on +methodology. Our opinion is that nothing relevant can be added to the +dictates of mere common sense on the subject of the apprenticeship to +the "art of writing history," unless perhaps that this apprenticeship +should consist, above everything, in the study, hitherto so generally +neglected, of the principles of historical method.</p> + +<p>Besides, it is not the "literary historian," the moralising and +quill-driving "historians," as conceived by Daunou and his school, that +we have had in view; we are here only concerned with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></span> those scholars and +historians who intend to deal with documents in order to facilitate or +actually perform the scientific work of history. These stand in need of +a <i>technical apprenticeship</i>. What meaning are we to attach to this +term?</p> + +<p>Let us suppose we have before us a written document. What use can we +make of it if we cannot read it? Up to the time of François Champollion, +Egyptian documents, being written in hieroglyphics, were, without +metaphor, a dead-letter. It will be readily admitted that in order to +deal with ancient Assyrian history it is necessary to have learnt to +decipher cuneiform inscriptions. Similarly, whoever desires to do +original work from the sources, in ancient or mediæval history, will, if +he is prudent, learn to decipher inscriptions and manuscripts. We thus +see why Greek and Latin epigraphy and mediæval palæography—that is, the +sum of the various kinds of knowledge required for the deciphering of +ancient and mediæval manuscripts and inscriptions—are considered as +"auxiliary sciences" to history, or rather, the historical study of +antiquity and the middle ages. It is evident that mediæval Latin +palæography forms part of the necessary outfit of the mediævalist, just +as the palæography of hieroglyphics is essential to the Egyptologist. +There is, however, a difference to be observed. No one will ever think +of devoting himself to Egyptology without having first studied the +appropriate palæography. On the other hand, it is not very rare for a +man to undertake the study of local documents of the middle ages without +having learnt to date their forms approximately, and to decipher<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span> their +abbreviations correctly. The resemblance which most mediæval writing +bears to modern writing is sufficiently close to foster the illusion +that ingenuity and practice will be enough to carry him through. This +illusion is dangerous. Scholars who have received no regular +palæographical initiation can almost always be recognised by the gross +errors which they commit from time to time in deciphering—errors which +are sometimes enough to completely ruin the subsequent operations of +criticism and interpretation. As for the self-taught experts who acquire +their skill by dint of practice, the orthodox palæographic initiation +which they have missed would at least have saved them much groping in +the dark, long hours of labour, and many a disappointment.</p> + +<p>Suppose a document has been deciphered. How is it to be turned to +account, unless it be first understood? Inscriptions in Etruscan and the +ancient language of Cambodia have been read, but no one understands +them. As long as this is the case they must remain useless. It is clear +that in order to deal with Greek history it is necessary to consult +documents in the Greek language, and therefore necessary to know Greek. +Rank truism, the reader will say. Yes, but many proceed as if it had +never occurred to them. Young students attack ancient history with only +a superficial tincture of Greek and Latin. Many who have never studied +mediæval French and Latin think they know them because they understand +classical Latin and modern French, and they attempt the interpretation +of texts whose literal meaning escapes them, or appears to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span> be obscure +when in reality perfectly plain. Innumerable historical errors owe their +origin to false or inexact interpretations of quite straightforward +texts, perpetrated by men who were insufficiently acquainted with the +grammar, the vocabulary, or the niceties of ancient languages. Solid +philological study ought logically to precede historical research in +every instance where the documents to be employed are not to be had in a +modern language, and in a form in which they can be easily understood.</p> + +<p>Suppose a document is intelligible. It would not be legitimate to take +it into consideration without having verified its authenticity, if its +authenticity has not been already settled beyond a doubt. Now in order +to verify the authenticity or ascertain the origin of a document two +things are required—reasoning power and knowledge. In other words, it +is necessary to reason from certain positive data which represent the +condensed results of previous research, which cannot be improvised, and +must, therefore, be learnt. To distinguish a genuine from a spurious +charter would, in fact, be often an impossible task for the best trained +logician, if he were unacquainted with the practice of such and such a +chancery, at such and such a date, or with the features common to all +the admittedly genuine charters of a particular class. He would be +obliged to do what the first scholars did—ascertain for himself, by the +comparison of a great number of similar documents, what features +distinguish the admittedly genuine documents from the others, before +allowing himself to pronounce judgment in any special instance. Will not +his task be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span> enormously simplified if there is in existence a body of +doctrine, a treasury of accumulated observations, a system of results +obtained by workers who have already made, repeated, and checked the +minute comparisons he would otherwise have been obliged to make for +himself? This body of doctrines, observations, and results, calculated +to assist the criticism of diplomas and charters, does exist; it is +called Diplomatic. We shall, therefore, assign to Diplomatic, along with +Epigraphy, Palæography, and Philology, the character of a subject +auxiliary to historical research.</p> + +<p>Epigraphy and Palæography, Philology, and Diplomatic with its adjuncts +(technical Chronology and Sphragistic) are not the only subjects of +study which subserve historical research. It would be extremely +injudicious to undertake to deal critically with literary documents on +which no critical work has as yet been done without making oneself +familiar with the results obtained by those who have already dealt +critically with documents of the same class: the sum of these results +forms a department to itself, which has a name—the History of +Literature.<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote-47" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 47.">[47]</a> The critical treatment of illustrative documents, such +as the productions of architecture, sculpture, and painting, objects of +all kinds (arms, dress, utensils, coins, medals, armorial bearings, and +so forth), presupposes a thorough acquaintance with the rules and +observations which constitute Archæology properly so<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span> called and its +detached branches—Numismatic and Heraldry.</p> + +<p>We are now in a position to examine to some purpose the hazy notion +expressed by the phrase, "the sciences auxiliary to history." We also +read of "ancillary sciences," and, in French, "sciences satellites." +None of these expressions is really satisfactory.</p> + +<p>First of all, the so-called "auxiliary sciences" are not all of them +<i>sciences</i>. Diplomatic, for example, and the History of Literature are +only systematised accumulations of facts, acquired by criticism, which +are of a nature to facilitate the application of critical methods to +documents hitherto untouched. On the other hand, Philology is an +organised science, and has its own laws.</p> + +<p>In the second place, among the branches of knowledge auxiliary—properly +speaking, not to history, but to historical research—we must +distinguish between those which every worker in the field ought to +master, and those in respect of which he needs only to know where to +look when he has occasion to make use of them; between knowledge which +ought to become part of a man's self, and information which he may be +content to possess only in potentiality. A mediævalist should <i>know</i> how +to read and understand mediæval texts; he would gain no advantage by +accumulating in his memory the mass of particular facts pertaining to +the History of Literature and Diplomatic which are to be found, in their +proper place, in well-constructed works of reference.</p> + +<p>Lastly, there are no branches of knowledge which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></span> are auxiliary to +History (or even historical research) in general—that is, which are +useful to all students irrespectively of the particular part of history +on which they are engaged.<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote-48" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 48.">[48]</a> It appears, then, that there is no +general answer possible to the question raised at the beginning of this +chapter: in what should the technical apprenticeship of the scholar or +historian consist? In what does it consist? That depends. It depends on +the part of history he proposes to study. A knowledge of palæography is +quite useless for the purpose of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></span>investigating the history of the +French Revolution, and a knowledge of Greek is equally useless for the +treatment of a question in mediæval French history.<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote-49" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 49.">[49]</a> But we may go so +far as to say that the preliminary outfit of every one who wishes to do +original work in history should consist (in addition to the "common +education," that is, general culture, of which Daunou writes) in the +knowledge calculated to aid in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></span> discovery, the understanding, and +the criticism of documents. The exact nature of this knowledge varies +from case to case according as the student specialises in one or another +part of universal history. The technical apprenticeship is relatively +short and easy for those who occupy themselves with modern or +contemporary history, long and laborious for those who occupy themselves +with ancient and mediæval history.</p> + +<p>This reform of the historian's technical apprenticeship which consists +in substituting the acquisition of positive knowledge, truly auxiliary +to historical research, for the study of the "great models," literary +and philosophical, is of quite recent date. In France, for the greater +part of the present century, students of history received none but a +literary education, after Daunou's pattern. Almost all of them were +contented with such a preparation, and did not look beyond it; some few +perceived and regretted, when it was too late for a remedy, the +insufficiency of their early training; with a few illustrious +exceptions, the best of them never rose to be more than distinguished +men of letters, incapable of scientific work. There was at that time no +organisation for teaching the "auxiliary sciences" and the technique of +research except in the case of French mediæval history, and that in a +special school, the École des chartes. This simple fact, moreover, +secured for this school during a period of fifty years a marked +superiority over all the other French (or even foreign) institutions of +higher education; excellent workers were there trained who contributed +many new results, while elsewhere people were idly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></span> discussing +problems.<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote-50" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 50.">[50]</a> To-day it is still at the École des chartes that the +mediævalist has the opportunity of going through his technical +apprenticeship in the best and most complete manner, thanks to the +combined and progressive three-years courses of Romance philology, +palæography, archæology, historiography, and mediæval law. But the +"auxiliary sciences" are now taught everywhere more or less adequately; +they have been introduced into the university curricula. On the other +hand, students' handbooks of epigraphy, palæography, diplomatic, and so +forth, have multiplied during the last twenty-five years. Twenty-five +years ago it would have been vain to look for a good book which should +supply the want of oral instruction on these subjects; since the +establishment of professorships "manuals" have appeared<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote-51" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 51.">[51]</a> which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></span> would +almost make them superfluous were it not that oral instruction, based on +practical exercises, has here an exceptional value. Whether a student +does or does not enjoy the advantage of a regular drilling in an +institution for higher education, he has henceforth no excuse for +remaining in ignorance of those things which he ought to know before +entering upon historical work. There is, in fact, less of this kind of +neglect than there used to be. On this head, the success of the +above-mentioned "manuals," with their rapid succession of editions, is +very significant.<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote-52" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 52.">[52]</a></p> + +<p>Here, then, we have the future historian armed with the preliminary +knowledge, the neglect of which would have condemned him to +powerlessness or to continual mistakes. We suppose him protected from +the errors without number which have their origin in an imperfect +knowledge of the writing and the language of documents, in ignorance of +previous work and the results obtained by textual criticism; he has an +irreproachable <i>cognitio cogniti et cognoscendi</i>. A very optimistic +supposition, by the way, as we are bound to admit. We know but too well +that to have gone through a regular course of "auxiliary sciences," or +to have read attentively the best treatises on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></span> bibliography, +palæography, philology, and so on, or even to have acquired some +personal experience by practical exercises, is not enough to ensure that +a man shall always be well informed, still less to make him infallible. +In the first place, those who have for a long time studied documents of +a given class or of a given period possess, in regard to these, +incommunicable knowledge in virtue of which they are able to deal better +than others with new documents which they may meet with of the same +class or period; nothing can replace the "special erudition" which is +the specialist's reward for hard work.<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote-53" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 53.">[53]</a> And secondly, specialists +themselves make mistakes: palæographers must be perpetually on their +guard not to decipher falsely; is there a philologist who has not some +faults of construing on his conscience? Scholars usually well informed +have printed as unedited texts which had already been published, and +have neglected documents it was their business to know. Scholars spend +their lives in incessantly perfecting their "auxiliary" knowledge, which +they rightly regard as never perfect. But all this does<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></span> not prevent us +from maintaining our hypothesis. Only let it be understood that in +practice we do not postpone work upon documents till we shall have +gained a serene and absolute mastery over all the "auxiliary branches of +knowledge:" we should never dare to begin.</p> + +<p>It remains to know how to treat documents supposing one has successfully +passed through the preliminary apprenticeship.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">61</a></span><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">60</a></span></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">62</a></span></p> + +<h3><a name="BOOK_II" id="BOOK_II"></a>BOOK II</h3> + +<h3 class="top5">ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS</h3> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">63</a></span></p> + + + +<h3 class="top5"><a name="CHAPTER_Ib" id="CHAPTER_Ib"></a>CHAPTER I</h3> + +<p class="head2">GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE</p> + + +<p>We have already stated that history is studied from documents, and that +documents are the traces of past events.<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote-54" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 54.">[54]</a> This is the place to +indicate the consequences involved in this statement and this +definition.</p> + +<p>Events can be empirically known in two ways only: by direct observation +while they are in progress; and indirectly, by the study of the traces +which they leave behind them. Take an earthquake, for example. I have a +direct knowledge of it if I am present when the phenomenon occurs; an +indirect knowledge if, without having been thus present, I observe its +physical effects (crevices, ruins), or if, after these effects have +disappeared, I read a description written by some one who has himself +witnessed the phenomenon or its effects. Now, the peculiarity of +"historical facts"<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote-55" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 55.">[55]</a> is this,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">64</a></span> that they are only known indirectly by +the help of their traces. Historical knowledge is essentially indirect +knowledge. The methods of historical science ought, therefore, to be +radically different from those of the direct sciences; that is to say, +of all the other sciences, except geology, which are founded on direct +observation. Historical science, whatever may be said,<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote-56" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 56.">[56]</a> is not a +science of observation at all.</p> + +<p>The facts of the past are only known to us by the traces of them which +have been preserved. These traces, it is true, are directly observed by +the historian, but, after that, he has nothing more to observe; what +remains is the work of reasoning, in which he endeavours to infer, with +the greatest possible exactness, the facts from the traces. The document +is his starting-point, the fact his goal.<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote-57" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 57.">[57]</a> Between this +starting-point and this goal he has to pass through a complicated series +of inferences, closely interwoven with each other, in which there are +innumerable chances of error; while the least error, whether committed +at the beginning, middle, or end of the work, may vitiate all his +conclusions.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">65</a></span> The "historical," or indirect, method is thus obviously +inferior to the method of direct observation; but historians have no +choice: it is the <i>only</i> method of arriving at past facts, and we shall +see later on<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote-58" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 58.">[58]</a> how, in spite of these disadvantages, it is possible +for this method to lead to scientific knowledge.</p> + +<p>The detailed analysis of the reasonings which lead from the inspection +of documents to the knowledge of facts is one of the chief parts of +Historical Methodology. It is the domain of criticism. The seven +following chapters will be devoted to it. We shall endeavour, first of +all, to give a very summary sketch of the general lines and main +divisions of the subject.</p> + +<p class="top5">I. We may distinguish two species of documents. Sometimes the past event +has left a material trace (a monument, a fabricated article). Sometimes, +and more commonly, the trace is of the psychological order—a written +description or narrative. The first case is much simpler than the +second. For there is a fixed relation between certain physical +appearances and the causes which produced them; and this relation, +governed by physical laws, is known to us.<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote-59" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 59.">[59]</a> But a psychological +trace, on the other hand, is purely symbolic: it is not the fact itself; +it is not even the immediate impression made by the fact upon the +witness's mind, but only a conventional symbol of that impression. +Written documents, then, are not, as material documents<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">66</a></span> are, valuable +by themselves; they are only valuable as signs of psychological +operations, which are often complicated and hard to unravel. The immense +majority of the documents which furnish the historian with +starting-points for his reasonings are nothing else than traces of +psychological operations.</p> + +<p>This granted, in order to conclude from a written document to the fact +which was its remote cause—that is, in order to ascertain the relation +which connects the document with the fact—it is necessary to reproduce +the whole series of intermediate causes which have given rise to the +document. It is necessary to revive in imagination the whole of that +series of acts performed by the author of the document which begins with +the fact observed by him and ends with the manuscript (or printed +volume), in order to arrive at the original event. Such is the aim and +such the process of critical analysis.<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote-60" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 60.">[60]</a></p> + +<p>First of all we observe the document. Is it now in the same state as +when it was produced? Has it deteriorated since? We endeavour to find +out how it was made in order to restore it, if need be, to its original +form, and to ascertain its origin. The first group of preliminary +investigations, bearing upon the writing, the language, the form, the +source, constitutes the special domain of <span class="smcap">External Criticism</span>, or +critical scholarship. Next comes <span class="smcap">Internal Criticism</span>: it endeavours, by +the help of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">67</a></span> analogies mostly borrowed from general psychology, to +reproduce the mental states through which the author of the document +passed. Knowing what the author of the document has said, we ask (1) +What did he mean? (2) Did he believe what he said? (3) Was he justified +in believing whatever he did believe? This last step brings the document +to a point where it resembles the data of the objective sciences: it +becomes an observation; it only remains to treat it by the methods of +the objective sciences. Every document is valuable precisely to the +extent to which, by the study of its origin, it has been reduced to a +well-made observation.</p> + +<p class="top5">II. Two conclusions may be drawn from what we have just said: the +extreme complexity and the absolute necessity of Historical Criticism.</p> + +<p>Compared with other students the historian is in a very disagreeable +situation. It is not merely that he cannot, as the chemist does, observe +his facts directly; it very rarely happens that the documents which he +is obliged to use represent precise observations. He has at his disposal +none of those systematic records of observations which, in the +established sciences, can and do replace direct observation. He is in +the situation of a chemist who should know a series of experiments only +from the report of his laboratory-boy. The historian is compelled to +turn to account rough and ready reports, such as no man <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">68</a></span>of science +would be content with.<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote-61" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 61.">[61]</a> All the more necessary are the precautions to +be taken in utilising these documents, the only materials of historical +science. It is evidently most important to eliminate those which are +worthless, and to ascertain the amount of correct observation +represented by those which are left.</p> + +<p>All the more necessary, too, are cautions on this subject, because the +natural inclination of the human mind is to take no precautions at all, +and to treat these matters, which really demand the utmost obtainable +precision, with careless laxity. It is true that every one admits the +utility of criticism in theory; but this is just one of those principles +which are more easily admitted than put into practice. Many centuries +and whole eras of brilliant civilisation had to pass away before the +first dawn of criticism was visible among the most intellectual peoples +in the world. Neither the orientals nor the middle ages ever formed a +definite conception of it.<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote-62" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 62.">[62]</a> Up to our own day there have been +enlightened men who, in employing documents for the purpose of writing +history, have neglected the most elementary precautions, and +unconsciously assumed false<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">69</a></span> generalisations. Even now most young +students would, if left to themselves, fall into the old errors. For +criticism is antagonistic to the normal bent of the mind. The +spontaneous tendency of man is to yield assent to affirmations, and to +reproduce them, without even clearly distinguishing them from the +results of his own observation. In every-day life do we not accept +indiscriminately, without any kind of verification, hearsay reports, +anonymous and unguaranteed statements, "documents" of indifferent or +inferior authority? It takes a special reason to induce us to take the +trouble to examine into the origin and value of a document on the +history of yesterday; otherwise, if there is no outrageous improbability +in it, and as long as it is not contradicted, we swallow it whole, we +pin our faith to it, we hawk it about, and, if need be, embellish it in +the process. Every candid man must admit that it requires a violent +effort to shake off <i>ignavia critica</i>, that common form of intellectual +sloth, that this effort must be continually repeated, and is often +accompanied by real pain.</p> + +<p>The natural instinct of a man in the water is to do precisely that which +will infallibly cause him to be drowned; learning to swim means +acquiring the habit of suppressing spontaneous movements and performing +others instead. Similarly, criticism is not a natural habit; it must be +inculcated, and only becomes organic by dint of continued practice.</p> + +<p>Historical work is, then, pre-eminently critical; whoever enters upon it +without having first been put on his guard against his instinct is sure +to be drowned in it. In order to appreciate the danger it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">70</a></span> is well to +examine one's conscience and analyse the causes of that <i>ignavia</i> which +must be fought against till it is replaced by a critical attitude of +mind.<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote-63" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 63.">[63]</a> It is also very salutary to familiarise oneself with the +principles of historical method, and to analyse the theory of them, one +by one, as we propose to do in the present volume. "History, like every +other study, is chiefly subject to errors of fact arising from +inattention, but it is more exposed than any other study to errors due +to that mental confusion which produces incomplete analyses and +fallacious reasonings.... Historians would advance fewer affirmations +without proof if they had to analyse each one of their affirmations; +they would commit themselves to fewer false principles if they made it a +rule to formulate all their principles; they would be guilty of fewer +fallacies if they were obliged to set out all their arguments in logical +form."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">71</a></span><a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote-64" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 64.">[64]</a></p> + + + +<h3><a name="SECTION_I" id="SECTION_I"></a><i>SECTION I.—EXTERNAL CRITICISM</i></h3> + + + +<h3 class="top5"><a name="CHAPTER_IIb" id="CHAPTER_IIb"></a>CHAPTER II</h3> + +<p class="head2">TEXTUAL CRITICISM</p> + + +<p>Let us suppose that an author of our own day has written a book: he +sends his manuscript to the printer; with his own hand he corrects the +proofs, and marks them "Press." A book which is printed under these +conditions comes into our hands in what is, for a document, a very good +condition. Whoever the author may be, and whatever his sentiments and +intentions, we can be certain—and this is the only point that concerns +us at present—that we have before us a fairly accurate reproduction of +the text which he wrote. We are obliged to say "fairly accurate," for if +the author has corrected his proofs badly, or if the printers have not +paid proper attention to his corrections, the reproduction of the +original text is imperfect, even in this specially favourable case. +Printers not unfrequently make a man say something which he never meant +to say, and which he does not notice till too late.</p> + +<p>Sometimes it is required to reproduce a work the author of which is +dead, and the autograph manuscript of which cannot be sent to the +printer. This was the case with the <i>Mémoires d'outre-tombe</i> of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">72</a></span> +Chateaubriand, for example; it is of daily occurrence in regard to the +familiar correspondence of well-known persons which is printed in haste +to satisfy the curiosity of the public, and of which the original +manuscript is very fragile. First the text is copied; it is then set up +by the compositor from the copy, which comes to the same thing as +copying it again; this second copy is lastly, or ought to be, collated +(in the proofs) with the first copy, or, better still, with the +original, by some one who takes the place of the deceased author. The +guarantees of accuracy are fewer in this case than in the first; for +between the original and the ultimate reproduction there is one +intermediary the more (the manuscript copy), and it may be that the +original is hard for anybody but the author to decipher. And, in fact, +the text of memoirs and posthumous correspondence is often disfigured by +errors of transcription and punctuation occurring in editions which at +first sight give the impression of having been carefully executed.<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote-65" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 65.">[65]</a></p> + +<p>Turning now to ancient documents, let us ask in what state they have +been preserved. In nearly every case the originals have been lost, and +we have nothing but copies. Have these copies been made directly from +the originals? No; they are copies of copies. The scribes who executed +them were not by any means all of them capable and conscientious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">73</a></span> men; +they often transcribed texts which they did not understand at all, or +which they understood incorrectly, and it was not always the fashion, as +it was in the time of the Carlovingian Renaissance, to compare the +copies with the originals.<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote-66" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 66.">[66]</a></p> + +<p>If our printed books, after the successive revisions of author and +printer's reader, are still but imperfect reproductions, it is only to +be expected that ancient documents, copied and recopied as they have +been for centuries with very little care, and exposed at every fresh +transcription to new risk of alteration, should have reached us full of +inaccuracies.</p> + +<p>There is thus an obvious precaution to be taken. Before using a document +we must find out whether its text is "sound"—that is, in as close +agreement as possible with the original manuscript of the author; and +when the text is "corrupt" we must emend it. In using a text which has +been corrupted in transmission, we run the risk of attributing to the +author what really comes from the copyists. There are actual cases of +theories which were based on passages falsified in transmission, and +which collapsed as soon as the true readings were discovered or +restored. Printers' errors and mistakes in copying are not always +innocuous or merely diverting; they are sometimes insidious and capable +of misleading the reader.<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote-67" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 67.">[67]</a></p> + +<p>One would naturally suppose that historians of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">74</a></span> repute would always make +it a rule to procure "sound" texts, properly emended and restored, of +the texts they have to consult. That is a mistake. For a long time +historians simply used the texts which they had within easy reach, +without verifying their accuracy. And, what is more, the very scholars +whose business it is to edit texts did not discover the art of restoring +them all at once; not so very long ago, documents were commonly edited +from the first copies, good or bad, that came to hand, combined and +corrected at random. Editions of ancient texts are nowadays mostly +"critical;" but it is not yet thirty years since the publication of the +first "critical editions" of the great works of the middle ages, and the +critical text of some ancient classics (Pausanias, for example) has +still to be constructed.</p> + +<p>Not all historical documents have as yet been published in a form +calculated to give historians the security they need, and some +historians still act as if they had not realised that an unsettled text, +as such, requires cautious handling. Still, considerable progress has +been made. From the experience accumulated by several generations of +scholars there has been evolved a recognised method of purifying and +restoring texts. No part of historical method has a more solid +foundation, or is more generally known. It is clearly explained in +several works of popular philology.<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote-68" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 68.">[68]</a> For this reason we shall here be +content to give a general view of its essential principles, and to +indicate its results.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">75</a></span></p> + +<p class="top5">I. We will suppose a document has not been edited in conformity with +critical rules. How are we to proceed in order to construct the best +possible text? Three cases present themselves.</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The most simple case is that in which we possess the original, the +author's autograph itself. There is then nothing to do but to reproduce +the text of it with absolute fidelity.<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote-69" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 69.">[69]</a> Theoretically nothing can be +easier; in practice this elementary operation demands a sustained +attention of which not every one is capable. If any one doubts it, let +him try. Copyists who never make mistakes and never allow their +attention to be distracted are rare even among scholars.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">76</a></span></p><p>(<i>b</i>) Second case. The original has been lost; only a single copy of it +is known. It is necessary to be cautious, for the probability is that +this copy contains errors.</p> + +<p>Texts degenerate in accordance with certain laws. A great deal of pains +has been taken to discover and classify the causes and the ordinary +forms of the differences which are observed between originals and +copies; and hence rules have been deduced which may be applied to the +conjectural restoration of those passages in a unique copy of a lost +original which are certainly corrupt (because unintelligible), or are so +in all probability.</p> + +<p>Alterations of an original occurring in a copy—"traditional variants," +as they are called—are due either to fraud or to error. Some copyists +have deliberately modified or suppressed passages.<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote-70" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 70.">[70]</a> Nearly all +copyists have committed errors of judgment or accidental errors. Errors +of judgment when half-educated and not wholly intelligent copyists have +thought it their duty to correct passages and words in the original +which they could not understand.<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote-71" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 71.">[71]</a> Accidental errors when they misread +while copying, or misheard while writing from dictation, or when they +involuntarily made slips of the pen.</p> + +<p>Modifications arising from fraud or errors of judgment are often very +difficult to rectify, or even to discover. Some accidental errors (the +omission of several lines, for example) are irreparable in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">77</a></span> case we +are considering, that of a unique copy. But most accidental errors can +be detected by any one who knows the ordinary forms: confusions of +sense, letters, and words, transpositions of words, letters, and +syllables, dittography (unmeaning repetition of letters or syllables), +haplography (syllables or words written once only where they should have +been written twice), false divisions between words, badly punctuated +sentences, and other mistakes of the same kind. Errors of these various +types have been made by the scribes of every country and every age, +irrespectively of the handwriting and language of the originals. But +some confusions of letters occur frequently in copies of uncial +originals, and others in copies of minuscule originals. Confusions of +sense and of words are explained by analogies of vocabulary or +pronunciation, which naturally vary from language to language and from +epoch to epoch. The general theory of conjectural emendation reduces to +the sketch we have just given; there is no general apprenticeship to the +art. What a man learns is not to restore any text that may be put before +him, but Greek texts, Latin texts, French texts, and so on, as the case +may be; for the conjectural emendation of a text presupposes, besides +general notions on the processes by which texts degenerate, a profound +knowledge of (1) a special language; (2) a special handwriting; (3) <i>the +confusions (of sense, letters, and words) which were habitual to those +who copied texts of that language written in that style of handwriting</i>. +To aid in the apprenticeship to the conjectural emendation of Greek and +Latin texts, tabulated lists (alphabetical and systematic) of various +readings, frequent<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">78</a></span> confusions, and probable corrections, have been +drawn up.<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote-72" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 72.">[72]</a> It is true that they cannot take the place of practical +work, done under the guidance of experts, but they are of very great use +to the experts themselves.<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote-73" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 73.">[73]</a></p> + +<p>It would be easy to give a list of happy emendations. The most +satisfactory are those whose correctness is obvious palæographically, as +is the case with the classical emendation by Madvig of the text of +Seneca's Letters (89, 4). The old reading was: "Philosophia unde dicta +sit, apparet; ipso enim nomine fatetur. Quidam et sapientiam ita quidam +finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum sapientiam ..."—which +does not make sense. It used to be supposed that words had dropped out +between <i>ita</i> and <i>quidam</i>. Madvig pictured to himself the text of the +lost archetype, which was written in capitals, and in which, as was +usual before the eighth century, the words were not separated (<i>scriptio +continua</i>), nor the sentences punctuated; he asked himself whether the +copyist, with such an archetype before him, had not divided the words at +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">79</a></span>random, and he had no difficulty in reading: "...ipso enim nomine +fatetur quid amet. Sapientiam ita quidam finierunt...." Blass, Reinach, +and Lindsay, in the works referred to in the note, mention several other +masterly and elegant emendations. Nor have the Hellenists and Latinists +any monopoly; equally brilliant emendations might be culled from the +works of Orientalists, Romancists, and Germanists, now that texts of +Oriental, Romance, and Germanic languages have been subjected to verbal +criticism. We have already stated that scholarly corrections are +possible even in the text of quite modern documents, reproduced +typographically under the most favourable conditions.</p> + +<p>Perhaps no one, in our day, has equalled Madvig in the art of +conjectural emendation. But Madvig himself had no high opinion of the +work of modern scholarship. He thought that the humanists of the +sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were, in this respect, better +trained than modern scholars. The conjectural emendation of Greek and +Latin texts is, in fact, a branch of sport, success in which is +proportionate not only to a man's ingenuity and palæographical instinct, +but also to the correctness, rapidity, and delicacy of his appreciation +of the niceties of the classical languages. Now, the early scholars were +undoubtedly too bold, but they were more intimately familiar with the +classical languages than our modern scholars are.</p> + +<p>However that may be, there can be no doubt that numerous texts which +have been preserved, in corrupt form, in unique copies, have resisted, +and will continue to resist, the efforts of criticism. Very often +criticism ascertains the fact of the text having<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">80</a></span> been altered, states +what the sense requires, and then prudently stops, every trace of the +original reading having been obscured by a confused tangle of successive +corrections and errors which it is hopeless to attempt to unravel. The +scholars who devote themselves to the fascinating pursuit of conjectural +criticism are liable, in their ardour, to suspect perfectly innocent +readings, and, in desperate passages, to propose adventurous hypotheses. +They are well aware of this, and therefore make it a rule to draw a very +clear distinction, in their editions, between readings found in +manuscripts and their own restorations of the text.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) Third case. We possess several copies, which differ from each +other, of a document whose original is lost. Here modern scholars have a +marked advantage over their predecessors: besides being better informed, +they set about the comparison of copies more methodically. The object +is, as in the preceding case, to reconstruct the archetype as exactly as +possible.</p> + +<p>The scholars of earlier days had to struggle, as novices have to +struggle now, in a case of this kind, against a very natural and a very +reprehensible impulse—to use the first copy that comes to hand, +whatever its character may happen to be. The second impulse is not much +better—to use the oldest copy out of several of different date. In +theory, and very often in practice, the relative age of the copies is of +no importance; a sixteenth-century manuscript which reproduces a good +lost copy of the eleventh century is much more valuable than a faulty +and retouched copy made in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">81</a></span> twelfth or thirteenth century. The third +impulse is still far from being good; it is to count the attested +readings and decide by the majority. Suppose there are twenty copies of +a text; the reading A is attested eighteen times, the reading B twice. +To make this a reason for choosing A is to make the gratuitous +assumption that all the manuscripts have the same authority. This is an +error of judgment; for if seventeen of the eighteen manuscripts which +give the reading A have been copied from the eighteenth, the reading A +is in reality attested only once; and the only question is whether it is +intrinsically better or worse than the reading B.</p> + +<p>It has been recognised that the only rational procedure is to begin by +determining in what relation the copies stand to each other. For this +purpose we adopt as our starting-point the incontrovertible axiom that +all the copies which contain the same mistakes in the same passages must +have been either copied from each other or all derived from a copy +containing those mistakes. It is inconceivable that several copyists, +independently reproducing an original free from errors, should all +introduce exactly the same errors; identity of errors attests community +of origin. We shall cast aside without scruple all the copies derived +from a single manuscript which has been preserved. Evidently they can +have no value beyond what is possessed by their common source; if they +differ from it, it can only be in virtue of new errors; it would be +waste of time to study their variations. Having eliminated these, we +have before us none but independent copies, which have been made +directly from the archetype, or secondary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">82</a></span> copies whose source (a copy +taken directly from the archetype) has been lost. In order to group the +secondary copies into <i>families</i>, each of which shall represent what is +substantially the same tradition, we again have recourse to the +comparison of errors. By this method we can generally draw up without +too much trouble a complete genealogical table (<i>stemma codicum</i>) of the +preserved copies, which will bring out very clearly their relative +importance. This is not the place to discuss the difficult cases where, +in consequence of too great a number of intermediaries having been lost, +or from ancient copyists having arbitrarily blended the texts of +different traditions, the operation becomes extremely laborious or +impracticable. Besides, in these extreme cases there is no new method +involved: the comparison of corresponding passages is a powerful +instrument, but it is the only one which criticism has at its disposal +for this task.</p> + +<p>When the genealogical tree of the manuscripts has been drawn up, we +endeavour to restore the text of the archetype by comparing the +different traditions. If these agree and give a satisfactory text, there +is no difficulty. If they differ, we decide between them. If they +accidentally agree in giving a defective text, we have recourse to +conjectural emendation, as if there were only one copy.</p> + +<p>It is, theoretically, much more advantageous to have several independent +copies of a lost original than to have only one, for the mere mechanical +comparison of the different readings is often enough to remove +obscurities which the uncertain light of conjectural criticism would +never have illuminated.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">83</a></span> However, an abundance of manuscripts is an +embarrassment rather than a help when the work of grouping them has been +left undone or done badly; nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the +arbitrary and hybrid restorations which are founded on copies whose +relations to each other and to the archetype have not been ascertained +beforehand. On the other hand, the application of rational methods +requires, in some cases, a formidable expenditure of time and labour. +Some works are preserved in hundreds of copies all differing from each +other; sometimes (as in the case of the Gospels) the variants of a text +of quite moderate extent are to be counted by thousands; several years +of assiduous labour are necessary for the preparation of a critical +edition of some mediæval romances. And after all this labour, all these +collations and comparisons, can we be sure that the text of the romance +is sensibly better than it would have been if there had been only two or +three manuscripts to work upon? No. Some critical editions, owing to the +apparent wealth of material applicable to the work, demand a mechanical +effort which is altogether out of proportion to the positive results +which are its reward.</p> + +<p>"Critical editions" founded on several copies of a lost original ought +to supply the public with the means of verifying the "<i>stemma codicum</i>" +which the editor has drawn up, and should give the rejected variants in +the notes. By this means competent readers are, at the worst, put in +possession, if not of the best possible text, at least of the materials +for constructing it.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">84</a></span><a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote-74" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 74.">[74]</a></p> + +<p class="top5">II. The results of textual criticism—a kind of cleaning and +mending—are purely negative. By the aid of conjecture, or by the aid of +conjecture and comparison combined, we are enabled to construct, not +necessarily a good text, but the best text possible, of documents whose +original is lost. What we thus effect is the elimination of corrupt and +adventitious readings likely to cause error, and the recognition of +suspected passages as such. But it is obvious that no new information is +supplied by this process. The text of a document which has been restored +at the cost of infinite pains is not worth more than that of a document +whose original has been preserved; on the contrary, it is worth less. If +the autograph manuscript of the Æneid had not been destroyed, centuries +of collation and conjecture would have been saved, and the text of the +Æneid would have been better than it is. This is intended for those who +excel at the "emendation game,"<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote-75" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 75.">[75]</a> who are in consequence fond of it, +and would really be sorry to have no occasion to play it.</p> + +<p class="top5">III. There will, however, be abundant scope for textual criticism as +long as we do not possess the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">85</a></span> exact text of every historical document. +In the present state of science few labours are more useful than those +which bring new texts to light or improve texts already known. It is a +real service to the study of history to publish unedited or badly edited +texts in a manner conformable to the rules of criticism. In every +country learned societies without number are devoting the greater part +of their resources and activity to this important work. But the immense +number of the texts to be criticised,<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote-76" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 76.">[76]</a> and the minute care required +by the operations of verbal criticism,<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote-77" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 77.">[77]</a> prevent the work of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">86</a></span> +publication and restoration from advancing at any but a slow pace. +Before all the texts which are of interest for mediæval and modern +history shall have been edited or re-edited <i>secundum artem</i>, a long +period must elapse, even supposing that the relatively rapid pace of the +last few years should be still further accelerated.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">87</a></span><a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote-78" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 78.">[78]</a></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_IIIa" id="CHAPTER_IIIa"></a>CHAPTER III</h3> + +<p class="head2">CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP</p> + + +<p>It would be absurd to look for information about a fact in the papers of +some one who knew nothing, and could know nothing, about it. The first +questions, then, which we ask when we are confronted with a document is: +Where does it come from? who is the author of it? what is its date? A +document in respect of which we necessarily are in total ignorance of +the author, the place, and the date is good for nothing.</p> + +<p>This truth, which seems elementary, has only been adequately recognised +in our own day. Such is the natural ἁκρισἱα of man, that those +who were the first to make a habit of inquiring into the authorship of +documents prided themselves, and justly, on the advance they had made.</p> + +<p>Most modern documents contain a precise indication of their authorship: +in our days, books, newspaper articles, official papers, and even +private writings, are, in general, dated and signed. Many ancient +documents, on the other hand, are anonymous, without date, and have no +sufficient indication of their place of origin.</p> + +<p>The spontaneous tendency of the human mind is to place confidence in the +indications of authorship, when there are any. On the cover and in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">88</a></span> +preface of the <i>Châtiments</i>, Victor Hugo is named as the author; +therefore Victor Hugo is the author of the <i>Châtiments</i>. In such and +such a picture gallery we see an unsigned picture whose frame has been +furnished by the management with a tablet bearing the name of Leonardo +da Vinci; therefore Leonardo da Vinci painted this picture. A poem with +the title <i>Philomena</i> is found under the name of Saint Bonaventura in M. +Clément's <i>Extraits des poètes chrétiens</i>, in most editions of Saint +Bonaventura's "works," and in a great number of mediæval manuscripts; +therefore <i>Philomena</i> was written by Saint Bonaventura, and "we may +gather thence much precious knowledge of the very soul" of this holy +man.<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote-79" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 79.">[79]</a> Vrain-Lucas offered to M. Chasles autographs of Vercingetorix, +Cleopatra, and Saint Mary Magdalene, duly signed, and with the +flourishes complete:<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote-80" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 80.">[80]</a> here, thought M. Chasles, are autographs of +Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Saint Mary Magdalene. This is one of the +most universal, and at the same time indestructible, forms of public +credulity.</p> + +<p>Experience and reflection have shown the necessity of methodically +checking these instinctive impulses of confiding trust. The autographs +of Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Mary Magdalene had been manufactured by +Vrain-Lucas. The <i>Philomena</i>, attributed by mediæval scribes now to +Saint Bonaventura, now to Louis of Granada, now to John Hoveden, now to +John Peckham, is perhaps by none<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">89</a></span> of these authors, and certainly not by +the first-named. Paintings in which there is not the least gleam of +talent have, in the most celebrated galleries of Italy, been tricked +out, without the least shadow of proof, with the glorious name of +Leonardo. On the other hand, it is perfectly true that Victor Hugo is +the author of the <i>Châtiments</i>. The conclusion is, that the most precise +indications of authorship are never sufficient <i>by themselves</i>. They +only afford a presumption, strong or weak—very strong, in general, +where modern documents are concerned, often very weak in the case of +ancient documents. False indications of authorship exist, some foisted +upon insignificant works in order to enhance their value, some appended +to works of merit in order to serve the reputation of a particular +person, or to mystify posterity; and there are a hundred other motives +which may easily be imagined, and of which a list has been drawn up:<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote-81" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 81.">[81]</a> +the "pseudepigraphic" literature of antiquity and the middle ages is +enormous. There are, in addition, documents which are forged from +beginning to end; the forgers have naturally furnished them with very +precise indications of their alleged authorship. Verification is +therefore necessary. But how is it to be had? When the apparent +authorship of a document is suspected, we use for its verification the +same method which serves to fix, as far as possible, the origin of +documents which are furnished with no indications at all on this head. +As the procedure<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">90</a></span> is the same in both cases, it is not necessary to +distinguish further between them.</p> + + +<p class="top5">I. The chief instrument used in the investigation of authorship is the +<i>internal analysis</i> of the document under consideration, performed with +a view to bring out any indications it may contain of a nature to supply +information about the author, and the time and place in which he lived.</p> + +<p>First of all we examine the handwriting of the document. Saint +Bonaventura was born in 1221; if poems attributed to him are contained +in manuscripts executed in the eleventh century, we have in this +circumstance an excellent proof that the attribution is ill-founded: no +document of which there exists a copy in eleventh-century handwriting +can be posterior in date to the eleventh century. Then we examine the +language. It is known that certain forms have only been used in certain +places and at certain dates. Most forgers have betrayed themselves by +ignorance of facts of this kind; they let slip modern words or phrases. +It has been possible to establish the fact that certain Phœnician +inscriptions, found in South America, were earlier than a certain German +dissertation on a point of Phœnician syntax. In the case of official +instruments we examine the formulæ. If a document which purports to be a +Merovingian charter does not exhibit the ordinary formulæ of genuine +Merovingian charters it must be spurious. Lastly, we note all the +positive data which occur in the document—the facts which are mentioned +or alluded to. When these facts are otherwise known, from sources which +a forger could not have had at his disposal, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">91</a></span> <i>bonâ fides</i> of the +document is established, and the date fixed approximately between the +most recent event of which the author shows knowledge, and the next +following event which he does not mention but would have done if he had +known of it. Arguments may also be founded on the circumstance that +particular facts are mentioned with approval, or particular opinions +expressed, and help us to make a conjectural estimate of the status, the +environment, and the character of the author.</p> + +<p>When the internal analysis of a document is carefully performed, it +generally gives us a tolerably accurate notion of its authorship. By +means of a methodical comparison, instituted between the various +elements of the documents analysed and the corresponding elements of +similar documents whose authorship was known with certainty, the +detection of many a forgery<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote-82" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 82.">[82]</a> has been rendered possible, and +additional information acquired about the circumstances under which most +genuine documents have been produced.</p> + +<p>The results obtained by internal analysis are supplemented and verified +by collecting all the external evidence relative to the document under +criticism which can be found scattered over the documents of the same or +later epochs—quotations, biographical details about the author, and so +on. Sometimes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">92</a></span> there is a significant absence of any such information: +the fact that an alleged Merovingian charter has not been quoted by +anybody before the seventeenth century, and has only been seen by a +seventeenth-century scholar who has been convicted of fraud, suggests +the thought that it is modern.</p> + + +<p class="top5">II. Hitherto we have considered only the simplest case, in which the +document under examination is the work of a single author. But many +documents have, at different times, received additions which it is +important to distinguish from the original text, in order that we may +not attribute to X, the author of the text, what really belongs to Y or +Z, his unforeseen collaborators.<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote-83" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 83.">[83]</a> There are two kinds of +additions—interpolations and continuations. To interpolate is to insert +into the text words or sentences which were not in the author's +manuscript.<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote-84" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 84.">[84]</a> Usually interpolations are accidental, due to the +negligence of the copyist, and explicable as the introduction into the +text of interlinear glosses or marginal notes; but there are cases where +some one has deliberately added to (or substituted for) the author's +text words or sentences out of his own head, for the sake of +completeness, ornament, or emphasis. If we had before us the manuscript +in which the deliberate interpolation was made, the appearance of the +added matter and the traces of erasure would make the case clear at +once. But the first interpolated copy has nearly always been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">93</a></span> lost, and +in the copies derived from it every trace of addition or substitution +has disappeared. There is no need to define "continuations." It is well +known that many chronicles of the middle ages have been "continued" by +various writers, none of whom took the trouble to indicate where his own +work began or ended.</p> + +<p>Sometimes interpolations and continuations can be very readily +distinguished in the course of the operations for restoring a text of +which there are several copies, when it so happens that some of these +copies reproduce the primitive text as it was before any addition was +made to it. But if all the copies are founded on previous copies which +already contained the interpolations or continuations, recourse must be +had to internal analysis. Is the style uniform throughout the document? +Does the book breathe one and the same spirit from cover to cover? Are +there no contradictions, no gaps in the sequence of ideas? In practice, +when the continuators or interpolators have been men of well-marked +personality and decided views, analysis will separate the original from +the additions as cleanly as a pair of scissors. When the whole is +written in a level, colourless style, the lines of division are not so +easy to see; it is then better to confess the fact than to multiply +hypotheses.</p> + + +<p class="top5">III. The critical investigation of authorship is not finished as soon as +a document has been accurately or approximately localised in space and +time, and as much information as possible obtained about the author or +authors.<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote-85" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 85.">[85]</a> Here is a book: we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">94</a></span> wish to ascertain the origin of the +information contained in it, that is, to be in a position to appreciate +its value; is it enough to know that it was written in 1890, at Paris, +by So-and-so? Perhaps So-and-so copied slavishly, without mentioning the +fact, an earlier work, written in 1850. The responsible guarantor of the +borrowed parts is not So-and-so, but the author of 1850. Plagiarism, it +is true, is now rare, forbidden by the law, and considered +dishonourable; formerly it was common, tolerated, and unpunished. Many +historical documents, with every appearance of originality, are nothing +but unavowed repetitions of earlier documents, and historians +occasionally experience, in this connection, remarkable disillusions. +Certain passages in Eginhard, a ninth-century chronicler, are borrowed +from Suetonius: they have nothing to do with the history of the ninth +century; how if the fact had not been discovered? An event is attested +three times, by three chroniclers; but these three attestations, which +agree so admirably, are really only one if it is ascertained that two of +the three chroniclers copied the third, or that the three parallel +accounts have been drawn from one and the same source. Pontifical +letters and Imperial charters of the middle ages contain eloquent +passages which must not be taken seriously; they are part of the +official style, and were copied word for word from chancery formularies.</p> + +<p>It belongs to the investigation of authorship to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">95</a></span> discover, as far as +possible, the <i>sources</i> utilised by the authors of documents.</p> + +<p>The problem thus presented to us has some resemblance to that of the +restoration of texts of which we have already spoken. In both cases we +proceed on the assumption that identical readings have a common source: +a number of different scribes, in transcribing a text, will not make +exactly the same mistakes in exactly the same places; a number of +different writers, relating the same facts, will not have viewed them +from exactly the same standpoint, nor will they say the same things in +exactly the same language. The great complexity of historical events +makes it extremely improbable that two independent observers should +narrate them in the same manner. We endeavour to group the documents +into families in the same way as we make families of manuscripts. +Similarly, we are enabled in the result to draw up genealogical tables. +The examiners who correct the compositions of candidates for the +bachelor's degree sometimes notice that the papers of two candidates who +sat next each other bear a family likeness. If they have a mind to find +out which is derived from the other, they have no difficulty in doing +so, in spite of the petty artifices (slight modifications, expansions, +abstracts, additions, suppressions, transpositions) which the plagiarist +multiplies in order to throw suspicion off the scent The two guilty ones +are sufficiently betrayed by their common errors; the more culpable of +the two is detected by the slips he will have made, and especially by +the errors in his own papers which are due to peculiarities in those of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">96</a></span> +his accommodating friend. Similarly when two ancient documents are in +question: when the author of one has copied directly from the other, the +filiation is generally easy to establish; the plagiarist, whether he +abridges or expands, nearly always betrays himself sooner or later.<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote-86" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 86.">[86]</a></p> + +<p>When there are three documents in a family their mutual relationships +are sometimes harder to specify. Let A, B, and C be the documents. +Suppose A is the common source: perhaps B and C copied it independently; +perhaps C only knew A through the medium of B, or B knew it only through +C. If B and C have abridged the common source in different ways, they +are evidently independent. When B depends on C, or <i>vice versâ</i>, we have +the simplest case, treated in the preceding paragraph. But suppose the +author of C combined A and B, while B had already used A: the genealogy +begins to get complicated. It is more complicated still when there are +four, five, or more documents in a family, for the number of possible +combinations increases with great rapidity. However, if too many +intermediate links have not been lost, criticism succeeds in +disentangling the relationships by persistent and ingenious applications +of the method of repeated comparisons. Modern scholars (Krusch, for +example, who has made a speciality of Merovingian hagiography) have +recently constructed, by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">97</a></span> the use of this method, precise genealogies of +the utmost solidity.<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote-87" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 87.">[87]</a> The results of the critical investigation of +authorship, as applied to the filiation of documents, are of two kinds. +Firstly, lost documents are reconstructed. Suppose two chroniclers, B +and C, have used, each in his own way, a common source X, which has now +disappeared. We may form an idea of X by piecing together the fragments +of it which occur imbedded in B and C, just as we form an idea of a lost +manuscript by comparing the partial copies of it which have been +preserved. On the other hand, criticism destroys the authority of a host +of "authentic" documents—that is, documents which no one suspects of +having been falsified—by showing that they are derivative, that they +are worth whatever their sources may be worth, and that, when they +embellish their sources with imaginary details and rhetorical +flourishes, they are worth just nothing at all. In Germany and England +editors of documents have introduced the excellent system of printing +borrowed passages in small characters, and original passages whose +source is unknown in larger characters. Thanks to this system it is +possible to see at a glance that celebrated chronicles, which are often +(very wrongly) quoted, are mere compilations, of no value in themselves: +thus the <i>Flores historiarum</i> of the self-styled Matthew of Westminster, +perhaps the most popular of the English mediæval chronicles,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">98</a></span> are almost +entirely taken from original works by Wendover and Matthew of Paris.<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote-88" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 88.">[88]</a></p> + + +<p class="top5">IV. The critical investigation of authorship saves historians from huge +blunders. Its results are striking. By eliminating spurious documents, +by detecting false ascriptions, by determining the conditions of +production of documents which had been defaced by time, and by +connecting them with their sources,<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote-89" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 89.">[89]</a> it has rendered services of such +magnitude that to-day it is regarded as having a special right to the +name of "criticism." It is usual to say of an historian that he "fails +in criticism" when he neglects to distinguish between documents, when he +never mistrusts traditional ascriptions, and when he accepts, as if +afraid to lose a single one, all the pieces of information, ancient or +modern, good or bad, which come to him, from whatever quarter.<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote-90" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 90.">[90]</a></p> + +<p>This view is perfectly just. We must not, however, be satisfied with +this form of criticism, and we must not abuse it.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">99</a></span></p> + +<p>We must not abuse it. The extreme of distrust, in these matters, is +almost as mischievous as the extreme of credulity. Père Hardouin, who +attributed the works of Vergil and Horace to mediæval monks, was every +whit as ridiculous as the victim of Vrain-Lucas. It is an abuse of the +methods of this species of criticism to apply them, as has been done, +indiscriminately, for the mere pleasure of it. The bunglers who have +used this species of criticism to brand as spurious perfectly genuine +documents, such as the writings of Hroswitha, the <i>Ligurinus</i>, and the +bull <i>Unam Sanctam</i>,<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote-91" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 91.">[91]</a> or to establish imaginary filiations between +certain annals, on the strength of superficial indications, would have +discredited criticism before now if that had been possible. It is +praiseworthy, certainly, to react against those who never raise a doubt +about the authorship of a document; but it is carrying the reaction too +far to take an exclusive interest in periods of history which depend on +documents of uncertain authorship. The only reason why the documents of +modern and contemporary history are found less interesting than those of +antiquity and the early middle ages, is that the identity which nearly +always obtains between their apparent and their real authorship leaves +no room for those knotty problems of attribution in which the <i>virtuosi</i> +of criticism are accustomed to display their skill.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">100</a></span><a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote-92" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 92.">[92]</a></p> + +<p>Nor must we be content with it. The critical investigation of +authorship, like textual criticism, is preparatory, and its results +negative. Its final aim and crowning achievement is to get rid of +documents which are not documents, and which would have misled us; that +is all. "It teaches us not to use bad documents; it does not teach us +how to turn good ones to account."<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote-93" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 93.">[93]</a> It is not the whole of +"historical criticism;" it is only one stone in the edifice.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">101</a></span><a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote-94" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 94.">[94]</a></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_IVa" id="CHAPTER_IVa"></a>CHAPTER IV</h3> + +<p class="head2">CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES</p> + + +<p>By the help of the preceding operations the documents, all the +documents, let us suppose, of a given class, or relating to a given +subject, have been found. We know where they are; the text of each has +been restored, if necessary, and each has been critically examined in +respect of authorship. We know where they have come from. It remains to +combine and classify the materials thus verified. This is the last of +the operations which may be called preparatory to the work of higher (or +internal) criticism and construction.</p> + +<p>Whoever studies a point of history is obliged, first of all, to classify +his sources. To arrange, in a rational and convenient manner, the +verified materials before making use of them, is an apparently humble, +but really very important, part of the historian's profession. Those who +have learnt how to do it possess, on that account alone, a marked +advantage: they give themselves less trouble, and they obtain better +results; the others waste their time and labour; they are smothered +sometimes under the disorderly mass of notes, extracts, copies, scraps, +which they themselves have accumulated. Who was it spoke of those busy +people who spend their lives lifting building-stones without knowing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">102</a></span> +where to place them, raising as they do so clouds of blinding dust?</p> + + +<p class="top5">I. Here, again, we have to confess that the first, the natural impulse, +is not the right one. The first impulse of most men who have to utilise +a number of texts is to make notes from them, one after another, in the +order in which they study them. Many of the early scholars (whose papers +we possess) worked on this system, and so do most beginners who are not +warned beforehand; the latter keep, as the former kept, note-books, +which they fill continuously and progressively with notes on the texts +they are interested in. This method is utterly wrong. The materials +collected must be classified sooner or later; otherwise it would be +necessary, when occasion arose, to deal separately with the materials +bearing on a given point, to read right through the whole series of +note-books, and this laborious process would have to be repeated every +time a new detail was wanted. If this method seems attractive at first, +it is because it appears to save time. But this is false economy; the +ultimate result is, an enormous addition to the labour of search, and +great difficulty in combining the materials.</p> + +<p>Others, well understanding the advantages of systematic classification, +have proposed to fit their materials, as fast as collected, into their +appropriate places in a prearranged scheme. For this purpose they use +note-books of which every page has first been provided with a heading. +Thus all the entries of the same kind are close to one another. This +system leaves something to be desired; for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">103</a></span>additions will not always +fit without inconvenience into their proper place; and the scheme of +classification, once adopted, is rigid, and can only be modified with +difficulty. Many librarians used to draw up their catalogues on this +plan, which is now universally condemned.</p> + +<p>There is a still more barbarous method, which need not receive more than +passing mention. This is simply to register documents in the memory +without taking written notes. This method has been used. Historians +endowed with excellent memories, and lazy to boot, have indulged this +whim, with the result that their quotations and references are mostly +inexact. The human memory is a delicate piece of registering apparatus, +but it is so little an instrument of precision that such presumption is +inexcusable.</p> + +<p>Every one admits nowadays that it is advisable to collect materials on +separate cards or slips of paper. The notes from each document are +entered upon a loose leaf furnished with the precisest possible +indications of origin. The advantages of this artifice are obvious: the +detachability of the slips enables us to group them at will in a host of +different combinations; if necessary, to change their places: it is easy +to bring texts of the same kind together, and to incorporate additions, +as they are acquired, in the interior of the groups to which they +belong. As for documents which are interesting from several points of +view, and which ought to appear in several groups, it is sufficient to +enter them several times over on different slips; or they may be +represented, as often as may be required, on reference-slips. Moreover,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">104</a></span> +the method of slips is the only one mechanically possible for the +purpose of forming, classifying, and utilising a collection of documents +of any great extent. Statisticians, financiers, and men of letters who +observe, have now discovered this as well as scholars.</p> + +<p>The method of slips is not without its drawbacks. Each slip ought to be +furnished with precise references to the source from which its contents +have been derived; consequently, if a document has been analysed upon +fifty different slips, the same references must be repeated fifty times. +Hence a slight increase in the amount of writing to be done. It is +certainly on account of this trivial complication that some obstinately +cling to the inferior note-book system. Again, in virtue of their very +detachability, the slips, or loose leaves, are liable to go astray; and +when a slip is lost how is it to be replaced? To begin with, its +disappearance is not perceived, and, if it were, the only remedy would +be to go right through all the work already done from beginning to end. +But the truth is, experience has suggested a variety of very simple +precautions, which we need not here explain in detail, by which the +drawbacks of the system are reduced to a minimum. It is recommended to +use slips of uniform size and tough material, and to arrange them at the +earliest opportunity in covers or drawers or otherwise. Every one is +free to form his own habits in these matters. But it is well to realise +beforehand that these habits, according as they are more or less +rational and practical, have a direct influence on the results of +scientific work. Renan speaks of "these points<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">105</a></span> of private librarianship +which make up the half of scientific work."<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote-95" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 95.">[95]</a> This is not too strong. +One scholar will owe a good part of his well-deserved reputation to his +method of collecting, while another will be, so to speak, paralysed by +his clumsiness in that particular.<a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote-96" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 96.">[96]</a></p> + +<p>After having collected the documents, whether copied <i>in extenso</i> or +abridged, on slips or loose leaves, we classify them. On what scheme? In +what order? Clearly different cases must be treated differently, and it +would not be reasonable to lay down precise formulæ to govern them all. +However, we may give a few general considerations.</p> + + +<p class="top5">II. We distinguish between the historian who classifies verified +documents for the purposes of historical work, and the scholar who +compiles "<i>Regesta</i>." By the words "<i>Regesta</i>" and "<i>Corpus</i>" we +understand methodically classified collections of historical documents. +In a "<i>Corpus</i>" documents are reproduced <i>in extenso</i>; in "<i>Regesta</i>" +they are analysed and described.</p> + +<p>The use of these compilations is to assist researchers in collecting +documents. Scholars set themselves to perform, once for all, tasks of +search and classification from which, thanks to them, the public will +henceforth be free.</p> + +<p>Documents may be grouped according to their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">106</a></span> date, according to their +place of origin, according to their contents, according to their +form.<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote-97" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 97.">[97]</a> Here we have the four categories of time, place, species, and +form; by superposing, then, we obtain divisions of smaller extent. We +may undertake, for example, to make a group of all the documents having +a given form, of a given country, and lying between two given dates +(French royal charters of the reign of Philip Augustus); or of all the +documents of a given form (Latin inscriptions); or of a given species +(Latin hymns); of a given epoch (antiquity, the middle ages). We may +recall, by way of illustration, the existence of a <i>Corpus Inscriptionum +Græcarum</i>, of a <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>, of a <i>Corpus +Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i>, the <i>Regesta Imperii</i> of J. F. +Böhmer and his continuators, the <i>Regesta Pontificum Romanorum</i> of P. +Jaffé and A. Potthast.</p> + +<p>Whatever the division chosen, there are two<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">107</a></span> alternatives: either the +documents to be placed in this division are dated or they are not.</p> + +<p>If they are dated, as is the case, for example, with the charters issued +from the chancery of a prince, care will have been taken to place at the +head of each slip the date (expressed in modern reckoning) of the +document entered upon it. Nothing is then easier than to group in +chronological order all the slips, that is, all the documents, which +have been collected. The rule is to use chronological classification +whenever possible. There is only one difficulty, and that is of a +practical order. Even in the most favourable circumstances some of the +documents will have accidentally lost their dates; these dates the +compiler is bound to restore, or at least to attempt to restore; long +and patient research is necessary for the purpose.</p> + +<p>If the documents are not dated, a choice must be made between the +alphabetical, the geographical, and the systematic order. The history of +the <i>Corpus</i> of Latin inscriptions bears witness to the difficulty of +this choice. "The arrangement according to date was impossible, seeing +that most of the inscriptions are not dated. From the time of Smetius it +was usual to divide them into classes, that is, a distinction was made, +resting solely on the contents of the inscription, and having no regard +to their place of origin, between religious, sepulchral, military, and +poetical inscriptions, those which have a public character, and those +which only concern private persons, and so on. Boeckh, although he had +preferred the geographical arrangement for his <i>Corpus Inscriptionum +Græcarum</i>, was of opinion that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">108</a></span> the arrangement by subjects, which had +been hitherto employed, was the only possible one for a Latin +<i>Corpus</i>...." [Even those who, in France, proposed the geographical +arrangement] "wished to make an exception of texts relating to the +general history of a country, certainly, at any rate, in the case of the +Empire; in 1845 Zumpt defended a very complicated eclectic system of +this kind. In 1847 Mommsen still rejected the geographical arrangement +except for municipal inscriptions, and in 1852, when he published the +Inscriptions of the Kingdom of Naples, he had not entirely changed his +opinion. It was only on being charged by the Academy of Berlin with the +publication of the <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>, that, grown wise by +experience, he rejected even the exceptions proposed by Egger in the +case of the general history of a province, and thought it his duty to +keep to the geographical arrangement pure and simple."<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote-98" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 98.">[98]</a> And yet, +considering the nature of epigraphic documents, the arrangement +according to place was the only rational one. This has been amply +demonstrated for more than fifty years; but collectors of inscriptions +did not come to an agreement on the subject till after two centuries of +tentative efforts in different directions. For two centuries collections +of Latin inscriptions have been made without any perception of the fact +that "to group inscriptions according to their subjects is much the same +thing as to publish an edition of Cicero in which his speeches, +treatises, and letters should be cut up and the fragments<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">109</a></span> arranged +according to their subject-matter;" that "epigraphic monuments belonging +to the same territory mutually explain each other when placed side by +side;" and, lastly, that "while it is all but impossible to range in +order of subject-matter a hundred thousand inscriptions nearly all of +which belong to several categories; on the other hand, each monument has +but one place, and a very definite place, in the geographical +order."<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote-99" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 99.">[99]</a></p> + +<p>The alphabetical arrangement is very convenient when the chronological +and geographical arrangements are unsuitable. There are documents, such +as the sermons, the hymns, and the secular songs of the middle ages, +which are not precisely dated or localised. They are arranged in the +alphabetical order of their <i>incipit</i>—that is, the words with which +they begin.<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote-100" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 100.">[100]</a></p> + +<p>The systematic order, or arrangement by subjects, is not to be +recommended for the compilation of a <i>Corpus</i> or of <i>regesta</i>. It is +always arbitrary, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">110</a></span> leads to inevitable repetition and confusion. +Besides, given collections arranged in chronological, geographical, or +alphabetical order, nothing more than the addition of a good table of +contents is needed to make them available for all the purposes which +would be served by a systematic arrangement. One of the chief rules of +the art of <i>Corpus</i> and <i>regesta</i>-making, that great art which has been +carried to such perfection in the second half of the nineteenth +century,<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote-101" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 101.">[101]</a> is to provide these collections, whatever the grouping +adopted, with a variety of tables and indexes of a kind to facilitate +the use of them: <i>incipit</i> tables in chronological <i>regesta</i> which lend +themselves to such treatment, indexes of names and dates in <i>regesta</i> +arranged by order of <i>incipit</i>, and so on.</p> + +<p><i>Corpus</i> and <i>regesta</i>-makers collect and classify for the use of others +documents in which, at any rate in <i>all</i> of which, they have no direct +interest, and are absorbed in this labour. Ordinary workers, on the +other hand, only collect and classify materials useful for their +individual studies. Hence certain differences arise. For example, the +arrangement by subjects, on a predetermined system, which is so little +to be recommended for great collections, often provides those who are +composing monographs on their own account with a scheme of +classification preferable to any other. But it will always be well to +cultivate the mechanical habits of which professional compilers have +learnt the value by experience: to write at the head of every slip its +date,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">111</a></span> if there is occasion for it, and a heading<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote-102" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 102.">[102]</a> in any case; to +multiply cross-references and indices; to keep a record, on a separate +set of slips, of all the sources utilised, in order to avoid the danger +of having to work a second time through materials already dealt with. +The regular observance of these maxims goes a great way towards making +scientific historical work easier and more solid. The possession of a +well-arranged, though incomplete, collection of slips has enabled M. B. +Hauréau to exhibit to the end of his life an undeniable mastery over the +very special class of historical problems which he studied.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">112</a></span><a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote-103" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 103.">[103]</a></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_Va" id="CHAPTER_Va"></a>CHAPTER V</h3> + +<p class="head2">CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS</p> + + +<p>The sum of the operations described in the preceding chapters +(restoration of texts, investigation of authorship, collection and +classification of verified documents) constitutes the vast domain of +external criticism, or critical scholarship.</p> + +<p>The public at large, with its vulgar and superficial standards, has +nothing but disdain for the whole of critical scholarship. Some of its +votaries, on the other hand, are inclined to exalt it unduly. But there +is a happy medium between these extremes of over-appreciation and +contempt.</p> + +<p>The crude opinion of those who pity and despise the minute analysis of +external criticism hardly deserves refutation. There is only one +argument for the legitimacy and honourable character of the obscure +labours of erudition, but it is a decisive argument: it rests on their +indispensability. No erudition, no history. "<i>Non sunt contemnenda quasi +parva</i>," says St. Jerome, "<i>sine quibus magna constare non +possunt</i>."<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote-104" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 104.">[104]</a></p> + +<p>On the other hand, scholars by profession, in their zeal to justify +their pride in their work, are not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">113</a></span>content with maintaining its +necessity; they allow themselves to be carried away into an exaggeration +of its merit and importance. It has been said that the sure methods of +external criticism have raised history to the dignity of a science, "of +an exact science;" that critical investigations of authorship "enable +us, better than any other study, to gain a profound insight into past +ages;" that the habit of criticising texts refines or even confers the +"historical sense." It has been tacitly assumed that external criticism +is the whole of historical criticism, and that beyond the purgation, +emendation, and classification of documents there is nothing left to do. +This illusion, common enough among specialists, is too crude to need +express refutation; the fact is, that it is the psychological criticism +which deals with interpretation and examines into the good faith and +accuracy of authors that has, better than any other study, enabled us to +gain a profound insight into past ages, not external criticism.<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote-105" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 105.">[105]</a> An +historian who should be fortunate enough to find all the documents +bearing on his studies already edited correctly, classified, and +critically<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">114</a></span> examined as to authorship, would be in just as good a +position to use them for writing history as if he had performed all the +preliminary operations himself. It is quite possible, whatever may be +said, to have the historical sense in full measure without having ever, +both literally and figuratively, wiped away the dust from original +documents—that is, without having discovered and restored them for +oneself. We need not interpret in the Jewish or etymological sense the +dictum of Renan: "I do not think it possible for any one to acquire a +clear notion of history, its limits, and the amount of confidence to be +placed in the different categories of historical investigation, unless +he is in the habit of <i>handling</i> original documents."<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote-106" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 106.">[106]</a> This is to be +understood as simply referring to the habit of going direct to the +sources, and treating definite problems.<a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote-107" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 107.">[107]</a> Without doubt a day will +come when all the documents relating to the history of classical +antiquity shall have been edited and treated critically. There will then +be no more room, in this department of study, for textual criticism or +the investigation of sources; but, for all that, the conditions for the +treatment of general ancient history, or special parts of it, will be +then eminently favourable. External criticism, as we cannot too often +repeat, is entirely preparatory; it is a means, not an end; the ideal +state of things would be that it should have been already sufficiently +practised<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">115</a></span> that we might dispense with it for the future; it is only a +temporary necessity. Theoretically, not only is it unnecessary for those +who wish to make historical syntheses to do for themselves the +preparatory work on the materials which they use, but we have a right to +ask, as has been often asked, whether there is any advantage in their +doing it.<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote-108" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 108.">[108]</a> Would it not be preferable that workers in the field of +history should specialise? On the one class—the specialists—would +devolve the absorbing tasks of external or erudite criticism; the +others, relieved of the weight of these tasks, would have greater +liberty to devote themselves to the work of higher criticism, of +combination and construction. Such was the opinion of Mark Pattison, who +said, <i>History cannot be written from manuscripts</i>, which is as much as +to say: "It is impossible for a man to write history from documents +which he is obliged to put for himself into a condition in which they +can be used."</p> + +<p>Formerly the professions of "critical scholar" and "historian" were, in +fact, clearly distinguished. The "historians" cultivated the empty and +pompous species of literature which then was known as "history," without +considering themselves bound to keep in touch with the work of the +scholars. The latter, for their part, determined by their critical +researches the conditions under which history must be written, but were +at no pains to write it themselves. Content to collect, emend, and +classify historical documents,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">116</a></span> they took no interest in history, and +understood the past no better than did the mass of their contemporaries. +The scholars acted as though erudition were an end in itself, and the +historians as if they had been able to reconstruct vanished realities by +the mere force of reflection and ingenuity applied to the inferior +documents, which were common property. So complete a divorce between +erudition and history seems to-day almost inexplicable, and it was in +truth mischievous enough. We need not say that the present advocates of +the division of labour in history have nothing of the kind in view. It +is admittedly necessary that close relations should obtain between the +world of historians and that of critical scholars, for the work of the +latter has no reason for existence beyond its utility to the former. All +that is meant is, that certain analytical and all synthetic operations +are not necessarily better performed when they are performed by the same +person; that though the characters of historian and scholar may be +combined, there is nothing illegitimate in their separation; and that +perhaps this separation is desirable in theory, as, in practice, it is +often a necessity.</p> + +<p>In practice, what happens is as follows. Whatever part of history a man +undertakes to study, there are only three possible cases. In the first +the sources have already been emended and classified; in the second the +preliminary work on the sources, which has been only partially done, or +not at all, offers no great difficulty; in the third the sources are in +a very bad state, and require a great deal of labour to fit them for +use. We may observe, in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">117</a></span> passing, that there is naturally no proportion +between the intrinsic importance of the subject and the amount of +preliminary work which must be done before it can be treated: there are +some subjects of the highest interest, for example the history of the +origin and early development of Christianity, which could not be +properly attacked till after the completion of investigations which +occupied several generations of scholars; but the material criticism of +the sources of the history of the French Revolution, another subject of +the first rank, gave much less trouble; and there are comparatively +unimportant problems in mediæval history which will not be solved till +after an immense amount of external criticism shall have been performed.</p> + +<p>In the two first cases the expediency of a division of labour does not +come in question. But take the third case. A man of ability discovers +that the documents which are necessary for the treatment of a point of +history are in a very bad condition; they are scattered, corrupt, and +untrustworthy. He must take his choice; either he must abandon the +subject, having no taste for the mechanical operations which he knows to +be necessary, but which, as he foresees, would absorb the whole of his +energy; or else he resolves to enter upon the preparatory critical work, +without concealing from himself that in all probability he will never +have time to utilise the materials he has verified, and that he will +therefore be working for those who will come after him. If he adopts the +second alternative he becomes a critical scholar by profession, as it +were in spite of himself. <i>A priori</i>, it is true, there is nothing to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">118</a></span> +prevent those who make great collections of texts and publish critical +editions from using their own compilations and editions for the writing +of history; and we see, as a matter of fact, that several men have +divided themselves between the preparatory tasks of external criticism +and the more exalted labours of historical construction: it is enough to +mention the names of Waitz, Mommsen, and Hauréau. But this combination +is very rare, for several reasons. The first is the shortness of life; +there are catalogues, editions, <i>regesta</i> on a great scale, the +construction of which entails so much mechanical labour as to exhaust +the strength of the most zealous worker. The second is the fact that, +for many persons, the tasks of critical scholarship are not without +their charm; nearly every one finds in them a singular satisfaction in +the long run; and some have confined themselves to these tasks who +might, strictly speaking, have aspired to higher things.</p> + +<p>Is it a good thing in itself that some workers should, voluntarily or +not, confine themselves to the researches of critical scholarship? Yes, +without a doubt. In the study of history, the results of the division of +labour are the same as in the industrial arts, and highly +satisfactory—more abundant, more successful, better regulated +production. Critics who have been long habituated to the restoration of +texts restore them with incomparable dexterity and sureness; those who +devote themselves exclusively to investigations of authorship and +sources have intuitions which would not occur to others less versed in +this difficult and highly specialised branch; those<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">119</a></span> who have spent +their lives in the construction of catalogues and the compilation of +<i>regesta</i> construct and compile them more easily, more quickly, and +better than the man in the street. Thus, not only is there no special +reason for requiring every "historian" to be at the same time an active +worker in the field of critical scholarship, but even those scholars who +are engaged in the operations of external criticism come under different +categories. Similarly, in a stoneyard there is no point in the architect +being at the same time a workman, nor have all the workmen the same +functions. Although most critical scholars have not rigorously +specialised so far, and although they vary their pleasures by +voluntarily executing different kinds of critical work, it would be easy +to name some who are specialists in descriptive catalogues and indexes +(archivists, librarians, and the like), others who are more particularly +"critics" (purifiers, restorers, and editors of texts), and others who +are pre-eminently compilers of <i>regesta</i>. "The moment it is admitted +that erudition is only valuable for the sake of its results, it becomes +impossible to carry the division of scientific labour too far;"<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote-109" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 109.">[109]</a> and +the progress of the historical sciences corresponds to the narrower and +narrower specialisation of the workers. It was possible, not very long +ago, for the same man to devote himself successively to all the +operations of historical inquiry, but that was because he appealed to a +not very exacting public: nowadays we require of those who criticise +documents a minute accuracy and an absolute perfection which presuppose +real professional<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">120</a></span> skill. The historical sciences have now reached a +stage in their evolution at which the main lines have been traced, the +great discoveries made, and nothing remains but a more precise treatment +of details. We feel instinctively that any further advance must be by +dint of investigations of such extent, and analyses of such depth, as +none but specialists are capable of.</p> + +<p>But the best justification of the division of workers into "scholars" +and "historians" (and of the distribution of the former among the +various branches of external criticism) is to be found in the fact that +different persons have a natural vocation for different tasks. One of +the chief justifications of the institution of higher historical +teaching is, in our opinion, the opportunity afforded the teachers +(presumably men of experience) of discerning in the students, in the +course of their university career, either the germ of a vocation for +critical scholarship, or fundamental unfitness for critical work, as the +case may be.<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote-110" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 110.">[110]</a> <i>Criticus non fit, sed nascitur.</i> For one who is not +endowed by nature with certain aptitudes, a career of technical +erudition has nothing but disappointments in store: the greatest service +that can be rendered to young men hesitating whether to adopt such a +career or not is to warn them of the fact. Those who hitherto have +devoted themselves to the preparatory tasks of criticism have either +chosen them in preference to others because<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">121</a></span> they had a taste for them, +or else have submitted to them because they knew they were necessary; +those who engaged in them by choice have less merit, from the ethical +point of view, than those who submitted to them, but, for all that, they +have mostly obtained better results, because they have worked, not as a +matter of duty, but joyfully and whole-heartedly. It is important that +every one should realise the situation, and, in his own as well as the +general interest, embrace the special work which suits him best.</p> + +<p>We now propose to examine the natural aptitudes which fit, and the truly +prohibitory defects which disqualify, for the labours of external +criticism. We shall, then, devote a few words to the effects produced on +the character by professional habituation to the labours of critical +scholarship.</p> + +<p>The chief condition of success in these labours is to like them. Those +who are exceptionally gifted as poets or thinkers—that is, those who +are endowed with creative power—have much difficulty in adapting +themselves to the technical drudgery of preparatory criticism: they are +far from despising it; on the contrary, they hold it in honour, if they +are clear-sighted; but they shrink from devoting themselves to it, for +fear of using a razor, as is said, to cut stones. "I have no mind," +wrote Leibnitz to Basnage, who had exhorted him to compile an immense +<i>Corpus</i> of unpublished and printed documents relating to the history of +the law of nations; "I have no mind to turn transcriber.... Does it not +occur to you that the advice you give me resembles that of a man who +should wish to marry his friend<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">122</a></span> to a shrew? For to engage a man in a +lifelong work is much the same as to find him a wife."<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote-111" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 111.">[111]</a> And Renan, +speaking of those immense preliminary labours "which have rendered +possible the researches of the higher criticism" and attempts at +historical construction, says: "The man who, with livelier intellectual +needs [than those of the men who performed these labours], should now +accomplish such an act of abnegation, would be a hero...."<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote-112" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 112.">[112]</a> Although +Renan directed the publication of the <i>Corpus Inscriptionum +Semiticarum</i>, and Leibnitz was the editor of the <i>Scriptores rerum +Brunsvicensium</i>, neither Leibnitz, nor Renan, nor their peers have, +fortunately, had the heroism to sacrifice their higher faculties to +purely critical learning.</p> + +<p>Outside the class of superior men (and the infinitely more numerous +class of those who wrongly think themselves such), nearly every one, as +we have already said, finds in the long run a kind of satisfaction in +the minutiæ of preparatory criticism. The reason is, that the practice +of this criticism appeals to and develops two very widespread +tastes—the taste for collecting and the taste for puzzles. The pleasure +of collecting is one which is felt not by children only, but by adults +as well, no matter whether the collection be one of various readings or +of postage-stamps. The deciphering of rebuses, the solution of small +problems of strictly definite scope, are occupations which attract many +able minds. Every find brings pleasure, and in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">123</a></span> field of erudition +there are innumerable finds—some lying exposed and obvious, some +guarded by all but impenetrable barriers—to reward both those who do +and those who do not delight in surmounting difficulties. All the +scholars of any distinction have possessed in an eminent degree the +instincts of the collector and the puzzle-solver, and some of them have +been quite conscious of the fact. "The more difficulties we encountered +in our chosen path," says M. Hauréau, "the more the enterprise pleased +us. This species of labour, which is called bibliography [investigations +of authorship, principally from the point of view of pseudepigraphy], +could not aspire to the homage of the public, but it has a great +attraction for those who devote themselves to it. Yes, it is doubtless a +humble study, but how many others are there which so often compensate +the trouble they give by affording us opportunity to cry Eureka."<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote-113" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 113.">[113]</a> +Julien Havet, when he was "already known to the learned men of Europe," +used to divert himself "by apparently frivolous amusements, such as +guessing square words or deciphering cryptograms."<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote-114" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 114.">[114]</a> Profound +instincts, and, for all the childish or ridiculous perversions which +they may exhibit in certain individuals, of the highest utility! After +all, these are forms, the most rudimentary forms, of the scientific +spirit. Those who are devoid of them have no place in the world of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">124</a></span> +critical scholarship. But those who aspire to be critical scholars will +always be numerous; for the labours of interpretation, construction, and +exposition require the rarest gifts: all those whom chance has thrown +into the study of history, who desire to do useful work in that +department, but are wanting in psychological tact, or find composition +irksome, will always allow themselves to be fascinated by the simple and +calm pleasures of the preliminary tasks.</p> + +<p>But in order to succeed in critical labours it is not enough to like +them. It is necessary to possess qualifications "for which zeal is no +substitute." What qualifications? Those who have asked this question +have answered vaguely: "Qualifications of the moral rather than the +intellectual order, patience, intellectual honesty...." Is it not +possible to be more precise?</p> + +<p>There are young students with no <i>a priori</i> repugnance for the labours +of external criticism, who perhaps are even disposed to like them, who +yet are—experience has shown it—totally incapable of performing them. +There would be nothing perplexing in this if these persons were +intellectually feeble; this incapacity would then be but one +manifestation of their general weakness; nor yet if they had gone +through no technical apprenticeship. But we are concerned with men of +education and intelligence, sometimes of exceptional ability, who do not +labour under the above disadvantages. These are the people of whom we +hear: "He works badly, he has the genius of inaccuracy." Their +catalogues, their editions, their <i>regesta</i>, their monographs swarm with +imperfections, and never inspire confidence; try as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">125</a></span> they may, they +never attain, I do not say absolute accuracy, but any decent degree of +accuracy. They are subject to "chronic inaccuracy," a disease of which +the English historian Froude is a typical and celebrated case. Froude +was a gifted writer, but destined never to advance any statement that +was not disfigured by error; it has been said of him that he was +constitutionally inaccurate. For example, he had visited the city of +Adelaide in Australia: "We saw," says he, "below us, in a basin with a +river winding through it, a city of 150,000 inhabitants, none of whom +has ever known or will ever know one moment's anxiety as to the +recurring regularity of his three meals a day." Thus Froude, now for the +facts: Adelaide is built on an eminence; no river runs through it; when +Froude visited it the population did not exceed 75,000, and it was +suffering from a famine at the time. And more of the same kind.<a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote-115" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 115.">[115]</a> +Froude was perfectly aware of the utility of criticism, and he was even +one of the first in England to base the study of history on that of +original documents, as well unpublished as published; but his mental +conformation rendered him altogether unfit for the emendation of texts; +indeed, he murdered them, unintentionally, whenever he touched them. +Just as Daltonism (an affection of the organs of sight which prevents a +man from distinguishing correctly between red and green signals) +incapacitates for employment on a railway, so chronic inaccuracy, or +"Froude's Disease" (a malady not very difficult to diagnose) ought to be +regarded as incompatible with the professional practice of critical +scholarship.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">126</a></span></p> + +<p>Froude's Disease does not appear to have ever been studied by the +psychologists, nor, indeed, is it to be considered as a separate +pathological entity. Every one makes mistakes "out of carelessness," +"through inadvertence," and in many other ways. What is abnormal is to +make many mistakes, to be always making them, in spite of the most +persevering efforts to be exact. Probably this phenomenon is connected +with weakness of the attention and excessive activity of the involuntary +(or subconscious) imagination which the will of the patient, lacking +strength and stability, is unable sufficiently to control. The +involuntary imagination intrudes upon intellectual operations only to +vitiate them; its part is to fill up the gaps of memory by conjecture, +to magnify and attenuate realities, and to confuse them with the +products of pure invention. Most children distort everything by +inexactitude of this kind, and it is only after a hard struggle that +they ever attain to a scrupulous accuracy—that is, learn to master +their imagination. Many men remain children, in this respect, the whole +of their lives.</p> + +<p>But, let the psychological causes of Froude's Disease be what they may, +another point claims our attention. The man of the sanest and +best-balanced mind is liable to bungle the simplest kinds of critical +work if he does not allow them the necessary time. In these matters +precipitancy is the source of innumerable errors. It is rightly said +that patience is the cardinal virtue of the scholar. Do not work too +fast, act as if there were always something to be gained by waiting, +leave work undone rather than spoil it: these are maxims easy enough to +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">127</a></span>pronounce, but not to be followed in practice by any but persons of +calm temperament. There are nervous, excitable persons, who are always +in a hurry to get to the end, always seeking variety in their +occupations, and always anxious to dazzle and astonish: these may +possibly find honourable employment in other careers; but if they +embrace erudition, they are doomed to pile up a mass of provisional +work, which is likely to do more harm than good, and is sure in the long +run to cause them many a vexation. The true scholar is cool, reserved, +circumspect. In the midst of the turmoil of life, which flows past him +like a torrent, he never hurries. Why should he hurry? The important +thing is, that the work he does should be solid, definitive, +imperishable. Better "spend weeks polishing a masterpiece of a score of +pages" in order to convince two or three among the scholars of Europe +that a particular charter is spurious, or take ten years to construct +the best possible text of a corrupt document, than give to the press in +the same interval volumes of moderately accurate <i>anecdota</i> which future +scholars will some day have to put through the mill again from beginning +to end.</p> + +<p>Whatever special branch of critical scholarship a man may choose, he +ought to be gifted with prudence, an exceptionally powerful attention +and will, and, moreover, to combine a speculative turn of mind with +complete disinterestedness and little taste for action; for he must make +up his mind to work for distant and uncertain results, and, in nearly +every case, for the benefit of others. For textual criticism and the +investigation of sources, it is, moreover, very useful<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">128</a></span> to have the +puzzle-solving instinct—that is, a nimble, ingenious mind, fertile in +hypotheses, prompt to seize and even to guess the relations of things. +For tasks of description and compilation (the preparation of inventories +and catalogues, <i>corpus</i> and <i>regesta</i>-making) it is absolutely +necessary to possess the collector's instinct, together with an +exceptional appetite for work, and the qualities of order, industry, and +perseverance.<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote-116" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 116.">[116]</a> These are the aptitudes required. The labours of +external criticism are so distasteful to those who lack these aptitudes, +and the results obtained are, in their case, so small in comparison with +the time expended, that it is impossible for a man to make too sure of +his vocation before entering upon a career of critical scholarship. It +is pitiful to see those who, for want of a wise word spoken in due +season, lose their way and vainly exhaust themselves in such a career, +especially when they have good reason for believing that they might have +employed their talents to better advantage in other directions.<a name="FNanchor_117_117" id="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href="#Footnote-117" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 117.">[117]</a></p> + +<p class="top5">II. As critical and preparatory tasks are remarkably well suited to the +temperament of a very large<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">129</a></span> number of Germans, and as the activity of +German erudition during the present century has been enormous, it is to +Germany that we must go for the best cases of those mental deformations +which are produced, in the long run, by the habitual practice of +external criticism. Hardly a year passes but complaints are heard, in +and about the German universities, of the ill effects produced on +scholars by the tasks of criticism.</p> + +<p>In 1890, Herr Philippi, as Rector of the University of Giessen, forcibly +deplored the chasm which, as he said, is opening between preparatory +criticism and general culture: textual criticism loses itself in +insignificant minutiæ; scholars collate for the mere pleasure of +collating; infinite precautions are employed in the restoration of +worthless documents; it is thus evident that "more importance is +attached to the materials of study than to its intellectual results." +The Rector of Giessen sees in the diffuse style of German scholars and +in the bitterness of their polemical writings an effect of the habit +they have contracted of "excessive preoccupation with little +things."<a name="FNanchor_118_118" id="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href="#Footnote-118" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 118.">[118]</a> In the same year the same note<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">130</a></span> was sounded, at the +University of Bâle, by Herr J. v. Pflugk-Harttung. "The highest branches +of historical science are despised," says this author in his +<i>Geschichtsbetrachtungen</i><a name="FNanchor_119_119" id="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href="#Footnote-119" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 119.">[119]</a>: "all that is valued is microscopic +observations and absolute accuracy in unimportant details. The criticism +of texts and sources has become a branch of sport: the least breach of +the rules of the game is considered unpardonable, while conformity to +them is enough to assure the approval of connoisseurs, irrespectively of +the intrinsic value of the results obtained. Scholars are mostly +malevolent and discourteous towards each other; they make molehills and +call them mountains; their vanity is as comic as that of the citizen of +Frankfort who used complacently to observe, 'All that you can see +through yonder archway is Frankfort territory.'"<a name="FNanchor_120_120" id="FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href="#Footnote-120" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 120.">[120]</a> We, for our part, +are inclined to draw a distinction between three professional risks to +which scholars are subject: dilettantism, hypercriticism, and loss of +the power to work.</p> + +<p>To take the last first: the habit of critical analysis has a relaxing +and paralysing action on certain intelligences. Men, of naturally timid +dispositions, discover that whatever pains they take with their critical +work, their editing or classifying of documents, they are very apt to +make slight mistakes, and these slight mistakes, as a result of their +critical education, fill them with horror and dread. To discover +blunders in their signed work when the time for correction is past, +causes them acute suffering. They reach at length a state of morbid +anxiety<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">131</a></span> and scrupulosity which prevents them from doing anything at +all, for fear of possible imperfections. The <i>examen rigorosum</i> to which +they are continually subjecting themselves brings them to a standstill. +They give the same measure to the productions of others, and in the end +they see in historical works nothing but the authorities and the notes, +the <i>apparatus criticus</i>, and in the <i>apparatus criticus</i> they see +nothing but the faults in it which require correction.</p> + +<p><i>Hypercriticism.</i>—The excess of criticism, just as much as the crudest +ignorance, leads to error. It consists in the application of critical +canons to cases outside their jurisdiction. It is related to criticism +as logic-chopping is to logic. There are persons who scent enigmas +everywhere, even where there are none. They take perfectly clear texts +and subtilise on them till they make them doubtful, under the pretext of +freeing them from imaginary corruptions. They discover traces of forgery +in authentic documents. A strange state of mind! By constantly guarding +against the instinct of credulity they come to suspect everything.<a name="FNanchor_121_121" id="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href="#Footnote-121" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 121.">[121]</a> +It is to be observed that in proportion as the criticism of texts and +sources makes positive progress, the danger of hypercriticism increases. +When all the sources of history have been properly criticised (for +certain parts of ancient history this is no distant prospect), good +sense will call a halt. But scholars will refuse to halt; they will +refine, as they do already on the best established texts, and those who +refine will inevitably fall into hypercriticism. "The peculiarity of the +study of history and its auxiliary philological sciences," says<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">132</a></span> Renan, +"is that as soon as they have attained their relative perfection they +begin to destroy themselves."<a name="FNanchor_122_122" id="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href="#Footnote-122" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 122.">[122]</a> Hypercriticism is the cause of this.</p> + +<p><i>Dilettantism.</i>—Scholars by profession and vocation have a tendency to +treat the external criticism of documents as a game of skill, difficult, +but deriving an interest, much as chess does, from the very complication +of its rules. Some of them are indifferent to the larger questions—to +history itself, in fact. They criticise for the sake of criticism, and, +in their view, the elegance of the method of investigation is much more +important than the results, whatever they may be. These <i>virtuosi</i> are +not concerned to connect their labours with some general idea—to +criticise systematically, for example, all the documents relating to a +question, in order to understand it; they criticise indiscriminately +texts relating to all manner of subjects, on the one condition of being +sufficiently corrupt. Armed with their critical skill, they range over +the whole of the domain of history, and stop wherever a knotty problem +invites their services; this problem solved, or at least discussed, they +go elsewhere to look for others. They leave behind them no coherent +work, but a heterogeneous collection of memoirs on every conceivable +subject, which resembles, as Carlyle says, a curiosity shop or an +archipelago of small islands.</p> + +<p>Dilettanti defend their dilettantism by sufficiently plausible +arguments. To begin with, say they, everything is important; in history +there is no document which has not its value: "No scientific<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">133</a></span> work is +barren, no truth is without its use for science ...; in history there is +no such thing as a trivial subject;" consequently, "it is not the nature +of the subject which makes work valuable, but the method employed."<a name="FNanchor_123_123" id="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href="#Footnote-123" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 123.">[123]</a> +The important thing in history is not "the ideas one accumulates; it is +the mental gymnastics, the intellectual training—in short, the +scientific spirit." Even supposing that there are degrees of importance +among the data of history, no one has a right to maintain <i>a priori</i> +that a document is "useless." What, pray, is the criterion of utility in +these matters? How many documents are there not which, after being long +despised, have been suddenly placed in the foreground by a change of +standpoint or by new discoveries? "All exclusion is rash; there is no +research which it is possible to brand beforehand as necessarily +sterile. That which has no value in itself may become valuable as a +necessary means." Perhaps a day may come when, science being in a sense +complete, indifferent documents and facts may be safely thrown +overboard; but we are not at present in a position to distinguish the +superfluous from the necessary, and in all probability the line of +demarcation will never be easy to trace. This justifies the most special +researches and the most futile in all appearance. And, if it come to the +worst, what does it matter if there is a certain amount of work wasted? +"It is a law in science, as in all human effort," and indeed in all the +operations of nature, "to work in broad outlines, with a wide margin of +what is superfluous."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">134</a></span></p> + +<p>We shall not undertake to refute these arguments to the full extent in +which this is possible. Besides, Renan, who has put the case for both +sides of the question with equal vigour, definitively closed the debate +in the following words: "It may be said that some researches are useless +in the sense of taking up time which would have been better spent on +more serious questions.... Although it is not necessary for an artisan +to have a complete knowledge of the work he is employed to execute, it +is still to be desired that those who devote themselves to special +labours should have some notion of the more general considerations which +alone give value to their researches. If all the industrious workers to +whom modern science owes its progress had had a philosophical +comprehension of what they were doing, how much precious time would have +been saved!... It is deeply to be regretted that there should be such an +immense waste of human effort, merely for want of guidance, and a clear +consciousness of the end to be pursued."<a name="FNanchor_124_124" id="FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href="#Footnote-124" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 124.">[124]</a></p> + +<p>Dilettantism is incompatible with a certain elevation of mind, and with +a certain degree of "moral perfection," but not with technical +proficiency. Some of the most accomplished critics merely make a trade +of their skill, and have never reflected on the ends to which their art +is a means. It would, however, be wrong to infer that science itself has +nothing to fear from dilettantism. The dilettanti<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">135</a></span> of criticism who work +as fancy or curiosity bids them, who are attracted to problems not by +their intrinsic importance, but by their difficulty, do not supply +historians (those whose work it is to combine materials and use them for +the main purposes of history) with the materials of which the latter +have the most pressing need, but with others which might have waited. If +the activity of specialists in external criticism were exclusively +directed to questions whose solution is important, and if it were +regulated and guided from above, it would be more fruitful.</p> + +<p>The idea of providing against the dangers of dilettantism by a rational +"organisation of labour" is already ancient. Fifty years ago it was +common to hear people talking of "supervision," of "concentrating +scattered forces;" dreams were rife of "vast workshops" organised on the +model of those of modern industry, in which the preparatory labours of +critical scholarship were to be performed on a great scale, in the +interests of science. In nearly all countries, in fact, governments +(through the medium of historical committees and commissions), +academies, and learned societies have endeavoured in our day, much as +monastic congregations did of old, to group professed scholars for the +purposes of vast collective enterprises, and to co-ordinate their +efforts. But this banding of specialists in external criticism for the +service and under the supervision of competent men presents great +mechanical difficulties. The problem of the "organisation of scientific +labour" is still the order of the day.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">136</a></span><a name="FNanchor_125_125" id="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href="#Footnote-125" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 125.">[125]</a></p> + + +<p class="top5">III. Scholars are often censured for pride and excessive harshness in +the judgments which they pass on the labours of their colleagues; and +these faults, as we have seen, are often attributed to their excessive +"preoccupation with little things," especially by persons whose attempts +have been severely judged. In reality there do exist modest and kindly +scholars: it is a question of character; professional "preoccupation +with little things" is not enough to change natural disposition in this +respect. "Ce bon monsieur Du Cange," as the Benedictines said, was +modest to excess. "Nothing more is required," says he, in speaking of +his labours, "but eyes and fingers in order to do as much and more;" he +never blamed any one, on principle. "If I study it is for the pleasure +of studying, and not to give pain to any one else, any more than to +myself."<a name="FNanchor_126_126" id="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a href="#Footnote-126" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 126.">[126]</a> It is, however, true that most scholars have no +compunction in exposing each other's mistakes, and that their austere +zeal sometimes finds expression in harsh and overbearing language. +Barring the harshness they are quite right. Like physicians, chemists, +and other members of learned and scientific professions, they have a +keen appreciation of the value of scientific truth, and it is for this +reason that they make a point of calling offenders<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">137</a></span> to account. They are +thus enabled to bar the door against the tribe of incapables and +charlatans who once infested their profession.</p> + +<p>Among the youths who propose to devote themselves to the study of +history there are some in whom the commercial spirit and vulgar ambition +are stronger than the love of science. These are apt to say to +themselves: "Historical work, if it is to be done according to the rules +of method, requires an infinite amount of labour and caution. But do we +not see historical writings whose authors have more or less seriously +violated the rules? Are these authors thought any the less of on this +account? Is it always the most conscientious writer who enjoys the +highest consideration? Cannot tact supply the place of knowledge?" If +tact really could supply the place of knowledge, then, as it is easier +to do bad work than good, and as the important thing with these people +is success, they might be tempted to conclude that it does not matter +how badly they work as long as they succeed. Why should not things go in +these matters as they do in life, where it is not necessarily the best +men that get on best? Well, it is due to the pitiless severity of the +critics that calculations of this kind would be as disastrous as they +are despicable.</p> + +<p>Towards the end of the Second Empire there was in France no enlightened +public opinion on the subject of historical work. Bad books of +historical erudition were published with impunity, and sometimes even +procured undeserved rewards for their authors. It was then that the +founders of the <i>Revue Critique d'histoire et de littérature</i> undertook +to combat<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">138</a></span> a state of things which they lightly deemed demoralising. +With this object they administered public chastisement to those scholars +who showed lack of conscience or method, in a manner calculated to +disgust them with erudition for ever. They performed sundry notable +executions, not for the pleasure of it, but with the firm resolve to +establish a censorship and a wholesome dread of justice, in the domain +of historical study. Bad workers henceforth received no quarter, and +though the <i>Revue</i> did not exert any great influence on the public at +large, its police-operations covered a wide enough radius to impress +most of those concerned with the necessity of sincerity and respect for +method. During the last twenty-five years the impulse thus given has +spread beyond all expectation.</p> + +<p>It is now a matter of great difficulty to impose on the world of +scholars, in matters connected with their studies, or at least to keep +up the deception for any length of time. In the case of the historical +sciences, as well as the sciences proper, it is now too late to found a +new error or to discredit an old truth. It may be a few months, possibly +a few years, before a bungled experiment in chemistry or a scamped +edition is recognised as such; but inexact results, though temporarily +accepted under reserve, are always sooner or later, and generally very +soon, discovered, denounced, and eliminated. The theory of the +operations of external criticism is now so well established, the number +of specialists thoroughly versed in them is now so great in every +country, that, with rare exceptions, descriptive catalogues of +documents, editions, <i>regesta</i>, monographs, are scrutinised,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">139</a></span> dissected, +and judged as soon as they appear. It is well to be warned. It will for +the future be the height of imprudence to risk publishing a work of +erudition without having first done everything possible to make it +unassailable; otherwise it will immediately, or after brief delay, be +attacked and demolished. Not knowing this, certain well-meaning persons +still show themselves, from time to time, simple enough to enter the +lists of critical scholarship insufficiently prepared; they are filled +with a desire to be useful, and are apparently convinced that here, as +in politics and elsewhere, it is possible to work by extemporised and +approximate methods without any "special knowledge." They are sorry +afterwards. The knowing ones do not take the risk; the tasks of critical +scholarship have no seductions for them, for they are aware that the +labour is great and the glory moderate, and that the field is engrossed +by clever specialists not too well disposed towards intruders. They see +plainly there is no room for them here. The blunt uncompromising honesty +of the scholars thus delivers them from undesirable company of a kind +which the "historians" proper have still occasionally to put up with.</p> + +<p>Bad workers, in fact, on the hunt for a public less closely critical +than the scholars, are very ready to take refuge in historical +exposition. The rules of method are here less obvious, or, rather, not +so well known. While the criticism of texts and sources has been placed +on a scientific basis, historical synthesis is still performed +haphazard. Mental confusion, ignorance, negligence—faults which stand +out so clearly in works of critical scholarship—may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">140</a></span> in historical +works be disguised up to a certain point by literary artifices, and the +public at large, which is not well educated in this respect, is not +shocked.<a name="FNanchor_127_127" id="FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href="#Footnote-127" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 127.">[127]</a> In short, there is still, in this department, a certain +chance of impunity. This chance, however, is diminishing, and a day will +come, before so very long, when the superficial writers who make +incorrect syntheses will be treated with as little consideration as is +now received by those who show themselves unscrupulous or unskilful in +the technique of preparatory criticism. The works of the most celebrated +historians of the nineteenth century, those who died but yesterday, +Augustin Thierry, Ranke, Fustel de Coulanges, Taine, and others, are +already battered and riddled with criticism. The faults of their methods +have already been seen, defined, and condemned.</p> + +<p>Those who are insensible to other considerations ought to be moved to +honesty in historical work by the reflection that the time is now past, +or nearly so, when it was possible to do bad work without having to +suffer for it.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">141</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="SECTION_II" id="SECTION_II"></a><i>SECTION II.—INTERNAL CRITICISM</i></h3> + + + +<h3 class="top5"><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h3> + +<p class="head2">INTERPRETATIVE CRITICISM (HERMENEUTIC)</p> + + +<p>I. When a zoologist describes the form and situation of a muscle, when a +physiologist gives the curve of a movement, we are able to accept their +results without reserve, because we know by what method, by what +instruments, by what system of notation they have obtained them.<a name="FNanchor_128_128" id="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href="#Footnote-128" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 128.">[128]</a> +But when Tacitus says of the Germans, <i>Arva per annos mutant</i>, we do not +know beforehand whether he took the right method to inform himself, nor +even in what sense he used the words <i>arva</i> and <i>mutant</i>; to ascertain +this a preliminary operation is required.<a name="FNanchor_129_129" id="FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href="#Footnote-129" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 129.">[129]</a> This operation is +internal criticism.</p> + +<p>The object of criticism is to discover what in a document may be +accepted as true. Now the document is only the final result of a long +series of operations, on the details of which the author gives<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">142</a></span> us no +information. He had to observe or collect facts, to frame sentences, to +write down words; and these operations, which are perfectly distinct one +from another, may not all have been performed with the same accuracy. It +is therefore necessary to <i>analyse</i> the product of the author's labour +in order to distinguish which operations have been incorrectly +performed, and reject their <i>results</i>. <i>Analysis</i> is thus necessary to +criticism; all criticism begins with analysis.</p> + +<p>In order to be logically complete, the analysis ought to reconstruct +<i>all</i> the operations which the author must have performed, and to +examine them <i>one by one</i>, to see whether each has been performed +correctly. It would be necessary to pass in review all the successive +acts by which the document was produced, from the moment when the author +observed the fact which is its subject up to the movements of his hand +by which he traced the letters of the document; or, rather, it would be +necessary to proceed in the opposite direction, step by step, from the +movements of the hand back to the observation. This method would be so +long and so tedious that no one would ever have the time or the patience +to apply it.</p> + +<p>Internal criticism is not, like external criticism, an instrument used +for the mere pleasure of using it;<a name="FNanchor_130_130" id="FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href="#Footnote-130" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 130.">[130]</a> it yields no immediate +satisfaction, because it does not definitively solve any problem. It is +only applied because it is necessary, and its use is restricted to a +bare minimum. The most exacting historian is satisfied with an abridged +method which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">143</a></span> concentrates all the operations into two groups: (1) the +analysis of the contents of the document, and the positive +interpretative criticism which is necessary for ascertaining what the +author meant; (2) the analysis of the conditions under which the +document was produced, and its negative criticism, necessary for the +verification of the author's statements. This twofold division of the +labour of criticism is, moreover, only employed by a select few. The +natural tendency, even of historians who work methodically, is to read +the text with the object of extracting information directly from it, +without any thought of first ascertaining what exactly was in the +author's mind.<a name="FNanchor_131_131" id="FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href="#Footnote-131" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 131.">[131]</a> This procedure is excusable at most in the case of +nineteenth-century documents, written by men whose language and mode of +thought are familiar to us, and then only when there is not more than +one possible interpretation. It becomes dangerous as soon as the +author's habits of language or thought begin to differ from those of the +historian who reads him, or when the meaning of the text is not obvious +and indisputable. Whoever, in reading a text, is not exclusively +occupied with the effort to understand it, is sure to read impressions +of his own into it; he is struck by phrases or words in the document +which correspond to his own ideas, or agree with his own <i>a priori</i> +notion of the facts; unconsciously he detaches these phrases or words,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">144</a></span> +and forms out of them an imaginary text which he puts in the place of +the real text of the author.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">145</a></span><a name="FNanchor_132_132" id="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href="#Footnote-132" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 132.">[132]</a></p> + + +<p class="top5">II. Here, as always in history, method consists in repressing the first +impulse. It is necessary to be penetrated by the principle, sufficiently +obvious but often forgotten, that a document only contains the ideas of +the man who wrote it, and to make it a rule to begin by understanding +the text by itself, <i>before</i> asking what can be extracted from it for +the purposes of history. We thus arrive at this general rule of method: +the study of every document should begin with an analysis of its +contents, made with the sole aim of determining the real meaning of the +author.</p> + +<p>This analysis is a preliminary operation, distinct and independent. +Experience here, as in the tasks of critical scholarship,<a name="FNanchor_133_133" id="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href="#Footnote-133" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 133.">[133]</a> has +decided in favour of the system of slips. Each slip will contain the +analysis of a document, of a separate part of a document, or of an +episode in a narrative; the analysis ought to indicate not only the +general sense of the text, but also, as far as possible, the object and +views of the author. It will be well to reproduce verbally any +expressions which may seem characteristic of the author's thought. +Sometimes it will be enough to have analysed the text mentally: it is +not always necessary to put down in black and white the whole contents +of a document; in such cases we simply enter the points of which we +intend to make use. But against the ever-present danger of substituting +one's personal impressions for the text there is only one real +safeguard; it should be made an invariable rule never on any account to +make an extract from a document, or a partial analysis of it, without<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">146</a></span> +having <i>first</i> made a comprehensive analysis<a name="FNanchor_134_134" id="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a href="#Footnote-134" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 134.">[134]</a> of it mentally, if not +on paper.</p> + +<p>To analyse a document is to discern and isolate all the ideas expressed +by the author. Analysis thus reduces to <i>interpretative criticism</i>.</p> + +<p>Interpretation passes through two stages: the first is concerned with +the literal, the second with the real meaning.</p> + + +<p class="top5">III. The determination of the literal meaning of a document is a +linguistic operation; accordingly, Philology (in the narrow sense) has +been reckoned among the auxiliary sciences of history. To understand a +text it is first necessary to know the language. But a <i>general</i> +knowledge of the language is not enough. In order to interpret Gregory +of Tours, it is not enough to know Latin in a general way; it is +necessary to add a special study of the particular kind of Latin written +by Gregory of Tours.</p> + +<p>The natural tendency is to attribute the same meaning to the same word +wherever it occurs. We instinctively treat a language as if it were a +fixed system of signs. Fixity, indeed, is a characteristic of the signs +which have been expressly invented for scientific use, such as +algebraical notation or the nomenclature of chemistry. Here every +expression has a single precise meaning, which is absolute and +invariable; it expresses an accurately analysed and defined idea, only +one such idea, and that always the same in whatever context the +expression may occur,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">147</a></span> and by whatever author it may be used. But +ordinary language, in which documents are written, fluctuates: each word +expresses a complex and ill-defined idea; its meanings are manifold, +relative, and variable; the same word may stand for several different +things, and is used in different senses by the same author according to +the context; lastly, the meaning of a word varies from author to author, +and is modified in the course of time. <i>Vel</i>, which in classical Latin +only has the meanings <i>or</i> and <i>even</i>, means <i>and</i> in certain epochs of +the middle ages; <i>suffragium</i>, which is classical Latin for <i>suffrage</i>, +takes in mediæval Latin the sense of <i>help</i>. We have, then, to learn to +resist the instinct which leads us to explain all the expressions of a +text by their classical or ordinary meanings. The grammatical +interpretation, based on the general rules of the language, must be +supplemented by an historical interpretation founded on an examination +of the particular case.</p> + +<p>The method consists in determining the special meaning of the words in +the document; it rests on a few very simple principles.</p> + +<p>(1) Language changes by continuous evolution. Each epoch has a language +of its own, which must be treated as a separate system of signs. In +order to understand a document we must know the <i>language of the +time</i>—that is, the meanings of words and forms of expression in use at +the time when the text was written. The meaning of a word is to be +determined by bringing together the passages where it is employed: it +will generally be found that in one or other of these the remainder of +the sentence leaves<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">148</a></span> no doubt as to the meaning of the word in +question.<a name="FNanchor_135_135" id="FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href="#Footnote-135" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 135.">[135]</a> Information of this kind is given in historical +dictionaries, such as the <i>Thesaurus Linguæ Latinæ</i>; or the glossaries +of Du Cange. In these compilations the article devoted to each word is a +collection of the passages in which the word occurs, accompanied by +indications of authorship which fix the epoch.</p> + +<p>When the author wrote in a dead language which he had learnt out of +books—this is the case with the Latin texts of the earlier middle +ages—we must be on our guard against words used in an arbitrary sense, +or selected for the sake of elegance: for example, <i>consul</i> (count, +earl), <i>capite census</i> (censitary), <i>agellus</i> (grand domain).</p> + +<p>(2) Linguistic usage may vary from one region to another; we have, then, +to know the <i>language of the country</i> where the document was +written—that is, the peculiar meanings current in the country.</p> + +<p>(3) Each author has his own manner of writing; we have, then, to study +the <i>language of the author</i>, the peculiar senses in which he used +words.<a name="FNanchor_136_136" id="FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href="#Footnote-136" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 136.">[136]</a> This purpose is served by lexicons to a single author, as +Meusel's <i>Lexicon Cæsarianum</i>, in which are brought<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">149</a></span> together all the +passages in which the author used each word.</p> + +<p>(4) An expression changes its meaning according to the passage in which +it occurs; we must therefore interpret each word and sentence not as if +it stood isolated, but with an eye to the general sense of the context. +This is the <i>rule of context</i>,<a name="FNanchor_137_137" id="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href="#Footnote-137" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 137.">[137]</a> a fundamental rule of +interpretation. Its meaning is that, before making use of a phrase taken +from a text, we must have read the text in its entirety; it prohibits +the stuffing of a modern work with <i>quotations</i>—that is, shreds of +phrases torn from passages without regard to the special sense given to +them by the context.<a name="FNanchor_138_138" id="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a href="#Footnote-138" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 138.">[138]</a></p> + +<p>These rules, if rigorously applied, would constitute an exact method of +interpretation which would hardly leave any chance of error, but would +require an enormous expenditure of time. What an immense amount of +labour would be necessary if, in the case of <i>each</i> word, we had to +determine by a special operation its meaning in the language of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">150</a></span> the +time, of the country, of the author, and in the context! Yet this is the +labour demanded by a well-made translation: in the case of some ancient +works of great literary value it has been submitted to; for the mass of +historical documents we content ourselves, in practice, with an abridged +method.</p> + +<p>All words are not equally subject to variations of meaning; most of them +keep a fairly uniform meaning in all authors and in all periods. We may +therefore be satisfied to study specially those expressions which, from +their nature, are liable to take different meanings: first, ready-made +expressions which, being fixed, do not follow the evolution of the words +of which they are composed; secondly, and chiefly, words denoting things +which are in their nature subject to evolution; classes of men (<i>miles</i>, +<i>colonus</i>, <i>servus</i>); institutions (<i>conventus</i>, <i>justitia</i>, <i>judex</i>); +usages (<i>alleu</i>, <i>bénéfice</i>, <i>élection</i>); feelings, common objects. In +the case of all words of such classes it would be imprudent to assume a +fixed meaning; it is an absolutely necessary precaution to ascertain +what is the sense in which they are used in the text to be interpreted. +"These studies of words," said Fustel de Coulanges, "have a great +importance in historical science. A badly interpreted term may be the +source of serious error."<a name="FNanchor_139_139" id="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href="#Footnote-139" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 139.">[139]</a> And, in fact, simply by a methodical +application of interpretative criticism to a hundred words or so, he +succeeded in revolutionising the study of the Merovingian epoch.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">151</a></span></p> + + +<p class="top5">IV. When we have analysed the document and determined the literal +meaning of its phrases, we cannot even yet be sure that we have reached +the real thoughts of the author. It is possible that he may have used +some expressions in an oblique sense; there are several kinds of cases +where this occurs: allegory and symbolism, jests and hoaxes, allusion +and implication, even the ordinary figures of speech, metaphor, +hyperbole, litotes.<a name="FNanchor_140_140" id="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a href="#Footnote-140" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 140.">[140]</a> In all these cases it is necessary to pierce +through the literal meaning to the real meaning, which the author has +purposely disguised under an inexact form.</p> + +<p>Logically the problem is very embarrassing: there is no fixed external +criterion by which we can make sure of detecting an oblique sense; in +the case of the hoax, which in the present century has become a branch +of literature, it is an essential part of the author's plan to leave no +indication which would betray the jest. In practice we may be morally +certain that an author is not using an oblique sense wherever his prime +object is to be understood; we are therefore not likely to meet with +difficulties of this kind in official documents, in charters, and in +historical narratives. In all these cases the general form of the +document permits us to assume that it is written in the literal sense of +the words.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, we must be prepared for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">152</a></span> oblique senses when the +author had other interests than that of being understood, or when he +wrote for a public which could understand his allusions and read between +the lines, or when his readers, in virtue of a religious or literary +initiation, might be expected to understand his symbolisms and figures +of speech. This is the case with religious texts, private letters, and +all those literary works which form so large a part of the documents on +antiquity. Thus the art of recognising and determining hidden meanings +in texts has always occupied a large space in the theory of +<i>hermeneutic</i><a name="FNanchor_141_141" id="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href="#Footnote-141" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 141.">[141]</a> (which is Greek for interpretative criticism), and in +the <i>exegesis</i> of the sacred texts and of classical authors.</p> + +<p>The different modes of introducing an oblique sense behind the literal +sense are too varied, and depend too much on special circumstances, for +it to be possible to reduce the art of detecting them to definite rules. +Only one general principle can be laid down, and that is, that when the +literal sense is absurd, incoherent, or obscure, or in contradiction +with the ideas of the author or the facts known to him, then we ought to +presume an oblique sense.</p> + +<p>In order to determine this sense, the procedure is the same as for +studying the language of an author: we compare the passages in which the +expressions occur in which we suspect an oblique sense, and look to see +whether there is not one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">153</a></span> where the meaning may be guessed from the +context. A celebrated instance of this procedure is the discovery of the +allegorical meaning of the Beast in the Apocalypse. But as there is no +certain method of solving these problems, we never have a right to say +we have discovered all the hidden meanings or seized all the allusions +contained in a text; and even when we think we have found the sense, we +shall do well to draw no inferences from a necessarily conjectural +interpretation.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, it is necessary to guard against the temptation to +look for allegorical meanings everywhere, as the neo-Platonists did in +Plato's works and the Swedenborgians in the Bible. This attack of +<i>hyper-hermeneutic</i> is now over, but we are not yet safe from the +analogous tendency to look for allusions everywhere. Investigations of +this kind are always conjectural, and are better calculated to flatter +the vanity of the interpreter than to furnish results of which history +can make use.</p> + +<p class="top5">V. When we have at length reached the real sense of the text, the +operation of positive analysis is concluded. Its result is to make us +acquainted with the author's conceptions, the images he had in his mind, +the general notions in terms of which he represented the world to +himself. This information belongs to a very important branch of +knowledge, out of which is constituted a whole group of historical +sciences:<a name="FNanchor_142_142" id="FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href="#Footnote-142" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 142.">[142]</a> the history of the illustrative arts and of literature, +the history of science, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">154</a></span> history of philosophical and moral +doctrine, mythology and the history of dogmas (wrongly called religious +beliefs, because here we are studying official doctrines without +inquiring whether they are believed), the history of law, the history of +official institutions (so far as we do not inquire how they were applied +in practice), the assemblage of popular legends, traditions, opinions, +conceptions (inexactly called beliefs) which are comprised under the +name of folk-lore.</p> + +<p>All these studies need only the external criticism which investigates +authorship and origin and interpretative criticism; they require one +degree less elaboration than the history of objective facts, and +accordingly they have been earlier established on a methodical basis.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">155</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h3> + +<p class="head2">THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE GOOD FAITH AND ACCURACY OF +AUTHORS</p> + + +<p>I. Analysis and positive interpretative criticism only penetrate as far +as the inward workings of the mind of the author of a document, and only +help us to know his ideas. They give no direct information about +external facts. Even when the author was able to observe them, his text +only indicates how he wished to represent them, not how he really saw +them, still less how they really happened. What an author expresses is +not always what he believed, for he may have lied; what he believed is +not necessarily what happened, for he may have been mistaken. These +propositions are obvious. And yet a first and natural impulse leads us +to accept as true every statement contained in a document, which is +equivalent to assuming that no author ever lied or was deceived; and +this spontaneous credulity seems to possess a high degree of vitality, +for it persists in spite of the innumerable instances of error and +mendacity which daily experience brings before us.</p> + +<p>Reflection has been forced on historians in the course of their work by +the circumstance of their finding documents which contradicted each +other; in such cases they have been obliged to doubt, and,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">156</a></span> after +examination, to admit the existence of error or mendacity; thus negative +criticism has appeared as a practical necessity for the purpose of +eliminating statements which are obviously false or erroneous. But the +instinct of confidence is so indestructible that it has hitherto +prevented even those professionally concerned from systematising the +internal criticism of statements in the same way as the external +criticism which deals with the origin of documents has been +systematised. Historians, in their works, and even theoretical writers +on historical method,<a name="FNanchor_143_143" id="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a href="#Footnote-143" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 143.">[143]</a> have been satisfied with common notions and +vague formulæ in striking contrast with the precise terminology of the +critical investigation of sources. They are content to examine whether +the author was roughly <i>contemporary</i> with the events, whether he was an +ocular <i>witness</i>, whether he was <i>sincere</i> and <i>well-informed</i>, whether +he knew the truth and desired to tell it, or even—summing up the whole +question in a single formula—whether he was <i>trustworthy</i>.</p> + +<p>This superficial criticism is certainly better than no criticism at all, +and has sufficed to give those who have applied it the consciousness of +incontestable superiority. But it is only a halfway-house between common +credulity and scientific method. Here, as in every science, the +starting-point must be methodical doubt.<a name="FNanchor_144_144" id="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href="#Footnote-144" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 144.">[144]</a> All that has not been +proved must be temporarily regarded as doubtful; no <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">157</a></span>proposition is to +be affirmed unless reasons can be adduced in favour of its truth. +Applied to the statements contained in documents, methodical doubt +becomes <i>methodical distrust</i>.</p> + +<p>The historian ought to distrust <i>a priori</i> every statement of an author, +for he cannot be sure that it is not mendacious or mistaken. At the best +it affords a presumption. For the historian to adopt it and affirm it +afresh on his own account implies that he regards it as a scientific +truth. To take this decisive step is what he has no right to do without +good reasons. But the human mind is so constituted that this step is +often taken unconsciously (cf. book ii. chap. i.). Against this +dangerous tendency criticism has only one means of defence. We must not +postpone doubt till it is forced upon us by conflicting statements in +documents; we must <i>begin</i> by doubting. We must never forget the +interval which separates a statement made by any author whatsoever from +a scientifically established truth, so that we may continually keep in +mind the responsibility which we assume when we reproduce a statement.</p> + +<p>Even after we have accepted the principle and resolved to apply this +unnatural distrust in practice, we tend instinctively to free ourselves +from it as soon as possible. The natural impulse is to perform the +criticism of the whole of an author, or at least of the whole of a +document, in the lump; to divide authorities into two categories, the +sheep on the right, the goats on the left; on the one side trustworthy +authors and good documents, on the other suspected authors and bad +documents. Having thus<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">158</a></span> exhausted our powers of distrust, we proceed to +reproduce without discussion all the statements contained in the "good +document." We consent to distrust suspected authors such as Suidas or +Aimo, but we affirm as established truth everything that has been said +by Thucydides or Gregory of Tours.<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></a><a href="#Footnote-145" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 145.">[145]</a> We apply to authors that +judicial procedure which divides witnesses into admissible and +inadmissible: having once accepted a witness, we feel ourselves bound to +admit all his testimony; we dare not doubt any of his statements without +a special reason. Instinctively we take sides with the author on whom we +have bestowed our approval, and we go so far as to say, as in the law +courts, that the burden of proof rests with those who reject valid +testimony.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">159</a></span><a name="FNanchor_146_146" id="FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href="#Footnote-146" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 146.">[146]</a></p> + +<p>The confusion is still further increased by the use of the word +<i>authentic</i>, borrowed from judicial language. It has reference to the +origin only, not to the contents; to say that a document is authentic is +merely to say that its origin is certain, not that its contents are free +from error. But authenticity inspires a degree of respect which disposes +us to accept the contents without discussion. To doubt the statements of +an authentic document would seem presumptuous, or at least we think +ourselves bound to wait for overwhelming proof before we impeach the +testimony of the author.</p> + + +<p class="top5">II. These natural instincts must be methodically resisted. A document +(still more a literary work) is not all of a piece; it is composed of a +great number of independent statements, any one of which may be +intentionally or unintentionally false, while the others are <i>bonâ fide</i> +and accurate, or conversely, since each statement is the outcome of a +mental operation which may have been incorrectly performed, while others +were performed correctly. It is not, therefore, enough to examine a +document as a whole; each of the statements in it must be examined +separately; <i>criticism</i> is impossible without <i>analysis</i>.</p> + +<p>Thus internal criticism conducts us to two general rules.</p> + +<p>(1) A scientific truth is not established by <i>testimony</i>. In order to +affirm a proposition we must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">160</a></span> have special reasons for believing it +true. It may happen in certain cases that an author's statement is a +sufficient reason for belief; but we cannot know that beforehand. The +rule, then, will be to examine each separate statement in order to make +sure whether it is of a nature to constitute a sufficient reason for +belief.</p> + +<p>(2) The criticism of a document is not to be performed <i>en bloc</i>. The +rule will be to <i>analyse</i> the document into its elements, in order to +isolate the different statements of which it is composed and to examine +each of them separately. Sometimes a single sentence contains several +statements; they must be separated and criticised one by one. In a sale, +for example, we distinguish the date, the place, the vendor, the +purchaser, the object, the price, and each one of the conditions.</p> + +<p>In practice, criticism and analysis are performed simultaneously, and, +except in the case of texts in a difficult language, may proceed <i>pari +passu</i> with interpretative analysis and criticism. As soon as we +understand a phrase we analyse it and criticise each of its elements.</p> + +<p>It thus appears that <i>logically</i> criticism comprises an enormous number +of operations. In describing them, with all the details necessary for +the understanding of their mechanism and the reasons for their +employment, we are likely to give the impression of a procedure too slow +to be practicable. Such an impression is inevitably produced by every +verbal description of a complicated process. Compare the time occupied +in describing a movement in fencing with that required to execute it; +compare the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">161</a></span> tedium of the grammar and dictionary with the rapidity of +reading. Like every practical art, criticism consists in the habit of +performing certain acts. In the period of apprenticeship, before the +habit is acquired, we are obliged to think of each act separately before +performing it, and to analyse the movements; accordingly we perform them +all slowly and with difficulty; but the habit once acquired, the acts, +which have now become instinctive and unconscious, are performed with +ease and rapidity. The reader must therefore not be uneasy about the +slowness of the critical processes; he will see later on how they are +abridged in practice.</p> + + +<p class="top5">III. The problem of criticism may be stated as follows. Given a +statement made by a man of whose mental operations we have no +experience, and the value of the statement depending exclusively on the +manner in which these operations were performed; to ascertain whether +these operations were performed correctly. The mere statement of the +problem shows that we cannot hope for any direct or definitive solution +of it; we lack the essential datum, namely, the manner in which the +author performed the mental operations concerned. Criticism therefore +does not advance beyond indirect and provisional solutions, and does no +more than furnish data which require a final elaboration.</p> + +<p>A natural instinct leads us to judge of the value of statements by their +form. We think we can tell at a glance whether an author is sincere or a +narrative accurate. We seek for what is called "the accent of +sincerity," or "an impression of truth." This impression is almost +irresistible, but it is none<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">162</a></span> the less an illusion. There is no external +criterion either of good faith or of accuracy. "The accent of sincerity" +is the appearance of conviction; an orator, an actor, an habitual liar +will put more of it into his lies than an undecided man into his +statement of what he believes to be the truth. Energy of affirmation +does not always mean strength of conviction, but sometimes only +cleverness or effrontery.<a name="FNanchor_147_147" id="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href="#Footnote-147" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 147.">[147]</a> Similarly, abundance and precision of +detail, though they produce a vivid impression on unexperienced readers, +do not guarantee the accuracy of the facts;<a name="FNanchor_148_148" id="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href="#Footnote-148" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 148.">[148]</a> they give us no +information about anything but the imagination of the author when he is +sincere, or his impudence when he is the reverse. We are apt to say of a +circumstantial narrative: "Things of this kind are not invented." They +are not invented, but they are very easy to transfer from one person, +country, or time to another. There is thus no external characteristic of +a document which can relieve us of the obligation to criticise it.</p> + +<p>The value of an author's statement depends solely on the conditions +under which he performed certain mental operations. Criticism has no +other resource<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">163</a></span> than the examination of these conditions. But it is not +a case of reconstructing all of them; it is enough to answer a single +question: did the author perform these operations correctly or not? The +question may be approached on two sides.</p> + +<p>(1) The critical investigation of authorship has often taught us the +<i>general</i> conditions under which the author operated. It is probable +that some of these influenced each one of the operations. We ought +therefore to begin by studying the information we possess about the +author and the composition of the document, taking particular pains to +look in the habits, sentiments, and personal situation of the author, or +in the circumstances in which he composed, for all the reasons which +could have existed for incorrectness on the one hand, or exceptional +accuracy on the other. In order to perceive these reasons it is +necessary to be on the lookout for them beforehand. The only method, +therefore, is to draw up a general set of questions having reference to +the possible causes of inaccuracy. We shall then apply it to the general +conditions under which the document was composed, in order to discover +those causes which may have rendered the author's mental operations +incorrect and vitiated the results. But all that we shall thus +obtain—even in the exceptionally favourable cases in which the +conditions of origin are well known—will be <i>general</i> indications, +which will be insufficient for the purposes of criticism, for criticism +must always deal with each separate statement.</p> + +<p>(2) The criticism of particular statements is confined to the use of a +single method, which, by a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">164</a></span> curious paradox, is the study of the +<i>universal</i> conditions under which documents are composed. The +information which is not furnished by the general study of the author +may be sought for by a consideration of the necessary processes of the +human mind; for, since these are universal, they must appear in each +particular case. We know what are the cases in which men in general are +inclined to alter or distort facts. What we have to do in the case of +each statement is to examine whether it was made under such +circumstances as to lead us to suspect, from our knowledge of the habits +of normal humanity, that the operations implied in the making of it were +incorrectly performed. The practical procedure will be to draw up a set +of questions relating to the habitual causes of inaccuracy.</p> + +<p>The whole of criticism thus reduces to the drawing up and answering of +two sets of questions: one for the purpose of bringing before our minds +those general conditions affecting the composition of the document, from +which we may deduce general motives for distrust or confidence; the +other for the purpose of realising the special conditions of each +statement, from which special motives may be drawn for distrust or +confidence. These two sets of questions ought to be drawn up beforehand +in such a form as may enable us to examine methodically both the +document in general and each statement in particular; and as they are +the same for all documents, it is useful to formulate them once for all.</p> + + +<p class="top5">IV. The critical process comprises two series of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">165</a></span> questions, which +correspond to the two series of operations by which the document was +produced. All that interpretative criticism tells us is what the author +meant; it remains to determine (1) what he really believed, for he may +not have been sincere; (2) what he really knew, for he may have been +mistaken. We may therefore distinguish a <i>critical examination of the +author's good faith</i>, by which we seek to determine whether the author +of the document lied or not, and a <i>critical examination</i> of his +<i>accuracy</i>, by which we seek to determine whether he was or was not +mistaken.</p> + +<p>In practice we rarely need to know what an author believed, unless we +are making a special study of his character. We have no direct interest +in the author; he is merely the medium through which we reach the +external facts he reports. The aim of criticism is to determine whether +the author has reported the facts correctly. If he has given inexact +information, it is indifferent whether he did so intentionally or not; +to draw a distinction would complicate matters unnecessarily. There is +thus little occasion to make a separate examination of an author's good +faith, and we may shorten our labours by including in a single set of +questions all the causes which lead to misstatement. But for the sake of +clearness it will be well to discuss the questions to be asked in two +separate series.</p> + +<p>The questions in the first series will help us to inquire whether we +have any reason to distrust the sincerity of a statement. We ask whether +the author was in any of those situations which normally incline a man +to be insincere. We must ask what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">166</a></span> these situations are, both as +affecting the general composition of a document, and as affecting each +particular statement. Experience supplies the answer. Every violation of +truth, small or great, is due to a wish on the part of the author to +produce a particular impression upon the reader. Our set of questions +thus reduces to a list of the motives which may, in the general case, +lead an author to violate truth. The following are the most important +cases:—</p> + +<p>(1) The author seeks to gain a practical advantage for himself; he +wishes to deceive the reader of the document, in order to persuade him +to an action, or to dissuade him from it; he knowingly gives false +information: we then say the author has an interest in deceiving. This +is the case with most official documents. Even in documents which have +not been composed for a practical purpose, every interested statement +has a chance of being mendacious. In order to determine which statements +are to be suspected, we are to ask what <i>can</i> have been the general aim +of the author in writing the document as a whole; and again, what can +have been his particular purpose in making each of the separate +statements which compose the document. But there are two natural +tendencies to be resisted. The first is, to ask what interest the author +could have <i>had</i> in lying, meaning what interest should <i>we</i> have had in +his place; we must ask instead what interest can he have <i>thought</i> he +had in lying, and we must look for the answer in his tastes and ideals. +The other tendency is to take sole account of the <i>individual</i> interest +of the author; we ought, however, to remember that the author may have +given<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">167</a></span> false information in order to serve a <i>collective</i> interest. This +is one of the difficulties of criticism. An author is a member at one +and the same time of several different groups, a family, a province, a +country, a religious denomination, a political party, a class in +society, whose interests often conflict; we have to discover the group +in which he took most interest, and for which he worked.</p> + +<p>(2) The author was placed in a situation which compelled him to violate +truth. This happens whenever he has to draw up a document in conformity +with rule or custom, while the actual circumstances are in some point or +other in conflict with rule or custom; he is then obliged to state that +the conditions were normal, and thus make a false declaration in respect +of all the irregularities. In nearly every report of proceedings there +is some slight deviation from truth as to the day, the hour, the place, +the number or the names of those present. Most of us have observed, if +not taken part in, some of these petty fictions. But we are too apt to +forget them when we come to criticise documents relating to the past. +The <i>authentic</i> character of the documents contributes to the illusion; +we instinctively make <i>authentic</i> a synonym of <i>sincere</i>. The rigid +rules which govern the composition of every authentic document seem to +guarantee sincerity; they are, on the contrary, an incentive to falsify, +not the main facts, but the accessory circumstances. From the fact of a +person having signed a report we may infer that he agreed to it, but not +that he was actually present at the time when the report mentions him as +having been present.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">168</a></span></p> + +<p>(3) The author viewed with sympathy or antipathy a group of men (nation, +party, denomination, province, city, family), or an assemblage of +doctrines or institutions (religion, school of philosophy, political +theory), and was led to distort facts in such a manner as to represent +his friends in a favourable and his opponents in an unfavourable light. +These are instances of a general bias which affects all the statements +of an author, and they are so obvious that the ancients perceived them +and gave them names (<i>studium</i> and <i>odium</i>); from ancient times it has +been a literary commonplace for historians to protest that they have +steered clear of both.</p> + +<p>(4) The author was induced by private or collective vanity to violate +truth for the purpose of exalting himself or his group. He made such +statements as he thought likely to give the reader the impression that +he and his possessed qualities deserving of esteem. We have therefore to +inquire whether a given statement may not be influenced by vanity. But +we must take care not to represent the author's vanity to ourselves as +being exactly like our own vanity or that of our contemporaries. +Different people are vain for different reasons; we must inquire what +was our author's particular vanity; he may have lied in order to +attribute to himself or his friends actions which we should consider +dishonourable. Charles IX. falsely boasted of having organised the +Massacre of St. Bartholomew. There is, however, a kind of vanity which +is universal, and that is, the desire to appear to be a person of +exalted rank playing an important part in affairs. We must, therefore, +always distrust a statement<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">169</a></span> which attributes to the author or his group +a high place in the world.<a name="FNanchor_149_149" id="FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href="#Footnote-149" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 149.">[149]</a></p> + +<p>(5) The author desired to please the public, or at least to avoid +shocking it. He has expressed sentiments and ideas in harmony with the +morality or the fashion of his public; he has distorted facts in order +to adapt them to the passions and prejudices of his time, even those +which he did not share. The purest types of this kind of falsehood are +found in ceremonial forms, official formulæ, declarations prescribed by +etiquette, set speeches, polite phrases. The statements which come under +this head are so open to suspicion that we are unable to derive from +them any information about the facts stated. We are all aware of this so +far as relates to the contemporary formulæ of which we see instances +every day, but we often forget it in the criticism of documents, +especially those belonging to an age from which few documents have come +down to us. No one would think of looking for the real sentiments of a +man in the assurances of respect with which he ends his letters. But +people believed for a long time in the humility of certain +ecclesiastical dignitaries of the middle ages, because, on the day of +their election, they began by refusing an office of which they declared +themselves unworthy, till at last comparison showed that this refusal +was a mere conventional form. And there are still scholars who, like the +Benedictines of the eighteenth century, look in the chancery-formulæ<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">170</a></span> of +a prince for information as to his piety or his liberality.<a name="FNanchor_150_150" id="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href="#Footnote-150" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 150.">[150]</a></p> + +<p>In order to recognise these conventional declarations there are two +lines of general study to be pursued: the one is directed to the author, +and seeks to discover what was the public he addressed, for in one and +the same country there are usually several different publics, each of +which has its own code of morals or propriety; the other is directed +towards the public, and seeks to determine its morals or its manners.</p> + +<p>(6) The author endeavoured to please the public by literary artifices. +He distorted facts in order to embellish them according to his own +æsthetic notions. We have therefore to look for the ideal of the author +or of his time, in order to be on our guard against passages distorted +to suit that ideal. But without special study we may calculate on the +common kinds of literary distortion. Rhetorical distortion consists in +attributing to persons noble attitudes, acts, sentiments, and, above +all, words: this is a natural tendency in young boys who are beginning +to practise the art of composition, and in writers still in a +semi-barbarous stage; it is the common defect of the mediæval +chroniclers.<a name="FNanchor_151_151" id="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href="#Footnote-151" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 151.">[151]</a> Epic<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">171</a></span> distortion embellishes the narrative by adding +picturesque details, speeches delivered by the persons concerned, +numbers, sometimes names of persons; it is dangerous, because the +precision of the details produces an illusive appearance of truth.<a name="FNanchor_152_152" id="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href="#Footnote-152" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 152.">[152]</a> +Dramatic distortion consists in grouping the facts in such a way as to +enhance the dramatic effect by concentrating facts, which in reality +were separate, upon a single moment, a single person, or a single group. +Writing of this kind is what we call "truer than the truth." It is the +most dangerous form of distortion, the form employed by artistic +historians, by Herodotus, Tacitus, the Italians of the Renaissance. +Lyrical distortion exaggerates the intensity of the sentiments and the +emotions of the author and his friends: we should remember this when we +attempt to reconstruct "the psychology" of a person.</p> + +<p>Literary distortion does not much affect archives (though instances of +it are found in most charters of the eleventh century); but it +profoundly modifies all literary texts, including the narratives of +historians. Now, the natural tendency is to trust writers more readily +when they have talent, and to admit statements with less difficulty when +they are presented in good literary form. Criticism must counteract this +tendency by the application of the paradoxical rule, that the more +interesting a statement is from the artistic point of view,<a name="FNanchor_153_153" id="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href="#Footnote-153" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 153.">[153]</a> the +more it ought to be suspected. We must distrust every narrative which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">172</a></span> +is very picturesque or very dramatic, in which the personages assume +noble attitudes or manifest great intensity of feeling.</p> + +<p>This first series of questions will yield the <i>provisional</i> result of +enabling us to note the statements which have a <i>chance</i> of being +mendacious.</p> + +<p class="top5">V. The second series of questions will be of use in determining whether +there is any reason to distrust the accuracy of a statement. Was the +author in one of those situations which cause a man to make mistakes? As +in dealing with good faith, we must look for these conditions both as +affecting the document as a whole, and as affecting each of the +particular statements in it.</p> + +<p>The practice of the established sciences teaches us the conditions of an +exact knowledge of facts. There is only one scientific procedure for +gaining knowledge of a fact, namely, <i>observation</i>; every statement, +therefore, must rest, directly or indirectly, upon an observation, and +this observation must have been made correctly.</p> + +<p>The set of questions by the aid of which we investigate the +probabilities of error may be drawn up in the light of experience, which +brings before us the most common cases of error.</p> + +<p>(1) The author was in a situation to observe the fact, and supposed he +really had observed it; he was, however, prevented from doing so by some +interior force of which he was unconscious, an hallucination, an +illusion, or a mere prejudice. It would be useless, as well as +impossible, to determine which of these agencies was at work; it is +enough to ascertain whether the author had a tendency to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">173</a></span> observe badly. +It is scarcely possible in the case of a particular statement to +recognise that it was the result of an hallucination or an illusion. At +the most we may learn, either from information derived from other +sources or by comparison, that an author had a <i>general</i> propensity to +this kind of error.</p> + +<p>There is a better chance of recognising whether a statement was due to +prejudice. In the life or the works of an author we may find the traces +of his dominant prejudices. With reference to each of his particular +statements, we ought to ask whether it is not the result of a +preconceived idea of the author on a class of men or a kind of facts. +This inquiry partly coincides with the search for motives of falsehood: +interest, vanity, sympathy, and antipathy give rise to prejudices which +alter the truth in the same manner as wilful falsehood. We therefore +employ the questions already formulated for the purpose of testing good +faith. But there is one to be added. In putting forward a statement has +the author been led to distort it unconsciously by the circumstance that +he was answering a question? This is the case of all statements obtained +by interrogating witnesses. Even apart from the cases where the person +interrogated seeks to please the proposer of the question by giving an +answer which he thinks will be agreeable to him, every question suggests +its own answer, or at least its form, and this form is dictated +beforehand by some one unacquainted with the facts. It is therefore +necessary to apply a special criticism to every statement obtained by +interrogation; we must ask what was the question put, and what were the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">174</a></span> +preconceptions to which it may have given rise in the mind of the person +interrogated.</p> + +<p>(2) The author was badly situated for observing. The practice of the +sciences teaches us what are the conditions for correct observation. The +observer ought to be placed where he can see correctly, and should have +no practical interest, no desire to obtain a particular result, no +preconceived idea about the result. He ought to record the observation +immediately, in a precise system of notation; he ought to give a precise +indication of his method. These conditions, which are insisted on in the +sciences of observation, are never completely fulfilled by the authors +of documents.</p> + +<p>It would be useless, therefore, to ask whether there have been chances +of inaccuracy; <i>there always have been</i>, and it is just this that +distinguishes a <i>document</i> from an <i>observation</i>. It only remains to +look for the obvious causes of error in the conditions of observation: +to inquire whether the observer was in a place where he could not see or +hear well, as would be the case, for example, with a subordinate who +should presume to narrate the secret deliberations of a council of +dignitaries; whether his attention was greatly distracted by the +necessity for action, as it would be on the field of battle, for +example; whether he was inattentive because the facts had little +interest for him; whether he lacked the special experience or general +intelligence necessary for understanding the facts; whether he analysed +his impressions badly, or confused different events. Above all, we must +ask when he <i>wrote down</i> what he saw or heard. This is the most +important point:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">175</a></span> the only exact observation is the one which is +recorded immediately it is made; such is the constant procedure in the +established sciences; an impression committed to writing later on is +only a recollection, liable to be confused in the memory with other +recollections. <i>Memoirs</i> written several years after the facts, often at +the very end of the author's career, have introduced innumerable errors +into history. It must be made a rule to treat <i>memoirs</i> with special +distrust as second-hand documents, in spite of their appearance of being +contemporary testimony.</p> + +<p>(3) The author states facts which he could have observed, but to which +he did not take the trouble to attend. From idleness or negligence he +reported details which he has merely inferred, or even imagined at +random, and which turn out to be false. This is a common source of +error, though it does not readily occur to one, and is to be suspected +wherever the author was obliged to procure information in which he took +little interest, in order to fill up a blank form. Of this kind are +answers to questions put by an authority (it is enough to observe how +most official inquiries are conducted in our own day), and detailed +accounts of ceremonies or public functions. There is too strong a +temptation to write the account from the programme, or in agreement with +the usual order of the proceedings. How many accounts of meetings of all +kinds have been published by reporters who were not present at them! +Similar efforts of imagination are suspected—sometimes, it is thought, +clearly recognised—in the writings of mediæval chroniclers.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">176</a></span><a name="FNanchor_154_154" id="FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href="#Footnote-154" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 154.">[154]</a> The +rule, then, will be to distrust all narratives conforming too closely to +a set formula.</p> + +<p>(4) The fact stated is of such a nature that it could not have been +learnt by observation alone. It may be a hidden fact—a private secret, +for example. It may be a fact relating to a collectivity, and applying +to an extensive area or a long period of time; for example, the common +act of a whole army, a custom common to a whole people or a whole age, a +statistical total obtained by the addition of numerous items. It may be +a comprehensive judgment on the character of a man, a group, a custom, +an event. Here we have to do with propositions derived from observations +by synthesis or inference: the author can only have arrived at them +indirectly; he began with data furnished by observation, and elaborated +them by the logical processes of abstraction, generalisation, reasoning, +calculation. Two questions arise. Does it appear that the author had +sufficient data to work upon? Was he accurate, or the reverse, in his +use of the data he had?</p> + +<p>On the probable inaccuracies of an author, general indications may be +obtained from an examination of his writings. This examination will show +us how he worked: whether he was capable of abstraction, reasoning, +generalisation, and what were the mistakes he was in the habit of +making. In order to determine the value of the data, we must criticise +each statement separately; we must imagine the conditions under which +the author observed, and ask ourselves whether he was able to procure +the necessary data for his statement. This is an indispensable +precaution in dealing with large totals<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">177</a></span> in statistics and descriptions +of popular usages; for it is possible that the author may have obtained +the total he gives by a process of conjectural valuation (this is the +ordinary practice in stating the number of combatants or killed in a +battle), or by combining subsidiary totals, all of which were not +accurate; it is possible that he may have extended to a whole people, a +whole country, a whole period, that which was true only of a small group +known to him.<a name="FNanchor_155_155" id="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href="#Footnote-155" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 155.">[155]</a></p> + +<p class="top5">VI. These two first series of questions bearing on the good faith and +the accuracy of the statements in the document are based on the +supposition that the author has observed the fact himself. This is a +feature common to all reports of observations in the established +sciences. But in history there is so great a dearth of direct +<i>observations</i>, of even moderate value, that we are obliged to turn to +account documents which every other science would reject.<a name="FNanchor_156_156" id="FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href="#Footnote-156" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 156.">[156]</a> Take any +narrative at random, even if it be the work of a contemporary, it will +be found that the facts observed by the author are never more than a +part of the whole number. In nearly every document the majority of the +statements do not come from the author at first hand, but are +reproductions of the statements of others. Even where a general relates +a battle in which he commanded, he does not communicate his own +observations, but those of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">178</a></span> his officers; his narrative is in a large +measure a "second-hand document."<a name="FNanchor_157_157" id="FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href="#Footnote-157" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 157.">[157]</a></p> + +<p>In order to criticise a second-hand statement it is no longer enough to +examine the conditions under which the author of the document worked: +this author is, in such a case, a mere agent of transmission; the true +author is the person who supplied him the information. The critic, +therefore, must change his ground, and ask whether the informant +observed and reported correctly; and if he too had the information from +some one else (the commonest case), the chase must be pursued from one +intermediary to another, till the person is found who first launched the +statement on its career, and with regard to him the question must be +asked: Was he an accurate observer?</p> + +<p>Logically such a search is not inconceivable; ancient collections of +Arab traditions give lists of their successive guarantors. But, in +practice, lack of documents nearly always prevents us from getting as +far as the observer of a fact; the observation remains anonymous. A +general question then presents itself: How are we to criticise an +anonymous statement? It is not only "anonymous documents"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">179</a></span> with which we +are concerned, where the composition as a whole is the work of an +unknown author; even when the author is known, this question arises with +respect to each statement of his drawn from an unknown source.</p> + +<p>Criticism works by reproducing the conditions under which an author +wrote, and has hardly anything to take hold of where a statement is +anonymous. The only method left is to examine the general conditions of +the document. We may inquire whether there is any feature common to all +the statements of a document indicating that they all proceed from +persons having the same prejudices or passions: in this case the +tradition followed by the author is biassed; the tradition followed by +Herodotus has both an Athenian bias and a Delphic bias. In respect of +each fact derived from such a tradition we must ask whether it has not +been distorted by the interest, the vanity, or the prejudices of the +group concerned. We may even ignore the author, and ask whether there +was anything likely to make for or against correct observation, common +to all the men of the time and country in which the observation must +have been made: for example, what means of information, and what +prejudices, had the Greeks of Herodotus' time with respect to the +Scythians.</p> + +<p>The most useful of all these general inquiries has reference to that +mode of transmitting anonymous statements which is called <i>tradition</i>. +No second-hand statement has any value except in so far as it reproduces +its source; every addition is an alteration, and ought to be eliminated. +Similarly, all the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">180</a></span>intermediary sources are valueless except as copies +of the original statement founded directly on observation. The critic +needs to know whether this transmission from hand to hand has preserved +or distorted the original statement; above all, whether the tradition +embodied in the document was <i>written</i> or <i>oral</i>. Writing fixes a +statement, and ensures its being transmitted faithfully; when a +statement is communicated orally, the impression in the mind of the +hearer is apt to be modified by confusion with other impressions; in +passing from one intermediary to another the statement is modified at +every step,<a name="FNanchor_158_158" id="FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href="#Footnote-158" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 158.">[158]</a> and as these modifications arise from different causes, +there is no possibility of measuring or correcting them.</p> + +<p>Oral tradition is by its nature a process of continual alteration; hence +in the established sciences only written transmission is accepted. +Historians have no avowable motive for proceeding differently, at any +rate when it is a case of establishing a particular fact. We must +therefore search documents for statements derived from oral tradition in +order that we may suspect them. We rarely have direct information as to +statements being thus derived; authors who borrow from oral tradition +are not anxious to proclaim the fact.<a name="FNanchor_159_159" id="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href="#Footnote-159" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 159.">[159]</a> There is thus only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">181</a></span> an +indirect method, and that is to ascertain that written transmission was +impossible; we may then be sure that the fact reached the author only by +oral tradition. We have therefore to ask the question: In this period +and in this group of men was it customary to commit to writing facts of +this kind? If the answer is negative, the fact considered rests on oral +tradition alone.</p> + +<p>The most striking form of oral tradition is <i>legend</i>. It arises among +groups of men with whom the spoken word is the only means of +transmission, in barbarous societies, or in classes of little culture, +such as peasants or soldiers. In this case it is the whole group of +facts which is transmitted orally and assumes the legendary form. There +is a legendary period in the early history of every people: in Greece, +at Rome, among the Germanic and Slavonic races, the most ancient +memories of the people form a stratum of legend. In periods of +civilisation popular legends continue to exist in reference to events +which strike the imagination of the people.<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Footnote-160" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 160.">[160]</a> Legend is exclusively +oral tradition.</p> + +<p>When a people has emerged from the legendary period and begun to commit +its history to writing, oral tradition does not come to an end, but only +applies to a narrower sphere; it is now restricted to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">182</a></span> facts which are +not registered, whether because they are by their nature secret, or +because no one takes the trouble to record them, such as private +actions, words, the details of events. Thus arise <i>anecdotes</i>, which +have been named "the legends of civilised society." Like legends they +have their origin in confused recollections, allusions, mistaken +interpretations, imaginings of all kinds which fasten upon particular +persons and events.</p> + +<p>Legends and anecdotes are at bottom mere popular beliefs, arbitrarily +attached to historical personages; they belong to folk-lore, not to +history.<a name="FNanchor_161_161" id="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href="#Footnote-161" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 161.">[161]</a> We must therefore guard against the temptation to treat +legend as an alloy of accurate facts and errors out of which it is +possible by analysis to extract grains of historical truth. A legend is +a conglomerate in which there may be some grains of truth, and which may +even be capable of being analysed into its elements; but there is no +means of distinguishing the elements taken from reality from those which +are the work of imagination. To use Niebuhr's expression, a legend is "a +mirage produced by an invisible object according to an unknown law of +refraction."</p> + +<p>The crudest analytical procedure consists in rejecting those details in +the legendary narrative which appear impossible, miraculous, +contradictory, or absurd, and retaining the rational residue as +historical. This is how the Protestant rationalists of the eighteenth +century treated biblical narratives.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">183</a></span> One might as well amputate the +marvellous part of a fairy tale, suppress Puss in Boots, and keep the +Marquis of Carabas as an historical character. A more refined but no +less dangerous method is to compare different legends in order to deduce +their common historical basis. Grote<a name="FNanchor_162_162" id="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href="#Footnote-162" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 162.">[162]</a> has shown, with reference to +Greek tradition, that it is impossible to extract any trustworthy +information from legend by any process whatever.<a name="FNanchor_163_163" id="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href="#Footnote-163" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 163.">[163]</a> We must make up +our minds to treat legend as a product of imagination; we may look in it +for a people's conceptions, not for the external facts in that people's +history. The rule will be to reject every statement of legendary origin; +nor does this apply only to narratives in legendary form: a narrative +which has an historical appearance, but is founded on the data of +legend, the opening chapters of Thucydides for example, ought equally to +be discarded.</p> + +<p>In the case of written transmission it remains to inquire whether the +author reproduced his source without altering it. This inquiry forms +part of the critical investigation of the sources,<a name="FNanchor_164_164" id="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href="#Footnote-164" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 164.">[164]</a> so far as it can +be pursued by a comparison of texts. But when the source has disappeared +we are reduced to internal criticism. We ask, first of all, whether the +author can have had exact information, otherwise his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">184</a></span>statement is +valueless. We next put to ourselves the general question: Was the author +in the habit of altering his sources, and in what manner? And in regard +to each separate second-hand statement we ask whether it has the +appearance of being an exact reproduction or an arrangement. We judge by +the form: when we meet with a passage whose style is out of harmony with +the main body of the composition, we have before us a fragment of an +earlier document; the more servile the reproduction the more valuable is +the passage, for it can contain no exact information beyond what was +already in the source.</p> + +<p class="top5">VII. In spite of all these investigations, criticism never succeeds in +determining the parentage of all the statements to the extent of finding +out who it was that observed, or even recorded, each fact. In most cases +the inquiry ends in leaving the statement anonymous.</p> + +<p>We are thus confronted with a fact, observed we know not by whom nor +how, recorded we know not when nor how. No other science accepts facts +which come in such a condition, without possibility of verification, +subject to incalculable chances of error. But history can turn them to +account, because it does not, like the other sciences, need a supply of +facts which are difficult to ascertain.</p> + +<p>The notion of a <i>fact</i>, when we come to examine it precisely, reduces to +an affirmative judgment having reference to external reality. The +operations by which we arrive at such a judgment are more or less +difficult, and the risk of error is greater or smaller according to the +nature of the realities<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">185</a></span> investigated and the degree of precision with +which we wish to formulate them. Chemistry and biology need to discern +facts of a delicate order, rapid movements, transient states, and to +measure them in exact figures. History can work with facts of a much +coarser kind, spread over a large extent of space or time, such as the +existence of a custom, of a man, of a group, even of a people; and these +facts may be roughly expressed in vague words conveying no idea of +accurate measurement. With such easily observed facts as these to deal +with, history can afford to be much less exacting with regard to the +conditions of observation. The imperfection of the means of information +is compensated by a natural faculty of being satisfied with information +which can easily be obtained.</p> + +<p>Documents supply little else besides ill-verified facts, subject to many +risks of falsehood or error. But there are some facts in respect of +which it is very difficult to lie or be mistaken. The last series of +questions which the critic should ask is intended to distinguish, in the +mass of alleged facts, those which by their nature are little subject to +the risk of alteration, and which are therefore very probably correct. +We know what, in general, are the classes of facts which enjoy this +privilege; we are thus enabled to draw up a list of questions for +general use, and in applying them to any particular case we ask whether +the fact in question comes under any of the heads specified in advance.</p> + +<p>(1) The fact is of a nature to render falsehood improbable. A man lies +in order to produce an impression, and has no motive to lie in a case<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">186</a></span> +where he believes that the false impression would be of no use, or that +the falsehood would be ineffectual. In order to determine whether the +author was in such a situation there are several questions to be asked.</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) Is the fact stated manifestly prejudicial to the effect which the +author wished to produce? Does it run counter to the interest, the +vanity, the sentiments, the literary tastes of the author and his group; +or to the opinions which he made a point of not offending? In such a +case there is a probability of good faith. But in the application of +this criterion there is danger; it has often been wrongly used, and in +two ways. One of these is to take for a confession what was meant for a +boast, as the declaration of Charles IX. that he was responsible for the +Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Or again, we trust without examination an +Athenian who speaks ill of the Athenians, or a Protestant who accuses +other Protestants. But it is quite possible the author's notions of his +interest or honour were very different from ours;<a name="FNanchor_165_165" id="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href="#Footnote-165" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 165.">[165]</a> or he may have +wished to calumniate fellow-citizens who did not belong to his own +party, or co-religionists who did not belong to his own sect. This +criterion must therefore be restricted to cases where we know exactly +what <i>effect</i> he wished to produce, and in what <i>group</i> he was mainly +interested.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) Was the fact stated so obviously known to the public that the +author, even if tempted to falsehood, would have been restrained by the +certainty of being detected? This is the case with facts which are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">187</a></span> easy +to verify, which are not remote in point of time or space, which apply +to a wide area or a long period, especially if the public had any +interest in verifying them. But the fear of detection is only an +intermittent check, opposed by interest whenever the author has any +motive for deceiving. It acts unequally on different minds—strongly on +men of culture and self-control who understand their public, feebly in +barbarous ages and on passionate men.<a name="FNanchor_166_166" id="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href="#Footnote-166" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 166.">[166]</a> This criterion, therefore, is +to be restricted to cases where we know what idea the author had of his +readers, and whether he was dispassionate enough to keep them in mind.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) Was the fact stated <i>indifferent</i> to the author, so that he had no +temptation to misrepresent it? This is the case with facts of a general +kind, usages, institutions, objects, persons, which the author mentions +incidentally. A narrative, even a false one, cannot be composed +exclusively of falsehoods; the author must localise his facts, and needs +to surround them with a framework of truth. The facts which form this +framework had no interest for him; at that time every one knew them. But +for us they are instructive, and we can depend on them, for the author +had no intention of deceiving us.</p> + +<p>(2) The fact was of a kind to render error improbable. Numerous as the +chances of error are, still there are facts so "big" it is hard to be +mistaken about them. We have, then, to ask<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">188</a></span> whether the alleged fact was +easy to ascertain: (<i>a</i>) Did it cover a long period of time, so that it +must have been frequently observed? Take, for example, the case of a +monument, a man, a custom, an event which was in progress for a +considerable time. (<i>b</i>) Did it cover a wide area, so that many people +observed it?—as, for example, a battle, a war, a custom common to a +whole people. (<i>c</i>) Is it expressed in such general terms that +superficial observation was enough to discover it?—as the mere +existence of a man, a city, a people, a custom. Facts of this large and +general kind make up the bulk of historical knowledge.</p> + +<p>(3) The fact was of such a nature that it would not have been stated +unless it was true. A man does not declare that he has seen something +contrary to his expectations and habits of mind unless observation has +compelled him to admit it. A fact which seems very improbable to the man +who relates it has a good chance of being true. We have, then, to ask +whether the fact stated was in contradiction with the author's opinions, +whether it is a phenomenon of a kind unknown to him, an action or a +custom which seems unintelligible to him; whether it is a saying whose +import transcends his intelligence, such as the sayings of Christ +reported in the Gospels, or the answers made by Joan of Arc to questions +put to her in the course of her trial. But we must guard against judging +of the author's ideas by our own standards: when men who are accustomed +to believe in the marvellous speak of monsters, of miracles, of wizards, +there is nothing in these to contradict their expectations, and the +criterion does not apply.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">189</a></span></p> + +<p>VIII. We have at last reached the end of this description of the +critical operations; its length is due to the necessity of describing +successively operations which are performed simultaneously. We will now +consider how these methods are applied in practice.</p> + +<p>If the text be one whose interpretation is debatable, the examination is +divided into two stages: the first comprises the reading of the text +with a view to the determination of the meaning, without attempting to +draw any information from it; the second comprises the critical study of +the facts contained in the document. In the case of documents whose +meaning is clear, we may begin the critical examination on the first +reading, reserving for separate study any individual passages of +doubtful meaning.</p> + +<p>We begin by collecting the <i>general</i> information we possess about the +document and the author, with the special purpose of discovering the +conditions which may have influenced the production of the document—the +epoch, the place, the purpose, the circumstances of its composition; the +author's social status, country, party, sect, family, interests, +passions, prejudices, linguistic habits, methods of work, means of +information, culture, abilities, and mental defects; the nature of the +facts and the mode of their transmission. Information on all these +points is supplied by the preparatory critical investigation of +authorship and sources. We now combine the different heads, mentally +applying the set of general critical questions; this should be done at +the outset, and the results impressed on the memory, for they will need +to be present to the mind during the remainder of the operations.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">190</a></span></p> + +<p>Thus prepared, we attack the document. As we read we mentally analyse +it, destroying all the author's combinations, discarding all his +literary devices, in order to arrive at the facts, which we formulate in +simple and precise language. We thus free ourselves from the deference +imposed by artistic form, and from all submission to the author's +ideas—an emancipation without which criticism is impossible.</p> + +<p>The document thus analysed resolves into a long series of the author's +conceptions and statements as to facts.</p> + +<p>With regard to each statement, we ask ourselves whether there is a +probability of their being false or erroneous, or whether, on the other +hand, there are exceptional chances in favour of good faith and +accuracy, working through the list of critical questions prepared for +particular cases. This list of questions must be always present to the +mind. At first it may seem cumbersome, perhaps pedantic; but as it will +be applied more than a hundred times in each page of the document, it +will in the end be used unconsciously. As we read a text, all the +reasons for distrust or confidence will occur to the mind +simultaneously, combined into a single impression.</p> + +<p>Analysis and critical questioning will then have become a matter of +instinct, and we shall have acquired for ever that methodically +analytical, distrustful, not too respectful turn of mind which is often +mystically called "the critical sense," but which is nothing else than +an unconscious <i>habit</i> of criticism.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">191</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h3> + +<p class="head2">THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR FACTS</p> + + +<p>Critical analysis yields in the result a number of conceptions and +statements, accompanied by comments on the probability of the facts +stated being accurate. It remains to examine how we can deduce from +these materials those particular historical facts which are to form the +basis of scientific knowledge. Conceptions and statements are two +different kinds of results, and must be treated by different methods.</p> + +<p class="top5">I. Every conception which is expressed in writing or by any illustrative +representation is in itself a definite, unimpeachable fact That which is +expressed must have first been present in the mind of some one—if not +in that of the author, who may have reproduced a formula he did not +understand, then in the mind of the man who originated the formula. The +existence of a conception may be learnt from a single instance and +proved from a single document. Analysis and interpretation are thus +sufficient for the purpose of drawing up the complete list of those +facts which form the basis of the history of the arts, the sciences, or +of doctrines.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">192</a></span><a name="FNanchor_167_167" id="FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href="#Footnote-167" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 167.">[167]</a> It is the task of external criticism to localise +these facts by determining the epoch, the country, the author of each +conception. The duration, geographical distribution, origin, and +filiation of conceptions belong to historical synthesis. Internal +criticism has nothing to do here; the fact is taken directly from the +document.</p> + +<p>We may advance a step farther. In themselves conceptions are nothing but +facts in psychology; but imagination does not create its objects, it +takes the elements of them from reality. Descriptions of imaginary facts +are constructed out of the real facts which the author has observed in +his experience. These elements of knowledge, the raw material of the +imaginary description, may be sought for and isolated. In dealing with +periods and with classes of facts for which documents are +rare—antiquity, for example, and the usages of private life—the +attempt has been made to lay under contribution works of literature, +epic poems, novels, plays.<a name="FNanchor_168_168" id="FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href="#Footnote-168" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 168.">[168]</a> The method is legitimate, but only +within the limits of certain restrictions which one is very apt to +forget.</p> + +<p>(1) It does not apply to social facts of a psychological order, the +moral or artistic standards of a society; the moral and æsthetic +conceptions in a document give at most the individual standards of the +author; we have no right to conclude from these to the morals or the +æsthetic tastes of the age. We must at least wait till we have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">193</a></span> compared +several different authors of the same period.</p> + +<p>(2) Descriptions even of physical facts and objects may be products of +the author's imagination. It is only the <i>elements</i> of them which we +know to be certainly real; all that we can assert is the separate +existence of the irreducible elements, form, material, colour, number. +When the poet speaks of golden gates or silver bucklers, we cannot infer +that golden gates and silver bucklers ever existed in reality; nothing +is certain beyond the separate existence of gates, bucklers, gold, and +silver. The analysis must therefore be carried to the point of +distinguishing those elements which the author must necessarily have +taken from experience: objects, their purpose, ordinary actions.</p> + +<p>(3) The conception of an object or an action proves that it existed, but +not that it was common; the object or action may have been unique, or +restricted to a very small circle; poets and novelists are fond of +taking their models from an exceptional world.</p> + +<p>(4) The facts yielded by this method are not localised in space or time; +the author may have taken them from a time or country not his own.</p> + +<p>All these restrictions may be summarised as follows: before drawing any +inference from a work of literature as to the state of the society in +which the author lived, we should ask ourselves what would be the worth +of a similar inference as to contemporary manners drawn from a modern +novel.</p> + +<p>With the facts yielded by conceptions we may join those indifferent +facts of an obvious and elementary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">194</a></span> character which the author has +stated almost without thinking. Logically we have no right to call them +certain, for we do sometimes meet with men who make mistakes about +obvious and elementary facts, and others who lie even on indifferent +matters. But such cases are so rare that there is not much danger in +admitting as certain facts of this kind which are supported by a single +document, and this is how we deal, in practice, with periods of which +little is known. The institutions of the Gauls and Germans are described +from the unique texts of Cæsar and Tacitus. Facts so easy to discover +are forced upon the authors of descriptions much as realities are forced +upon poets.</p> + +<p class="top5">II. On the other hand, a statement in a document as to an objective fact +is never enough to establish that fact. The chances of falsehood or +error are so many, the conditions which gave rise to the statement are +so little known, that we cannot be sure that none of these chances has +taken effect. The critical examination provides no definitive solution; +it is indispensable if we are to avoid error, but it is insufficient to +conduct us to truth.</p> + +<p>Criticism can <i>prove</i> no fact; it only yields probabilities. Its end and +result is to decompose documents into statements, each labelled with an +estimate of its value—worthless statement, statement open to suspicion +(strong or weak), statement probably (or, very probably) true, statement +of unknown value.</p> + +<p>Of all these different kinds of results one only is definitive—<i>the +statement of an author who can have had no information on the fact he +states is null and void</i>;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">195</a></span> it is to be rejected as we reject an +apocryphal document.<a name="FNanchor_169_169" id="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href="#Footnote-169" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 169.">[169]</a> But criticism here merely destroys illusory +sources of information; it supplies nothing certain to take their place. +The only sure results of criticism are <i>negative</i>. All the positive +results are subject to doubt; they reduce to propositions of the form: +"There are chances for or against the truth of such and such a +statement." Chances only. A statement open to suspicion may turn out to +be true; a statement whose truth is probable may, after all, be false. +Instances occur continually, and we are never sufficiently well +acquainted with the conditions under which the observation was made to +<i>know</i> whether it was made ill or well.</p> + +<p>In order to obtain a definitive result we require a final operation. +After passing through the ordeal of criticism, statements present +themselves as probable or improbable. But even the most probable of +them, taken by themselves, remain mere probabilities: to pass from them +to categorical propositions in scientific form is a step we have no +right to take; a proposition in a science is an assertion not open to +debate, and that is what the statements we have before us are not. It is +a principle common to all sciences of observation not to base a +scientific conclusion on a single observation; the fact must have been +corroborated by several independent observations before it is affirmed +categorically. History,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">196</a></span> with its imperfect modes of acquiring +information, has less right than any other science to claim exemption +from this principle. An historical statement is, in the most favourable +case, but an indifferently made observation, and needs other +observations to corroborate it.</p> + +<p>It is by combining observations that every science is built up: a +scientific fact is a centre on which several different observations +converge.<a name="FNanchor_170_170" id="FNanchor_170_170"></a><a href="#Footnote-170" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 170.">[170]</a> Each observation is subject to chances of error which +cannot be entirely eliminated; but if several observations agree, this +can hardly be in virtue of a common error: the more probable explanation +of the agreement is that the observers have all seen the same reality +and have all described it correctly. Errors are personal and tend to +diverge; it is the correct observations that agree.</p> + +<p>Applied to history, this principle leads to a last series of operations, +intermediate between purely analytical criticism and the synthetic +operations—the comparison of statements.</p> + +<p>We begin by classifying the results yielded by critical analysis in such +a way as to bring together those statements which relate to the same +fact. The operation is facilitated mechanically by the method of slips. +Either each statement has been entered on a separate slip, or else a +single slip has been assigned for each fact, and the different +statements relating to it entered upon the slip as met with in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">197</a></span> the +course of reading. By bringing the statements together we learn the +extent of our information on the fact; the definitive conclusion depends +on the relation between the statements. We have, then, to study +separately the different cases which may occur.</p> + +<p class="top5">III. Most frequently, except in contemporary history, the documents only +supply a single statement on a given fact. In such a case all the other +sciences follow an invariable rule: an isolated observation is not +admitted into science; it is quoted (with the observer's name), but no +conclusions are drawn from it. Historians have no avowable motive for +proceeding otherwise. When a fact is supported by no more than the +statement of a single man, however honest he may be, historians ought +not to assert it, but to do as men of science do—give the reference +(Thucydides states, Cæsar says that ...); this is all they have a right +to affirm. In reality they all retain the habit of stating facts, as was +done in the middle ages, on the <i>authority</i> of Thucydides or of Cæsar; +many are simple enough to do so in express terms. Thus, allowing +themselves to be guided by natural credulity, unchecked by science, +historians end by admitting, on the insufficient presumption afforded by +a unique document, any statement which does not happen to be +contradicted by another document. Hence the absurd consequence that +history is more positive, and seems better established in regard to +those little known periods which are represented by a single writer than +in regard to facts known from thousands of documents which contradict +each other. The wars of the Medes known to Herodotus alone, the +adventures of Fredegonda<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">198</a></span> related by none but Gregory of Tours, are less +subject to discussion than the events of the French Revolution, which +have been described by hundreds of contemporaries. This is a +discreditable state of things which cannot be ended except by a +revolution in the minds of historians.</p> + +<p class="top5">IV. When we have several statements relating to the same fact, they may +contradict each other or they may agree. In order to be certain that +they really do contradict each other, we have to make sure that they do +actually relate to the same fact. Two apparently contradictory +statements may be merely parallel; they may not relate exactly to the +same moment, the same place, the same persons, the same episodes of an +event, and they may be both correct.<a name="FNanchor_171_171" id="FNanchor_171_171"></a><a href="#Footnote-171" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 171.">[171]</a> We must not, however, infer +that they confirm each other; each comes under the category of unique +statements.</p> + +<p>If the contradiction is real, at least one of the statements is false. +In such cases it is a natural tendency to seek to reconcile them by a +compromise—to split the difference. This peace-making spirit is the +reverse of scientific. A says two and two make four; B says they make +five. We are not to conclude that two and two make four and a half; we +must examine and see which is right. This examination is the work of +criticism. Of two contradictory statements, it nearly always happens +that one is open to suspicion; this should be rejected if the competing +statement has been judged very probably true. If both are open to +suspicion,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">199</a></span> we abstain from drawing any conclusion. We do the same if +several statements open to suspicion agree together as against a single +statement which is not suspected.<a name="FNanchor_172_172" id="FNanchor_172_172"></a><a href="#Footnote-172" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 172.">[172]</a></p> + +<p class="top5">V. When several statements agree, it is still necessary to resist the +natural tendency to believe that the fact has been demonstrated. The +first impulse is to count each document as one source of information. We +are well aware in matters of every-day life that men are apt to copy +each other, that a single narrative often serves the turn of several +narrators, that several newspapers sometimes happen to publish the same +correspondence, that several reporters sometimes agree to let one of +their number do the work for all. We have, in such a case, several +documents, several statements—have we the same number of observations? +Obviously not. When one statement reproduces another, it does not +constitute a new observation, and even if an observation were to be +reproduced by a hundred different authors, these hundred copies would +amount to no more than one observation. To count them as a hundred would +be the same thing as to count a hundred printed copies of the same book +as a hundred different documents. But the respect paid to "historical +documents" is sometimes stronger than obvious truth. The same statement +occurring in several different documents by different authors has an +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">200</a></span>illusory appearance of multiplicity; an identical fact related in ten +different documents at once gives the impression of being established by +ten agreeing observations. This impression is to be distrusted. An +agreement is only conclusive when the agreeing statements represent +<i>observations</i> which are independent of each other. Before we draw any +conclusion from an agreement we must examine whether it is an agreement +between <i>independent</i> observations. Two operations are thus required.</p> + +<p>(1) We begin by inquiring whether the statements are independent, or are +reproductions of one and the same observation. This inquiry is partly +the work of that part of external criticism which deals with the +investigation of sources;<a name="FNanchor_173_173" id="FNanchor_173_173"></a><a href="#Footnote-173" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 173.">[173]</a> but that investigation only touches the +relations between written documents, and stops short when it has +determined which passages of an author are borrowed from other authors. +Borrowed passages are to be rejected without discussion. But the same +work remains to be done in reference to statements which were not +committed to writing. We have to compare the statements which relate to +the same fact, in order to find out whether they proceeded originally +from different observers, or at least from different observations.</p> + +<p>The principle is analogous to that employed in the investigation of +sources. The details of a social fact are so manifold, and there are so +many different ways of looking at the same fact, that two independent +observers cannot possibly give completely coincident accounts; if two +statements present the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">201</a></span> same details in the same order, they must be +derived from a common observation; different observations are bound to +diverge somewhere. We may often apply an <i>a priori</i> principle: if the +fact was of such a nature that it could only be observed or reported by +a single observer, then all the accounts of it must be derived from a +single observation. These principles<a name="FNanchor_174_174" id="FNanchor_174_174"></a><a href="#Footnote-174" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 174.">[174]</a> enable us to recognise many +cases of different observations, and still more numerous cases of +observations being reproduced.</p> + +<p>There remains a great number of doubtful cases. The natural tendency is +to treat them as if they were cases of independent observation. But the +scientific procedure would be the exact reverse of this: as long as the +statements are not proved to be independent we have no right to assume +that their agreement is conclusive.</p> + +<p>It is only after we have determined the relations between the different +statements that we can begin to count them and examine into their +agreement. Here again we have to distrust the first impulse; the kind of +agreement which is really conclusive is not, as one would naturally +imagine, a perfect similarity between two narratives, but an occasional +coincidence between two narratives which only partially resemble each +other. The natural tendency is to think that the closer the agreement +is, the greater is its demonstrative power; we ought, on the contrary, +to adopt as a rule the paradox that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">202</a></span> an agreement proves more when it is +confined to a small number of circumstances. It is at such points of +coincidence between diverging statements that we are to look for +scientifically established historical facts.</p> + +<p>(2) Before drawing any conclusions it remains to make sure whether the +<i>different</i> observations of the same fact are entirely <i>independent</i>; +for it is possible that one may have influenced another to such a degree +that their agreement is inconclusive. We have to guard against the +following cases:—</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The different observations have been made by the same author, who +has recorded them either in the same or in different documents; special +reasons must then be had before it can be assumed that the author really +made the observation afresh, and did not content himself with merely +repeating a single observation.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) There were several observers, but they commissioned one of their +number to write a single document. We have to ascertain whether the +document merely gives the statements of the writer, or whether the other +observers checked his work.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) Several observers recorded their observations in different +documents, but under similar conditions. We must apply the list of +critical questions in order to ascertain whether they were not all +subject to the same influences, predisposing to falsehood or error; +whether, for example, they had a common interest, a common vanity, or +common prejudices.</p> + +<p>The only observations which are certainly independent are those which +are contained in different documents, written by different authors, who +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">203</a></span>belonged to different groups, and worked under different conditions. +Cases of perfectly conclusive agreement are thus rare, except in +reference to modern periods.</p> + +<p>The possibility of proving an historical fact depends on the number of +independent documents relating to it which have been preserved, and the +preservation of the documents is a matter of chance; this explains the +share which chance has in the formation of historical science.</p> + +<p>The facts which it is possible to establish are chiefly those which +cover a large extent of space or time (sometimes called <i>general</i> +facts), customs, doctrines, institutions, great events; they were easier +to observe than the others, and are now easier to prove. Historical +method is not, however, essentially powerless to establish facts of +short duration and limited extent (those which are called <i>particular +facts</i>), such as a saying, a momentary act. It is enough that several +persons should have been present when the fact occurred, that they +should have recorded it, and that their writings should have come down +to us. We know what were the words which Luther uttered at the Diet of +Worms; we know that he did not say what tradition puts in his mouth. +This concurrence of favourable conditions becomes more and more frequent +with the organisation of newspapers, of shorthand writers, and of +depositories of documents.</p> + +<p>In the case of antiquity and the middle ages historical knowledge is +limited to general facts by the scarcity of documents. In dealing with +contemporary history it is possible to include more and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">204</a></span> more particular +facts. The general public supposes the opposite of this; it is +suspicious about contemporary facts, with reference to which it sees +contradictory narratives circulating, and believes without hesitation +ancient facts, which it does not see contradicted anywhere. Its +confidence is at its greatest in respect of that history which we have +not the means of knowing, and its scepticism increases with the means of +knowledge.</p> + +<p class="top5">VI. <i>Agreement between documents</i> leads to conclusions which are not all +of them definitive. In order to complete and rectify our conclusions we +have still to study <i>the harmony of the facts</i>.</p> + +<p>Several facts which, taken in isolation, are only imperfectly proved, +may confirm each other in such a manner as to produce a collective +certainty. The facts which the documents present in isolation have +sometimes been in reality sufficiently near each other to be connected. +Of this kind are the successive actions of the same man or of the same +group of men, the habits of the same group at different epochs separated +by short intervals, or of similar groups at the same epoch. It is no +doubt possible that one of several analogous facts may be true and +another false; the certainty of the first does not justify the +categorical assertion of the second. But yet the harmony of several such +facts, each proved imperfectly, yields a kind of certainty; the facts do +not, in the strict sense of the word, prove, but they <i>confirm</i><a name="FNanchor_175_175" id="FNanchor_175_175"></a><a href="#Footnote-175" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 175.">[175]</a> +each other. The doubt which attached to each one of them disappears; we +obtain that species<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">205</a></span> of certainty which is produced by the +interconnection of facts. Thus the comparison of conclusions which are +separately doubtful yields a whole which is morally certain. In an +itinerary of a sovereign, the days and the places confirm each other +when they harmonize so as to form a coherent whole. An institution or a +popular usage is established by the harmony of accounts, each of which +is no more than probable, relating to different times and places.</p> + +<p>This method is a difficult one to apply. The notion of harmony is a much +vaguer one than that of agreement. We cannot assign any precise general +rules for distinguishing facts which are sufficiently connected to form +a whole, the harmony of whose parts would be conclusive; nor can we +determine beforehand the duration and extent of that which may be taken +to form a whole. Facts separated by half a century of time and a hundred +leagues of space may confirm each other in such a way as to establish a +popular usage (for example, among the ancient Germans); but they would +prove nothing if they were taken from a heterogeneous society subject to +rapid evolution (take, for example, French society in 1750, and again in +1800, in Alsace and in Provence). Here we have to study the relation +between the facts. This brings us to the beginnings of historical +construction; here is the transition from analytical to synthetic +operations.</p> + +<p class="top5">VII. But it remains to consider cases of discordance between facts +established by documents and other facts established by other methods. +It happens sometimes that a fact obtained as an historical conclusion is +in contradiction with a body of known<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">206</a></span> historical facts, or with the sum +of our knowledge of humanity founded on direct observation, or with a +scientific law established by the regular method of an established +science. In the first two cases the fact is only in conflict with +history, psychology, or sociology, all imperfectly established sciences; +we then simply call the fact <i>improbable</i>. If it is in conflict with a +true science it becomes a <i>miracle</i>. What are we to do with an +improbable or miraculous fact? Are we to admit it after examination of +the documents, or are we to pass on and shelve the question?</p> + +<p><i>Improbability</i> is not a scientific notion; it varies with the +individual. Each person finds improbable what he is not accustomed to +see: a peasant would think the telephone much more improbable than a +ghost; a king of Siam refused to believe in the existence of ice. It is +important to know who precisely it is to whom the fact appears to be +improbable. Is it to the mass who have no scientific culture? For these, +science is more improbable than miracle, physiology than spiritualism; +their notions of improbability are worthless. Is it to the man who +possesses scientific culture? If so, we have to deal with that which +seems improbable to a scientific mind, and it would be more accurate to +say that the fact is contrary to the results of science—that there is +disagreement between the direct observations of men of science and the +indirect testimony of the documents.</p> + +<p>How is this conflict to be decided? The question has no great practical +interest; nearly all the documents which relate miraculous facts are +already open<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">207</a></span> to suspicion on other grounds, and would be discarded by a +sound criticism. But the question of miracles has raised such passions +that it may be well to indicate how it affects the historian.<a name="FNanchor_176_176" id="FNanchor_176_176"></a><a href="#Footnote-176" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 176.">[176]</a></p> + +<p>The general tendency to believe in the marvellous has filled with +miraculous facts the documents of nearly every people. Historically the +existence of the devil is much better proved than that of Pisistratus: +there has not been preserved a single word of a contemporary of +Pisistratus saying that he has seen him; thousands of "ocular witnesses" +declare they have seen the devil; few historical facts have been +established by so great a number of independent testimonies. However, we +do not hesitate to reject the devil and to accept Pisistratus. For the +existence of the devil would be irreconcilable with the laws of all the +established sciences.</p> + +<p>For the historian the solution of the problem is obvious.<a name="FNanchor_177_177" id="FNanchor_177_177"></a><a href="#Footnote-177" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 177.">[177]</a> The +observations whose results are contained in historical documents are +never of equal value with those of contemporary scientists; we have +already shown why. The indirect method of history is always inferior to +the direct methods of the sciences of observation. If its results do not +harmonise with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">208</a></span> theirs, it is history which must give way; historical +science, with its imperfect means of information, cannot claim to check, +contradict, or correct the results of other sciences, but must rather +use their results to correct its own. The progress of the direct +sciences sometimes modifies the results of historical interpretation; a +fact established by direct observation aids in the comprehension and +criticism of documents. Cases of stigmata and nervous anæsthesia which +have been scientifically observed have led to the admission as true of +historical narratives of analogous facts, as in the case of the stigmata +of certain saints and the possessed nuns of Loudun. But history cannot +aid the progress of the direct sciences. It is kept at a distance from +reality by its indirect means of information, and must accept the laws +that are established by those sciences which come into immediate contact +with reality. In order to reject one of these laws new direct +observations are necessary. Such revolutions are possible, but they must +be brought about from within. History has no power to take the +initiative in them.</p> + +<p>The solution is not so clear in the case of facts which do not harmonise +with a body of historical knowledge or with the sciences, still in the +embryonic stage, which deal with man. It depends on the opinion we form +as to the value of such knowledge. We can at least lay down the +practical rule that in order to contradict history, psychology, or +sociology, we must have very strong documents, and this is a case which +hardly ever occurs.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">209</a></span></p> + + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">210</a></span></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">211</a></span></p> + + +<h3><a name="BOOK_III" id="BOOK_III"></a>BOOK III</h3> + +<h3 class="top5"><i>SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS</i></h3> + +<h3 class="top5"><a name="CHAPTER_Ic" id="CHAPTER_Ic"></a>CHAPTER I</h3> + +<p class="head2">GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION</p> + + +<p>The criticism of documents only yields isolated facts. In order to +organise them into a body of science it is necessary to perform a series +of synthetic operations. The study of these processes of historical +construction forms the second half of Methodology.</p> + +<p>The mode of construction cannot be regulated by the ideal plan of the +science we desire to construct; it depends on the materials we have at +our disposal. It would be chimerical to formulate a scheme which the +materials would not allow us to carry out; it would be like proposing to +construct an Eiffel tower with building-stones. The fundamental defect +of philosophies of history is that they forget this practical necessity.</p> + +<p class="top5">I. Let us begin by considering the materials of history. What is their +form and their nature? How do they differ from the materials of other +sciences?</p> + +<p>Historical facts are derived from the critical analysis of the +documents. They issue from this process in the form to which analysis +has reduced them,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">212</a></span> chopped small into individual statements; for a +single sentence contains several statements: we have often accepted some +and rejected others; each of these statements represents a fact.</p> + +<p>Historical facts have the common characteristic of having been taken +from documents; but they differ greatly among themselves.</p> + +<p>(1) They represent phenomena of very different nature. From the same +document we derive facts bearing on handwriting, language, style, +doctrines, customs, events. The Mesha inscription furnishes facts +bearing on Moabite handwriting and language, the belief in the god +Chemosh, the practices belonging to his cult, the war between the +Moabites and Israel. Thus the facts reach us pell-mell, without +distinction of nature. This mixture of heterogeneous facts is one of the +characteristics which differentiate history from the other sciences. The +sciences of direct observation choose the facts to be studied, and +systematically limit themselves to the observation of facts of a single +species. The documentary sciences receive the facts, already observed, +at the hands of authors of documents, who supply them in disorder. For +the purpose of remedying this disorder it is necessary to sort the facts +and group them by species. But, for the purpose of sorting them, it is +necessary to know precisely what it is that constitutes a <i>species</i> of +historical facts; in order to group them we need a principle of +classification applicable to them. But on these two questions of capital +importance historians have not as yet succeeded in formulating precise +rules.</p> + +<p>(2) Historical facts present themselves in very<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">213</a></span> different degrees of +generality, from the highly general facts which apply to a whole people +and which lasted for centuries (institutions, customs, beliefs), down to +the most transient actions of a single man (a word, a movement). Here +again history differs from the sciences of direct observation, which +regularly start from particular facts and labour methodically to +condense them into general facts. In order to form groups the facts must +be reduced to a common degree of generality, which makes it necessary to +inquire to what degree of generality we can and ought to reduce the +different species of facts. And this is what historians do not agree +about among themselves.</p> + +<p>(3) Historical facts are localised; each belongs to a given time and a +given country. If we suppress the time and place to which they belong, +they lose their historical character; they now contribute only to the +knowledge of universal humanity, as is the case with facts of folk-lore +whose origin is unknown. This necessity of localisation is also foreign +to the general sciences; it is confined to the descriptive sciences, +which deal with the geographical distribution and with the evolution of +phenomena. It obliges the historian to study separately the facts +belonging to different countries and different epochs.</p> + +<p>(4) The facts which have been extracted from documents by critical +analysis present themselves accompanied by a critical estimate of their +probability.<a name="FNanchor_178_178" id="FNanchor_178_178"></a><a href="#Footnote-178" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 178.">[178]</a> In every case where we have not reached complete +certainty, whenever the fact is merely probable—still more when it is +open to suspicion<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">214</a></span>—criticism supplies the fact to the historian +accompanied by a label which he has no right to remove, and which +prevents the fact from being definitively admitted into the science. +Even those facts which, after comparison with others, end by being +established, are subject to temporary exclusion, like the clinical cases +which accumulate in the medical reviews before they are considered +sufficiently proved to be received as scientific facts.</p> + +<p>Historical construction has thus to be performed with an incoherent mass +of minute facts, with detail-knowledge reduced as it were to a powder. +It must utilise a heterogeneous medley of materials, relating to +different subjects and places, differing in their degree of generality +and certainty. No method of classifying them is provided by the practice +of historians; history, which began by being a form of literature, has +remained the least methodical of the sciences.</p> + +<p class="top5">II. In every science the next step after observing the facts is to +formulate a series of questions according to some methodical +system;<a name="FNanchor_179_179" id="FNanchor_179_179"></a><a href="#Footnote-179" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 179.">[179]</a> every science is composed of the answers to such a series +of questions. In all the sciences of direct observation, even if the +questions to be answered have not been put down in advance, the facts +which are observed suggest questions, and require them to be formulated +precisely. But historians have no discipline of this kind; many of them +are accustomed to imitate artists, and do not even think of asking +themselves what they are looking for. They take from their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">215</a></span> documents +those parts which strike them, often for purely personal reasons, and +reproduce them, changing the language and adding any miscellaneous +reflections which come into their minds.</p> + +<p>If history is not to be lost in the confusion of its materials, it must +be made a rule to proceed here, as in the other sciences, by way of +question and answer.<a name="FNanchor_180_180" id="FNanchor_180_180"></a><a href="#Footnote-180" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 180.">[180]</a> But how are the questions to be chosen in a +science so different from the others? This is the fundamental problem of +method. The only way to solve it is to begin by determining the +essential characteristic of historical facts by which they are +differentiated from the facts of the other sciences.</p> + +<p>The sciences of direct observation deal with <i>realities</i>, taken in their +entirety. The science which borders most closely on history in respect +of its subject-matter, descriptive zoology, proceeds by the examination +of a real and complete animal. This animal is first observed, as a +whole, by actual vision; it is then dissected into its parts; this +dissection is <i>analysis</i> in the original sense of the word +(ἁναλὑειν, +to break up into parts). It is then possible to put the parts +together again in such a way as to exhibit the structure of the whole; +this is <i>real</i> synthesis. It is possible to watch the <i>real</i> movements +which are the functions of the organs in such a way as to observe the +mutual actions and reactions of the different parts of the organism. It +is possible to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">216</a></span> compare <i>real</i> wholes and see what are the parts in +which they resemble each other, so as to be able to classify them +according to real points of resemblance. The science is a body of +objective knowledge founded on <i>real</i> analysis, synthesis, and +comparison; actual sight of the things studied guides the scientific +researcher and dictates the questions he is to ask himself.</p> + +<p>In history there is nothing like this. One is apt to say that history is +the "vision" of past events, and that it proceeds by "analysis": these +are two metaphors, dangerous if we suffer ourselves to be misled by +them.<a name="FNanchor_181_181" id="FNanchor_181_181"></a><a href="#Footnote-181" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 181.">[181]</a> In history we see nothing real except paper with writing on +it—and sometimes monuments or the products of art or industry. The +historian has nothing before him which he can analyse physically, +nothing which he can destroy and reconstruct. "Historical analysis" is +no more real than is the vision of historical facts; it is an abstract +process, a purely intellectual operation. The analysis of a document +consists in a <i>mental</i> search for the items of information it contains, +with the object of criticising them one by one. The analysis of a fact +consists in the process of distinguishing <i>mentally</i> between its +different details (the various episodes of an event, the characteristics +of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">217</a></span> an institution), with the object of paying special attention to each +detail in turn; that is what is called examining the different "aspects" +of a fact,—another metaphor. The human mind is vague by nature, and +spontaneously revives only vague collective impressions; to impart +clearness to these it is necessary to ask what individual impressions go +to form a given collective impression, in order that precision may be +attained by a successive consideration of them. This is an indispensable +operation but we must not exaggerate its scope. It is not an objective +method which yields a knowledge of real objects; it is only a subjective +method which aims at detecting those abstract elements which compose our +impressions.<a name="FNanchor_182_182" id="FNanchor_182_182"></a><a href="#Footnote-182" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 182.">[182]</a> From the very nature of its materials history is +necessarily a subjective science. It would be illegitimate to extend to +this intellectual analysis of subjective impressions the rules which +govern the real analysis of real objects.</p> + +<p>History, then, must guard against the temptation to imitate the method +of the biological sciences. Historical facts are so different from the +facts of the other sciences that their study requires a different +method.</p> + +<p class="top5">III. Documents, the sole source of historical knowledge, give +information on three categories of facts:</p> + +<p>(1) <i>Living beings and material objects.</i> Documents make us acquainted +with the existence of human beings, physical conditions, products of art +and industry. In all these cases physical facts<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">218</a></span> have been brought +before the author by physical perception. But we have before us nothing +but intellectual phenomena, facts seen "through the author's +imagination," or, to speak accurately, mental images representative of +the author's impressions—images which we form on the <i>analogy</i> of the +images which were in his mind. The Temple at Jerusalem was a material +object which men saw, but we cannot see it now; all we can now do is to +form a mental image of it, analogous to that which existed in the minds +of those who saw and described it.</p> + +<p>(2) <i>Actions of men.</i> Documents relate the actions (and words) of men of +former times. Here, too, are physical facts which were known to the +authors by sight and hearing, but which are now for us no more than the +author's recollections, subjective images which are reproduced in our +minds. When Cæsar was stabbed the dagger-thrusts were seen, the words of +the murderers were heard; we have nothing but mental images. Actions and +words all have this characteristic, that each was the action or the word +of an individual; the imagination can only represent to itself +<i>individual</i> acts, copied from those which are brought before us by +direct physical observation. As these are the actions of men living in a +society, most of them are performed simultaneously by several +individuals, or are directed to some common end. These are collective +acts; but, in the imagination as in direct observation, they always +reduce to a sum of individual actions. The "social fact," as recognised +by certain sociologists, is a philosophical construction, not an +historical fact.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">219</a></span></p> + +<p>(3) Motives and conceptions. Human actions do not contain their own +cause within themselves; they have <i>motives</i>. This vague word denotes +both the stimulus which occasions the performance of an action, and the +<i>representation</i> of the action which is in the mind of a man at the +moment when he performs it. We can imagine motives only as existing in a +man's mind, and in the form of vague interior representations, analogous +to those which we have of our own inward states; we can express them +only by words, generally metaphorical. Here we have <i>psychic</i> facts, +generally called feelings and ideas. Documents exhibit three kinds of +such facts: (<i>a</i>) motives and conceptions in the authors' minds and +expressed by them; (<i>b</i>) motives and ideas attributed by the authors to +contemporaries of theirs whose actions they have seen; (<i>c</i>) motives +which we ourselves may suppose to have influenced the actions related in +the documents, and which we represent to ourselves on the model of our +own motives.</p> + +<p>Physical facts, human actions (both individual and collective), psychic +facts—these form the objects of historical knowledge; they are none of +them observed directly, they are all <i>imagined</i>. Historians—nearly all +of them unconsciously and under the impression that they are observing +realities—are occupied solely with images.</p> + +<p class="top5">IV. How, then, is it possible to imagine facts without their being +wholly imaginary? The facts, as they exist in the historian's mind, are +necessarily subjective; that is one of the reasons given for refusing to +recognise history as a science. But subjective is not a synonym of +unreal. A recollection<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">220</a></span> is only an image; but it is not therefore a +chimera, it is the representation of a vanished reality. It is true that +the historian who works with documents has no personal recollections of +which he can make direct use; but he forms mental images on the model of +his own recollections. He assumes that realities (objects, actions, +motives), which have now disappeared, but were formerly observed by the +authors of the documents, resembled the realities of his own day which +he has himself seen and which he retains in his memory. This is the +postulate of all the documentary sciences. If former humanity did not +resemble the humanity of to-day, documents would be unintelligible. +Starting from this assumed resemblance, the historian forms a mental +representation of the bygone facts of history similar to his own +recollection of the facts he has witnessed.</p> + +<p>This operation, which is performed unconsciously, is one of the +principal sources of error in history. The things of the past which are +to be pictured in imagination were not wholly similar to the things of +the present which we have seen; we have never seen a man like Cæsar or +Clovis, and we have never experienced the same mental states as they. In +the established sciences it is equally true that one man will work on +facts which another has observed, and which he must therefore represent +to himself by analogy; but these facts are defined by precise terms +which indicate what invariable elements ought to appear in the image. +Even in physiology the notions which occur are sufficiently clear and +fixed for the same word to evoke in the minds of all naturalists similar +images of an organ or a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">221</a></span>movement. The reason is that each notion which +has a name has been formed by a method of observation and abstraction in +the course of which all the characteristics which belong to the notion +have been precisely determined and described.</p> + +<p>But in proportion as a body of knowledge is more nearly concerned with +the invisible facts of the mind, its notions become more confused and +its language less precise. Even the most ordinary facts of human life, +social conditions, actions, motives, feelings, can only be expressed by +vague terms (<i>king</i>, <i>warrior</i>, <i>to fight</i>, <i>to elect</i>). In the case of +more complex phenomena, language is so indefinite that there is no +agreement even as to the essential elements of the phenomena. What are +we to understand by a tribe, an army, an industry, a market, a +revolution? Here history shares the vagueness common to all the sciences +of humanity, psychological or social. But its indirect method of +representation by mental images renders this vagueness still more +dangerous. The historical images in our minds ought, then, to reproduce +at least the essential features of the images which were in the minds of +the direct observers of past facts; but the terms in which they +expressed their mental images never tell us exactly what these essential +elements were.</p> + +<p>Facts which we did not see, described in language which does not permit +us to represent them in our minds with exactness, form the data of +history. The historian, however, is obliged to picture the facts in his +imagination, and he should make it his constant endeavour to construct +his mental images out of none but correct elements, so that he may +imagine<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">222</a></span> the facts as he would have seen them if he had been able to +observe them personally.<a name="FNanchor_183_183" id="FNanchor_183_183"></a><a href="#Footnote-183" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 183.">[183]</a> But the formation of a mental image +requires more elements than the documents supply. Let any one endeavour +to form a mental representation of a battle or a ceremony out of the +data of a narrative, however detailed; he will see how many features he +is compelled to add. This necessity becomes physically perceptible in +attempts to restore monuments in accordance with descriptions (for +example, the Temple at Jerusalem), in pictures which claim to be +representations of historical scenes, in the drawings of illustrated +newspapers.</p> + +<p>Every historical image contains a large part of fancy. The historian +cannot get rid of it, but he can take stock of the real elements which +enter into his images and confine his constructions to these; they are +the elements which he has derived from the documents. If, in order to +understand the battle between Cæsar and Ariovistus, he finds it +necessary to make a mental picture of the two opposing armies, he will +be careful to draw no conclusions from the general aspect under which he +imagines them; he will base his reasonings exclusively on the real +details furnished by the documents.</p> + +<p class="top5">V. The problem of historical method may be finally stated as follows. +Out of the different elements we find in documents we form mental +images. Some of these, relating entirely to physical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">223</a></span> objects, are +furnished to us by illustrative monuments, and they directly represent +some of the physical aspects of the things of the past. Most of them, +however, including all the images we form of psychic facts, are +constructed on the model either of ancient representations, or, more +frequently, of the facts we have observed in our own experience. Now, +the things of the past were only partially similar to the things of the +present, and it is precisely the points of difference which make history +interesting. How are we to represent to ourselves these elements of +difference for which we have no model? We have never seen a company of +men resembling the Frankish warriors, and we have never personally +experienced the feelings which Clovis had when setting out to fight +against the Visigoths. How are we to make our imagination of facts of +this kind harmonise with the reality?</p> + +<p>Practically, what happens is as follows. Immediately on the reading of a +sentence in a document an image is formed in our minds by a spontaneous +operation beyond our control. This image is based on a superficial +analogy, and is, as a rule, grossly inaccurate. Any one who searches his +memory may recall the absurd manner in which he first represented to +himself the persons and scenes of the past. It is the task of history to +rectify these images gradually, by eliminating the false elements one by +one, and replacing them by true ones. We have seen red-haired people, +bucklers, and Frankish battle-axes (or at least drawings of these +objects); we bring these elements together, in order to correct our +first mental image of the Frankish warriors. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">224</a></span> historical image thus +ends by becoming a combination of features borrowed from different +experiences.</p> + +<p>It is not enough to represent to oneself isolated persons, objects, and +actions. Men and their actions form part of a whole, of a society and of +a process of evolution. It is, therefore, further necessary to represent +to oneself the relations between different men and different actions +(nations, governments, laws, wars).</p> + +<p>But in order to imagine relations it is necessary to have a conception +of collectivities or wholes, and the documents only give isolated +elements. Here again the historian is obliged to use a subjective +method. He imagines a society or a process of evolution, and in this +imaginary framework he disposes the elements furnished by the documents. +Thus, whereas biological classification is guided by the objective +observation of physical units, historical classification can only be +effected upon subjective units existing in the imagination.</p> + +<p>The realities of the past are things which we do not observe, and which +we can only know in virtue of their resemblance to the realities of the +present. In order to realise the conditions under which past events +happened, we must observe the humanity of to-day, and look for the +conditions under which analogous events happen now. History thus becomes +an application of the descriptive sciences which deal with humanity, +descriptive psychology, sociology or social science; but all these +sciences are still but imperfectly established, and their defects retard +the establishment of a science of history.</p> + +<p>Some of the conditions of human life are, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">225</a></span>however, so necessary and so +obvious that the most superficial observation is enough to establish +them. These are the conditions common to all humanity; they have their +origin either in the physiological organisation which determines the +material needs of men, or in the psychological organisation which +determines their habits in matters of conduct. These conditions can +therefore be provided for by the use of a set of general questions +applicable to all the cases that may occur. It is with historical +construction as with historical criticism—the impossibility of direct +observation compels the use of prearranged sets of questions.</p> + +<p>The human actions which form the subject-matter of history differ from +age to age and from country to country, just as men and societies have +differed from each other; and, indeed, it is the special aim of history +to study these differences. If men had always had the same form of +government or spoken the same language, there would be no occasion to +write the history of forms of government or the history of languages. +But these differences are comprised within limits imposed by the general +conditions of human life; they are but varieties of certain modes of +being and doing which are common to the whole of humanity, or at least +to the great majority of men. We cannot know <i>a priori</i> what was the +mode of government or the language of an historical people; it is the +business of history to tell us. But that a given people had a language +and had a form of government is something which we are entitled to +assume, before examination, in every possible case.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">226</a></span></p> + +<p>By drawing up the list of the fundamental phenomena which we may expect +to find in the life of every individual and every people, we shall have +suggested to us a set of general questions which will be summary, but +still sufficient to enable us to arrange the bulk of historical facts in +a certain number of natural groups, each of which will form a special +branch of history. This scheme of general classification will supply the +scaffolding of historical construction.</p> + +<p>The set of general questions will only apply to phenomena of constant +occurrence: it cannot anticipate the thousands of local or accidental +events which enter into the life of an individual or a nation; it will, +therefore, not contain all the questions which the historian must answer +before he can give a complete picture of the past. The detailed study of +the facts will require the use of lists of questions entering more into +detail, and differing according to the nature of the events, the men, or +the societies studied. In order to frame these lists, we begin by +setting down those questions or matters of detail which are suggested by +the mere reading of the documents; but for the purpose of arranging +these questions, often indeed for the purpose of making the list +complete, recourse must be had to the systematic <i>a priori</i> method. +Among the classes of facts, the persons, and the societies with which we +are well acquainted (either from direct observation or from history), we +look for those which resemble the facts, the persons, or the societies +which we wish to study. By analysing the scheme of arrangement used in +the scientific treatment of these familiar cases we shall learn what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">227</a></span> +questions ought to be asked in reference to the analogous cases which we +propose to investigate. Of course the model must be chosen +intelligently; we must not apply to a barbarous society a list of +questions framed on the study of a civilised nation, and ask with regard +to a feudal domain what agents corresponded to each of our ministers of +state—as Boutaric did in his study of the administration of Alphonse of +Poitiers.</p> + +<p>This method of drawing up lists of questions which bases all historical +construction on an <i>a priori</i> procedure, would be objectionable if +history really were a science of observation; and perhaps some will +think it compares very unfavourably with the <i>a posteriori</i> methods of +the natural sciences. But its justification is simple: it is the only +method which it is possible to employ, and the only method which, as a +matter of fact, ever has been employed. The moment an historian attempts +to put in order the facts contained in documents, he constructs out of +the knowledge he has (or thinks he has) of human affairs a scheme of +arrangement which is the equivalent of a list of questions—unless, +perhaps, he adopts a scheme which one of his predecessors has +constructed in a similar manner. But when this work has been performed +unconsciously, the scheme of arrangement remains incomplete and +confused. Thus it is not a case of deciding whether to work with or +without an <i>a priori</i> set of questions—we must work with such a set in +any case—the choice merely lies between the unconscious use of an +incomplete and confused set of questions and the conscious use of a +precise and complete set.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">228</a></span></p> + +<p class="top5">VI. We can now sketch the plan of historical construction in a way which +will determine the series of synthetic operations necessary to raise the +edifice.</p> + +<p>The critical analysis of the documents has supplied the +materials—historical facts still in a state of dispersion. We begin by +<i>imagining</i> these facts on the model of what we suppose to be the +analogous facts of the present; by combining elements taken from reality +at different points, we endeavour to form a mental image which shall +resemble as nearly as possible that which would have been produced by +direct observation of the past event. This is the first operation, +inseparable in practice from the reading of the documents. Considering +that it will be enough to have indicated its nature here,<a name="FNanchor_184_184" id="FNanchor_184_184"></a><a href="#Footnote-184" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 184.">[184]</a> we have +refrained from devoting a special chapter to it.</p> + +<p>The facts having been thus imagined, we <i>group</i> them according to +schemes of classification devised on the model of a body of facts which +we have observed directly, and which we suppose analogous to the body of +past facts under consideration. This is the second operation; it is +performed by the aid of systematic questions, and its result is to +divide the mass of historical facts into homogeneous portions which we +afterwards form into groups until the entire history of the past has +been systematically arranged according to a general scheme.</p> + +<p>When we have arranged in this scheme the facts taken from the documents, +there remain gaps whose extent is always considerable, and is enormous +for those parts of history in regard to which documents<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">229</a></span> are scanty. We +endeavour to fill some of these gaps by <i>reasoning</i> based on the facts +which are known. This is (or should be) the third operation; it +increases the sum of historical knowledge by an application of logic.</p> + +<p>We still possess nothing but a mass of facts placed side by side in a +scheme of classification. We have to condense them into <i>formulæ</i>, in +order to deduce their general characteristics and their relation to each +other. This is the fourth operation; it leads to the final conclusions +of history, and crowns the work of historical construction from the +scientific point of view.</p> + +<p>But as historical knowledge, which is by nature complex and unwieldy, is +exceptionally difficult to communicate, we still have to look for the +methods of expounding historical results in appropriate form.</p> + +<p class="top5">VII. This series of operations, easy to conceive in the mind, has never +been more than imperfectly performed. It is beset by material +difficulties which theories of methodology do not take into account, but +which it would be better to face, with the purpose of discovering +whether they are after all insurmountable.</p> + +<p>The operations of history are so numerous, from the first discovery of +the document to the final formula of the conclusion, they require such +minute precautions, so great a variety of natural gifts and acquired +habits, that there is no man who can perform <i>by himself</i> all the work +on any one point. History is less able than any other science to +dispense with the division of labour; but there is no other science in +which labour is so imperfectly divided. We find specialists in critical +scholarship writing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">230</a></span> general histories in which they let their +imagination guide them in the work of construction;<a name="FNanchor_185_185" id="FNanchor_185_185"></a><a href="#Footnote-185" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 185.">[185]</a> and, on the +other hand, there are constructive historians who use for their work +materials whose value they have not tested.<a name="FNanchor_186_186" id="FNanchor_186_186"></a><a href="#Footnote-186" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 186.">[186]</a> The reason is that the +division of labour implies a common understanding among the workers, and +in history no such understanding exists. Except in the preparatory +operations of external criticism, each worker follows the guidance of +his own private inspiration; he is at no pains to work on the same lines +as the others, nor does he pay any regard to the whole of which his own +work is to form a part. Thus no historian can feel perfectly safe in +adopting the results of another's work, as may be done in the +established sciences, for he does not know whether these results have +been obtained by trustworthy methods. The most scrupulous go so far as +to admit nothing until they have done the work on the documents over +again for themselves. This was the attitude adopted by Fustel de +Coulanges. It is barely possible to satisfy this exacting standard in +the case of little-known periods, the documents relating to which are +confined to a few volumes; and yet some have gone so far as to maintain +the dogma that no historian should ever work at second hand.<a name="FNanchor_187_187" id="FNanchor_187_187"></a><a href="#Footnote-187" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 187.">[187]</a> This, +indeed, is what an historian is compelled to do when the documents are +too numerous for him<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">231</a></span> to be able to read them all; but he does not say +so, to avoid scandal.</p> + +<p>It would be better to acknowledge the truth frankly. So complex a +science as history, where facts must ordinarily be accumulated by the +million before it is possible to formulate conclusions, cannot be built +up on this principle of continually beginning afresh. Historical +construction is not work that can be done with documents, any more than +history can be "written from manuscripts," and for the same reason—the +shortness of time. In order that science may advance it is necessary to +combine the results of thousands of detail-researches.</p> + +<p>But how are we to proceed in view of the fact that most researches have +been conducted upon methods which, if not defective, are at least open +to suspicion? Universal confidence would lead to error as surely as +universal distrust would make progress impossible. One useful rule, at +any rate, may be stated, as follows: The works of historians should be +read with the same critical precautions which are observed in the +reading of documents. A natural instinct impels us to look principally +for the conclusions, and to accept them as so much established truth; we +ought, on the contrary, to be continually applying analysis, we ought to +look for the facts, the <i>proofs</i>, the fragments of documents—in short, +the materials. We shall be doing the author's work over again, but we +shall do it very much faster than he did, for that which takes up time +is the collection and combination of the materials; and we shall accept +no conclusions but those we consider to have been proved.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">232</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_IIc" id="CHAPTER_IIc"></a>CHAPTER II</h3> + +<p class="head2">THE GROUPING OF FACTS</p> + + +<p>I. The prime necessity for the historian, when confronted with the chaos +of historical facts, is to limit the field of his researches. In the +ocean of universal history what facts is he to choose for collection? +Secondly, in the mass of facts so chosen he will have to distinguish +between different groups and make subdivisions. Lastly, within each of +these subdivisions he will have to arrange the facts one by one. Thus +all historical construction should begin with the search for a principle +to guide in the selection, the grouping, and the arrangement of facts. +This principle may be sought either in the external conditions of the +facts or in their intrinsic nature.</p> + +<p>The simplest and easiest mode of classification is that which is founded +on external conditions. Every historical fact belongs to a definite time +and a definite place, and relates to a definite man or group of men: a +convenient basis is thus afforded for the division and arrangement of +facts. We have the history of a period, of a country, of a nation, of a +man (biography); the ancient historians and those of the Renaissance +used no other type. Within this general scheme the subdivisions are +formed on the same principle, and facts are arranged in chronological +and geographical order, or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">233</a></span>according to the groups to which they +relate. As to the selection of facts to be arranged in this scheme, for +a long time it was made on no fixed principle; historians followed their +individual fancy, and chose from among the facts relating to a given +period, country, or nation all that they deemed interesting or curious. +Livy and Tacitus mingle accounts of floods, epidemics, and the birth of +monsters with their narratives of wars and revolutions.</p> + +<p>Classification of facts by their intrinsic nature was introduced very +late, and has made way but slowly and imperfectly. It took its rise +outside the domain of history, in certain branches of study dealing with +special human phenomena—language, literature, art, law, political +economy, religion; studies which began by being dogmatic, but gradually +assumed an historical character. The principle of this mode of +classification is to select and group together those facts which relate +to the same species of actions; each of these groups becomes the +subject-matter of a special branch of history. The totality of facts +thus comes to be arranged in compartments which may be constructed <i>a +priori</i> by the study of the totality of human activities; these +correspond to the set of general questions of which we have spoken in +the preceding chapter.</p> + +<p>In the following table we have attempted to provide a general scheme for +the classification<a name="FNanchor_188_188" id="FNanchor_188_188"></a><a href="#Footnote-188" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 188.">[188]</a> of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">234</a></span> historical facts, founded on the nature of +the <i>conditions</i> and of the <i>manifestations</i> of activity.</p> + +<p class="top5">I. <span class="smcap">Material Conditions.</span> (1) <i>Study of the body</i>: <i>A.</i> Anthropology +(ethnology), anatomy, and physiology, anomalies and pathological +peculiarities. <i>B.</i> Demography (number, sex, age, births, deaths, +diseases). (2) <i>Study of the environment</i>: <i>A.</i> Natural geographical +environment (orographic configuration, climate, water, soil, flora, and +fauna). <i>B.</i> Artificial environment, forestry (cultivation, buildings, +roads, implements, &c.).</p> + +<p>II. <span class="smcap">Intellectual Habits</span> (not obligatory). (1) <i>Language</i> (vocabulary, +syntax, phonetics, semasiology). Handwriting. (2) <i>Arts</i>: <i>A.</i> Plastic +arts (conditions of production, conceptions, methods, works). <i>B.</i> Arts +of expression, music, dance, literature. (3) <i>Sciences</i> (conditions of +production, methods, results). (4) <i>Philosophy and Morals</i> (conceptions, +precepts, actual practice). (5) <i>Religion</i> (beliefs, practices).<a name="FNanchor_189_189" id="FNanchor_189_189"></a><a href="#Footnote-189" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 189.">[189]</a></p> + +<p>III. <span class="smcap">Material Customs</span> (not obligatory). (1) <i>Material life</i>: <i>A.</i> Food +(materials, modes of preparing, stimulants). <i>B.</i> Clothes and personal +adornment. <i>C.</i> Dwellings and furniture. (2) <i>Private life</i>: <i>A.</i> +Employment of time (toilette, care of the person, meals). <i>B.</i> Social +ceremonies (funerals and marriages, festivals, etiquette). <i>C.</i> +Amusements (modes of exercise and hunting, games and spectacles, social +meetings, travelling).</p> + +<p>IV. <span class="smcap">Economic Customs.</span> (1) <i>Production</i>: <i>A.</i> Agriculture and +stock-breeding. <i>B.</i> Exploitation of minerals. (2) <i>Transformation, +Transport and industries</i>:<a name="FNanchor_190_190" id="FNanchor_190_190"></a><a href="#Footnote-190" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 190.">[190]</a> technical processes, division of labour, +means of communication. (3) <i>Commerce</i>:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">235</a></span> exchange and sale, credit. (4) +<i>Distribution</i>: system of property, transmission, contracts, +profit-sharing.</p> + +<p>V. <span class="smcap">Social Institutions.</span> (1) <i>The family</i>: <i>A.</i> Constitution, authority, +condition of women and children. <i>B.</i> Economic organisation.<a name="FNanchor_191_191" id="FNanchor_191_191"></a><a href="#Footnote-191" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 191.">[191]</a> Family +property, succession. (2) <i>Education and instruction</i> (aim, methods, +<i>personnel</i>). (3) <i>Social classes</i> (principle of division, rules +regulating intercourse).</p> + +<p>VI. <span class="smcap">Public Institutions</span> (obligatory). (1) <i>Political institutions</i>: <i>A.</i> +Sovereign (<i>personnel</i>, procedure). <i>B.</i> Administration, services (war, +justice, finance, &c.). <i>C.</i> Elected authorities, assemblies, electoral +bodies (powers, procedure). (2) <i>Ecclesiastical institutions</i> (the same +divisions). (3) <i>International institutions</i>: <i>A.</i> Diplomacy. <i>B.</i> War +(usages of war and military arts). <i>C.</i> Private law and commerce.</p> + +<p class="top5">>This grouping of facts according to their nature is combined with the +system of grouping by time and place; we thus obtain chronological, +geographical, or, national sections in each branch. The history of a +species of activity (language, painting, government) subdivides into the +history of periods, countries, and nations (history of the ancient Greek +language, history of the government of France in the nineteenth +century).</p> + +<p>The same principles aid in determining the order in which the facts are +to be arranged. The necessity of presenting facts one after another +obliges us to adopt some methodical rule of succession. We may describe +successively either all the facts which relate to a given place, or +those which relate to a given country, or all the facts of a given +species. All historical matter can be distributed in three different +kinds of order: <i>chronological</i> order, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">236</a></span><i>geographical</i> order, that kind +of order which is governed by the nature of actions and is generally +called <i>logical</i> order. It is impossible to use any of these orders +exclusively: in every chronological exposition there necessarily occur +geographical or logical cross-divisions, transitions from one country to +another, or from one species of facts to a different species, and +conversely. But it is always necessary to decide which shall be the main +order into which the others enter as subdivisions.</p> + +<p>It is a delicate matter to choose between these three orders; our choice +will be decided by different reasons according to the subject, and +according to the public for whom we are working. That is to say, it will +depend on the method of exposition; it would take up too much space to +give the theory of it.</p> + + +<p class="top5">>II. When we come to the selection of historical facts for classification +and arrangement, a question is raised which has been disputed with +considerable warmth.</p> + +<p>Every human action is by its nature an individual transient phenomenon +which is confined to a definite time and a definite place. Strictly +speaking, every fact is unique. But every action of a man resembles +other actions of the same man, or of other members of the same group, +and often to so great a degree that the whole group of actions receives +a common name, in which their individuality is lost. These groups of +similar actions, which the human mind is irresistibly impelled to form, +are called habits, usages, institutions. These are merely constructions +of the mind, but they are imposed so forcibly on our intellect that many +of them must be recognised and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">237</a></span> constantly employed; habits are +collective facts, possessing extension in time and space. Historical +facts may therefore be considered under two different aspects: we may +regard either the individual, particular, and transient elements in +them, or we may look for what is collective, general, and durable. +According to the first conception, history is a continuous narrative of +the incidents which have happened among men in the past; according to +the second, it is the picture of the successive habits of humanity.</p> + +<p>On this subject there has been a contest, especially in Germany, between +the partisans of the history of civilisation (<i>Kulturgeschichte</i>)<a name="FNanchor_192_192" id="FNanchor_192_192"></a><a href="#Footnote-192" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 192.">[192]</a> +and the historians who remain faithful to ancient tradition; in France +we have had the struggle between the history of institutions, manners, +and ideas, and political history, contemptuously nicknamed +"battle-history" by its opponents.</p> + +<p>This opposition is explained by the difference between the documents +which the workers on either side were accustomed to deal with. The +historians, principally occupied with political history, read of +individual and transient acts of rulers in which it was difficult to +detect any common feature. In the special histories, on the contrary +(except that of literature), the documents exhibit none but general +facts, a linguistic form, a religious rite, a rule of law; an effort of +imagination is required to picture the man who pronounced the word, who +performed the rite, or who applied the rule in practice.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">238</a></span></p> + +<p>There is no need to take sides in this controversy. Historical +construction in its completeness implies the study of facts under both +aspects. The representation of men's habits of thought, life, and action +is obviously an important part of history. And yet, supposing we had +brought together all the acts of all individuals for the purpose of +extracting what is common to them, there would still remain a residue +which we should have no right to reject, for it is the distinctively +historical element—the circumstance that a particular action was the +action of a given man, or group of men, at a given moment. In a scheme +of classification which should only recognise the general facts of +political life there would be no place for the victory of Pharsalia or +the taking of the Bastille—accidental and transient facts, but without +which the history of Roman and French institutions would be +unintelligible.</p> + +<p>History is thus obliged to combine with the study of general facts the +study of certain particular facts. It has a mixed character, fluctuating +between a science of generalities and a narrative of adventures. The +difficulty of classing this hybrid under one of the categories of human +thought has often been expressed by the childish question: Is history a +science or an art?</p> + + +<p class="top5">>III. The general table given above may be used for the determination of +all the species of habits (usages or institutions) of which the history +may be written. But before applying this general scheme to the study of +any particular group of habits, language, religion, private usages, or +political institutions, there is always a preliminary question to be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">239</a></span> +answered: Whose were the habits we are about to study? They were common +to a great number of individuals; and a collection of individuals with +the same habits is what we call a <i>group</i>. The first condition, then, +for the study of a habit is the determination of the group which has +practised it. At this point we must beware of the first impulse; it +leads to a negligence which may ruin the whole of our historical +construction.</p> + +<p>The natural tendency is to conceive the human group on the model of the +zoological species—as a body of men who all resemble each other. We +take a group united by a very obvious common characteristic, a nation +united by a common official government (Romans, English, French), a +people speaking the same language (Greeks, ancient Germans), and we +proceed as if all the members of this group resembled each other at +every point and had the same usages.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, no real group, not even a centralised society, is a +homogeneous whole. For a great part of human activity—language, art, +science, religion, economic interests—the group is constantly +fluctuating. What are we to understand by the group of those who speak +Greek, the Christian group, the group of modern science? And even those +groups to which some precision is given by an official organisation, +States and Churches, are but superficial unities composed of +heterogeneous elements. The English nation comprises Welsh, Scotch, and +Irish; the Catholic Church is composed of adherents scattered over the +whole world, and differing in everything but religion. There is no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">240</a></span> +group whose members have the same habits in every respect. The same man +is at the same time a member of several groups, and in each group he has +companions who differ from those he has in the others. A French Canadian +belongs to the British Empire, the Catholic Church, the group of +French-speaking people. Thus the different groups overlap each other in +a way that makes it impossible to divide humanity into sharply distinct +societies existing side by side.</p> + +<p>In historical documents we find the contemporary names of groups, many +of them resting on mere superficial resemblances. It must be made a rule +not to adopt popular notions of this kind without criticising them. We +must accurately determine the nature and extent of the group, asking: Of +what men was it composed? What bond united them? What habits had they in +common? In what species of activity did they differ? Not till after such +criticism shall we be able to tell what are the habits in respect of +which the group in question may be used as a basis of study. In order to +study intellectual habits (language, religion, art, science) we shall +not take a political unit, the nation, but the group consisting of those +who shared the habit in question. In order to study economic facts we +shall choose a group united by a common economic interest; we shall +reserve the political group for the study of social and political facts, +and we shall discard <i>race</i><a name="FNanchor_193_193" id="FNanchor_193_193"></a><a href="#Footnote-193" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 193.">[193]</a> altogether.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">241</a></span></p> + +<p>Even in those points in which a group is homogeneous it is not entirely +so; it is divided into sub-groups, the members of which differ in +secondary habits; a language is divided into dialects, a religion into +sects, a nation into provinces. Conversely, one group resembles other +groups in a way that justifies its being regarded as contiguous with +them; in a general classification we may recognise "families" of +languages, arts, and peoples. We have, then, to ask: How was a given +group sub-divided? Of what larger group did it form a part?</p> + +<p>It then becomes possible to study methodically a given habit, or even +the totality of the habits belonging to a given time and place, by +following the table given above. The operation presents no difficulties +of method in the case of those species of facts which appear as +individual and voluntary habits—language, art, sciences, conceptions, +private usages; here it is enough to ascertain in what each habit +consisted. It is merely necessary to distinguish carefully between those +who originated or maintained habits (artists, the learned, philosophers, +introducers of fashions) and the mass who accepted them.</p> + +<p>But when we come to social or political habits (what we call +institutions), we meet with new conditions which produce an inevitable +illusion.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">242</a></span> The members of the same social or political group do not +merely habitually perform <i>similar</i> actions; they influence each other +by <i>reciprocal</i> actions, they command, coerce, pay each other. Habits +here take the form of <i>relations</i> between the different members; when +they are of old standing, formulated in official rules, imposed by a +visible authority, maintained by a special set of persons, they occupy +so important a place in life, that, to the persons under their +influence, they appear as external realities. The men, too, who +specialise in an occupation or a function which becomes the dominating +habit of their lives, appear as grouped in distinct categories (classes, +corporations, churches, governments); and these categories are taken for +real existences, or at least for organs of various functions in a real +existence, namely, society. We follow the analogy of an animal's body so +far as to describe the "structure" and the "functions" of a society, +even its "anatomy" and "physiology." These are pure metaphors. By the +structure of a society we mean the rules and the customs by which +occupations and enjoyments are distributed among its members; by its +functions we mean the habitual actions by which each man enters into +relations with the others. It may be convenient to use these terms, but +it should be remembered that the underlying reality is composed entirely +of habits and customs.</p> + +<p>The study of institutions, however, obliges us to ask special questions +about persons and their functions. In respect of social and economic +institutions we have to ask what was the principle of the division of +labour and of the division into<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">243</a></span> classes, what were the professions and +classes, how were they recruited, what were the relations between the +members of the different professions and classes. In respect of +political institutions, which are sanctioned by obligatory rules and a +visible authority, two new series of questions arise. (1) Who were the +persons invested with authority? When authority is divided we have to +study the division of functions, to analyse the <i>personnel</i> of +government into its different groups (supreme and subordinate, central +and local), and to distinguish each of the special bodies. In respect of +each class of men concerned in the government we shall ask: How were +they recruited? What was their official authority? What were their real +powers? (2) What were the official rules? What was their form (custom, +orders, law, precedent)? What was their content (rules of law)? What was +the mode of application (procedure)? And, above all, how did the rules +differ from the practice (abuse of power, exploitation, conflicts +between executive agents, non-observance of rules)?</p> + +<p>After the determination of all the facts which constitute a society, it +remains to find the place which this society occupies among the total +number of the societies contemporary with it. Here we enter upon the +study of international institutions, intellectual, economic, and +political (diplomacy and the usages of war); the same questions apply as +in the study of political institutions. A study should also be made of +the habits common to several societies, and of those relations which do +not assume an official form. This is one of the least advanced parts of +historical construction.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">244</a></span></p> + + +<p class="top5">IV. The outcome of all this labour is a tabulated view of human life at +a given moment; it gives us the knowledge of a <i>state</i> of society (in +German, <i>Zustand</i>). But history is not limited to the study of +simultaneous facts, taken in a state of rest, to what we may call the +<i>statics</i> of society. It also studies the states of society at different +moments, and discovers the differences between these states. The habits +of men and the material conditions under which they live change from +epoch to epoch; even when they appear to be constant they do not remain +unaltered in every respect. There is therefore occasion to investigate +these changes; thus arises the study of successive facts.</p> + +<p>Of these changes the most interesting for the work of historical +construction are those which tend in a common direction,<a name="FNanchor_194_194" id="FNanchor_194_194"></a><a href="#Footnote-194" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 194.">[194]</a> so that in +virtue of a series of gradual differentiations a usage or a state of +society is transformed into a different usage or state, or, to speak +without metaphor, cases where the men of a given period practise a habit +very different from that of their predecessors without any abrupt change +having taken place. This is <i>evolution</i>.</p> + +<p>Evolution occurs in all human habits. In order to investigate it, +therefore, it is enough to turn once more to the series of questions +which we used in constructing a tabulated view of society. In respect of +each of the facts, conditions, usages, persons invested with authority, +official rules, the question is to be asked: What was the evolution of +this fact?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">245</a></span></p> + +<p>This study will involve several operations: (1) the determination of the +fact whose evolution is to be studied; (2) the fixing of the duration of +the time during which the evolution took place (the period should be so +chosen that while the transformation is obvious, there yet remains a +connecting link between the initial and the final condition); (3) the +establishing of the different stages of the evolution; (4) the +investigation of the means by which it was brought about.</p> + + +<p class="top5">V. A series, even a complete series, of all the states of all societies +and of all their evolutions would not be enough to exhaust the +subject-matter of history. There remains a number of unique facts which +we cannot pass over, because they explain the origin of certain states +of society, and form the starting-points of evolutions. How could we +study the institutions or the evolution of France if we ignored the +conquest of Gaul by Cæsar and the invasion of the Barbarians?</p> + +<p>This necessity of studying unique facts has caused it to be said that +history cannot be a science, for every science has for its object that +which is general. History is here in the same situation as cosmography, +geology, the science of animal species: it is not the abstract knowledge +of the general relations between facts, it is a study which aims at +<i>explaining</i> reality. Now, reality exists but once. There has been but a +single evolution of the world, of animal life, of humanity. In each of +these evolutions the successive facts have not been the product of +abstract laws, but of the concurrence, at each moment, of several +circumstances of different nature. This concurrence,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">246</a></span> sometimes called +chance, has produced a series of accidents which have determined the +particular course taken by evolution.<a name="FNanchor_195_195" id="FNanchor_195_195"></a><a href="#Footnote-195" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 195.">[195]</a> Evolution can only be +understood by the study of these accidents; history is here on the same +footing as geology or palæontology.</p> + +<p>Thus scientific history may go back to the accidents, or events, which +traditional history collected for literary reasons, because they struck +the imagination, and employ them for the study of evolution. We may thus +look for the facts which have influenced the evolution of each one of +the habits of humanity. Each event will be arranged under its date in +the evolution which it is supposed to have influenced. It will then +suffice to bring together the events of every kind, and to arrange them +in chronological and geographical order, to have a representation of +historical evolution as a whole.</p> + +<p>Then, over and above the <i>special</i> histories in which the facts are +arranged under purely abstract categories (art, religion, private life, +political institutions), we shall have constructed a concrete <i>general</i> +history, which will connect together the various special histories by +exhibiting the main stream of evolution which has dominated all the +special evolutions. None of the species of facts which we study apart +(religion, art, law, constitutions) forms a closed world within which +evolution takes place in obedience to a kind of internal impulse, as +specialists are prone to imagine. The evolution of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">247</a></span> a usage or of an +institution (language, religion, church, state) is only a metaphor; a +usage is an abstraction, abstractions do not evolve; it is only +<i>existences</i> that evolve, in the strict sense of the word.<a name="FNanchor_196_196" id="FNanchor_196_196"></a><a href="#Footnote-196" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 196.">[196]</a> When a +change takes place in a usage, this means that the men who practise it +have changed. Now, men are not built in water-tight compartments +(religious, juridical, economic) within which phenomena can occur in +isolation; an event which modifies the condition of a man changes his +habits in a great variety of respects. The invasion of the Barbarians +influenced alike language, private life, and political institutions. We +cannot, therefore, understand evolution by confining ourselves to a +special branch of history; the specialist, even for the purpose of +writing the complete history of his own branch, must look beyond the +confines of his own subject into the field of general events. It is the +merit of Taine to have asserted, with reference to English literature, +that literary evolution depends, not on literary events, but on facts of +a general character.</p> + +<p>The general history of individual facts was developed before the special +histories. It contains the residue of facts which have not found a place +in the special histories, and has been reduced in extent by the +formation and detachment of special branches. As general facts are +principally of a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">248</a></span> political nature, and as it is more difficult to +organise these into a special branch, general history has in practice +been confounded with political history (<i>Staatengeschichte</i>).<a name="FNanchor_197_197" id="FNanchor_197_197"></a><a href="#Footnote-197" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 197.">[197]</a> Thus +political historians have been led to make themselves the champions of +general history, and to retain in their constructions all the general +facts (migrations of peoples, religious reforms, inventions, and +discoveries) necessary for the understanding of political evolution.</p> + +<p>In order to construct general history it is necessary to look for all +the facts which, because they have produced changes, can explain either +the state of a society or one of its evolutions. We must search for them +among all classes of facts, displacements of population, artistic, +scientific, religious, technical innovations, changes in the <i>personnel</i> +of government, revolutions, wars, discoveries of countries.</p> + +<p>That which is important is that the fact should have had a decisive +influence. We must therefore resist the natural temptation to divide +facts into great and small. It goes against the grain to admit that +great effects may have had small causes, that Cleopatra's nose may have +made a difference to the Roman Empire. This repugnance is of a +metaphysical order; it springs from a preconceived opinion on the +government of the world. In all the sciences which deal with an +evolution we find individual facts which serve as starting-points for +series of vast transformations. A drove of horses brought by the +Spanish<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">249</a></span> has stocked the whole of South America. In a flood a branch of +a tree may dam a current and transform the aspect of a valley.</p> + +<p>In human evolution we meet with great transformations which have no +intelligible cause beyond an individual accident.<a name="FNanchor_198_198" id="FNanchor_198_198"></a><a href="#Footnote-198" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 198.">[198]</a> In the sixteenth +century England changed its religion three times on the death of a +sovereign (Henry VIII., Edward VI., Mary). Importance not to be measured +by the initial fact, but by the facts which resulted from it. We must +not, therefore, deny <i>a priori</i> the action of individuals and discard +individual facts. We must examine whether a given individual was in a +position to make his influence strongly felt. There are two cases in +which we may assume that he was: (1) when his action served as an +example to a mass of men and created a tradition, a case frequent in +art, science, religion, and technical matters; (2) when he had power to +issue commands and direct the actions of a mass of men, as is the case +with the heads of a state, an army, or a church. The episodes in a man's +life may thus become important facts.</p> + +<p>Accordingly, in the scheme of historical classification a place should +be assigned for persons and events.</p> + + +<p class="top5">VI. In every study of successive facts it is necessary to provide a +number of halting-places, to distinguish beginnings and ends, in order +that chronological divisions may be made in the enormous mass of facts. +These divisions are <i>periods</i>; the use of them is as old as history. We +need<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">250</a></span> them, not only in general history, but in the special branches of +history as well, whenever we study an extent of time long enough for an +evolution to be sensible. It is by means of events that we fix their +limits.</p> + +<p>In the special branches of history, after having decided what changes of +habits are to be considered as reaching deepest, we adopt them as +marking <i>dates</i> in the evolution; we then inquire what event produced +them. The event which led to the formation or the change of a habit +becomes the beginning or the end of a period. Sometimes these boundary +events are of the same species as the facts whose evolution we are +studying—literary facts in the history of literature, political facts +in political history. But more often they belong to a different species, +and the special historian is obliged to borrow them from general +history.</p> + +<p>In general history the periods should be divided according to the +evolution of several species of phenomena; we look for events which mark +an epoch simultaneously in several branches (the Invasion of the +Barbarians, the Reformation, the French Revolution). We may thus +construct periods which are common to several branches of evolution, +whose beginning and whose end are each marked by a single event. It is +thus that the traditional division of universal history into periods has +been effected. The sub-periods are obtained by the same process, by +taking for limits events which have produced consequences of secondary +importance.</p> + +<p>The periods which are thus constructed according to the events are of +unequal duration. We must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">251</a></span> not be troubled by this want of symmetry; a +period ought not to be a fixed number of years, but the time occupied by +a distinct phase of evolution. Now, evolution is not a regular movement; +sometimes a long series of years passes without notable change, then +come moments of rapid transformation. On this difference Saint-Simon has +founded a distinction between <i>organic</i> periods (of slow change) and +<i>critical</i> periods (of rapid change).<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">252</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_IIIb" id="CHAPTER_IIIb"></a>CHAPTER III</h3> + +<p class="head2">CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING</p> + + +<p>I. The historical facts supplied by documents are never enough to fill +all the blanks in such schemes of classification and arrangement as we +have been considering. There are many questions to which no direct +answer is given by the documents; many features are lacking without +which the complete picture of the various states of society, of +evolutions and events, cannot be given. We are irresistibly impelled to +endeavour to fill up these gaps.</p> + +<p>In the sciences of direct observation, when a fact is missing from a +series, it is sought for by a new observation. In history, where we have +not this resource, we seek to extend our knowledge by the help of +reasoning. Starting from facts known to us from the documents, we +endeavour to reach new facts by inference. If the reasoning be correct, +this method of acquiring knowledge is legitimate.</p> + +<p>But experience shows that of all the methods of acquiring historical +knowledge, reasoning is the most difficult to employ correctly, and the +one which has introduced the most serious errors. It should not be used +without the safeguard of a number of precautions calculated to keep the +danger continually before the mind.</p> + +<p>(1) Reasoning should never be combined with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">253</a></span> the analysis of a document. +The reader who allows himself to introduce into a text what the author +has not expressly put there ends by making him say what he never +intended to say.<a name="FNanchor_199_199" id="FNanchor_199_199"></a><a href="#Footnote-199" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 199.">[199]</a></p> + +<p>(2) Facts obtained by the direct examination of documents should never +be confused with the results obtained by reasoning. When we state a fact +known to us by reasoning only, we must not allow it to be supposed that +we have found it in the documents; we must disclose the method by which +we have obtained it.</p> + +<p>(3) Unconscious reasoning must never be allowed; there are too many +chances of error. It will be enough to make a point of putting every +argument into logical form; in the case of bad reasoning the major +premiss is generally monstrous to an appalling degree.</p> + +<p>(4) If the reasoning leaves the least doubt, no attempt must be made to +draw a conclusion; the point treated must be left in the conjectural +stage, clearly distinguished from the definitively established results.</p> + +<p>(5) It is not permissible to return to a conjecture and endeavour to +transform it into a certainty. Here the first impression is most likely +to be right. By reflection upon a conjecture we familiarise ourselves +with it, and end by thinking it better established; while the truth is, +we are merely more accustomed to it. This is a frequent mishap with +those who devote themselves to long meditation on a small number of +texts.</p> + +<p>There are two ways of employing reasoning, one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">254</a></span> negative, the other +positive; we shall examine them separately.</p> + + +<p class="top5">II. The negative mode of reasoning, called also the "argument from +silence," is based on the absence of indications with regard to a +fact.<a name="FNanchor_200_200" id="FNanchor_200_200"></a><a href="#Footnote-200" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 200.">[200]</a> From the circumstance of the fact not being mentioned in any +document it is inferred that there was no such fact; the argument is +applied to all kinds of subjects, usages of every description, +evolutions, events. It rests on a feeling which in ordinary life is +expressed by saying: "If it were true, we should have heard of it;" it +implies a general proposition which may be formulated thus: "If an +alleged event really had occurred, there would be some document in +existence in which it would be referred to."</p> + +<p>In order that such reasoning should be justified it would be necessary +that every fact should have been observed and recorded in writing, and +that all the records should have been preserved. Now, the greater part +of the documents which have been written have been lost, and the greater +part of the events which happen are not recorded in writing. In the +majority of cases the argument would be invalid. It must therefore be +restricted to the cases where the conditions implied in it have been +fulfilled.</p> + +<p>(1) It is necessary not only that there should be now no documents in +existence which mention the fact in question, but that there should +never have been any. If the documents are lost we can conclude<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">255</a></span> nothing. +The argument from silence ought, therefore, to be employed the more +rarely the greater the number of documents that have been lost; it is of +much less use in ancient history than in dealing with the nineteenth +century. Some, desiring to free themselves from this restriction, are +tempted to assume that the lost documents contained nothing interesting; +if they were lost, say they, the reason was that they were not worth +preserving. But the truth is, every manuscript is at the mercy of the +least accident; its preservation or destruction is a matter of pure +chance.</p> + +<p>(2) The fact must have been of such a kind that it could not fail to be +observed and recorded. Because a fact has not been recorded it does not +follow that it has not been observed. Any one who is concerned in an +organisation for the collection of a particular species of facts knows +how much commoner those facts are than people think, and how many cases +pass unnoticed or without leaving any written trace. It is so with +earthquakes, cases of hydrophobia, whales stranded on the shore. +Besides, many facts, even those which are well known to those who are +contemporary with them, are not recorded, because the official +authorities prevent their publication; this is what happens to the +secret acts of governments and the complaints of the lower classes. This +silence, which proves nothing, greatly impresses unreflecting +historians; it is the origin of the widespread sophism of the "good old +times." No document relates any abuse of power by officials or any +complaints made by peasants; therefore, everything was regular and +nobody was suffering.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">256</a></span> Before we argue from silence we should ask: Might +not this fact have failed to be recorded in any of the documents we +possess? That which is conclusive is not the absence of any document on +a given fact, but silence as to the fact in a document in which it would +naturally be mentioned.</p> + +<p>The negative argument is thus limited to a few clearly defined cases. +(1) The author of the document in which the fact is not mentioned had +the intention of systematically recording all the facts of the same +class, and must have been acquainted with all of them. (Tacitus sought +to enumerate the peoples of Germany; the <i>Notitia dignitatum</i> mentioned +all the provinces of the Empire; the absence from these lists of a +people or a province proves that it did not then exist.) (2) The fact, +if it was such, must have affected the author's imagination so forcibly +as necessarily to enter into his conceptions. (If there had been regular +assemblies of the Frankish people, Gregory of Tours could not have +conceived and described the life of the Frankish kings without +mentioning them.)</p> + + +<p class="top5">III. The positive mode of reasoning begins with a fact established by +the documents, and infers some other fact which the documents do not +mention. It is an application of the fundamental principle of history, +the <i>analogy</i> between present and past humanity. In the present we +observe that the facts of humanity are connected together. Given one +fact, another fact accompanies it, either because the first is the cause +of the second, or because the second is the cause of the first, or +because both are effects of a common cause. We assume that in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">257</a></span> past +similar facts were connected in a similar manner, and this assumption is +corroborated by the direct study of the past in the documents. From a +given fact, therefore, which we find in the past, we may infer the +existence of the other facts which were connected with it.</p> + +<p>This reasoning applies to facts of all kinds, usages, transformations, +individual incidents. We may begin with any known fact and endeavour to +infer unknown facts from it. Now the facts of humanity, having a common +centre, man, are all connected together, not merely facts of the same +class, but facts belonging to the most widely different classes. There +are connections, not merely between the different facts relating to art, +to religion, to manners, to politics, but between the facts of religion +on the one hand and the facts of art, of politics, and of manners on the +other; thus from a fact of one species we may infer facts of all the +other species.</p> + +<p>To examine those connections between facts on which reasonings may be +founded would mean tabulating all the known relations between the facts +of humanity, that is, giving a full account of all the empirical laws of +social life. Such a labour would provide matter for a whole book.<a name="FNanchor_201_201" id="FNanchor_201_201"></a><a href="#Footnote-201" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 201.">[201]</a> +Here we shall content ourselves with indicating the general rules +governing this kind of reasoning, and the precautions to be taken +against the most common errors.</p> + +<p>The argument rests on two propositions: one is general, and is derived +from experience of human<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">258</a></span> affairs; the other is particular, and is +derived from the documents. In practice, we begin with the particular +proposition, the historical fact: Salamis bears a Phœnician name. We +then look for a general proposition: the language of the name of a city +is the language of the people which founded it. And we conclude: +Salamis, bearing a Phœnician name, was founded by the Phœnicians.</p> + +<p>In order that the conclusion may be certain, two conditions are +necessary.</p> + +<p>(1) The general proposition must be accurately true; the two facts which +it declares to be connected must be connected in such a way that the one +is never found without the other. If this condition were completely +satisfied we should have a <i>law</i>, in the scientific sense of the word; +but in dealing with the facts of humanity—apart from those physical +conditions whose laws are established by the regular sciences—we can +only work with empirical laws obtained by rough determinations of +general facts which are not analysed in such a manner as to educe their +true causes. These empirical laws are approximately true only when they +relate to a numerous body of facts, for we can never quite know how far +each is necessary to produce the result. The proposition relating to the +language of the name of a city does not go enough into detail to be +always true. Petersburg is a German name, Syracuse in America bears a +Greek name. Other conditions must be fulfilled before we can be sure +that the name is connected with the nationality of the founders. We +should, therefore, only employ such propositions as go into detail.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">259</a></span></p> + +<p>(2) In order to employ a general proposition which goes into detail, we +must have a detailed knowledge of the particular fact; for it is not +till after this fact has been established that we look for an empirical +general law on which to found an argument. We shall begin, then, by +studying the particular conditions of the case (the situation of +Salamis, the habits of the Greeks and Phœnicians); we shall not work +on a single detail, but on an assemblage of details.</p> + +<p>Thus, in historical reasoning it is necessary to have (1) an accurate +general proposition; (2) a detailed knowledge of a past fact. It is bad +workmanship to assume a false general proposition—to suppose, for +example, as Augustin Thierry did, that every aristocracy had its origin +in a conquest. It is bad workmanship, again, to found an argument on an +isolated detail (the name of a city). The nature of these errors +indicates the precautions to be taken.</p> + +<p>(1) The spontaneous tendency is to take as a basis of reasoning those +"common-sense truths" which form nearly the whole of our knowledge of +social life. Now, the greater part of these are to some extent false, +for the science of social life is still imperfect. And the chief danger +in them lies in the circumstance that we use them unconsciously. The +safest precaution will be always to formulate the supposed law on which +we propose to base an argument. In every instance where such and such a +fact occurs, it is certain that such and such another fact occurs also. +If this proposition is obviously false, we shall at once see it to be +so; if it is too<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">260</a></span> general, we shall inquire what new conditions may be +introduced to make it accurate.</p> + +<p>(2) A second spontaneous impulse leads us to draw consequences from +isolated facts, even of the slightest kind (or rather, the idea of each +fact awakens in us, by association, the idea of other facts). This is +the natural procedure in the history of literature. Each circumstance in +the life of an author supplies material for reasoning; we construct by +conjecture all the influences which could have acted upon him, and we +assume that they did act upon him. All the branches of history which +study a single species of facts, isolated from every other species +(language, arts, private law, religion), are exposed to the same danger, +because they deal with fragments of human life, not with comprehensive +collections of phenomena. But few conclusions are firmly established +except those which rest on a comprehensive body of data. We do not make +a diagnosis from a single symptom, but from a number of concurrent +symptoms. The precaution to be taken will be to avoid working with an +isolated detail or an abstract fact. We must have before our minds +actual men, as affected by the principal conditions under which they +lived.</p> + +<p>We must be prepared to realise but rarely the conditions of a certain +inference; we are too little acquainted with the laws of social life, +and too seldom know the precise details of an historical fact. Thus most +of our reasonings will only afford presumptions, not certainties. But it +is with reasonings as with documents.<a name="FNanchor_202_202" id="FNanchor_202_202"></a><a href="#Footnote-202" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 202.">[202]</a> When several <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">261</a></span>presumptions +all point in the same direction they confirm each other, and end by +producing a legitimate certitude. History fills up some of its gaps by +an accumulation of reasonings. Doubts remain as to the Phœnician +origin of various Greek cities, but there is no doubt about the presence +of the Phœnicians in Greece.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">262</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_IVb" id="CHAPTER_IVb"></a>CHAPTER IV</h3> + +<p class="head2">THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULÆ</p> + + +<p>I. Suppose we had methodically arranged all the historical facts +established by the analysis of documents, or by reasoning; we should +possess a systematised inventory of the whole of history, and the work +of construction would be complete. Ought history to stop at this point? +The question is warmly debated, and we cannot avoid giving an answer, +for it is a question with a practical bearing.</p> + +<p>Critical scholars, who are accustomed to collect all the facts relating +to their speciality, without any personal preference, are inclined to +regard a complete, accurate, and objective collection of facts as the +prime requisite. All historical facts have an equal right to a place in +history; to retain some as being of greater importance, and reject the +rest as comparatively unimportant, would be to introduce the subjective +element of choice, variable according to individual fancy; history +cannot sacrifice a single fact.</p> + +<p>Against this very reasonable view there is nothing to be urged except a +material difficulty; this, however, is enough, for it is the practical +motive of all the sciences: we mean the impossibility of acquiring or +communicating complete knowledge. A body of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">263</a></span> history in which no fact +was sacrificed would have to contain all the actions, all the thoughts, +all the adventures of all men at all times. It would form a total which +no one could possibly make himself master of, not for want of materials, +but for want of time. This, indeed, applies, as things are, to certain +voluminous collections of documents: the collected reports of +parliamentary debates contain the whole history of the various +assemblies, but to learn their history from these sources would require +more than a lifetime.</p> + +<p>Every science must take into consideration the practical conditions of +life, at least so far as it claims to be a real science, a science which +it is possible to know. Any ideal which ends by making knowledge +impossible impedes the establishment of the science.</p> + +<p>Science is a saving of time and labour, effected by a process which +provides a rapid means of learning and understanding facts; it consists +in the slow collection of a quantity of details and their condensation +into portable and incontrovertible formulæ. History, which is more +encumbered with details than any other science, has the choice between +two alternatives: to be complete and unknowable, or to be knowable and +incomplete. All the other sciences have chosen the second alternative; +they abridge and they condense, preferring to take the risk of +mutilating and arbitrarily combining the facts to the certainty of being +unable either to understand or communicate them. Scholars have preferred +to confine themselves to the periods of ancient history, where chance, +which has destroyed nearly all the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">264</a></span> sources of information, has freed +them from the responsibility of choosing between facts by depriving them +of nearly all the means of knowing them.</p> + +<p>History, in order to constitute itself a science, must elaborate the raw +material of facts. It must condense them into manageable form by means +of descriptive formulæ, qualitative and quantitative. It must search for +those connections between facts which form the ultimate conclusions of +every science.</p> + + +<p class="top5">II. The facts of humanity, with their complex and varied character, +cannot be reduced like chemical facts to a few simple formulæ. Like the +other sciences which deal with life, history needs descriptive formulæ +in order to express the nature of the different phenomena.</p> + +<p>In order to be manageable, a formula must be short; in order to give an +exact idea of the facts, it must be precise. Now, in the knowledge of +human affairs, precision can only be obtained by attention to +characteristic details, for these alone enable us to understand how one +fact differed from others, and what there was in it peculiar to itself. +There is thus a conflict between the need of brevity, which leads us to +look for concrete formulæ, and the necessity of being precise, which +requires us to adopt detailed formulæ. Formulæ which are too short make +science vague and illusory, formulæ which are too long encumber it and +make it useless. This dilemma can only be evaded by a perpetual +compromise, the principle of which is to compress the facts by omitting +all that is not necessary for the purpose of representing them to the +mind, and to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">265</a></span> stop at the point where omission would suppress some +characteristic feature.</p> + +<p>This operation, which is difficult in itself, is still further +complicated by the state in which the facts which are to be condensed +into formulæ present themselves. According to the nature of the +documents from which they are derived, they come to us in all the +different degrees of precision: from the detailed narrative which +relates the smallest episodes (the battle of Waterloo) down to the +barest mention in a couple of words (the victory of the Austrasians at +Testry). On different facts of the same kind we possess an amount of +details which is infinitely variable according as the documents give us +a complete description or a mere mention. How are we to organise into a +common whole, items of knowledge which differ so widely in point of +precision? When facts are known to us from a vague word of general +import, we cannot reduce them to a less degree of generality and a +greater degree of precision; we do not know the details. If we add them +conjecturally we shall produce an historical novel. This is what +Augustin Thierry did in the case of his <i>Récits mérovingiens</i>. When +facts are known in detail, it is always easy to reduce them to a greater +degree of generality by suppressing characteristic details; this is what +is done by the authors of abridgements. But the result of this procedure +would be to reduce history to a mass of vague generalities, uniform for +the whole of time except for the proper names and the dates. It would be +a dangerous method of introducing symmetry, to bring all facts to a +common degree of generality by levelling them all<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">266</a></span> to the condition of +those which are the most imperfectly known. In those cases, therefore, +where the documents give details, our descriptive formulæ should always +retain the characteristic features of the facts.</p> + +<p>In order to construct these formulæ we must return to the set of +questions which we employed in grouping the facts, we must answer each +question, and compare the answers. We shall then combine them into as +condensed and as precise a formula as possible, taking care to keep a +fixed sense for every word. This may appear to be a matter of style, but +what we have in view here is not merely a principle of exposition, +necessary for the sake of being intelligible to the reader, it is a +precaution which the author ought to take on his own account. The facts +of society are of an elusive nature, and for the purpose of seizing and +expressing them, fixed and precise language is an indispensable +instrument; no historian is complete without good language.</p> + +<p>It will be well to make the greatest possible use of concrete and +descriptive terms: their meaning is always clear. It will be prudent to +designate collective groups only by collective, not by abstract names +(royalty, State, democracy, Reformation, Revolution), and to avoid +personifying abstractions. We think we are simply using metaphors, and +then we are carried away by the force of the words. Certainly abstract +terms have something very seductive about them, they give a scientific +appearance to a proposition. But it is only an appearance, behind which +scholasticism is apt to be concealed; the word, having no concrete +meaning, becomes a purely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">267</a></span> verbal notion (like the soporific virtue of +which Molière speaks). As long as our notions on social phenomena have +not been reduced to truly scientific formulæ, the most scientific course +will be to express them in terms of every-day experience.</p> + +<p>In order to construct a formula, we should know beforehand what elements +ought to enter into it. We must here make a distinction between general +facts (habits and evolutions) and unique facts (events).</p> + + +<p class="top5">III. General facts consist in actions which are often repeated, and are +common to a number of men. We have to determine their <i>character</i>, +<i>extent</i>, and <i>duration</i>.</p> + +<p>In order to formulate their character, we combine all the features which +constitute a fact (habit, institution) and distinguish it from all +others. We unite under the same formula all the individual cases which +greatly resemble each other, by neglecting the individual differences.</p> + +<p>This concentration is performed without effort in the case of habits +which have to do with forms (language, handwriting), and in the case of +all intellectual habits; those who practised these habits have already +given them expression in formulæ, which we have only to collect. The +same holds of these institutions which are sanctioned by expressly +formulated rules (regulations, laws, private statutes). Accordingly the +special branches of history were the first to yield methodical formulæ. +On the other hand, these special branches do not go beyond superficial +and conventional facts, they do not reach the real actions and thoughts +of men:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">268</a></span> in language they deal with written words, not the real +pronunciation; in religion with official dogmas and rites, not with the +real beliefs of the mass of the people; in morals with avowed precepts, +not with the effective ideals; in institutions with official rules, not +with the real practice. On all these subjects the knowledge of +conventional forms must some day be supplemented by a parallel study of +the real habits.</p> + +<p>It is much more difficult to embrace in a single formula a habit which +is composed of real actions, as is the case with economic phenomena, +private life, politics; for we have to find in the different actions +those common characteristics which constitute the habit; or, if this +work has already been done in the documents, and condensed into a +formula (the most common case), we must criticise this formula in order +to make sure that it really represents a homogeneous habit.</p> + +<p>The same difficulty occurs in constructing the formula for a group; we +have to describe the characteristic common to all the members of the +group and to find a collective name which shall exactly designate it. In +documents there is no lack of names of groups; but, as they have their +origin in usage, many of them correspond but ill to the real groups; we +have to criticise these names to fix their precise meaning, sometimes to +correct their application.</p> + +<p>This first operation should yield formulæ expressive of the conventional +and real characteristics of all the habits of the different groups.</p> + +<p>In order to fix the precise <i>extent</i> of a habit we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">269</a></span> shall seek the most +distant points where it appears (this will give the area of +distribution), and the region where it is most common (the centre). +Sometimes the operation takes the form of a map (for example the map of +the <i>tumuli</i> and the <i>dolmens</i> of France). It will also be necessary to +indicate the groups of men who practised each habit, and the sub-groups +in which it was most pronounced.</p> + +<p>The formula should also indicate the <i>duration</i> of the habit. We shall +look for the extreme cases, the first and the last appearance of the +form, the doctrine, the usage, the institution, the group. But it will +not be enough to note the two isolated cases, the earliest and the most +recent; we must ascertain the period in which it was really active.</p> + +<p>The formula of an evolution ought to indicate the successive variations +in the habit, giving in each case precise limits of extent and duration. +Then, by comparing all the variations, it will be possible to determine +the general course of the evolution. The general formula will indicate +when and where the evolution began and ended, and the nature of the +change which it effected. All evolutions present common features which +enable them to be divided into stages. Every habit (usage or +institution) begins by being the spontaneous act of several individuals; +when others imitate them it becomes a usage. Similarly social functions +are in the first instance performed by persons who undertake them +spontaneously, when these persons are recognised by others they acquire +an official status. This is the first stage; individual initiative +followed by general imitation and recognition. The usage becomes +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">270</a></span>traditional and is transformed into an obligatory custom or rule; the +persons acquire a permanent status and are invested with powers of +material or moral constraint. This is the stage of tradition and +authority; very often it is the last stage, and continues till the +society is destroyed. The usage is relaxed, the rules are violated, the +persons in authority cease to be obeyed; this is the stage of revolt and +decomposition. Finally, in certain civilised societies, the rule is +criticised, the persons in authority are censured, by the action of a +part of the subjects a rational change is effected in the composition of +the governing body, which is subjected to supervision; this is the stage +of reform and of checks.</p> + + +<p class="top5">IV. In the case of unique facts we cannot expect to bring several +together under a common formula, for the nature of these facts is to +occur but once. However, it is imperatively necessary to abridge, we +cannot preserve all the acts of all the members of an assembly or of all +the officers of a state. Many individuals and many facts must be +sacrificed.</p> + +<p>How are we to choose? Personal tastes and patriotism give rise to +preferences for congenial characters and for local events; but the only +principle of selection which can be employed by all historians in common +is that which is based on the part played in the evolution of human +affairs. We ought to retain those persons and those events which have +visibly influenced the course of an evolution. We may recognise them by +our inability to describe the evolution without mentioning them. The men +are those who have modified the state of a society either by the +creation or the introduction of a habit<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">271</a></span> (artists, men of science, +inventors, founders, apostles), or as directors of a movement, heads of +states, of parties, of armies. The events are those which have brought +about changes in the habits or the state of societies.</p> + +<p>In order to construct a formula descriptive of an historical person, we +must take particulars from his biography and his habits. From his +biography we shall take those facts which determined his career, formed +his habits, and occasioned the actions by which he influenced society. +These comprise physiological conditions (physique, temperament, state of +health),<a name="FNanchor_203_203" id="FNanchor_203_203"></a><a href="#Footnote-203" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 203.">[203]</a> the educational influences, the social conditions to which +he was subject. The history of literature has accustomed us to +researches of this kind.</p> + +<p>Among the habits of a man it is necessary to determine his fundamental +conceptions relating to the class of facts in which his influence was +felt, his conception of life, his knowledge, his predominating tastes, +his habitual occupations, his principles of conduct. From these details, +in which there is infinite variety, an impression is formed of the man's +"character," and the collection of these characteristic features +constitutes his "portrait," or, to use a favourite phrase of the day, +his "psychology." This exercise, which is still held in great esteem, +dates from the time when history was still a branch of literature; it is +doubtful whether it can ever <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">272</a></span>become a scientific process. There is +perhaps no sure method of summing up the character of a man, even in his +lifetime, still less when we can only know him indirectly through the +medium of documents. The controversies relative to the interpretation of +the conduct of Alexander are a good example of this uncertainty.</p> + +<p>If, however, we take the risk of seeking a formula to describe a +character, there are two natural temptations against which we must +guard: (I) We must not construct the formula out of the person's +assertions in regard to himself. (2) The study of imaginary personages +(dramas and novels) has accustomed us to seek a logical connection +between the various sentiments and the various acts of a man; a +character, in literature, is constructed logically. This search for +coherency must not be transferred to the study of real men. We are less +likely to do so in the case of those whom we observe in their lifetime, +because we see too many characteristics in them which could not enter +into a coherent formula. But the absence of documents, by suppressing +those characteristics which would have checked us, encourages us to +arrange the very small number of those which remain in the form of a +stage-character. This is why the great men of antiquity seem to us to +have been much more logical than our contemporaries are.</p> + +<p>How are we to construct a formula for an event? The imperative need of +simplification causes us to combine under a single name an enormous mass +of minute facts which are perceived in the lump, and between which we +vaguely feel that there is a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">273</a></span>connection (a battle, a war, a reform). +The facts which are thus combined are such facts as have conduced to a +common result. That is how the common notion of an event arises, and +there is no more scientific conception to put in its place. Facts, then, +are to be grouped according to their consequences; those which have had +no visible consequences disappear, the others are fused into a certain +number of aggregates which we call events.</p> + +<p>In order to describe an event, it is necessary to give precise +indications (I) of its character, (2) of its extent.</p> + +<p>(I) By the character of an event we mean the features which distinguish +it from every other event, not merely the external conditions of date +and place, but the manner in which it occurred, and its immediate +causes. The following are the items of information which the formula +should contain. One or more men, in such and such mental states +(conceptions, motives of the action), working under such and such +material conditions (locality, instrument), performed such and such +actions, which had for their result such and such a modification. For +the determination of the motives of the actions, the only method is to +compare the actions, firstly, with the declarations of those who +performed them; secondly, with the interpretation of those who witnessed +their performance. There is often a doubt remaining: this is the field +of party polemics; every one attributes noble motives to the actions of +his own party and discreditable motives to those of the opposite party. +But actions described without any indication of motive would be +unintelligible.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">274</a></span></p> + +<p>(2) The extension of the event will be indicated both in space (the +place where it happened, and the region in which its immediate effects +were felt) and in time, the moment when its realisation began, and the +moment when the result was brought about.</p> + +<p class="top5">V. Descriptive formulæ relating to characters, being merely qualitative, +only give an abstract idea of the facts; in order to realise the place +they occupied in reality, quantity is necessary. It is not a matter of +indifference whether a given usage was practised by a hundred men or by +millions.</p> + +<p>For the purpose of introducing quantity into formulæ we have at our +disposal several methods, of various degrees of imperfection, which help +us to attain the end in view with various degrees of precision. Arranged +in descending order of precision they are as follows:—</p> + +<p>(1) <i>Measurement</i> is a perfectly scientific procedure, for equal numbers +represent absolutely identical values. But a common unit is necessary, +and that can only be had for time and for physical phenomena (lengths, +surfaces, weights). Figures relating to production and sums of money are +the essential elements in the statement of economic and financial facts. +But facts of the psychological order remain inaccessible to measurement.</p> + +<p>(2) <i>Enumeration</i>, which is the process employed in statistics,<a name="FNanchor_204_204" id="FNanchor_204_204"></a><a href="#Footnote-204" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 204.">[204]</a> is +applicable to all the facts which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">275</a></span> have in common a definite +characteristic which can be made use of for counting them. The facts +which are thus comprehended under a single number do not all belong to +the same species, they may have in common but a single characteristic, +abstract (crime, lawsuit) or conventional (workman, lodging); the +figures merely indicate the number of cases in which a given +characteristic is met with; they do not represent a homogeneous whole. A +natural tendency is to confuse number with measurement, and to suppose +that facts are known with scientific precision because it has been +possible to apply number to them; this is an illusion to be guarded +against, we must not take the figures which give the number of a +population or an army for the measure of its importance.<a name="FNanchor_205_205" id="FNanchor_205_205"></a><a href="#Footnote-205" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 205.">[205]</a> Still, +enumeration yields results which are necessary for the construction of +formulæ relating to groups. But the operation is restricted to those +cases in which it is possible to know all the units of a given species +lying within given limits, for it is performed by first ticking off, +then adding. Before undertaking a retrospective enumeration, therefore, +it will be well to make sure that the documents are complete enough to +exhibit all the units which are to be enumerated. As to figures given in +documents, they are to be distrusted.</p> + +<p>(3) <i>Valuation</i> is a kind of incomplete enumeration applying to a +portion of the field, and made on the supposition that the same +proportions hold good through the whole of the field. It is an expedient +to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">276</a></span> which, in history, it is often necessary to have recourse when +documents are unequally abundant for the different divisions of the +subject. The result is open to doubt, unless we are sure that the +portion to which enumeration was applied was exactly similar to the +remainder.</p> + +<p>(4) <i>Sampling</i> is a process of enumeration restricted to a few units +taken at different points in the field of investigation; we calculate +the proportion of cases (say 90 per cent.) where a given characteristic +occurs, we assume that the same proportion holds throughout, and if +there are several categories we obtain the proportion between them. In +history this procedure is applicable to facts of every kind, for the +purpose of determining either the proportion between the different forms +or usages which occur within a given region or period, or the proportion +which obtains, within a heterogeneous group, between members belonging +to different classes. This procedure gives us an approximate idea of the +frequency of facts and the proportion between the different elements of +a society; it can even show what species of facts are most commonly +found together, and are therefore probably connected. But in order that +the method may be employed correctly it is necessary that the samples +should be representative of the whole, and not of a part which might +possibly be exceptional in character. They should therefore be chosen at +very different points, and under very different conditions, in order +that the exceptions may compensate each other. It is not enough to take +them at points which are <i>distant</i> from each other; for example, on the +different frontiers of a country,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">277</a></span> for the very circumstance of +situation on a frontier is an exceptional condition. Verification may be +had by following the methods by which anthropologists obtain averages.</p> + +<p>(5) <i>Generalisation</i> is only an instinctive process of simplification. +As soon as we perceive a certain characteristic in an object, we extend +this characteristic to all other objects which at all resemble it. In +all human concerns, where the facts are always complex, we make +generalisations unconsciously; we attribute to a whole people the habits +of a few individuals, or those of the first group forming part of the +people which comes within our knowledge; we extend to a whole period +habits which are ascertained to have existed at a given moment. This is +the most active of all the causes of historical error, and one whose +influence is felt in every department, in the study of usages and of +institutions, even in the appreciation of the morality of a people.<a name="FNanchor_206_206" id="FNanchor_206_206"></a><a href="#Footnote-206" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 206.">[206]</a> +Generalisation rests on a vague idea that all facts which are contiguous +to each other, or which resemble each other in some point, are similar +at all points. It is an unconscious and ill-performed process of +sampling. It may therefore be made correct by being subjected to the +conditions of a well-performed process of sampling. We must examine the +cases on which we propose to found a generalisation and ask ourselves. +What right have we to generalise? That is, what reason have we for +assuming that the characteristic discovered in these cases will occur in +the remaining thousands of cases? that the cases chosen<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">278</a></span> resemble the +average? The only valid reason would be that these cases are +representative of the whole. We are thus brought back to the process of +methodical sampling.</p> + +<p>The right method of conducting the operation is as follows: (1) We must +fix the precise limits of the field within which we intend to generalise +(that is, to assume the similarity of all the cases), we must determine +the country, the group, the class, the period as to which we are to +generalise. Care must be taken not to make the field too large by +confusing a part with the whole (a Greek or Germanic people with the +whole Greek or Germanic race). (2) We must make sure that the facts +lying within the field resemble each other in the points on which we +wish to generalise, and therefore we have to distrust those vague names +under which are comprehended groups of very different character +(Christians, French, Aryans, Romans). (3) We must make sure that the +facts from which we propose to generalise are representative samples, +that they really belong to the field of investigation, for it does +happen sometimes that men or facts are taken as specimens of one group +when they really belong to another. Nor must they be exceptional, as is +to be presumed in all cases when the conditions are exceptional; authors +of documents tend to record by preference those facts which surprise +them, hence exceptional cases occupy in documents a space which is out +of proportion to their real number; this is one of the chief sources of +error. (4) The number of samples necessary to support a generalisation +is the greater the less ground there is for supposing a resemblance +between<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">279</a></span> all the cases occurring within the field of investigation. A +small number may suffice in treating of points in which men tend to bear +a strong resemblance to each other, either by imitation and convention +(language, rites, ceremonies), or from the influence of custom and +obligatory regulations (social institutions, political institutions in +countries where the authorities are obeyed). A large number is requisite +for facts where individual initiative plays a more important part (art, +science, morality), and sometimes, as in respect of private conduct, all +generalisation is as a rule impossible.</p> + + +<p class="top5">VI. Descriptive formulæ are in no science the final result of the work. +It still remains to group the facts in such a way as to bring out their +collective import, it still remains to search for their mutual +relations; these are the general conclusions. History, by reason of the +imperfection of its mode of acquiring knowledge, needs, in addition, a +preliminary operation for determining the bearing of the knowledge +acquired.<a name="FNanchor_207_207" id="FNanchor_207_207"></a><a href="#Footnote-207" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 207.">[207]</a></p> + +<p>The work of criticism has supplied us with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">280</a></span> nothing but a number of +isolated remarks on the value of the knowledge which the documents have +permitted us to acquire. These must be combined. We shall therefore take +a whole group of facts entered under a common heading—a particular +class of facts, a country, a period, an event—and we shall summarise +the results yielded by the criticism of particular facts so as to obtain +a general formula. We shall have to take into consideration: (1) the +extent, (2) the value of our knowledge.</p> + +<p>(1) We shall ask ourselves what are the blanks left by the documents. By +working through the scheme used for the grouping of facts it is easy to +discover what are the classes of facts on which we lack information. In +the case of evolution, we notice which links are missing in the chain of +successive modifications; in the case of events, what episodes, what +groups of actors are still unknown to us; what facts enter or disappear +from the field of our knowledge without our being able to trace their +beginning or end. We ought to construct, mentally at any rate, a +tabulated scheme of the points on which we are ignorant, in order to +keep before our minds the distance separating the knowledge we have from +a perfect knowledge.</p> + +<p>(2) The value of our knowledge depends on the value of our documents. +Criticism has given us indications on this point in each separate case, +these indications, so far as relating to a given body of facts, must be +summarised under a few heads. Does our knowledge come originally from +direct observation, from written tradition, or from oral tradition?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">281</a></span> Do +we possess several traditions of different bias, or a single tradition? +Do we possess documents of different classes or of one single class? Is +our information vague or precise, detailed or summary, literary or +positive, official or confidential?</p> + +<p>The natural tendency is to forget, in construction, the results yielded +by criticism, to forget the incompleteness of our knowledge and the +elements of doubt in it. An eager desire to increase to the greatest +possible extent the amount of our information and the number of our +conclusions impels us to seek emancipation from all negative +restrictions. We thus run a great risk of using fragmentary and +suspicious sources of information for the purpose of forming general +impressions, just as if we were in possession of a complete record. It +is easy to forget the existence of those facts which the documents do +not describe (economic facts, slaves in antiquity), it is easy to +exaggerate the space occupied by facts which are known to us (Greek art, +Roman inscriptions, mediæval monasteries). We instinctively estimate the +importance of facts by the number of the documents which mention them. +We forget the peculiar character of the documents, and, when they all +have a common origin, we forget that they have all subjected the facts +to the same distortions, and that their community of origin renders +verification impossible; we submissively reproduce the bias of the +tradition (Roman, orthodox, aristocratic).</p> + +<p>In order to resist these natural tendencies, it is enough to pass in +review the whole body of facts<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">282</a></span> and the whole body of tradition, before +attempting to draw any general conclusion.</p> + + +<p class="top5">VII. Descriptive formulæ give the particular character of each small +group of facts. In order to obtain a general conclusion, we must combine +these detailed results into a general formula. We must not compare +together isolated details or secondary characteristics,<a name="FNanchor_208_208" id="FNanchor_208_208"></a><a href="#Footnote-208" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 208.">[208]</a> but groups +of facts which resemble each other in a whole set of characteristics.</p> + +<p>We thus form an aggregate (of institutions, of groups of men, of +events). Following the method indicated above, we determine its +distinguishing characteristics, its extent, its duration, its quantity +or importance.</p> + +<p>As we form groups of greater and greater generality we drop, with each +new degree of generality, those characteristics which vary, and retain +those which are common to all the members of the new group. We must stop +at the point where nothing is left except the characteristics common to +the whole of humanity. The result is the condensation into a single +formula of the general character of an order of facts, of a language, a +religion, an art, an economic organisation, a society, a government, a +complex event (such as the Invasion or the Reformation).</p> + +<p>As long as these comprehensive formulæ remain isolated the conclusion is +incomplete. And as it is no longer possible to fuse them into higher +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">283</a></span>generalisations, we feel the need of comparing them for the purpose of +classification. This classification may be attempted by two methods.</p> + +<p>(1) We may compare together similar categories of special facts, +language, religions, arts, governments, taking them from the whole of +humanity, and classifying together those which most resemble each other. +We obtain families of languages, religions, and governments, which we +may again classify and arrange among themselves. This is an abstract +kind of classification; it isolates one species of facts from all the +others, and thus renounces all claim to exhibit causes. It has the +advantage of being rapidly performed and of yielding a technical +vocabulary which is useful for designating facts.</p> + +<p>(2) We may compare real groups of real individuals, we may take +societies which figure in history and classify them according to their +similarities. This is a concrete classification analogous to that of +zoology, in which, not functions, but whole animals are classified. It +is true that the groups are less clearly marked than in zoology; nor is +there a general agreement as to the characteristics in respect of which +we are to look for resemblances. Are we to choose the economic or the +political organisation of the groups, or their intellectual condition? +No principle of choice has as yet become obligatory.</p> + +<p>History has not yet succeeded in establishing a scientific system of +comprehensive classification. Possibly human groups are not sufficiently +homogeneous to furnish a solid basis of comparison, and not sharply +enough divided to be treated as comparable units.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">284</a></span></p> + +<p class="top5">VIII. The study of the relations between simultaneous facts consists in +a search for the connections between all the facts of different species +which occur in a given society. We have a vague consciousness that the +different habits which are separated by abstraction and ranged under +different categories (art, religion, political institutions), are not +isolated in reality, that they have common characteristics, and that +they are closely enough connected for a change in one of them to bring +about a change in another. This is a fundamental idea of the <i>Esprit des +Lois</i> of Montesquieu. This bond of connection, sometimes called +<i>consensus</i>, has received the name of <i>Zusammenhang</i> from the German +school. From this conception has arisen the theory of the <i>Volksgeist</i> +(the mind of a people), a counterfeit of which has within the last few +years been introduced into France under the name of "âme nationale." +This conception is also at the bottom of the theory regarding the soul +of society which Lamprecht has expounded.</p> + +<p>After the rejection of these mystical conceptions there remains a vague +but incontrovertible fact, the "solidarity" which exists between the +different habits of one and the same people. In order to study it with +precision it would be necessary to analyse it, and a connecting bond +cannot be analysed. It is thus quite natural that this part of social +science should have remained a refuge for mystery and obscurity.</p> + +<p>By the comparison of different societies which resemble or differ from +each other in a given department (religion or government), with the +object of discovering in what other departments they <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">285</a></span>resemble or differ +from each other, it is possible that interesting empirical results might +be obtained. But, in order to <i>explain</i> the <i>consensus</i>, it is necessary +to work back to the facts which have produced it, the common causes of +the various habits. We are thus obliged to undertake the investigation +of causes, and we enter the province of what is called <i>philosophical</i> +history, because it investigates what was formerly called the +<i>philosophy</i> of facts—that is to say, their permanent relations.</p> + +<p class="top5">IX. The necessity of rising above the simple determination of facts in +order to <i>explain</i> them by their <i>causes</i>, a necessity which has +governed the development of all the sciences, has at length been felt +even in the study of history. Hence have arisen systematic philosophies +of history, and attempts to discover historical laws and causes. We +cannot here enter into a critical examination of these attempts, which +the nineteenth century has produced in so great number; we shall merely +indicate what are the ways in which the problem has been attacked, and +what obstacles have prevented a scientific solution from being reached.</p> + +<p>The most natural method of explanation consists in the assumption that a +transcendental cause, Providence, guides the whole course of events +towards an end which is known to God.<a name="FNanchor_209_209" id="FNanchor_209_209"></a><a href="#Footnote-209" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 209.">[209]</a> This explanation can be but a +metaphysical doctrine, crowning the work of science; for the +distinguishing feature of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">286</a></span> science is that it only studies efficient +causes. The historian is not called upon to investigate the first cause +or final causes any more than the chemist or the naturalist. And, in +fact, few writers on history nowadays stop to discuss the theory of +Providence in its theological form.</p> + +<p>But the tendency to explain historical facts by transcendental causes +survives in more modern theories in which metaphysic is disguised under +scientific forms. The historians of the nineteenth century have been so +strongly influenced by their philosophical education that most of them, +sometimes unconsciously, introduce metaphysical formulæ into the +construction of history. It will be enough to enumerate these systems, +and point out their metaphysical character, so that reflecting +historians may be warned to distrust them.</p> + +<p>The theory of the rational character of history rests on the notion that +every real historical fact is at the same time "rational"—that is, in +conformity with an intelligible comprehensive plan; ordinarily it is +tacitly assumed that every social fact has its <i>raison d'être</i> in the +development of society—that is, that it ends by turning to the +advantage of society; hence the cause of every institution is sought for +in the social need it was originally meant to supply.<a name="FNanchor_210_210" id="FNanchor_210_210"></a><a href="#Footnote-210" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 210.">[210]</a> This is the +fundamental idea of Hegelianism, if not with Hegel, at least with the +historians who have been his disciples (Ranke, Mommsen, Droysen, in +France Cousin, Taine, and Michelet). This is a lay<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">287</a></span> disguise of the old +theological theory of final causes which assumes the existence of a +Providence occupied in guiding humanity in the direction of its +interests. This is a consoling, but not a scientific <i>a priori</i> +hypothesis; for the observation of historical facts does not indicate +that things have always happened in the most rational way, or in the way +most advantageous to men, nor that institutions have had any other cause +than the interest of those who established them; the facts, indeed, +point rather to the opposite conclusion.</p> + +<p>From the same metaphysical source has also sprung the Hegelian theory of +the <i>ideas</i> which are successively realised in history through the +medium of successive peoples. This theory, which has been popularised in +France by Cousin and Michelet, has had its day, even in Germany, but it +has been revived, especially in Germany, in the form of the historical +mission (<i>Beruf</i>) which is attributed to peoples and persons. It will +here be enough to observe that the very metaphors of "idea" and +"mission" imply a transcendental anthropomorphic cause.</p> + +<p>From the same optimistic conception of a rational guidance of the world +is derived the theory of the continuous and necessary <i>progress</i> of +humanity. Although it has been adopted by the positivists, this is +merely a metaphysical hypothesis. In the ordinary sense of the word, +"progress" is merely a subjective expression denoting those changes +which follow the direction of our preferences. But, even taking the word +in the objective sense given to it by Spencer (an increase in the +variety and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">288</a></span>coordination of social phenomena), the study of historical +facts does not point to a <i>single</i> universal and continuous progress of +humanity, it brings before us a <i>number</i> of partial and intermittent +progressive movements, and it gives us no reason to attribute them to a +permanent cause inherent in humanity as a whole rather than to a series +of local accidents.<a name="FNanchor_211_211" id="FNanchor_211_211"></a><a href="#Footnote-211" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 211.">[211]</a></p> + +<p>Attempts at a more scientific form of explanation have had their origin +in the special branches of history (of languages, religion, law). By the +separate study of the succession of facts of a single species, +specialists have been enabled to ascertain the regular recurrence of the +same successions of facts, and these results have been expressed in +formulæ which are sometimes called laws (for example, the law of the +tonic accent); these are never more than empirical laws which merely +indicate successions of facts without explaining them, for they do not +reveal the efficient cause. But specialists, influenced by a natural +metaphor, and struck by the regularity of these successions, have +regarded the evolution of usages (of a word, a rite, a dogma, a rule of +law), as if it were an organic development analogous to the growth of a +plant; we hear of the "life of words," of the "death of dogmas," of the +"growth of myths." Then, in forgetfulness of the fact that all these +things are pure abstractions, it has been tacitly assumed that there is +a force inhering in the word, the rite, the rule, which produces its +evolution. This is the theory of the development (<i>Entwickelung</i>) of +usages and institutions; it was started in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">289</a></span>Germany by the "historical" +school, and has dominated all the special branches of history. The +history of languages alone has succeeded in shaking off its +influence.<a name="FNanchor_212_212" id="FNanchor_212_212"></a><a href="#Footnote-212" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 212.">[212]</a> Just as usages have been treated as if they were +existences possessing a separate life of their own, so the succession of +individuals composing the various bodies within a society (royalty, +church, senate, parliament) has been personified by the attribution to +it of a will, which is treated as an active cause. A world of imaginary +beings has thus been created behind the historical facts, and has +replaced Providence in the explanation of them. For our defence against +this deceptive mythology a single rule will suffice: Never seek the +causes of an historical fact without having first expressed it +concretely in terms of acting and thinking individuals. If abstractions +are used, every metaphor must be avoided which would make them play the +part of living beings.</p> + +<p>By a comparison of the evolutions of the different species of facts +which coexist in one and the same society, the "historical" school was +led to the discovery of solidarity (<i>Zusammenhang</i>).<a name="FNanchor_213_213" id="FNanchor_213_213"></a><a href="#Footnote-213" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 213.">[213]</a> But, before +attempting to discover its causes by analysis, the adherents of this +school assumed the existence of a permanent general cause residing in +the society itself. And, as it was customary to personify society, a +special temperament was attributed to it, the peculiar genius of the +nation or the race, manifesting itself<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">290</a></span> in the different social +activities and explaining their solidarity.<a name="FNanchor_214_214" id="FNanchor_214_214"></a><a href="#Footnote-214" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 214.">[214]</a> This was simply an +hypothesis suggested by the animal world, in which each species has +permanent characteristics. It would have been inadequate, for in order +to explain how a given society comes to change its character from one +epoch to another (the Greeks between the seventh and the fourth +centuries, the English between the fifteenth and the nineteenth), it +would have been necessary to invoke the aid of external causes. And the +theory is untenable, for all the societies known to history are groups +of men without anthropological unity and without common hereditary +characteristics.</p> + +<p>In addition to these metaphysical or metaphorical explanations, attempts +have been made to apply to the investigation of causes in history the +classical procedure of the natural sciences: the comparison of parallel +series of successive phenomena in order to discover those which always +appear together. The "comparative method" has assumed several different +forms. Sometimes the subject of study has been a detail of social life +(a usage, an institution, a belief, a rule), defined in abstract terms; +its evolutions in different societies have been compared with a view to +determine the common evolution which is to be attributed to one and the +same general cause. Thus have arisen comparative philology, mythology, +and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">291</a></span> law. It has been proposed (in England) to give precision to the +comparative method by applying "statistics"; this would mean the +systematic comparison of all known societies and the enumeration of all +the cases where two usages are found together. This is the principle of +Bacon's tables of agreement; it is to be feared that it will be no more +fertile in results. The defect of all such methods is that they apply to +abstract and partly arbitrary notions, sometimes merely to verbal +resemblances, and do not rest on a knowledge of the whole of the +conditions under which the facts occur.</p> + +<p>We can conceive a more concrete method which, instead of comparing +fragments, should compare wholes, that is entire societies, either the +same society at different stages of its evolution (England in the +sixteenth, and again in the nineteenth century), or else the general +evolution of several societies, contemporary with each other (England +and France), or existing at different epochs (Rome and England). Such a +method might be useful negatively, for the purpose of ascertaining that +a given fact is not the necessary effect of another, since they are not +always found together (for example, the emancipation of women and +Christianity). But positive results are hardly to be expected of it, for +the concomitance of two facts in several series does not show whether +one is the cause of the other, or whether both are joint effects of a +single cause.</p> + +<p>The methodical investigation of the causes of a fact requires an +analysis of the conditions under which the fact occurs, performed so as +to isolate the necessary condition which is its cause; it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">292</a></span>presupposes, +therefore, the complete knowledge of these conditions. But this is +precisely what we never have in history. We must therefore renounce the +idea of arriving at causes by direct methods such as are used in the +other sciences.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, however, historians often do employ the notion of +cause, which, as we have shown above, is indispensable for the purpose +of formulating events and constructing periods. They know causes partly +from the authors of documents who observed the facts, partly from the +analogy of the causes which we all observe at the present day. The whole +history of events is a chain of obviously and incontrovertibly connected +incidents, each one of which is the determining cause of another. The +lance-thrust of Montgomery is the cause of the death of Henry II.; this +death is the cause of the accession to power of the Guises, which again +is the cause of the rising of the Protestants.</p> + +<p>The observation of causes by the authors of documents is limited to the +interconnection of the accidental facts observed by them; these are, in +truth, the causes which are known with the greatest certainty. Thus +history, unlike the other sciences, is better able to ascertain the +causes of particular incidents than those of general transformations, +for the work is found already done in the documents.</p> + +<p>In the investigation of the causes of general facts, historical +construction is reduced to the analogy between the past and the present. +Whatever chance there is of finding the causes which explain the +evolution of past societies must lie in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">293</a></span> direct observation of the +transformations of present societies.</p> + +<p>This is a branch of study which is not yet firmly established; here we +can only state the principles of it.</p> + +<p>(1) In order to ascertain the causes of the solidarity between the +different habits of one and the same society, it is necessary to look +beyond the abstract and conventional form which the facts assume in +language (dogma, rule, rite, institution), and attend to the real +concrete centres, which are always thinking and acting men. Here only +are found together the different species of activity which language +separates by abstraction. Their solidarity is to be sought for in some +dominating feature in the character or the environment of the men which +influences all the different manifestations of their activity. We must +not expect the same degrees of solidarity in all the species of +activity; there will be most of it in those species where each +individual is in close dependence on the actions of the mass (economic, +social, political life); there will be less of it in the intellectual +activities (arts, sciences), where individual initiative has freer +play.<a name="FNanchor_215_215" id="FNanchor_215_215"></a><a href="#Footnote-215" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 215.">[215]</a> Documents mention most habits (beliefs, customs, +institutions) in the lump, without distinguishing individuals; and yet, +in one and the same society, habits vary considerably from one man to +another. It is necessary to take account of these differences, otherwise +there is a danger of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">294</a></span> explaining the actions of artists and men of +science by the beliefs and the habits of their prince or their +tradesmen.</p> + +<p>(2) In order to ascertain the causes of an evolution, it is necessary to +study the only beings which can evolve—men. Every evolution has for its +cause a change in the material conditions or in the habits of certain +men. Observation shows us two kinds of change. In the one case, the men +remain the same, but change their manner of acting or thinking, either +voluntarily through imitation, or by compulsion. In the other, the men +who practised the old usage disappear and are replaced by others who do +not practise it; these may be strangers, or they may be the descendants +of the first set of men, but educated in a different manner. This +renewing of the generations seems, in our day, to be the most active +cause of evolution. It is natural to suppose that the same holds good of +the past; evolution has been slower, the more exclusively each +generation has been formed by the imitation of its forerunners.</p> + +<p>There is still one more question to ask. Are men all alike, differing +merely in the <i>conditions</i> under which they live (education, resources, +government), and is evolution produced solely by changes in these +<i>conditions</i>? Or are there groups of men with <i>hereditary differences</i>, +born with tendencies to different activities and with aptitudes leading +to different evolutions, so that evolution may be the product, in part +at least, of the increase, the diminution, and the displacement of these +groups? Taking the extreme cases, the white, black, and yellow races of +mankind, the differences in aptitude are obvious; no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">295</a></span> black people has +ever developed a civilisation. It is thus probable that smaller +hereditary differences may have had their share in the determination of +events. If so, historical evolution would be partly produced by +physiological and anthropological causes. But history provides us with +no sure means of determining the action of these hereditary differences +between men; it goes no further than the conditions of their existence. +The last question of history remains insoluble by historical methods.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">296</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CHAPTER_Vb" id="CHAPTER_Vb"></a>CHAPTER V</h3> + +<p class="head2">EXPOSITION</p> + + +<p>We have still to study a question whose practical interest is obvious: +What are the forms in which historical works present themselves? These +forms are, in fact, very numerous. Some of them are antiquated; not all +are legitimate; the best have their drawbacks. We should ask, therefore, +not only what are the forms in which historical works appear, but also +which of these represent truly rational types of exposition.</p> + +<p>By "historical works" we mean here all those which are intended to +communicate results obtained by the labour of historical construction, +whatever may be the nature, the extent, and the bearing of these +results. The critical elaboration of documents, which is treated of in +Book II., and which is preparatory to historical construction, is +naturally excluded.</p> + +<p>Historians may differ, and up to the present have differed, on several +essential points. They have not always had, nor have they all now, the +same conception of the end aimed at by historical work; hence arise +differences in the nature of the facts chosen, the manner of dividing +the subject, that is, of co-ordinating the facts, the manner of +presenting them, the manner of proving them. This would be the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">297</a></span> place to +indicate how "the mode of writing history" has evolved from the +beginning. But as the history of the modes of writing history has not +yet been written well,<a name="FNanchor_216_216" id="FNanchor_216_216"></a><a href="#Footnote-216" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 216.">[216]</a> we shall here content ourselves with some +very general remarks on the period prior to the second half of the +nineteenth century, confining ourselves to what is strictly necessary +for the understanding of the present situation.</p> + +<p class="top5">I. History was first conceived as the narration of memorable events. To +preserve the memory and propagate the knowledge of glorious deeds, or of +events which were of importance to a man, a family, or a people; such +was the aim of history in the tune of Thucydides and Livy. In addition, +history was early considered as a collection of precedents, and the +knowledge of history as a practical preparation for life, especially +political life (military and civil). Polybius and Plutarch wrote to +instruct, they claimed to give recipes for action. Hence in classical +antiquity the subject-matter of history consisted chiefly of political +incidents, wars, and revolutions. The ordinary framework of historical +exposition (within which the facts were usually arranged in +chronological order) was the life of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">298</a></span> a person, the whole life of a +people, or a particular period in it; there were in antiquity but few +essays in general history. As the aim of the historian was to please or +to instruct, or to please and instruct at the same time, history was a +branch of literature: there were not too many scruples on the score of +proofs; those who worked from written documents took no care to +distinguish the text of such documents from their own text; in +reproducing the narratives of their predecessors they adorned them with +details, and sometimes (under pretext of being precise) with numbers, +with speeches, with reflections, and elegances. We can in a manner see +them at work in every instance where it is possible to compare Greek and +Roman historians, Ephorus and Livy, for example, with their sources.</p> + +<p>The writers of the Renaissance directly imitated the ancients. For them, +too, history was a literary art with apologetic aims or didactic +pretensions. In Italy it was too often a means of gaining the favour of +princes, or a theme for declamations. This state of affairs lasted a +long time. Even in the seventeenth century we find, in Mézeray, an +historian of the ancient classical pattern.</p> + +<p>However, in the historical literature of the Renaissance, two novelties +claim our attention, in which the mediæval influence is incontrovertibly +manifest. On the one hand we see the retention of a form of exposition +which was unusual in antiquity, which was created by the Catholic +historians of the later ages (Eusebius, Orosius), and which enjoyed +great favour in the Middle Ages,—that which, instead of embracing only +the history of a single man,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">299</a></span> family, or people, embraces universal +history. On the other hand there was introduced a mechanical artifice of +exposition, having its origin in a practice common in the mediæval +schools (the gloss), which had far-reaching consequences. The custom +arose of adding notes to printed books of history.<a name="FNanchor_217_217" id="FNanchor_217_217"></a><a href="#Footnote-217" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 217.">[217]</a> Notes have made +it possible to distinguish between the historical narrative and the +documents which support it, to give references to sources, to +disencumber and illustrate the text. It was in collections of documents, +and in critical dissertations, that the artifice of annotation was first +employed; thence it penetrated, slowly, into historical works of other +classes.</p> + +<p>A second period begins in the eighteenth century. The "philosophers" +then began to conceive history as the study, not of events for their own +sakes, but of the habits of men. They were thus led to take an interest, +not only in facts of a political order, but in the evolution of the +arts, the sciences, of industry, and in manners. Montesquieu and +Voltaire personified these tendencies. The <i>Essai sur les mœurs</i> is +the first sketch, and, in some respects, the masterpiece of history thus +conceived. The detailed narration of political and military events was +still regarded as the main work of history, but to this it now became +customary to add, generally by way of supplement or appendix, a sketch +of the "progress of the human mind." The expression "history of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">300</a></span> +civilisation" appears before the end of the eighteenth century. At the +same time German university professors, especially at Göttingen, were +creating, in order to supply educational needs, the new form of the +historical "manual," a methodical collection of carefully justified +facts, with no literary or other pretensions. Collections of historical +facts, made with a view to aid in the interpretation of literary texts, +or out of mere curiosity in regard to the things of the past, had +existed from ancient times; but the medleys of Athenæus and Aulus +Gellius, or the vaster and better arranged compilations of the Middle +Ages and the Renaissance, are by no means to be compared with the +"scientific manuals" of which the German professors then gave the +models. These professors, moreover, contributed towards the clearing up +of the vague, general notion which the philosophers had of +"civilisation," for they applied themselves to the organisation of the +history of languages, of literatures, of the arts, of religions, of law, +of economic phenomena, and so on, as so many separate branches of study. +Thus the domain of history was greatly enlarged, and scientific, that +is, simple and objective, exposition began to compete with the +rhetorical or sententious, patriotic or philosophical ideals of +antiquity.</p> + +<p>This competition was at first timid and obscure, for the beginning of +the nineteenth century was marked by a literary renaissance which +renovated historical literature. Under the influence of the romantic +movement historians sought for more vivid methods of exposition than +those employed by their predecessors, methods better adapted to strike +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">301</a></span> imagination and rouse the emotions of the public, by filling the +mind with poetical images of vanished realities. Some endeavoured to +preserve the peculiar colouring of the original documents, which they +adapted: "Charmed with the contemporary narratives," says Barante, "I +have endeavoured to write a consecutive account which should borrow from +them their animation and interest." This leads directly to the neglect +of criticism, and to the reproduction of whatever is effective from the +literary point of view. Others declared that the facts of the past ought +to be recounted with all the emotions of a spectator. "Thierry," says +Michelet, praising him, "in telling us the story of Klodowig, breathes +the spirit and shows the emotion of recently invaded France...." +Michelet "stated the problem of history as the resuscitation of integral +life in the inmost parts of the organism." With the romantic historians +the choice of subject, of plan, of the proofs, of the style, is +dominated by an engrossing desire to produce an effect—a literary, not +a scientific ambition. Some romantic historians have slid down this +inclined plane to the level of the "historical novel." We know the +nature of this species of literature, which flourished so vigorously +from the Abbé Barthélemy and Chateaubriand down to Mérimée and Ebers, +and which some are now vainly attempting to rejuvenate. The object is to +"make the scenes of the past live again" in dramatic pictures +artistically constructed with "true" colours and details. The obvious +object of the method is that it does not provide the reader with any +means of distinguishing between the elements borrowed from the +documents<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">302</a></span> and the imaginary elements, not to mention the fact that +generally the documents used are not all of the same origin, so that +while the colour of each stone may be "true" that of the mosaic is +false. Dezobry's <i>Rome au siècle d'Auguste</i>, Augustin Thierry's <i>Récits +mérovingiens</i>, and other "pictures" produced at the same epoch were +constructed on the same principle, and are subject to the same drawbacks +as the historical novels properly so-called.<a name="FNanchor_218_218" id="FNanchor_218_218"></a><a href="#Footnote-218" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 218.">[218]</a></p> + +<p>We may summarise what precedes by saying that, up to about 1850, history +continued to be, both for historians and the public, a branch of +literature. An excellent proof of this lies in the fact that up till +then historians were accustomed to publish new editions of their works, +at intervals of several years, without making any change in them, and +that the public tolerated the practice. Now every scientific work needs +to be continually recast, revised, brought up to date. Scientific +workers do not claim to give their works an immutable form, they do not +expect to be read by posterity or to achieve personal immortality; it is +enough for them if the results of their researches, corrected, it may +be, and possibly transformed by subsequent researches, should be +incorporated in the fund of knowledge which forms the scientific +heritage of mankind. No one reads Newton or Lavoisier; it is enough for +their glory that their labours should have contributed to the +production<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">303</a></span> of works by which their own have been superseded, and which +will be, sooner or later, superseded in their turn. It is only works of +art that enjoy perpetual youth. And the public is well aware of the +fact; no one would ever think of studying natural history in Buffon, +whatever his opinion might be of the merits of this stylist. But the +same public is quite ready to study history in Augustin Thierry, in +Macaulay, in Carlyle, in Michelet, and the books of the great writers +who have treated historical subjects are reprinted, fifty years after +the author's death, in their original form, though they are manifestly +no longer on a level with current knowledge. It is clear that, for many, +form counts before matter in history, and that an historical work is +primarily, if not exclusively, a work of art.<a name="FNanchor_219_219" id="FNanchor_219_219"></a><a href="#Footnote-219" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 219.">[219]</a></p> + +<p class="top5">II. It is within the last fifty years that the scientific forms of +historical exposition have been evolved and settled, in accordance with +the general principle that the aim of history is not to please, nor to +give practical maxims of conduct, nor to arouse the emotions, but +knowledge pure and simple.</p> + +<p>We begin by distinguishing between (1) monographs and (2) works of a +general character.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">304</a></span></p> + +<p>(1) A man writes a monograph when he proposes to elucidate a special +point, a single fact, or a limited body of facts, for example the whole +or a portion of the life of an individual, a single event or a series of +events between two dates lying near together. The types of possible +subjects of a monograph cannot be enumerated, for the subject-matter of +history can be divided indefinitely, and in an infinite number of ways. +But all modes of division are not equally judicious, and, though the +reverse has been maintained, there are, in history as in all the +sciences, subjects which it would be stupid to treat in monographs, and +monographs which, though well executed, represent so much useless +labour.<a name="FNanchor_220_220" id="FNanchor_220_220"></a><a href="#Footnote-220" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 220.">[220]</a> Persons of moderate ability and no great mental range, +devoted to what is called "curious" learning, are very ready to occupy +themselves with insignificant questions;<a name="FNanchor_221_221" id="FNanchor_221_221"></a><a href="#Footnote-221" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 221.">[221]</a> indeed, for the purpose of +making a first estimate of an historian's intellectual power, a fairly +good criterion may be had in the list of the monographs he has +written.<a name="FNanchor_222_222" id="FNanchor_222_222"></a><a href="#Footnote-222" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 222.">[222]</a> It is the gift of seeing the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">305</a></span> important problems, and the +taste for their treatment, as well as the power of solving them, which, +in all the sciences, raise men to the first rank. But let us suppose the +subject has been rationally chosen. Every monograph, in order to be +useful—that is, capable of being fully turned to account—should +conform to three rules: (1) in a monograph every historical fact derived +from documents should only be presented accompanied by a reference to +the documents from which it is taken, and an estimate of the value of +these documents;<a name="FNanchor_223_223" id="FNanchor_223_223"></a><a href="#Footnote-223" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 223.">[223]</a> (2) chronological order should be followed as far +as possible, because this is the order in which we know that the facts +occurred, and by which we are guided in searching for causes and +effects; (3) the title of the monograph must enable its subject to be +known with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">306</a></span>exactitude: we cannot protest too strongly against those +incomplete or fancy titles which so unnecessarily complicate +bibliographical searches. A fourth rule has been laid down; it has been +said "a monograph is useful only when it exhausts the subject"; but it +is quite legitimate to do temporary work with documents which one has at +one's disposal, even when there is reason to believe that others exist, +provided always that precise notice is given as to what documents have +been employed.</p> + +<p>Any one who has tact will see that, in a monograph, the apparatus of +demonstration, while needing to be complete, ought to be reduced to what +is strictly necessary. Sobriety is imperative; all parading of erudition +which might have been spared without inconvenience is odious.<a name="FNanchor_224_224" id="FNanchor_224_224"></a><a href="#Footnote-224" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 224.">[224]</a> In +history it often happens that the best executed monographs furnish no +other result than the proof that knowledge is impossible. It is +necessary to resist the desire which leads some to round off with +subjective, ambitious, and vague conclusions monographs which will not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">307</a></span> +bear them.<a name="FNanchor_225_225" id="FNanchor_225_225"></a><a href="#Footnote-225" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 225.">[225]</a> The proper conclusion of a good monograph is the +balance-sheet of the results obtained by it and the points left +doubtful. A monograph made on these principles may grow antiquated, but +it will not fall to pieces, and its author will never need to blush for +it.</p> + +<p>(2) Works of a general character are addressed either to students or to +the general public.</p> + +<p><i>A.</i> General works intended principally for students and specialists now +appear in the form of "repertories," "manuals," and "scientific +histories." In a repertory a number of verified facts belonging to a +given class are collected and arranged in an order which makes it easy +to refer to them. If the facts thus collected have precise dates, +chronological order is adopted: thus the task has been undertaken of +compiling "Annals" of German history, in which the summary entry of the +events, arranged by dates, is accompanied by the texts from which the +events are known, with accurate references to the sources and the works +of critics; the collection of the <i>Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte</i> +has for its object the elucidation, as far as is possible, of the facts +of German history, including all that is susceptible of scientific +discussion and proof, but omitting all that belongs to the domain of +appreciation and general views. When the facts are badly dated, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">308</a></span> are +simultaneous, alphabetical arrangement must be employed; thus we have +Dictionaries: dictionaries of institutions, biographical dictionaries, +historical encyclopædias, such as the <i>Realencyclopædie</i> of +Pauly-Wissowa. These alphabetical repertories are, in theory, just as +the <i>Jahrbücher</i>, collections of proved facts; if, in practice, the +references in them are less rigorous, if the apparatus of texts +supporting the statements is less complete, the difference is without +justification.<a name="FNanchor_226_226" id="FNanchor_226_226"></a><a href="#Footnote-226" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 226.">[226]</a> <i>Scientific manuals</i> are also, properly speaking, +repertories, since they are collections in which established facts are +arranged in systematic order, and are exhibited objectively, with their +proofs, and without any literary adornment. The authors of these +"manuals," of which the most numerous and the most perfect specimens +have been composed in our days in the German universities, have no +object in view except to draw up minute inventories of the acquisitions +made by knowledge, in order that workers may be enabled to assimilate +the results of criticism with greater ease and rapidity, and may be +furnished with starting-points for new researches. Manuals of this kind +now exist for most of the special branches of the history of +civilisation (languages, literature, religion, law, <i>Alterthümer</i>, and +so on), for the history of institutions, for the different parts of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">309</a></span> +ecclesiastical history. It will suffice to mention the names of +Schœmann, of Marquardt and Mommsen, of Gilbert, of Krumbacher, of +Harnack, of Möller. These works are not marked by the dryness of the +majority of the primitive "manuals," which were published in Germany a +hundred years ago, and which were little more than tables of subjects, +with references to the books and documents to be consulted; in the +modern type the exposition and discussion are no doubt terse and +compact, but yet not abbreviated beyond a point at which they may be +tolerated, even preferred by cultivated readers. They take away the +taste for other books, as G. Paris very well says:<a name="FNanchor_227_227" id="FNanchor_227_227"></a><a href="#Footnote-227" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 227.">[227]</a> "When one has +feasted on these substantial pages, so full of facts, which, with all +their appearance of impersonality, yet contain, and above all suggest, +so many thoughts, it is difficult to read books, even books of +distinction, in which the subject is cut up symmetrically to fit in with +a preconceived system, is coloured by fancy, and is, so to speak, +presented to us in disguise, books in which the author continually comes +between us and the spectacle which he claims to make intelligible to us, +but which he never allows us to see." The great historical "manuals," +uniform with the treatises and manuals of the other sciences (with the +added complication of authorities and proofs), ought to be, and are, +continually improved, emended, corrected, brought up to date: they are, +by definition, works of science and not of art.</p> + +<p>The earliest repertories and the earliest scientific "manuals" were +composed by isolated individuals.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">310</a></span> But it was soon recognised that a +single man cannot correctly arrange, or have the proper mastery over a +vast collection of facts. The task has been divided. Repertories are +executed, in our days, by collaborators in association (who are +sometimes of different nationalities and write in different languages). +The great manuals (of I. von Müller, of G. Gröber, of H. Paul, and +others) are collections of special treatises each written by a +specialist. The principle of collaboration is excellent, but on +condition (1) that the collective work is of a nature to be resolved +into great independent, though co-ordinated, monographs; (2) that the +section entrusted to each collaborator has a certain extent; if the +number of collaborators is too great and the part of each too limited, +the liberty and the responsibility of each are diminished or disappear.</p> + +<p><i>Histories</i>, intended to give a narrative of events which happened but +once, and to state the general facts which dominate the whole course of +special evolutions, still have a reason for existence, even after the +multiplication of methodical manuals. But scientific methods of +exposition have been introduced into them, as into monographs and +manuals, and that by imitation. The reform has consisted, in every case, +in the renunciation of literary ornaments and of statements without +proof. Grote produced the first model of a "history" thus defined. At +the same time certain forms which once had a vogue have now fallen into +disuse: this is the case with the "Universal Histories" with continuous +narrative, which were so much liked, for different reasons, in the +Middle Ages and in the eighteenth century; in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">311</a></span> the present century +Schlosser and Weber in Germany, Cantù in Italy, have produced the last +specimens of them. This type has been abandoned for historical reasons, +because we have ceased to regard humanity as a whole, bound together by +a single evolution; and for practical reasons, because we have +recognised the impossibility of collecting so overwhelming a mass of +facts in a single work. The Universal Histories which are still +published in collaboration (the Oncken collection is the best type of +them), are, like the great manuals, composed of independent sections, +each treated by a different author; they are publishers' combinations. +Historians have in our days been led to adopt the division by states +(national histories) and by epochs.<a name="FNanchor_228_228" id="FNanchor_228_228"></a><a href="#Footnote-228" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 228.">[228]</a></p> + +<p><i>B.</i> There is in theory no reason why historical works intended +principally for the public should not be conceived in the same spirit as +works designed for students and specialists, nor why they should not be +composed in the same manner, apart from simplifications and omissions +which readily suggest themselves. And, in fact, there are in existence +succinct, substantial, and readable summaries, in which no statement is +advanced which is not tacitly supported by solid references, in which +the acquisitions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">312</a></span> of science are precisely stated, judiciously +explained, their significance and value clearly brought out. The French, +thanks to their natural gifts of tact, dexterity, and accuracy of mind, +excel, as a rule, in this department. There have been published in our +country review-articles and works of higher popularisation in which the +results of a number of original works have been cleverly condensed, in a +way that has won the admiration of the very specialists who, by their +heavy monographs, have rendered these works possible. Nothing, however, +is more dangerous than popularisation. As a matter of fact, most works +of popularisation do not conform to the modern ideal of historical +exposition; we frequently find in them survivals of the ancient ideal, +that of antiquity, the Renaissance, and the romantic school.</p> + +<p>The explanation is easy. The defects of the historical works designed +for the general public—defects which are sometimes enormous, and have, +with many able minds, discredited popular works as a class—are the +consequences of the insufficient preparation or of the inferior literary +education of the "popularisers."</p> + +<p>A populariser is excused from original research; but he ought to know +everything of importance that has been published on his subject, he +ought to be up to date, and to have thought out for himself the +conclusions reached by the specialists. If he has not personally made a +special study of the subject he proposes to treat, he must obviously +read it up, and the task is long. For the professional populariser there +is a strong temptation to study superficially a few recent monographs, +to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">313</a></span> hastily string together or combine extracts from them, and, in order +to render this medley more attractive, to deck it out, as far as is +possible, with "general ideas" and external graces. The temptation is +all the stronger from the circumstance that most specialists take no +interest in works of popularisation, that these works are, in general, +lucrative, and that the public at large is not in a position to +distinguish clearly between honest and sham popularisation. In short, +there are some, absurd as it may seem, who do not hesitate to summarise +for others what they have not taken the trouble to learn for themselves, +and to teach that of which they are ignorant. Hence, in most works of +historical popularisation, there inevitably appear blemishes of every +kind, which the well-informed always note with pleasure, but with a +pleasure in which there is some touch of bitterness, because they alone +can see these faults: unacknowledged borrowings, inexact references, +mutilated names and texts, second-hand quotations, worthless hypotheses, +imprudent assertions, puerile generalisations, and, in the enunciation +of the most false or the most debatable opinions, an air of tranquil +authority.<a name="FNanchor_229_229" id="FNanchor_229_229"></a><a href="#Footnote-229" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 229.">[229]</a></p> + +<p>On the other hand, men whose information is all that could be desired, +whose monographs intended<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">314</a></span> for specialists are full of merit, sometimes +show themselves capable, when they write for the public, of grave +offences against scientific method. The Germans are habitual offenders: +consider Mommsen, Droysen, Curtius, and Lamprecht. The reason is that +these authors, when they address the public, wish to produce an effect +upon it. Their desire to make a strong impression leads them to a +certain relaxation of scientific rigour, and to the old rejected habits +of ancient historiography. These men, scrupulous and minute as they are +when they are engaged in establishing details, abandon themselves, in +their exposition of general questions, to their natural impulses, like +the common run of men. They take sides, they censure, they extol; they +colour, they embellish; they allow themselves to be influenced by +personal, patriotic, moral, or metaphysical considerations. And, over +and above all this, they apply themselves, with their several degrees of +talent, to the task of producing works of art; in this endeavour those +who have no talent make themselves ridiculous, and the talent of those +who have any is spoilt by their preoccupation with the effect they wish +to produce.</p> + +<p>Not, let it be well understood, that "form" is of no importance, or +that, provided he makes himself intelligible, the historian has a right +to employ incorrect, vulgar, slovenly, or clumsy language. A contempt +for rhetoric, for paste diamonds and paper flowers, does not exclude a +taste for a pure and strong, a terse and pregnant style. Fustel de +Coulanges was a good writer, although throughout his life he recommended +and practised the avoidance of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">315</a></span> metaphor. On the contrary we see no harm +in repeating<a name="FNanchor_230_230" id="FNanchor_230_230"></a><a href="#Footnote-230" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 230.">[230]</a> that the historian, considering the extreme complexity +of the phenomena he undertakes to describe, is under an obligation not +to write badly. But he should write <i>consistently</i> well, and never +bedeck himself with finery.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">316</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="CONCLUSION" id="CONCLUSION"></a>CONCLUSION</h3> + + +<p>I. History is only the utilisation of documents. But it is a matter of +chance whether documents are preserved or lost. Hence the predominant +part played by chance in the formation of history.</p> + +<p>The quantity of documents in existence, if not of known documents, is +given; time, in spite of all the precautions which are taken nowadays, +is continually diminishing it; it will never increase. History has at +its disposal a limited stock of documents; this very circumstance limits +the possible progress of historical science. When all the documents are +known, and have gone through the operations which fit them for use, the +work of critical scholarship will be finished. In the case of some +ancient periods, for which documents are rare, we can now see that in a +generation or two it will be time to stop. Historians will then be +obliged to take refuge more and more in modern periods. Thus history +will not fulfil the dream which, in the nineteenth century, inspired the +romantic school with so much enthusiasm for the study of history: it +will not penetrate the mystery of the origin of societies; and, for want +of documents, the beginnings of the evolution of humanity will always +remain obscure.</p> + +<p>The historian does not collect by his own <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">317</a></span>observation the materials +necessary for history as is done in the other sciences: he works on +facts the knowledge of which has been transmitted by former observers. +In history knowledge is not obtained, as in the other sciences, by +direct methods, it is indirect. History is not, as has been said, a +science of observation, but a science of reasoning.</p> + +<p>In order to use facts which have been observed under unknown conditions, +it is necessary to apply criticism to them, and criticism consists in a +series of reasonings by analogy. The facts as furnished by criticism are +isolated and scattered; in order to organise them into a structure it is +necessary to imagine and group them in accordance with their +resemblances to facts of the present day, an operation which also +depends on the use of analogies. This necessity compels history to use +an exceptional method. In order to frame its arguments from analogy, it +must always combine the knowledge of the particular conditions under +which the facts of the past occurred with an understanding of the +general conditions under which the facts of humanity occur. Its method +is to draw up special <i>tables</i> of the facts of an epoch in the past, and +to apply to them sets of <i>questions</i> founded on the study of the +present.</p> + +<p>The operations which must necessarily be performed in order to pass from +the inspection of documents to the knowledge of the facts and evolutions +of the past are very numerous. Hence the necessity of the division and +organisation of labour in history. It is requisite, on the one hand, +that those specialists who occupy themselves with the search for +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">318</a></span>documents, their restoration and preliminary classification, should +co-ordinate their efforts, in order that the preparatory work of +critical scholarship may be finished as soon as possible, under the best +conditions as to accuracy and economy of labour. On the other hand, +authors of partial syntheses (monographs) designed to serve as materials +for more comprehensive syntheses ought to agree among themselves to work +on a common method, in order that the results of each may be used by the +others without preliminary investigations. Lastly, workers of experience +should be found to renounce personal research and devote their whole +time to the study of these partial syntheses, in order to combine them +scientifically in comprehensive works of historical construction. And if +the result of these labours were to bring out clear and certain +conclusions as to the nature and the causes of social evolution, a truly +scientific "philosophy of history" would have been created, which +historians might acknowledge as legitimately crowning historical +science.</p> + +<p>Conceivably a day may come when, thanks to the organisation of labour, +all existing documents will have been discovered, emended, arranged, and +all the facts established of which the traces have not been destroyed. +When that day comes, history will be established, but it will not be +fixed: it will continue to be gradually modified in proportion as the +direct study of existing societies becomes more scientific and permits a +better understanding of social phenomena and their evolution; for the +new ideas which will doubtless be acquired on the nature, the causes, +and the relative importance of social facts will <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">319</a></span>continue to transform +the ideas which will be formed of the societies and events of the +past.<a name="FNanchor_231_231" id="FNanchor_231_231"></a><a href="#Footnote-231" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 231.">[231]</a></p> + + +<p class="top5">II. It is an obsolete illusion to suppose that history supplies +information of practical utility in the conduct of life (<i>Historia +magistra vitæ</i>), lessons directly profitable to individuals and peoples; +the conditions under which human actions are performed are rarely +sufficiently similar at two different moments for the "lessons of +history" to be directly applicable. But it is an error to say, by way of +reaction, that "the distinguishing feature of history is to be good for +nothing."<a name="FNanchor_232_232" id="FNanchor_232_232"></a><a href="#Footnote-232" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 232.">[232]</a> It has an indirect utility.</p> + +<p>History enables us to understand the present in so far as it explains +the origin of the existing state of things. Here we must admit that +history does not offer an equal interest through the whole extent of +time which it covers; there are remote <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">320</a></span>generations whose traces are no +longer visible in the world as it now is; for the purpose of explaining +the political constitution of contemporary England, for example, the +study of the Anglo-Saxon witangemot is without value, that of the events +of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is all-important. The +evolution of the civilised societies has within the last hundred years +been accelerated to such a degree that, for the understanding of their +present form, the history of these hundred years is more important than +that of the ten preceding centuries. As an explanation of the present, +history would almost reduce to the study of the contemporary period.</p> + +<p>History is also indispensable for the completion of the political and +social sciences, which are still in process of formation; for the direct +observation of social phenomena (in a state of rest) is not a sufficient +foundation for these sciences—there must be added a study of the +development of these phenomena in time, that is, their history.<a name="FNanchor_233_233" id="FNanchor_233_233"></a><a href="#Footnote-233" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 233.">[233]</a> +This is why all the sciences which deal with man (linguistic, law, +science of religions, political economy, and so on) have in this century +assumed the form of historical sciences.</p> + +<p>But the chief merit of history is that of being an instrument of +intellectual culture; it is so in several<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">321</a></span> ways. Firstly, the practice +of the historical method of investigation, of which the principles have +been sketched in the present volume, is very hygienic for the mind, +which it cures of credulity. Secondly, history, by exhibiting to us a +great number of differing societies, prepares us to understand and +tolerate a variety of usages; by showing us that societies have often +been transformed, it familiarises us with variation in social forms, and +cures us of a morbid dread of change. Lastly, the contemplation of past +evolutions, which enables us to understand how the transformations of +humanity are brought about by changes of habits and the renewal of +generations, saves us from the temptation of applying biological +analogies (selection, struggle for existence, inherited habits, and so +on) to the explanation of social evolution, which is not produced by the +operation of the same causes as animal evolution.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">323</a></span><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">322</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">324</a></span></p><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">325</a></span></p> +<h3>APPENDICES</h3> + + + +<h3><a name="APPENDIX_I" id="APPENDIX_I"></a>APPENDIX I</h3> + +<p class="head2">THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE</p> + + +<p>I. The teaching of history is a recent addition to secondary education. +Formerly history was taught to the sons of kings and great persons, in +order to give them a preparation in the art of governing, according to +the ancient tradition, but it was a sacred science reserved for the +future rulers of states, a science for princes, not for subjects. The +secondary schools which have been organised since the sixteenth century, +ecclesiastical or secular, Catholic or Protestant, did not admit history +into their plan of study, or only admitted it as an appendage to the +study of the ancient languages. This was the tradition of the Jesuits in +France; it was adopted by the University of Napoleon.</p> + +<p>History was only introduced into secondary education in the nineteenth +century, under the pressure of public opinion; and although it has been +allotted more space in France than in England, or even in Germany, it +has continued to be a subsidiary subject, not taught in a special class +(as philosophy is), nor always by a special professor, and counting for +very little in examinations.</p> + +<p>Historical instruction has for a long time felt the effects of the +manner in which it was introduced. The subject was imposed by the +authorities on teachers trained exclusively in the study of literature, +and could find no suitable place in a system of classical education +based on the study of forms, and indifferent to the knowledge of social +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">326</a></span>phenomena. History was taught because it was prescribed by the +programme; but this programme, the sole motive and guide of the +instruction, was always an accident, and varied with the preferences, or +even the personal studies of those who framed it. History formed part of +the social conventions; there are, it was said, names and facts "of +which it is not permissible to be ignorant"; but the things of which +ignorance was not permitted varied greatly, from the names of the +Merovingian kings and the battles of the Seven Years' War to the Salic +Law and the work of Saint Vincent de Paul.</p> + +<p>The improvised staffs which, in order to carry out the programme, had to +furnish impromptu instruction in history, had no clear idea either of +the reasons for such instruction, or of its place in general education, +or of the technical methods necessary for giving it. With this lack of +tradition, of pedagogic preparation, and even of mechanical aids, the +professor of history found himself carried back to the ages before +printing, when the teacher had to supply the pupil with all the facts +which formed the subject-matter of instruction, and he adopted the +mediæval procedure. Armed with a note-book in which he had written down +the list of facts to be taught, he read it out to the pupils, sometimes +making a pretence of extemporising; this was the "lesson," the +corner-stone of historical instruction. The whole series of lessons, +determined by the programme, formed the "course." The pupil was expected +to write as he listened (this was called "taking notes") and to compose +a written account of what he had heard (this was the <i>rédaction</i>). But +as the pupils were not taught how to take notes, nearly all of them were +content to write very rapidly, from the professor's dictation, a rough +draft, which they copied out at home in the form of a <i>rédaction</i>, +without any endeavour to grasp the meaning either of what they heard or +what they transcribed. To this mechanical labour the most zealous added +extracts copied from books, generally with just as little reflection.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">327</a></span></p> + +<p>In order to get the facts judged essential into the pupils' heads, the +professor used to make a very short version of the lesson, the "summary" +or "abstract," which he dictated openly, and caused to be learnt by +heart. Thus of the two written exercises which occupied nearly the whole +time of the class, one (the summary) was an overt dictation, the other +(the <i>rédaction</i>) an unavowed dictation.</p> + +<p>The only means adopted to check the pupils' work was to make them repeat +the summary word for word, and to question them on the <i>rédaction</i>, that +is to make them repeat approximately the words of the professor. Of the +two oral exercises one was an overt, the other an unavowed repetition.</p> + +<p>It is true the pupil was given a book, the <i>Précis d'histoire</i>,<a name="FNanchor_234_234" id="FNanchor_234_234"></a><a href="#Footnote-234" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 234.">[234]</a> but +this book had the same form as the professor's course, and instead of +serving as a basis for the oral instruction, merely duplicated it, and, +as a rule, duplicated it badly, for it was not intelligible to the +pupil. The authors of these text-books,<a name="FNanchor_235_235" id="FNanchor_235_235"></a><a href="#Footnote-235" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 235.">[235]</a> adopting the traditional +methods of "abridgments," endeavoured to accumulate the greatest +possible number of facts by omitting all their characteristic details +and summarising them in the most general, and therefore vague, +expressions. In the elementary books nothing was left but a residue of +proper names and dates connected by formulæ of a uniform type; history +appeared as a series of wars, treaties, reforms, revolutions, which only +differed in the names of peoples, sovereigns, fields of battle, and in +the figures giving the years.<a name="FNanchor_236_236" id="FNanchor_236_236"></a><a href="#Footnote-236" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 236.">[236]</a></p> + +<p>Such, down to the end of the Second Empire, was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">328</a></span>historical instruction +in all French institutions, both secular and ecclesiastical—with a few +exceptions, whose merit is measured by their rarity, for in those days a +professor of history needed a more than common share of energy and +initiative to rise above the routine of <i>rédaction</i> and summary.</p> + +<p class="top5">II. In recent times the general movement of educational reform, which +began in the Department and the Faculties, has at last extended to +secondary instruction. The professors of history have been emancipated +from the jealous supervision which weighed on their teaching under the +government of the Empire, and have taken the opportunity to make trial +of new methods. A system of historical pedagogy has been devised. It has +been revealed with the approbation of the Department in the discussions +of the society for the study of questions of secondary education, in the +<i>Revue de l'enseignement secondaire</i>, and in the <i>Revue universitaire</i>. +It has received official sanction in the <i>Instructions</i> appended to the +programme of 1890; the report on history, the work of M. Lavisse, has +become the charter which protects the professors who favour reform in +their struggle against tradition.<a name="FNanchor_237_237" id="FNanchor_237_237"></a><a href="#Footnote-237" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 237.">[237]</a></p> + +<p>Historical instruction will no doubt issue from this crisis of +renovation organised and provided with a rational pedagogic and +technical system, such as is possessed by the older branches of +instruction in languages, literature, and philosophy. But it is only to +be expected that the reform should be much slower than in the case of +the higher instruction. The <i>personnel</i> is much more numerous, and takes +longer to train or to renew; the pupils are less zealous and less +intelligent; the routine of the parents opposes to the new methods a +force of inertia which is unknown to the Faculties; and the +Baccalaureate, that general obstacle to all reform, is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">329</a></span> particularly +mischievous in its effect on historical instruction, which it reduces to +a set of questions and answers.</p> + +<p class="top5">III. It is now possible, however, to indicate what is the direction in +which historical instruction is likely to develop in France<a name="FNanchor_238_238" id="FNanchor_238_238"></a><a href="#Footnote-238" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 238.">[238]</a> and the +questions which will need to be solved for the purpose of introducing a +rational technical system. Here we shall endeavour to formulate these +questions in a methodical table.</p> + +<p>(1) <i>General Organisation.</i>—What object should historical instruction +aim at? What services can it render to the culture of the pupil? What +influence can it have upon his conduct? What facts ought it to enable +him to understand? And, consequently, what principles ought to guide the +choice of subjects and methods? Ought the instruction to be spread over +the whole duration of the classes, or should it be concentrated in a +special class? Should it be given in one-hour or two-hour classes? +Should history be distributed into several cycles, as in Germany, so as +to cause the pupil to return several times to the same subject at +different periods of his studies? Or should it be expounded in a single +continuous course, beginning with the commencement of study, as in +France? Should the professor give a complete course, or should he select +a few questions and leave the pupil to study the others by himself? +Should he expound the facts orally, or should he require the pupils to +learn them in the first instance from a book, so as to make the course a +series of explanations?</p> + +<p>(2) <i>Choice of Subjects.</i>—What proportion should be observed between +home and foreign history? between ancient and contemporary history? +between the special branches of history (art, religion, customs, +economics) and general <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">330</a></span>history? between institutions or usages, and +events? between the evolution of material usages, intellectual history, +social life, political life? between the study of particular incidents, +of biography, of dramatic episodes, and the study of the interconnection +of events and general evolutions? What place should be assigned to +proper names and dates? Should we profit by the opportunities afforded +by legends to arouse the critical spirit? or should we avoid legends?</p> + +<p>(3) <i>Order.</i>—In what order should the subjects be attacked? Should +instruction begin with the most ancient periods and the countries with +the most ancient civilisations in order to follow chronological order +and the order of evolution? or should it begin with the periods and the +countries which are nearest to us so as to proceed from the better known +to the less known? In the exposition of each period, should the +chronological, geographical, or logical order be followed? Should the +teacher begin by describing conditions or by narrating events?</p> + +<p>(4) <i>Methods of Instruction.</i>—Should the pupil be given general formulæ +first or particular images? Should the professor state the formulæ +himself or require the pupil to search for them? Should formulæ be +learnt by heart? In what cases? How are images of historical facts to be +produced in the pupils' minds? What use is to be made of engravings? of +reproductions and restorations? of imaginary scenes? What use is to be +made of narratives and descriptions? of authors' texts? of historical +novels? To what extent ought words and formulæ to be quoted? How are +facts to be localised? What use is to be made of chronological tables? +of synchronical tables? of geographical sketches? of statistical and +graphic tables? What is the way to make comprehensible the character of +events and customs? the motives of actions? the conditions of customs? +How are the episodes of an event to be chosen? and the examples of a +custom? How is the interconnection of facts and the process of evolution +to be made intelligible? What use is to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">331</a></span> be made of comparison? What +style of language is to be employed? To what extent should concrete, +abstract, and technical terms be used? How is it to be verified that the +pupil has understood the terms and assimilated the facts? Can exercises +be organised in which the pupil may do original work on the facts? What +instruments of study should the pupil have? How should school-books be +compiled, with a view to giving the pupil practice in original work?</p> + +<p>For the purpose of stating and justifying the solutions of all these +problems, a special treatise would not be too much.<a name="FNanchor_239_239" id="FNanchor_239_239"></a><a href="#Footnote-239" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 239.">[239]</a> Here we shall +merely indicate the general principles on which a tolerable agreement +seems to have been now reached in France.</p> + +<p>We no longer go to history for lessons in morals, nor for good examples +of conduct, nor yet for dramatic or picturesque scenes. We understand +that for all these purposes legend would be preferable to history, for +it presents a chain of causes and effects more in accordance with our +ideas of justice, more perfect and heroic characters, finer and more +affecting scenes. Nor do we seek to use history, as is done in Germany, +for the purpose of promoting patriotism and loyalty; we feel that it +would be illogical for different persons to draw opposite conclusions +from the same science according to their country or party; it would be +an invitation to every people to mutilate, if not to alter, history in +the direction of its preferences. We understand that the value of every +science consists in its being true, and we ask from history truth and +nothing more.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">332</a></span><a name="FNanchor_240_240" id="FNanchor_240_240"></a><a href="#Footnote-240" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 240.">[240]</a></p> + +<p>The function of history in education is perhaps not yet clearly apparent +to all those who teach it. But all those who reflect are agreed to +regard it as being principally an instrument of social culture. The +study of the societies of the past causes the pupil to understand, by +the help of actual instances, what a society is; it familiarises him +with the principal social phenomena and the different species of usages, +their variety and their resemblances. The study of events and evolutions +familiarises him with the idea of the continual transformation which +human affairs undergo, it secures him against an unreasoning dread of +social changes; it rectifies his notion of progress. All these +acquisitions render the pupil fitter for public life; history thus +appears as an indispensable branch of instruction in a democratic +society.</p> + +<p>The guiding principle of historical pedagogy will therefore be to seek +for those subjects and those methods which are best calculated to +exhibit social phenomena and give an understanding of their evolution. +Before admitting a fact into the plan of instruction, it should be asked +first of all what educational influence it can exercise; secondly, +whether there are adequate means of bringing the pupil to see and +understand it. Every fact should be discarded which is instructive only +in a low degree, or which is too complicated to be understood, or in +regard to which we do not possess details enough to make it +intelligible.</p> + +<p class="top5">IV. To make rational instruction a reality it is not enough to develop a +theory of historical pedagogy. It is necessary to renew the material +aids and the methods.</p> + +<p>History necessarily involves the knowledge of a great number of facts. +The professor of history, with no resources but his voice, a blackboard, +and abridgments which are little better than chronological tables, is in +much the same situation as a professor of Latin without texts or +dictionary. The pupil in history needs a repertory of historical facts +as the Latin pupil needs a repertory of Latin words; he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">333</a></span> needs +collections of <i>facts</i>, and the school text-books are mostly collections +of <i>words</i>.</p> + +<p>There are two vehicles of facts, engravings and books. Engravings +exhibit material objects and external aspects, they are useful +principally for the study of material civilisation. It is some time +since the attempt was first made in Germany to put in the hands of the +pupil a collection of engravings arranged for the purposes of historical +instruction. The same need has, in France, produced the <i>Album +historique</i>, which is published under the direction of M. Lavisse.</p> + +<p>The book is the chief instrument. It ought to contain all the +characteristic features necessary for forming mental representations of +the events, the motives, the habits, the institutions studied; it will +consist principally in narratives and descriptions, to which +characteristic sayings and formulæ may be appended. For a long time it +was endeavoured to construct those books out of extracts selected from +ancient authors; they were compiled in the form of collections of +texts.<a name="FNanchor_241_241" id="FNanchor_241_241"></a><a href="#Footnote-241" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 241.">[241]</a> Experience seems to indicate that this method must be +abandoned; it has a scientific appearance, it is true, but is not +intelligible to children. It is better to address pupils in contemporary +language. It is in this spirit that, pursuant to the <i>Instructions</i> of +1890,<a name="FNanchor_242_242" id="FNanchor_242_242"></a><a href="#Footnote-242" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 242.">[242]</a> collections of <i>Historical Readings</i> have been compiled, of +which the most important has been published by the firm of Hachette.</p> + +<p>The pupils' methods of work still bear witness to the late introduction +of historical teaching. In most historical classes methods still prevail +which only exercise the pupils' receptivity: the course of lectures, the +summary, reading, questioning, the <i>rédaction</i>, the reproduction of +maps. It is as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">334</a></span> if a Latin pupil were to confine himself to repeating +grammar-lessons and extracts from authors, without ever doing +translation or composition.</p> + +<p>In order that the teaching may make an adequate impression, it is +necessary, if not to discard all these passive methods, at least to +supplement them by exercises which call out the activity of the pupil. +Some such exercises have already been experimented with, and others +might be devised.<a name="FNanchor_243_243" id="FNanchor_243_243"></a><a href="#Footnote-243" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 243.">[243]</a> The pupil may be set to analyse engravings, +narratives, and descriptions in such a way as to bring out the character +of the facts: the short written or oral analysis will guarantee that he +has seen and understood, it will be an opportunity to inculcate the +habit of using only precise terms. Or the pupil may be asked to furnish +a drawing, a geographical sketch, a synchronical table. He may be +required to draw up tables of comparison between different societies, +and tables showing the interconnection of facts.</p> + +<p>A book is needed to supply the pupil with the materials for these +exercises. Thus the reform of methods is connected with the reform of +the instruments of work. Both reforms will progress according as the +professors and the public perceive more clearly the part played by +historical instruction in social education.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">335</a></span></p> + + + +<h3><a name="APPENDIX_II" id="APPENDIX_II"></a>APPENDIX II</h3> + +<p class="head2">THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE</p> + + +<p>The higher teaching of history has been in a great measure transformed, +in our country, within the last thirty years. The process has been +gradual, as it ought to have been, and has consisted in a succession of +slight modifications. But although a rational continuity has been +observed in the steps taken, the great number of these steps has not +failed, in these last days, to astonish, and even to offend, the public. +Public opinion, to which appeal has been made in favour of reforms, has +been somewhat surprised by being appealed to so often, and perhaps it is +not superfluous to indicate here, once more, the general significance +and the inner logic of the movement which we are witnessing.</p> + +<p class="top5">I. Before the last years of the Second Empire, the higher teaching of +the historical sciences was organised in France on no coherent +system.<a name="FNanchor_244_244" id="FNanchor_244_244"></a><a href="#Footnote-244" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 244.">[244]</a></p> + +<p>There were chairs of history in different institutions, of different +types: at the Collège de France, in the Faculties of Letters, and in the +"special schools," such as the École normale supérieure and the École +des chartes.</p> + +<p>The Collège de France was a relic of the institutions of the <i>ancien +régime</i>. It was founded in the sixteenth century<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">336</a></span> in opposition to the +scholastic Sorbonne, to be a refuge for the new sciences, and had the +glorious privilege of representing historically the higher speculative +studies, the spirit of free inquiry, and the interests of pure science. +Unfortunately, in the domain of the historical sciences, the Collège de +France had allowed its traditions to be obliterated up to a certain +point. The great men who taught history in this illustrious institution +(J. Michelet, for example), were not technical experts, nor even men of +learning, in the proper sense of the word. The audiences which they +swayed by their eloquence were not composed of students of history.</p> + +<p>The Faculties of Letters formed part of a system established by the +Napoleonic legislator. This legislator, in creating the Faculties, by no +means entertained the design of encouraging scientific research. He had +no great love for science. The Faculties of Law, of Medicine, and so on, +were intended by him to be professional schools supplying society with +the lawyers, physicians, and so on, which it needs. But three of the +five Faculties were unable, from the beginning, to perform the part +allotted them, while the other two, Law and Medicine, successfully +performed theirs. The Faculties of Catholic Theology did not train the +priests needed by society, because the State consented to the education +of the priests being conducted in the diocesan seminaries. The Faculties +of Sciences and of Letters did not train the professors for secondary +education, the engineers, and so on, needed by society, because they +were here met by the triumphant competition of "special schools" +previously instituted: the École normale, the École polytechnique. The +Faculties of Catholic Theology, of Sciences, and of Letters were +therefore obliged to justify their existence by other modes of activity. +In particular, the professors of history in the Faculties of Letters +could not undertake the instruction of the young men who were destined +to teach history in the <i>lycées</i>. Deprived of these special pupils, they +found themselves in a situation analogous to that of those<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">337</a></span> charged with +historical instruction at the Collège de France. They too were not, as a +rule, technical experts. For half a century they carried on the work of +higher popularisation in lectures delivered to large audiences of +leisured persons (since much abused), who were attracted by the force, +the elegance, and the pleasing style of their diction.</p> + +<p>The function of training the future teachers for secondary education was +reserved for the École normale supérieure. Now at this epoch it was an +admitted principle that to be a good secondary teacher it is necessary +for a man to know, and sufficient to know perfectly, the subject he is +charged to teach. The one is certainly necessary, but the other is not +sufficient: knowledge of a different, of a higher, order is no less +indispensable than the regular "scholastic" equipment. At the École +there was never any question of such higher knowledge, but, in +accordance with the prevailing theory, preparation was made for +secondary teaching simply by imparting it. However, as the École normale +has always been excellently recruited, the system in vogue has not +prevented it from numbering among its former pupils men of the first +order, not only as professors, thinkers, or writers, but even as +critical scholars. But it must be recognised that they made their way +for themselves, in spite of the system, not thanks to it, after, not +during, their pupilage, and principally when they had the advantage, +during a stay at the French School at Athens, of the wholesome contact +with documents which they had not enjoyed at the Rue d'Ulm. "Does it not +seem strange," it has been said, "that so many generations of professors +should have been turned out by the École normale incapable of utilising +documents?... Formerly, in short, students of history, on leaving the +École, were not prepared either to teach history, which they had learned +in a great hurry, or to investigate difficult questions."<a name="FNanchor_245_245" id="FNanchor_245_245"></a><a href="#Footnote-245" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 245.">[245]</a></p> + +<p>As for the École des chartes, which was founded under<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">338</a></span> the Restoration, +it was, from a certain point of view, a special school like the others, +designed in theory to train those useful functionaries, archivists and +librarians. But professional instruction was early reduced to a strict +minimum, and the École des chartes was organised on a very original +plan, with a view to provide a rational and complete apprenticeship for +the young men who proposed to study mediæval French history. The pupils +of the École des chartes did not follow any course of "mediæval +history," but they learnt all that is necessary for doing work on the +solution of the still open questions of mediæval history. Here alone, in +virtue of an accidental anomaly, the subjects which are preliminary and +auxiliary to historical research were systematically taught. We have +already had occasion to note the effects of this circumstance.<a name="FNanchor_246_246" id="FNanchor_246_246"></a><a href="#Footnote-246" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 246.">[246]</a></p> + +<p>This was the state of affairs when, towards the end of the Second +Empire, a vigorous reform movement set in. Some young Frenchmen had +visited Germany; they had been struck by the superiority of the German +university system over the Napoleonic system of Faculties and special +schools. Certainly France, with its defective organisation, had produced +many men and many works, but it now began to be held that "in all kinds +of enterprises the least possible part should be left to chance," and +that "when an institution proposes to train professors of history and +historians, it ought to supply them with the means of becoming what it +intends them to be."</p> + +<p>M. V. Duruy, minister of Public Education, supported the partisans of a +renaissance of the higher studies. But he did not think it practicable +to interfere, for the purpose either of remodelling, of fusing, or of +suppressing them, with the existing institutions,—the Collège de +France, the Faculties of Letters, the École normale supérieure, the +École des chartes, all of which were consecrated by the services they +had rendered, and by the lustre they received from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">339</a></span> eminent men who +had been, or were, connected with them. He changed nothing, he added. He +crowned the somewhat heterogeneous edifice of existing institutions by +the creation of an "École pratique des hautes études," which was +established at the Sorbonne in 1868.</p> + +<p>The École pratique des hautes études (historical and philological +section) was intended by those who founded it to prepare young men for +research of a scientific character. It was not meant to be subservient +to the interests of the professions, and there was to be no +popularisation. Students were not to go there to learn the results +obtained by science, but, for the same purpose which takes the chemical +student to the laboratory, to be initiated into the technical methods by +which new results can be obtained. Thus the spirit of the new +institution was not without some analogy to that of the primitive +tradition of the Collège de France. It was endeavoured to do there, for +all the branches of universal history and philology, what had long been +done at the École des chartes for the limited domain of French mediæval +history.</p> + +<p class="top5">II. As long as the Faculties of Letters were satisfied to be as they +were (that is, without students), and as long as their ambition did not +go beyond their traditional functions (the holding of public lectures, +the conferring of degrees), the organisation of the higher teaching of +the historical sciences in France remained in the condition which we +have described. When the Faculties of Letters began to seek a new +justification for their existence and new functions, changes became +inevitable.</p> + +<p>This is not the place to explain why and how the Faculties of Letters +were led to desire to work more actively, or rather in other ways than +in the past, for the promotion of the historical sciences. M. V. Duruy, +in inaugurating the École des hautes études at the Sorbonne, had +declared that this young and vigorous plant would thrust asunder the old +stones; and, without a doubt, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">340</a></span> spectacle of the fruitful activity of +the École des hautes études has contributed not a little to awaken the +conscience of the Faculties. On the other hand the liberality of the +public authorities, which have increased the <i>personnel</i> of the +Faculties, which have built palaces for them, and liberally endowed them +with the materials required by their work, has imposed new duties on +these privileged institutions.</p> + +<p>It is about twenty-five years since the Faculties of Letters began to +transform themselves, and during this period their progressive +transformation has occasioned changes in the whole fabric of the higher +teaching of historical science in France, which up to that time had +remained unshaken, even by the ingenious addition of 1868.</p> + +<p class="top5">III. The first care of the Faculties was to provide themselves with +students. This was not, to be sure, the main difficulty, for the École +normale supérieurs (in which twenty pupils are admitted every year, +chosen from among hundreds of candidates) was no longer sufficient for +the recruiting of the now numerous body of professors engaged in +secondary education. Many young men who had been candidates (along with +the pupils of the École normale supérieure) for the degrees which give +access to the scholastic profession, were thrown on their own resources. +Here was an assured supply of students. At the same time the military +laws, by attaching much-prized immunities to the title of <i>licencié ès +lettres</i>, were calculated to attract to the Faculties, if they prepared +students for the licentiate, a large and very interesting class of young +men. Lastly, the foreigners (so numerous at the École des hautes +études), who come to France to complete their scientific education, and +who up to that time were surprised to have no opportunity of profiting +by the Faculties, were sure to go to them as soon as they found there +something analogous to what they had been accustomed to find in the +German universities, and the kind of instruction they wanted.</p> + +<p>Before students in any great number could be taught the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">341</a></span> way to the +Faculties, great efforts were necessary and several years passed; but it +was after the Faculties obtained the students they desired that the real +problems presented themselves for solution.</p> + +<p>The great majority of the students in the Faculties of Letters have been +originally candidates for degrees, for the licentiate, and for +<i>agrégation</i>, who entered with the avowed intention of "preparing" for +the licentiate and for <i>agrégation</i>. The Faculties have not been able to +escape the obligation of helping them in this "preparation." But, twenty +years ago, examinations were still conceived in accordance with ancient +formulæ. The licentiate was an attestation of advanced secondary study, +a kind of "higher baccalaureate"; for the <i>agrégation</i> in the classes of +history and geography (which became the real <i>licentia docendi</i>), the +candidates were required to show that they "had a very good knowledge of +the subjects they would be charged to teach." Henceforth there was a +danger lest the teaching of the Faculties, which must, like that of the +École normale supérieure, be preparatory for the examinations for the +licentiate and for <i>agrégation</i>, should be compelled by the force of +circumstances to assume the same character. Note that a certain +emulation could not fail to arise between the pupils of the École +normale and those of the Faculties in the competitions for <i>agrégation</i>. +The <i>agrégation</i> programmes being what they were, this emulation seemed +likely to have the result of engaging the rival teachers and students +more and more in school work, not of a scientific kind, equally devoid +of dignity and real utility.</p> + +<p>The danger was very serious. It was perceived from the first by those +clear-sighted promoters of the reform of the Faculties, MM. A. Dumont, +L. Liard, E. Lavisse. M. Lavisse wrote in 1884: "To maintain that the +Faculties have for their chief object the preparation for examinations +is to substitute drill for scientific culture: this is the serious +grievance which able men have against the partisans of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">342</a></span> innovation.... +The partisans of innovation reply that they have seen the drawbacks of +the new departure from the beginning, but that they are convinced that a +modification of the examination-system will follow the reform of higher +education; that a reconciliation will be found between scientific work +and the preparation for examinations; and that thus the only grievance +their opponents have against them will fall to the ground." It is only +doing justice to the foremost champion of reform to acknowledge that he +was never tired of insisting on the weak point; and in order to convince +oneself that the <i>examination question</i> has always been considered the +key-stone of the problem of the organisation of higher education in +France, it is only necessary to look through the speeches and the +articles entitled "Education and Examinations," "Examinations and +Study," "Study and Examinations," &c., which M. Lavisse has collected in +his three volumes published at intervals of five years from 1885 +onwards: <i>Questions d'enseignement national, Études et étudiants, A +propos de nos écoles.</i></p> + +<p>Thus the question of the reform of the examinations connected with +higher education (licentiate, <i>agrégation</i>, doctorate) has been placed +on the order of the day. It was then in 1884; it is still there in 1897. +But, during the interval, visible progress has been made in the +direction which we consider the right one, and now a solution seems +near.</p> + +<p class="top5">IV. The old examination-system required candidates for degrees to show +that they had received an excellent secondary education. As it condemned +those candidates, students receiving higher instruction, to exercises of +the same kind as those of which they had already had their fill in the +<i>lycées</i>, it was a simple matter to attack it. It was defended feebly, +and has been demolished.</p> + +<p>But how was it to be replaced? The problem was very complex. Is it any +wonder that it was not solved at a stroke?</p> + +<p>First of all, it was important to come to an agreement on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">343</a></span> this +preliminary question: What are the capacities and what is the knowledge +students should be required to give proof of possessing? General +knowledge? Technical knowledge and the capacity of doing original +research (as at the École des chartes and the École des hautes études)? +Pedagogic capacity? It came gradually to be recognised that, considering +the great extent and variety of the class from which the students are +drawn, it is necessary to draw distinctions.</p> + +<p>From candidates for the licentiate it is enough to require that they +should give proof of good general culture, permitting them at the same +time, if they wish, to show that they have a taste for, and some +experience in, original research.</p> + +<p>From the candidates for <i>agrégation</i> (<i>licentia docendi</i>) who have +already obtained the licentiate, there will be required (1) formal proof +that they know, by experience, what it is to study an historical +problem, and that they have the technical knowledge necessary for such +studies; (2) proof of pedagogic capacity, which is a professional +necessity for this class.</p> + +<p>The students who are not candidates for anything, neither for the +licentiate nor for <i>agrégation</i>, and who are simply seeking to obtain +scientific initiation—the old programmes did not contemplate the +existence of such a class of students—will merely be required to prove +that they have profited by the tuition and the advice they have +received.</p> + +<p>This settled, a great stride has been made. For programmes, as we know, +regulate study. By virtue of the authority of the programmes historical +studies in the Faculties will now have the threefold character which it +is desirable that they should have. General culture will not cease to be +held in honour. Technical exercises in criticism and research will have +their legitimate place. Lastly, pedagogy (theoretical and practical) +will not be neglected.</p> + +<p>The difficulties begin when it is attempted to determine<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">344</a></span> the tests +which, in each department, are the best, that is, the most conclusive. +On this subject opinions differ. Though no one now contests the +principles, the modes of application which have hitherto been tried or +suggested do not meet with unanimous approval. The organisation of the +licentiate has been revised three times; the statute relating to the +<i>agrégation</i> in history has been reformed or amended five times. And +this is not the end. New simplifications are imperative. But what is the +importance of this instability—of which, however, complaints begin to +be heard<a name="FNanchor_247_247" id="FNanchor_247_247"></a><a href="#Footnote-247" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 247.">[247]</a>—if it is established, as we believe it is, that progress +towards a better state of things has been continuous through all these +changes, without any notable retrogression?</p> + +<p>There is no need to explain here in detail the different transitory +systems which have been put into practice. We have had occasion to +criticise them elsewhere.<a name="FNanchor_248_248" id="FNanchor_248_248"></a><a href="#Footnote-248" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 248.">[248]</a> Now that most of what we objected to has +been abolished, what is the use of reviving old controversies? We shall +not even mention the points in which the present system seems to us to +be still capable of improvement, for there is reason to hope that it +will soon be modified, and in a very satisfactory manner. Let it suffice +to say that the Faculties now confer a new diploma, the <i>Diplôme +d'études supérieures</i>, which all the students have a right to seek, but +which the candidates for <i>agrégation</i> are obliged to obtain. This +diploma of higher studies, analogous to that of the École des hautes +études, the <i>brevet</i> of the École des chartes, and the doctorate in +philosophy at the German universities, is given to those students of +history who, qualified by a certain academical standing, have passed an +examination in which the principal tests are, besides questions on the +"sciences" auxiliary to historical research, the composition and the +defence of an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">345</a></span> original monograph. Every one now recognises that "the +examination for the diploma of studies will yield excellent fruit, if +the vigilance and conscientiousness of examiners maintain it at its +proper value."<a name="FNanchor_249_249" id="FNanchor_249_249"></a><a href="#Footnote-249" class="fnanchor" title="Go to footnote 249.">[249]</a></p> + +<p class="top5">V. To sum up, the attractions of preparation for degrees have brought +the Faculties a host of students. But, under the old system of +examinations for the licentiate and for <i>agrégation</i>, preparation for +degrees was a task which did not harmonise very well with the work which +the Faculties deemed suitable for themselves, useful to their pupils, +and advantageous to science. The examination-system has therefore been +perseveringly reformed, not without difficulty, into conformity with a +certain ideal of what the higher teaching of history ought to be. The +result is that the Faculties have taken rank among the institutions +which contribute to the positive progress of the historical sciences. An +enumeration of the works which have appeared under their auspices during +the last few years would, if necessary, bear witness to the fact.</p> + +<p>This evolution has already produced satisfactory results, and will +produce more if it goes on as well as it has begun. To begin with, the +transformation of historical instruction in the Faculties has brought +about a corresponding transformation at the École normale supérieure. +The École normale has also, for two years, been awarding a "<i>Diplôme +d'études</i>"; original researches, pedagogic exercises, and general +culture are encouraged there in the same degree as by the new Faculties. +It now differs from the Faculties only in being a close institution, +recruited under certain precautions; practically it is a Faculty like +the others, but with a small number of select students. Secondly, the +École des hautes études and the École des chartes, both of which will be +installed at the end of 1897, in the renovated<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">346</a></span> Sorbonne, have still +their justification for existence; for many specialists are represented +at the École des hautes études which are not, and doubtless never will +be, represented in the Faculties; and, in the case of the studies +bearing on mediæval history, the body of converging instruction given at +the École des chartes will always be incomparable. But the old +antagonism between the École des hautes études and the École des chartes +on the one hand, and the Faculties on the other, has disappeared. All +these institutions, lately so dissimilar, will henceforth co-operate for +the purpose of carrying on a common work in a common spirit. Each of +these retains its name, its autonomy, and its traditions; but together +they form a whole: the historical section of an ideal University of +Paris, much vaster than the one which was sanctioned by the law in 1896. +Of this "greater" University, the École des chartes, the École des +hautes études, the École normale supérieure, and the whole body of +historical instruction given by the Faculty of Letters, are now +practically so many independent "<i>instituts</i>."</p> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">347</a></span></p> + +<h3><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX"></a>INDEX OF PROPER NAMES</h3> + +<ul> +<li>Abd-el-Kader, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> +<li>Aimo, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> +<li>Alexander the Great, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> +<li>Alphonse of Poitiers, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> +<li>Altamira, R., <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> +<li>Anselme, Père, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> +<li>Ariovistus, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> +<li>Aristophanes, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> +<li>Aristotle, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Athenæus, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Bacon, Francis, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> +<li>Bancroft, H. H., <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> +<li>Barthélemy, Abbé, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> +<li>Bast, F. J., <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li>Bédier, J., <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> +<li>Bernheim, E., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> +<li>Blanchère, R., de la, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> +<li>Blass, F., <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> +<li>Bodin, Jean, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Boeckh, A., <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> +<li>Böhmer, J. F., <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> +<li>Bollandists, Society of, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> +<li>Bonaventura, St., <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> +<li>Bouché-Leclercq, A., <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> +<li>Boucherie, A., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> +<li>Bourdeau, L., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> +<li>Boutaric, E., <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> +<li>Boyce, W. B., <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> +<li>Bréquigny, L. G. O. F. de, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> +<li>Broglie, E. de, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> +<li>Brugière de Barante, A. G. P., <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> +<li>Brunetière, F., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> +<li>Buchez, P. J. B., <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> +<li>Bühler, G., <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Cæsar, Julius, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> +<li>Cagnat, R., <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> +<li>Cantù, C., <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> +<li>Carlyle, Thomas, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> +<li>Champollion, F., <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> +<li>Charles IX. of France, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> +<li>Chasles, M., <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> +<li>Chateaubriand, F. A. de, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> +<li>Chemosh, the god, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> +<li>Chérot, H., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> +<li>Chevalier, U., <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> +<li>Chladenius, J. M., <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> +<li>Cicero, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> +<li>Cleopatra, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> +<li>Clovis, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> +<li>Cobet, C. C., <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li>Coulanges, Fustel de, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> +<li>Cournot, A. A., <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> +<li>Cousin, V., <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> +<li>Curtius, G., <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Daniel, Père, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> +<li>Daremberg, C. V., <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> +<li>Darius Hystaspes, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> +<li>Daunou, P. C. F., <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> +<li>Delisle, L., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> +<li>Deloche, J. E. M., <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> +<li>Demosthenes, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> +<li>Dezobry, C. L., <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> +<li>Droysen, J. G., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> +<li>Du Cange, C. du F., <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> +<li>Dumont, A., <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li> +<li>Duruy, V., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Ebers, G., <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> +<li>Edward VI. of England, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> +<li>Egger, E., <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> +<li>Eginhard, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> +<li>Ephorus, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> +<li>Eusebius, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Feillet, A., <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> +<li>Feugère, L., <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li>Fisher, H. A. L., <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li> +<li>Flaubert, G., <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> +<li>Flint, R., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> +<li>France, A., <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> +<li>Fredegonda, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> +<li>Freeman, E. A., <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> +<li>Froissart, Jean, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> +<li>Froude, J. A., <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Geiger, W., <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> +<li>Gellius, Aulus, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> +<li>Georgisch, P., <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> +<li>Giannone, Pietro, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> +<li>Gibbon, E., <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Gilbert, Gustav, <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> +<li>Giry, A., <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> +<li>Glasson, E., <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> +<li>Goethe, J. W. von, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> +<li>Gow, J., <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> +<li>Graux, C., <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> +<li>Gregory of Corinth, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li>Gregory of Tours, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> +<li>Gröber, G., <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> +<li>Grote, G., <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> +<li>Grotius, Hugo, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Guicciardini, Francesco, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Guiraud, P., <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Hagen, H., <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li>Hardouin, Père, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> +<li>Harnack, A., <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> +<li>Havet, Julien, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> +<li>Havet, Louis, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> +<li>Hauréau, B., <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> +<li>Hegel, G. W. F., <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> +<li>Henry VIII. of England, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> +<li>Henry II. of France, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> +<li>Henry, V., <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> +<li>Herodotus, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> +<li>Horace, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> +<li>Hoveden, John, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> +<li>Hroswitha, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> +<li>Hugo, Victor, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> +<li>Hume, D., <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Jaffé, P., <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> +<li>Jameson, J. F., <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li>Jerome, St., <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> +<li>Jesus Christ, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> +<li>Joan of Arc, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> +<li>John, King of England, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> +<li>Jullian, C., <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Krumbacher, K., <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> +<li>Kuhn, E., <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Lacombe, T., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> +<li>Lamprecht, K., <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> +<li>Langlois, Ch. V., <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></li> +<li>Lasch, B., <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> +<li>Laurent, F., <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> +<li>Lavisse, E., <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> +<li>Lavoisier, A. L., <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> +<li>Leibnitz, G. W., <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> +<li>Lee, Sidney, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> +<li>Le Moyne, Père, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> +<li>Lenglet de Fresnoy, N., <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> +<li>Leonardo da Vinci, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> +<li>Liard, L., <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li> +<li>Lindner, T., <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> +<li>Lindsay, W. M., <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> +<li>Livy, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> +<li>Locke, John, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Loebell, J. W., <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> +<li>Lorenz, O., <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> +<li>Loudun, the nuns of, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> +<li>Louis VIII. of France, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> +<li>Louis of Granada, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> +<li>Luard, H. R., <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> +<li>Luther, Martin, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Mably, G. B. De, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Macaulay, Lord, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> +<li>Macchiavelli, N., <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Madvig, J. N., <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li>Mariani, L., <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> +<li>Marquardt, J., <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> +<li>Marselli, N., <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> +<li>Mary Magdalene, St., <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> +<li>Mary, Queen, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> +<li>Matthew of Paris, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> +<li>Matthew of Westminster, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> +<li>Mayr, J. von, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> +<li>Mérimée, P., <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> +<li>Mesha Inscription, the, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> +<li>Meusel, H., <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> +<li>Meyer, E., <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> +<li>Meyer, P., <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> +<li>Mézeray, F. E. de, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> +<li>Michelet, J., <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li> +<li>Möller, W., <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> +<li>Mommsen, T., <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> +<li>Monod, G., <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> +<li>Montesquieu, C. de S., <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> +<li>Montfaucon, Père Bernard de, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> +<li>Montgomery, Gabriel de, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> +<li>Mortet, Ch. and V., <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> +<li>Mourin, E., <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> +<li>Müller, I. von, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> +<li>Mylaeus, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Napoleon I., <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> +<li>Newton, Isaac, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> +<li>Niebuhr, B. G., <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> +<li>Nietzsche, F., <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> +<li>Nitzsch, C. W., <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Oncken, W., <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> +<li>Orosius, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> +<li>Ossian, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> +<li>Otto I., <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Paris, G., <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> +<li>Patrizzi, Francesco, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> +<li>Pattison, Mark, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> +<li>Paul, H., <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> +<li>Pauly, A., <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> +<li>Pausanias, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> +<li>Peckham, John, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> +<li>Peiresc, N. F. C. de, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> +<li>Pflugk-Harttung, J. von, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> +<li>Philippi, A., <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> +<li>Piaget, A., <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> +<li>Pisistratus, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> +<li>Plato, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> +<li>Plutarch, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> +<li>Polybius, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> +<li>Potthast, A., <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> +<li>Prou, M., <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Ranke, L., <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> +<li>Raynal, J., <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Reinach, S., <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> +<li>Renan, E., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li> +<li>Retz, Cardinal de, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> +<li>Rilliet, A., <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> +<li>Robertson, J. M., <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> +<li>Robertson, W., <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Rocholl, R., <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> +<li>Rousseau, J. J., <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Rulhière, C. C. de, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Saglio, E., <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> +<li>Saint-Simon, C. H. de, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> +<li>Sallust, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Sanchoniathon, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> +<li>Schiller, J. C. F. von, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> +<li>Schlosser, F. C., <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> +<li>Schœmann, G. F., <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> +<li>Séguier, J. F., <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> +<li>Seignobos, Ch., <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> +<li>Seneca, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li>Sforza, Ludovico, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> +<li>Sickel, T. von, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> +<li>Simmel, G., <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> +<li>Smedt, Père de, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> +<li>Spencer, Herbert, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> +<li>Stephen, Leslie, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> +<li>Stubbe, W., <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> +<li>Suetonius, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> +<li>Suger, Abbot, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> +<li>Suidas, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> +<li>Sully, M., <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> +<li>Surville, Clotilde de, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Tacitus, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> +<li>Taine, H. A., <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> +<li>Tardif, A., <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> +<li>Taylor, J., <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> +<li>Thierry, Augustin, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> +<li>Thomas, A., <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> +<li>Thucydides, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> +<li>Tobler, A., <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> +<li>Tschudi, J. H., <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> +<li>Turenne, H. de la T. d'A., <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Vercingetorix, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> +<li>Vergil, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> +<li>Vertot, R. A. de, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> +<li>Villemarqué, H. de, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> +<li>Vincent de Paul, St. <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li> +<li>Voltaire, F. M. A. de, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> +<li>Vrain-Lucas, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Waitz, G., <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li> +<li>Wallace, A. R., <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> +<li>Waltzing, J. P., <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> +<li>Wattenbach, W., <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> +<li>Wauters, A. C., <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> +<li>Weber, G., <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> +<li>Wegele, F. X. von, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> +<li>Wendover, Roger de, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> +<li>Wissowa, G., <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> +<li>Wittekind, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> +<li>Wright, T., <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Xenophon, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> + +<li class="alpha">Zumpt, A. W., <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> +</ul> + + + +<div class="footnotes"><h3><a name="NOTES" id="NOTES"></a>FOOTNOTES:</h3> +<ol> +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-1" id="Footnote-1"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> W. B. Boyce, "Introduction to the Study of History, Civil, +Ecclesiastical, and Literary," London, 1894, 8vo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-2" id="Footnote-2"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For example, P. J. B. Buches, in his <i>Introduction à la +science de l'histoire</i>, Paris, 1842, 2 vols. 8vo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-3" id="Footnote-3"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The history of the attempts which have been made to +understand and explain philosophically the history of humanity has been +undertaken, as is well known, by Robert Flint. Mr. Flint has already +given the history of the Philosophy of History in French-speaking +countries: "Historical Philosophy in France and French Belgium and +Switzerland," Edinburgh and London, 1893, 8vo. It is the first volume of +the expanded re-edition of his "History of the Philosophy of History in +Europe," published twenty-five years ago. Compare the retrospective (or +historical) part of the work of N. Marselli, <i>La scienza della storia</i>, +i., Torino, 1873. +</p><p> +The most important original work which has appeared in France since the +publication of the analytical repertory of R. Flint is that of P. +Lacombe, <i>De l'histoire considérée comme science</i>, Paris, 1894, 8vo. Cf. +<i>Revue Critique</i>, 1895, i. p. 132.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-4" id="Footnote-4"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Revue Critique d'histoire et de littérature</i>, 1892, i. p. +164.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-5" id="Footnote-5"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Revue Critique d'histoire et de littérature</i>, 1888, ii. p. +295. Cf. <i>Le Moyen Age</i>, x. (1897), p. 91: "These books [treatises on +historical method] are seldom read by those to whom they might be +useful, amateurs who devote their leisure to historical research; and as +to professed scholars, it is from their masters' lessons that they have +learnt to know and handle the tools of their trade, leaving out of +consideration the fact that the method of history is the same as that of +the other sciences of observation, the gist of which can be stated in a +few words.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-6" id="Footnote-6"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> In accordance with the principle that historical method can +only be taught by example, L. Mariani has given the humorous title +<i>Corso pratico di metodologia della storia</i> to a dissertation on a +detail in the history of Fermo. See the <i>Archivio della Società romana +di storia patria</i>, xiii. (1890), p. 211.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-7" id="Footnote-7"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> See an account of Freeman's work, "The Methods of +Historical Study," in the <i>Revue Critique</i>, 1887, i. p. 376. This work, +says the critic, is empty and commonplace. We learn from it "that +history is not so easy a study as many fondly imagine, that it has +points of contact with all the sciences, and that the historian truly +worthy of the name ought to know everything; that historical certitude +is unattainable, and that, in order to make the nearest approach to it, +it is necessary to have constant recourse to the original sources; that +it is necessary to know and use the best modern historians, but never to +take their word for gospel. That is all." He concludes: Freeman "without +a doubt taught historical method far better by example than he ever +succeeded in doing by precept." +</p><p> +Compare <i>Bouvard et Pécuchet</i>, by G. Flaubert. Here we have two +simpletons who, among other projects, propose to write history. In order +to help them, one of their friends sends them (p. 156) "rules of +criticism taken from the <i>Cours</i> of Daunou," such as: "It is no proof to +appeal to rumour and common opinion; the witnesses cannot appear. Reject +impossibilities: Pausanias was shown the stone swallowed by Saturn. Keep +in mind the skill of forgers, the interest of apologists and +calumniators." Daunou's work contains a number of truisms quite as +obvious, and still more comic than the above.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-8" id="Footnote-8"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Flint (ibid. p. 15) congratulates himself on not having to +study the literature of <i>Historic</i>, for "a very large portion of it is +so trivial and superficial that it can hardly ever have been of use even +to persons of the humblest capacity, and may certainly now be safely +confined to kindly oblivion." Nevertheless, Flint has given in his book +a summary list of the principal works of this kind published in +French-speaking countries from the earliest times. A more general and +complete account (though still a summary one) of the literature of this +subject in all countries is furnished by the <i>Lehrbuch der historischen +Methode</i> of E. Bernheim (Leipzig, 1894, 8vo), pp. 143 <i>sqq.</i> Flint (who +was acquainted with several works unknown to Bernheim) stops at 1893, +Bernheim at 1894. Since 1889 the <i>Jahresberichte der +Geschichtswissenschaft</i> have contained a periodical account of recent +works on historical methodology.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-9" id="Footnote-9"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> This seventh volume was published in 1844. But Daunou's +celebrated <i>Cours</i> was delivered at the Collège de France in the years +1819-30.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-10" id="Footnote-10"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> The Italians of the Renaissance (Mylæns, Francesco +Patrizzi, and others), and after them the writers of the last two +centuries, ask what is the relation of history to dialectic and +rhetoric; to how many laws the historical branch of literature is +subject; whether it is right for the historian to relate treasons, acts +of cowardice, crimes, disorders; whether history is entitled to use any +style other than the sublime; and so on. The only books on <i>Historic</i>, +published before the nineteenth century, which give evidence of any +original effort to attack the real difficulties, are those of Lenglet de +Fresnoy (<i>Méthode pour étudier l'histoire</i>, Paris, 1713), and of J. M. +Chladenius (<i>Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft</i>, Leipzig, 1752). The +work of Chladenius has been noticed by Bernheim (ibid. p. 166).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-11" id="Footnote-11"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> He has not always shown even good sense, for, in the +<i>Cours d'études historiques</i> (vii. p. 105), where he treats of a work, +<i>De</i> <i>l'histoire</i>, published in 1670 by Père Le Moyne, a feeble +production, to say the least, bearing evident traces of senility, he +expresses himself as follows: "I cannot adopt all the maxims and +precepts contained in this treatise; but I believe that, after that of +Lucian, it is the best we have yet seen, and I greatly doubt whether any +of those whose acquaintance we have still to make has risen to the same +height of philosophy and originality." Père H. Chérot has given a +sounder estimate of the treatise <i>De l'histoire</i> in his <i>Étude sur la +vie et les œuvres du P. Le Moyne</i> (Paris, 1887, 8vo), pp. 406 <i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-12" id="Footnote-12"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Bernheim declares, however (ibid. p. 177), that this +little work is, in his opinion, the only one which stands at the present +level of science.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-13" id="Footnote-13"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Flint says very well (ibid. p. 15): "The course of +Historic has been, on the whole, one of advance from commonplace +reflection on history towards a philosophical comprehension of the +conditions and processes on which the formation of historical science +depends.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-14" id="Footnote-14"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> By P. Guiraud, in the <i>Revue des Deux Mondes</i>, March 1896, +p. 75.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-15" id="Footnote-15"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Renan has said some of the truest and best things that +have ever been said on the historical sciences in <i>L'Avenir de la +science</i> (Paris, 1890, 8vo), written in 1848.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-16" id="Footnote-16"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Some of the most ingenious, some of the most logical, and +some of the most widely applicable observations, on the method of the +historical sciences, have so far appeared, not in books on methodology, +but in the reviews—of which the <i>Revue Critique d'histoire et de +littérature</i> is the type—devoted to the criticism of new works of +history and erudition. It is a very useful exercise to run through the +file of the <i>Revue Critique</i>, founded, at Paris, in 1867, "to enforce +respect for method, to execute justice upon bad books, to check +misdirected and superfluous work."</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-17" id="Footnote-17"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> The first edition of the <i>Lehrbuch</i> is dated 1889.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-18" id="Footnote-18"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> The best work that has hitherto been published (in French) +on historical method is a pamphlet by MM. Ch. and V. Mortet, <i>La Science +de l'histoire</i> (Paris, 1894, 8vo), 88 pp., extracted from vol. xx. of +the <i>Grande Encyclopédie</i>.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-19" id="Footnote-19"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> One of us, M. Seignobos, proposes to publish later on a +complete treatise of Historical Methodology, if there appears to be a +public for this class of work.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-20" id="Footnote-20"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> It cannot be too often stated that the study of history, +as it is prosecuted at school, does not presuppose the same aptitudes as +the same study when prosecuted at the university or in after life. +Julien Havet, who afterwards devoted himself to the (critical) study of +history, found history wearisome at school. "I believe," says M. L. +Havet, "that the teaching of history [in schools] is not organised in +such a manner as to provide sufficient nourishment for the scientific +spirit.... Of all the studies comprised in our school curricula, history +is the only one in which the pupil is not being continually called upon +to verify something. When he is learning Latin or German, every sentence +in a translation requires him to verify a dozen different rules. In the +various branches of mathematics the results are never divorced from +their proofs; the <i>problems</i>, too, compel the pupil to think through the +whole for himself. Where are the <i>problems</i> in history, and what +schoolboy is ever trained to gain by independent effort an insight into +the interconnection of events?" (<i>Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes</i>, +1896, p. 84).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-21" id="Footnote-21"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> M. Langlois wrote Book I., Book II. as far at Chapter VI., +the second Appendix, and this Preface; M. Seignobos the end of Book II., +Book III., and the first Appendix. Chapter I. in the second book, +Chapter V. of the third book, and the Conclusion, were written in +common.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-22" id="Footnote-22"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> In practice one does not as a rule resolve to treat a +point of history before knowing whether there are or are not documents +in existence which enable it to be studied. On the contrary, it is the +accidental discovery of a document which suggests the idea of thoroughly +elucidating the point of history to which it relates, and thus leads to +the collection, for this purpose, of other documents of the same class.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-23" id="Footnote-23"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> It is pitiable to see how the best of the early scholars +struggled bravely, but vainly, to solve problems which would not even +have existed for them if their collections had not been so incomplete. +This lack of material was a disadvantage for which the most brilliant +ingenuity could not compensate.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-24" id="Footnote-24"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> "How hard it is to gain the means whereby we mount to the +sources" (Goethe, <i>Faust</i>, i. 3).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-25" id="Footnote-25"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> See C. V. Langlois, <i>H. H. Bancroft et Cie.</i>, in the +<i>Revue universitaire</i>, 1894, i. p. 233.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-26" id="Footnote-26"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> The earlier scholars were conscious of the unfavourable +character of the conditions under which they worked. They suffered +keenly from the insufficiency of the instruments of research and the +means of comparison. Most of them made great efforts to obtain +information. Hence these voluminous correspondences between scholars of +the last few centuries, of which our libraries preserve so many precious +fragments, and these accounts of scientific searches, of journeys +undertaken for the discovery of historical documents, which, under the +name of <i>Iter</i> (<i>Iter Italicum</i>, <i>Iter Germanicum</i>, &c.), were formerly +fashionable.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-27" id="Footnote-27"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> We may remark, in passing, a delusion which is childish +enough but very natural, and very common among collectors: they all tend +to exaggerate the intrinsic value of the documents they possess, simply +because they themselves are the possessors. Documents have been +published with a sumptuous array of commentaries by persons who had +accidentally acquired them, and who would, quite rightly, have attached +no importance to them if they had met with them in public collections. +This is, we may add, merely a manifestation, in a somewhat crude form, +of a general tendency against which it is always necessary to guard: a +man readily exaggerates the importance of the documents he possesses, +the documents he has discovered, the texts he has edited, the persons +and the questions he has studied.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-28" id="Footnote-28"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> See L. Delisle, <i>Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la +Bibliothèque nationale</i>, Paris, 1868-81, 3 vols. 4to. The histories of +ancient depositories of documents, which have been recently published in +considerable number, have been modelled on this admirable work.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-29" id="Footnote-29"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> Many of the ancient documents still in circulation are the +proceeds of ancient thefts from state institutions. The precautions now +taken against a recurrence of such depredations are stringent, and, in +nearly every instance, as effective as could be desired. +</p><p> +As to modern (printed) documents, the rule of legal deposit [compulsory +presentation of copies to specified libraries], which has now been +adopted by nearly all civilised countries, guarantees their preservation +in public institutions.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-30" id="Footnote-30"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> It is known that Napoleon I. entertained the chimerical +design of concentrating at Paris the archives of the whole of Europe, +and that, for a beginning, he conveyed to that city the archives of the +Vatican, the Holy Roman Empire, the crown of Castile, and others, which +later on the French were compelled to restore. Confiscation is now out +of the question. But the ancient archives of the notaries might be +centralised everywhere, as in some countries they are already, in public +institutions. It is not easy to explain why at Paris the departments of +Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Marine preserve ancient papers whose +natural place would be at the Archives Nationales. A great many more +anomalies of this kind might be mentioned, which in certain cases +impede, where they do not altogether preclude, research; for the small +collections, whose existence is not required, are precisely those whose +regulations are the most oppressive.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-31" id="Footnote-31"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> The international exchange of documents is worked in +Europe (without charge to the public) by the agency of the various +Foreign Offices. Besides this, most of the great institutions have +agreements with each other for mutual loans; this system is as sure and +sometimes more rapid in its operation than the diplomatic system. The +question of lending original documents for use outside the institution +where they are preserved has of late years been frequently mooted at +congresses of historians and librarians. The results so far obtained are +eminently satisfactory.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-32" id="Footnote-32"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> These are sometimes large collections of formidable bulk; +it is more natural to undertake the cataloguing of small accumulations +which demand less labor. It is for the same reason that many +insignificant but short cartularies have been published, while several +cartularies of the highest importance, being voluminous, have still to +be edited.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-33" id="Footnote-33"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> See his autobibliography, published by E. de Broglie, +<i>Bernard de Montfaucon et les Bernardins</i>, ii. (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. +323.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-34" id="Footnote-34"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> E. Renan, <i>L'Avenir de la science</i>, p. 217.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-35" id="Footnote-35"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Romania</i>, xxi. (1892), p. 625.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-36" id="Footnote-36"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> In the passage quoted above.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-37" id="Footnote-37"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Mr. H. H. Bancroft, in his Memoirs, entitled "Literary +Industries" (New York, 1891, 16mo), analyses with sufficient minuteness +some practical consequences of the imperfection of the methods of +research. He considers the case of an industrious writer proposing to +write the history of California. He easily procures a few books, reads +them, takes notes; these books refer him to others, which he consults in +the public libraries of the city where he resides. Several years are +passed in this manner, at the end of which he perceives that he has not +a tenth part of the resources in his hands; he travels, maintains +correspondences, but, finally despairing of exhausting the subject, he +comforts his conscience and pride with the reflection that he has done +much, and that many of the works he has not seen, like many of those he +has, are probably of very slight historic value. As to newspapers and +the myriads of United States government reports, all of them containing +facts bearing on Californian history; being a sane man, he has never +dreamed of searching them from beginning to end: he has turned over a +few of them, that is all; he knows that each of these fields of research +would afford a labour of several years, and that all of them would fill +the better part of his life with drudgery. As for oral testimony and +manuscripts, he will gather a few unpublished anecdotes in chance +conversations; he will obtain access to a few family papers; all this +will appear in his book as notes and authorities. Now and again he will +get hold of a few documentary curiosities among the state archives, but +as it would take fifteen years to master the whole collection, he will +naturally be content to glean a little here and there. Then he begins to +write. He does not feel called upon to inform the public that he has not +seen <i>all</i> the documents; on the contrary, he makes the most of what he +has been able to procure in the course of twenty-five years of +industrious research.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-38" id="Footnote-38"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Some dispense with personal search by invoking the +assistance of the functionaries charged with the administration of +depositories of documents; the indispensable search is, in these cases, +conducted by the functionaries instead of by the public. Cf. <i>Bouvard et +Pécuchet</i>, p. 158. Bouvard and Pécuchet resolve to write the life of the +Duke of Angoulême; for this purpose "they determined to spend several +days at the municipal library of Caen to make researches. The librarian +placed general histories and pamphlets at their disposal...."</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-39" id="Footnote-39"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> These considerations have already been presented and +developed in the <i>Revue universitaire</i>, 1894, i. p. 321 <i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-40" id="Footnote-40"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> It is well known that, since the opening of the Papal +Archives, several governments and learned societies have established +Institutes at Rome, the members of which are, for the most part, +occupied in cataloguing and making known the documents of these +archives, in co-operation with the functionaries of the Vatican. The +French School at Rome, the Austrian Institute, the Prussian Institute, +the Polish Mission, the Institute of the "Goerresgesellschaft," Belgian, +Danish, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and other scholars, have +performed, and are performing, cataloguing work of considerable extent +in the archives of the Vatican.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-41" id="Footnote-41"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Catalogues of documents sometimes, but not always, mention +the fact that such and such a document has been edited, dealt with +critically, utilised. The generally received rule is that the compiler +mentions circumstances of this kind when he is aware of them, without +imposing on himself the enormous task of ascertaining the truth on this +head[sic] in every instance where he is ignorant of it.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-42" id="Footnote-42"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> E. Bernheim, <i>Lehrbuch der historischen Methode</i>, 2nd ed., +pp. 196-202.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-43" id="Footnote-43"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> C. V. Langlois, <i>Manuel de Bibliographie historique</i>: I. +<i>Instruments bibliographiques</i>, Paris, 1896, 16mo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-44" id="Footnote-44"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> E. Renan, <i>Feuilles détachées</i> (Paris, 1892, 8vo), pp. 96 +<i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-45" id="Footnote-45"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> vii. p. 228 <i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-46" id="Footnote-46"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> E. A. Freeman, <i>The Methods of Historical Study</i> (London, +1885, 8vo), p. 45. +</p><p> +In France geography has long been regarded as a science closely related +to history. An <i>Agrégation</i>, which combines history and geography, +exists at the present day, and in the <i>lycées</i> history and geography are +taught by the same professors. Many people persist in asserting the +legitimacy of this combination, and even take umbrage when it is +proposed to separate two branches of knowledge united, as they say, by +many essential connecting links. But it would be hard to find any good +reason, or any facts of experience, to prove that a professor of +history, or an historian, is so much the better the more he knows of +geology, oceanography, climatology, and the whole group of geographical +sciences. In fact, it is with some impatience, and to no immediate +advantage, that students of history work through the courses of +geography which their curricula force upon them; and those students who +have a real taste for geography would be very glad to throw history +overboard. The artificial union of history with geography dates back, in +France, to an epoch when geography was an ill-defined and ill-arranged +subject, regarded by all as a negligeable branch of study. It is a relic +of antiquity that we ought to get rid of at once.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-47" id="Footnote-47"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> "Historiography" is a branch of the "History of +Literature;" it is the sum of the results obtained by the critics who +have hitherto studied ancient historical writings, such as annals, +memoirs, chronicles, biographies, and so forth.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-48" id="Footnote-48"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> This is only true under reservation; there is an +instrument of research which is indispensable to all historians, to all +students, whatever be the subject of their special study. History, +moreover, is here in the same situation as the majority of the other +sciences: all who prosecute original research, of whatever kind, need to +know several living languages, those of countries where men think and +work, of countries which, from the point of view of science, stand in +the forefront of contemporary civilisation. +</p><p> +In our days the cultivation of the sciences is not confined to any +single country, or even to Europe. It is international. All problems, +the same problems, are being studied everywhere simultaneously. It is +difficult to-day, and to-morrow it will be impossible, to find a subject +which can be treated without taking cognisance of works in a foreign +language. Henceforth, for ancient history, Greek and Roman, a knowledge +of German will be as imperative as a knowledge of Greek and Latin. +Questions of strictly local history are the only ones still accessible +to those who do not possess the key to foreign literatures. The great +problems are beyond their reach, for the wretched and ridiculous reason +that works on these problems in any language but their own are sealed +books to them. +</p><p> +Total ignorance of the languages which have hitherto been the ordinary +vehicles of science (German, English, French, Italian) is a disease +which age renders incurable. It would not be exacting too much to +require every candidate for a scientific profession to be at least +<i>trilinguis</i>—that is, to be able to understand, fairly easily, two +languages besides his mother-tongue. This is a requirement to which +scholars were not subject formerly, when Latin was still the common +language of learned men, but which the conditions of modern scientific +work will henceforth cause to press with increasing weight upon the +scholars of every country.[*] +</p><p> +The French scholars who are unable to read German and English are +thereby placed in a position of permanent inferiority as compared with +their better instructed colleagues in France and abroad; whatever their +merit, they are condemned to work with insufficient means of +information, to work badly. They know it. They do their best to hide +their infirmity, as something to be ashamed of, except when they make a +cynical parade of it and boast of it; but this boasting, as we can +easily see, is only shame showing itself in a different way. Too much +stress cannot be laid upon the fact that a practical knowledge of +foreign languages is auxiliary in the first degree to all historical +work, as indeed it is to scientific work in general.</p> + +<p>[*]Perhaps a day will come when it will be necessary to know +the most important Slavonic language; there are already scholars who are +setting themselves to learn Russian. The idea of restoring Latin to its +old position of universal language is chimerical. See the file of the +<i>Phœnix, seu nuntius latinus universalis</i> (London, 1891, 4to).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-49" id="Footnote-49"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> When the "auxiliary sciences" were first inserted in the +curricula of French universities, it was observed that some students +whose special subject was the French Revolution, and who had no interest +whatever in the middle ages, took up palæography as an "auxiliary +science," and that some students of geography, who were in no way +interested in antiquity, took up epigraphy. Evidently they had failed to +understand that the study of the "auxiliary sciences" is recommended, +not as an end in itself, but because it is of practical utility to those +who devote themselves to certain special subjects. See the <i>Revue +universitaire</i>, 1895, ii. p. 123.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-50" id="Footnote-50"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> On this point note the opinions of T. von Sickel and J. +Havet, quoted in the <i>Bibliothèque l'École des chartes</i>, 1896, p. 87. In +1854 the Austrian Institute "für österreichische Geschichtsforschung" +was organised on the model of the French École des chartes. Another +institution of the same type has lately been created in the "Istituto di +studi superiori" at Florence. "We are accustomed," we read in England, +"to hear the complaint that there is not in this country any institution +resembling the École des chartes" (<i>Quarterly Review</i>, July 1896, p. +122).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-51" id="Footnote-51"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> This is a suitable place to enumerate the principal +"manuals" published in the last twenty-five years. But a list of them, +ending at 1894, will be found in Bernheim's <i>Lehrbuch</i>, pp. 206 sqq. We +will only refer to the great "manuals" of "Philology" (in the +comprehensive sense of the German "Philologie," which includes the +history of language and literature, epigraphy, palæography, and all that +pertains to textual criticism) now in course of publication: the +<i>Grundriss far indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde</i>, edited by +G. Bühler; the <i>Grundriss der iranischen Philologie</i>, edited by W. +Geiger and E. Kuhn; the <i>Handbuch der classichen Altertumswissenschaft</i>, +edited by I. von Müller; the <i>Grundriss der germanischen Philologie</i>, +edited by H. Paul, the second edition of which began to appear in 1896; +the <i>Grundriss der romanischen Philologie</i>, edited y G. Gröber. In these +vast repertories there will be found, along with a short presentment of +the subject, complete bibliographical references, direct as well as +indirect.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-52" id="Footnote-52"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> The French "manuals" of MM. Prou (Palæography), Giry +(Diplomatic), Cagnat (Latin Epigraphy), and others, have diffused among +the public the idea and knowledge of the auxiliary subjects of study. +New editions have enabled, and will enable, them to be kept up to +date—a very necessary operation, for most of these subjects, though now +settled in the main, are being enriched and made more precise every day. +Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 38.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-53" id="Footnote-53"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> What exactly are we to understand by this "incommunicable +knowledge," of which we speak? When a specialist is very familiar with +the documents of a given class or period, associations of ideas are +formed in his brain; and when he examines a new document of the same +class or species, analogies suddenly dawn upon him which would escape +any one of less experience, however well furnished he might be with the +most perfect repertories. The fact is, that not all the peculiarities of +documents can be isolated; there are some which cannot be classified +under any intelligible head, and which, therefore, cannot be found in +any tabulated list. But the human memory, when it is good, retains the +impression of these peculiarities, and even a faint and distant stimulus +suffices to revive the apprehension of them.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-54" id="Footnote-54"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, p. 17.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-55" id="Footnote-55"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> This expression, which frequently occurs, needs +explanation. It is not to be taken to apply to a <i>species</i> of facts. +There are no historical facts in the sense in which we speak of chemical +facts. The same fact is or is not historical according to the manner in +which it is known. It is only the mode of acquiring knowledge that is +historical. A sitting of the Senate is a fact of direct observation for +one who takes part in it; it becomes historical for the man who reads +about it in a report. The eruption of Vesuvius in the time of Pliny is a +geological fact which is known historically. The historical character is +not in the facts, but in the manner of knowing them.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-56" id="Footnote-56"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> Fustel de Coulanges has said it. Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 4, note +1.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-57" id="Footnote-57"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> In the sciences of observation it is the fact itself, +observed directly, which is the starting-point.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-58" id="Footnote-58"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, ch. vii.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-59" id="Footnote-59"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> We shall not treat specially of the criticism of material +documents (objects, monuments, &c.) where it differs from the criticism +of written documents.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-60" id="Footnote-60"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> For the details and the logical justification of this +method see Seignobos, <i>Les Conditions psychologiques de la connaissance +en histoire</i>, in the <i>Revue philosophique</i>, 1887, ii. pp. 1, 168.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-61" id="Footnote-61"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> The most favourable case, that in which the document has +been drawn up by what is called an ocular "witness," is still far short +of the ideal required for scientific knowledge. The notion of <i>witness</i> +has been borrowed from the procedure of the law-courts; reduced to +scientific terms, it becomes that of an <i>observer</i>. A testimony is an +observation. But, in point of fact, historical testimony differs +materially from scientific observation. The observer proceeds by fixed +rules, and clothes his report in language of rigorous precision. On the +other hand, the "witness" observes without method, and reports in +unprecise language; it is not known whether he has taken the necessary +precautions. It is an essential attribute of historical documents that +they come before us as the result of work which has been done without +method and without guarantee.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-62" id="Footnote-62"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> See B. Lasch, <i>Das Erwachen und die Entwickelung der +historischen Kritik im Mittelalter</i> (Breslan, 1887, 8vo).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-63" id="Footnote-63"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> Natural credulity is deeply rooted in indolence. It is +easier to believe than to discuss, to admit than to criticise, to +accumulate documents than to weigh them. It is also pleasanter; he who +criticises documents must sacrifice some of them, and such a sacrifice +seems a dead loss to the man who has discovered or acquired the +document.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-64" id="Footnote-64"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>Revue philosophique</i>, l.c., p. 178.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-65" id="Footnote-65"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> A member of the <i>Société des humanistes français</i> (founded +at Paris in 1894) amused himself by pointing out, in the <i>Bulletin</i> of +this society, certain errors amenable to verbal criticism which occur in +various editions of posthumous works, especially the <i>Mémoires +d'outre-tombe</i>. He showed that it is possible to remove obscurities in +the most modern documents by the same methods which are used in +restoring ancient texts.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-66" id="Footnote-66"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> On the habits of the mediæval copyists, by whose +intermediate agency most of the literary works of antiquity have come +down to us, see the notices collected by W. Wattenbach, <i>Das +Schriftwesen im Mittelalter</i>, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1896, 8vo).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-67" id="Footnote-67"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> See, for example, the <i>Coquilles lexicographiques</i> which +have been collected by A. Thomas, in <i>Romania</i>, xx. (1891), pp. 464 +<i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-68" id="Footnote-68"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> See E. Bernheim, <i>Lehrbuch der historischen Methode</i>, 2nd +ed., pp. 341-54. Also consult F. Blass, in the <i>Handbuch der klassischen +Altertumswissenschaft</i>, edited by I. von Müller, I., 2nd ed. (1892), pp. +249-89 (with a detailed bibliography); A. Tobler, in the <i>Grundriss der +romanischen Philologie</i>, I. (1888), pp. 253-63; H. Paul, in the +<i>Grundriss der germanischen Philologie</i>, I., 2nd ed. (1896), pp. 184-96. +</p><p> +In French read the section <i>Critique des textes, in Minerva, +Introduction à l'étude des classiques scolaires grecs et latins</i>, by J. +Gow and S. Reinach (Paris, 1890, 16mo), pp. 50-65. +</p><p> +The work of J. Taylor, "History of the Transmission of Ancient Books to +Modern Times" (Liverpool, 1889, 16mo), is of no value.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-69" id="Footnote-69"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> This rule is not absolute. The editor is generally +accorded the right of unifying the spelling of an autograph +document—provided that he informs the public of the fact—wherever, as +in most modern documents, the orthographical vagaries of the author +possess no philological interest. See the <i>Instructions pour la +publication des textes historiques</i>, in the <i>Bulletin de la Commission +royale d'histoire de Belgique</i>, 5th series, vi. (1896); and the +<i>Grundsätze für die Herausgabe von Actenstücken zur neueren Geschichte</i>, +laboriously discussed by the second and third Congresses of German +historians, in 1894 and 1895, in the Deutsche <i>Zeitschrift für +Geschichtswissenschaft</i>, xi. p. 200, xii. p. 364. The last Congresses of +Italian historians, held at Genoa (1893) and at Rome (1895), have also +debated this question, but without result. What are the liberties which +it is legitimate to take in reproducing autograph texts? The question is +more difficult than is imagined by those who are not professionally +concerned with it.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-70" id="Footnote-70"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> Interpolations will be treated of in chapter iii p. 92.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-71" id="Footnote-71"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> The scribes of the Carlovingian Renaissance and of the +Renaissance proper of the fifteenth century endeavoured to furnish +intelligible texts. They therefore corrected everything they did not +understand. Several ancient works have been in this manner irretrievably +ruined.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-72" id="Footnote-72"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> The principal of these are, for the classical languages, +besides the above-mentioned work of Blass (<i>supra</i>, p. 74, note), the +<i>Adversaria critica</i> of Madvig (Copenhagen, 1871-74, 3 vols. 8vo). For +Greek, the celebrated <i>Commentatio palæographica</i> of F. J. Bast, +published as an appendix to an edition of the grammarian Gregory of +Corinth (Leipzig, 1811, 8vo), and the <i>Variæ lectiones</i> of Cobet +(Leiden, 1873, 8vo). For Latin, H. Hagen, <i>Gradus ad criticen</i> (Leipzig, +1879, 8vo), and W. M. Lindsay, "An Introduction to Latin Textual +Emendation based on the Text of Plautus" (London, 1896, 16mo). A +contributor to the <i>Bulletin de la Société des humanistes français</i> has +expressed, in this publication, a wish that a similar collection might +be compiled for modern French.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-73" id="Footnote-73"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> Cf. <i>Revue Critique</i>, 1895, ii. p. 358.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-74" id="Footnote-74"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Quite recently our scholars used to neglect this +elementary precaution, in order, as they said, to avoid an "air of +pedantry." M. B. Hauréau has published, in his <i>Notices et extraits de +quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque nationale</i> (vi. p. 310), a +piece of rhythmic verse, "De presbytero et logico." "It is not +unedited," says he; "Thomas Wright has already published it.... But this +edition is very defective; the text is occasionally quite +unintelligible. We have, therefore, considerably amended it, making use, +for this purpose, of two copies, which, it most be conceded, are neither +of them faultless...." The edition follows, with no variants. +Verification is impossible.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-75" id="Footnote-75"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> "Textual emendation too often misses the mark through want +of knowledge of what may be called <i>the rules of the game</i>" (W. M. +Lindsay, p.v. in the work referred to above).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-76" id="Footnote-76"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> It has often been asked whether <i>all</i> texts are worth the +trouble of "establishing" and publishing them. "Among our ancient +texts," says M. J. Bédier, referring to French mediæval literature, +"which ought we to publish? Every one. But, it will be asked, are we not +already staggering under the weight of documents?... The following is +the reason why publication should be exhaustive. As long as we are +confronted by this mass of sealed and mysterious manuscripts, they will +appeal to us as if they contained the answer to every riddle; every +candid mind will be hampered by them in its flights of induction. It is +desirable to publish them, if only to get rid of them and to be able, +for the future, to work as if they did not exist...." (<i>Revue des Deux +Mondes</i>, February 15, 1894, p. 910). All documents ought to be +catalogued, as we have already pointed out (p. 31), in order that +researchers may be relieved of the fear that there may be documents, +useful for their purposes, of which they know nothing. But in every case +where a summary analysis of a document can give a sufficient idea of its +contents, and its form is of no special interest, there is nothing +gained by publishing it <i>in extenso</i>. We need not overburden ourselves. +Every document will be analysed some day, but many documents will never +be published.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-77" id="Footnote-77"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> Editors of texts often render their task still longer and +more difficult than it need be by undertaking the additional duty of +commentators, under the pretext of explaining the text. It would be to +their advantage to spare themselves this labour, and to dispense with +all annotation which does not belong to the "apparatus criticus" proper. +See, on this point, T. Lindner, <i>Ueber die Herausgabe von +geschichtlichen Quellen</i>, in the <i>Mittheilungen des Instituts für +österreichische Geschichtsforschung</i>, xvi., 1895, pp. 501 <i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-78" id="Footnote-78"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> To realise this it is enough to compare what has hitherto +been done by the most active societies, such as the Society of the +<i>Monumenta Germaniæ historica</i> and the <i>Istituto storico italiano</i>, with +what still remains for them to do. The greater part of the most ancient +documents and the hardest to restore, which have long taxed the +ingenuity of scholars, have now been placed in a relatively satisfactory +condition. But an immense amount of mechanical work has still to be +done.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-79" id="Footnote-79"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> R. de Gourmont, <i>Le Latin mystique</i> (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. +258.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-80" id="Footnote-80"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> See these alleged autographs in the <i>Bibliothèque +nationale</i>, nouv. acq. fr., No. 709.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-81" id="Footnote-81"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> F. Blass has enumerated the chief of these motives with +reference to the pseudepigraphic literature of antiquity (pp. 269 <i>sqq.</i> +in the work already quoted).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-82" id="Footnote-82"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> E. Bernheim (<i>Lehrbuch</i>, pp. 243 <i>sqq.</i>) gives a somewhat +lengthy list of spurious documents, now recognised as such. Here it will +be enough to recall a few famous hoaxes: Sarchoniathon, Clotilde de +Surville, Ossian. Since the publication of Bernheim's book several +celebrated documents, hitherto exempt from suspicion, have been struck +off the list of authorities. See especially A. Piaget, <i>La Chronique des +chanoines de Neuchâtel</i> (Neuchâtel, 1896, 8vo).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-83" id="Footnote-83"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> When the modifications of the primitive text are the work +of the author himself, they are "alterations." Internal analysis, and +the comparison of different editions, bring them to light.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-84" id="Footnote-84"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> See F. Blass, ibid., pp. 254 <i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-85" id="Footnote-85"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> As a rule it matters little whether the <i>name</i> of the +author has or has not been discovered. We read, however, in the +<i>Histoire</i> <i>littéraire de la France</i> (xxvi. p. 388): "We have ignored +anonymous sermons: writings of this facile character are of no +importance for literary history when their authors are unknown." Are +they of any more importance when we know the authors' names?</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-86" id="Footnote-86"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> In very favourable cases the examination of the +plagiarist's mistakes has made it possible to determine even this style +of handwriting, the size, and the manner of arrangement of the +manuscript source. The deductions of the investigation of sources, like +those of textual criticism, are sometimes supported by obvious +palæographical considerations.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-87" id="Footnote-87"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> The Investigations of Julien Havet (<i>Questions +mérovingiennes</i>, Paris, 1896, 8vo) are regarded as models. Very +difficult problems are there solved with faultless elegance. It is also +well worth while to read the memoirs in which M. L. Delisle has +discussed questions of origin. It is in the treatment of these questions +that the most accomplished scholars win their triumphs.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-88" id="Footnote-88"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> See the edition of H. R. Luard (vol. i., London, 1890, +8vo) in the <i>Rerum Britannicarum medii ævi scriptores</i>. Matthew of +Westminster's <i>Flores historiarum</i> figure in the Roman "Index," because +of the passages borrowed from the <i>Chronica majora</i> of Matthew of Paris, +while the <i>Chronica majora</i> themselves have escaped censure.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-89" id="Footnote-89"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> It would be instructive to draw up a list of the +celebrated historical works, such as Augustin Thierry's <i>Histoire de la +Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands</i>, whose authority has been +completely destroyed after the authorship of their sources has been +studied. Nothing amuses the gallery more than to see an historian +convicted of having built a theory on falsified documents. Nothing is +more calculated to cover an historian with confusion than to find that +he has fallen into the error of treating seriously documents which are +no documents at all.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-90" id="Footnote-90"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> One of the crudest (and commonest) forms of "uncritical +method" is that which consists in employing as if they were documents, +and placing on the same footing as documents, the utterances of modern +authors on the subject of documents. Novices do not make a sufficient +distinction, in the works of modern authors, between what is added to +the original source and what is taken from it.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-91" id="Footnote-91"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> See a list of examples in Bernheim's <i>Handbuch</i>, pp. 283, +289.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-92" id="Footnote-92"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> It is because it is necessary to subject documents of +mediæval and ancient history to the most searching criticism in respect +of authorship that the study of antiquity and the middle ages passes for +more "scientific" than that of modern times. The truth is, that it is +merely hampered by more preliminary difficulties.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-93" id="Footnote-93"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> <i>Revue philosophique</i>, 1887, ii. p. 170.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-94" id="Footnote-94"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> The theory of the critical investigation of authorship is +now settled, <i>ne varietur</i>; it is given in detail in Bernheim's +<i>Lehrbuch</i>, pp. 242-340. For this reason we have had no scruple in +dismissing it with a short sketch. In French, the introduction of M. G. +Monod to his <i>Études critiques sur les sources de l'histoire +mérovingienne</i> (Paris, 1872, 8vo) contains elementary considerations on +the subject. Cf. <i>Revue Critique</i>, 1873, i. p. 308.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-95" id="Footnote-95"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> Renan, <i>Feuilles détachées</i>, p. 103.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-96" id="Footnote-96"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> It would be very interesting to have information on the +methods of work of the great scholars, particularly those who undertook +long tasks of collection and classification. Some information of this +kind is to be found in their papers, and occasionally in their +correspondence. On the methods of Du Cange, see L. Feugère, <i>Étude sur +la vie et les ouvrages de Du Cange</i> (Paris, 1858, 8vo), pp. 62 <i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-97" id="Footnote-97"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> See J. G. Droysen, <i>Grundriss der Historik</i>, p. 19: +"Critical classification does not exclusively adopt the chronological +point of view.... The more varied the points of view which criticism +uses to group materials, the more solid are the results yielded by +converging lines of inquiry." +</p><p> +The system has now been abandoned of grouping documents in a <i>Corpus</i> or +in <i>regesta</i>, as was done formerly, because they have the common +characteristic of being unedited, or possibly for the exactly opposite +reason. At one time the compilers of <i>Analecta, Reliquiæ +manuscriptorum</i>, "treasuries of <i>anecdota</i>," <i>spicilegia</i>, and so on, +used to publish all the documents of a certain class which had the +common feature of being unedited and of appearing interesting to them; +on the other hand, Georgisch (<i>Regesta Chronologico-diplomatica</i>), +Bréquigny (<i>Table chronologique des diplômes, chartes et actes imprimés +concernant l'histoire de France</i>), Wauters (<i>Table chronologique des +chartes et diplômes imprimés concernant l'histoire de Belgique</i>), have +grouped together all the documents of a certain species which had the +common character of having been printed.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-98" id="Footnote-98"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> J. P. Waltzing, <i>Recueil général des inscriptions latines</i> +(Louvain, 1892, 8vo), p. 41.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-99" id="Footnote-99"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> Ibid. When the geographical order is adopted, a difficulty +arises from the fact that the origin of certain documents is unknown; +many inscriptions preserved in museums have been brought there no one +knows whence. The difficulty is analogous to that which results, for +chronological <i>regesta</i>, from documents without date.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-100" id="Footnote-100"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> Here the only difficulty arises in the case of documents +whose <i>incipit</i> has been lost. In the eighteenth century Séguier devoted +a great part of his life to the construction of a catalogue, in the +alphabetical order of the <i>incipit</i>, of the Latin inscriptions, to the +number of 50,000, which had at that time been published: he searched +through some twelve thousand works. This vast compilation has remained +unpublished and useless. Before undertaking work of such magnitude it is +well to make sure that it is on a rational plan, and that the +labour—the hard and thankless labour—will not be wasted.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-101" id="Footnote-101"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> See G. Waitz, <i>Ueber die Herausgabe und Bearbeitung von +Regesten</i>, in the <i>Historische Zeitschrift</i>, xl. (1878), pp. 280-95.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-102" id="Footnote-102"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> In the absence of a predetermined logical order, and when +the chronological order is not suitable, it is sometimes an advantage to +provisionally group the documents (that is, the slips) in the +alphabetical order of the words chosen as headings (<i>Schlagwörter</i>). +This is what is called the "dictionary system."</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-103" id="Footnote-103"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> See Langlois, <i>Manuel de bibliographie historique</i>, i. p. +88.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-104" id="Footnote-104"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> This argument is easy to develop, and often has been, +recently by M. J. Bédier, in the <i>Revue des Deux Mondes</i>, February 15, +1894, pp. 932 <i>sqq.</i> +</p><p> +There are some who willingly admit that the labours of erudition are +useful, but ask impatiently whether "the editing of a text" or "the +deciphering of a Gothic parchment" is "the supreme effort of the human +mind," and whether the intellectual ability implied by the practice of +external criticism does or does not justify "all the fuss made over +those who possess it." On this question, obviously devoid of importance, +a controversy was held between M. Brunetière, who recommended scholars +to be modest, and M. Boucherie, who insisted on their reasons for being +proud, in the pages of the <i>Revue des langues romanes</i>, 1880, vols. i +and ii.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-105" id="Footnote-105"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> There have been men who were critics of the first water +where external criticism alone was concerned, but who never rose to the +conception of higher criticism, or to a true understanding of history.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-106" id="Footnote-106"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> Renan, <i>Essais de morale et de critique</i>, p. 36.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-107" id="Footnote-107"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> "If it were only for the sake of the severe mental +discipline, I should not think very highly of the philosopher who had +not, at least once in his life, worked at the elucidation of some +special point" (<i>L'Avenir de la science</i>, p. 136).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-108" id="Footnote-108"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> On the question whether it is necessary for every one to +do "all the preliminary grubbing for himself," cf. J. M. Robertson, +"Buckle and His Critics" (London, 1895, 8vo), p. 299.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-109" id="Footnote-109"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> Renan, <i>L'Avenir de la science</i>, p. 230.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-110" id="Footnote-110"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> A university professor is in a very good position for +discouraging and encouraging vocations; but "it is by personal effort +that the goal (critical skill) must be attained by the students, as +Waitz well said in an academic oration; the teacher's part in this work +is small...." (<i>Revue Critique</i>, 1874, ii. p. 232).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-111" id="Footnote-111"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> Quoted by Fr. X. von Wegele, <i>Geschichte der deutschen +Historiographie</i> (München, 1885, 8vo), p. 653.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-112" id="Footnote-112"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> Renan, ibid., p. 125.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-113" id="Footnote-113"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> B. Hauréau, <i>Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits +latins de la Bibliothèque nationale</i>, i. (Paris, 1890, 8vo). p. v.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-114" id="Footnote-114"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> <i>Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes</i>, 1896, p. 88. +Compare analogous traits in the interesting intellectual biography of +the Hellenist, palæographer, and bibliographer, Charles Graux, by E. +Lavisse (<i>Questions d'enseignement national</i>, Paris, 1885, 18mo, pp. 265 +<i>sqq.</i>).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-115" id="Footnote-115"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> See H. A. L. Fisher in the <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, Dec. +1894, p. 815.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-116" id="Footnote-116"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> Most of those who have a vocation for critical +scholarship possess both the power of solving problems and the taste for +collecting. It is, however, easy to divide them into two categories +according as they show a marked preference for textual criticism and +investigation of authorship on the one hand, or for the more absorbing +and less intellectual labours of collection on the other. J. Havet, a +past-master in the study of erudite problems, always declined to +undertake a general collection of Merovingian royal charters, a work +which his admirers expected from him. In this connection he readily +admitted his "want of taste for feats of endurance" (<i>Bibliothèque de +l'École des chartes</i>, 1896, p. 222).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-117" id="Footnote-117"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> It is common to hear the opposite of this maintained, +namely, that the labours of critical scholarship (external criticism) +have this advantage over other labours in the field of history that they +are within the range of average ability, and that the most moderate +intellects, after a suitable preliminary drilling, may be usefully +employed in them. It is quite true that men with no elevation of soul or +power of thought can make themselves useful in the field of criticism, +but then they must have special qualities. The mistake is to think that +with good will and a special drilling every one without exception can be +fitted for the operations of external criticism. Among those who are +incapable of these operations, as well as among those who are fitted for +them, there are both men of sense and blockheads.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-118" id="Footnote-118"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> A. Philippi, <i>Einige Bemerkungen über den philologischen +Unterricht</i>, Giessen, 1890, 4to. Cf. <i>Revue Critique</i>, 1892, i. p. 25.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-119" id="Footnote-119"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> J. von Pflugk-Harttung, <i>Geschichtsbetrachtungen</i>, Gotha, +1890, 8vo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-120" id="Footnote-120"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> Ibid., p. 21.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-121" id="Footnote-121"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 99.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-122" id="Footnote-122"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> Renan, <i>L'Avenir de la science</i>, p. xiv.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-123" id="Footnote-123"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> <i>Revue historique</i>, lxiii. (1897), p. 320.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-124" id="Footnote-124"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> Renan, ibid., pp. 122, 243. The same thought has been +more than once expressed, in different language, by E. Lavisse, in his +addresses to the students of Paris (<i>Questions d'enseignement national</i>, +pp. 14, 86, &c.).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-125" id="Footnote-125"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> One of us (M. Langlois) proposes to give elsewhere a +detailed account of all that has been done in the last three hundred +years, but especially in the nineteenth century, for the organisation of +historical work in the principal countries of the world. Some +information has already been collected on this subject by J. Franklin +Jameson, "The Expenditures of Foreign Governments in behalf of History," +in the "Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1891," +pp. 38-61.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-126" id="Footnote-126"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> L. Feugère, <i>Étude sur la vie et les ouvrages de Du +Cange</i>, pp. 55, 58.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-127" id="Footnote-127"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> Even the specialists in external criticism themselves, +when they do not take the line of despising all synthesis <i>a priori</i>, +are almost as easily dazzled as anybody else by incorrect syntheses, by +a show of "general ideas," or by literary artifices, in spite of their +clear-sightedness where works of critical scholarship are concerned.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-128" id="Footnote-128"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> The sciences of observation do, however, need a species +of criticism. We do not accept without verification results obtained by +anybody, but only results obtained by those who know how to work. But +this criticism is made once for all, and applies to the author, not to +his works; historical criticism, on the contrary, is obliged to deal +separately with every part of a document.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-129" id="Footnote-129"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, book ii. chap. i. p. 67.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-130" id="Footnote-130"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 122.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-131" id="Footnote-131"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> Taine appears to have proceeded thus in vol. ii, <i>La +Révolution</i>, of his <i>Origines de la France contemporaine</i>. He had made +extracts from unpublished documents and inserted a great number of them +in his work, but it would seem that he did not first methodically +analyse them in order to determine their meaning.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-132" id="Footnote-132"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> Fustel de Coulanges explains very clearly the danger of +this <i>method</i>: "Some students begin by forming an opinion ... and it is +not till afterwards that they begin to read the texts. They run a great +risk of not understanding them at all, or of understanding them wrongly. +What happens is that a kind of tacit contest goes on between the text +and the preconceived opinions of the reader; the mind refuses to grasp +what is contrary to its idea, and the issue of the contest commonly is, +not that the mind surrenders to the evidence of the text, but that the +text yields, bends, and accommodates itself to the preconceived +opinion.... To bring one's personal ideas into the study of texts is the +subjective method. A man thinks he is contemplating an object, and it is +his own idea that he is contemplating. He thinks he is observing a fact, +and the fact at once assumes the colour, and the significance his mind +wishes it to have. He thinks he is reading a text, and the words of the +text take a particular meaning to suit a ready-made opinion. It is this +subjective method which has done most harm to the history of the +Merovingian epoch.... To read the texts was not enough; what was +required was to read them before forming any convictions...." +(<i>Monarchie franque</i>, p. 31). For the same reason Fustel de Coulanges +deprecated the reading of one document in the light of another; he +protested against the custom of explaining the <i>Germania</i> of Tacitus by +the barbaric laws. In the <i>Revue des questions historiques</i>, 1897, vol. +i, a lesson on method, <i>De l'analyse des textes historiques</i>, is given +apropos of a commentary by M. Monod on Gregory of Tours: "The historian +ought to begin his work with an exact analysis of each document.... The +analysis of a text ... consists in determining the sense of each word +and eliciting the true meaning of the writer.... Instead of searching +for the sense of each of the historian's words, and for the thought he +has expressed in them, he [M. Monod] comments on each sentence in the +light of what is found in Tacitus or the Salic law.... We should +understand what analysis really is. Many talk about it, few use it.... +The use of analysis is, by an attentive study of every detail, to elicit +from a text all that is in it; not to introduce into the text what is +not there." +</p><p> +After reading this excellent advice it will be instructive to read M. +Monod's reply (in the <i>Revue historique</i>); it will be seen that Fustel +de Coulanges himself did not always practise the method he recommended.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-133" id="Footnote-133"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 103.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-134" id="Footnote-134"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> The work of analysis may be entrusted to a second person; +this is what happens in the case of <i>regesta</i> and catalogues of records; +if the analysis has been correctly performed by the compiler of +<i>regesta</i>, there is no need to do it over again.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-135" id="Footnote-135"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> Practical examples of this procedure will be found in +Deloche, <i>La Trustis et l'antrustion royal</i> (Paris, 1873, 8vo), and, +above all, in Fustel de Coulanges. See especially the study of the words +<i>marca</i> (<i>Recherches sur quelques problêmes d'histoire</i>, pp. 322-56), +<i>mallus</i> (ibid., 372-402), <i>alleu</i> (<i>L'Alleu et le domaine rural</i>, pp. +149-70), <i>portio</i> (ibid., pp. 239-52).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-136" id="Footnote-136"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> The theory and an example of this procedure will be found +in Fustel de Coulanges, <i>Recherches sur quelques problêmes d'histoire</i> +(pp. 189-289), with reference to the statements of Tacitus about the +Germans. See especially pp. 263-89, the discussion of the celebrated +passage on the German mode of culture.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-137" id="Footnote-137"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> Fustel de Coulanges formulates it thus: "It is never safe +to separate two words from their context; this is just the way to +mistake their meaning" (<i>Monarchie franque</i>, p. 228, note <span class="smcap">I</span>).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-138" id="Footnote-138"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> This is how Fustel de Coulanges condemns this practice: +"I am not speaking of pretenders to learning who quote second-hand, and +at most take the trouble to verify whether the phrase they have seen +quoted really occurs in the passage indicated. To verify quotations is +one thing and to read texts quite another, and the two often lead to +opposite results" (<i>Revue des questions historiques</i>, 1887, vol. i.). +See also (<i>L'Alleu et le domaine rural</i>, pp. 171-98) the lesson given to +M. Glasson on the theory of the community of land: forty-five quotations +are studied in the light of their context, with the object of proving +that none of them bears the meaning M. Glasson attributed to it. We may +also compare the reply: Glasson, <i>Les Communaux et le domaine rural a +l'époque franque</i>, Paris, 1890.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-139" id="Footnote-139"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> All that is original in Fustel de Coulanges rests on his +interpretative criticism; he never did personally any work in external +criticism, and his critical examination of authors' good faith and +accuracy was hampered by a respect for the statements of ancient authors +which amounted to credulity.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-140" id="Footnote-140"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> A parallel difficulty occurs in the interpretation of +illustrative monuments; the representations are not always to be taken +literally. In the Behistun monument Darius tramples the vanquished +chiefs under foot: this is a metaphor. Mediæval miniatures show us +persons lying in bed with crowns on their heads: this is to symbolise +their royal rank; the painter did not mean that they wore their crowns +to sleep in.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-141" id="Footnote-141"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> A. Boeckh, in the <i>Encyclopædie und Methodologie der +philologischen Wissenschaften</i>, second edition (1886), has given a +theory of <i>hermeneutic</i> to which Bernheim has been content to refer.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-142" id="Footnote-142"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> The method of extracting information on external facts +from a writer's conceptions forms part of the theory of constructive +reasoning. <i>See</i> book iii.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-143" id="Footnote-143"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> For example, Père de Smedt, Tardif, Droysen, and even +Bernheim.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-144" id="Footnote-144"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> Descartes, who came at a time when history still +consisted in the reproduction of pre-existing narratives, did not see +how to apply methodical doubt to the subject; he therefore refused to +allow it a place among the sciences.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-145" id="Footnote-145"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> Fustel de Coulanges himself did not rise above this kind +of timidity. With reference to a speech attributed to Clovis by Gregory +of Tours, he says: "Doubtless we are unable to affirm that these words +were ever pronounced. But, all the same, we ought not to affirm, in +contradiction to Gregory of Tours, that they were not.... The wisest +course is to accept Gregory's text" (<i>Monarchie franque</i>, p. 66). The +wisest, or rather the only scientific course, is to admit that we know +nothing about the words of Clovis, for Gregory himself had no knowledge +of them.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-146" id="Footnote-146"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> Quite recently, E. Meyer, one of the most critically +expert historians of antiquity, has in his work, <i>Die Entstehung des +Judenthums</i> (Halle, 1896, 8vo), revived this strange juridical argument +in favour of the narrative of Nehemiah. M. Bouché-Leclercq, in a +remarkable study on "The Reign of Seleucus II. (Callinicus) and +Historical Criticism" (<i>Revue des Universités du Midi</i>, April-June +1897), seems, by way of reaction against the hypercriticism of Niebuhr +and Droysen, to incline towards an analogous theory: "Historical +criticism, if it is not to degenerate into agnosticism—which would be +suicidal—or into individual caprice, must place a certain amount of +trust in testimony which it cannot verify, as long as it is not flatly +contradicted by other testimony of equal value." M. Bouché-Leclercq is +right as against the historian who, "after having discredited all his +witnesses, claims to put himself in their place, and sees with their +eyes something quite different from what they themselves saw." But when +the "testimony" is insufficient to give us the scientific knowledge of a +fact, the only correct attitude is "agnosticism," that is, a confession +of ignorance; we have no right to shirk this confession because chance +has permitted the destruction of the documents which might have +contradicted the testimony.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-147" id="Footnote-147"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> The "Memoirs of Cardinal de Retz" furnish a conclusive +instance: the anecdote of the ghosts met by Retz and Turenne. A. +Feillet, who edited Retz in the <i>Collection des Grands Écrivains de la +France</i>, has shown (vol. i. p. 192) that this story, so vividly +narrated, is false from beginning to end.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-148" id="Footnote-148"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> A good example of the fascination exerted by a +circumstantial narrative is the legend respecting the origin of the +League of the three primitive Swiss cantons (Gessler and the Grütli +conspirators), which was <i>fabricated</i> by Tschudi in the sixteenth +century, became classical on the production of Schiller's "William +Tell," and has only been extirpated with the greatest difficulty. (See +Rilliet, <i>Origines de la Conféderation suisse</i>, Geneva, 1869, 8vo.)</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-149" id="Footnote-149"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> Striking example of falsehoods due to vanity are to be +found in abundance in the <i>Économies royales</i> of Sully and the +<i>Mémoires</i> of Retz.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-150" id="Footnote-150"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> Fustel de Coulanges himself went to the formulæ of the +inscriptions in honour of the emperors for a proof that the peoples +liked the imperial <i>régime</i>. "If we read the inscriptions, the sentiment +which they exhibit is always one of satisfaction and gratitude.... See +the collection of Orelli, the most frequent expressions are...." And the +enumeration of the titles of respect given to the emperors ends with +this strange aphorism: "It would show ignorance of human nature to see +nothing but flattery in all this." There is not even flattery here; +there is nothing but formulæ.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-151" id="Footnote-151"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> Suger, in his life of Louis VI., is a model of this +type.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-152" id="Footnote-152"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> The <i>Chronicon Helveticum</i> of Tschudi is a striking +instance.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-153" id="Footnote-153"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> Aristophanes and Demosthenes are two striking examples of +the power great writers have of paralysing critics and obscuring facts. +Not till the close of the nineteenth century has any one ventured to +recognise frankly their lack of good faith.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-154" id="Footnote-154"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> For example, the account of the election of Otto I. in +the <i>Gesta Ottonis</i> of Wittekind.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-155" id="Footnote-155"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> For example, the statistics on the population, the +commerce, and the wealth of European countries given by the Venetian +ambassadors of the sixteenth century, and the descriptions of the usages +of the Germans in the <i>Germania</i> of Tacitus.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-156" id="Footnote-156"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> It would be interesting to examine how much of Roman or +Merovingian history would be left if we rejected all documents but those +which represent direct observation.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-157" id="Footnote-157"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> It will be seen why we have not separately defined and +studied "first-hand documents." The question has not been raised in the +proper manner in historical practice. The distinction ought to apply to +<i>statements</i>, not to documents. It is not the document which comes to us +at first, second, or third hand; it is the statement. What is called a +"first-hand document" is nearly always composed in part of second-hand +statements about facts of which the author had no personal knowledge. +The name "second-hand document" is given to those which, like the work +of Livy, contain nothing first-hand; but the distinction is too crude to +serve as a guide in the critical examination of statements.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-158" id="Footnote-158"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> There is much less modification where the oral tradition +assumes a regular or striking form, as is the case with verses, maxims, +proverbs.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-159" id="Footnote-159"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> Sometimes the <i>form</i> of the phrase tells its own tale, +when, in the midst of a detailed narrative, obviously of legendary +origin, we come across a curt, dry entry in annalistic style, obviously +copied from a written document. That is what we find in Livy (see +Nitzsch, <i>Die römische Annalistik</i>, Leipzig, 1873, 8vo), and in Gregory +of Tours (see Loebell, <i>Gregor von Tours</i>, Leipzig, 1868, 8vo).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-160" id="Footnote-160"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> The events which strike the popular imagination and are +transmitted by legend are not generally those which seem to us the most +important. The heroes of the <i>chansons de gestes</i> are hardly known +historically. The Breton epic songs relate, not to the great historical +events, as Villemarqué's collection led people to believe, but to +obscure local episodes. The same holds of the Scandinavian sagas; for +the most part they relate to quarrels among the villagers of Iceland or +the Orkneys.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-161" id="Footnote-161"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> The theory of legend is one of the most advanced parts of +criticism. Bernheim (in his <i>Lehrbuch</i>, pp. 380-90) gives a good summary +and a bibliography of it.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-162" id="Footnote-162"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> "History of Greece," vols. i. and ii. Compare Renan, +<i>Histoire du peuple d'Israël</i>, vol. i. (Paris, 1887, 8vo), +Introduction.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-163" id="Footnote-163"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> And yet Niebuhr made use of the Roman legends to +construct a theory, which it was afterwards necessary to demolish, of +the struggle between the patricians and the plebeians; and Curtius, +twenty years after Grote, looked for historical facts in the Greek +legends.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-164" id="Footnote-164"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> See <i>supra</i>, pp. 93 <i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-165" id="Footnote-165"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 166.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-166" id="Footnote-166"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> It is often said, "The author would not have dared to +write this if it had not been true." This argument does not apply to +societies in a low state of civilisation. Louis VIII. dared to write +that John Lackland had been condemned by the verdict of his peers.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-167" id="Footnote-167"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> See above, p. 153. Similarly, the particular facts which +compose the history of forms (palæography, linguistic science) are +directly established by the analysis of the document.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-168" id="Footnote-168"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> Primitive Greece has been studied in the Homeric poems. +Mediæval private life has been reconstructed principally from the +<i>chansons de gestes</i>. (See C. V. Langlois, <i>Les Traditions sur +l'histoire de la société française au moyen âge d'après les sources +littéraires</i>, in the <i>Revue historique</i>, March-April, 1897.)</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-169" id="Footnote-169"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> Most historians refrain from rejecting a legend till its +falsity has been proved, and if by chance no document has been preserved +to contradict it, they adopt it provisionally. This is how the first +five centuries of Rome are still dealt with. This method, unfortunately +still too general, helps to prevent history from being established as a +science.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-170" id="Footnote-170"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_170_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> For the logical justification of this principle in +history see C. Seignobos, <i>Revue Philosophique</i>, July-August 1887. +Complete scientific certitude is only produced by an agreement between +observations made on different <i>methods</i>; it is to be found at the +junction of two different paths of research.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-171" id="Footnote-171"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_171_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> This case is studied and a good example given by +Bernheim, <i>Lehrbuch</i>, p. 421.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-172" id="Footnote-172"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_172_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> It is hardly necessary to enter a caution against the +childish method of counting the documents on each side of a question and +deciding by the majority. The statement of a single author who was +acquainted with a fact is evidently worth more than a hundred statements +made by persons who knew nothing about it. The rule has been formulated +long ago: <i>Ne numerentur, sed ponderentur</i>.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-173" id="Footnote-173"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_173_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 94.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-174" id="Footnote-174"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_174_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> It is hardly possible to study here the special +difficulties which arise in the application of these principles, as when +the author, wishing to conceal his indebtedness, has introduced +deviations in order to put his readers off the scent, or when the author +has combined statements taken from different documents.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-175" id="Footnote-175"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_175_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> Here we merely indicate the principle of the method of +confirmation; its applications would require a very lengthy study.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-176" id="Footnote-176"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_176_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> Père de Smedt has devoted to this question a part of his +<i>Principes de la critique histoire</i> (Paris, 1887, 12mo).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-177" id="Footnote-177"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_177_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> The solution of the question is different in the case of +the sciences of direct observation, especially the biological sciences. +Science knows nothing of the possible and the impossible; it only +recognises facts which have been correctly or incorrectly observed: +facts which had been declared impossible, as the existence of aerolites, +have been discovered to be genuine. The very notion of a miracle is +metaphysical; it implies a conception of the universe as a whole which +transcends the limits of observation. (See Wallace, "Miracles and Modern +Spiritualism.")</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-178" id="Footnote-178"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_178_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> See above, p. 194.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-179" id="Footnote-179"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_179_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> In the experimental sciences an hypothesis is a form of +question accompanied by a provisional answer.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-180" id="Footnote-180"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_180_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> Fustel de Coulanges saw the necessity of this. In the +preface to his <i>Recherches sur quelques problêmes d'histoire</i> (Paris, +1885, 8vo) he announces his intention of presenting his researches "in +the form which all my works have, that is, in the form of questions +which I ask myself, and on which I endeavour to throw light."</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-181" id="Footnote-181"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_181_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> Fustel de Coulanges himself seems to have been misled by +them: "History is a science; it does not imagine, it only sees" +(<i>Monarchie franque</i>, p. 1). "History, like every science, consists in a +process of discerning facts, analysing them, comparing them, and noting +their connections.... The historian ... seeks facts and attains them by +the minute observation of texts, as the chemist finds his in the course +of experiments conducted with minute precision" (Ibid., p. 39).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-182" id="Footnote-182"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_182_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> The subjective character of history has been brought out +into strong relief by the philosopher G. Simmel, <i>Die Probleme der +Geschichtsphilosophie</i> (Leipzig, 1892, 8vo).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-183" id="Footnote-183"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_183_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> This has been eloquently put by Carlyle and Michelet. It +is also the substance of the famous expression of Ranke: "I wish to +state how that really was" (<i>wie es eigentlich gewesen</i>).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-184" id="Footnote-184"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_184_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> Cf. pp. 219-23.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-185" id="Footnote-185"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_185_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> Curtius in his "History of Greece," Mommsen in his +"History of Rome" (before the Empire), Lamprecht in his "History of +Germany."</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-186" id="Footnote-186"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_186_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> It will be enough to mention Augustin Thierry, Michelet, +and Carlyle.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-187" id="Footnote-187"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_187_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> See P. Guiraud, <i>Fustel de Coulanges</i> (Paris, 1896, +12mo), p. 164, for some very judicious observations on this subject.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-188" id="Footnote-188"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_188_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> The classification of M. Lacombe (<i>De l'histoire +considérée comme science</i>, chap. vi.), founded on the motives of actions +and the wants they are intended to satisfy, is very judicious from the +philosophical point of view, but does not meet the practical needs of +historians; it rests on abstract psychological categories (economic, +reproductive, sympathetic, ambitious, &c.), and ends by classing +together very different species of phenomena (military institutions +along with economics).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-189" id="Footnote-189"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_189_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> Ecclesiastical institutions form part of the government; +in German manuals of antiquities they are found among institutions, +while religion is classed with the arts.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-190" id="Footnote-190"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_190_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> Modes of transport, which are often put under commerce, +form a species of industry.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-191" id="Footnote-191"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_191_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> Property is an institution of mixed character, being at +once economic, social, and political.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-192" id="Footnote-192"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_192_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> For the history and biography of this movement see +Bernheim, <i>Lehrbuch</i>, pp. 45-55.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-193" id="Footnote-193"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_193_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> It is no longer necessary to demonstrate the nullity of +the notion of <i>race</i>. It used to be applied to vague groups, formed by a +nation or a language; for race as understood by historians (Greek, +Roman, Germanic, Celtic, Slavonic races) has nothing but the name in +common with race in the anthropological sense—that is, a group of men +possessing the same hereditary characteristics. It has been reduced to +an absurdity by the abuse Taine made of it. A very good criticism of it +will be found in Lacombe (ibid., chap. xviii.), and in Robertson ("The +Saxon and the Celt," London, 1897, 8vo).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-194" id="Footnote-194"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_194_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> There is no general agreement on the proper place in +history of retrograde changes, of those oscillations which bring things +back to the point from which they started.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-195" id="Footnote-195"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_195_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> The theory of chance as affecting history has been +expounded in a masterly manner by M. Cournot, <i>Considérations sur la +marche des idées et des événements dans les temps modernes</i> (Paris, +1872, 2 vols. 8vo).</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-196" id="Footnote-196"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_196_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> Lamprecht, in a long article, <i>Was ist Kulturgeschichte</i>, +published in the <i>Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft</i>, New +Series, vol. i., 1896, has attempted to base the history of civilisation +on the theory of a collective soul of society producing "social-psychic" +phenomena common to the whole society, and differing from period to +period. This is a metaphysical hypothesis.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-197" id="Footnote-197"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_197_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> The expression <i>national</i> history, introduced in the +interests of patriotism, denotes the same thing. The history of the +nation means practically the history of the State.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-198" id="Footnote-198"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_198_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> See Cournot, ibid., i. p. iv.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-199" id="Footnote-199"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_199_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> We have already (p. 143) treated of this fault of +method.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-200" id="Footnote-200"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_200_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> The discussion of this argument, which was formerly much +used in religious history, was a favourite subject with the earlier +writers who treated of methodology, and still occupies a considerable +space in the <i>Principes de la critique historique</i> of Père de Smedt.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-201" id="Footnote-201"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_201_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> This is what Montesquieu attempted in his <i>Esprit des +Lois</i>. In a course of lectures at the Sorbonne, I have endeavoured to +give a sketch of such a comprehensive account.—[Ch. S.]</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-202" id="Footnote-202"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_202_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> See p. 204.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-203" id="Footnote-203"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_203_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> Michelet has discredited the study of physiological +influences by the abuse which he has made of it in the last part of his +"History of France"; it is, however, indispensable for the understanding +of a man's career.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-204" id="Footnote-204"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_204_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> On the subject of statistics, a method which is now +perfected, a good summary with a bibliography will be found in the +<i>Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften</i>, Jena, 1890-94, Ia. 8vo. and +two good methodical treatises, J. von. Mayr, <i>Theoretische Statistik</i> +and <i>Bevölkerungsstatistik</i>, in the collection of Marquardsen and +Seydel, Freiburg, 1895 and 1897, Ia. 8vo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-205" id="Footnote-205"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_205_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> As is done by Boardeau (<i>l'Histoire et les Historiens</i>, +Paris, 1888, 8vo), who proposes to reduce the whole of history to a +series of statistics.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-206" id="Footnote-206"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_206_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> A good example will be found in Lacombe, <i>De l'Histoire +Considérée Comme Science</i>, p. 146.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-207" id="Footnote-207"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_207_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> We have thought it useless to discuss here the question +whether history ought, in accordance with the ancient tradition, to +fulfil yet another function, whether it ought to pass judgment on men +and events, that is to supplement the description of facts by +expressions of approbation or censure, either from the point of view of +a moral ideal, general or particular (the ideal of a sect, a party, or a +nation), or from the practical point of view, by examining, as Polybius +did, whether historical actions were well or ill adapted to their +purpose. An addition of this kind could be made to any descriptive +study: the naturalist might express his sympathy with or his admiration +for an animal, he might condemn the ferocity of the tiger, and praise +the devotion of the hen to her chickens. But it is obvious that in +history, as in every other subject, judgments of this kind are foreign +to science.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-208" id="Footnote-208"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_208_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> Comparison between two facts of detail belonging to very +different aggregates (for example the comparison of Abd-el-Kader with +Jagurtha, of Napoleon with Sforza) is a striking method of exposition, +but not a means of reaching a scientific conclusion.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-209" id="Footnote-209"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_209_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> This system is still followed by several contemporary +authors, the Belgian jurist Laurent in his <i>Études sur l'histoire de +l'humanité</i>, the German Rocholl, and even Flint, the English historian +of the philosophy of history.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-210" id="Footnote-210"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_210_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> Thus Taine, in <i>Les origines de la France Contemporaine</i>, +explains the origin of the privileges of the <i>ancien régime</i> by the +services formerly rendered by the privileged classes.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-211" id="Footnote-211"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_211_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> A good criticism of the theory of progress will be found +in P. Lacombe, <i>De l'histoire Considérée Comme Science</i>.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-212" id="Footnote-212"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_212_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> See the very clear declarations of one of the principal +representatives of linguistic science in France, V. Henry, <i>Antinomies +linguistiques</i>, Paris, 1896, 8vo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-213" id="Footnote-213"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_213_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> See above, p. 284.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-214" id="Footnote-214"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_214_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> Lamprecht, in the article quoted, p. 247, after having +compared the artistic, religious, and economic evolutions of mediæval +Germany, and after having shown that they can all be divided into +periods of the same duration, explains the simultaneous transformations +of the different usages and institutions of a given society by the +transformations of the collective "social soul." This is only another +form of the same hypothesis.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-215" id="Footnote-215"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_215_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> The historians of literature, who began by searching for +the connection between the arts and the rest of social life, thus gave +the first place to the most difficult question.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-216" id="Footnote-216"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_216_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> For the earlier epochs, consult good histories of Greek, +Roman, and mediæval literature which contain chapters devoted to +"historians." For the modern period, consult the Introduction of M. G. +Monod to vol. i. of the <i>Revue historique</i>; the work by F. X. v. Wegde, +<i>Geschichte der deutschen Historiographie</i> (1885), relates only to +Germany, and is mediocre. Some "Notes on History in France in the +Nineteenth Century" have been published by C. Jullian as an Introduction +to his <i>Extraits des historiens français du xix<sup>e</sup> siècle</i> (Paris, +1897, 12mo). The history of modern historiography has still to be +written. See the partial attempt by E. Bernheim, <i>Lehrbuch</i>, pp. 13 +<i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-217" id="Footnote-217"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_217_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> It would be interesting to find out what are the earliest +printed books furnished with notes in the modern fashion. Bibliophiles +whom we have consulted are unable to say, their attention never having +been drawn to the point.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-218" id="Footnote-218"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_218_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> It is clear that the romantic methods which are used for +the purpose of obtaining effects of local colour and "revising" the +past, often puerile in the hands of the ablest writers, are altogether +intolerable when they are employed by any others. See a good example +(criticism of a book of M. Mourin by M. Monod) in the <i>Revue Critique</i>, +1874, ii. pp. 163 <i>sqq.</i></p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-219" id="Footnote-219"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_219_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> It is a commonplace, and an error all the same, to +maintain the exact opposite of the above, namely, that the works of +critical scholars live, while the works of historians grow antiquated, +so that scholars gain a more solid reputation than historians do: "Père +Daniel is now read no longer, and Père Anselme is always read." But the +works of scholars become antiquated too, and the fact that not all the +parts of the work of Père Anselme have yet been superseded (that is why +he is still read), ought not to deceive us: the great majority of the +works written by scholars, like those of researchers in the sciences +proper, are provisional and doomed to oblivion.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-220" id="Footnote-220"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_220_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> "It is in vain that those professionally concerned try to +deceive themselves on this point; not everything in the past is +interesting." "Supposing we were to write the Life of the Duke of +Angoulême," says Pécuchet. "But he was an imbecile!" answers Bouvard; +"Never mind; personages of the second order often have an enormous +influence, and perhaps he was able to control the march of events."—G. +Flaubert, <i>Bouvard et Pécuchet</i>, p. 157.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-221" id="Footnote-221"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_221_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> As persons of moderate ability have a tendency to prefer +insignificant subjects, there is active competition in the treatment of +such subjects. We often have occasion to note the simultaneous +appearance of several monographs on the same subject. It is not rare for +the subject to be altogether devoid of importance.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-222" id="Footnote-222"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_222_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> Interesting subjects for monographs are not always +capable of being treated: there are some which the state of the sources +puts out of the question. This is why beginners, even those who have +ability, experience so much embarrassment in choosing subjects for their +first monographs, when they are not aided by good advice or good +fortune, and often lose themselves in attempting the impossible. It +would be very severe, and very unjust, to judge any one from the list of +his <i>first</i> monographs.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-223" id="Footnote-223"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_223_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> In practice it is proper to give at the beginning a list +of the sources used in the whole of the monograph (with appropriate +bibliographical information as to the printed works, and in the case of +manuscripts, a mention of the nature of the documents and their +shelf-marks); besides, each special statement should be accompanied by +its proof: the exact text of the supporting document should be quoted, +if possible, so that the reader may be in a position to verify the +interpretation; otherwise an analysis of it should be given in a note, +or, at the least, the title of the document, with its shelf-mark, or +with a precise indication of the place where it was published. The +general rule is to put the reader in a position to know the exact +reasons for which such and such conclusions have been adopted at each +stage of the analysis. +</p><p> +Beginners, resembling ancient authors in this respect, naturally do not +observe all these rules. Frequently, instead of quoting the text or the +titles of documents, they refer to these by their shelf-mark, or by the +title of the general collection in which they are printed, from which +the reader can learn nothing as to the nature of the text adduced. The +following is another mistake of the crudest kind, and yet of frequent +occurrence: Beginners, and persons of little experience, do not always +understand why the custom has been introduced of inserting footnotes; at +the bottom of the pages of the books they have they see a fringe of +notes; they think themselves bound to fringe their own books in the same +way, but their notes are adventitious and purely ornamental; they do not +serve either to exhibit the proof or to enable the reader to verify the +statements. All these methods are inadmissible, and should be vigorously +denounced.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-224" id="Footnote-224"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_224_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> Almost all beginners have an unfortunate tendency to +wander off into superfluous digressions, to amass reflections and pieces +of information which have no relevance to the main subject; they would +recognise, if they reflected, that the causes of this tendency are bad +taste, a kind of naïve vanity, sometimes mental confusion.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-225" id="Footnote-225"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_225_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> We meet with declarations like the following: "I have +been long familiar with the documents of this period and this class. I +have an impression that such and such conclusions, which I cannot prove, +are true." Of two things one: either the author can give the reasons for +his impression, and then we can judge them, or he cannot give them, and +we may assume that he has none of serious value.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-226" id="Footnote-226"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_226_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> This difference has a tendency to disappear. The most +recent alphabetical collections of historical facts (the +<i>Realencyclopædie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> of +Pauly-Wissowa, the <i>Dictionnaire des antiquités</i> of Daremberg and +Saglio, the <i>Dictionary of National Biography</i> of Leslie Stephen and +Sidney Lee) are furnished with a sufficiently ample apparatus. It is +principally in biographical dictionaries that the custom of giving no +proofs tends to persist; see the <i>Allgemeine deutsche Biographie</i>, &c.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-227" id="Footnote-227"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_227_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> <i>Revue Critique</i>, 1874, i. p. 327.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-228" id="Footnote-228"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_228_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> The custom of appending to "histories," that is to +narratives of political events, summaries of the results obtained by the +special historians of art, literature, &c., still persists. A "History +of France" would not be considered complete if it did not contain +chapters on the history of art, literature, manners, &c., in France. +However, it is not the summary account of special evolutions, described +at second hand from the works of specialists, which is in its proper +place in a scientific "History"; it is the study of those general facts +which have dominated the special evolutions in their entirety.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-229" id="Footnote-229"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_229_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> It is hard to imagine what it is possible for the most +interesting and best established results of modern criticism to become, +in the hands of negligent and unskilful popularisers. The persons who +know most of these possibilities are those who have occasion to read the +improvised "compositions" of candidates in history examinations: the +ordinary defects of inferior popularisation are here pushed sometimes to +an absurd length.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-230" id="Footnote-230"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_230_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 266.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-231" id="Footnote-231"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_231_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> We have spoken above of the element of subjectivity which +it is impossible to eliminate from historical construction, and which +has been misinterpreted to the extent of denying history the character +of a science: this element of subjectivity which troubled Pécuchet (G. +Flaubert, <i>Bouvard et Pécuchet</i>, p. 157) and Sylvestre Bonnard (A. +France, <i>Le crime de Silvestre Bonnard</i>, p. 310), and which causes Faust +to say: +</p><p> +</p><p class="poem"> +<span style="margin-left: 5em;">"Die Zeiten der Vergangenheit</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln."</span><br /> +</p> +<p> +["Past times are to us a book with seven seals. What you call the spirit +of the times is at bottom your own spirit, in which the times are +mirrored."—Goethe, <i>Faust</i>, i. 3.]</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-232" id="Footnote-232"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_232_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> A saying attributed to a "Sorbonne professor" by M. de la +Blanchère (<i>Revue Critique</i>, 1895, i. p. 176). Others have declaimed on +the theme that the knowledge of history is mischievous and paralyses. +See F. Nietzsche, <i>Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen</i>, II. <i>Nutzen und +Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben</i>, Leipzig, 1874, 8vo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-233" id="Footnote-233"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_233_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> History and the social sciences are mutually dependent on +each other; they progress in parallel lines by a continual interchange +of services. The social sciences furnish a knowledge of the present, +required by history for the purpose of making representations of the +facts and reasoning from documents. History gives the information about +evolutions which is necessary in order to understand the present.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-234" id="Footnote-234"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_234_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> The same institution has been adopted in German-speaking +countries under the name of <i>Leitfaden</i> (guiding-thread), and in +English-speaking countries under the name of <i>Text-book</i>.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-235" id="Footnote-235"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_235_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> We must make an exception of Michelet's <i>Précis de +l'histoire moderne</i>, and do Duruy the justice to acknowledge that in his +school-books, even in the first editions, he has endeavoured, often +successfully, to make his narratives both interesting and instructive.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-236" id="Footnote-236"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_236_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> For a criticism of this method, see above, p. 265.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-237" id="Footnote-237"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_237_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> The most complete, and probably the most accurate, +account of the state of the secondary teaching of history after the +reforms has been given by a Spaniard, R. Altamira, <i>La Enseñanza de la +historia</i>, 2nd edition, Madrid, 1895, 8vo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-238" id="Footnote-238"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_238_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> We are here treating only of France. But, in order to +dispel an illusion of the French public, we may remark that historical +pedagogy is still less advanced in English-speaking countries, where the +methods used are still mechanical, and even in German-speaking +countries, where it is hampered by the conception of patriotic +teaching.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-239" id="Footnote-239"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_239_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> I have endeavoured, in a course of lectures at the +Sorbonne, to do a part of this work.—[Ch. S.]</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-240" id="Footnote-240"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_240_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> Let it be noted, however, that to the question put to the +candidates for the modern Baccalaureate in July 1897, "What purpose is +served by the teaching of history?" eighty per cent. of the candidates +answered, in effect, either because they believed it, or because they +thought it would please, "To promote patriotism."—[C. V. L.]</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-241" id="Footnote-241"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_241_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> This is what has been produced in Germany under the name +of <i>Quellenbuch</i>.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-242" id="Footnote-242"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_242_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> The same pedagogic theory will be found in the preface to +my <i>Histoire narrative et descriptive des anciens peuples de l'Orient</i>, +Supplement for the use of professors, Paris, 1890, 8vo.—[Ch. S.]</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-243" id="Footnote-243"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_243_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> I have treated this question in the <i>Revue +universitaire</i>, 1896, vol. i.—[Ch. S.]</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-244" id="Footnote-244"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_244_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> On the organisation of higher education in France at this +epoch and on the first reforms, see the excellent work of M. L. Liard, +<i>l'Enseignement supérieur en France</i>, Paris, 1888-94, 2 vols. 8vo.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-245" id="Footnote-245"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_245_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> E. Lavisse, <i>Questions d'enseignement national</i>, p. 12.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-246" id="Footnote-246"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_246_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. 55.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-247" id="Footnote-247"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_247_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> <i>Revue historique</i>, lxiii. (1897), p. 96.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-248" id="Footnote-248"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_248_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> See the <i>Revue internationale d'enseignement</i>, Feb. 1893; +the <i>Revue universitaire</i>, June 1892, Oct. and Nov. 1894, July 1895; and +the <i>Political Science Quarterly</i>, Sept 1894.</p></li> + +<li class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote-249" id="Footnote-249"></a><a title="Return to text." href="#FNanchor_249_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> <i>Revue historique</i>, l.c. p. 98. I have developed +elsewhere what I have here contented myself with stating. See the <i>Revue +internationale de l'enseignement</i>, Nov. 1897.—[C. V. L.]</p></li> +</ol> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<hr class="full" /> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Study of History, by +Charles V. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Introduction to the Study of History + +Author: Charles V. Langlois + Charles Seignobos + +Translator: G. G. Berry + +Release Date: August 8, 2009 [EBook #29637] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRODUCTION--STUDY OF HISTORY *** + + + + +Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was +produced from scanned images of public domain material +from the Google Print project.) + + + + + + + + + +INTRODUCTION + +TO THE + +STUDY OF HISTORY + +BY + +CH. V. LANGLOIS & CH. SEIGNOBOS + +OF THE SORBONNE + +AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION BY G. G. BERRY + +WITH A PREFACE BY F. YORK POWELL + +NEW YORK + +HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY + +1904 + + + + +TO THE READER + + +It is a pleasure to recommend this useful and well-written little book +to English readers. It will both interest and help. There are, for +instance, a few pages devoted to the question of evidence that will be +an aid to every one desirous of getting at the truth respecting any +series of facts, as well as to the student of history. No one can read +it without finding out that to the historian history is not merely a +pretty but rather difficult branch of literature, and that a history +book is not necessarily good if it appears to the literary critic +'readable and interesting,' nor bad because it seems to him 'hard or +heavy reading.' The literary critic, in fact, is beginning to find out +that he reads a history as he might read a treatise on mathematics or +linguistics, at his peril, and that he is no judge of its value or lack +of value. Only the expert can judge that. It will probably surprise some +people to find that in the opinion of our authors (who agree with Mr. +Morse Stephens and with the majority of scholars here) the formation and +expression of ethical judgments, the approval or condemnation of Caius +Julius Caesar, or of Caesar Borgia, is not a thing within the historian's +province. His business is to find out what can be known about the +characters and situations with which he is engaged, to put what he can +ascertain before his readers in a clear form, and lastly to consider and +attempt to ascertain what scientific use can be made of these facts he +has ascertained. Ethic on its didactic side is outside his business +altogether. In fact MM. Langlois and Seignobos write for those "who +propose to deal with documents [especially written documents] with a +view to preparing or accomplishing historic work in a scientific way." +They have the temerity to view history as a scientific pursuit, and they +are endeavouring to explain to the student who intends to pursue this +branch of anthropologic science the best and safest methods of +observation open to him, hence they modestly term their little book "an +essay on the method of historic sciences." They are bold enough to look +forward to a day, as not far distant, when a sensible or honest man will +no more dare to write history unscientifically than he would to-day be +willing to waste his time and that of others on observing the heavens +unscientifically, and registering as trustworthy his unchecked and +untimed observations. + +Whether we like it or not, history has got to be scientifically studied, +and it is not a question of style but of accuracy, of fulness of +observation, and correctness of reasoning, that is before the student. +Huxley and Darwin and Clifford have shown that a book may be good +science and yet good reading. Truth has not always been found repulsive +although she was not bedizened with rhetorical adornments; indeed, the +very pursuit of her has long been recognised as arduous but extremely +fascinating. _Toute trouvaille_, as our authors aptly remark, _procure +une jouissance_. + +It will be a positive gain to have the road cleared of a mass of +rubbish, that has hindered the advance of knowledge. History must be +worked at in a scientific spirit, as biology or chemistry is worked at. +As M. Seignobos says, "On ne s'arrete plus guere aujourd'hui a discuter, +sous sa forme theologique la theorie de la Providence dans l'Histoire. +Mais la tendence a expliquer les faits historiques par les causes +transcendantes persiste dans des theories plus modernes ou la +metaphysique se deguise sous des formes scientifiques." We should +certainly get rid in time of those curious Hegelianisms "under which in +lay disguise lurks the old theologic theory of final causes"; or the +pseudo-patriotic supposition of the "historic mission (Beruf) attributed +to certain people or persons." The study of historic facts does not even +make for the popular newspaper theory of the continuous and necessary +progress of humanity, it shows only "partial and intermittent advances, +and gives us no reason to attribute them to a permanent cause inherent +in collective humanity rather than to a series of local accidents." But +the historian's path is still like that of Bunyan's hero, bordered by +pitfalls and haunted by hobgoblins, though certain of his giant +adversaries are crippled and one or two slain. He has also his own +faults to master, or at least to check, as MM. Langlois and Seignobos +not infrequently hint, _e.g._ "Nearly all beginners have a vexatious +tendency to go off into superfluous digressions, heaping up reflexion +and information that have no bearing on the main subject. They will +recognise, if they think over it, that the causes of this leaning are +bad taste, a kind of naive vanity, sometimes a disordered mind." Again: +"The faults of historic works intended for the general public ... are +the results of the insufficient preparation of the bad literary training +of the popularisers." What an admirable criticism there is too of that +peculiarly German shortcoming (one not, however, unknown elsewhere), +which results in men "whose learning is ample, whose monographs destined +for scholars are highly praiseworthy, showing themselves capable, when +they write for the public, of sinning heavily against scientific +methods," so that, in their determination to stir their public, "they +who are so scrupulous and particular when it is a question of dealing +with minutiae, abandon themselves like the mass of mankind to their +natural inclinations when they come to set forth general questions. They +take sides, they blame, they praise, they colour, they embellish, they +allow themselves to take account of personal, patriotic, ethical, or +metaphysical considerations. Above all, they apply themselves with what +talent has fallen to their lot to the task of creating a work of art, +and, so applying themselves, those of them who lack talent become +ridiculous, and the talent of those who possess it is spoilt by their +anxiety for effect." + +On the other hand, while the student is rejoicing at the smart raps +bestowed upon the Teutonic offender, he is warned against the error of +thinking that "provided he can make himself understood, the historian +has the right to use a faulty, low, careless, or clogged style.... +Seeing the extreme complexity of the phenomena he must endeavour to +describe, he has not the privilege of writing badly. But he ought +_always_ to write well, and not to bedizen his prose with extra finery +once a week." + +Of course much that is said in this book has been said before, but I do +not know any book wherein the student of history will find such an +organised collection of practical and helpful instructions. There are +several points on which one is unable to find oneself in agreement with +MM. Langlois and Seignobos, but these occur mainly where they are +dealing with theory; as far as practical work goes, one finds oneself in +almost perfect concurrence with them. That they know little of the way +in which history is taught and studied in England or Canada or the +United States is not at all an hindrance to the use of their book. The +student may enjoy the pleasure of making his own examples out of English +books to the rules they lay down. He may compare their cautions against +false reasoning and instances of fallacy with those set forth in that +excellent and concise essay of Bentham's, which is apparently unknown to +them. He will not fail to see that we in England have much to learn in +this subject of history from the French. The French archives are not so +fine as ours, but they take care to preserve their local and provincial +documents, as well as their national and central records; they give +their archivists a regular training, they calendar and make accessible +all that time and fate have spared of pre-revolutionary documents. We +have not got farther than the provision of a fine central Record Office +furnished with very inadequate means for calendaring the masses of +documents already stored and monthly accumulating there, though we have +lately set up at Oxford, Cambridge, and London the regular courses of +palaeography, diplomatic, and bibliography, that constitute the +preliminary training of the archivist or historical researcher. We want +more: we must have county archives, kept by trained archivists. We must +have more trained archivists at the disposal of the Deputy Keeper of the +Rolls, we must have such means as the _Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des +Chartes_ for full reports of special and minute investigations and +discoveries, for hand-lists and the like, before we can be considered as +doing as much for history as the heavily taxed French nation does +cheerfully, and with a sound confidence that the money it spends wisely +in science is in the truest sense money saved. + +For those interested in the teaching of history, this book is one of the +most suggestive helps that has yet appeared. With a blackboard, a text +(such as are now cheap), or a text-book (such as Stubbs or Prothero or +Gardiner), an atlas, and access to a decent public library and an +average local museum, the teacher who has mastered its intent should +never be at a loss for an interesting catechetical lecture or exposition +to a class, whether of adults or of younger folk. + +Not the least practical part of the work of MM. Langlois and Seignobos +has been the consideration they have given to such every-day issues as +the teacher is constantly called upon to face. History cannot safely be +neglected in schools, though it is by no means necessary that the +Universities should turn out large bodies of trained historians. It is +possible indeed that the serious study of history might gain were there +fewer external inducements at the Universities to lead to the popularity +of the History Schools. But in this very popularity there lies a great +opportunity for concerted efforts, not only to better the processes of +study, but also to clear off the vast arrears of classification and +examination of the erroneous historic material at our disposition in +this country. + +The historian has been (as our authors hint) too much the ally of the +politician; he has used his knowledge as material for preaching +democracy in the United States, absolutism in Prussia, Orleanist +opposition in France, and so on (English readers will easily recall +examples from their own countrymen's work): in the century to come he +will have to ally himself with the students of physical science, with +whose methods his own have so much in common. It is not patriotism, nor +religion, nor art, but the attainment of truth that is and must be the +historian's single aim. + +But it is also to be borne in mind that history is an excellent +instrument of culture, for, as our authors point out, "the practice and +method of historic investigation is a pursuit extremely healthful for +the mind, freeing it from the disease of credulity," and fortifying it +in other ways as a discipline, though precisely how to best use history +for this purpose is still in some ways uncertain, and after all it is a +matter which concerns Paedagogic and Ethic more than the student of +history, though it is plain that MM. Langlois and Seignobos have not +neglected to consider it. + +One can hardly help thinking, too, that, in schools and places where the +young are trained, something might be gained by treating such books as +Plutarch's Lives not as history (for which they were never intended) but +as text-books of ethic, as examples of conduct, public or private. The +historian very properly furnishes the ethical student with material, +though it is not right to reckon the ethical student's judgment upon the +historian's facts as history in any sense. It is not an historian's +question, for instance, whether Napoleon was right or wrong in his +conduct at Jaffa, or Nelson in his behaviour at Naples; that is a matter +for the student of ethic or the religious dogmatist to decide: all that +the historian has to do is to get what conclusion he can out of the +conflict of evidence, and to decide whether Napoleon or Nelson actually +did that of which their enemies accused them, or, if he cannot arrive at +fact, to state probability, and the reasons that incline him to lean to +the affirmative or negative. + +As to the possibility of a "philosophy of history," a real one, not the +mockeries that have long been discredited by scientific students, the +reader will find some pregnant remarks here in the epilogue and the +chapters that precede it. There is an absence of unreasonable optimism +in our authors' views. "It is probable that hereditary differences have +contributed to determine events; so that in part historic evolution is +produced by physiological and anthropologic causes. But history +furnishes no trustworthy process by which it may be possible to +determine the action of those hereditary differences between man and +man," _i.e._ she starts with races 'endowed' each with peculiarities +that make them 'disposed to act' somewhat differently under similar +pressure. "History is only able to grasp the conditions of their +existence." And what M. Seignobos calls the final problem--_Is evolution +produced merely by changed conditions?_--must according to him remain +insoluble by the legitimate processes of history. The student may accept +or reject this view as his notions of evidence prompt him to do. M. +Seignobos has at all events laid down a basis for discussion in +sufficiently clear terms. + +As to the composition of the joint work we are told that M. Seignobos +has been especially concerned with the chapters that touch theory, and +M. Langlois with those that deal with practice. Both authors have +already proved their competence--M. Seignobos' labours on Modern History +have been widely appreciated, while M. Langlois' "Hand-book of Historic +Bibliography" is already a standard text-book, and bids fair to remain +so. We are grateful to both of them for the pains they have taken to be +clear and definite, and for their determination to shirk none of the +difficulties that have met them. They have produced a hand-book that +students will use and value in proportion to their use of it, a book +that will save much muddle of thought and much loss of time, a book +written in the right spirit to inspire its readers. We are not bound to +agree with all M. Seignobos' dogmas, and can hardly accept, for +instance, M. Langlois' apology for the brutal methods of controversy +that are an evil legacy from the theologian and the grammarian, and are +apt to darken truth and to cripple the powers of those who engage in +them. For though it is possible that the secondary effect of these +barbarous scuffles may sometimes have been salutary in deterring +impostors from 'taking up' history, I am not aware of any positive +examples to justify this opinion. There is this, however, to be said, +that fully conscious of their own fallibility, M. Langlois and his +excellent collaborator have supplied in their canons of criticism and +maxims the best corrections of any mistakes into which they may have +fallen by the way. Is not the House of Fame, as the poet tells us, a +more wonderful and quaintly wrought habitation than _Domus Dedali_ +itself? And may not honest historians be pardoned if they are sometimes +confused for a brief moment by the never-ending noise and marvellous +motion of that deceptive mint and treasury, and fatigued by the +continual trial and examination of the material that issues therefrom? +The student will, at least, learn from MM. Langlois and Seignobos to +have no mercy on his own shortcomings, to spare no pains, to grudge no +expenditure of time or energy in the investigation of a carefully chosen +and important historical problem, to aim at doing the bit of work in +hand so thoroughly that it will not need to be done again. + +It would be unjust to omit here to mention Dr. Bernheim's "Exposition of +Historic Method," or _Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_, so justly +praised and used by our authors, but I believe that as an introduction +to the subject, intended for the use of English or North American +students, this little volume will be found the handier and more +practical work. Of its value to English workers I can speak from +experience, and I know many teachers to whom it will be welcome in its +present form. + +It would have been easy to 'adapt' this book by altering its examples, +by modifying its excellent plan, by cutting here and carving there to +the supposed convenience of an imaginary public, but the better part has +been chosen of giving English readers this manual precisely as it +appeared in French. And surely one would rather read what M. Langlois, +an experienced teacher and a tried scholar, thought on a moot point, +than be presented with the views of some English 'adaptor' who had read +his book, as to what he would have said had he been an Englishman +lecturing to English students. That the present translator has taken +much pains to faithfully report his authors, I know (though I have not +compared English and French throughout every page), so that I can +commend his honest work to the reader as I have already commended the +excellent matter that he has been concerned in preparing for a wider +public than the French original could command. + +F. YORK POWELL. + +ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD, _July 1898_. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +PAGE + +TO THE READER v + + +AUTHORS' PREFACE + +What this work is _not_ meant to be--Works on the Philosophy +of History 1 + +What it _is_ meant to be 2 + +Existing works on Historical Methods--Droysen, Freeman, +Daunou, &c. 3 + +Reasons why the study of method is useful 7 + +Bernheim's _Lehrbuch_--In what way it leaves room for another +book 10 + +Need of warning to students 11 + +The general public 13 + +Distribution of the work between the two authors 13 + + +BOOK I + +PRELIMINARY STUDIES + +CHAPTER I + +THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS + +Documents: their nature, use, necessity 17 + +Utility of _Heuristic_, or the art of discovering documents 18 + +The difficulties of Heuristic--Ancient times--H. H. Bancroft--State +of things at the Renaissance 19 + +Growth of libraries--Collectors--Effects of revolutionary +confiscation in promoting the concentration and the +accessibility of documents 20 + +Possible future progress--Need for the cataloguing and indexing +of documents 27 + +Students and bibliographical knowledge--Effect of present +conditions in deterring men from historical work 32 + +The remedies--Official cataloguing of libraries--Activity of +learned societies--of governments 34 + +Different kinds of bibliographical works needed by students 37 + +Different degrees of difficulty of Heuristic in different parts of +History--to be kept in view when choosing a subject of +research 38 + + +CHAPTER II + +"AUXILIARY SCIENCES" + +Documents are raw material, and need a preliminary elaboration 42 + +Obsolete views on the historian's apprenticeship--Mably, +Daunou 43 + +Commonplace and exaggeration on this subject--Freeman--Various +futilities 45 + +The scientific conception of the historian's +apprenticeship--Palaeography--Epigraphy--Philology--Diplomatic 48 + +History of Literature--Archaeology 51 + +Criticism of phrase "auxiliary sciences"--The subjects not all +_sciences_--None of them auxiliary to the _whole_ of History 52 + +This scientific conception is of recent growth--The Ecole des +Chartes--Modern manuals of Palaeography, Epigraphy, +&c.--List of the chief of them 55 + + +BOOK II + + +_ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS_ + +CHAPTER I + +GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE + +Direct and indirect knowledge of facts 63 + +History not a science of direct observation--Its data obtained +by chains of reasoning 64 + +Twofold division of Historical Criticism: _External_, investigating +the transmission and origin of documents and the +statements in them; _Internal_, dealing with the content +of the statements and their probability 66 + +Complexity of Historical Criticism 67 + +Necessity of Criticism--The human mind naturally uncritical 68 + + +SECTION I.--EXTERNAL CRITICISM + + +CHAPTER II + +TEXTUAL CRITICISM + +Errors in the reproduction of documents: their frequency +under the most favourable conditions--Mistakes of +copyists--"Sound" and "corrupt" texts 71 + +Necessity of emendation--The method subject to fixed rules 73 + +Methods of textual criticism: (_a_) original preserved; (_b_) a +single copy preserved, conjectural emendation; (_c_) several +copies preserved, comparison of errors, families of manuscripts 75 + +Different degrees of difficulty of textual criticism: its results +negative--The "emendation game"--What still remains +to be done 83 + + +CHAPTER III + +CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP + PAGE +Natural tendency to accept indications of authorship--Examples +of false attributions--Necessity of verification--Application +of internal criticism 87 + +Interpolations and continuations--Evidence of style 92 + +Plagiarism and borrowings by authors from each other--The +filiation of statements--The investigation of sources 93 + +Importance of investigations of authorship--The extreme of +distrust to be avoided--Criticism only a means to an end 98 + +CHAPTER IV + +CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES + +Importance of classification--The first impulse wrong--The +note-book system not the best--Nor the ledger-system--Nor +the "system" of trusting the memory 101 + +The system of slips the best--Its drawbacks--Means of +obviating them--The advantage of good "private librarianship" 103 + +Methods of work vary according to the object aimed at--The +compiling of _Regesta_ or of a _Corpus_--Classification by +time, place, species, and form 105 + +Chronological arrangement to be used when possible--Geographical +arrangement best for inscriptions--When these +fail, alphabetical order of "incipit"--Logical order useful +for some special purposes--Not for a _Corpus_ or for _Regesta_ 107 + +CHAPTER V + +CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS + +Different opinions on the importance and dignity of external +criticism--It is justified by its necessity--But is only +preliminary to the higher part of historical work 112 + + +Distinction between "historians" and "critical scholars" [Fr. +"_erudite_"]--Expediency, within limits, of the division of +labour in this respect--The exceptional skill acquired by +specialists--Difference of work the corollary of difference +of natural aptitudes 115 + +The natural aptitudes required for external criticism--Fondness +for the work, which is distasteful to the creative +genius--The puzzle-solving instinct--Accuracy and its +opposite--"Froude's Disease"--Patience, order, perseverance 121 + +The mental defects produced by devotion to external +criticism--Its paralysing effect on the +over-scrupulous--Hypercriticism--Dilettantism 128 + +The "organisation of scientific labour" 135 + +The harshness of judgment attributed to scholars, not always +rightly--Much of it a proper jealousy for historic truth--Bad +work nowadays soon detected 136 + + +SECTION II.--INTERNAL CRITICISM + +CHAPTER VI + +INTERPRETATIVE CRITICISM (HERMENEUTIC) + +Internal criticism deals with the mental operations which +begin with the observation of a fact and end with the +writing of words in a document--It is divided into two +stages: the first concerned with what the author meant, +the second with the value of his statements 141 + +Necessity of separating the two operations--Danger of reading +opinions into a text 143 + +The analysis of documents--The method of slips--Completeness +necessary 145 + +Necessity of linguistic study--General knowledge of a language +not enough--Particular variety of a language as used at a +given time, in a given country, by a given author--The +rule of context 146 + +Different degrees of difficulty in interpretation 149 + +Oblique senses: allegory, metaphor, &c.--How to detect them--Former +tendency to find symbolism everywhere--Modern +tendency to find allusion everywhere 151 + +Results of interpretation--Subjective inquiries 153 + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE GOOD FAITH +AND ACCURACY OF AUTHORS + +Natural tendency to trust documents--Criticism originally due +to contradictions--The rule of methodical doubt--Defective +modes of criticism 155 + +Documents to be analysed, and the irreducible elements +criticised separately 159 + +The "accent of sincerity"--No trust to be placed in impressions +produced by the form of statements 161 + +Criticism examines the conditions affecting (1) the composition +of the document as a whole; (2) the making of each particular +statement--In both cases using a previously made +list of possible reasons for distrust or confidence 162 + +Reasons for doubting good faith: (1) the author's interest; +(2) the force of circumstances, official reports; (3) sympathy +and antipathy; (4) vanity; (5) deference to public +opinion; (6) literary distortion 166 + +Reasons for doubting accuracy: (1) the author a bad observer, +hallucinations, illusions, prejudices; (2) the author not +well situated for observing; (3) negligence and indifference; +(4) fact not of nature to be directly observed 172 + +Cases where the author is not the original observer of the +fact--Tradition, written and oral--Legend--Anecdotes--Anonymous +statements 177 + +Special reasons without which anonymous statements are not +to be accepted: (1) falsehood improbable because (_a_) the +fact is opposed to interest or vanity of author, (_b_) the fact +was generally known, (_c_) the fact was indifferent to the +author; (2) error improbable because the fact was too big +to mistake; (3) the fact seemed improbable or unintelligible +to the author 185 + +How critical operations are shortened in practice 189 + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR FACTS + +The conceptions of authors, whether well or ill founded, are +the subject-matter of certain studies--They necessarily +contain elements of truth, which, under certain restrictions, +may sometimes be inferred from them 191 + +The statements of authors, taken singly, do not rise above +probability--The only _sure_ results of criticism are _negative_--To +establish facts it is necessary to compare different +statements 194 + +Contradictions between statements, real and apparent 198 + +Agreement of statements--Necessity of proving them to be +independent--Perfect agreement not so conclusive as +occasional coincidence--Cases where different observations +of the same fact are not independent--General facts +the easiest to prove 199 + +Different facts, each imperfectly proved, corroborate each +other when they harmonise 204 + +Disagreement between documents and other sources of +knowledge--Improbable statements--Miracles--When science +and history conflict, history should give way 205 + + +BOOK III + +_SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS_ + + +CHAPTER I + +GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION + +The materials of Historical Construction are isolated facts, +of very different kinds, of very different degrees of +generality, each belonging to a definite time and place, +of different degrees of certainty 211 + +Subjectivity of History 214 + +The facts learnt from documents relate to (1) living beings +and material objects; (2) actions, individual and collective; +(3) motives and conceptions 217 + +The facts of the past must be imagined on the model of those +of the present--Danger of error especially in regard to +mental facts 219 + +Some of the conditions of human life are permanent--The +study of these provides a framework into which details +taken from documents are to be fitted--For this purpose +systematic lists of questions are to be used, drawn up +beforehand, and relating to the universal conditions of life 224 + +Outline of Historical Construction--The division of +labour--Historians must use the works of their colleagues and +predecessors, but not without critical precautions 228 + +CHAPTER II + +THE GROUPING OF FACTS + +Historical facts may be classified and arranged either according +to their time and place, or according to their nature--Scheme +for the _logical_ classification of general historical +facts 232 + +The selection of facts for treatment--The history of civilisation +and "battle-history"--Both needed 236 + +The determination of groups of men--Precautions to be +observed--The notion of "race" 238 + +The study of institutions--Danger of being misled by metaphors--The +questions which should be asked 241 + +Evolutions: operations involved in the study of them--The +place of particular facts (events) in evolution--Important +and unimportant facts 244 + +Periods--How they should be defined 249 + +CHAPTER III + +CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING + +Incompleteness of the facts yielded by documents--Cautions +to be observed in filling up the gaps by reasoning 252 + +The argument from silence--When admissible 254 + +Positive reasoning based on documents--The general principles +employed must enter into details, and the particular +facts to which they are applied must not be taken in +isolation 256 + +CHAPTER IV + +THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULAE + +History, like every science, needs formulae by which the facts +acquired may be condensed into manageable form 262 + +Descriptive formulae--Should retain characteristic features--Should +be as concrete as possible 264 + +Formulae describing general facts--How constructed--Conventional +forms and realities--Mode of formulating an +evolution 266 + +Formulae describing unique facts--Principle of choice--"Character" +of persons--Precautions in formulating +them--Formulae describing events 270 + +Quantitative formulae--Operations by which they may be +obtained: measurement, enumeration, valuation, sampling, +generalisation--Precautions to be observed in generalising 274 + +Formulae expressing relations--General conclusions--Estimation +of the extent and value of the knowledge acquired--Imperfection +of data not to be forgotten in construction 279 + +Groups and their classification 282 + +The "solidarity" of social phenomena--Necessity of studying +causes--Metaphysical hypothesis--Providence--Conception +of events as "rational"--The Hegelian "ideas"--The +historical "mission"--The theory of the general +progress of humanity 285 + +The conception of society as an organism--The comparative +method--Statistics--Causes cannot be investigated +directly, as in other sciences--Causation as exhibited in +the sequence of particular events 288 + +The study of the causes of social evolution must look beyond +abstractions to the concrete, acting and thinking men--The +place of hereditary characteristics in determining +evolution 292 + + +CHAPTER V + +EXPOSITION + +Former conceptions of history-writing--The ancient and +mediaeval ideal--The "history of civilisation"--The +modern historical "manual"--The romantic ideal at the +beginning of the century--History regarded as a branch +of literature up to 1850 296 + +The modern scientific ideal--Monographs--Right choice of +subject--References--Chronological order--Unambiguous +titles--Economy of erudition 303 + +General works--_A._ meant for students and specialists--Works +of reference or "repertories" and scientific manuals of +special branches of history--Their form and style--Collaboration +in their production--Scientific general +histories 307 + +_B._ Works intended for the public--The best kind of +popularisation--The inferior kind--Specialists who lower their +standard when they write for the public--The literary +style suitable for history 311 + + +CONCLUSION + +Summary description of the methods of history--The future +of history 316 + +The utility of history--Not directly applicable to present +conditions--Affords an explanation of the present--Helps +(and is helped by) the social sciences--A means of intellectual +culture 319 + + +APPENDIX I + +THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE + +Late introduction of history as a subject of secondary +instruction--Defective methods employed up to the end of the +Second Empire 325 + +The reform movement--Questions involved relating to general +organisation--Choice of subjects--Order of teaching--Methods +of instruction--These questions to be answered +in the way that will make history most useful as a means +of social culture 328 + +Material aids--Engravings--Books--Methods of teaching 332 + + +APPENDIX II + +THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE + +The different institutions--The College de France--The +Faculties of Letters--The Ecole Normale--The Ecole des +Chartes--The Ecole pratique des hautes Etudes 335 + +Reform of the Faculties--Preparation for degrees--The +Examination question--Principles on which it is to be +solved--The _Diplome d'etudes superieures_ 340 + +Influence of the movement on the other institutions--Co-operation +of the institutions 345 + + +INDEX OF PROPER NAMES 347 + + + + +AUTHORS' PREFACE + + +The title of this work is clear. However, it is necessary to state +succinctly both what our intention has, and what it has not been; for +under this same title, "Introduction to the Study of History," very +different books have already been published. + +It has not been our intention to give, as Mr. W. B. Boyce[1] has done, a +summary of universal history for the use of beginners and readers of +scanty leisure. + +Nor has it been our intention to add a new item to the abundant +literature of what is ordinarily called the "Philosophy of History." +Thinkers, for the most part not professed historians, have made history +the subject of their meditations; they have sought for its "analogies" +and its "laws." Some have supposed themselves to have discovered "the +laws which have governed the development of humanity," and thus to have +"raised history to the rank of a positive science."[2] These vast +abstract constructions inspire with an invincible _a priori_ mistrust, +not the general public only, but superior minds as well. Fustel de +Coulanges, as his latest biographer tells us, was severe on the +Philosophy of History; these systems were as repugnant to him as +metaphysics to the positivists. Rightly or wrongly (without doubt +wrongly), the Philosophy of History, not having been cultivated +exclusively by well-informed, cautious men of vigorous and sound +judgment, has fallen into disrepute. The reader will be reassured--or +disappointed, as the case may be--to learn that this subject will find +no place in the present work.[3] + +We propose to examine the conditions and the methods, to indicate the +character and the limits, of historical knowledge. How do we ascertain, +in respect of the past, what part of it it is possible, what part of it +it is important, to know? What is a document? How are documents to be +treated with a view to historical work? What are historical facts? How +are they to be grouped to make history? Whoever occupies himself with +history performs, more or less unconsciously, complicated operations of +criticism and construction, of analysis and synthesis. But beginners, +and the majority of those who have never reflected on the principles of +historical methodology, make use, in the performance of these +operations, of instinctive methods which, not being, in general, +rational methods, do not usually lead to scientific truth. It is, +therefore, useful to make known and logically justify the theory of the +truly rational methods--a theory which is now settled in some parts, +though still incomplete in some points of capital importance. + +The present "Introduction to the Study of History" is thus intended, not +as a summary of ascertained facts or a system of general ideas on +universal history, but as an essay on the method of the historical +sciences. + +We proceed to state the reasons why we have thought such a work +opportune, and to explain the spirit in which we have undertaken to +write it. + + +I + +The books which treat of the methodology of the historical sciences are +scarcely less numerous, and at the same time not in much better favour, +than the books on the Philosophy of History. Specialists despise them. A +widespread opinion is expressed in the words attributed to a certain +scholar: "You wish to write a book on philology; you will do much better +to produce a book with some good philology in it. When I am asked to +define philology, I always answer that it is what I work at."[4] Again, +in reference to J. G. Droysen's _Precis of the Science of History_, a +certain critic expressed an opinion which was meant to be, and was, a +commonplace: "Generally speaking, treatises of this kind are of +necessity both obscure and useless: obscure, because there is nothing +more vague than their object; useless, because it is possible to be an +historian without troubling oneself about the principles of historical +methodology which they claim to exhibit."[5] The arguments used by these +despisers of methodology are strong enough in all appearance. They +reduce to the following. As a matter of fact, there are men who +manifestly follow good methods, and are universally recognised as +scholars or historians of the first order, without having ever studied +the principles of method; conversely, it does not appear that those who +have written on historical method from the logical point of view have in +consequence attained any marked superiority as scholars or historians: +some, indeed, have been known for their incompetence or mediocrity in +these capacities. In this there is nothing that need surprise us. Who +would think of postponing original research in chemistry, mathematics, +the sciences proper, until he had studied the methods employed in those +sciences? Historical criticism! Yes, but the best way to learn it is to +apply it; practice teaches all that is wanted.[6] Take, too, the extant +works on historical method, even the most recent of them, those of J. G. +Droysen, E. A. Freeman, A. Tardif, U. Chevalier, and others; the utmost +diligence will extract from them nothing in the way of clear ideas +beyond the most obvious and commonplace truisms.[7] + +We willingly recognise that this manner of thinking is not entirely +wrong. The great majority of works on the method of pursuing historical +investigations and of writing history--what is called _Historic_ in +Germany and England--are superficial, insipid, unreadable, sometimes +ridiculous.[8] To begin with, those prior to the nineteenth century, a +full analysis of which is given by P. C. F. Daunou in the seventh volume +of his _Cours d'etudes historiques_,[9] are nearly all of them mere +treatises on rhetoric, in which the rhetoric is antiquated, and the +problems discussed are the oddest imaginable.[10] Daunou makes merry +over them, but he himself has shown good sense and nothing more in his +monumental work, which at the present time seems little better, and +certainly not more useful, than the earlier treatises.[11] As to the +modern ones, it is true that not all have been able to escape the two +dangers to which works of this character are exposed--that of being +obscure on the one hand, or commonplace on the other. J. G. Droysen's +_Grundriss der Historik_ is heavy, pedantic, and confused beyond all +imagination.[12] Freeman, Tardif, and Chevalier tell us nothing but what +is elementary and obvious. Their followers may still be observed +discussing at interminable length idle questions, such as: whether +history is a science or an art; what are the duties of history; what is +the use of history; and so on. On the other hand, there is incontestable +truth in the remark that nearly all the specialists and historians of +to-day are, as far as method goes, self-taught, with no training except +what they have gained by practice, or by imitating and associating with +the older masters of the craft. + +But though many works on the principles of method justify the distrust +with which such works are generally regarded, and though most professed +historians have been able, apparently with no ill results, to dispense +with reflection upon historical method, it would, in our opinion, be a +strained inference to conclude that specialists and historians +(especially those of the future) have no need to make themselves +acquainted with the processes of historical work. The literature of +methodology is, in fact, not without its value: gradually there has been +formed a treasury of subtle observations and precise rules, suggested by +experience, which are something more than mere common sense.[13] And, +admitting the existence of those who, without having ever learnt to +reason, always reason well, by a gift of nature, it would be easy to set +against these exceptions innumerable cases in which ignorance of logic, +the use of irrational methods, want of reflection on the conditions of +historical analysis and synthesis, have robbed the work of specialists +and historians of much of its value. + +The truth is, that, of all branches of study, history is without a doubt +the one in which it is most necessary for students to have a clear +consciousness of the methods they use. The reason is, that in history +instinctive methods are, as we cannot too often repeat, irrational +methods; some preparation is therefore required to counteract the first +impulse. Besides, the rational methods of obtaining historical knowledge +differ so widely from the methods of all other sciences, that some +perception of their distinctive features is necessary to avoid the +temptation of applying to history the methods of those sciences which +have already been systematised. This explains why mathematicians and +chemists can, more easily than historians, dispense with an +"introduction" to their subject. There is no need to insist at greater +length on the utility of historical methodology, for there is evidently +nothing very serious in the attacks which have been made on it. But it +behooves us to explain the reasons which have led to the composition of +the present work. For the last fifty years a great number of intelligent +and open-minded men have meditated on the methods of the historical +sciences. Naturally we find among them many historians, university +professors, whose position enables them to understand better than others +the intellectual needs of the young; but at the same time professed +logicians, and even novelists. In this connection, Fustel de Coulanges +left a tradition behind him at the University of Paris. "He +endeavoured," we are told,[14] "to reduce the rules of method to very +precise formulae ...; in his view no task was more urgent than that of +teaching students how to attain truth." Among these men, some, like +Renan,[15] have been content to insert scattered observations in their +general works or their occasional writings;[16] others, as Fustel de +Coulanges, Freeman, Droysen, Laurence, Stubbs, De Smedt, Von +Pflugk-Harttung, and so on, have taken the trouble to express their +thoughts on the subject in special treatises. There are many books, +"inaugural lectures," "academic orations," and review-articles, +published in all countries, but especially in France, Germany, England, +the United States, and Italy, both on the whole subject of methodology +and on the different parts of it. It will occur to the reader that it +would be a far from useless labour to collect and arrange the +observations which are scattered, and, one might say, lost, in these +numerous books and minor writings. But it is too late to undertake this +pleasant task; it has been recently performed, and in the most +painstaking manner. Professor Ernst Bernheim, of the University of +Greifswald, has worked through nearly all the modern works on historical +method, and the fruit of his labours is an arrangement under appropriate +headings, most of them invented by himself, of a great number of +reflections and selected references. His _Lehrbuch der historischen +Methode_[17] (Leipzig, 1894, 8vo) condenses, in the manner of German +_Lehrbuecher_, the special literature of the subject of which it treats. +It is not our intention to do over again what has already been done so +well. But we are of opinion that even after this laborious and +well-planned compilation something still remains to be said. In the +first place, Professor Bernheim deals largely with metaphysical problems +which we consider devoid of interest; while, conversely, he entirely +ignores certain considerations which appear to us to be, both +theoretically and practically, of the greatest importance. In the second +place, the teaching of the _Lehrbuch_ is sound enough, but lacks vigour +and originality. Lastly, the _Lehrbuch_ is not addressed to the general +public; both the language in which it is written and the form in which +it is composed render it inaccessible to the great majority of French +readers. This is enough to justify our undertaking to write a book of +our own, instead of simply recommending the book of Professor +Bernheim.[18] + + +II + +This "Introduction to the Study of History" does not claim, like the +_Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_, to be a treatise on historical +methodology.[19] It is a sketch in outline. We undertook its +composition, at the beginning of the scholastic year 1896-97, in order +that the new students at the Sorbonne might be warned what the study of +history is and ought to be. + +Long experience has taught us the necessity of such warnings. The +greater part of those who enter upon a career of historical study do so, +as a matter of fact, without knowing why, without having ever asked +themselves whether they are fitted for historical work, of the true +nature of which they are often ignorant. Generally their motives for +choosing an historical career are of the most futile character. One has +been successful in history at college;[20] another feels himself drawn +towards the past by the same kind of romantic attraction which, we are +told, determined the vocation of Augustin Thierry; some are misled by +the fancy that history is a comparatively easy subject. It is certainly +important that these irrational votaries should be enlightened and put +to the test as soon as possible. + +Having given a course of lectures, to novices, by way of "Introduction +to the Study of History," we thought that, with a little revision, these +lectures might be made useful to others besides novices. Scholars and +professed historians will doubtless have nothing to learn from this +work; but if they should find in it a stimulus to personal reflection on +the craft which some of them practise in a mechanical fashion, that +would be something gained. As for the public, which reads the works of +historians, is it not desirable that it should know how these works are +produced, in order to be able to judge them better? + +We do not, therefore, like Professor Bernheim, write exclusively for +present and future specialists, but also for the public interested in +history. We thus lay ourselves under an obligation to be as concise, as +clear, and as little technical as possible. But to be concise and clear +on subjects of this kind often means to appear superficial. Commonplace +on the one hand, obscurity on the other: these, as we have already seen, +are the evils between which we have the sorry privilege of choosing. We +admit the difficulty. But we do not think it insurmountable, and our +endeavour has been to say what we had to say in the clearest possible +manner. + +The first half of the book has been written by M. Langlois, the second +by M. Seignobos; but the two collaborators have constantly aided, +consulted, and checked each other.[21] + +PARIS, _August 1897_. + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HISTORY + +BOOK I + +PRELIMINARY STUDIES + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS (HEURISTIC) + + +The historian works with documents. Documents are the traces which have +been left by the thoughts and actions of men of former times. Of these +thoughts and actions, however, very few leave any visible traces, and +these traces, when there are any, are seldom durable; an accident is +enough to efface them. Now every thought and every action that has left +no visible traces, or none but what have since disappeared, is lost for +history; is as though it had never been. For want of documents the +history of immense periods in the past of humanity is destined to remain +for ever unknown. For there is no substitute for documents: no +documents, no history. + +In order to draw legitimate inferences from a document to the fact of +which it is the trace, numerous precautions are requisite which will be +indicated in the sequel. But it is clear that, prior to any critical +examination or interpretation of documents, the question presents itself +whether there are any documents at all, how many there are, and where +they are. If I undertake to deal with a point of history,[22] of +whatever nature, my first step will be to ascertain the place or places +where the documents necessary for its treatment, if any such exist, are +to be found. The search for and the collection of documents is thus a +part, logically the first and most important part, of the historian's +craft. In Germany it has received the convenient, because short, name of +_Heuristik_. Is there any need to prove the capital importance of +Heuristic? Assuredly not. It is obvious that if it is neglected, if the +student does not, before he sets to work on a point of history, place +himself in a position to command all accessible sources of information, +his risk (no small one at the best) of working upon insufficient data is +quite unnecessarily increased: works of erudition or history constructed +in accordance with the rules of the most exact method have been +vitiated, or even rendered worthless, by the accidental circumstance +that the author was unacquainted with the documents by which those which +he had within reach, and with which he was content, might have been +illustrated, supplemented, or discredited. The scholars and historians +of to-day, standing, as they do, in other respects on an equality with +their predecessors of the last few centuries, are only enabled to +surpass them by their possession of more abundant means of +information.[23] Heuristic is, in fact, easier to-day than it used to +be, although the honest Wagner has still good grounds for saying: + + "Wie schwer sind nicht die Mittel zu erwerben, + Durch die man zu den Quellen steigt!"[24] + +Let us endeavour to explain why the collection of documents, once so +laborious, is still no easy matter, in spite of the progress made in the +last century; and how this essential operation may, in the course of +continued progress, be still further simplified. + + +I. Those who first endeavoured to write history from the sources found +themselves in an embarrassing situation. Were the events they proposed +to relate recent, so that all the witnesses of them were not yet dead? +They had the resource of interviewing the witnesses who survived. +Thucydides, Froissart, and many others have followed this procedure. +When Mr. H. H. Bancroft, the historian of the Pacific Coast of +California, resolved to collect materials for the history of events many +of the actors in which were still alive, he mobilised a whole army of +reporters charged to extract conversations from them.[25] But when the +events to be related were ancient, so that no man then living could have +witnessed them, and no account of them had been preserved by oral +tradition, what then? Nothing was left but to collect documents of every +kind, principally written ones, relating to the distant past which was +to be studied. This was a difficult task at a time when libraries were +rare, archives secret, and documents scattered. About the year 1860, Mr. +Bancroft, in California, was in a situation analogous to that of the +earlier researchers in our part of the world. His plan was as follows: +He was rich; he cleared the market of all documents, printed or +manuscript; he negotiated with financially embarrassed families and +corporations for the purchase of their archives, or the permission to +have them copied by his paid agents. This done, he housed his collection +in premises built for the purpose, and classified it. Theoretically +there could not be a more rational procedure. But this rapid, American +method has only once been employed with sufficient resources and +sufficient consistency to ensure its success; at any other time, and in +any other place, it would have been out of the question. Nowhere else +have the circumstances been so favourable for it. + +At the epoch of the Renaissance the documents of ancient and modern +history were scattered in innumerable private libraries and in +innumerable depositories of archives, almost all of them inaccessible, +not to mention those which lay hidden beneath the soil, their very +existence as yet unsuspected. It was at that time a physical +impossibility to procure a list of all the documents serving for the +elucidation of a question (for example, a list of all the manuscripts +still preserved of an ancient work); and if, by a miracle, such a list +was to be had, it was another impossibility to consult all these +documents except at the cost of journeys, expenses, and negotiations +without end. Consequences easy to foresee did, as a matter of fact, +ensue. Firstly, the difficulties of Heuristic being insurmountable, the +earliest scholars and historians--employing, as they did, not all the +documents, nor the best documents, but those documents on which they +could lay their hands--were nearly always ill-informed; and their works +are now without interest except so far as they are founded on documents +which have since been lost. Secondly, the first scholars and historians +to be relatively well-informed were those who, in virtue of their +profession, had access to rich storehouses of documents--librarians, +keepers of archives, monks, magistrates, whose order or whose +corporation possessed libraries or archives of considerable extent.[26] + +It is true that collectors soon arose who, by money payments, or by more +questionable expedients, such as theft, formed, with more or less regard +for the interests of scientific study, "cabinets" of collections of +original documents, and of copies. But these European collectors, of +whom there has been a great number since the fifteenth century, differ +very noticeably from Mr. Bancroft. The Californian, in fact, only +collected documents relating to a particular subject (the history of +certain Pacific states), and his ambition was to make his collection +complete; most European collectors have acquired waifs and strays and +fragments of every description, forming, when combined, totals which +appear insignificant by the side of the huge mass of historical +documents which existed at the time. Besides, it was not, in general, +with any purpose of making them generally accessible that collectors +like Peiresc, Gaignieres, Clairambault, Colbert, and many others, +withdrew from circulation documents which were in danger of being lost; +they were content (and it was creditable to do as much as this) to share +them, more or less freely, with their friends. But collectors (and their +heirs) are fickle people, and sometimes eccentric in their notions. +Certainly it is better that documents should be preserved in private +collections, than that they should be entirely unprotected and +absolutely inaccessible to the scientific worker; but in order that +Heuristic should be made really easier, the first condition is that all +collections of documents should be _public_.[27] + +Now the finest private collections of documents--libraries and museums +combined--were naturally, in the Europe of the Renaissance, those +possessed by kings. And while other private collections were often +dispersed upon the death of their founders, these, on the contrary, +never ceased to grow; they were enriched, indeed, by the wreckage of all +the others. The _Cabinet des manuscrits de France_, for example, formed +by the French kings, and by them thrown open to the public, had, at the +end of the eighteenth century, absorbed the best part of the collections +which had been the personal work of the amateurs and scholars of the two +preceding centuries.[28] Similarly in other countries. The concentration +of a great number of historical documents in vast public (or +semi-public) establishments was the fortunate result of this spontaneous +evolution. + +The arbitrary proceedings of the Revolution were still more favourable, +and still more effective in securing the amelioration of the material +conditions of historical research. The Revolution of 1789 in France, +analogous movements in other countries, led to the violent confiscation, +for the profit of the state (that is, of everybody), of a host of +private archives and collections--the archives, libraries, and museums +of the crown, the archives and libraries of monasteries and suppressed +corporations, and so on. In France, in 1790, the Constituent Assembly +thus placed the state in possession of a great number of depositories of +historical documents, previously scattered, and guarded more or less +jealously from the curiosity of scholars; these treasures have since +been divided among four different national institutions. The same +phenomenon has been more recently observed, on a smaller scale, in +Germany, Spain, and Italy. + +The confiscations of the revolutionary period, as well as the +collections of the period which preceded it, have both been productive +of serious damage. The collector is, or rather often was, a barbarian +who did not hesitate, when he saw a chance of adding to his collection +of specimens and rare remains, to mutilate monuments, to dissect +manuscripts, to break up whole archives, in order to possess himself of +the fragments. On this score many acts of vandalism were perpetrated +before the Revolution. Naturally, the revolutionary procedure of +confiscation and transference was also productive of lamentable +consequences; besides the destruction which was the result of negligence +and that which was due to the mere pleasure of destroying, the +unfortunate idea arose that collections might be systematically +_weeded_, those documents only to be preserved which were "interesting" +or "useful," the rest to be got rid of. The task of weeding was +entrusted to well-meaning but incompetent and overworked men, who were +thus led to commit irreparable havoc in our ancient archives. At the +present day there are workers engaged in the task, one requiring an +extraordinary amount of time, patience, and care, of restoring the +dismembered collections, and replacing the fragments which were then +isolated in so brutal a manner by these zealous but unreflecting +manipulators of historical documents. It must be recognised, moreover, +that the mutilations due to revolutionary activity and the +pre-revolutionary collectors are insignificant in comparison with those +which are the result of accident and the destructive work of time. But +had they been ten times as serious, they would have been amply +compensated by two advantages of the first importance, on which we +cannot lay too much stress: (1) the concentration, in a relatively small +number of depositories, of documents which were formerly scattered, and, +as it were, lost, in a hundred different places; (2) the opening of +these depositories to the public. The remnant of historical documents +which has survived the destructive effects of accident and vandalism is +now at last safely housed, classified, made accessible, and treated as +public property. + +Ancient historical documents are now, as we have seen, collected and +preserved chiefly in those public institutions which are called +archives, libraries, and museums. It is true that this does not apply to +_all_ existing documents; in spite of the unceasing acquisitions by +purchase and gift which archives, libraries, and museums all over the +world have been making every year for a long time past, there still +exist private collections, dealers who supply them, and documents in +circulation. But the exceptions, which in this case are negligeable, do +not affect the general rule. Besides, all the ancient documents which, +in limited quantity, still range at large, are destined sooner or later +to find their way into the state institutions, whose doors are always +open to let in, but never to let out.[29] + +It is to be desired, as a matter of principle, that the depositories of +documents (archives, libraries, and museums) should not be too numerous; +and we have pointed out that, fortunately, they are now beyond +comparison less numerous than they were a hundred years ago. Could not +the centralisation of documents, with its evident advantages for +researchers, be carried still further? Are there not still collections +of documents of which it would be hard to justify the separate +existence? Perhaps;[30] but the problem of the centralisation of +documents is no longer urgent, now that the processes of reproduction +have been perfected, especially as the inconveniences arising from a +multitude of depositories are met by the expedient, now in general use, +of allowing the documents to travel: it is now possible for the student +to consult, without expense, in the public library of the city where he +resides, documents belonging, say, to the libraries of St. Petersburg, +Brussels, and Florence; we now rarely meet with institutions like the +Archives Nationales at Paris, the British Museum at London, and the +Mejanes Library at Aix-en-Provence, whose statutes absolutely prohibit +all lending-out of their contents.[31] + + +II. It being granted that the majority of historical documents are now +preserved in public institutions (archives, libraries, and museums), +Heuristic would be very easy if only good descriptive catalogues had +been drawn up of all the existing collections of documents, if these +catalogues were furnished with indexes, or if general repertories +(alphabetical, systematic, &c.) had been made relating to them; lastly, +if there were some place where it was possible to consult the complete +collection of all these catalogues and their indexes. But Heuristic is +still difficult, because these conditions are, unfortunately, still very +far from being adequately realised. + +Firstly, there are depositories of documents (archives, libraries, and +museums) whose contents have never been even partially catalogued, so +that no one knows what is in them. The depositories of which we possess +complete descriptive catalogues are rare; there are many collections +preserved in celebrated institutions which have only been catalogued in +part, and the bulk of which still remains to be described.[32] In the +second place, what a variety there is among existing catalogues! There +are some old ones which do not now correspond to the present +classification of documents, and which cannot be used without +reference-tables; there are new ones which are equally based on obsolete +systems, too detailed or too summary; some are printed, others in +manuscript, on registers or slips; some are carefully executed and +clear, many are scamped, inadequate, and provisional. Taking printed +catalogues alone, it requires a whole apprenticeship to learn to +distinguish, in this enormous mass of confusion, between what is +trustworthy and what is not; in other words, to make any use of them at +all. Lastly, where are the existing catalogues to be consulted? Most of +the great libraries only possess incomplete collections of them; there +is no general guide to them anywhere. + +This is a deplorable state of things. In fact, the documents contained +in uncatalogued depositories and collections are practically +non-existent for researchers who have no leisure to work through the +whole of their contents for themselves. We have said before: no +documents, no history. But to have no good descriptive catalogues of +collections of documents means, in practice, to be unable to ascertain +the existence of documents otherwise than by chance. We infer that the +progress of history depends in great measure on the progress of the +general catalogue of historical documents which is still fragmentary and +imperfect. On this point there is general agreement. Pere Bernard de +Montfaucon considered his _Bibliotheca bibliothecarum manuscriptarum +nova_, a collection of library catalogues, as "the most useful and most +interesting work he had produced in his whole life."[33] "In the present +state of science," wrote Renan in 1848,[34] "nothing is wanted more +urgently than a critical catalogue of the manuscripts in the different +libraries ... a humble task to all appearance; ... and yet the +researches of scholars are hampered and incomplete pending its +definitive completion." "We should have better books on our ancient +literature," says M. P. Meyer,[35] "if the predecessors of M. Delisle +[in his capacity of administrator of the Bibliotheque Nationale at +Paris] had applied themselves with equal ardour and diligence to the +cataloguing of the treasures committed to their care." + +It will be well to indicate briefly the causes and state the exact +consequences of a state of things which has been deplored as long as +scholars have existed, and which is improving, though slowly. "I assure +you," said Renan,[36] "that the few hundred thousand francs a Minister +of Public Instruction might apply to the purpose [of preparing +catalogues] would be better employed than three-quarters of the sum now +devoted to literature." It is rare to find a minister, in France or +elsewhere, convinced of this truth, and resolute enough to act +accordingly. Besides, it has not always been true that, in order to +obtain good catalogues, it is sufficient, as well as necessary, to make +a pecuniary sacrifice: it is only recently that the best methods of +describing documents have been authoritatively fixed; the task of +recruiting competent workers--no great difficulty nowadays--would have +been neither easy nor free from anxiety at an epoch when competent +workers were rarer than they are now. So much for the material +obstacles--want of money and want of men. A cause of another kind has +not been without its influence. The functionaries charged with the +administration of depositories of documents have not always displayed +the zeal which they now display for making their collections accessible +by means of accurate catalogues. To prepare a catalogue (in the exact +and at the same time summary form which is now used) is a laborious +task, a task without joy and without reward. It has often happened that +such a functionary, living, in virtue of his office, in the midst of +documents which he is at liberty to consult at any moment, and placed in +a much more favourable position than the general public for utilising +the collection without the aid of a catalogue, and making discoveries in +the process, has preferred to work for himself rather than for others, +and made the tedious construction of a catalogue a secondary matter +compared with his personal researches. + +Who are the persons that in our own day have discovered, published, and +annotated the greatest number of documents? The functionaries attached +to the depositories of documents. Without a doubt this circumstance has +retarded the progress of the general catalogue of historical documents. +The situation has been this: the persons who were the best able to +dispense with catalogues were precisely the persons whose duty it was to +make them. + +The imperfection of descriptive catalogues has consequences which +deserve our attention. On the one hand, we can never be sure that we +have exhausted all the sources of information; who knows what may be +held in reserve by the uncatalogued collections?[37] On the other hand, +in order to obtain the maximum amount of information, it is necessary to +be thoroughly acquainted with the resources furnished by the existing +literature of Heuristic, and to devote a great deal of time to +preliminary researches. In point of fact, every one who proposes to +collect documents for the treatment of a point of history begins by +consulting indexes and catalogues.[38] Novices set about this important +operation so slowly, with so little skill, and with so much effort, as +to move more experienced workers to mirth or pity, according to their +disposition. Those who find amusement in watching novices stumble and +strain and waste their time in the labyrinth of catalogues, neglecting +those which are valuable, and thoroughly exploring those which are +useless, remember that they also have passed through similar +experiences: let every one have his turn. Those who observe with regret +this waste of time and strength consider that, while inevitable up to a +certain point, it serves no good purpose; they ask whether something +might not be done to mitigate the severity of this apprenticeship to +Heuristic, which at one time cost them so dear. Besides, is not +research, in the present condition of its material aids, difficult +enough whatever the experience of the researcher? There are scholars and +historians who devote the best part of their powers to material +searches. Certain branches of historical work, relating chiefly to +mediaeval and modern subjects (the documents of ancient history are +fewer, have been more studied, and are better catalogued than the +others), imply not merely the assiduous use of catalogues, not all +furnished with indexes, but also the personal inspection of the whole +contents of immense collections which are either badly catalogued or not +catalogued at all. Experience proves beyond a doubt that the prospect of +these long searches, which must be performed before the more +intellectual part of the work can be begun, has deterred, and continues +to deter, men of excellent abilities from undertaking historical work. +They are, in fact, confronted with a dilemma: either they must work on a +supply of documents which is in all probability incomplete, or they must +spend themselves in unlimited searches, often fruitless, the results of +which seldom appear worth the time they have cost. It goes against the +grain to spend a great part of one's life in turning over catalogues +without indexes, or in passing under review, one after another, all the +items which go to form accumulations of uncatalogued _miscellanea_, in +order to obtain information (positive or negative) which might have been +obtained easily and instantaneously if the collections had been +catalogued and if the catalogues had been indexed. The most serious +consequence of the present imperfection of the material aids to +Heuristic is the discouragement which is sure to be felt by many able +men who know their worth, and have some sense of the due proportion of +effort and reward.[39] + +If it lay in the nature of things that the search for historical +documents, in public depositories, must necessarily be as laborious as +it still is, we might resign ourselves to the inconvenience: no one +thinks of regretting the inevitable expenditure of time and labour which +is demanded by archaeological research, whatever the results may prove to +be. But the imperfection of the modern instruments of Heuristic is quite +unnecessary. The state of things which existed for some centuries has +now been reformed indifferently; there is no valid reason why it should +not some day be reformed altogether. We are thus led, after treating of +the causes and the effects, to say a few words about the remedies. + +The instruments of Heuristic are being continually perfected, before our +eyes, in two ways. Every year witnesses an increase in the number of +descriptive catalogues of archives, libraries, and museums, prepared by +the functionaries attached to these institutions. In addition to this, +powerful learned societies employ experts to pass from one depository +to another cataloguing the documents there, in order to pick out all the +documents of a particular class, or relating to a special subject: thus +the society of Bollandists caused a general catalogue of hagiographical +documents to be prepared by its emissaries, and the Imperial Academy of +Vienna catalogued in a similar manner the monuments of patristic +literature. The society of the _Monumenta Germanioe Historica_ has for +a long time been conducting vast searches of the same kind; and it was +by the same process of exploring the museums and libraries of the whole +of Europe that the construction of the _Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum_ +was lately rendered possible. Lastly, several governments have taken the +initiative in sending abroad persons charged to catalogue, on their +behalf, documents in which they are interested: thus England, the +Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, and other governments, +grant regular subsidies to agents of theirs occupied in cataloguing and +transcribing, in the great depositories of Europe, the documents which +relate to the history of England, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the +United States, and the rest.[40] With what rapidity and with what +perfection these useful labours can be conducted, provided that a +competent staff, suitably directed, can be had as well as the money to +pay it, is shown by the history of the _general catalogue of the +manuscripts in the public libraries of France_. This excellent +descriptive catalogue was begun in 1885, and now, in 1897, it extends to +nearly fifty volumes, and will soon be completed. The _Corpus +Inscriptionum Latinarum_ will have been produced in less than fifty +years. The results obtained by the Bollandists and the Imperial Academy +of Vienna are not less conclusive. Assuredly nothing is now lacking, +except funds, to secure the speedy endowment of historical study with +the indispensable instruments of research. The methods employed in the +construction of these instruments are now permanently fixed, and it is +an easy matter to recruit a trained staff. Such a staff must evidently +be largely composed of keepers of archives and professional librarians, +but it would also contain unattached workers with a decided vocation for +the construction of catalogues and indexes. Such workers are more +numerous than one would at first be inclined to think. Not that +cataloguing is easy: it requires patience, the most scrupulous +attention, and the most varied learning; but many minds are attracted by +tasks which, like this, are at once determinate, capable of being +definitely completed, and of manifest utility. In the large and +heterogeneous family of those who labour to promote the progress of +historical study, the makers of descriptive catalogues and indexes form +a section to themselves. When they devote themselves exclusively to +their art they acquire by practice, as one might expect, a high degree +of dexterity. + +While waiting for the fact to be clearly recognised that the time is +opportune for pushing vigorously in every country the construction of a +general catalogue of historical documents, we may indicate a palliative: +it is important that scholars and historians, especially novices, should +be accurately informed of the state of the instruments of research which +are at their disposal, and be regularly apprised of any improvements +that from time to time may be made in them. Experience and accident have +been for a long time trusted to supply this information; but empirical +knowledge, besides being costly, as we have already pointed out, is +almost always imperfect. Recently the task has been undertaken of +constructing catalogues of catalogues--critical and systematic lists of +all the catalogues in existence. There can be no doubt that few +bibliographical enterprises have possessed, in so great a degree, the +character of general utility. + +But scholars and historians often need, in respect of documents, +information not usually supplied by descriptive catalogues; they wish, +for example, to know whether such and such a document is known or not, +whether it has already been critically dealt with, annotated, or +utilised.[41] This information can only be found in the works of former +scholars and historians. In order to become acquainted with these +works, recourse must be had to those "bibliographical repertories," +properly so called, of all kinds, compiled from very different points of +view, which have already been published. Among the indispensable +instruments of Heuristic must thus be reckoned bibliographical +repertories of historical literature, as well as repertories of +catalogues of original documents. + +To supply the classified list of all those repertories (repertories of +catalogues, bibliographical repertories, properly so called), together +with other appropriate information, in order to save students from +mistakes and waste of time, is the object of what we are at liberty to +call the "science of repertories," or "historical bibliography." +Professor Bernheim has published a preliminary sketch[42] of it, which +we have endeavoured to expand.[43] The expanded sketch bears date April +1896: numerous additions, not to speak of revision, would already be +necessary, for the bibliographical apparatus of the historical sciences +is being renewed, at the present time, with astonishing rapidity. A book +on the repertories for the use of scholars and historians is, as a +general rule, out of date the day after it has been completed. + + +III. The knowledge of repertories is useful to all; the preliminary +search for documents is laborious to all; but not in the same degree. +Certain parts of history, which have been long cultivated, now enjoy +the advantage of having all their documents described, collected, and +classified in large publications devoted to the purpose, so that, in +dealing with these subjects, the historian can do all that need be done +at his desk. The study of local history does not generally require more +than local search. Some important monographs are based on a small number +of documents, all belonging to the same collection, and of such a nature +that it would be superfluous to look for others elsewhere. On the other +hand, a humble piece of work, such as a modest edition of a text of +which the ancient copies are not rare, and are to be found scattered in +several libraries of Europe, may have involved inquiries, negotiations, +and journeys without end. Since the majority of the documents of +mediaeval and modern history are still unedited, or badly edited, it may +be laid down as a general principle that, in order to write a really new +chapter of mediaeval or modern history, it is necessary to have long +haunted the great depositories of original documents, and to have, if we +may use the expression, worried their catalogues. + +It is thus incumbent on every one to choose the subject of his labours +with the greatest care, instead of leaving it to be determined by pure +chance. There are some subjects which, in the present state of the +instruments of research, cannot be treated except at the cost of +enormous searches in which life and intellect are consumed without +profit. These subjects are not necessarily more interesting than others, +and some day, perhaps to-morrow, improvements in the aids to research +will make them easily manageable. It is necessary for the student +consciously and deliberately to make his choice between different +historical subjects depend on the existence or non-existence of +particular catalogues of documents and bibliographical repertories; on +his relative inclination for desk work on the one hand, and the labour +of exploring depositories on the other; even on the facilities he has +for making use of particular collections. "Is it possible to do work in +the provinces?" Renan asked at the congress of learned societies at the +Sorbonne in 1889; and gave a very good answer to his own question: "At +least half one's scientific work can be done at one's own desk ... Take +comparative philology, for example: with an initial outlay of some +thousands of francs, and subscriptions to three or four special +publications, a student would command all the tools of his trade ... The +same applies to universal philosophy ... Many branches of study can thus +be prosecuted quite privately, and in the closest retirement."[44] +Doubtless, but there are "rarities, specialities, researches which +require the aid of powerful machinery." One half of historical work may +now be done in private, with limited resources, but only half; the other +half still presupposes the employment of such resources, in the way of +repertories and documents, as can only be found in the great centres of +study; often, indeed, it is necessary to visit several of these centres +in succession. In short, the case stands with history much as it does +with geography: in respect of some portions of the globe, we possess +documents published in manageable form sufficiently complete and +sufficiently well classified to enable us to reason about them to good +purpose without leaving our fireside; while in the case of an unexplored +or badly explored region, the slightest monograph implies a considerable +expenditure of time and physical strength. It is dangerous to choose a +subject of study, as many do, without having first realised the nature +and extent of the preliminary researches which it demands; there are +instances of men struggling for years with such researches, who might +have been occupied to better advantage in work of another character. As +precautions against this danger, which is the more formidable to novices +the more active and zealous they are, an examination of the present +conditions of Heuristic in general, and positive notions of Historical +Bibliography, are certainly to be warmly recommended. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +"AUXILIARY SCIENCES" + + +Let us suppose that the preliminary searches, treated of in the +preceding chapter, have been made methodically and successfully; the +greater part, if not the whole, of the documents bearing on a given +subject have been discovered and made available. Of two things one: +either these documents have been already subjected to critical +elaboration, or they are in the condition of raw material; this is a +point which must be settled by "bibliographical" researches, which also, +as we have already observed, form part of the inquiries which precede +the logical part of the work. In the first case, where the documents +have already gone through a process of elaboration, it is necessary to +be in a position to verify the accuracy of the critical work; in the +second case, where the documents are still raw material, the student +must do the critical work himself. In both cases certain antecedent and +auxiliary knowledge of a positive kind, _Vor-und Huelfskenntnisse_, as +they are called, are every whit as indispensable as the habit of +accurate reasoning; for if, in the course of critical work, it is +possible to go wrong through reasoning badly, it is also possible to go +wrong out of pure ignorance. The profession of a scholar or historian +is, moreover, similar in this respect to all other professions; it is +impossible to follow it without possessing a certain equipment of +technical notions, whose absence neither natural aptitude nor even +method can make good. In what, then, does the technical _apprenticeship_ +of the scholar or the historian consist? Or, to employ language which, +though inappropriate, as we shall endeavour to show, is in more common +use: what, in addition to the knowledge of repertories, are the +"auxiliary sciences" of history? + +Daunou, in his _Cours d'etudes historiques_,[45] has proposed a question +of the same kind. "What studies," says he, "will the intending historian +need to have gone through, what kinds of knowledge ought he to have +acquired, in order to begin writing a work with any hope of success?" +Before him, Mably, in his _Traite de l'etude de l'histoire_, had also +recognised that "there are preparatory studies with which no historian +can dispense." But on this subject Mably and Daunou entertained views +which nowadays seem singular enough. It is instructive to mark the exact +distance which separates their point of view from ours. "First of all," +said Mably, "study the law of nature, public law, moral and political +science." Daunou, a man of great judgment, permanent secretary to the +Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, writing about 1820, divides +the studies which, in his opinion, constitute "the apprenticeship of the +historian," into three classes--literary, philosophical, historical. On +the "literary" studies he expatiates at great length: to begin with, +the historian must "have read with attention the great models." Which +great models? Daunou "does not hesitate" to place in the front rank "the +masterpieces of epic poetry;" for "it is the poets who have created the +art of narrative, and whoever has not learnt it from them cannot have +more than an imperfect knowledge of it." He further recommends the +reading of modern novels; "they will teach the method of giving an +artistic pose to persons and events, of distributing details, of +skilfully carrying on the thread of the narrative, of interrupting it, +of resuming it, of sustaining the attention and provoking the curiosity +of the reader." Finally, good historical works should be read: +"Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Plutarch among the +Greeks; Caesar, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus among the Latins; and among +the moderns, Macchiavelli, Guicciardini, Giannone, Hume, Robertson, +Gibbon, the Cardinal de Retz, Vertot, Voltaire, Raynal, and Rulhiere. +Not that I would exclude the others, but these will suffice to provide +all the styles which are suitable for history; for a great diversity of +form is to be met with in the works of these writers." In the second +place come philosophical studies; a thorough mastery of "ideology, +morals, and politics" is required. "As to the works from which knowledge +of this kind is to be obtained, Daguesseau has instanced Aristotle, +Cicero, Grotius: I should add the best ancient and modern moralists, +treatises on political economy published since the middle of the last +century, the writings on political science in general, and on its +details and application, of Macchiavelli, Bodin, Locke, Montesquieu, +Rousseau, Mably, and the most enlightened of their disciples and +commentators." In the third place, before writing history, "it is +evidently necessary to know it." "A writer will not give the world new +information on a subject like this unless he begins by making himself +master of what is already known of it." The future historian has already +made the acquaintance of the best historical works, and studied them as +models of style; "it will be to his advantage to read them a second +time, but endeavouring more particularly to grasp all the facts which +they contain, and to let them make so deep an impression on his mind +that they may be permanently fixed in his memory." + +These are the "positive" notions which, eighty years ago, were +considered indispensable to the general historian. At the same time +there was a confused idea that "in order to acquire a profound knowledge +of particular subjects" there were yet other useful branches of study. +"The subjects of which historians treat," says Daunou, "the details +which they occasionally light upon, require very extensive and varied +attainments." He goes on to particularise, observe in what terms: "very +often a knowledge of several languages, sometimes too some notion of +physics and mathematics." And he adds: "On these subjects, however, the +general education which we may assume to be common to all men of letters +is sufficient for the writer who devotes himself to historical +composition...." + +All the authors who, like Daunou, have attempted to enumerate the +preliminary attainments, as well as the moral or intellectual aptitudes, +necessary for "writing history," have either fallen into commonplace or +pitched their requirements ridiculously high. According to Freeman, the +historian ought to know everything--philosophy, law, finance, +ethnography, geography, anthropology, natural science, and what not; is +not an historian, in point of fact, likely enough in the course of his +study of the past to meet with questions of philosophy, law, finance, +and the rest of the series? And if financial science, for example, is +necessary to a writer who treats of contemporary finance, is it less so +to the writer who claims to express an opinion on the financial +questions of the past? "The historian," Freeman declares, "may have +incidentally to deal with any subject whatever, and the more branches of +knowledge he is master of, the better prepared he is for his own work." +True, all branches of human knowledge are not equally useful; some of +them are only serviceable on rare occasions, and accidentally: "We could +hardly make it even a counsel of perfection to the historian to make +himself an accomplished chemist, on the chance of an occasion in which +chemistry might be of use to him in his study;" but other special +subjects are more closely related to history: "for example, geology and +a whole group of sciences which have a close connection with geology.... +The historian will clearly do his own regular work better for being +master of them...."[46] The question has also been asked whether +"history is one of those studies anciently called _umbratiles_, for +which all that is wanted is a quiet mind and habits of industry," or +whether it is a good thing for the historian to have mingled in the +turmoil of active life, and to have helped to make the history of his +own time before sitting down to write that of the past. Indeed, what +questions have not been asked? Floods of ink have been poured out over +these uninteresting and unanswerable questions, the long and fruitless +debating of which has done not a little to discredit works on +methodology. Our opinion is that nothing relevant can be added to the +dictates of mere common sense on the subject of the apprenticeship to +the "art of writing history," unless perhaps that this apprenticeship +should consist, above everything, in the study, hitherto so generally +neglected, of the principles of historical method. + +Besides, it is not the "literary historian," the moralising and +quill-driving "historians," as conceived by Daunou and his school, that +we have had in view; we are here only concerned with those scholars and +historians who intend to deal with documents in order to facilitate or +actually perform the scientific work of history. These stand in need of +a _technical apprenticeship_. What meaning are we to attach to this +term? + +Let us suppose we have before us a written document. What use can we +make of it if we cannot read it? Up to the time of Francois Champollion, +Egyptian documents, being written in hieroglyphics, were, without +metaphor, a dead-letter. It will be readily admitted that in order to +deal with ancient Assyrian history it is necessary to have learnt to +decipher cuneiform inscriptions. Similarly, whoever desires to do +original work from the sources, in ancient or mediaeval history, will, if +he is prudent, learn to decipher inscriptions and manuscripts. We thus +see why Greek and Latin epigraphy and mediaeval palaeography--that is, the +sum of the various kinds of knowledge required for the deciphering of +ancient and mediaeval manuscripts and inscriptions--are considered as +"auxiliary sciences" to history, or rather, the historical study of +antiquity and the middle ages. It is evident that mediaeval Latin +palaeography forms part of the necessary outfit of the mediaevalist, just +as the palaeography of hieroglyphics is essential to the Egyptologist. +There is, however, a difference to be observed. No one will ever think +of devoting himself to Egyptology without having first studied the +appropriate palaeography. On the other hand, it is not very rare for a +man to undertake the study of local documents of the middle ages without +having learnt to date their forms approximately, and to decipher their +abbreviations correctly. The resemblance which most mediaeval writing +bears to modern writing is sufficiently close to foster the illusion +that ingenuity and practice will be enough to carry him through. This +illusion is dangerous. Scholars who have received no regular +palaeographical initiation can almost always be recognised by the gross +errors which they commit from time to time in deciphering--errors which +are sometimes enough to completely ruin the subsequent operations of +criticism and interpretation. As for the self-taught experts who acquire +their skill by dint of practice, the orthodox palaeographic initiation +which they have missed would at least have saved them much groping in +the dark, long hours of labour, and many a disappointment. + +Suppose a document has been deciphered. How is it to be turned to +account, unless it be first understood? Inscriptions in Etruscan and the +ancient language of Cambodia have been read, but no one understands +them. As long as this is the case they must remain useless. It is clear +that in order to deal with Greek history it is necessary to consult +documents in the Greek language, and therefore necessary to know Greek. +Rank truism, the reader will say. Yes, but many proceed as if it had +never occurred to them. Young students attack ancient history with only +a superficial tincture of Greek and Latin. Many who have never studied +mediaeval French and Latin think they know them because they understand +classical Latin and modern French, and they attempt the interpretation +of texts whose literal meaning escapes them, or appears to be obscure +when in reality perfectly plain. Innumerable historical errors owe their +origin to false or inexact interpretations of quite straightforward +texts, perpetrated by men who were insufficiently acquainted with the +grammar, the vocabulary, or the niceties of ancient languages. Solid +philological study ought logically to precede historical research in +every instance where the documents to be employed are not to be had in a +modern language, and in a form in which they can be easily understood. + +Suppose a document is intelligible. It would not be legitimate to take +it into consideration without having verified its authenticity, if its +authenticity has not been already settled beyond a doubt. Now in order +to verify the authenticity or ascertain the origin of a document two +things are required--reasoning power and knowledge. In other words, it +is necessary to reason from certain positive data which represent the +condensed results of previous research, which cannot be improvised, and +must, therefore, be learnt. To distinguish a genuine from a spurious +charter would, in fact, be often an impossible task for the best trained +logician, if he were unacquainted with the practice of such and such a +chancery, at such and such a date, or with the features common to all +the admittedly genuine charters of a particular class. He would be +obliged to do what the first scholars did--ascertain for himself, by the +comparison of a great number of similar documents, what features +distinguish the admittedly genuine documents from the others, before +allowing himself to pronounce judgment in any special instance. Will not +his task be enormously simplified if there is in existence a body of +doctrine, a treasury of accumulated observations, a system of results +obtained by workers who have already made, repeated, and checked the +minute comparisons he would otherwise have been obliged to make for +himself? This body of doctrines, observations, and results, calculated +to assist the criticism of diplomas and charters, does exist; it is +called Diplomatic. We shall, therefore, assign to Diplomatic, along with +Epigraphy, Palaeography, and Philology, the character of a subject +auxiliary to historical research. + +Epigraphy and Palaeography, Philology, and Diplomatic with its adjuncts +(technical Chronology and Sphragistic) are not the only subjects of +study which subserve historical research. It would be extremely +injudicious to undertake to deal critically with literary documents on +which no critical work has as yet been done without making oneself +familiar with the results obtained by those who have already dealt +critically with documents of the same class: the sum of these results +forms a department to itself, which has a name--the History of +Literature.[47] The critical treatment of illustrative documents, such +as the productions of architecture, sculpture, and painting, objects of +all kinds (arms, dress, utensils, coins, medals, armorial bearings, and +so forth), presupposes a thorough acquaintance with the rules and +observations which constitute Archaeology properly so called and its +detached branches--Numismatic and Heraldry. + +We are now in a position to examine to some purpose the hazy notion +expressed by the phrase, "the sciences auxiliary to history." We also +read of "ancillary sciences," and, in French, "sciences satellites." +None of these expressions is really satisfactory. + +First of all, the so-called "auxiliary sciences" are not all of them +_sciences_. Diplomatic, for example, and the History of Literature are +only systematised accumulations of facts, acquired by criticism, which +are of a nature to facilitate the application of critical methods to +documents hitherto untouched. On the other hand, Philology is an +organised science, and has its own laws. + +In the second place, among the branches of knowledge auxiliary--properly +speaking, not to history, but to historical research--we must +distinguish between those which every worker in the field ought to +master, and those in respect of which he needs only to know where to +look when he has occasion to make use of them; between knowledge which +ought to become part of a man's self, and information which he may be +content to possess only in potentiality. A mediaevalist should _know_ how +to read and understand mediaeval texts; he would gain no advantage by +accumulating in his memory the mass of particular facts pertaining to +the History of Literature and Diplomatic which are to be found, in their +proper place, in well-constructed works of reference. + +Lastly, there are no branches of knowledge which are auxiliary to +History (or even historical research) in general--that is, which are +useful to all students irrespectively of the particular part of history +on which they are engaged.[48] It appears, then, that there is no +general answer possible to the question raised at the beginning of this +chapter: in what should the technical apprenticeship of the scholar or +historian consist? In what does it consist? That depends. It depends on +the part of history he proposes to study. A knowledge of palaeography is +quite useless for the purpose of investigating the history of the +French Revolution, and a knowledge of Greek is equally useless for the +treatment of a question in mediaeval French history.[49] But we may go so +far as to say that the preliminary outfit of every one who wishes to do +original work in history should consist (in addition to the "common +education," that is, general culture, of which Daunou writes) in the +knowledge calculated to aid in the discovery, the understanding, and +the criticism of documents. The exact nature of this knowledge varies +from case to case according as the student specialises in one or another +part of universal history. The technical apprenticeship is relatively +short and easy for those who occupy themselves with modern or +contemporary history, long and laborious for those who occupy themselves +with ancient and mediaeval history. + +This reform of the historian's technical apprenticeship which consists +in substituting the acquisition of positive knowledge, truly auxiliary +to historical research, for the study of the "great models," literary +and philosophical, is of quite recent date. In France, for the greater +part of the present century, students of history received none but a +literary education, after Daunou's pattern. Almost all of them were +contented with such a preparation, and did not look beyond it; some few +perceived and regretted, when it was too late for a remedy, the +insufficiency of their early training; with a few illustrious +exceptions, the best of them never rose to be more than distinguished +men of letters, incapable of scientific work. There was at that time no +organisation for teaching the "auxiliary sciences" and the technique of +research except in the case of French mediaeval history, and that in a +special school, the Ecole des chartes. This simple fact, moreover, +secured for this school during a period of fifty years a marked +superiority over all the other French (or even foreign) institutions of +higher education; excellent workers were there trained who contributed +many new results, while elsewhere people were idly discussing +problems.[50] To-day it is still at the Ecole des chartes that the +mediaevalist has the opportunity of going through his technical +apprenticeship in the best and most complete manner, thanks to the +combined and progressive three-years courses of Romance philology, +palaeography, archaeology, historiography, and mediaeval law. But the +"auxiliary sciences" are now taught everywhere more or less adequately; +they have been introduced into the university curricula. On the other +hand, students' handbooks of epigraphy, palaeography, diplomatic, and so +forth, have multiplied during the last twenty-five years. Twenty-five +years ago it would have been vain to look for a good book which should +supply the want of oral instruction on these subjects; since the +establishment of professorships "manuals" have appeared[51] which would +almost make them superfluous were it not that oral instruction, based on +practical exercises, has here an exceptional value. Whether a student +does or does not enjoy the advantage of a regular drilling in an +institution for higher education, he has henceforth no excuse for +remaining in ignorance of those things which he ought to know before +entering upon historical work. There is, in fact, less of this kind of +neglect than there used to be. On this head, the success of the +above-mentioned "manuals," with their rapid succession of editions, is +very significant.[52] + +Here, then, we have the future historian armed with the preliminary +knowledge, the neglect of which would have condemned him to +powerlessness or to continual mistakes. We suppose him protected from +the errors without number which have their origin in an imperfect +knowledge of the writing and the language of documents, in ignorance of +previous work and the results obtained by textual criticism; he has an +irreproachable _cognitio cogniti et cognoscendi_. A very optimistic +supposition, by the way, as we are bound to admit. We know but too well +that to have gone through a regular course of "auxiliary sciences," or +to have read attentively the best treatises on bibliography, +palaeography, philology, and so on, or even to have acquired some +personal experience by practical exercises, is not enough to ensure that +a man shall always be well informed, still less to make him infallible. +In the first place, those who have for a long time studied documents of +a given class or of a given period possess, in regard to these, +incommunicable knowledge in virtue of which they are able to deal better +than others with new documents which they may meet with of the same +class or period; nothing can replace the "special erudition" which is +the specialist's reward for hard work.[53] And secondly, specialists +themselves make mistakes: palaeographers must be perpetually on their +guard not to decipher falsely; is there a philologist who has not some +faults of construing on his conscience? Scholars usually well informed +have printed as unedited texts which had already been published, and +have neglected documents it was their business to know. Scholars spend +their lives in incessantly perfecting their "auxiliary" knowledge, which +they rightly regard as never perfect. But all this does not prevent us +from maintaining our hypothesis. Only let it be understood that in +practice we do not postpone work upon documents till we shall have +gained a serene and absolute mastery over all the "auxiliary branches of +knowledge:" we should never dare to begin. + +It remains to know how to treat documents supposing one has successfully +passed through the preliminary apprenticeship. + + + + +BOOK II + +ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS + + + + +CHAPTER I + +GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE + + +We have already stated that history is studied from documents, and that +documents are the traces of past events.[54] This is the place to +indicate the consequences involved in this statement and this +definition. + +Events can be empirically known in two ways only: by direct observation +while they are in progress; and indirectly, by the study of the traces +which they leave behind them. Take an earthquake, for example. I have a +direct knowledge of it if I am present when the phenomenon occurs; an +indirect knowledge if, without having been thus present, I observe its +physical effects (crevices, ruins), or if, after these effects have +disappeared, I read a description written by some one who has himself +witnessed the phenomenon or its effects. Now, the peculiarity of +"historical facts"[55] is this, that they are only known indirectly by +the help of their traces. Historical knowledge is essentially indirect +knowledge. The methods of historical science ought, therefore, to be +radically different from those of the direct sciences; that is to say, +of all the other sciences, except geology, which are founded on direct +observation. Historical science, whatever may be said,[56] is not a +science of observation at all. + +The facts of the past are only known to us by the traces of them which +have been preserved. These traces, it is true, are directly observed by +the historian, but, after that, he has nothing more to observe; what +remains is the work of reasoning, in which he endeavours to infer, with +the greatest possible exactness, the facts from the traces. The document +is his starting-point, the fact his goal.[57] Between this +starting-point and this goal he has to pass through a complicated series +of inferences, closely interwoven with each other, in which there are +innumerable chances of error; while the least error, whether committed +at the beginning, middle, or end of the work, may vitiate all his +conclusions. The "historical," or indirect, method is thus obviously +inferior to the method of direct observation; but historians have no +choice: it is the _only_ method of arriving at past facts, and we shall +see later on[58] how, in spite of these disadvantages, it is possible +for this method to lead to scientific knowledge. + +The detailed analysis of the reasonings which lead from the inspection +of documents to the knowledge of facts is one of the chief parts of +Historical Methodology. It is the domain of criticism. The seven +following chapters will be devoted to it. We shall endeavour, first of +all, to give a very summary sketch of the general lines and main +divisions of the subject. + +I. We may distinguish two species of documents. Sometimes the past event +has left a material trace (a monument, a fabricated article). Sometimes, +and more commonly, the trace is of the psychological order--a written +description or narrative. The first case is much simpler than the +second. For there is a fixed relation between certain physical +appearances and the causes which produced them; and this relation, +governed by physical laws, is known to us.[59] But a psychological +trace, on the other hand, is purely symbolic: it is not the fact itself; +it is not even the immediate impression made by the fact upon the +witness's mind, but only a conventional symbol of that impression. +Written documents, then, are not, as material documents are, valuable +by themselves; they are only valuable as signs of psychological +operations, which are often complicated and hard to unravel. The immense +majority of the documents which furnish the historian with +starting-points for his reasonings are nothing else than traces of +psychological operations. + +This granted, in order to conclude from a written document to the fact +which was its remote cause--that is, in order to ascertain the relation +which connects the document with the fact--it is necessary to reproduce +the whole series of intermediate causes which have given rise to the +document. It is necessary to revive in imagination the whole of that +series of acts performed by the author of the document which begins with +the fact observed by him and ends with the manuscript (or printed +volume), in order to arrive at the original event. Such is the aim and +such the process of critical analysis.[60] + +First of all we observe the document. Is it now in the same state as +when it was produced? Has it deteriorated since? We endeavour to find +out how it was made in order to restore it, if need be, to its original +form, and to ascertain its origin. The first group of preliminary +investigations, bearing upon the writing, the language, the form, the +source, constitutes the special domain of EXTERNAL CRITICISM, or +critical scholarship. Next comes INTERNAL CRITICISM: it endeavours, by +the help of analogies mostly borrowed from general psychology, to +reproduce the mental states through which the author of the document +passed. Knowing what the author of the document has said, we ask (1) +What did he mean? (2) Did he believe what he said? (3) Was he justified +in believing whatever he did believe? This last step brings the document +to a point where it resembles the data of the objective sciences: it +becomes an observation; it only remains to treat it by the methods of +the objective sciences. Every document is valuable precisely to the +extent to which, by the study of its origin, it has been reduced to a +well-made observation. + +II. Two conclusions may be drawn from what we have just said: the +extreme complexity and the absolute necessity of Historical Criticism. + +Compared with other students the historian is in a very disagreeable +situation. It is not merely that he cannot, as the chemist does, observe +his facts directly; it very rarely happens that the documents which he +is obliged to use represent precise observations. He has at his disposal +none of those systematic records of observations which, in the +established sciences, can and do replace direct observation. He is in +the situation of a chemist who should know a series of experiments only +from the report of his laboratory-boy. The historian is compelled to +turn to account rough and ready reports, such as no man of science +would be content with.[61] All the more necessary are the precautions to +be taken in utilising these documents, the only materials of historical +science. It is evidently most important to eliminate those which are +worthless, and to ascertain the amount of correct observation +represented by those which are left. + +All the more necessary, too, are cautions on this subject, because the +natural inclination of the human mind is to take no precautions at all, +and to treat these matters, which really demand the utmost obtainable +precision, with careless laxity. It is true that every one admits the +utility of criticism in theory; but this is just one of those principles +which are more easily admitted than put into practice. Many centuries +and whole eras of brilliant civilisation had to pass away before the +first dawn of criticism was visible among the most intellectual peoples +in the world. Neither the orientals nor the middle ages ever formed a +definite conception of it.[62] Up to our own day there have been +enlightened men who, in employing documents for the purpose of writing +history, have neglected the most elementary precautions, and +unconsciously assumed false generalisations. Even now most young +students would, if left to themselves, fall into the old errors. For +criticism is antagonistic to the normal bent of the mind. The +spontaneous tendency of man is to yield assent to affirmations, and to +reproduce them, without even clearly distinguishing them from the +results of his own observation. In every-day life do we not accept +indiscriminately, without any kind of verification, hearsay reports, +anonymous and unguaranteed statements, "documents" of indifferent or +inferior authority? It takes a special reason to induce us to take the +trouble to examine into the origin and value of a document on the +history of yesterday; otherwise, if there is no outrageous improbability +in it, and as long as it is not contradicted, we swallow it whole, we +pin our faith to it, we hawk it about, and, if need be, embellish it in +the process. Every candid man must admit that it requires a violent +effort to shake off _ignavia critica_, that common form of intellectual +sloth, that this effort must be continually repeated, and is often +accompanied by real pain. + +The natural instinct of a man in the water is to do precisely that which +will infallibly cause him to be drowned; learning to swim means +acquiring the habit of suppressing spontaneous movements and performing +others instead. Similarly, criticism is not a natural habit; it must be +inculcated, and only becomes organic by dint of continued practice. + +Historical work is, then, pre-eminently critical; whoever enters upon it +without having first been put on his guard against his instinct is sure +to be drowned in it. In order to appreciate the danger it is well to +examine one's conscience and analyse the causes of that _ignavia_ which +must be fought against till it is replaced by a critical attitude of +mind.[63] It is also very salutary to familiarise oneself with the +principles of historical method, and to analyse the theory of them, one +by one, as we propose to do in the present volume. "History, like every +other study, is chiefly subject to errors of fact arising from +inattention, but it is more exposed than any other study to errors due +to that mental confusion which produces incomplete analyses and +fallacious reasonings.... Historians would advance fewer affirmations +without proof if they had to analyse each one of their affirmations; +they would commit themselves to fewer false principles if they made it a +rule to formulate all their principles; they would be guilty of fewer +fallacies if they were obliged to set out all their arguments in logical +form."[64] + + + + +_SECTION I.--EXTERNAL CRITICISM_ + + + + +CHAPTER II + +TEXTUAL CRITICISM + + +Let us suppose that an author of our own day has written a book: he +sends his manuscript to the printer; with his own hand he corrects the +proofs, and marks them "Press." A book which is printed under these +conditions comes into our hands in what is, for a document, a very good +condition. Whoever the author may be, and whatever his sentiments and +intentions, we can be certain--and this is the only point that concerns +us at present--that we have before us a fairly accurate reproduction of +the text which he wrote. We are obliged to say "fairly accurate," for if +the author has corrected his proofs badly, or if the printers have not +paid proper attention to his corrections, the reproduction of the +original text is imperfect, even in this specially favourable case. +Printers not unfrequently make a man say something which he never meant +to say, and which he does not notice till too late. + +Sometimes it is required to reproduce a work the author of which is +dead, and the autograph manuscript of which cannot be sent to the +printer. This was the case with the _Memoires d'outre-tombe_ of +Chateaubriand, for example; it is of daily occurrence in regard to the +familiar correspondence of well-known persons which is printed in haste +to satisfy the curiosity of the public, and of which the original +manuscript is very fragile. First the text is copied; it is then set up +by the compositor from the copy, which comes to the same thing as +copying it again; this second copy is lastly, or ought to be, collated +(in the proofs) with the first copy, or, better still, with the +original, by some one who takes the place of the deceased author. The +guarantees of accuracy are fewer in this case than in the first; for +between the original and the ultimate reproduction there is one +intermediary the more (the manuscript copy), and it may be that the +original is hard for anybody but the author to decipher. And, in fact, +the text of memoirs and posthumous correspondence is often disfigured by +errors of transcription and punctuation occurring in editions which at +first sight give the impression of having been carefully executed.[65] + +Turning now to ancient documents, let us ask in what state they have +been preserved. In nearly every case the originals have been lost, and +we have nothing but copies. Have these copies been made directly from +the originals? No; they are copies of copies. The scribes who executed +them were not by any means all of them capable and conscientious men; +they often transcribed texts which they did not understand at all, or +which they understood incorrectly, and it was not always the fashion, as +it was in the time of the Carlovingian Renaissance, to compare the +copies with the originals.[66] + +If our printed books, after the successive revisions of author and +printer's reader, are still but imperfect reproductions, it is only to +be expected that ancient documents, copied and recopied as they have +been for centuries with very little care, and exposed at every fresh +transcription to new risk of alteration, should have reached us full of +inaccuracies. + +There is thus an obvious precaution to be taken. Before using a document +we must find out whether its text is "sound"--that is, in as close +agreement as possible with the original manuscript of the author; and +when the text is "corrupt" we must emend it. In using a text which has +been corrupted in transmission, we run the risk of attributing to the +author what really comes from the copyists. There are actual cases of +theories which were based on passages falsified in transmission, and +which collapsed as soon as the true readings were discovered or +restored. Printers' errors and mistakes in copying are not always +innocuous or merely diverting; they are sometimes insidious and capable +of misleading the reader.[67] + +One would naturally suppose that historians of repute would always make +it a rule to procure "sound" texts, properly emended and restored, of +the texts they have to consult. That is a mistake. For a long time +historians simply used the texts which they had within easy reach, +without verifying their accuracy. And, what is more, the very scholars +whose business it is to edit texts did not discover the art of restoring +them all at once; not so very long ago, documents were commonly edited +from the first copies, good or bad, that came to hand, combined and +corrected at random. Editions of ancient texts are nowadays mostly +"critical;" but it is not yet thirty years since the publication of the +first "critical editions" of the great works of the middle ages, and the +critical text of some ancient classics (Pausanias, for example) has +still to be constructed. + +Not all historical documents have as yet been published in a form +calculated to give historians the security they need, and some +historians still act as if they had not realised that an unsettled text, +as such, requires cautious handling. Still, considerable progress has +been made. From the experience accumulated by several generations of +scholars there has been evolved a recognised method of purifying and +restoring texts. No part of historical method has a more solid +foundation, or is more generally known. It is clearly explained in +several works of popular philology.[68] For this reason we shall here be +content to give a general view of its essential principles, and to +indicate its results. + +I. We will suppose a document has not been edited in conformity with +critical rules. How are we to proceed in order to construct the best +possible text? Three cases present themselves. + +(_a_) The most simple case is that in which we possess the original, the +author's autograph itself. There is then nothing to do but to reproduce +the text of it with absolute fidelity.[69] Theoretically nothing can be +easier; in practice this elementary operation demands a sustained +attention of which not every one is capable. If any one doubts it, let +him try. Copyists who never make mistakes and never allow their +attention to be distracted are rare even among scholars. + +(_b_) Second case. The original has been lost; only a single copy of it +is known. It is necessary to be cautious, for the probability is that +this copy contains errors. + +Texts degenerate in accordance with certain laws. A great deal of pains +has been taken to discover and classify the causes and the ordinary +forms of the differences which are observed between originals and +copies; and hence rules have been deduced which may be applied to the +conjectural restoration of those passages in a unique copy of a lost +original which are certainly corrupt (because unintelligible), or are so +in all probability. + +Alterations of an original occurring in a copy--"traditional variants," +as they are called--are due either to fraud or to error. Some copyists +have deliberately modified or suppressed passages.[70] Nearly all +copyists have committed errors of judgment or accidental errors. Errors +of judgment when half-educated and not wholly intelligent copyists have +thought it their duty to correct passages and words in the original +which they could not understand.[71] Accidental errors when they misread +while copying, or misheard while writing from dictation, or when they +involuntarily made slips of the pen. + +Modifications arising from fraud or errors of judgment are often very +difficult to rectify, or even to discover. Some accidental errors (the +omission of several lines, for example) are irreparable in the case we +are considering, that of a unique copy. But most accidental errors can +be detected by any one who knows the ordinary forms: confusions of +sense, letters, and words, transpositions of words, letters, and +syllables, dittography (unmeaning repetition of letters or syllables), +haplography (syllables or words written once only where they should have +been written twice), false divisions between words, badly punctuated +sentences, and other mistakes of the same kind. Errors of these various +types have been made by the scribes of every country and every age, +irrespectively of the handwriting and language of the originals. But +some confusions of letters occur frequently in copies of uncial +originals, and others in copies of minuscule originals. Confusions of +sense and of words are explained by analogies of vocabulary or +pronunciation, which naturally vary from language to language and from +epoch to epoch. The general theory of conjectural emendation reduces to +the sketch we have just given; there is no general apprenticeship to the +art. What a man learns is not to restore any text that may be put before +him, but Greek texts, Latin texts, French texts, and so on, as the case +may be; for the conjectural emendation of a text presupposes, besides +general notions on the processes by which texts degenerate, a profound +knowledge of (1) a special language; (2) a special handwriting; (3) _the +confusions (of sense, letters, and words) which were habitual to those +who copied texts of that language written in that style of handwriting_. +To aid in the apprenticeship to the conjectural emendation of Greek and +Latin texts, tabulated lists (alphabetical and systematic) of various +readings, frequent confusions, and probable corrections, have been +drawn up.[72] It is true that they cannot take the place of practical +work, done under the guidance of experts, but they are of very great use +to the experts themselves.[73] + +It would be easy to give a list of happy emendations. The most +satisfactory are those whose correctness is obvious palaeographically, as +is the case with the classical emendation by Madvig of the text of +Seneca's Letters (89, 4). The old reading was: "Philosophia unde dicta +sit, apparet; ipso enim nomine fatetur. Quidam et sapientiam ita quidam +finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum sapientiam ..."--which +does not make sense. It used to be supposed that words had dropped out +between _ita_ and _quidam_. Madvig pictured to himself the text of the +lost archetype, which was written in capitals, and in which, as was +usual before the eighth century, the words were not separated (_scriptio +continua_), nor the sentences punctuated; he asked himself whether the +copyist, with such an archetype before him, had not divided the words at +random, and he had no difficulty in reading: "...ipso enim nomine +fatetur quid amet. Sapientiam ita quidam finierunt...." Blass, Reinach, +and Lindsay, in the works referred to in the note, mention several other +masterly and elegant emendations. Nor have the Hellenists and Latinists +any monopoly; equally brilliant emendations might be culled from the +works of Orientalists, Romancists, and Germanists, now that texts of +Oriental, Romance, and Germanic languages have been subjected to verbal +criticism. We have already stated that scholarly corrections are +possible even in the text of quite modern documents, reproduced +typographically under the most favourable conditions. + +Perhaps no one, in our day, has equalled Madvig in the art of +conjectural emendation. But Madvig himself had no high opinion of the +work of modern scholarship. He thought that the humanists of the +sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were, in this respect, better +trained than modern scholars. The conjectural emendation of Greek and +Latin texts is, in fact, a branch of sport, success in which is +proportionate not only to a man's ingenuity and palaeographical instinct, +but also to the correctness, rapidity, and delicacy of his appreciation +of the niceties of the classical languages. Now, the early scholars were +undoubtedly too bold, but they were more intimately familiar with the +classical languages than our modern scholars are. + +However that may be, there can be no doubt that numerous texts which +have been preserved, in corrupt form, in unique copies, have resisted, +and will continue to resist, the efforts of criticism. Very often +criticism ascertains the fact of the text having been altered, states +what the sense requires, and then prudently stops, every trace of the +original reading having been obscured by a confused tangle of successive +corrections and errors which it is hopeless to attempt to unravel. The +scholars who devote themselves to the fascinating pursuit of conjectural +criticism are liable, in their ardour, to suspect perfectly innocent +readings, and, in desperate passages, to propose adventurous hypotheses. +They are well aware of this, and therefore make it a rule to draw a very +clear distinction, in their editions, between readings found in +manuscripts and their own restorations of the text. + +(_c_) Third case. We possess several copies, which differ from each +other, of a document whose original is lost. Here modern scholars have a +marked advantage over their predecessors: besides being better informed, +they set about the comparison of copies more methodically. The object +is, as in the preceding case, to reconstruct the archetype as exactly as +possible. + +The scholars of earlier days had to struggle, as novices have to +struggle now, in a case of this kind, against a very natural and a very +reprehensible impulse--to use the first copy that comes to hand, +whatever its character may happen to be. The second impulse is not much +better--to use the oldest copy out of several of different date. In +theory, and very often in practice, the relative age of the copies is of +no importance; a sixteenth-century manuscript which reproduces a good +lost copy of the eleventh century is much more valuable than a faulty +and retouched copy made in the twelfth or thirteenth century. The third +impulse is still far from being good; it is to count the attested +readings and decide by the majority. Suppose there are twenty copies of +a text; the reading A is attested eighteen times, the reading B twice. +To make this a reason for choosing A is to make the gratuitous +assumption that all the manuscripts have the same authority. This is an +error of judgment; for if seventeen of the eighteen manuscripts which +give the reading A have been copied from the eighteenth, the reading A +is in reality attested only once; and the only question is whether it is +intrinsically better or worse than the reading B. + +It has been recognised that the only rational procedure is to begin by +determining in what relation the copies stand to each other. For this +purpose we adopt as our starting-point the incontrovertible axiom that +all the copies which contain the same mistakes in the same passages must +have been either copied from each other or all derived from a copy +containing those mistakes. It is inconceivable that several copyists, +independently reproducing an original free from errors, should all +introduce exactly the same errors; identity of errors attests community +of origin. We shall cast aside without scruple all the copies derived +from a single manuscript which has been preserved. Evidently they can +have no value beyond what is possessed by their common source; if they +differ from it, it can only be in virtue of new errors; it would be +waste of time to study their variations. Having eliminated these, we +have before us none but independent copies, which have been made +directly from the archetype, or secondary copies whose source (a copy +taken directly from the archetype) has been lost. In order to group the +secondary copies into _families_, each of which shall represent what is +substantially the same tradition, we again have recourse to the +comparison of errors. By this method we can generally draw up without +too much trouble a complete genealogical table (_stemma codicum_) of the +preserved copies, which will bring out very clearly their relative +importance. This is not the place to discuss the difficult cases where, +in consequence of too great a number of intermediaries having been lost, +or from ancient copyists having arbitrarily blended the texts of +different traditions, the operation becomes extremely laborious or +impracticable. Besides, in these extreme cases there is no new method +involved: the comparison of corresponding passages is a powerful +instrument, but it is the only one which criticism has at its disposal +for this task. + +When the genealogical tree of the manuscripts has been drawn up, we +endeavour to restore the text of the archetype by comparing the +different traditions. If these agree and give a satisfactory text, there +is no difficulty. If they differ, we decide between them. If they +accidentally agree in giving a defective text, we have recourse to +conjectural emendation, as if there were only one copy. + +It is, theoretically, much more advantageous to have several independent +copies of a lost original than to have only one, for the mere mechanical +comparison of the different readings is often enough to remove +obscurities which the uncertain light of conjectural criticism would +never have illuminated. However, an abundance of manuscripts is an +embarrassment rather than a help when the work of grouping them has been +left undone or done badly; nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the +arbitrary and hybrid restorations which are founded on copies whose +relations to each other and to the archetype have not been ascertained +beforehand. On the other hand, the application of rational methods +requires, in some cases, a formidable expenditure of time and labour. +Some works are preserved in hundreds of copies all differing from each +other; sometimes (as in the case of the Gospels) the variants of a text +of quite moderate extent are to be counted by thousands; several years +of assiduous labour are necessary for the preparation of a critical +edition of some mediaeval romances. And after all this labour, all these +collations and comparisons, can we be sure that the text of the romance +is sensibly better than it would have been if there had been only two or +three manuscripts to work upon? No. Some critical editions, owing to the +apparent wealth of material applicable to the work, demand a mechanical +effort which is altogether out of proportion to the positive results +which are its reward. + +"Critical editions" founded on several copies of a lost original ought +to supply the public with the means of verifying the "_stemma codicum_" +which the editor has drawn up, and should give the rejected variants in +the notes. By this means competent readers are, at the worst, put in +possession, if not of the best possible text, at least of the materials +for constructing it.[74] + +II. The results of textual criticism--a kind of cleaning and +mending--are purely negative. By the aid of conjecture, or by the aid of +conjecture and comparison combined, we are enabled to construct, not +necessarily a good text, but the best text possible, of documents whose +original is lost. What we thus effect is the elimination of corrupt and +adventitious readings likely to cause error, and the recognition of +suspected passages as such. But it is obvious that no new information is +supplied by this process. The text of a document which has been restored +at the cost of infinite pains is not worth more than that of a document +whose original has been preserved; on the contrary, it is worth less. If +the autograph manuscript of the AEneid had not been destroyed, centuries +of collation and conjecture would have been saved, and the text of the +AEneid would have been better than it is. This is intended for those who +excel at the "emendation game,"[75] who are in consequence fond of it, +and would really be sorry to have no occasion to play it. + +III. There will, however, be abundant scope for textual criticism as +long as we do not possess the exact text of every historical document. +In the present state of science few labours are more useful than those +which bring new texts to light or improve texts already known. It is a +real service to the study of history to publish unedited or badly edited +texts in a manner conformable to the rules of criticism. In every +country learned societies without number are devoting the greater part +of their resources and activity to this important work. But the immense +number of the texts to be criticised,[76] and the minute care required +by the operations of verbal criticism,[77] prevent the work of +publication and restoration from advancing at any but a slow pace. +Before all the texts which are of interest for mediaeval and modern +history shall have been edited or re-edited _secundum artem_, a long +period must elapse, even supposing that the relatively rapid pace of the +last few years should be still further accelerated.[78] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP + + +It would be absurd to look for information about a fact in the papers of +some one who knew nothing, and could know nothing, about it. The first +questions, then, which we ask when we are confronted with a document is: +Where does it come from? who is the author of it? what is its date? A +document in respect of which we necessarily are in total ignorance of +the author, the place, and the date is good for nothing. + +This truth, which seems elementary, has only been adequately recognised +in our own day. Such is the natural [Greek: hakrishia] of man, that those +who were the first to make a habit of inquiring into the authorship of +documents prided themselves, and justly, on the advance they had made. + +Most modern documents contain a precise indication of their authorship: +in our days, books, newspaper articles, official papers, and even +private writings, are, in general, dated and signed. Many ancient +documents, on the other hand, are anonymous, without date, and have no +sufficient indication of their place of origin. + +The spontaneous tendency of the human mind is to place confidence in the +indications of authorship, when there are any. On the cover and in the +preface of the _Chatiments_, Victor Hugo is named as the author; +therefore Victor Hugo is the author of the _Chatiments_. In such and +such a picture gallery we see an unsigned picture whose frame has been +furnished by the management with a tablet bearing the name of Leonardo +da Vinci; therefore Leonardo da Vinci painted this picture. A poem with +the title _Philomena_ is found under the name of Saint Bonaventura in M. +Clement's _Extraits des poetes chretiens_, in most editions of Saint +Bonaventura's "works," and in a great number of mediaeval manuscripts; +therefore _Philomena_ was written by Saint Bonaventura, and "we may +gather thence much precious knowledge of the very soul" of this holy +man.[79] Vrain-Lucas offered to M. Chasles autographs of Vercingetorix, +Cleopatra, and Saint Mary Magdalene, duly signed, and with the +flourishes complete:[80] here, thought M. Chasles, are autographs of +Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Saint Mary Magdalene. This is one of the +most universal, and at the same time indestructible, forms of public +credulity. + +Experience and reflection have shown the necessity of methodically +checking these instinctive impulses of confiding trust. The autographs +of Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Mary Magdalene had been manufactured by +Vrain-Lucas. The _Philomena_, attributed by mediaeval scribes now to +Saint Bonaventura, now to Louis of Granada, now to John Hoveden, now to +John Peckham, is perhaps by none of these authors, and certainly not by +the first-named. Paintings in which there is not the least gleam of +talent have, in the most celebrated galleries of Italy, been tricked +out, without the least shadow of proof, with the glorious name of +Leonardo. On the other hand, it is perfectly true that Victor Hugo is +the author of the _Chatiments_. The conclusion is, that the most precise +indications of authorship are never sufficient _by themselves_. They +only afford a presumption, strong or weak--very strong, in general, +where modern documents are concerned, often very weak in the case of +ancient documents. False indications of authorship exist, some foisted +upon insignificant works in order to enhance their value, some appended +to works of merit in order to serve the reputation of a particular +person, or to mystify posterity; and there are a hundred other motives +which may easily be imagined, and of which a list has been drawn up:[81] +the "pseudepigraphic" literature of antiquity and the middle ages is +enormous. There are, in addition, documents which are forged from +beginning to end; the forgers have naturally furnished them with very +precise indications of their alleged authorship. Verification is +therefore necessary. But how is it to be had? When the apparent +authorship of a document is suspected, we use for its verification the +same method which serves to fix, as far as possible, the origin of +documents which are furnished with no indications at all on this head. +As the procedure is the same in both cases, it is not necessary to +distinguish further between them. + + +I. The chief instrument used in the investigation of authorship is the +_internal analysis_ of the document under consideration, performed with +a view to bring out any indications it may contain of a nature to supply +information about the author, and the time and place in which he lived. + +First of all we examine the handwriting of the document. Saint +Bonaventura was born in 1221; if poems attributed to him are contained +in manuscripts executed in the eleventh century, we have in this +circumstance an excellent proof that the attribution is ill-founded: no +document of which there exists a copy in eleventh-century handwriting +can be posterior in date to the eleventh century. Then we examine the +language. It is known that certain forms have only been used in certain +places and at certain dates. Most forgers have betrayed themselves by +ignorance of facts of this kind; they let slip modern words or phrases. +It has been possible to establish the fact that certain Phoenician +inscriptions, found in South America, were earlier than a certain German +dissertation on a point of Phoenician syntax. In the case of official +instruments we examine the formulae. If a document which purports to be a +Merovingian charter does not exhibit the ordinary formulae of genuine +Merovingian charters it must be spurious. Lastly, we note all the +positive data which occur in the document--the facts which are mentioned +or alluded to. When these facts are otherwise known, from sources which +a forger could not have had at his disposal, the _bona fides_ of the +document is established, and the date fixed approximately between the +most recent event of which the author shows knowledge, and the next +following event which he does not mention but would have done if he had +known of it. Arguments may also be founded on the circumstance that +particular facts are mentioned with approval, or particular opinions +expressed, and help us to make a conjectural estimate of the status, the +environment, and the character of the author. + +When the internal analysis of a document is carefully performed, it +generally gives us a tolerably accurate notion of its authorship. By +means of a methodical comparison, instituted between the various +elements of the documents analysed and the corresponding elements of +similar documents whose authorship was known with certainty, the +detection of many a forgery[82] has been rendered possible, and +additional information acquired about the circumstances under which most +genuine documents have been produced. + +The results obtained by internal analysis are supplemented and verified +by collecting all the external evidence relative to the document under +criticism which can be found scattered over the documents of the same or +later epochs--quotations, biographical details about the author, and so +on. Sometimes there is a significant absence of any such information: +the fact that an alleged Merovingian charter has not been quoted by +anybody before the seventeenth century, and has only been seen by a +seventeenth-century scholar who has been convicted of fraud, suggests +the thought that it is modern. + + +II. Hitherto we have considered only the simplest case, in which the +document under examination is the work of a single author. But many +documents have, at different times, received additions which it is +important to distinguish from the original text, in order that we may +not attribute to X, the author of the text, what really belongs to Y or +Z, his unforeseen collaborators.[83] There are two kinds of +additions--interpolations and continuations. To interpolate is to insert +into the text words or sentences which were not in the author's +manuscript.[84] Usually interpolations are accidental, due to the +negligence of the copyist, and explicable as the introduction into the +text of interlinear glosses or marginal notes; but there are cases where +some one has deliberately added to (or substituted for) the author's +text words or sentences out of his own head, for the sake of +completeness, ornament, or emphasis. If we had before us the manuscript +in which the deliberate interpolation was made, the appearance of the +added matter and the traces of erasure would make the case clear at +once. But the first interpolated copy has nearly always been lost, and +in the copies derived from it every trace of addition or substitution +has disappeared. There is no need to define "continuations." It is well +known that many chronicles of the middle ages have been "continued" by +various writers, none of whom took the trouble to indicate where his own +work began or ended. + +Sometimes interpolations and continuations can be very readily +distinguished in the course of the operations for restoring a text of +which there are several copies, when it so happens that some of these +copies reproduce the primitive text as it was before any addition was +made to it. But if all the copies are founded on previous copies which +already contained the interpolations or continuations, recourse must be +had to internal analysis. Is the style uniform throughout the document? +Does the book breathe one and the same spirit from cover to cover? Are +there no contradictions, no gaps in the sequence of ideas? In practice, +when the continuators or interpolators have been men of well-marked +personality and decided views, analysis will separate the original from +the additions as cleanly as a pair of scissors. When the whole is +written in a level, colourless style, the lines of division are not so +easy to see; it is then better to confess the fact than to multiply +hypotheses. + + +III. The critical investigation of authorship is not finished as soon as +a document has been accurately or approximately localised in space and +time, and as much information as possible obtained about the author or +authors.[85] Here is a book: we wish to ascertain the origin of the +information contained in it, that is, to be in a position to appreciate +its value; is it enough to know that it was written in 1890, at Paris, +by So-and-so? Perhaps So-and-so copied slavishly, without mentioning the +fact, an earlier work, written in 1850. The responsible guarantor of the +borrowed parts is not So-and-so, but the author of 1850. Plagiarism, it +is true, is now rare, forbidden by the law, and considered +dishonourable; formerly it was common, tolerated, and unpunished. Many +historical documents, with every appearance of originality, are nothing +but unavowed repetitions of earlier documents, and historians +occasionally experience, in this connection, remarkable disillusions. +Certain passages in Eginhard, a ninth-century chronicler, are borrowed +from Suetonius: they have nothing to do with the history of the ninth +century; how if the fact had not been discovered? An event is attested +three times, by three chroniclers; but these three attestations, which +agree so admirably, are really only one if it is ascertained that two of +the three chroniclers copied the third, or that the three parallel +accounts have been drawn from one and the same source. Pontifical +letters and Imperial charters of the middle ages contain eloquent +passages which must not be taken seriously; they are part of the +official style, and were copied word for word from chancery formularies. + +It belongs to the investigation of authorship to discover, as far as +possible, the _sources_ utilised by the authors of documents. + +The problem thus presented to us has some resemblance to that of the +restoration of texts of which we have already spoken. In both cases we +proceed on the assumption that identical readings have a common source: +a number of different scribes, in transcribing a text, will not make +exactly the same mistakes in exactly the same places; a number of +different writers, relating the same facts, will not have viewed them +from exactly the same standpoint, nor will they say the same things in +exactly the same language. The great complexity of historical events +makes it extremely improbable that two independent observers should +narrate them in the same manner. We endeavour to group the documents +into families in the same way as we make families of manuscripts. +Similarly, we are enabled in the result to draw up genealogical tables. +The examiners who correct the compositions of candidates for the +bachelor's degree sometimes notice that the papers of two candidates who +sat next each other bear a family likeness. If they have a mind to find +out which is derived from the other, they have no difficulty in doing +so, in spite of the petty artifices (slight modifications, expansions, +abstracts, additions, suppressions, transpositions) which the plagiarist +multiplies in order to throw suspicion off the scent The two guilty ones +are sufficiently betrayed by their common errors; the more culpable of +the two is detected by the slips he will have made, and especially by +the errors in his own papers which are due to peculiarities in those of +his accommodating friend. Similarly when two ancient documents are in +question: when the author of one has copied directly from the other, the +filiation is generally easy to establish; the plagiarist, whether he +abridges or expands, nearly always betrays himself sooner or later.[86] + +When there are three documents in a family their mutual relationships +are sometimes harder to specify. Let A, B, and C be the documents. +Suppose A is the common source: perhaps B and C copied it independently; +perhaps C only knew A through the medium of B, or B knew it only through +C. If B and C have abridged the common source in different ways, they +are evidently independent. When B depends on C, or _vice versa_, we have +the simplest case, treated in the preceding paragraph. But suppose the +author of C combined A and B, while B had already used A: the genealogy +begins to get complicated. It is more complicated still when there are +four, five, or more documents in a family, for the number of possible +combinations increases with great rapidity. However, if too many +intermediate links have not been lost, criticism succeeds in +disentangling the relationships by persistent and ingenious applications +of the method of repeated comparisons. Modern scholars (Krusch, for +example, who has made a speciality of Merovingian hagiography) have +recently constructed, by the use of this method, precise genealogies of +the utmost solidity.[87] The results of the critical investigation of +authorship, as applied to the filiation of documents, are of two kinds. +Firstly, lost documents are reconstructed. Suppose two chroniclers, B +and C, have used, each in his own way, a common source X, which has now +disappeared. We may form an idea of X by piecing together the fragments +of it which occur imbedded in B and C, just as we form an idea of a lost +manuscript by comparing the partial copies of it which have been +preserved. On the other hand, criticism destroys the authority of a host +of "authentic" documents--that is, documents which no one suspects of +having been falsified--by showing that they are derivative, that they +are worth whatever their sources may be worth, and that, when they +embellish their sources with imaginary details and rhetorical +flourishes, they are worth just nothing at all. In Germany and England +editors of documents have introduced the excellent system of printing +borrowed passages in small characters, and original passages whose +source is unknown in larger characters. Thanks to this system it is +possible to see at a glance that celebrated chronicles, which are often +(very wrongly) quoted, are mere compilations, of no value in themselves: +thus the _Flores historiarum_ of the self-styled Matthew of Westminster, +perhaps the most popular of the English mediaeval chronicles, are almost +entirely taken from original works by Wendover and Matthew of Paris.[88] + + +IV. The critical investigation of authorship saves historians from huge +blunders. Its results are striking. By eliminating spurious documents, +by detecting false ascriptions, by determining the conditions of +production of documents which had been defaced by time, and by +connecting them with their sources,[89] it has rendered services of such +magnitude that to-day it is regarded as having a special right to the +name of "criticism." It is usual to say of an historian that he "fails +in criticism" when he neglects to distinguish between documents, when he +never mistrusts traditional ascriptions, and when he accepts, as if +afraid to lose a single one, all the pieces of information, ancient or +modern, good or bad, which come to him, from whatever quarter.[90] + +This view is perfectly just. We must not, however, be satisfied with +this form of criticism, and we must not abuse it. + +We must not abuse it. The extreme of distrust, in these matters, is +almost as mischievous as the extreme of credulity. Pere Hardouin, who +attributed the works of Vergil and Horace to mediaeval monks, was every +whit as ridiculous as the victim of Vrain-Lucas. It is an abuse of the +methods of this species of criticism to apply them, as has been done, +indiscriminately, for the mere pleasure of it. The bunglers who have +used this species of criticism to brand as spurious perfectly genuine +documents, such as the writings of Hroswitha, the _Ligurinus_, and the +bull _Unam Sanctam_,[91] or to establish imaginary filiations between +certain annals, on the strength of superficial indications, would have +discredited criticism before now if that had been possible. It is +praiseworthy, certainly, to react against those who never raise a doubt +about the authorship of a document; but it is carrying the reaction too +far to take an exclusive interest in periods of history which depend on +documents of uncertain authorship. The only reason why the documents of +modern and contemporary history are found less interesting than those of +antiquity and the early middle ages, is that the identity which nearly +always obtains between their apparent and their real authorship leaves +no room for those knotty problems of attribution in which the _virtuosi_ +of criticism are accustomed to display their skill.[92] + +Nor must we be content with it. The critical investigation of +authorship, like textual criticism, is preparatory, and its results +negative. Its final aim and crowning achievement is to get rid of +documents which are not documents, and which would have misled us; that +is all. "It teaches us not to use bad documents; it does not teach us +how to turn good ones to account."[93] It is not the whole of +"historical criticism;" it is only one stone in the edifice.[94] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES + + +By the help of the preceding operations the documents, all the +documents, let us suppose, of a given class, or relating to a given +subject, have been found. We know where they are; the text of each has +been restored, if necessary, and each has been critically examined in +respect of authorship. We know where they have come from. It remains to +combine and classify the materials thus verified. This is the last of +the operations which may be called preparatory to the work of higher (or +internal) criticism and construction. + +Whoever studies a point of history is obliged, first of all, to classify +his sources. To arrange, in a rational and convenient manner, the +verified materials before making use of them, is an apparently humble, +but really very important, part of the historian's profession. Those who +have learnt how to do it possess, on that account alone, a marked +advantage: they give themselves less trouble, and they obtain better +results; the others waste their time and labour; they are smothered +sometimes under the disorderly mass of notes, extracts, copies, scraps, +which they themselves have accumulated. Who was it spoke of those busy +people who spend their lives lifting building-stones without knowing +where to place them, raising as they do so clouds of blinding dust? + + +I. Here, again, we have to confess that the first, the natural impulse, +is not the right one. The first impulse of most men who have to utilise +a number of texts is to make notes from them, one after another, in the +order in which they study them. Many of the early scholars (whose papers +we possess) worked on this system, and so do most beginners who are not +warned beforehand; the latter keep, as the former kept, note-books, +which they fill continuously and progressively with notes on the texts +they are interested in. This method is utterly wrong. The materials +collected must be classified sooner or later; otherwise it would be +necessary, when occasion arose, to deal separately with the materials +bearing on a given point, to read right through the whole series of +note-books, and this laborious process would have to be repeated every +time a new detail was wanted. If this method seems attractive at first, +it is because it appears to save time. But this is false economy; the +ultimate result is, an enormous addition to the labour of search, and +great difficulty in combining the materials. + +Others, well understanding the advantages of systematic classification, +have proposed to fit their materials, as fast as collected, into their +appropriate places in a prearranged scheme. For this purpose they use +note-books of which every page has first been provided with a heading. +Thus all the entries of the same kind are close to one another. This +system leaves something to be desired; for additions will not always +fit without inconvenience into their proper place; and the scheme of +classification, once adopted, is rigid, and can only be modified with +difficulty. Many librarians used to draw up their catalogues on this +plan, which is now universally condemned. + +There is a still more barbarous method, which need not receive more than +passing mention. This is simply to register documents in the memory +without taking written notes. This method has been used. Historians +endowed with excellent memories, and lazy to boot, have indulged this +whim, with the result that their quotations and references are mostly +inexact. The human memory is a delicate piece of registering apparatus, +but it is so little an instrument of precision that such presumption is +inexcusable. + +Every one admits nowadays that it is advisable to collect materials on +separate cards or slips of paper. The notes from each document are +entered upon a loose leaf furnished with the precisest possible +indications of origin. The advantages of this artifice are obvious: the +detachability of the slips enables us to group them at will in a host of +different combinations; if necessary, to change their places: it is easy +to bring texts of the same kind together, and to incorporate additions, +as they are acquired, in the interior of the groups to which they +belong. As for documents which are interesting from several points of +view, and which ought to appear in several groups, it is sufficient to +enter them several times over on different slips; or they may be +represented, as often as may be required, on reference-slips. Moreover, +the method of slips is the only one mechanically possible for the +purpose of forming, classifying, and utilising a collection of documents +of any great extent. Statisticians, financiers, and men of letters who +observe, have now discovered this as well as scholars. + +The method of slips is not without its drawbacks. Each slip ought to be +furnished with precise references to the source from which its contents +have been derived; consequently, if a document has been analysed upon +fifty different slips, the same references must be repeated fifty times. +Hence a slight increase in the amount of writing to be done. It is +certainly on account of this trivial complication that some obstinately +cling to the inferior note-book system. Again, in virtue of their very +detachability, the slips, or loose leaves, are liable to go astray; and +when a slip is lost how is it to be replaced? To begin with, its +disappearance is not perceived, and, if it were, the only remedy would +be to go right through all the work already done from beginning to end. +But the truth is, experience has suggested a variety of very simple +precautions, which we need not here explain in detail, by which the +drawbacks of the system are reduced to a minimum. It is recommended to +use slips of uniform size and tough material, and to arrange them at the +earliest opportunity in covers or drawers or otherwise. Every one is +free to form his own habits in these matters. But it is well to realise +beforehand that these habits, according as they are more or less +rational and practical, have a direct influence on the results of +scientific work. Renan speaks of "these points of private librarianship +which make up the half of scientific work."[95] This is not too strong. +One scholar will owe a good part of his well-deserved reputation to his +method of collecting, while another will be, so to speak, paralysed by +his clumsiness in that particular.[96] + +After having collected the documents, whether copied _in extenso_ or +abridged, on slips or loose leaves, we classify them. On what scheme? In +what order? Clearly different cases must be treated differently, and it +would not be reasonable to lay down precise formulae to govern them all. +However, we may give a few general considerations. + + +II. We distinguish between the historian who classifies verified +documents for the purposes of historical work, and the scholar who +compiles "_Regesta_." By the words "_Regesta_" and "_Corpus_" we +understand methodically classified collections of historical documents. +In a "_Corpus_" documents are reproduced _in extenso_; in "_Regesta_" +they are analysed and described. + +The use of these compilations is to assist researchers in collecting +documents. Scholars set themselves to perform, once for all, tasks of +search and classification from which, thanks to them, the public will +henceforth be free. + +Documents may be grouped according to their date, according to their +place of origin, according to their contents, according to their +form.[97] Here we have the four categories of time, place, species, and +form; by superposing, then, we obtain divisions of smaller extent. We +may undertake, for example, to make a group of all the documents having +a given form, of a given country, and lying between two given dates +(French royal charters of the reign of Philip Augustus); or of all the +documents of a given form (Latin inscriptions); or of a given species +(Latin hymns); of a given epoch (antiquity, the middle ages). We may +recall, by way of illustration, the existence of a _Corpus Inscriptionum +Graecarum_, of a _Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum_, of a _Corpus +Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum_, the _Regesta Imperii_ of J. F. +Boehmer and his continuators, the _Regesta Pontificum Romanorum_ of P. +Jaffe and A. Potthast. + +Whatever the division chosen, there are two alternatives: either the +documents to be placed in this division are dated or they are not. + +If they are dated, as is the case, for example, with the charters issued +from the chancery of a prince, care will have been taken to place at the +head of each slip the date (expressed in modern reckoning) of the +document entered upon it. Nothing is then easier than to group in +chronological order all the slips, that is, all the documents, which +have been collected. The rule is to use chronological classification +whenever possible. There is only one difficulty, and that is of a +practical order. Even in the most favourable circumstances some of the +documents will have accidentally lost their dates; these dates the +compiler is bound to restore, or at least to attempt to restore; long +and patient research is necessary for the purpose. + +If the documents are not dated, a choice must be made between the +alphabetical, the geographical, and the systematic order. The history of +the _Corpus_ of Latin inscriptions bears witness to the difficulty of +this choice. "The arrangement according to date was impossible, seeing +that most of the inscriptions are not dated. From the time of Smetius it +was usual to divide them into classes, that is, a distinction was made, +resting solely on the contents of the inscription, and having no regard +to their place of origin, between religious, sepulchral, military, and +poetical inscriptions, those which have a public character, and those +which only concern private persons, and so on. Boeckh, although he had +preferred the geographical arrangement for his _Corpus Inscriptionum +Graecarum_, was of opinion that the arrangement by subjects, which had +been hitherto employed, was the only possible one for a Latin +_Corpus_...." [Even those who, in France, proposed the geographical +arrangement] "wished to make an exception of texts relating to the +general history of a country, certainly, at any rate, in the case of the +Empire; in 1845 Zumpt defended a very complicated eclectic system of +this kind. In 1847 Mommsen still rejected the geographical arrangement +except for municipal inscriptions, and in 1852, when he published the +Inscriptions of the Kingdom of Naples, he had not entirely changed his +opinion. It was only on being charged by the Academy of Berlin with the +publication of the _Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum_, that, grown wise by +experience, he rejected even the exceptions proposed by Egger in the +case of the general history of a province, and thought it his duty to +keep to the geographical arrangement pure and simple."[98] And yet, +considering the nature of epigraphic documents, the arrangement +according to place was the only rational one. This has been amply +demonstrated for more than fifty years; but collectors of inscriptions +did not come to an agreement on the subject till after two centuries of +tentative efforts in different directions. For two centuries collections +of Latin inscriptions have been made without any perception of the fact +that "to group inscriptions according to their subjects is much the same +thing as to publish an edition of Cicero in which his speeches, +treatises, and letters should be cut up and the fragments arranged +according to their subject-matter;" that "epigraphic monuments belonging +to the same territory mutually explain each other when placed side by +side;" and, lastly, that "while it is all but impossible to range in +order of subject-matter a hundred thousand inscriptions nearly all of +which belong to several categories; on the other hand, each monument has +but one place, and a very definite place, in the geographical +order."[99] + +The alphabetical arrangement is very convenient when the chronological +and geographical arrangements are unsuitable. There are documents, such +as the sermons, the hymns, and the secular songs of the middle ages, +which are not precisely dated or localised. They are arranged in the +alphabetical order of their _incipit_--that is, the words with which +they begin.[100] + +The systematic order, or arrangement by subjects, is not to be +recommended for the compilation of a _Corpus_ or of _regesta_. It is +always arbitrary, and leads to inevitable repetition and confusion. +Besides, given collections arranged in chronological, geographical, or +alphabetical order, nothing more than the addition of a good table of +contents is needed to make them available for all the purposes which +would be served by a systematic arrangement. One of the chief rules of +the art of _Corpus_ and _regesta_-making, that great art which has been +carried to such perfection in the second half of the nineteenth +century,[101] is to provide these collections, whatever the grouping +adopted, with a variety of tables and indexes of a kind to facilitate +the use of them: _incipit_ tables in chronological _regesta_ which lend +themselves to such treatment, indexes of names and dates in _regesta_ +arranged by order of _incipit_, and so on. + +_Corpus_ and _regesta_-makers collect and classify for the use of others +documents in which, at any rate in _all_ of which, they have no direct +interest, and are absorbed in this labour. Ordinary workers, on the +other hand, only collect and classify materials useful for their +individual studies. Hence certain differences arise. For example, the +arrangement by subjects, on a predetermined system, which is so little +to be recommended for great collections, often provides those who are +composing monographs on their own account with a scheme of +classification preferable to any other. But it will always be well to +cultivate the mechanical habits of which professional compilers have +learnt the value by experience: to write at the head of every slip its +date, if there is occasion for it, and a heading[102] in any case; to +multiply cross-references and indices; to keep a record, on a separate +set of slips, of all the sources utilised, in order to avoid the danger +of having to work a second time through materials already dealt with. +The regular observance of these maxims goes a great way towards making +scientific historical work easier and more solid. The possession of a +well-arranged, though incomplete, collection of slips has enabled M. B. +Haureau to exhibit to the end of his life an undeniable mastery over the +very special class of historical problems which he studied.[103] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS + + +The sum of the operations described in the preceding chapters +(restoration of texts, investigation of authorship, collection and +classification of verified documents) constitutes the vast domain of +external criticism, or critical scholarship. + +The public at large, with its vulgar and superficial standards, has +nothing but disdain for the whole of critical scholarship. Some of its +votaries, on the other hand, are inclined to exalt it unduly. But there +is a happy medium between these extremes of over-appreciation and +contempt. + +The crude opinion of those who pity and despise the minute analysis of +external criticism hardly deserves refutation. There is only one +argument for the legitimacy and honourable character of the obscure +labours of erudition, but it is a decisive argument: it rests on their +indispensability. No erudition, no history. "_Non sunt contemnenda quasi +parva_," says St. Jerome, "_sine quibus magna constare non +possunt_."[104] + +On the other hand, scholars by profession, in their zeal to justify +their pride in their work, are not content with maintaining its +necessity; they allow themselves to be carried away into an exaggeration +of its merit and importance. It has been said that the sure methods of +external criticism have raised history to the dignity of a science, "of +an exact science;" that critical investigations of authorship "enable +us, better than any other study, to gain a profound insight into past +ages;" that the habit of criticising texts refines or even confers the +"historical sense." It has been tacitly assumed that external criticism +is the whole of historical criticism, and that beyond the purgation, +emendation, and classification of documents there is nothing left to do. +This illusion, common enough among specialists, is too crude to need +express refutation; the fact is, that it is the psychological criticism +which deals with interpretation and examines into the good faith and +accuracy of authors that has, better than any other study, enabled us to +gain a profound insight into past ages, not external criticism.[105] An +historian who should be fortunate enough to find all the documents +bearing on his studies already edited correctly, classified, and +critically examined as to authorship, would be in just as good a +position to use them for writing history as if he had performed all the +preliminary operations himself. It is quite possible, whatever may be +said, to have the historical sense in full measure without having ever, +both literally and figuratively, wiped away the dust from original +documents--that is, without having discovered and restored them for +oneself. We need not interpret in the Jewish or etymological sense the +dictum of Renan: "I do not think it possible for any one to acquire a +clear notion of history, its limits, and the amount of confidence to be +placed in the different categories of historical investigation, unless +he is in the habit of _handling_ original documents."[106] This is to be +understood as simply referring to the habit of going direct to the +sources, and treating definite problems.[107] Without doubt a day will +come when all the documents relating to the history of classical +antiquity shall have been edited and treated critically. There will then +be no more room, in this department of study, for textual criticism or +the investigation of sources; but, for all that, the conditions for the +treatment of general ancient history, or special parts of it, will be +then eminently favourable. External criticism, as we cannot too often +repeat, is entirely preparatory; it is a means, not an end; the ideal +state of things would be that it should have been already sufficiently +practised that we might dispense with it for the future; it is only a +temporary necessity. Theoretically, not only is it unnecessary for those +who wish to make historical syntheses to do for themselves the +preparatory work on the materials which they use, but we have a right to +ask, as has been often asked, whether there is any advantage in their +doing it.[108] Would it not be preferable that workers in the field of +history should specialise? On the one class--the specialists--would +devolve the absorbing tasks of external or erudite criticism; the +others, relieved of the weight of these tasks, would have greater +liberty to devote themselves to the work of higher criticism, of +combination and construction. Such was the opinion of Mark Pattison, who +said, _History cannot be written from manuscripts_, which is as much as +to say: "It is impossible for a man to write history from documents +which he is obliged to put for himself into a condition in which they +can be used." + +Formerly the professions of "critical scholar" and "historian" were, in +fact, clearly distinguished. The "historians" cultivated the empty and +pompous species of literature which then was known as "history," without +considering themselves bound to keep in touch with the work of the +scholars. The latter, for their part, determined by their critical +researches the conditions under which history must be written, but were +at no pains to write it themselves. Content to collect, emend, and +classify historical documents, they took no interest in history, and +understood the past no better than did the mass of their contemporaries. +The scholars acted as though erudition were an end in itself, and the +historians as if they had been able to reconstruct vanished realities by +the mere force of reflection and ingenuity applied to the inferior +documents, which were common property. So complete a divorce between +erudition and history seems to-day almost inexplicable, and it was in +truth mischievous enough. We need not say that the present advocates of +the division of labour in history have nothing of the kind in view. It +is admittedly necessary that close relations should obtain between the +world of historians and that of critical scholars, for the work of the +latter has no reason for existence beyond its utility to the former. All +that is meant is, that certain analytical and all synthetic operations +are not necessarily better performed when they are performed by the same +person; that though the characters of historian and scholar may be +combined, there is nothing illegitimate in their separation; and that +perhaps this separation is desirable in theory, as, in practice, it is +often a necessity. + +In practice, what happens is as follows. Whatever part of history a man +undertakes to study, there are only three possible cases. In the first +the sources have already been emended and classified; in the second the +preliminary work on the sources, which has been only partially done, or +not at all, offers no great difficulty; in the third the sources are in +a very bad state, and require a great deal of labour to fit them for +use. We may observe, in passing, that there is naturally no proportion +between the intrinsic importance of the subject and the amount of +preliminary work which must be done before it can be treated: there are +some subjects of the highest interest, for example the history of the +origin and early development of Christianity, which could not be +properly attacked till after the completion of investigations which +occupied several generations of scholars; but the material criticism of +the sources of the history of the French Revolution, another subject of +the first rank, gave much less trouble; and there are comparatively +unimportant problems in mediaeval history which will not be solved till +after an immense amount of external criticism shall have been performed. + +In the two first cases the expediency of a division of labour does not +come in question. But take the third case. A man of ability discovers +that the documents which are necessary for the treatment of a point of +history are in a very bad condition; they are scattered, corrupt, and +untrustworthy. He must take his choice; either he must abandon the +subject, having no taste for the mechanical operations which he knows to +be necessary, but which, as he foresees, would absorb the whole of his +energy; or else he resolves to enter upon the preparatory critical work, +without concealing from himself that in all probability he will never +have time to utilise the materials he has verified, and that he will +therefore be working for those who will come after him. If he adopts the +second alternative he becomes a critical scholar by profession, as it +were in spite of himself. _A priori_, it is true, there is nothing to +prevent those who make great collections of texts and publish critical +editions from using their own compilations and editions for the writing +of history; and we see, as a matter of fact, that several men have +divided themselves between the preparatory tasks of external criticism +and the more exalted labours of historical construction: it is enough to +mention the names of Waitz, Mommsen, and Haureau. But this combination +is very rare, for several reasons. The first is the shortness of life; +there are catalogues, editions, _regesta_ on a great scale, the +construction of which entails so much mechanical labour as to exhaust +the strength of the most zealous worker. The second is the fact that, +for many persons, the tasks of critical scholarship are not without +their charm; nearly every one finds in them a singular satisfaction in +the long run; and some have confined themselves to these tasks who +might, strictly speaking, have aspired to higher things. + +Is it a good thing in itself that some workers should, voluntarily or +not, confine themselves to the researches of critical scholarship? Yes, +without a doubt. In the study of history, the results of the division of +labour are the same as in the industrial arts, and highly +satisfactory--more abundant, more successful, better regulated +production. Critics who have been long habituated to the restoration of +texts restore them with incomparable dexterity and sureness; those who +devote themselves exclusively to investigations of authorship and +sources have intuitions which would not occur to others less versed in +this difficult and highly specialised branch; those who have spent +their lives in the construction of catalogues and the compilation of +_regesta_ construct and compile them more easily, more quickly, and +better than the man in the street. Thus, not only is there no special +reason for requiring every "historian" to be at the same time an active +worker in the field of critical scholarship, but even those scholars who +are engaged in the operations of external criticism come under different +categories. Similarly, in a stoneyard there is no point in the architect +being at the same time a workman, nor have all the workmen the same +functions. Although most critical scholars have not rigorously +specialised so far, and although they vary their pleasures by +voluntarily executing different kinds of critical work, it would be easy +to name some who are specialists in descriptive catalogues and indexes +(archivists, librarians, and the like), others who are more particularly +"critics" (purifiers, restorers, and editors of texts), and others who +are pre-eminently compilers of _regesta_. "The moment it is admitted +that erudition is only valuable for the sake of its results, it becomes +impossible to carry the division of scientific labour too far;"[109] and +the progress of the historical sciences corresponds to the narrower and +narrower specialisation of the workers. It was possible, not very long +ago, for the same man to devote himself successively to all the +operations of historical inquiry, but that was because he appealed to a +not very exacting public: nowadays we require of those who criticise +documents a minute accuracy and an absolute perfection which presuppose +real professional skill. The historical sciences have now reached a +stage in their evolution at which the main lines have been traced, the +great discoveries made, and nothing remains but a more precise treatment +of details. We feel instinctively that any further advance must be by +dint of investigations of such extent, and analyses of such depth, as +none but specialists are capable of. + +But the best justification of the division of workers into "scholars" +and "historians" (and of the distribution of the former among the +various branches of external criticism) is to be found in the fact that +different persons have a natural vocation for different tasks. One of +the chief justifications of the institution of higher historical +teaching is, in our opinion, the opportunity afforded the teachers +(presumably men of experience) of discerning in the students, in the +course of their university career, either the germ of a vocation for +critical scholarship, or fundamental unfitness for critical work, as the +case may be.[110] _Criticus non fit, sed nascitur._ For one who is not +endowed by nature with certain aptitudes, a career of technical +erudition has nothing but disappointments in store: the greatest service +that can be rendered to young men hesitating whether to adopt such a +career or not is to warn them of the fact. Those who hitherto have +devoted themselves to the preparatory tasks of criticism have either +chosen them in preference to others because they had a taste for them, +or else have submitted to them because they knew they were necessary; +those who engaged in them by choice have less merit, from the ethical +point of view, than those who submitted to them, but, for all that, they +have mostly obtained better results, because they have worked, not as a +matter of duty, but joyfully and whole-heartedly. It is important that +every one should realise the situation, and, in his own as well as the +general interest, embrace the special work which suits him best. + +We now propose to examine the natural aptitudes which fit, and the truly +prohibitory defects which disqualify, for the labours of external +criticism. We shall, then, devote a few words to the effects produced on +the character by professional habituation to the labours of critical +scholarship. + +The chief condition of success in these labours is to like them. Those +who are exceptionally gifted as poets or thinkers--that is, those who +are endowed with creative power--have much difficulty in adapting +themselves to the technical drudgery of preparatory criticism: they are +far from despising it; on the contrary, they hold it in honour, if they +are clear-sighted; but they shrink from devoting themselves to it, for +fear of using a razor, as is said, to cut stones. "I have no mind," +wrote Leibnitz to Basnage, who had exhorted him to compile an immense +_Corpus_ of unpublished and printed documents relating to the history of +the law of nations; "I have no mind to turn transcriber.... Does it not +occur to you that the advice you give me resembles that of a man who +should wish to marry his friend to a shrew? For to engage a man in a +lifelong work is much the same as to find him a wife."[111] And Renan, +speaking of those immense preliminary labours "which have rendered +possible the researches of the higher criticism" and attempts at +historical construction, says: "The man who, with livelier intellectual +needs [than those of the men who performed these labours], should now +accomplish such an act of abnegation, would be a hero...."[112] Although +Renan directed the publication of the _Corpus Inscriptionum +Semiticarum_, and Leibnitz was the editor of the _Scriptores rerum +Brunsvicensium_, neither Leibnitz, nor Renan, nor their peers have, +fortunately, had the heroism to sacrifice their higher faculties to +purely critical learning. + +Outside the class of superior men (and the infinitely more numerous +class of those who wrongly think themselves such), nearly every one, as +we have already said, finds in the long run a kind of satisfaction in +the minutiae of preparatory criticism. The reason is, that the practice +of this criticism appeals to and develops two very widespread +tastes--the taste for collecting and the taste for puzzles. The pleasure +of collecting is one which is felt not by children only, but by adults +as well, no matter whether the collection be one of various readings or +of postage-stamps. The deciphering of rebuses, the solution of small +problems of strictly definite scope, are occupations which attract many +able minds. Every find brings pleasure, and in the field of erudition +there are innumerable finds--some lying exposed and obvious, some +guarded by all but impenetrable barriers--to reward both those who do +and those who do not delight in surmounting difficulties. All the +scholars of any distinction have possessed in an eminent degree the +instincts of the collector and the puzzle-solver, and some of them have +been quite conscious of the fact. "The more difficulties we encountered +in our chosen path," says M. Haureau, "the more the enterprise pleased +us. This species of labour, which is called bibliography [investigations +of authorship, principally from the point of view of pseudepigraphy], +could not aspire to the homage of the public, but it has a great +attraction for those who devote themselves to it. Yes, it is doubtless a +humble study, but how many others are there which so often compensate +the trouble they give by affording us opportunity to cry Eureka."[113] +Julien Havet, when he was "already known to the learned men of Europe," +used to divert himself "by apparently frivolous amusements, such as +guessing square words or deciphering cryptograms."[114] Profound +instincts, and, for all the childish or ridiculous perversions which +they may exhibit in certain individuals, of the highest utility! After +all, these are forms, the most rudimentary forms, of the scientific +spirit. Those who are devoid of them have no place in the world of +critical scholarship. But those who aspire to be critical scholars will +always be numerous; for the labours of interpretation, construction, and +exposition require the rarest gifts: all those whom chance has thrown +into the study of history, who desire to do useful work in that +department, but are wanting in psychological tact, or find composition +irksome, will always allow themselves to be fascinated by the simple and +calm pleasures of the preliminary tasks. + +But in order to succeed in critical labours it is not enough to like +them. It is necessary to possess qualifications "for which zeal is no +substitute." What qualifications? Those who have asked this question +have answered vaguely: "Qualifications of the moral rather than the +intellectual order, patience, intellectual honesty...." Is it not +possible to be more precise? + +There are young students with no _a priori_ repugnance for the labours +of external criticism, who perhaps are even disposed to like them, who +yet are--experience has shown it--totally incapable of performing them. +There would be nothing perplexing in this if these persons were +intellectually feeble; this incapacity would then be but one +manifestation of their general weakness; nor yet if they had gone +through no technical apprenticeship. But we are concerned with men of +education and intelligence, sometimes of exceptional ability, who do not +labour under the above disadvantages. These are the people of whom we +hear: "He works badly, he has the genius of inaccuracy." Their +catalogues, their editions, their _regesta_, their monographs swarm with +imperfections, and never inspire confidence; try as they may, they +never attain, I do not say absolute accuracy, but any decent degree of +accuracy. They are subject to "chronic inaccuracy," a disease of which +the English historian Froude is a typical and celebrated case. Froude +was a gifted writer, but destined never to advance any statement that +was not disfigured by error; it has been said of him that he was +constitutionally inaccurate. For example, he had visited the city of +Adelaide in Australia: "We saw," says he, "below us, in a basin with a +river winding through it, a city of 150,000 inhabitants, none of whom +has ever known or will ever know one moment's anxiety as to the +recurring regularity of his three meals a day." Thus Froude, now for the +facts: Adelaide is built on an eminence; no river runs through it; when +Froude visited it the population did not exceed 75,000, and it was +suffering from a famine at the time. And more of the same kind.[115] +Froude was perfectly aware of the utility of criticism, and he was even +one of the first in England to base the study of history on that of +original documents, as well unpublished as published; but his mental +conformation rendered him altogether unfit for the emendation of texts; +indeed, he murdered them, unintentionally, whenever he touched them. +Just as Daltonism (an affection of the organs of sight which prevents a +man from distinguishing correctly between red and green signals) +incapacitates for employment on a railway, so chronic inaccuracy, or +"Froude's Disease" (a malady not very difficult to diagnose) ought to be +regarded as incompatible with the professional practice of critical +scholarship. + +Froude's Disease does not appear to have ever been studied by the +psychologists, nor, indeed, is it to be considered as a separate +pathological entity. Every one makes mistakes "out of carelessness," +"through inadvertence," and in many other ways. What is abnormal is to +make many mistakes, to be always making them, in spite of the most +persevering efforts to be exact. Probably this phenomenon is connected +with weakness of the attention and excessive activity of the involuntary +(or subconscious) imagination which the will of the patient, lacking +strength and stability, is unable sufficiently to control. The +involuntary imagination intrudes upon intellectual operations only to +vitiate them; its part is to fill up the gaps of memory by conjecture, +to magnify and attenuate realities, and to confuse them with the +products of pure invention. Most children distort everything by +inexactitude of this kind, and it is only after a hard struggle that +they ever attain to a scrupulous accuracy--that is, learn to master +their imagination. Many men remain children, in this respect, the whole +of their lives. + +But, let the psychological causes of Froude's Disease be what they may, +another point claims our attention. The man of the sanest and +best-balanced mind is liable to bungle the simplest kinds of critical +work if he does not allow them the necessary time. In these matters +precipitancy is the source of innumerable errors. It is rightly said +that patience is the cardinal virtue of the scholar. Do not work too +fast, act as if there were always something to be gained by waiting, +leave work undone rather than spoil it: these are maxims easy enough to +pronounce, but not to be followed in practice by any but persons of +calm temperament. There are nervous, excitable persons, who are always +in a hurry to get to the end, always seeking variety in their +occupations, and always anxious to dazzle and astonish: these may +possibly find honourable employment in other careers; but if they +embrace erudition, they are doomed to pile up a mass of provisional +work, which is likely to do more harm than good, and is sure in the long +run to cause them many a vexation. The true scholar is cool, reserved, +circumspect. In the midst of the turmoil of life, which flows past him +like a torrent, he never hurries. Why should he hurry? The important +thing is, that the work he does should be solid, definitive, +imperishable. Better "spend weeks polishing a masterpiece of a score of +pages" in order to convince two or three among the scholars of Europe +that a particular charter is spurious, or take ten years to construct +the best possible text of a corrupt document, than give to the press in +the same interval volumes of moderately accurate _anecdota_ which future +scholars will some day have to put through the mill again from beginning +to end. + +Whatever special branch of critical scholarship a man may choose, he +ought to be gifted with prudence, an exceptionally powerful attention +and will, and, moreover, to combine a speculative turn of mind with +complete disinterestedness and little taste for action; for he must make +up his mind to work for distant and uncertain results, and, in nearly +every case, for the benefit of others. For textual criticism and the +investigation of sources, it is, moreover, very useful to have the +puzzle-solving instinct--that is, a nimble, ingenious mind, fertile in +hypotheses, prompt to seize and even to guess the relations of things. +For tasks of description and compilation (the preparation of inventories +and catalogues, _corpus_ and _regesta_-making) it is absolutely +necessary to possess the collector's instinct, together with an +exceptional appetite for work, and the qualities of order, industry, and +perseverance.[116] These are the aptitudes required. The labours of +external criticism are so distasteful to those who lack these aptitudes, +and the results obtained are, in their case, so small in comparison with +the time expended, that it is impossible for a man to make too sure of +his vocation before entering upon a career of critical scholarship. It +is pitiful to see those who, for want of a wise word spoken in due +season, lose their way and vainly exhaust themselves in such a career, +especially when they have good reason for believing that they might have +employed their talents to better advantage in other directions.[117] + +II. As critical and preparatory tasks are remarkably well suited to the +temperament of a very large number of Germans, and as the activity of +German erudition during the present century has been enormous, it is to +Germany that we must go for the best cases of those mental deformations +which are produced, in the long run, by the habitual practice of +external criticism. Hardly a year passes but complaints are heard, in +and about the German universities, of the ill effects produced on +scholars by the tasks of criticism. + +In 1890, Herr Philippi, as Rector of the University of Giessen, forcibly +deplored the chasm which, as he said, is opening between preparatory +criticism and general culture: textual criticism loses itself in +insignificant minutiae; scholars collate for the mere pleasure of +collating; infinite precautions are employed in the restoration of +worthless documents; it is thus evident that "more importance is +attached to the materials of study than to its intellectual results." +The Rector of Giessen sees in the diffuse style of German scholars and +in the bitterness of their polemical writings an effect of the habit +they have contracted of "excessive preoccupation with little +things."[118] In the same year the same note was sounded, at the +University of Bale, by Herr J. v. Pflugk-Harttung. "The highest branches +of historical science are despised," says this author in his +_Geschichtsbetrachtungen_[119]: "all that is valued is microscopic +observations and absolute accuracy in unimportant details. The criticism +of texts and sources has become a branch of sport: the least breach of +the rules of the game is considered unpardonable, while conformity to +them is enough to assure the approval of connoisseurs, irrespectively of +the intrinsic value of the results obtained. Scholars are mostly +malevolent and discourteous towards each other; they make molehills and +call them mountains; their vanity is as comic as that of the citizen of +Frankfort who used complacently to observe, 'All that you can see +through yonder archway is Frankfort territory.'"[120] We, for our part, +are inclined to draw a distinction between three professional risks to +which scholars are subject: dilettantism, hypercriticism, and loss of +the power to work. + +To take the last first: the habit of critical analysis has a relaxing +and paralysing action on certain intelligences. Men, of naturally timid +dispositions, discover that whatever pains they take with their critical +work, their editing or classifying of documents, they are very apt to +make slight mistakes, and these slight mistakes, as a result of their +critical education, fill them with horror and dread. To discover +blunders in their signed work when the time for correction is past, +causes them acute suffering. They reach at length a state of morbid +anxiety and scrupulosity which prevents them from doing anything at +all, for fear of possible imperfections. The _examen rigorosum_ to which +they are continually subjecting themselves brings them to a standstill. +They give the same measure to the productions of others, and in the end +they see in historical works nothing but the authorities and the notes, +the _apparatus criticus_, and in the _apparatus criticus_ they see +nothing but the faults in it which require correction. + +_Hypercriticism._--The excess of criticism, just as much as the crudest +ignorance, leads to error. It consists in the application of critical +canons to cases outside their jurisdiction. It is related to criticism +as logic-chopping is to logic. There are persons who scent enigmas +everywhere, even where there are none. They take perfectly clear texts +and subtilise on them till they make them doubtful, under the pretext of +freeing them from imaginary corruptions. They discover traces of forgery +in authentic documents. A strange state of mind! By constantly guarding +against the instinct of credulity they come to suspect everything.[121] +It is to be observed that in proportion as the criticism of texts and +sources makes positive progress, the danger of hypercriticism increases. +When all the sources of history have been properly criticised (for +certain parts of ancient history this is no distant prospect), good +sense will call a halt. But scholars will refuse to halt; they will +refine, as they do already on the best established texts, and those who +refine will inevitably fall into hypercriticism. "The peculiarity of the +study of history and its auxiliary philological sciences," says Renan, +"is that as soon as they have attained their relative perfection they +begin to destroy themselves."[122] Hypercriticism is the cause of this. + +_Dilettantism._--Scholars by profession and vocation have a tendency to +treat the external criticism of documents as a game of skill, difficult, +but deriving an interest, much as chess does, from the very complication +of its rules. Some of them are indifferent to the larger questions--to +history itself, in fact. They criticise for the sake of criticism, and, +in their view, the elegance of the method of investigation is much more +important than the results, whatever they may be. These _virtuosi_ are +not concerned to connect their labours with some general idea--to +criticise systematically, for example, all the documents relating to a +question, in order to understand it; they criticise indiscriminately +texts relating to all manner of subjects, on the one condition of being +sufficiently corrupt. Armed with their critical skill, they range over +the whole of the domain of history, and stop wherever a knotty problem +invites their services; this problem solved, or at least discussed, they +go elsewhere to look for others. They leave behind them no coherent +work, but a heterogeneous collection of memoirs on every conceivable +subject, which resembles, as Carlyle says, a curiosity shop or an +archipelago of small islands. + +Dilettanti defend their dilettantism by sufficiently plausible +arguments. To begin with, say they, everything is important; in history +there is no document which has not its value: "No scientific work is +barren, no truth is without its use for science ...; in history there is +no such thing as a trivial subject;" consequently, "it is not the nature +of the subject which makes work valuable, but the method employed."[123] +The important thing in history is not "the ideas one accumulates; it is +the mental gymnastics, the intellectual training--in short, the +scientific spirit." Even supposing that there are degrees of importance +among the data of history, no one has a right to maintain _a priori_ +that a document is "useless." What, pray, is the criterion of utility in +these matters? How many documents are there not which, after being long +despised, have been suddenly placed in the foreground by a change of +standpoint or by new discoveries? "All exclusion is rash; there is no +research which it is possible to brand beforehand as necessarily +sterile. That which has no value in itself may become valuable as a +necessary means." Perhaps a day may come when, science being in a sense +complete, indifferent documents and facts may be safely thrown +overboard; but we are not at present in a position to distinguish the +superfluous from the necessary, and in all probability the line of +demarcation will never be easy to trace. This justifies the most special +researches and the most futile in all appearance. And, if it come to the +worst, what does it matter if there is a certain amount of work wasted? +"It is a law in science, as in all human effort," and indeed in all the +operations of nature, "to work in broad outlines, with a wide margin of +what is superfluous." + +We shall not undertake to refute these arguments to the full extent in +which this is possible. Besides, Renan, who has put the case for both +sides of the question with equal vigour, definitively closed the debate +in the following words: "It may be said that some researches are useless +in the sense of taking up time which would have been better spent on +more serious questions.... Although it is not necessary for an artisan +to have a complete knowledge of the work he is employed to execute, it +is still to be desired that those who devote themselves to special +labours should have some notion of the more general considerations which +alone give value to their researches. If all the industrious workers to +whom modern science owes its progress had had a philosophical +comprehension of what they were doing, how much precious time would have +been saved!... It is deeply to be regretted that there should be such an +immense waste of human effort, merely for want of guidance, and a clear +consciousness of the end to be pursued."[124] + +Dilettantism is incompatible with a certain elevation of mind, and with +a certain degree of "moral perfection," but not with technical +proficiency. Some of the most accomplished critics merely make a trade +of their skill, and have never reflected on the ends to which their art +is a means. It would, however, be wrong to infer that science itself has +nothing to fear from dilettantism. The dilettanti of criticism who work +as fancy or curiosity bids them, who are attracted to problems not by +their intrinsic importance, but by their difficulty, do not supply +historians (those whose work it is to combine materials and use them for +the main purposes of history) with the materials of which the latter +have the most pressing need, but with others which might have waited. If +the activity of specialists in external criticism were exclusively +directed to questions whose solution is important, and if it were +regulated and guided from above, it would be more fruitful. + +The idea of providing against the dangers of dilettantism by a rational +"organisation of labour" is already ancient. Fifty years ago it was +common to hear people talking of "supervision," of "concentrating +scattered forces;" dreams were rife of "vast workshops" organised on the +model of those of modern industry, in which the preparatory labours of +critical scholarship were to be performed on a great scale, in the +interests of science. In nearly all countries, in fact, governments +(through the medium of historical committees and commissions), +academies, and learned societies have endeavoured in our day, much as +monastic congregations did of old, to group professed scholars for the +purposes of vast collective enterprises, and to co-ordinate their +efforts. But this banding of specialists in external criticism for the +service and under the supervision of competent men presents great +mechanical difficulties. The problem of the "organisation of scientific +labour" is still the order of the day.[125] + + +III. Scholars are often censured for pride and excessive harshness in +the judgments which they pass on the labours of their colleagues; and +these faults, as we have seen, are often attributed to their excessive +"preoccupation with little things," especially by persons whose attempts +have been severely judged. In reality there do exist modest and kindly +scholars: it is a question of character; professional "preoccupation +with little things" is not enough to change natural disposition in this +respect. "Ce bon monsieur Du Cange," as the Benedictines said, was +modest to excess. "Nothing more is required," says he, in speaking of +his labours, "but eyes and fingers in order to do as much and more;" he +never blamed any one, on principle. "If I study it is for the pleasure +of studying, and not to give pain to any one else, any more than to +myself."[126] It is, however, true that most scholars have no +compunction in exposing each other's mistakes, and that their austere +zeal sometimes finds expression in harsh and overbearing language. +Barring the harshness they are quite right. Like physicians, chemists, +and other members of learned and scientific professions, they have a +keen appreciation of the value of scientific truth, and it is for this +reason that they make a point of calling offenders to account. They are +thus enabled to bar the door against the tribe of incapables and +charlatans who once infested their profession. + +Among the youths who propose to devote themselves to the study of +history there are some in whom the commercial spirit and vulgar ambition +are stronger than the love of science. These are apt to say to +themselves: "Historical work, if it is to be done according to the rules +of method, requires an infinite amount of labour and caution. But do we +not see historical writings whose authors have more or less seriously +violated the rules? Are these authors thought any the less of on this +account? Is it always the most conscientious writer who enjoys the +highest consideration? Cannot tact supply the place of knowledge?" If +tact really could supply the place of knowledge, then, as it is easier +to do bad work than good, and as the important thing with these people +is success, they might be tempted to conclude that it does not matter +how badly they work as long as they succeed. Why should not things go in +these matters as they do in life, where it is not necessarily the best +men that get on best? Well, it is due to the pitiless severity of the +critics that calculations of this kind would be as disastrous as they +are despicable. + +Towards the end of the Second Empire there was in France no enlightened +public opinion on the subject of historical work. Bad books of +historical erudition were published with impunity, and sometimes even +procured undeserved rewards for their authors. It was then that the +founders of the _Revue Critique d'histoire et de litterature_ undertook +to combat a state of things which they lightly deemed demoralising. +With this object they administered public chastisement to those scholars +who showed lack of conscience or method, in a manner calculated to +disgust them with erudition for ever. They performed sundry notable +executions, not for the pleasure of it, but with the firm resolve to +establish a censorship and a wholesome dread of justice, in the domain +of historical study. Bad workers henceforth received no quarter, and +though the _Revue_ did not exert any great influence on the public at +large, its police-operations covered a wide enough radius to impress +most of those concerned with the necessity of sincerity and respect for +method. During the last twenty-five years the impulse thus given has +spread beyond all expectation. + +It is now a matter of great difficulty to impose on the world of +scholars, in matters connected with their studies, or at least to keep +up the deception for any length of time. In the case of the historical +sciences, as well as the sciences proper, it is now too late to found a +new error or to discredit an old truth. It may be a few months, possibly +a few years, before a bungled experiment in chemistry or a scamped +edition is recognised as such; but inexact results, though temporarily +accepted under reserve, are always sooner or later, and generally very +soon, discovered, denounced, and eliminated. The theory of the +operations of external criticism is now so well established, the number +of specialists thoroughly versed in them is now so great in every +country, that, with rare exceptions, descriptive catalogues of +documents, editions, _regesta_, monographs, are scrutinised, dissected, +and judged as soon as they appear. It is well to be warned. It will for +the future be the height of imprudence to risk publishing a work of +erudition without having first done everything possible to make it +unassailable; otherwise it will immediately, or after brief delay, be +attacked and demolished. Not knowing this, certain well-meaning persons +still show themselves, from time to time, simple enough to enter the +lists of critical scholarship insufficiently prepared; they are filled +with a desire to be useful, and are apparently convinced that here, as +in politics and elsewhere, it is possible to work by extemporised and +approximate methods without any "special knowledge." They are sorry +afterwards. The knowing ones do not take the risk; the tasks of critical +scholarship have no seductions for them, for they are aware that the +labour is great and the glory moderate, and that the field is engrossed +by clever specialists not too well disposed towards intruders. They see +plainly there is no room for them here. The blunt uncompromising honesty +of the scholars thus delivers them from undesirable company of a kind +which the "historians" proper have still occasionally to put up with. + +Bad workers, in fact, on the hunt for a public less closely critical +than the scholars, are very ready to take refuge in historical +exposition. The rules of method are here less obvious, or, rather, not +so well known. While the criticism of texts and sources has been placed +on a scientific basis, historical synthesis is still performed +haphazard. Mental confusion, ignorance, negligence--faults which stand +out so clearly in works of critical scholarship--may in historical +works be disguised up to a certain point by literary artifices, and the +public at large, which is not well educated in this respect, is not +shocked.[127] In short, there is still, in this department, a certain +chance of impunity. This chance, however, is diminishing, and a day will +come, before so very long, when the superficial writers who make +incorrect syntheses will be treated with as little consideration as is +now received by those who show themselves unscrupulous or unskilful in +the technique of preparatory criticism. The works of the most celebrated +historians of the nineteenth century, those who died but yesterday, +Augustin Thierry, Ranke, Fustel de Coulanges, Taine, and others, are +already battered and riddled with criticism. The faults of their methods +have already been seen, defined, and condemned. + +Those who are insensible to other considerations ought to be moved to +honesty in historical work by the reflection that the time is now past, +or nearly so, when it was possible to do bad work without having to +suffer for it. + + + + +_SECTION II.--INTERNAL CRITICISM_ + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +INTERPRETATIVE CRITICISM (HERMENEUTIC) + + +I. When a zoologist describes the form and situation of a muscle, when a +physiologist gives the curve of a movement, we are able to accept their +results without reserve, because we know by what method, by what +instruments, by what system of notation they have obtained them.[128] +But when Tacitus says of the Germans, _Arva per annos mutant_, we do not +know beforehand whether he took the right method to inform himself, nor +even in what sense he used the words _arva_ and _mutant_; to ascertain +this a preliminary operation is required.[129] This operation is +internal criticism. + +The object of criticism is to discover what in a document may be +accepted as true. Now the document is only the final result of a long +series of operations, on the details of which the author gives us no +information. He had to observe or collect facts, to frame sentences, to +write down words; and these operations, which are perfectly distinct one +from another, may not all have been performed with the same accuracy. It +is therefore necessary to _analyse_ the product of the author's labour +in order to distinguish which operations have been incorrectly +performed, and reject their _results_. _Analysis_ is thus necessary to +criticism; all criticism begins with analysis. + +In order to be logically complete, the analysis ought to reconstruct +_all_ the operations which the author must have performed, and to +examine them _one by one_, to see whether each has been performed +correctly. It would be necessary to pass in review all the successive +acts by which the document was produced, from the moment when the author +observed the fact which is its subject up to the movements of his hand +by which he traced the letters of the document; or, rather, it would be +necessary to proceed in the opposite direction, step by step, from the +movements of the hand back to the observation. This method would be so +long and so tedious that no one would ever have the time or the patience +to apply it. + +Internal criticism is not, like external criticism, an instrument used +for the mere pleasure of using it;[130] it yields no immediate +satisfaction, because it does not definitively solve any problem. It is +only applied because it is necessary, and its use is restricted to a +bare minimum. The most exacting historian is satisfied with an abridged +method which concentrates all the operations into two groups: (1) the +analysis of the contents of the document, and the positive +interpretative criticism which is necessary for ascertaining what the +author meant; (2) the analysis of the conditions under which the +document was produced, and its negative criticism, necessary for the +verification of the author's statements. This twofold division of the +labour of criticism is, moreover, only employed by a select few. The +natural tendency, even of historians who work methodically, is to read +the text with the object of extracting information directly from it, +without any thought of first ascertaining what exactly was in the +author's mind.[131] This procedure is excusable at most in the case of +nineteenth-century documents, written by men whose language and mode of +thought are familiar to us, and then only when there is not more than +one possible interpretation. It becomes dangerous as soon as the +author's habits of language or thought begin to differ from those of the +historian who reads him, or when the meaning of the text is not obvious +and indisputable. Whoever, in reading a text, is not exclusively +occupied with the effort to understand it, is sure to read impressions +of his own into it; he is struck by phrases or words in the document +which correspond to his own ideas, or agree with his own _a priori_ +notion of the facts; unconsciously he detaches these phrases or words, +and forms out of them an imaginary text which he puts in the place of +the real text of the author.[132] + + +II. Here, as always in history, method consists in repressing the first +impulse. It is necessary to be penetrated by the principle, sufficiently +obvious but often forgotten, that a document only contains the ideas of +the man who wrote it, and to make it a rule to begin by understanding +the text by itself, _before_ asking what can be extracted from it for +the purposes of history. We thus arrive at this general rule of method: +the study of every document should begin with an analysis of its +contents, made with the sole aim of determining the real meaning of the +author. + +This analysis is a preliminary operation, distinct and independent. +Experience here, as in the tasks of critical scholarship,[133] has +decided in favour of the system of slips. Each slip will contain the +analysis of a document, of a separate part of a document, or of an +episode in a narrative; the analysis ought to indicate not only the +general sense of the text, but also, as far as possible, the object and +views of the author. It will be well to reproduce verbally any +expressions which may seem characteristic of the author's thought. +Sometimes it will be enough to have analysed the text mentally: it is +not always necessary to put down in black and white the whole contents +of a document; in such cases we simply enter the points of which we +intend to make use. But against the ever-present danger of substituting +one's personal impressions for the text there is only one real +safeguard; it should be made an invariable rule never on any account to +make an extract from a document, or a partial analysis of it, without +having _first_ made a comprehensive analysis[134] of it mentally, if not +on paper. + +To analyse a document is to discern and isolate all the ideas expressed +by the author. Analysis thus reduces to _interpretative criticism_. + +Interpretation passes through two stages: the first is concerned with +the literal, the second with the real meaning. + + +III. The determination of the literal meaning of a document is a +linguistic operation; accordingly, Philology (in the narrow sense) has +been reckoned among the auxiliary sciences of history. To understand a +text it is first necessary to know the language. But a _general_ +knowledge of the language is not enough. In order to interpret Gregory +of Tours, it is not enough to know Latin in a general way; it is +necessary to add a special study of the particular kind of Latin written +by Gregory of Tours. + +The natural tendency is to attribute the same meaning to the same word +wherever it occurs. We instinctively treat a language as if it were a +fixed system of signs. Fixity, indeed, is a characteristic of the signs +which have been expressly invented for scientific use, such as +algebraical notation or the nomenclature of chemistry. Here every +expression has a single precise meaning, which is absolute and +invariable; it expresses an accurately analysed and defined idea, only +one such idea, and that always the same in whatever context the +expression may occur, and by whatever author it may be used. But +ordinary language, in which documents are written, fluctuates: each word +expresses a complex and ill-defined idea; its meanings are manifold, +relative, and variable; the same word may stand for several different +things, and is used in different senses by the same author according to +the context; lastly, the meaning of a word varies from author to author, +and is modified in the course of time. _Vel_, which in classical Latin +only has the meanings _or_ and _even_, means _and_ in certain epochs of +the middle ages; _suffragium_, which is classical Latin for _suffrage_, +takes in mediaeval Latin the sense of _help_. We have, then, to learn to +resist the instinct which leads us to explain all the expressions of a +text by their classical or ordinary meanings. The grammatical +interpretation, based on the general rules of the language, must be +supplemented by an historical interpretation founded on an examination +of the particular case. + +The method consists in determining the special meaning of the words in +the document; it rests on a few very simple principles. + +(1) Language changes by continuous evolution. Each epoch has a language +of its own, which must be treated as a separate system of signs. In +order to understand a document we must know the _language of the +time_--that is, the meanings of words and forms of expression in use at +the time when the text was written. The meaning of a word is to be +determined by bringing together the passages where it is employed: it +will generally be found that in one or other of these the remainder of +the sentence leaves no doubt as to the meaning of the word in +question.[135] Information of this kind is given in historical +dictionaries, such as the _Thesaurus Linguae Latinae_; or the glossaries +of Du Cange. In these compilations the article devoted to each word is a +collection of the passages in which the word occurs, accompanied by +indications of authorship which fix the epoch. + +When the author wrote in a dead language which he had learnt out of +books--this is the case with the Latin texts of the earlier middle +ages--we must be on our guard against words used in an arbitrary sense, +or selected for the sake of elegance: for example, _consul_ (count, +earl), _capite census_ (censitary), _agellus_ (grand domain). + +(2) Linguistic usage may vary from one region to another; we have, then, +to know the _language of the country_ where the document was +written--that is, the peculiar meanings current in the country. + +(3) Each author has his own manner of writing; we have, then, to study +the _language of the author_, the peculiar senses in which he used +words.[136] This purpose is served by lexicons to a single author, as +Meusel's _Lexicon Caesarianum_, in which are brought together all the +passages in which the author used each word. + +(4) An expression changes its meaning according to the passage in which +it occurs; we must therefore interpret each word and sentence not as if +it stood isolated, but with an eye to the general sense of the context. +This is the _rule of context_,[137] a fundamental rule of +interpretation. Its meaning is that, before making use of a phrase taken +from a text, we must have read the text in its entirety; it prohibits +the stuffing of a modern work with _quotations_--that is, shreds of +phrases torn from passages without regard to the special sense given to +them by the context.[138] + +These rules, if rigorously applied, would constitute an exact method of +interpretation which would hardly leave any chance of error, but would +require an enormous expenditure of time. What an immense amount of +labour would be necessary if, in the case of _each_ word, we had to +determine by a special operation its meaning in the language of the +time, of the country, of the author, and in the context! Yet this is the +labour demanded by a well-made translation: in the case of some ancient +works of great literary value it has been submitted to; for the mass of +historical documents we content ourselves, in practice, with an abridged +method. + +All words are not equally subject to variations of meaning; most of them +keep a fairly uniform meaning in all authors and in all periods. We may +therefore be satisfied to study specially those expressions which, from +their nature, are liable to take different meanings: first, ready-made +expressions which, being fixed, do not follow the evolution of the words +of which they are composed; secondly, and chiefly, words denoting things +which are in their nature subject to evolution; classes of men (_miles_, +_colonus_, _servus_); institutions (_conventus_, _justitia_, _judex_); +usages (_alleu_, _benefice_, _election_); feelings, common objects. In +the case of all words of such classes it would be imprudent to assume a +fixed meaning; it is an absolutely necessary precaution to ascertain +what is the sense in which they are used in the text to be interpreted. +"These studies of words," said Fustel de Coulanges, "have a great +importance in historical science. A badly interpreted term may be the +source of serious error."[139] And, in fact, simply by a methodical +application of interpretative criticism to a hundred words or so, he +succeeded in revolutionising the study of the Merovingian epoch. + + +IV. When we have analysed the document and determined the literal +meaning of its phrases, we cannot even yet be sure that we have reached +the real thoughts of the author. It is possible that he may have used +some expressions in an oblique sense; there are several kinds of cases +where this occurs: allegory and symbolism, jests and hoaxes, allusion +and implication, even the ordinary figures of speech, metaphor, +hyperbole, litotes.[140] In all these cases it is necessary to pierce +through the literal meaning to the real meaning, which the author has +purposely disguised under an inexact form. + +Logically the problem is very embarrassing: there is no fixed external +criterion by which we can make sure of detecting an oblique sense; in +the case of the hoax, which in the present century has become a branch +of literature, it is an essential part of the author's plan to leave no +indication which would betray the jest. In practice we may be morally +certain that an author is not using an oblique sense wherever his prime +object is to be understood; we are therefore not likely to meet with +difficulties of this kind in official documents, in charters, and in +historical narratives. In all these cases the general form of the +document permits us to assume that it is written in the literal sense of +the words. + +On the other hand, we must be prepared for oblique senses when the +author had other interests than that of being understood, or when he +wrote for a public which could understand his allusions and read between +the lines, or when his readers, in virtue of a religious or literary +initiation, might be expected to understand his symbolisms and figures +of speech. This is the case with religious texts, private letters, and +all those literary works which form so large a part of the documents on +antiquity. Thus the art of recognising and determining hidden meanings +in texts has always occupied a large space in the theory of +_hermeneutic_[141] (which is Greek for interpretative criticism), and in +the _exegesis_ of the sacred texts and of classical authors. + +The different modes of introducing an oblique sense behind the literal +sense are too varied, and depend too much on special circumstances, for +it to be possible to reduce the art of detecting them to definite rules. +Only one general principle can be laid down, and that is, that when the +literal sense is absurd, incoherent, or obscure, or in contradiction +with the ideas of the author or the facts known to him, then we ought to +presume an oblique sense. + +In order to determine this sense, the procedure is the same as for +studying the language of an author: we compare the passages in which the +expressions occur in which we suspect an oblique sense, and look to see +whether there is not one where the meaning may be guessed from the +context. A celebrated instance of this procedure is the discovery of the +allegorical meaning of the Beast in the Apocalypse. But as there is no +certain method of solving these problems, we never have a right to say +we have discovered all the hidden meanings or seized all the allusions +contained in a text; and even when we think we have found the sense, we +shall do well to draw no inferences from a necessarily conjectural +interpretation. + +On the other hand, it is necessary to guard against the temptation to +look for allegorical meanings everywhere, as the neo-Platonists did in +Plato's works and the Swedenborgians in the Bible. This attack of +_hyper-hermeneutic_ is now over, but we are not yet safe from the +analogous tendency to look for allusions everywhere. Investigations of +this kind are always conjectural, and are better calculated to flatter +the vanity of the interpreter than to furnish results of which history +can make use. + +V. When we have at length reached the real sense of the text, the +operation of positive analysis is concluded. Its result is to make us +acquainted with the author's conceptions, the images he had in his mind, +the general notions in terms of which he represented the world to +himself. This information belongs to a very important branch of +knowledge, out of which is constituted a whole group of historical +sciences:[142] the history of the illustrative arts and of literature, +the history of science, the history of philosophical and moral +doctrine, mythology and the history of dogmas (wrongly called religious +beliefs, because here we are studying official doctrines without +inquiring whether they are believed), the history of law, the history of +official institutions (so far as we do not inquire how they were applied +in practice), the assemblage of popular legends, traditions, opinions, +conceptions (inexactly called beliefs) which are comprised under the +name of folk-lore. + +All these studies need only the external criticism which investigates +authorship and origin and interpretative criticism; they require one +degree less elaboration than the history of objective facts, and +accordingly they have been earlier established on a methodical basis. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE GOOD FAITH AND ACCURACY OF +AUTHORS + + +I. Analysis and positive interpretative criticism only penetrate as far +as the inward workings of the mind of the author of a document, and only +help us to know his ideas. They give no direct information about +external facts. Even when the author was able to observe them, his text +only indicates how he wished to represent them, not how he really saw +them, still less how they really happened. What an author expresses is +not always what he believed, for he may have lied; what he believed is +not necessarily what happened, for he may have been mistaken. These +propositions are obvious. And yet a first and natural impulse leads us +to accept as true every statement contained in a document, which is +equivalent to assuming that no author ever lied or was deceived; and +this spontaneous credulity seems to possess a high degree of vitality, +for it persists in spite of the innumerable instances of error and +mendacity which daily experience brings before us. + +Reflection has been forced on historians in the course of their work by +the circumstance of their finding documents which contradicted each +other; in such cases they have been obliged to doubt, and, after +examination, to admit the existence of error or mendacity; thus negative +criticism has appeared as a practical necessity for the purpose of +eliminating statements which are obviously false or erroneous. But the +instinct of confidence is so indestructible that it has hitherto +prevented even those professionally concerned from systematising the +internal criticism of statements in the same way as the external +criticism which deals with the origin of documents has been +systematised. Historians, in their works, and even theoretical writers +on historical method,[143] have been satisfied with common notions and +vague formulae in striking contrast with the precise terminology of the +critical investigation of sources. They are content to examine whether +the author was roughly _contemporary_ with the events, whether he was an +ocular _witness_, whether he was _sincere_ and _well-informed_, whether +he knew the truth and desired to tell it, or even--summing up the whole +question in a single formula--whether he was _trustworthy_. + +This superficial criticism is certainly better than no criticism at all, +and has sufficed to give those who have applied it the consciousness of +incontestable superiority. But it is only a halfway-house between common +credulity and scientific method. Here, as in every science, the +starting-point must be methodical doubt.[144] All that has not been +proved must be temporarily regarded as doubtful; no proposition is to +be affirmed unless reasons can be adduced in favour of its truth. +Applied to the statements contained in documents, methodical doubt +becomes _methodical distrust_. + +The historian ought to distrust _a priori_ every statement of an author, +for he cannot be sure that it is not mendacious or mistaken. At the best +it affords a presumption. For the historian to adopt it and affirm it +afresh on his own account implies that he regards it as a scientific +truth. To take this decisive step is what he has no right to do without +good reasons. But the human mind is so constituted that this step is +often taken unconsciously (cf. book ii. chap. i.). Against this +dangerous tendency criticism has only one means of defence. We must not +postpone doubt till it is forced upon us by conflicting statements in +documents; we must _begin_ by doubting. We must never forget the +interval which separates a statement made by any author whatsoever from +a scientifically established truth, so that we may continually keep in +mind the responsibility which we assume when we reproduce a statement. + +Even after we have accepted the principle and resolved to apply this +unnatural distrust in practice, we tend instinctively to free ourselves +from it as soon as possible. The natural impulse is to perform the +criticism of the whole of an author, or at least of the whole of a +document, in the lump; to divide authorities into two categories, the +sheep on the right, the goats on the left; on the one side trustworthy +authors and good documents, on the other suspected authors and bad +documents. Having thus exhausted our powers of distrust, we proceed to +reproduce without discussion all the statements contained in the "good +document." We consent to distrust suspected authors such as Suidas or +Aimo, but we affirm as established truth everything that has been said +by Thucydides or Gregory of Tours.[145] We apply to authors that +judicial procedure which divides witnesses into admissible and +inadmissible: having once accepted a witness, we feel ourselves bound to +admit all his testimony; we dare not doubt any of his statements without +a special reason. Instinctively we take sides with the author on whom we +have bestowed our approval, and we go so far as to say, as in the law +courts, that the burden of proof rests with those who reject valid +testimony.[146] + +The confusion is still further increased by the use of the word +_authentic_, borrowed from judicial language. It has reference to the +origin only, not to the contents; to say that a document is authentic is +merely to say that its origin is certain, not that its contents are free +from error. But authenticity inspires a degree of respect which disposes +us to accept the contents without discussion. To doubt the statements of +an authentic document would seem presumptuous, or at least we think +ourselves bound to wait for overwhelming proof before we impeach the +testimony of the author. + + +II. These natural instincts must be methodically resisted. A document +(still more a literary work) is not all of a piece; it is composed of a +great number of independent statements, any one of which may be +intentionally or unintentionally false, while the others are _bona fide_ +and accurate, or conversely, since each statement is the outcome of a +mental operation which may have been incorrectly performed, while others +were performed correctly. It is not, therefore, enough to examine a +document as a whole; each of the statements in it must be examined +separately; _criticism_ is impossible without _analysis_. + +Thus internal criticism conducts us to two general rules. + +(1) A scientific truth is not established by _testimony_. In order to +affirm a proposition we must have special reasons for believing it +true. It may happen in certain cases that an author's statement is a +sufficient reason for belief; but we cannot know that beforehand. The +rule, then, will be to examine each separate statement in order to make +sure whether it is of a nature to constitute a sufficient reason for +belief. + +(2) The criticism of a document is not to be performed _en bloc_. The +rule will be to _analyse_ the document into its elements, in order to +isolate the different statements of which it is composed and to examine +each of them separately. Sometimes a single sentence contains several +statements; they must be separated and criticised one by one. In a sale, +for example, we distinguish the date, the place, the vendor, the +purchaser, the object, the price, and each one of the conditions. + +In practice, criticism and analysis are performed simultaneously, and, +except in the case of texts in a difficult language, may proceed _pari +passu_ with interpretative analysis and criticism. As soon as we +understand a phrase we analyse it and criticise each of its elements. + +It thus appears that _logically_ criticism comprises an enormous number +of operations. In describing them, with all the details necessary for +the understanding of their mechanism and the reasons for their +employment, we are likely to give the impression of a procedure too slow +to be practicable. Such an impression is inevitably produced by every +verbal description of a complicated process. Compare the time occupied +in describing a movement in fencing with that required to execute it; +compare the tedium of the grammar and dictionary with the rapidity of +reading. Like every practical art, criticism consists in the habit of +performing certain acts. In the period of apprenticeship, before the +habit is acquired, we are obliged to think of each act separately before +performing it, and to analyse the movements; accordingly we perform them +all slowly and with difficulty; but the habit once acquired, the acts, +which have now become instinctive and unconscious, are performed with +ease and rapidity. The reader must therefore not be uneasy about the +slowness of the critical processes; he will see later on how they are +abridged in practice. + + +III. The problem of criticism may be stated as follows. Given a +statement made by a man of whose mental operations we have no +experience, and the value of the statement depending exclusively on the +manner in which these operations were performed; to ascertain whether +these operations were performed correctly. The mere statement of the +problem shows that we cannot hope for any direct or definitive solution +of it; we lack the essential datum, namely, the manner in which the +author performed the mental operations concerned. Criticism therefore +does not advance beyond indirect and provisional solutions, and does no +more than furnish data which require a final elaboration. + +A natural instinct leads us to judge of the value of statements by their +form. We think we can tell at a glance whether an author is sincere or a +narrative accurate. We seek for what is called "the accent of +sincerity," or "an impression of truth." This impression is almost +irresistible, but it is none the less an illusion. There is no external +criterion either of good faith or of accuracy. "The accent of sincerity" +is the appearance of conviction; an orator, an actor, an habitual liar +will put more of it into his lies than an undecided man into his +statement of what he believes to be the truth. Energy of affirmation +does not always mean strength of conviction, but sometimes only +cleverness or effrontery.[147] Similarly, abundance and precision of +detail, though they produce a vivid impression on unexperienced readers, +do not guarantee the accuracy of the facts;[148] they give us no +information about anything but the imagination of the author when he is +sincere, or his impudence when he is the reverse. We are apt to say of a +circumstantial narrative: "Things of this kind are not invented." They +are not invented, but they are very easy to transfer from one person, +country, or time to another. There is thus no external characteristic of +a document which can relieve us of the obligation to criticise it. + +The value of an author's statement depends solely on the conditions +under which he performed certain mental operations. Criticism has no +other resource than the examination of these conditions. But it is not +a case of reconstructing all of them; it is enough to answer a single +question: did the author perform these operations correctly or not? The +question may be approached on two sides. + +(1) The critical investigation of authorship has often taught us the +_general_ conditions under which the author operated. It is probable +that some of these influenced each one of the operations. We ought +therefore to begin by studying the information we possess about the +author and the composition of the document, taking particular pains to +look in the habits, sentiments, and personal situation of the author, or +in the circumstances in which he composed, for all the reasons which +could have existed for incorrectness on the one hand, or exceptional +accuracy on the other. In order to perceive these reasons it is +necessary to be on the lookout for them beforehand. The only method, +therefore, is to draw up a general set of questions having reference to +the possible causes of inaccuracy. We shall then apply it to the general +conditions under which the document was composed, in order to discover +those causes which may have rendered the author's mental operations +incorrect and vitiated the results. But all that we shall thus +obtain--even in the exceptionally favourable cases in which the +conditions of origin are well known--will be _general_ indications, +which will be insufficient for the purposes of criticism, for criticism +must always deal with each separate statement. + +(2) The criticism of particular statements is confined to the use of a +single method, which, by a curious paradox, is the study of the +_universal_ conditions under which documents are composed. The +information which is not furnished by the general study of the author +may be sought for by a consideration of the necessary processes of the +human mind; for, since these are universal, they must appear in each +particular case. We know what are the cases in which men in general are +inclined to alter or distort facts. What we have to do in the case of +each statement is to examine whether it was made under such +circumstances as to lead us to suspect, from our knowledge of the habits +of normal humanity, that the operations implied in the making of it were +incorrectly performed. The practical procedure will be to draw up a set +of questions relating to the habitual causes of inaccuracy. + +The whole of criticism thus reduces to the drawing up and answering of +two sets of questions: one for the purpose of bringing before our minds +those general conditions affecting the composition of the document, from +which we may deduce general motives for distrust or confidence; the +other for the purpose of realising the special conditions of each +statement, from which special motives may be drawn for distrust or +confidence. These two sets of questions ought to be drawn up beforehand +in such a form as may enable us to examine methodically both the +document in general and each statement in particular; and as they are +the same for all documents, it is useful to formulate them once for all. + + +IV. The critical process comprises two series of questions, which +correspond to the two series of operations by which the document was +produced. All that interpretative criticism tells us is what the author +meant; it remains to determine (1) what he really believed, for he may +not have been sincere; (2) what he really knew, for he may have been +mistaken. We may therefore distinguish a _critical examination of the +author's good faith_, by which we seek to determine whether the author +of the document lied or not, and a _critical examination_ of his +_accuracy_, by which we seek to determine whether he was or was not +mistaken. + +In practice we rarely need to know what an author believed, unless we +are making a special study of his character. We have no direct interest +in the author; he is merely the medium through which we reach the +external facts he reports. The aim of criticism is to determine whether +the author has reported the facts correctly. If he has given inexact +information, it is indifferent whether he did so intentionally or not; +to draw a distinction would complicate matters unnecessarily. There is +thus little occasion to make a separate examination of an author's good +faith, and we may shorten our labours by including in a single set of +questions all the causes which lead to misstatement. But for the sake of +clearness it will be well to discuss the questions to be asked in two +separate series. + +The questions in the first series will help us to inquire whether we +have any reason to distrust the sincerity of a statement. We ask whether +the author was in any of those situations which normally incline a man +to be insincere. We must ask what these situations are, both as +affecting the general composition of a document, and as affecting each +particular statement. Experience supplies the answer. Every violation of +truth, small or great, is due to a wish on the part of the author to +produce a particular impression upon the reader. Our set of questions +thus reduces to a list of the motives which may, in the general case, +lead an author to violate truth. The following are the most important +cases:-- + +(1) The author seeks to gain a practical advantage for himself; he +wishes to deceive the reader of the document, in order to persuade him +to an action, or to dissuade him from it; he knowingly gives false +information: we then say the author has an interest in deceiving. This +is the case with most official documents. Even in documents which have +not been composed for a practical purpose, every interested statement +has a chance of being mendacious. In order to determine which statements +are to be suspected, we are to ask what _can_ have been the general aim +of the author in writing the document as a whole; and again, what can +have been his particular purpose in making each of the separate +statements which compose the document. But there are two natural +tendencies to be resisted. The first is, to ask what interest the author +could have _had_ in lying, meaning what interest should _we_ have had in +his place; we must ask instead what interest can he have _thought_ he +had in lying, and we must look for the answer in his tastes and ideals. +The other tendency is to take sole account of the _individual_ interest +of the author; we ought, however, to remember that the author may have +given false information in order to serve a _collective_ interest. This +is one of the difficulties of criticism. An author is a member at one +and the same time of several different groups, a family, a province, a +country, a religious denomination, a political party, a class in +society, whose interests often conflict; we have to discover the group +in which he took most interest, and for which he worked. + +(2) The author was placed in a situation which compelled him to violate +truth. This happens whenever he has to draw up a document in conformity +with rule or custom, while the actual circumstances are in some point or +other in conflict with rule or custom; he is then obliged to state that +the conditions were normal, and thus make a false declaration in respect +of all the irregularities. In nearly every report of proceedings there +is some slight deviation from truth as to the day, the hour, the place, +the number or the names of those present. Most of us have observed, if +not taken part in, some of these petty fictions. But we are too apt to +forget them when we come to criticise documents relating to the past. +The _authentic_ character of the documents contributes to the illusion; +we instinctively make _authentic_ a synonym of _sincere_. The rigid +rules which govern the composition of every authentic document seem to +guarantee sincerity; they are, on the contrary, an incentive to falsify, +not the main facts, but the accessory circumstances. From the fact of a +person having signed a report we may infer that he agreed to it, but not +that he was actually present at the time when the report mentions him as +having been present. + +(3) The author viewed with sympathy or antipathy a group of men (nation, +party, denomination, province, city, family), or an assemblage of +doctrines or institutions (religion, school of philosophy, political +theory), and was led to distort facts in such a manner as to represent +his friends in a favourable and his opponents in an unfavourable light. +These are instances of a general bias which affects all the statements +of an author, and they are so obvious that the ancients perceived them +and gave them names (_studium_ and _odium_); from ancient times it has +been a literary commonplace for historians to protest that they have +steered clear of both. + +(4) The author was induced by private or collective vanity to violate +truth for the purpose of exalting himself or his group. He made such +statements as he thought likely to give the reader the impression that +he and his possessed qualities deserving of esteem. We have therefore to +inquire whether a given statement may not be influenced by vanity. But +we must take care not to represent the author's vanity to ourselves as +being exactly like our own vanity or that of our contemporaries. +Different people are vain for different reasons; we must inquire what +was our author's particular vanity; he may have lied in order to +attribute to himself or his friends actions which we should consider +dishonourable. Charles IX. falsely boasted of having organised the +Massacre of St. Bartholomew. There is, however, a kind of vanity which +is universal, and that is, the desire to appear to be a person of +exalted rank playing an important part in affairs. We must, therefore, +always distrust a statement which attributes to the author or his group +a high place in the world.[149] + +(5) The author desired to please the public, or at least to avoid +shocking it. He has expressed sentiments and ideas in harmony with the +morality or the fashion of his public; he has distorted facts in order +to adapt them to the passions and prejudices of his time, even those +which he did not share. The purest types of this kind of falsehood are +found in ceremonial forms, official formulae, declarations prescribed by +etiquette, set speeches, polite phrases. The statements which come under +this head are so open to suspicion that we are unable to derive from +them any information about the facts stated. We are all aware of this so +far as relates to the contemporary formulae of which we see instances +every day, but we often forget it in the criticism of documents, +especially those belonging to an age from which few documents have come +down to us. No one would think of looking for the real sentiments of a +man in the assurances of respect with which he ends his letters. But +people believed for a long time in the humility of certain +ecclesiastical dignitaries of the middle ages, because, on the day of +their election, they began by refusing an office of which they declared +themselves unworthy, till at last comparison showed that this refusal +was a mere conventional form. And there are still scholars who, like the +Benedictines of the eighteenth century, look in the chancery-formulae of +a prince for information as to his piety or his liberality.[150] + +In order to recognise these conventional declarations there are two +lines of general study to be pursued: the one is directed to the author, +and seeks to discover what was the public he addressed, for in one and +the same country there are usually several different publics, each of +which has its own code of morals or propriety; the other is directed +towards the public, and seeks to determine its morals or its manners. + +(6) The author endeavoured to please the public by literary artifices. +He distorted facts in order to embellish them according to his own +aesthetic notions. We have therefore to look for the ideal of the author +or of his time, in order to be on our guard against passages distorted +to suit that ideal. But without special study we may calculate on the +common kinds of literary distortion. Rhetorical distortion consists in +attributing to persons noble attitudes, acts, sentiments, and, above +all, words: this is a natural tendency in young boys who are beginning +to practise the art of composition, and in writers still in a +semi-barbarous stage; it is the common defect of the mediaeval +chroniclers.[151] Epic distortion embellishes the narrative by adding +picturesque details, speeches delivered by the persons concerned, +numbers, sometimes names of persons; it is dangerous, because the +precision of the details produces an illusive appearance of truth.[152] +Dramatic distortion consists in grouping the facts in such a way as to +enhance the dramatic effect by concentrating facts, which in reality +were separate, upon a single moment, a single person, or a single group. +Writing of this kind is what we call "truer than the truth." It is the +most dangerous form of distortion, the form employed by artistic +historians, by Herodotus, Tacitus, the Italians of the Renaissance. +Lyrical distortion exaggerates the intensity of the sentiments and the +emotions of the author and his friends: we should remember this when we +attempt to reconstruct "the psychology" of a person. + +Literary distortion does not much affect archives (though instances of +it are found in most charters of the eleventh century); but it +profoundly modifies all literary texts, including the narratives of +historians. Now, the natural tendency is to trust writers more readily +when they have talent, and to admit statements with less difficulty when +they are presented in good literary form. Criticism must counteract this +tendency by the application of the paradoxical rule, that the more +interesting a statement is from the artistic point of view,[153] the +more it ought to be suspected. We must distrust every narrative which +is very picturesque or very dramatic, in which the personages assume +noble attitudes or manifest great intensity of feeling. + +This first series of questions will yield the _provisional_ result of +enabling us to note the statements which have a _chance_ of being +mendacious. + + +V. The second series of questions will be of use in determining whether +there is any reason to distrust the accuracy of a statement. Was the +author in one of those situations which cause a man to make mistakes? As +in dealing with good faith, we must look for these conditions both as +affecting the document as a whole, and as affecting each of the +particular statements in it. + +The practice of the established sciences teaches us the conditions of an +exact knowledge of facts. There is only one scientific procedure for +gaining knowledge of a fact, namely, _observation_; every statement, +therefore, must rest, directly or indirectly, upon an observation, and +this observation must have been made correctly. + +The set of questions by the aid of which we investigate the +probabilities of error may be drawn up in the light of experience, which +brings before us the most common cases of error. + +(1) The author was in a situation to observe the fact, and supposed he +really had observed it; he was, however, prevented from doing so by some +interior force of which he was unconscious, an hallucination, an +illusion, or a mere prejudice. It would be useless, as well as +impossible, to determine which of these agencies was at work; it is +enough to ascertain whether the author had a tendency to observe badly. +It is scarcely possible in the case of a particular statement to +recognise that it was the result of an hallucination or an illusion. At +the most we may learn, either from information derived from other +sources or by comparison, that an author had a _general_ propensity to +this kind of error. + +There is a better chance of recognising whether a statement was due to +prejudice. In the life or the works of an author we may find the traces +of his dominant prejudices. With reference to each of his particular +statements, we ought to ask whether it is not the result of a +preconceived idea of the author on a class of men or a kind of facts. +This inquiry partly coincides with the search for motives of falsehood: +interest, vanity, sympathy, and antipathy give rise to prejudices which +alter the truth in the same manner as wilful falsehood. We therefore +employ the questions already formulated for the purpose of testing good +faith. But there is one to be added. In putting forward a statement has +the author been led to distort it unconsciously by the circumstance that +he was answering a question? This is the case of all statements obtained +by interrogating witnesses. Even apart from the cases where the person +interrogated seeks to please the proposer of the question by giving an +answer which he thinks will be agreeable to him, every question suggests +its own answer, or at least its form, and this form is dictated +beforehand by some one unacquainted with the facts. It is therefore +necessary to apply a special criticism to every statement obtained by +interrogation; we must ask what was the question put, and what were the +preconceptions to which it may have given rise in the mind of the person +interrogated. + +(2) The author was badly situated for observing. The practice of the +sciences teaches us what are the conditions for correct observation. The +observer ought to be placed where he can see correctly, and should have +no practical interest, no desire to obtain a particular result, no +preconceived idea about the result. He ought to record the observation +immediately, in a precise system of notation; he ought to give a precise +indication of his method. These conditions, which are insisted on in the +sciences of observation, are never completely fulfilled by the authors +of documents. + +It would be useless, therefore, to ask whether there have been chances +of inaccuracy; _there always have been_, and it is just this that +distinguishes a _document_ from an _observation_. It only remains to +look for the obvious causes of error in the conditions of observation: +to inquire whether the observer was in a place where he could not see or +hear well, as would be the case, for example, with a subordinate who +should presume to narrate the secret deliberations of a council of +dignitaries; whether his attention was greatly distracted by the +necessity for action, as it would be on the field of battle, for +example; whether he was inattentive because the facts had little +interest for him; whether he lacked the special experience or general +intelligence necessary for understanding the facts; whether he analysed +his impressions badly, or confused different events. Above all, we must +ask when he _wrote down_ what he saw or heard. This is the most +important point: the only exact observation is the one which is +recorded immediately it is made; such is the constant procedure in the +established sciences; an impression committed to writing later on is +only a recollection, liable to be confused in the memory with other +recollections. _Memoirs_ written several years after the facts, often at +the very end of the author's career, have introduced innumerable errors +into history. It must be made a rule to treat _memoirs_ with special +distrust as second-hand documents, in spite of their appearance of being +contemporary testimony. + +(3) The author states facts which he could have observed, but to which +he did not take the trouble to attend. From idleness or negligence he +reported details which he has merely inferred, or even imagined at +random, and which turn out to be false. This is a common source of +error, though it does not readily occur to one, and is to be suspected +wherever the author was obliged to procure information in which he took +little interest, in order to fill up a blank form. Of this kind are +answers to questions put by an authority (it is enough to observe how +most official inquiries are conducted in our own day), and detailed +accounts of ceremonies or public functions. There is too strong a +temptation to write the account from the programme, or in agreement with +the usual order of the proceedings. How many accounts of meetings of all +kinds have been published by reporters who were not present at them! +Similar efforts of imagination are suspected--sometimes, it is thought, +clearly recognised--in the writings of mediaeval chroniclers.[154] The +rule, then, will be to distrust all narratives conforming too closely to +a set formula. + +(4) The fact stated is of such a nature that it could not have been +learnt by observation alone. It may be a hidden fact--a private secret, +for example. It may be a fact relating to a collectivity, and applying +to an extensive area or a long period of time; for example, the common +act of a whole army, a custom common to a whole people or a whole age, a +statistical total obtained by the addition of numerous items. It may be +a comprehensive judgment on the character of a man, a group, a custom, +an event. Here we have to do with propositions derived from observations +by synthesis or inference: the author can only have arrived at them +indirectly; he began with data furnished by observation, and elaborated +them by the logical processes of abstraction, generalisation, reasoning, +calculation. Two questions arise. Does it appear that the author had +sufficient data to work upon? Was he accurate, or the reverse, in his +use of the data he had? + +On the probable inaccuracies of an author, general indications may be +obtained from an examination of his writings. This examination will show +us how he worked: whether he was capable of abstraction, reasoning, +generalisation, and what were the mistakes he was in the habit of +making. In order to determine the value of the data, we must criticise +each statement separately; we must imagine the conditions under which +the author observed, and ask ourselves whether he was able to procure +the necessary data for his statement. This is an indispensable +precaution in dealing with large totals in statistics and descriptions +of popular usages; for it is possible that the author may have obtained +the total he gives by a process of conjectural valuation (this is the +ordinary practice in stating the number of combatants or killed in a +battle), or by combining subsidiary totals, all of which were not +accurate; it is possible that he may have extended to a whole people, a +whole country, a whole period, that which was true only of a small group +known to him.[155] + + +VI. These two first series of questions bearing on the good faith and +the accuracy of the statements in the document are based on the +supposition that the author has observed the fact himself. This is a +feature common to all reports of observations in the established +sciences. But in history there is so great a dearth of direct +_observations_, of even moderate value, that we are obliged to turn to +account documents which every other science would reject.[156] Take any +narrative at random, even if it be the work of a contemporary, it will +be found that the facts observed by the author are never more than a +part of the whole number. In nearly every document the majority of the +statements do not come from the author at first hand, but are +reproductions of the statements of others. Even where a general relates +a battle in which he commanded, he does not communicate his own +observations, but those of his officers; his narrative is in a large +measure a "second-hand document."[157] + +In order to criticise a second-hand statement it is no longer enough to +examine the conditions under which the author of the document worked: +this author is, in such a case, a mere agent of transmission; the true +author is the person who supplied him the information. The critic, +therefore, must change his ground, and ask whether the informant +observed and reported correctly; and if he too had the information from +some one else (the commonest case), the chase must be pursued from one +intermediary to another, till the person is found who first launched the +statement on its career, and with regard to him the question must be +asked: Was he an accurate observer? + +Logically such a search is not inconceivable; ancient collections of +Arab traditions give lists of their successive guarantors. But, in +practice, lack of documents nearly always prevents us from getting as +far as the observer of a fact; the observation remains anonymous. A +general question then presents itself: How are we to criticise an +anonymous statement? It is not only "anonymous documents" with which we +are concerned, where the composition as a whole is the work of an +unknown author; even when the author is known, this question arises with +respect to each statement of his drawn from an unknown source. + +Criticism works by reproducing the conditions under which an author +wrote, and has hardly anything to take hold of where a statement is +anonymous. The only method left is to examine the general conditions of +the document. We may inquire whether there is any feature common to all +the statements of a document indicating that they all proceed from +persons having the same prejudices or passions: in this case the +tradition followed by the author is biassed; the tradition followed by +Herodotus has both an Athenian bias and a Delphic bias. In respect of +each fact derived from such a tradition we must ask whether it has not +been distorted by the interest, the vanity, or the prejudices of the +group concerned. We may even ignore the author, and ask whether there +was anything likely to make for or against correct observation, common +to all the men of the time and country in which the observation must +have been made: for example, what means of information, and what +prejudices, had the Greeks of Herodotus' time with respect to the +Scythians. + +The most useful of all these general inquiries has reference to that +mode of transmitting anonymous statements which is called _tradition_. +No second-hand statement has any value except in so far as it reproduces +its source; every addition is an alteration, and ought to be eliminated. +Similarly, all the intermediary sources are valueless except as copies +of the original statement founded directly on observation. The critic +needs to know whether this transmission from hand to hand has preserved +or distorted the original statement; above all, whether the tradition +embodied in the document was _written_ or _oral_. Writing fixes a +statement, and ensures its being transmitted faithfully; when a +statement is communicated orally, the impression in the mind of the +hearer is apt to be modified by confusion with other impressions; in +passing from one intermediary to another the statement is modified at +every step,[158] and as these modifications arise from different causes, +there is no possibility of measuring or correcting them. + +Oral tradition is by its nature a process of continual alteration; hence +in the established sciences only written transmission is accepted. +Historians have no avowable motive for proceeding differently, at any +rate when it is a case of establishing a particular fact. We must +therefore search documents for statements derived from oral tradition in +order that we may suspect them. We rarely have direct information as to +statements being thus derived; authors who borrow from oral tradition +are not anxious to proclaim the fact.[159] There is thus only an +indirect method, and that is to ascertain that written transmission was +impossible; we may then be sure that the fact reached the author only by +oral tradition. We have therefore to ask the question: In this period +and in this group of men was it customary to commit to writing facts of +this kind? If the answer is negative, the fact considered rests on oral +tradition alone. + +The most striking form of oral tradition is _legend_. It arises among +groups of men with whom the spoken word is the only means of +transmission, in barbarous societies, or in classes of little culture, +such as peasants or soldiers. In this case it is the whole group of +facts which is transmitted orally and assumes the legendary form. There +is a legendary period in the early history of every people: in Greece, +at Rome, among the Germanic and Slavonic races, the most ancient +memories of the people form a stratum of legend. In periods of +civilisation popular legends continue to exist in reference to events +which strike the imagination of the people.[160] Legend is exclusively +oral tradition. + +When a people has emerged from the legendary period and begun to commit +its history to writing, oral tradition does not come to an end, but only +applies to a narrower sphere; it is now restricted to facts which are +not registered, whether because they are by their nature secret, or +because no one takes the trouble to record them, such as private +actions, words, the details of events. Thus arise _anecdotes_, which +have been named "the legends of civilised society." Like legends they +have their origin in confused recollections, allusions, mistaken +interpretations, imaginings of all kinds which fasten upon particular +persons and events. + +Legends and anecdotes are at bottom mere popular beliefs, arbitrarily +attached to historical personages; they belong to folk-lore, not to +history.[161] We must therefore guard against the temptation to treat +legend as an alloy of accurate facts and errors out of which it is +possible by analysis to extract grains of historical truth. A legend is +a conglomerate in which there may be some grains of truth, and which may +even be capable of being analysed into its elements; but there is no +means of distinguishing the elements taken from reality from those which +are the work of imagination. To use Niebuhr's expression, a legend is "a +mirage produced by an invisible object according to an unknown law of +refraction." + +The crudest analytical procedure consists in rejecting those details in +the legendary narrative which appear impossible, miraculous, +contradictory, or absurd, and retaining the rational residue as +historical. This is how the Protestant rationalists of the eighteenth +century treated biblical narratives. One might as well amputate the +marvellous part of a fairy tale, suppress Puss in Boots, and keep the +Marquis of Carabas as an historical character. A more refined but no +less dangerous method is to compare different legends in order to deduce +their common historical basis. Grote[162] has shown, with reference to +Greek tradition, that it is impossible to extract any trustworthy +information from legend by any process whatever.[163] We must make up +our minds to treat legend as a product of imagination; we may look in it +for a people's conceptions, not for the external facts in that people's +history. The rule will be to reject every statement of legendary origin; +nor does this apply only to narratives in legendary form: a narrative +which has an historical appearance, but is founded on the data of +legend, the opening chapters of Thucydides for example, ought equally to +be discarded. + +In the case of written transmission it remains to inquire whether the +author reproduced his source without altering it. This inquiry forms +part of the critical investigation of the sources,[164] so far as it can +be pursued by a comparison of texts. But when the source has disappeared +we are reduced to internal criticism. We ask, first of all, whether the +author can have had exact information, otherwise his statement is +valueless. We next put to ourselves the general question: Was the author +in the habit of altering his sources, and in what manner? And in regard +to each separate second-hand statement we ask whether it has the +appearance of being an exact reproduction or an arrangement. We judge by +the form: when we meet with a passage whose style is out of harmony with +the main body of the composition, we have before us a fragment of an +earlier document; the more servile the reproduction the more valuable is +the passage, for it can contain no exact information beyond what was +already in the source. + +VII. In spite of all these investigations, criticism never succeeds in +determining the parentage of all the statements to the extent of finding +out who it was that observed, or even recorded, each fact. In most cases +the inquiry ends in leaving the statement anonymous. + +We are thus confronted with a fact, observed we know not by whom nor +how, recorded we know not when nor how. No other science accepts facts +which come in such a condition, without possibility of verification, +subject to incalculable chances of error. But history can turn them to +account, because it does not, like the other sciences, need a supply of +facts which are difficult to ascertain. + +The notion of a _fact_, when we come to examine it precisely, reduces to +an affirmative judgment having reference to external reality. The +operations by which we arrive at such a judgment are more or less +difficult, and the risk of error is greater or smaller according to the +nature of the realities investigated and the degree of precision with +which we wish to formulate them. Chemistry and biology need to discern +facts of a delicate order, rapid movements, transient states, and to +measure them in exact figures. History can work with facts of a much +coarser kind, spread over a large extent of space or time, such as the +existence of a custom, of a man, of a group, even of a people; and these +facts may be roughly expressed in vague words conveying no idea of +accurate measurement. With such easily observed facts as these to deal +with, history can afford to be much less exacting with regard to the +conditions of observation. The imperfection of the means of information +is compensated by a natural faculty of being satisfied with information +which can easily be obtained. + +Documents supply little else besides ill-verified facts, subject to many +risks of falsehood or error. But there are some facts in respect of +which it is very difficult to lie or be mistaken. The last series of +questions which the critic should ask is intended to distinguish, in the +mass of alleged facts, those which by their nature are little subject to +the risk of alteration, and which are therefore very probably correct. +We know what, in general, are the classes of facts which enjoy this +privilege; we are thus enabled to draw up a list of questions for +general use, and in applying them to any particular case we ask whether +the fact in question comes under any of the heads specified in advance. + +(1) The fact is of a nature to render falsehood improbable. A man lies +in order to produce an impression, and has no motive to lie in a case +where he believes that the false impression would be of no use, or that +the falsehood would be ineffectual. In order to determine whether the +author was in such a situation there are several questions to be asked. + +(_a_) Is the fact stated manifestly prejudicial to the effect which the +author wished to produce? Does it run counter to the interest, the +vanity, the sentiments, the literary tastes of the author and his group; +or to the opinions which he made a point of not offending? In such a +case there is a probability of good faith. But in the application of +this criterion there is danger; it has often been wrongly used, and in +two ways. One of these is to take for a confession what was meant for a +boast, as the declaration of Charles IX. that he was responsible for the +Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Or again, we trust without examination an +Athenian who speaks ill of the Athenians, or a Protestant who accuses +other Protestants. But it is quite possible the author's notions of his +interest or honour were very different from ours;[165] or he may have +wished to calumniate fellow-citizens who did not belong to his own +party, or co-religionists who did not belong to his own sect. This +criterion must therefore be restricted to cases where we know exactly +what _effect_ he wished to produce, and in what _group_ he was mainly +interested. + +(_b_) Was the fact stated so obviously known to the public that the +author, even if tempted to falsehood, would have been restrained by the +certainty of being detected? This is the case with facts which are easy +to verify, which are not remote in point of time or space, which apply +to a wide area or a long period, especially if the public had any +interest in verifying them. But the fear of detection is only an +intermittent check, opposed by interest whenever the author has any +motive for deceiving. It acts unequally on different minds--strongly on +men of culture and self-control who understand their public, feebly in +barbarous ages and on passionate men.[166] This criterion, therefore, is +to be restricted to cases where we know what idea the author had of his +readers, and whether he was dispassionate enough to keep them in mind. + +(_c_) Was the fact stated _indifferent_ to the author, so that he had no +temptation to misrepresent it? This is the case with facts of a general +kind, usages, institutions, objects, persons, which the author mentions +incidentally. A narrative, even a false one, cannot be composed +exclusively of falsehoods; the author must localise his facts, and needs +to surround them with a framework of truth. The facts which form this +framework had no interest for him; at that time every one knew them. But +for us they are instructive, and we can depend on them, for the author +had no intention of deceiving us. + +(2) The fact was of a kind to render error improbable. Numerous as the +chances of error are, still there are facts so "big" it is hard to be +mistaken about them. We have, then, to ask whether the alleged fact was +easy to ascertain: (_a_) Did it cover a long period of time, so that it +must have been frequently observed? Take, for example, the case of a +monument, a man, a custom, an event which was in progress for a +considerable time. (_b_) Did it cover a wide area, so that many people +observed it?--as, for example, a battle, a war, a custom common to a +whole people. (_c_) Is it expressed in such general terms that +superficial observation was enough to discover it?--as the mere +existence of a man, a city, a people, a custom. Facts of this large and +general kind make up the bulk of historical knowledge. + +(3) The fact was of such a nature that it would not have been stated +unless it was true. A man does not declare that he has seen something +contrary to his expectations and habits of mind unless observation has +compelled him to admit it. A fact which seems very improbable to the man +who relates it has a good chance of being true. We have, then, to ask +whether the fact stated was in contradiction with the author's opinions, +whether it is a phenomenon of a kind unknown to him, an action or a +custom which seems unintelligible to him; whether it is a saying whose +import transcends his intelligence, such as the sayings of Christ +reported in the Gospels, or the answers made by Joan of Arc to questions +put to her in the course of her trial. But we must guard against judging +of the author's ideas by our own standards: when men who are accustomed +to believe in the marvellous speak of monsters, of miracles, of wizards, +there is nothing in these to contradict their expectations, and the +criterion does not apply. + +VIII. We have at last reached the end of this description of the +critical operations; its length is due to the necessity of describing +successively operations which are performed simultaneously. We will now +consider how these methods are applied in practice. + +If the text be one whose interpretation is debatable, the examination is +divided into two stages: the first comprises the reading of the text +with a view to the determination of the meaning, without attempting to +draw any information from it; the second comprises the critical study of +the facts contained in the document. In the case of documents whose +meaning is clear, we may begin the critical examination on the first +reading, reserving for separate study any individual passages of +doubtful meaning. + +We begin by collecting the _general_ information we possess about the +document and the author, with the special purpose of discovering the +conditions which may have influenced the production of the document--the +epoch, the place, the purpose, the circumstances of its composition; the +author's social status, country, party, sect, family, interests, +passions, prejudices, linguistic habits, methods of work, means of +information, culture, abilities, and mental defects; the nature of the +facts and the mode of their transmission. Information on all these +points is supplied by the preparatory critical investigation of +authorship and sources. We now combine the different heads, mentally +applying the set of general critical questions; this should be done at +the outset, and the results impressed on the memory, for they will need +to be present to the mind during the remainder of the operations. + +Thus prepared, we attack the document. As we read we mentally analyse +it, destroying all the author's combinations, discarding all his +literary devices, in order to arrive at the facts, which we formulate in +simple and precise language. We thus free ourselves from the deference +imposed by artistic form, and from all submission to the author's +ideas--an emancipation without which criticism is impossible. + +The document thus analysed resolves into a long series of the author's +conceptions and statements as to facts. + +With regard to each statement, we ask ourselves whether there is a +probability of their being false or erroneous, or whether, on the other +hand, there are exceptional chances in favour of good faith and +accuracy, working through the list of critical questions prepared for +particular cases. This list of questions must be always present to the +mind. At first it may seem cumbersome, perhaps pedantic; but as it will +be applied more than a hundred times in each page of the document, it +will in the end be used unconsciously. As we read a text, all the +reasons for distrust or confidence will occur to the mind +simultaneously, combined into a single impression. + +Analysis and critical questioning will then have become a matter of +instinct, and we shall have acquired for ever that methodically +analytical, distrustful, not too respectful turn of mind which is often +mystically called "the critical sense," but which is nothing else than +an unconscious _habit_ of criticism. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR FACTS + + +Critical analysis yields in the result a number of conceptions and +statements, accompanied by comments on the probability of the facts +stated being accurate. It remains to examine how we can deduce from +these materials those particular historical facts which are to form the +basis of scientific knowledge. Conceptions and statements are two +different kinds of results, and must be treated by different methods. + + +I. Every conception which is expressed in writing or by any illustrative +representation is in itself a definite, unimpeachable fact That which is +expressed must have first been present in the mind of some one--if not +in that of the author, who may have reproduced a formula he did not +understand, then in the mind of the man who originated the formula. The +existence of a conception may be learnt from a single instance and +proved from a single document. Analysis and interpretation are thus +sufficient for the purpose of drawing up the complete list of those +facts which form the basis of the history of the arts, the sciences, or +of doctrines.[167] It is the task of external criticism to localise +these facts by determining the epoch, the country, the author of each +conception. The duration, geographical distribution, origin, and +filiation of conceptions belong to historical synthesis. Internal +criticism has nothing to do here; the fact is taken directly from the +document. + +We may advance a step farther. In themselves conceptions are nothing but +facts in psychology; but imagination does not create its objects, it +takes the elements of them from reality. Descriptions of imaginary facts +are constructed out of the real facts which the author has observed in +his experience. These elements of knowledge, the raw material of the +imaginary description, may be sought for and isolated. In dealing with +periods and with classes of facts for which documents are +rare--antiquity, for example, and the usages of private life--the +attempt has been made to lay under contribution works of literature, +epic poems, novels, plays.[168] The method is legitimate, but only +within the limits of certain restrictions which one is very apt to +forget. + +(1) It does not apply to social facts of a psychological order, the +moral or artistic standards of a society; the moral and aesthetic +conceptions in a document give at most the individual standards of the +author; we have no right to conclude from these to the morals or the +aesthetic tastes of the age. We must at least wait till we have compared +several different authors of the same period. + +(2) Descriptions even of physical facts and objects may be products of +the author's imagination. It is only the _elements_ of them which we +know to be certainly real; all that we can assert is the separate +existence of the irreducible elements, form, material, colour, number. +When the poet speaks of golden gates or silver bucklers, we cannot infer +that golden gates and silver bucklers ever existed in reality; nothing +is certain beyond the separate existence of gates, bucklers, gold, and +silver. The analysis must therefore be carried to the point of +distinguishing those elements which the author must necessarily have +taken from experience: objects, their purpose, ordinary actions. + +(3) The conception of an object or an action proves that it existed, but +not that it was common; the object or action may have been unique, or +restricted to a very small circle; poets and novelists are fond of +taking their models from an exceptional world. + +(4) The facts yielded by this method are not localised in space or time; +the author may have taken them from a time or country not his own. + +All these restrictions may be summarised as follows: before drawing any +inference from a work of literature as to the state of the society in +which the author lived, we should ask ourselves what would be the worth +of a similar inference as to contemporary manners drawn from a modern +novel. + +With the facts yielded by conceptions we may join those indifferent +facts of an obvious and elementary character which the author has +stated almost without thinking. Logically we have no right to call them +certain, for we do sometimes meet with men who make mistakes about +obvious and elementary facts, and others who lie even on indifferent +matters. But such cases are so rare that there is not much danger in +admitting as certain facts of this kind which are supported by a single +document, and this is how we deal, in practice, with periods of which +little is known. The institutions of the Gauls and Germans are described +from the unique texts of Caesar and Tacitus. Facts so easy to discover +are forced upon the authors of descriptions much as realities are forced +upon poets. + + +II. On the other hand, a statement in a document as to an objective fact +is never enough to establish that fact. The chances of falsehood or +error are so many, the conditions which gave rise to the statement are +so little known, that we cannot be sure that none of these chances has +taken effect. The critical examination provides no definitive solution; +it is indispensable if we are to avoid error, but it is insufficient to +conduct us to truth. + +Criticism can _prove_ no fact; it only yields probabilities. Its end and +result is to decompose documents into statements, each labelled with an +estimate of its value--worthless statement, statement open to suspicion +(strong or weak), statement probably (or, very probably) true, statement +of unknown value. + +Of all these different kinds of results one only is definitive--_the +statement of an author who can have had no information on the fact he +states is null and void_; it is to be rejected as we reject an +apocryphal document.[169] But criticism here merely destroys illusory +sources of information; it supplies nothing certain to take their place. +The only sure results of criticism are _negative_. All the positive +results are subject to doubt; they reduce to propositions of the form: +"There are chances for or against the truth of such and such a +statement." Chances only. A statement open to suspicion may turn out to +be true; a statement whose truth is probable may, after all, be false. +Instances occur continually, and we are never sufficiently well +acquainted with the conditions under which the observation was made to +_know_ whether it was made ill or well. + +In order to obtain a definitive result we require a final operation. +After passing through the ordeal of criticism, statements present +themselves as probable or improbable. But even the most probable of +them, taken by themselves, remain mere probabilities: to pass from them +to categorical propositions in scientific form is a step we have no +right to take; a proposition in a science is an assertion not open to +debate, and that is what the statements we have before us are not. It is +a principle common to all sciences of observation not to base a +scientific conclusion on a single observation; the fact must have been +corroborated by several independent observations before it is affirmed +categorically. History, with its imperfect modes of acquiring +information, has less right than any other science to claim exemption +from this principle. An historical statement is, in the most favourable +case, but an indifferently made observation, and needs other +observations to corroborate it. + +It is by combining observations that every science is built up: a +scientific fact is a centre on which several different observations +converge.[170] Each observation is subject to chances of error which +cannot be entirely eliminated; but if several observations agree, this +can hardly be in virtue of a common error: the more probable explanation +of the agreement is that the observers have all seen the same reality +and have all described it correctly. Errors are personal and tend to +diverge; it is the correct observations that agree. + +Applied to history, this principle leads to a last series of operations, +intermediate between purely analytical criticism and the synthetic +operations--the comparison of statements. + +We begin by classifying the results yielded by critical analysis in such +a way as to bring together those statements which relate to the same +fact. The operation is facilitated mechanically by the method of slips. +Either each statement has been entered on a separate slip, or else a +single slip has been assigned for each fact, and the different +statements relating to it entered upon the slip as met with in the +course of reading. By bringing the statements together we learn the +extent of our information on the fact; the definitive conclusion depends +on the relation between the statements. We have, then, to study +separately the different cases which may occur. + + +III. Most frequently, except in contemporary history, the documents only +supply a single statement on a given fact. In such a case all the other +sciences follow an invariable rule: an isolated observation is not +admitted into science; it is quoted (with the observer's name), but no +conclusions are drawn from it. Historians have no avowable motive for +proceeding otherwise. When a fact is supported by no more than the +statement of a single man, however honest he may be, historians ought +not to assert it, but to do as men of science do--give the reference +(Thucydides states, Caesar says that ...); this is all they have a right +to affirm. In reality they all retain the habit of stating facts, as was +done in the middle ages, on the _authority_ of Thucydides or of Caesar; +many are simple enough to do so in express terms. Thus, allowing +themselves to be guided by natural credulity, unchecked by science, +historians end by admitting, on the insufficient presumption afforded by +a unique document, any statement which does not happen to be +contradicted by another document. Hence the absurd consequence that +history is more positive, and seems better established in regard to +those little known periods which are represented by a single writer than +in regard to facts known from thousands of documents which contradict +each other. The wars of the Medes known to Herodotus alone, the +adventures of Fredegonda related by none but Gregory of Tours, are less +subject to discussion than the events of the French Revolution, which +have been described by hundreds of contemporaries. This is a +discreditable state of things which cannot be ended except by a +revolution in the minds of historians. + + +IV. When we have several statements relating to the same fact, they may +contradict each other or they may agree. In order to be certain that +they really do contradict each other, we have to make sure that they do +actually relate to the same fact. Two apparently contradictory +statements may be merely parallel; they may not relate exactly to the +same moment, the same place, the same persons, the same episodes of an +event, and they may be both correct.[171] We must not, however, infer +that they confirm each other; each comes under the category of unique +statements. + +If the contradiction is real, at least one of the statements is false. +In such cases it is a natural tendency to seek to reconcile them by a +compromise--to split the difference. This peace-making spirit is the +reverse of scientific. A says two and two make four; B says they make +five. We are not to conclude that two and two make four and a half; we +must examine and see which is right. This examination is the work of +criticism. Of two contradictory statements, it nearly always happens +that one is open to suspicion; this should be rejected if the competing +statement has been judged very probably true. If both are open to +suspicion, we abstain from drawing any conclusion. We do the same if +several statements open to suspicion agree together as against a single +statement which is not suspected.[172] + + +V. When several statements agree, it is still necessary to resist the +natural tendency to believe that the fact has been demonstrated. The +first impulse is to count each document as one source of information. We +are well aware in matters of every-day life that men are apt to copy +each other, that a single narrative often serves the turn of several +narrators, that several newspapers sometimes happen to publish the same +correspondence, that several reporters sometimes agree to let one of +their number do the work for all. We have, in such a case, several +documents, several statements--have we the same number of observations? +Obviously not. When one statement reproduces another, it does not +constitute a new observation, and even if an observation were to be +reproduced by a hundred different authors, these hundred copies would +amount to no more than one observation. To count them as a hundred would +be the same thing as to count a hundred printed copies of the same book +as a hundred different documents. But the respect paid to "historical +documents" is sometimes stronger than obvious truth. The same statement +occurring in several different documents by different authors has an +illusory appearance of multiplicity; an identical fact related in ten +different documents at once gives the impression of being established by +ten agreeing observations. This impression is to be distrusted. An +agreement is only conclusive when the agreeing statements represent +_observations_ which are independent of each other. Before we draw any +conclusion from an agreement we must examine whether it is an agreement +between _independent_ observations. Two operations are thus required. + +(1) We begin by inquiring whether the statements are independent, or are +reproductions of one and the same observation. This inquiry is partly +the work of that part of external criticism which deals with the +investigation of sources;[173] but that investigation only touches the +relations between written documents, and stops short when it has +determined which passages of an author are borrowed from other authors. +Borrowed passages are to be rejected without discussion. But the same +work remains to be done in reference to statements which were not +committed to writing. We have to compare the statements which relate to +the same fact, in order to find out whether they proceeded originally +from different observers, or at least from different observations. + +The principle is analogous to that employed in the investigation of +sources. The details of a social fact are so manifold, and there are so +many different ways of looking at the same fact, that two independent +observers cannot possibly give completely coincident accounts; if two +statements present the same details in the same order, they must be +derived from a common observation; different observations are bound to +diverge somewhere. We may often apply an _a priori_ principle: if the +fact was of such a nature that it could only be observed or reported by +a single observer, then all the accounts of it must be derived from a +single observation. These principles[174] enable us to recognise many +cases of different observations, and still more numerous cases of +observations being reproduced. + +There remains a great number of doubtful cases. The natural tendency is +to treat them as if they were cases of independent observation. But the +scientific procedure would be the exact reverse of this: as long as the +statements are not proved to be independent we have no right to assume +that their agreement is conclusive. + +It is only after we have determined the relations between the different +statements that we can begin to count them and examine into their +agreement. Here again we have to distrust the first impulse; the kind of +agreement which is really conclusive is not, as one would naturally +imagine, a perfect similarity between two narratives, but an occasional +coincidence between two narratives which only partially resemble each +other. The natural tendency is to think that the closer the agreement +is, the greater is its demonstrative power; we ought, on the contrary, +to adopt as a rule the paradox that an agreement proves more when it is +confined to a small number of circumstances. It is at such points of +coincidence between diverging statements that we are to look for +scientifically established historical facts. + +(2) Before drawing any conclusions it remains to make sure whether the +_different_ observations of the same fact are entirely _independent_; +for it is possible that one may have influenced another to such a degree +that their agreement is inconclusive. We have to guard against the +following cases:-- + +(_a_) The different observations have been made by the same author, who +has recorded them either in the same or in different documents; special +reasons must then be had before it can be assumed that the author really +made the observation afresh, and did not content himself with merely +repeating a single observation. + +(_b_) There were several observers, but they commissioned one of their +number to write a single document. We have to ascertain whether the +document merely gives the statements of the writer, or whether the other +observers checked his work. + +(_c_) Several observers recorded their observations in different +documents, but under similar conditions. We must apply the list of +critical questions in order to ascertain whether they were not all +subject to the same influences, predisposing to falsehood or error; +whether, for example, they had a common interest, a common vanity, or +common prejudices. + +The only observations which are certainly independent are those which +are contained in different documents, written by different authors, who +belonged to different groups, and worked under different conditions. +Cases of perfectly conclusive agreement are thus rare, except in +reference to modern periods. + +The possibility of proving an historical fact depends on the number of +independent documents relating to it which have been preserved, and the +preservation of the documents is a matter of chance; this explains the +share which chance has in the formation of historical science. + +The facts which it is possible to establish are chiefly those which +cover a large extent of space or time (sometimes called _general_ +facts), customs, doctrines, institutions, great events; they were easier +to observe than the others, and are now easier to prove. Historical +method is not, however, essentially powerless to establish facts of +short duration and limited extent (those which are called _particular +facts_), such as a saying, a momentary act. It is enough that several +persons should have been present when the fact occurred, that they +should have recorded it, and that their writings should have come down +to us. We know what were the words which Luther uttered at the Diet of +Worms; we know that he did not say what tradition puts in his mouth. +This concurrence of favourable conditions becomes more and more frequent +with the organisation of newspapers, of shorthand writers, and of +depositories of documents. + +In the case of antiquity and the middle ages historical knowledge is +limited to general facts by the scarcity of documents. In dealing with +contemporary history it is possible to include more and more particular +facts. The general public supposes the opposite of this; it is +suspicious about contemporary facts, with reference to which it sees +contradictory narratives circulating, and believes without hesitation +ancient facts, which it does not see contradicted anywhere. Its +confidence is at its greatest in respect of that history which we have +not the means of knowing, and its scepticism increases with the means of +knowledge. + + +VI. _Agreement between documents_ leads to conclusions which are not all +of them definitive. In order to complete and rectify our conclusions we +have still to study _the harmony of the facts_. + +Several facts which, taken in isolation, are only imperfectly proved, +may confirm each other in such a manner as to produce a collective +certainty. The facts which the documents present in isolation have +sometimes been in reality sufficiently near each other to be connected. +Of this kind are the successive actions of the same man or of the same +group of men, the habits of the same group at different epochs separated +by short intervals, or of similar groups at the same epoch. It is no +doubt possible that one of several analogous facts may be true and +another false; the certainty of the first does not justify the +categorical assertion of the second. But yet the harmony of several such +facts, each proved imperfectly, yields a kind of certainty; the facts do +not, in the strict sense of the word, prove, but they _confirm_[175] +each other. The doubt which attached to each one of them disappears; we +obtain that species of certainty which is produced by the +interconnection of facts. Thus the comparison of conclusions which are +separately doubtful yields a whole which is morally certain. In an +itinerary of a sovereign, the days and the places confirm each other +when they harmonize so as to form a coherent whole. An institution or a +popular usage is established by the harmony of accounts, each of which +is no more than probable, relating to different times and places. + +This method is a difficult one to apply. The notion of harmony is a much +vaguer one than that of agreement. We cannot assign any precise general +rules for distinguishing facts which are sufficiently connected to form +a whole, the harmony of whose parts would be conclusive; nor can we +determine beforehand the duration and extent of that which may be taken +to form a whole. Facts separated by half a century of time and a hundred +leagues of space may confirm each other in such a way as to establish a +popular usage (for example, among the ancient Germans); but they would +prove nothing if they were taken from a heterogeneous society subject to +rapid evolution (take, for example, French society in 1750, and again in +1800, in Alsace and in Provence). Here we have to study the relation +between the facts. This brings us to the beginnings of historical +construction; here is the transition from analytical to synthetic +operations. + + +VII. But it remains to consider cases of discordance between facts +established by documents and other facts established by other methods. +It happens sometimes that a fact obtained as an historical conclusion is +in contradiction with a body of known historical facts, or with the sum +of our knowledge of humanity founded on direct observation, or with a +scientific law established by the regular method of an established +science. In the first two cases the fact is only in conflict with +history, psychology, or sociology, all imperfectly established sciences; +we then simply call the fact _improbable_. If it is in conflict with a +true science it becomes a _miracle_. What are we to do with an +improbable or miraculous fact? Are we to admit it after examination of +the documents, or are we to pass on and shelve the question? + +_Improbability_ is not a scientific notion; it varies with the +individual. Each person finds improbable what he is not accustomed to +see: a peasant would think the telephone much more improbable than a +ghost; a king of Siam refused to believe in the existence of ice. It is +important to know who precisely it is to whom the fact appears to be +improbable. Is it to the mass who have no scientific culture? For these, +science is more improbable than miracle, physiology than spiritualism; +their notions of improbability are worthless. Is it to the man who +possesses scientific culture? If so, we have to deal with that which +seems improbable to a scientific mind, and it would be more accurate to +say that the fact is contrary to the results of science--that there is +disagreement between the direct observations of men of science and the +indirect testimony of the documents. + +How is this conflict to be decided? The question has no great practical +interest; nearly all the documents which relate miraculous facts are +already open to suspicion on other grounds, and would be discarded by a +sound criticism. But the question of miracles has raised such passions +that it may be well to indicate how it affects the historian.[176] + +The general tendency to believe in the marvellous has filled with +miraculous facts the documents of nearly every people. Historically the +existence of the devil is much better proved than that of Pisistratus: +there has not been preserved a single word of a contemporary of +Pisistratus saying that he has seen him; thousands of "ocular witnesses" +declare they have seen the devil; few historical facts have been +established by so great a number of independent testimonies. However, we +do not hesitate to reject the devil and to accept Pisistratus. For the +existence of the devil would be irreconcilable with the laws of all the +established sciences. + +For the historian the solution of the problem is obvious.[177] The +observations whose results are contained in historical documents are +never of equal value with those of contemporary scientists; we have +already shown why. The indirect method of history is always inferior to +the direct methods of the sciences of observation. If its results do not +harmonise with theirs, it is history which must give way; historical +science, with its imperfect means of information, cannot claim to check, +contradict, or correct the results of other sciences, but must rather +use their results to correct its own. The progress of the direct +sciences sometimes modifies the results of historical interpretation; a +fact established by direct observation aids in the comprehension and +criticism of documents. Cases of stigmata and nervous anaesthesia which +have been scientifically observed have led to the admission as true of +historical narratives of analogous facts, as in the case of the stigmata +of certain saints and the possessed nuns of Loudun. But history cannot +aid the progress of the direct sciences. It is kept at a distance from +reality by its indirect means of information, and must accept the laws +that are established by those sciences which come into immediate contact +with reality. In order to reject one of these laws new direct +observations are necessary. Such revolutions are possible, but they must +be brought about from within. History has no power to take the +initiative in them. + +The solution is not so clear in the case of facts which do not harmonise +with a body of historical knowledge or with the sciences, still in the +embryonic stage, which deal with man. It depends on the opinion we form +as to the value of such knowledge. We can at least lay down the +practical rule that in order to contradict history, psychology, or +sociology, we must have very strong documents, and this is a case which +hardly ever occurs. + + + + +BOOK III + +_SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS_ + + + + +CHAPTER I + +GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION + + +The criticism of documents only yields isolated facts. In order to +organise them into a body of science it is necessary to perform a series +of synthetic operations. The study of these processes of historical +construction forms the second half of Methodology. + +The mode of construction cannot be regulated by the ideal plan of the +science we desire to construct; it depends on the materials we have at +our disposal. It would be chimerical to formulate a scheme which the +materials would not allow us to carry out; it would be like proposing to +construct an Eiffel tower with building-stones. The fundamental defect +of philosophies of history is that they forget this practical necessity. + + +I. Let us begin by considering the materials of history. What is their +form and their nature? How do they differ from the materials of other +sciences? + +Historical facts are derived from the critical analysis of the +documents. They issue from this process in the form to which analysis +has reduced them, chopped small into individual statements; for a +single sentence contains several statements: we have often accepted some +and rejected others; each of these statements represents a fact. + +Historical facts have the common characteristic of having been taken +from documents; but they differ greatly among themselves. + +(1) They represent phenomena of very different nature. From the same +document we derive facts bearing on handwriting, language, style, +doctrines, customs, events. The Mesha inscription furnishes facts +bearing on Moabite handwriting and language, the belief in the god +Chemosh, the practices belonging to his cult, the war between the +Moabites and Israel. Thus the facts reach us pell-mell, without +distinction of nature. This mixture of heterogeneous facts is one of the +characteristics which differentiate history from the other sciences. The +sciences of direct observation choose the facts to be studied, and +systematically limit themselves to the observation of facts of a single +species. The documentary sciences receive the facts, already observed, +at the hands of authors of documents, who supply them in disorder. For +the purpose of remedying this disorder it is necessary to sort the facts +and group them by species. But, for the purpose of sorting them, it is +necessary to know precisely what it is that constitutes a _species_ of +historical facts; in order to group them we need a principle of +classification applicable to them. But on these two questions of capital +importance historians have not as yet succeeded in formulating precise +rules. + +(2) Historical facts present themselves in very different degrees of +generality, from the highly general facts which apply to a whole people +and which lasted for centuries (institutions, customs, beliefs), down to +the most transient actions of a single man (a word, a movement). Here +again history differs from the sciences of direct observation, which +regularly start from particular facts and labour methodically to +condense them into general facts. In order to form groups the facts must +be reduced to a common degree of generality, which makes it necessary to +inquire to what degree of generality we can and ought to reduce the +different species of facts. And this is what historians do not agree +about among themselves. + +(3) Historical facts are localised; each belongs to a given time and a +given country. If we suppress the time and place to which they belong, +they lose their historical character; they now contribute only to the +knowledge of universal humanity, as is the case with facts of folk-lore +whose origin is unknown. This necessity of localisation is also foreign +to the general sciences; it is confined to the descriptive sciences, +which deal with the geographical distribution and with the evolution of +phenomena. It obliges the historian to study separately the facts +belonging to different countries and different epochs. + +(4) The facts which have been extracted from documents by critical +analysis present themselves accompanied by a critical estimate of their +probability.[178] In every case where we have not reached complete +certainty, whenever the fact is merely probable--still more when it is +open to suspicion--criticism supplies the fact to the historian +accompanied by a label which he has no right to remove, and which +prevents the fact from being definitively admitted into the science. +Even those facts which, after comparison with others, end by being +established, are subject to temporary exclusion, like the clinical cases +which accumulate in the medical reviews before they are considered +sufficiently proved to be received as scientific facts. + +Historical construction has thus to be performed with an incoherent mass +of minute facts, with detail-knowledge reduced as it were to a powder. +It must utilise a heterogeneous medley of materials, relating to +different subjects and places, differing in their degree of generality +and certainty. No method of classifying them is provided by the practice +of historians; history, which began by being a form of literature, has +remained the least methodical of the sciences. + + +II. In every science the next step after observing the facts is to +formulate a series of questions according to some methodical +system;[179] every science is composed of the answers to such a series +of questions. In all the sciences of direct observation, even if the +questions to be answered have not been put down in advance, the facts +which are observed suggest questions, and require them to be formulated +precisely. But historians have no discipline of this kind; many of them +are accustomed to imitate artists, and do not even think of asking +themselves what they are looking for. They take from their documents +those parts which strike them, often for purely personal reasons, and +reproduce them, changing the language and adding any miscellaneous +reflections which come into their minds. + +If history is not to be lost in the confusion of its materials, it must +be made a rule to proceed here, as in the other sciences, by way of +question and answer.[180] But how are the questions to be chosen in a +science so different from the others? This is the fundamental problem of +method. The only way to solve it is to begin by determining the +essential characteristic of historical facts by which they are +differentiated from the facts of the other sciences. + +The sciences of direct observation deal with _realities_, taken in their +entirety. The science which borders most closely on history in respect +of its subject-matter, descriptive zoology, proceeds by the examination +of a real and complete animal. This animal is first observed, as a +whole, by actual vision; it is then dissected into its parts; this +dissection is _analysis_ in the original sense of the word ([Greek: +hanalhyein], to break up into parts). It is then possible to put the parts +together again in such a way as to exhibit the structure of the whole; +this is _real_ synthesis. It is possible to watch the _real_ movements +which are the functions of the organs in such a way as to observe the +mutual actions and reactions of the different parts of the organism. It +is possible to compare _real_ wholes and see what are the parts in +which they resemble each other, so as to be able to classify them +according to real points of resemblance. The science is a body of +objective knowledge founded on _real_ analysis, synthesis, and +comparison; actual sight of the things studied guides the scientific +researcher and dictates the questions he is to ask himself. + +In history there is nothing like this. One is apt to say that history is +the "vision" of past events, and that it proceeds by "analysis": these +are two metaphors, dangerous if we suffer ourselves to be misled by +them.[181] In history we see nothing real except paper with writing on +it--and sometimes monuments or the products of art or industry. The +historian has nothing before him which he can analyse physically, +nothing which he can destroy and reconstruct. "Historical analysis" is +no more real than is the vision of historical facts; it is an abstract +process, a purely intellectual operation. The analysis of a document +consists in a _mental_ search for the items of information it contains, +with the object of criticising them one by one. The analysis of a fact +consists in the process of distinguishing _mentally_ between its +different details (the various episodes of an event, the characteristics +of an institution), with the object of paying special attention to each +detail in turn; that is what is called examining the different "aspects" +of a fact,--another metaphor. The human mind is vague by nature, and +spontaneously revives only vague collective impressions; to impart +clearness to these it is necessary to ask what individual impressions go +to form a given collective impression, in order that precision may be +attained by a successive consideration of them. This is an indispensable +operation but we must not exaggerate its scope. It is not an objective +method which yields a knowledge of real objects; it is only a subjective +method which aims at detecting those abstract elements which compose our +impressions.[182] From the very nature of its materials history is +necessarily a subjective science. It would be illegitimate to extend to +this intellectual analysis of subjective impressions the rules which +govern the real analysis of real objects. + +History, then, must guard against the temptation to imitate the method +of the biological sciences. Historical facts are so different from the +facts of the other sciences that their study requires a different +method. + + +III. Documents, the sole source of historical knowledge, give +information on three categories of facts: + +(1) _Living beings and material objects._ Documents make us acquainted +with the existence of human beings, physical conditions, products of art +and industry. In all these cases physical facts have been brought +before the author by physical perception. But we have before us nothing +but intellectual phenomena, facts seen "through the author's +imagination," or, to speak accurately, mental images representative of +the author's impressions--images which we form on the _analogy_ of the +images which were in his mind. The Temple at Jerusalem was a material +object which men saw, but we cannot see it now; all we can now do is to +form a mental image of it, analogous to that which existed in the minds +of those who saw and described it. + +(2) _Actions of men._ Documents relate the actions (and words) of men of +former times. Here, too, are physical facts which were known to the +authors by sight and hearing, but which are now for us no more than the +author's recollections, subjective images which are reproduced in our +minds. When Caesar was stabbed the dagger-thrusts were seen, the words of +the murderers were heard; we have nothing but mental images. Actions and +words all have this characteristic, that each was the action or the word +of an individual; the imagination can only represent to itself +_individual_ acts, copied from those which are brought before us by +direct physical observation. As these are the actions of men living in a +society, most of them are performed simultaneously by several +individuals, or are directed to some common end. These are collective +acts; but, in the imagination as in direct observation, they always +reduce to a sum of individual actions. The "social fact," as recognised +by certain sociologists, is a philosophical construction, not an +historical fact. + +(3) Motives and conceptions. Human actions do not contain their own +cause within themselves; they have _motives_. This vague word denotes +both the stimulus which occasions the performance of an action, and the +_representation_ of the action which is in the mind of a man at the +moment when he performs it. We can imagine motives only as existing in a +man's mind, and in the form of vague interior representations, analogous +to those which we have of our own inward states; we can express them +only by words, generally metaphorical. Here we have _psychic_ facts, +generally called feelings and ideas. Documents exhibit three kinds of +such facts: (_a_) motives and conceptions in the authors' minds and +expressed by them; (_b_) motives and ideas attributed by the authors to +contemporaries of theirs whose actions they have seen; (_c_) motives +which we ourselves may suppose to have influenced the actions related in +the documents, and which we represent to ourselves on the model of our +own motives. + +Physical facts, human actions (both individual and collective), psychic +facts--these form the objects of historical knowledge; they are none of +them observed directly, they are all _imagined_. Historians--nearly all +of them unconsciously and under the impression that they are observing +realities--are occupied solely with images. + + +IV. How, then, is it possible to imagine facts without their being +wholly imaginary? The facts, as they exist in the historian's mind, are +necessarily subjective; that is one of the reasons given for refusing to +recognise history as a science. But subjective is not a synonym of +unreal. A recollection is only an image; but it is not therefore a +chimera, it is the representation of a vanished reality. It is true that +the historian who works with documents has no personal recollections of +which he can make direct use; but he forms mental images on the model of +his own recollections. He assumes that realities (objects, actions, +motives), which have now disappeared, but were formerly observed by the +authors of the documents, resembled the realities of his own day which +he has himself seen and which he retains in his memory. This is the +postulate of all the documentary sciences. If former humanity did not +resemble the humanity of to-day, documents would be unintelligible. +Starting from this assumed resemblance, the historian forms a mental +representation of the bygone facts of history similar to his own +recollection of the facts he has witnessed. + +This operation, which is performed unconsciously, is one of the +principal sources of error in history. The things of the past which are +to be pictured in imagination were not wholly similar to the things of +the present which we have seen; we have never seen a man like Caesar or +Clovis, and we have never experienced the same mental states as they. In +the established sciences it is equally true that one man will work on +facts which another has observed, and which he must therefore represent +to himself by analogy; but these facts are defined by precise terms +which indicate what invariable elements ought to appear in the image. +Even in physiology the notions which occur are sufficiently clear and +fixed for the same word to evoke in the minds of all naturalists similar +images of an organ or a movement. The reason is that each notion which +has a name has been formed by a method of observation and abstraction in +the course of which all the characteristics which belong to the notion +have been precisely determined and described. + +But in proportion as a body of knowledge is more nearly concerned with +the invisible facts of the mind, its notions become more confused and +its language less precise. Even the most ordinary facts of human life, +social conditions, actions, motives, feelings, can only be expressed by +vague terms (_king_, _warrior_, _to fight_, _to elect_). In the case of +more complex phenomena, language is so indefinite that there is no +agreement even as to the essential elements of the phenomena. What are +we to understand by a tribe, an army, an industry, a market, a +revolution? Here history shares the vagueness common to all the sciences +of humanity, psychological or social. But its indirect method of +representation by mental images renders this vagueness still more +dangerous. The historical images in our minds ought, then, to reproduce +at least the essential features of the images which were in the minds of +the direct observers of past facts; but the terms in which they +expressed their mental images never tell us exactly what these essential +elements were. + +Facts which we did not see, described in language which does not permit +us to represent them in our minds with exactness, form the data of +history. The historian, however, is obliged to picture the facts in his +imagination, and he should make it his constant endeavour to construct +his mental images out of none but correct elements, so that he may +imagine the facts as he would have seen them if he had been able to +observe them personally.[183] But the formation of a mental image +requires more elements than the documents supply. Let any one endeavour +to form a mental representation of a battle or a ceremony out of the +data of a narrative, however detailed; he will see how many features he +is compelled to add. This necessity becomes physically perceptible in +attempts to restore monuments in accordance with descriptions (for +example, the Temple at Jerusalem), in pictures which claim to be +representations of historical scenes, in the drawings of illustrated +newspapers. + +Every historical image contains a large part of fancy. The historian +cannot get rid of it, but he can take stock of the real elements which +enter into his images and confine his constructions to these; they are +the elements which he has derived from the documents. If, in order to +understand the battle between Caesar and Ariovistus, he finds it +necessary to make a mental picture of the two opposing armies, he will +be careful to draw no conclusions from the general aspect under which he +imagines them; he will base his reasonings exclusively on the real +details furnished by the documents. + + +V. The problem of historical method may be finally stated as follows. +Out of the different elements we find in documents we form mental +images. Some of these, relating entirely to physical objects, are +furnished to us by illustrative monuments, and they directly represent +some of the physical aspects of the things of the past. Most of them, +however, including all the images we form of psychic facts, are +constructed on the model either of ancient representations, or, more +frequently, of the facts we have observed in our own experience. Now, +the things of the past were only partially similar to the things of the +present, and it is precisely the points of difference which make history +interesting. How are we to represent to ourselves these elements of +difference for which we have no model? We have never seen a company of +men resembling the Frankish warriors, and we have never personally +experienced the feelings which Clovis had when setting out to fight +against the Visigoths. How are we to make our imagination of facts of +this kind harmonise with the reality? + +Practically, what happens is as follows. Immediately on the reading of a +sentence in a document an image is formed in our minds by a spontaneous +operation beyond our control. This image is based on a superficial +analogy, and is, as a rule, grossly inaccurate. Any one who searches his +memory may recall the absurd manner in which he first represented to +himself the persons and scenes of the past. It is the task of history to +rectify these images gradually, by eliminating the false elements one by +one, and replacing them by true ones. We have seen red-haired people, +bucklers, and Frankish battle-axes (or at least drawings of these +objects); we bring these elements together, in order to correct our +first mental image of the Frankish warriors. The historical image thus +ends by becoming a combination of features borrowed from different +experiences. + +It is not enough to represent to oneself isolated persons, objects, and +actions. Men and their actions form part of a whole, of a society and of +a process of evolution. It is, therefore, further necessary to represent +to oneself the relations between different men and different actions +(nations, governments, laws, wars). + +But in order to imagine relations it is necessary to have a conception +of collectivities or wholes, and the documents only give isolated +elements. Here again the historian is obliged to use a subjective +method. He imagines a society or a process of evolution, and in this +imaginary framework he disposes the elements furnished by the documents. +Thus, whereas biological classification is guided by the objective +observation of physical units, historical classification can only be +effected upon subjective units existing in the imagination. + +The realities of the past are things which we do not observe, and which +we can only know in virtue of their resemblance to the realities of the +present. In order to realise the conditions under which past events +happened, we must observe the humanity of to-day, and look for the +conditions under which analogous events happen now. History thus becomes +an application of the descriptive sciences which deal with humanity, +descriptive psychology, sociology or social science; but all these +sciences are still but imperfectly established, and their defects retard +the establishment of a science of history. + +Some of the conditions of human life are, however, so necessary and so +obvious that the most superficial observation is enough to establish +them. These are the conditions common to all humanity; they have their +origin either in the physiological organisation which determines the +material needs of men, or in the psychological organisation which +determines their habits in matters of conduct. These conditions can +therefore be provided for by the use of a set of general questions +applicable to all the cases that may occur. It is with historical +construction as with historical criticism--the impossibility of direct +observation compels the use of prearranged sets of questions. + +The human actions which form the subject-matter of history differ from +age to age and from country to country, just as men and societies have +differed from each other; and, indeed, it is the special aim of history +to study these differences. If men had always had the same form of +government or spoken the same language, there would be no occasion to +write the history of forms of government or the history of languages. +But these differences are comprised within limits imposed by the general +conditions of human life; they are but varieties of certain modes of +being and doing which are common to the whole of humanity, or at least +to the great majority of men. We cannot know _a priori_ what was the +mode of government or the language of an historical people; it is the +business of history to tell us. But that a given people had a language +and had a form of government is something which we are entitled to +assume, before examination, in every possible case. + +By drawing up the list of the fundamental phenomena which we may expect +to find in the life of every individual and every people, we shall have +suggested to us a set of general questions which will be summary, but +still sufficient to enable us to arrange the bulk of historical facts in +a certain number of natural groups, each of which will form a special +branch of history. This scheme of general classification will supply the +scaffolding of historical construction. + +The set of general questions will only apply to phenomena of constant +occurrence: it cannot anticipate the thousands of local or accidental +events which enter into the life of an individual or a nation; it will, +therefore, not contain all the questions which the historian must answer +before he can give a complete picture of the past. The detailed study of +the facts will require the use of lists of questions entering more into +detail, and differing according to the nature of the events, the men, or +the societies studied. In order to frame these lists, we begin by +setting down those questions or matters of detail which are suggested by +the mere reading of the documents; but for the purpose of arranging +these questions, often indeed for the purpose of making the list +complete, recourse must be had to the systematic _a priori_ method. +Among the classes of facts, the persons, and the societies with which we +are well acquainted (either from direct observation or from history), we +look for those which resemble the facts, the persons, or the societies +which we wish to study. By analysing the scheme of arrangement used in +the scientific treatment of these familiar cases we shall learn what +questions ought to be asked in reference to the analogous cases which we +propose to investigate. Of course the model must be chosen +intelligently; we must not apply to a barbarous society a list of +questions framed on the study of a civilised nation, and ask with regard +to a feudal domain what agents corresponded to each of our ministers of +state--as Boutaric did in his study of the administration of Alphonse of +Poitiers. + +This method of drawing up lists of questions which bases all historical +construction on an _a priori_ procedure, would be objectionable if +history really were a science of observation; and perhaps some will +think it compares very unfavourably with the _a posteriori_ methods of +the natural sciences. But its justification is simple: it is the only +method which it is possible to employ, and the only method which, as a +matter of fact, ever has been employed. The moment an historian attempts +to put in order the facts contained in documents, he constructs out of +the knowledge he has (or thinks he has) of human affairs a scheme of +arrangement which is the equivalent of a list of questions--unless, +perhaps, he adopts a scheme which one of his predecessors has +constructed in a similar manner. But when this work has been performed +unconsciously, the scheme of arrangement remains incomplete and +confused. Thus it is not a case of deciding whether to work with or +without an _a priori_ set of questions--we must work with such a set in +any case--the choice merely lies between the unconscious use of an +incomplete and confused set of questions and the conscious use of a +precise and complete set. + + +VI. We can now sketch the plan of historical construction in a way which +will determine the series of synthetic operations necessary to raise the +edifice. + +The critical analysis of the documents has supplied the +materials--historical facts still in a state of dispersion. We begin by +_imagining_ these facts on the model of what we suppose to be the +analogous facts of the present; by combining elements taken from reality +at different points, we endeavour to form a mental image which shall +resemble as nearly as possible that which would have been produced by +direct observation of the past event. This is the first operation, +inseparable in practice from the reading of the documents. Considering +that it will be enough to have indicated its nature here,[184] we have +refrained from devoting a special chapter to it. + +The facts having been thus imagined, we _group_ them according to +schemes of classification devised on the model of a body of facts which +we have observed directly, and which we suppose analogous to the body of +past facts under consideration. This is the second operation; it is +performed by the aid of systematic questions, and its result is to +divide the mass of historical facts into homogeneous portions which we +afterwards form into groups until the entire history of the past has +been systematically arranged according to a general scheme. + +When we have arranged in this scheme the facts taken from the documents, +there remain gaps whose extent is always considerable, and is enormous +for those parts of history in regard to which documents are scanty. We +endeavour to fill some of these gaps by _reasoning_ based on the facts +which are known. This is (or should be) the third operation; it +increases the sum of historical knowledge by an application of logic. + +We still possess nothing but a mass of facts placed side by side in a +scheme of classification. We have to condense them into _formulae_, in +order to deduce their general characteristics and their relation to each +other. This is the fourth operation; it leads to the final conclusions +of history, and crowns the work of historical construction from the +scientific point of view. + +But as historical knowledge, which is by nature complex and unwieldy, is +exceptionally difficult to communicate, we still have to look for the +methods of expounding historical results in appropriate form. + + +VII. This series of operations, easy to conceive in the mind, has never +been more than imperfectly performed. It is beset by material +difficulties which theories of methodology do not take into account, but +which it would be better to face, with the purpose of discovering +whether they are after all insurmountable. + +The operations of history are so numerous, from the first discovery of +the document to the final formula of the conclusion, they require such +minute precautions, so great a variety of natural gifts and acquired +habits, that there is no man who can perform _by himself_ all the work +on any one point. History is less able than any other science to +dispense with the division of labour; but there is no other science in +which labour is so imperfectly divided. We find specialists in critical +scholarship writing general histories in which they let their +imagination guide them in the work of construction;[185] and, on the +other hand, there are constructive historians who use for their work +materials whose value they have not tested.[186] The reason is that the +division of labour implies a common understanding among the workers, and +in history no such understanding exists. Except in the preparatory +operations of external criticism, each worker follows the guidance of +his own private inspiration; he is at no pains to work on the same lines +as the others, nor does he pay any regard to the whole of which his own +work is to form a part. Thus no historian can feel perfectly safe in +adopting the results of another's work, as may be done in the +established sciences, for he does not know whether these results have +been obtained by trustworthy methods. The most scrupulous go so far as +to admit nothing until they have done the work on the documents over +again for themselves. This was the attitude adopted by Fustel de +Coulanges. It is barely possible to satisfy this exacting standard in +the case of little-known periods, the documents relating to which are +confined to a few volumes; and yet some have gone so far as to maintain +the dogma that no historian should ever work at second hand.[187] This, +indeed, is what an historian is compelled to do when the documents are +too numerous for him to be able to read them all; but he does not say +so, to avoid scandal. + +It would be better to acknowledge the truth frankly. So complex a +science as history, where facts must ordinarily be accumulated by the +million before it is possible to formulate conclusions, cannot be built +up on this principle of continually beginning afresh. Historical +construction is not work that can be done with documents, any more than +history can be "written from manuscripts," and for the same reason--the +shortness of time. In order that science may advance it is necessary to +combine the results of thousands of detail-researches. + +But how are we to proceed in view of the fact that most researches have +been conducted upon methods which, if not defective, are at least open +to suspicion? Universal confidence would lead to error as surely as +universal distrust would make progress impossible. One useful rule, at +any rate, may be stated, as follows: The works of historians should be +read with the same critical precautions which are observed in the +reading of documents. A natural instinct impels us to look principally +for the conclusions, and to accept them as so much established truth; we +ought, on the contrary, to be continually applying analysis, we ought to +look for the facts, the _proofs_, the fragments of documents--in short, +the materials. We shall be doing the author's work over again, but we +shall do it very much faster than he did, for that which takes up time +is the collection and combination of the materials; and we shall accept +no conclusions but those we consider to have been proved. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE GROUPING OF FACTS + + +I. The prime necessity for the historian, when confronted with the chaos +of historical facts, is to limit the field of his researches. In the +ocean of universal history what facts is he to choose for collection? +Secondly, in the mass of facts so chosen he will have to distinguish +between different groups and make subdivisions. Lastly, within each of +these subdivisions he will have to arrange the facts one by one. Thus +all historical construction should begin with the search for a principle +to guide in the selection, the grouping, and the arrangement of facts. +This principle may be sought either in the external conditions of the +facts or in their intrinsic nature. + +The simplest and easiest mode of classification is that which is founded +on external conditions. Every historical fact belongs to a definite time +and a definite place, and relates to a definite man or group of men: a +convenient basis is thus afforded for the division and arrangement of +facts. We have the history of a period, of a country, of a nation, of a +man (biography); the ancient historians and those of the Renaissance +used no other type. Within this general scheme the subdivisions are +formed on the same principle, and facts are arranged in chronological +and geographical order, or according to the groups to which they +relate. As to the selection of facts to be arranged in this scheme, for +a long time it was made on no fixed principle; historians followed their +individual fancy, and chose from among the facts relating to a given +period, country, or nation all that they deemed interesting or curious. +Livy and Tacitus mingle accounts of floods, epidemics, and the birth of +monsters with their narratives of wars and revolutions. + +Classification of facts by their intrinsic nature was introduced very +late, and has made way but slowly and imperfectly. It took its rise +outside the domain of history, in certain branches of study dealing with +special human phenomena--language, literature, art, law, political +economy, religion; studies which began by being dogmatic, but gradually +assumed an historical character. The principle of this mode of +classification is to select and group together those facts which relate +to the same species of actions; each of these groups becomes the +subject-matter of a special branch of history. The totality of facts +thus comes to be arranged in compartments which may be constructed _a +priori_ by the study of the totality of human activities; these +correspond to the set of general questions of which we have spoken in +the preceding chapter. + +In the following table we have attempted to provide a general scheme for +the classification[188] of historical facts, founded on the nature of +the _conditions_ and of the _manifestations_ of activity. + + +I. MATERIAL CONDITIONS. (1) _Study of the body_: _A._ Anthropology +(ethnology), anatomy, and physiology, anomalies and pathological +peculiarities. _B._ Demography (number, sex, age, births, deaths, +diseases). (2) _Study of the environment_: _A._ Natural geographical +environment (orographic configuration, climate, water, soil, flora, and +fauna). _B._ Artificial environment, forestry (cultivation, buildings, +roads, implements, &c.). + +II. INTELLECTUAL HABITS (not obligatory). (1) _Language_ (vocabulary, +syntax, phonetics, semasiology). Handwriting. (2) _Arts_: _A._ Plastic +arts (conditions of production, conceptions, methods, works). _B._ Arts +of expression, music, dance, literature. (3) _Sciences_ (conditions of +production, methods, results). (4) _Philosophy and Morals_ (conceptions, +precepts, actual practice). (5) _Religion_ (beliefs, practices).[189] + +III. MATERIAL CUSTOMS (not obligatory). (1) _Material life_: _A._ Food +(materials, modes of preparing, stimulants). _B._ Clothes and personal +adornment. _C._ Dwellings and furniture. (2) _Private life_: _A._ +Employment of time (toilette, care of the person, meals). _B._ Social +ceremonies (funerals and marriages, festivals, etiquette). _C._ +Amusements (modes of exercise and hunting, games and spectacles, social +meetings, travelling). + +IV. ECONOMIC CUSTOMS. (1) _Production_: _A._ Agriculture and +stock-breeding. _B._ Exploitation of minerals. (2) _Transformation, +Transport and industries_:[190] technical processes, division of labour, +means of communication. (3) _Commerce_: exchange and sale, credit. (4) +_Distribution_: system of property, transmission, contracts, +profit-sharing. + +V. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS. (1) _The family_: _A._ Constitution, authority, +condition of women and children. _B._ Economic organisation.[191] Family +property, succession. (2) _Education and instruction_ (aim, methods, +_personnel_). (3) _Social classes_ (principle of division, rules +regulating intercourse). + +VI. PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (obligatory). (1) _Political institutions_: _A._ +Sovereign (_personnel_, procedure). _B._ Administration, services (war, +justice, finance, &c.). _C._ Elected authorities, assemblies, electoral +bodies (powers, procedure). (2) _Ecclesiastical institutions_ (the same +divisions). (3) _International institutions_: _A._ Diplomacy. _B._ War +(usages of war and military arts). _C._ Private law and commerce. + + +This grouping of facts according to their nature is combined with the +system of grouping by time and place; we thus obtain chronological, +geographical, or, national sections in each branch. The history of a +species of activity (language, painting, government) subdivides into the +history of periods, countries, and nations (history of the ancient Greek +language, history of the government of France in the nineteenth +century). + +The same principles aid in determining the order in which the facts are +to be arranged. The necessity of presenting facts one after another +obliges us to adopt some methodical rule of succession. We may describe +successively either all the facts which relate to a given place, or +those which relate to a given country, or all the facts of a given +species. All historical matter can be distributed in three different +kinds of order: _chronological_ order, _geographical_ order, that kind +of order which is governed by the nature of actions and is generally +called _logical_ order. It is impossible to use any of these orders +exclusively: in every chronological exposition there necessarily occur +geographical or logical cross-divisions, transitions from one country to +another, or from one species of facts to a different species, and +conversely. But it is always necessary to decide which shall be the main +order into which the others enter as subdivisions. + +It is a delicate matter to choose between these three orders; our choice +will be decided by different reasons according to the subject, and +according to the public for whom we are working. That is to say, it will +depend on the method of exposition; it would take up too much space to +give the theory of it. + + +II. When we come to the selection of historical facts for classification +and arrangement, a question is raised which has been disputed with +considerable warmth. + +Every human action is by its nature an individual transient phenomenon +which is confined to a definite time and a definite place. Strictly +speaking, every fact is unique. But every action of a man resembles +other actions of the same man, or of other members of the same group, +and often to so great a degree that the whole group of actions receives +a common name, in which their individuality is lost. These groups of +similar actions, which the human mind is irresistibly impelled to form, +are called habits, usages, institutions. These are merely constructions +of the mind, but they are imposed so forcibly on our intellect that many +of them must be recognised and constantly employed; habits are +collective facts, possessing extension in time and space. Historical +facts may therefore be considered under two different aspects: we may +regard either the individual, particular, and transient elements in +them, or we may look for what is collective, general, and durable. +According to the first conception, history is a continuous narrative of +the incidents which have happened among men in the past; according to +the second, it is the picture of the successive habits of humanity. + +On this subject there has been a contest, especially in Germany, between +the partisans of the history of civilisation (_Kulturgeschichte_)[192] +and the historians who remain faithful to ancient tradition; in France +we have had the struggle between the history of institutions, manners, +and ideas, and political history, contemptuously nicknamed +"battle-history" by its opponents. + +This opposition is explained by the difference between the documents +which the workers on either side were accustomed to deal with. The +historians, principally occupied with political history, read of +individual and transient acts of rulers in which it was difficult to +detect any common feature. In the special histories, on the contrary +(except that of literature), the documents exhibit none but general +facts, a linguistic form, a religious rite, a rule of law; an effort of +imagination is required to picture the man who pronounced the word, who +performed the rite, or who applied the rule in practice. + +There is no need to take sides in this controversy. Historical +construction in its completeness implies the study of facts under both +aspects. The representation of men's habits of thought, life, and action +is obviously an important part of history. And yet, supposing we had +brought together all the acts of all individuals for the purpose of +extracting what is common to them, there would still remain a residue +which we should have no right to reject, for it is the distinctively +historical element--the circumstance that a particular action was the +action of a given man, or group of men, at a given moment. In a scheme +of classification which should only recognise the general facts of +political life there would be no place for the victory of Pharsalia or +the taking of the Bastille--accidental and transient facts, but without +which the history of Roman and French institutions would be +unintelligible. + +History is thus obliged to combine with the study of general facts the +study of certain particular facts. It has a mixed character, fluctuating +between a science of generalities and a narrative of adventures. The +difficulty of classing this hybrid under one of the categories of human +thought has often been expressed by the childish question: Is history a +science or an art? + + +III. The general table given above may be used for the determination of +all the species of habits (usages or institutions) of which the history +may be written. But before applying this general scheme to the study of +any particular group of habits, language, religion, private usages, or +political institutions, there is always a preliminary question to be +answered: Whose were the habits we are about to study? They were common +to a great number of individuals; and a collection of individuals with +the same habits is what we call a _group_. The first condition, then, +for the study of a habit is the determination of the group which has +practised it. At this point we must beware of the first impulse; it +leads to a negligence which may ruin the whole of our historical +construction. + +The natural tendency is to conceive the human group on the model of the +zoological species--as a body of men who all resemble each other. We +take a group united by a very obvious common characteristic, a nation +united by a common official government (Romans, English, French), a +people speaking the same language (Greeks, ancient Germans), and we +proceed as if all the members of this group resembled each other at +every point and had the same usages. + +As a matter of fact, no real group, not even a centralised society, is a +homogeneous whole. For a great part of human activity--language, art, +science, religion, economic interests--the group is constantly +fluctuating. What are we to understand by the group of those who speak +Greek, the Christian group, the group of modern science? And even those +groups to which some precision is given by an official organisation, +States and Churches, are but superficial unities composed of +heterogeneous elements. The English nation comprises Welsh, Scotch, and +Irish; the Catholic Church is composed of adherents scattered over the +whole world, and differing in everything but religion. There is no +group whose members have the same habits in every respect. The same man +is at the same time a member of several groups, and in each group he has +companions who differ from those he has in the others. A French Canadian +belongs to the British Empire, the Catholic Church, the group of +French-speaking people. Thus the different groups overlap each other in +a way that makes it impossible to divide humanity into sharply distinct +societies existing side by side. + +In historical documents we find the contemporary names of groups, many +of them resting on mere superficial resemblances. It must be made a rule +not to adopt popular notions of this kind without criticising them. We +must accurately determine the nature and extent of the group, asking: Of +what men was it composed? What bond united them? What habits had they in +common? In what species of activity did they differ? Not till after such +criticism shall we be able to tell what are the habits in respect of +which the group in question may be used as a basis of study. In order to +study intellectual habits (language, religion, art, science) we shall +not take a political unit, the nation, but the group consisting of those +who shared the habit in question. In order to study economic facts we +shall choose a group united by a common economic interest; we shall +reserve the political group for the study of social and political facts, +and we shall discard _race_[193] altogether. + +Even in those points in which a group is homogeneous it is not entirely +so; it is divided into sub-groups, the members of which differ in +secondary habits; a language is divided into dialects, a religion into +sects, a nation into provinces. Conversely, one group resembles other +groups in a way that justifies its being regarded as contiguous with +them; in a general classification we may recognise "families" of +languages, arts, and peoples. We have, then, to ask: How was a given +group sub-divided? Of what larger group did it form a part? + +It then becomes possible to study methodically a given habit, or even +the totality of the habits belonging to a given time and place, by +following the table given above. The operation presents no difficulties +of method in the case of those species of facts which appear as +individual and voluntary habits--language, art, sciences, conceptions, +private usages; here it is enough to ascertain in what each habit +consisted. It is merely necessary to distinguish carefully between those +who originated or maintained habits (artists, the learned, philosophers, +introducers of fashions) and the mass who accepted them. + +But when we come to social or political habits (what we call +institutions), we meet with new conditions which produce an inevitable +illusion. The members of the same social or political group do not +merely habitually perform _similar_ actions; they influence each other +by _reciprocal_ actions, they command, coerce, pay each other. Habits +here take the form of _relations_ between the different members; when +they are of old standing, formulated in official rules, imposed by a +visible authority, maintained by a special set of persons, they occupy +so important a place in life, that, to the persons under their +influence, they appear as external realities. The men, too, who +specialise in an occupation or a function which becomes the dominating +habit of their lives, appear as grouped in distinct categories (classes, +corporations, churches, governments); and these categories are taken for +real existences, or at least for organs of various functions in a real +existence, namely, society. We follow the analogy of an animal's body so +far as to describe the "structure" and the "functions" of a society, +even its "anatomy" and "physiology." These are pure metaphors. By the +structure of a society we mean the rules and the customs by which +occupations and enjoyments are distributed among its members; by its +functions we mean the habitual actions by which each man enters into +relations with the others. It may be convenient to use these terms, but +it should be remembered that the underlying reality is composed entirely +of habits and customs. + +The study of institutions, however, obliges us to ask special questions +about persons and their functions. In respect of social and economic +institutions we have to ask what was the principle of the division of +labour and of the division into classes, what were the professions and +classes, how were they recruited, what were the relations between the +members of the different professions and classes. In respect of +political institutions, which are sanctioned by obligatory rules and a +visible authority, two new series of questions arise. (1) Who were the +persons invested with authority? When authority is divided we have to +study the division of functions, to analyse the _personnel_ of +government into its different groups (supreme and subordinate, central +and local), and to distinguish each of the special bodies. In respect of +each class of men concerned in the government we shall ask: How were +they recruited? What was their official authority? What were their real +powers? (2) What were the official rules? What was their form (custom, +orders, law, precedent)? What was their content (rules of law)? What was +the mode of application (procedure)? And, above all, how did the rules +differ from the practice (abuse of power, exploitation, conflicts +between executive agents, non-observance of rules)? + +After the determination of all the facts which constitute a society, it +remains to find the place which this society occupies among the total +number of the societies contemporary with it. Here we enter upon the +study of international institutions, intellectual, economic, and +political (diplomacy and the usages of war); the same questions apply as +in the study of political institutions. A study should also be made of +the habits common to several societies, and of those relations which do +not assume an official form. This is one of the least advanced parts of +historical construction. + + +IV. The outcome of all this labour is a tabulated view of human life at +a given moment; it gives us the knowledge of a _state_ of society (in +German, _Zustand_). But history is not limited to the study of +simultaneous facts, taken in a state of rest, to what we may call the +_statics_ of society. It also studies the states of society at different +moments, and discovers the differences between these states. The habits +of men and the material conditions under which they live change from +epoch to epoch; even when they appear to be constant they do not remain +unaltered in every respect. There is therefore occasion to investigate +these changes; thus arises the study of successive facts. + +Of these changes the most interesting for the work of historical +construction are those which tend in a common direction,[194] so that in +virtue of a series of gradual differentiations a usage or a state of +society is transformed into a different usage or state, or, to speak +without metaphor, cases where the men of a given period practise a habit +very different from that of their predecessors without any abrupt change +having taken place. This is _evolution_. + +Evolution occurs in all human habits. In order to investigate it, +therefore, it is enough to turn once more to the series of questions +which we used in constructing a tabulated view of society. In respect of +each of the facts, conditions, usages, persons invested with authority, +official rules, the question is to be asked: What was the evolution of +this fact? + +This study will involve several operations: (1) the determination of the +fact whose evolution is to be studied; (2) the fixing of the duration of +the time during which the evolution took place (the period should be so +chosen that while the transformation is obvious, there yet remains a +connecting link between the initial and the final condition); (3) the +establishing of the different stages of the evolution; (4) the +investigation of the means by which it was brought about. + + +V. A series, even a complete series, of all the states of all societies +and of all their evolutions would not be enough to exhaust the +subject-matter of history. There remains a number of unique facts which +we cannot pass over, because they explain the origin of certain states +of society, and form the starting-points of evolutions. How could we +study the institutions or the evolution of France if we ignored the +conquest of Gaul by Caesar and the invasion of the Barbarians? + +This necessity of studying unique facts has caused it to be said that +history cannot be a science, for every science has for its object that +which is general. History is here in the same situation as cosmography, +geology, the science of animal species: it is not the abstract knowledge +of the general relations between facts, it is a study which aims at +_explaining_ reality. Now, reality exists but once. There has been but a +single evolution of the world, of animal life, of humanity. In each of +these evolutions the successive facts have not been the product of +abstract laws, but of the concurrence, at each moment, of several +circumstances of different nature. This concurrence, sometimes called +chance, has produced a series of accidents which have determined the +particular course taken by evolution.[195] Evolution can only be +understood by the study of these accidents; history is here on the same +footing as geology or palaeontology. + +Thus scientific history may go back to the accidents, or events, which +traditional history collected for literary reasons, because they struck +the imagination, and employ them for the study of evolution. We may thus +look for the facts which have influenced the evolution of each one of +the habits of humanity. Each event will be arranged under its date in +the evolution which it is supposed to have influenced. It will then +suffice to bring together the events of every kind, and to arrange them +in chronological and geographical order, to have a representation of +historical evolution as a whole. + +Then, over and above the _special_ histories in which the facts are +arranged under purely abstract categories (art, religion, private life, +political institutions), we shall have constructed a concrete _general_ +history, which will connect together the various special histories by +exhibiting the main stream of evolution which has dominated all the +special evolutions. None of the species of facts which we study apart +(religion, art, law, constitutions) forms a closed world within which +evolution takes place in obedience to a kind of internal impulse, as +specialists are prone to imagine. The evolution of a usage or of an +institution (language, religion, church, state) is only a metaphor; a +usage is an abstraction, abstractions do not evolve; it is only +_existences_ that evolve, in the strict sense of the word.[196] When a +change takes place in a usage, this means that the men who practise it +have changed. Now, men are not built in water-tight compartments +(religious, juridical, economic) within which phenomena can occur in +isolation; an event which modifies the condition of a man changes his +habits in a great variety of respects. The invasion of the Barbarians +influenced alike language, private life, and political institutions. We +cannot, therefore, understand evolution by confining ourselves to a +special branch of history; the specialist, even for the purpose of +writing the complete history of his own branch, must look beyond the +confines of his own subject into the field of general events. It is the +merit of Taine to have asserted, with reference to English literature, +that literary evolution depends, not on literary events, but on facts of +a general character. + +The general history of individual facts was developed before the special +histories. It contains the residue of facts which have not found a place +in the special histories, and has been reduced in extent by the +formation and detachment of special branches. As general facts are +principally of a political nature, and as it is more difficult to +organise these into a special branch, general history has in practice +been confounded with political history (_Staatengeschichte_).[197] Thus +political historians have been led to make themselves the champions of +general history, and to retain in their constructions all the general +facts (migrations of peoples, religious reforms, inventions, and +discoveries) necessary for the understanding of political evolution. + +In order to construct general history it is necessary to look for all +the facts which, because they have produced changes, can explain either +the state of a society or one of its evolutions. We must search for them +among all classes of facts, displacements of population, artistic, +scientific, religious, technical innovations, changes in the _personnel_ +of government, revolutions, wars, discoveries of countries. + +That which is important is that the fact should have had a decisive +influence. We must therefore resist the natural temptation to divide +facts into great and small. It goes against the grain to admit that +great effects may have had small causes, that Cleopatra's nose may have +made a difference to the Roman Empire. This repugnance is of a +metaphysical order; it springs from a preconceived opinion on the +government of the world. In all the sciences which deal with an +evolution we find individual facts which serve as starting-points for +series of vast transformations. A drove of horses brought by the +Spanish has stocked the whole of South America. In a flood a branch of +a tree may dam a current and transform the aspect of a valley. + +In human evolution we meet with great transformations which have no +intelligible cause beyond an individual accident.[198] In the sixteenth +century England changed its religion three times on the death of a +sovereign (Henry VIII., Edward VI., Mary). Importance not to be measured +by the initial fact, but by the facts which resulted from it. We must +not, therefore, deny _a priori_ the action of individuals and discard +individual facts. We must examine whether a given individual was in a +position to make his influence strongly felt. There are two cases in +which we may assume that he was: (1) when his action served as an +example to a mass of men and created a tradition, a case frequent in +art, science, religion, and technical matters; (2) when he had power to +issue commands and direct the actions of a mass of men, as is the case +with the heads of a state, an army, or a church. The episodes in a man's +life may thus become important facts. + +Accordingly, in the scheme of historical classification a place should +be assigned for persons and events. + + +VI. In every study of successive facts it is necessary to provide a +number of halting-places, to distinguish beginnings and ends, in order +that chronological divisions may be made in the enormous mass of facts. +These divisions are _periods_; the use of them is as old as history. We +need them, not only in general history, but in the special branches of +history as well, whenever we study an extent of time long enough for an +evolution to be sensible. It is by means of events that we fix their +limits. + +In the special branches of history, after having decided what changes of +habits are to be considered as reaching deepest, we adopt them as +marking _dates_ in the evolution; we then inquire what event produced +them. The event which led to the formation or the change of a habit +becomes the beginning or the end of a period. Sometimes these boundary +events are of the same species as the facts whose evolution we are +studying--literary facts in the history of literature, political facts +in political history. But more often they belong to a different species, +and the special historian is obliged to borrow them from general +history. + +In general history the periods should be divided according to the +evolution of several species of phenomena; we look for events which mark +an epoch simultaneously in several branches (the Invasion of the +Barbarians, the Reformation, the French Revolution). We may thus +construct periods which are common to several branches of evolution, +whose beginning and whose end are each marked by a single event. It is +thus that the traditional division of universal history into periods has +been effected. The sub-periods are obtained by the same process, by +taking for limits events which have produced consequences of secondary +importance. + +The periods which are thus constructed according to the events are of +unequal duration. We must not be troubled by this want of symmetry; a +period ought not to be a fixed number of years, but the time occupied by +a distinct phase of evolution. Now, evolution is not a regular movement; +sometimes a long series of years passes without notable change, then +come moments of rapid transformation. On this difference Saint-Simon has +founded a distinction between _organic_ periods (of slow change) and +_critical_ periods (of rapid change). + + + + +CHAPTER III + +CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING + + +I. The historical facts supplied by documents are never enough to fill +all the blanks in such schemes of classification and arrangement as we +have been considering. There are many questions to which no direct +answer is given by the documents; many features are lacking without +which the complete picture of the various states of society, of +evolutions and events, cannot be given. We are irresistibly impelled to +endeavour to fill up these gaps. + +In the sciences of direct observation, when a fact is missing from a +series, it is sought for by a new observation. In history, where we have +not this resource, we seek to extend our knowledge by the help of +reasoning. Starting from facts known to us from the documents, we +endeavour to reach new facts by inference. If the reasoning be correct, +this method of acquiring knowledge is legitimate. + +But experience shows that of all the methods of acquiring historical +knowledge, reasoning is the most difficult to employ correctly, and the +one which has introduced the most serious errors. It should not be used +without the safeguard of a number of precautions calculated to keep the +danger continually before the mind. + +(1) Reasoning should never be combined with the analysis of a document. +The reader who allows himself to introduce into a text what the author +has not expressly put there ends by making him say what he never +intended to say.[199] + +(2) Facts obtained by the direct examination of documents should never +be confused with the results obtained by reasoning. When we state a fact +known to us by reasoning only, we must not allow it to be supposed that +we have found it in the documents; we must disclose the method by which +we have obtained it. + +(3) Unconscious reasoning must never be allowed; there are too many +chances of error. It will be enough to make a point of putting every +argument into logical form; in the case of bad reasoning the major +premiss is generally monstrous to an appalling degree. + +(4) If the reasoning leaves the least doubt, no attempt must be made to +draw a conclusion; the point treated must be left in the conjectural +stage, clearly distinguished from the definitively established results. + +(5) It is not permissible to return to a conjecture and endeavour to +transform it into a certainty. Here the first impression is most likely +to be right. By reflection upon a conjecture we familiarise ourselves +with it, and end by thinking it better established; while the truth is, +we are merely more accustomed to it. This is a frequent mishap with +those who devote themselves to long meditation on a small number of +texts. + +There are two ways of employing reasoning, one negative, the other +positive; we shall examine them separately. + + +II. The negative mode of reasoning, called also the "argument from +silence," is based on the absence of indications with regard to a +fact.[200] From the circumstance of the fact not being mentioned in any +document it is inferred that there was no such fact; the argument is +applied to all kinds of subjects, usages of every description, +evolutions, events. It rests on a feeling which in ordinary life is +expressed by saying: "If it were true, we should have heard of it;" it +implies a general proposition which may be formulated thus: "If an +alleged event really had occurred, there would be some document in +existence in which it would be referred to." + +In order that such reasoning should be justified it would be necessary +that every fact should have been observed and recorded in writing, and +that all the records should have been preserved. Now, the greater part +of the documents which have been written have been lost, and the greater +part of the events which happen are not recorded in writing. In the +majority of cases the argument would be invalid. It must therefore be +restricted to the cases where the conditions implied in it have been +fulfilled. + +(1) It is necessary not only that there should be now no documents in +existence which mention the fact in question, but that there should +never have been any. If the documents are lost we can conclude nothing. +The argument from silence ought, therefore, to be employed the more +rarely the greater the number of documents that have been lost; it is of +much less use in ancient history than in dealing with the nineteenth +century. Some, desiring to free themselves from this restriction, are +tempted to assume that the lost documents contained nothing interesting; +if they were lost, say they, the reason was that they were not worth +preserving. But the truth is, every manuscript is at the mercy of the +least accident; its preservation or destruction is a matter of pure +chance. + +(2) The fact must have been of such a kind that it could not fail to be +observed and recorded. Because a fact has not been recorded it does not +follow that it has not been observed. Any one who is concerned in an +organisation for the collection of a particular species of facts knows +how much commoner those facts are than people think, and how many cases +pass unnoticed or without leaving any written trace. It is so with +earthquakes, cases of hydrophobia, whales stranded on the shore. +Besides, many facts, even those which are well known to those who are +contemporary with them, are not recorded, because the official +authorities prevent their publication; this is what happens to the +secret acts of governments and the complaints of the lower classes. This +silence, which proves nothing, greatly impresses unreflecting +historians; it is the origin of the widespread sophism of the "good old +times." No document relates any abuse of power by officials or any +complaints made by peasants; therefore, everything was regular and +nobody was suffering. Before we argue from silence we should ask: Might +not this fact have failed to be recorded in any of the documents we +possess? That which is conclusive is not the absence of any document on +a given fact, but silence as to the fact in a document in which it would +naturally be mentioned. + +The negative argument is thus limited to a few clearly defined cases. +(1) The author of the document in which the fact is not mentioned had +the intention of systematically recording all the facts of the same +class, and must have been acquainted with all of them. (Tacitus sought +to enumerate the peoples of Germany; the _Notitia dignitatum_ mentioned +all the provinces of the Empire; the absence from these lists of a +people or a province proves that it did not then exist.) (2) The fact, +if it was such, must have affected the author's imagination so forcibly +as necessarily to enter into his conceptions. (If there had been regular +assemblies of the Frankish people, Gregory of Tours could not have +conceived and described the life of the Frankish kings without +mentioning them.) + + +III. The positive mode of reasoning begins with a fact established by +the documents, and infers some other fact which the documents do not +mention. It is an application of the fundamental principle of history, +the _analogy_ between present and past humanity. In the present we +observe that the facts of humanity are connected together. Given one +fact, another fact accompanies it, either because the first is the cause +of the second, or because the second is the cause of the first, or +because both are effects of a common cause. We assume that in the past +similar facts were connected in a similar manner, and this assumption is +corroborated by the direct study of the past in the documents. From a +given fact, therefore, which we find in the past, we may infer the +existence of the other facts which were connected with it. + +This reasoning applies to facts of all kinds, usages, transformations, +individual incidents. We may begin with any known fact and endeavour to +infer unknown facts from it. Now the facts of humanity, having a common +centre, man, are all connected together, not merely facts of the same +class, but facts belonging to the most widely different classes. There +are connections, not merely between the different facts relating to art, +to religion, to manners, to politics, but between the facts of religion +on the one hand and the facts of art, of politics, and of manners on the +other; thus from a fact of one species we may infer facts of all the +other species. + +To examine those connections between facts on which reasonings may be +founded would mean tabulating all the known relations between the facts +of humanity, that is, giving a full account of all the empirical laws of +social life. Such a labour would provide matter for a whole book.[201] +Here we shall content ourselves with indicating the general rules +governing this kind of reasoning, and the precautions to be taken +against the most common errors. + +The argument rests on two propositions: one is general, and is derived +from experience of human affairs; the other is particular, and is +derived from the documents. In practice, we begin with the particular +proposition, the historical fact: Salamis bears a Phoenician name. We +then look for a general proposition: the language of the name of a city +is the language of the people which founded it. And we conclude: +Salamis, bearing a Phoenician name, was founded by the Phoenicians. + +In order that the conclusion may be certain, two conditions are +necessary. + +(1) The general proposition must be accurately true; the two facts which +it declares to be connected must be connected in such a way that the one +is never found without the other. If this condition were completely +satisfied we should have a _law_, in the scientific sense of the word; +but in dealing with the facts of humanity--apart from those physical +conditions whose laws are established by the regular sciences--we can +only work with empirical laws obtained by rough determinations of +general facts which are not analysed in such a manner as to educe their +true causes. These empirical laws are approximately true only when they +relate to a numerous body of facts, for we can never quite know how far +each is necessary to produce the result. The proposition relating to the +language of the name of a city does not go enough into detail to be +always true. Petersburg is a German name, Syracuse in America bears a +Greek name. Other conditions must be fulfilled before we can be sure +that the name is connected with the nationality of the founders. We +should, therefore, only employ such propositions as go into detail. + +(2) In order to employ a general proposition which goes into detail, we +must have a detailed knowledge of the particular fact; for it is not +till after this fact has been established that we look for an empirical +general law on which to found an argument. We shall begin, then, by +studying the particular conditions of the case (the situation of +Salamis, the habits of the Greeks and Phoenicians); we shall not work +on a single detail, but on an assemblage of details. + +Thus, in historical reasoning it is necessary to have (1) an accurate +general proposition; (2) a detailed knowledge of a past fact. It is bad +workmanship to assume a false general proposition--to suppose, for +example, as Augustin Thierry did, that every aristocracy had its origin +in a conquest. It is bad workmanship, again, to found an argument on an +isolated detail (the name of a city). The nature of these errors +indicates the precautions to be taken. + +(1) The spontaneous tendency is to take as a basis of reasoning those +"common-sense truths" which form nearly the whole of our knowledge of +social life. Now, the greater part of these are to some extent false, +for the science of social life is still imperfect. And the chief danger +in them lies in the circumstance that we use them unconsciously. The +safest precaution will be always to formulate the supposed law on which +we propose to base an argument. In every instance where such and such a +fact occurs, it is certain that such and such another fact occurs also. +If this proposition is obviously false, we shall at once see it to be +so; if it is too general, we shall inquire what new conditions may be +introduced to make it accurate. + +(2) A second spontaneous impulse leads us to draw consequences from +isolated facts, even of the slightest kind (or rather, the idea of each +fact awakens in us, by association, the idea of other facts). This is +the natural procedure in the history of literature. Each circumstance in +the life of an author supplies material for reasoning; we construct by +conjecture all the influences which could have acted upon him, and we +assume that they did act upon him. All the branches of history which +study a single species of facts, isolated from every other species +(language, arts, private law, religion), are exposed to the same danger, +because they deal with fragments of human life, not with comprehensive +collections of phenomena. But few conclusions are firmly established +except those which rest on a comprehensive body of data. We do not make +a diagnosis from a single symptom, but from a number of concurrent +symptoms. The precaution to be taken will be to avoid working with an +isolated detail or an abstract fact. We must have before our minds +actual men, as affected by the principal conditions under which they +lived. + +We must be prepared to realise but rarely the conditions of a certain +inference; we are too little acquainted with the laws of social life, +and too seldom know the precise details of an historical fact. Thus most +of our reasonings will only afford presumptions, not certainties. But it +is with reasonings as with documents.[202] When several presumptions +all point in the same direction they confirm each other, and end by +producing a legitimate certitude. History fills up some of its gaps by +an accumulation of reasonings. Doubts remain as to the Phoenician +origin of various Greek cities, but there is no doubt about the presence +of the Phoenicians in Greece. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULAE + + +I. Suppose we had methodically arranged all the historical facts +established by the analysis of documents, or by reasoning; we should +possess a systematised inventory of the whole of history, and the work +of construction would be complete. Ought history to stop at this point? +The question is warmly debated, and we cannot avoid giving an answer, +for it is a question with a practical bearing. + +Critical scholars, who are accustomed to collect all the facts relating +to their speciality, without any personal preference, are inclined to +regard a complete, accurate, and objective collection of facts as the +prime requisite. All historical facts have an equal right to a place in +history; to retain some as being of greater importance, and reject the +rest as comparatively unimportant, would be to introduce the subjective +element of choice, variable according to individual fancy; history +cannot sacrifice a single fact. + +Against this very reasonable view there is nothing to be urged except a +material difficulty; this, however, is enough, for it is the practical +motive of all the sciences: we mean the impossibility of acquiring or +communicating complete knowledge. A body of history in which no fact +was sacrificed would have to contain all the actions, all the thoughts, +all the adventures of all men at all times. It would form a total which +no one could possibly make himself master of, not for want of materials, +but for want of time. This, indeed, applies, as things are, to certain +voluminous collections of documents: the collected reports of +parliamentary debates contain the whole history of the various +assemblies, but to learn their history from these sources would require +more than a lifetime. + +Every science must take into consideration the practical conditions of +life, at least so far as it claims to be a real science, a science which +it is possible to know. Any ideal which ends by making knowledge +impossible impedes the establishment of the science. + +Science is a saving of time and labour, effected by a process which +provides a rapid means of learning and understanding facts; it consists +in the slow collection of a quantity of details and their condensation +into portable and incontrovertible formulae. History, which is more +encumbered with details than any other science, has the choice between +two alternatives: to be complete and unknowable, or to be knowable and +incomplete. All the other sciences have chosen the second alternative; +they abridge and they condense, preferring to take the risk of +mutilating and arbitrarily combining the facts to the certainty of being +unable either to understand or communicate them. Scholars have preferred +to confine themselves to the periods of ancient history, where chance, +which has destroyed nearly all the sources of information, has freed +them from the responsibility of choosing between facts by depriving them +of nearly all the means of knowing them. + +History, in order to constitute itself a science, must elaborate the raw +material of facts. It must condense them into manageable form by means +of descriptive formulae, qualitative and quantitative. It must search for +those connections between facts which form the ultimate conclusions of +every science. + + +II. The facts of humanity, with their complex and varied character, +cannot be reduced like chemical facts to a few simple formulae. Like the +other sciences which deal with life, history needs descriptive formulae +in order to express the nature of the different phenomena. + +In order to be manageable, a formula must be short; in order to give an +exact idea of the facts, it must be precise. Now, in the knowledge of +human affairs, precision can only be obtained by attention to +characteristic details, for these alone enable us to understand how one +fact differed from others, and what there was in it peculiar to itself. +There is thus a conflict between the need of brevity, which leads us to +look for concrete formulae, and the necessity of being precise, which +requires us to adopt detailed formulae. Formulae which are too short make +science vague and illusory, formulae which are too long encumber it and +make it useless. This dilemma can only be evaded by a perpetual +compromise, the principle of which is to compress the facts by omitting +all that is not necessary for the purpose of representing them to the +mind, and to stop at the point where omission would suppress some +characteristic feature. + +This operation, which is difficult in itself, is still further +complicated by the state in which the facts which are to be condensed +into formulae present themselves. According to the nature of the +documents from which they are derived, they come to us in all the +different degrees of precision: from the detailed narrative which +relates the smallest episodes (the battle of Waterloo) down to the +barest mention in a couple of words (the victory of the Austrasians at +Testry). On different facts of the same kind we possess an amount of +details which is infinitely variable according as the documents give us +a complete description or a mere mention. How are we to organise into a +common whole, items of knowledge which differ so widely in point of +precision? When facts are known to us from a vague word of general +import, we cannot reduce them to a less degree of generality and a +greater degree of precision; we do not know the details. If we add them +conjecturally we shall produce an historical novel. This is what +Augustin Thierry did in the case of his _Recits merovingiens_. When +facts are known in detail, it is always easy to reduce them to a greater +degree of generality by suppressing characteristic details; this is what +is done by the authors of abridgements. But the result of this procedure +would be to reduce history to a mass of vague generalities, uniform for +the whole of time except for the proper names and the dates. It would be +a dangerous method of introducing symmetry, to bring all facts to a +common degree of generality by levelling them all to the condition of +those which are the most imperfectly known. In those cases, therefore, +where the documents give details, our descriptive formulae should always +retain the characteristic features of the facts. + +In order to construct these formulae we must return to the set of +questions which we employed in grouping the facts, we must answer each +question, and compare the answers. We shall then combine them into as +condensed and as precise a formula as possible, taking care to keep a +fixed sense for every word. This may appear to be a matter of style, but +what we have in view here is not merely a principle of exposition, +necessary for the sake of being intelligible to the reader, it is a +precaution which the author ought to take on his own account. The facts +of society are of an elusive nature, and for the purpose of seizing and +expressing them, fixed and precise language is an indispensable +instrument; no historian is complete without good language. + +It will be well to make the greatest possible use of concrete and +descriptive terms: their meaning is always clear. It will be prudent to +designate collective groups only by collective, not by abstract names +(royalty, State, democracy, Reformation, Revolution), and to avoid +personifying abstractions. We think we are simply using metaphors, and +then we are carried away by the force of the words. Certainly abstract +terms have something very seductive about them, they give a scientific +appearance to a proposition. But it is only an appearance, behind which +scholasticism is apt to be concealed; the word, having no concrete +meaning, becomes a purely verbal notion (like the soporific virtue of +which Moliere speaks). As long as our notions on social phenomena have +not been reduced to truly scientific formulae, the most scientific course +will be to express them in terms of every-day experience. + +In order to construct a formula, we should know beforehand what elements +ought to enter into it. We must here make a distinction between general +facts (habits and evolutions) and unique facts (events). + + +III. General facts consist in actions which are often repeated, and are +common to a number of men. We have to determine their _character_, +_extent_, and _duration_. + +In order to formulate their character, we combine all the features which +constitute a fact (habit, institution) and distinguish it from all +others. We unite under the same formula all the individual cases which +greatly resemble each other, by neglecting the individual differences. + +This concentration is performed without effort in the case of habits +which have to do with forms (language, handwriting), and in the case of +all intellectual habits; those who practised these habits have already +given them expression in formulae, which we have only to collect. The +same holds of these institutions which are sanctioned by expressly +formulated rules (regulations, laws, private statutes). Accordingly the +special branches of history were the first to yield methodical formulae. +On the other hand, these special branches do not go beyond superficial +and conventional facts, they do not reach the real actions and thoughts +of men: in language they deal with written words, not the real +pronunciation; in religion with official dogmas and rites, not with the +real beliefs of the mass of the people; in morals with avowed precepts, +not with the effective ideals; in institutions with official rules, not +with the real practice. On all these subjects the knowledge of +conventional forms must some day be supplemented by a parallel study of +the real habits. + +It is much more difficult to embrace in a single formula a habit which +is composed of real actions, as is the case with economic phenomena, +private life, politics; for we have to find in the different actions +those common characteristics which constitute the habit; or, if this +work has already been done in the documents, and condensed into a +formula (the most common case), we must criticise this formula in order +to make sure that it really represents a homogeneous habit. + +The same difficulty occurs in constructing the formula for a group; we +have to describe the characteristic common to all the members of the +group and to find a collective name which shall exactly designate it. In +documents there is no lack of names of groups; but, as they have their +origin in usage, many of them correspond but ill to the real groups; we +have to criticise these names to fix their precise meaning, sometimes to +correct their application. + +This first operation should yield formulae expressive of the conventional +and real characteristics of all the habits of the different groups. + +In order to fix the precise _extent_ of a habit we shall seek the most +distant points where it appears (this will give the area of +distribution), and the region where it is most common (the centre). +Sometimes the operation takes the form of a map (for example the map of +the _tumuli_ and the _dolmens_ of France). It will also be necessary to +indicate the groups of men who practised each habit, and the sub-groups +in which it was most pronounced. + +The formula should also indicate the _duration_ of the habit. We shall +look for the extreme cases, the first and the last appearance of the +form, the doctrine, the usage, the institution, the group. But it will +not be enough to note the two isolated cases, the earliest and the most +recent; we must ascertain the period in which it was really active. + +The formula of an evolution ought to indicate the successive variations +in the habit, giving in each case precise limits of extent and duration. +Then, by comparing all the variations, it will be possible to determine +the general course of the evolution. The general formula will indicate +when and where the evolution began and ended, and the nature of the +change which it effected. All evolutions present common features which +enable them to be divided into stages. Every habit (usage or +institution) begins by being the spontaneous act of several individuals; +when others imitate them it becomes a usage. Similarly social functions +are in the first instance performed by persons who undertake them +spontaneously, when these persons are recognised by others they acquire +an official status. This is the first stage; individual initiative +followed by general imitation and recognition. The usage becomes +traditional and is transformed into an obligatory custom or rule; the +persons acquire a permanent status and are invested with powers of +material or moral constraint. This is the stage of tradition and +authority; very often it is the last stage, and continues till the +society is destroyed. The usage is relaxed, the rules are violated, the +persons in authority cease to be obeyed; this is the stage of revolt and +decomposition. Finally, in certain civilised societies, the rule is +criticised, the persons in authority are censured, by the action of a +part of the subjects a rational change is effected in the composition of +the governing body, which is subjected to supervision; this is the stage +of reform and of checks. + + +IV. In the case of unique facts we cannot expect to bring several +together under a common formula, for the nature of these facts is to +occur but once. However, it is imperatively necessary to abridge, we +cannot preserve all the acts of all the members of an assembly or of all +the officers of a state. Many individuals and many facts must be +sacrificed. + +How are we to choose? Personal tastes and patriotism give rise to +preferences for congenial characters and for local events; but the only +principle of selection which can be employed by all historians in common +is that which is based on the part played in the evolution of human +affairs. We ought to retain those persons and those events which have +visibly influenced the course of an evolution. We may recognise them by +our inability to describe the evolution without mentioning them. The men +are those who have modified the state of a society either by the +creation or the introduction of a habit (artists, men of science, +inventors, founders, apostles), or as directors of a movement, heads of +states, of parties, of armies. The events are those which have brought +about changes in the habits or the state of societies. + +In order to construct a formula descriptive of an historical person, we +must take particulars from his biography and his habits. From his +biography we shall take those facts which determined his career, formed +his habits, and occasioned the actions by which he influenced society. +These comprise physiological conditions (physique, temperament, state of +health),[203] the educational influences, the social conditions to which +he was subject. The history of literature has accustomed us to +researches of this kind. + +Among the habits of a man it is necessary to determine his fundamental +conceptions relating to the class of facts in which his influence was +felt, his conception of life, his knowledge, his predominating tastes, +his habitual occupations, his principles of conduct. From these details, +in which there is infinite variety, an impression is formed of the man's +"character," and the collection of these characteristic features +constitutes his "portrait," or, to use a favourite phrase of the day, +his "psychology." This exercise, which is still held in great esteem, +dates from the time when history was still a branch of literature; it is +doubtful whether it can ever become a scientific process. There is +perhaps no sure method of summing up the character of a man, even in his +lifetime, still less when we can only know him indirectly through the +medium of documents. The controversies relative to the interpretation of +the conduct of Alexander are a good example of this uncertainty. + +If, however, we take the risk of seeking a formula to describe a +character, there are two natural temptations against which we must +guard: (I) We must not construct the formula out of the person's +assertions in regard to himself. (2) The study of imaginary personages +(dramas and novels) has accustomed us to seek a logical connection +between the various sentiments and the various acts of a man; a +character, in literature, is constructed logically. This search for +coherency must not be transferred to the study of real men. We are less +likely to do so in the case of those whom we observe in their lifetime, +because we see too many characteristics in them which could not enter +into a coherent formula. But the absence of documents, by suppressing +those characteristics which would have checked us, encourages us to +arrange the very small number of those which remain in the form of a +stage-character. This is why the great men of antiquity seem to us to +have been much more logical than our contemporaries are. + +How are we to construct a formula for an event? The imperative need of +simplification causes us to combine under a single name an enormous mass +of minute facts which are perceived in the lump, and between which we +vaguely feel that there is a connection (a battle, a war, a reform). +The facts which are thus combined are such facts as have conduced to a +common result. That is how the common notion of an event arises, and +there is no more scientific conception to put in its place. Facts, then, +are to be grouped according to their consequences; those which have had +no visible consequences disappear, the others are fused into a certain +number of aggregates which we call events. + +In order to describe an event, it is necessary to give precise +indications (I) of its character, (2) of its extent. + +(I) By the character of an event we mean the features which distinguish +it from every other event, not merely the external conditions of date +and place, but the manner in which it occurred, and its immediate +causes. The following are the items of information which the formula +should contain. One or more men, in such and such mental states +(conceptions, motives of the action), working under such and such +material conditions (locality, instrument), performed such and such +actions, which had for their result such and such a modification. For +the determination of the motives of the actions, the only method is to +compare the actions, firstly, with the declarations of those who +performed them; secondly, with the interpretation of those who witnessed +their performance. There is often a doubt remaining: this is the field +of party polemics; every one attributes noble motives to the actions of +his own party and discreditable motives to those of the opposite party. +But actions described without any indication of motive would be +unintelligible. + +(2) The extension of the event will be indicated both in space (the +place where it happened, and the region in which its immediate effects +were felt) and in time, the moment when its realisation began, and the +moment when the result was brought about. + +V. Descriptive formulae relating to characters, being merely qualitative, +only give an abstract idea of the facts; in order to realise the place +they occupied in reality, quantity is necessary. It is not a matter of +indifference whether a given usage was practised by a hundred men or by +millions. + +For the purpose of introducing quantity into formulae we have at our +disposal several methods, of various degrees of imperfection, which help +us to attain the end in view with various degrees of precision. Arranged +in descending order of precision they are as follows:-- + +(1) _Measurement_ is a perfectly scientific procedure, for equal numbers +represent absolutely identical values. But a common unit is necessary, +and that can only be had for time and for physical phenomena (lengths, +surfaces, weights). Figures relating to production and sums of money are +the essential elements in the statement of economic and financial facts. +But facts of the psychological order remain inaccessible to measurement. + +(2) _Enumeration_, which is the process employed in statistics,[204] is +applicable to all the facts which have in common a definite +characteristic which can be made use of for counting them. The facts +which are thus comprehended under a single number do not all belong to +the same species, they may have in common but a single characteristic, +abstract (crime, lawsuit) or conventional (workman, lodging); the +figures merely indicate the number of cases in which a given +characteristic is met with; they do not represent a homogeneous whole. A +natural tendency is to confuse number with measurement, and to suppose +that facts are known with scientific precision because it has been +possible to apply number to them; this is an illusion to be guarded +against, we must not take the figures which give the number of a +population or an army for the measure of its importance.[205] Still, +enumeration yields results which are necessary for the construction of +formulae relating to groups. But the operation is restricted to those +cases in which it is possible to know all the units of a given species +lying within given limits, for it is performed by first ticking off, +then adding. Before undertaking a retrospective enumeration, therefore, +it will be well to make sure that the documents are complete enough to +exhibit all the units which are to be enumerated. As to figures given in +documents, they are to be distrusted. + +(3) _Valuation_ is a kind of incomplete enumeration applying to a +portion of the field, and made on the supposition that the same +proportions hold good through the whole of the field. It is an expedient +to which, in history, it is often necessary to have recourse when +documents are unequally abundant for the different divisions of the +subject. The result is open to doubt, unless we are sure that the +portion to which enumeration was applied was exactly similar to the +remainder. + +(4) _Sampling_ is a process of enumeration restricted to a few units +taken at different points in the field of investigation; we calculate +the proportion of cases (say 90 per cent.) where a given characteristic +occurs, we assume that the same proportion holds throughout, and if +there are several categories we obtain the proportion between them. In +history this procedure is applicable to facts of every kind, for the +purpose of determining either the proportion between the different forms +or usages which occur within a given region or period, or the proportion +which obtains, within a heterogeneous group, between members belonging +to different classes. This procedure gives us an approximate idea of the +frequency of facts and the proportion between the different elements of +a society; it can even show what species of facts are most commonly +found together, and are therefore probably connected. But in order that +the method may be employed correctly it is necessary that the samples +should be representative of the whole, and not of a part which might +possibly be exceptional in character. They should therefore be chosen at +very different points, and under very different conditions, in order +that the exceptions may compensate each other. It is not enough to take +them at points which are _distant_ from each other; for example, on the +different frontiers of a country, for the very circumstance of +situation on a frontier is an exceptional condition. Verification may be +had by following the methods by which anthropologists obtain averages. + +(5) _Generalisation_ is only an instinctive process of simplification. +As soon as we perceive a certain characteristic in an object, we extend +this characteristic to all other objects which at all resemble it. In +all human concerns, where the facts are always complex, we make +generalisations unconsciously; we attribute to a whole people the habits +of a few individuals, or those of the first group forming part of the +people which comes within our knowledge; we extend to a whole period +habits which are ascertained to have existed at a given moment. This is +the most active of all the causes of historical error, and one whose +influence is felt in every department, in the study of usages and of +institutions, even in the appreciation of the morality of a people.[206] +Generalisation rests on a vague idea that all facts which are contiguous +to each other, or which resemble each other in some point, are similar +at all points. It is an unconscious and ill-performed process of +sampling. It may therefore be made correct by being subjected to the +conditions of a well-performed process of sampling. We must examine the +cases on which we propose to found a generalisation and ask ourselves. +What right have we to generalise? That is, what reason have we for +assuming that the characteristic discovered in these cases will occur in +the remaining thousands of cases? that the cases chosen resemble the +average? The only valid reason would be that these cases are +representative of the whole. We are thus brought back to the process of +methodical sampling. + +The right method of conducting the operation is as follows: (1) We must +fix the precise limits of the field within which we intend to generalise +(that is, to assume the similarity of all the cases), we must determine +the country, the group, the class, the period as to which we are to +generalise. Care must be taken not to make the field too large by +confusing a part with the whole (a Greek or Germanic people with the +whole Greek or Germanic race). (2) We must make sure that the facts +lying within the field resemble each other in the points on which we +wish to generalise, and therefore we have to distrust those vague names +under which are comprehended groups of very different character +(Christians, French, Aryans, Romans). (3) We must make sure that the +facts from which we propose to generalise are representative samples, +that they really belong to the field of investigation, for it does +happen sometimes that men or facts are taken as specimens of one group +when they really belong to another. Nor must they be exceptional, as is +to be presumed in all cases when the conditions are exceptional; authors +of documents tend to record by preference those facts which surprise +them, hence exceptional cases occupy in documents a space which is out +of proportion to their real number; this is one of the chief sources of +error. (4) The number of samples necessary to support a generalisation +is the greater the less ground there is for supposing a resemblance +between all the cases occurring within the field of investigation. A +small number may suffice in treating of points in which men tend to bear +a strong resemblance to each other, either by imitation and convention +(language, rites, ceremonies), or from the influence of custom and +obligatory regulations (social institutions, political institutions in +countries where the authorities are obeyed). A large number is requisite +for facts where individual initiative plays a more important part (art, +science, morality), and sometimes, as in respect of private conduct, all +generalisation is as a rule impossible. + + +VI. Descriptive formulae are in no science the final result of the work. +It still remains to group the facts in such a way as to bring out their +collective import, it still remains to search for their mutual +relations; these are the general conclusions. History, by reason of the +imperfection of its mode of acquiring knowledge, needs, in addition, a +preliminary operation for determining the bearing of the knowledge +acquired.[207] + +The work of criticism has supplied us with nothing but a number of +isolated remarks on the value of the knowledge which the documents have +permitted us to acquire. These must be combined. We shall therefore take +a whole group of facts entered under a common heading--a particular +class of facts, a country, a period, an event--and we shall summarise +the results yielded by the criticism of particular facts so as to obtain +a general formula. We shall have to take into consideration: (1) the +extent, (2) the value of our knowledge. + +(1) We shall ask ourselves what are the blanks left by the documents. By +working through the scheme used for the grouping of facts it is easy to +discover what are the classes of facts on which we lack information. In +the case of evolution, we notice which links are missing in the chain of +successive modifications; in the case of events, what episodes, what +groups of actors are still unknown to us; what facts enter or disappear +from the field of our knowledge without our being able to trace their +beginning or end. We ought to construct, mentally at any rate, a +tabulated scheme of the points on which we are ignorant, in order to +keep before our minds the distance separating the knowledge we have from +a perfect knowledge. + +(2) The value of our knowledge depends on the value of our documents. +Criticism has given us indications on this point in each separate case, +these indications, so far as relating to a given body of facts, must be +summarised under a few heads. Does our knowledge come originally from +direct observation, from written tradition, or from oral tradition? Do +we possess several traditions of different bias, or a single tradition? +Do we possess documents of different classes or of one single class? Is +our information vague or precise, detailed or summary, literary or +positive, official or confidential? + +The natural tendency is to forget, in construction, the results yielded +by criticism, to forget the incompleteness of our knowledge and the +elements of doubt in it. An eager desire to increase to the greatest +possible extent the amount of our information and the number of our +conclusions impels us to seek emancipation from all negative +restrictions. We thus run a great risk of using fragmentary and +suspicious sources of information for the purpose of forming general +impressions, just as if we were in possession of a complete record. It +is easy to forget the existence of those facts which the documents do +not describe (economic facts, slaves in antiquity), it is easy to +exaggerate the space occupied by facts which are known to us (Greek art, +Roman inscriptions, mediaeval monasteries). We instinctively estimate the +importance of facts by the number of the documents which mention them. +We forget the peculiar character of the documents, and, when they all +have a common origin, we forget that they have all subjected the facts +to the same distortions, and that their community of origin renders +verification impossible; we submissively reproduce the bias of the +tradition (Roman, orthodox, aristocratic). + +In order to resist these natural tendencies, it is enough to pass in +review the whole body of facts and the whole body of tradition, before +attempting to draw any general conclusion. + + +VII. Descriptive formulae give the particular character of each small +group of facts. In order to obtain a general conclusion, we must combine +these detailed results into a general formula. We must not compare +together isolated details or secondary characteristics,[208] but groups +of facts which resemble each other in a whole set of characteristics. + +We thus form an aggregate (of institutions, of groups of men, of +events). Following the method indicated above, we determine its +distinguishing characteristics, its extent, its duration, its quantity +or importance. + +As we form groups of greater and greater generality we drop, with each +new degree of generality, those characteristics which vary, and retain +those which are common to all the members of the new group. We must stop +at the point where nothing is left except the characteristics common to +the whole of humanity. The result is the condensation into a single +formula of the general character of an order of facts, of a language, a +religion, an art, an economic organisation, a society, a government, a +complex event (such as the Invasion or the Reformation). + +As long as these comprehensive formulae remain isolated the conclusion is +incomplete. And as it is no longer possible to fuse them into higher +generalisations, we feel the need of comparing them for the purpose of +classification. This classification may be attempted by two methods. + +(1) We may compare together similar categories of special facts, +language, religions, arts, governments, taking them from the whole of +humanity, and classifying together those which most resemble each other. +We obtain families of languages, religions, and governments, which we +may again classify and arrange among themselves. This is an abstract +kind of classification; it isolates one species of facts from all the +others, and thus renounces all claim to exhibit causes. It has the +advantage of being rapidly performed and of yielding a technical +vocabulary which is useful for designating facts. + +(2) We may compare real groups of real individuals, we may take +societies which figure in history and classify them according to their +similarities. This is a concrete classification analogous to that of +zoology, in which, not functions, but whole animals are classified. It +is true that the groups are less clearly marked than in zoology; nor is +there a general agreement as to the characteristics in respect of which +we are to look for resemblances. Are we to choose the economic or the +political organisation of the groups, or their intellectual condition? +No principle of choice has as yet become obligatory. + +History has not yet succeeded in establishing a scientific system of +comprehensive classification. Possibly human groups are not sufficiently +homogeneous to furnish a solid basis of comparison, and not sharply +enough divided to be treated as comparable units. + + +VIII. The study of the relations between simultaneous facts consists in +a search for the connections between all the facts of different species +which occur in a given society. We have a vague consciousness that the +different habits which are separated by abstraction and ranged under +different categories (art, religion, political institutions), are not +isolated in reality, that they have common characteristics, and that +they are closely enough connected for a change in one of them to bring +about a change in another. This is a fundamental idea of the _Esprit des +Lois_ of Montesquieu. This bond of connection, sometimes called +_consensus_, has received the name of _Zusammenhang_ from the German +school. From this conception has arisen the theory of the _Volksgeist_ +(the mind of a people), a counterfeit of which has within the last few +years been introduced into France under the name of "ame nationale." +This conception is also at the bottom of the theory regarding the soul +of society which Lamprecht has expounded. + +After the rejection of these mystical conceptions there remains a vague +but incontrovertible fact, the "solidarity" which exists between the +different habits of one and the same people. In order to study it with +precision it would be necessary to analyse it, and a connecting bond +cannot be analysed. It is thus quite natural that this part of social +science should have remained a refuge for mystery and obscurity. + +By the comparison of different societies which resemble or differ from +each other in a given department (religion or government), with the +object of discovering in what other departments they resemble or differ +from each other, it is possible that interesting empirical results might +be obtained. But, in order to _explain_ the _consensus_, it is necessary +to work back to the facts which have produced it, the common causes of +the various habits. We are thus obliged to undertake the investigation +of causes, and we enter the province of what is called _philosophical_ +history, because it investigates what was formerly called the +_philosophy_ of facts--that is to say, their permanent relations. + + +IX. The necessity of rising above the simple determination of facts in +order to _explain_ them by their _causes_, a necessity which has +governed the development of all the sciences, has at length been felt +even in the study of history. Hence have arisen systematic philosophies +of history, and attempts to discover historical laws and causes. We +cannot here enter into a critical examination of these attempts, which +the nineteenth century has produced in so great number; we shall merely +indicate what are the ways in which the problem has been attacked, and +what obstacles have prevented a scientific solution from being reached. + +The most natural method of explanation consists in the assumption that a +transcendental cause, Providence, guides the whole course of events +towards an end which is known to God.[209] This explanation can be but a +metaphysical doctrine, crowning the work of science; for the +distinguishing feature of science is that it only studies efficient +causes. The historian is not called upon to investigate the first cause +or final causes any more than the chemist or the naturalist. And, in +fact, few writers on history nowadays stop to discuss the theory of +Providence in its theological form. + +But the tendency to explain historical facts by transcendental causes +survives in more modern theories in which metaphysic is disguised under +scientific forms. The historians of the nineteenth century have been so +strongly influenced by their philosophical education that most of them, +sometimes unconsciously, introduce metaphysical formulae into the +construction of history. It will be enough to enumerate these systems, +and point out their metaphysical character, so that reflecting +historians may be warned to distrust them. + +The theory of the rational character of history rests on the notion that +every real historical fact is at the same time "rational"--that is, in +conformity with an intelligible comprehensive plan; ordinarily it is +tacitly assumed that every social fact has its _raison d'etre_ in the +development of society--that is, that it ends by turning to the +advantage of society; hence the cause of every institution is sought for +in the social need it was originally meant to supply.[210] This is the +fundamental idea of Hegelianism, if not with Hegel, at least with the +historians who have been his disciples (Ranke, Mommsen, Droysen, in +France Cousin, Taine, and Michelet). This is a lay disguise of the old +theological theory of final causes which assumes the existence of a +Providence occupied in guiding humanity in the direction of its +interests. This is a consoling, but not a scientific _a priori_ +hypothesis; for the observation of historical facts does not indicate +that things have always happened in the most rational way, or in the way +most advantageous to men, nor that institutions have had any other cause +than the interest of those who established them; the facts, indeed, +point rather to the opposite conclusion. + +From the same metaphysical source has also sprung the Hegelian theory of +the _ideas_ which are successively realised in history through the +medium of successive peoples. This theory, which has been popularised in +France by Cousin and Michelet, has had its day, even in Germany, but it +has been revived, especially in Germany, in the form of the historical +mission (_Beruf_) which is attributed to peoples and persons. It will +here be enough to observe that the very metaphors of "idea" and +"mission" imply a transcendental anthropomorphic cause. + +From the same optimistic conception of a rational guidance of the world +is derived the theory of the continuous and necessary _progress_ of +humanity. Although it has been adopted by the positivists, this is +merely a metaphysical hypothesis. In the ordinary sense of the word, +"progress" is merely a subjective expression denoting those changes +which follow the direction of our preferences. But, even taking the word +in the objective sense given to it by Spencer (an increase in the +variety and coordination of social phenomena), the study of historical +facts does not point to a _single_ universal and continuous progress of +humanity, it brings before us a _number_ of partial and intermittent +progressive movements, and it gives us no reason to attribute them to a +permanent cause inherent in humanity as a whole rather than to a series +of local accidents.[211] + +Attempts at a more scientific form of explanation have had their origin +in the special branches of history (of languages, religion, law). By the +separate study of the succession of facts of a single species, +specialists have been enabled to ascertain the regular recurrence of the +same successions of facts, and these results have been expressed in +formulae which are sometimes called laws (for example, the law of the +tonic accent); these are never more than empirical laws which merely +indicate successions of facts without explaining them, for they do not +reveal the efficient cause. But specialists, influenced by a natural +metaphor, and struck by the regularity of these successions, have +regarded the evolution of usages (of a word, a rite, a dogma, a rule of +law), as if it were an organic development analogous to the growth of a +plant; we hear of the "life of words," of the "death of dogmas," of the +"growth of myths." Then, in forgetfulness of the fact that all these +things are pure abstractions, it has been tacitly assumed that there is +a force inhering in the word, the rite, the rule, which produces its +evolution. This is the theory of the development (_Entwickelung_) of +usages and institutions; it was started in Germany by the "historical" +school, and has dominated all the special branches of history. The +history of languages alone has succeeded in shaking off its +influence.[212] Just as usages have been treated as if they were +existences possessing a separate life of their own, so the succession of +individuals composing the various bodies within a society (royalty, +church, senate, parliament) has been personified by the attribution to +it of a will, which is treated as an active cause. A world of imaginary +beings has thus been created behind the historical facts, and has +replaced Providence in the explanation of them. For our defence against +this deceptive mythology a single rule will suffice: Never seek the +causes of an historical fact without having first expressed it +concretely in terms of acting and thinking individuals. If abstractions +are used, every metaphor must be avoided which would make them play the +part of living beings. + +By a comparison of the evolutions of the different species of facts +which coexist in one and the same society, the "historical" school was +led to the discovery of solidarity (_Zusammenhang_).[213] But, before +attempting to discover its causes by analysis, the adherents of this +school assumed the existence of a permanent general cause residing in +the society itself. And, as it was customary to personify society, a +special temperament was attributed to it, the peculiar genius of the +nation or the race, manifesting itself in the different social +activities and explaining their solidarity.[214] This was simply an +hypothesis suggested by the animal world, in which each species has +permanent characteristics. It would have been inadequate, for in order +to explain how a given society comes to change its character from one +epoch to another (the Greeks between the seventh and the fourth +centuries, the English between the fifteenth and the nineteenth), it +would have been necessary to invoke the aid of external causes. And the +theory is untenable, for all the societies known to history are groups +of men without anthropological unity and without common hereditary +characteristics. + +In addition to these metaphysical or metaphorical explanations, attempts +have been made to apply to the investigation of causes in history the +classical procedure of the natural sciences: the comparison of parallel +series of successive phenomena in order to discover those which always +appear together. The "comparative method" has assumed several different +forms. Sometimes the subject of study has been a detail of social life +(a usage, an institution, a belief, a rule), defined in abstract terms; +its evolutions in different societies have been compared with a view to +determine the common evolution which is to be attributed to one and the +same general cause. Thus have arisen comparative philology, mythology, +and law. It has been proposed (in England) to give precision to the +comparative method by applying "statistics"; this would mean the +systematic comparison of all known societies and the enumeration of all +the cases where two usages are found together. This is the principle of +Bacon's tables of agreement; it is to be feared that it will be no more +fertile in results. The defect of all such methods is that they apply to +abstract and partly arbitrary notions, sometimes merely to verbal +resemblances, and do not rest on a knowledge of the whole of the +conditions under which the facts occur. + +We can conceive a more concrete method which, instead of comparing +fragments, should compare wholes, that is entire societies, either the +same society at different stages of its evolution (England in the +sixteenth, and again in the nineteenth century), or else the general +evolution of several societies, contemporary with each other (England +and France), or existing at different epochs (Rome and England). Such a +method might be useful negatively, for the purpose of ascertaining that +a given fact is not the necessary effect of another, since they are not +always found together (for example, the emancipation of women and +Christianity). But positive results are hardly to be expected of it, for +the concomitance of two facts in several series does not show whether +one is the cause of the other, or whether both are joint effects of a +single cause. + +The methodical investigation of the causes of a fact requires an +analysis of the conditions under which the fact occurs, performed so as +to isolate the necessary condition which is its cause; it presupposes, +therefore, the complete knowledge of these conditions. But this is +precisely what we never have in history. We must therefore renounce the +idea of arriving at causes by direct methods such as are used in the +other sciences. + +As a matter of fact, however, historians often do employ the notion of +cause, which, as we have shown above, is indispensable for the purpose +of formulating events and constructing periods. They know causes partly +from the authors of documents who observed the facts, partly from the +analogy of the causes which we all observe at the present day. The whole +history of events is a chain of obviously and incontrovertibly connected +incidents, each one of which is the determining cause of another. The +lance-thrust of Montgomery is the cause of the death of Henry II.; this +death is the cause of the accession to power of the Guises, which again +is the cause of the rising of the Protestants. + +The observation of causes by the authors of documents is limited to the +interconnection of the accidental facts observed by them; these are, in +truth, the causes which are known with the greatest certainty. Thus +history, unlike the other sciences, is better able to ascertain the +causes of particular incidents than those of general transformations, +for the work is found already done in the documents. + +In the investigation of the causes of general facts, historical +construction is reduced to the analogy between the past and the present. +Whatever chance there is of finding the causes which explain the +evolution of past societies must lie in the direct observation of the +transformations of present societies. + +This is a branch of study which is not yet firmly established; here we +can only state the principles of it. + +(1) In order to ascertain the causes of the solidarity between the +different habits of one and the same society, it is necessary to look +beyond the abstract and conventional form which the facts assume in +language (dogma, rule, rite, institution), and attend to the real +concrete centres, which are always thinking and acting men. Here only +are found together the different species of activity which language +separates by abstraction. Their solidarity is to be sought for in some +dominating feature in the character or the environment of the men which +influences all the different manifestations of their activity. We must +not expect the same degrees of solidarity in all the species of +activity; there will be most of it in those species where each +individual is in close dependence on the actions of the mass (economic, +social, political life); there will be less of it in the intellectual +activities (arts, sciences), where individual initiative has freer +play.[215] Documents mention most habits (beliefs, customs, +institutions) in the lump, without distinguishing individuals; and yet, +in one and the same society, habits vary considerably from one man to +another. It is necessary to take account of these differences, otherwise +there is a danger of explaining the actions of artists and men of +science by the beliefs and the habits of their prince or their +tradesmen. + +(2) In order to ascertain the causes of an evolution, it is necessary to +study the only beings which can evolve--men. Every evolution has for its +cause a change in the material conditions or in the habits of certain +men. Observation shows us two kinds of change. In the one case, the men +remain the same, but change their manner of acting or thinking, either +voluntarily through imitation, or by compulsion. In the other, the men +who practised the old usage disappear and are replaced by others who do +not practise it; these may be strangers, or they may be the descendants +of the first set of men, but educated in a different manner. This +renewing of the generations seems, in our day, to be the most active +cause of evolution. It is natural to suppose that the same holds good of +the past; evolution has been slower, the more exclusively each +generation has been formed by the imitation of its forerunners. + +There is still one more question to ask. Are men all alike, differing +merely in the _conditions_ under which they live (education, resources, +government), and is evolution produced solely by changes in these +_conditions_? Or are there groups of men with _hereditary differences_, +born with tendencies to different activities and with aptitudes leading +to different evolutions, so that evolution may be the product, in part +at least, of the increase, the diminution, and the displacement of these +groups? Taking the extreme cases, the white, black, and yellow races of +mankind, the differences in aptitude are obvious; no black people has +ever developed a civilisation. It is thus probable that smaller +hereditary differences may have had their share in the determination of +events. If so, historical evolution would be partly produced by +physiological and anthropological causes. But history provides us with +no sure means of determining the action of these hereditary differences +between men; it goes no further than the conditions of their existence. +The last question of history remains insoluble by historical methods. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +EXPOSITION + + +We have still to study a question whose practical interest is obvious: +What are the forms in which historical works present themselves? These +forms are, in fact, very numerous. Some of them are antiquated; not all +are legitimate; the best have their drawbacks. We should ask, therefore, +not only what are the forms in which historical works appear, but also +which of these represent truly rational types of exposition. + +By "historical works" we mean here all those which are intended to +communicate results obtained by the labour of historical construction, +whatever may be the nature, the extent, and the bearing of these +results. The critical elaboration of documents, which is treated of in +Book II., and which is preparatory to historical construction, is +naturally excluded. + +Historians may differ, and up to the present have differed, on several +essential points. They have not always had, nor have they all now, the +same conception of the end aimed at by historical work; hence arise +differences in the nature of the facts chosen, the manner of dividing +the subject, that is, of co-ordinating the facts, the manner of +presenting them, the manner of proving them. This would be the place to +indicate how "the mode of writing history" has evolved from the +beginning. But as the history of the modes of writing history has not +yet been written well,[216] we shall here content ourselves with some +very general remarks on the period prior to the second half of the +nineteenth century, confining ourselves to what is strictly necessary +for the understanding of the present situation. + + +I. History was first conceived as the narration of memorable events. To +preserve the memory and propagate the knowledge of glorious deeds, or of +events which were of importance to a man, a family, or a people; such +was the aim of history in the tune of Thucydides and Livy. In addition, +history was early considered as a collection of precedents, and the +knowledge of history as a practical preparation for life, especially +political life (military and civil). Polybius and Plutarch wrote to +instruct, they claimed to give recipes for action. Hence in classical +antiquity the subject-matter of history consisted chiefly of political +incidents, wars, and revolutions. The ordinary framework of historical +exposition (within which the facts were usually arranged in +chronological order) was the life of a person, the whole life of a +people, or a particular period in it; there were in antiquity but few +essays in general history. As the aim of the historian was to please or +to instruct, or to please and instruct at the same time, history was a +branch of literature: there were not too many scruples on the score of +proofs; those who worked from written documents took no care to +distinguish the text of such documents from their own text; in +reproducing the narratives of their predecessors they adorned them with +details, and sometimes (under pretext of being precise) with numbers, +with speeches, with reflections, and elegances. We can in a manner see +them at work in every instance where it is possible to compare Greek and +Roman historians, Ephorus and Livy, for example, with their sources. + +The writers of the Renaissance directly imitated the ancients. For them, +too, history was a literary art with apologetic aims or didactic +pretensions. In Italy it was too often a means of gaining the favour of +princes, or a theme for declamations. This state of affairs lasted a +long time. Even in the seventeenth century we find, in Mezeray, an +historian of the ancient classical pattern. + +However, in the historical literature of the Renaissance, two novelties +claim our attention, in which the mediaeval influence is incontrovertibly +manifest. On the one hand we see the retention of a form of exposition +which was unusual in antiquity, which was created by the Catholic +historians of the later ages (Eusebius, Orosius), and which enjoyed +great favour in the Middle Ages,--that which, instead of embracing only +the history of a single man, family, or people, embraces universal +history. On the other hand there was introduced a mechanical artifice of +exposition, having its origin in a practice common in the mediaeval +schools (the gloss), which had far-reaching consequences. The custom +arose of adding notes to printed books of history.[217] Notes have made +it possible to distinguish between the historical narrative and the +documents which support it, to give references to sources, to +disencumber and illustrate the text. It was in collections of documents, +and in critical dissertations, that the artifice of annotation was first +employed; thence it penetrated, slowly, into historical works of other +classes. + +A second period begins in the eighteenth century. The "philosophers" +then began to conceive history as the study, not of events for their own +sakes, but of the habits of men. They were thus led to take an interest, +not only in facts of a political order, but in the evolution of the +arts, the sciences, of industry, and in manners. Montesquieu and +Voltaire personified these tendencies. The _Essai sur les moeurs_ is +the first sketch, and, in some respects, the masterpiece of history thus +conceived. The detailed narration of political and military events was +still regarded as the main work of history, but to this it now became +customary to add, generally by way of supplement or appendix, a sketch +of the "progress of the human mind." The expression "history of +civilisation" appears before the end of the eighteenth century. At the +same time German university professors, especially at Goettingen, were +creating, in order to supply educational needs, the new form of the +historical "manual," a methodical collection of carefully justified +facts, with no literary or other pretensions. Collections of historical +facts, made with a view to aid in the interpretation of literary texts, +or out of mere curiosity in regard to the things of the past, had +existed from ancient times; but the medleys of Athenaeus and Aulus +Gellius, or the vaster and better arranged compilations of the Middle +Ages and the Renaissance, are by no means to be compared with the +"scientific manuals" of which the German professors then gave the +models. These professors, moreover, contributed towards the clearing up +of the vague, general notion which the philosophers had of +"civilisation," for they applied themselves to the organisation of the +history of languages, of literatures, of the arts, of religions, of law, +of economic phenomena, and so on, as so many separate branches of study. +Thus the domain of history was greatly enlarged, and scientific, that +is, simple and objective, exposition began to compete with the +rhetorical or sententious, patriotic or philosophical ideals of +antiquity. + +This competition was at first timid and obscure, for the beginning of +the nineteenth century was marked by a literary renaissance which +renovated historical literature. Under the influence of the romantic +movement historians sought for more vivid methods of exposition than +those employed by their predecessors, methods better adapted to strike +the imagination and rouse the emotions of the public, by filling the +mind with poetical images of vanished realities. Some endeavoured to +preserve the peculiar colouring of the original documents, which they +adapted: "Charmed with the contemporary narratives," says Barante, "I +have endeavoured to write a consecutive account which should borrow from +them their animation and interest." This leads directly to the neglect +of criticism, and to the reproduction of whatever is effective from the +literary point of view. Others declared that the facts of the past ought +to be recounted with all the emotions of a spectator. "Thierry," says +Michelet, praising him, "in telling us the story of Klodowig, breathes +the spirit and shows the emotion of recently invaded France...." +Michelet "stated the problem of history as the resuscitation of integral +life in the inmost parts of the organism." With the romantic historians +the choice of subject, of plan, of the proofs, of the style, is +dominated by an engrossing desire to produce an effect--a literary, not +a scientific ambition. Some romantic historians have slid down this +inclined plane to the level of the "historical novel." We know the +nature of this species of literature, which flourished so vigorously +from the Abbe Barthelemy and Chateaubriand down to Merimee and Ebers, +and which some are now vainly attempting to rejuvenate. The object is to +"make the scenes of the past live again" in dramatic pictures +artistically constructed with "true" colours and details. The obvious +object of the method is that it does not provide the reader with any +means of distinguishing between the elements borrowed from the +documents and the imaginary elements, not to mention the fact that +generally the documents used are not all of the same origin, so that +while the colour of each stone may be "true" that of the mosaic is +false. Dezobry's _Rome au siecle d'Auguste_, Augustin Thierry's _Recits +merovingiens_, and other "pictures" produced at the same epoch were +constructed on the same principle, and are subject to the same drawbacks +as the historical novels properly so-called.[218] + +We may summarise what precedes by saying that, up to about 1850, history +continued to be, both for historians and the public, a branch of +literature. An excellent proof of this lies in the fact that up till +then historians were accustomed to publish new editions of their works, +at intervals of several years, without making any change in them, and +that the public tolerated the practice. Now every scientific work needs +to be continually recast, revised, brought up to date. Scientific +workers do not claim to give their works an immutable form, they do not +expect to be read by posterity or to achieve personal immortality; it is +enough for them if the results of their researches, corrected, it may +be, and possibly transformed by subsequent researches, should be +incorporated in the fund of knowledge which forms the scientific +heritage of mankind. No one reads Newton or Lavoisier; it is enough for +their glory that their labours should have contributed to the +production of works by which their own have been superseded, and which +will be, sooner or later, superseded in their turn. It is only works of +art that enjoy perpetual youth. And the public is well aware of the +fact; no one would ever think of studying natural history in Buffon, +whatever his opinion might be of the merits of this stylist. But the +same public is quite ready to study history in Augustin Thierry, in +Macaulay, in Carlyle, in Michelet, and the books of the great writers +who have treated historical subjects are reprinted, fifty years after +the author's death, in their original form, though they are manifestly +no longer on a level with current knowledge. It is clear that, for many, +form counts before matter in history, and that an historical work is +primarily, if not exclusively, a work of art.[219] + + +II. It is within the last fifty years that the scientific forms of +historical exposition have been evolved and settled, in accordance with +the general principle that the aim of history is not to please, nor to +give practical maxims of conduct, nor to arouse the emotions, but +knowledge pure and simple. + +We begin by distinguishing between (1) monographs and (2) works of a +general character. + +(1) A man writes a monograph when he proposes to elucidate a special +point, a single fact, or a limited body of facts, for example the whole +or a portion of the life of an individual, a single event or a series of +events between two dates lying near together. The types of possible +subjects of a monograph cannot be enumerated, for the subject-matter of +history can be divided indefinitely, and in an infinite number of ways. +But all modes of division are not equally judicious, and, though the +reverse has been maintained, there are, in history as in all the +sciences, subjects which it would be stupid to treat in monographs, and +monographs which, though well executed, represent so much useless +labour.[220] Persons of moderate ability and no great mental range, +devoted to what is called "curious" learning, are very ready to occupy +themselves with insignificant questions;[221] indeed, for the purpose of +making a first estimate of an historian's intellectual power, a fairly +good criterion may be had in the list of the monographs he has +written.[222] It is the gift of seeing the important problems, and the +taste for their treatment, as well as the power of solving them, which, +in all the sciences, raise men to the first rank. But let us suppose the +subject has been rationally chosen. Every monograph, in order to be +useful--that is, capable of being fully turned to account--should +conform to three rules: (1) in a monograph every historical fact derived +from documents should only be presented accompanied by a reference to +the documents from which it is taken, and an estimate of the value of +these documents;[223] (2) chronological order should be followed as far +as possible, because this is the order in which we know that the facts +occurred, and by which we are guided in searching for causes and +effects; (3) the title of the monograph must enable its subject to be +known with exactitude: we cannot protest too strongly against those +incomplete or fancy titles which so unnecessarily complicate +bibliographical searches. A fourth rule has been laid down; it has been +said "a monograph is useful only when it exhausts the subject"; but it +is quite legitimate to do temporary work with documents which one has at +one's disposal, even when there is reason to believe that others exist, +provided always that precise notice is given as to what documents have +been employed. + +Any one who has tact will see that, in a monograph, the apparatus of +demonstration, while needing to be complete, ought to be reduced to what +is strictly necessary. Sobriety is imperative; all parading of erudition +which might have been spared without inconvenience is odious.[224] In +history it often happens that the best executed monographs furnish no +other result than the proof that knowledge is impossible. It is +necessary to resist the desire which leads some to round off with +subjective, ambitious, and vague conclusions monographs which will not +bear them.[225] The proper conclusion of a good monograph is the +balance-sheet of the results obtained by it and the points left +doubtful. A monograph made on these principles may grow antiquated, but +it will not fall to pieces, and its author will never need to blush for +it. + +(2) Works of a general character are addressed either to students or to +the general public. + +_A._ General works intended principally for students and specialists now +appear in the form of "repertories," "manuals," and "scientific +histories." In a repertory a number of verified facts belonging to a +given class are collected and arranged in an order which makes it easy +to refer to them. If the facts thus collected have precise dates, +chronological order is adopted: thus the task has been undertaken of +compiling "Annals" of German history, in which the summary entry of the +events, arranged by dates, is accompanied by the texts from which the +events are known, with accurate references to the sources and the works +of critics; the collection of the _Jahrbuecher der deutschen Geschichte_ +has for its object the elucidation, as far as is possible, of the facts +of German history, including all that is susceptible of scientific +discussion and proof, but omitting all that belongs to the domain of +appreciation and general views. When the facts are badly dated, or are +simultaneous, alphabetical arrangement must be employed; thus we have +Dictionaries: dictionaries of institutions, biographical dictionaries, +historical encyclopaedias, such as the _Realencyclopaedie_ of +Pauly-Wissowa. These alphabetical repertories are, in theory, just as +the _Jahrbuecher_, collections of proved facts; if, in practice, the +references in them are less rigorous, if the apparatus of texts +supporting the statements is less complete, the difference is without +justification.[226] _Scientific manuals_ are also, properly speaking, +repertories, since they are collections in which established facts are +arranged in systematic order, and are exhibited objectively, with their +proofs, and without any literary adornment. The authors of these +"manuals," of which the most numerous and the most perfect specimens +have been composed in our days in the German universities, have no +object in view except to draw up minute inventories of the acquisitions +made by knowledge, in order that workers may be enabled to assimilate +the results of criticism with greater ease and rapidity, and may be +furnished with starting-points for new researches. Manuals of this kind +now exist for most of the special branches of the history of +civilisation (languages, literature, religion, law, _Alterthuemer_, and +so on), for the history of institutions, for the different parts of +ecclesiastical history. It will suffice to mention the names of +Schoemann, of Marquardt and Mommsen, of Gilbert, of Krumbacher, of +Harnack, of Moeller. These works are not marked by the dryness of the +majority of the primitive "manuals," which were published in Germany a +hundred years ago, and which were little more than tables of subjects, +with references to the books and documents to be consulted; in the +modern type the exposition and discussion are no doubt terse and +compact, but yet not abbreviated beyond a point at which they may be +tolerated, even preferred by cultivated readers. They take away the +taste for other books, as G. Paris very well says:[227] "When one has +feasted on these substantial pages, so full of facts, which, with all +their appearance of impersonality, yet contain, and above all suggest, +so many thoughts, it is difficult to read books, even books of +distinction, in which the subject is cut up symmetrically to fit in with +a preconceived system, is coloured by fancy, and is, so to speak, +presented to us in disguise, books in which the author continually comes +between us and the spectacle which he claims to make intelligible to us, +but which he never allows us to see." The great historical "manuals," +uniform with the treatises and manuals of the other sciences (with the +added complication of authorities and proofs), ought to be, and are, +continually improved, emended, corrected, brought up to date: they are, +by definition, works of science and not of art. + +The earliest repertories and the earliest scientific "manuals" were +composed by isolated individuals. But it was soon recognised that a +single man cannot correctly arrange, or have the proper mastery over a +vast collection of facts. The task has been divided. Repertories are +executed, in our days, by collaborators in association (who are +sometimes of different nationalities and write in different languages). +The great manuals (of I. von Mueller, of G. Groeber, of H. Paul, and +others) are collections of special treatises each written by a +specialist. The principle of collaboration is excellent, but on +condition (1) that the collective work is of a nature to be resolved +into great independent, though co-ordinated, monographs; (2) that the +section entrusted to each collaborator has a certain extent; if the +number of collaborators is too great and the part of each too limited, +the liberty and the responsibility of each are diminished or disappear. + +_Histories_, intended to give a narrative of events which happened but +once, and to state the general facts which dominate the whole course of +special evolutions, still have a reason for existence, even after the +multiplication of methodical manuals. But scientific methods of +exposition have been introduced into them, as into monographs and +manuals, and that by imitation. The reform has consisted, in every case, +in the renunciation of literary ornaments and of statements without +proof. Grote produced the first model of a "history" thus defined. At +the same time certain forms which once had a vogue have now fallen into +disuse: this is the case with the "Universal Histories" with continuous +narrative, which were so much liked, for different reasons, in the +Middle Ages and in the eighteenth century; in the present century +Schlosser and Weber in Germany, Cantu in Italy, have produced the last +specimens of them. This type has been abandoned for historical reasons, +because we have ceased to regard humanity as a whole, bound together by +a single evolution; and for practical reasons, because we have +recognised the impossibility of collecting so overwhelming a mass of +facts in a single work. The Universal Histories which are still +published in collaboration (the Oncken collection is the best type of +them), are, like the great manuals, composed of independent sections, +each treated by a different author; they are publishers' combinations. +Historians have in our days been led to adopt the division by states +(national histories) and by epochs.[228] + +_B._ There is in theory no reason why historical works intended +principally for the public should not be conceived in the same spirit as +works designed for students and specialists, nor why they should not be +composed in the same manner, apart from simplifications and omissions +which readily suggest themselves. And, in fact, there are in existence +succinct, substantial, and readable summaries, in which no statement is +advanced which is not tacitly supported by solid references, in which +the acquisitions of science are precisely stated, judiciously +explained, their significance and value clearly brought out. The French, +thanks to their natural gifts of tact, dexterity, and accuracy of mind, +excel, as a rule, in this department. There have been published in our +country review-articles and works of higher popularisation in which the +results of a number of original works have been cleverly condensed, in a +way that has won the admiration of the very specialists who, by their +heavy monographs, have rendered these works possible. Nothing, however, +is more dangerous than popularisation. As a matter of fact, most works +of popularisation do not conform to the modern ideal of historical +exposition; we frequently find in them survivals of the ancient ideal, +that of antiquity, the Renaissance, and the romantic school. + +The explanation is easy. The defects of the historical works designed +for the general public--defects which are sometimes enormous, and have, +with many able minds, discredited popular works as a class--are the +consequences of the insufficient preparation or of the inferior literary +education of the "popularisers." + +A populariser is excused from original research; but he ought to know +everything of importance that has been published on his subject, he +ought to be up to date, and to have thought out for himself the +conclusions reached by the specialists. If he has not personally made a +special study of the subject he proposes to treat, he must obviously +read it up, and the task is long. For the professional populariser there +is a strong temptation to study superficially a few recent monographs, +to hastily string together or combine extracts from them, and, in order +to render this medley more attractive, to deck it out, as far as is +possible, with "general ideas" and external graces. The temptation is +all the stronger from the circumstance that most specialists take no +interest in works of popularisation, that these works are, in general, +lucrative, and that the public at large is not in a position to +distinguish clearly between honest and sham popularisation. In short, +there are some, absurd as it may seem, who do not hesitate to summarise +for others what they have not taken the trouble to learn for themselves, +and to teach that of which they are ignorant. Hence, in most works of +historical popularisation, there inevitably appear blemishes of every +kind, which the well-informed always note with pleasure, but with a +pleasure in which there is some touch of bitterness, because they alone +can see these faults: unacknowledged borrowings, inexact references, +mutilated names and texts, second-hand quotations, worthless hypotheses, +imprudent assertions, puerile generalisations, and, in the enunciation +of the most false or the most debatable opinions, an air of tranquil +authority.[229] + +On the other hand, men whose information is all that could be desired, +whose monographs intended for specialists are full of merit, sometimes +show themselves capable, when they write for the public, of grave +offences against scientific method. The Germans are habitual offenders: +consider Mommsen, Droysen, Curtius, and Lamprecht. The reason is that +these authors, when they address the public, wish to produce an effect +upon it. Their desire to make a strong impression leads them to a +certain relaxation of scientific rigour, and to the old rejected habits +of ancient historiography. These men, scrupulous and minute as they are +when they are engaged in establishing details, abandon themselves, in +their exposition of general questions, to their natural impulses, like +the common run of men. They take sides, they censure, they extol; they +colour, they embellish; they allow themselves to be influenced by +personal, patriotic, moral, or metaphysical considerations. And, over +and above all this, they apply themselves, with their several degrees of +talent, to the task of producing works of art; in this endeavour those +who have no talent make themselves ridiculous, and the talent of those +who have any is spoilt by their preoccupation with the effect they wish +to produce. + +Not, let it be well understood, that "form" is of no importance, or +that, provided he makes himself intelligible, the historian has a right +to employ incorrect, vulgar, slovenly, or clumsy language. A contempt +for rhetoric, for paste diamonds and paper flowers, does not exclude a +taste for a pure and strong, a terse and pregnant style. Fustel de +Coulanges was a good writer, although throughout his life he recommended +and practised the avoidance of metaphor. On the contrary we see no harm +in repeating[230] that the historian, considering the extreme complexity +of the phenomena he undertakes to describe, is under an obligation not +to write badly. But he should write _consistently_ well, and never +bedeck himself with finery. + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +I. History is only the utilisation of documents. But it is a matter of +chance whether documents are preserved or lost. Hence the predominant +part played by chance in the formation of history. + +The quantity of documents in existence, if not of known documents, is +given; time, in spite of all the precautions which are taken nowadays, +is continually diminishing it; it will never increase. History has at +its disposal a limited stock of documents; this very circumstance limits +the possible progress of historical science. When all the documents are +known, and have gone through the operations which fit them for use, the +work of critical scholarship will be finished. In the case of some +ancient periods, for which documents are rare, we can now see that in a +generation or two it will be time to stop. Historians will then be +obliged to take refuge more and more in modern periods. Thus history +will not fulfil the dream which, in the nineteenth century, inspired the +romantic school with so much enthusiasm for the study of history: it +will not penetrate the mystery of the origin of societies; and, for want +of documents, the beginnings of the evolution of humanity will always +remain obscure. + +The historian does not collect by his own observation the materials +necessary for history as is done in the other sciences: he works on +facts the knowledge of which has been transmitted by former observers. +In history knowledge is not obtained, as in the other sciences, by +direct methods, it is indirect. History is not, as has been said, a +science of observation, but a science of reasoning. + +In order to use facts which have been observed under unknown conditions, +it is necessary to apply criticism to them, and criticism consists in a +series of reasonings by analogy. The facts as furnished by criticism are +isolated and scattered; in order to organise them into a structure it is +necessary to imagine and group them in accordance with their +resemblances to facts of the present day, an operation which also +depends on the use of analogies. This necessity compels history to use +an exceptional method. In order to frame its arguments from analogy, it +must always combine the knowledge of the particular conditions under +which the facts of the past occurred with an understanding of the +general conditions under which the facts of humanity occur. Its method +is to draw up special _tables_ of the facts of an epoch in the past, and +to apply to them sets of _questions_ founded on the study of the +present. + +The operations which must necessarily be performed in order to pass from +the inspection of documents to the knowledge of the facts and evolutions +of the past are very numerous. Hence the necessity of the division and +organisation of labour in history. It is requisite, on the one hand, +that those specialists who occupy themselves with the search for +documents, their restoration and preliminary classification, should +co-ordinate their efforts, in order that the preparatory work of +critical scholarship may be finished as soon as possible, under the best +conditions as to accuracy and economy of labour. On the other hand, +authors of partial syntheses (monographs) designed to serve as materials +for more comprehensive syntheses ought to agree among themselves to work +on a common method, in order that the results of each may be used by the +others without preliminary investigations. Lastly, workers of experience +should be found to renounce personal research and devote their whole +time to the study of these partial syntheses, in order to combine them +scientifically in comprehensive works of historical construction. And if +the result of these labours were to bring out clear and certain +conclusions as to the nature and the causes of social evolution, a truly +scientific "philosophy of history" would have been created, which +historians might acknowledge as legitimately crowning historical +science. + +Conceivably a day may come when, thanks to the organisation of labour, +all existing documents will have been discovered, emended, arranged, and +all the facts established of which the traces have not been destroyed. +When that day comes, history will be established, but it will not be +fixed: it will continue to be gradually modified in proportion as the +direct study of existing societies becomes more scientific and permits a +better understanding of social phenomena and their evolution; for the +new ideas which will doubtless be acquired on the nature, the causes, +and the relative importance of social facts will continue to transform +the ideas which will be formed of the societies and events of the +past.[231] + + +II. It is an obsolete illusion to suppose that history supplies +information of practical utility in the conduct of life (_Historia +magistra vitae_), lessons directly profitable to individuals and peoples; +the conditions under which human actions are performed are rarely +sufficiently similar at two different moments for the "lessons of +history" to be directly applicable. But it is an error to say, by way of +reaction, that "the distinguishing feature of history is to be good for +nothing."[232] It has an indirect utility. + +History enables us to understand the present in so far as it explains +the origin of the existing state of things. Here we must admit that +history does not offer an equal interest through the whole extent of +time which it covers; there are remote generations whose traces are no +longer visible in the world as it now is; for the purpose of explaining +the political constitution of contemporary England, for example, the +study of the Anglo-Saxon witangemot is without value, that of the events +of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is all-important. The +evolution of the civilised societies has within the last hundred years +been accelerated to such a degree that, for the understanding of their +present form, the history of these hundred years is more important than +that of the ten preceding centuries. As an explanation of the present, +history would almost reduce to the study of the contemporary period. + +History is also indispensable for the completion of the political and +social sciences, which are still in process of formation; for the direct +observation of social phenomena (in a state of rest) is not a sufficient +foundation for these sciences--there must be added a study of the +development of these phenomena in time, that is, their history.[233] +This is why all the sciences which deal with man (linguistic, law, +science of religions, political economy, and so on) have in this century +assumed the form of historical sciences. + +But the chief merit of history is that of being an instrument of +intellectual culture; it is so in several ways. Firstly, the practice +of the historical method of investigation, of which the principles have +been sketched in the present volume, is very hygienic for the mind, +which it cures of credulity. Secondly, history, by exhibiting to us a +great number of differing societies, prepares us to understand and +tolerate a variety of usages; by showing us that societies have often +been transformed, it familiarises us with variation in social forms, and +cures us of a morbid dread of change. Lastly, the contemplation of past +evolutions, which enables us to understand how the transformations of +humanity are brought about by changes of habits and the renewal of +generations, saves us from the temptation of applying biological +analogies (selection, struggle for existence, inherited habits, and so +on) to the explanation of social evolution, which is not produced by the +operation of the same causes as animal evolution. + + + + +APPENDICES + + + + +APPENDIX I + +THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE + + +I. The teaching of history is a recent addition to secondary education. +Formerly history was taught to the sons of kings and great persons, in +order to give them a preparation in the art of governing, according to +the ancient tradition, but it was a sacred science reserved for the +future rulers of states, a science for princes, not for subjects. The +secondary schools which have been organised since the sixteenth century, +ecclesiastical or secular, Catholic or Protestant, did not admit history +into their plan of study, or only admitted it as an appendage to the +study of the ancient languages. This was the tradition of the Jesuits in +France; it was adopted by the University of Napoleon. + +History was only introduced into secondary education in the nineteenth +century, under the pressure of public opinion; and although it has been +allotted more space in France than in England, or even in Germany, it +has continued to be a subsidiary subject, not taught in a special class +(as philosophy is), nor always by a special professor, and counting for +very little in examinations. + +Historical instruction has for a long time felt the effects of the +manner in which it was introduced. The subject was imposed by the +authorities on teachers trained exclusively in the study of literature, +and could find no suitable place in a system of classical education +based on the study of forms, and indifferent to the knowledge of social +phenomena. History was taught because it was prescribed by the +programme; but this programme, the sole motive and guide of the +instruction, was always an accident, and varied with the preferences, or +even the personal studies of those who framed it. History formed part of +the social conventions; there are, it was said, names and facts "of +which it is not permissible to be ignorant"; but the things of which +ignorance was not permitted varied greatly, from the names of the +Merovingian kings and the battles of the Seven Years' War to the Salic +Law and the work of Saint Vincent de Paul. + +The improvised staffs which, in order to carry out the programme, had to +furnish impromptu instruction in history, had no clear idea either of +the reasons for such instruction, or of its place in general education, +or of the technical methods necessary for giving it. With this lack of +tradition, of pedagogic preparation, and even of mechanical aids, the +professor of history found himself carried back to the ages before +printing, when the teacher had to supply the pupil with all the facts +which formed the subject-matter of instruction, and he adopted the +mediaeval procedure. Armed with a note-book in which he had written down +the list of facts to be taught, he read it out to the pupils, sometimes +making a pretence of extemporising; this was the "lesson," the +corner-stone of historical instruction. The whole series of lessons, +determined by the programme, formed the "course." The pupil was expected +to write as he listened (this was called "taking notes") and to compose +a written account of what he had heard (this was the _redaction_). But +as the pupils were not taught how to take notes, nearly all of them were +content to write very rapidly, from the professor's dictation, a rough +draft, which they copied out at home in the form of a _redaction_, +without any endeavour to grasp the meaning either of what they heard or +what they transcribed. To this mechanical labour the most zealous added +extracts copied from books, generally with just as little reflection. + +In order to get the facts judged essential into the pupils' heads, the +professor used to make a very short version of the lesson, the "summary" +or "abstract," which he dictated openly, and caused to be learnt by +heart. Thus of the two written exercises which occupied nearly the whole +time of the class, one (the summary) was an overt dictation, the other +(the _redaction_) an unavowed dictation. + +The only means adopted to check the pupils' work was to make them repeat +the summary word for word, and to question them on the _redaction_, that +is to make them repeat approximately the words of the professor. Of the +two oral exercises one was an overt, the other an unavowed repetition. + +It is true the pupil was given a book, the _Precis d'histoire_,[234] but +this book had the same form as the professor's course, and instead of +serving as a basis for the oral instruction, merely duplicated it, and, +as a rule, duplicated it badly, for it was not intelligible to the +pupil. The authors of these text-books,[235] adopting the traditional +methods of "abridgments," endeavoured to accumulate the greatest +possible number of facts by omitting all their characteristic details +and summarising them in the most general, and therefore vague, +expressions. In the elementary books nothing was left but a residue of +proper names and dates connected by formulae of a uniform type; history +appeared as a series of wars, treaties, reforms, revolutions, which only +differed in the names of peoples, sovereigns, fields of battle, and in +the figures giving the years.[236] + +Such, down to the end of the Second Empire, was historical instruction +in all French institutions, both secular and ecclesiastical--with a few +exceptions, whose merit is measured by their rarity, for in those days a +professor of history needed a more than common share of energy and +initiative to rise above the routine of _redaction_ and summary. + + +II. In recent times the general movement of educational reform, which +began in the Department and the Faculties, has at last extended to +secondary instruction. The professors of history have been emancipated +from the jealous supervision which weighed on their teaching under the +government of the Empire, and have taken the opportunity to make trial +of new methods. A system of historical pedagogy has been devised. It has +been revealed with the approbation of the Department in the discussions +of the society for the study of questions of secondary education, in the +_Revue de l'enseignement secondaire_, and in the _Revue universitaire_. +It has received official sanction in the _Instructions_ appended to the +programme of 1890; the report on history, the work of M. Lavisse, has +become the charter which protects the professors who favour reform in +their struggle against tradition.[237] + +Historical instruction will no doubt issue from this crisis of +renovation organised and provided with a rational pedagogic and +technical system, such as is possessed by the older branches of +instruction in languages, literature, and philosophy. But it is only to +be expected that the reform should be much slower than in the case of +the higher instruction. The _personnel_ is much more numerous, and takes +longer to train or to renew; the pupils are less zealous and less +intelligent; the routine of the parents opposes to the new methods a +force of inertia which is unknown to the Faculties; and the +Baccalaureate, that general obstacle to all reform, is particularly +mischievous in its effect on historical instruction, which it reduces to +a set of questions and answers. + + +III. It is now possible, however, to indicate what is the direction in +which historical instruction is likely to develop in France[238] and the +questions which will need to be solved for the purpose of introducing a +rational technical system. Here we shall endeavour to formulate these +questions in a methodical table. + +(1) _General Organisation._--What object should historical instruction +aim at? What services can it render to the culture of the pupil? What +influence can it have upon his conduct? What facts ought it to enable +him to understand? And, consequently, what principles ought to guide the +choice of subjects and methods? Ought the instruction to be spread over +the whole duration of the classes, or should it be concentrated in a +special class? Should it be given in one-hour or two-hour classes? +Should history be distributed into several cycles, as in Germany, so as +to cause the pupil to return several times to the same subject at +different periods of his studies? Or should it be expounded in a single +continuous course, beginning with the commencement of study, as in +France? Should the professor give a complete course, or should he select +a few questions and leave the pupil to study the others by himself? +Should he expound the facts orally, or should he require the pupils to +learn them in the first instance from a book, so as to make the course a +series of explanations? + +(2) _Choice of Subjects._--What proportion should be observed between +home and foreign history? between ancient and contemporary history? +between the special branches of history (art, religion, customs, +economics) and general history? between institutions or usages, and +events? between the evolution of material usages, intellectual history, +social life, political life? between the study of particular incidents, +of biography, of dramatic episodes, and the study of the interconnection +of events and general evolutions? What place should be assigned to +proper names and dates? Should we profit by the opportunities afforded +by legends to arouse the critical spirit? or should we avoid legends? + +(3) _Order._--In what order should the subjects be attacked? Should +instruction begin with the most ancient periods and the countries with +the most ancient civilisations in order to follow chronological order +and the order of evolution? or should it begin with the periods and the +countries which are nearest to us so as to proceed from the better known +to the less known? In the exposition of each period, should the +chronological, geographical, or logical order be followed? Should the +teacher begin by describing conditions or by narrating events? + +(4) _Methods of Instruction._--Should the pupil be given general formulae +first or particular images? Should the professor state the formulae +himself or require the pupil to search for them? Should formulae be +learnt by heart? In what cases? How are images of historical facts to be +produced in the pupils' minds? What use is to be made of engravings? of +reproductions and restorations? of imaginary scenes? What use is to be +made of narratives and descriptions? of authors' texts? of historical +novels? To what extent ought words and formulae to be quoted? How are +facts to be localised? What use is to be made of chronological tables? +of synchronical tables? of geographical sketches? of statistical and +graphic tables? What is the way to make comprehensible the character of +events and customs? the motives of actions? the conditions of customs? +How are the episodes of an event to be chosen? and the examples of a +custom? How is the interconnection of facts and the process of evolution +to be made intelligible? What use is to be made of comparison? What +style of language is to be employed? To what extent should concrete, +abstract, and technical terms be used? How is it to be verified that the +pupil has understood the terms and assimilated the facts? Can exercises +be organised in which the pupil may do original work on the facts? What +instruments of study should the pupil have? How should school-books be +compiled, with a view to giving the pupil practice in original work? + +For the purpose of stating and justifying the solutions of all these +problems, a special treatise would not be too much.[239] Here we shall +merely indicate the general principles on which a tolerable agreement +seems to have been now reached in France. + +We no longer go to history for lessons in morals, nor for good examples +of conduct, nor yet for dramatic or picturesque scenes. We understand +that for all these purposes legend would be preferable to history, for +it presents a chain of causes and effects more in accordance with our +ideas of justice, more perfect and heroic characters, finer and more +affecting scenes. Nor do we seek to use history, as is done in Germany, +for the purpose of promoting patriotism and loyalty; we feel that it +would be illogical for different persons to draw opposite conclusions +from the same science according to their country or party; it would be +an invitation to every people to mutilate, if not to alter, history in +the direction of its preferences. We understand that the value of every +science consists in its being true, and we ask from history truth and +nothing more.[240] + +The function of history in education is perhaps not yet clearly apparent +to all those who teach it. But all those who reflect are agreed to +regard it as being principally an instrument of social culture. The +study of the societies of the past causes the pupil to understand, by +the help of actual instances, what a society is; it familiarises him +with the principal social phenomena and the different species of usages, +their variety and their resemblances. The study of events and evolutions +familiarises him with the idea of the continual transformation which +human affairs undergo, it secures him against an unreasoning dread of +social changes; it rectifies his notion of progress. All these +acquisitions render the pupil fitter for public life; history thus +appears as an indispensable branch of instruction in a democratic +society. + +The guiding principle of historical pedagogy will therefore be to seek +for those subjects and those methods which are best calculated to +exhibit social phenomena and give an understanding of their evolution. +Before admitting a fact into the plan of instruction, it should be asked +first of all what educational influence it can exercise; secondly, +whether there are adequate means of bringing the pupil to see and +understand it. Every fact should be discarded which is instructive only +in a low degree, or which is too complicated to be understood, or in +regard to which we do not possess details enough to make it +intelligible. + + +IV. To make rational instruction a reality it is not enough to develop a +theory of historical pedagogy. It is necessary to renew the material +aids and the methods. + +History necessarily involves the knowledge of a great number of facts. +The professor of history, with no resources but his voice, a blackboard, +and abridgments which are little better than chronological tables, is in +much the same situation as a professor of Latin without texts or +dictionary. The pupil in history needs a repertory of historical facts +as the Latin pupil needs a repertory of Latin words; he needs +collections of _facts_, and the school text-books are mostly collections +of _words_. + +There are two vehicles of facts, engravings and books. Engravings +exhibit material objects and external aspects, they are useful +principally for the study of material civilisation. It is some time +since the attempt was first made in Germany to put in the hands of the +pupil a collection of engravings arranged for the purposes of historical +instruction. The same need has, in France, produced the _Album +historique_, which is published under the direction of M. Lavisse. + +The book is the chief instrument. It ought to contain all the +characteristic features necessary for forming mental representations of +the events, the motives, the habits, the institutions studied; it will +consist principally in narratives and descriptions, to which +characteristic sayings and formulae may be appended. For a long time it +was endeavoured to construct those books out of extracts selected from +ancient authors; they were compiled in the form of collections of +texts.[241] Experience seems to indicate that this method must be +abandoned; it has a scientific appearance, it is true, but is not +intelligible to children. It is better to address pupils in contemporary +language. It is in this spirit that, pursuant to the _Instructions_ of +1890,[242] collections of _Historical Readings_ have been compiled, of +which the most important has been published by the firm of Hachette. + +The pupils' methods of work still bear witness to the late introduction +of historical teaching. In most historical classes methods still prevail +which only exercise the pupils' receptivity: the course of lectures, the +summary, reading, questioning, the _redaction_, the reproduction of +maps. It is as if a Latin pupil were to confine himself to repeating +grammar-lessons and extracts from authors, without ever doing +translation or composition. + +In order that the teaching may make an adequate impression, it is +necessary, if not to discard all these passive methods, at least to +supplement them by exercises which call out the activity of the pupil. +Some such exercises have already been experimented with, and others +might be devised.[243] The pupil may be set to analyse engravings, +narratives, and descriptions in such a way as to bring out the character +of the facts: the short written or oral analysis will guarantee that he +has seen and understood, it will be an opportunity to inculcate the +habit of using only precise terms. Or the pupil may be asked to furnish +a drawing, a geographical sketch, a synchronical table. He may be +required to draw up tables of comparison between different societies, +and tables showing the interconnection of facts. + +A book is needed to supply the pupil with the materials for these +exercises. Thus the reform of methods is connected with the reform of +the instruments of work. Both reforms will progress according as the +professors and the public perceive more clearly the part played by +historical instruction in social education. + + + + +APPENDIX II + +THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE + + +The higher teaching of history has been in a great measure transformed, +in our country, within the last thirty years. The process has been +gradual, as it ought to have been, and has consisted in a succession of +slight modifications. But although a rational continuity has been +observed in the steps taken, the great number of these steps has not +failed, in these last days, to astonish, and even to offend, the public. +Public opinion, to which appeal has been made in favour of reforms, has +been somewhat surprised by being appealed to so often, and perhaps it is +not superfluous to indicate here, once more, the general significance +and the inner logic of the movement which we are witnessing. + + +I. Before the last years of the Second Empire, the higher teaching of +the historical sciences was organised in France on no coherent +system.[244] + +There were chairs of history in different institutions, of different +types: at the College de France, in the Faculties of Letters, and in the +"special schools," such as the Ecole normale superieure and the Ecole +des chartes. + +The College de France was a relic of the institutions of the _ancien +regime_. It was founded in the sixteenth century in opposition to the +scholastic Sorbonne, to be a refuge for the new sciences, and had the +glorious privilege of representing historically the higher speculative +studies, the spirit of free inquiry, and the interests of pure science. +Unfortunately, in the domain of the historical sciences, the College de +France had allowed its traditions to be obliterated up to a certain +point. The great men who taught history in this illustrious institution +(J. Michelet, for example), were not technical experts, nor even men of +learning, in the proper sense of the word. The audiences which they +swayed by their eloquence were not composed of students of history. + +The Faculties of Letters formed part of a system established by the +Napoleonic legislator. This legislator, in creating the Faculties, by no +means entertained the design of encouraging scientific research. He had +no great love for science. The Faculties of Law, of Medicine, and so on, +were intended by him to be professional schools supplying society with +the lawyers, physicians, and so on, which it needs. But three of the +five Faculties were unable, from the beginning, to perform the part +allotted them, while the other two, Law and Medicine, successfully +performed theirs. The Faculties of Catholic Theology did not train the +priests needed by society, because the State consented to the education +of the priests being conducted in the diocesan seminaries. The Faculties +of Sciences and of Letters did not train the professors for secondary +education, the engineers, and so on, needed by society, because they +were here met by the triumphant competition of "special schools" +previously instituted: the Ecole normale, the Ecole polytechnique. The +Faculties of Catholic Theology, of Sciences, and of Letters were +therefore obliged to justify their existence by other modes of activity. +In particular, the professors of history in the Faculties of Letters +could not undertake the instruction of the young men who were destined +to teach history in the _lycees_. Deprived of these special pupils, they +found themselves in a situation analogous to that of those charged with +historical instruction at the College de France. They too were not, as a +rule, technical experts. For half a century they carried on the work of +higher popularisation in lectures delivered to large audiences of +leisured persons (since much abused), who were attracted by the force, +the elegance, and the pleasing style of their diction. + +The function of training the future teachers for secondary education was +reserved for the Ecole normale superieure. Now at this epoch it was an +admitted principle that to be a good secondary teacher it is necessary +for a man to know, and sufficient to know perfectly, the subject he is +charged to teach. The one is certainly necessary, but the other is not +sufficient: knowledge of a different, of a higher, order is no less +indispensable than the regular "scholastic" equipment. At the Ecole +there was never any question of such higher knowledge, but, in +accordance with the prevailing theory, preparation was made for +secondary teaching simply by imparting it. However, as the Ecole normale +has always been excellently recruited, the system in vogue has not +prevented it from numbering among its former pupils men of the first +order, not only as professors, thinkers, or writers, but even as +critical scholars. But it must be recognised that they made their way +for themselves, in spite of the system, not thanks to it, after, not +during, their pupilage, and principally when they had the advantage, +during a stay at the French School at Athens, of the wholesome contact +with documents which they had not enjoyed at the Rue d'Ulm. "Does it not +seem strange," it has been said, "that so many generations of professors +should have been turned out by the Ecole normale incapable of utilising +documents?... Formerly, in short, students of history, on leaving the +Ecole, were not prepared either to teach history, which they had learned +in a great hurry, or to investigate difficult questions."[245] + +As for the Ecole des chartes, which was founded under the Restoration, +it was, from a certain point of view, a special school like the others, +designed in theory to train those useful functionaries, archivists and +librarians. But professional instruction was early reduced to a strict +minimum, and the Ecole des chartes was organised on a very original +plan, with a view to provide a rational and complete apprenticeship for +the young men who proposed to study mediaeval French history. The pupils +of the Ecole des chartes did not follow any course of "mediaeval +history," but they learnt all that is necessary for doing work on the +solution of the still open questions of mediaeval history. Here alone, in +virtue of an accidental anomaly, the subjects which are preliminary and +auxiliary to historical research were systematically taught. We have +already had occasion to note the effects of this circumstance.[246] + +This was the state of affairs when, towards the end of the Second +Empire, a vigorous reform movement set in. Some young Frenchmen had +visited Germany; they had been struck by the superiority of the German +university system over the Napoleonic system of Faculties and special +schools. Certainly France, with its defective organisation, had produced +many men and many works, but it now began to be held that "in all kinds +of enterprises the least possible part should be left to chance," and +that "when an institution proposes to train professors of history and +historians, it ought to supply them with the means of becoming what it +intends them to be." + +M. V. Duruy, minister of Public Education, supported the partisans of a +renaissance of the higher studies. But he did not think it practicable +to interfere, for the purpose either of remodelling, of fusing, or of +suppressing them, with the existing institutions,--the College de +France, the Faculties of Letters, the Ecole normale superieure, the +Ecole des chartes, all of which were consecrated by the services they +had rendered, and by the lustre they received from the eminent men who +had been, or were, connected with them. He changed nothing, he added. He +crowned the somewhat heterogeneous edifice of existing institutions by +the creation of an "Ecole pratique des hautes etudes," which was +established at the Sorbonne in 1868. + +The Ecole pratique des hautes etudes (historical and philological +section) was intended by those who founded it to prepare young men for +research of a scientific character. It was not meant to be subservient +to the interests of the professions, and there was to be no +popularisation. Students were not to go there to learn the results +obtained by science, but, for the same purpose which takes the chemical +student to the laboratory, to be initiated into the technical methods by +which new results can be obtained. Thus the spirit of the new +institution was not without some analogy to that of the primitive +tradition of the College de France. It was endeavoured to do there, for +all the branches of universal history and philology, what had long been +done at the Ecole des chartes for the limited domain of French mediaeval +history. + + +II. As long as the Faculties of Letters were satisfied to be as they +were (that is, without students), and as long as their ambition did not +go beyond their traditional functions (the holding of public lectures, +the conferring of degrees), the organisation of the higher teaching of +the historical sciences in France remained in the condition which we +have described. When the Faculties of Letters began to seek a new +justification for their existence and new functions, changes became +inevitable. + +This is not the place to explain why and how the Faculties of Letters +were led to desire to work more actively, or rather in other ways than +in the past, for the promotion of the historical sciences. M. V. Duruy, +in inaugurating the Ecole des hautes etudes at the Sorbonne, had +declared that this young and vigorous plant would thrust asunder the old +stones; and, without a doubt, the spectacle of the fruitful activity of +the Ecole des hautes etudes has contributed not a little to awaken the +conscience of the Faculties. On the other hand the liberality of the +public authorities, which have increased the _personnel_ of the +Faculties, which have built palaces for them, and liberally endowed them +with the materials required by their work, has imposed new duties on +these privileged institutions. + +It is about twenty-five years since the Faculties of Letters began to +transform themselves, and during this period their progressive +transformation has occasioned changes in the whole fabric of the higher +teaching of historical science in France, which up to that time had +remained unshaken, even by the ingenious addition of 1868. + + +III. The first care of the Faculties was to provide themselves with +students. This was not, to be sure, the main difficulty, for the Ecole +normale superieurs (in which twenty pupils are admitted every year, +chosen from among hundreds of candidates) was no longer sufficient for +the recruiting of the now numerous body of professors engaged in +secondary education. Many young men who had been candidates (along with +the pupils of the Ecole normale superieure) for the degrees which give +access to the scholastic profession, were thrown on their own resources. +Here was an assured supply of students. At the same time the military +laws, by attaching much-prized immunities to the title of _licencie es +lettres_, were calculated to attract to the Faculties, if they prepared +students for the licentiate, a large and very interesting class of young +men. Lastly, the foreigners (so numerous at the Ecole des hautes +etudes), who come to France to complete their scientific education, and +who up to that time were surprised to have no opportunity of profiting +by the Faculties, were sure to go to them as soon as they found there +something analogous to what they had been accustomed to find in the +German universities, and the kind of instruction they wanted. + +Before students in any great number could be taught the way to the +Faculties, great efforts were necessary and several years passed; but it +was after the Faculties obtained the students they desired that the real +problems presented themselves for solution. + +The great majority of the students in the Faculties of Letters have been +originally candidates for degrees, for the licentiate, and for +_agregation_, who entered with the avowed intention of "preparing" for +the licentiate and for _agregation_. The Faculties have not been able to +escape the obligation of helping them in this "preparation." But, twenty +years ago, examinations were still conceived in accordance with ancient +formulae. The licentiate was an attestation of advanced secondary study, +a kind of "higher baccalaureate"; for the _agregation_ in the classes of +history and geography (which became the real _licentia docendi_), the +candidates were required to show that they "had a very good knowledge of +the subjects they would be charged to teach." Henceforth there was a +danger lest the teaching of the Faculties, which must, like that of the +Ecole normale superieure, be preparatory for the examinations for the +licentiate and for _agregation_, should be compelled by the force of +circumstances to assume the same character. Note that a certain +emulation could not fail to arise between the pupils of the Ecole +normale and those of the Faculties in the competitions for _agregation_. +The _agregation_ programmes being what they were, this emulation seemed +likely to have the result of engaging the rival teachers and students +more and more in school work, not of a scientific kind, equally devoid +of dignity and real utility. + +The danger was very serious. It was perceived from the first by those +clear-sighted promoters of the reform of the Faculties, MM. A. Dumont, +L. Liard, E. Lavisse. M. Lavisse wrote in 1884: "To maintain that the +Faculties have for their chief object the preparation for examinations +is to substitute drill for scientific culture: this is the serious +grievance which able men have against the partisans of innovation.... +The partisans of innovation reply that they have seen the drawbacks of +the new departure from the beginning, but that they are convinced that a +modification of the examination-system will follow the reform of higher +education; that a reconciliation will be found between scientific work +and the preparation for examinations; and that thus the only grievance +their opponents have against them will fall to the ground." It is only +doing justice to the foremost champion of reform to acknowledge that he +was never tired of insisting on the weak point; and in order to convince +oneself that the _examination question_ has always been considered the +key-stone of the problem of the organisation of higher education in +France, it is only necessary to look through the speeches and the +articles entitled "Education and Examinations," "Examinations and +Study," "Study and Examinations," &c., which M. Lavisse has collected in +his three volumes published at intervals of five years from 1885 +onwards: _Questions d'enseignement national, Etudes et etudiants, A +propos de nos ecoles._ + +Thus the question of the reform of the examinations connected with +higher education (licentiate, _agregation_, doctorate) has been placed +on the order of the day. It was then in 1884; it is still there in 1897. +But, during the interval, visible progress has been made in the +direction which we consider the right one, and now a solution seems +near. + + +IV. The old examination-system required candidates for degrees to show +that they had received an excellent secondary education. As it condemned +those candidates, students receiving higher instruction, to exercises of +the same kind as those of which they had already had their fill in the +_lycees_, it was a simple matter to attack it. It was defended feebly, +and has been demolished. + +But how was it to be replaced? The problem was very complex. Is it any +wonder that it was not solved at a stroke? + +First of all, it was important to come to an agreement on this +preliminary question: What are the capacities and what is the knowledge +students should be required to give proof of possessing? General +knowledge? Technical knowledge and the capacity of doing original +research (as at the Ecole des chartes and the Ecole des hautes etudes)? +Pedagogic capacity? It came gradually to be recognised that, considering +the great extent and variety of the class from which the students are +drawn, it is necessary to draw distinctions. + +From candidates for the licentiate it is enough to require that they +should give proof of good general culture, permitting them at the same +time, if they wish, to show that they have a taste for, and some +experience in, original research. + +From the candidates for _agregation_ (_licentia docendi_) who have +already obtained the licentiate, there will be required (1) formal proof +that they know, by experience, what it is to study an historical +problem, and that they have the technical knowledge necessary for such +studies; (2) proof of pedagogic capacity, which is a professional +necessity for this class. + +The students who are not candidates for anything, neither for the +licentiate nor for _agregation_, and who are simply seeking to obtain +scientific initiation--the old programmes did not contemplate the +existence of such a class of students--will merely be required to prove +that they have profited by the tuition and the advice they have +received. + +This settled, a great stride has been made. For programmes, as we know, +regulate study. By virtue of the authority of the programmes historical +studies in the Faculties will now have the threefold character which it +is desirable that they should have. General culture will not cease to be +held in honour. Technical exercises in criticism and research will have +their legitimate place. Lastly, pedagogy (theoretical and practical) +will not be neglected. + +The difficulties begin when it is attempted to determine the tests +which, in each department, are the best, that is, the most conclusive. +On this subject opinions differ. Though no one now contests the +principles, the modes of application which have hitherto been tried or +suggested do not meet with unanimous approval. The organisation of the +licentiate has been revised three times; the statute relating to the +_agregation_ in history has been reformed or amended five times. And +this is not the end. New simplifications are imperative. But what is the +importance of this instability--of which, however, complaints begin to +be heard[247]--if it is established, as we believe it is, that progress +towards a better state of things has been continuous through all these +changes, without any notable retrogression? + +There is no need to explain here in detail the different transitory +systems which have been put into practice. We have had occasion to +criticise them elsewhere.[248] Now that most of what we objected to has +been abolished, what is the use of reviving old controversies? We shall +not even mention the points in which the present system seems to us to +be still capable of improvement, for there is reason to hope that it +will soon be modified, and in a very satisfactory manner. Let it suffice +to say that the Faculties now confer a new diploma, the _Diplome +d'etudes superieures_, which all the students have a right to seek, but +which the candidates for _agregation_ are obliged to obtain. This +diploma of higher studies, analogous to that of the Ecole des hautes +etudes, the _brevet_ of the Ecole des chartes, and the doctorate in +philosophy at the German universities, is given to those students of +history who, qualified by a certain academical standing, have passed an +examination in which the principal tests are, besides questions on the +"sciences" auxiliary to historical research, the composition and the +defence of an original monograph. Every one now recognises that "the +examination for the diploma of studies will yield excellent fruit, if +the vigilance and conscientiousness of examiners maintain it at its +proper value."[249] + + +V. To sum up, the attractions of preparation for degrees have brought +the Faculties a host of students. But, under the old system of +examinations for the licentiate and for _agregation_, preparation for +degrees was a task which did not harmonise very well with the work which +the Faculties deemed suitable for themselves, useful to their pupils, +and advantageous to science. The examination-system has therefore been +perseveringly reformed, not without difficulty, into conformity with a +certain ideal of what the higher teaching of history ought to be. The +result is that the Faculties have taken rank among the institutions +which contribute to the positive progress of the historical sciences. An +enumeration of the works which have appeared under their auspices during +the last few years would, if necessary, bear witness to the fact. + +This evolution has already produced satisfactory results, and will +produce more if it goes on as well as it has begun. To begin with, the +transformation of historical instruction in the Faculties has brought +about a corresponding transformation at the Ecole normale superieure. +The Ecole normale has also, for two years, been awarding a "_Diplome +d'etudes_"; original researches, pedagogic exercises, and general +culture are encouraged there in the same degree as by the new Faculties. +It now differs from the Faculties only in being a close institution, +recruited under certain precautions; practically it is a Faculty like +the others, but with a small number of select students. Secondly, the +Ecole des hautes etudes and the Ecole des chartes, both of which will be +installed at the end of 1897, in the renovated Sorbonne, have still +their justification for existence; for many specialists are represented +at the Ecole des hautes etudes which are not, and doubtless never will +be, represented in the Faculties; and, in the case of the studies +bearing on mediaeval history, the body of converging instruction given at +the Ecole des chartes will always be incomparable. But the old +antagonism between the Ecole des hautes etudes and the Ecole des chartes +on the one hand, and the Faculties on the other, has disappeared. All +these institutions, lately so dissimilar, will henceforth co-operate for +the purpose of carrying on a common work in a common spirit. Each of +these retains its name, its autonomy, and its traditions; but together +they form a whole: the historical section of an ideal University of +Paris, much vaster than the one which was sanctioned by the law in 1896. +Of this "greater" University, the Ecole des chartes, the Ecole des +hautes etudes, the Ecole normale superieure, and the whole body of +historical instruction given by the Faculty of Letters, are now +practically so many independent "_instituts_." + + + + +INDEX OF PROPER NAMES + + +Abd-el-Kader, 282 + +Aimo, 158 + +Alexander the Great, 272 + +Alphonse of Poitiers, 227 + +Altamira, R., 328 + +Anselme, Pere, 303 + +Ariovistus, 222 + +Aristophanes, 171 + +Aristotle, 44 + +Athenaeus, 300 + + +Bacon, Francis, 291 + +Bancroft, H. H., 19, 20, 22, 31 + +Barthelemy, Abbe, 301 + +Bast, F. J., 78 + +Bedier, J., 85, 112 + +Bernheim, E., 6, 7, 10, 13, 38, 56, 74, 91, 99, 100, 156, 182, 198, +237, 297 + +Blanchere, R., de la, 319 + +Blass, F., 74, 78, 79, 89, 92 + +Bodin, Jean, 44 + +Boeckh, A., 107, 152 + +Boehmer, J. F., 106 + +Bollandists, Society of, 35 + +Bonaventura, St., 88, 90 + +Bouche-Leclercq, A., 158 + +Boucherie, A., 113 + +Bourdeau, L., 275 + +Boutaric, E., 227 + +Boyce, W. B., 1 + +Brequigny, L. G. O. F. de, 106 + +Broglie, E. de, 29 + +Brugiere de Barante, A. G. P., 301 + +Brunetiere, F., 113 + +Buchez, P. J. B., 1 + +Buehler, G., 56 + + +Caesar, Julius, 44, 194, 197, 218, 220, 222, 245 + +Cagnat, R., 57 + +Cantu, C., 311 + +Carlyle, Thomas, 132, 230, 303 + +Champollion, F., 48 + +Charles IX. of France, 168, 186 + +Chasles, M., 88 + +Chateaubriand, F. A. de, 72, 301 + +Chemosh, the god, 212 + +Cherot, H., 7 + +Chevalier, U., 5, 7 + +Chladenius, J. M., 6 + +Cicero, 44, 108 + +Cleopatra, 88, 248 + +Clovis, 158, 220, 223, 301 + +Cobet, C. C., 78 + +Coulanges, Fustel de, 1, 9, 10, 64, 140, 144, +148, 149, 150, 158, 170, 215, 216, 230 + +Cournot, A. A., 246, 249 + +Cousin, V., 286, 287 + +Curtius, G., 230, 314 + + +Daniel, Pere, 303 + +Daremberg, C. V., 308 + +Darius Hystaspes, 151 + +Daunou, P. C. F., 5, 6, 43, 47, 54, 55 + +Delisle, L., 23, 97 + +Deloche, J. E. M., 148 + +Demosthenes, 171 + +Dezobry, C. L., 302 + +Droysen, J. G., 3, 5, 7, 10, 106, 156, 158, 286, 314 + +Du Cange, C. du F., 105, 136, 148 + +Dumont, A., 341 + +Duruy, V., 327, 338, 339 + + +Ebers, G., 301 + +Edward VI. of England, 249 + +Egger, E., 108 + +Eginhard, 94 + +Ephorus, 298 + +Eusebius, 298 + + +Feillet, A., 162 + +Feugere, L., 105, 136 + +Fisher, H. A. L., 125 + +Flaubert, G., 5, 32, 304, 319 + +Flint, R., 2, 6, 8, 285 + +France, A., 319 + +Fredegonda, 197 + +Freeman, E. A., 5, 7, 10, 46 + +Froissart, Jean, 19 + +Froude, J. A., 125, 126 + + +Geiger, W., 56 + +Gellius, Aulus, 300 + +Georgisch, P., 106 + +Giannone, Pietro, 104 + +Gibbon, E., 44 + +Gilbert, Gustav, 309 + +Giry, A., 57 + +Glasson, E., 149 + +Goethe, J. W. von, 19, 319 + +Gow, J., 75 + +Graux, C., 123 + +Gregory of Corinth, 78 + +Gregory of Tours, 144, 146, 158, 180, 198, 256 + +Groeber, G., 57, 310 + +Grote, G., 183, 310 + +Grotius, Hugo, 44 + +Guicciardini, Francesco, 44 + +Guiraud, P., 230 + + +Hagen, H., 78 + +Hardouin, Pere, 99 + +Harnack, A., 309 + +Havet, Julien, 12, 56, 97, 123, 128 + +Havet, Louis, 12 + +Haureau, B., 84, 111, 118, 123 + +Hegel, G. W. F., 286 + +Henry VIII. of England, 249 + +Henry II. of France, 292 + +Henry, V., 289 + +Herodotus, 44, 171, 179, 197 + +Horace, 99 + +Hoveden, John, 88 + +Hroswitha, 99 + +Hugo, Victor, 88, 89 + +Hume, D., 44 + + +Jaffe, P., 106 + +Jameson, J. F., 136 + +Jerome, St., 112 + +Jesus Christ, 188 + +Joan of Arc, 188 + +John, King of England, 187 + +Jullian, C., 297 + + +Krumbacher, K., 309 + +Kuhn, E., 56 + + +Lacombe, T., 2, 233, 241, 277, 288 + +Lamprecht, K., 230, 247, 284, 290, 314 + +Langlois, Ch. V., 19, 38, 111, 135, 192, 345 + +Lasch, B., 68 + +Laurent, F., 285 + +Lavisse, E., 134, 328, 333, 337, 341, 342 + +Lavoisier, A. L., 302 + +Leibnitz, G. W., 121, 122 + +Lee, Sidney, 308 + +Le Moyne, Pere, 7 + +Lenglet de Fresnoy, N., 6 + +Leonardo da Vinci, 88, 89 + +Liard, L., 335, 341 + +Lindner, T., 81 + +Lindsay, W. M., 78, 79, 84 + +Livy, 44, 178, 180, 233, 297, 298 + +Locke, John, 44 + +Loebell, J. W., 180 + +Lorenz, O., 10 + +Loudun, the nuns of, 208 + +Louis VIII. of France, 187 + +Louis of Granada, 88 + +Luard, H. R., 98 + +Luther, Martin, 203 + + +Mably, G. B. De, 43, 44 + +Macaulay, Lord, 303 + +Macchiavelli, N., 44 + +Madvig, J. N., 78 + +Mariani, L., 4 + +Marquardt, J., 309 + +Marselli, N., 2 + +Mary Magdalene, St., 88 + +Mary, Queen, 249 + +Matthew of Paris, 98 + +Matthew of Westminster, 97 + +Mayr, J. von, 274 + +Merimee, P., 301 + +Mesha Inscription, the, 212 + +Meusel, H., 148 + +Meyer, E., 158 + +Meyer, P., 29 + +Mezeray, F. E. de, 298 + +Michelet, J., 230, 271, 286, 287, 301, 303, 327, 336 + +Moeller, W., 309 + +Mommsen, T., 108, 118, 230, 286, 309, 314 + +Monod, G., 100, 144, 297, 302 + +Montesquieu, C. de S., 44, 257, 284, 299 + +Montfaucon, Pere Bernard de, 29 + +Montgomery, Gabriel de, 292 + +Mortet, Ch. and V., 11 + +Mourin, E., 302 + +Mueller, I. von, 56, 74, 310 + +Mylaeus, 6 + + +Napoleon I., 26, 282 + +Newton, Isaac, 302 + +Niebuhr, B. G., 158, 182 + +Nietzsche, F., 319 + +Nitzsch, C. W., 180 + + +Oncken, W., 311 + +Orosius, 298 + +Ossian, 91 + +Otto I., 175 + + +Paris, G., 309 + +Patrizzi, Francesco, 6 + +Pattison, Mark, 115 + +Paul, H., 75, 310 + +Pauly, A., 308 + +Pausanias, 74 + +Peckham, John, 88 + +Peiresc, N. F. C. de, 22 + +Pflugk-Harttung, J. von, 10, 130 + +Philippi, A., 129 + +Piaget, A., 91 + +Pisistratus, 207 + +Plato, 153 + +Plutarch, 44, 297 + +Polybius, 44, 279, 297 + +Potthast, A., 106 + +Prou, M., 57 + + +Ranke, L., 140, 286 + +Raynal, J., 44 + +Reinach, S., 75, 79 + +Renan, E., 9, 29, 30, 40, 105, 114, 119, 122, 132, 134, 183 + +Retz, Cardinal de, 44, 162, 169 + +Rilliet, A., 162 + +Robertson, J. M., 115, 241 + +Robertson, W., 44 + +Rocholl, R., 285 + +Rousseau, J. J., 44 + +Rulhiere, C. C. de, 44 + + +Saglio, E., 308 + +Saint-Simon, C. H. de, 251 + +Sallust, 44 + +Sanchoniathon, 91 + +Schiller, J. C. F. von, 162 + +Schlosser, F. C., 311 + +Schoemann, G. F., 309 + +Seguier, J. F., 109 + +Seignobos, Ch., 11, 66, 196, 257, 333, 334 + +Seneca, 78 + +Sforza, Ludovico, 282 + +Sickel, T. von, 56 + +Simmel, G., 217 + +Smedt, Pere de, 10, 156, 207, 254 + +Spencer, Herbert, 287 + +Stephen, Leslie, 308 + +Stubbe, W., 10 + +Suetonius, 94 + +Suger, Abbot, 170 + +Suidas, 158 + +Sully, M., 169 + +Surville, Clotilde de, 91 + + +Tacitus, 44, 141, 144, 171, 177, 194, 233, 256 + +Taine, H. A., 140, 143, 247, 286 + +Tardif, A., 5, 7, 156 + +Taylor, J., 75 + +Thierry, Augustin, 98, 140, 230, 259, 265, 301, 302, 303 + +Thomas, A., 73 + +Thucydides, 19, 44, 158, 183, 197, 297 + +Tobler, A., 75 + +Tschudi, J. H., 162, 171 + +Turenne, H. de la T. d'A., 162 + + +Vercingetorix, 88 + +Vergil, 84, 99 + +Vertot, R. A. de, 44 + +Villemarque, H. de, 181 + +Vincent de Paul, St. 326 + +Voltaire, F. M. A. de, 44, 299 + +Vrain-Lucas, 88 + + +Waitz, G., 110, 118 + +Wallace, A. R., 207 + +Waltzing, J. P., 108 + +Wattenbach, W., 73 + +Wauters, A. C., 106 + +Weber, G., 311 + +Wegele, F. X. von, 122, 297 + +Wendover, Roger de, 98 + +Wissowa, G., 308 + +Wittekind, 175 + +Wright, T., 84 + + +Xenophon, 44 + + +Zumpt, A. W., 108 + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] W. B. Boyce, "Introduction to the Study of History, Civil, +Ecclesiastical, and Literary," London, 1894, 8vo. + +[2] For example, P. J. B. Buches, in his _Introduction a la science de +l'histoire_, Paris, 1842, 2 vols. 8vo. + +[3] The history of the attempts which have been made to understand and +explain philosophically the history of humanity has been undertaken, as +is well known, by Robert Flint. Mr. Flint has already given the history +of the Philosophy of History in French-speaking countries: "Historical +Philosophy in France and French Belgium and Switzerland," Edinburgh and +London, 1893, 8vo. It is the first volume of the expanded re-edition of +his "History of the Philosophy of History in Europe," published +twenty-five years ago. Compare the retrospective (or historical) part of +the work of N. Marselli, _La scienza della storia_, i., Torino, 1873. + +The most important original work which has appeared in France since the +publication of the analytical repertory of R. Flint is that of P. +Lacombe, _De l'histoire consideree comme science_, Paris, 1894, 8vo. Cf. +_Revue Critique_, 1895, i. p. 132. + +[4] _Revue Critique d'histoire et de litterature_, 1892, i. p. 164. + +[5] _Revue Critique d'histoire et de litterature_, 1888, ii. p. 295. Cf. +_Le Moyen Age_, x. (1897), p. 91: "These books [treatises on historical +method] are seldom read by those to whom they might be useful, amateurs +who devote their leisure to historical research; and as to professed +scholars, it is from their masters' lessons that they have learnt to +know and handle the tools of their trade, leaving out of consideration +the fact that the method of history is the same as that of the other +sciences of observation, the gist of which can be stated in a few words. + +[6] In accordance with the principle that historical method can only be +taught by example, L. Mariani has given the humorous title _Corso +pratico di metodologia della storia_ to a dissertation on a detail in +the history of Fermo. See the _Archivio della Societa romana di storia +patria_, xiii. (1890), p. 211. + +[7] See an account of Freeman's work, "The Methods of Historical Study," +in the _Revue Critique_, 1887, i. p. 376. This work, says the critic, is +empty and commonplace. We learn from it "that history is not so easy a +study as many fondly imagine, that it has points of contact with all the +sciences, and that the historian truly worthy of the name ought to know +everything; that historical certitude is unattainable, and that, in +order to make the nearest approach to it, it is necessary to have +constant recourse to the original sources; that it is necessary to know +and use the best modern historians, but never to take their word for +gospel. That is all." He concludes: Freeman "without a doubt taught +historical method far better by example than he ever succeeded in doing +by precept." + +Compare _Bouvard et Pecuchet_, by G. Flaubert. Here we have two +simpletons who, among other projects, propose to write history. In order +to help them, one of their friends sends them (p. 156) "rules of +criticism taken from the _Cours_ of Daunou," such as: "It is no proof to +appeal to rumour and common opinion; the witnesses cannot appear. Reject +impossibilities: Pausanias was shown the stone swallowed by Saturn. Keep +in mind the skill of forgers, the interest of apologists and +calumniators." Daunou's work contains a number of truisms quite as +obvious, and still more comic than the above. + +[8] Flint (ibid. p. 15) congratulates himself on not having to study the +literature of _Historic_, for "a very large portion of it is so trivial +and superficial that it can hardly ever have been of use even to persons +of the humblest capacity, and may certainly now be safely confined to +kindly oblivion." Nevertheless, Flint has given in his book a summary +list of the principal works of this kind published in French-speaking +countries from the earliest times. A more general and complete account +(though still a summary one) of the literature of this subject in all +countries is furnished by the _Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_ of E. +Bernheim (Leipzig, 1894, 8vo), pp. 143 _sqq._ Flint (who was acquainted +with several works unknown to Bernheim) stops at 1893, Bernheim at 1894. +Since 1889 the _Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft_ have +contained a periodical account of recent works on historical +methodology. + +[9] This seventh volume was published in 1844. But Daunou's celebrated +_Cours_ was delivered at the College de France in the years 1819-30. + +[10] The Italians of the Renaissance (Mylaens, Francesco Patrizzi, and +others), and after them the writers of the last two centuries, ask what +is the relation of history to dialectic and rhetoric; to how many laws +the historical branch of literature is subject; whether it is right for +the historian to relate treasons, acts of cowardice, crimes, disorders; +whether history is entitled to use any style other than the sublime; and +so on. The only books on _Historic_, published before the nineteenth +century, which give evidence of any original effort to attack the real +difficulties, are those of Lenglet de Fresnoy (_Methode pour etudier +l'histoire_, Paris, 1713), and of J. M. Chladenius (_Allgemeine +Geschichtswissenschaft_, Leipzig, 1752). The work of Chladenius has been +noticed by Bernheim (ibid. p. 166). + +[11] He has not always shown even good sense, for, in the _Cours +d'etudes historiques_ (vii. p. 105), where he treats of a work, _De_ +_l'histoire_, published in 1670 by Pere Le Moyne, a feeble production, +to say the least, bearing evident traces of senility, he expresses +himself as follows: "I cannot adopt all the maxims and precepts +contained in this treatise; but I believe that, after that of Lucian, it +is the best we have yet seen, and I greatly doubt whether any of those +whose acquaintance we have still to make has risen to the same height of +philosophy and originality." Pere H. Cherot has given a sounder estimate +of the treatise _De l'histoire_ in his _Etude sur la vie et les +oeuvres du P. Le Moyne_ (Paris, 1887, 8vo), pp. 406 _sqq._ + +[12] Bernheim declares, however (ibid. p. 177), that this little work +is, in his opinion, the only one which stands at the present level of +science. + +[13] Flint says very well (ibid. p. 15): "The course of Historic has +been, on the whole, one of advance from commonplace reflection on +history towards a philosophical comprehension of the conditions and +processes on which the formation of historical science depends. + +[14] By P. Guiraud, in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, March 1896, p. 75. + +[15] Renan has said some of the truest and best things that have ever +been said on the historical sciences in _L'Avenir de la science_ (Paris, +1890, 8vo), written in 1848. + +[16] Some of the most ingenious, some of the most logical, and some of +the most widely applicable observations, on the method of the historical +sciences, have so far appeared, not in books on methodology, but in the +reviews--of which the _Revue Critique d'histoire et de litterature_ is +the type--devoted to the criticism of new works of history and +erudition. It is a very useful exercise to run through the file of the +_Revue Critique_, founded, at Paris, in 1867, "to enforce respect for +method, to execute justice upon bad books, to check misdirected and +superfluous work." + +[17] The first edition of the _Lehrbuch_ is dated 1889. + +[18] The best work that has hitherto been published (in French) on +historical method is a pamphlet by MM. Ch. and V. Mortet, _La Science de +l'histoire_ (Paris, 1894, 8vo), 88 pp., extracted from vol. xx. of the +_Grande Encyclopedie_. + +[19] One of us, M. Seignobos, proposes to publish later on a complete +treatise of Historical Methodology, if there appears to be a public for +this class of work. + +[20] It cannot be too often stated that the study of history, as it is +prosecuted at school, does not presuppose the same aptitudes as the same +study when prosecuted at the university or in after life. Julien Havet, +who afterwards devoted himself to the (critical) study of history, found +history wearisome at school. "I believe," says M. L. Havet, "that the +teaching of history [in schools] is not organised in such a manner as to +provide sufficient nourishment for the scientific spirit.... Of all the +studies comprised in our school curricula, history is the only one in +which the pupil is not being continually called upon to verify +something. When he is learning Latin or German, every sentence in a +translation requires him to verify a dozen different rules. In the +various branches of mathematics the results are never divorced from +their proofs; the _problems_, too, compel the pupil to think through the +whole for himself. Where are the _problems_ in history, and what +schoolboy is ever trained to gain by independent effort an insight into +the interconnection of events?" (_Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des chartes_, +1896, p. 84). + +[21] M. Langlois wrote Book I., Book II. as far at Chapter VI., the +second Appendix, and this Preface; M. Seignobos the end of Book II., +Book III., and the first Appendix. Chapter I. in the second book, +Chapter V. of the third book, and the Conclusion, were written in +common. + +[22] In practice one does not as a rule resolve to treat a point of +history before knowing whether there are or are not documents in +existence which enable it to be studied. On the contrary, it is the +accidental discovery of a document which suggests the idea of thoroughly +elucidating the point of history to which it relates, and thus leads to +the collection, for this purpose, of other documents of the same class. + +[23] It is pitiable to see how the best of the early scholars struggled +bravely, but vainly, to solve problems which would not even have existed +for them if their collections had not been so incomplete. This lack of +material was a disadvantage for which the most brilliant ingenuity could +not compensate. + +[24] "How hard it is to gain the means whereby we mount to the sources" +(Goethe, _Faust_, i. 3). + +[25] See C. V. Langlois, _H. H. Bancroft et Cie._, in the _Revue +universitaire_, 1894, i. p. 233. + +[26] The earlier scholars were conscious of the unfavourable character +of the conditions under which they worked. They suffered keenly from the +insufficiency of the instruments of research and the means of +comparison. Most of them made great efforts to obtain information. Hence +these voluminous correspondences between scholars of the last few +centuries, of which our libraries preserve so many precious fragments, +and these accounts of scientific searches, of journeys undertaken for +the discovery of historical documents, which, under the name of _Iter_ +(_Iter Italicum_, _Iter Germanicum_, &c.), were formerly fashionable. + +[27] We may remark, in passing, a delusion which is childish enough but +very natural, and very common among collectors: they all tend to +exaggerate the intrinsic value of the documents they possess, simply +because they themselves are the possessors. Documents have been +published with a sumptuous array of commentaries by persons who had +accidentally acquired them, and who would, quite rightly, have attached +no importance to them if they had met with them in public collections. +This is, we may add, merely a manifestation, in a somewhat crude form, +of a general tendency against which it is always necessary to guard: a +man readily exaggerates the importance of the documents he possesses, +the documents he has discovered, the texts he has edited, the persons +and the questions he has studied. + +[28] See L. Delisle, _Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque +nationale_, Paris, 1868-81, 3 vols. 4to. The histories of ancient +depositories of documents, which have been recently published in +considerable number, have been modelled on this admirable work. + +[29] Many of the ancient documents still in circulation are the proceeds +of ancient thefts from state institutions. The precautions now taken +against a recurrence of such depredations are stringent, and, in nearly +every instance, as effective as could be desired. + +As to modern (printed) documents, the rule of legal deposit [compulsory +presentation of copies to specified libraries], which has now been +adopted by nearly all civilised countries, guarantees their preservation +in public institutions. + +[30] It is known that Napoleon I. entertained the chimerical design of +concentrating at Paris the archives of the whole of Europe, and that, +for a beginning, he conveyed to that city the archives of the Vatican, +the Holy Roman Empire, the crown of Castile, and others, which later on +the French were compelled to restore. Confiscation is now out of the +question. But the ancient archives of the notaries might be centralised +everywhere, as in some countries they are already, in public +institutions. It is not easy to explain why at Paris the departments of +Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Marine preserve ancient papers whose +natural place would be at the Archives Nationales. A great many more +anomalies of this kind might be mentioned, which in certain cases +impede, where they do not altogether preclude, research; for the small +collections, whose existence is not required, are precisely those whose +regulations are the most oppressive. + +[31] The international exchange of documents is worked in Europe +(without charge to the public) by the agency of the various Foreign +Offices. Besides this, most of the great institutions have agreements +with each other for mutual loans; this system is as sure and sometimes +more rapid in its operation than the diplomatic system. The question of +lending original documents for use outside the institution where they +are preserved has of late years been frequently mooted at congresses of +historians and librarians. The results so far obtained are eminently +satisfactory. + +[32] These are sometimes large collections of formidable bulk; it is +more natural to undertake the cataloguing of small accumulations which +demand less labor. It is for the same reason that many insignificant but +short cartularies have been published, while several cartularies of the +highest importance, being voluminous, have still to be edited. + +[33] See his autobibliography, published by E. de Broglie, _Bernard de +Montfaucon et les Bernardins_, ii. (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. 323. + +[34] E. Renan, _L'Avenir de la science_, p. 217. + +[35] _Romania_, xxi. (1892), p. 625. + +[36] In the passage quoted above. + +[37] Mr. H. H. Bancroft, in his Memoirs, entitled "Literary Industries" +(New York, 1891, 16mo), analyses with sufficient minuteness some +practical consequences of the imperfection of the methods of research. +He considers the case of an industrious writer proposing to write the +history of California. He easily procures a few books, reads them, takes +notes; these books refer him to others, which he consults in the public +libraries of the city where he resides. Several years are passed in this +manner, at the end of which he perceives that he has not a tenth part of +the resources in his hands; he travels, maintains correspondences, but, +finally despairing of exhausting the subject, he comforts his conscience +and pride with the reflection that he has done much, and that many of +the works he has not seen, like many of those he has, are probably of +very slight historic value. As to newspapers and the myriads of United +States government reports, all of them containing facts bearing on +Californian history; being a sane man, he has never dreamed of searching +them from beginning to end: he has turned over a few of them, that is +all; he knows that each of these fields of research would afford a +labour of several years, and that all of them would fill the better part +of his life with drudgery. As for oral testimony and manuscripts, he +will gather a few unpublished anecdotes in chance conversations; he will +obtain access to a few family papers; all this will appear in his book +as notes and authorities. Now and again he will get hold of a few +documentary curiosities among the state archives, but as it would take +fifteen years to master the whole collection, he will naturally be +content to glean a little here and there. Then he begins to write. He +does not feel called upon to inform the public that he has not seen +_all_ the documents; on the contrary, he makes the most of what he has +been able to procure in the course of twenty-five years of industrious +research. + +[38] Some dispense with personal search by invoking the assistance of +the functionaries charged with the administration of depositories of +documents; the indispensable search is, in these cases, conducted by the +functionaries instead of by the public. Cf. _Bouvard et Pecuchet_, p. +158. Bouvard and Pecuchet resolve to write the life of the Duke of +Angouleme; for this purpose "they determined to spend several days at +the municipal library of Caen to make researches. The librarian placed +general histories and pamphlets at their disposal...." + +[39] These considerations have already been presented and developed in +the _Revue universitaire_, 1894, i. p. 321 _sqq._ + +[40] It is well known that, since the opening of the Papal Archives, +several governments and learned societies have established Institutes at +Rome, the members of which are, for the most part, occupied in +cataloguing and making known the documents of these archives, in +co-operation with the functionaries of the Vatican. The French School at +Rome, the Austrian Institute, the Prussian Institute, the Polish +Mission, the Institute of the "Goerresgesellschaft," Belgian, Danish, +Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and other scholars, have performed, and +are performing, cataloguing work of considerable extent in the archives +of the Vatican. + +[41] Catalogues of documents sometimes, but not always, mention the fact +that such and such a document has been edited, dealt with critically, +utilised. The generally received rule is that the compiler mentions +circumstances of this kind when he is aware of them, without imposing on +himself the enormous task of ascertaining the truth on this head[sic] in +every instance where he is ignorant of it. + +[42] E. Bernheim, _Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_, 2nd ed., pp. +196-202. + +[43] C. V. Langlois, _Manuel de Bibliographie historique_: I. +_Instruments bibliographiques_, Paris, 1896, 16mo. + +[44] E. Renan, _Feuilles detachees_ (Paris, 1892, 8vo), pp. 96 _sqq._ + +[45] vii. p. 228 _sqq._ + +[46] E. A. Freeman, _The Methods of Historical Study_ (London, 1885, +8vo), p. 45. + +In France geography has long been regarded as a science closely related +to history. An _Agregation_, which combines history and geography, +exists at the present day, and in the _lycees_ history and geography are +taught by the same professors. Many people persist in asserting the +legitimacy of this combination, and even take umbrage when it is +proposed to separate two branches of knowledge united, as they say, by +many essential connecting links. But it would be hard to find any good +reason, or any facts of experience, to prove that a professor of +history, or an historian, is so much the better the more he knows of +geology, oceanography, climatology, and the whole group of geographical +sciences. In fact, it is with some impatience, and to no immediate +advantage, that students of history work through the courses of +geography which their curricula force upon them; and those students who +have a real taste for geography would be very glad to throw history +overboard. The artificial union of history with geography dates back, in +France, to an epoch when geography was an ill-defined and ill-arranged +subject, regarded by all as a negligeable branch of study. It is a relic +of antiquity that we ought to get rid of at once. + +[47] "Historiography" is a branch of the "History of Literature;" it is +the sum of the results obtained by the critics who have hitherto studied +ancient historical writings, such as annals, memoirs, chronicles, +biographies, and so forth. + +[48] This is only true under reservation; there is an instrument of +research which is indispensable to all historians, to all students, +whatever be the subject of their special study. History, moreover, is +here in the same situation as the majority of the other sciences: all +who prosecute original research, of whatever kind, need to know several +living languages, those of countries where men think and work, of +countries which, from the point of view of science, stand in the +forefront of contemporary civilisation. + +In our days the cultivation of the sciences is not confined to any +single country, or even to Europe. It is international. All problems, +the same problems, are being studied everywhere simultaneously. It is +difficult to-day, and to-morrow it will be impossible, to find a subject +which can be treated without taking cognisance of works in a foreign +language. Henceforth, for ancient history, Greek and Roman, a knowledge +of German will be as imperative as a knowledge of Greek and Latin. +Questions of strictly local history are the only ones still accessible +to those who do not possess the key to foreign literatures. The great +problems are beyond their reach, for the wretched and ridiculous reason +that works on these problems in any language but their own are sealed +books to them. + +Total ignorance of the languages which have hitherto been the ordinary +vehicles of science (German, English, French, Italian) is a disease +which age renders incurable. It would not be exacting too much to +require every candidate for a scientific profession to be at least +_trilinguis_--that is, to be able to understand, fairly easily, two +languages besides his mother-tongue. This is a requirement to which +scholars were not subject formerly, when Latin was still the common +language of learned men, but which the conditions of modern scientific +work will henceforth cause to press with increasing weight upon the +scholars of every country.[*] + +[*] Perhaps a day will come when it will be necessary to know the most +important Slavonic language; there are already scholars who are setting +themselves to learn Russian. The idea of restoring Latin to its old +position of universal language is chimerical. See the file of the +_Phoenix, seu nuntius latinus universalis_ (London, 1891, 4to). + +The French scholars who are unable to read German and English are +thereby placed in a position of permanent inferiority as compared with +their better instructed colleagues in France and abroad; whatever their +merit, they are condemned to work with insufficient means of +information, to work badly. They know it. They do their best to hide +their infirmity, as something to be ashamed of, except when they make a +cynical parade of it and boast of it; but this boasting, as we can +easily see, is only shame showing itself in a different way. Too much +stress cannot be laid upon the fact that a practical knowledge of +foreign languages is auxiliary in the first degree to all historical +work, as indeed it is to scientific work in general. + +[49] When the "auxiliary sciences" were first inserted in the curricula +of French universities, it was observed that some students whose special +subject was the French Revolution, and who had no interest whatever in +the middle ages, took up palaeography as an "auxiliary science," and that +some students of geography, who were in no way interested in antiquity, +took up epigraphy. Evidently they had failed to understand that the +study of the "auxiliary sciences" is recommended, not as an end in +itself, but because it is of practical utility to those who devote +themselves to certain special subjects. See the _Revue universitaire_, +1895, ii. p. 123. + +[50] On this point note the opinions of T. von Sickel and J. Havet, +quoted in the _Bibliotheque l'Ecole des chartes_, 1896, p. 87. In 1854 +the Austrian Institute "fuer oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung" was +organised on the model of the French Ecole des chartes. Another +institution of the same type has lately been created in the "Istituto di +studi superiori" at Florence. "We are accustomed," we read in England, +"to hear the complaint that there is not in this country any institution +resembling the Ecole des chartes" (_Quarterly Review_, July 1896, p. +122). + +[51] This is a suitable place to enumerate the principal "manuals" +published in the last twenty-five years. But a list of them, ending at +1894, will be found in Bernheim's _Lehrbuch_, pp. 206 sqq. We will only +refer to the great "manuals" of "Philology" (in the comprehensive sense +of the German "Philologie," which includes the history of language and +literature, epigraphy, palaeography, and all that pertains to textual +criticism) now in course of publication: the _Grundriss far +indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde_, edited by G. Buehler; the +_Grundriss der iranischen Philologie_, edited by W. Geiger and E. Kuhn; +the _Handbuch der classichen Altertumswissenschaft_, edited by I. von +Mueller; the _Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, edited by H. Paul, +the second edition of which began to appear in 1896; the _Grundriss der +romanischen Philologie_, edited y G. Groeber. In these vast repertories +there will be found, along with a short presentment of the subject, +complete bibliographical references, direct as well as indirect. + +[52] The French "manuals" of MM. Prou (Palaeography), Giry (Diplomatic), +Cagnat (Latin Epigraphy), and others, have diffused among the public the +idea and knowledge of the auxiliary subjects of study. New editions have +enabled, and will enable, them to be kept up to date--a very necessary +operation, for most of these subjects, though now settled in the main, +are being enriched and made more precise every day. Cf. _supra_, p. 38. + +[53] What exactly are we to understand by this "incommunicable +knowledge," of which we speak? When a specialist is very familiar with +the documents of a given class or period, associations of ideas are +formed in his brain; and when he examines a new document of the same +class or species, analogies suddenly dawn upon him which would escape +any one of less experience, however well furnished he might be with the +most perfect repertories. The fact is, that not all the peculiarities of +documents can be isolated; there are some which cannot be classified +under any intelligible head, and which, therefore, cannot be found in +any tabulated list. But the human memory, when it is good, retains the +impression of these peculiarities, and even a faint and distant stimulus +suffices to revive the apprehension of them. + +[54] _Supra_, p. 17. + +[55] This expression, which frequently occurs, needs explanation. It is +not to be taken to apply to a _species_ of facts. There are no +historical facts in the sense in which we speak of chemical facts. The +same fact is or is not historical according to the manner in which it is +known. It is only the mode of acquiring knowledge that is historical. A +sitting of the Senate is a fact of direct observation for one who takes +part in it; it becomes historical for the man who reads about it in a +report. The eruption of Vesuvius in the time of Pliny is a geological +fact which is known historically. The historical character is not in the +facts, but in the manner of knowing them. + +[56] Fustel de Coulanges has said it. Cf. _supra_, p. 4, note 1. + +[57] In the sciences of observation it is the fact itself, observed +directly, which is the starting-point. + +[58] _Infra_, ch. vii. + +[59] We shall not treat specially of the criticism of material documents +(objects, monuments, &c.) where it differs from the criticism of written +documents. + +[60] For the details and the logical justification of this method see +Seignobos, _Les Conditions psychologiques de la connaissance en +histoire_, in the _Revue philosophique_, 1887, ii. pp. 1, 168. + +[61] The most favourable case, that in which the document has been drawn +up by what is called an ocular "witness," is still far short of the +ideal required for scientific knowledge. The notion of _witness_ has +been borrowed from the procedure of the law-courts; reduced to +scientific terms, it becomes that of an _observer_. A testimony is an +observation. But, in point of fact, historical testimony differs +materially from scientific observation. The observer proceeds by fixed +rules, and clothes his report in language of rigorous precision. On the +other hand, the "witness" observes without method, and reports in +unprecise language; it is not known whether he has taken the necessary +precautions. It is an essential attribute of historical documents that +they come before us as the result of work which has been done without +method and without guarantee. + +[62] See B. Lasch, _Das Erwachen und die Entwickelung der historischen +Kritik im Mittelalter_ (Breslan, 1887, 8vo). + +[63] Natural credulity is deeply rooted in indolence. It is easier to +believe than to discuss, to admit than to criticise, to accumulate +documents than to weigh them. It is also pleasanter; he who criticises +documents must sacrifice some of them, and such a sacrifice seems a dead +loss to the man who has discovered or acquired the document. + +[64] _Revue philosophique_, l.c., p. 178. + +[65] A member of the _Societe des humanistes francais_ (founded at Paris +in 1894) amused himself by pointing out, in the _Bulletin_ of this +society, certain errors amenable to verbal criticism which occur in +various editions of posthumous works, especially the _Memoires +d'outre-tombe_. He showed that it is possible to remove obscurities in +the most modern documents by the same methods which are used in +restoring ancient texts. + +[66] On the habits of the mediaeval copyists, by whose intermediate +agency most of the literary works of antiquity have come down to us, see +the notices collected by W. Wattenbach, _Das Schriftwesen im +Mittelalter_, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1896, 8vo). + +[67] See, for example, the _Coquilles lexicographiques_ which have been +collected by A. Thomas, in _Romania_, xx. (1891), pp. 464 _sqq._ + +[68] See E. Bernheim, _Lehrbuch der historischen Methode_, 2nd ed., pp. +341-54. Also consult F. Blass, in the _Handbuch der klassischen +Altertumswissenschaft_, edited by I. von Mueller, I., 2nd ed. (1892), pp. +249-89 (with a detailed bibliography); A. Tobler, in the _Grundriss der +romanischen Philologie_, I. (1888), pp. 253-63; H. Paul, in the +_Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, I., 2nd ed. (1896), pp. 184-96. + +In French read the section _Critique des textes, in Minerva, +Introduction a l'etude des classiques scolaires grecs et latins_, by J. +Gow and S. Reinach (Paris, 1890, 16mo), pp. 50-65. + +The work of J. Taylor, "History of the Transmission of Ancient Books to +Modern Times" (Liverpool, 1889, 16mo), is of no value. + +[69] This rule is not absolute. The editor is generally accorded the +right of unifying the spelling of an autograph document--provided that +he informs the public of the fact--wherever, as in most modern +documents, the orthographical vagaries of the author possess no +philological interest. See the _Instructions pour la publication des +textes historiques_, in the _Bulletin de la Commission royale d'histoire +de Belgique_, 5th series, vi. (1896); and the _Grundsaetze fuer die +Herausgabe von Actenstuecken zur neueren Geschichte_, laboriously +discussed by the second and third Congresses of German historians, in +1894 and 1895, in the Deutsche _Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft_, +xi. p. 200, xii. p. 364. The last Congresses of Italian historians, held +at Genoa (1893) and at Rome (1895), have also debated this question, but +without result. What are the liberties which it is legitimate to take in +reproducing autograph texts? The question is more difficult than is +imagined by those who are not professionally concerned with it. + +[70] Interpolations will be treated of in chapter iii p. 92. + +[71] The scribes of the Carlovingian Renaissance and of the Renaissance +proper of the fifteenth century endeavoured to furnish intelligible +texts. They therefore corrected everything they did not understand. +Several ancient works have been in this manner irretrievably ruined. + +[72] The principal of these are, for the classical languages, besides +the above-mentioned work of Blass (_supra_, p. 74, note), the +_Adversaria critica_ of Madvig (Copenhagen, 1871-74, 3 vols. 8vo). For +Greek, the celebrated _Commentatio palaeographica_ of F. J. Bast, +published as an appendix to an edition of the grammarian Gregory of +Corinth (Leipzig, 1811, 8vo), and the _Variae lectiones_ of Cobet +(Leiden, 1873, 8vo). For Latin, H. Hagen, _Gradus ad criticen_ (Leipzig, +1879, 8vo), and W. M. Lindsay, "An Introduction to Latin Textual +Emendation based on the Text of Plautus" (London, 1896, 16mo). A +contributor to the _Bulletin de la Societe des humanistes francais_ has +expressed, in this publication, a wish that a similar collection might +be compiled for modern French. + +[73] Cf. _Revue Critique_, 1895, ii. p. 358. + +[74] Quite recently our scholars used to neglect this elementary +precaution, in order, as they said, to avoid an "air of pedantry." M. B. +Haureau has published, in his _Notices et extraits de quelques +manuscrits latins de la Bibliotheque nationale_ (vi. p. 310), a piece of +rhythmic verse, "De presbytero et logico." "It is not unedited," says +he; "Thomas Wright has already published it.... But this edition is very +defective; the text is occasionally quite unintelligible. We have, +therefore, considerably amended it, making use, for this purpose, of two +copies, which, it most be conceded, are neither of them faultless...." +The edition follows, with no variants. Verification is impossible. + +[75] "Textual emendation too often misses the mark through want of +knowledge of what may be called _the rules of the game_" (W. M. Lindsay, +p.v. in the work referred to above). + +[76] It has often been asked whether _all_ texts are worth the trouble +of "establishing" and publishing them. "Among our ancient texts," says +M. J. Bedier, referring to French mediaeval literature, "which ought we +to publish? Every one. But, it will be asked, are we not already +staggering under the weight of documents?... The following is the reason +why publication should be exhaustive. As long as we are confronted by +this mass of sealed and mysterious manuscripts, they will appeal to us +as if they contained the answer to every riddle; every candid mind will +be hampered by them in its flights of induction. It is desirable to +publish them, if only to get rid of them and to be able, for the future, +to work as if they did not exist...." (_Revue des Deux Mondes_, February +15, 1894, p. 910). All documents ought to be catalogued, as we have +already pointed out (p. 31), in order that researchers may be relieved +of the fear that there may be documents, useful for their purposes, of +which they know nothing. But in every case where a summary analysis of a +document can give a sufficient idea of its contents, and its form is of +no special interest, there is nothing gained by publishing it _in +extenso_. We need not overburden ourselves. Every document will be +analysed some day, but many documents will never be published. + +[77] Editors of texts often render their task still longer and more +difficult than it need be by undertaking the additional duty of +commentators, under the pretext of explaining the text. It would be to +their advantage to spare themselves this labour, and to dispense with +all annotation which does not belong to the "apparatus criticus" proper. +See, on this point, T. Lindner, _Ueber die Herausgabe von +geschichtlichen Quellen_, in the _Mittheilungen des Instituts fuer +oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung_, xvi., 1895, pp. 501 _sqq._ + +[78] To realise this it is enough to compare what has hitherto been done +by the most active societies, such as the Society of the _Monumenta +Germaniae historica_ and the _Istituto storico italiano_, with what still +remains for them to do. The greater part of the most ancient documents +and the hardest to restore, which have long taxed the ingenuity of +scholars, have now been placed in a relatively satisfactory condition. +But an immense amount of mechanical work has still to be done. + +[79] R. de Gourmont, _Le Latin mystique_ (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. 258. + +[80] See these alleged autographs in the _Bibliotheque nationale_, nouv. +acq. fr., No. 709. + +[81] F. Blass has enumerated the chief of these motives with reference +to the pseudepigraphic literature of antiquity (pp. 269 _sqq._ in the +work already quoted). + +[82] E. Bernheim (_Lehrbuch_, pp. 243 _sqq._) gives a somewhat lengthy +list of spurious documents, now recognised as such. Here it will be +enough to recall a few famous hoaxes: Sarchoniathon, Clotilde de +Surville, Ossian. Since the publication of Bernheim's book several +celebrated documents, hitherto exempt from suspicion, have been struck +off the list of authorities. See especially A. Piaget, _La Chronique des +chanoines de Neuchatel_ (Neuchatel, 1896, 8vo). + +[83] When the modifications of the primitive text are the work of the +author himself, they are "alterations." Internal analysis, and the +comparison of different editions, bring them to light. + +[84] See F. Blass, ibid., pp. 254 _sqq._ + +[85] As a rule it matters little whether the _name_ of the author has or +has not been discovered. We read, however, in the _Histoire_ _litteraire +de la France_ (xxvi. p. 388): "We have ignored anonymous sermons: +writings of this facile character are of no importance for literary +history when their authors are unknown." Are they of any more importance +when we know the authors' names? + +[86] In very favourable cases the examination of the plagiarist's +mistakes has made it possible to determine even this style of +handwriting, the size, and the manner of arrangement of the manuscript +source. The deductions of the investigation of sources, like those of +textual criticism, are sometimes supported by obvious palaeographical +considerations. + +[87] The Investigations of Julien Havet (_Questions merovingiennes_, +Paris, 1896, 8vo) are regarded as models. Very difficult problems are +there solved with faultless elegance. It is also well worth while to +read the memoirs in which M. L. Delisle has discussed questions of +origin. It is in the treatment of these questions that the most +accomplished scholars win their triumphs. + +[88] See the edition of H. R. Luard (vol. i., London, 1890, 8vo) in the +_Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores_. Matthew of Westminster's +_Flores historiarum_ figure in the Roman "Index," because of the +passages borrowed from the _Chronica majora_ of Matthew of Paris, while +the _Chronica majora_ themselves have escaped censure. + +[89] It would be instructive to draw up a list of the celebrated +historical works, such as Augustin Thierry's _Histoire de la Conquete de +l'Angleterre par les Normands_, whose authority has been completely +destroyed after the authorship of their sources has been studied. +Nothing amuses the gallery more than to see an historian convicted of +having built a theory on falsified documents. Nothing is more calculated +to cover an historian with confusion than to find that he has fallen +into the error of treating seriously documents which are no documents at +all. + +[90] One of the crudest (and commonest) forms of "uncritical method" is +that which consists in employing as if they were documents, and placing +on the same footing as documents, the utterances of modern authors on +the subject of documents. Novices do not make a sufficient distinction, +in the works of modern authors, between what is added to the original +source and what is taken from it. + +[91] See a list of examples in Bernheim's _Handbuch_, pp. 283, 289. + +[92] It is because it is necessary to subject documents of mediaeval and +ancient history to the most searching criticism in respect of authorship +that the study of antiquity and the middle ages passes for more +"scientific" than that of modern times. The truth is, that it is merely +hampered by more preliminary difficulties. + +[93] _Revue philosophique_, 1887, ii. p. 170. + +[94] The theory of the critical investigation of authorship is now +settled, _ne varietur_; it is given in detail in Bernheim's _Lehrbuch_, +pp. 242-340. For this reason we have had no scruple in dismissing it +with a short sketch. In French, the introduction of M. G. Monod to his +_Etudes critiques sur les sources de l'histoire merovingienne_ (Paris, +1872, 8vo) contains elementary considerations on the subject. Cf. _Revue +Critique_, 1873, i. p. 308. + +[95] Renan, _Feuilles detachees_, p. 103. + +[96] It would be very interesting to have information on the methods of +work of the great scholars, particularly those who undertook long tasks +of collection and classification. Some information of this kind is to be +found in their papers, and occasionally in their correspondence. On the +methods of Du Cange, see L. Feugere, _Etude sur la vie et les ouvrages +de Du Cange_ (Paris, 1858, 8vo), pp. 62 _sqq._ + +[97] See J. G. Droysen, _Grundriss der Historik_, p. 19: "Critical +classification does not exclusively adopt the chronological point of +view.... The more varied the points of view which criticism uses to +group materials, the more solid are the results yielded by converging +lines of inquiry." + +The system has now been abandoned of grouping documents in a _Corpus_ or +in _regesta_, as was done formerly, because they have the common +characteristic of being unedited, or possibly for the exactly opposite +reason. At one time the compilers of _Analecta, Reliquiae +manuscriptorum_, "treasuries of _anecdota_," _spicilegia_, and so on, +used to publish all the documents of a certain class which had the +common feature of being unedited and of appearing interesting to them; +on the other hand, Georgisch (_Regesta Chronologico-diplomatica_), +Brequigny (_Table chronologique des diplomes, chartes et actes imprimes +concernant l'histoire de France_), Wauters (_Table chronologique des +chartes et diplomes imprimes concernant l'histoire de Belgique_), have +grouped together all the documents of a certain species which had the +common character of having been printed. + +[98] J. P. Waltzing, _Recueil general des inscriptions latines_ +(Louvain, 1892, 8vo), p. 41. + +[99] Ibid. When the geographical order is adopted, a difficulty arises +from the fact that the origin of certain documents is unknown; many +inscriptions preserved in museums have been brought there no one knows +whence. The difficulty is analogous to that which results, for +chronological _regesta_, from documents without date. + +[100] Here the only difficulty arises in the case of documents whose +_incipit_ has been lost. In the eighteenth century Seguier devoted a +great part of his life to the construction of a catalogue, in the +alphabetical order of the _incipit_, of the Latin inscriptions, to the +number of 50,000, which had at that time been published: he searched +through some twelve thousand works. This vast compilation has remained +unpublished and useless. Before undertaking work of such magnitude it is +well to make sure that it is on a rational plan, and that the +labour--the hard and thankless labour--will not be wasted. + +[101] See G. Waitz, _Ueber die Herausgabe und Bearbeitung von Regesten_, +in the _Historische Zeitschrift_, xl. (1878), pp. 280-95. + +[102] In the absence of a predetermined logical order, and when the +chronological order is not suitable, it is sometimes an advantage to +provisionally group the documents (that is, the slips) in the +alphabetical order of the words chosen as headings (_Schlagwoerter_). +This is what is called the "dictionary system." + +[103] See Langlois, _Manuel de bibliographie historique_, i. p. 88. + +[104] This argument is easy to develop, and often has been, recently by +M. J. Bedier, in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, February 15, 1894, pp. 932 +_sqq._ + +There are some who willingly admit that the labours of erudition are +useful, but ask impatiently whether "the editing of a text" or "the +deciphering of a Gothic parchment" is "the supreme effort of the human +mind," and whether the intellectual ability implied by the practice of +external criticism does or does not justify "all the fuss made over +those who possess it." On this question, obviously devoid of importance, +a controversy was held between M. Brunetiere, who recommended scholars +to be modest, and M. Boucherie, who insisted on their reasons for being +proud, in the pages of the _Revue des langues romanes_, 1880, vols. i +and ii. + +[105] There have been men who were critics of the first water where +external criticism alone was concerned, but who never rose to the +conception of higher criticism, or to a true understanding of history. + +[106] Renan, _Essais de morale et de critique_, p. 36. + +[107] "If it were only for the sake of the severe mental discipline, I +should not think very highly of the philosopher who had not, at least +once in his life, worked at the elucidation of some special point" +(_L'Avenir de la science_, p. 136). + +[108] On the question whether it is necessary for every one to do "all +the preliminary grubbing for himself," cf. J. M. Robertson, "Buckle and +His Critics" (London, 1895, 8vo), p. 299. + +[109] Renan, _L'Avenir de la science_, p. 230. + +[110] A university professor is in a very good position for discouraging +and encouraging vocations; but "it is by personal effort that the goal +(critical skill) must be attained by the students, as Waitz well said in +an academic oration; the teacher's part in this work is small...." +(_Revue Critique_, 1874, ii. p. 232). + +[111] Quoted by Fr. X. von Wegele, _Geschichte der deutschen +Historiographie_ (Muenchen, 1885, 8vo), p. 653. + +[112] Renan, ibid., p. 125. + +[113] B. Haureau, _Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de +la Bibliotheque nationale_, i. (Paris, 1890, 8vo). p. v. + +[114] _Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des chartes_, 1896, p. 88. Compare +analogous traits in the interesting intellectual biography of the +Hellenist, palaeographer, and bibliographer, Charles Graux, by E. Lavisse +(_Questions d'enseignement national_, Paris, 1885, 18mo, pp. 265 +_sqq._). + +[115] See H. A. L. Fisher in the _Fortnightly Review_, Dec. 1894, p. +815. + +[116] Most of those who have a vocation for critical scholarship possess +both the power of solving problems and the taste for collecting. It is, +however, easy to divide them into two categories according as they show +a marked preference for textual criticism and investigation of +authorship on the one hand, or for the more absorbing and less +intellectual labours of collection on the other. J. Havet, a past-master +in the study of erudite problems, always declined to undertake a general +collection of Merovingian royal charters, a work which his admirers +expected from him. In this connection he readily admitted his "want of +taste for feats of endurance" (_Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des chartes_, +1896, p. 222). + +[117] It is common to hear the opposite of this maintained, namely, that +the labours of critical scholarship (external criticism) have this +advantage over other labours in the field of history that they are +within the range of average ability, and that the most moderate +intellects, after a suitable preliminary drilling, may be usefully +employed in them. It is quite true that men with no elevation of soul or +power of thought can make themselves useful in the field of criticism, +but then they must have special qualities. The mistake is to think that +with good will and a special drilling every one without exception can be +fitted for the operations of external criticism. Among those who are +incapable of these operations, as well as among those who are fitted for +them, there are both men of sense and blockheads. + +[118] A. Philippi, _Einige Bemerkungen ueber den philologischen +Unterricht_, Giessen, 1890, 4to. Cf. _Revue Critique_, 1892, i. p. 25. + +[119] J. von Pflugk-Harttung, _Geschichtsbetrachtungen_, Gotha, 1890, +8vo. + +[120] Ibid., p. 21. + +[121] Cf. _supra_, p. 99. + +[122] Renan, _L'Avenir de la science_, p. xiv. + +[123] _Revue historique_, lxiii. (1897), p. 320. + +[124] Renan, ibid., pp. 122, 243. The same thought has been more than +once expressed, in different language, by E. Lavisse, in his addresses +to the students of Paris (_Questions d'enseignement national_, pp. 14, +86, &c.). + +[125] One of us (M. Langlois) proposes to give elsewhere a detailed +account of all that has been done in the last three hundred years, but +especially in the nineteenth century, for the organisation of historical +work in the principal countries of the world. Some information has +already been collected on this subject by J. Franklin Jameson, "The +Expenditures of Foreign Governments in behalf of History," in the +"Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1891," pp. +38-61. + +[126] L. Feugere, _Etude sur la vie et les ouvrages de Du Cange_, pp. +55, 58. + +[127] Even the specialists in external criticism themselves, when they +do not take the line of despising all synthesis _a priori_, are almost +as easily dazzled as anybody else by incorrect syntheses, by a show of +"general ideas," or by literary artifices, in spite of their +clear-sightedness where works of critical scholarship are concerned. + +[128] The sciences of observation do, however, need a species of +criticism. We do not accept without verification results obtained by +anybody, but only results obtained by those who know how to work. But +this criticism is made once for all, and applies to the author, not to +his works; historical criticism, on the contrary, is obliged to deal +separately with every part of a document. + +[129] Cf. _supra_, book ii. chap. i. p. 67. + +[130] Cf. _supra_, p. 122. + +[131] Taine appears to have proceeded thus in vol. ii, _La Revolution_, +of his _Origines de la France contemporaine_. He had made extracts from +unpublished documents and inserted a great number of them in his work, +but it would seem that he did not first methodically analyse them in +order to determine their meaning. + +[132] Fustel de Coulanges explains very clearly the danger of this +_method_: "Some students begin by forming an opinion ... and it is not +till afterwards that they begin to read the texts. They run a great risk +of not understanding them at all, or of understanding them wrongly. What +happens is that a kind of tacit contest goes on between the text and the +preconceived opinions of the reader; the mind refuses to grasp what is +contrary to its idea, and the issue of the contest commonly is, not that +the mind surrenders to the evidence of the text, but that the text +yields, bends, and accommodates itself to the preconceived opinion.... +To bring one's personal ideas into the study of texts is the subjective +method. A man thinks he is contemplating an object, and it is his own +idea that he is contemplating. He thinks he is observing a fact, and the +fact at once assumes the colour, and the significance his mind wishes it +to have. He thinks he is reading a text, and the words of the text take +a particular meaning to suit a ready-made opinion. It is this subjective +method which has done most harm to the history of the Merovingian +epoch.... To read the texts was not enough; what was required was to +read them before forming any convictions...." (_Monarchie franque_, p. +31). For the same reason Fustel de Coulanges deprecated the reading of +one document in the light of another; he protested against the custom of +explaining the _Germania_ of Tacitus by the barbaric laws. In the _Revue +des questions historiques_, 1897, vol. i, a lesson on method, _De +l'analyse des textes historiques_, is given apropos of a commentary by +M. Monod on Gregory of Tours: "The historian ought to begin his work +with an exact analysis of each document.... The analysis of a text ... +consists in determining the sense of each word and eliciting the true +meaning of the writer.... Instead of searching for the sense of each of +the historian's words, and for the thought he has expressed in them, he +[M. Monod] comments on each sentence in the light of what is found in +Tacitus or the Salic law.... We should understand what analysis really +is. Many talk about it, few use it.... The use of analysis is, by an +attentive study of every detail, to elicit from a text all that is in +it; not to introduce into the text what is not there." + +After reading this excellent advice it will be instructive to read M. +Monod's reply (in the _Revue historique_); it will be seen that Fustel +de Coulanges himself did not always practise the method he recommended. + +[133] Cf. _supra_, p. 103. + +[134] The work of analysis may be entrusted to a second person; this is +what happens in the case of _regesta_ and catalogues of records; if the +analysis has been correctly performed by the compiler of _regesta_, +there is no need to do it over again. + +[135] Practical examples of this procedure will be found in Deloche, _La +Trustis et l'antrustion royal_ (Paris, 1873, 8vo), and, above all, in +Fustel de Coulanges. See especially the study of the words _marca_ +(_Recherches sur quelques problemes d'histoire_, pp. 322-56), _mallus_ +(ibid., 372-402), _alleu_ (_L'Alleu et le domaine rural_, pp. 149-70), +_portio_ (ibid., pp. 239-52). + +[136] The theory and an example of this procedure will be found in +Fustel de Coulanges, _Recherches sur quelques problemes d'histoire_ (pp. +189-289), with reference to the statements of Tacitus about the Germans. +See especially pp. 263-89, the discussion of the celebrated passage on +the German mode of culture. + +[137] Fustel de Coulanges formulates it thus: "It is never safe to +separate two words from their context; this is just the way to mistake +their meaning" (_Monarchie franque_, p. 228, note I). + +[138] This is how Fustel de Coulanges condemns this practice: "I am not +speaking of pretenders to learning who quote second-hand, and at most +take the trouble to verify whether the phrase they have seen quoted +really occurs in the passage indicated. To verify quotations is one +thing and to read texts quite another, and the two often lead to +opposite results" (_Revue des questions historiques_, 1887, vol. i.). +See also (_L'Alleu et le domaine rural_, pp. 171-98) the lesson given to +M. Glasson on the theory of the community of land: forty-five quotations +are studied in the light of their context, with the object of proving +that none of them bears the meaning M. Glasson attributed to it. We may +also compare the reply: Glasson, _Les Communaux et le domaine rural a +l'epoque franque_, Paris, 1890. + +[139] All that is original in Fustel de Coulanges rests on his +interpretative criticism; he never did personally any work in external +criticism, and his critical examination of authors' good faith and +accuracy was hampered by a respect for the statements of ancient authors +which amounted to credulity. + +[140] A parallel difficulty occurs in the interpretation of illustrative +monuments; the representations are not always to be taken literally. In +the Behistun monument Darius tramples the vanquished chiefs under foot: +this is a metaphor. Mediaeval miniatures show us persons lying in bed +with crowns on their heads: this is to symbolise their royal rank; the +painter did not mean that they wore their crowns to sleep in. + +[141] A. Boeckh, in the _Encyclopaedie und Methodologie der +philologischen Wissenschaften_, second edition (1886), has given a +theory of _hermeneutic_ to which Bernheim has been content to refer. + +[142] The method of extracting information on external facts from a +writer's conceptions forms part of the theory of constructive reasoning. +_See_ book iii. + +[143] For example, Pere de Smedt, Tardif, Droysen, and even Bernheim. + +[144] Descartes, who came at a time when history still consisted in the +reproduction of pre-existing narratives, did not see how to apply +methodical doubt to the subject; he therefore refused to allow it a +place among the sciences. + +[145] Fustel de Coulanges himself did not rise above this kind of +timidity. With reference to a speech attributed to Clovis by Gregory of +Tours, he says: "Doubtless we are unable to affirm that these words were +ever pronounced. But, all the same, we ought not to affirm, in +contradiction to Gregory of Tours, that they were not.... The wisest +course is to accept Gregory's text" (_Monarchie franque_, p. 66). The +wisest, or rather the only scientific course, is to admit that we know +nothing about the words of Clovis, for Gregory himself had no knowledge +of them. + +[146] Quite recently, E. Meyer, one of the most critically expert +historians of antiquity, has in his work, _Die Entstehung des +Judenthums_ (Halle, 1896, 8vo), revived this strange juridical argument +in favour of the narrative of Nehemiah. M. Bouche-Leclercq, in a +remarkable study on "The Reign of Seleucus II. (Callinicus) and +Historical Criticism" (_Revue des Universites du Midi_, April-June +1897), seems, by way of reaction against the hypercriticism of Niebuhr +and Droysen, to incline towards an analogous theory: "Historical +criticism, if it is not to degenerate into agnosticism--which would be +suicidal--or into individual caprice, must place a certain amount of +trust in testimony which it cannot verify, as long as it is not flatly +contradicted by other testimony of equal value." M. Bouche-Leclercq is +right as against the historian who, "after having discredited all his +witnesses, claims to put himself in their place, and sees with their +eyes something quite different from what they themselves saw." But when +the "testimony" is insufficient to give us the scientific knowledge of a +fact, the only correct attitude is "agnosticism," that is, a confession +of ignorance; we have no right to shirk this confession because chance +has permitted the destruction of the documents which might have +contradicted the testimony. + +[147] The "Memoirs of Cardinal de Retz" furnish a conclusive instance: +the anecdote of the ghosts met by Retz and Turenne. A. Feillet, who +edited Retz in the _Collection des Grands Ecrivains de la France_, has +shown (vol. i. p. 192) that this story, so vividly narrated, is false +from beginning to end. + +[148] A good example of the fascination exerted by a circumstantial +narrative is the legend respecting the origin of the League of the three +primitive Swiss cantons (Gessler and the Gruetli conspirators), which was +_fabricated_ by Tschudi in the sixteenth century, became classical on +the production of Schiller's "William Tell," and has only been +extirpated with the greatest difficulty. (See Rilliet, _Origines de la +Confederation suisse_, Geneva, 1869, 8vo.) + +[149] Striking example of falsehoods due to vanity are to be found in +abundance in the _Economies royales_ of Sully and the _Memoires_ of +Retz. + +[150] Fustel de Coulanges himself went to the formulae of the +inscriptions in honour of the emperors for a proof that the peoples +liked the imperial _regime_. "If we read the inscriptions, the sentiment +which they exhibit is always one of satisfaction and gratitude.... See +the collection of Orelli, the most frequent expressions are...." And the +enumeration of the titles of respect given to the emperors ends with +this strange aphorism: "It would show ignorance of human nature to see +nothing but flattery in all this." There is not even flattery here; +there is nothing but formulae. + +[151] Suger, in his life of Louis VI., is a model of this type. + +[152] The _Chronicon Helveticum_ of Tschudi is a striking instance. + +[153] Aristophanes and Demosthenes are two striking examples of the +power great writers have of paralysing critics and obscuring facts. Not +till the close of the nineteenth century has any one ventured to +recognise frankly their lack of good faith. + +[154] For example, the account of the election of Otto I. in the _Gesta +Ottonis_ of Wittekind. + +[155] For example, the statistics on the population, the commerce, and +the wealth of European countries given by the Venetian ambassadors of +the sixteenth century, and the descriptions of the usages of the Germans +in the _Germania_ of Tacitus. + +[156] It would be interesting to examine how much of Roman or +Merovingian history would be left if we rejected all documents but those +which represent direct observation. + +[157] It will be seen why we have not separately defined and studied +"first-hand documents." The question has not been raised in the proper +manner in historical practice. The distinction ought to apply to +_statements_, not to documents. It is not the document which comes to us +at first, second, or third hand; it is the statement. What is called a +"first-hand document" is nearly always composed in part of second-hand +statements about facts of which the author had no personal knowledge. +The name "second-hand document" is given to those which, like the work +of Livy, contain nothing first-hand; but the distinction is too crude to +serve as a guide in the critical examination of statements. + +[158] There is much less modification where the oral tradition assumes a +regular or striking form, as is the case with verses, maxims, proverbs. + +[159] Sometimes the _form_ of the phrase tells its own tale, when, in +the midst of a detailed narrative, obviously of legendary origin, we +come across a curt, dry entry in annalistic style, obviously copied from +a written document. That is what we find in Livy (see Nitzsch, _Die +roemische Annalistik_, Leipzig, 1873, 8vo), and in Gregory of Tours (see +Loebell, _Gregor von Tours_, Leipzig, 1868, 8vo). + +[160] The events which strike the popular imagination and are +transmitted by legend are not generally those which seem to us the most +important. The heroes of the _chansons de gestes_ are hardly known +historically. The Breton epic songs relate, not to the great historical +events, as Villemarque's collection led people to believe, but to +obscure local episodes. The same holds of the Scandinavian sagas; for +the most part they relate to quarrels among the villagers of Iceland or +the Orkneys. + +[161] The theory of legend is one of the most advanced parts of +criticism. Bernheim (in his _Lehrbuch_, pp. 380-90) gives a good summary +and a bibliography of it. + +[162] "History of Greece," vols. i. and ii. Compare Renan, _Histoire du +peuple d'Israel_, vol. i. (Paris, 1887, 8vo), Introduction. + +[163] And yet Niebuhr made use of the Roman legends to construct a +theory, which it was afterwards necessary to demolish, of the struggle +between the patricians and the plebeians; and Curtius, twenty years +after Grote, looked for historical facts in the Greek legends. + +[164] See _supra_, pp. 93 _sqq._ + +[165] Cf. _supra_, p. 166. + +[166] It is often said, "The author would not have dared to write this +if it had not been true." This argument does not apply to societies in a +low state of civilisation. Louis VIII. dared to write that John Lackland +had been condemned by the verdict of his peers. + +[167] See above, p. 153. Similarly, the particular facts which compose +the history of forms (palaeography, linguistic science) are directly +established by the analysis of the document. + +[168] Primitive Greece has been studied in the Homeric poems. Mediaeval +private life has been reconstructed principally from the _chansons de +gestes_. (See C. V. Langlois, _Les Traditions sur l'histoire de la +societe francaise au moyen age d'apres les sources litteraires_, in the +_Revue historique_, March-April, 1897.) + +[169] Most historians refrain from rejecting a legend till its falsity +has been proved, and if by chance no document has been preserved to +contradict it, they adopt it provisionally. This is how the first five +centuries of Rome are still dealt with. This method, unfortunately still +too general, helps to prevent history from being established as a +science. + +[170] For the logical justification of this principle in history see C. +Seignobos, _Revue Philosophique_, July-August 1887. Complete scientific +certitude is only produced by an agreement between observations made on +different _methods_; it is to be found at the junction of two different +paths of research. + +[171] This case is studied and a good example given by Bernheim, +_Lehrbuch_, p. 421. + +[172] It is hardly necessary to enter a caution against the childish +method of counting the documents on each side of a question and deciding +by the majority. The statement of a single author who was acquainted +with a fact is evidently worth more than a hundred statements made by +persons who knew nothing about it. The rule has been formulated long +ago: _Ne numerentur, sed ponderentur_. + +[173] Cf. _supra_, p. 94. + +[174] It is hardly possible to study here the special difficulties which +arise in the application of these principles, as when the author, +wishing to conceal his indebtedness, has introduced deviations in order +to put his readers off the scent, or when the author has combined +statements taken from different documents. + +[175] Here we merely indicate the principle of the method of +confirmation; its applications would require a very lengthy study. + +[176] Pere de Smedt has devoted to this question a part of his +_Principes de la critique histoire_ (Paris, 1887, 12mo). + +[177] The solution of the question is different in the case of the +sciences of direct observation, especially the biological sciences. +Science knows nothing of the possible and the impossible; it only +recognises facts which have been correctly or incorrectly observed: +facts which had been declared impossible, as the existence of aerolites, +have been discovered to be genuine. The very notion of a miracle is +metaphysical; it implies a conception of the universe as a whole which +transcends the limits of observation. (See Wallace, "Miracles and Modern +Spiritualism.") + +[178] See above, p. 194. + +[179] In the experimental sciences an hypothesis is a form of question +accompanied by a provisional answer. + +[180] Fustel de Coulanges saw the necessity of this. In the preface to +his _Recherches sur quelques problemes d'histoire_ (Paris, 1885, 8vo) he +announces his intention of presenting his researches "in the form which +all my works have, that is, in the form of questions which I ask myself, +and on which I endeavour to throw light." + +[181] Fustel de Coulanges himself seems to have been misled by them: +"History is a science; it does not imagine, it only sees" (_Monarchie +franque_, p. 1). "History, like every science, consists in a process of +discerning facts, analysing them, comparing them, and noting their +connections.... The historian ... seeks facts and attains them by the +minute observation of texts, as the chemist finds his in the course of +experiments conducted with minute precision" (Ibid., p. 39). + +[182] The subjective character of history has been brought out into +strong relief by the philosopher G. Simmel, _Die Probleme der +Geschichtsphilosophie_ (Leipzig, 1892, 8vo). + +[183] This has been eloquently put by Carlyle and Michelet. It is also +the substance of the famous expression of Ranke: "I wish to state how +that really was" (_wie es eigentlich gewesen_). + +[184] Cf. pp. 219-23. + +[185] Curtius in his "History of Greece," Mommsen in his "History of +Rome" (before the Empire), Lamprecht in his "History of Germany." + +[186] It will be enough to mention Augustin Thierry, Michelet, and +Carlyle. + +[187] See P. Guiraud, _Fustel de Coulanges_ (Paris, 1896, 12mo), p. 164, +for some very judicious observations on this subject. + +[188] The classification of M. Lacombe (_De l'histoire consideree comme +science_, chap. vi.), founded on the motives of actions and the wants +they are intended to satisfy, is very judicious from the philosophical +point of view, but does not meet the practical needs of historians; it +rests on abstract psychological categories (economic, reproductive, +sympathetic, ambitious, &c.), and ends by classing together very +different species of phenomena (military institutions along with +economics). + +[189] Ecclesiastical institutions form part of the government; in German +manuals of antiquities they are found among institutions, while religion +is classed with the arts. + +[190] Modes of transport, which are often put under commerce, form a +species of industry. + +[191] Property is an institution of mixed character, being at once +economic, social, and political. + +[192] For the history and biography of this movement see Bernheim, +_Lehrbuch_, pp. 45-55. + +[193] It is no longer necessary to demonstrate the nullity of the notion +of _race_. It used to be applied to vague groups, formed by a nation or +a language; for race as understood by historians (Greek, Roman, +Germanic, Celtic, Slavonic races) has nothing but the name in common +with race in the anthropological sense--that is, a group of men +possessing the same hereditary characteristics. It has been reduced to +an absurdity by the abuse Taine made of it. A very good criticism of it +will be found in Lacombe (ibid., chap. xviii.), and in Robertson ("The +Saxon and the Celt," London, 1897, 8vo). + +[194] There is no general agreement on the proper place in history of +retrograde changes, of those oscillations which bring things back to the +point from which they started. + +[195] The theory of chance as affecting history has been expounded in a +masterly manner by M. Cournot, _Considerations sur la marche des idees +et des evenements dans les temps modernes_ (Paris, 1872, 2 vols. 8vo). + +[196] Lamprecht, in a long article, _Was ist Kulturgeschichte_, +published in the _Deutsche Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft_, New +Series, vol. i., 1896, has attempted to base the history of civilisation +on the theory of a collective soul of society producing "social-psychic" +phenomena common to the whole society, and differing from period to +period. This is a metaphysical hypothesis. + +[197] The expression _national_ history, introduced in the interests of +patriotism, denotes the same thing. The history of the nation means +practically the history of the State. + +[198] See Cournot, ibid., i. p. iv. + +[199] We have already (p. 143) treated of this fault of method. + +[200] The discussion of this argument, which was formerly much used in +religious history, was a favourite subject with the earlier writers who +treated of methodology, and still occupies a considerable space in the +_Principes de la critique historique_ of Pere de Smedt. + +[201] This is what Montesquieu attempted in his _Esprit des Lois_. In a +course of lectures at the Sorbonne, I have endeavoured to give a sketch +of such a comprehensive account.--[Ch. S.] + +[202] See p. 204. + +[203] Michelet has discredited the study of physiological influences by +the abuse which he has made of it in the last part of his "History of +France"; it is, however, indispensable for the understanding of a man's +career. + +[204] On the subject of statistics, a method which is now perfected, a +good summary with a bibliography will be found in the _Handwoerterbuch +der Staatswissenschaften_, Jena, 1890-94, Ia. 8vo. and two good +methodical treatises, J. von. Mayr, _Theoretische Statistik_ and +_Bevoelkerungsstatistik_, in the collection of Marquardsen and Seydel, +Freiburg, 1895 and 1897, Ia. 8vo. + +[205] As is done by Boardeau (_l'Histoire et les Historiens_, Paris, +1888, 8vo), who proposes to reduce the whole of history to a series of +statistics. + +[206] A good example will be found in Lacombe, _De l'Histoire Consideree +Comme Science_, p. 146. + +[207] We have thought it useless to discuss here the question whether +history ought, in accordance with the ancient tradition, to fulfil yet +another function, whether it ought to pass judgment on men and events, +that is to supplement the description of facts by expressions of +approbation or censure, either from the point of view of a moral ideal, +general or particular (the ideal of a sect, a party, or a nation), or +from the practical point of view, by examining, as Polybius did, whether +historical actions were well or ill adapted to their purpose. An +addition of this kind could be made to any descriptive study: the +naturalist might express his sympathy with or his admiration for an +animal, he might condemn the ferocity of the tiger, and praise the +devotion of the hen to her chickens. But it is obvious that in history, +as in every other subject, judgments of this kind are foreign to +science. + +[208] Comparison between two facts of detail belonging to very different +aggregates (for example the comparison of Abd-el-Kader with Jagurtha, of +Napoleon with Sforza) is a striking method of exposition, but not a +means of reaching a scientific conclusion. + +[209] This system is still followed by several contemporary authors, the +Belgian jurist Laurent in his _Etudes sur l'histoire de l'humanite_, the +German Rocholl, and even Flint, the English historian of the philosophy +of history. + +[210] Thus Taine, in _Les origines de la France Contemporaine_, explains +the origin of the privileges of the _ancien regime_ by the services +formerly rendered by the privileged classes. + +[211] A good criticism of the theory of progress will be found in P. +Lacombe, _De l'histoire Consideree Comme Science_. + +[212] See the very clear declarations of one of the principal +representatives of linguistic science in France, V. Henry, _Antinomies +linguistiques_, Paris, 1896, 8vo. + +[213] See above, p. 284. + +[214] Lamprecht, in the article quoted, p. 247, after having compared +the artistic, religious, and economic evolutions of mediaeval Germany, +and after having shown that they can all be divided into periods of the +same duration, explains the simultaneous transformations of the +different usages and institutions of a given society by the +transformations of the collective "social soul." This is only another +form of the same hypothesis. + +[215] The historians of literature, who began by searching for the +connection between the arts and the rest of social life, thus gave the +first place to the most difficult question. + +[216] For the earlier epochs, consult good histories of Greek, Roman, +and mediaeval literature which contain chapters devoted to "historians." +For the modern period, consult the Introduction of M. G. Monod to vol. +i. of the _Revue historique_; the work by F. X. v. Wegde, _Geschichte +der deutschen Historiographie_ (1885), relates only to Germany, and is +mediocre. Some "Notes on History in France in the Nineteenth Century" +have been published by C. Jullian as an Introduction to his _Extraits +des historiens francais du xixe siecle_ (Paris, 1897, 12mo). The +history of modern historiography has still to be written. See the +partial attempt by E. Bernheim, _Lehrbuch_, pp. 13 _sqq._ + +[217] It would be interesting to find out what are the earliest printed +books furnished with notes in the modern fashion. Bibliophiles whom we +have consulted are unable to say, their attention never having been +drawn to the point. + +[218] It is clear that the romantic methods which are used for the +purpose of obtaining effects of local colour and "revising" the past, +often puerile in the hands of the ablest writers, are altogether +intolerable when they are employed by any others. See a good example +(criticism of a book of M. Mourin by M. Monod) in the _Revue Critique_, +1874, ii. pp. 163 _sqq._ + +[219] It is a commonplace, and an error all the same, to maintain the +exact opposite of the above, namely, that the works of critical scholars +live, while the works of historians grow antiquated, so that scholars +gain a more solid reputation than historians do: "Pere Daniel is now +read no longer, and Pere Anselme is always read." But the works of +scholars become antiquated too, and the fact that not all the parts of +the work of Pere Anselme have yet been superseded (that is why he is +still read), ought not to deceive us: the great majority of the works +written by scholars, like those of researchers in the sciences proper, +are provisional and doomed to oblivion. + +[220] "It is in vain that those professionally concerned try to deceive +themselves on this point; not everything in the past is interesting." +"Supposing we were to write the Life of the Duke of Angouleme," says +Pecuchet. "But he was an imbecile!" answers Bouvard; "Never mind; +personages of the second order often have an enormous influence, and +perhaps he was able to control the march of events."--G. Flaubert, +_Bouvard et Pecuchet_, p. 157. + +[221] As persons of moderate ability have a tendency to prefer +insignificant subjects, there is active competition in the treatment of +such subjects. We often have occasion to note the simultaneous +appearance of several monographs on the same subject. It is not rare for +the subject to be altogether devoid of importance. + +[222] Interesting subjects for monographs are not always capable of +being treated: there are some which the state of the sources puts out of +the question. This is why beginners, even those who have ability, +experience so much embarrassment in choosing subjects for their first +monographs, when they are not aided by good advice or good fortune, and +often lose themselves in attempting the impossible. It would be very +severe, and very unjust, to judge any one from the list of his _first_ +monographs. + +[223] In practice it is proper to give at the beginning a list of the +sources used in the whole of the monograph (with appropriate +bibliographical information as to the printed works, and in the case of +manuscripts, a mention of the nature of the documents and their +shelf-marks); besides, each special statement should be accompanied by +its proof: the exact text of the supporting document should be quoted, +if possible, so that the reader may be in a position to verify the +interpretation; otherwise an analysis of it should be given in a note, +or, at the least, the title of the document, with its shelf-mark, or +with a precise indication of the place where it was published. The +general rule is to put the reader in a position to know the exact +reasons for which such and such conclusions have been adopted at each +stage of the analysis. + +Beginners, resembling ancient authors in this respect, naturally do not +observe all these rules. Frequently, instead of quoting the text or the +titles of documents, they refer to these by their shelf-mark, or by the +title of the general collection in which they are printed, from which +the reader can learn nothing as to the nature of the text adduced. The +following is another mistake of the crudest kind, and yet of frequent +occurrence: Beginners, and persons of little experience, do not always +understand why the custom has been introduced of inserting footnotes; at +the bottom of the pages of the books they have they see a fringe of +notes; they think themselves bound to fringe their own books in the same +way, but their notes are adventitious and purely ornamental; they do not +serve either to exhibit the proof or to enable the reader to verify the +statements. All these methods are inadmissible, and should be vigorously +denounced. + +[224] Almost all beginners have an unfortunate tendency to wander off +into superfluous digressions, to amass reflections and pieces of +information which have no relevance to the main subject; they would +recognise, if they reflected, that the causes of this tendency are bad +taste, a kind of naive vanity, sometimes mental confusion. + +[225] We meet with declarations like the following: "I have been long +familiar with the documents of this period and this class. I have an +impression that such and such conclusions, which I cannot prove, are +true." Of two things one: either the author can give the reasons for his +impression, and then we can judge them, or he cannot give them, and we +may assume that he has none of serious value. + +[226] This difference has a tendency to disappear. The most recent +alphabetical collections of historical facts (the _Realencyclopaedie der +classischen Altertumswissenschaft_ of Pauly-Wissowa, the _Dictionnaire +des antiquites_ of Daremberg and Saglio, the _Dictionary of National +Biography_ of Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee) are furnished with a +sufficiently ample apparatus. It is principally in biographical +dictionaries that the custom of giving no proofs tends to persist; see +the _Allgemeine deutsche Biographie_, &c. + +[227] _Revue Critique_, 1874, i. p. 327. + +[228] The custom of appending to "histories," that is to narratives of +political events, summaries of the results obtained by the special +historians of art, literature, &c., still persists. A "History of +France" would not be considered complete if it did not contain chapters +on the history of art, literature, manners, &c., in France. However, it +is not the summary account of special evolutions, described at second +hand from the works of specialists, which is in its proper place in a +scientific "History"; it is the study of those general facts which have +dominated the special evolutions in their entirety. + +[229] It is hard to imagine what it is possible for the most interesting +and best established results of modern criticism to become, in the hands +of negligent and unskilful popularisers. The persons who know most of +these possibilities are those who have occasion to read the improvised +"compositions" of candidates in history examinations: the ordinary +defects of inferior popularisation are here pushed sometimes to an +absurd length. + +[230] Cf. _supra_, p. 266. + +[231] We have spoken above of the element of subjectivity which it is +impossible to eliminate from historical construction, and which has been +misinterpreted to the extent of denying history the character of a +science: this element of subjectivity which troubled Pecuchet (G. +Flaubert, _Bouvard et Pecuchet_, p. 157) and Sylvestre Bonnard (A. +France, _Le crime de Silvestre Bonnard_, p. 310), and which causes Faust +to say: + + "Die Zeiten der Vergangenheit + Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln. + Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst, + Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist, + In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln." + +["Past times are to us a book with seven seals. What you call the spirit +of the times is at bottom your own spirit, in which the times are +mirrored."--Goethe, _Faust_, i. 3.] + +[232] A saying attributed to a "Sorbonne professor" by M. de la +Blanchere (_Revue Critique_, 1895, i. p. 176). Others have declaimed on +the theme that the knowledge of history is mischievous and paralyses. +See F. Nietzsche, _Unzeitgemaesse Betrachtungen_, II. _Nutzen und +Nachtheil der Historie fuer das Leben_, Leipzig, 1874, 8vo. + +[233] History and the social sciences are mutually dependent on each +other; they progress in parallel lines by a continual interchange of +services. The social sciences furnish a knowledge of the present, +required by history for the purpose of making representations of the +facts and reasoning from documents. History gives the information about +evolutions which is necessary in order to understand the present. + +[234] The same institution has been adopted in German-speaking countries +under the name of _Leitfaden_ (guiding-thread), and in English-speaking +countries under the name of _Text-book_. + +[235] We must make an exception of Michelet's _Precis de l'histoire +moderne_, and do Duruy the justice to acknowledge that in his +school-books, even in the first editions, he has endeavoured, often +successfully, to make his narratives both interesting and instructive. + +[236] For a criticism of this method, see above, p. 265. + +[237] The most complete, and probably the most accurate, account of the +state of the secondary teaching of history after the reforms has been +given by a Spaniard, R. Altamira, _La Ensenanza de la historia_, 2nd +edition, Madrid, 1895, 8vo. + +[238] We are here treating only of France. But, in order to dispel an +illusion of the French public, we may remark that historical pedagogy is +still less advanced in English-speaking countries, where the methods +used are still mechanical, and even in German-speaking countries, where +it is hampered by the conception of patriotic teaching. + +[239] I have endeavoured, in a course of lectures at the Sorbonne, to do +a part of this work.--[Ch. S.] + +[240] Let it be noted, however, that to the question put to the +candidates for the modern Baccalaureate in July 1897, "What purpose is +served by the teaching of history?" eighty per cent. of the candidates +answered, in effect, either because they believed it, or because they +thought it would please, "To promote patriotism."--[C. V. L.] + +[241] This is what has been produced in Germany under the name of +_Quellenbuch_. + +[242] The same pedagogic theory will be found in the preface to my +_Histoire narrative et descriptive des anciens peuples de l'Orient_, +Supplement for the use of professors, Paris, 1890, 8vo.--[Ch. S.] + +[243] I have treated this question in the _Revue universitaire_, 1896, +vol. i.--[Ch. S.] + +[244] On the organisation of higher education in France at this epoch +and on the first reforms, see the excellent work of M. L. Liard, +_l'Enseignement superieur en France_, Paris, 1888-94, 2 vols. 8vo. + +[245] E. Lavisse, _Questions d'enseignement national_, p. 12. + +[246] Cf. _supra_, p. 55. + +[247] _Revue historique_, lxiii. (1897), p. 96. + +[248] See the _Revue internationale d'enseignement_, Feb. 1893; the +_Revue universitaire_, June 1892, Oct. and Nov. 1894, July 1895; and the +_Political Science Quarterly_, Sept 1894. + +[249] _Revue historique_, l.c. p. 98. I have developed elsewhere what I +have here contented myself with stating. See the _Revue internationale +de l'enseignement_, Nov. 1897.--[C. V. L.] + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Study of History, by +Charles V. 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